U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67–874 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

S. HRG. 106–752

KOSOVO: ONE YEAR AFTER THE BOMBING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 8, 2000

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director

EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

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CONTENTS

Page

Abramowitz, Hon. Morton I., board of trustees, International Crisis Group;

and former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared statement . 49

Bugajski, Janusz, director, Eastern Europe Project, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, Washington, DC ............................................................. 35

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37

Pardew, Hon. James W., Jr., Principal Deputy Special Advisor for Kosovo

and Dayton Implementation, Department of State, Washington, DC ............. 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Williams, Dr. Paul R., assistant professor of Law and International Relations,

American University, Washington, DC .............................................................. 23

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26

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KOSOVO: ONE YEAR AFTER THE BOMBING

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2000

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m. in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H. Smith

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Smith, Lugar, and Biden.

Senator SMITH. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We apologize for the delay in convening this hearing of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee. Too many duties early in the morning before

this one today.

I am pleased to have with me my colleague, Richard Lugar of Indiana, and our witnesses today. This morning we are here to examine the situation in Kosovo. It is almost exactly a year to the day

since the war ended. We welcome on our first panel Ambassador

James Pardew, Principal Deputy Special Advisor for Kosovo and

Dayton Implementation at the State Department.

We will then welcome Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, a member of the board of directors at the International Crisis Group, Dr.

Paul Williams, assistant professor of Law and International Relations at American University, and Janusz Bugajski, the director of

East European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses to share with us

their thoughts on what has occurred in Kosovo over the course of

the past year, and I look forward to hearing their views on how the

United States should go about winning the peace.

With the withdrawal of the Yugoslav military forces from Kosovo

last June and the end of the NATO air strikes, the United Nations

set up an interim administration and NATO deployed tens of thousands of troops in the region for peacekeeping duties.

The goal of these missions was to establish a secure environment

so that self-governing institutions could be formed and could function effectively. Certainly much has been accomplished since that

time. Over 1 million ethnic Albanians were able to return to their

homes in Kosovo and begin the process of rebuilding their lives.

With the assistance of the international community, no one froze

or starved this past winter. Elections are being planned for this

fall, allowing the residents of Kosovo to choose their political leaders in a fair and open process. If serious problems persist in

Kosovo, it may make it impossible for the United Nations and

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NATO to accomplish its stated goals. Of these, the most significant

are the inherent contradictions between the statements of the

international community, which call for substantial autonomy and

self-government in Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the wishes of nearly all ethnic Albanians for independence.

I wonder if the current policy of the alliance, that is, intentional

ambiguity about the future status of Kosovo, whether this is the

most effective way to proceed. Additionally, KFOR has been unable

to prevent ethnic violence against Kosovar Serbs and other minorities, leading tens of thousands of them to flee Kosovo. Those that

remain have boycotted interim structures established by the

United Nations designed to bring Serbs and Albanians together for

purposes of governing.

The tensions are especially high in the northern areas of Kosovo,

where most ethnic Serbs are living, and I fear that radical elements controlled by Belgrade will persist in undermining any

chance of a peaceful resolution of those tensions. Incursions by ethnic Albanian militias into southern Serbia is also a serious cause

for concern. Although they stated they will give up their effort to

unify this area with Kosovo, I fear that their ambitions have not

been fully abandoned.

When the American soldiers intervene to prevent these incursions, there is a danger that they could be seen as the enemy by

all sides. The slow pace at which the United Nations established

its presence in Kosovo and its continued lethargic efforts at fully

implementing its mandate has led to other difficulties as well.

Judicial reform has barely begun, allowing various criminal elements free rein to operate. Indigenous administrative structures

are not operational. The international police is woefully understaffed, and local police will not be able to fulfill these functions for

quite sometime.

I supported the NATO air strikes in Kosovo and I support doing

what is necessary to win the peace as well. Difficult decisions will

have to be made regarding what kind of Kosovo we want to see

emerge. Postponing these decisions may be detrimental to the longterm interests of the United States and our allies in the Balkans.

Again, I welcome our witnesses, and will turn to my colleague for

his opening statement.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming the witnesses. I look forward to the testimony, and why don’t we just proceed.

Senator SMITH. Very good.

Mr. Pardew, we welcome you and thank you for your presence,

and invite your testimony now.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES W. PARDEW, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador PARDEW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very

pleased today to update the committee on the situation in Kosovo

1 year after the NATO air campaign and intensive diplomacy

brought the conflict there to a halt. I will briefly summarize my

more formal testimony, which I would like to submit for the record.

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Senator SMITH. Without objection.

Ambassador PARDEW. My presentation will highlight the accomplishments to date in Kosovo, identify the challenges—many of

them mentioned in your statement—facing the international community, and outline the course of action for the next several

months as we see it.

Next Saturday is the 1-year anniversary of the adoption of U.N.

Security Council Resolution 1244 [UNSCR], authorizing the Secretary General to establish an international security presence and

interim civil administration in Kosovo. This resolution is the foundation for the international effort in Kosovo, and will remain in effect until it is withdrawn by the unanimous vote of the Security

Council. With the passage of UNSCR 1244, NATO forces already

deployed in Macedonia and Albania moved quickly into Kosovo as

the nucleus of the international security force, or KFOR.

The international civil administration organization—the U.N.

Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK]—last June had no funding or standing

capability except for a humanitarian effort. The conditions facing

the international organization in June 1999 were daunting. Thousands of Kosovars were killed or missing, more than 1 million ethnic Albanians had been expelled from their home, Kosovo had no

government, its economy was devastated, an insurgent force, the

Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA], had grown from a very small group

to over 26,000 people at the end of the conflict.

Kosovo was devoid of laws and judicial institutions. There were

no police, no judicial system, no prisons. Press facilities and equipment had been destroyed. Community service organizations,

schools and clinics were damaged, looted, and destroyed.

Much has been accomplished in the past 365 days. We have

stopped the killing by Serb security forces. We have returned 1 million refugees and displaced persons to their home areas, and we got

them through the winter. Services are available to some degree in

most areas. Schools are open. Basic health services are available,

and the civil administration staff is being paid.

The international community has begun Kosovo’s transition to a

market economy with a hard currency monetary system, and a new

central bank. KFOR has overseen the demilitarization and disarmament of the KLA and created a civilian-oriented Kosovo Protection Corps [KPC]. UNMIK has appointed local judges and prosecutors, and trials are occurring in all districts.

The international community has deployed over 3,000 police of

the 3,500 authorized, and more than half of the special police have

been deployed. Nearly 800 new recruits have graduated from the

OSCE police school, and we hope to have 4,000 trained by early

2001.

Although recent violence has set back the Kosovar Serb participation in the interim administrative process, we are hopeful that

the local Serbs will continue to participate in activities that affect

their future. Today, 193 in-country voter registration sites are

open, and almost 500,000 Kosovars have registered for voter registration and personal documentation. We have 7 daily newspapers,

39 radio stations, and 5 broadcast outlets operational.

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, securing the peace and promoting democracy in Kosovo has been no easy task. Allow me to

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summarize some of the major challenges we face. I want to use this

forum this morning to highlight one current issue, the recent vicious attacks on Serbs in Kosovo. We condemn these extremist attacks in the strongest possible terms.

Vigilante attacks against minority citizens violate the principles

of democracy and tolerance which we hold so dear, and divert attention and limited resources away from assistance to law-abiding

people of Kosovo. We are urging local Kosovar Albanian leaders

and the people to work with the UNMIK and KFOR to stop these

attacks.

Other challenges include the U.N. staffing procedure. The United

Nations must improve its capability to deploy and organize staff for

civil administrative structures. With over 60 percent of its authorized strength, municipalities are not adequately governed, and key

managerial positions have gone unfilled.

In mid-May, the U.S. Government began an initiative with the

United Nations and the European Union to resolve these staffing

shortfalls. The United Nations in New York is delegating hiring authority to the field and assigning personnel specialists to UNMIK

to speed up the hiring process. The criminal justice system in

Kosovo remains inadequate. This spring, the United States conducted a comprehensive judicial assessment and organized a quick

start program for local courts.

OSCE is strengthening judicial training, and as an interim measure the Special Representative to the Secretary General plans to

place international judges in Kosovo district courts to handle sensitive cases.

Mitrovica and southern Serbia continue to be potential

flashpoints. KFOR and UNMIK have developed a set of measures

to address the issue in Mitrovica. The United Nations has appointed a strong regional administrator in Bill Nash, an American.

KFOR has established control zones of confidence, and international judges and prosecutors have been appointed there to deal

with the criminal issues.

UNMIK is engaging an international consortium in the mining

program in the area to begin preliminary work on the mines. Another challenge is demobilized members of the KLA, including

those who have joined the Kosovo Protection Corps. Some of them

have acted inappropriately. KFOR retains high standards for participation in the KPC organization, and we support a zero tolerance

policy regarding illicit activities by members of the KPC. So far,

KFOR has initiated 95 individual investigations, expelled four and

suspended nine members of the KPC for misbehavior.

Finally, the continued retention of power by the Milosevic regime

in Belgrade obstructs progress in Kosovo, as it does elsewhere in

the region. The sooner the Milosevic regime is replaced by a democratic alternative, the sooner the region can begin to heal.

The recent crackdown on independent media and students shows

that the regime is fearful, brittle, and in a downward spiral. We

continue to oppose those individuals and actions that reinforce

Milosevic, and we support those who promote democratic alternatives. Our focus for the next several months will be on establishing democracy in Kosovo, but defining the term in the UNSCR

1244 substantial autonomy in the interim period.

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The first step is to overcome the practical challenges that I have

discussed previously. The second step is to establish the provisional

institutions for democratic self-government under the international

supervision of UNMIK, including municipal elections to be held in

October.

The issue of final status of Kosovo was set aside for now as we

promote democracy, autonomy, and economic development. We

have been clear and consistent that Europe must shoulder the

lion’s share of the resource burden in Kosovo. Our European allies

accept this responsibility. Under normal conditions, the U.S. fields

about 5,500 of the 45,000 troops in Kosovo plus 800 support troops

in Macedonia, thus our contribution to KFOR remains at about 14

percent of the total KFOR deployment.

In other areas in the general category of revitalization and reconstruction for Kosovo, the total contribution for calendar year 2000

for all donors is about $1.1 billion. At $168 million, the U.S. contribution for 2000 for Kosovo’s revitalization and reconstruction is

about 14.6 percent.

We understand and agree with the Senate’s concerns about adequate burden-sharing in Kosovo, and we are vigilant in ensuring

that our European allies honor their commitments. At the same

time, the United States needs to fulfill its obligation as a party in

Europe.

Mr. Chairman, for months now several ideas have been proposed

in the Congress that limits U.S. participation in Kosovo, or links

our participation to levels of resource support provided by Europe.

The message from the Congress on burden-sharing has been received loud and clear on both sides of the Atlantic.

We continue to believe that legislation which limits the flexibility

of this administration and the next one is unnecessary and unwise.

Arbitrary percentages on ceilings on our participation risk reciprocal actions in the future, limits our policy actions, and degrades

our leadership in the key security institutions.

The engagement of the United States in Europe and our allies

in Kosovo has been a success, but much work remains. We stopped

the killing, restored regional stability, and are beginning to reinvigorate society and bring democracy to Kosovo. Our continuing engagement in Kosovo relates directly to our national security interest.

Two days ago, we had another anniversary, the anniversary of

the D-day landing, and that anniversary reminds us of our security

linkage to Europe. Our security is served by our leadership and

participation in European security institutions like NATO and the

OSCE. We cannot expect these institutions to support our interest

if we do not participate in important European security issues.

Second, we know from history that a stable Europe is vital to

American security, and that Europe is not stable if its southeastern

corner is in turmoil. In the past 5 years, the United States and our

allies have successfully contained and then subdued conflicts in

Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo as the former Yugoslavia broke apart,

but the area’s stability remains at risk from the Milosevic regime

and the fragile states recovering from the conflict.

The international security and civil administration presence is

critical not only to creating a secure environment in Kosovo, but for

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sustaining the peace and establishing the conditions for long-term

stability in the region. The costs of our engagement have not been

excessive, Mr. Chairman, and we must remain engaged with our

allies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to update the

committee.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pardew follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES W. PARDEW, JR.

DEMOCRACY IN THE BALKANS

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here today to update the committee on the situation in Kosovo one year after the NATO air campaign expelled Milosevic’s security

forces from the area. Today, I wish to review the current situation in Kosovo, highlight the accomplishments to date, and identify the greatest challenges we face. I

will conclude with some points on the key objectives in Kosovo over the next several

months.

First, let me go back slightly more than one year to pay tribute to the men and

women of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) and OSCE’s Kosovo

Verification Mission (KVM). These unarmed international peacekeepers and diplomats, including a significant number of U.S. Foreign Service personnel, risked

their lives daily on the ground in Kosovo seeking to avoid war in the autumn and

winter of 1998. On March 20, 1999, these peacekeepers were forced to withdraw,

as the Milosevic ethnic cleansing program against the Albanian majority in Kosovo

became increasingly brutal and made peacekeeping ineffective. Three days after

they withdrew, NATO began the air campaign against the FRY that, in combination

with an intensive diplomatic effort on many fronts, expelled Milosevic’s security

forces from Kosovo.

KOSOVO—JUNE 1999

Almost exactly one year ago, a rapid series of events established the conditions

for the international security force and the interim civil administration organization

operating in Kosovo today. On June 3 of last year, Belgrade accepted the G–8 conditions to pull its security forces from Kosovo and agreed to negotiate with NATO a

Military Technical Agreement (MTA) spelling out the conditions for that withdrawal. On June 10, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, authorizing

the Secretary General to establish an international security presence and an interim

civilian administration to restore order and governance to Kosovo. NATO suspended

the air campaign the next day once the MTA was signed and the withdrawal of Serbian security forces had begun in earnest.

Already deployed on the perimeter of the conflict to assist the humanitarian relief

efforts in Macedonia and Albania, NATO forces moved quickly into Kosovo on June

12 as the nucleus of the international Kosovo Force (KFOR). The international civil

administration organization, the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), had no funding

or standing capability except for the humanitarian effort and could only begin to be

organized after UNSCR 1244 was adopted.

The conditions facing the international organizations in June 1999 were daunting:

• More than one million ethnic Albanians had been expelled from their homes.

Over 800,000 refugees were in camps in Albanian and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 550,000 were internally displaced within Kosovo. Over

120,000 Kosovar homes had been systematically destroyed.

• Kosovo had no government. Opposed to the 1989 imposition of a Serb apartheid

regime in the province, the Albanian majority established a shadow state. FRY

security forces murdered many Albanian leaders and destroyed many of the informal networks through which they governed.

• Kosovo’s economy was devastated. Without food, power, sanitation, and shelter,

a humanitarian disaster appeared imminent.

• An insurgent force—the Kosovo Liberation Army—had grown from a small local

group to an estimated 26,000 troops at the height of the conflict.

• Kosovo was devoid of laws and institutions. There were no police, no judicial

system, and no prisons.

• Significant portions of Kosovo’s television network were incapacitated, including

the large-scale destruction of its towers, masts, and repeaters. Press facilities

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and equipment were destroyed to prevent Albanian voices from describing the

scale of the devastation perpetrated by Belgrade.

• Many community service organizations, schools, and clinics were damaged,

looted, or destroyed.

While UNMIK continues to struggle in fulfilling its mission, please keep in mind

the ad hoc nature of new international civil administrative organizations, and the

sheer scale of the devastation in Kosovo. Both make the effort of rebuilding from

the war and converting old communist structures to democratic ones much more arduous.

JUNE 2000—MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE FIRST YEAR

The international effort to organize the interim civil implementation mission in

Kosovo drew heavily on the lessons learned from Bosnia. The U.N. gave UNMIK

a strong mandate supported by NATO and the international community, and established clearer lines of authority for the mission. Additionally, the relationship between the civilian and military missions in Kosovo has also been close and effective.

We often wish implementation measures would move faster, but much as been accomplished in Kosovo in the past 365 days:

• The intervention by the international community stopped the killing by Serb security forces.

• International agencies helped return over one million refugees and displaced

persons to their homes. Last winter the international community provided

75,000 shelter kits to 387,000 Kosovars, averting a large-scale humanitarian

disaster. Since August 1999, UNMIK has begun to rebuild destroyed houses,

primarily with European donations. Electricity is being restored to the province,

with the repair of 50 power station transformers. Two of Kosovo’s five generators are also operational.

• Services are available to some degree in most areas, schools are open, basic

health services are available, and the civil administration is being paid.

• The international community has begun Kosovo’s transition to a market economy with a ‘‘deutschmark’’ monetary system and a new Central Bank. A microcredit bank has been established in Kosovo, and will assist in the financing of

small start-up businesses. UNMIK has submitted a strategy for private sector

development, which has been favorably received by the Interim Administrative

Council (IAC). Upon IAC approval, UNMIK will implement the proposed commercial code and phased privatization program.

• KFOR and UNMIK together have begun to establish public order, but under a

new system that will promote a rule-of-law society. The level of ethnic violence

remains too high, but it is down significantly from the early days of the international deployment.

• KFOR has overseen the demilitarization and disarmament of the KLA. The

former KLA handed in 10,000 arms during the demilitarization process; 3,800

other small arms have subsequently been collected and destroyed. The international community created the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civil emergency services organization of 5,000, to employ former KLA in useful public

service efforts.

• UNMIK has appointed 242 local judges and 75 local prosecutors, and re-established the Supreme Court, municipal courts, and other minor courts. Trials are

occurring in all district courts and some lower courts.

• The international community has deployed 3,035 of 3,593 regular police authorized for Kosovo; 540 of these are from the United States. More than half of the

1,125 special police (609) have also deployed, with more on the way. A Spanish

unit should arrive in Kosovo in about a week.

• UNMIK and OSCE have accelerated the training of an indigenous, multi-ethnic

police force to hasten the commissioning of 4,000 officers by early 2001. To date,

nearly 800 new recruits have graduated from the OSCE police school.

• Barred from participation in official Yugoslav institutions, Kosovar Albanian

leaders are involved in democratic governance with UNMIK’s guidance. Recently, the Gracanica Serbs, under the leadership of Bishop Artemije, joined

Kosovo’s interim administrative institutions as observers. Although recent violence has set back Kosovar Serb participation in these institutions, we are hopeful that the local Serbs will continue to participate in activities that affect their

future.

• In April, UNMIK, through the OSCE, began a Kosovo-wide voter registration

program. Today, 193 in-country sites were open, and over 400,000 people have

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been registered. Out-of-area registration is underway in-person in Montenegro,

Macedonia, and Albania. The voter registration process is the basis for issuing

internationally recognized identity papers, but more importantly, it lays the

foundation for the involvement of the people in democratic political institutions.

• An independent and vibrant media environment is emerging in Kosovo today.

Kosovo now has 7 daily papers, 39 radio stations, and 5 television broadcast

outlets. The U.S. is supporting independent television stations, and is working

with moderates in the Serb National Council to establish a radio station in Central Kosovo that is scheduled to open in June. Its broadcasts will reach the majority of Serb enclaves in Kosovo.

CURRENT CHALLENGES

As expected, securing the peace and promoting democracy in Kosovo is no easy

task. Allow me to summarize some of the most significant challenges we face today.

The U.N. must improve its capability to deploy and organize staff for its civil administrative structures. While UNMIK has begun to address the problems caused

by Belgrade’s actions, it has not fully established its authority over civil administration. With only 60% of its authorized civil administration staff deployed, it has not

been able to adequately govern many municipalities. Additionally, some key managerial positions have gone unfilled. The United Nations’ system of personnel recruitment and appointment has slowed significantly the civilian implementation process

in Kosovo.

The Department of State is making a concerted effort to focus international attention on UNMIK’s staffing problems. In mid-May, a U.S. government team began coordinating with the U.N. and EU on a plan to remedy civil administration staffing

shortfalls. The EU is also supporting an initiative with the aim of soliciting qualified personnel from its member nations for vacant positions in the EU pillar. In addition, the U.N. in New York is delegating hiring authority to the field and assigning personnel specialists to UNMIK to speed the hiring process. These measures are

a welcome beginning to much-needed reform.

The criminal justice system in Kosovo remains inadequate. Courtroom facilities

must be improved and the trial monitoring structure should be strengthened. In

some instances, local judges have been unable to effectively try cases and the number of supplemental international judges is not enough to compensate. More civilian

prison space is required. This spring the United States conducted a comprehensive

judicial assessment and organized a ‘‘quick start’’ program to deliver much needed

electrical generators and office equipment as early as this month to local courts. We

are also working with the OSCE to strengthen its judicial training capacity. As an

interim measure, until local judges are sufficiently trained in democratic law and

secure enough to consider adjudicating a full docket, the SRSG plans to place international judges in all Kosovo district courts to handle sensitive cases.

Another weak spot in the criminal justice system is the lack of sufficient detention

facilities and experienced personnel to run them. UNMIK has trained about 260 corrections officers, and an additional 60 are currently in training. More needs to be

done to fulfill the requirement for 600 officers to operate the prison system. A prison

in Istok that can hold 520 inmates re-opened on June 1 and will expand significantly the system’s current incarceration capacity. We are working with our allies

to shore up the system in the interim, and provide the resources necessary to create

and sustain a functioning penal system.

The municipal elections, which will be held this fall, will further focus the involvement of local leaders in municipal administrative structures by providing a public

mandate to guide their participation. Organization for the elections is well underway.

The Serbs who remain in Kosovo feel insecure and are reluctant partners in steps

to establish democracy in Kosovo. The OSCE and UNMIK are engaging with the

Serb community to stress the importance of civil registration, but thus far few Serbs

are registering. We are also working on a pilot project to return Serbs to Kosovo,

and are investigating possibilities for enhanced assistance to existing Serb communities.

Mitrovica and southern Serbia continue to be potential flashpoints. Ethnic Albanian insurgents in the Presevo region had pledged to reject the use of violence and

seek a political solution, but we know that their insurgency continues. We continue

to warn extremists on both sides of the border that provocation and violence will

not be tolerated. Additionally, KFOR and UNMIK are monitoring the situation carefully.

KFOR and UNMIK have developed a set of measures to address the issue of

Mitrovica. The U.N. has appointed a strong administrator for the region, American

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retired General William Nash. KFOR and UNMIK have returned more than 140

displaced Albanians to homes north of the Ibar River and KFOR-controlled ‘‘Zones

of Confidence’’ have been established in problem areas around two bridges and one

neighborhood. Two international judges and an international prosecutor have been

appointed in Mitrovica. Additionally, UNMIK is engaging an international mining

consortium to begin preliminary work in elements of the Trepce mining complex,

previously the largest economic enterprise in Kosovo.

The violence toward minorities and the atmosphere of intolerance in Kosovo is of

serious concern. The overall reduction in violence over the past year is heartening

and is a tribute to KFOR and UNMIK police efforts. However, recent violence

against Serbs and Roma, the isolation of those communities and the appearance of

provocative ‘‘vigilante journalism’’ undermines the international effort in Kosovo and

sets back the process of creating a tolerant democratic society there. We believe that

those who aspire to lead in Kosovo should denounce these developments as UNMIK

and KFOR take measures to improve security for minorities.

We are keenly aware of the possibility that demobilized members of the former

KLA, including those who have joined the KPC, may act inappropriately. KFOR retains high standards for participation in the organization and enforces a zero tolerance policy regarding illicit activities by members of the KPC. In March, KFOR and

UNMIK put into force the KPC Disciplinary Code (DC), which constitutes the formal mechanism for enforcement of the rules for compliance and disciplinary action

against offenders. The DC applies to all KPC members and provides the legal basis

for the commander of the KPC to take disciplinary action against non-compliant

members. UNMIK and KFOF also recently signed the Compliance Enforcement

Framework Document, which assigns responsibility for investigating criminal actions to UNMIK, administrative discipline to KPC, and compliance violations to

KFOR. Thus far, KFOR has initiated 95 individual investigations, expelled 4, and

suspended 9 KPC members.

One regional challenge is critical to Kosovo. The continued retention of power by

the Milosevic regime in Belgrade obstructs progress in Kosovo as it does elsewhere

in the region. The Milosevic factor confuses engagement with Kosovar Serbs and

prevents any serious discussion of long-term options with the Kosovar Albanians.

The sooner the Milosevic regime is replaced by democratic alternatives, the sooner

the region can begin to heal. The recent crackdown on independent media and students shows that the regime is fearful, brittle, and in a downward spiral. While no

one can predict when a change in Belgrade will occur, we continue to oppose those

individuals and actions which reinforce Milosevic, and we support those which promote democratic alternatives.

PROJECTIONS FOR YEAR TWO

Our focus for the next several months will be on establishing democracy in

Kosovo, not on defining its final status. The first step is to overcome the practical

challenges I previously described. The second step is to establish the provisional institutions for democratic self-government under the international supervision of

UNMIK. Democracy should be well-established in Kosovo before we can resolve the

issue of final status. Over the past few months, with the Rambouillet draft constitution as a point of departure, we have begun building consensus with key allies on

the form that the provisional self-government will take, and its relationship to

UNMIK and KFOR. These discussions will also include consultations with Kosovars.

UNSCR 1244 establishes the foundation for this undefined interim period. We believe the resolution requires no modification and it may only be withdrawn upon the

unanimous consent of the U.N. Security Council.

BURDENSHARING

We have been clear and consistent that Europe must shoulder the lion’s share of

the resource burden in Kosovo. Our NATO Allies, partners and other countries do

contribute the large majority of KFOR’s forces. Under normal conditions, the U.S.

fields about 5,500 of the 45,000 troops in Kosovo, plus 800 support troops in Macedonia. Thus, the U.S. contribution stays close to 14% of the total KFOR deployment. In the general category of revitalization and reconstruction for Kosovo, the

total contribution for CY2000 from all donors is about $1.1 billion. At $168 million,

the U.S. contribution for 2000 for Kosovo’s revitalization and reconstruction is about

14.6%. We understand and agree with the Senate’s concerns about adequate

burdensharing in Kosovo, and are vigilant in ensuring that our European allies

honor their commitments. At the same time, the United States needs to fulfill its

obligations. With the European’s providing the lion’s share, the U.S. contribution is

affordable.

10

Mr. Chairman, for months now several ideas have been proposed in the Congress

that limit U.S. participation in Kosovo or link our participation to levels of resource

support provided by Europe. The message from the Congress on burdensharing has

been received loud and clear on both sides of the Atlantic. We continue to believe

that limiting the flexibility of this Administration and the next is unnecessary and

unwise. Arbitrary percentages to our participation risks reciprocal actions in the future, limits our policy options, and degrades our leadership in key security institutions.

U.S. INTEREST IN KOSOVO

The engagement of the United States and our allies in Kosovo has been a success.

We stopped the killing, restored regional stability, and are beginning to reinvigorate

the society and bring democracy to Kosovo. Our continuing engagement in Kosovo

relates directly to our national security interests. First, our security is served by

leadership and participation in European security institutions like NATO and

OSCE. We cannot expect these institutions to support our interests if we do not participate in important European security issues.

Second, we know from history that a stable Europe is vital to American security,

and that Europe is not stable if its southeastern corner is in turmoil. In the past

four years, the U.S. and our allies have successfully contained, then subdued, conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo as the former Yugoslavia broke apart. But the

area’s stability remains at risk from the Milosevic regime and the fragility of states

recovering from conflict. The international security presence is critical to not only

creating a secure environment in Kosovo, but for sustaining the peace and establishing the conditions for long-term stability in the region that will allow robust political, economic, and reconstruction programs backed by sufficient resources to

make a difference. The costs have not been excessive given the outcome. We must

remain engaged with our allies.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, from the beginning of our involvement in Kosovo I have supported the administration both in

the decision to engage and in defending it recently on a move in

the Senate to withdraw.

But I have also said from the beginning that I do not believe our

objective is realistic. The objective of the international community

is autonomy within Yugoslavia for Kosovo. The problem I have is

that nobody on the ground seems to want that. The Serbs want

Kosovo on their terms, and the Albanians want independence of

the Serbs. Can you allay my ongoing skepticism of the achievability

of our stated goal?

Ambassador PARDEW. Mr. Chairman, the difficulty in discussing

long-term status of Kosovo is compounded by the Milosevic problem

in Belgrade. It is impossible to have a meaningful discussion with

Kosovars over the long-term status with Milosevic in power in Belgrade, and so close to the tragic events that have occurred in

Kosovo.

Senator SMITH. Does it substantially abate if Milosevic is gone?

Do you think the Albanians will want to be—— Ambassador PARDEW. Not immediately, I do not, but we continue

to believe that some appropriate relationship with Serbia yet to be

defined is better than independence.

We have not supported independence, but we do insist that the

final status of Kosovo must be acceptable to the people of Kosovo.

Right now, we have set that issue aside while we work to achieve

democratic institutions, a market economy, and to bring Western

democratic values to the area. It is just impossible at this point in

time, sir, to have a serious discussion with them on the status

question.

Senator SMITH. But the consequence of sticking to this hybrid

end game is, we are there for an indeterminate amount of time, naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67874 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
11

tion-building on our terms and not their terms. Am I wrong in that

fear?

Ambassador PARDEW. We certainly cannot put a timeframe on

our presence there. Again, we believe that the area is important,

regional stability is important, and we have to take the necessary

measures to ensure regional stability. However, we learned from

Bosnia not to set specific time lines on when we can leave.

I can only say our focus right now is on defining what substantial autonomy means in this interim period. We are doing everything we can to give them effective governance under the UNMIK

structure for this interim period and set aside the long-term status.

Senator SMITH. What I think you have implied, in order for that

ever to be achievable we have got to get rid of Mr. Milosevic. What

is being done on that score?

Ambassador PARDEW. We are working with our allies in Europe

in a range of measures to undermine the Milosevic regime and to

promote those forces that support democracy. We are pursuing a

number of initiatives. We are supporting independent media in the

FRY. We are working with the Serb opposition. We are promoting

the democracy in Bosnia and in Montenegro and in Kosovo and in

the surrounding area. We have a very serious sanctions regime

which we are tightening with our European allies right now.

So there are a whole range of very serious measures we are

using, but ultimately, Mr. Chairman, whether Milosevic goes or

stays is an issue for Serbs. The Serbian people have to decide when

he goes. We hope that that will happen sooner rather than later.

Senator SMITH. So if he stays, that means we stay as well?

Ambassador PARDEW. It makes it much more difficult to leave.

Senator SMITH. It seems to me the international community

ought to go get him and take him to The Hague, and things would

get better a lot quicker.

Can you speak to Russia’s involvement? Are they our partner

there, or our opponent there? They are hosting a Serb war criminal

during Mr. Putin’s inauguration, giving him a nice week of good

food and camaraderie. What role are they taking on the ground?

Ambassador PARDEW. This whole Serbian issue and the breakup

of Yugoslavia has been a very difficult problem for the Russians.

They have their own domestic political factors to consider, and

quite frankly, their actions have sometimes been inconsistent. For

example, Foreign Minister Ivanov apologized publicly for the visit

to Moscow by the person under indictment by the War Crimes Tribunal.

In other cases the Russians have been extremely helpful. They

were helpful in the negotiation of the end of the air campaign. We

are working with them expectively in the contact group, so the relationship with Russia over Kosovo has varied from time to time.

Their forces, if I could go on, have been responsible members of

the alliance in Kosovo and have, in fact, acted professionally. So in

many ways Russia has been a plus, but there have been those instances in which they have made things a little more difficult for

us, and they have made mistakes which they have openly admitted.

Senator SMITH. Senator Lugar.

12

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Pardew,

you have described, I think accurately and very thoughtfully, the

status of our forces in Kosovo, and the job they have to do, and that

is a very difficult one. Chairman Smith has surveyed the larger picture and your role as advisor to the President and Secretary for democracy in the Balkans. You have taken a larger view even as you

try to help bring democracy to 2 million people in Kosovo.

I would just underline the thought that the debate that we had

the other day on the Byrd-Warner amendment was especially important because it drew the Senate’s attention for the first time to

the responsibilities of the United States in Europe. We all understand that role in a way, and Chairman Smith’s underlining of the

D-day anniversary is significant. You have talked about this as

well.

We are in Europe because we want to be there and because Europeans want us to be there. The German Foreign Minister and the

French Foreign Minister have come through here, have met with

us and have emphasized that our presence in Europe has made all

the difference in terms of peace in Europe for the past 60-years— all because the United States is there, and we are there in a very

large way as a leader of NATO.

Now, the thing that was upsetting about the debate the other

day was that, because of the irritation of many Members of the

Senate who reflect the public as a whole, we might cut and run

under very dubious circumstances. They feel this way out of irritation or weariness, over a lack of foresight in Kosovo, a lack of comprehensive plans now, or the lack of an end game plan.

For each of us who have been involved in these discussions,

whether it be the White House or the State Department, there was

not a consensus in the Senate or the House as to what had occurred. The votes were always very problematic, and on occasion,

as you recall, even after we had been involved in bombing for several weeks, there was a tie vote in the House on whether we should

be bombing at all.

So, in a way democracy works, and we finally confronted in this

very close vote the fact that we have a responsibility, and it is a

very tough one, but it is an ongoing responsibility.

This was a close call, and the administration understands that,

and, in fairness, Secretary Cohen and Secretary Albright and perhaps yourself and others were very busy, as you needed to be, to

explain how drastic circumstances might be.

Now, having said that, I am concerned that there does not appear to be in our administration, quite apart from NATO or the

United Nations, an overall strategy. There are pieces of this, and

sometimes persons like yourself are able to be an interlocutor and

relate them.

For instance, the Southeast European Assistance Plan is extremely important. It is important for those in that area, for the

United States, for NATO, Bulgaria, Romania and other countries

because the problems in Serbia have isolated them in terms of

trade and development even as they wish to become a part of

NATO and wish to become affiliated with us. There has been almost no debate here and very little word about our participation,

although it is a European situation primarily.

13

Likewise how are Albania and Macedonia to be supported given

Serbia in the middle of all this, quite apart from the Kosovo situation or from Montenegro? From time to time we edge up to what

we should be doing in Montenegro.

Not all of it is covert, but it sometimes takes on that flavor. After

all, Kosovo is a part of Serbia and, therefore, it is unseemly to get

into too much discussion about the whole place which might be stabilized this summer, and we may have a big NATO problem again

for which we’re not very well prepared.

And I don’t see, as the chairman has pointed out, an end game

at all with regard to Kosovo. Now, you have to answer these questions diplomatically because our European friends are very sensitive on the issue of independence and autonomy, and therefore

public testimony by you or anybody else is likely to be difficult.

But the fact is that, as I rephrase the steps of how we got involved to begin with, we were involved at Rambouillet.

We felt a responsibility to make that conference credible. Whoever made the estimate that the bombing raids would change the

opinion of Milosevic may or may not have been correct. Whether we

were prepared for that war is beside the point, because it is over,

but the fact is there are lots of questions about Rambouillet, our

negotiating position, and how we came into such a war to begin

with, and all the ramifications that follow it.

Now, I think at some point either your administration or the

next one has to put in context what is going to happen, and we

have to take leadership in the United States and in NATO to make

it happen.

As it stands, it seems to me we are mostly reactive and defensive. Some say that 15 percent of the people there doing peacekeeping seems like a fair share, but we are skeptical whether the

Europeans are doing their share. It is a very small area anyway

and very tough for any of these people to make a difference in

southeastern Europe, its economy, and lack of overall strategy.

What can you inform us about any overall strategic plan, or a

way in which the administration might explain or take leadership

in bringing some plan so that you then come to the Congress and

say this is the way it is. It may be expensive, but these are things

we have got to do, and they involve all these countries, and they

involve money and investment and the rest.

This is preferable to a piecemeal approach to Kosovo appearing,

in ways suggesting that we might do something more or we might

not, or defending the amount that we are doing. I think ultimately

you would have to admit this is an interim stop-gap affair or a finger in the dike, and hope that some good things might happen, like

Milosevic leaving, or other countries stepping to the fore.

Can you give us any grand idea about all of this?

Ambassador PARDEW. I do not know how grand it will be Senator, but I will give it my best shot.

First of all, I think we appear sometimes to be reactive, because

we are in some ways responding to events we do not control. I

mean, we simply cannot predict what Milosevic is going to do

tactically. This all started in the early nineties as Yugoslavia came

apart, and we were faced with confrontations between these new

countries. Bosnia was a particular difficult example.

14

We tried long ago to deter Milosevic from taking action in Kosovo

but we were not successful, and we do not know for sure what he

might do next. But you are exactly right in that it is very difficult

to deal with regional issues because of Serbia’s current leadership,

its location and the size of its population.

I would say that our strategy is governed by our interest in regional stability. We wish to take a regional approach to problems,

not just a piece by piece approach.

Part of the regional strategy is the Stability Pact and what we

are trying to do to integrate countries of the region into the European economic system and the European political institutions. We

seek to bring these countries into NATO, OSCE, EU, and other regional institutions, and to have them work together toward common economic structures and goals. The Stability Pact is a large

part of that effort.

Another element of our strategy is the replacement of the regime

in Serbia, because such a change is so critical to the region, and

our goal of building democracies in these countries. We have made

great headway in Croatia. We have not had as much success in

Bosnia as we would have liked, but things have gotten better there.

We are working very hard in Kosovo to improve the situation.

Overall, I would characterize our strategy as based on regional stability and regional cooperation. Then you go into the individual

countries and what we are doing there.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I think you can

infer from both of our comments and questions that our ability to

keep support in the U.S. Senate for the current end game is not

indefinite, and the sooner we get on to realizing that we picked a

side on the side of the Kosovar Albanians the better off we will be,

because that will lead us to a goal that is achievable, and that is

their independence, and if the Europeans do not want that, I believe they will find that they are the ones enforcing something

other than that.

We thank you, sir.

Ambassador PARDEW. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. We invite now our next panel, Ambassador

Abramowitz, Dr. Williams, and Mr. Bugajski.

Ambassador Abramowitz, we will start with you, sir. Thanks for

being here.

STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, BOARD OF

TRUSTEES, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AND FORMER

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND

RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very

much appreciate the chance to discuss Kosovo with you. Let me

just say that there have been very powerful voices on this committee over the past decade saying some very important things,

and it is an honor for me to be with some of them here today.

Thank you very much.

Kosovo is a subject of great political and moral importance. For

all the ills of Western policy in the Balkans the past year, the useless rhetoric—past decade, I should say—the useless rhetoric, the

15

evasions of reality, the half-way measures, in the end Kosovo represented an extraordinary allied motivation effort and accomplishment.

Kosovo, of course, is not over. It remains a poor, disorganized society with a long-term security problem. It is essential for the people of Kosovo, peace in the Balkans, and to the cohesion and the

values of the alliance that our efforts to create a stable and reasonable democratic Kosovo be successful. That will require continuing

personnel, military and civilian resources of sizable magnitude, determination, and some political imagination.

There is no easy exit strategy, that wonderful phrase which is

often used to lead democratic countries to less decisive action or no

action at all, and ultimately produces greater cost and greater suffering. How long Western forces have to stay, and the magnitude

of the resources needed, will be heavily dependant by what we and

our allies do in Kosovo in a wider regional setting.

I thought it might be useful to raise at least five important questions about our efforts in Kosovo, and I will try to be brief. The

first and most obvious is where are we, and what has been accomplished?

Mr. Chairman, you have already answered that very well. Your

description at the beginning of the session I think was dead on,

and I am not going to repeat essentially what you had said. I would

like to just close that part with a little paragraph which I have

written which says, it seems inevitable that after a war the resources and attention of concerned nations to post-war reconstruction fall far behind what is needed, indeed, in some cases imperiling the results of the war.

The U.N. administration has been burdened with a deficiency of

all sorts of resources, as well as a mandate to keep Kosovo as part

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which flies in the face of reality. However valiant their effort, it is clear that UNMIK has neither the resources, time, nor ability to reshape Kosovo society, but

UNMIK, with the help of KFOR, can establish a reasonably secure

political environment, encourage responsible political parties, promote movement or democratic practices, and institute an elective

process.

My second question is, do Serbs still have a place in Kosovo? In

Kosovo our ideals collide with popular fears and profound antagonisms. It is not a situation that can be changed overnight. Serbs

have been leaving Kosovo for the past 20 years, as Albanian predominance in the province increased. The outcome of the war sped

further departures. Probably half of pre-war Kosovo’s 200,000

Serbs, not all of whom were long-term residents, fled partially because of Albanian violence or provocation, but in part because they

also feared to live under Albanian rule, or lost their jobs when Serbian administration ceased.

Despite their inhospitable reception in Serbia, and the presence

of KFOR in Kosovo, it is uncertain whether many Kosovo Serbs

want to return to Kosovo without jobs to go to, which have largely

been taken over by Albanians, and without the restoration of Serbian authority. The latter is not likely for a long time to come, if

ever. To encourage Serbs remaining in Kosovo to stay and those in

Serbia to return is no easy task, and from the perspective of many

16

Albanians in Kosovo the fewer Serbs in Kosovo the better, and the

less likely in the future that Serbia would attempt to take back the

area.

The issue of Serb returns is a tricky one, in part because Belgrade is deeply involved in the Serb presence in Kosovo. Many

Serbs also came late to Kosovo, as part of Belgrade’s apparatus. In

part, this issue of returns is also intimately related to the establishment of a serious Kosovo entity, one with a real court system,

a better rule of law, and adequate policing, in short, a functioning

society where there is security and predictability.

That does not yet exist in Kosovo, and encouraging Serbs to return at this point is questionable, since they will almost certainly

end up in enclaves controlled by Belgrade, but while a stable environment is necessary, it is probably not sufficient. Getting Serbs to

return will also require continuing Western pressure, lots of material support and military and police protection for some uncertain

time to come.

This means: No. 1, that Serbs must somehow be assured security, democratic rights, power-sharing in their communities, and

political participation outside their communities, however difficult

that will be in Albanian areas.

No. 2, that Serbs in Kosovo will have to accept that they will

have to live in a single Kosovo not ruled by Belgrade. Right now,

that does not seem to be the case for a large number of them.

No. 3, that Albanian violence must be controlled, and Albanian

leaders need to understand that they will ultimately have to accept

the return of those Serbs wishing to return to Kosovo and make

that work as well as possible if they are to sustain the international community support for majority rule in Kosovo.

Given the difficulties and uncertainties involved, one practical

strategy does not answer the problem, but one practical strategy

might be to focus initial returns on the much smaller number of

displaced Roma gypsies, who invariably get the short end of the

stick. If their returns can be successfully managed, it could offer

some confidence to move ahead with a program to return Serbs to

Kosovo.

My third question, one that you have alluded to and Senator

Lugar has alluded to, is the uncertainty of the future status of

Kosovo inhibiting the political and economic development of

Kosovo. The answer to this is almost certainly yes, although it is

hard to quantify.

Economic and political decisions are made because the only international mandate is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which

says that Kosovo’s part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

[FRY], and that is used in many quarters to contribute to delay in

creating meaningful institutions which are run by the people of

Kosovo. There seems to be a continuing struggle between UNMIK

and Pristina and the United Nations in New York over the implementation of a mandate and the structure and timing of self rule.

Russia and China are against any change in the international

status of Kosovo. The allies continue to fear that a too rapid movement toward Kosovo self-rule and any enunciation of Kosovo independence as a goal will imperil the viability of Macedonia and stir

up a major international dispute.

17

They all apparently believe that the issue of Kosovo’s status

could be better dealt with once Milosevic leaves the scene. That is,

there is a greater possibility of keeping Kosovo and Serbia together

in some way if Serbia has a more democratic government, or conversely, that a more democratic government in Serbia is more likely to accept the succession of Kosovo, or at least a republic status

for Kosovo in the FRY.

One problem with this approach is that no one is smart enough

to figure out when Milosevic will lose power. However significant

the weaknesses of his regime, his departure could be delayed a long

time. We have seen that with Castro, we have seen that with Saddam Hussein. It could be delayed a long time, creating tension and

instability in Kosovo should power and responsibility continue to be

denied the Albanians.

Moreover, it is not at all clear that a post-Milosevic Government

will have the desire or the political backing to accept a change in

Kosovo’s status. One could reasonably argue that it is better for the

international community and the Serb opposition to change

Kosovo’s status while Milosevic is in charge.

Another problem is our use of so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the FRY. I think we all know why the term was used in

1244 and not Serbia. The sad fact is, the FRY is the family enterprise of Mr. Milosevic that serves to give his rule some legal patina. Every republic has gotten out, and the last remaining one,

Montenegro, also wants out, much to our discomfiture.

Resurrection of the FRY is a highly dubious enterprise even in

a post-Milosevic period. It is, however, at this time not possible politically in the international community, whether it is desirable or

not, easier now rather than later, to change the status of court in

Kosovo by the international community, and that, I believe, is producing a drift in Kosovo and in allied determination.

The people in Kosovo still do not know what local elections which

are to be held in the autumn mean, and there seems to be, at least

among some allies, a sense that Kosovo is really part of Serbia. It

is important for the United States to make its views crystal clear

to the people of Kosovo and to the world at large that while the

status of Kosovo still has to be determined, Serbian rule will not

return to Kosovo and independence is a possible goal once certain

conditions about the nature of independent Kosovo are met, including a demonstrated commitment to minority rights, and an adherence to internationally recognized borders.

Credible elections will also be needed to establish the legitimacy

of Kosovo Governments, and the growing responsibility of those

voted into office. In short, we either start to set the rules for a

transition to what may be Kosovo independence, or we allow ourselves to be hostage to events in Kosovo and the region.

My fourth question: How do Serbia and Kosovo live with each

other in the long run? If Western forces are to ever be withdrawn

from Kosovo, clearly Serbia and Kosovo must be able to work out

some sort of stable relationship. Whether this will be possible, and

when, I am not smart enough to predict.

The history of the two communities has obviously been a violent

one, but even if that objective is difficult to attain, it is important

not to lose sight of it. I think we can say at least a few things

18

about the longer term. First, the relationship cannot improve while

Milosevic remains in power. He is still trying to preserve the potentiality for Serb rule in Kosovo, and to undermine UNMIK authority. We cannot do business with him, and a different type of Serbia

will be needed.

Second, even if a Serbian Abe Lincoln took charge and offered

malice toward none, not one Albanian would support any serious

political tie to Belgrade. Nevertheless, the Albanian leaders of

Kosovo must realize that, while independence is their goal, they

will have to coexist with next door ultimately a much stronger Serbia. They must examine the government that succeeds Milosevic in

that light, and how they might proceed constructively with its leaders. They must also recognize that a continuing Western military

presence in Kosovo could be challenged by the domestic considerations and domestic politics in allied nations.

Third, and this is, I think, in the end ultimately the most important thing, much will depend on Europe and what it does in

Kosovo, in Serbia when it is free of Milosevic, and in the broad Balkan region. The prospects for stability and ultimate reconciliation

in the Balkans depend in great part both on economic growth in

all the countries, but also on their respective relationships with Europe.

It will be only possible to remove Western troops when both

Kosovo and Serbia are bound to European institutions in some serious fashion. Whether Europe can rise to the occasion and produce

a long term integrative process remains to be seen. Europe has

plenty of things on its mind. But I believe that the EU increasingly

recognizes that connection, and Mr. Solana and Mr. Patten have

added enormous energy and urgency to the EU effort.

Finally, what is the role of the United States in shaping the future of Kosovo? The United States was the heart of the alliance

war effort, but long term, however, it is the EU, as I noted above,

which has a central role in ultimately stabilizing the former Yugoslavia, but it can take a long while to get to the long term, and the

United States remains essential for security and for political purposes.

The United States supplies only 15 percent of KFOR, but the

continued presence of a significant American force is needed to provide the assurance to the Kosovo Albanians that Serb forces will

not simply be able one day to walk in and resume control. The

presence of American forces conveys a similar type message to any

Serbian Government. Certainly, until more progress is made in creating new, self-sustaining political institutions in Kosovo, and we

see the impact of a post-Milosevic Government in Belgrade, serious

American forces will be required.

While the bulk of the military presence will have to come from

European countries, I think it would be a mistake to simply consider the division of forces a burden-sharing problem. The nature

and role of American forces are also important, whether U.S. military efforts are narrowly confined or significantly robust, and determined to get the job done.

I note that Kosovo Serbs have complained a few days ago that

British forces do a better job of providing protection to Serbs than

19

American ones. That may be unfair. I do not know. But I think the

way our forces are being used in Kosovo is worth serious review.

There is, moreover, an important political purpose served by the

continuing presence of U.S. forces in Kosovo, namely, a stronger

voice in determining allied strategy in the Balkans, where we have

a major investment in interests and values to protect.

The United States, to its credit, is an important catalytic government, particularly in the Balkans. It needs to remain involved in

working to avoid backsliding so that we do not fall into repeating

our past experience in Kosovo, and that we do what is necessary

to ensure that the alliance maintains a sufficiently strong posture

in Kosovo and indeed the whole of the former Yugoslavia, so that

we will be successful, rather than doing just enough to fail or create uncertainty and further instability, and in this regard I must

express some concern as to our involvement in the nonmilitary aspects of the Kosovo problem.

An Albanian friend has commented that the United States has

won the war and seems to have disappeared from Kosovo. In helping make things happen in Kosovo, in the vital tasks, particularly

building a civil society, the U.S. Government seems to me to be

largely absent. I am sure you will get a catalogue, and we have already heard a catalogue of all the U.S. Government is doing in

Kosovo if you ask the question, but I believe it is another subject

worth seriously looking at.

Let me close by saying that in western Europe in the 1940’s our

exit strategy in peace and war was to be successful. If you need an

exit strategy for Kosovo, I suggest that is still a fitting one.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abramowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the invitation to discuss Kosovo with you. It is a subject of great political and moral importance. For all the ills of Western policy in the Balkans the

past decade—the useless rhetoric, the evasions of reality, the half-way measures—

in the end Kosovo represented an extraordinary allied motivation, effort, and accomplishment. The saga is, of course, not over; Kosovo remains a poor disorganized society with a long-term security problem. It is essential to the people of Kosovo, to

peace in the Balkans, and to the cohesion and values of the alliance that our efforts

to create a stable and reasonable democratic Kosovo be successful. That will require

continuing personnel—military and civilian—resources of sizable magnitude, determination, and some political imagination. There is no easy exit strategy, that wonderful Washington phrase which often is used to lead democratic countries to less

decisive action or no action at all and ultimately produces greater cost and suffering.

How long Western forces have to stay and the magnitude of the resources needed,

will be influenced by what we and our allies do in Kosovo and its wider regional

setting.

I thought it might be most useful to raise at least five important questions surrounding our efforts in Kosovo that need to be aired, and to give my answers. I will

try to be direct and brief.

1. The most obvious question is where are we: what has and has not been achieved

in not quite a year of U.N. rule?

Views diverge, often radically—some see the glass half full, some see it mostly

empty. In the media pessimism usually predominates, with the overwhelming emphasis on continuing violence against Serbs. Much depends on when you entered the

Kosovo problem. One needs to be reminded of Kosovo’s tortured post-1989 history:

the repression, the dislocation of people, the ethnic animosities, and the destruction

of property in evaluating developments under U.N. rule. Here is how I see it, and

I rely on my own observations and particularly the work in Kosovo of the International Crisis Group, of which I am a board member:

20

• The vast bulk of Kosovo’s people are now better off, livelier, and more hopeful

than before the war. That is, of course, because the Serbian ruling apparatus

with its hallmark of fear and repression is gone. Incidents of violence against

Serbs and other minorities continue. The present security climate is heavily dependent on a significant Western military and police presence.

• Whatever the suspicions and accusations—true or false—hurled at the KLA and

some of its leaders, the organization has been significantly demilitarized.

Whether it can turn itself into a popular and cohesive political force not tainted

by intimidation, corruption, violence, or fractiousness remains to be seen.

• Albanians got through a hard winter and moved quickly, mostly on their own,

to reconstruct homes, establish small and medium sized private business, and

resume farm production.

• Basic public services have begun to function after a slow UNMIK start—garbage collection, traffic, etc., are all improving and ninety percent of the children

are back in school.

• A process has begun to hold local elections in the fall and to give some political

power to the people of Kosovo;

However, there are major areas where little has been done or even can be done in

the short-term:

• The communities are more ethnically separated than ever. Kosovo’s remaining

Serbs live in enclaves under permanent KFOR guard and are mostly supplied

by Belgrade. Other minorities remain at risk.

• Kosovo is still divided. Albanians have been entirely driven from territories

north of the city of Mitrovica—this area functions de facto as part of Serbia.

Indeed, Belgrade’s hand is still felt throughout Kosovo.

• Major infrastructure has not been repaired or reconstructed, most notably utilities.

• Very little Kosovo administration has been established. There is U.N. rule but

not a real government and Albanian administration is noted mostly by its absence. Kosovo lacks the rule of law and a serious judiciary. Most publicized has

been the inability of the international community to provide an adequate police

presence; less than half those originally planned have arrived.

It seems inevitable that after a war the resources and attention of concerned nations to post war reconstruction fall far behind what is needed, indeed in some cases

imperiling the results of the war. The U.N. administration has been burdened with

a deficiency of all sorts of resources as well as by a mandate to keep Kosovo as part

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which flies in the face of reality. However valiant their efforts, it is clear that UNMIK has neither the resources, time,

nor ability to reshape Kosovo society. But UNMIK can establish a reasonably secure

political environment, encourage responsible political parties, promote movement toward democratic practices, and institute an elective process.

2. Do Serbs still have a place in Kosovo?

In Kosovo our ideals collide with popular fears and profound antagonisms. It is

not a situation that can be changed overnight.

Serbs have been leaving Kosovo for the past twenty years as Albanian predominance in the province increased. The outcome of the war sped further departures.

Probably half of pre-war Kosovo’s two hundred thousand Serbs (not all long term

residents) fled, partly because of Albanian violence or provocation but in part also

because they feared to live under Albanian rule or had lost their jobs when Serbian

administration ceased.

Despite their inhospitable reception in Serbia and the presence of KFOR in

Kosovo, it is questionable whether many Kosovo Serbs want to return to Kosovo

without jobs to go to (which have largely been taken over by Albanians) and without

the restoration of Serbian authority. The latter is not likely for a long time to come,

if ever. To encourage Serbs remaining in Kosovo to stay and those in Serbia to return is no easy task. From the perspective of many Albanians the fewer Serbs in

Kosovo the better, and the less likely in the future that Serbia would attempt to

take back the area.

This issue of Serb returns is a tricky one in part because Belgrade is deeply involved in the Serb presence in Kosovo. Many Serbs also came late to Kosovo as part

of Belgrade’s apparatus. In part this issue of returns is also intimately related to

the establishment of a serious Kosovo entity: one with a real court system, a better

rule of law, and adequate policing—in short a functioning society where there is security and predictability. That does not yet exist in Kosovo and encouraging Serbs

to return at this point is questionable since they will almost certainly end up in enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67874 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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claves controlled by Belgrade. But while a stable environment is necessary it is

probably not sufficient. Getting Serbs to return will also require continuing Western

pressure, lots of material support, and military and police protection for some time

to come. This means:

• that Serbs must somehow be assured security, democratic rights, power sharing

in their communities, and political participation outside their communities,

however difficult that will be in Albanian areas;

• that Serbs in Kosovo will have to accept that they will have to live in a single

Kosovo not ruled by Belgrade. Right now that does not seem to be the case for

at least a large number of them; and

• that Albanian violence must be controlled and Albanian leaders need to understand that they will ultimately have to accept the return of Serbs to Kosovo and

make that work as well as possible if they are to sustain the international community’s support for majority rule in Kosovo.

Given the difficulties and uncertainties involved, one strategy might be to focus

returns turns initially on the much smaller number displaced of Roma, who invariably get the least attention. If their returns can be successfully managed it could

offer some confidence to move ahead with in a program to return Serbs to Kosovo.

3. Is the uncertainty of the future status of Kosovo inhibiting the political and economic development of the country?

The answer to this is almost certainly yes, although it is hard to quantify. Economic and political decisions are delayed because the only international mandate is

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which says that Kosovo is part of the FRY

and that is used in many quarters to contribute to the delay in creating meaningful

institutions run by the people of Kosovo. There seems to be a continuing struggle

between UNMIK in Pristina and the U.N. in New York over the implementation of

the mandate and the structure and timing of self-rule.

Russia and China are dead set against any change in the international status of

Kosovo. The allies are divided but most continue to fear that too rapid movement

toward Kosovo self-rule and any enunciation of Kosovo independence as a goal will

imperil the viability of Macedonia (although any declaration of Montenegro independence from the FRY would throw even greater doubt on allied perspectives of

the Kosovo issue) and stir up an international dispute. They all apparently believe

that the issue of Kosovo’s status could be better dealt with once Milosevic leaves

the scene, that is, there is a greater prospect of keeping Kosovo and Serbia together

in some way if Serbia has a more democratic government, or conversely, that a more

democratic Serbian government is more likely to accept the secession of Kosovo or

at least a republic status for Kosovo in the FRY.

One problem with this approach is that no one is smart enough to figure out when

Milosevic will lose power. However significant the weaknesses of his regime, his departure could be delayed a long time, creating tension and instability in Kosovo

should power and responsibility continue to be denied the Albanians. Moreover, it

is not at all clear that a post-Milosevic government will have the desire or the political backing to accept a change in Kosovo’s status. One could reasonably argue that

is better for the international community and the Serbian opposition to change

Kosovo’s status while Milosevic is in charge.

Another problem is our use of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—the

FRY. Everyone knows why that term was used in 1244 and not Serbia. The sad fact

is that the FRY is a family enterprise of Mr. Milosevic that serves to give his rule

some legal patina. Every republic has gotten out, and the last remaining one—Montenegro—also wants out, much to allied discomfiture. The U.S. does not recognize

the FRY, although we appear to have stopped saying that. Resurrection of the FRY

is a highly dubious enterprise even in a post-Milosevic period.

It is, however, at this time not possible politically—desirable or not, easier now

rather than later—to change the status accorded Kosovo by the international community. And that, I believe, is producing a drift in Kosovo and in Allied determination. The people of Kosovo still does not know what local elections—which are to

be held in the autumn—mean; and there seems to be, at least among some allies,

a sense that Kosovo is really just a part of Serbia. It is important for the U.S. to

make its views crystal clear to the people of Kosovo and to the world at large: that

while the status of Kosovo still has to be determined, Serbian rule will not return

to Kosovo and independence is a permissible goal once certain conditions about the

nature of an independent Kosovo state are met, including a demonstrated commitment to minority rights and the adherence to internationally recognized borders.

Credible elections will also be needed to establish the legitimacy of Kosovo governments and the growing responsibility of those voted into office. In short, we either

22

start to set the rules for a transition to what may be Kosovo independence or we

allow ourselves to be hostage to events in Kosovo and the region.

4. How do Serbia and Kosovo live with each other in the long run?

If Western forces are ever to be withdrawn from Kosovo, clearly Serbia and

Kosovo must be able to work out some sort of stable relationship. Whether this will

be possible and when is, of course, hard to predict. The history of the two communities has been a violent one. Even if attainment of that objective is difficult, it is

important not to lose sight of it.

We can say a few things about the longer term. First, the relationship can not

improve while Milosevic remains in power. He is still trying to preserve the potentiality for Serb rule in Kosovo and to undermine UNMIK authority. Business can

not be done with him. A different type of Serbia will be needed.

Second, even if a Serbian Abe Lincoln took charge and offered malice toward

none, not one Albanian would support any serious political tie to Belgrade. Nevertheless, the Albanian leaders of Kosovo must realize, that while independence is

their goal, they will still have to coexist with a next-door, much stronger Serbia.

They must examine the government that succeeds Milosevic in that light and how

they might proceed constructively with its leaders. They also must recognize that

a continuing Western military presence in Kosovo could be challenged by domestic

considerations in allied nations.

Third, much will depend on Europe and what it does in Kosovo, in Serbia when

it is free of Milosevic, and in the broad Balkan region. The prospects for stability

and ultimate reconciliation depend in great part both on economic growth in all the

countries in the area but also on their respective relationships with Europe. It will

only be possible to remove Western troops when both Kosovo and Serbia are bound

to European institutions in some serious fashion. Whether Europe can rise to the

occasion and produce a long-term integrative process remains to be seen. Europe

has many other things on its mind. But I believe the EU increasingly realizes that

connection and Mr. Solana and Mr. Patten have added energy and urgency to EU

efforts.

5. Finally, what is the role of the U.S. in shaping the future of Kosovo?

The U.S. was the heart of the Alliance war effort. For the long term, however,

it is the EU, as I noted above, which has the central role in ultimately stabilizing

the former Yugoslavia. But it can take quite a while to get to the long-term and

the U.S. remains essential for security and political purposes. The U.S. supplies only

15-20 percent of KFOR, but the continued presence of a significant American force

is needed to provide the assurance to the Kosovo Albanians that Serbian forces will

not simply be able one day to walk in and resume control. The presence of American

forces conveys a similar type message to any Serbian government.

Certainly until more progress is made in creating new self-sustaining political institutions in Kosovo and we see the impact of a post-Milosevic government in Belgrade, serious American forces will be required. While the bulk of the Western military presence will have to come from European countries, it would be a mistake to

simply consider this division a burden sharing problem.

The nature and role of our forces are also important—whether U.S. military efforts are narrowly confined or significantly robust and determined to get the job

done. I note that Kosovo Serbs have complained a few days ago that British forces

do a better job of providing protection to Serbs than American ones. I think the way

our forces are being used in Kosovo is worth serious review.

There is, moreover, an important political purpose served by the continuing presence of U.S. forces in Kosovo, namely a stronger voice in determining Alliance strategy in the Balkans, where we have a major investment and interests and values

to protect. The U.S., to its credit, is an important catalytic element, particularly in

the Balkans; it needs to remain involved in working to avoid backsliding so that we

do not fall into repeating our past experience with Kosovo, and that we do what is

necessary to insure that the Alliance maintains a sufficiently strong posture in

Kosovo, and indeed the whole of the former Yugoslavia, so that we will be successful, rather than doing just enough to falter and create uncertainty and further instability.

And in this regard I must express some concern as to our involvement in the nonmilitary aspects of the Kosovo problem. An Albanian friend has commented that the

U.S. won the war and seems to have disappeared from Kosovo. In helping make

things happen in Kosovo, in the vital task of building a civil society the U.S. government seems to be largely absent. I am sure you will get a catalogue of all the U.S.

government is doing in Kosovo if you ask the question, but, I believe, it is another

subject worth seriously looking at in detail.

23

Let me close by saying that in Western Europe in the 1940’s our exit strategy in

war and peace was to be successful. If you need an exit strategy for Kosovo I suggest that is also the most fitting one.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Dr. Williams.

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL R. WILLIAMS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. WILLIAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear before the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss American efforts to build peace in Kosovo and

throughout the former Yugoslavia.

I am particularly grateful to appear before this body, as many of

its members have a long and active role in seeking to ensure a coherent American policy that promotes America’s moral interest in

human rights and human dignity in the former Yugoslavia while

also protecting America’s strategic interest in a stable Europe, a

democratic Balkan region, and the preservation of American military capability and readiness.

Before I begin my testimony, I should mention by way of background that I served as an advisor to the Kosovo Albanian delegation during the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations and to the Bosnian

delegation during the Dayton negotiations, and previously served

as a lawyer with the Department of State’s Office of Legal Adviser

for European Affairs.

Let me now turn to a summary of the substance of my written

testimony, which I would like to submit for the record. I have entitled it, ‘‘Winning the Peace in Kosovo, Time to Formulate a Strategy.’’

To win the peace in Kosovo the United States must articulate a

clear and attainable objective and develop and pursue a coherent

strategy. To date, the United States has not articulated a meaningful objective and has pursued only a tactical approach to the crisis

in Kosovo and to the broader crisis in the former Yugoslavia. If this

vacuum of strategic policy continues, the United States will be unable to extricate its military forces from either Bosnia or Kosovo in

the foreseeable future, and will find itself confronted with perpetual conflict and crises, as it has for the past decade in this region.

Although some American officials have proclaimed an objective of

integrating the Balkan region into the economic and democratic

structure of Europe, no official has articulated a clear and realistically attainable objective for Kosovo beyond securing the peace.

Rather, they have pursued a policy of intentional ambiguity on important matters such as the final status of Kosovo.

Consistent with this policy, the American Government has pursued only a tactical approach of addressing the consequences of the

conflict, such as promoting the return of refugees, reconstructing

homes, drafting legal codes, repairing the electrical grid, and getting children back to school. While necessary first aid, these actions

are not sufficient to heal the wounds of the conflict, or to prevent

further conflict.

24

Importantly, the American Government has deployed over 5,000

military personnel to support this Band-Aid approach in Kosovo. At

no time, however, not even during the debate over the Byrd-Warner amendment, has the U.S. Government publicly articulated the

overall strategy which the deployment of American troops is designed to support.

This purely tactical approach represents a failure to learn the

lessons of the Bosnia conflict, where the absence of a strategic policy has cost the United States billions of dollars and tens of thousands of military man-hours. The results of this effort have been

that only a fraction of the refugees have returned to their homes,

while Serb nationalists still exercise significant, if not determinative, political influence in the Republic of Srpska which they use

to prevent the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

One reason why the U.S. Government has been unable to move

beyond the tactical approach is that since the origination of the

conflict American policy has revolved around accommodating the

interests of Slobodan Milosevic, and now that he has been indicted

for crimes against humanity by the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal,

he can no longer be relied upon as our partner in peace.

As a result, rather than now crafting an aggressive strategy to

confront Milosevic and deny him the fruits of ethnic aggression,

American diplomats have developed a passive shadow strategy of

waiting for a democratic transformation in Serbia to remove Mr.

Milosevic.

In formulating a clear and obtainable objective for U.S. policy, it

is necessary to assess the costs of losing the peace, assess the

causes of the conflict, and understand the requirements for further

peace-building. The consequence of losing the peace in Kosovo will

be a politically radical Kosovo population, devoid of Serbian or

other minorities, which is, de facto if not de jure, partitioned along

the Mitrovica fault line, leaving the Kosovo Albanian controlled territory to seek unification with Albania and/or the Albanian areas

of Macedonia.

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. What do you mean by

losing? Does your little scenario mean that there are no NATO

forces any longer in Kosovo?

Dr. WILLIAMS. It means failing to win the peace, withdrawal of

NATO forces, and the failure to democratize properly within

Kosovo.

Senator BIDEN. You think that this would result in the Kosovars

in control of Kosovo? Good luck.

Dr. WILLIAMS. Well, on a good day.

Senator BIDEN. They would last about a day.

Dr. WILLIAMS. I did not want to be too pessimistic, but I will get

to that more pessimistic part in a few moments.

The Kosovo crisis is largely the result of the failure to win the

peace in Bosnia, the failure to politically confront Milosevic before

the use of force becomes necessary, and the failure to ensure equal

protection of rights and the security of Albanian and Serbian ethnic

groups.

Now, to create the circumstances necessary for winning the peace

in Kosovo, the United States must immediately undertake a process for determining the final status in Kosovo. The approach of deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67874 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
25

laying the resolution of Kosovo’s final status in hopes of a nearterm democratic transition in Serbia is flawed, as either Mr.

Milosevic will be replaced by a strong nationalistic force that would

pursue a similar or even more aggressive policy toward Kosovo.

And when over time a more democratic force will come to power,

it will be unlikely to cope with the responsibilities and burdens of

addressing the Kosovo crisis as well as the multitude of other tasks

that will confront them as they try to politically and economically

reconstruct Serbia. In fact, Mr. Milosevic and not the democratic

opposition should be held politically accountable for Serbia’s inevitable loss of Kosovo.

The second important element is to exercise American leadership

to coordinate and to constrain the actions of our allies, in particular

the French, who seem to have embarked upon a separate policy of

engagement with Kosovo Serbian political forces based on the principal of maintaining peace through the accommodation of hard-line

local Serbian interests, which we know are directed from Belgrade.

It is also necessary for the United States to take the lead in containing the influence of Russia.

To win the peace in Kosovo, the American objective should be to

create an economically and politically self-sufficient multi-ethnic

Kosovo capable of defending itself against possible further acts of

Serbian State-sponsored ethnic aggression.

In return, this entity must protect the rights of minority populations resident on its territory and act responsibly toward its

neighbors. The strategy for accomplishing this objective should be

for the United States, supported by its allies, to manage a process

of intermediate sovereignty and earned independence for the people

of Kosovo.

This process would entail arrangements whereby the people of

Kosovo for a period of 3 to 5 years would be entitled to exercise

specified sovereign rights while under the continuing mandate of

Resolution 1244, and undertake certain essential political commitments. After this period, Kosovo would be entitled, subject to an

internationally conducted referendum within Kosovo, to seek recognition from the international community.

During the interim period, the people of Kosovo would exercise,

in cooperation with UNMIK, complete legislative, executive, and judicial control over their internal affairs. The people of Kosovo

would also be entitled to begin to conduct their own international

affairs, and to appoint international representatives.

In exchange for the exercise of these sovereign rights, Kosovo

would be required to implement specific guarantees that it would

protect the rights of all minority populations within its territory,

respect the territorial integrity of neighboring states such as Macedonia and Albania, and accept its borders as confirmed by the

1974 Yugoslav constitution. Compliance with these obligations

should be measured and assessed by an independent international

entity.

At the end of this interim period, the criteria for recognition of

Kosovo would be based upon an assessment of the fulfillment of

these commitments. If recognized by the international community,

Kosovo would remain bound by these commitments.

26

Now, as the most recent crisis in Kosovo is but a continuation

of the Yugoslav crisis begun in 1991, it is also necessary to establish objectives and strategies for winning the peace throughout the

territory of the former Yugoslavia, which I go into in more detail

in my written testimony. To win back the peace in Bosnia it is necessary to acknowledge the nature of the Dayton Accords as a

flawed peace agreement and either renegotiate or evolve these accords in a manner which deconstructs the resulting institutions

and attributes of Milosevic’s efforts to partition Bosnia.

To prevent the conflict in Montenegro, it is necessary to demonstrate tangible benefits to democracy on a political path separate

from that of Serbia. Montenegro must be provided with security

guarantees, and Serbia must be confronted with clear warnings of

economic and political sanctions in the event it sponsors a coup or

other covert action in Montenegro. Moreover, Montenegro must be

engaged in the Kosovo peace-building process.

To win the conflict in Serbia, it is necessary to promote a democratic transition beyond the current institutionalized political opposition. This will require a series of transitions. The Yugoslav tribunal’s indictment of the top leadership should be maximally utilized

to delegitimize and discredit the current nationalist regime, and

America should lead its allies in isolating Milosevic and his accomplices.

America should make clear that Serbia will be barred from international assistance until Milosevic is not only removed from power,

but also surrendered to The Hague.

In conclusion, the lack of a strategic policy for bringing a lasting

peace to Yugoslavia has resulted in hundreds of thousands of

deaths, the displacement of over a million refugees, the degradation of United States and NATO military forces, diplomatic strains

within the American-European alliance, and a diversion of resources and attention from other areas of strategic importance.

Unless the United States wishes to create a permanent peacekeeping force in the region, it must develop an aggressive strategy

for each zone of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. For Kosovo, that

policy should be one of intermediate sovereignty and earned independence.

I thank the members of the committee for this opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Williams follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL R. WILLIAMS

WINNING THE PEACE IN KOSOVO: TIME TO FORMULATE A STRATEGY

It is an honor to appear before members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss American efforts to build peace in Kosovo and throughout the

former Yugoslavia. I am particularly grateful to appear before this body as many

of its members have taken an active role in seeking to ensure a coherent American

policy which promotes America’s moral interest in human rights and human dignity,

while also protecting America’s strategic interest in a stable Europe, a democratic

Balkan region, and the preservation of American military capability and readiness.

Before I begin my testimony I should mention by way of background that I served

as an advisor to the Kosovo Albanian delegation in Rambouillet and Paris, and as

an advisor to the Bosnian government delegation to the Dayton negotiations. I have

also advised the government of Macedonia on matters relating to the conflict. Earlier in my career, during the initial development of America’s response to the conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67874 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
27

flict in the former Yugoslavia, I served with the Department of State as a lawyer

for the Office of European and Canadian Affairs.

Let me now turn to the substance of my testimony, which I have submitted for

the record.

To win the peace in Kosovo the United States must articulate a clear and attainable objective and develop and pursue a coherent strategy. To date, the U.S. Government has not articulated a meaningful objective, and has pursued only a tactical

approach to the crisis in Kosovo, and to the broader crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

If this vacuum of strategic policy continues, the United States will be unable to extricate its military forces from either Bosnia or Kosova in the foreseeable future and

will find itself confronted with perpetual conflict and crises in the region.

To win the peace in Kosovo the American objective should be to create an economically and politically self-sufficient multi-ethnic Kosovo capable of defending

itself against possible further acts of Serbian state sponsored ethnic aggression. In

return this entity must protect the rights of minority populations resident on its territory and act responsibly toward its neighbors. The strategy for accomplishing this

objective should be for the U.S., supported by its allies, to manage a process of intermediate sovereignty and earned independence for the people of Kosovo.

As the most recent crisis in Kosovo is but a continuation of the Yugoslav crisis

begun in 1991, it is also necessary to establish objectives and strategies for winning

the peace throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

THE CURRENT TACTICAL APPROACH TO WINNING THE PEACE

Addressing the Consequences of the Conflict, While Failing to Address the Causes

Although some American officials have proclaimed an objective of integrating the

Balkan region into the economic and democratic structure of Europe, no official has

articulated a clear and realistically attainable objective for Kosovo or for the region

of the former Yugoslavia, beyond ‘‘securing the peace.’’ 1

Moreover, while American officials have declared their intent to promote vague

principles of democracy, security, human rights, economic development, and have

discussed a second Marshall Plan or a reapplication of the ‘‘states in transition’’ approach to the northern tier of Central and Eastern Europe, they have not articulated concrete objectives tailored to the specific circumstances of the former Yugoslavia.2

Rather, the American Government has pursued a tactical approach of addressing

the consequences and not the causes of the conflict, which include promoting the

return of refugees, reconstructing homes, drafting legal codes, repairing the electrical grid and getting children back to school.3 More generally, the approach has

included efforts to build ‘‘civil society,’’ arrange elections, provide security and revitalize the economy.4 The success of this policy has been defined in terms of a reduced homicide rate, pledges for international, funding, and an increasing number

of international personnel deployed to the region.5

The American Government has also deployed over 5,000 military personnel to

support its tactical efforts in Kosovo. At no time, however, has the U.S. Government

articulated the overall strategy which these tactical efforts, or which the deployment

of American troops is designed to support, or has it demonstrated how the tactical

efforts and the actions of the military forces are interrelated as part of a larger plan.

While necessary to repair and redress the consequences of the Kosovo conflict, the

tactical efforts currently pursued by the U.S. Government, absent a strategic approach, are insufficient to build the foundation for a lasting peace in Kosovo or the

former Yugoslavia. Even if the U.S. successfully restores electricity, reconstitutes

the police force, redrafts the school curriculum and trains an impartial judiciary, the

U.S. still will not have resolved the underlying causes of the conflict, which emanate

from Belgrade and have become deeply rooted in the Kosovo political context. To

win the peace it is necessary to address the fact that the primary cause of the conflict and the continued instability in the region is the use of ethnic aggression and

political oppression by Milosevic’s Serbian nationalist regime as a means of perpetuating its political power.

Failing to Learn the Lessons of Bosnia

In fact, if pursued in a policy vacuum, even these limited tactical objectives are

unlikely to be met. In the case of Bosnia, the absence of a strategic approach has

meant that despite billions of dollars in international assistance and tens of thousands of military man-hours few Bosniac refugees have been able to return to their

homes in Serb controlled Republika Srpska; there is only the most minimal freedom

of movement across the inter-entity boundary line; Serb nationalists still exercise

significant if not determinative political influence in the Republika Srpska; the

28

Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian central government are politically gridlocked along ethnic lines; the economy continues to teeter on the brink of collapse;

and the Bosniac political community has become polarized.6

More importantly, the rush to pursue tactical objectives on their own is likely to

undermine the prospects for a meaningful peace, as has been the case in Bosnia.

For instance, in an effort to demonstrate movement toward the tactical objectives

of the Dayton Accords the U.S. Government essentially directed the OSCE to hold

elections even though the circumstances all but precluded the possibility of free and

fair elections. After 104% of the population voted, the OSCE, again under pressure

from the U.S. Government, declared these elections to have been substantially free

and fair.7 As a result, hard-line Serbian representatives took up power in the

Republika Srpska institutions and the Serbian section of the Bosnian parliament,

and Momcilo Krajisnik was elected as the Serb representative to the Bosnian Presidency. From this vantage point, and. with support in the Bosnian parliament and

the Republika Srpska, Mr. Krajisnik continued to pursue the policy of a de facto

partition of Bosnia and ethnic segregation which he had orchestrated during the

campaign of ethnic aggression. After completing his term, Mr. Krajisnik was indicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal for crimes of genocide which he had committed

prior to being elected to the Bosnian Presidency.

The continued absence of a strategic policy for Bosnia has created conditions

where even just this last May an Italian military contingent assigned to provide security to a convoy of Bosniac women returning to visit graves in Bratunac stood by

while Serb protesters stoned the Bosniac women in their care. Moreover, growing

weary of the inability of international efforts to secure their return home, increasing

numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons are engaging in spontaneous

returns. Even then, the international community is only capable of providing reconstruction assistance to approximately 10 percent of these returnees.8

Affirmatively Declining to Formulate or Declare a Strategy

As a consequence of the absence of a strategic approach to the Kosovo crisis, and

in light of concerns about the proper use of U.S. military forces and the extent of

European financial and military commitments, Senators Byrd and Warner recently

unsuccessfully sought to insert a provision into the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001. This provision would have terminated funding for the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the

President sought and received congressional authorization to continue such deployment.9 A similar measure was adopted by the House.

Notably, during the debate over the Byrd-Warner provision the Executive Branch

objected to the withdrawal of American troops on the grounds that a number of negative consequences would occur, including straining our relations with our European

allies, undermining the effectiveness of NATO and usurping the constitutional authority of the Executive Branch. At no time, however, did the Executive branch offer

an affirmative public explanation as to what purpose the troops were serving in

Kosovo, beyond that of ‘‘providing security.’’ Notably, the Executive branch failed to

articulate the specific policy which required that the troops be placed in harms way,

or to establish a standard by which the success of the mission could be measured

and American troops withdrawn. In fact, according to a recent International Crisis

Group report, the primary mission of American forces in Kosovo is ‘‘force protection,’’ 10 which is to say that the American military forces in Kosovo are there to

protect the American military forces in Kosovo. Such a state of affairs could only

occur in a policy vacuum.

Failing to Aggressively Delegitimize Slobodan Milosevic

One reason why the U.S. Government is unable to move beyond a tactical approach is that since the origination of the conflict, and particularly during the Dayton negotiations and the run-up to the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, American

policy revolved around accommodating the interests of Slobodan Milosevic. Now that

Mr. Milosevic has been indicted for crimes against humanity by the Yugoslav Tribunal, he can no longer be relied upon as America’s partner in peace and the American Government has found it difficult to formulate an alternative strategy.11

Thus, rather than crafting a strategy to confront Milosevic and deny him the

fruits of ethnic aggression, American diplomats have developed a passive shadow

strategy of waiting for a democratic transformation in Serbia to remove Milosevic.12

It should be recalled, however, that much of the current institutionalized ‘‘democratic opposition’’ is based on Milosevic’s failure to achieve his nationalist agenda

or on the negative consequences experienced by Serbia, but not necessarily on opposition to his ideas of ethnic supremacy or notions of a greater Serbia.

29

CRAFTING AN APPROACH TO WINNING THE PEACE: SETTING AN OBJECTIVE AND

FORMULATING A STRATEGY

In formulating a clear and attainable objective for U.S. policy there are three important steps to undertake. The first is to assess the costs of losing the peace in

Kosovo, the second is to assess the larger geopolitical context of the conflict, and

the third is to assess the causes of the conflict and the requirements of further

peacebuilding.

The Costs of Losing the Peace in Kosovo

A lost bid to win the peace in Kosovo will:

Undermine the pluralistic and moderate political forces, which understand

the necessity of maintaining an ethnically diverse Kosovo and ensuring the protection of minority rights;

Strengthen less moderate elements of the majority population, which are

more inclined to act with hostility toward minority groups in a manner designed

to promote their emigration and displacement;

Negate international efforts to provide meaningful physical security and a

sense of rightful participation in the political or economic future of a unified

Kosovo;

Enhance the international legitimacy and likelihood of achieving Slobodan

Milosevic’s plan for a partition of Kosovo;

Legitimize the Kosovo Albanian interest in creating a larger territorial entity,

which might include portions of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro;

Contribute to further conflict in the former Yugoslavia just as the mismanaged peace in Bosnia significantly contributed to Milosevic’s calculation to

undertake ethnic warfare in Kosovo.

In sum, the consequence of losing the peace in Kosovo will be a politically radical

Kosovo population, devoid of Serbian or other minorities, which is de facto if not de

jure partitioned along the Mitrovica fault line, leaving the Kosovo Albanian controlled territory to seek unification with Albania and/or the Albanian areas of Macedonia.

Understanding the Broader Geopolitical Context of the Kosovo Crisis

The crisis in Kosovo occurs within a broader geopolitical context of the former

Yugoslavia and the Balkan region.

When formulating an objective for American policy in Kosovo, it is necessary to

learn the lessons of our failed effort confront ethnic aggression in Bosnia, and how

our continuing refusal to reassess our Bosnian policy and renegotiate or further

evolve the substance of the Dayton Accords, inhibits our ability to develop a coherent Kosovo policy. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that our primary interlocutor, Slobodan Milosevic, is not a partner in peace, but a man indicted for crimes

against humanity, that the current Serbian regime has a distinct interest in its own

survival and is willing to invoke ethnic nationalism, and rely on totalitarian acts

by the military, secret police and paramilitaries to manipulate political outcomes.

The peace in Kosovo is thus linked to the reversal of political and territorial gains

achieved in Bosnia through ethnic aggression, the efforts of the Serbian people to

topple Milosevic’s nationalist regime, as well as to the efforts of Montenegro to chart

a democratic path separate from that of the Milosevic regime. The Kosovo peace is

also linked to political and economic stability in Albania and Macedonia and those

countries interpretations of American and European intentions.

Assessing the Causes of the Conflict and the Requirements of Further Peacebuilding

As we assess the causes of the conflict and the requirements for the creation of

political circumstances conducive to peacebuilding, we find that they are the same

issues which existed when the U.S. Government accepted the Holbrooke/Milosevic

Deal of October 1999 providing for the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission, and

which pre-occupied American efforts during the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations and

the drafting of UNSC Resolution 1244.

(1) The need to meaningfully protect the physical security, human rights and

property interests of all ethnic groups in Kosovo

Throughout Kosovo’s incorporation in the former Yugoslavia, the equal and fair

treatment of ethnic groups has been a major point of friction, whether it was the

treatment of the Serbian and other ethnic groups from 1974 to 1989, or the treatment of Kosovo Albanians from 1989 until the summer of 1999. To remove this issue

as a source of conflict will be difficult and will require both an incentive for the regionally and locally dominant ethnic groups to respect each others rights and ensure

30

their physical security. These efforts must be matched by aggressive KFOR actions

designed to ensure security for all groups.

(2) The need to meaningfully restructure the economy and promote economic

development

In Bosnia the international community has created an aid dependent economic

structure, and political institutions which are structurally incapable of exercising cogent control over the economy or raising economic revenue through fair taxes and

customs. To avoid a similar situation in Kosovo it is necessary to first return to the

Kosovo government the state owned property illegitimately transferred to Serbia

after 1989 and privatized to Milosevic’s supporters or to international entities—primarily located in Greece and Italy. It is also necessary to create an incentive for

long term investment by international concerns, and for long term planning by

Kosovo’s indigenous governing institutions. Importantly, the state operation or privatization of this industrial property could significantly enhance a Kosovo government’s financial resources separate from aid donations. Finally, it is necessary to

prevent the partition of Kosovo along the current defacto line of segregation running

through the industrial town of Mitrovica. KFOR’s removal of the Serbian Ministry

of Interior Forces serving as ‘‘Bridge Watchers’’ would be a constructive first step

in this process.

(3) The need to ascertain and articulate a final status for Kosovo which promotes regional security

Articulating a clear and workable process for settling on a final status for Kosovo

is essential to preventing further conflict and to promoting the political and economic progress discussed immediately above. Without a clear timetable for resolution of the final status issue, and without a clear objective toward which the people

of Kosovo can strive, there will be little incentive to protect minority rights, and

plan for long term economic growth.

Unfortunately, the U.S. Government has adopted only a short term policy which

calls for substantial autonomy under the interim regulation of the United Nations,13

and avoids discussions concerning determination of a final status. In fact, when

asked about plans for resolving the question of the final status of Kosovo, now

former Department of State Press Spokesman James Rubin summarized U.S. policy

as,

[UNSCR 1244] doesn’t envisage independence. What the resolution does

is say that this issue is to be determined pursuant to the same kind of process—and I think it refers to the Rambouillet Accords—in which the international community, the views of the people of Kosovo, will be taken into

account in some diplomatic process. That’s how we, the United States, see

the future unfolding; that, at the appropriate time, a conference or a meeting or discussion will be held in which all the relevant views can be considered and decisions can be considered. So that is our view.14

Delaying an initiation of a process for the resolution of the final status of Kosovo

plants the seeds of further, conflict, as the Contact Group did during the Dayton

negotiations when it failed to address the status of Kosovo while it held maximum

leverage over Milosevic.

The approach of delaying the resolution of Kosovo’s final status in the hopes of

a near term democratic transition in Serbia is flawed as either Milosevic will be replaced by strong nationalist forces that would pursue a similar or even more aggressive policy toward Kosovo. And, when over time more genuinely democratic forces

came to power, they would be unlikely to cope with the responsibilities and burdens

of addressing the Kosovo crisis as well as the multitude of other tasks that will confront them as they try to politically and economically reconstruct Serbia. In fact,

Milosevic and not the democratic opposition, should be held politically accountable

for Serbia’s inevitable loss of Kosovo.

Interestingly, American officials have indicated that they believe the Kosovars’ desire for independence will wane as they experience ‘‘genuine self-government’’ under

the interim U.N. administration.15 Such a development is unlikely given that even

the most moderate Kosovo Albanian political forces are calling for immediate independence.16 By acknowledging the Kosovo Albanians’ well founded desire for independence and structuring a process for establishing a final status, the U.S. Government would both reassure the Kosovo Albanian majority that they will not be pressured by the international community to return to Serbian rule, while also permitting the international community to demand responsible and accountable behavior

on the part of the Kosovo Albanian political leadership. The creation of such a process would also signal the Kosovo Serbs that they will have to choose between their

31

Serbian and Kosovar identities, thus facilitating individual decisions on whether to

reside in Kosovo.

(4) The need to create and maintain political cohesion and solidarity among

the Kosovo Albanian political forces, and to create a Serbian political force

separate from Milosevic’s control and manipulation

The regime of near-apartheid imposed upon the Kosovo Albanian population from

1989 predictably fragmented civil society. Moreover, the failure of the peaceful resistance to yield tangible results led to the militarization and in some instances the

radicalization of certain segments of society. This diversity of public views has become reflected in the institutions of political representation.

To move forward in building peace in Kosovo it is necessary to cultivate a process

whereby through political dialogue these divergent views and interests can be

brought together to form common consent on important political matters. During the

Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, the members of the Kosovo delegation demonstrated

the ability not only to make politically tough decisions, but also to operate by consensus. As in Bosnia, where recent international efforts to influence local elections have

polarized the Bosniac political forces, the U.S. and its European allies run the risk

of polarizing the Kosovo political forces and creating a situation where one can readily blame the victims for the failure to win the peace.

Similarly, by failing to confront the henchmen of the Serbian nationalist regime,

the international community may stunt the development of a responsible Serbian

political class by allowing Milosevic’s Ministry of Interior forces to dictate political

events, particularly in the strategic town of Mitrovica.

(5) The need to create a democratic governing regime based on majority rule

and minority rights

The former Yugoslav political system, which failed, was based on a series of ethnic representations and prerogatives. No other system like this existed in Europe.

During the Dayton negotiations, and again during the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations the Contact Group, led by the U.S., sought to recreate such a system for the

people of Bosnia and the people of Kosovo. While the Bosnians now suffer the consequences of institutionalized ethnic identity and political gridlock, the people of

Kosovo have been temporarily spared this fate. To create a healthy and functional

political system for Kosovo it will be necessary to create a system similar to those

throughout Western and Central Europe based on the principle of majority rule and

minority rights.

(6) The need to constructively engage and transform the militarized elements

of the Kosovo Albanian population

While the U.S. Government accurately asserts that the KLA has been demilitarized,17 certain more radical elements have not been constructively engaged or

transformed. Rather they have been directed into the police, Kosovo Protection

Corps and the political process. While this action disperses them throughout civil

society, it does not transform their beliefs or actions, but in fact provides them a

wider base from which to seek to accomplish their objectives. Importantly, most of

the members of the KLA or associated organizations are not radical—yet there appears to be no clear program of enhanced engagement for these more moderate elements demonstrate the political benefits of their more moderate approach. Rather,

the policy-makers are relying on KFOR to maintain security in the region, while

they simply demand that the moderate elements exercise control over the more radical elements.18

U.S. efforts thus should not be focused on the KLA as an institution, but rather

on members of the KLA who have become radicalize by the near-apartheid regime

of the 1990s and the atrocities committed in 1998 and 1999. Moreover, U.S. policy

should remove the public attraction to these radicals by moving to actively address

the question of Kosovo’s ability to carry out its own self-defense upon the withdrawal of NATO forces. To accomplish this objective America should lead efforts to

create a Kosovo Defense Corps. The creation of such a Corps would also serve as

a key element of an exit strategy for American military forces.

(7) The need for American leadership to coordinate and constrain the actions

of our allies, and to moderate the influence of Russia

While the United States has sought to promote cooperation among our allies

through various multilateral mechanisms,19 our European allies have been at the

forefront of efforts to remove or weaken the sanctions against the Belgrade regime,

while allies such as Argentina, Australia and Mexico have undermined American efforts to isolate Milosevic by permitting their Ambassadors to meet with Milosevic

32

personally to establish full diplomatic relations. Moreover, numerous Chinese,

Greek, Nigerian, and Russian officials have met with Milosevic and other indicted

war criminals in Serbia. These allies and partners in our peace effort bolster the

interests of such states as Cuba, Iraq, Libya and Syria (all of which maintain full

diplomatic relations with Serbia) in undermining U.S. policy in the Balkan region.

Most troubling is the fact that our French allies seem to have embarked on a separate policy of engagement with Kosovo Serbian political forces which is based on

the principle of maintaining peace through the accommodation of hard-line local

Serbian interests—which are dictated by Milosevic’s nationalist regime in Belgrade.

Under these circumstances it is imperative that the U.S. assert its leadership role

in the international efforts to bring lasting peace to the territory of the former Yugoslavia as absent such leadership our European allies are incapable of maintaining

a united or coherent front in the face of either Milosevic or a resurgent Russia.

In light of the risks of losing the peace, the geopolitical context of the conflict, and

the above assessment of the causes of the conflict and circumstances necessary for

peacebuilding, the American policy objective should be to create an economically and

politically self-sufficient Kosovo entity capable of defending itself against possible

further acts of Serbian state sponsored ethnic aggression, and which protects the

rights of minority populations resident on its territory and acts responsibly toward

its neighbors. To accomplish this objective the U.S., supported by its allies, must

manage a process of intermediate sovereignty and earned independence for the people of Kosovo.

IMPLEMENTING INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY AND EARNED INDEPENDENCE

The status of intermediate sovereignty and the process of earned independence

would entail arrangements whereby the people of Kosovo would for a period of three

to five years be entitled to exercise specified sovereign rights, while under the continuing mandate of resolution 1244, and undertake certain essential political commitments. After this period, Kosovo would be entitled, subject to an internationally

conducted referendum within Kosovo, to seek recognition from the international

community.

During the interim period, the people of Kosovo would exercise, in cooperation

with UNMIK, complete legislative, executive and judicial control over their internal

affairs relating to economic development, internal security, education, taxation, extraction and processing of natural resources, transportation, health care, media and

news broadcasting, cultural development, and the protection of minority rights. The

people of Kosovo would also be entitled to begin to conduct their own international

affairs and appoint international representatives.

In exchange for the exercise of these sovereign rights, Kosovo would be required

to implement specific guarantees that it would protect the rights of all minority populations within its territory, respect the territorial integrity of neighboring states

such as Macedonia and Albania, renounce any intention of political or territorial association with Albania, and accept its borders as confirmed by the 1974 Yugoslav

Constitution. Compliance with these obligations should be measured and assessed

by an independent international entity. While UNMIK should be consulted as to its

assessment of Kosovo’s compliance its efforts must remain focused on the tactical

objectives set out in resolution 1244.

At the end of this interim period the criteria for recognition of Kosovo would include the traditional legal criteria of territory, population, government and capacity

to conduct international relations, as well as the additional political criteria of

whether it had protected the rights of minority populations within its territory, respected the territorial integrity of Macedonia and Albania, rejected any political or

territorial association with Albania, and maintained the status of its borders. Once

recognized by the international community, Kosovo would remain bound by these

commitments.

This approach to winning the peace in Kosovo is based on principles of international law, which provide that all self-identified groups with a coherent identity

and connection to a defined territory are entitled to collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic fashion, and to be free from systematic persecution.

In cases where self-identified groups were effectively denied their right to democratic self-government, and are consequently subjected to gross violations of their

human rights, as has been the case with Kosovo, they are entitled to seek their own

international status in order to ensure the protection of those rights.

The case for intermediate sovereignty is further supported by: (1) the legal and

factual similarity between Kosovo and the other Republics of the former Yugoslavia

that were deemed by the international community to be entitled to international

recognition; (2) the legal precedent of earned recognition established by the interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67874 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
33

national community in recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; (3) the fact that Yugoslavia has dissolved, and the international community

has rejected Serbia/Montenegro’s claim to continue its international legal personality; (4) the historic fact that Kosovo, while legitimately part of Yugoslavia, has

never been legitimately incorporated into Serbia; (5) the fact that the people of

Kosovo have been subjected to ethnic aggression; and (6) recent precedent set by the

Northern Ireland Peace Agreement and others.

SECURING THE PEACE IN KOSOVO BY WINNING THE PEACE THROUGHOUT THE FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA

To win the peace in Kosovo it is necessary to recognize that the recent crisis in

Kosovo is but a continuation of the Yugoslav crisis which began in 1991. As such,

it is necessary to link the peace efforts in Kosovo to those in the other former Yugoslav Republics, and in particular to establish objectives and strategies for winning

the peace throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

To secure the peace in Croatia, it is necessary to continue to work with the new

government and the Yugoslav Tribunal to ensure the indictment and transfer to the

Hague of all high level officials responsible for war crimes against Serb and Bosniac

populations. It is further necessary to provide the new Croatian government with

the political support, and when necessary political pressure, to severe the political

and financial links between Croatia and Bosnian Croat political forces which continue to harbor an interest in a partitioned Bosnia.

To win back the peace in Bosnia it is necessary to acknowledge the nature of the

Dayton accords as a flawed peace resulting from America’s failure to seriously confront Slobodan Milosevic or to truncate and roll back political gains, achieved

through ethnic aggression. This effort must involve a three phase process. First, the

U.S. Government must discontinue its policy of moral equivalence and equal blame

among the parties, which undermines its efforts to constructively engage Bosniac

and certain Croat forces in the peacebuilding process. Second, the U.S. Government

must acknowledge the Dayton agreement was never meant to be static, but rather

that it was designed and intended to evolve with changing political circumstances.

And third, the U.S. Government must seek to evolve the Dayton agreement in a

manner which deconstructs the resulting institutions and attributes of Milosevic’s

efforts to partition Bosnia along ethnic lines, including the gradual erasure of the

inter-entity boundary line, the removal of the institutionalized ethnic veto, and the

dissolution of most of the Republika Srpska political institutions—which are regularly used to organize actions which undermine or inhibit the reintegration of Bosnia.

To prevent conflict in Montenegro it is necessary to demonstrate tangible benefits

to democracy and a political path separate from that of Serbia.20 Montenegro must

be provided security guarantees and Serbia must be confronted with clear warnings

of economic and political sanctions in the event it sponsors a coup or other covert

action in Montenegro.21 Moreover, Montenegro must be engaged in the Kosovo

peacebuilding process.

To secure the peace in Macedonia it is necessary to ensure continued economic

growth and the resolution of outstanding political disputes with Greece. Most important is the need to further integrate the Macedonian Albanian population into Macedonia’s political and economic infrastructure.

To win the conflict in Serbia and silence the engine of aggression in the former

Yugoslavia it is necessary to promote a democratic transition beyond the current institutionalized political opposition. This will require a series of transitions, with the

first likely including members of the current opposition, but with subsequent governments including more genuinely moderate elements that accurately reflect the

views of the oppressed and silenced mainstream population committed to a regionally responsible Serbia—such as the ones currently driving the Otpor student movement. The Yugoslav Tribunal’s indictment of the top leadership should be maximally

utilized to delegitimze and discredit the current nationalist regime, and America

should lead its allies in isolating Milosevic and his accomplices.

CONCLUSION

The lack of a strategic policy for bringing a lasting peace to Yugoslavia has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, the displacement of over a million refugees, the degradation of U.S. and NATO military forces, diplomatic strains within

the American-European alliance, and a diversion of resources and attention from

other areas of strategic importance.

34

Unless the U.S. wishes to create a permanent peacekeeping presence in the region

it must develop an aggressive strategy for each zone of conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

For Kosovo, the United States should pursue a policy of intermediate sovereignty

and earned independence as this provides the best possible means for ensuring the

long-term security of the Kosovo Albanian population, and for creating a meaningful

incentive for the Kosovo Albanian political forces to ensure the protection of Serbian

rights and security. Such an approach will also permit the U.S. to undertake a

phased withdrawal of its troops over a reasonable period of time as the security of

Kosovo increases and as the rights of minorities are increasingly safeguarded.

ENDNOTES

1Madeleine Albright, Our Stake in Kosovo, The New York Times, (March 28, 2000).

2 Anthony E. Wayne, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, (August

4, 1999); Larry Napper, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, (August

4, 1999). 3 James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International Relations Committee, (April

11, 2000); William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to the Students, Organization Leaders

and Community Leaders of the Ferizaj (Urosevac) Area, Kosovo, (November 23, 1999); James

W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International Relations Committee, (August 4,

1999). 4Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks at European Institute Awards Dinner, (January 26, 2000).

The most concise statement of a U.S. policy with respect to Kosovo is, ‘‘The United States and

our European allies are committed to winning the peace in Kosovo by: addressing humanitarian

needs and preparing for winter; easing ethnic tensions and protecting minority rights; and

strengthening democracy and supporting civil society.’’ The White House, Fact Sheet: Winning

the Peace in Kosovo: A Progress Report, (November 23, 1999). 5Madeleine Albright, Our Stake in Kosovo, The New York Times, (March 28, 2000); James

P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, (March 22, 2000). 6For a more detailed account of the failure of Dayton implementation, see Is Dayton Failing?:

Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement, Report of the International Crisis Group, (October 28, 1999). 7For a more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the Bosnian elections, see

Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report of the International Crisis Group, (September 9,

1996); Why the Bosnian Elections Must be Postponed, Report of the International Crisis Group,

(August 14, 1996). 8 Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International Community Ready?, Report of the

International Crisis Group (May 30, 2000). 9The proposed amendment further directed the President to develop a plan for turning over

peacekeeping efforts to the Europeans by July 1, 2001. 10Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, Report of the International Crisis

Group, (May, 31, 2000). 11 As concisely articulated by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, U.S. policy has been, ‘‘You can’t

make peace without President Milosevic.’’ Jurek Martin, Holbrooke Sees ‘‘Tough Slog’’ to Peace

in Bosnia, Financial Times (London), (November 2, 1995). 12 Anthony E. Wayne, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999). 13 James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International Relations Committee,

(April 11, 2000). 14 James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, (April 21, 2000). 15Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks and Q&A Session with the Council on Foreign Relations,

(June 28, 1999). 16See, James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, (April 21, 2000). 17 James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House International Relations Committee,

(April 11, 2000). 18 James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, (March 16, 2000). 19 Anthony E. Wayne, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999). 20To date, the U.S. Government has provided benefits only in the form of financial and technical assistance in the amount of $25 million, with limited observer status in some of the regional political cooperation mechanisms. See James W. Pardew Jr., Statement before the House

International Relations Committee, (August 4, 1999). 21To date, the U.S. Government has refused to provide any express security guarantees for

Montenegro. Rather it has engaged in vague statements concerning American interests in Montenegro—similar to those which preceded the ethnic aggression in Kosovo in 1998. See, James

P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, (March 22, 2000).

Senator SMITH. That is excellent testimony as well.

Mr. Bugajski.

35

STATEMENT OF MR. JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR, EASTERN

EUROPE PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting

me today to speak on Kosovo, past, present, and future. It is an

honor to be here. I would simply summarize my written statement,

which is deliberately concise to begin with, and so I am going to

be very brief.

Let me just say that since the liberation and occupation of

Kosovo by NATO forces in June 1999, a year ago, both constructive

and negative developments have been evident on the territory as

a result of both internal factors and external factors.

Let me just point out some of the positives that we mentioned

already, but I think it is worth underscoring. On the security side,

Kosovo has witnessed the expulsion of repressive Serb security

forces, and the successful return of over 1 million Kosovar Albanian

refugees. NATO, despite some of the security concerns vis-a-vis the

minority groups, is effectively safeguarding the territory from

Yugoslav or Serbian military reintervention.

Second, on the reconstruction side, some basic reconstruction

work has been accomplished, especially in providing shelter, food,

medical aid, and other services to the destitute. Some initiatives

have begun in encouraging development of small businesses and in

identifying key infrastructural projects over the coming years. Efforts are also underway to rebuild the educational system, the

health care system, the energy network, and public administration.

This is all to the good. However, what I would like to focus on

are the shortcomings, and I think there are four major shortcomings with the U.N. mandate and with our operation there.

First, I would call it political paralysis. There is currently no legitimate Kosovar Albanian authority, and this contributes to paralyzing and polarizing the development of political institutions. The

creation of a Kosovar Advisory Council under the supervision of

U.N. Special Representative Bernard Kouchner has not filled the

political vacuum.

Second, criminality and corruption threaten the security of residents. They perpetuate the climate of revenge against minority

Serbs and undermine the emergence of a democratic system. In addition, Milosevic’s special security forces and paramilitaries sometimes in plain clothes continue to operate in Kosovo, deliberately

provoking violence to discredit international institutions, to undermine the longevity of the NATO mission, and to discount any realistic possibility of Kosovar self-government.

Third, international failures. I would say Kosovo has witnessed

a number of institutional shortcomings by international agencies.

For example, lack of serious reconstruction resources, insufficient

number of international police officers, turf battles between international organizations, and the creation of deliberative councils

without any ultimate authority or decisionmaking power.

There have also been persistent delays in training and deploying

an indigenous police force and establishing a credible and professional judiciary system that could enforce law and order on the territory.

36

Fourth, and I think the most important failing, and it has been

mentioned already, but again is worth underscoring, is the lack of

final legal status for Kosovo as an independent state. Western leaders still believe that postponing the decision on Kosovo’s status will

allow for democratic changes to take place inside Serbia and enable

some new relationship to emerge between Serbia and Kosovo.

In the interim, and regardless of whether such a rosy scenario

actually materializes, NATO may be faced with escalating anger

amongst the Albanian community if the United Nations insists on

preserving Kosovo within Serbia. As we know, the vast majority of

Albanians support statehood, irrespective of any possible leadership changes, or regime changes in Belgrade.

For the indefinite future, Kosovo it looks will remain an international ward without any inspiring vision for its future status, but

such a scenario has raised, I believe, serious questions about the

self-determination of Kosovo’s population and the instabilities that

could be generated by any planned reintegration into Serbia.

Indeed, I would say a valid argument can be made that in order

to avoid future destabilization or permanent dependency on outside

agencies self-determination and independence for Kosovo should be

the primary objective of international leaders.

Such a step could have several positive ramifications. First, it

would restore Kosovar confidence in the international community

and help preclude potential radicalization of Albanian politics as

long-term ambiguity on the status question can undermine the

democrats and favor the demagogues.

Most policymakers unfortunately still adhere to the conventional

wisdom that an independent Kosovo would destabilize the Balkans.

In reality, it seems to me it is the forcible maintenance of Yugoslavia in which we are now ready accomplices that continues to

generate instability.

Second, protection. Acceptance of future independence can undercut the threat of a new Serbian takeover by delegitimizing Belgrade’s incessant provocations on the territory. Additionally, criteria and timetables for a democratic independent state will give

both the internationalists and the locals a concrete goal to which

political, institutional, and economic reconstruction can be directed.

And third, Kosovo’s statehood can also help resolve the wider Albanian question in the Balkans. I believe instead of provoking calls

for a greater Albania which we keep hearing, such a step could actually pacify the more radical Albanian demands, allow Europe to

increase its positive influences by dealing with Kosovo as a country

in its own right, and delegitimize any potential threat to Macedonian or Montenegran territory.

Over the coming year I believe the international community

needs to focus attention on two overriding questions in Kosovo, political legitimacy and international dependency. First, political legitimacy. In line with the resolution of its status question, Kosovo

will need a new indigenous constitution that can help concentrate

political energy, give credence to legality, and provide a more solid

basis for democratic development.

All major political players in Kosovo evidently support such an

approach, as it would create the foundations of statehood. The organs of government, including the constitutional assembly, would

37

then acquire the confidence of the public and the commitment of

all major political leaders.

Second, international dependence. A dependency relationship has

emerged between the Kosovars and international institutions. That

may become more difficult to overcome the longer the current stalemate exists. Moreover, I believe such a relationship could seriously

threaten the development of indigenous institutions and democratic

procedures.

To counter such a phenomenon, a comprehensive election process

for both local and national elections is essential through a campaign of voter registration, political party development, and civic

education, and here I think the United States can play a major

role. This could help establish structure, legitimacy, and authority

for elected Kosovar leaders. Local and central Kosovar authorities

must then obtain the authority and resources to govern, and not

simply to consult with international agencies.

Above all, I believe there needs to be clarity as to the powers of

the proposed local and central government, its relationship with

the interim U.N. authorities, and its independence from the Serbian and/or Yugoslav regime.

Thank you very much. That concludes my summary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI

KOSOVA: ONE YEAR LATER

Since the liberation and occupation of Kosova by NATO forces in June 1999, both

constructive and destructive developments have been evident on the territory as a

result of internal and external factors. On the positive side:

• Security: Kosova has witnessed the expulsion of repressive Serb security forces

and the successful return of over a million Kosova Albanian refugees and displaced persons to their homes. Under the United Nations Mission in Kosova

(UNMIK), NATO established a Kosova Force (K-FOR) consisting of approximately 50,000 troops that is effectively safeguarding the territory from Yugoslav

or Serbian military intervention.

• Reconstruction: Some basic reconstruction work has been accomplished, especially in providing shelter, food, and medical aid to the bulk of the destitute.

Several initiatives have begun in encouraging the development of small businesses and in identifying key infrastructural projects over the coming years. Efforts are also underway to rebuild the educational system, the energy network,

and the public administration.

However, four major shortcomings of the Kosova operation have also been evident.

• Political Paralysis: There is currently no legitimate Kosovar Albanian authority

and this contributes to paralyzing the development of political institutions and

the emergence of a civic society. In some respects, such a situation suits U.N.

officials who argue that the Kosovars are simply unable to govern themselves

and need to be shepherded by international players into some future Yugoslav

framework. The creation of a Kosova advisory council under the supervision of

the U.N. Special Representative Bernard Kouchner has not filled the political

vacuum.

• Criminality: The problem of criminalization and the lack of the rule of law has

become widespread in Kosova. Corruption and crime threaten the security of

residents, perpetuate a climate of revenge against minority Serbs, and undermine the emergence of a democratic system. Such a phenomenon also serves

those who argue that the Kosovars are not prepared for self-government or

statehood. In addition, Serbian special forces and paramilitaries continued to

operate in Kosova, deliberately provoking violence to discredit international institutions, to undermine the longevity of the NATO mission, and to discount any

realistic possibility of Kosovar self-government.

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• International Failings: Kosova has witnessed a number of institutional shortcomings by international agencies. This has been visible in a lack of serious reconstruction resources, an insufficient number of international police officers,

turf battles between international organizations, the undercutting of embryonic

Albanian local authorities, and the creation of deliberative councils without any

ultimate authority or decision-making powers. There have also been persistent

delays in the training and deployment of an indigenous police force and the establishment of a credible and professional judiciary system that could enforce

law and order on the territory.

• Status Question: The most important failing is the lack of final legal status for

Kosova as an independent state. Western leaders believe that postponing the

decision on Kosova’s status will allow for democratic changes to take place inside Serbia and enable a new relationship to emerge between Serbia and

Kosova once Yugoslav President Milosevic is ousted. However, in the interim

and regardless of whether such a rosy scenario actually materializes, NATO

may be faced with escalating anger among the Albanian community if the U.N.

insists on preserving Kosova within Serbia. The vast majority of Albanians support statehood for Kosova irrespective of any possible leadership changes in Belgrade.

For the indefinite future Kosova will remain an international ward, without any

inspiring vision for its future status. The U.N. mandate in Kosova is ultimately designed to return the region to Belgrade’s jurisdiction. A large-scale international

presence will continue until conditions have been met for a peaceful reintegration

of the territory. But such a scenario has raised serious questions about the self-determination of Kosova’s population and the instabilities that could be generated by

any planned reintegration into Serbia. A valid argument can be made that in order

to avoid future destabilization or permanent dependance on outside agencies, selfdetermination and independence for Kosova should be the primary objective of international leaders. Such a step could have several positive ramifications.

• Stabilization: It would restore Kosovar confidence in the ‘‘international community’’ and help preclude a potential radicalization of Albanian politics as longterm ambiguity on the status question can undermine the region’s democrats

and favor its demagogues. The ‘‘non-status’’ stalemate or the proposed return

of Kosova to Serbian or Yugoslav control may exacerbate the problems already

faced by international actors in guaranteeing security and building credible

local institutions. Most policy makers still adhere to the conventional wisdom

that an independent Kosova will destabilize the Balkans. Comparable arguments were employed a decade ago in opposition to Slovenian and Croatian

statehood. In reality, it is the forcible maintenance of Yugoslavia that continues

to generate instability.

• Protection: Acceptance of future independence can undercut the threat of a new

Serbian takeover by deligitimizing Belgrade’s incessant provocations on the territory. Additionally, criteria and timetables for a democratic independent state

will give both the internationals and the locals a concrete goal toward which

political, institutional, and economic reconstruction can be directed.

• Regional Security: On the international arena, it is worth considering some

positive implications of a Kosovar state, initially under the auspices of an officially declared international ‘‘protectorate.’’ For example, any potential threat

from Belgrade toward Albania will be terminated; Montenegro could feel more

secure from a Serbian attack; while Macedonia’s shorter border with Serbia will

limit the destabilizing effects of Belgrade’s nonrecognition of Macedonia’s frontiers. Above all, a substantial NATO presence while a national Kosova defense

force is trained and empowered will convince military forces in the surrounding

region to desist from any provocative actions.

• Albanian Question: Kosova’s statehood can also help resolve the wider ‘‘Albanian question’’ in the south Balkans. Instead of provoking calls for a ‘‘Greater

Albania’’ such a step could actually pacify the more radical Albanian demands

and allow Europe to increase its positive influences by dealing with Kosova as

a country in its own right. A timetable can therefore be pursued by internationals working in tandem with indigenous parties in the construction of

Kosova’s political, legal, and security institutions. The interim international

‘‘ward’’ could thereby evolve toward autonomy and sovereignty, regardless of

whether Serbia remains under the control of its kleptocratic nationalist-socialist

elite or descends into protracted violence and civil war.

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Over the coming year, the ‘‘international community’’ needs to focus attention on

two overriding questions in Kosova: political legitimacy and international dependency.

• Political Legitimacy: In line with the resolution of its ‘‘status’’ question, Kosova

will need a new indigenous constitution that can help concentrate political energy, give credence to legality, and provide a more solid basis for democratic development. All major political players in Kosova evidently support such an approach as it would create the foundations of statehood. The organs of government, including a constitutional assembly, would then acquire the confidence of

the public and the commitment of all major political players. In this context,

extremist parties advocating ultra-nationalist, anti-minority, and authoritarian

solutions would be exposed and marginalized so that they do not undermine the

body politic of the new state.

The OSCE can oversee the creation of a new Kosovar administration in a

much more resolute manner than was evident in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Indeed,

during the next two to three years Kosova can establish all the elements and

qualifications for statehood. The Prishtina government will of course have to renounce any territorial aspirations and sign treaties with its three Slavic neighbors, and commit itself to democratic pluralism, the rule of law, a market economy, and European integration.

• International Dependence: A dependency relationship has emerged between

Kosovars and international institutions that may become difficult to overcome

the longer the current ‘‘stalemate’’ continues. Moreover, such a relationship

could seriously threaten the development of indigenous institutions and democratic procedures. To counter such a phenomenon, a comprehensive election

process for the local and national ballot is essential through a campaign of voter

registration, political party development, and civic education. This could help

establish structure, legitimacy, and authority for elected Kosovar leaders. Local

and central Kosovar authorities must obtain the authority and resources to govern and not simply to consult with international agencies. Above all, there

needs to be clarity as to the powers of the proposed central government, its relationship with the interim U.N. authorities, and its independence from the Serbian and Yugoslav regime.

Senator SMITH. Thank you all.

I wonder if any of you would care to respond to, I think both of

us, what both of us were saying, that if we actually just come forward and say we are now for independence, and that is the stated

goal and the condition of the United States continued presence

there, what dynamic does that set in place?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I will give you my perspective. I think

while one must have definite objectives, that one cannot also depart from political reality. I believe it is very important, as I said

in the testimony, to make it clear that—and this the United States

can do without necessarily creating a division in the alliance. Make

it clear that Serbian rule will never return to Kosovo. It does not

now have to create, I believe, a problem within the alliance and

within the international community by trying to change U.N. Resolution 1244.

But I think the most important thing to do over the next year

is basically what Mr. Bugajski just said, to start to work to create

Albanian institutions, and to give Albanians charge to begin that

process. That is not an easy process, because the leadership is absent in many ways, but that, to me, is the beginning of the process

of establishing the movement toward what I think will be eventual

independence without creating an enormous brouhaha in the international community.

So that is my view on it, is that we have to have that, I think,

as an ultimate objective, but we have to move there with deference

to what the circumstances are in the international community, and

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particularly within the alliance. That may seem a little faint-hearted, but that is what I feel at this time.

Senator SMITH. That is a very valuable insight.

Dr. WILLIAMS. Addressing that question, there would be three

consequences of articulating a policy of conditional independence.

The first would be that it would create an incentive, or at least a

possibility of incentivizing the Kosovo Albanian population to behave in a more moderate and less radical fashion.

Generally a significant percentage of the population are by nature moderate. However, the conflict and near apartheid of the last

10 years has resulted in a radicalization of that population. Denying them their aspirations for independence has to date played into

the hands of the more radical elements.

The second is that it would help us to create a political reality

with our European allies. We deferred to our European allies in

1991. We had the conflict in Croatia and in Bosnia. We stepped in,

tried to fix the problem. We deferred to our European allies at the

initiation of the Kosovo conflict. Again, the American Government

had to step in, fix the problem through the use of force.

We are now deferring to our European allies on winning the

peace in Kosovo. It is not going to work. The Americans have to

take a leadership role, and independence, or conditional independence or some other forward-thinking policy would have the effect,

I think, of galvanizing the Europeans. They would object. There

would be difficulties, but we could bring them along with us.

Third, and probably most importantly, it would lay the blame for

the loss of Kosovo, which will occur 3 years, 5 years, 10 years from

now. Sooner or later Kosovo will be lost to the people and the Republic of Serbia. It would lay this blame at the foot of Milosevic.

It could then be used by the democratic opposition, which are

very pluralistic and diverse, in a good way and in a bad way, but

it would also remove it from the tasks that any genuine opposition

will have to deal with once they come into power in a post

Milosevic regime. If a truly democratic opposition takes power and

then gives the Kosovars the right to vote for independence, they

will lose Kosovo, and you will see a transition back to more nationalist Serbian politics.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Bugajski.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Yes. Just to reiterate what Paul has said, I would

say that it would send a very clear signal to Belgrade and to the

Serbian people that basically focus on your domestic issues, Kosovo

is out of bounds. This is now an international issue. We are moving

toward independence, whatever the steps.

Paradoxically, though, I think if it is important to the Serbs—in

other words, Kosovo is the heartland, so to speak—then it would

further delegitimize the Milosevic regime, because it would be clear

Milosevic had lost the territory. If it is not important to Serbs, and

according to recent public opinion polls it does not even figure

amongst the six top issues that concern ordinary Serbs, then it

really does not matter to them, in other words, we may have exaggerated the importance of Kosovo to the Serbs.

So either way, I think we will win vis-a-vis Belgrade.

Senator SMITH. So if we set up this process, establish the democratic institutions, and define the goal as conditional independence,

41

if you could all speak briefly to the collateral consequence to Macedonia and Bosnia, what does it mean to them?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I think one should not be too categorical. There is a lot we do not know. There is a lot of things that

can happen. For example, I think—take the case of Greece. I think

if—and this is no reason for not doing it, but if Kosovo moved toward independence I think Greece would have a fit.

Senator SMITH. Greece would what?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Have a fit. What Greece would do in

that case, I do not know, and the situation in Macedonia is uncertain. There are a lot of Albanians who recognize they do not want

conflict. They want to try to make Macedonia work. There are a lot

of people in Macedonia who have had longer term means.

My own view is that we can proceed at some point toward independence and still maintain the viability of Macedonia, but I think

it will require an awful lot of effort and an awful lot of attention

to what is happening in Macedonia internally, and I do not say

that with great confidence, and I do not think anybody can speak

with great confidence on this subject. It is a legitimate concern to

be worried about, but I believe—my own belief is, it can be managed.

But it has to be very significantly thought through, the things

you have to do to make sure that nothing untoward happens in

terms of the stability of Macedonia.

Senator SMITH. Do you have a brief comment, Dr. Williams?

Dr. WILLIAMS. I think there would be important consequences

both for Bosnia and Macedonia. In Bosnia it would demonstrate the

West’s willingness to roll back the gains of ethnic aggression. We

need to resurrect the peace in Bosnia. One way of doing that is to

evolve the Dayton Accords. Working on conditional independence

for Kosovo would set a precedence for managing and somehow constructing a new process in Bosnia.

In Macedonia, as Ambassador Abramowitz has pointed out, it is

highly unstable. There are three options. Either we manage eventual independence of Kosovo, we keep our troops in Kosovo indefinitely, or we withdraw our troops and there is a process of de facto

independence, which we will not be able to regulate and which will

be met with aggression by Serbian forces. It brings us back to 1998

all over again.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Bugajski.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I personally think a little bit what Paul was saying, that Macedonia does remain a great unknown in terms of its

internal development and ethnic developments. However, I do believe that the nonindependence option for Kosovo, either long-term

international dependency or reintegration into Yugoslavia, does actually encourage radical elements, particularly those factions that

favor a Greater Albania, and I think they could become more important and active and even gain some popular support if they see

the international community is not favoring independence for

Kosovo, and they could spread, let us say, their message, their activities to part of Macedonia.

At this point I do not believe most Albanians in Macedonia would

want to join either Kosovo or Albania. A lot, of course, depends on

the development of internal political relations within Macedonia,

42

and this is the key, of course, in the south Balkans we should be

focusing on.

Senator SMITH. We are very pleased to be joined—much earlier,

but the first time we have acknowledged—by the ranking member

of the full committee and of this subcommittee, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I apologize, gentlemen. There is a defense bill on

the floor and a lot of amendments, and I have been called in and

out to come do my amendment and then not, so I apologize for the

delay.

I found the testimony interesting and informative and, as usual,

Mr. Ambassador, I found your testimony to be first-rate. Not that

the others were not, but you quite frankly have captured the nuances of the problem better than anybody.

I find it kind of fascinating, the little scenario, sir, you just went

through about if, in fact, we made it clear that there was no independence in the future and there was going to be some continued

association with Serbia, that could potentially radicalize the population and Macedonia could cause a problem.

Well, if all of that happens, one of the things I am confident of

from meeting with Mr. Thaci on several occasions, and being there

on half-a-dozen occasions and talking, I think, to every player in

the process over the last 8 years, including everyone in Kosovo the

last 2 years, if any of that happens, I just want to go on record

doing something no one should ever do, making a prediction, and

the prediction is, we are out, the Europeans are out, Slobodan

Milosevic owns it all.

The idea that Thaci and any successor, KLA, could possibly withstand any movement by Serbia is nonexistent—nonexistent—and

the possibility in the face of a withdrawal under the circumstance

I mentioned of NATO forces, of NATO going back in is nonexistent,

and your formulas are, in my humble opinion, formulas for absolute disaster.

I think the only thing to focus on here is, how do you keep this

thing going as long as you can without things blowing up, and hoping the dynamic circumstance emerges that provides opportunities

we do not even know exist now to take advantage of moving toward

stability, and I have a few questions along those lines, if I may.

The idea that we defer to allies, the implication being that had

we not we would have had a better outcome, I do not know where

you have been the last 5 years. If we had not deferred to our allies

in some of the things, there was no possibility this place would

have given any—any—support for sending any Americans anywhere in the Balkans if the allies said, we are not in.

I find these exercises in what we should have done fascinating.

I mean, we just beat back by, what, seven votes a proposal to set

an end date to get out and conditions for our allies that reflect, in

case you have not noticed, that close to half this place ain’t sure

about us even being there when no one is being killed, and the absolute condition of being there is that the allies do more.

So we are going to stand down our allies, right. We are going to

stand them down. Now we are going to get tough with them and

tell them we are going to do it our way, that is the implication, because we have yielded to them.

43

I would like not to have to yield to them, but I would like to find

49-plus votes here on the floor if we did not on some of these

things, which takes me to this question in point.

I think, Ambassador Abramowitz, if I understood the statement

correctly it is absolutely right. The way to do this—and I would

like you to respond—is to make it clear that there will not be a return to any circumstance within Kosovo where Belgrade dictates

outcomes in any way in Kosovo, and we have opened the question

as to whether or not there will be an incredibly loose federation,

independence, or a process toward independence.

I just got finished meeting with a number of Greek officials. I

promise you, Mr. Ambassador—you are more diplomatic than I

am—the prospect of us declaring that we are for an independent

Kosovo means goodbye Charlie. You know what is going to happen.

They will cease and desist from their support. You will see the

French follow them, and you will see a vote on the floor of the U.S.

Senate, because they will not be coming forward with their commitments, for American troops to be out of there by June. I will bet

my career on it. By next June, troops will be out.

So it seems to me that one of the things we have got to figure

out is, what are the things we should not be doing, rather than

what are the things we should be doing. One of the things I want

to raise is that we are about to vote on an amendment by a Senator

who I have great respect for, and who has been the person who has

most ardently disagreed with my views on the Balkans for the past

8 years, and that is Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison.

She has an amendment, and she has been consistent for 8 years,

and so it is not like this is anything new—and some think this is

a good idea. She has a sense of the Senate resolution calling for

a Balkan stabilization conference that contemplates a rewriting of

the borders. She cites the Treaty of Vienna, or the Treaty of Berlin

from 1878, and she cites London, 1913, et cetera, in all of which

we wrote borders.

I will painfully point out that they are all disasters on the floor,

but they are the models that we are to use, and we would invite

all parties—I assume that includes Slobodan Milosevic—to this

conference.

Now, my general question is, should we be at this moment making any substantial changes in our posture in Kosovo? Should we

be calling a major conference to get all the parties together? Should

we be declaring that we are on the road to independence?

I was very intrigued—and I agree with some of what Dr. Williams said. I wish there were a way in which we could say, here

is the deal. We are going to further establish clearly Kosovar institutions and support them in return for commitments that you will

engage in a rule of law that is even remotely approaching a rule

of law, including acknowledging a multiethnic society in your future, and we will see about independence. We will see where this

takes us.

But talk to me about whether or not we should be having any

big conference of any type now.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, Senator, you as always raise

very important considerations, practical as well as conceptual. I do

not know of any conference in the Balkans that has made a conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:20 Dec 04, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67874 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
44

tribution, an international conference, and certainly not the Congress of Berlin, and that is one of the sources of the continuing

problems.

So the notion that we would get together a group of nations with

different views, particularly about where Serbia under Slobodan

Milosevic fits in, seems to me a formula for further chaos, further

disorder in the Balkans, and it is amazing, I think, that this is

being proposed in a serious way to resolve really difficult problems.

Now, I do think, however, that—I guess I perhaps have been in

the State Department too long, and tend to see some of the complexities more than I should. I do believe, however, that we cannot

just drift. We cannot just accept the fact that it is very politically

difficult, which it is. The Russians, the Chinese, a lot of the allies,

that they have different views.

Senator SMITH. Ambassador, we cannot just drift. We cannot

keep seven votes here for who knows how long.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I am trying to answer the question of

what do we do in the short term, and we can be swept along, so

to speak and hope that something turns up. That usually turns out

to be American policy. Let us wait until something good turns up

and then we do not have to face critical difficulties with our allies,

or the Russians, or the Chinese.

I sort of believe that the best thing is to start a process in which

the people of Kosovo know that they are moving ahead and that

the facts that will be represented by functioning Kosovo institutions establishes a basic underpinning.

Senator BIDEN. Can you give me a specific example of an institution you have in mind?

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. The obvious institution is an assembly, a legislative assembly, because the place does not have a constitution. We are now developing a constitution. I do not know

what degree of consultation with the Albanians is, but clearly, if

you are going to develop an entity it has got to have some rules.

It does not have any rules now.

You have a half-hearted United Nations administration which

provides a certain amount of law and order but clearly does nothing to build an entity, so you have to start building an entity, it

seems to me, or you are going to get ultimately developments in

Kosovo that are going to create an awful lot of trouble and make

it even worse on the Hill.

So I do not believe it is a prudent policy, whatever the international complexities are, and they are great, and the domestic

complexities, to sit still and hope for the best. My answer is a very

limited one under the circumstances, that the United States, for its

own, should make it clear that while it is not precluding Kosovo

independence, it is saying what will not happen any more, that we

will not stand by and we will not accept Serbian rule for Kosovo.

That to me is an important beginning, and I think it does not

create a major crisis in the alliance.

Senator BIDEN. I am of that view, Mr. Ambassador, and I will

cease because Senator Lugar has not had a chance to speak and

I will ask you to refrain from answering the rest of my question

until Senator Lugar is done. However, the last two times I was

there, I asked all the parties I could meet, including former and

45

present KLA people, about us just imposing a constitution, just

writing a constitution, just simply having the United Nations go in

there as a mandate and lay out a constitution and set up those institutions now.

Everyone I spoke to said they would welcome the idea of this

being done by a committee, or this being done by consultation, Albanian as well as Serb, because they cannot figure out how to get

from here to there.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Well, you are referring to an existing

problem, that the Albanians are divided. There is a lot of

fractionating organizations there, fractionated politics, and some

people will say, post constitution. I am an American. I have little

problems about the constitution——

Senator BIDEN. When I say impose a constitution, I mean we did

not, quote, impose a constitution in Germany, and we did not impose one in Japan, but we did—but that is another story.

I would yield the floor. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate each of the papers enormously. I thought they were brilliant, and make a real contribution and have stimulated our conversation.

Picking up where Senator Biden left off, it seems to me there is

a case to be made for the United Nations, NATO, the United

States, or somebody to formulate a constitutional system. We discussed today—and this is not a pejorative term—that Kosovo is a

ward of international security forces which for the moment, depends on NATO or the U.N. mandate and is likely to be the case

for a long time.

In other words, this is a very special case which, for a good reason, the rest of the world and us got involved with 2 million people,

a million of whom were dispersed, and we discussed that. A million

came back. How in the world can people who are shifted around

in 1 year, lose their lives and families and fortunes, are redistributed back and expected to have a deliberative assembly and then

work all this out. It seems to me to stretch the imagination, but

the failure to do so does not stretch imagination. It is chaos.

In any event, I think, and am stimulated by your testimony

today, that I can conceive the international ward, where we provide

a constitution, and people begin to think and deliberate on democracy.

Now, meanwhile, as you suggest Ambassador Abramowitz, it is

clear, that since we have surrounded this in protective coating, the

Serbs are not going to get into it. We have the armed forces, and

we would beat them, and we could stay there and demonstrate

that. That would be true if there were Albanians coming in, Greeks

coming in, whoever wants to come in. This is going to be a sacrosanct place for 2 million people involved in learning how to build

democratic institutions.

Your suggestion, and Dr. Williams’ suggestion, is that eventually

there has to be integration not only of Kosovo but of a lot of places

in southeastern Europe into European institutions, perhaps joining

the European Union, maybe joining NATO in some form, but at

46

least becoming involved and integrated, but that may take some

time, too.

As a matter of fact, even well-developed situations may have to

be discussed 10 years from now including European Union membership. That was always the problem in discussing NATO expansion. Ideally, some said, let the economics flow, and the institutions, and then you pick up the military, but that just did not happen.

It seems to me if the United States is to be involved, we are

going to have debates on the floor of the Congress, the rest would

be a demonstrated American interest in this that is more substantial.

Now, a part of this may be that we would say the Europeans are

not moving fast enough, but we believe that we Americans want to

establish much more of a relationship with an expanding Romania,

or Bulgaria, or with Greece, for that matter.

In other words, we accept the fact that they are in Europe, but

the world is very small. You know, why not have much more extensive bilateral relationships with the United States? Why not allow

or facilitate the United States to come in in a very big economic

way?

So you do have stability here, but at the pace the Europeans are

going at it, you will never make it. They will be quarrelling, warring, be back into it trying to separate the pairs again.

This might get the European juices going and they would say,

this is an American invasion. We already think you are involved

in hegemony and trying to do your own thing, and this simply

proves it, and we might just say, you are right. You are absolutely

right. That is what we are going to do, because you folks again and

again come to us and say, we cannot handle it. That really is the

basic reason for the American presence.

The Europeans say, we cannot handle it, so we say, we accept

that, and you accept that, because we are coming. We are not about

to devote tens of billions of dollars to fight wars spasmodically,

then have big debates whether we come in or out, or what the end

game is.

The end game for us is a prosperous southeastern Europe.

Kosovo got us going. It may be a dubious enterprise. It may be a

good one, but nevertheless we are not a cut-and-run group. We are

not going to undermine NATO. We are not going to undermine integration. As a matter of fact, our policy is really to come in in a

big way and to get it all straightened out.

Now, how does that strike you? In other words, as we had been

talking today, we criticize the previous testimony as there being no

strategy, and you have talked about tactics, and that is about,

muddling through, hanging on, hoping for the best. Maybe the

seven-vote margin Senator Biden mentioned disappears, and we all

leave. Maybe Montenegro comes or goes, and no one really cares.

I am suggesting that if we do care, and I think we should, for

strategic reasons and security reasons of our own, there has to be

something for the American people and its elected representatives

to support, something to hang onto to say, this is us, this is our

strategy. This is good for America.

47

Now, why do we not try to do that, Dr. Williams? Do you have

an idea about this?

Dr. WILLIAMS. Yes, Senator. I would agree with you and Senator

Biden that the first step in a policy of intermediate sovereignty or

earned independence is imposing a constitution.

Now, the important question is, which type of constitution? In

Bosnia we imposed a constitution on the Bosnian Government similar to the constitution of the former Yugoslavia, the only one of its

kind. It institutionalized ethnic division and created institutionalized political gridlock.

The alternative approach would be constitutions like everywhere

else in western and central Europe and the U.S., majority rule with

minority rights protections.

One of the concerns we have about that first step of intermediate

sovereignty is that we are working with the European allies rather

than leading our European allies to a policy, and they are pursuing

a similar approach to Dayton, which is institutionalized ethnic vetoes, rotating presidencies, rotating supreme court justices. We cannot dismiss the Europeans, but we need to demonstrate to them

the benefits of majority rule, minority right protections, and putting it in part of a larger package.

I think from afar one reason why some Senators are uncomfortable with our continued presence in the Balkans is the lack of a

strategic policy. If we lead the European allies to a policy, starting

with the constitution, and not only imposing a constitution but also

imposing things that you could not impose on a sovereign state— thou shalt not have a political or territorial association with certain

neighboring states—and then things which are part of international law, respecting the territorial integrity of neighbors.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. Senator Lugar, I think you are asking

some very fundamental questions, and the problem is that we are

trying to solve a very difficult problem in a short period of time,

and it cannot be done that way, and our domestic politics or domestic considerations prevent it from being done, or insisting that it be

done in an impossibly short time.

I do not know how to correct that, because for me there is no

way, at least, that American troops can be withdrawn from Kosovo

for many years. Whatever we do in terms of enunciating a long

term goal, that happens to be the case.

I also believe that these countries are not going to create stability by regional associations. That is a wonderful thing to encourage. I do not think it will happen that way. If you are going to create stability, you have got to bring them into a wider association

of Serbs dealing with the Kosovars, and Kosovars dealing with the

Macedonians. You have got to give them a wider goal.

That is why I always have said that if you were ever going to

create stability in Yugoslavia, it is not going to be done by the— the Americans are necessary, but the long term has to be to draw

them in seriously, and I believe the Europeans—I probably will regret ever saying this. I believe the Europeans increasingly recognize that.

Now, whether they can get their act together, whether their institutions have enough flexibility to do that, I do not know, but I

believe that is one reason why we need troops there, so we can

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bang on them and legitimately say, it is your responsibility to do

certain things, and we are going to keep reminding you of this, and

we are making a contribution, because I believe that if we do take

out U.S. forces, or we go down to a platoon or company, or even

a battalion, I believe that I think it would send terrible security

signals, but I believe it would undermine any serious long term effort.

How you get the U.S. Congress to accept that this is a long term

effort is beyond my capability, and I think one of the things Mr.

Milosevic quite frankly is looking at is the Americans, if we get a

new administration, are going to take a long term view of Kosovo.

Senator LUGAR. I think there has to be an economic dimension,

not just a political one. In other words, that will not make it on

humanitarian grounds alone for strategic stability. There has to be

a context in which there are jobs, and arguments in which grassroots America sees some value in southeastern Europe beyond

what they see now.

Ambassador ABRAMOWITZ. I am sort of skeptical it can be done

economically.

Senator BIDEN. I agree. I wish, if we are going to have a Republican President, that it would be you, and I mean that sincerely.

Unfortunately, we have both been through that, and it did not

work.

I probably just ruined his reputation by saying that. But all kidding aside, I think if a President, if someone came forward with a

strong proposal saying what we were going to do, what the objective was, et cetera, we would have the ability to go more than

seven votes.

I would point out to everyone that we went through Bosnia, declared a failure, continued to be declared a failure, and we beat

back on three occasions an attempt to withdraw from Bosnia. Now

no one is trying to withdraw from Bosnia.

Bosnia clearly has a long way to go, a long way to go. But my

point is, I do not think it is as hard to sustain American commitment down the road as we are making it sound when I talk about

the seven votes.

The general point I wanted to make is, it is close to impossible

to sustain it if the end result is an open fissure within NATO that

results in any one of the NATO parties withdrawing. That is the

thing that will, I think, toll the bell here quickly.

We have more forces there, or as many forces there as last year.

You do not hear that, and even though all of us who know the issue

well can point to an incredible number of failures in Bosnia and

what has not been done, we have the support now, I believe, to sustain a continued effort to try to make it work. That is the only general point I wanted to make.

And I did not want to mislead people by suggesting that I

thought the support was so fragile that it would evaporate. It will

evaporate only if we end up in a shooting match with our European

allies that results in them withholding either troops or money or

police or whatever. That will be the thing that I think will change

14 votes.

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I am not sure I am making my point clear, but I hope I am, and

I think a more robust effort is not inconsistent with getting American support.

Senator SMITH. If there is no objection we will include Senator

Biden’s opening statement in the record as if read.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this important hearing.

My views on Kosovo are a matter of record:

• First, I believe that the Balkans—Kosovo included—are not a strategic sideshow as some have asserted. The region is vital to U.S. national security, since its

destabilization would harm all of Europe.

• Second, for that reason, we did the right thing in Operation Allied Force. In

fact, I introduced the resolution authorizing U.S. participation in a NATO air campaign, which passed the Senate. The House, as we know, failed to pass such an authorization.

In the middle of the war, I co-sponsored with Senator McCain a resolution, which

was tabled, authorizing the President to use all necessary force to achieve victory.

• Third, Operation Allied Force was successful in that it succeeded in reversing

the vile ethnic cleansing of Slobodan Milosevic. Ensuing problems in peace-enforcement cannot detract from our having achieved the air campaign’s principal goal.

• Fourth, although a year after the end of the air campaign there remains a huge

amount of political, economic, and societal reconstruction to be done, measurable

progress has been achieved.

• Fifth, our European allies are for the first time in memory carrying their fair

share of the burden in the peace-enforcing and reconstruction effort. This is a development of the first order of importance, particularly for NATO.

• And sixth, and last, we must stay the course in the Balkans, including Kosovo.

This follows from my first postulate, that stability in Southeastern Europe is a vital

U.S. national security interest.

We Americans are not noted for our patience, but we must learn that mammoth

reconstruction tasks take time.

Mr. Chairman, I have a great many questions on the specifics of the current situation in Kosovo, and on U.S. and U.N. policies there.

We have assembled two panels of excellent, expert witnesses, whose testimonies

I am eager to hear.

Once again, thank you for holding this hearing.

Senator SMITH. Senator Lugar, do you have anything else?

Senator LUGAR. No.

Senator SMITH. Do any of you gentlemen want to make a closing

response to any of our comments or criticisms or questions?

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I just wanted to make a short statement in response to Senator Biden’s comments. I do not think anybody is seriously suggesting the Albanians could defend Kosovo if NATO

withdraws. I think the message is, NATO is in there for a long

time, but the involvement will be more costly and more complex

and potentially more damaging if we do not have a vision for the

Albanians as to their future status, and if in the interim we do not

seriously build the institutions which are not completely dependent

on the international community. That is the way I put it.

We are there for a long time, but it is going to be even more complicated, more costly, if we do not engage in those two strategies.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with you, as long as that vision is

brought along, or shared, or not completely at odds with the European vision, with the NATO vision. That was my only point.

Senator SMITH. Dr. Williams.

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Dr. WILLIAMS. I would just conclude, in agreement, that we will

likely have continued U.S. Government support for the troops on

the ground in Kosovo. However, we must understand why they are

there, and articulate their objectives.

Conditional independence and immediate sovereignty is an option, and it has been deliberately crafted in a way which is long

term, which is phased, and I think with substantial U.S. leadership

we can bring the Europeans—who understandably make policy

through conferences, we can bring them into our vision of a stable

Kosovo in a slow and incremental fashion.

Senator SMITH. Gentlemen, thank you. It has been very, very

helpful and insightful, and we appreciate hearing about the nuances of a very complicated situation.

So with that, this committee hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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