NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Na me: 12a0139n.06 No. 10-3713 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

KI RK TEETS; BRANDY TEETS,
P laintif fs-App ellants,

v. CUYAHOG A COUNTY, O HI O; CUYAHOG A COUNTY D EPARTMENT OF CHI L DREN AND F AMI L Y SERVI CES; ARL ENE SPENCER; BARBARA MORUS, Defendan ts-Appellees.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE ) UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT ) COURT FOR THE N ORTHERN ) DI STRI CT OF OH I O ) ) ) O P I N I O N ) ) )

Before: M OORE an d GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges; and QUIST , District Judge. *
KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Kirk and Br andy Tee ts
appea l the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt in favor of Def endants-A

ppellees Cuy ahog a County , Ohio (“the County ”), the Cuy ahog a C ounty Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s (“CCDCFS”) , and individual social worke rs Arlene Spencer and Ba rbar a Morus. The Tee tses filed suit unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleg ing substantive and proce dural due proce ss violations as a result of CCDCFS’s and the social worke rs’ alleg ed misstatements and materia l omissions in connec tion with an investiga tion of sexual-abuse alleg ations by Br andy Tee ts’s d aughter A.F. ag ainst her

The Honora

ble Gordon J

. Quist, Senior United States District J udg e for the Western District * of Michig an, sitting by

desig nation.No. 10-3713

Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.
stepfathe r Kirk Tee ts. The district c ourt g rante d the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt as
to all claims, finding that the Tee tses had not established any substantive or proce dural due proce ss violation. W e ag ree and ther efor e AF F IRM

. I. BACKG ROUND A. Spencer’ s Investigation On Marc h 28, 2006, middle-school g uidance counselor Sherry Porach repor ted a ca s e o f possible sexual abuse to the Cuy ahog a County child-abuse hotline. The call was based on a written
statement from A.F., the twelve- y ear -old daug hter of Br andy Tee ts, that descr ibed a single instance of sexual abuse by her step-fa ther, Kirk Tee ts. A short while later, CCDCFS social worke r Arlene Spencer arr ived at the school to beg in investiga ting A.F.’ s alleg a ti o n s . Spencer interviewe d A.F. that day and, over the ensuing th re e-w eek period, conducte d an investiga tion that included follow-up discussions with A.F. and interviews with A.F.’ s family members. Fr om her b ri ef investiga tion, Spencer conclude d that sexual abuse was “indicate d,” and the case was transfe rre d to the ong oing 1 investiga tion unit. R. 21-9 at 16 (I nvestig ation & Assessment). Spence r’ s s upervisor, Ba rbar a Morus, concur

red with Spencer ’s finding s. Morus rec ounted that, “in the three wee ks I had the case , the daug hter had been intervi ew ed by my worke r, by the police, by the school counselor and had

An indicated disposition means that, at the c onclusion of the int ake investiga tion, there is 1 “some sort of circ umstantial evidenc e to believe that abuse occur red.” R. 21-13 (Morus Dep. at 33). I n other words, the social worke r “ha[s] rea son to believe something is happening ” but lacks “har d evidenc e” to prove it. R. 21-5 (Spence r Dep. at 41). Other potential dispositi ons are “substantiated,” meaning there is actua l evidenc e to confirm the abuse, such as a medical exam o r p er p et ra tor admission, a

nd “unsubstantiated,” meaning the alleg ation appea rs not to be cre dible. Id. at 41–42. 2No. 10-3713

Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

g iven the same story to three people.” R. 21-13 (Morus De p. at 46). Dur ing tha t period, “[A.F’ s] story did not chang e nor did she r eca nt.” Id. 2
B. Ou tside Investigations in to A.F .’s Allegations As Spencer was conducting her investiga tion, the Parma Heig hts Police Depa rtment beg an its own investiga tion into A.F.’ s alleg ations. Wit h a few minor discrepa ncies, A.F.’ s statements to police we re g ener ally

consistent with those she m ade to Spencer. A t some point, however, police obtained a journal that A.F. had share d with a friend. The descr iption of the incident in the journal contained a few d i ff

er ences from the descr iption A.F. g ave to Spencer and the police, the most notable of which was a statement that the incident lasted about three -and- a-ha lf hours instead of the
ten or fiftee n minutes A.F. had described in her earlier interviews. Nonethele ss, the Teetses have
not prese nted any evidenc e to sug g est that Spencer knew or had reason to know about the j ournal

or this discrepa

ncy . Aside from the journal, the other evidenc e g ather ed during this period g ener ally supported the finding s in Spencer ’s repor t. A medical repor

t from MetroHe alth Medica l Center, for example, concluded tha t A.F.’ s case was “ [v] ery suspicious for sex ual abuse” after pe rfor ming its own examination and interview. R. 21-18 ( Med. Report a t 9).

Br andy Tee ts did provide police with a tape- rec orded rec antation wh ile the intake 2 investiga tion was ong oing, but police and the CCDCFS social worke rs discounted the r eca ntation beca use it strong ly appea

red that Br andy Tee ts had coer ced A.F. into g iving it. About a y ear and a half later, A.F. independe ntly rec anted her allega tions ag ainst Kirk Teets, but the t iming was well afte r Spence r’s investig ation was c ompleted. 3No. 10-3713

Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

C. State C ourt P roce edings i n the Juvenil e and Crim inal Cou rts CCDCFS soug ht to place A.F. at a friend’ s house while th e in ta k e investiga tion was ong oing. When the original arrang ement fell throug h, Spencer , on beha l f o f CCDCFS, filed a complaint in the Cuy ahog a County juvenile court, alleg ing abuse and neg lect and seeking temporar y custody of A.F. A mag istrate judge later deter mined by clea

r and convincing evidenc e that A.F. had b ee n abused by her stepfathe r and awa rded temporar

y custody to CCDCFS. I n a subsequent hear ing, the
court adjudicate d A.F. an “abuse d child” under Ohio law. R. 21- 14 at 4 (F eb. 2, 2007 J udg ment).
Br andy Tee ts appea led the adjudication in st ate c ourt, but her a ppeal wa s dismis sed.
Ba sed on their investiga tion, police and prosec utors also soug ht c r im in a l c h a r g e s a g a in s t K irk Tee ts, and a g rand jury returne d a bill of indictment ag ainst him for eng ag ing in sexual conduct with

a minor under the ag e of thirteen. Kirk Tee ts ultimately pleade d g uilty to misdemeanor interfe renc e with custody

in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.23(A)( 1). D. The DistrictCourt P roce edings The district court g rante d the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt on May 12, 2010. After observing that “[t] he basis for all of P laintiffs’ claims is the asser tion that Def

endants made knowing ly false alleg ations of child abuse ag ainst P l ai n t iffs,” the district court conclude d that “[t] here is no evidenc e in the rec ord to support this asser tion.” R. 30 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 12–13). The district court re asoned tha t [w] hile Plaintiffs believe a differ ent deter mination by CCDCFS was war rante d, the alleg ed “inconsistencies or discrepa ncies ” l isted by Plaintiffs are immaterial t o the claims raised by Plaintiffs in this case . There is no fac tual basis for Plaintiffs’ asser tion that M s . S p en cer intentionally fabr icated evidence in an effort to support 4No. 10-3713

Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

a finding of sexual abuse ag ainst Mr. Tee ts or that she failed to thoroughly investi gat e t he claims of sexual abuse raised by A.F. There fore , Def endants are entitled to summary

judgme nt as a matter

of law. Id. The district court further conclude d that the individual defe ndants wer e entitled to both absolute and qualified immunit y and that t h e T eetse s had failed to asser t viable claims for supervisory or municipal liability

under § 1983. The Tee tses filed this timely appea l. II. LAW & ANALYSIS “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must alleg e the violation of a rig ht secur ed by the Constit ution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged depriva tion was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Gray v. City of Detroit , 399 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l quotation marks omitted). We revie w de novo the district court’s g rant of
summary judgme nt. Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’ t of Children & Family Servs. , 640 F.3d 716, 723 (6th Cir. 2011). 3
A. The Teetse s’ Constitutional Claims 1. Sub stantive Due P roce ss The Tee tses first contend that CCDCFS and Spencer intentionally interfe red with their Four teenth Amendment rig ht to familial association, and that there was a g enuine issue of materia l

I nitially , the Def

endants contend that the Tee tses should be estopped from challeng ing Kirk 3 Tee ts’s alleg ed criminal admission that he sexually abused A.F. We disag ree . Although Kirk Tee ts did plead g uilty in criminal proce eding s, the prosec utor had amende d the char g e to interfe renc e with custody in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.23(A)( 1), which prohibits a person from knowing ly or rec klessly “entic[ing ], tak[ing], keep[ing ], or harbor [i ng ]” a child under the ag e of eig hteen from his or her pare nt, g uardia n, or cu s t odian. This is not an admission of sexual abuse that somehow bars our consideration of the Tee tses’ cla ims. 5No. 10-3713

Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

fac t conce rning whether the “investig ati o n wa s underta ken (or continued) in bad faith or with a malicious motive” in violation of that rig ht. Appellant B r. at 27. “[T] he Supreme Court has repe atedly rea ffirme d the exis tence of a constitutional rig ht to the maintenanc e of a pare nt-child rela tionship.” Kottmyer v. Maas , 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006). 4
But “the rig ht to family integ rity

. . . is neither absolute nor unqualified.” Id. at 690. I nstead, it “ is limit ed by an equal[ly ] compelling g overnme ntal interest in the protec tion of children, particula rly wher e the children need to be protec ted from their own pare nt s .” Id. As a result, “the rig ht to familial association is not implicated mere ly by g overnme ntal investiga tion into alleg ations of child abuse.” Id. Absent evidenc e of bad faith, improper motive, or investiga tion tactics that “shock the conscie nce,” such investiga tions will not infring e on a family ’s fundame ntal rig hts. Id. at 691 & n.1. Substantive due proce ss claims come in two varie ties: “(1) d epriva tions of a particula

r constitutional g uara

ntee; and (2) actions that ‘shock the conscie nce.’ ” Pitt ma n , 6 40 F.3d at 728 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Under either c la s s if ic a ti o n , h o w e v e r , th e Tee tses’ contention that S p en cer fabr icated evidenc e and ignor ed conflicting acc ounts fails beca use the Tee tse s re l y principally

on manufa cture d discrepa ncies a nd evidenc e that did not exis t at the time that Spencer

was conducting her investiga tion. For example, tha t A .F.’ s journal provides a differ ent acc ount of the i ncident is o f n o conseque nce beca use t he Teetses have prese nted no evidenc e to demonstrate

The Def endants contend that Kirk Tee ts does not have a constitutionally protec ted interest 4 in familial association with A.F. beca use he is not a natura l pare nt. We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that he does. The Six th Circ uit ha s not de cided that question, but be cause the answe r has no impact on our a

naly sis, we nee d not resolve it her e. 6No. 10-3713

Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

that Spencer ever knew of the alterna tive acc ount. I n addition, the Tee tses’ contention that Spencer failed to c onsider the possible influence of A.F .’s frie nd who had made simil ar alleg ations ag ainst

a family member at about the same time, A.F’ s history of ly ing, and Kirk Tee ts’s immediate denial is also unsup p o rted; eac h of those fac ts is specific ally listed in Spencer ’s investiga tion and
assessment. L ikewise, S pence r’s o b s er v ations about A.F.’s appeara nce and gra des also appea r t o have been supported by contempora neous evidenc e uncover ed in the police investiga tion and A.F.’ s medical exam. The bulk of the Tee tses’ rema ining challeng es to Spencer ’s repor t point only to minor inconsistencies, such as A.F.’ s inability to pinpoint the exact date o f t h e abuse and the
prese nce of cer

tain details in some repor ts but not others. Such differ ence s are hardly materia l and would not rea sonably have cause d CCDCFS or Spence r to abandon the investiga tion, particula rly in light of A.F .’s g ener ally consistent statements to her g uidance counselor, Spenc er, a nd police. Thus, even taking all fac ts in their favor , the Tee tses’ arg uments amount t o n o m o re than alleg ations of neg lige n ce t hat fall far short of showing the requisite bad faith or intentional misrepre sentation neede d to sustain their claim. I ndeed, if thes e fa cts alone wer e sufficie nt to withstand a motion for summary judgme nt, our decision would risk leaving score s of social worke rs subject to suit for leg itimate child-abuse investiga tions. Such an outcome could have broad policy implications for state entities seeking to protec t the best interests of dependent children, and we decline to incite suc h a re sult. Finally , to the extent that the Tee tses seek to hold Spencer , Morus, and CCDCFS acc ountable for subsequent criminal or juvenile court actions, that arg ument also fails. I n Pittman , we reje cted

7No. 10-3713

Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

a simil ar claim alleg ing that a social worke r’s “detr imental misrepre sentations” in internal CCDCFS
proce eding s led the ag ency to see k custody in juvenile court, which the plaintiffs arg ued had deprive d the fathe r of his fundame ntal rig ht to family integ rity

. 640 F.3d at 729. Be cause Ohio law ref ers custody decisions to the juvenile court, which has independe nt authority to conduct hear ings and collect evidenc e, we held that even intentional misrepre sentations by a social worke r during an investiga tion leading up to Ohio custody proce edin gs d o n o t violate the pare nt’s substantive due
proce ss rig hts beca

use the social worker has no independe nt ability to instit ute the alleg ed depriva tion. Id. The same analy sis applies here

. Acc ording ly , the Tee tses have failed to state a constitutional violation, and the district court proper ly g rante d summary judgme nt on th eir substantive due proc ess claims. 2. P roce dural Due Pr ocess The Tee tses next asser

t that their proce dural due proce ss rig hts wer e violated when A.F. was

remove d from their home without a prede privation hear ing. Soon afte r t h e investiga tion beg an, CCDCFS, in conce rt with the Tee tses, develope d a “saf ety plan” to remove A.F. from the Tee tses’ home and place her at a friend’ s house until A.F’ s alleg ations could be confirme d or dispelled. The Tee tses now claim that their ag ree ment to the plan was involunta ry . S p ec i fica lly , Br andy Tee ts contends that she acquie sced only beca use she “fe lt like [she] had no choice .” R. 21-3 (B randy Tee ts Dep. at 32). She believed t h at “[ t ] h e o n l y way I could keep my daug hter [A.F.] was to g o to a

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Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

women’s shelter and battere d home and I wasn’t putting my fa m i l y throug h that. I wasn’t g iven
many options.” Id. 5
Be cause of a pare nt’s fundame ntal liberty interest in the custody of hi s or her chi l d , “s t ate intervention in the rela tionship betwee n a pare nt and child must be acc omplished by proce dures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’ t of Children’s Servs ., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, even for temporar y depriva tions of custodial rig hts, pare nts are g ener ally entitled to a hear ing “within a rea sonable time.” Id. Such hear ings, howeve r, are require d only when a child ’s remova l is instit uted or sustained over the pare nts’ objections. Smith v. W illiams-Ash , 520 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2008). I n contra st, a pare nt’s voluntary consent to a safe ty plan obviates the need for any additional due proce ss pr ocedur es on the part of the ag ency seeking to remove the child from a pa rent’s c ustody

. Id.
I n this case , the Tee tses’ asser tion that the initial safe ty plan was involuntary is belied by Kirk Tee ts’s admission that he and his wife “[a]bsol utely ” ag ree d to it. R. 21-10 (Kirk Tee ts Dep. at 37). The Tee tses point to no evidenc e to sug g est that they ever soug ht a nd wer e denied custody of A.F. afte r the safe ty plan to which they ag ree d was put into place

. Fur thermore , even if we cre dit Br andy Tee ts’s statement that she felt coer ced, that fac t alone is not enoug h to establish that the safe ty plan

was involuntary

. See Smith , 520 F.3d at 600 (citing Dupuy v. Samuels , 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006)) (re jecting the pare nts’ claim that “saf ety plans are inhere ntly coer cive when ag encie s forc e pare nts

After a problem arose with the orig inal place ment, CCDCFS and the Tee tses met to cre ate 5 a new safe ty plan, which resulted in CCDCFS seeking custody throug h the juveni l e court. The Tee tses do not appea

r to contest the r evised plan. 9No. 10-3713

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to sign the plan or fac e the threa t of formal remova l proce eding s” and concluding that “this strateg y ” does n o t undermine the voluntary nature of a safe ty plan). Thus, the district court did not err in finding no g enuine issue of materia l fac t reg arding the Tee tses’ proc edura l due proc ess claim.
B. Th e Tee tses’ M uni cipal Li abili ty Claim s Against the County and CCDCF S The Tee tses finally contend that the C o u n t y an d C CDCFS are liable under a theory of municipal liability p u rs uant to Monell v. Dep’ t of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658 (1977). The Tee tses

m ai n t ai n that such liability is war rante d on acc ount of CCDCFS’s unconstitutional “‘g uilty un t i l proven innoc ent’ policy

reg arding

child abuse a lleg ations.” Appe llant Br. a t 40. To succe ed on a municipal-liability claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate an officia l policy or
custom that i s either “fac ially unconstitutional as written or articulated” or has been implemented in such a manner as t o d em o n strate “deliber ate indiffer ence ” to the “plainly obvious” risk of constitutional violation. Gregory v. City of Louisvill e , 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted), cert. denied , 127 S. Ct. 962 (2007). Fur thermore , liability under Monell “must rest on a dire ct ca

usal conne ction betwee n the policies or c ustoms of the [l ocal g overnme nt entity ] and the constitutional inj ury to the plaintiff.” Gray , 399 F.3d a t 617. Read as a whole, Morus’s depositi on testimony does not support the ex istence of a guilty

until-proven-inn ocent policy at CCDCFS. Rather, it depicts an investiga tional proce ss aimed at balanc ing the need to ensure t h at v i cti ms are comforta ble coming forwa

rd with claims with a continual ree valuation of victim alleg ations to deter mine t h ei r truthfulness. I n addition, even if Morus’s statements had indicated that she advocated a g uilty -until-proven- innocent standar d , the

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Teets, et al. v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, e t al.

Tee tses provide no e vidence to sugg est that Morus was a n officia l policy

maker or that the County

or CCDCFS endorse d that viewpoint. Cf. Moldowan v. City of W arren , 578 F.3d 351, 394 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting an “off

icial must be ‘re sponsible for establishing final g overnme nt policy respe cting [an] activity befor e the municipality can be held liable.’” (quoting Pembaur v. C i t y of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion))), cert. denied , 130 S. Ct. 3504 (2010). Acc ording ly , the Tee tses have failed to demonstrate an unconstitutional policy or custom at CCDCFS, and the dis t ri ct court corr ectly conclude d that they cannot rec over from CCDCFS or the County on this theory of liability

. C. Sup ervisor Liab ility and Quali fi ed and Ab solute Im m uni ty Be cause the Tee tses have failed to show that Spencer ’s i n v es t i g ation violated their constitutional rig hts, we decline to addre ss the T eetses’ asser tion that Morus should be subject to supervisor liability on acc ount of her role in a pproving Spencer ’s work. Fur thermore , beca

use the Tee tses have failed to identify any constitutional injury , we also decline to addre ss the parties’
arg uments conce rning the applica bility of qualified or

absolute immunity

to Spencer

and Morus. III. CONCLUSION For the foreg oing rea sons, we AF F IRM the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of the County , CCDCFS, and the in d i vidual social worke rs, Arlene Spencer and Ba rbar a Morus.

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