The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. 

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: 

Document Title: Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention 

Program (MGIP) 

Author(s): Irving A. Spergel; Kwai Ming Wa; 

Rolando V. Sosa 

Document No.: 209187 

Date Received: May 2005 

Award Number: 97-MU-FX-K014 

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. 

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federallyfunded grant final report available electronically in addition to 

traditional paper copies. 

Opinions or points of view expressed are those 

of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect 

the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention Program (MGIP) 

Irving A. Spergel, Kwai Ming Wa, Rolando Villarreal Sosa 

with 

Candice Kane, Elisa Barrios and Annot M. Spergel 

School of Social Service Administration 

University of Chicago 

969 East 60th Street 

Chicago, Illinois 60637 

October, 2002 

© School of Social Service Administration, The University of Chicago 

This evaluation was supported by a grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention (97-MU-FX-K014-S-4). Points of view are those of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the position of the United States Department of Justice. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Acknowledgments (Mesa) 

Many thanks to all who helped with the National Evaluation of the Comprehensive, 

Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program in 

Mesa, Arizona. The Evaluation could not have been completed without the extensive efforts and 

cooperation of the Mesa Police Department, the lead agency, the City Manager’s Office, the City 

Council, the United Way, Mesa Public Schools, and the Juvenile and Adult divisions of the 

Maricopa County Probation Department. 

The burden of collaborating with the National Evaluation team was added to the 

challenge of developing a comprehensive program to address the youth gang problem. Projectrelated agency staff, Mesa public and non-profit agencies, grassroots organizations and city 

government leaders went to extra lengths, not only to support the Project, but to make possible 

the elaboration of existing agency data systems useful to the Evaluation. 

Project and related agency staff directly contributed to the success of the Evaluation. The 

local evaluator went to great lengths to develop and collect data from a comparison youth 

sample, as well as from program youth. Based on their collective work, we now know better 

what needs to be done to reduce the youth gang problem, and have documented how it was done. 

We must extend special thanks to the commitment and talents of the Project leaders: Dan 

Zorich, Project Case Management Coordinator and Supervisor, Adult Probation Department, 

Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County; Captain Lin Adams, Project Director, Commander, 

Mesa Police Department; as well as the very able Project Team of outreach youth workers, 

probation, police and other workers; T. Farrel Jensen, Vice-Mayor of Mesa; Lieutenant Steve 

Toland, Commander of Gang Crimes and Project Director (succeeding Captain Lin Adams), 

Cheryl K. Townsend, Chief Juvenile Probation Officer, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa 

County; Dr. Ray Rafford, Assistant Superintendent, and Dr. Lou Ann Dickson, Research and 

Evaluation, Mesa Public Schools; Jan Strauss, Chief of the Mesa Police Department; Dr. Guy 

Spiesman, Senior Vice-President, Mesa United Way; and last, but certainly not least, our highly 

resourceful local Evaluators, Professor Charles M. Katz and Vincent J. Webb of the College of 

Human Services, Administration of Justice Program, Arizona State University, who provided 

much valuable insight into the Mesa gang problem. 

These people were an extraordinary crew, highly committed to the success of the Project 

and the National Evaluation. 

Irving A. Spergel and Staff, National Evaluation 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Abstract 

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project, based on the OJJDP Comprehensive, CommunityWide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Model was successful in 

reducing the youth gang problem at the individual and Project-area levels. The Mesa Police 

Department – the lead agency – collaborated in the development of the program with the 

Maricopa Juvenile and Adult Probation Departments, the Mesa School District and United Way 

social agencies, and received strong support from the Mesa City Council. In the course of the 

five-year Project, the MGIP utilized a case-management approach involving a team of gang 

police, probation officers, case managers and outreach youth workers. 

The program emphasized the provision of social-intervention services, as well as 

controls, for 258 youth, mainly male Latinos between the ages of 12 and 20. Most were gang 

members on probation, but were not violent offenders. In a multivariate, statistically-controlled 

comparison of these youth with 96 comparison youth (who received no program services) from 

three comparison gang-problem areas, the program youth reduced their level of arrests 18% more 

than did the comparison youth, over a four-year program period compared to an equivalent fouryear pre-program period. The program area also experienced a 10.4% greater reduction in 

selected youth-typical crime incidents relative to an average of such crime incidents over the 

three comparison areas. The factors of gang identification – gang membership, gang association, 

or no gang connection – were not significant in accounting for changes in arrest patterns. 

Category of prior total arrests, program effects and community/institutional collaboration were 

the most significant factors accounting for the considerable measure of success. 

i 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Executive Summary 

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project was generally successful in reducing the 

delinquency-related gang problem at both individual and area levels. Its success in adapting the 

OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and 

Suppression Model was based largely on the collaboration of the lead agency – the Mesa Police 

Department – with the Maricopa County Juvenile and Adult Probation Departments, the Mesa 

School District, United Way social agencies, and the City Council. The Project utilized a case 

management team approach, involving the Project Director, a Case Management Coordinator, 

gang detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers, and a Youth Intervention Specialist 

– all housed together in a central location in the program area. 

OJJDP funded the Project for five years, with additional funding from local agency 

sources, especially from the police and probation departments. The gang problem in its 

delinquent character was just emerging in Mesa, although gangs were known to have existed 

there for generations. Gangs as a criminal-justice problem were identified only in the early 

1990s. The key program objective was to provide social-intervention services, as well as control 

activities, to gang-involved and at-risk youth, most of whom were on probation but were not 

serious offenders (at least not for violence offenses). 

Two-hundred-and-fifty-eight (258) program youth were provided with a wide variety of 

social-intervention and control services, including individual and family counseling, group 

discussions, referrals to a variety of community agencies, and surveillance, supervision, 

monitoring and arrest. Some neighborhood-development services were provided to residents of 

ii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the program area. A sample of 96 comparison youth was matched with program youth on age, 

gender and program-exposure time. The comparison youth were from an area similar to the 

program area but did not receive Project services. Older-youth probationers with arrest records 

predominated in the program during its first two years of operations; somewhat younger, lessserious offenders and non-offenders predominated in the second two years. Approximately 82% 

of youth in the program were males; 85% were Latino (mainly of Mexican or Mexican-American 

origin); at program entry, ages ranged from 12 to 20 years, with 15 to 17-year-olds comprising 

the major age group. 

The majority of youth at program entry (or its equivalent for comparison youth) were 

either self-declared gang members, or were so identified by Project workers. An additional 17% 

were gang associates, but more than 20% were non-gang youth. Based on arrest records, gangidentified youth were more often delinquent than gang associates and non-gang youth; more than 

a third of program youth had no arrest history prior to program entry. For both program and 

comparison youth, between two-thirds and three-quarters of pre-program and program-period 

arrests were for property offenses and minor offenses (such as driving without a license, 

disorderly conduct, possession of alcohol, and curfew violations). Serious violence comprised 

3.8% of all arrests; total violence (including felony and misdemeanor violence) comprised 

14.5%; and drug arrests about 8.0% of all arrests. 

A total of 10,933 services, 11,893 direct worker contacts and 3140 coordinated worker 

contacts were provided by Project workers to program youth. Program data analysis was based 

on 1650 worker tracking forms completed every three months by Project workers. Youth who 

entered the program during its first two years were provided with an average of 27.8 months of 

iii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
services and worker contacts; youth who entered the program in the last two years were provided 

with an average of 9.4 months of services and worker contacts. Despite the differences in length 

of program-exposure time, youth who came into the program in the last two years were provided 

with more services (69.6%), more direct contacts (50.0%) and more coordinated contacts 

(57.1%) on a monthly basis than were youth who came into the program in the first two years. 

The Evaluators were able to obtain interviews and self-reports only for program youth 

who entered the program in the first two years, and for comparison youth. Complete police arrest 

histories, however, were obtained for all youth in the program, whether interviewed or not, and 

for the comparison youth (all of whom were interviewed). The effectiveness of the program was 

determined at the individual and area levels, using arrest data. A series of multivariate 

procedures (General Linear and Logistic Regression models) were constructed to examine 

program effects, controlling for youth demographics, gang membership, program-exposure time, 

and prior arrest histories. The key dependent, or outcome, variables were differences in 

annualized total arrests between the matched program and pre-program periods. 

We also compared differences in self-reported offenses among the interviewed program 

youth (n = 106) and the interviewed comparison youth (n = 96) over the generally shorter (1 to 

11⁄4-year period between the first and second interviews. Results of the analyses using arrest and 

self-report data were similar. 

In general, program and comparison youth reduced their average levels of arrests (and 

self-reported offenses). Program youth, under controlled statistical conditions, had an 18% 

greater reduction in total arrests than comparison youth. The oldest age group (18 years and 

over) and the youngest age group (12 to 14 years) reduced their levels of total arrests more than 

iv 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
did the 15 to 17-year-olds. Program females did significantly better than males. 

Factors that did not seem to make a difference were: whether the youth was a gang 

member, a gang associate, or a non-gang youth; length of time (years) in the program; and 

probation status. The most significant factor (or main effect) in the models was prior arrest 

category (or self-reported offenses) × program effects. 

Social-intervention services (including individual or family counseling and group 

discussion) – whether provided by probation officers, case managers, or outreach youth workers 

– were the significant program variables predictive of lower outcome effects for total arrests, 

including arrests for violence, drugs, property and “other” (minor) offenses. Suppression 

activities were generally less effective. General levels of contacts by the various types of Project 

workers (coordinated suppression or non-suppression services) and total services were also less 

important. Specific level of social-intervention service was not significant, except that the 

highest level of social-intervention services was significant in lowering arrests for youth with the 

highest category of prior arrests. 

Program youth (i.e., those for whom interview data were available) provided with high 

levels of social-intervention services increased their levels of educational achievement compared 

to program youth who were provided with low levels of social-intervention services (controlling 

for age and pre-program arrests). Further, there was evidence that those program youth who 

stayed in school or achieved a higher grade level significantly decreased their total arrests. 

Project success was also evident at the area level. Total incidents of crime typically 

committed by youth (including violence, property, drug crime and status offenses) declined 

10.4% more in the program area than in the average of the three comparison areas. Furthermore, 

v 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the program was more effective with program gang youth who hung out in the program area, 

compared to program gang youth who hung out with gangs in the comparison areas. The fact 

that Project workers were particularly active in the program area probably accounted for these 

differences. 

Finally, we observe that the MGIP did not incorporate all of the elements of the OJJDP 

Comprehensive Gang Model in program development, particularly the use of outreach youth 

workers in the neighborhood, and collaboration with grassroots organizations. Also, more 

seriously-delinquent gang youth should have been included in the program. 

In sum, major factors contributing to Project success were cohesive and capable 

community and staff leadership committed to a balanced social-intervention and control 

approach, particularly to the provision of social-intervention services to moderately delinquent, 

non-violent, and at-risk youth. 

vi 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) 

vii


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Research, Evaluation and Technical Assistance (GRETA) Projects 

Staff 

Irving A. Spergel, Principal Investigator 

Candice Kane, Co-Principal Investigator 

Kwai Ming Wa, Assistant Research Director 

Rolando V. Sosa, Senior Research Analyst 

Elisa Barrios, Assistant Projects’ Manager 

Cheong Sun Park, Research Assistant 

Lorita A. Purnell, Research Assistant 

Francisco Perez, Research Assistant 

Gabriela Ibarra, Research Assistant 

Ayad Jacob, Research Assistant 

Annot Spergel, Editorial Assistant 

viii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) 

The University of Chicago, School of Social Service Administration 

© 2002 by the University of Chicago 

All rights reserved. 

ix 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table of Contents 

Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 


Executive Summary ........................................................... ii


Chapters 

1. Program and Evaluation Background .......................................... 1.1


2. Evaluation Issues and Problems .............................................. 2.1


3. The Program and Comparison Areas .......................................... 3.1


4. The Gang Problem In Mesa ................................................. 4.1


5. Mesa’s Response to the Gang Problem ......................................... 5.1


6. Program Implementation: Strengths and Weaknesses ............................. 6.1


7. Organization Perceptions and Program Performance .............................. 7.1


8. Research Method: Data Collection, Measurement, and Analysis ..................... 8.1


9. Characteristics of the Program and Comparison Youth Samples ..................... 9.1


10. Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies .......... 10.1


11. Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables ..................... 11.1


12. Program Youth Outcomes: Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Variables ........... 12.1


13. Mediating Variables ..................................................... 13.1


14. Gang and Community-Level Crime Changes .................................. 14.1


15. Lessons Learned (and to Be Learned) ........................................ 15.1


16. General Summary ....................................................... 16.1


x 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table of Contents – continued 

Appendices


Appendix A – Police Arrest Charges ............................... Appendix A - Page 1

Appendix B – Self-Report Offenses ............................... Appendix B - Page 1

Appendix C – Glossary of Services/Worker Contacts .................. Appendix C - Page 1

Appendix D – S/W Gang Involvement Scale ........................ Appendix D - Page 1

References ........................................................ References - 1

xi 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Illustrations 

Charts 

Chart 1.1 – Comprehensive Gang Program: Implementation Model ................... 1.32


Chart 1.2 – Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model .......................... 1.33


Chart 2.1 – Evaluation Model: Program and Comparison Areas, Gangs, Youth .......... 2.23


Figures 

Figure 14.1 – Total Offense Rates, By Year and By Program and Comparison Area ...... 14.25 

Figure 14.2 – Selected Offense Rates, By Year and By Program and Comparison Area ... 14.26 

xii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Tables 

Chapter 3 

Table 3.1– Selected Population Characteristics: 1990 and 2000 Census, Mesa, Arizona ..... 3.6 

Table 3.2 – Selected Population Characteristics: 1990 and 2000 Census, Powell Jr. High School 

Attendance Area ................................................... 3.7 

Table 3.3 – Selected Population Characteristics: 1990 and 2000 Census, Carson Jr. High School 

Attendance Area ................................................... 3.8 

Table 3.4 – Selected Population Characteristics: 1990 and 2000 Census, Kino Jr. High School 

Attendance Area ................................................... 3.9 

Table 3.5 – Selected Population Characteristics: 1990 and 2000 Census, Mesa Jr. High School 

Attendance Area .................................................. 3.10 

Chapter 7 

Table 7.1 – Organization Survey Mean Ratings of Gang and Non-Gang Crime Categories 

 in Program Area by Site and by Time Period ............................ 7.10 

Table 7.2 – Gang Problem Experienced by Organization by Site and by Time Period: 

Mean Rating ........................................................ 7.11 

Table 7.3 – Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem 

 by Site and by Time Period: Mean Rating ............................... 7.12


Table 7.4 – Program Performance Indicators: Mean Scores .......................... 7.14


Table 7.5 – Program Performance Score Distribution (All Respondents) ................ 7.15


Chapter 8 

Table 8.1 – Age of Program and Comparison Youth ............................... 8.24 

Table 8.2 – Age of Matched and Unmatched Youth with Arrests ...................... 8.25 

xiii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 9 

Table 9.1A – Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I (or Program Entry), Gender ...... 9.19 

Table 9.1B – Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II, Gender ........... 9.19 

Table 9.2A – Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I (or Program Entry), 

 Race/Ethnicity .................................................. 9.20 

Table 9.2B – Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II, Race/Ethnicity ..... 9.20 

Table 9.3A – Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I (or Program Entry), Age ........ 9.21 

Table 9.3B – Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II, Age ............. 9.21 

Table 9.4A – Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I (or Program Entry),Gang Membership 

................................................................... 9.22 

Table 9.4B – Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II, Gang Membership .. 9.22 

Table 9.5A – Interviewed Program Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period .. 9.23 

Table 9.5B – Non-Interviewed Program Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period 

................................................................... 9.24


Table 9.5C – Comparison Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period ......... 9.25


Table 9.6 – Gang Membership by Location ....................................... 9.26


Table 9.7 – Self-Reported Total Offenses at Time I ................................ 9.27


Table 9.8 – Self-Reported Total Arrests at Time I .................................. 9.28


Table 9.9 – Self-Reported Total Violence Offenses at Time I ........................ 9.29


Table 9.10 – Self-Reported Total Property Offenses at Time I ........................ 9.30


Table 9.11A – Self-Reported Drug Selling at Time I ............................... 9.31


Table 9.11B – Self-Reported Drug Selling at Time I – continued ...................... 9.32


Table 9.12A – Self-Reported Drug Use at Time I .................................. 9.33


xiv 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.12B – Self-Reported Drug Use at Time I – continued ........................ 9.34


Table 9.13 – Self-Reported Alcohol Use at Time I ................................. 9.35


Table 9.14 – Access to a Handgun at Time I ...................................... 9.36


Table 9.15 – Arrest Histories: Pre-Program Period ................................. 9.37


Table 9.16 – Youth on Probation ............................................... 9.38


Table 9.17A – Type of Arrest Charge: All Program Youth by Pre-Program and Program Period 


................................................................... 9.39 

Table 9.17B – Type of Arrest Charge: Time-I-Interviewed Program Youth by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ...................................................... 9.40 

Table 9.17C – Type of Arrest Charge: Non-Interviewed Program Youth by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ...................................................... 9.41 

Table 9.17D – Type of Arrest Charge: Comparison Youth by Pre-Program and Program Period 

................................................................... 9.42 

Table 9.18A – Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: All Program Youth by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ...................................................... 9.43 

Table 9.18B – Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Time-I-Interviewed Program Youth by PreProgram and Program Period ........................................... 9.44 

Table 9.18C – Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Non-Interviewed Program Youth by PreProgram and Program Period ........................................... 9.45 

Table 9.18D – Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Comparison Youth by Pre-Program and 

Program Period ...................................................... 9.46 

Chapter 10 

Table 10.1A – Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the MGIP, By Year and 6-Month Period 

................................................................. 10.22 

Table 10.1B – Non-Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the MGIP, By Year and 6-Month 

Period ............................................................. 10.23 

xv 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.2A – Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the MGIP by Selected Demographic 

Characteristics ...................................................... 10.24 

Table 10.2B – Non-Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the MGIP by Selected 

Demographic Characteristics ........................................... 10.25 

Table 10.3 – Dosage of Services and Contacts, Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Program Youth 

.................................................................. 10.26 

Table 10.4 – Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Youth, Types of Services .............. 10.27


Table 10.5A – Types of Services, Interviewed Program Youth ...................... 10.28


Table 10.5B – Types of Services, Non-Interviewed Program Youth .................. 10.33


Table 10.6A – Types of Direct Contacts, Interviewed Program Youth ................. 10.38


Table 10.6B – Types of Direct Contacts, Non-Interviewed Program Youth ............. 10.42


Table 10.7 – Coordinated Contacts: Interviewed Program Youth, By Type of Worker and Type of


Worker Contacted ................................................... 10.47 

Table 10.8 – Coordinated Contacts: Non-Interviewed Youth, By Type of Worker and Type of 

Worker Contacted ................................................... 10.48 

Table 10.9 – Types of Services by Types of Workers .............................. 10.49 

Chapter 11 

Table 11.1 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests .............. 11.23 

Table 11.2 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total 

Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ..................... 11.26 

Table 11.3 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure On Total 

Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ................. 11.27 

Table 11.4 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests (Controlling 

for Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) ....................... 11.28 

Table 11.5 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total 

Violence Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ............. 11.30 

xvi 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.6 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total 

Violence Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ......... 11.31 

Table 11.7 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total 

Violence Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth (Eliminating “ZeroZeros”) ............................................................ 11.32 

Table 11.8 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total 

Violence Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth (Eliminating 

“Zero-Zeros”) ....................................................... 11.33 

Table 11.9 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests (Controlling for 

Property Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) ............................... 11.34 

Table 11.10 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Property 

Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ..................... 11.36 

Table 11.11 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Property 

Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ................. 11.37 

Table 11.12 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests (Controlling for Drug 

Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) ...................................... 11.38 

Table 11.13 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug 

Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ..................... 11.40 

Table 11.14 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug 

Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ................. 11.41 

Table 11.15 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug 

Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth (Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”) 

.................................................................. 11.42 

Table 11.16 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Drug 

Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth (Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”) 

.................................................................. 11.43 

Table 11.17 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests (Controlling for 

“Other” Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) ............................... 11.44 

Table 11.18 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on “Other” 

Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ..................... 11.45 

xvii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.19 – Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on “Other” 

Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ................. 11.46 

Chapter 12 

Table 12.1 – Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Covariates (N=148): An Analysis of Variance 

of Change in Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Control Variables .... 12.25 

Table 12.2 – Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention (N=148): An Analysis of 

Variance of Change in Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social 

Intervention ........................................................ 12.27 

Table 12.3 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention for Total Sample 

(N=169): Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure)on Total 

Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention ........... 12.30 

Table 12.4 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention Provided by 

Probation and Police Officers (N=169): Summary of Logistic Regression of Project 

Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Social Intervention ................................................... 12.31 

Table 12.5 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention Provided by 

Probation and Police Officers (N=42): Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect 

(Success vs Failure) on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social 

Intervention ........................................................ 12.32 

Table 12.6 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention Provided by 

Probation and Police Officers (N=127): Summary of Logistic Regression of Project 

Effect (Success vs Failure)on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Social Intervention ................................................... 12.33 

Table 12.7 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention Provided by Case 

Managers and Outreach Workers (N=169): Summary of Logistic Regression of Project 

Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Social Intervention ................................................... 12.34 

Table 12.8 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention Provided by Case 

Managers and Outreach Workers (N=90): Summary of Logistic Regression of Project 

Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Social Intervention ................................................... 12.35 

Table 12.9 – Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention Provided by Case 

xviii 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Managers and Outreach Workers (N=79): Summary of Logistic Regression of Project 

Effect (Success vs Failure) on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Social Intervention .................................................. 12.36 

Table 12.10 – Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Suppression (N=65): An Analysis of 

Variance of Change in Yearly Violence Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Suppression ........................................................ 12.37 

Table 12.11 – Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Social Intervention (N=65): An Analysis 

of Variance of Change in Yearly Violence Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Social Intervention ................................................... 12.39 

Table 12.12 – Logistic Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Suppression (N=65): Summary of 

Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Violence Arrests for 

Program Youth with Level of Suppression ................................ 12.41 

Table 12.13 – Logistic Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Social Intervention (N = 65) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly 

Violence Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention .......... 12.42 

Table 12.14 – Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Social Intervention (N=39): An Analysis of 

Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social 

Intervention ........................................................ 12.43 

Table 12.15 – Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Suppression (N=39): An Analysis of Variance 

of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Suppression .. 12.45 

Table 12.16 – Logistic Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Social Intervention (N=39): 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Drug 

Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention .................. 12.46 

Table 12.17 – Logistic Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Suppression (N=39): Summary of 

Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Drug Arrests for 

Program Youth with Level of Suppression ................................ 12.47 

Table 12.18 – Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Suppression (N=90): An Analysis of 

Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests for Program Youth with Level of 

Suppression ........................................................ 12.48 

Table 12.19 – Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Social Intervention (N=90): An Analysis 

of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social 

Intervention ........................................................ 12.51 

xix 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.20 – Logistic Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Suppression (N=90): Summary of 

Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly Property Arrests for 

Program Youth with Level of Suppression ................................ 12.53 

Table 12.21 – Logistic Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Social Intervention (N=90): 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly 

Property Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention .......... 12.54 

Table 12.22 – Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests and Social Intervention (N=105): An Analysis 

of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social 

Intervention ........................................................ 12.55 

Table 12.23 – Logistic Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests and Social Intervention (N=169): 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) on Yearly “Other” 

Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention .................. 12.57 

Chapter 13 

Table 13.1 – Summary of School Status Change for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

.................................................................. 13.15 

Table 13.2 – Summary of Job Status Change for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

.................................................................. 13.16 

Table 13.3 – Summary of Change in Youth Legal Monthly Income for Interviewed Program and 

Comparison Youth .................................................. 13.17 

Table 13.4 – Summary of Change in Youth “Legal” Monthly Income from Household Members 

and Friends for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ................. 13.18 

Table 13.5 – Summary of Change in Youth Illegal Monthly Income for Interviewed Program and 

Comparison Youth .................................................. 13.19 

Table 13.6 – Summary of Change in Legal Household Yearly Income for Interviewed Program 

and Comparison Youth ............................................... 13.20 

Table 13.7 – Summary of Change in Illegal Household Yearly Income for Interviewed Program 

and Comparison Youth ............................................... 13.21 

Table 13.8 – Summary of Change in Drug Use for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

.................................................................. 13.22 

xx 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.9 – Summary of Change in Personal Crises for Interviewed Program and Comparison 

Youth ............................................................. 13.23 

Table 13.10 – Summary of Change in Family Crises for Interviewed Program and Comparison 

Youth ............................................................. 13.24 

Table 13.11 – Summary of Change in Gang Involvement for Interviewed Program and 

Comparison Youth .................................................. 13.25 

Table 13.12 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Education Level/School Status, Controlling 

for Total Arrests in the Pre-Program Period ............................... 13.26 

Table 13.13 – Summary of Change in Education Level/School Status for Interviewed Program 

Youth ............................................................. 13.27 

Table 13.14 – An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Arrests, Controlling for Total Arrests 

in the Pre-Program Period, for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth ..... 13.28 

Chapter 14 

Table 14.1 – Gang Membership of 14 Gangs: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews, Program and 

Comparison Areas ................................................... 14.20 

Table 14.2 – Police Perceptions of Gang Crime: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews, Program and 

Comparison Areas ................................................... 14.21


Table 14.3 – Offense Rate per 1000 by Type of Offense ............................ 14.23


Table 14.4 – Offense Rate per 1000 by Selected Type of Offense .................... 14.34


xxi 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
xxii


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 1 

Program and Evaluation Background 

Introduction 

In 1994, in accordance with Sections 281 and 282 of the Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Act of 1974, as amended, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, utilized a collaborative 

process to respond to America’s gang problem (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention, 1994). Its purpose was to implement a comprehensive approach for gang prevention, 

intervention, and suppression through local programs around the country. Five cities – 

Bloomington-Normal (McLean County), Illinois; San Antonio, Texas; Mesa, Arizona; Tucson, 

Arizona; and Riverside, California – were selected and awarded funds for periods of four or five 

years to develop and conduct a series of coordinated efforts to assess the nature and extent of the 

local gang problem, and to plan and implement comprehensive, community-wide programs. 

The comprehensive initiative also provided funding for technical assistance, and for an 

evaluation of the development and impact of these programs. This report of the Mesa Gang 

Intervention Project (MGIP) is the second of a series of evaluations of each of the five programs. 

Background. Youth gangs were in existence and had been troublesome for many decades in 

large cities, among them Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, 

Detroit, San Antonio, and Cleveland (Miller, 2001). Youth gang violence, gang-related drug 

activities, and other forms of gang crime became increasingly prevalent in cities and towns of 

1.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
varying sizes, and in rural areas as well. Violence was increasingly lethal in the late 1980s and 

throughout much of the 1990s. Drive-by shootings claimed the lives of rival gang members as 

well as those of innocent bystanders. Entrepreneurial gang members also became active in the 

distribution of illegal drugs. A range of other types of organized group crimes committed by 

youth was also prevalent (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). 

A disturbing trend since the 1980s and 1990s has been the emergence, or re-emergence, 

of the gang problem in a range of large- , mid- , and small-sized cities, suburban areas, small 

towns, rural areas and Indian reservations in almost all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the territories. 

However, the specific scope, nature and severity of the gang problem in those jurisdictions has 

not been clearly defined. The best approach(es) for addressing the problem has (have) not been 

identified. 

In an early national survey of law enforcement agencies, officials in 91% of the 79 largest 

U.S. cities reported the presence of youth gang problems (Curry, 1992). It conservatively 

estimated that during 1991, there were 4,881 gangs with nearly 250,000 gang members. An 

estimated 780,200 gang members were active in 28,700 youth gangs in 1998. This was a 

decrease from 1997's figures of 816,000 gang members and 30,500 gangs (National Youth Gang 

Center, November, 2000). In 1996, 1997, and 1998, Curry, Maxson, and Howell examined gang 

homicide trends in 1216 cities with populations greater than 25,000. A total of 237 cities 

reported both a gang problem and at least one gang-related homicide for each of these years. 

However, relatively few of the cities, outside of Los Angeles and Chicago, reported large 

numbers of gang homicides (Curry, Maxson, Howell, 2001 #3). 

The characteristics of the gang problem, including such terms as gang, gang member, and 

1.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang incident, have not been clearly or consensually defined. A street gang or youth gang, for 

program and policy-development purposes, is usually differentiated from adult crime gangs, 

prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, drug gangs, tagger groups, racist groups, or even delinquent 

groups. Nevertheless, these categories of gangs, crime groups, or delinquent groups can overlap. 

What generally distinguishes the youth gang are a commitment to violence, group symbolism, 

turf, drug use and drug selling, variable degrees of group cohesion, and sustainability. 

Most active youth-gang members are between the ages of 12 and 20, sometimes younger 

or older. While gangs comprise mainly males, females are increasingly identified as gang 

members and commit a range of property crimes, although they tend to be less violent, less 

chronically delinquent, and less committed to the gang than males. Youth identified as gang 

members usually have different statuses in, and degrees of attachment to, the gangs, which vary 

over time. They generally come from low-income, minority, problem families in certain oftensegregated neighborhoods. The definition of the gang problem, based on the definition of a gang 

incident, varies somewhat from city to city or state to state. The definition of a gang incident or a 

gang offense depends on: 1) gang-membership criteria (i.e., the youth has been identified as a 

member of a criminal gang or associates with gang members and is on a police gang-membership 

[or gang-associate] list); or 2) gang-motivated criteria (i.e., the youth has been involved in an 

incident involving certain distinctive gang characteristics, such as drive-by shooting, 

intimidation, retaliation, use of symbols, signs, or graffiti) (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995). The 

definitions are usually incorporated in state law and have become a basis for increased lawenforcement activity and justice-system processing. The gang-membership definition generally 

results in identification of larger numbers of gang youth than the gang-motivational definition 

1.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(Maxson and Klein, 1990). 

While progress has been made in defining and explaining the gang problem, limited 

progress has been made in learning or demonstrating how to deal with the problem successfully. 

In recent decades, law enforcement has been the dominant agency attempting to control or 

resolve the problem, which nevertheless continues to develop and spread in sometimes cyclical, 

seemingly unpredictable ways. Increasingly, policy makers, program operators, and researchers 

have concluded that the youth-gang problem is highly complex, and that a better-informed and 

coordinated effort is required from key community and public agency elements to correctly target 

problem gangs and gang youth, and develop an interrelated approach to successfully addressing 

the problem. 

Preliminary Efforts. In 1987, OJJDP funded The Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention 

Program, a preliminary research and development initiative to investigate and describe conditions 

that perpetuate the youth-gang problem, and to develop a model for local community effort to 

reduce it. Literature reviews, national surveys, site visits, conferences, reports, intervention and 

technical assistance models were produced. The report of that program (1987-1991) concluded 

that the gang problem varied somewhat from community to community, but that it was a result of 

a combination of interactive factors: poverty, rapid population movement, racism, segregation 

and social isolation of minority groups, weak family structure, adolescent youth in crisis, the 

development of youth-gang subcultures, and, in particular, community disorganization, or 

fragmentation of levels and types of community efforts to address the problem (Spergel, 1995). 

A model approach was developed based on the notion that local institutions had to 

1.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
coordinate their efforts and target particular community sectors and unsatisfactory organizational 

arrangements, as well as particular gangs, gang members and youth highly at risk of gang 

involvement (Spergel, 1995). In 1994, OJJDP solicited applications for, and subsequently 

launched, the five-site demonstration of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program (the “Comprehensive Gang Program”). 

Comprehensive evaluation, training and technical assistance efforts, and the creation of a 

national advisory board were to be closely associated with and related to the set of demonstration 

programs (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994). 

Theory 

The Program Model derives from Community Social Disorganization theory and, to some 

extent, from theories such as Differential Association, Opportunity, Anomie, and Social Control. 

The community-based program model builds on the ideas and research of Battin-Pearson et al 

(1998), Bursik and Grasmick (1993), Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Cohen (1980), Curry and 

Spergel (1988), Haynie (2001), Hirschi (1969), Klein (1971, 1995), Kobrin, (1951), Kornhauser 

(1978), Markowitz, Bellair, Liska and Liu (2001), Merton (1957), Morenoff, Sampson and 

Raudenbush (2001), Sampson (1991), Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson and Laub (1993), 

Shaw and McKay (1972), Spergel (1995), Sullivan and Miller (1999), Sutherland and Cressey 

(1978), Suttles (1968), Thrasher (1927), Veysey and Messner (1999), and Zatz (1987). 

Gang-problem communities (or segments of communities) are viewed as comprising two 

overlapping types – chronic and emerging. The first is characterized by an established, 

marginalized population and a long-term, serious gang problem. The second is characterized by 

1.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
a recently-arrived, less-marginalized population and a less serious, more recently-developed gang 

problem. Scope, duration, and severity of both adult and juvenile crime, including gang crime, 

tend to be greater in the chronic than in the emerging gang-crime communities or their segments. 

Turf-based gang violence and drug-crime markets, although not always closely related, seem to 

be more prevalent in chronic gang-problem communities; a range of minor offenses, less 

violence and increasing drug crime activities seem to be more prevalent in emerging gangproblem communities. The nature of the gang problem and the response to it are also based on 

the community’s – especially the city’s – perception of the problem, its level of concern, and 

political interests in addressing the problem. 

Organized crime and youth-gang crime are often better developed and interrelated in 

chronic than in emerging gang-problem communities. Conventional or legitimate institutions are 

relatively stronger in the emerging local gang-crime community or community segment, and are 

also better integrated with conventional institutions of the city or larger community. Moral panic 

often characterizes the response of formerly-stable but now changing populations, and of 

established community leaders in emerging gang-crime communities (Cohen, 1980; Zatz, 1987). 

Levels of victimization due to violence are lower in emerging gang-crime communities, but 

higher in chronic gang-crime communities. 

Socialization of youth in the chronic gang-problem community is more likely to occure 

because of the presence of a variety of criminal, weak social-agency or conventionalneighborhood and street-based group pressures (Venkatesh, 1999) than in the emerging gangproblem community. Youth access to illegitimate opportunities and to gang status may not be as 

well-developed in the emerging gang-problem community, where legitimate opportunities may 

1.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
be relatively more available, and pressures for conventional behavior may be greater (see also 

Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). 

Social-intervention and suppression strategies are poorly integrated in chronic gangproblem communities. The police may pay more attention to serious gang crime, while social 

agencies and grassroots organizations provide limited social support for youth, especially those at 

risk. Suppression and intervention strategies are carried out in a manner unrelated to each other. 

In emerging gang-problem communities, social intervention and suppression strategies are 

reasonably well-integrated, at least at the established-agency level of the community, and efforts 

are usually targeted to youth committing less-serious gang offenses. Community, justice system, 

and social service agencies seem to overreact to the presence of low-income minority youths, 

who are increasingly identified, or defined, as gang-at-risk or actual gang members. 

Efforts to counter community social disorganization require mobilization of agency and 

citizen interest, social intervention, and provision of social opportunities as well as suppression, 

but in different combinations in the chronic and emerging gang-problem communities. In the 

chronic gang-problem community, relatively greater responsibility may be necessary at the city or 

county level for mobilizing local and area-wide institutions, coordinating strategies and efforts, 

and developing and extending resources to prevent and control serious gang problems. In the 

emerging gang-problem community, relatively greater responsibility may be necessary at the 

local neighborhood or community level for mobilizing and integrating local institutions, 

coordinating prevention and social-intervention strategies, and for directing existing local 

resources to less serious gang problems, and particularly to youth at risk for gang involvement. 

However, chronic and emerging gang-problem sectors of a community or region may interact and 

1.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
even coalesce, and therefore variable attention may need to be paid and resources allocated to the 

different types of youth-gang problems at the individual and community-sector levels over time. 

The Program Model 

The OJJDP Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program Model consists of three sets of interrelated components: 

key program elements, strategies, and implementation principles, all directed to the nature and 

scope of the gang problem and related demographic, socio-economic, organizational and local 

community factors (Chart 1.1). Coordinated policy, program, and worker efforts have to take 

place at individual-youth, organization, and community levels. Ideally, all components of the 

Model have to be present, and developed for maximum positive effects, for the reduction of the 

gang problem to occur. 

Program Elements 

A series of program structures and processes is necessary to activate the Model, which 

comprise a steering committee, lead-agency management, an interagency street team (including 

youth outreach workers), grassroots involvement, social services, criminal justice participation, 

school participation, and employment and training. 

The Steering Committee has to engage the leadership of the community, including the 

mayor’s office, public and non-profit agencies, local schools, grassroots and county organizations 

in a comprehensive effort of gang-problem analysis, policy planning, strategy development, 

acquisition of resources, and program implementation and refinement. The direction of the Gang 

1.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Program Model requires criminal justice system policy and administrative support, and the frontline collaborative involvement of law enforcement, probation, community-based youth agencies, 

schools and employment sources, as well as the involvement of local grassroots groups 

(particularly churches and neighborhood groups) and even of former gang members. The 

steering committee is to bring the knowledge and influence of key community leaders together in 

a cohesive structure to guide the development of the Gang Program and an approach that will 

both protect the community and target gang-involved and highly-at-risk youth for integration into 

the legitimate life of the community. 

Lead-Agency Management. A lead agency has to be selected to develop, manage and 

coordinate the various elements of the Comprehensive Gang Program. Such an organization 

must have a background of work with gang-involved or highly at-risk gang youth, and a broad 

understanding of their needs and problems. It should have the capacity to mobilize its own 

agency resources as well as those of other agencies, to enlist grassroots support, and develop 

additional resources to sustain the Program. A police department, youth agency, public school, 

community mental health agency, probation department, or a special youth authority may be well 

positioned to undertake leadership and responsibility for program development. Much depends 

on the agency’s leadership commitment to an outreaching, well-balanced, social-service as well 

as community-control and community-participation approach, targeted to delinquent, highly atrisk and gang youth. 

A special requirement is that the lead agency not only have sufficient management, 

capable staff, and interest and experience in dealing with the gang problem, but also genuine 

commitment to the comprehensive community-wide gang approach. The normal bureaucratic 

1.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
impulse to acquire and use resources to meet traditional or particular organizational interests and 

the routine provision of services must be restrained. It is inappropriate for the lead agency or a 

consortium of agencies to “buy into the approach,” and simply to “split the pie,” so that each 

agency can continue to do what it usually does, only now with more resources. The lead agency 

must be truly committed to a new, institutional and community-participatory approach, which 

ensures that policy and practices are developed to implement the Model. 

The Interagency Street Team should be a formal outreach team of direct-service personnel 

(police, probation, outreach youth workers, school officials and community organizers) who 

continually interact with each other in regard to differential planning, programming and 

contacting gang-involved and/or highly-at-risk youth, as well as particular gangs and families. 

The team must also address neighborhood contexts and organizational situations that influence 

the behavior of targeted gang youth. The outreach or street team is the key youth direct-service 

component of the Gang Program, whose members are also in communication with local groups 

and neighborhood residents. It operates during day-time as well as evening and late night hours, 

on weekends, and during crisis times. 

The outreach youth worker has an especially important role to play. Ideally he should be 

a former influential gang member from the neighborhood, now fully identified with the norms 

and values of legitimate society, yet sensitive to the needs and problems of the local youth-gang 

society or culture. Minimally, he should be someone who is “streetwise” and able to relate 

comfortably to the targeted youth. He contributes to the assessment of the nature of youth-gang 

problem situations, and facilitates the outreach efforts of the rest of staff. Qualified and trained 

outreach youth workers can provide ready access to youth gangs, help define the gang problem, 

1.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and serve as mediators between the gang and established local community and institutional 

sectors. While the use of outreach youth workers has inherent risks, the benefits to program 

outcome outweigh the risks. 

Grassroots Involvement. The local community is complex, with many different 

individuals, groups, and organizations concerned about the gang problem, working with and 

against gang-involved and gang at-risk youth. Two key parts of the community that must be 

involved in the comprehensive gang program approach are: 1) established agencies such as 

police, schools, key governmental organizations, and youth agencies, who are all primarily 

concerned with the interests and concerns of the larger community; and 2) the grassroots 

community, comprising family, neighborhood groups, block clubs, political associations, citizen 

groups, churches, and other organizations whose members live and interact with gang youth in 

the area. Established agencies often set key program policies (affecting the lives of the residents) 

which are primarily based on the values and interests of the middle-class community or the city 

at large, and thus, ultimately, the legitimate developmental and career interests of youth. The 

grassroots organizations often focus on social support, crisis intervention and socialization issues 

more directly related to the expressed needs of the local (usually lower class) minority 

population. Communication and interaction between these two parts of the community in respect 

to the gang problem are often characterized by ambivalence or antagonism. A gang-problem 

community is usually characterized by a lack of sufficient interdependence and cooperation 

among and between established agencies and grassroots organizations. Grassroots elements as 

well as established agencies must participate in determining the direction of the project, as well 

as the day-to-day operation of the project street team. 

1.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Social Services. A variety of social service programs should be provided to ganginvolved program youth and their families, including younger siblings who may be at risk of 

gang membership and delinquent behavior. Targeted program youth often require crisis 

intervention and referral, and/or direct help with school, employment, and drug use problems, as 

well as with gang-related and personal-development issues. Social services should also be 

provided to families of targeted youth who may need assistance with housing, public aid, health 

care, family conflict resolution, employment, immigration, racism, and other problems which 

either directly affect gang youth, or are conducive to their gang behavior. 

The street team provides front-line and initial services to gang-at-risk and gang-involved 

youth. The outreach youth worker and other team members – police, probation, the 

neighborhood organizer – as well as lead agency staff are collectively responsible for a variable 

combination of support and control services. Each member of the team must share some 

responsibility for a complementary, and at times common, approach to the youth’s and 

community’s gang problem. 

Criminal Justice Participation. Police (including gang detectives) juvenile and adult 

probation, and juvenile and adult parole must be knowledgeable about the scope and nature of 

gang-crime in the target area and the community’s response to it. They must also be closely 

identified with the Comprehensive Gang Program. Police and probation are directly concerned 

with social control and suppression of the targeted youth, particularly those who are delinquent 

and gang-involved, but also must be careful not to label as gang members those youth who are 

not at high risk for gang involvement. Judicial authority, prosecution, detention and other justice 

system elements must support the street team through graduated sanctions in such a way as to 

1.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
facilitate the youth’s social development and to protect the community. 

Criminal justice administrators must encourage, if not require, law enforcement officials 

to collaborate with each other, as well as with other members of the street team, including 

outreach youth workers, educators and job-development personnel, in an integrated socialdevelopment and social-control approach. The police have a special responsibility to accurately 

assess the gang problem, and address it in as balanced and rational a way as possible, especially 

recognizing the close connection between the gang problem, race/ethnic issues, and political 

pressures and conflicting community interests. 

School Participation. Principals, teachers, and disciplinarians of regular public, 

parochial, and alternative schools are key components of the comprehensive approach to the gang 

problem. Schools, already overwhelmed with a range of educational and social problems, are 

generally reluctant to deal directly with the gang problem. The steering committee and lead 

agency administration have to persuade and assist school personnel to modify school “zerotolerance” practices, and often their practice of almost exclusive suspension and expulsion of 

gang members and at-risk youth. The street team should participate in the life of the school and 

assist school staff in addressing gang-related issues, thereby facilitating better development and 

use of educational opportunities by gang youth, preferably in the regular school program. 

Targeted youth need to be mainstreamed within the context of regular school to the extent 

possible, where it is hoped that they will receive an appropriate education which prepares them 

for legitimate career development. 

The use of alternative schools may or may not be the best way to address the educational 

and behavioral problems of gang youth. Special collaborative arrangements with social agencies 

1.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and therapeutic programs may assist gang youth to remain in regular school and to make 

productive use of educational opportunities. If the youth is referred to an alternative school, a 

high-quality educational program in a therapeutic context must be provided, with a firm 

commitment to returning the youth to a mainstream school as soon as possible. Outreach youth 

workers have a special responsibility not only to help program youth make the best use of 

available learning resources, but to assist school staff in better understanding the nature of gang 

pressures on program youth which arise from situations and crises both inside and outside the 

school. 

Employment and Training. Obtaining a job is critical to the transition of youth from the 

gang to legitimate and personally satisfying adult roles. Getting and holding a full-time job is a 

significant step for the youth, so that he no longer needs the gang or has the time and motivation 

to associate with gang members or participate in gang life. Job and work-skills training provide a 

legitimate and satisfying basis for leaving the gang. 

The youth worker and the job developer, closely related to the Gang Program, are the key 

personnel responsible for motivating youth to obtain jobs, and for helping sustain them on the job 

once employed. A major task of the job developer is contacting employers and training 

institutions to facilitate access to job and training opportunities for gang youth. Special 

arrangements may be required to open up jobs for youth who may at first be marginal workers. 

Special incentives may be necessary to enable employers to hire gang youth. Neighborhood 

residents, former gang members, and the youth’s family are sources of information about hiring 

opportunities and referrals for jobs, and need to be accessed by the street team. Steady 

girlfriends or wives also play an important part in sustaining youth on the job. 

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Steps in the Approach 

The steps in the application of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model (Chart 1.2) are 

as follows:1 

•	 The community leadership, including those in established agencies and grassroots groups, 

the mayor’s office and political leaders, as well as business leaders and the media must 

acknowledge that a youth-gang problem exists. 

•	 The steering committee, including criminal justice and youth agencies, schools, and other 

major public, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations, together with grassroots groups, 

must: conduct an assessment of the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem in the 

identified target community where gang crime (particularly violence and often drug 

selling) is most evident; develop and use appropriate definitions or descriptions of what is 

a delinquent/criminal gang, a gang member, or a youth who is at risk of gang 

membership; identify who particular gangs are; and identify the organizations available to 

address the gang problem in its various interrelated aspects. 

•	 Once the steering committee is established, a set of goals and objectives is determined, 

with the assistance and involvement of the lead agency and community leaders at 

influential and grassroots levels. The goals and objectives must address the identified 

gang problem and causal factors, based on the results of the assessment, and may be 

refined over time as a better understanding of the gang problem emerges. 

•	 The key goals must be the reduction of youth-gang crime, as well as the socialdevelopment of gang youth or those youth at high risk for gang involvement. This is to 

1

 Adapted from OJJDP Gang-Free Schools and Communities Initiatives 2000. 

1.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
be accomplished by improving the capacity of the community grassroots groups and 

agencies to address the problem through the application of interrelated strategies of 

community mobilization, opportunities provision, social intervention, suppression, and 

organizational change and development targeted to the particular gang problem. 

• The steering committee, the lead agency and community leaders must interact with each 

other to produce and make available relevant programming, i.e., strategies, services, 

tactics and procedures consistent with the Comprehensive Gang Program Model, 

particularly its five “core strategies” (see below). 

• The steering committee and community leaders must then assess the operation of the 

program, its outcome and impact, preferably through systematic evaluation procedures. If 

the results are positive, i.e., gang crime is absolutely or relatively reduced, then sufficient 

resources must be provided to sustain project activity and program development. 

• The process of intervention and attempting to cope with the youth-gang problem also 

contributes to ongoing assessment and understanding of the nature and changing scope of 

the problem, as well as to a determination of whether the Model has been appropriately 

applied. This is a process that continues during the course of the life of the project and 

beyond. 

Strategies 

The Model is multi-faceted and multi-layered, involving individual youth, family 

members, peers, agencies and the community. It is based on theory, research, and practice which 

assume that the gang problem is systemic, and is a response to rapid social change, local 

1.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community disorganization, poverty, fragmentation of approaches to the problem across multiple 

organizations, and institutional racism. The five core Model strategies and their associated 

cultural elements are as follows: 

Community Mobilization 

• Key established organizations, including police, probation, social agencies, schools, 

manpower agencies, community organizations (especially local community grassroots 

groups), churches, block clubs, and political groups, along with local residents and even 

former gang members, are involved in or advise on various assessments, problem 

analyses, policies, and program measures to be undertaken. These efforts are coordinated 

by the steering committee and the lead agency and, to the extent possible, integrated into 

a program and community-development process focused on the gang problem. 

• A steering committee of key established agencies and community organizations 

(including grassroots groups and faith-based organizations), as well as political and 

governmental leaders, is closely involved in the development of policy and practices, 

within and across agencies and community groups, and in the creation of a multidisciplinary street team. Key agencies will generally have to modify policies and 

practices to achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang 

Program Model. The lead agency is challenged to take responsibility for crossing agencymission and community-group boundaries, and getting the steering committee to take 

collective ownership of the comprehensive-program initiative. 

• The lead agency along with the steering committee initiates, develops, and maintains 

1.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interagency communication and relationships across agencies and community groups. A 

special challenge is modifying established law-enforcement, school, and governmental 

policy to include the participation of faith-based and grassroots groups, as well as former 

youth-gang members, in the steering committee process. The multi-disciplinary street 

team must participate in steering committee activities and assist in community and 

neighborhood gang-program-focused development efforts within the framework of the 

lead agency. Awareness of the issues of population change, and sensitivity to the 

neighborhood and its culture, its varied organizational interests, the needs of gang youth, 

and the complaints of local residents are essential for the operation of the steering 

committee, the street team, and the lead agency. 

Social Intervention 

• The street team, especially the youth outreach-worker staff, must collaborate with social 

service agencies, youth agencies, grassroots groups, schools, faith-based and other 

organizations, in directly providing gang and at-risk-for-gang-involvement youth with 

appropriate combinations of prevention, intervention, and socialized control services, 

depending on their social-service and social-control needs. Differential diagnoses and 

treatment/intervention planning must occur. Not all youth should be provided with the 

same pattern or dosages of control and social services, or even with highly-coordinated 

services or contacts. 

• Street outreach services focus simultaneously on protecting community citizens 

(including gang youth) from gang crime, enforcing the law, serving the interests and 

1.18 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
needs of targeted youth and their families, and on assuring the linkage of youth to social 

services and the case-coordination of these services. 

•	 Group activities are carefully developed so as not to cohere delinquent or gang youth to 

each other. Primary attention is on individualized youth interests, and needs of ganginvolved and highly-at-risk youth which, if met, contribute to their better transition and 

attachment to mainstream institutions of school, training and employment, and to 

association with non-gang peers. 

•	 Sensitivity to the influence of gang norms and values, and street-team skill in the use of 

group, community and situational structures and processes are important, particularly at 

times of crisis when violent and serious criminal behavior is likely to occur and has to be 

prevented and controlled. 

•	 A clear, mutually-understood and accepting relationship between the street team 

(including the youth outreach worker), the individual youth and the gang must be 

established so that the youth and the gang clearly understand the purpose of the program, 

the nature and scope of the team’s operation and the interdependent roles of team 

members. 

•	 Social intervention and social control should not be restricted to a 9 AM to 5 PM agencybased workday routine of making contact and assisting youth with social-development 

needs and meeting justice-system reporting requirements. Outreach, including social 

intervention, focuses on contacts with youth in the neighborhood, at home, and in 

hangouts during evenings, on weekends, and in crisis times, and assisting youth to 

assume legitimate obligations to the neighborhood and the larger society. 

1.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Provision of Social Opportunities 

•	 Access to opportunities, especially for further education, training, and jobs must be 

provided to gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement. Such access has to be 

structured, nurtured, and supported through the collective policy and administrative 

efforts of the steering committee, the lead agency, community agencies, and the 

implementation activities of the street-level team. 

•	 The members of the steering committee should be in a position to provide special and/or 

additional and sustained access to opportunity systems in their own agencies and across 

organizations, in order to better mainstream program youth into legitimate society. 

Appropriate arrangements have to be made to avoid segregating gang youth from 

mainstream society in the course of providing opportunities to them. 

•	 The street team (especially the outreach youth workers and case managers) serves to 

mediate relationships and modify exclusionary policies and practices of agencies, so that 

targeted youth have access to and are carefully prepared to make use of educational and 

training programs and jobs. In this process, agency, school, and employment personnel 

must be willing and prepared to modify their practices, and to assist these vulnerable 

youth who have special needs and social limitations. Social control and social 

intervention tactics have to be carefully integrated in this process. 

•	 The street team collaborates with local residents and families, as well as with grassroots 

groups, businesses, schools, and social-agency personnel in the provision of, and access 

to, opportunities for gang-involved and highly at-risk youth. 

•	 The opportunity-needs of program youth siblings, parents and peer group associates are 

1.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
also addressed, to the extent possible, particularly as the fulfillment of those needs may 

assist in facilitating the transition of program youth to non-delinquent and non-gang roles. 

•	 Of special importance is encouragement of the contributions of businesses, industry, 

government, and legislators in providing improved access to school, job, and training 

opportunities for lower-income and minority (including gang) youth, in part through not 

excluding those youth who may already have criminal records. In this process, in order 

for youth to make the best use of opportunities provided, appropriate social-control and 

social-support measures may also be necessary. 

Suppression/Social Control 

•	 The development by staff of formal and informal procedures of social control in order to 

hold youth accountable for their behavior is integral to a comprehensive approach to gang 

youth. Highly-targeted sweeps and interdiction of gang youth about to engage in (or who 

have actually engaged in) criminal acts are appropriate. However, labeling as gang 

members those youth who are not gang members, and targeting minority youth for a 

whole range of minor and questionable offenses, are inappropriate. Social control must 

be based on positive communication, respect for youth, some level of youth 

accountability in return, law enforcement discretion in use of suppression tactics, and 

focus on youth who are involved, or prove to be involved, in serious delinquent behavior. 

•	 Controls are broadly conceived, and range from arrest and warnings to behavior 

modeling, advice, counseling, crisis intervention and positive attention paid to youth 

interests and needs by members of the street team. Carefully structured situations may be 

1.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
required in which activities such as recreation, athletic events, holiday and family 

celebrations, cultural and ethnic events, group meetings, or conflict mediation sessions 

are arranged, which may involve police, probation, youth workers, and gang youth in 

sharing mutual or communal obligations and benefits. At the same time, informationsharing among all team members about serious, criminal acts by gang members is 

essential so that offenders are accurately identified, arrested and prosecuted. 

•	 Suppression involves the street team organizing neighbors to patrol neighborhoods, 

encouraging them to report criminal acts to the police, making sure that gang youth show 

up for probation or parole interviews and court appearances, as well as getting gang youth 

not to hang on street corners, and to help clean up litter and remove graffiti. 

•	 Social control also requires the defense of gang youth from false accusations and 

prosecution, illegal harassment and/or brutal treatment by police officers, and defending 

or vouching for youth in court when they are brought in for violations of local laws 

(which themselves may prove to be illegal and/or unconstitutional). The street team, 

administrators of the Gang Program, steering committee members and community leaders 

must not only directly and indirectly contribute to the suppression of unlawful (especially 

serious) criminal behavior, but to the modification of criminal justice system policies and 

practices that unjustly criminalize and/or punish youth. 

•	 Valid definitions of the nature and scope of gang crime, especially gang incidents, must 

be developed, and appropriate data collected, managed, and used. Such accurate and 

meaningful gang information should be routinely collected and shared among members of 

the street team and the steering committee – with due regard to issues of confidentiality – 

1.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
as a basis for ongoing diagnosis and assessment of the gang problem and the development 

of effective policies and programs. 

•	 Special commitments from police administrators to accept the Model, and special training 

sessions for gang specialists or team police to implement the Model correctly, may be 

required to assure that police and criminal-justice personnel participate in the Gang 

Program in accordance with the Model. The purpose of the Program is not simply to 

assist police or probation to acquire intelligence in order to make better arrests, but also to 

train the police to refer troublemakers and troubled gang youth to social and mental health 

agencies when appropriate. 

•	 Suppression, along with social intervention, opportunities-provision, and relevant 

organizational change, should be viewed as part of an interrelated and interdependent 

community-building process focused on reducing gang crime. The lead agency, the 

members of the street team and the steering committee share responsibility for carrying 

out the suppression or social-control functions critical for building a “good” community, 

one of benefit to gang-involved youth as well as to other citizens of the local and larger 

communities. Gang members are not all likely to be or to become delinquents and/or 

serious offenders. Most gang youth in gang-crime communities grow out of their 

delinquent or criminal gang involvement in due course. 

Organizational Change and Development 

•	 Organizational change and development underlie the strategies of the Comprehensive 

Gang Program. Local institutions must change, and local agency and community group 

1.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
procedures must be developed both to reduce gang crime and to meet the social needs of 

gang youth. Enhanced law enforcement alone, and enhanced preventive and treatment 

services alone, may be ineffective and may even exacerbate the gang problem. 

•	 Positive change in individual youth-gang-member behavior may occur naturally, but it 

can be facilitated in interrelated, interdisciplinary and collaborative fashion by the team of 

workers within a context of respective agency and community-group support for the 

Model. The activities of street-team personnel, in community groups and across 

agencies, may have to be modified to achieve a more generalist mission, e.g., the police 

take some responsibility for social intervention, the outreach workers assist with 

suppression of serious crime and violence, and the community organizers encourage 

alienated neighborhood residents to communicate with the police about gang-crime 

incidents, and advise them of better ways to address the problem. 

•	 Organizational policies, practices, and worker responsibilities have to become more 

community-oriented, even communal, and take into consideration the particular interests, 

needs, and cultural backgrounds of local residents, including the targeted gang youth 

themselves. A panicked, alienating, punitive community response to the gang problem, 

together with an elitist, bureaucratic, non-community-oriented agency approach to gang 

youth are counter-productive. 

•	 Administrative arrangements, special training, and close supervision of staff must be 

established, particularly for youth-outreach and law-enforcement workers in order for 

them to develop collaborative roles in a mutually respectful and effective fashion. 

•	 Staff development and training of the intervention team has to be both collaborative and 

1.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
coordinated, as appropriate, on a separate subunit professional basis. The orientation of 

team members may not completely mesh and accommodations have to be made. 

Appropriate mechanisms must evolve for data sharing, interactive social intervention, 

suppression planning, and other carefully-managed implementation activities. Not all 

types of data about youth gang-member activities have to be shared; only those that 

significantly impact the achievement of program objectives and goals. 

•	 Case-management and associated data systems are established so that contacts and 

services provided by all members of the street intervention team can be documented and 

monitored for effective targeting and assessment of youth, for program planning and 

implementation, and for measuring program quality and effects. These and other data 

then become the basis for evaluating outcomes at individual, gang, program, agency, 

interagency, and community levels. 

Program Implementation Principles 

A special set of principles guides the various organizations, community groups, and staffs 

in the implementation of the Model strategies. They are the basis for developing, carrying out, 

and testing the Program Model, with focus on the core strategies. 

Targeting 

It is critically important that the steering committee and lead agency select the right 

neighborhoods, gangs and youth in the community that account for the gang problem, and 

identify the organizations addressing (and which should be addressing) the problem. This 

1.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
includes identifying the most significant aspects of the gang problem, based on careful initial and 

ongoing assessments of gang situations, the specific youth involved, and the locations and 

contexts of gang activities. There are many cultural and organizational myths which create 

obstacles to appropriate identification and assessment of the gang problem. Police may claim 

that the gang problem is pervasive throughout the whole city, when in fact gang incidents, gang 

hangouts, and where gang youth live tend to be concentrated only in certain parts of a 

community. The majority of youth in the most gang- and crime-ridden communities are not gang 

members. Youth agencies may claim they are serving at-risk or gang-involved youth, when they 

are not. Schools committed to “zero tolerance” and strong suspension policies may in the long 

term contribute to an increased level of crime in the community. If the majority of youth in the 

program are under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system, and are required to participate 

in the program based on court, probation or parole orders, the program may then be viewed as 

primarily an extension of law enforcement and potentially punitive. At the same time, certain 

organizations (e.g., particular schools, churches, youth agencies, special police units, 

neighborhood organizations, aldermen and government units) in gang-ridden and emerging gang 

communities may, on a case-by-case basis, be substantially and constructively involved in 

addressing the gang problem, but these efforts may not be effectively aggregated. 

A careful assessment of the gang problem from a street-based as well as an agency-based 

perspective is necessary to determine which gangs and gang members are most involved in 

serious crime (including drug selling and violence), where and when the gang offenses are being 

committed, and what community situations and changed organizational policies and practices are 

critical to understanding and addressing the specifics of the problem. It is important not only to 

1.26


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
regard the gang problem as systemic, but to address the most serious aspects of the problem first. 

Hardcore youth, including key gang leaders and influentials, are the critical focus of initial 

attention, as much to develop access to other gang members as to address their own particular, 

ongoing and crisis-related gang problems. 

Unfocused violence-prevention, generalized public health approaches, non-targeted 

suppression, and reactive citizen demonstrations (such as neighborhood marches or poorly 

planned meetings) may be useful for particular agency- or community-cathartic purposes, but 

may be of little value for problem-solving and positive community development. Diffuse 

strategies by interagency coalitions may also become devices to avoid dealing with the gang 

problem. Especially to be avoided are responses to the problem based strictly on political 

interests, narrow agency missions and opportunism, professional turf considerations, ignorance 

of the details of the problem, and impulsive collective action. 

Balance 

Once the specific problem(s), target area(s), target gang-youth, institutions or agencies to 

be involved and their required policies are identified, a set of balanced strategies must be 

considered and operationalized. Dominance of particular strategies in regard to program 

development may be inappropriate. One type of program service and/or control will not be 

suitable for all youth. Gang youth have varying commitments to the gang life and varying 

degrees of troublesome personal problems during the course of their gang careers. Targeting 

only hardcore gang youth for suppression, younger gang youth or wannabees for prevention 

services, and “creaming” only selected youth for jobs are not consistent with the Model. A 

1.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
differential mix and dosage of multiple strategies is required for specific categories of program 

youth at different times. 

An imbalanced strategy may result in a dominant suppression approach, which 

contributes to excessive imprisonment of youth who can be readily served in the community with 

a combination of treatment, opportunities-provision and graduated sanctions. An imbalanced 

strategy may serve to label at-risk youth as gang members and make them more subject to arrest 

for minor offenses (or even non-offenses). An approach which focuses only on recreation and 

group activities may increase gang cohesion, delinquent activity, and the solidification of 

delinquent norms, and may not meet the longer-term socialization and community-integration 

needs of alienated gang youth. 

An appropriate mix of agency and grassroots participation is extremely important. A 

basic goal of the approach – to improve community capacity to address youth-gang crime – 

cannot be achieved unless critically important organizational and community-based components 

are involved in the program’s development, and participate in its activities. The Model is not 

served if only established social or youth agencies or law enforcement organizations participate. 

On the other hand, if the program is primarily based on grassroots participation, adequate 

resources may not be available to implement, sustain, or institutionalize the approach, even if the 

program shows promise. The basic functions of community-building and social integration 

across different community sectors relevant to the gang problem have to be integrated. 

Intensity 

Dosage refers to the duration, frequency and continuity of particular worker contacts, 

1.28


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
services and strategies carried out for different categories of youth. An appropriate dosage is 

necessary for a positive outcome. However, a balance of strategies, types of workers, 

coordination of worker contacts, and the nature of specific services and controls may be more 

important than the amount of services or contacts provided. The nature of the coordination 

among team workers in relation to particular types of youth may be more important than the 

specific range or intensity of services or strategies provided by each of them. 

The length and frequency of contact the youth has in the program may be inversely 

related to positive outcome. Once the youth begins to make progress, it may be beneficial for 

him to disassociate himself from the program. The purpose, combination and intensity of 

relationships by particular workers with different types of youth may be critically important in 

predicting outcome for different categories of youth in the program. 

Continuity 

The same worker or combination of workers providing services and contacts for a 

substantial period of time may have more influence in determining positive outcome than 

different workers contacting particular youth for only short periods of time. Continuity of 

contact is important, particularly for gang or delinquent youth who have special needs for social 

support and control, and for building trusting relationships with adults. Gang youth are often 

distrustful of adults and are often exploitive of relationships with them. Workers may be viewed 

as undependable, rejecting, hostile, or as easily manipulated. It takes a good deal of time for the 

worker(s) to develop a positive working (controlling and helping) relationship with certain gang 

youth. Service interruption and lack of continuity of contact may result in further alienation of 

1.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the youth, and interfere with the program’s plan for the his or her rehabilitation. A return to, or 

intensification of, gang behaviors may result from the absence of (or undependable contacts with) 

a worker during periods of crisis that the youth may not be able to manage on his own. An 

accessible and responsive worker whom the youth trusts and needs at such junctures may be 

critically important. 

Commitment 

The Program Model challenges existing agency policies and procedures and existing 

professional specialization norms, requires the development of new knowledge and skills, and 

creates extra work and distress for all. Commitment to the promise and the validity of the 

approach does not come quickly or easily. Appropriate steering-committee, lead-agencymanagement and extra supervisory support and commitment have to be developed. Steeringcommittee members and program administrators must persevere in their program-support efforts, 

and they must periodically renew their commitment to the Comprehensive Gang Program 

approach. Project lead-agency administrators and supervisors and steering-committee members 

may not be fully aware of the difficulties and challenges faced by direct-service, street-team 

workers, or of special staff needs for support (and sometimes controls) for their outreach 

activities, particularly the problems and frustrations of outreach workers on the streets. 

Work with gang youth and gang problems is complex, difficult and frustrating. Gang 

youth are often undependable, elusive, and hostile in their relationships with adults and peers, 

and require a high level of sensitivity, firmness and concentrated attention by workers. 

Traditional agency, school, and other institutional staff may not be interested in, prepared for, or 

1.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
have sufficient resources to work with troublesome gang youth. The team workers on the street 

have to develop multidimensional skills. Street-team, lead-agency, and steering-committee 

efforts together must be reinforcing, and combine to introduce an integrated world of real 

opportunity, social support, and constraints to gang youth. 

1.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
1.32

Chart 1.1 

Comprehensive Gang Program: Implementation Model 

Goal 1: Improve Community Capacity to Address Youth Gang Crime 

Goal 2: Reduce Gang Crime 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 1.2 

Comprehensive Gang Program: Process Model 

Steps in the Application of the Approach 

OJJDP Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program 

(Candice Kane) 

1.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 2 

Evaluation Issues and Problems 

We do not attempt to review the literature on gang (or gang violence) prevention, 

intervention, or suppression programs. A growing list of such reviews exists (Curry, 1995; 

Klein, 1995; Howell, 2000; Mihalec, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan and Hansen, 2001; Sivilli, Yim and 

Nugent 1995; Spergel, 1995). Gang programs in earlier decades emphasized single-strategy 

approaches to gang prevention, social intervention, crisis intervention, community organization, 

street work, interagency coordination, and community organization. Evaluations of these 

programs suggest negative, indeterminate, or in a very few cases limited positive results (Howell, 

2000). Community-based gang programs have failed for a range of reasons: poor 

conceptualization, vague or conflicting objectives, weak implementation, organizational-goal 

displacement (particularly by police and youth agencies), interagency conflict, politicization, lack 

of sustained effort, insufficient resources, etc. 

The evidence that a particular approach does or does not work, however, may be due not 

only to program design or implementation, but also to the failures of public policy and the 

limitations of evaluation research methodologies (Curry, 1995). Gang program approaches 

assessed as successful by community leaders, politicians, and policy makers may not necessarily 

be sustained, and those assessed as failures but which are consistent with community myth and 

traditional agency missions may continue to flourish. Evaluation research, particularly outcome 

research, has generally had little or no impact on policy or gang-program development. It has not 

contributed to the creation of alternate or modified approaches to the gang problem. This may be 

2.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
due in large measure to the complexity of community-based gang programs, and to the 

difficulties of designing and implementing complex evaluations of such programs in the 

community. 

Below, we discuss briefly those elements of gang research methodology which we believe 

are essential for the evaluation of gang-programs implemented within a comprehensivecommunity or interagency-coordination framework. We address some of the issues or obstacles 

relevant to gang-program evaluations. Ideal program-evaluation models require experimental 

and quasi-experimental designs and rigorous procedures which usually cannot be applied in the 

real world of gang-program development and operations. Evaluation research is expected to be 

objective and independent, and not clearly identified with program operations. However, the 

critical (often politicized) nature of community-based gang programs requires an interdependent 

and sustained relationship between evaluation and program personnel from program start to 

finish. This characterizes the best of classic community-based gang program research, limited as 

it was by the then-present-day research, methodological, and statistical standards (Gold and 

Mattick, 1974; Klein, 1968, 1971; Miller, 1962). 

Nevertheless, there are issues which may not have been adequately resolved in past or 

current evaluations of comprehensive and/or community-based gang programs and which we 

have had to contend with in our present evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide 

Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. 

Cooperation with Program Operators and Data Managers. Program directors and operators are 

prone to distrust gang researchers who are not sufficiently knowledgeable of their own program’s 

2.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
pressures, interests and constraints. Gang program directors are under great and conflicting 

pressure to accommodate program development to the interests and needs of funders, community 

residents, steering committees or advisory boards, partner agencies (including criminal-justice 

and social-service agencies), as well as the media, government or political officials, and the 

program youth themselves. Program operators generally regard evaluators as a necessary evil, 

since they may affect the flow of funding for the program, and are costly in terms of program 

time and effort which that they believe should be directed instead to specific, ongoing program or 

agency operations. Evaluators interfere with the flow of agency program operations and 

information systems, to the extent that they exist. Program operators can be skilled at avoiding, 

or partially complying with, evaluators’ requests for data, and even when pressured or compelled 

to comply tend to provide incomplete or inadequate data for evaluation purposes. The gang 

program executive’s interest and desire to comply with the evaluation-research design and need 

for data is tempered by the his need to survive in a resource-limited environment. 

Gang-program operators are also over-stressed by the complexity, frustrations and 

unpredictability of community-based, gang-program operations, and may be subject to a 

pervasive sense of impending program failure. The program operator tends not to know much 

about gangs or gang youth, or how or whether he can conduct a community-wide or street-based 

program that will provide clearly positive results. The evaluator enters the chaotic, community 

gang-problem arena without sufficient understanding of the complex, community context or the 

diverse interests of the various program-related actors in cooperating with the program. These 

actors usually control various kinds of program-process or outcome data essential to the 

evaluator for achieving research objectives. 

2.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The evaluator therefore must be prepared to make time for a considerable effort to 

understand local community and program contextual factors in order to establish a basis for a 

positive relationship with program operators and those who control data sources. The 

mechanisms of access to evaluation data have to be negotiated and renegotiated if the evaluation 

process and its substantive outcome are to be objective and meaningful to the key community 

constituents, funders, program operators, and the research community. The gang-program 

evaluators have to engage key program-related personnel as soon as possible, and regard them as 

creators, providers, and partners in the development of a successful evaluation. 

Research Design. Good program evaluation ideally should be designed to assess program 

process, individual outcome, and gang the program’s impact on the gang and the community, 

based on an explicit (hopefully well-developed) program model which is conceptually clear, 

logical and operationally practicable. The program evaluator’s primary purpose is not to test 

theory, but to test a program model which usually contains elements of several theories and 

interests. Gang programs in the real world cannot be encompassed by one set of theories or 

interests. Most criminologists are often more interested in testing theoretical propositions than 

the specific nature and effects of a program model. Funders are interested in testing general 

policy which may not be clear, consistent, or formulated in detail. Program managers, on the 

other hand, are mainly concerned with program development and its contribution to their 

agency’s value – economic, political and organizational. A consensus must be reached in the 

funder+program operator+evaluator relationship as to the mutually-acceptable goals and specific 

objectives of the program to be tested. This process may drag on a long time. 

2.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The objectives and activities that reduce gang-delinquent behavior need to be specified 

and agreed upon by the program operator and the evaluator: what key services or worker 

contacts are to be provided, for which types of youth, for what purposes (i.e., what project 

activities are to produce what intended results), and how. Research variables, i.e., independent, 

mediating, outcome, and controlling factors (e.g., youth demographics, gang status and 

delinquency characteristics) must be articulated and related to the program model, as well as to 

the reality of program structure and operation. Ultimately, the main job of the evaluator is to 

know what the program components are, what they are intended to do, and what they in fact do. 

This process occurs through ongoing dialogue and mutual accommodation between the project 

operator and evaluator. This evaluation-relationship process determines and explains what and 

how evaluation-design procedures for data collection and analysis are related to the program 

model. Obviously, some flexibility has to be built into the implementation of both the program 

and evaluation models. The researcher and program operator have to negotiate continually to 

accommodate the needs of both program and evaluation implementation. 

Community-based gang research is not medical or experimental research, in which almost 

all elements are (ideally) rigidly controlled. At best, community-based gang research is quasiexperimental, with room for limited manipulation by the program operator and the evaluator. 

Technical Assistance. An intermediary may be required to assure that informed and focused 

relationships are initiated and sustained which meet the needs of program implementation as well 

as the interests of the funder and the evaluator. Ideally, the technical assistance teams, with the 

aid of the sponsor or funder, initiates and sustains these relationships. While technical assistance 

2.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
is provided mainly to assist and supplement the efforts of the program operator, involvement of 

the evaluator is required to insure that he, the program operator, the technical assistance team, 

and the funding agency are on board together as to the nature of the program model and how it is 

to be implemented. 

The program and evaluation models have to be effectively articulated and sustained, and 

changes that occur must be explicit. Gaps and failures in the implementation of the program and 

evaluation model have to be addressed consensually as early as possible. The gaps, deficiencies 

and changes over time have to be anticipated, recognized, accounted for, and explained. 

Deficiencies in the efforts of the technical assistance team, the evaluator, and the funder have to 

be identified and corrected, with limited politicization. In any case, the evaluator has a special 

responsibility for controlling the integrity of the program model for research purposes. This 

complexity of relationships, which can support or handicap common understanding and effective 

implementation of the program model, is avoided when the program operator and the evaluator 

are the same person, when the evaluator is a partner with the program operator in the 

development of the program model, and/or when the funder or sponsor of the program is strongly 

identified with the evaluator’s conception of the program model and its implementation. 

Start-Up Problems 

Program Youth Selection. A key problem of the community-based gang program arises when 

youth selected are not representative of the expected program sample, i.e., they are not gang 

members or youth clearly at risk for gang involvement. The problem may be compounded 

because the program operator and the evaluator often do not know what the characteristics of 

2.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth truly are until a sufficient number of youth have actually entered the program. Procedures 

for who is admitted to the gang program are often weak because definitions of who is eligible for 

the program are not clearly communicated to program staff and/or referring agencies. Certain 

gang or at-risk youth may not easily be recruited, or allowed into the program. Conflicting views 

may arise early as to who appropriately should be eligible for the program. 

A key problem is that sources of reliable information about target-youth characteristics 

(e.g., gang membership) may not be available at the start of the program. Police, probation, 

schools, or in-house agency workers may not know specifically the identity and location of 

gangs, the specific character of their activities, and which youth are at what level of risk. The 

concept of risk may not be clearly defined or understood. Gang-related information about youth 

referred to the program should be obtained from multiple sources: official and established youth 

agencies, neighbors, local community groups, sometimes family members, and especially former 

and present gang members themselves. 

Who selected youth are in terms of age, race/ethnicity, gender, justice-system 

background, gang-membership status, why they are referred to the program, by whom and from 

where, must be known to the evaluator as soon as possible. We know from previous research 

that gender, age, race/ethnicity, and prior arrests of youth may be critical factors in determining 

eligibility for the program, and predict expected outcomes. Females are less likely than males to 

be serious or chronic delinquents, or gang members. Younger gang youth, 12 to 14 or 15 years 

of age, are more likely to show increasing levels of gang delinquency than older gang youth. 

The research or theoretical interests of the evaluator may deter him from a close 

examination of who these youth are, and why they got into the program. He may be less 

2.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interested in the types of youth who should be in the program, than in the specific characteristics 

of youth or gangs which may be useful to his own ongoing research or theory development. He 

may focus too much on hardcore or at-risk youth, females rather than males, the psychological or 

structural characteristics of gangs, and insufficiently on the selection of youth consistent with the 

program model. The acquisition of simple, basic data (on age, gender, race/ethnicity, and – as 

soon as possible – gang status and prior-offense or arrest record) for youth who enter the program 

is essential for program-development and evaluation purposes. These data become the basis for 

comparison-sample selection and evaluation multivariate analysis. 

Gang Status and Prior Delinquency. Extensive research indicates there is a very close 

relationship between gang membership and the nature and level of the youth’s delinquent 

behavior, especially during the youth’s active or self-declared gang membership phase. 

Obviously, the evaluator’s task is to determine to what extent the youth is a gang member and a 

delinquent in relation to criteria for selection into the program. Each of these two factors must be 

considered as a variable, yet they may not be known to program staff, and not necessarily clearly 

revealed even by gang youth themselves. A key proposition not recognized or accepted by many 

policy and program personnel, or even by researchers, is that not all gang youth are or will 

become delinquent, and not all delinquents are or will become gang members. Non-gang 

delinquent youth may respond worse to the program than gang youth who may be less delinquent 

and less committed to the gang life. Most gang programs deal with a varied sample of gang and 

non-gang, delinquent and non-delinquent youth. 

A variety of sources of data on gang and delinquent behavior in different contexts over 

2.8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
time may have to be accessed. Earlier field observations, self-reports, police records, and 

program-worker information separately may be insufficient for determining eligibility of youth 

for the program, and to predict outcome. Consistency of findings about the nature and level of 

gang identification and delinquency also provides validity as to how the youth is to be classified. 

Delinquency and gang-involvement scales have to be developed. Different types of delinquency 

and patterns of association must be identified and addressed over the course of the youth’s 

involvement in the program. As they age, gang youth may also change their patterns of 

offending (increasingly from turf or interpersonal violence to relatively more criminal-gain 

behavior, including drug selling), or may follow conventional routes and build legitimate careers. 

Sampling. Typologies of gangs and gang youth abound (Klein, 1995; Spergel, 1995; Fagan, 

1989). What gang or pre-gang universe from which to select the sample depends on the nature 

and purpose of the program and, ideally, on some assessment of the community’s actual gang 

problem. Characteristics of the universe of gangs in a particular community may be based on 

police, other criminal-justice, school, youth-agency, and media information, and occasionally on 

community surveys. The youth referred to a gang program may or may not be representative of 

gang youth known to the police from a particular neighborhood or set of gang neighborhoods in a 

city, or across cities. 

In earlier decades, community-based youth-gang programs focused on field or street 

observations of, and work with, particular gangs and their membership. Specific gangs were the 

primary targets of service, and the basis for research and evaluation. More recently, youth appear 

to be selected for gang programs and research based on an institutional cross-section of youth2.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
agency, probation, school, and correctional caseloads. This may reflect increased community 

concern about the problem of youth gangs, the prevalence and dispersion of the youth-gang 

problem, fragmentation of gang structures into smaller units (still as part of a larger gang 

conglomeration), or a lack of familiarity with the gang problem in particular community or 

agency contexts by established agency personnel and researchers. 

Another primary task of the evaluator is to select a comparison-group sample, i.e., nonserved youth with characteristics similar or equivalent to program youth. However, as suggested 

earlier, both the program operator and evaluator may not know a priori, up front, or even during 

the program period what the gang or delinquency characteristics of program youth are. A time 

lag usually exists between selecting and interviewing program and comparison youth. Finding 

and interviewing appropriate comparison youth may not be easy. Police, probation, and youth 

agencies may have insufficient information about characteristics of gang youth, let alone where 

appropriate comparison gang youth are to be located and how they are to be contacted. 

Comparison-gang youth often tend to be less delinquent or problematic than program youth. 

When a community-wide consortium establishes a gang program, it usually tries to address the 

most problematic gangs, and sometimes gang members in the most gang-problematic 

neighborhood. 

Probably the best solution to the problem of obtaining or developing similar, let alone 

equivalent, samples in the open community is to use several types of comparison groups, if 

funding permits. Co-arrestee gang members from the same gangs are often similar; youth from 

the same-named gangs in an equivalent gang area in the same city may be somewhat similar. 

Individual program youth may be used as their own control, matched for an earlier and equivalent 

2.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
age period when they were not served, i.e., using a growth-curve model for analysis purposes. 

This option assumes that community contexts, gang patterns, and police practices have been 

comparable during the pre-program and program periods, which may not be the case in part 

because of program operations. Nevertheless, there may be sufficient and similar program and 

comparison youth available in the program and comparison samples to conduct a matching 

process. A community-based program model also may require selection of a comparison group 

from a comparable city. This creates even more problems of complexity in data collection and 

analysis. 

No community-based gang program research has as yet been able to resolve satisfactorily 

the matching or control-group problem. Appropriate measurement and multivariate analytic 

techniques can, within limits, compensate for the lack of the availability of an adequatelyselected comparison sample. 

Sources of Data and Data Collection Instruments 

Multiple units of analysis as well as multiple sources of data may be essential in 

community gang-program research. Gang-as-a-unit and community-level gang incident or arrest 

data, as well as ethnographic or field observations may be important for interpreting and 

explaining individual-level findings. However, researcher field observation and interviewing, the 

data collection method which has been the basis for classic gang studies, may not be sufficient 

for program evaluation, or even for understanding gang structure and process. Youth-gang 

activities occur at different times of the day or night, or in early morning hours. The field 

observer cannot be present 24 hours a day to observe changes in gang or delinquent behavior of 

2.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth. Estimates of changes in gang structure (e.g., cohesion, leadership, recruitment, violation 

of gang codes, inter-gang conflict) cannot be accurately or reliably measured by a single datagathering procedure. Interviews, field observations and police and agency-worker records 

together are required to clarify and verify gang process and program-effect patterns. The classic 

use of field observations as a primary basis for theorizing about program effects is not adequate 

for evaluation research (Klein, 1971; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965). 

Program Process Data. Special worker-service, or program-tracking or recording devices have to 

be created to describe the key program activities or worker contacts provided to, and received by, 

program youth. Existing agency records (whether police, probation, or social-agency) may be 

insufficient for purposes of testing the program model. The problem of collecting data from 

workers or agency records is compounded when information derived from multiple sources 

across multiple agencies has to be integrated. Evaluation of comprehensive gang programs must 

develop commonly understood terms across different agencies, community groups and staffs, 

which also take unique organizational and worker missions into consideration. 

Commonly accepted definitions of program measures must be established, since services 

or contacts may have different definitions and purposes for different agencies and worker 

disciplines. The nature of collaboration among workers and agencies in the provision of services 

has to be viewed as an important variable. The identity and function of the particular service 

provider gives special meaning to the service or contact, and therefore has to be duly recognized 

and its significance understood. The variety of measures developed to obtain data on meaningful 

program effects has to include types of services provided, and types and dosage of worker 

2.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
contacts made. Most important, the type and purpose of the service must be incorporated into the 

development and analyses of community-based, program-process data. 

Measurement. The need to integrate data (even at the same level of analysis) derived from 

different data sets, the reduction of differences between program and comparison youth 

characteristics and their different selection and interview periods, the integration of multiple 

variables (especially when sample sizes are relatively small), as well as missing data – all create 

formidable measurement problems in community-based, gang-program research. Meaningful 

connections across variables as well as the reduction of the number of variables have to be 

engineered. Use of factor-analytic procedures may not be sufficient. Critically important are key 

program-model concepts and propositions as a basis for selection of variables and interpretation 

of findings. Appropriate scales may be required to reduce ratio or interval data to ordinal or 

nominal-level scales, especially when program and comparison-youth characteristics are highly 

disparate and sample size is small. Special measures or indices have to be created to test 

propositions of the program model. For example, a gang-involvement scale may have to be 

conceptualized and specific items introduced to measure change over time, not only in terms of 

the youth’s original gang- or non-gang-member status, but in terms of a cluster of items such as 

rank in the gang, level of gang participation, time spent with gang friends, gang victimization, 

gang status of parents or siblings, etc. 

Analysis. Differences in the findings relating to key characteristics of program and comparison 

youth have to be related to the specific effects of the program. Whether the program or parts of 

2.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the program are successful or unsuccessful in predicting or accounting for differences with the 

non-served sample may best be determined through the use of multivariate analytic procedures, 

particularly the use of General Linear Modeling and Logistical Regression. Such analyses may 

still be unconvincing unless other sources of data using both the same and different units of 

analysis (such as related gang, agency, program-structure, and community characteristics and 

changes) are available to throw light on the reasons for the individual-level findings. In other 

words, the analysis of program effects based on individual-level quantitative findings from a 

single data source as a means for determining individual youth change may still not be sufficient 

to determine what the program accomplished or failed to accomplish. 

The congruence of findings in the relationship of the same or similar variables using 

different sources of data (e.g., individual youth self-reports, police arrest data, field observations 

and agency progress reports) and different units of analysis (group, and community-level), and 

their relationship to predicted program outcomes at the individual level are the best bases for 

making judgements about the value of the program. Researcher and program-operator qualitative 

observations, as well as theory and prior research findings, provide reference points against 

which to measure not only the reliability and validity of the findings, but their interpretation. The 

degrees of rigor of the different but associated analyses have to be duly recognized. The 

relationships of findings at the different levels of analysis may not be easily made. 

2.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Evaluation Model 

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) Evaluation examined the nature of program 

implementation, and the services and contacts provided to individual youth, based on the 

requirements of the program Model, described above. It examined individual-youth outcome in 

particular, the nature of services and contacts provided by different workers, and to some extent 

the impact of the program on gang and community crime. It required a great deal of qualitative 

and quantitative data and examined the relationship of concepts and variables at different levels 

of analysis. 

The Evaluation Model was based on the relationship of sets of recursive factors. It 

sought to describe and test the influence of elements of the Program Model, using concepts 

derived from social-disorganization and social-opportunity theories. The Evaluation Model was 

built upon factors which interact with and influence each other, beginning with contextual 

(mainly community social disorganization) factors and ending, for evaluation purposes, with 

changes-in-crime factors at the individual-youth, gang, and community levels. A variety of 

intermediate factors, such as organizational relationships, program structure, services and worker 

contacts provided, changes in youth life course/space behaviors and law enforcement policies 

and practices, were also identified, and the direction and strength of their influence analyzed 

(Chart 2.1). 

I. Community Social Disorganization 

Certain ecological, economic, social, and cultural conditions were expected to create the 

community circumstances favorable to the development of the gang problem. These 

2.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
circumstances included: the rapid movement, expansion, and/or shift of population (particularly 

of low-income minority groups) into the program area, and the outflux of a stable, often middleclass, non-minority population from the program area; the presence of a large adolescent 

population (especially males) weakly integrated into educational, socialization, or employment 

systems in the community; and the existence of criminal structures and alternate opportunity 

agencies. 

II. Organizational/Interorganizational Factors 

Key institutions were unable to adequately accommodate the interests and needs of a 

changing population that required better access to services and social and economic 

opportunities, as well as appropriate controls on deviant subcultures and quasi-organized groups 

adapting to community disorganization. Key organizations coalesced to cope with problems of 

community disorganization and the gang problem through the development of a coalition of 

agency programs and the development of a comprehensive approach to the gang problem. 

III. Program Implementation Structure 

The additional federal resources introduced into the community were utilized to develop a 

comprehensive, community-wide approach that emphasized varying levels of control, 

opportunities provision, social services, and policy and program changes that would affect the 

youth-gang population and meet the interest and needs of the leadership structure in the larger 

community. 

2.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
IV. Services and Worker Contacts 

Program Model elements, strategies, and implementation principles emphasized varying 

degrees of control and social services. How the Model was operationalized depended mainly on 

the interests of police and probation in targeting certain elements of the youth population for the 

program. 

V. Changes in Youth Characteristics 

The key objective of the Steering Committee, program leadership and the operational 

street team was to change the behavior of targeted youth while protecting established community 

interests, especially by reducing gang involvement, constraining youth to conform to school rules 

and responsibilities, and providing access to, and sustaining them on, jobs. 

VI. Individual-Youth Outcome 

Changes in the life space and life course of program youth through provision of social 

opportunities, access to treatment services, more sensitive and pervasive controls, and enhanced 

coordination among workers was expected to reduce or prevent delinquency among program 

youth, especially among gang-involved members and those at serious risk of gang involvement. 

VII. Law Enforcement Policy/Practice 

The success of individual-youth outcome also depended on the nature and scope of crime 

or deviancy attributed to youth at the time of program entry, relative to the interests of law 

enforcement in suppressing or controlling the behavior of program youth. 

2.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
VIII. Gang-as-a-Unit 

Program effects at the individual program-youth level were expected to be translated into 

gang effects, depending on the degree to which program youth were representative of active 

gangs, the scope and structure of the established gangs, the extent to which program workers 

reached out to gangs and gang youth in the neighborhood, and police policy and practice. 

IX. Target-Area Outcome (Crime Change) 

Changes in crime, especially gang-related incidents and gang-related crime, were 

contingent on changes in (and/or control of) program youth behavior, and especially gang-as-aunit behavior. In general, the program was expected more directly and powerfully to influence 

program youth, and indirectly and less powerfully to contribute to change in gang-as-a-unit 

behavior. The scope of these effects was expected to influence changes in area (gang) crime 

rates. 

Implementing the Evaluation 

The evaluations of the Program Model across the five sites – Mesa, Tucson, Riverside, 

San Antonio, and Bloomington-Normal – were simultaneous and complex, requiring extensive 

collaboration among local project personnel, local evaluators and technical-assistance and 

national-evaluation teams, within the general guidelines set by the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, and aided by the suggestions of the National Advisory Board. Major 

problems of research design, program modification and implementation, data collection, sample 

development, and analysis had to be addressed at all stages of the evaluations. The National 

2.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluator, the University of Chicago, was responsible for overall research design, instrument 

development, coordination of data management within and across sites, and the interim and final 

analyses. The National Evaluator had no responsibility for program implementation, and only 

partial responsibility for the selection of the program- and comparison-youth samples and 

implementation of data collection procedures. The local evaluator at each site was appointed and 

funded by the local program director, under guidelines formulated by the National Evaluator and 

OJJDP. 

Early problems of a lack of understanding of the Program Model and how to implement 

it, as well as slow acceptance of data-collection procedures and requirements at the local sites, 

had to be addressed. Not all components of the Model were adequately implemented by the local 

site operators; not all procedures for local data collection were followed. The difficulties of 

program-youth (and especially comparison-youth) sample selection and interview data collection 

were not fully anticipated, either at local or national levels. Distinctive, individual-site program 

and evaluation problems occurred and were continually addressed; some were never fully 

overcome. 

The problems of insufficient understanding and acceptance of the Program Model by the 

local sites were largely handled by OJJDP management and technical-assistance staff, but they 

also involved the National Evaluator. Much of the early problem of Program Model 

implementation and local evaluation data collection surfaced around the issue of who was to be 

selected for the program. The local program directors generally presumed that the primary, longterm purpose of the program was prevention and early intervention, i.e. targeting at-risk, usually 

younger youth not yet gang members or even having police arrest records. At some of the sites, 

2.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
key organizations such as police and youth agencies assumed that the funds they received were to 

help them keep doing what each organization separately had been doing all along. 

The problems of sample selection and implementation of the Model were further 

complicated when the local projects were required to focus on bringing both gang delinquents 

and youth at high risk for gang involvement into the program. Also, none of the lead agencies 

had experience developing a program combining social-service and suppression activities. The 

initial applications to OJJDP did not clearly articulate the criteria for the selection of youth into 

the program. The lead agencies (except possibly in San Antonio) did not have the experience or 

know-how to reach gang delinquents directly from the streets. No grassroots organizations, 

neighborhood groups or former gang members with access to gangs or gang youth were involved 

in program planning, or even later in program implementation. The programs were based mainly 

on referrals of youth from probation sources (mainly juvenile probation) and to a limited extent 

from schools – youth who might be suspended or expelled and who were regarded as 

troublesome, but not necessarily gang-involved or at serious risk for gang involvement. The 

probation departments, especially juvenile probation, came to be heavily invested in the 

programs. 

The selection of both the program-youth sample, and the comparison-youth sample would 

require special evaluation efforts, particularly by the local evaluators. A comparable gangproblem community, where the program was not established, had to be selected. It was not clear 

which areas and which kinds of youth would be selected for the comparison samples. At four of 

the five sites, another part of the same city was selected. At the fifth site, another city (or set of 

twin cities) was selected. 

2.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Each local site evaluator had his or her own research interest, which sometimes could 

become complementary to the evaluation mission of the National Evaluator, sometimes not. At 

four of the five sites, the local evaluator had no research experience with gang youth. Some of 

the local evaluators were not particularly interested in testing the Program Model, and delegated 

major sections of the local evaluation responsibility to students. There were changes of local 

evaluators at two of the sites. There were also long delays in initiating the data-collection 

process. 

Collection of data was a great burden for local program personnel, as well as for the 

national and local evaluators, at all the sites. A variety of continuing obstacles, and resistance by 

local program personnel and local evaluators had to be overcome. The plan for data collection 

included: individual youth surveys to be administered to each of 100 program and 100 

comparison youth at annual interview periods; summary program-service records of contacts by 

workers with each youth every three months, to be gathered by the different program workers at 

each site; and complete police arrest and confinement histories to be collected for all program 

and comparison youth. The effort to obtain official school records and misconduct histories for 

each program and comparison youth had to be aborted because of the unavailability of such 

records for youth, and the lack of complete attendance or grade records. Gang-as-a-unit data for 

all gangs and community gang-crime statistics had to be obtained from gang-crime police and 

crime analysts in the program and comparison areas. Organization surveys were to be collected 

from 20-25 administrators in key agencies and organizations addressing the gang problem in each 

of the program and comparison areas. 

The data collected also included: on-site observations of program operations by local and 

2.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
national evaluators; interviews of program staff; minutes of steering committee meetings; 

minutes of cluster (multi-site program staff) meetings; minutes of monthly telephone conferences 

with key program staff from each site; reviews of yearly funding applications, progress reports 

and special communications by each site with OJJDP; and, lastly, program-performance 

measures based on interviews with key local agency and steering committee personnel at the end 

of the 4 to 5-year program periods. 

The evaluations were complex undertakings at all five project sites. Site visits by the 

national evaluators were made two or three times per year. Visits to the national evaluation 

office in Chicago were also made periodically by some site project directors and local evaluators 

to provide information and resolve evaluation issues. In many respects, data collection 

represented the most difficult and time-consuming part of the evaluation process, extending well 

into the data-organization, cleaning, and data-analysis phases. This happened in large measure 

because multiple sources and years of data had to be collected from different agency providers, 

and especially because problems of data reliability were not discovered until the analysis stage of 

the evaluation, when the different data sets were integrated. The various agency providers at the 

sites, including the lead agencies, were not always sure which youth were in the program and 

which youth were not. Missing and incorrect data were discovered. These issues were resolved 

only at the final stage of the integration of data sets. 

2.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chart 2.1 

Evaluation Model: Program and Comparison Areas, Gangs, Youth


(Comparison Area Components = I, II, V [partial], VI, VIII, IX)


2.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 3 

The Program and Comparison Areas 

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) is located in the Powell Junior High School 

attendance area. (It is also identified by the Mesa United Way as “Building a Healthier Mesa 

Area 3.”) The program or target area, located in south central Mesa, comprises a rapidlychanging, low-income, increasingly Hispanic population of Mexican origin. 

Mesa, Arizona has been one of the fastest growing cities in the United States. Based on 

the 2000 U.S. Census its population was 396,375, an increase of 37.6% since the 1990 Census. 

Mesa is located in Maricopa County which also contains Phoenix, the sixth largest city in the 

United States with a population of 1,321,045 (2000 Census). Mesa is 12 miles east of Phoenix 

and is substantially affected by that city’s economy and social problems, including a growing 

gang problem. 

Mesa has a distinctive and rich cultural history. Founded by the Mormons in 1828 but 

with deep roots in its Mexican settlements, the city, which originally occupied 15 square miles, 

now encloses 122-plus square miles. It has a diverse and changing population and a diversified 

economic structure. Among the city’s largest employers are the McDonnell Douglas Helicopter 

Company, Boeing Corporation, Motorola, TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, General Motors, the 

Lutheran Health Care Network, the Maricopa County Community College and the Mesa Police 

Department, which employs one thousand people. In recent years, employment growth has 

shifted from the high-paying manufacturing to the low-paying services and retail-trade sectors. 

There has been a swing from full-time to part-time jobs. Mesa adjoins the Maricopa Indian Salt 

3.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
River Indian Reservation, which has few resources and whose increasing social problems are part 

of those of the city itself (Tribune Newspapers, June 7, 1992, “The Changing Face of Mesa”). 

Many youth from the Reservation attend schools in Mesa. 

Community leaders say that Mesa has traditionally viewed itself as a wholesome, selfsufficient, family-oriented community which takes pride in solving its problems from within 

rather than depending on assistance from outside. It is a conservative community with the 

second largest settlement of Mormons in the country. It is currently experiencing the negative 

consequences of its rapid growth, and the acceleration of a variety of social, economic, and 

educational problems. “Among the most alarming is the visible rise in youth ‘gang-related’ 

criminal activity” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, September 18, 1996). 

Many local citizens perceive Mesa to be a small town where people care for one another. 

This is particularly so in its central area, which includes the Project target area. “Hispanic 

families have lived in the area for several generations, with gang life often multi-generational. 

However, even on the worse streets, neighborhoods in Mesa are still generally safe...” For many 

years youth gangs have been viewed as only small neighborhood groups of youth committing 

minor crimes (Third-Year OJJDP Funding Application, September 12, 1997). 

Mesa has become an increasingly diverse city with growing migration, education, poverty 

and health problems. Central Mesa and East Mesa, with an increasing Hispanic and decreasing 

non-Hispanic white population, have the greatest need for health and human services (Tribune 

Newspapers, June 7, 1992). The population in the target area comprises not only settled 

Mexican-American families who have become assimilated into American culture, but “Mexican 

nationals – more recent arrivals with strong connections to Mexico, who often lack English skills 

3.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and are less familiar with local ways, including land ordinances and zoning requirements” 

(Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). An underlying tension is said to exist between 

“established” neighborhood groups and recent immigrants, which may be accounted for by the 

increase in gangs and conflict between Mexican immigrants and established Mexican-American 

youth gangs (Memo to I. Spergel from C. Kane, October 28, 1996). 

The Mexican-American population is highly visible in the Powell Junior High School 

area and the three comparison areas (see below). According to Project leadership, the MexicanAmerican community is not well-represented politically. The increasing number of alternative 

high schools and junior high schools in Mesa contain an increasing proportion of MexicanAmerican youth. Many old-time white and Mexican-American residents have moved out as 

immigrants have moved into the target area. All of this may have added to the isolation of the 

Mexican immigrant population from Mesa’s established social and cultural life. 

At the start of the Project, a 1996 study conducted by the Mesa Unified School District 

found that the Powell Junior High School neighborhood had undergone increases in immigrant 

residents and single-parent homes, and decreases in family incomes which left the community 

with a weakened capacity to deal with the increasing crime rate and gang problem (Katz, Webb, 

Schaefer, December 1999, “An Assessment of Mesa, Arizona’s Gang Problem”). 

Nevertheless, city officials and community leaders continue to emphasize the distinctive 

and relatively mild character of crime (both gang and non-gang) in Mesa. Police data indicate 

that the problem is not characterized by serious violence. However, drug use (and particularly 

drug dealing) have become increasingly common, especially in low-income areas. Non-gang as 

well as gang youth, some parents and family members regularly drive to Mexico to pick up 

3.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
quantities of marijuana or “meth,” not only for personal use but to sell and “make a living.” 

Dealing drugs has become a more lucrative occupation than legitimate employment, since access 

to good-paying jobs is not really available to unskilled and poorly-educated newcomers (Zorich 

Visit to Chicago, May 28, 1998). 

The areas of Mesa with the highest levels of human and social problems, which are on 

Mesa’s south and southeast sides, appear to be Mesa Junior High School (Area 5), Powell Junior 

High School (Area 3), Carson Junior High School (Area 4), and Kino Junior High School (Area 

6). The area served by Powell Junior High School is the Project target area, and we determined 

to use the other three areas as comparison areas for purposes of program evaluation. A large 

majority of the city’s documented gang members were said to be located in the Project and 

comparison areas (Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). 

In a recent telephone survey of citizens – 400 from the Project target area and 400 from 

the rest of the city (including but not focused on the specific comparison areas) by Katz, Webb, 

and Choate (2001) – target-area respondents reported significantly more social disorder in their 

areas than respondents from the rest of the city. According to target-area respondents, the quality 

of life had significantly declined; there was significantly more concern expressed about 

racial/ethnic relations, and target-area residents viewed neighbors as significantly less cohesive 

than did residents in the rest of the city. 

Population Characteristics of the City: Program and Comparison Areas 

Based on U.S. Census data (Table 3.1), Mesa experienced a major (37.6%) growth in 

population size between 1990 and 2000, although the increase was not so great as that between 

3.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
1980 and 1990 (87.3%). Of greater significance to the rise of the youth-gang problem since the 

1980s was the relatively greater growth and concentration of the Mexican and MexicanAmerican population in the program and comparison areas, compared to the rest of the city. In 

these areas, the number of non-Hispanic whites grew by 45,603 (18.6%), but the Hispanic-origin 

population grew by 46,924 (149.6%). The increase in the proportion of Hispanic population was: 

from 16.5% to 33.8% in the Powell Junior High School program area; from 13.1% to 30.3% in 

the Carson Junior High School area; and from 12.8% to 25.5% in the Kino Junior High School 

area. The greatest relative increase in Hispanic population was in the Mesa Junior High School 

area – from 21.8% to 49.9% (Tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). 

It was possible to speculate that the increase in the gang problem, particularly the growth 

in numbers of gang members in the 1990s, was closely related to two socio-demographic 

phenomena: 1) the growth of the Hispanic population in the program and comparison areas; and 

2) the size of the decline of the non-Hispanic white population relative to the increase in the size 

of the Hispanic population in these areas, i.e., the increasing segregation and isolation of the lowincome, relatively younger Hispanic population from the rest of the city, especially from its nonHispanic white population. 

3.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- ---

---

--- ---

Table 3.1 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Mesa, Arizona 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/Latino 

(any race) 

Asian /or 

Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian Other Two or More Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 288,091 

(100.0) 

244,577 

(84.9) 

5,146 

(1.8) 

31,357 

(10.9) 

26,506 

(84.5) 

4,140 

(1.4) 

2,621 

(0.9) 

250 

(0.1) NA 

2000 396,375 

difference (%) 37.6 

20001 

(low estimate) 

390,323 

(100.0) 

290,180 

(74.3) 

9,377 

(2.4) 

78,281 

(20.1) 

63,519 

(81.1) 

6,629 

(1.7) 

5,454 

(1.4) 

402 

(0.1) (6,052) 

difference (%) -10.6 +0.6 +9.2 -3.4 +0.3 +0.5 0 

20002 402,911 295,371 11,103 78,281 63,519 8,924 7,336 1,896 

(high estimate) (100.0) (73.3) (2.8) (19.4) (81.1) (2.2) (1.8) (0.5) 

difference (%) -11.6 +1.0 +8.6 -3.4 +0.8 +0.9 +0.4 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

1

 Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 

1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a 

the figure of 390,323, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 396,375: the sum of the one-race responses – 

390,323 – and the two-or-more-race responses – 6,052. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; 

there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

2

 In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person 

indicating “White and Black or African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they 

reported gives a total population of 402,911, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high 

estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. 

3.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

---

--- --- ---

--- ---

--- --- ---

Table 3.2 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Powell Jr. High School Attendance Area 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/Latino 

(any race) 

Asian /or 

Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian Other Two or More Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 42,375 

(100.1) 

32,502 

(76.7) 

1,230 

(2.9) 

6,999 

(16.5) 

6,042 

(86.3) 

828 

(2.0) 

752 

(1.8) 

64 

(0.2) 

2000 49,789 

difference (%) 17.5 

20001 

(low estimate) 

48,682 

(100.0) 

26,614 

(54.7) 

2,234 

(4.6) 

16,476 

(33.8) 

1,309 

(2.7) 

1,970 

(4.0) 

79 

(0.2) (1,107) 

difference (%) -22.0 +1.7 +17.3 +0.7 +2.2 0 

20002 50,736 27,504 2,479 16,476 1,632 2,251 394 

(high estimate) (100.0) (54.2) (4.9) (32.5) (3.2) (4.4) (0.8) 

difference (%) -21.5 +2.0 +16.0 +1.2 +2.6 +0.6 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

1

Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 

1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a 

the figure of 48,682, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 49,789: the sum of the one-race responses – 

48,682–and the two-or-more-race responses – 1,107. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; 

there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

2

In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person 

indicating “White and Black or African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they 

reported gives a total population of 50,736, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high 

estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. 

3.7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

---

--- --- ---

--- ---

--- --- ---

Table 3.3 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Carson Jr. High School Attendance Area 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/Latino 

(any race) 

Asian /or 

Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian 

Other Two or More 

Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 32,348 

(100.1) 

26,680 

(82.5) 

592 

(1.8) 

4,223 

(13.1) 

3,656 

(86.6) 

394 

(1.2) 

437 

(1.4) 

22 

(0.1) 

2000 36,960 

difference (%) 14.3 

20001 

(low estimate) 

36,262 

(100.1) 

22,612 

(62.4) 

1,201 

(3.3) 

10,988 

(30.3) 

573 

(1.6) 

830 

(2.3) 

58 

(0.2) (698) 

difference (%) -20.1 1.5 17.2 0.4 0.9 0.1 

20002 37,697 23,215 1,442 10,988 717 1,092 243 

(high estimate) (99.9) (61.6) (3.8) (29.1) (1.9) (2.9) (0.6) 

difference (%) -20.9 2.0 16.0 0.7 1.5 0.5 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

1

Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 

1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a 

the figure of 36,262, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 36,960: the sum of the one-race responses – 32,262 – 

and the two-or-more-race responses – 698. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no 

difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

2

In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person 

indicating “White and Black or African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they 

reported gives a total population of 37,697, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high 

estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. 

3.8 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- -- --- --- --- ---

---

--- --- ---

---- ---

--- --- ---

Table 3.4 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Kino Jr. High School Attendance Area 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/Latino 

(any race) 

Asian /or 

Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian 

Other Two or More 

Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 26,111 

(100.0) 

21,751 

(83.3) 

541 

(2.1) 

3,343 

(12.8) 

2,890 

(86.4) 

194 

(0.7) 

257 

(1.0) 

25 

(0.1) 

2000 29,680 

difference (%) 13.7 

20001 

(low estimate) 

29,297 

(100.0) 

20,119 

(68.7) 

886 

(3.0) 

7,484 

(25.5) 

282 

(1.0) 

502 

(1.7) 

24 

(0.1) (383) 

difference (%) -14.6 0.9 12.7 0.3 0.7 0 

20002 30,071 20,458 1,010 7,484 366 652 101 

(high estimate) (100.0) (68.0) (3.4) (24.9) (1.2) (2.2) (0.3) 

difference (%) -15.3 1.4 12.1 0.5 1.2 0.2 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding error. 

1

Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 

1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a 

the figure of 29,297, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 29,680: the sum of the one-race responses – 29,297 – 

and the two-or-more-race responses – 383. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response exclusion; there is no 

difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

2

In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person 

indicating “White and Black or African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they 

reported gives a total population of 30,071, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high 

estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. 

3.9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

---

--- --- ---

--- ---

--- --- ---

Table 3.5 

Selected Population Characteristics 

1990 and 2000 Census 

Mesa Jr. High School Attendance Area 

Year 

Race/Ethnic Composition (n and %) 

Total 

Population 

Non-Hispanic 

White 

Non-Hispanic 

African-American 

Hispanic Origin/Latino 

(any race) 

Asian /or 

Pacific 

Islander 

American 

Indian 

Other Two or More 

Races 

TOTAL Mexican 

1990 28,094 

(99.9) 

20,651 

(73.5) 

584 

(2.1) 

6,136 

(21.8) 

5,464 

(89.0) 

367 

(1.3) 

321 

(1.1) 

35 

(0.1) 

2000 34,074 

difference (%) +21.2 

20001 

(low estimate) 

33,628 

(100.0) 

15,248 

(45.3) 

707 

(2.1) 

16,775 

(49.9) 

480 

(1.4) 

390 

(1.2) 

28 

(0.1) (446) 

difference (%) -28.2 0 +28.1 +0.1 +0.1 0 

20002 34,626 15,696 847 16,775 608 539 161 

(high estimate) (100.0) (45.3) (2.4) (48.4) (1.8) (1.6) (0.5) 

difference (%) -28.2 +0.3 +26.6 +0.5 +0.5 0 

Totals do not always sum due to rounding errors. 

1 Because individuals could report only one race in 1990 and could report more than one race in 2000, and because of other changes in the 2000 Census questionnaire, the race data for 

1990 and 2000 are not directly comparable. Only individual one-race responses were used to calculate racial/ethnic percentages for the columns in this row. The percentages were calculated from a 

the figure of 33,628, and should be considered low estimates for each of the racial/ethnic categories. In actuality, the total population for 2000 is 34,074: the sum of the one-race 

responses–33,628–and the two-or-more-race responses–446. Because individuals in the Hispanic/Latino category could be of any race, they are not affected by the two-or-more-race-response 

exclusion; there is no difference in low or high estimates for this category in 2000. 

2

 In order to account for individuals who reported two or more races in 2000, this row includes counts for the individuals in all categories that they marked. For example, a person 

indicating “White and Black or African-American and Asian” is included in the counts for White, Black and Asian. Counting individuals more than once for each racial/ethnic category they 

reported gives a total population of 34,626, which was used to calculate the high estimates for the racial/ethnic percentages in this row. These percentage differences should be considered high 

estimates for each of the social/ethnic categories. 

3.10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 4 

The Gang Problem in Mesa 

It is difficult to estimate the actual scope and nature of the gang problem in Mesa. This 

may in part be due to the fact that Mesa does not have a chronic and serious gang problem. What 

the gang problem has been, and how it is changing in terms of numbers of gangs, numbers of 

gang members, and the character of gang incidents cannot be clearly or accurately determined 

based on existing data sources. The Mesa Police Department began assessing the gang problem 

using quantitative data in 1998, and is still in the process of developing and perfecting its gangdata system. Initially, the assessment of the scope of the problem was largely based on anecdotal 

or case description. Recent reports of the gang problem are also available from occasional 

surveys conducted by the Mesa School District and Arizona State University, as well as from 

estimates of the Maricopa Juvenile Probation Department and Gang Prevention Steering 

Committee, and from the media. 

The general perception is that the Mesa gang problem is mild compared to medium-sized 

and larger cities, and is characterized by relatively less violence but growing drug dealing and 

drug use. Nevertheless, recent data indicate that the gang problem is increasing, and that this is 

due both to the arrival of an immigrant and mobile low-income population (especially of 

Mexican and Mexican-American origin) and the growth of African-American and Skinhead 

groups. The gang problem has grown statewide, particularly in and around the Phoenix area. 

Gangs are increasingly mobile, and distinctions between gang problems in Phoenix, Tempe, 

Chandler, Glendale, Mesa and other nearby cities and communities seem to be eroding. 

4.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Various Mesa institutions appear to view the gang problem – and the necessary response 

to it – somewhat differently. The Mesa Police Department sees the problem as mainly one of 

young adult males who are to be watched or arrested and incarcerated, as the situation requires. 

The Maricopa County Juvenile Court and Probation Department see the gang problem as 

comprising juvenile males (and some juvenile females) who have been involved in less-seriously 

violent, minor criminal or status offenses; youth who are to be closely supervised, and (usually) 

provided with community-based services as well as (sometimes) “intensive” supervision. 

Prosecution focuses on the more serious gang offenders involved in drive-bys or violent crimes, 

who are to be prosecuted and sent to correctional institutions. The Mesa Unified School District 

pays attention to a broad range of disruptive youth, including gang members, gang associates and 

non-gang youth who may not always be delinquents, but who may be removed from the regular 

school system and referred to alternative junior high and high schools. Youth agencies see the 

gang problem as comprising a younger, juvenile at-risk population who mainly require 

recreational activities, mentoring, and substance-abuse counseling. 

Definitions 

Arizona state law has defined a criminal gang, a gang member or gang associate, and a 

gang incident. Identification procedures have not yet been fully developed, implemented or 

systematically operationalized. Arizona State Legislative Senate Bill 1921, passed in the Spring 

of 1993, defined the gang problem as requiring a suppression-oriented approach. Parts of the 

California State Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (S.T.E.P.) Act have been incorporated 

into Arizona law. Mesa community leaders joined the Arizona Attorney General and others to 

4.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
support enactment of this legislation, with funding provided for special intelligence units under 

the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS), whose responsibility would be centralizing the 

gathering, analysis, and dispersal of gang statistics (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding 

Application, 1994). 

The Mesa Police Department (MPD) utilized the definition of a gang included in the 

Arizona Revised Statute 13-105: a “criminal street gang means an ongoing formal or informal 

association of persons whose members or associates individually or collectively engage in the 

commission, attempted commission, facilitation or solicitation of any felony act and who has at 

least one individual who is a criminal street-gang member” (Katz, Webb, Schafer, December, 

1999). 

The MPD Gang Unit uses seven criteria to assess whether or not an individual should be 

classified as a gang member: 

• Self-proclamation 

• Witness testimony or official statement 

• Written or electronic correspondence 

• Paraphernalia or photographs 

• Tattoos 

• Clothing or colors 

• Any other indicia of street-gang membership. 

4.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Any individual meeting one of the above criteria can be classified by the Gang Unit as a 

gang associate. Any individual meeting two or more of the above criteria can be classified as a 

gang member (Katz, Webb, Schaefer, December 1999). 

Furthermore, a gang member convicted of a felony offense “with the intent to promote, 

further, or assist any criminal conduct by a criminal street gang may have his or her sentence 

increased by three years” (Arizona Revised Statutes 13-604). 

Applying the gang-membership criteria can be subjective. Much depends on police, 

probation, or school identification of the youth as a gang member, regardless of whether he 

commits a crime or not. It is possible that adolescents in certain neighborhoods and of certain 

ethnic backgrounds are more likely to be identified as gang members or gang associates than is 

the case for adolescents in other neighborhoods of other ethnic backgrounds. Hispanic youth are 

probably more likely to be placed on special police gang-membership lists than are members of 

other racial or ethnic groups. Neo-Nazi, militia, and satanic groups (or gangs) are apparently 

classified separately, and are usually not identified as part of the street-gang problem. 

Most gang members on police lists are young adults. According to Katz, Webb, and 

Schaefer (1999), based on the MPD’s Gang Unit data (collected over a period 1995-1999) only 

16.2% of documented gang members are juveniles, i.e., under the age of 18 years. The major 

age-category of gang members, 18 to 25 years, comprises 67.9% of those on the documentedgang-member list. The remaining age-category, over 25 years, comprises 15.9% of the 

documented gang members. The age distribution of gang members may represent youth who are 

placed on these lists and not appropriately removed over time. 

Names of youth on gang-membership lists are supposed to be expunged if the youth has 

4.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
not been arrested during a five-year period, but we do not know how frequently or systematically 

the police update their files. The list of gang members in the MPD files continues to grow. The 

distinctions between gang members and gang associates or non-gang youth may also not be clear. 

Gang members are arrested more often than gang associates or non-gang youth (Katz, Webb, 

Schaefer, December 1999). It is not known whether the classification of a youth as a gang 

member is compellingly associated with particular patterns of offenses (such as gang violence) 

which may be distinctively gang-related. 

Number of Gangs 

The number of gangs increased in Mesa, particularly in certain areas. Elements of the 

same gang, or gangs with similar names, were present in the Project and comparison areas as 

well as citywide, but the largest segments of the most troublesome gangs appeared to be located 

in the Project and comparison areas. The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994) 

under the Comprehensive Gang Program claimed that few of the “homegrown” gangs existed 

five years ago, and that the number of gangs (as well as their violent activity) had grown 

exponentially due to the influence of gang youth moving to Mesa from Phoenix, Los Angeles, 

and Chicago. The “rapid infiltration of gangs” signified an “accelerating problem.” There were 

five gangs in Mesa in 1990, ten gangs in 1991 and fifteen gangs in 1994. Furthermore, in the 

same First-Year OJJDP Funding Application there was reference to “30 different gangs [that] 

had developed in Mesa.” 

The Second-Year OJJDP Funding Application (1996), however, claimed there were 19 

gangs in Mesa: five gangs that had only an Hispanic membership; seven gangs that had primarily 

4.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Hispanic membership but also included whites; one mixed gang (Hispanic, African-American, 

and white); three African-American-only gangs; two African-American gangs that included 

whites; and one white-only gang. Of the 19 documented gangs, six were known to have female 

members; 8 of the 19 gangs were viewed as having a “high propensity for violence ... such as 

drive-bys, aggravated assault robberies ...” 

In the Spring of 1997, during a National Evaluation staff visit to the Mesa Project, 

program administrators still claimed there were 19 gangs in Mesa, but there was no specific data 

on the number of gangs in the Project target area. The MGIP Director claimed that such 

information would not be available from the MPD data system until July 1997. In February 

1998, the MPD documented 17 Mesa gangs. In the course of a telephone conference between 

National Evaluation and Mesa staff (Conference Call with National Evaluators and MGIP Staff, 

August 19, 1998), the Case Management Coordinator indicated that the Project was working 

with members of 4 gangs mainly in the Project area (Southside Mesa, Wetback Power, Westside 

Mesa, and Los Varrio Locos). He claimed that the gang problem was as strong as ever, but 

“they had seen a reduction of violence in the youth they work with.” 

In 1999, Katz, Webb, and Schaefer reported that Mesa had 25 documented gangs, the five 

largest of which were Wetback Power, Westside Mesa, Southside Mesa, La Victoria Locos, and 

West Side City Crips (an African-American gang). However, these five gangs contained only 

39.7% of total gang members in the city. Apparently, the smaller-size gangs collectively 

contained the majority of gang members in Mesa.1

 The claim continued to be made that gangs 

1

 However, based on four annual interviews with Mesa Ga ng Unit detectives, the largest numbers of gang 

members in the program and com parison areas were claimed to be from these five gangs. Also, members of the 

progra m and c omp arison youth sam ples were largely from these same ga ngs. 

4.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and gang members were dispersed citywide, except perhaps for Wetback Power, which was 

located mainly in the Mesa Junior High area (the comparison area just east of the Project target 

area). Members of most gangs were said to be dispersed “randomly” throughout the city, 

although the gang problem – at least based on school-survey and police gang-specialist estimates 

– was concentrated in the four central-city areas, including the Project area and three comparison 

areas. There was also occasional reference to the Skinhead, White Supremacist, Indian 

Reservation and motorcycle gangs or groups in Mesa, but presumably they were not generally 

present in the target area. 

In their Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding Application (1998), the Mesa Project leadership 

claimed that “Mesa does, in fact, have a gang problem, although it is still an ‘emerging gang 

problem.’ This problem is growing incrementally ... Mesa has 25 gangs operating in the city ... a 

500 percent increase over the five documented gangs in 1990.” As in the First-Year Funding 

Application, there was reference to the increase in the “degree of violence” due to the influence 

of Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Chicago gangs. And there was reference to “a rapid infiltration of 

gangs [in the Mesa Vista alternative school student population] over the same [8 to 10 year] 

period.” 

In June and July of 2000, the MPD Gang Unit lieutenant observed that 26 gangs were 

now documented by the MPD, although only five or six “were really active” (Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee Minutes, July 2000). However, the same lieutenant, who later became the 

Gang Unit Commander and Project Director of MGIP, mentioned that gang arrests were up – 

“involving 39 different gangs”– presumably from Mesa (Steering Committee Minutes, 

November 14, 2000). This latest claim was made around the time of termination of OJJDP 

4.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
funding of the Project in December, 2000. The number of gangs was apparently growing, but the 

exact numbers remained elusive. In the course of the final site visit by the National Evaluation 

team (June 22-23, 2000), the departing MPD Gang Unit Commander noted that the growing gang 

problem was predominantly Hispanic. The incoming Gang Unit Commander and Project 

Director also raised the issue of “how one could view the Project as a success when the number 

of gang members continued to increase” (I. Spergel, Field Notes, June 24, 2000). 

Number of Gang Members 

It was also difficult to determine how many gang members and gang associates were 

present in the target area and in the city as a whole, and what changes in these numbers were 

occurring over time. Based on data sources from the MPD and Maricopa County Probation 

Departments (Juvenile and Adult), estimates were imprecise in part because distinctions between 

juvenile and adult gang members were not always made. Estimates also often referred to at-risk 

youth, who may or may not have met the criteria of gang associate. Further, we are not sure if 

the estimates of numbers of gang youth referred to the membership of key gangs operating in the 

program or comparison areas only, or citywide. Nevertheless, the number of gang members did 

not seem to have grown as much as the number of gangs. 

A Tribune newspaper feature article, The Changing Face of Mesa (June 7, 1992), stated 

that “the Mesa Police Department’s Gang Suppression Action plan (1993) estimates ... only 550 

known gang members being tracked in Mesa by the local police.” In Mesa’s First-Year Funding 

Application (and Abstract, 1994), these figures jumped dramatically to 1500 gang members, and 

included a large number of “at risk” youth who would be classified as “wannabes.” 

4.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Katz, Webb, and Schaefer (1999) stated that “in 1995, when the police department began 

to document gang members, there were 1,333, [but] by June 1999, 1506 gang members had been 

documented in Mesa, Arizona [a rise of 12%].” The Mesa Fifth-Year Funding Application 

(1999) specified these figures as 1035 documented gang members and 471 gang associates. In 

the same Application, target-area gang members from the four large gangs – West Side Mesa, 

Southside Mesa, East Side Locos, and Wetback Power – were said to number 240, or 40%, of the 

601 total Mesa documented gang members in the target area. A year later, the Arizona 

Republican reported there were 700 to 800 gang members in the target area (Christina Leonard, 

“Feds, City Offering Opportunities to Gangs,” June 7, 2000). In 2000, the MGIP Director said 

there were 1600 documented gang members and gang associates in all of Mesa (Steering 

Committee Minutes, July 11, 2000). 

Probably our best estimate of the number of gang members and gang associates, and 

changes in these numbers over time, is from figures cited in the Fifth-Year MGIP Funding 

Application (1999). 

Number of Gang Members in Mesa 

Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

Number of Gang 

Members 

1335 1464 1206 1423 1506 

A MPD Gang Unit detective, presumably knowledgeable about gangs and gang members, 

estimated the total citywide gang membership in January 2001 to be 1135, and the total number 

of gang members in the target area to be 1010. Whether these numbers included both gang 

members and gang associates is not clear. In any case, the proportion of target-area gang 

4.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
members appears to have risen, although overall gang-member numbers may have declined. 

The difference between the increases in estimated numbers of gangs and gang members is 

a puzzle. The number of gangs appears to have grown about 500%, but the number of gang 

members only 15% to 20%. We would have expected the number of gang members to have 

grown more than the number of gangs. We address these changing patterns in the numbers of 

gangs and gang members, comparing the program and comparison areas, and using police gangspecialist estimates, in a later chapter: Gang and Community-Level Crime Changes (Chapter 

14). 

Finally, Katz, Webb, and Schaefer (1999) report that of the 481 juvenile gang members in 

their citywide sample (derived from MPD Gang Unit lists, which include gang associates), 22.5 

% (n = 108) had no arrest records. Furthermore, of the 146 (mainly juvenile) youth in the Project 

at the time, 42.5% (n = 62) had not ever been arrested. In other words, a substantial proportion 

of youth documented as gang members or gang associates in the city at large, including the target 

area, probably had no arrest records. If we use MPD 1999 estimates of the age distribution of 

juvenile gang members or gang associates in Mesa, only 16.2% were listed as juveniles (under 18 

years of age). This computes to only 244 juvenile gang members or gang associates in all of 

Mesa. 

The Nature of the Gang Crime Problem 

In this chapter we report mainly agency and field-observation findings of the nature of 

juvenile gang-offender arrests, and of changes in these arrests over time. In a later chapter, based 

on more systematically-collected and analyzed self-report and police-arrest data for program and 

4.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
comparison youth, we present findings on the specific scope and nature of crime and gang 

offenses of program and comparison youth (Chapter 9). 

Various observations of Project administrative staff and other sources of data suggested 

that Mesa was an emerging gang-problem city, that the gang-crime problem was not serious, and 

that crimes such as homicides and aggravated assaults were not dominant features of the gang 

problem. Maricopa County Juvenile Probation records indicated that among the 481 gang 

juveniles known to them in the three-year period between 1995 and 1998, charges were brought 

for only 4 homicides, no forcible rapes, 16 robberies, no drivebys, but for 53 aggravated assaults. 

Between 1995 and 1998, homicides decreased by 100%, robberies by 77.% and aggravated 

assault by 79.4%. The crimes most often committed by these juvenile probationers in the three 

year period were larceny, theft, and motor vehicle theft (21.7%), misdemeanor assaults (15.6%), 

drug violations (8.5%), and curfew violations (13.4%). All crimes by these probationers 

decreased 33.1% in this period (Katz, Webb, Schaefer, December, 1999). Nevertheless, the 

Mesa Police Department website (2002) and their more detailed area-level crime data suggested 

that the program and comparison areas accounted for more than half the city’s crime, but 

contained only a little more than a third of the city’s population. The majority of almost all types 

of crime incidents were occurring in the program and three comparison areas together during the 

program and pre-program periods. 

At the time of the Katz, Webb, Schaefer (1999) survey, 59% of program participants had 

a record of arrests. Only 14 (9.7%) of these were chronic offenders (arrested 6 or more times), 

and 42 (28.0%) were moderate offenders (arrested 2 to 5 times). While the majority of program 

youth were on probation, only 6 were classified as hardcore offenders involved in criminal 

4.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
activities such as drivebys (Amy Silverman, New Times – Phoenix, December 16, 1999). 

Project police and probation officers also estimated that youth-gang incidents had generally 

declined in the Project area during the program period, but had increased in the neighboring area 

to the east – the Mesa Junior High School comparison area– which was experiencing a greater 

increase in Hispanic population than were the program and other two comparison areas. Project 

police officers claimed that, since the Project was established, crime in the target area – 

particularly crime committed by gang youth – had gone down (I. Spergel and F. Perez, Field 

Notes of June 22-23, 2000 visit to Mesa). 

This was not to deny that there were occasional serious gang-crime incidents involving 

juveniles and adults, as reported by Gang Unit detectives at Gang Prevention Steering Committee 

meetings: five driveby shooting incidents in 1996, with no injuries and no arrests made; Gang 

Unit intervention in a conflict between gangs at an alternative high school in 1999; several gang 

members arrested for armed robbery in 2000; and phone harassment and aggravated assault 

incidents by Skinhead groups. At one of the Steering Committee meetings, a program youth was 

identified as the victim of a gang assault at a local junior high school; there was no injury 

inflicted and the suspect was charged with an aggravated assault because he used a club (Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 15, 1998). 

The Case Management Coordinator reported that there was “so much violence in the 

[target] community,” but when pressed to be more specific, responded “well the violence related 

to the people using drugs and alcohol... lots of bar fights... violence against their [gang youth] 

moms” (Transcript of conversation with Mesa Case Management Coordinator in Chicago, 

December 23, 1999). 

4.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Drugs. The larger gang problem was identified as use of alcohol and marijuana, and 

selling drugs such as marijuana and cocaine (and increasingly methamphetamines) by gang youth 

– more and more by undocumented gang youth. There was some disagreement among police and 

probation as to whether gang youth were selling large quantities of drugs, and whether their drug 

dealing was well-organized. There was evidence that a good deal of drug dealing involved nongang youth and young adults, as well as gang members. 

One Project detective reported that “our Narcotics Unit conducted an investigation in an 

area where we have the most Project participants living. The investigation centered around a 

group of individuals who were selling large amounts of marijuana (anywhere from 25 pounds 

and up) and methamphetamines (anywhere from one ounce and up). These individuals were 

distributing the drugs in the neighborhood to be sold at street level amounts. Some of the sellers 

were gang members and others were illegal citizens from Mexico... One of the subjects targeted 

during the investigation was a Project participant” (Memo from the Project Gang Unit detective 

to the Project Director and Commander, January 3, 1998). 

Another MPD detective, not directly connected with the Project, reported that “two West 

Side Mesa Gang members (probably not program participants) were arrested for selling 50 

pounds of marijuana.” He noted that “gangs are getting more involved in drug trafficking...” 

(Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 15, 1998). It was not yet evident that 

gang youth were becoming hardcore drug users or drug sellers. There was little evidence that 

gangs hung out in crack houses or in areas where heavy drug distribution took place. Gang 

hangouts and drug distribution centers were still not associated (F. Perez Field Notes, June 22­

23, 2000). 

4.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Female Gang Members. Also noted was that young adolescent females were becoming 

more involved with gangs, and that “female gang members [were] becoming more violent and 

more directly involved in criminal activity.” “Females are playing a more prominent role in gang 

activity. They are being jumped into gangs more frequently, becoming full-fledged members... 

they are becoming much more violent than in the past... motives for two recent gang-related 

shootings have centered around disputes over females” (Third- and Fourth-Year OJJDP Funding 

Applications, 1997 and 1998). The Project Gang Unit detective expressed the view that “... 

females were not that ... involved in the gang problem ... [but] it would eventually be coming ... it 

would only be a matter of time before this site too would be affected” (F. Perez, Field Notes from 

June 22-23, 2000 Visit to Mesa). 

Timing of Gang-Related Offenses. Despite the claims of Steering Committee members 

and the views of school authorities that gang offenses occurred mainly in the afternoons or after 

school hours during the week, this was not entirely the case. Based on police data, Katz, Webb, 

and Schaefer revealed that gang-related offenses were most likely to take place at the end of each 

week. Approximately 25% of such offenses took place on Thursday, 14% on Friday, 12% on 

Saturday, and 14% on Sunday. Furthermore, gang-related offenses took place mainly between 

6:00 and 11:59 PM (40.8%) and between midnight and 3:00 AM (12.7%). Only 15.9% of gang 

incidents occurred between 3:00 PM and 6:00 PM, in the hours after school. It is possible that 

the Gang Prevention Steering Committee focused more on juveniles, and the police focused on, 

and arrested, more adults for gang offenses. 

4.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Reasons for the Gang Problem 

The general-community and Steering Committee view was that youth joined gangs “to 

meet social and economic needs not satisfied through family, religion, school, or employment. 

The lack of stable families and neighbors combined with racism will continue to create an 

environment in Mesa where gangs may thrive” (Tribune Newspapers, June 7, 1992, “The 

Changing Face of Mesa”). Project staff increasingly noted the family dysfunction of youth 

served by the MGIP. Youth are frequently being raised by single parents (mostly by mothers) 

with generally low economic status and little education. Many families move frequently, and the 

instability of uprooting residence is a risk factor for gang involvement. There is violence in the 

home of a lot of youth; family role models are often inappropriate for the youth. Some families 

are so dysfunctional it appeared evident that mental-health services would be necessary at some 

point... (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). 

The perception of some local residents about gangs, at least based on the views of a small 

sample of residents at a community meeting, did not entirely jibe with official police or agency 

views. “Several of the people [parents] present said that gang members protected the 

neighborhood. However, after some discussion they admitted that local gang youth attracted 

opposing gangs...and drivebys. There had recently been several shootings. Luckily no one had 

been hurt, yet...” (Summary of Community Meeting, I. Spergel Field Notes, December 13-15, 

1999) (See Jankowski, 1991; Sullivan, 1989; Suttles, 1968; and Whyte, 1943). 

The Katz, Welsh, Choate Citizen Assessment of Gangs and Gang Control in Mesa, 

Arizona (2001) also indicated that 39% of residents in the target area believed that gang crime 

was “the most serious or one of the most serious problems facing law enforcement, whereas 

4.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
about 45% of residents from the comparison area [the rest of the city] believed that gang crime 

was the most serious or one of the most serious problems facing law enforcement.” Target-area 

residents were less concerned with gang problems than were residents of the rest of the city, 

including the Project comparison areas. 

There was the general Mesa-community and agency sense that the gang problem was 

growing worse, but it was not out of control; it was not the chief problem in either the city or the 

target community, and there was no clear or consistent assessment of the scope and nature of the 

problem. Adequate data management systems to assess the problem, and changes in the problem 

over time, were still to be established. 

4.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 5 

Mesa’s Response to the Gang Problem 

Before the OJJDP grant for the Comprehensive Gang Program was awarded, Mesa 

agencies, schools, and government already comprised a well-developed leadership structure 

which was concerned with and active in addressing youth-development problems, particularly 

problems of youth at risk of gang involvement. However, the gang problem had not been clearly 

assessed, and focus was on youth city-wide, particularly on younger youth in the context of 

schools and youth agencies. The criminal justice system was just beginning to address the gang 

problem, which seemed to be growing. OJJDP funding for the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

(MGIP) was viewed initially as a primary opportunity to target at-risk and moderately-involved 

delinquent gang youth, particularly on an individual-youth and family basis. Control and 

suppression of gang-involved youth represented a separate approach, and seemed to be of lesser 

long-term importance than prevention of the gang problem itself. 

While a broad, comprehensive prevention and early-intervention program was the priority 

for Mesa leadership, they also realized the importance of the Project’s targeting moderatelydelinquent gang-involved youth (including those already on probation). The MGIP could also be 

a project that would further meet the long-term interests and needs of the community. In this 

chapter, we describe Mesa’s efforts at community and agency mobilization and its plan of 

community action in regard to gang prevention; the adaptation of the Comprehensive 

Community-Wide Gang Model to the youth selected for the program; and the institutionalization 

of the program. The specific nature of the implementation of the OJJDP Model in Mesa is 

5.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
described in Chapter 6. 

Early Response to the Gang Problem 

A major social-development program called “New Turf” was started in Mesa in 1991 

(funded by the U.S. Office of Substance Abuse Prevention), which became the basis for the 

United Way’s “Building a Healthy Mesa” (BHM) plan. This plan called for the community to 

work toward world-class levels of health and fitness, educational excellence, emotional wellness 

and economic health. One of the main recommendations of the BHM plan was the creation of 11 

different area or neighborhood councils; each neighborhood was to be associated with and 

designated by a junior high school catchment area. 

At the same time, concern was expressed about an emerging gang problem. The Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee was formed in May 1992 (prior to the OJJDP initiative) and 

comprised representatives of the United Way, the Mesa Public Schools, city government, the 

Mesa Police Department and other community agencies. Its mission was “to develop and 

implement a community action plan that would prevent, intervene [in], and suppress youth gang 

activity and mobilize coordinated community efforts to sustain positive results against gangs” 

(Appendix, Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). 

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee (GPSC) of Mesa was chaired originally by a 

City Council member and later by the Superintendent of Schools. Although the GPSC was not a 

Mesa City Council committee, it made recommendations to the City Council as well as to the 

Mesa Public School District and Mesa United Way. The GPSC was comprised of policy-level 

representatives from a range of government, criminal-justice, and community-based agencies, as 

5.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
well as from faith-based and business organizations. It subsequently became the policy-making 

body of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. The MGIP became a major project of the Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee, but its scope was broader than the OJJDP initiative in Mesa 

(Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). 

The original mission of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee was “to develop and 

implement a community action plan that would mobilize coordinated community efforts to 

sustain positive results against gangs.” The GPSC’s Community Action Plan of December, 

1993, included a list of 19 priorities which emphasized expansion of resources, and programs of 

prevention and early intervention such as operating junior and senior high school gymnasia for 

teen recreation on Friday and Saturday, developing neighborhood after-school programs, and 

doubling the number of elementary schools offering summer recreation programs for youth. 

Only five of the nineteen priorities referred explicitly to gangs, and three of them 

emphasized suppression or control: “provide additional uniformed or civilian personnel for Mesa 

Police Department Gang Suppression;” “develop ... ‘prevention alternatives to gangs’ through 

[an] earn and learn program ...;” “meet with area legislators to discuss legislation to suppress 

gang activity; support legislation banning possession of handguns by minors;” and “develop 

positive alternatives to gangs program for up to 100 adolescents” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1994). 

The emphasis of the Community Action Plan was to “provide opportunities to help direct 

a large number of youth toward positive activities and on suppression efforts to hold youth 

accountable for their criminal activities.” The Mesa Gang Intervention Project was to be a 

further component of the GPSC’s plan to “provide a comprehensive, collaborative effort to 

5.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
intervene in the lives of violent gang members and associates” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1996). However, it was not clear that Mesa in fact had a “violent gang” 

problem, and no specific plan for addressing a violent gang problem evolved. Instead, a 

coordinated, team approach was expected to develop which would offer program participants 

opportunities to address “educational, psychological, family and employment needs through 

school, social services, neighborhoods, churches and the business community working together” 

(Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). 

At the very first OJJDP cross-site orientation and technical assistance session, held in 

Kansas City in June 1995, Mesa community leaders expressed their key long term “purpose and 

direction to touch all the kids where they may be at risk ... the target area is the city as a whole ... 

We’ve been targeting programs for the at-risk [youth] ... We know that with heavy-duty gang 

members... we have to treat them very differently...” (Transcript of discussion with Mesa 

Community leaders, Kansas City, June 7, 1995). 

In the first application for funding from OJJDP, the MGIP appeared to have two major 

“themes for action.” The first was to “provide positive alternatives for children and youth so that 

they will not become associated with gangs or resort to violence as an answer to problems.” This 

was to be achieved through: expansion of positive alternatives to gang membership and 

violence; opening up neighborhood and agency facilities; promotion of positive values and 

informing youth about services; and development of a training and leadership program for youth 

(First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). The GSPC agencies were to take 

responsibility for implementing this theme. 

The second and somewhat separate “theme for action” was to adopt a community-wide 

5.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
“zero-tolerance” attitude against criminal gang activity, to be achieved through: “increase of law 

enforcement suppression of criminal gang activities;” “encourage reform in the Department [of 

Corrections] to specifically address length of incarceration and rehabilitation;” and “encourage 

and support legislative action to stiffen penalties for repeat juvenile offenders and gang-related 

violence” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). 

Gang Prevention Steering Committee leadership and the MGIP administration perceived 

that OJJDP was concerned with social intervention and outreach, as well as suppression, for 

hardcore, gang-involved, and at-risk youth. However, the long-term interest of community 

leaders and the GPSC was prevention and early intervention (Executive Committee, Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, April 18, 1996). Based on “Building a Healthy Mesa,” 

the frame of reference for the GPSC and (initially, but to a lesser extent) for the MGIP, was 

meeting the “human service needs of participants and neighborhood families, mentorship, and 

intensifying efforts to provide services which benefit at-risk youth in general in the area” (FourthYear MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

In order to obtain OJJDP funding, the Mesa community and Project leadership agreed 

that MGIP would concern itself with “the reduction of violent crime by current hard-core gang 

members” through social intervention. Mesa would need to show that “we are going to do 

intensive intervention involving MPD and Probation and utilizing some type of outreach 

component” (Mesa Gang Prevention Steering Committee, Executive Committee Minutes, April 

18, 1996). Again, there was little evidence of a violent gang problem in Mesa. Also, the 

hardcore offenders, whether gang members or not, were generally sent directly to correctional 

institutions and bypassed the Project. 

5.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Project Development Issues 

A good deal of communication and coordination already existed among established 

criminal justice, education, and social welfare organizations in respect to various aspects of the 

delinquency problem. A key initial problem for community leaders and the Project 

administrators was how to sustain the commitment to “building a healthier Mesa,” in particular 

facilitating a broad youth-development and prevention approach while incorporating the OJJDP 

youth-gang-focused Model. The Project Director – the Mesa Police Department Captain who 

later became Commander of the Gang Unit – early recognized the difficulties of integrating the 

two approaches. The Captain and the Project Case-Management Coordinator were also already 

raising questions about the feasibility and value of the youth-worker outreach approach, which 

required contact with youth gangs and their more delinquent members on the streets (Summary 

Notes, I. Spergel Visit to Mesa, December 13-15, 1995). 

The MGIP, as it developed, appeared to emphasize certain components of the Model, 

particularly community mobilization and the involvement of police (especially the Gang Unit), 

juvenile and adult probation, and selected established social agencies. It seemed to avoid contact 

with grassroots or faith-based organizations, interagency coordination arrangements, and the 

training of its outreach youth workers to focus on contacting gang-youth on the streets. A team 

of workers evolved in a central neighborhood, but it was not clear that criminal justice 

authorities, police and probation were together systematically directing their attention to the same 

youth that outreach youth workers or case managers were. The OJJDP Model was understood 

but not entirely adopted. 

Furthermore, the MGIP administrators and Steering Committee did not follow through on 

5.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
their claim as to how they would proceed, program-wise. This could have resulted because the 

MGIP and the Steering Committee had overlapping but slightly different agendas. The MGIP 

third-year application for continued OJJDP funding stated that the Project’s goal was to 

“implement and test a comprehensive, community-based model program for gang prevention, 

intervention, and suppression focusing upon violent offenders and the reduction of violent gang 

activity.” At the same time, the third-year application for funding cited the MGIP’s and the 

Steering Committee’s key objectives, which emphasized youth social development: 

•	 “Expand current parenting program and provide bilingual parenting program in the 

community, i.e., churches, Mesa Alternative Schools. 

•	 Provide afterschool programs at Carson/Emerson/Salk, Kino/Edison, Powell/Redbird, 

Mesa Junior/Lowell, McKellips Learning Center, Power Learning Center and Mesa Vista 

Alternative Schools. Emphasis should be providing activities after school between the 

hours of 3 and 7 PM and should include youth training, sibling care, etc. 

•	 Develop and implement a mentoring program within the neighborhood, whereby 25 adult 

mentors/role models would be identified and connected with 25 at-risk youth in each of 

fourteen (14) Building Healthier Mesa areas.” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding 

Application, 1997). It is not clear that more than one or two MGIP youth were ever 

involved in this program, although the MGIP Case-Management Coordinator was 

responsible for the mentoring program. 

In their Fifth-Year Application for OJJDP Funding (1999) the MGIP Administrators 

persisted in a statement-of-focus on the reduction of gang-violent activity. In a telephone 

5.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
conference call between the National Evaluators, OJJDP Local Evaluators, and the MGIP 

administrative staff, the National Evaluation Co-principal Investigator asked “whether there was 

any evidence of violence between [program] youth.” The MGIP Case Management Coordinator 

responded that he didn’t consider there was any serious violence among program youth. “One 

youth kicked another. That’s about the most violence they had in the last year” (Mesa 

Conference Call Minutes, August 19, 1998). 

Further, while the MGIP Fifth-Year Application abstract states that the Project “provides 

intervention strategies to 119 gang members, gang associates, youth at-risk for gangs and their 

families,” it adds that the Project’s objective or strategy is “community mobilization to fight 

gangs in the target area of Central Mesa.” However, the Funding Application does not indicate 

how this was to be done, and how fighting gangs was related to a youth social-development 

strategy. The MGIP appeared to have difficulty developing an approach that emphasized and 

integrated both control and social intervention for its program youth. Because of the greater 

number of police and probation staff relative to social-intervention staff on the team, the control 

function appeared to dominate, especially in regard to the relatively large number of probationers 

who were referred to the program in its early development. 

The Local Evaluators stated that many of the youth had to participate in the program as a 

condition of probation, but the Project had a problem maintaining contact with those youth once 

the probation condition was terminated, at least in the earlier years of the program. Youth who 

were no longer on probation seemed not to be interested in Project services (Conference call with 

National Evaluators and Local Evaluators, June 25, 1998). One of the outreach youth workers 

also raised questions about the nature and degree of participation of youth in the Project. There 

5.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
wasn’t as much direct contact with youth as he had expected (Memo from D. Coleman to L. 

Adams, January 5, 1998). Not all probationers in the Project had contact with outreach youth 

workers. 

Tensions initially existed between the Gang Unit Police who were not involved in the 

Project and a key alternative high school regarding the approach(es) of the Project. At first, the 

police Gang Unit perceived the MGIP as being soft on crime. The tensions were largely 

eliminated with the incorporation of the Project into the Gang Unit. On the other hand, Mesa 

Vista Alternative High School, where many of the program youth were located, believed the 

Project was too closely associated with the police. The MGIP administrative staff felt that “the 

school was not observing the district’s policy regarding no gang signs, colors, etc. in school ...” 

(C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, October 26, 1999). It wasn’t until close to the end of the fifth and 

final year of the OJJDP grant period that an adequate relationship of communication exchange 

and coordinated programming began to take place between these two groups. 

During the early phase of program operations, the OJJDP Program Manager raised a 

range of questions about the nature of the program that the MGIP was developing. He wondered 

about the type of youth reached by the community outreach workers and whether gang youth 

were receiving an appropriate range of services, including contacts by outreach workers on the 

street. He asked whether the community-development worker’s efforts were sufficiently directed 

to the gang problem (Letter from J. Burch to L. Adams, October 2, 1998). 

Two different client groups seemed to evolve in the course of program development: a 

group comprising males referred mainly from juvenile probation, and an at-risk group 

comprising younger youth from the target area junior high school. It was not clear to what extent 

5.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the admissions criteria developed for probationers referred to the program were implemented, 

and whether appropriate criteria for the at-risk group existed. 

The following general criteria were established for referrals of probationers to the Mesa 

Gang Intervention Project (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996): 

•	 documented gang member or associate using Gang Member Identification Criteria 

(GMIC), age 16-21 years 

•	 currently on juvenile or adult probation 

•	 history of involvement in, or propensity for, violent crime 

•	 lives in the target area. 

We have already raised questions about some of these criteria (Chapter 4). The definition 

of a gang member and especially a gang associate was exceedingly broad. Gang probationers in 

the program were generally not violent or serious offenders. Many youth were not exclusively 

recruited from the neighborhood, and some had no criminal-justice record. The Case 

Management Coordinator said he could not politically resist court, social agency, and other 

community organization pressures to include youth from other parts of the city in the program. 

He also noted that the Project worked with approximately 25% more youth than were listed on 

MGIP rosters and for whom no program tracking records existed (Mesa Conference Call 

Minutes, October 29, 1998). 

The Fourth-Year Mesa Funding Application (1998) indicated that the Project worked 

with at-risk youth primarily through its Youth Intervention Specialist, whose purpose was to 

deter youth, ages 12 to 15, from gang involvement. Delinquent, disruptive, or deviant school 

behavior often preceded gang involvement. The Youth Intervention Specialist stated that she 

5.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
worked with youth exhibiting signs of the following: 

• incorrigibility 

• excessive school truancy 

• school suspension 

• inability to control anger 

• noticeably negative attitudes 

• lack of respect for authority figures 

• association with known gang members 

• gang graffiti on books 

• clothing resembling gang attire 

• substance-abuse issues 

• family dysfunction. 

The school counselor generally referred school youth to the MGIP Youth Intervention 

Specialist for anger management, substance-use discussion, and other forms of (mainly group) 

counseling and home visits (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). There were 

girls in the school at-risk group, but many initially referred to the program had behavior 

problems, were not delinquent, and may not have been gang associates. The Case Management 

Coordinator later noted that the Youth Intervention Specialist is “now doing a better job of 

targeting the gang at-risk youth,” especially those already hanging out with gang members. Some 

of the girls were “seriously involved with older guys – at 15 they’re already pregnant [but these] 

girls weren’t viewed as active in gangs...” (Mesa Conference Call Minutes, October 29, 1998 

and February 16, 1999). 

5.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Institutionalizing the Program 

Despite questions about the extent to which the MGIP implemented some of the 

significant components of the OJJDP Model, other key components of the Model were well 

developed. The institutionalization of the program was assured for several years from the start of 

the program, based on the strength and capacity of community leadership and the availability of 

local resources. No other Comprehensive Gang Program site had prepared as well for the 

development of the program and provided the extensive local resources in support of the 

comprehensive community-wide approach. The commitment of key agency directors – 

particularly police, probation, the United Way, the school system and city government – to the 

support of the program was continuously evident. Community and agency leaders on the 

Steering Committee were highly active in support of the Project. 

At the time of the initial funding application, the Gang Prevention Steering Committee 

and the Mesa Police Department promised that “Mesa will encourage 11 mandatory agencies 

discussed in the RFP to take ownership of the Program and shift funding priorities... Community 

leaders would continue to be involved at policy and program levels. The Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee would continue to monitor and evaluate program implementation and would 

market successful programs to local organizations for funding consideration. With this oversight 

process, achievement of future funding in our community to continue programs after the 

demonstration grant’s termination is a realistic expectation” (Letter from L. Adams to J. Burch, 

January 19, 1995). 

From the start, it was clear that the single strongest agency that could facilitate not only 

the development but the institutionalization of the program was the Mesa Police Department. 

5.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Captain of the MPD (the initial Director of the Project), was highly identified with the 

purpose of the Project; she was extremely resourceful, and politically savvy about what would 

have to be done to sustain the Project and its approach within the MPD. The Mesa City Council 

was also integrally involved in considerations of funding the Project when OJJDP funding 

terminated. The support of the City Council was critical regarding whether and how the MPD 

would modify its traditional approach, and integrate the Project into its structure. “If monetary 

support were withdrawn by the City Council [and the Project terminated], it would be possible 

that a narrow, punitive suppression approach to the gang problem would characterize the policy 

and practices of the Mesa Police Department” (Summary notes of visit by National Evaluation 

staff to the MGIP, December 13-15, 1995). 

The support and guidance of the national technical assistance team, OJJDP program 

management, and top-level administrative staff were important in structuring and assuring 

continuation of the program. The OJJDP Program Manager paid a special visit to the MGIP and 

indicated the likelihood of fifth-year funding for the Project. He praised Mesa’s substantial 

contribution of in-kind resources and the linkage among organizations in the city that supported 

the Project (Steering Committee Meeting Notes, January 8, 1998). 

In early June 1998, the OJJDP Program Manager and the national Technical Assistance 

Advisor spent “nearly four hours” with the Project Director “discussing how to manage a team 

[of police, probation, United Way, and social service agency staff].” The problem was how to 

encourage and integrate staff into Project operations when agencies had different vacation, sicktime, compensatory-time, supervisory and other distinctive agency policies. The OJJDP 

Manager and national Technical Assistance Advisor also made recommendations about the 

5.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
future “placement” of the Project in the police department. Placing it in the MPD Gang Unit 

seemed most feasible, particularly after the current Project Director’s expected retirement from 

the Department in the near future. (Memo from C. Kane to I. Spergel, June 5, 1998). 

In a meeting in Washington, D.C. with U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and the Chiefs 

of Police from the five OJJDP project sites, Chief Strauss spoke of the progress of the Mesa 

Police Department – particularly its Gang Unit – in accepting the OJJDP Model. The Gang Unit 

had been “very suppression/confinement oriented.” But officers of the Gang Unit and others 

associated with the Project now “better understood issues concerning family dysfunction [of gang 

members],” and how the police could better “work with those families by providing them with 

[access or referral to] services. The police had become more knowledgeable due to the Project 

information-sharing process. The department was exploring whether the Gang Unit and the 

Project should merge in the near future in order to increase the ‘buy-in’ that will be necessary 

[for the Mesa Police Department] to sustain the program once the [OJJDP] grant ends” (Minutes 

of the Police Chiefs’ Round Table with the Attorney General, Washington, D.C., December 14, 

1998). 

In 1998, the Mesa Gang Prevention Steering Committee formed a special task force to 

begin the planning process to insure the Project’s institutionalization. The task force comprised 

representatives from the Mesa Police Department, PreHab of Arizona (a comprehensive social 

service agency that had supplied much of the outreach youth-work and specialized-counseling 

services for the Project), Mesa Public Schools, and the Maricopa County Juvenile Probation 

Department. The Chief Juvenile Probation Officer was the chair of the task force (Fourth-Year 

MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). The task force called on Steering Committee 

5.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
agencies with staff collaborating with the Project to examine their next year’s budget cycles in 

order to integrate these Project positions more fully into their own agency budgets. 

The Mesa Police Department stated that it would continue to be a strong supporter of the 

program. It was already contributing a Commander and two detectives and their salaries to the 

work of the Project. The MPD Chief believed that police involvement was critical to the 

development of the Project, and that in turn the Project enhanced the department’s “overall 

philosophy of community policing.” Nevertheless, the Chief cautioned that in order for the 

Department to continue its support, “there would need to be a direct correlation between 

continuation of the Project’s activities and a reduction in crime (specifically gang-related) or 

other measurable positive outcomes” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

The Chief Juvenile Probation Officer was highly supportive of the Project, which she 

claimed had significantly and positively affected the agency’s work. She stated that in the first 

year of the project, juvenile referrals from the Mesa (ZIP code) target area to the court dropped 

8% (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, April 13, 1999). The United Way 

representative, who had been integrally involved in writing the various Project funding 

applications, also declared that the United Way continued to have a primary interest in the 

development of city-wide services to at-risk youth. Such a program could still be centered in the 

police department (Gang Prevention Steering Committee, September 14, 1999). 

Finally, the OJJDP Program Manager praised the Project’s involvement of community 

agencies, particularly the participation of the YMCA, PreHab of Arizona, and the Boys and Girls 

Club. He noted the importance of corporate involvement (e.g., the presence of the Boeing 

Corporation) at the Gang Prevention Steering Committee executive meetings. He directed 

5.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
special praise to the MPD’s successful integration of the Project into it’s Gang Unit (Executive 

Committee Minutes, Gang Prevention Steering Committee, April 13, 1999). 

5.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 6 

Program Implementation: Strengths and Weaknesses 

Despite highly effective community-wide agency mobilization, committed leadership of 

public and nonprofit agencies and major corporations, and sustained Project structure (even after 

OJJDP funding ceased), the OJJDP Model was not entirely adopted in Mesa. The full range of 

gang-involved youth present in the community was probably not addressed. Emphasis in the 

program was on recruiting and working with youth on probation who were gang members or 

gang associates, disruptive, mildly delinquent, and who were not violent offenders (it could have 

been there were relatively few violent gang youth in the community). A more effective approach 

was probably developed for at-risk and less-delinquent rather than more-delinquent ganginvolved youth. Community-mobilization efforts did not include grassroots and faith-based 

organizations. The strategy of social intervention did not make use of neighborhood workers in 

contacts with gang youth on the streets. Provision of social opportunities, particularly in relation 

to jobs and job development, also received insufficient attention. 

The Project Philosophy 

A structure and process of community leadership, decision making and commitment to a 

particular philosophy was in place prior to the Mesa Police Department’s OJJDP Funding 

Application and the development of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP). The guiding 

philosophy of the Mesa Gang Prevention Steering Committee (GPSC) was social development of 

youth in the community. The MGIP was relatively more focused on delinquent youth. Social 

6.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
development of youth emphasized prevention and early intervention by case managers, 

particularly through group and individual counseling programs. Suppression was to be carried 

out almost exclusively by criminal-justice personnel. The MGIP was developed within a 

framework of dual philosophies. The police, probation, and outreach youth workers (or case 

managers) were committed to the MGIP program in separate fashion. They were housed together 

and communicated frequently about particular youth, but each had a separate mission, which 

changed somewhat over time. During the early years of the program, the dominant interest of the 

Project was more effective control of the large majority of its youth who were probationers. 

During the later years, greater interest seemed to be on relatively more social-development 

services for at-risk youth. 

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee was integrally responsible for planning the 

Mesa Gang Intervention Project. “The Committee is deeply concerned with addressing Mesa’s 

emerging needs in regard to the gang problem. It sees gang members as primarily not hardcore. 

Most are salvageable and worth trying to save from further criminal involvement” (Second-Year 

MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). In its original plan in 1993, the focus of the 

Committee’s plan to address the emerging community gang problem was on family and 

neighborhood-intervention issues. Gangs were hardly mentioned (Mesa’s Community Plan to 

Address Gang Issues, January 1, 1994-June 30, 1995). In the course of the Project, the Steering 

Committee developed a stronger interest in social intervention and suppression for gang youth. 

In 1997, the Technical Advisory Committee of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee 

finalized its recommendation of the “Community Action Plan.” Its focus – rather than directly 

on gang intervention – was still on prevention: “expand prevention programming... provide 

6.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
afterschool programs... emphases should be on providing activities between the hours of 3 and 7 

PM... developing and implement a mentoring program [for] ... at-risk kids” (Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee Minutes, March 27, 1987; Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 

1999). 

Community Mobilization 

The dominant strategy of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee was the mobilization 

of established community agencies, the organizational context for the development of the Mesa 

Gang Intervention Project. “In 1992 ... the community was just realizing it had a gang problem. 

Its reaction was to call together a large group (not yet named the Gang Prevention Steering 

Committee) of policy makers, representing many governmental and human service groups, with 

resources to make changes in the community and discuss what should be done.” The Steering 

Committee claimed to operate “independently without political constraints, yet it had 

representatives and sanctions from all the community organizations necessary to make an impact 

on the problem of gangs” (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999, “Program 

Strategy”). 

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee was a broad-based partnership of at times as 

many as forty agencies (MGIP Progress Report, October 30, 1995). Its key members, i.e., those 

with special policy influence on city institutions as well as on operations of the MGIP, were the 

Mesa City Council, United Way, the Mesa Public School Superintendent’s Office, the Maricopa 

County Juvenile Probation Department and the Mesa Police Department (the direct operator of 

the Mesa Gang Intervention Project). Other agencies also involved in the Steering Committee, 

6.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
but perhaps with less direct involvement in Project operations, were the Maricopa County Adult 

Probation Department, Mesa City Court, East Valley Institute of Technology (EVIT), Mesa 

Chamber of Commerce, Boys and Girls Club of East Valley, Empact, YMCA, Mesa 

Family/Welfare Services, Boeing Corporation, Motorola Corporation and other organizations or 

associations of organizations. By the time of its Fifth-Year Application, 30 organizations were 

still listed as members of the Steering Committee which included the 11 mandatory agency 

components in planning activities addressed to “gang involved and at-risk youth.” The Steering 

Committee met on a bi-monthly basis “with consistently high attendance” (Second-Year MGIP 

OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). 

The Steering Committee also comprised an Executive Committee as well as the 

Technical Advisory Committee. The Executive Committee met on October 26, 1995 and 

recommended certain structural arrangements to provide better coordination of Project objectives 

and activities with those of the Steering Committee (Progress Report, October 30, 1995): 

•	 “All component agencies represented in the grant project be member agencies of 

the Steering Committee; 

•	 All of the grant project policymakers be added to the Steering Committee’s 

Executive Committee; thus the Executive Committee and the grant project 

policymakers be the same group of individuals; 

•	 A Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) comprised of staff-level personnel from 

the various component agencies be established and report to the Executive 

Committee. The TAC be responsible for working on specific areas of the 

Project’s goals and objectives.” 

6.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In June, 1996, a Memorandum of Understanding developed by the Steering Committee 

was signed by thirteen organizations – Mesa Police Department, Mesa City Probation, Maricopa 

County Juvenile Probation, Maricopa County Adult Probation, Maricopa Country Attorney, 

Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, Mesa Ecumenical Council, PreHab of Arizona, 

Boys and Girls Club of East Valley, Mesa YMCA, Mesa United Way, Mesa Public Schools, and 

the Mesa Chamber of Commerce. The purpose of the Memorandum of Understanding was to 

commit the agencies to “the development and operation of a smaller networking process at the 

operational-level management program involving documented gang members.” 

It was “the intent of the agreement to facilitate replication of cooperation and dialogue 

among those agencies at the operational level which is already shared at the policy-making level. 

These persons [representing the agencies] would facilitate the communication and coordination 

of services at the community level... interagency procedures would be developed to address 

specific concerns...” The Steering Committee was interested not only in the development and 

support of the Community Action Plan, which favored the creation and extension of programs 

and services that contribute to the prevention of the gang problem and early intervention with 

youth at risk or peripherally-involved gang youth, but also in the sharing of possibly confidential 

information about youth across agencies, and in utilizing the Arizona State Gang Member 

Identification Criteria (GMIC) as a standard means of identifying gang members and gang 

associates (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). 

The MGIP utilized a “case-management team approach” involving a case-management 

coordinator, gang detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers, a youth intervention 

specialist, and a neighborhood development specialist. The program objective was to develop 

6.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
alternative opportunities for gang-involved and other at-risk youth. Program participants were to 

be provided with prevention and intervention services as well as suppression activities and 

intensive supervision. It was expected that “frequent interaction and information-sharing among 

police and probation [would] also facilitate a greater knowledge of participants’ criminal 

activities” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Proposal, Updated Abstract, September 12, 1997). 

Missing from the structure were local neighborhood groups, local churches and faithbased groups, ethnic associations, and even former gang youth and community residents, all of 

whom could be involved at policy, program-operational or client levels. The Steering 

Committee, its subcommittees, and the MGIP included representatives of the major formal public 

and volunteer agencies. The GPSC and the MGIP developed highly professional, top-down, and 

well-organized efforts to address the gang problem. The Steering Committee viewed itself as a 

community forum at the broad, community level addressing gang problems, and creating 

programs to address both the at-risk and gang-involved youth. It focused on facilitating 

interagency collaboration. 

A key component of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model was grassroots 

involvement of local residents, neighborhood groups, churches, ethnic organizations, local 

businesses, and those closest to the daily activities, interests, and needs of youth and their 

families, as viable local-community and program decision makers, or advisors, in the 

development of the MGIP. This occurred in a limited and indirect way through the work of the 

Neighborhood Development Specialist, who was also associated with United Way local 

community citizen-development efforts. The Project did establish close ties with the schools, 

which were concerned with control of the gang problem, and particularly with disruptive youth. 

6.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Contacts were made with administrators, teachers, and probation officers located in at least 14 

schools, mainly in the target area. MGIP workers also made contacts with 57 or more 

organizations and their representatives for services to or controls of program youth. In this 

process, apparently not a single church or neighborhood group was contacted. However, four 

local business were contacted for purposes of providing program youth with jobs. 

Project leadership came to recognize that a gap existed in its local, community-based 

approach to the gang problem, and indicated several times in the course of the five-year Project 

period that it “planned” to address the gap. In the original First-Year Funding Application, under 

the category of planned “organizational change and development,” the MGIP leaders stated that 

“what is needed is further development of membership by one or a partnership among several 

community-based organizations to fund, organize and supervise a community-wide 

neighborhood development committee to ... provide technical assistance and resources to achieve 

and maintain neighborhood improvement and protection from gangs and other destructive 

forces.” 

In the first National Evaluation visit to the Mesa site, a group of five target-area citizens 

were assembled by MGIP staff to discuss the gang problem. They seemed more concerned with 

issues of noise, garbage collection and the restrictive rules of the Boys and Girls Club, which 

kept gang youth in their neighborhood out of the Club program. Several of the local residents 

said that gang members “protected the neighborhood.” After some discussion, however, they 

admitted that local gang youth attracted opposing gangs and there had been several shootings, but 

no one had been hurt (I. Spergel, Field Notes of December 14, 1995 Visit to Mesa). 

In the Second-Year Application for OJJDP Funding (1996), the MGIP noted that 

6.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
“community mobilization will be intertwined throughout the Project strategies, encouraging 

residents to become organized and responsible for improving their personal quality of life and 

that in their neighborhood, including gang prevention/reduction.” However, at a planned 

community meeting to which the National Evaluation staff were invited, five or six MGIP staff 

and only three local residents attended. The meeting was used by the Project Administrators to 

announce future planned activities of the Project. There was no discussion by the local residents 

about local gang problems, except that the Project police officer on the MGIP staff wanted local 

residents to cooperate in testifying against gang members in open court. The citizens present 

were not cooperative. To do so would be a threat to their person or property (I. Spergel Field 

Notes of March 26, 1999 Visit to Mesa). 

In a discussion of community mobilization at one of the cross-site meetings in Orlando, 

Florida, the MGIP Administrators noted that they were trying to find ways to build grassroots 

involvement into their program “because currently the community where the majority come from 

do not trust the program or the police connected with it” (R. Scott, Field Notes, October 2, 1997). 

In the course of a conference telephone call made late in 1998, the National Evaluator 

noted that MGIP administration had at one time mentioned their interest in developing a local 

advisory board. The MGIP Director replied that the Gang Prevention Steering and Executive 

Committees were to function as a local advisory board, so another layer may not be necessary. 

The National Evaluator wondered whether the Neighborhood Development Specialist had 

identified individual residents from the target area who could become part of the Steering 

Committee. The Project Director said that such persons had not been identified. The Steering 

Committee had been formed, but “things could change in the future” (Mesa Conference Call 

6.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Minutes, October 29, 1998). 

In the Fourth-Year Application for OJJDP Funding, the idea of a local advisory 

committee, comprising members of the target community (residents, teachers, business owners, 

etc.) who would provide feedback to the Project regarding Project strategies, was no longer 

mentioned. Such feedback was now to be provided by the Neighborhood Development 

Specialist based on her informal contacts with neighborhood groups (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1998). 

In their Fifth (and final)-Year Funding Application (1999), the MGIP noted that “the 

Project has not involved the target [area] business community ... [but] the Project [plans to] 

organize a business advisory group to meet regularly with Project staff [so the advisory group 

could] be updated on gang issues ... When formed, such a group could provide assistance to 

program participants, their families, and the neighborhood at large.” The Neighborhood 

Development Specialist and outreach workers, however, would continue to work with individual 

residents and neighborhood groups to help them in their organized efforts to fight criminal gang 

activities. This would involve collaboration with the police. 

Also in their Fifth-Year Funding Application, the MGIP observed that the two major 

faith-based organizations, the Mesa Ecumenical Clergy Association and the East Valley 

Association of Evangelicals, were on the Steering Committee, but as they represented primarily 

Protestant churches, they had not been utilized because the Hispanic population in the target area 

(including most Project participants and their families) were Catholic. They tried to keep the 

Youth Ministries Director of the Catholic parish serving the Project updated about the Project. 

In a tape-recorded conversation with the Project Case Management Coordinator, one of 

6.9 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the National Evaluation team members asked: 

Evaluator: “Grassroots involvement, how is that coming along?” 

Coord: “That is one of the most difficult things. One of the things we are fighting is that 

the neighborhood is primarily made up of a lot of illegals ... So that makes them 

very anxious or fearful of working with any agency, not just police, people from 

United Way [including the Neighborhood Development Specialist] ... the 

language barriers also makes it difficult ... what you see in Mesa is the backfilling 

of the older city ... most of them are just trying to survive” [Edited transcript with 

D. Zorich in Chicago, December 23, 1999). 

Neighborhood Development Specialist. The Neighborhood Development Specialist, funded 

partially by the United Way, contributed to the work of the MGIP. She was to “serve as a 

resource to help mobilize residents in the target area to meet the needs of that particular 

neighborhood,” and as a liaison with the Neighborhood and Community Assistance Office and 

the MPD Community Action Team” (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). 

Instead, she principally provided residents with access to individual and family services, and 

encouraged participation in Neighborhood Watch groups to “fight gangs.” 

The Neighborhood Development Specialist was the principal team member working at 

the grassroots level. She helped the MGIP staff access and interact with local residents, 

particularly assisting Project police to fight gang crime. She helped neighbors “conduct 

surveillance on [drug trafficking], get license plate numbers, and prepare documentation for the 

police. These efforts ... contributed to ... [a] ‘crack house’ being closed.” She was also a “link” 

6.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
to the East Valley Food Bank “to provide food boxes throughout the year and on major holidays 

and organized drives to provide Christmas gifts for youth” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding 

Application, 1998). 

Despite the accomplishments of the Neighborhood Development Specialist, the OJJDP 

Program Manager raised questions about the extent to which the she mobilized “...organizations, 

groups, and agencies ... to deal with or respond to the gang problem. To what extent has 

neighborhood cooperation been developed to deal with this problem?” (Letter from OJJDP 

Program Manager to MGIP Director, October 2, 1998). 

It appears that the Neighborhood Development Specialist emphasized linking 

neighborhood residents with services and assisting Project staff to relate to neighborhood 

residents in the further development of their particular agency-service mission, over gang control 

and social development of gang-involved youth. Her focus was consistent with the mission of 

the United Way’s “Building a Healthier Mesa.” 

Nevertheless, the community-mobilization strategy of the MGIP was highly effective in 

several respects. It mobilized established community organizations to address the gang problem 

at the youth at-risk level, particularly involving schools and youth agencies (which we shall 

elaborate further, below). It facilitated coordination of police and probation in targeting gang 

problems. However, it did not adequately facilitate the collaboration of grassroots groups and 

organizations with criminal-justice and social agencies to address the social-development and 

control problems of gang-involved youth. The youth gang problem was not viewed or addressed 

in its full continuum of formal and informal, established-agency and grassroots-organization 

connections. 

6.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Coordination. In the Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Application for Funding (1996), the MGIP 

claimed it would 

“apply a team approach involving government and social service agencies, 

schools, businesses, churches, neighborhoods and families ... the team will work 

together, share information, and utilize an ‘Intervention Case Management 

System.’ They will work together to assist each other’s efforts with Project 

participants ... it is anticipated that the team will share some type of office space ... 

in close proximity to the target area...” 

The Case Management Coordinator was to be responsible for making caseload 

assignments and conducting team activities. Weekly meetings among Project staff were planned, 

and monthly meetings were to be conducted among team members and representatives of the 

Technical Advisory Committee to facilitate planning and collaboration of program agencies and 

workers. 

Some of these stated objectives were achieved, some were not. Coordination was 

achieved in a way that generally met traditional agency-mission objectives. The integration or 

coordination of criminal-justice and social-development staff was not fully achieved in a way 

that simultaneously and interactively met the needs of the community for protection and the 

needs of gang-involved youth for social control and social development. These respective needs 

were variably achieved, mainly within particular agency domains and not substantially across 

them. Justice-system personnel were now better able to utilize information and contacts 

provided by outreach youth workers, youth intervention specialists, and school personnel who 

6.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were still not sufficiently able to get criminal-justice personnel to refer youth sufficiently for 

services. 

As Project operations got under way, Project detectives were now more quickly able to 

find and apprehend youth with outstanding court warrants, because they had information from 

outreach youth workers, case managers, and especially from probation officers. The Project 

police were better able to maintain “updated data bases with current photos, names of associates, 

vehicles, etc., that they can incorporate with gang intelligence files.” Information-sharing about 

program participants greatly assisted criminal investigations by Project detectives. The Project 

Case Management Coordinator’s observation was that “this close monitoring was somewhat of a 

deterrent to the participants, as it frequently seems that the detectives are now [continually] 

watching them; [or at least] the participants think they are, and are less likely to get involved in 

criminal activity” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). 

The Case Management Coordinator also thought that the Project police were “doing a 

really good job ... to identify youth who don’t want to get involved in the Project. The Project 

detectives are making arrests when necessary of these youth who aren’t going to change and who 

will be problems in the community ...” (Gang Prevention Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, 

January 15, 1998). 

By the end of the second year of the program, clear relationships were established, 

particularly between the outreach youth workers and Neighborhood Development Specialist 

(Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). There was greater clarity in the roles of 

outreach worker and youth intervention specialist, and greater collaboration in respect to 

referring at-risk youth to the program and working with them. The Youth Intervention Specialist 

6.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
was making referrals of at-risk program youth to the Boys and Girls Club, which reciprocally was 

referring Boys and Girls Club youth to the Project. An example of the impact of the Project was 

“instances where youth have been suspended from school and/or activities, but were allowed to 

return on condition that they participate in our Project” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding 

Application, 1998). 

The Project clearly served the interests and needs of probation. Both Juvenile and Adult 

Probation were very pleased with their involvement with the Project. They had each contributed 

manpower, above and beyond what was federally funded and/or their original commitments to 

the Project. The MGIP provided probation not only with enhanced rehabilitation services and 

better community surveillance of probationers, but also made it possible for probation to increase 

the pool of probationers available (or potentially available) for enriched services and controls. 

“The Project fits very well with Juvenile Probation’s community justice model ... 

this is the first time that Juvenile Probation has ever placed a probation officer on special 

assignment to work with gangs and, as a result of this positive collaboration, the agency is 

now considering the possibility of institutionalizing a specialized gang caseload in other 

parts of the county. Similar probationers assigned to the Project have received enhanced 

services previously not as readily available to them (participation in Any Town camps, 

additional advocacy and support from outreach workers and interns), and increased police 

contact and surveillance. Juvenile Probation has increased its involvement in the Project 

by housing a Juvenile Intensive Probation Supervisor (JIPS) team at the Project ... this 

also enables the Project probation officer to handle a larger caseload of standard 

probationers and provides the Project with a panel of JIPS participants previously not 

6.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
identified as gang members or at-risk of gang membership ... It also enhances 

communication between the Project [regular] probation officers and the JIPS team and 

provides opportunities for more referrals to/from the Project” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1998). 

The Maricopa Adult Probation Department also advocated a 

“restorative justice philosophy ... so the Project’s philosophy fits well with the 

agency’s philosophy. Three additional adult probation officers use the Project as a 

satellite work area. Their caseload includes some older former gang participants. 

Information shared will enable the Project staff to become more knowledgeable about this 

kind of offender in the community and possibly become more aware of prospective 

participants who have not been identified as gang members” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1998). 

The greatest benefit of collaboration resulted in the exchange of information and the 

coordinated efforts of Project police and probation working together, which had implications 

beyond the immediate officers involved. 

“A very positive outcome of having all Project staff working in the same office is 

the familiarity and trust that has been developed between the gang detectives and 

probation officers ... As a result of their intense patrolling of the target area they (Project 

detectives) have also been able to assist the MPD Gang Unit in identifying suspects the 

Gang Unit detectives had not been able to previously identify. [Project] probation 

6.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
officers [also] ... frequently participate in ride-alongs with gang detectives to share 

information about [program] participants and their friends they observe during the ridealong” (Fourth Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

Nevertheless, despite the positive results derived from coordination between Project 

probation and Project gang detectives, there was a problem of “lack of understanding and 

appreciation” of the role of the Project detectives, who were supposed to operate in a 

motivational context of intervention or prevention as well as suppression. At first, [separately 

from the Project detectives] the MPD Gang Unit still preferred to operate in heavy enforcement 

mode. At the end of the third year of MGIP operations the general feeling of most Project staff 

was that the “Gang Unit does not support the Project’s efforts and thinks the Project coddles 

gang members too much” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

By the end of the fourth year of the Project, the MPD police chief had reorganized the 

department, which brought the Gang Unit and the Project closer together. A new MPD Gang 

Unit Lieutenant had been assigned to direct the Project. He immediately brought the entire Gang 

Unit to Project staff meetings, and personally encouraged a two-way free exchange of 

information which was of benefit to both. Gang detectives not directly connected with the MGIP 

began more frequently to visit the Project, and even participated in particular client staffings. 

Also, because of the new Lieutenant’s support of the Project’s concept, there were now not only 

referrals to the Project from the Gang Unit, but from the patrol division as well (Fifth-Year 

MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). 

The police and probation were increasingly willing to accept assignment to or association 

6.16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
with the Project (I. Spergel Field Notes of January 22-24, 2000 Visit to Mesa). At the same time, 

outreach youth workers came to play a more specialized or limited role. Outreach youth workers 

interacted with probation officers only “if asked to provide a particular service; they do not 

otherwise make a priority of building relationships with these youth, though they do know many 

from descriptions [of them] in the office [meetings] ...” (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, April 16, 

1999). 

The role of the schools in the MGIP was less dominant than the role of other agency 

personnel. Schools were associated with the Project, but the association often came through the 

efforts of probation officers already located in the schools in conjunction with youth already on 

probation (although not necessarily only because they were adjudicated delinquents; they were 

often status offenders). As indicated above, a small group of these at-risk youth was 

recommended by the Project’s Youth Intervention Specialist. 

Finally, we note that the MGIP developed an association with the Mayfield Alternative 

Youth Center, where one of the Project outreach youth workers conducted group counseling 

sessions. The center was a detention facility providing services and other agency contacts of an 

“early intervention” nature to status offenders and their families. The offenders were referred to 

the Center by juvenile court for such offenses as runaway, curfew violation, truancy, possession 

of alcohol and incorrigibility (Mesa Progress Report, January 1-June 30, 1997). 

Social Intervention 

The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994) emphasized “proactive 

alternatives for children and youth so that they will not become associated with gangs or resort to 

6.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
violence as an answer to problem.” This was to be done through the following means: 

• “expand positive alternatives to gang membership; 

• open neighborhood facilities; 

• promote positive values/inform youth about services; 

• training and leadership program for youth.” 

The Application stated that “early intervention, referral, and creative counseling programs 

must be established with interagency participation to produce a streamlined, cost-effective 

utilization of staff resources” and in such a way as to “empower all family members [so] that they 

are the primary means of developing a healthy family identity.” 

The Technical Advisory Committee – “trained in the Hawkins/Catalano ‘Risk and 

Protective Factors’ or [Assets] model” – recommended that agencies: 

“expand current parenting programming and provide bilingual parenting programs in the 

community ... provide afterschool programs ... emphasis should be on providing activities 

between the hours of 3 and 7 PM and should include youth training sibling care, etc. ... 

develop and implement a mentoring program ... in each of (14) Building a Healthier Mesa 

areas” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). 

The Superintendent of Schools in Mesa, who was the Chairman of the Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee, supported this approach and commented that “the afterschool piece fits in 

very well with what we’re learning from OJJDP and from the discussions the Executive 

Committee have had about the critical times for youth (from 3-7 PM)” (Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee, Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, February 27, 1997). The notion of 

6.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
social intervention was interpreted as consistent with, and encompassed by, the idea of social 

development and prevention. 

On entering the new MGIP Project office (which housed all staff – Project police, 

probation, outreach youth workers, youth-intervention and neighborhood-specialist staff) in the 

middle of a major shopping mall in the center of the program target area, visitors were 

“immediately confronted by well-appointed framed statements [hanging on the wall] of 

the missions of the various organizations participating. Each of the mission statements 

emphasized prevention and the provision of community services to youth and others. 

Partnerships with community groups was emphasized, [but] no mention of the word gang 

or delinquency . . .” (I. Spergel Field Notes of March 25-27, 1997 Visit to Mesa). 

The Director of the Project, the MPD Captain, said they were not entirely happy with the 

Technical Advisory Committee’s recommendations, which were too broadly focused. She added 

that since January [1997], apparently most of the youth were referred “from juvenile court, a few 

from adult probation, and some from the city court. The program was viewed as a level 2 

intermediate probation service, between general probation and intensive probation” (I. Spergel 

Field Notes of March 25-27, 1997 Visit to Mesa). 

At the same time, in the Fourth-Year Funding Application (1998), it was stated: “Future 

plans are to continue to involve Building a Healthier Mesa, Area 3, in Project activities, 

including meetings on the human-service needs of participants and neighborhood families, 

mentorship, and intensifying efforts to provide services which benefit at-risk youth in general in 

the area.” In its Fifth-Year Funding Application (1999), under Community Action Plan, in the 

6.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
section on prevention and intervention activities, it was stated that the theme for action is to 

“provide alternatives for children and youth so that they will not become associated with gangs or 

resort to violence as an answer to problems.” Emphasis was, again, to “empower all family 

members so that they are the primary means of developing a healthy family identity” (and in 

particular to “assist all families in gang prevention and intervention activities”). 

Outreach Youth Workers. The role of the outreach youth worker (key to a social-intervention 

approach as developed in the OJJDP Model), although understood, was not adequately 

operationalized, despite the fact it would have contributed to better contact with gang youth, 

greater grassroots involvement, and better understanding and potential control of the gang 

problem. According to a job description in the Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application 

(1996), the primary function of the outreach youth worker was “to develop and maintain close 

relationships with Project participants, serving as a role model, mentor, and advocate, counseling 

and advising participants in order to prevent, control, and eliminate violent behavior.” The 

outreach youth worker was responsible for directing youth to “more productive activities; [he] 

conducts mediation and crisis intervention activities as needed; assists in preparing and referring 

youth to educational, training, job placement; [advises on] personal and family issues; establishes 

liaison with police, probation, schools, community agencies, businesses, neighborhood residents, 

and others as appropriate; assists in prevention and control of violent gang activities; assists in 

individualized plan development and modification.” 

When it became apparent that the scope of these functions was too broad for the outreach 

youth worker, the functions were divided and carried out by a Youth Intervention Specialist, 

6.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Neighborhood Development Specialist, and an outreach youth worker. The outreach youthworker role in general excluded contacting gang youth or youth at risk in their natural habitats or 

hangouts, or establishing helping, referral, and monitoring relationships with them. The jobreferral or placement function was not a primary function of any of these workers. 

Initially, part-time student interns from the Arizona State University School of Social 

Work were hired as outreach youth workers. They were called outreach workers, although it was 

stressed that they “would be mainly caseworker types ... much of the work of the interns would 

be counseling, home visits, and follow-up; little would be with gang groups.” These youth 

workers would be available from about 3:00 PM to 7:00 PM each work day, and would explicitly 

not be available to contact gang members in the neighborhood (Site Visit to Mesa, March 25-27, 

1997). During most of the Project period, the outreach youth workers were used either to liaise 

with the schools and the Boys and Girls Club, or to conduct group discussion sessions with male 

or female youth at the Project office. They involved youth in recreational activities at camp or at 

the Boys and Girls Club, delivered turkeys or food baskets to families in the Project area, and 

occasionally accompanied police and probation officers on visits to program youths’ homes. 

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee, the Mesa Police Department, Mesa social 

agencies, and the MGIP Administration did not make a significant investment in the recruitment, 

hiring, or development of outreach youth workers for a range of reasons. There may have been 

some lack of understanding of what the outreach youth-worker role should encompass. 

However, there was extensive orientation and advice provided by the Technical Assistance 

Advisor, the National Evaluator, and the OJJDP Program Manager about the tasks of the worker 

and qualifications for the position. The outreach youth worker preferably should be from the 

6.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang neighborhood, possess understanding of gang youth and gang culture, and be required to 

work at night and on weekends to make contact with gangs and gang youth in their natural 

hangouts or habitat. 

The reasons given by the Project Administration for not accepting or addressing the 

development of the outreach-worker role was that Mesa agencies had no experience with 

outreach youth workers. It was too dangerous for youth workers to be out on the streets at night. 

Their role was too complicated and qualified candidates were not available. Probably the key 

reasons for the lack of full development and use of outreach youth workers on the Project was the 

objection by the police to hiring former gang members who might have had criminal records, and 

the general social distance of the established, majority community from its minority, low-income, 

Latino adolescents. 

When the Project’s female outreach youth-worker interns finished their school 

assignments with the Project, two male, African-American ASU interns were assigned the parttime youth work job, but their interests were primarily athletic activities and work with youth in 

an agency gym. They apparently did not obtain adequate supervision from the lead outreach 

youth worker, whose background was that of a case manager and counselor with little knowledge 

of gangs. The lead outreach youth workers resigned his position and returned to his original 

agency. 

A series of applicants then applied for the part-time positions, but were not hired because 

of their questionable backgrounds (one applicant had been convicted of an armed robbery). The 

issue of full-time versus part-time outreach youth workers also had to be resolved. Finally, an 

African-American male, formerly a member of a Los Angeles gang, was hired. He lived in the 

6.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
target area and began to work at nights, but did not know the local gangs. One night the youth 

worker was pushed by a gang member; he resigned his position shortly afterwards. 

Project Administration received persistent criticism from OJJDP, the National Evaluation 

staff, the Technical Assistance Advisor and even the Local Evaluators about the inadequacy of 

MGIP’s approach to outreach youth work. The two Mesa Local Evaluators reported: 

“The Project had been unable to hire the right people and keep them. They also 

believed that the Mesa Police Department or city was imposing unnecessary restrictions 

on who could become an outreach worker, limiting recruitment only to college interns 

who work part-time and do not live [in] or know the target community. They did not 

attempt to recruit young adults from the community who were ex-cons or had previous 

records, but who had turned their lives around; and who were willing to actively engage 

neighborhood gang youth. The current outreach youth workers saw Project youth and 

their families mainly in the Project office. They rarely made home visits” (Minutes of 

Telephone Conference Call with C. Katz and V. Webb, August 20, 1998). 

The initial reaction of the Project Case Management Coordinator to the persistent criticisms was 

recognition of the weaknesses of MGIP’s outreach-youth-worker approach. He thought the 

problem could be addressed with additional funding for the gang-prevention component of the 

Project. The youth worker could then reach out to the Boys and Girls Club and work with a 

younger group of 10 to 12-year-olds at risk (Minutes of D. Zorich’s Visit to Chicago, August 28, 

1998). Finally, in late 1999, the City Council, the Mesa Police Department, and the Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee agreed to modify qualifications for the outreach youth worker 

position. The Case Management Coordinator was able to recruit a former local “hardcore gang 

6.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
member.” He was first employed part time, and later full time. He worked well with probation 

and began to do a “phenomenal” job as a “good role model” to gang youth in the community 

(Gang Prevention Steering Executive Committee Meeting, December 7, 1999). 

In a meeting with National Evaluation staff in Chicago, the Case Management 

Coordinator announced: 

“I hired an ex-gang member. His major job is to make contact with kids out in the 

community. I have him go to the Boys and Girls Club two or three times a week. He put 

together a fitness program to get some of the older guys to come in. When I say older 

guys, I mean that they are sixteen, seventeen years old ... His hours are flexible ... He 

works about three nights a week and part of that work is going to the Boys and Girls 

Club. He’s trying to get the guys off the street ... Each time the guys show up they bring 

somebody else with them” (Edited Transcript of D. Zorich’s Discussion with National 

Evaluation Staff, December 23, 1999). 

The second MPD Commander to serve as Director of the Project indicated that he was 

pleased with the Project’s progress, particularly the addition of a former gang member from the 

community to the staff. He believed this added a needed dimension to the Project (C. Kane 

Memo to I. Spergel, Mesa Site Visit, October 28, 1999). An additional outreach worker, an 

African-American female, was also hired. They operated as a team and were able to contact gang 

youth in the streets in the early evening, then switched their hours to later at night. They were 

making significant contacts with gang youth, and were happy with this arrangement (Memo to C. 

Kane from F. Perez, Report on Outreach Training Session, June 23, 2000). 

6.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In the Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (Abstract, 1999), the MGIP stated 

that an important goal was strengthening the Project’s outreach component utilizing former gang 

members as outreach workers. Later, the Case Management Coordinator’s report to the Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee stated that “because the collaboration of outreach [workers] with 

police and probation had not been done before,” he believes “this has now been achieved and the 

community is being served in the best interests of the collaborating agencies” (Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee Minutes, January 11, 2000). 

Nevertheless, the Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1999) also took a 

significant step backward. It redefined “outreach contact and social services to gang youth” as 

“[to] those at high risk of gang involvement, and their families, with the collaboration of local 

citizens and other agencies including criminal justice, schools, and manpower, especially in 

respect to prevention and intervention.” Project emphasis had changed or reverted to a focus on 

younger, at-risk youth, and a social-development approach. 

At a meeting at the National Evaluation office in Chicago in October 2001 (after OJJDP 

funding for the project had terminated), the former Case Management Coordinator said he was 

“upset that the one decent, former-gang-member, outreach youth worker they had was terminated 

from the Project. He was caught driving on a suspended driver’s license. [He] said if he were 

still the case manager and coordinator that he would not have let this happen. The police made a 

wrong decision ... The lack of use of outreach youth workers ... was still a major weakness of the 

Project” (Minutes of Meeting in Chicago October 15, 2001, between D. Zorich and I. Spergel). 

Agency Contacts and Activities. Project workers, especially case managers, youth intervention 

6.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers, and outreach youth workers referred program youth to a great variety of agencies in the 

community. Personnel of community agencies, the schools, and probation reciprocally referred 

other youth (who may or may not have been gang members or at risk) to the Project for a variety 

of services. A substantial portion of these other gang, school, or probation youth – perhaps as 

many as 25% of the youth in some way connected to the Project – were not documented at all in 

the MGIP’s records, and we do not know exactly what services were provided. 

The school or community-agency programs from which youth referrals came included: 

•	 Positive Alternatives to Gangs (PAG) at Mesa Vista Alternative High School, the Power 

Learning Center, and McKellips Learning Center 

•	 SUNS Nite HOOPS, a basketball-skills development program associated with the 

Phoenix Suns professional baseball team 

•	 Boys and Girls Club 

•	 Anytown Camping Program 

•	 Arts and Crafts activity at the Mesa Service Center 

•	 Concerned Offenders for Northern Arizona (COYA) (an activity in which Project youth 

were brought to Arizona State Prison for interaction with prisoners) 

•	 Mesa Tattoo Removal Program 

•	 East Valley Family Resource Center (counseling for MGIP youth as well as their parents) 

•	 Arizona Museum trips 

•	 Arizona Theatre Corporation 

•	 Sun Valley High School Tutorial Program 

•	 Gene Lewis Boxing Club 

•	 Mayfield Youth Alternative Center, a county detention center for minor offenders and 

status offenders 

6.26


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
There was a range of other programs which were developed or used primarily by MGIP, 

and from which MGIP did not receive referrals in turn: 

•	 Pre Hab Youth and Family Counseling Program 

•	 Gang Resources, Education and Training (GREAT) 

•	 Mesa Mentoring Program 

•	 Parent Intervention Groups at Kino Junior High School 

In addition, MGIP staff participated in the following (mainly Project-area) activities: 

•	 Informational meetings about the program, held at local junior high schools 

•	 Block watch group 

•	 Home visits from Project outreach staff to Project and non-project youth, mainly in the 

Project area. 

•	 City-wide basketball tournaments 

•	 Distribution of food baskets, mainly to target-community residents 

The variety of additional service-activities provided mainly for Project youth (but also for 

non-Project youth) at the MGIP office included: 

•	 Counseling, discussion groups, tutorial (GED) groups, parent discussion groups, young 

fathers discussion group, female support group, co-ed therapy group 

•	 Cognitive restructuring class, anger management group sessions, substance abuse 

6.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
discussion groups, one-on-one counseling, family counseling, drug treatment groups, 

individual probation counseling sessions for the MGIP or non-MGIP youth on probation 

(staffed mainly by probation officers) 

• Arts and crafts classes with a strong Mexican cultural content 

• English as a Second Language (ESL) classes. 

Since records were not kept of the number of youth who were involved in these various 

activities, the full range of activities provided for Project or non-Project youth through the MGIP 

is not known. MGIP records and reports were not adequate to describe the nature and scope of 

activities provided. The closest we can come is through National Evaluation worker-tracking or 

program-process records completed by the MGIP staff. These records were completed mainly 

for MGIP program probationers and school-youth referred to the program. Many of the youth for 

whom no adequate program records exist were probably youth from the target area and to some 

extent from other areas who were at risk for gang involvement and who were referred for 

services later in the program. 

Provision of Social Opportunities 

The MGIP paid less attention to the provision of access to social opportunities than to the 

provision of social intervention services. A computer lab was established at the MGIP offices to 

enhance the academic skills of program participants. Only limited, belated attention was given to 

improved (or better) utilization of educational programs, and to access to direct job-placement or 

training. 

6.28


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Educational Opportunities. The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994) 

emphasized the importance of keeping marginal, at-risk youth in regular school with the aid of 

community-based services, or of mainstreaming youth back from alternative schools. According 

to a local newspaper report, “not-so-perfect youth” had to be better prepared for the changing job 

market. The problem of a disassociated educational system had to be addressed for low-income 

Hispanic youth. “Schools, colleges, and social agencies must become full partners raising the 

skill levels of graduates across a complex of newer and technical skills and providing the needed 

training and education for citizens to become gainfully employed” (Tribune Newspapers (Special 

Supplement) “The Changing Face of Mesa,” June 7, 1992). 

The Mesa educational problem was apparently not adequately addressed. During the 

course of the MGIP program there was an increase in alternative and charter schools for youth 

who did not meet public school academic standards or conform to school-district behavioral 

standards. A special problem was the presence of undocumented youth not acculturated to the 

standard school system. Students at the alternative schools were increasingly subjected to 

random searches, since a considerable number of students seemed to have “lots of money and 

drugs on them” (I. Spergel December 13-15, 1995 Field Notes of Visit to Mesa). The “student 

population of Mesa Vista Alternative School [continued to exhibit] a rapid infiltration of gangs” 

(Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). Youth were unable to get or hold jobs 

and consequently became increasingly involved in the drug trade, but still congregated around 

schools. (I. Spergel, June 24, 2000 Field Notes of Visit to Mesa). Public schools were under 

more and more pressure to get rid of gang youth. As a consequence, police and probation 

became more and more integrated into the educational process. 

6.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The schools used suppression and zero tolerance to address the youth-gang problem (I. 

Spergel March 25-27, 1997 Field Notes of Visit to Mesa). During the early years of the Program, 

the Project Director and Case Management Coordinator were particularly concerned with the 

lack of cooperation from public schools (including some alternative schools) in sharing 

information with the Project about problem youth, and the schools’ reluctance to use remedial 

community-based services. In due course, the MGIP – particularly its youth outreach workers 

and youth intervention specialists – established productive relationships with a regular junior 

high school in the program area, and with charter schools that served some program youth. A 

good deal of information-sharing between Powell Junior High School staff and the MGIP Youth 

Intervention Specialist enabled teachers to refer students to the Project for family-crisis, selfesteem, literacy, cognitive-restructuring, and arts and recreational services. These services 

provided school personnel with needed resources, mainly for at-risk youth. 

Much of the relationship between the Project and schools in the program area focused on 

the assistance Project workers could provide in regard to behavioral problems of students, and 

how the Project could be helpful in getting youth to conform to school norms. Participation in 

the Project was required if youth who had behavioral problems were to return to school. At first, 

many of the youth with behavioral problems referred to the Project were not gang members or at 

risk for gang membership, but Project staff were increasingly responsible for referral decisions, 

and made those decisions based on clear gang-at-risk criteria. While the role of Project workers 

was being built into the school disciplinary system, it was not clear how or to what extent the 

Project staff facilitated improved educational opportunities for gang or gang-at-risk youth in the 

schools. Toward the end of the Project, the new Case Management Coordinator spoke of 

6.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
developing a plan that would enable Project youth to be bused to the Sun Valley High School, a 

charter school, for a five hour program that would tailor class activities to particular-youth 

learning levels and interests. The same Case Management Coordinator was also working on a 

plan at the Powell Junior High School to cut down on expulsion or suspension of Project youth. 

Nevertheless, significant educational opportunities were provided to some Project gang-youth 

through the Project’s GED learning laboratory. Between twenty-five and thirty school dropouts, 

mainly gang-involved youth, (though not all formally regarded as Project youth) were provided 

with educational learning opportunities. The Project’s GED learning laboratory also became a 

resource for charter or regular high schools. Established educational organizations were using 

the MGIP’s GED learning laboratory to provide educational opportunities that they themselves 

should have provided. It is not clear, however, how many youth actually kept up attendance and 

graduated from the Project’s GED program. 

Job Opportunities. MGIP leadership apparently did not invest resources in a program of job 

preparation or job placement for gang-involved or at-risk youth, and the specialized staff to run 

it. The Case Management Coordinator believed that employment opportunities were not an issue 

in Mesa; that Mesa (he said) had the lowest unemployment rate in the country at that time. The 

problem was that Project youth did not know how to access job opportunities, and could not hold 

a job. The Project made little effort to address this problem. 

A part-time Job Development Specialist was hired early in the Project to help program 

participants develop employment skills, counsel them in job/career decisions, establish liaison 

with local employers, refer participants to jobs, monitor job progress and assist with 

6.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
individualized job-development planning, as well as utilize state-level employment services 

(Second-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1996). However, the person hired for the jobdevelopment position apparently did not work out, presumably because “the majority of Project 

participants were juveniles who had no job experience.” The Job Development Specialist also 

regarded the youth as undisciplined; he could not accept or deal with their behavioral problems 

(Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). Referrals were then made by Project 

Case Management Coordinators to a range of employment-training and placement programs, 

such as Phoenix Job Corps, Maricopa County Work Development, JTPA Summer Program, East 

Valley Institute of Technology, Mesa Public Schools Vocational High School and a JTPA 

summer program. 

The Project eliminated the position of Job Development Specialist and used the PreHab’s 

World of Work (WOW) program to develop jobs for Project youth (Gang Prevention Steering 

Committee, Executive Committee Meeting, February 22, 1997). It is unclear if this plan ever 

materialized. The general view of Project personnel was that their job-development efforts were 

not successful, and considerably more Project resources had to be put into training and jobdevelopment programming (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, “Planning for Sixth 

Year and Beyond,” 1999). 

In sum, the Project made only limited progress in the provision of social opportunities. 

Some effort was made to assist Project youth with educational opportunities available in regular 

and alternative or charter schools. The Project did assist the schools in constraining disruptive 

youth behavior and possibly in limiting the number of youth suspended and expelled. But it is 

not clear that established school-system educational opportunities were expanded, or better 

6.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
tailored to meet the needs of Project youth. Alternative charter school programs expanded, but it 

is also not clear that these programs were effective in educating gang-involved or gang-at-risk 

youth. The nature, scope, and effects of the MGIP workers’ job-referral or placement efforts 

were not documented, and their efforts at job preparation or job development for program youth 

essentially did not get off the ground. 

Suppression/Social Control 

The Mesa Police Department (MPD), which operated the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

(MGIP), modified its structures and strategies to accommodate the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang 

Program. Over time, it made the Project an integral component of the MPD Gang Unit. The 

MPD developed a strategy which directed attention to the service needs of gang-involved youth, 

sensitivity to the interests of neighborhood residents and social agencies and developing closer 

relationships with them, while still emphasizing law enforcement and control of the gang 

problem. According to the MPD Chief, the Department modeled its approach to gangs based on 

the notion of community-oriented policing. 

However, the MGIP was initiated primarily within a framework of “zero tolerance” 

against criminal activity. The goals of the MPD, as stated in the MGIP’s 1994 First-Year 

Funding Application, were to: 

•	 increase suppression of criminal gang activities 

•	 engage and support legislation, judicial and law-enforcement reform to ensure that the 

criminal justice system works as an effective deterrent to control gang activity 

•	 encourage and support legislation to stiffen penalties for repeat offenders and gang6.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
related violence. 

In 1993, the Arizona State Legislature passed Senate Bill 1291 which translated parts of 

the California State Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (S.T.E.P.) Act into Arizona law. The 

issues or concerns of Mesa leadership in 1994 were that gangs ... were “growing in number. 

Violence by gang members is increasing although only 5% of the gang members are involved in 

violent crime.” “In particular, ‘gang’ and illegal gang activity were defined for the first time. 

Mesa community leaders, including the chairman of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee, ... 

joined with the Arizona Attorney General and others to enact this legislation” (First-Year MGIP 

OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). 

Gang-membership identification criteria (GMIC) were established. The courts could now 

treat convicted gang offenders more harshly than defendants who were not gang members. “A 

person convicted of committing any following offense with the intent to promote, further or 

assist any criminal conduct by a criminal street gang shall not be eligible for suspension of 

sentence, probation, or release from confinement ... the presumptive, minimal and maximum 

sentence for the offense shall be increased by three years ...” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding 

Application, 1994). Later, the Gang Prevention Steering Committee also recommended that 

standardized GMIC criteria be utilized by community agencies (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1998) and that information on what a gang is, who a gang member is, and 

what a gang incident is be included in a common “valid database” (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1999). 

Implicit in the building of a gang database was increased contacts between police and 

6.34


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community agencies. In this process, suppression would come to include a social component. 

Holding a youth accountable for his crimes and misbehavior would now be “in accordance with 

law, social policy, and the interests of the community” (Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding 

Application, 1999). Improved communication and some modification of attitudes among the 

various units of the MPD about the activities of the MGIP were expected to facilitate the purpose 

of the Project and the mission of the Mesa Police Department. The Gang Unit and patrol officers 

now began to refer youth to the Project for services. 

Structure of the MGIP in the MPD 

The Mesa Police Department Chief was a strong supporter of the MGIP and its 

underlying concepts. A full-time police Commander and the Gang Unit detectives had been 

assigned to the Project. MPD support appeared to grow stronger over time. The Gang Unit, at 

first independent of the MGIP, was now expected to fully support Project efforts, and “by doing 

so, would be enhancing the Department’s overall philosophy of community policing ...” (FourthYear MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). In the early years of the Project it was unclear 

what the relationship between the Project and the Gang Unit was, and might be. It was uncertain 

how the role of detectives on the Project would differ from those in the Gang Unit (J. Burch 

letter to L. Adams, October 2, 1998). A further complication was that the reporting structure was 

different for each of the first two MGIP detectives, who came from different sections of the Mesa 

Police Department. The most obvious problem, however, was “the apparent lack of 

understanding and appreciation on the part of the Gang Unit of the Project’s strategies of 

utilizing prevention, intervention, and suppression, coupled with opportunities provision and 

6.35


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
community mobilization ... the general feeling of most [MGIP] staff is that the Gang Unit does 

not support the Project’s efforts” (Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

The Local Evaluators observed during the first year or two of the Project that there was 

“no consistent, established relationship between MGIP and the Gang Unit ...” There were no 

referrals and very little communication about youth in the program known to both the Project and 

the Gang Unit detectives. The Local Evaluators concluded there was “no direct incentive [for the 

Gang Unit] to cooperate and so they rarely were willing to help” (R. Scott memo to I. Spergel, 

August 20, 1998). During this period there was extensive concern and discussion by the Project 

Director and the Case Management Coordinator about placing the Project within the Police 

Department. Working relationships between the Gang Unit and the MGIP were proceeding too 

slowly. The MPD Commander, who was also the first Director of MGIP, was expected to retire 

from the Department at the end of the third Project year. While she was dedicated to the concept 

of the Project, the Department’s “ownership” of the Project was unclear. As indicated above, 

with strong urging from the National Technical Advisor and the OJJDP Program Manager, and 

the subsequent support and commitment of the MPD Chief, the Project was placed in the Gang 

Unit in 1999 (C. Kane Memo to I. Spergel, June 5, 1998). 

The Shifting Suppression Strategy. The First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1994) 

already indicated that the commitment of the Gang Prevention Steering Committee and the MPD 

was not only to “zero tolerance for senseless crimes,” but also to “finding ways to educate and 

provide alternatives for individuals and families to make positive changes to avoid violence and 

involvement with gangs.” By the second application for funding, the MGIP leaders emphasized 

6.36


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
that “although suppression/enforcement tasks ... [are] primarily ... provided by the gang 

detectives and probation officers ... the primary goal will not be to incarcerate, but to monitor, 

supervise, and enforce to such a degree that the [Project] participants will find it more conducive 

to become involved in alternative Project-defined opportunities ... (Second-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1996). By the third funding application, the lessons learned from year two 

about police participation in the MGIP Street Team was that “building trust is very timeconsuming. Distrust needed to be overcome not only between team members and participants, 

but also among team members themselves ...” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 

1997). Finally, by the end of the fourth year of program operations, the “gang suppression 

activities of the Mesa Police Department [began to] focus on crime committed by gangs, not 

necessarily on [simply] disbanding gangs.” Again, there was growing recognition that only a 

small percent (5%) of gang members were involved in violent crime. The majority of crimes 

committed by gang youth, at least in junior high school, were minor or status offenses (FifthYear MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). 

The fact that Project staff – gang detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers 

and case managers – were located in the same set of offices and were in frequent communication 

provided the Project detectives with increased understanding of the personal and family nature of 

the gang problem in the program area. Information about Project youth was more widely 

disseminated among Project staff and the Mesa Police Department. Project detectives assigned 

to Project areas were now “able to spend more time patrolling the area and interacting with gang 

members. This enhances their ability to identify more gang members, put faces with names, and 

in general assist in the intelligence gathering process.” Project detectives had greater ability to 

6.37


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
determine whether program youth were involved in criminal activities, which contributed to their 

ability to investigate crimes (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). 

Project detectives’ attitudes were changing. One of the detectives noted that “having 

contact only on a negative basis (arrests, citations) will only develop animosity from the 

families” (R. Monares Memo to Commander Adams, January 6, 1997). The same detective 

earlier thought the way to strengthen the Project was to “use ‘the hook and book’ mentality ... 

[but] the officers have to ease up on arresting people for minor offenses and concentrate on more 

serious offenses, if they hope ultimately to reduce them” (F. Perez Field Notes, June 22-23, 2000 

Visit to Mesa). These new evolving relationships with youth also meant more positive 

relationships with parents. One of the Project detectives commented, “on occasion, I have been 

able to locate their missing children because I knew they were just hanging out at a friend’s 

house and didn’t want to come home. I have gone and picked them up and taken them home” (R. 

Van Gelder Memo to Commander Adams, January 3, 1998). Relationships with Project 

participants and parents also facilitated investigations about serious crime, especially drug 

dealing. 

Coordinating Suppression-Staff Relationships. The MGIP created better coordination among 

Project detectives, probation, other justice-system agencies, schools, neighborhood residents and 

businesses. A wide variety of organizations and groups now directly and indirectly aided the 

law-enforcement mission of the MPD. A Project detective observed that their new, close 

relationship with probation made getting information about participants “faster than normal. As 

police, we have also benefitted from knowing who is on probation and what the stipulations of 

6.38


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
probation are ... Our participants have been held more accountable ...” (R. VanGelder, Memo to 

Commander Adams, January 3, 1998). Project police were able to incorporate information about 

program youth known to probation. For example, if the Project detective had an outstanding 

warrant, he was able to more quickly apprehend the youth because the probation officer knew 

where the youth was (Third Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1997). 

As gangs have increasingly crossed city and state borders, the Mesa Gang Unit was able 

to increase contact with justice-system agencies in other parts of the state. Closer 

communication has occurred between the Mesa Gang Unit and the Arizona Department of Public 

Safety Gang Intelligence unit “to improve the quality and quantity of gang-related statistical 

information.” The Gang Unit has also worked “with the Tempe Police Department’s 

surveillance efforts of several Gangster Disciples who lived in Mesa, and who were responsible 

for several drivebys in Tempe and Chandler, nearby gang problem cities” (Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee Minutes, January 16, 1997). 

Nevertheless, the Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application (1999) indicated that the 

MPD was still highly focused on suppression, but in more sophisticated ways. A school/police 

liaison officer would now be stationed at schools and work with the school intervention 

coordinator to “intervene” early with at-risk and gang-involved students based on the teachers’ 

use of GMIC. Information obtained by the teacher and school officials would be shared with the 

MPD. In this process, the school staff would contact parents and guardians of students 

“suspected of gang activity or at-risk for gang activity” and obtain permission for Project staff to 

talk with them. Whether this procedure increased the labeling of youth as gang members and 

potential delinquents, and induced a higher level of police and probation contacts and, 

6.39


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
consequently, a higher level of arrests of such youth is explored in Chapter 12. 

The Associate Superintendent of Schools observed that use of the new GMIC procedure 

has been effective in maintaining confidentiality in the schools where it has been used. The 

procedure also has enabled teachers to refer students for Project services such as crisis 

intervention, self-esteem building, literacy, cognitive restructuring, etc. “These opportunities 

provide school personnel with additional needed resources for students at-risk for gangs ...” 

(Letter of Support for Fifth-Year Funding from D. Duvall, Associate Superintendent, Mesa 

Public Schools, June 27, 1999). 

Close working relationships between the Project detectives, the Neighborhood 

Development Specialist, local residents, and neighborhood groups also facilitated law 

enforcement’s neighborhood efforts in “fighting criminal gang activity.” The Neighborhood 

Development Specialist worked with Project detectives to organize a neighborhood group which 

suspected that a “crack house” was operating in their agea. As indicated above, she worked with 

neighbors to conduct surveillance on traffic, get license plate numbers, and prepare 

documentation for the police. These efforts not only “empowered” the citizens, but contributed 

to an ongoing police investigation which resulted in the “crack house” being closed (Fourth-Year 

MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

Project Gang Unit detectives were less effective in addressing a problem of youth hanging 

out after school at a local delicatessen, which was a recruiting ground for the Wetback Power 

gang. Parents had called police on numerous occasions, but little was done to control or alleviate 

this situation. The Commander of the Gang Unit noted the “area continues to be a problem 

because of a lack of cooperation from the owner of the deli. The owner needs the business of the 

6.40


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
students who hang out there, and therefore does not want the police to chase them away” (Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee Minutes, January 11 and March 14, 2000). Perhaps pressures 

from a better-organized neighborhood group, greater involvement by Project youth workers, or 

the influence of a neighborhood business advisory group (which did not exist) would have helped 

in this suppression process. 

Limitations of the Police Suppression Approach. At the start of the program, Mesa was viewed 

as an emerging gang-problem city. The scope and severity of the gang problem was not fully or 

accurately identified while the program was getting underway. Youth targeted for the program 

were almost exclusively Latino, but based on city-wide and program and comparison-area arrest 

and incident data, there also appeared to be African-American and white (or white supremacist) 

youth-gang problems as well. These aspects of the gang problem were not targeted, in part 

because gangs present in the target area were mainly Latino. However, the MGIP did not entirely 

confine its services, or the police their suppression efforts, to youth in the program area. 

Furthermore, insufficient attention may have been directed to the group, or systemic, 

factor of gang activities and gang crime. Gangs or gang segments were not targeted. Individual 

youth who were less-serious gang offenders were selected to participate in the program. Gang 

leaders and more-serious offenders were generally incarcerated and did not participate in the 

program. Many of these somewhat older youth should have been referred to the program. Based 

on age alone, they would normally have been more likely to reduce their gangbanging patterns, 

and (probably) positively affect the younger gang members selected for the program, who were 

more likely to increase their gang activities. 

6.41


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Police in Mesa, including the Project detectives, were still largely law-enforcementoriented and only beginning to understand the nature of gang structure and gang activities in a 

community context. It was unclear to what extent the Project police substantially understood the 

complexity of gang phenomena. Positive communication with gang youth was essential to obtain 

information for intelligence and law-enforcement purposes, but this could not adequately be 

accomplished unless some level of respect for and ability to communicate effectively with gang 

youth was established. Based on National Evaluation staff observations, there apparently was 

little in the way of “relationship building” between the Project police officers and any of the 

groups of gang members on the streets (F. Perez Field Notes on June 22-23, 2000 Visit to Mesa). 

The Project Director and Case Management Coordinator frequently expressed concern that patrol 

officers and the Project detectives often harassed gang youth or associates by taking away their 

driver’s licenses for minor infractions. Based on Mesa justice-system policy, it was extremely 

difficult to recover licenses unless a $500 fine was paid. The court issued additional arrest 

warrants when fines were not paid. 

The Case Management Coordinator said “the police were very hard-nosed and reflected 

general community or white attitudes toward Latinos” (Notes from D. Zorich’s Visit to Chicago, 

August 28, 1999). The Coordinator said that he and the Project Director planned to approach the 

city prosecutor and the city court about the driving-without-a-license problem and “propose that 

as an alternative to owing thousands of dollars, the youth should be given the option of 

participating in the Project. But the only way this is going to happen is if the police department, 

and particularly the Gang Unit, sees some worth in this. They have been talking about this for 

years” (Mesa Conference Call Minutes, August 19, 1998). 

6.42


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A limitation in the implementation of the Comprehensive Gang Program Model was the 

inability of the MPD, the criminal-justice system, and city leadership to come to terms with 

employing neighborhood residents, including former gang members, as outreach youth workers. 

Although the MGIP’s notion of youth-outreach encompassed agency and community-based 

(including some citizen group) contacts with gang youth, it did not encompass people from the 

Project-area neighborhood who were already in contact with these gang youth. 

Probation 

The Maricopa County Juvenile and Adult Probation departments played key roles in 

supporting the Project, particularly in elaborating the Project’s suppression and deterrence 

strategy so that it included the provision of access to community-based services. Juvenile 

probation was responsible for the great majority of youth formally referred to the MGIP. The 

Project probation officer was the person most frequently seen by the program participants. 

Active probationers were required by the court to participate in various aspects of the MGIP 

program, at least while they were on probation. Both juvenile and adult probation were 

committed to a “restorative justice philosophy,” and provided extensive manpower resources 

directly or indirectly in support of the Project, including intensive-probation, regular-probation, 

school-probation and surveillance officers. 

As discussed above, a close relationship developed between Project probation officers 

and Project detectives. They frequently rode together on their tours of duty in the target area. 

Probation officers kept the Project police au courant on whether program youth had outstanding 

warrants, where they could be located, and what the probationer’s family situation, work, and 

6.43


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
school status were. Probation maintained an updated data base which greatly assisted police in 

the investigation of crime in which program youth might be involved. 

Probation made a significant contribution to the work of the Project, which also enhanced 

the administrative efficiency of the Maricopa County Juvenile Probation Department. “Juvenile 

probation has increased its involvement in the Project by housing a juvenile intensive probation 

supervision (JIPS) team at the Project. This provides a greater level of juvenile supervision of 

youth in the Project. The team’s presence at the Project provides the opportunity for them to 

utilize Project resources and increase the number of participants ... this also enables the Project 

juvenile probation officer to handle a larger caseload of standard probationers and provides the 

Project with a pool of JIPS participants previously not identified as gang members or at risk of 

gang membership [some of the youth on the probation caseload did not necessarily have arrest 

records, but often may have been known to the Juvenile Court for truancy or misbehavior]” 

(Fourth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1998). 

Both juvenile and adult probation used the MGIP as a satellite probation office to fulfill 

probation’s supervisory as well as service functions. The Project provided access to services for 

their probationers. Juvenile probation provided resources for a computer lab based at the Project 

office. A teen drug-treatment probation group began to meet once per week at the Project office 

(Fifth-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1999). Juvenile and adult probation were highly 

pleased with the existence and operation of the MGIP. The officers believed that the Project 

enabled probation officers to reduce recidivism. “ ... the more closely the team works with the 

participant to address his need, the better the participant does. Project probation officers feel the 

violation rate for the group of offenders is lower than what normally would be expected with a 

6.44


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
similar group ... and they believe it is attributable to the increased contacts and depth of the 

relationships established with participants by the Project team” (Third-Year MGIP OJJDP 

Funding Application, 1997). 

In sum, the dominant workers in the Project were probation officers and police, and the 

dominant strategy of the Project was suppression, surveillance, and deterrence, with access to 

services for program youth referred to the program by probation. Probation and police, in 

relation to each other, provided a high level of coordinated contact to program youth. A service 

approach was built into the program for a range of justice-system-connected gang offenders who 

generally had committed less-serious rather than more-serious crimes or offenses. A limitation 

of probation’s suppression and deterrence-oriented approach was retaining youth in the program. 

Both Local Evaluators observed early in the Project that “the youth attend the program as a 

condition of their probation, but once they are off probation, they lose interest in sticking around 

...” (Conference Call with the Local Site Evaluators, June 25, 1998). This apparently changed 

over time. Program youth and neighborhood residents pressured the city to continue the Project 

when a city funding crisis developed. 

Organizational Change and Development 

The MGIP was a richly-developed program, characterized by significant institutional 

change during the course of its five years of operation. There were important organizational 

changes and commitments to the Comprehensive Model by the Mesa Police Department. 

Probation expanded its services. There was coordination among agency workers, particularly 

police and probation, and, to a lesser extent, school personnel. There was a broadening of agency 

6.45


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
involvement on behalf of program youth across a great variety of agencies. 

Established community-agency mobilization and program development took place, but 

not inclusionary community effort directed to the full and complex nature of the gang problem. 

Grassroots groups and faith-based organizations were hardly contacted; local area advisory 

groups were never developed. It is not clear to what extent local residents in the target area 

participated and made a contribution to the program’s development. The Project’s commitment 

to hiring and using local neighborhood residents as outreach youth workers remained a weak 

aspect of the Project. The inclusion of representatives of the grassroots Latino community was 

not achieved. 

Community-agency and Project leadership preferred to address the gang problem in 

established agency and in-house service terms. Community outreach was interpreted more as 

communication among workers across established agencies. Little street-gang-level information 

was developed by the MGIP staff, other than by police. The outreach youth worker was not 

available to gang youth on the street or at times of crisis in the community. 

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee and to some extent the MGIP were 

fundamentally committed to a general community-development effort, particularly in regard to 

increasingly addressing the social service needs of at-risk youth. The MGIP was significantly 

involved in social control of youth in the program referred by probation. The Gang Prevention 

Steering Committee early on was committed to “making punishment fit the crime” and to 

graduated sanctions, but it also identified itself as a catalyst for change in the community, 

especially in regard to legislation that could lead “to more effective rehabilitation means and 

ends” (First-Year MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). It was not clear to what extent 

6.46


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
these two commitments applied to seriously delinquent, gang-involved youth. The Steering 

Committee’s interests were broader than the MGIP’s, and its primary community-development 

goals were specified by a set of objectives that were not as focused on the gang problem or gang 

youth. 

The initial Funding Application (1994) noted that “two very separate systems exist to 

rehabilitate troubled youth: a community-based system and a criminal-justice system. The 

systems needed to be integrated into one service-delivery system through joint planning and 

coordinated participation. Interagency contact must become much more common to provide the 

underlying authority necessary to effect a continuum of integrated services. Management 

information systems concerning gang membership and illegal activities must be created” (FirstYear MGIP OJJDP Funding Application, 1994). Such systems were not created. 

The same 1994 Funding Application recommended that a program should be established 

“with representation from the community as well as state and criminal justice systems. 

Recreation, intervention, and job-training programs must gain access to criminal-justice 

[systems] to better serve as resources to establish a ‘continuum of service’ for gang and ‘at-risk’ 

youth.” This program approach has not yet been fully developed. Progress was made during the 

course of the Project, before local funding was terminated. 

6.47


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 7 

Organization Perceptions and Program Performance 

As part of the National Evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program, executives and administrators from a 

range of local agencies and organizations were surveyed twice in the early years of the Project to 

determine whether changes occurred in their perceptions of the gang problem and their 

organizations’ strategic responses to it. A brief questionnaire was also administered at the end of 

the OJJDP Project period to executives of agencies closely connected to the development of the 

Project, as well as to the National Evaluators, to determine whether they felt the objectives of the 

Program Model had been achieved. 

Organization Survey Analysis (Rolando V. Sosa) 

The National Evaluation conducted community-agency leadership surveys at each 

of the five Project sites, including Mesa, Arizona. At the start of the program, each local Project 

Director provided lists of organizations and relevant contact persons for the National Evaluators 

to interview. These lists consisted of organizations expected to be members of the local steering 

committees, service providers expected to be part of the Project intervention programs, and other 

community organizations in the program areas concerned about or involved with the youth-gang 

problem. The individuals interviewed were in key policy-making, administrative, or high-level 

program-implementation positions, and familiar with the youth-gang problem and their 

organization’s response to it. 

7.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Organization surveys were administered at two time periods, to ascertain whether changes 

had occurred at the sites between 1996 and 1998 – the early years of the program. In the first 

survey (Time I), representatives of 132 organizations across all five Project sites were 

interviewed; in the second survey (Time II), representatives of 104 organizations were 

interviewed.1

 Before the Time II survey, the lists of respondents were updated, and 

representatives of the new organizations were also interviewed. The following tables and 

analyses include only organizations in the program areas who completed both a Time I and a 

Time II survey questionnaire, i.e., 104 (or 79%) of the 132 organizations interviewed at Time I. 

Not all of the organization respondents answered all questions at each survey period. 

Representatives of twenty Mesa organizations completed interviews, both at Time I and 

Time II, about the average response rate for the five sites (n = 20.8). Also, Mesa had a very high 

proportion of same-organization respondents at both time periods – 80% – compared to the fivesite average percentage – 69.2% (a low for one site = 43%). 

Mesa organizations/agencies responding to the Time I and Time II Organization Survey 

included: 

Mesa Police Department 

Mesa City Prosecutors Office 

Maricopa County Juvenile Court Services 

Maricopa Country Adult Probation 

Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections 

Mesa Youth Placement 

Prehab of Arizona 

Empact Suicide Prevention Center 

YMCA Urban Services 

1

 We were only able to collect Time I organization-level data from the comparison sites. The original 

Mesa co mparison areas (Carson and Kino Junior H igh Schools) together contained a similar number of organizations 

at Time I (n = 26), and were representative of the same kinds of organizations as in the program area. 

7.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Mesa Boys and Girls Club


Mesa United Way Neighborhood Development


City of Mesa Parks and Recreation


Mesa School Board


Mesa Public Schools, Student Services


Power Learning Center


Mesa Alternative High School


Mesa Gang Intervention Project


Queen of Peace Catholic Church


Westwood Junior High School


Powell Junior School


Mesa organizations/agencies responding only to the Time I Organization Survey included: 

Maricopa County Deputy Attorney


Maricopa County Juvenile Court Services


Salt River/Pima Indian Reservation


Mesa City Council


Neighborhood Development Center


Mesa organizations/agencies added at Time II who completed a modified (brief) Time I 

Organization Survey included: 

Maricopa County Juvenile Court


First Assembly of God


MECA, c/o Red Mountain United Methodist Church


El Sendero de la Cruz/The Pathway of the Cross


Building A Healthier Mesa, Area 3


Neighbors as Partners


Lincoln Elementary School


Respondents in all five Project sites generally were males, in their middle 40s, with 

masters degrees, who lived in the Project cities, although not necessarily in the program areas. 

The Mesa Time I-Time II respondents were similar to those at the other Project sites. At both 

Time I and Time II, few Mesa respondents – less than 10% – lived in the program area; most 

7.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Mesa respondents – more than 80% – were white, compared to the average of about 67% for all 

five Project sites. 

The gang problem in Mesa was regarded by city-wide leaders and outside observers as 

just emerging, and minor in scope. They viewed the problem as less serious than did community 

leaders at the other Project sites. Mesa organization representatives rated the gang-crime 

problem in the area at a modest level on a five-point (1 - 5) scale, both at Time I (3.66) and at 

Time II (3.09), compared to higher average levels across the five sites (Time I = 3.74; Time II = 

3.36). Mesa respondents rated gang crime at a significantly lower level at Time II than at Time I; 

they also rated gang and non-gang crime at the lowest levels of all the sites, both at Time I and 

Time II.2 

Respondents at all the sites, including Mesa, reported that levels of serious violence and 

less-serious violence declined at Time II. Only Mesa organizations reported significant drops in 

both serious and less-serious violence between the two interview periods. Mesa organization 

respondents also perceived a decline in gang-related property and drug crime. However, the 

perception of a decrease in gang-related drug crime was not consistent with the view of Mesa 

gang police specialists, who estimated there had been a growth in gang membership and drug 

crimes during the Project period. 

Non-gang crime was rated at lower levels than gang crime at other Project sites, while 

levels of non-gang crime (particularly less-serious violence and property crime) were rated as 

2

 The comparison areas’ ratings of gang crime (3.57) and non-gang crime (2.23) were at slightly lower 

levels, but not significantly lower. These patterns were similar across different types of crime during the early years 

of the p rogra m, i.e., they w ere sligh tly lower in the co mpa rison a reas fo r violen ce, drug, and pro perty c rimes, b oth 

gang, and non-gang. 

7.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
significantly lower at Time II in Mesa. Levels of both gang and non-gang problems – for specific 

types of crime – were rated significantly lower at Time II in Mesa than in any of the other sites 

(Table 7.1). 

When Mesa respondents were asked the question: “would you say the gang problem 

experienced by specific programs of your organization has become worse, stayed the same, or 

become better?” (“over the last three years” at Time I, and “over the last year” at Time II), all 

sites reported an increase over the three years prior to the Time I interview. However, Mesa 

organizations generally perceived a slightly lower level of the gang-crime problem at both Time I 

and Time II (Table 7.2). 

Mesa organization respondents regarded their community’s general gang-problem 

strategies as fairly good, but a little worse than did the average of respondents from organizations 

at the other sites, especially in respect to coordination, although slightly better in respect to 

provision of social opportunities and social intervention, and about average in regard to 

suppression and a little better in regard to community mobilization (Table 7.3). The response in 

respect to coordination was surprising. The evidence was clear that Mesa produced a higher 

level of community mobilization or coordination – at least among established organizations – 

than did the other sites, both before and during the program period. Only Mesa was able to house 

representatives of various agencies within their site’s office. 

Organization respondents in Mesa believed that their community had a small problem in 

respect to most types of crime. They believed, with a great deal of consensus, that while their 

strategies for addressing the gang problem were adequate, they needed an even more 

comprehensive and coordinated planning and programming focus on prevention and early 

7.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
intervention. Coordinated policies and agency efforts were highly emphasized and 

operationalized in Mesa, based on National Evaluation field observations.3 

Representatives of Mesa’s organizations also indicated that they did not feel threatened 

by the growth of the gang problem. These community leaders and the Project staff believed that 

the gang problem should be addressed through a series of somewhat-separate, but wellcoordinated prevention and suppression efforts. The administrators of the Mesa Project also 

clearly and explicitly recognized the distinction between the OJJDP Model and their own local 

model. Their model emphasized prevention and early intervention, in contrast to the OJJDP 

Model’s more balanced and interrelated prevention, intervention, and suppression approach, 

which included work with delinquent and gang-involved youth, as well as with at-risk youth. 

Program Performance Indicators (Lorita A. Purnell) 

In the final months of the Project, the National Evaluators asked key program agency 

administrators, Steering Committee members and (sometimes) the Local Evaluators to 

systematically assess the manner in which the local Projects were implemented, based on a series 

of performance-rating scales. Six Mesa program-related personnel completed the ratings, 

including the MPD Commander (who was the first Project Director), both Project Case 

Management Coordinators, the Project detective, the vice-principal of Powell Junior High 

School, and a representative of the “Hispanic Associates,” a citywide community organization. 

3

 Mesa com parison organizations at Time I rated their community strategies for addressing the gang 

problem at almost the same (sometimes identical) levels as the Mesa program organizations. Most of the 

organizations that responded to the survey questions, particularly at Time I, were the same citywide or countywide 

orga nizatio ns; how ever, the respo nde nts may h ave b een d ifferent an d had to focu s on d ifferent are as in their 

response s. 

7.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The performance-rating scales were also completed by two members of the National Evaluation 

team. The ratings were completed by respondents independent of each other. The rating scales 

covered the major and specific Model categories: the program elements – team approach, 

steering committee, grassroots involvement, youth outreach, criminal justice, school 

participation, employment/training, lead-agency management; the program strategies – 

community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities provision, suppression/social control, 

organizational change and development; and the program implementation principles – targeting, 

balance, intensity, continuity, commitment. (There were multiple subcategories for each of the 

categories – targeting, team approach, or community mobilization, etc.). The scale for each item 

was: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. The largest number of responses 

was for four subcategories: lead-agency management, suppression/social control, criminal 

justice, and schools. There were very few missing responses. 

The item scores per category were summed first, and then the items for all categories 

were summed. The combined mean scores for all subcategories (not weighted) were in the 

“good” or “very good” range. The combined mean score was 3.43 for the local Project staff 

respondents and 3.28 for the National Evaluators. These combined mean scores were remarkably 

similar for each subcategory. The combined, unweighted mean score of all eight respondents, for 

all items, was 3.36 (Table 7.4). The mean scores for the items and categories in Mesa were 

generally higher than for any other site. (See Table 7.5 for Program Performance Score 

Distribution). 

The categories which received the highest ratings by local program-related personnel in 

Mesa were suppression/social control, followed by lead-agency management and intensity. The 

7.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
categories which received the highest ratings by the National Evaluation staff were continuity, 

followed by intensity and commitment. 

There was better overlap in estimates of subcategories which received the lowest scores 

in both surveys, albeit the subcategories were rated at a slightly higher level by program-related 

personnel than by National Evaluation personnel. The subcategories with the lowest ratings, in 

rank order by the program-related respondents, were school participation, grassroots involvement 

and team approach. The categories with the lowest ratings by the National Evaluators were 

targeting, grassroots involvement (closely behind), and school participation. 

If we combine the unweighted mean scores across local-program and National Evaluation 

respondents, the highest-ranked scores were continuity, intensity and lead-agency management. 

The lowest combined mean scores were school participation, grassroots involvement and 

targeting. These combined mean scores would appear to be consistent with field observations of 

the National and Local Evaluation staffs, except for school participation, which probably would 

have received a higher rating in the fourth and fifth years of the program. 

Conclusion 

In light of the qualitative findings reported in earlier chapters and the descriptive 

quantitative findings in the present chapter thus far, we believe the Comprehensive Gang 

Program Model was reasonably well developed in Mesa. It was distinguished by a highly 

cohesive community and a set of approaches that were well integrated, except for grassroots 

involvement, the use of the outreach youth workers and the limited targeting of a range of ganginvolved and hardcore gang youth. There was a strong tendency for the Project to target less7.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
delinquent gang-involved and at-risk youth. 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

7.9 
Ta ble 7 .1 

Organization Survey Mean Ratings1

 of Gang and No n-Gang Crime Categories in Program Area 

By Site and By Time Period 

Type of Crime2 

San Antonio 

(n=12) 

Time I Time II 

Tucson 

(n=18) 

Time I Time II 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

Time I Time II 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=24) 

Time I Time II 

Riverside 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Total3 

(N=86) 

Time I Time II 

Gang 

Total 4.27 3.61* 4.27 3.97 3.66 3.09* 3.07 3.11 4.00 3.29 3.74 3.36*** 

 Serious Violence 4.32 3.45 4.40 3.92 3.55 3.08* 3.25 3.10 3.66 3.39 3.76 3.35*** 

 Other Violence 4.27 3.50* 4.21 4.07 3.62 2.85* 3.07 2.93 3.88 3.46 3.72 3.30*** 

Drugs 4.33 4.04 4.50 4.38 3.94 3.62 3.85 4.04 4.13 4.15 4.11 4.04 

 Property 4.27 3.76* 4.00 3.64 3.47 3.06 2.41 2.53 3.70 3.35 3.41 3.16* 

Non-gang 

Total 2.93 2.95 3.15 3.37 2.87 2.31 2.39 2.40 3.06 2.45 2.81 2.64 

 Serious Violence 2.89 2.60 2.63 3.09* 2.54 2.11 2.31 2.15 2.68 2.35 2.55 2.41 

 Other Violence 2.55 2.80 3.14 3.43 2.82 2.03* 2.18 2.11 2.88 2.35* 2.67 2.47 

Drugs 3.09 3.36 3.72 3.91 3.47 2.88 3.21 3.31 3.67 3.53 3.43 3.39 

 Property 3.11 3.41 3.21 3.19 3.16 2.43* 2.29 2.33 3.10 2.70 2.89 2.71

 For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 

Instruments: Time I and Time II Organization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

1

 Respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of gang and non-gang crime on the following scale: 1=No Problem; 2=Small Problem; 3=Moderate Problem; 4=Serious 

Problem; 5=Very Serious Problem. 

2

 The question asks: “For each crime, please rate how serious a crime problem you think exists in [specific program area for each site] in the last 6 months.” Specific 

crimes were categorized as: 1) serious violence – robbery, battery without a weapon, battery with a weapon, and drive-by shootings; 2) other violence – threats/intimidation, 

possession of a knife, and possession of a gun; 3) drugs – both selling drugs and using drugs; and 4) property – vandalism/graffiti, breaking and entering, and car theft. 

3 The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response. 

7.10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.2 

Gang Problem Experienced by Organization 

By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating 

Survey Item San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Time I Time II 

Tucson 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

Time I Time II 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=23) 

Time I Time II 

Riverside 

(n=15) 

Time I Time II 

Total 

(N=83)1 

Time I Time II 

Gang Problem Experienced 

by Your Organization...2 1.92 2.23 1.33 2.13** 1.59 2.12** 1.74 2.35** 1.87 2.67 1.69 2.30*** 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 

Instrum ents: Tim e I and Tim e II O rganization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Com munity-W ide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

1 The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid 

response. 

2 Respondents were asked to rate the gang problem experienced by their organization on the following scale: 1=Become Worse; 2=Stayed About the Same; 3=Became 

Better. In the Time I Organization Survey, the question was: “Over the last 3 years, would you say the youth gang problem experienced by your organization has become worse, 

stayed about the same, or become better?” In the Time II Organization Survey, the question differs only in reference to the time period, “Over the last year, would you say the gang 

problem experienced by your organization has become worse, stayed about the same, or become better?” 

7.11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.3 

Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning the Gang Problem 

By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating 

Strategy1 

San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Tucson 

(n=21) 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=25) 

Riverside 

(n=19) 

Total2 

(N=95) 

Time I Time 

II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II 

Coordination: Organizations Defining the 3.81 3.62 3.53 3.78 3.53 3.56 3.70 4.07 3.20 3.53 3.55 3.74 

Problem 4.23 3.95 3.84 3.95 3.76 3.76 3.80 4.28 3.53 3.92 3.82 3.99 

Agreement On What a Gang Is 

Agreement On Which Individuals Are Gang 3.77 3.69 3.68 4.00 3.59 3.71 3.64 4.00* 3.00 3.44 3.53 3.78 

Members 

Agreement On What A Gang Incident Is 3.46 3.69 3.63 3.89 3.76 3.47 3.88 4.12 3.16 3.58 3.61 3.79 

Agreement On What Should Be Done About 

The Youth-Gang Problem 3.77 3.23 2.90 3.35 3.00 3.29 3.48 3.88 3.16 3.18 3.25 3.41 

Coordination: Organization Information 3.38 3.25 3.08 3.44 3.06 3.53 3.33 4.27* 2.69 3.36 3.11 3.64*** 

Sharing 

Sharing Information About Criminal Actions Of 3.77 3.38 3.30 3.60 3.24 3.65 3.38 4.38* 2.81 2.42 3.27 3.73 

Specific Gang Youth 

Sharing Information About Service Needs Of 3.08 3.17 2.89 3.42 2.88 3.41 3.20 4.16* 2.66 3.26 2.95 3.55 

Specific Gang Youth 

Social Opportunities 2.31 2.38 2.39 2.47 2.47 2.79 2.35 2.85 2.32 2.81 2.37 2.69* 

Employment Opportunities For Gang Members 

Access To Education Programs For Gang 2.23 2.08 1.95 2.15 2.06 2.35 1.83 2.46 1.62 2.38 1.93 2.28* 

Members 

2.38 2.69 2.80 2.85 2.88 3.24 2.88 3.25 3.14 3.22 2.84 3.07 

For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

1

Respondents were asked to rate these items on the following scale: 1=Poor; 2=Fair; 3=Average; 4=Good; 5=Excellent. 

2

The total number of organizations completing a survey at both time periods is 104. The total in this table indicates the number of organizations providing a valid response. 

7.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7.3 (continued)


Organizations’ Perceptions of Community Strategies Concerning The Gang Problem


By Site and By Time Period: Mean Rating


Strategy 

San Antonio 

(n=13) 

Tucson 

(n=21) 

Mesa 

(n=17) 

BloomingtonNormal 

(n=25) 

Riverside 

(n=19) 

Total 

(N=95) 

Time I Time 

II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II Time I Time II 

Social Intervention 2.62 2.85 3.00 3.15 3.06 3.29 3.60 3.64 2.42 3.84 2.99 3.28* 

Local Service-Agency Programming To Deal With 

The Gang Problem 2.62 2.85 3.00 3.15 3.06 3.29 3.60 3.64 2.42 3.84 2.99 3.28* 

Suppression 

Law Enforcement Efforts Regarding Gangs 

3.83 

3.83 

3.58 

3.58 

3.95 

3.95 

3.95 

3.95 

3.82 

3.82 

4.00 

4.00 

4.40 

4.40 

4.48 

4.48 

3.37 

3.37 

3.84 

3.84 

3.92 

3.92 

4.01 

4.01 

Community Mobilization 

Citizen Action Regarding Gangs 

Community Planning Regarding Gangs 

2.88 

3.23 

2.54 

2.31 

2.23 

2.38 

2.79 

2.67 

2.90 

2.84 

2.81 

2.86 

3.03 

3.00 

3.06 

3.00 

2.82 

3.18 

3.68 

3.52 

3.84 

3.72 

3.32 

4.12 

2.72 

2.45 

3.00 

2.61 

2.42 

2.79 

3.08 

2.99 

3.16 

2.98 

2.78 

3.15

 For differences between time periods: * p<.05; ** p<.01; and *** p<.001. 

Instrum ents: Tim e I and Tim e II O rganization Surveys 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Com munity-W ide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Rolando Luis Villarreal Sosa 

7.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Ta ble 7 .4 

Program Performance Indicators: Mean Scores1 

Model Indicators 

Respondents 

Combined Mean Mesa Program-Related 

Personnel (N = 6) 

National Evaluation 

Staff (N = 2) 

Program Elements 

Team Approach 3.29 3.30 3.30 

Steering Committee 3.54 3.41 3.48 

Grassroots Involvement 3.09 2.71 2.90 

Youth Outreach 3.54 3.21 3.38 

Criminal Justice 3.50 3.43 3.47 

School Participation 2.83 2.93 2.88 

Employment/Training 3.37 3.06 3.22 

Lead-Agency Management 3.67 3.33 3.50 

Program Strategies 

Community Mobilization 3.38 3.20 3.29 

Social Intervention 3.42 3.41 3.42 

Opportunities Provision 3.56 3.35 3.46 

Suppression/Social Control 3.71 3.27 3.49 

Organizational Change and Development 3.50 3.41 3.46 

Program Implementation Principles 

Targeting 3.46 2.63 3.05 

Balance 3.50 3.25 3.38 

Intensity 3.59 3.75 3.67 

Continuity 3.50 3.88 3.69 

Commitment 3.33 3.51 3.42 

Totals 3.43 3.28 3.36 

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey 

Eva luation o f “The Compr ehensive Comm unity-W ide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The U niversity of Chicago 

Lorita A. P urnell 

 Based on a rating scale of: 0 = no good; 1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = good; 4 = very good. 

7.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Table 7.5 

Program Performance Score Distribution 

(All Respondents) 

Model Indicators 

Ratings 

Missing 

Response 

Total1 

Responses 

Combined 

0 Mean

no good 

1 

poor 

2 

fair 

3 

good 

4 

very good 

Program Elements 

Team Approach 0 0 10 42 36 0 88 3.30 

Steering Committee 0 1 12 25 50 0 88 3.48 

Grassroots Involvement 0 2 25 37 8 0 72 2.90 

Youth Outreach 0 6 12 53 49 0 120 3.38 

Criminal Justice 0 0 4 55 93 0 152 3.47 

School Participation 0 7 36 60 40 1 144 2.88 

Employment/Training 0 3 6 16 14 1 40 3.22 

Lead-Agency Management 0 0 15 85 107 1 208 3.50 

Program Strategies 

Community Mobilization 0 1 13 54 36 0 104 3.29 

Social Intervention 1 0 2 49 44 0 96 3.42 

Opportunities Provision 0 0 5 41 32 2 80 3.46 

Suppression/Social Control 1 1 15 80 63 0 160 3.49 

Organizational Change and 

Development 

0 0 8 26 37 1 72 3.46 

Program Implementation 

Principles 

Targeting 0 0 4 16 12 0 32 3.05 

Balance 0 0 1 7 8 0 16 3.38 

Intensity 0 0 1 10 21 0 32 3.67 

Continuity 0 0 1 11 20 0 32 3.69 

Commitment 0 0 3 10 19 0 32 3.42 

Instrument: Performance Indicator Survey 

Evaluation of “The Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to 

Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program” 

School of Social Service Administration 

The University of Chicago 

Lorita A. Purnell 

 Each of the Elements, Strategies and Implementation Principles contain varying numbers of items. 

7.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Chapter 8 

Research Method: Data Collection, Measurement, and Analysis 

The Evaluation attempted to answer several general and interrelated questions: 1) how 

and to what extent was the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model 

implemented?; 2) did the Mesa program contribute to a relative reduction in youth gang crime, 

particularly at the individual-youth level?; and 3) to what extent did the program contribute to a 

change in (gang) crime at the community level? We addressed the first question in the previous 

chapters of this report, in terms of the Project’s origin and structure, the development of its 

response to the gang problem, and the extent to which the community organizational response 

was consistent with the OJJDP Model. 

We now move to a discussion of the more specific nature of program services, worker 

contacts, and outcome for individual youth, particularly in respect to delinquent behavior. Later 

we examine the possible effects of the program which may have led to a reduction in crime at the 

community level. Our general hypothesis is that certain patterns of program services and worker 

contacts contribute to a reduction in delinquency or crime, and/or to a change in key life-course 

or life-space characteristics of program youth, which more directly contribute to a change 

(reduction) in their gang involvement and delinquency. Before we proceed with the analysis, we 

describe in more detail our research design, the instruments employed to gather data, and the 

resolutions of problems we encountered in data collection. We pay special attention to datacollection and sampling limitations, and then to measurement and analysis procedures used to 

overcome these limitations. We describe the procedures used to match our program samples. 

8.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
At the start of the program, we anticipated and planned for a sample of at least 100 

program and 100 comparison youth1 at each site who would be identified gang members (or 

youth at high risk of gang involvement), and whom we would be able to interview at least twice. 

The youth were expected to be mainly between the ages of 12 and 20 years, predominantly male 

(but with a substantial number of females), mainly African-American and/or Latino, and (to a 

lesser extent) non-Hispanic white, Asian, and Native American. We expected the samples to 

reflect the full nature of the gang problem at each of the sites. Gang-problem program and 

comparison areas, and program and comparison youth were to be selected by Project-site 

program and local evaluation personnel, based on criteria consistent with the Model. Some of 

these expectations were met, others were not. A variety of data sources and data-collection 

procedures were used. Many of the burdens of sampling and data collection and subsequent 

obstacles to measurement and analysis were not anticipated. 

Data Collection 

Our main individual-level data-collection instruments were the individual gang-member 

survey, the worker tracking form for program youth, and official police arrest histories for both 

program youth (interviewed and not interviewed) and comparison youth (all of whom we 

interviewed). Somewhat simpler and shorter forms were used to collect data on program 

exposure, i.e., dates of entry to and exit from the program, and risk period, i.e., the duration of 

1

In M esa, we obta ined d ata (p articular ly prog ram-p roce ss or wo rking-trac king info rmatio n) for 2 58 yo uth. 

However, only 109 of these received at least a Time I interview. The remaining 149 program youth, for whom we 

had no inter views b ut did h ave p rogra m-pr oce ss and polic e-history d ata, wer e also in clude d in ou r analyse s. W e 

obtained interview and police-history data for 96 comparison youth. 

8.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
time the youth spent in detention or corrections and was not at risk for crime activity or arrest in 

the community. 

The gang member survey was administered by Mesa research interviewers to each 

program and comparison youth. The hour-long interview requested information about the youth 

regarding: demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, age); gang activity; school performance; 

employment; leisure time and friends; crime and fear in the neighborhood; the youth’s 

neighborhood relationships; gang status; gang structure, size, and activities; family composition 

and relationships; self-reported delinquency; self-reported arrests; criminal-justice experience; 

and the nature of his response to program activities and worker contacts. Information on selfesteem and alienation was also gathered. The interviews were administered at yearly intervals, 

approximately one year apart (Time I and Time II). However, only 109 program youth 

completed a Time I interview: 75 of these completed a Time II interview, and 149 program 

youth were not interviewed either at Time I or Time II. Ninety-six (96) comparison youth were 

interviewed at Time I, and 60 at Time II. 

A program-youth tracking form was completed by each worker having contact with 

youth. Basic socio-demographic information about the youth was collected, as well as: Project 

worker’s perceptions of the youth’s gang status; dates of the youth’s contacts with the worker; 

average number and duration of contacts with the youth; reasons for youth being in the program 

and sources of referral; types of services the worker provided; types of referrals made; the 

worker’s perception of his own helpfulness in providing services to youth; and which other 

workers were involved in servicing program youth. The worker tracking form was completed on 

a quarterly basis (every three months) for each individual program youth contacted by the 

8.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers – mainly probation officers and outreach youth workers, but also police, teachers, 

manpower specialists, and family treatment workers. 

The local evaluators or police crime analysts completed an entire police history for each 

youth. The history included information on all arrests, warrants or suspect cases recorded in the 

youth’s police files: dates and locations of arrests; home address of the youth; gang-involvement 

characteristics; arrest charges; nature of weapons used; brief description of the arrest incident; 

disposition of the incident; and whether the youth was placed in custody. In Mesa, police 

histories included all of the youth’s contacts with the police, prior to program entry and updated 

through the end of the program period, December 31, 2000. Of special importance for later 

analysis of the program’s effort was the matching of the youth’s program-period arrest history 

with an equivalent pre-program arrest history (discussed later in this report). 

Data-Collection Problems and Resolutions 

A great deal of extra research time and effort was involved in resolving data-collection 

problems. We describe how these problems were resolved under the following headings: 

collaboration, data infrastructure development, accessing and transferring data, and sample 

comparability. 

Collaboration. The implementation of the research design was influenced by the structure of the 

Evaluation. As indicated above, those directly involved in the Evaluation included a national 

evaluation team at the University of Chicago, local evaluators at the five sites, program and 

evaluation management staff of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. 

8.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Department of Justice, and an advisory board. The technical assistance team was closely 

integrated into this complex program/research evaluation structure. The National Evaluation was 

directed by the Principal Investigator at the School of Social Service Administration, University 

of Chicago. He and his team were responsible for the design of the Evaluation, including 

sampling frames and data-collection instruments, and management of the Evaluation, both at and 

across the local sites. Community crime, census, gang-as-a-unit, program performance 

indicators, organization-survey and qualitative on-site observational and other data were also 

collected by the National Evaluation team. Program and comparison youth interviews, individual 

police arrest histories, and program worker tracking forms were completed by local evaluators 

and program personnel. All individual-level and aggregate-level data were processed, cleaned, 

and analyzed by the National Evaluation staff. 

The OJJDP Special Emphasis and Research and Development Division’s program 

managers, and other OJJDP administrative staff, played significant roles in the development and 

implementation of the local programs and the research. OJJDP staff worked to assure the proper 

implementation of the Model. Most importantly, they assisted and pressured the local evaluators 

and project directors to complete their evaluation-related assignments in conformity with the 

research as well as with the Program-Model designs. The OJJDP staff mediated conflicts that 

arose between National Evaluators, local evaluators and/or local program staff. The National 

Evaluators also participated in resolving differences between local program staff and local site 

evaluators, who were not always in close communication and collaboration with each other, 

particularly in respect to the collection of individual gang-member surveys, worker tracking 

forms, and youth police histories. 

8.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
To a large extent, collaboration between program-development and evaluation staffs was 

structured into the funding of the different program and evaluation functions. Local evaluation 

funding came out of the local-site’s program budgets. The Technical Assistance and National 

Evaluation staffs were also closely integrated; their functions were carried out by some of the 

same people, funded from different budgets. Since the Model and ways to implement it were 

developed at the University of Chicago, the Principal Investigator took primary responsibility for 

the National Evaluation, and the Co-principal Investigator of the Evaluation, also involved in 

development of the Model, took primary responsibility for technical assistance. Both worked in 

close collaboration with each other. 

The National Advisory Board comprised three national experts in the areas of gang 

research and gang-program development. The Advisory Board met annually with the National 

Evaluation and Technical Assistance teams and their staffs to advise on research design, review 

evaluation materials, participate in selected cross-site program-leadership meetings, assess 

evaluation progress, and recommend modification of evaluation strategies. 

Data Infrastructure Development. Information and data processing systems had to be developed 

at the local level to provide the National Evaluators with useful individual-youth, programprocess, and police-arrest data. None of the sites had or were able to construct data systems 

useful for adequately determining individual program-youth characteristics. It was not always 

clear why certain youth were in the program and others were not, what the relevant gang 

characteristics of youth were, how the youth’s problem was diagnosed, what activities or 

treatments were appropriate, etc. The nature of the general gang problem in the program area 

8.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
was not clearly known at the start of the program, or even well into program operations. On what 

basis youth outreach workers were to make contact with gang youth was unclear. Police were 

often rotated in and out of the areas. Probation officers were still learning to be communitybased. 

There was a special problem in regard to gathering gang-incident data from police 

sources. The definition and procedures for collection of gang-incident data at the individualyouth or community levels were not adequately developed. A definition of a gang incident had 

been poorly established at the beginning of the Project, referring mainly to youth in a situation 

involving a drive-by shooting or a gang graffiti incident. The police departments at the different 

sites had to develop specific mechanisms for identifying a gang or non-gang-related incident; 

whether a gang incident was based on gang function or interest, or whether it was based simply 

on the youth’s identification as a gang member. In Mesa, a gang incident was to be based on the 

identification and involvement of a subject, offender or victim as a gang member or gang 

associate. Definitions of a gang or a gang member were just being formulated. Juvenile or youth 

gangs had to be distinguished from motorcycle, prison, or adult criminal gangs. 

Another problem was that even if police arrest forms had a check-off box to indicate 

whether the incident was gang- or non-gang-related, the officers often did not check off the box. 

They may not have known if the youth was a gang member or whether the incident was gangmotivated. Some consistency of definitions, for example, gang-involved, youth-at-risk, and 

youth-at-serious-risk, had to be established by the National Evaluation team for use across the 

local sites. Existing police data systems had to be redesigned to accommodate new operational 

definitions and new data-collection and data-organizing procedures for both local and National 

8.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Evaluation purposes. 

A further problem at some local sites was clarification of whether youth with police 

histories were classified as suspects, offenders, or as arrested on a warrant. A suspect might not 

necessarily be arrested, but a “suspect incident” could be regarded as equivalent to an arrest in 

some sites. A warrant arrest did not necessarily mean that a new crime or incident had occurred. 

The problems of interpreting police data, and the potential for over-counting arrests/offenses, 

were present at several sites. The development of criminal histories for youth known to one or 

more police jurisdictions sometimes required the integration of police-history data from several 

sources in the same or overlapping jurisdictions. 

The collection of aggregate or community-level police data was even more complex and 

burdensome for the local crime analysts and National Evaluator. It required the realignment of 

police beats and districts, using selected program and comparison-area boundaries, for criminalincident or arrest-counting purposes. 

Accessing and Transferring Data 

Data Sources. Closely related to the problem of developing new data systems at the local 

sites (or modifying existing ones), which would be useful both to the local and National 

Evaluators (and to the local programs), was gaining access to data sources. Criminal-justice data 

was particularly difficult to access and use for the purpose of compiling criminal-history data. 

Official data systems varied; offense codes differed at each site. The data was often located in 

different sections or bureaus of the police departments, i.e., juvenile, adult, and drug-crime 

sections might have to be accessed separately to obtain a complete youth history. Arrest 

8.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
dispositions might not be located in police records, but only at a corrections or detention center. 

Criminal case-record data was sometimes available in computerized form, sometimes only in 

hard copy (or partially on the computer). The police and sheriffs dealing with the same youth 

might also not customarily share data. Police crime analysts and court clerks were generally 

reluctant to provide access to case records to outsiders. Special arrangements had to be made 

through local police chiefs, chief probation officers, and sometimes presiding judges to 

accommodate local and National Evaluation data-accessing needs. 

Computerized data was sometimes provided in a local-police format and submitted on a 

diskette, which often contained local data-input and classification errors and omissions, and had 

to be corrected. Errors in data transfer from local police crime analysts to local evaluators and 

then to the National Evaluators were numerous. Software systems might be different and 

incompatible across the police-department, local-evaluator, and National-Evaluation sites. 

Interviews. Interviewing gang youth and those at high risk of gang involvement 

presented a series of problems for interviewers. Local interviewers were mainly students, and 

often females from middle-class backgrounds who had little familiarity with gang youth or gangproblem neighborhoods. Many of the interviewers were fearful of contacting youth in the gang 

neighborhoods, particularly in the evenings or on weekends. Interview locations that assured 

privacy, safety, and some comfort for youth were difficult to arrange. It was usually 

inappropriate to interview youth at local Project offices, where police or probation staff might 

also be present. This was the case particularly in Mesa, where alternative venues, such as the 

Boys and Girls Club, were found. Skill and sensitivity were also required to explain the research 

to the program youth and to obtain consents (from the youth himself, and from a parent if the 

8.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth was a juvenile). Also, considerable effort was required to reestablish contact with a youth 

in the open community in order to obtain second or third interviews. As time went on, the youth 

might no longer have contact with the Project or with other established organizations. This 

especially was a problem with comparison youth. Whereas the reinterview rate at the second 

interview ranged from 65% to 80% for program youth, it was only 50% to 65% for comparison 

youth. 

Worker-Contact Data. Obtaining program-process data (i.e., standardized worker-service 

or contact-activity records from the different types of workers within and across sites) proved to 

be another formidable problem. Project-related agencies had their own systems of 

recordkeeping, and Project-related workers did not welcome an additional bureaucratic burden. 

It was difficult for police or probation to understand why the recordkeeping they did for their 

own agencies was not sufficient for Project purposes. Some of the workers did not believe the 

National Evaluation program tracking form was adequate to document all that they were doing in 

the Project. At one site, the probation department insisted that all the necessary data for 

Evaluation of the Comprehensive Gang Program was already available, either in their hard-copy 

or computer records. However, this was not the case, since a detailed comparison of data 

necessary for the National Evaluation and data available at the local-program sites revealed very 

little match. 

Cooperation and Training. Youth agencies did not have a tradition of systematic 

recordkeeping, although outreach youth workers were somewhat less resistant to completion of 

worker tracking forms than Project workers from criminal-justice agencies. Police were 

especially reluctant to complete worker tracking forms. Special pressures from OJJDP had to be 

8.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
brought to bear to assure police cooperation, and since a substantial amount of Project funding 

was allocated to the police, after a while the police were persuaded to cooperate. Probation 

officers and youth workers were more interested in completing worker tracking forms. School 

personnel generally refused to fill out forms for program youth, generally for reasons of 

confidentiality, work pressure, avoidance of the problem, or lack of interest. 

Local site evaluators and their data collectors usually had to be trained in how to use 

existing local data sources – whether police, court, or school records – and how to interview gang 

youth. Inherent in the process of obtaining good data was not only the training of local data 

collectors, but also developing cooperation among local program-site management staffs and 

effective monitoring procedures among the data collectors. Training sessions were conducted by 

National Evaluation staff with the different data collectors at each of the local sites. Refresher 

training sessions took place when new local data collectors were hired. 

Pressures from OJJDP were needed (particularly for agencies receiving Project funds) 

when required data were not collected or provided in timely fashion. In one case, serious 

deficiencies in local data collection meant that the National Evaluator had to make special 

arrangements through OJJDP for a non-local evaluator to collect program-youth interview data. 

In another case, the local police department denied access to aggregate-level arrest and incident 

data. Such data (particularly pre-program data) was too much trouble for the particular police 

department to gather or reconstruct. This situation became the basis in part for termination of 

funding for that local-site program at the end of the fourth program year. 

Sample Comparability. The most serious data-selection and data-collection problem – a 

8.11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
limitation of the research design and its implementation – was establishing comparability of 

gang-involved and highly gang-at-risk youth in the program and comparison areas. We needed 

to find comparison youth who were similar to program youth, but from a comparable, gangproblem community not “contaminated” by the program. A research assumption was that ganginvolved and gang-at-risk youth could be found in a comparable community or communities, and 

that local evaluators could identify such communities and had sufficient know-how to obtain 

interviews from these youth. Police usually provided information on comparable gang-problem 

areas. However, the task of finding comparison youth depended on knowing, beforehand, 

characteristics of program youth such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, delinquency background, 

and gang mmebership. Generally, this information was not clearly known until program youth 

were actually in the program and receiving services and worker contacts. 

Ideally, the nature and scope of the youth-gang problem, and specific information about 

the youth-gang population, should have been known for the Project and comparison areas before 

the program was implemented and the Evaluation developed. This was not the case. The details 

of program youth gang membership, gang structure, gang process, and the delinquency problems 

of the program youth were just becoming known by program personnel and the local evaluators 

as the Projects were beginning. There was even less knowledge of the gang problem and the 

gang population in the comparison communities. The difficulties of selecting comparable youth 

to interview in the comparison areas was compounded because there was no easy access to them. 

While it was not clear how representative program youth were of the general youth-gang 

population in the program area, at least gang youth in the program area ordinarily would become 

known over time, and would likely be more reachable than gang youth in the comparison areas. 

8.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Police, probation and community-agency personnel in the comparison areas were less 

likely to be interested in the program evaluation, to have information to assist in adequate gangyouth contact, or to assist the local program evaluators in the interviewing process. Information 

about potential comparison youth and how to contact them had to be obtained with special 

assistance from police, local agency personnel, neighborhood informants, or ex-convicts, but the 

process of contacting and “using” these intermediaries took time, and was not always effective. 

One enterprising and risk-taking local evaluator had her data collectors simply knock on doors in 

the comparison area to find prospective gang-member interviewees. She developed a gangmember network approach, and was successful up to a point. Finding and matching comparison 

with program youth was still a difficult, somewhat unpredictable and not completely manageable 

process for all the local evaluators. 

At the end of a period when a substantial number of initial (Time I) program and 

comparison youth interviews were completed and analyzed, the National Evaluators found there 

were some program youth who were not interviewed, but for whom we had extensive programprocess or worker-tracking data. This was especially the case in Mesa. Police histories, 

however, were available for these youth, and we included them in the analysis. The National 

Evaluators also found that comparison youth were sometimes less delinquent than program 

youth, and sometimes disproportionately female. The National Evaluators tried to make 

adjustments through special selection, matching and statistical procedures. 

Measurement 

We had to overcome problems of: 1) mismatched samples; 2) erratic timing of 

8.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interviews; 3) missing worker-tracking data from the early days of the program; 4) different 

police arrest practices for youth in different jurisdictions or cities; and 5) different time periods 

for collection and integration of certain types of data. 

Mismatched Samples. While youth in the program and comparison samples were usually 12 to 

20 years of age, both samples sometimes contained a number of youth who were younger than 12 

years and older than 20 years. We included these youth in several of the program analyses, but 

we had to eliminate them from our comparison-youth analysis when they did not match the ages 

of program youth. We adjusted for specific youth age differences (to facilitate age comparisons 

between program and comparison samples) by placing youth in three age categories – 14 years 

and under, 15-16 or 15-17 years, and 17 or 18 years and over, depending on the age distribution 

at the sites and on state criminal law as to the cut-off age between juvenile and adult. In general, 

program and comparison youth at each site were predominantly male, and of the same 

race/ethnicity (mainly of Mexican origin, and African-American). 

Erratic Timing of Interviews. Youth who entered the program were not always administered a 

Time I interview at baseline (i.e., when they came into the program). Time I interviews took 

place in a few cases before the program officially began, but mainly at any time within the first 

three to six months of the youth’s entry into the program. The interval between the Time I and 

Time II interviews of program youth was generally a year to a year-and-a-quarter, but a handful 

of youth were administered Time II interviews slightly before the first-year interval, or after the 

year-and-a-quarter interval. We tested (or compared) youth interviewed at somewhat different 

8.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Time-I and Time-II periods. In most cases, the difference did not significantly affect outcome. 

Comparison youth were interviewed at a later time period than were program youth. The 

ages of comparison youth had not only to be adjusted to match the ages of program youth at their 

Time I interviews, but to match the age of program youth when they entered the program. This 

also had to be done in such a way that criminal-history periods of comparison youth matched 

those of the program youth. 

Missing Worker Tracking Forms. A problem was not simply that certain workers were reluctant 

to complete worker tracking forms, which described the kinds of services they provided and/or 

the contacts they made with other workers around program youth. Worker tracking did not 

usually commence until months after the program had been underway. For the period prior to 

worker-tracking data collection, we usually had no detailed evidence of services or worker 

contacts provided to specific youth. However, we did have relatively accurate official Projectentry dates, criminal histories, and youth-confinement records for all program youth, and the 

youth’s own record of services received (from the individual gang-member survey). 

Different Police Arrest Patterns Across Areas. We learned belatedly that the arrest procedures 

and practices of police in the program and comparison areas sometimes differed. The police 

might arrest youth for certain status offenses and not for others, and be more pro-active in one 

area or city than another in identifying gang youth and arresting them for a different range of 

offenses or crimes, minor or major. This could explain why frequency of arrests (and sometimes 

differences in arrests for certain types of offenses) varied among program and comparison youth. 

8.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The youth samples from the program and comparison areas might otherwise be similar, using 

interview and self-report data on key youth characteristics (e.g., school performance, 

employment, family structure, household income, personal problems, use of or selling drugs), but 

might differ in arrest patterns. This was mainly a problem when comparison youth came from a 

different city. 

The best we could do to show an adequate comparison existed between the program and 

comparison youth samples was to use different sources of data in the separate multivariate 

analyses, and hope that somewhat similar, or explainable, change patterns would emerge. We 

could also examine trends and compare similarities and differences at the individual-youth level 

with those at the gang-as-a-unit and general-community gang-offense levels in the program and 

comparison areas. A design limitation in the collection of police arrest data was that we did not 

usually have access to police data for youth who might have been arrested in adjoining cities or 

jurisdictions. Furthermore, police data might not always reflect further justice-system 

processing, particularly for status offenses. In Mesa, youth could be on probation (due to referral 

from family and school) for certain status offenses and not have a police record. 

Different Time Periods for Data Collection. Ideally, all of the data at the individual-youth level 

(gang member survey, worker tracking, police, program exposure, and confinement period) 

should have been integrated into one comprehensive data set. But this assumed that the time 

frames for the data collected for each youth would match, i.e., that interviews, services provided, 

worker contacts, police arrests, and program exposure covered the same periods for each youth. 

They did not. 

8.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Official police data covered the longest periods – 4 to 5 years before and 4 to 5 years 

during the program period. The police criminal-history period could be adjusted to match the 

program-exposure and interview periods. The program worker-tracking period averaged about 

21⁄2 years; the interval between the Time I and Time II interviews was 1 to 11⁄4 years. We could 

not readily make projections of findings based on matching shorter time periods to longer time 

periods, or vice versa. Our basic time period became police arrest history matched to programexposure time. The interview time period was usually shorter, and generally only part of the total 

program and criminal-history period. Time periods for the varieties of data collected were 

matched to the extent possible. However, weight was given to findings resulting from matching 

of data over longer rather than shorter time periods. It was still possible to match findings based 

on police and self-report data. Usually, the outcome findings were in the same direction. 

Analysis Strategy 

We wanted to maximize the length of time during which the program could reasonably 

have had some effect – utilizing detailed program-service, self-report and police information 

together – in order to predict possible youth changes and comprise a basis for determining the 

Project’s success or failure in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of delinquency and 

the gang problem, particularly at the individual-youth level. 

We were not sure we could integrate key elements of all the data sets satisfactorily to 

achieve a grand analysis strategy, because of differences in sample sizes and characteristics, 

different time periods, and the reliability of some of the data. We decided to analyze the data sets 

in stages, moving from simpler but extensive to more complex and richer analyses using smaller 

8.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth samples. The major steps in our approach were: 

1. Compare the effects of the program using official police data and program exposure 

over the full program period, based on program-entry and exit data. We determined what the 

effects were on youth during their full program-exposure period, compared to an identical period 

for matched comparison youth. While the advantage of this approach was the utilization of the 

longest period of possible program effect for all youth (using systematically collected police 

arrest data), it did not include detailed data from worker tracking, or most of the interview data 

on characteristics of program youth. All we could do was control for age, gender, race/ethnicity, 

for whether the youth said he had been a gang member prior to program entry, and for prior 

arrests and probation status. We determined the effects of the program on youth using the police 

outcome variables of total arrests, violence arrests, property arrests, drug arrests, and other 

arrests (usually for minor offenses) in a series of multivariate analyses. 

2. Next, compare the effects of the program on youth using the official police arrest data 

and also specific worker-tracking services and contact data over a shorter time period (about the 

21⁄2-year period during which detailed worker-service and worker-contact data were collected). 

These program service/contact variables were indicators of the five Model strategies. A 

limitation was that we did not have a genuine baseline for when program effects could have 

started for many of the youth. In other words, we did not observe, but did measure or estimate, 

the program effects on those youth who had been in the program before worker tracking forms 

had begun, or at times when worker tracking forms were not completed. However, we did have 

accurate program-entry and exit data, but not always complete worker-tracking data. We used 

the same control variables as we did in the analysis described above, and compared arrest 

8.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
changes of youth during the average 21⁄2-year program period compared to the matched 21⁄2-year 

pre-program period. 

3. As in (1) above, compare the effects of the program using self-report data instead of 

police arrest data, and the general (but non-detailed) program-exposure effects during the 1 to 11⁄4 

-year period between the Time I and Time II interviews. If there were differences in outcome for 

program and comparison youth, we could determine what the effects of the program were on 

program youth, compared to matched comparison youth. The advantage of this approach was 

using the youth’s self-reported offense (including specific gang-related) behaviors over the sixmonth-prior-to-Time-I and six-month-prior-to-Time-II interview periods, 1 to 11⁄4 years apart. 

Again, controlling for age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership, and prior self-reported 

offenses, we looked for differences in total offenses, serious violence, total violence, and 

property and drug-selling offenses over time. 

4. Compare the effects of the program on the same youth who were interviewed both at 

Time I and Time II, using detailed program services and contacts provided by the workers in the 

interval between the Time I and Time II interviews. We introduced mediating variables derived 

from the interview findings, such as changes in youth space or life course characteristics (school 

participation, employment, and gang involvement). The key outcome variables were differences 

in self-reported offenses and police arrests between Time I and Time II, and (when possible) 

between the pre-program and program period (using arrest data). Similar control and outcome 

variables (indicated above) using self-report offense or police arrest data were employed. We 

were interested in the effects of the program-service and worker-contact variables on the 

outcome variables (primarily for direct program effects), then in the effects of the program 

8.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
variables on the mediating variables, and finally in the effects of the mediating variables on the 

outcome variables. Both direct and possibly indirect program effects would be determined. 

Matching Program and Comparison Youth (Kwai Ming Wa) 

Our analysis strategies depended on establishing equivalency in the program and 

comparison youth samples, particularly the Time-I-interviewed youth samples. We had to make 

sure our comparison youth were adequately matched to our program youth on key demographics, 

especially age and gender, program-entry date and program-exposure time. Special assessment 

and matching procedures were required. 

In Mesa, we established a one-to-one, comparison-to-program-youth matching procedure 

to avoid biasing program effects. Our purpose was to maximize equivalent arrest periods for 

youth in the two Time-I-interview samples (program youth = 109 and comparison youth = 96). 

The youth were matched individually as closely as possible on gender, age, and programexposure, and an equivalent period for comparison youth. (The program-exposure period was 

the period between the program youth’s dates of entry into, and exit from, the program.) Due to 

a smaller number of youth in the comparison sample, not all youth were subjected to this 

matching procedures. Nevertheless, all youth were used in the multivariate analyses. 

The steps in the matching procedure were: 

Step 1: Select only those interviewed youth with arrest histories: program youth = 98, 

comparison youth = 72. 

Step 2: Match the youth in separate gender categories by age groupings. The age of the 

youth is computed backward from the standard reference point of January 1, 2001, the date 

8.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
OJJDP funding ceased for the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. Nine age groupings are 

established based on this reference point: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 years and older 

(Table 8.1). 

In this process, 26 male program youth are removed from the age groupings to provide a 

better balance of comparison to program youth in each age grouping. The criteria selected for 

removal of these 26 program youth (who were added back later) is program participation of less 

than 11⁄2 years and age distribution. It is important to examine youth with the maximum 

program-exposure time possible in order better to measure variations in police arrests that may 

have occurred in respect to similarity of age and gender. 

The gender and age groupings for the matched 98 program and comparison youth are 

presented in Table 8.1. 

Step 3: Assign a comparison youth to a particular program youth based on gender and 

closest age. This means that some program youth are matched with somewhat younger or older 

comparison youth, and vice versa. 

Since there are more females in the comparison than in the program sample, three 

comparison females, 20 and 21 years of age, have to be assigned to 3 non-matched program 

males with arrests, 21 years and older, to establish the closest possible age grouping for 

determining program-equivalent exposure period. 

The gender and age groupings for the matched 72 program and 72 comparison youth are 

established, with 27 program males remaining (Table 8.2). 

Step 4: With each comparison youth assigned to one (and only one) program youth, that 

program youth’s program entry and exit dates are also assigned to his matched comparison youth. 

8.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The period between program entry and exit also becomes the arrest period, in which number and 

types of arrests for both program and comparison youth during the program and pre-program 

periods were determined. These arrest periods are further controlled for days in detention or 

incarceration, when the youth was not available or at risk for arrest in the community. 

Step 5: The 24 remaining male program youth removed earlier – who had arrest records 

but less than 11⁄2 years of program exposure – are added back to the 11 program youth without 

arrest histories. 

Step 6: Twenty-four (24) comparison youth without arrest histories are matched on the 

basis of gender and closest age to the 35 program youth in Step 5. More than one comparison 

youth may have to be matched to the program youth with arrest histories (on the basis of gender 

and closest age) for the purpose of determining program exposure and program and pre-program 

arrest periods. 

Step 7: A second, non-interviewed program sample (consisting of 149 youth who entered 

the program later) was matched on the demographics and program-exposure time of the Time-Iinterviewed program sample. 

Those program and comparison youth without arrest records were excluded from the 

multivariate analysis, using General Linear Modeling to avoid statistical bias, but were included 

in the Logistical Regression analysis. 

Summary 

A variety of procedures were used to overcome data-collection problems in the course of 

collaboration between program and evaluation personnel: developing appropriate local data 

8.22


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
systems; accessing local data sources and transferring data from local to national sites; and 

establishing comparable program and comparison youth samples. Equivalency was established 

between the Time-I-interviewed program youth sample and the Time-I interviewed comparison 

(non-served) youth sample, based on age, gender, program-entry date and program-exposure 

time, as explained above. A series of multivariate analyses using police arrest and self-reported 

offense variables, in separate but similar equations, were carried out to determine program effects 

for both the interviewed and non-interviewed program groups in relation to the comparison 

sample. 

8.23


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8.1 

Age of Program and Comparison Youth 

(Reference Date: January 1, 2001) 

Sample: #15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 $23 Total 

Program M ales 4 8 10 16 8 9 9 7 15 86 

Comparison Males 2 5 4 10 6 12 4 4 12 59 

Program Females 4 2 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 12 

Comparison Females 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 13 

8.24


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 8.2 

Age of Matched and Unmatched Youth with Arrests 

(Reference Date: January 1, 2001) 

Sample: #15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 $23 Total 

Comparison 

Males matched to 

Program males 

2 5 4 10 8 9 5 4 12 59 

Program M ales 

Remaining 2 3 6 6 0 0 4 3 3 27 

Comparison 

Females matched 

to Program 

Females 

2 2 2 1 3 2* 1* 0 0 13 

Program Females 

Remaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

*The three comparison older females are matched to three program older male youth. 

8.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 9 

Characteristics of the Program and Comparison Youth Samples 

(Kwai Ming Wa, Rolando V. Sosa) 

In this chapter, we present a picture of youth in three samples, based mainly on singledimensional characteristics of age, gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership, probation status, 

self-reported offenses, gang location in the program and comparison communities, and arrest 

patterns. These characteristics are not interrelated and their relationship to program effects are 

not described in this chapter. The multivariate analyses as to program effects are discussed in the 

chapters that follow. We look at these characteristics of the youth in the samples at the time of 

program entry and how they appear similar or dissimilar, but not in any statistically controlled 

fashion. A picture of changes in arrest patterns of the aggregate youth samples between the preprogram and program periods (without statistical controls) is also presented, to indicate the 

general nature of crimes for which youth are arrested. 

We describe the youth characteristics of: 1) an interviewed program youth sample (n = 

109); 2) an interviewed comparison youth sample (n = 96), and; 3) a non-interviewed program 

youth sample (n = 149)1. We have criminal history data for all three samples, and interview data 

for only one of the program samples and for the matched comparison sample. Characteristics of 

youth from the three samples are drawn from three sources of data: youth interviews, police 

arrest histories, and worker tracking records. Data for the non-interviewed program sample is 

1

 The non-interviewed program sample consisted of youth who entered the program mainly in its last two 

years. 

9.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
derived solely from worker tracking records and police arrest histories. The attrition rate for the 

Time-I-interviewed youth is fairly high at Time II: 31.2% for the program youth and 37.5% for 

the comparison youth. Since the second program sample was not interviewed, the issue of 

attrition is not raised for them. 

The characteristics of the interviewed program and comparison youth are displayed in 

two ways. Comparisons are made between the samples of: 1) total program and comparison 

youth interviewed at Time I; 2) youth interviewed at Time I only; and 3) youth interviewed at 

both Time I and Time II (the smaller sample, since sizable numbers of youth interviewed at Time 

I were not interviewed at Time II). The major discrepancy between Time-I-interviewed youth 

and Time-I/Time-II-interviewed youth is that the former group appears to have contained more 

serious offenders. 

Demographic Characteristics 

Gender 

Males are predominant in all of the samples. At Time I, in the three samples together 

81.6% of all youth are male and 18.4% are female (Table 9.1A). The highest proportion of males 

is in the interviewed program sample (85.3%), and the lowest proportion of males is in the 

comparison sample (77.1%). The highest proportion of females is in the comparison sample 

(22.9%), and the lowest proportion of females is in the interviewed program sample (14.7%). 

The proportions of males and females in the non-interviewed program sample are between those 

of the other two samples. At Time II, the proportion of males and females in the interviewed 

program and comparison samples remains approximately the same as at Time I, with a slightly 

9.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
greater loss of females than males from both samples (Table 9.1B). 

Race/Ethnicity 

Latinos predominate in all of the samples at Time I and Time II. In the three samples 

together, 77.4% of youth are Latino, i.e., mainly of Mexican or Mexican-American origin; 13.3% 

are non-Latino/white; and 9.3% are of other racial/ethnic backgrounds (African-American, 

American Indian, and Asian-American) (Table 9.2A). 

The largest proportions of youth in the interviewed program sample (86.2%) and noninterviewed program sample (84.3%) are Latino. A smaller majority of youth in the comparison 

sample are Latino (58.3%). The largest proportion of non-Latino/white youth is in the 

comparison sample (31.3%). There are relatively few non-Latino/whites in the program samples 

(interviewed sample = 5.5%; non-interviewed sample = 6.3%). The proportion of youth with 

other race/ethnic backgrounds ranges from 10.4% in the comparison sample to 8.3% in the 

interviewed program sample and 9.5% in the non-interviewed program sample (Table 9.2A). 

At Time II, the proportion of interviewed program youth from the different race/ethnic 

groups remains about the same as at Time I. However, in the comparison sample, the proportion 

of non-Latino/whites drops from 31.3% to 26.7% and the proportion of Latinos and other 

race/ethnic groups rises slightly (Table 9.2B). 

Age 

At Time I, youth in the three samples were categorized into three age groups: 14 years 

and under (32.1%), 15 to 17 years (44.1%), and 18 years and over (23.8%). According to 

9.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Arizona law, youth under 18 years are juveniles, and youth 18 years and over are adults. The 

largest age group across each of the three samples is the 15-to-17-year-olds; the smallest is the 

18-years-and-over group. In general, the non-interviewed program sample contains younger 

youth (i.e., those 14-and-under and 15-17), than either of the two interviewed samples (Table 

9.3A). 

The largest percent of youth 18 years and over is in the interviewed program sample 

(30.3%); the smallest percent of youth 18 years and over is in the non-interviewed program 

sample (18.1%). The largest percent of youth 14 years and under is in the non-interviewed 

program sample (36.1%); the smallest percent of youth 14 and under is in the comparison sample 

(26.0%). 

At Time II, the distribution of age groups in the samples varies little from Time I (Table 

9.3B). The percentage of comparison youth 15-17 years old is higher at Time I, and the 

percentage of both 14-and-under and 18-and-over youth is slightly smaller. The percentage of 

program youth 15-17 years old is also higher than at Time I, as is the percentage of 14-and-under 

youth, but the percentage of 18-and-over youth is much smaller. The largest age group in all 

three samples remains the 15 to 17 year olds (40.7%). 

Gang Membership 

It is difficult to compare the proportions of youth who are gang members, gang associates 

and non-gang-member youth across the three samples. Data for the classification of gang 

membership status is derived from different sources. At Time I, gang membership status for the 

interviewed program and comparison youth is based on self-reports, and gang membership status 

9.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
for the non-interviewed program youth is based on worker-tracking records. Project workers did 

not know the gang membership status of 23.5% of the non-interviewed youth, who came into the 

program mainly during the last two years. 

We have some question about the reliability of the estimates for non-interviewed program 

youth in Table 9.4A. Since these youth are somewhat younger, and fewer of them are delinquent 

(based on police arrest data) than youth in the other two samples, we feel that many of them with 

unknown gang membership status are probably non-gang youth. 

In any case, most of the youth in each sample and across the samples appear to have been 

gang members (57.6%). The next largest group are gang associates, i.e., those youth only 

peripherally involved with gangs (18.6%). A high proportion of non-gang youth is present in 

each of the interviewed samples (program = 19.3%; comparison = 20.8%), as well as in the noninterviewed program sample if we combine unknown and non-gang youth (28.8%). 

What is clear is that there are more self-reported gang members in the interviewed 

program sample (66.1%) at the Time I interview compared to the two other samples. The 

interviewed program sample also contains a smaller proportion of gang associates (14.7%). 

The gang membership status of the interviewed youth at Time II reveals interesting 

differences from Time I, particularly in the comparison sample. There is a substantial drop in 

gang members from 53.1% to 45.0%, and an increase in non-gang youth from 20.8% to 26.7% in 

the comparison sample. The percent of gang associates decreased somewhat for the interviewed 

program sample at Time II (Table 4B). 

9.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang Membership and Delinquency 

If we consider delinquency rates of youth by their gang membership status based on arrest 

data in the three samples at Time I/program entry, gang members are more often delinquent and 

chronic delinquents than gang associates or non-delinquents. More delinquent gang members are 

in the interviewed program sample (77.5%) than in the comparison sample (58.8%) or the noninterviewed program sample (51.6%). The smallest proportion of non-gang youth (those without 

arrest records at program entry) is in the interviewed program sample (23.8%), but a surprisingly 

high proportion of non-gang youth without arrest records is in the comparison sample (80.0%). 

There is an even slightly higher proportion of non-interviewed program non-gang youth (87.5%) 

with no arrest records at program entry. In sum, a high proportion of youth in the three samples, 

whether gang members (41.2%), gang associates (68.0%) or non-gang youth (80.0%) have no 

delinquency records (Tables 9.5A, 9.5B, 9.5C). 

The highest proportions of chronic gang-member delinquents (i.e., medium and high 

rates) is in the interviewed program sample (46.4%), followed by the non-interviewed program 

sample (37.0%) and the comparison sample (31.4%). The next-highest chronic delinquency rates 

are for gang associates in the interviewed program sample (33.7%), although there are only small 

numbers of gang associates in their sample. Furthermore, the largest proportion of chronicdelinquent non-gang youth is in the interviewed program sample (38.1%) (Tables 9.5A, 9.5B, 

9.5C). 

The most-delinquent youth – gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth – are in 

the interviewed program sample. Delinquency patterns are milder in the comparison and noninterviewed program samples. However, gang members, gang associates, and non-gang youth 

9.6


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
are somewhat more delinquent in the comparison sample than the non-interviewed program 

sample. These two samples appear to be relatively more alike in terms of gang membership and 

delinquency status compared to the interviewed program sample. 

Probably most noteworthy is that there are varying but substantial proportions of gang 

youth in gang programs and community-based research samples who are not delinquent. While 

gang members are more delinquent than associate or peripheral gang members, there are 

significant numbers of gang members in the three samples who have no arrest records, and may 

not be delinquent. It is, therefore, a major policy, program, and research error to regard all gang 

members as delinquent, and those gang members who are delinquent as delinquent to the same 

degree. 

Gang Membership by Program/Comparison Areas 

It is important to determine not only the effect of the program on individual youth, but 

also whether the program was more effective with youth affiliated with gangs in the program area 

than with gangs in the comparison areas. We know that most program youth, particularly 

interviewed youth, were affiliated with the dominant South Side Mesa gang in the program area, 

but other program youth were affiliated with the South Side Mesa gang located in the 

Kino/Carson and Mesa Junior High School comparison areas. The Project workers were 

particularly active in the program, area both on an individual-program-youth and a communitysurveillance and resident-involvement basis. It is possible that program effects occurred 

interactively at individual-youth and area levels, and could have been particularly cumulative in 

the program area. 

9.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
We know from an examination of Time I interview responses that program youth were 

affiliated with the dominant South Side Mesa gang in the program area (40.4%), and comparison 

youth were affiliated with the dominant Westside Mesa gang in the Kino/Carson Junior High 

comparison area and the dominant Doble/Wetback Power gang in the Mesa Junior High 

comparison area (40.6%). 

A question testing the success of the Project at interrelated program-youth and 

community levels might be: did youth affiliated with the dominant South Side Mesa gang and 

other gangs in the program area do better than those affiliated with gangs outside of their areas? 

We attempt to answer this question in a later chapter where we assess changes in gang size and 

severity of gang problems on an area basis, and the effects of the Project on program youth 

affiliated with gangs in the program area and program youth affiliated with gangs in the 

comparison areas (see Chapter 14). Table 9.6 shows interviewed program and comparison-youth 

affiliation with gangs located in the program or comparison areas and elsewhere. As indicated, 

the largest proportion of program youth (40.4%) was affiliated with gangs in the program area, 

but a minority of program youth (15.6%) were affiliated with gangs in the comparison areas. A 

substantial proportion of youth had no gang affiliation: program youth (19.3%) and comparison 

youth (20.8%). The data also suggest that program youth could better identify specific gang 

locations of their gangs than could comparison youth. Relatively more program (26.6%) than 

comparison (16.6%) youth appeared to be affiliated with gangs outside of their particular areas. 

9.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Delinquency, Offense and Arrest Patterns 

Introduction 

It was important to obtain a clear picture of the nature as well as the scope of the gang 

delinquency problem among program and comparison youth. It was evident that substantial 

numbers of youth in the program, including gang members, were not delinquent, and many were 

not chronic offenders. We needed to know how serious the nature of their offenses were and 

what the distribution of the various types of offenses, serious and less serious, might be. The 

relative distribution of offenses or arrests among youth was not clear. The individual gang 

member survey did not include all offenses, but focused on the more serious violence and 

property offenses. Police arrest data covered a full array of offenses. 

The following discussions are based on a simple analysis of the types of offenses and 

arrests, and the relative distribution of those offenses and arrests among the three samples during 

the pre-program and the program periods. No controls or demographic characteristics (such as 

gender, race/ethnicity, or age groupings) are provided at this time. Our purpose is to provide an 

overall picture of the kinds of crime and the severity of offenses committed by program and 

comparison youth, both before and during their time in the program (or equivalent). 

The character of these offenses, as indicated by arrests, hardly changed across the three 

samples, although their scope did change – generally diminishing for the youth in all three 

samples. Between 2/3 and 3/4 of arrests made during the program or pre-program periods were 

for property offenses, and other relatively minor offenses such as driving without a license, 

possession of alcohol, disorderly conduct and curfew violation. Serious violence offenses 

comprised between 3% and 6% of all arrests, total violence offenses (including felony and 

9.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
misdemeanor violence) between 10% and 15% , and drug offenses between 6%and 14%. 

It is important to remember that, in all the samples, arrests of gang members or non-gang 

youth generally did not represent serious offenses. The gang problem in Mesa, as represented by 

youth in the program, was an emerging one, and may not have differed much from non-gang 

delinquency problems in either Mesa or comparable cities, at least at the time that the Mesa Gang 

Intervention Project was in operation. 

Pre-Program Self-Reported Offense Patterns 

Data on offense patterns were derived from responses to self-report items on the 

individual gang member survey administered to program and comparison youth at Time I and 

Time II (approximately 1 to 1-1⁄4 years apart). The following discussion and related tables do not 

include the non-interviewed program youth, for whom we do not have self-report information. 

At the Time I and Time II interview, each youth was asked to indicate whether he or she had 

committed any of 26 offenses in the previous six months. Additional survey items asked whether 

the youth had used or sold drugs (and what kind of drugs), had used alcohol, and whether the 

youth had access to a handgun. 

The self-reported offense patterns were identified for six categories of youth (with no 

demographic, gang-status, or other controls): all program youth interviewed at Time I; program 

youth interviewed only at Time I; program youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II; all 

comparison youth interviewed at Time I; comparison youth interviewed at Time-I-only; and 

comparison youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II. This discussion focuses on the Time I 

characteristics of each category of program and comparison youth, and indicates how the 

9.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Time-I-only and Time I/Time II groups differed. Generally, the Time-I-only (or the dropout) 

youth tended to be more serious offenders. In the next section of this chapter we provide police 

arrest data for all sample youth, whether they were interviewed or not. 

Self-reported offenses are categorized as follows: total offenses (and total self-reported 

arrests), total violence offenses (serious and less serious), total property offenses, drug selling 

offenses (by type of drug sold and by type of drug used) and alcohol-use offenses. Self-reported 

offenses are listed in Appendix B. Youth access to a handgun is also identified. The selfreported offenses and their classifications into categories are as similar as possible to those of 

official police arrest charges described in the next section. The self-reported offense categories 

differ from the police arrest categories in that they focus on the often-more-serious offenses 

typically committed by gang youth; the police arrest data also cover a larger inventory of major 

and minor, gang and non-gang-related offenses, as well as status offenses. 

Total Offenses 

Not all interviewed youth reported having committed offenses in the six-month period 

prior to the first interview. More program youth (74.3%) than comparison youth (53.1%) 

indicated they had committed prior offenses. A higher proportion of youth interviewed at Time I 

only had committed prior offenses than had youth who were interviewed at both Time I and Time 

II. Both program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I and Time II had fewer preprogram offenses (based on mean and median estimates) than had those interviewed at Time I 

only. Youth who were interviewed at Time I only tended more often to be chronic offenders 

(Table 9.7). 

9.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Total Arrests 

Less than half of the youth in each of the samples self-reported arrests. The median 

number of arrests per youth is small and does not vary much across the samples. Youth had been 

arrested on average about twice during the six-month period prior to the Time I interview, but the 

mean number of arrests seemed to vary, with more comparison youth reporting arrests than 

program youth. The self-reported arrest patterns of the program and comparison samples are at 

some variance with their respective self-reported offending patterns, described above. Youth 

were engaged in many more offenses than they were arrested for (Table 9.7 and 9.8). 

Total Violence Offenses 

About half of all program youth (51.4%) and somewhat less than half of comparison 

youth (42.7%) reported they had committed a violent act in the six months prior to the Time I 

interview. In general, more youth in the program sample said they had committed more violence 

offenses than comparison youth. The exception was that more comparison Time-I-only 

interviewed youth self reported more violence offenses than did program Time-I-only 

interviewed youth. Nevertheless, program youth appeared to have committed more violence 

offenses than comparison youth across each of the samples, based on a mean measure of offenses 

(Table 9.9). 

Total Property Offenses 

A somewhat higher percentage of program (68.8%) than comparison (47.9%) youth 

reported they committed property offenses rather than violence offenses. Program youth 

9.12


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
committed a higher mean level, but not always a higher median level, of property offenses than 

comparison youth. Of interest again is that program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I 

only had the highest median levels of self-reported property offenses. In general, all youth 

committed a higher frequency of property offenses than violence offenses (Table 9.10). 

Drug Selling 

Relatively more program (25.7%) than comparison youth (18.8%) reported selling drugs 

in the period six months prior to the Time I interview. Drug-selling per month was more 

frequent for program youth than for comparison youth across the various samples, using a 

median measure. Again, more youth interviewed at Time I only were involved in drug selling 

(Table 9.11A). 

Youth in the various samples were engaged in selling a wide range of drugs. More 

program (22.9%) than comparison (18.8%) youth were involved in selling marijuana than other 

types of drugs. More program (15.6%) than comparison (6.3%) youth were selling cocaine; and 

more program (13.8%) than comparison (8.3%) youth were selling methamphetmines. Fewer 

youth were involved in selling other drugs, such as crack, heroin, PCP, and LSD. Higher 

percentages of youth interviewed at Time I only, particularly program youth, were selling drugs, 

especially marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamines, although the numbers of youth selling 

drugs was very small (Table 9.11B). 

Drug Use 

There was less distinction overall between program and comparison samples in both the 

9.13


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
number of youth using drugs and the frequency of drug use. About half or more of all youth in 

each sample reported using drugs. The mean or median frequency of drug use was consistently 

higher among comparison youth than program youth, with the greatest proportion and highest 

usage reported among the comparison youth interviewed at Time I only (Table 9.12A). 

Marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamines were the drugs of choice for program and 

comparison youth. Relatively more comparison (57.3%) than program (50.5%) youth used 

marijuana; but more program youth used cocaine (29.4%) and methamphetamines (20.2%) than 

did comparison youth (14.6% and 11.5% respectively). Relatively more program and 

comparison youth interviewed at Time I only used these drugs than did youth from the samples 

of both program and comparison youth interviewed at Time I and Time II. The highest 

proportion of youth using marijuana was in the comparison (77.8%) and program (63.9%) 

samples interviewed at Time I only (Table 9.12B). 

Alcohol Use 

Relatively more program (69.7%) and comparison (72.9%) youth said they consumed 

alcohol compared to those youth who said they used drugs. Generally, program and comparison 

youth interviewed at Time I only reported they consumed about as much alcohol as they used 

drugs. However, comparison youth seemed more generally involved in the consumption of 

alcohol than were program youth (Table 9.13). 

Access to a Handgun 

More program youth (60.6%) had access to handguns than did comparison youth (46.9%). 

9.14


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
This pattern was similar across the youth samples. Again, more of the youth interviewed at Time 

I only had access to handguns than did youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II (Table 

9.14). 

Summary 

Relatively more program than comparison youth were engaged in a wide range of selfreported delinquent activities, typical of gang youth. Also, the more delinquent youth, program 

and comparison, seemed to be those interviewed at Time I only. The difference in self-reported 

delinquency patterns between youth interviewed at Time I only and youth interviewed at both 

Time I and Time II was greater in the comparison than in the program youth samples. 

Arrest Patterns 

In this section, we focus on patterns of arrests of all youth in the three samples: all 

program youth interviewed at Time I (n = 109), all comparison youth interviewed at Time I (n = 

96), and all non-interviewed program youth (n = 149). Dates of entry into and exit from the 

program (and an equivalent period for comparison youth) were used to determine arrest risk 

periods for the youth. Mesa Police Department and probation records were searched for arrest 

and confinement records for all three samples. The only youth excluded from the analyses were 

those program youth (mainly non-interviewed) who received less than one month of service. We 

tried to be as inclusive as possible of youth for our analyses. 

Arrest patterns are based on a comparison of program and pre-program periods. For 

program youth, program periods covered the time of the youth’s entry into the program until his 

9.15


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
exit from the program, or until the Project terminated (December 31, 2000). The pre-program 

arrest period and the program-service period are equivalent in length for each youth. Equivalent 

pre-program and program-service periods for comparison youth were calculated with reference to 

the Time-I-interviewed program youth, as explained in Chapter 8. Data in this section are 

derived mainly from Mesa Police Department records, and also from worker-tracking records. 

Pre-Program-Period Arrest Histories 

More program youth (76.1%) than comparison youth (43.8%) had pre-program arrest 

records (Table 9.15). Fewer non-interviewed program youth (32.2%) had pre-program arrest 

records, but this was partially due to the fact that this sample contained many youth who had 

been in the program for a short period of time and therefore had a short pre-program risk period. 

The non-interviewed program youth sample also contained a larger proportion of younger youth 

than the other two samples (Table 9.3A). If the full prior (to pre-program) arrest period for 18 

non-interviewed youth who were in the program for a short period of time are included, the 

percentage of youth with pre-program arrests would jump to 45.0%, similar to the proportion of 

comparison youth with pre-program arrests. 

Youth on Probation 

Since the majority of program youth (whether interviewed or not interviewed) were 

referred through court services, especially probation, we were able to ascertain the probation 

status of youth in both of the program samples. The sources of information on probation status 

were the worker tracking form (for program youth) and the individual gang member survey (for 

9.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program and comparison youth). The period of time covered in probation-status records could 

include both the pre-program and program arrest periods. 

Table 9.16 shows that a considerable proportion of both interviewed and non-interviewed 

program youth were on probation at some point during the program and pre-program periods 

(and even prior to program-entry), but that comparison youth were probably less likely to have 

had probation experiences, even though the comparison youth may have been somewhat similar 

to program youth (particularly to non-interviewed youth) in their pre-program arrest histories. 

We will control for prior arrests and program-exposure periods in our later multivariate analyses. 

Pre-Program Arrest Patterns 

The majority of arrest charges among youth in all three samples in the pre-program period 

was for property offenses and other relatively minor offenses, including driving without a license 

(motor vehicle act), curfew violations and status offenses. There were relatively fewer youth 

arrested for (and a lower frequency of arrests made for) serious and less-serious violence offenses 

and drug offenses. There were few variations in these patterns across the three samples. The 

Time-I-interviewed program youth seemed to be slightly more involved in various types of minor 

offenses, although relatively more comparison youth had motor vehicle charges. Relatively more 

non-interviewed program youth were arrested on drug charges than were youth from the other 

two samples (Tables 9.17A-D and 9.18A-D). 

Changes in Arrest Patterns 

There were minor pattern changes in arrests across the three samples between the pre9.17


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program and program periods. At the aggregate level – uncontrolled for demographic, gangstatus, or prior-arrest categories and other factors – the Time-I-interviewed program sample was 

associated with a reduced number of youth arrested: from 83 to 68, a reduction of 18.1%. The 

number of arrests for these youth fell from 253 in the pre-program period to 193 in the program 

period, a reduction of 23.7%. The non-interviewed program sample was associated with a 

reduced number of youth arrested: from 49 to 47, a reduction of 4.1%. The number of arrests for 

these youth fell from 104 to 84, a reduction of 19.2%. The comparison youth sample was 

associated with an increase in the number of youth arrested: from 42 to 51, an increase of 21.4%. 

Their number of arrests increased from 137 to 166 – 21.2%. There was also evidence of a 

relatively greater decrease in more serious offenses for the two program samples than for the 

comparison sample (Tables 9.17A-D and 9.18A-D). 

These differences in arrest patterns among the three samples are systematically tested for 

program effects under controlled statistical conditions in later multivariate analyses. What is 

noteworthy is that the youth in the three samples were more often arrested for less-serious than 

more-serious offenses, and that more-serious-offense arrests appear to decline, while lessserious-offense arrests increased during the program period. We briefly compare changes in selfreported offense patterns and arrest patterns for the interviewed program and comparison youth 

samples in Chapter 13. 

9.18


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.1A


Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I"

 (or Program Entry#)


Gender


Samples Male Female Total 

Percent n Percent n Percent N 

Interviewed 

Comparison Youth"

77.08 74 22.92 22 27.12 96 

Interviewed Program 

Youth"

85.32 93 14.68 16 30.79 109 

Non-Interviewed 

Program Youth#

81.88 122 18.12 27 42.09 149 

Total 81.64 289 18.36 65 100.0 354 

Table 9.1B 

Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II1 

Gender 

Samples Male Female Total 

Percent n Percent n Percent N 

Comparison Youth 78.83 47 21.67 13 44.44 60 

Program Youth 86.67 65 13.33 10 55.56 75 

Total 82.96 112 16.54 23 100.0 135 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys; Worker Tracking Forms 

1

 Characteristics of youth interviewed at Time I and Time II. 

9.19 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.2A


Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I"

 (or Program Entry#)


Race/Ethnicity


Samples White Latino Other1 Total 

Percent n Percent n Percent n Percent N 

Interviewed 

Comparison 

Youth"

31.25 30 58.33 56 10.42 10 28.92 96 

Interviewed 

Program Youth" 5.50 6 86.24 94 8.26 9 32.83 109 

Non-Interviewed 

Program Youth# 6.30 8 84.25 107 9.45 12 38.25 1272 

Total 13.25 44 77.41 257 9.34 31 100.0 332 

Table 9.2B 

Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II3 

Race/Ethnicity 

Samples White Latino Other Total 

Percent n Percent n Percent n Percent N 

Comparison 

Youth 

26.67 16 61.67 37 11.67 7 44.44 60 

Program 

Youth 

5.33 4 85.33 64 9.34 7 55.56 75 

Total 14.81 20 74.81 101 10.38 14 100.0 135 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys; and Worker Tracking Forms 

1 Mainly African-American, American Indian and some Asian-American youth. 

2

 Frequency missing = 22 (from the non-interviewed program sample). 

3

 Characteristics of youth interviewed both at Time I and Time II. 

9.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.3A


Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I"

 (or at Program Entry#)


Age


Samples 14 and Under 15 to 17 18 and Over Total 

Percent n Percent n Percent n Percent N 

Interviewed 

Comparison Y outh"

26.04 25 48.96 47 25.00 24 27.51 96 

Interviewed 

Program Youth"

32.11 35 37.61 41 30.28 33 31.23 109 

Non-Interviewed 

Program Youth#

36.11 52 45.83 66 18.06 26 41.26 1441 

Total 32.09 112 44.13 154 23.78 83 100.0 349 

Table 9.3B 

Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II2 

Age 

Samples 14 and Under 15 to 17 18 and Over Total 

Percent n Percent n Percent n Percent N 

Comparison 

Youth 

26.67 16 46.67 28 26.67 16 44.44 60 

Program 

Youth 

33.33 25 36.00 27 30.67 23 55.56 75 

Total 30.37 41 40.74 55 28.89 39 100.0 135 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys; Worker Tracking Forms 

1

 Frequency missing = 5 (from non-interviewed program sample). 

2

 Characteristics of youth interviewed at both Time I and Time II. 

9.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.4A


Characteristics of Sample Youth at Time I"

 (or Program Entry#)


Gang Membership


Samples Unknown Non-Gang Gang Gang 

Associate 

Total 

% n % n % n % n % N 

Interviewed 

Comparison 

Youth"

0.00 0 20.83 20 53.13 51 26.04 25 27.12 96 

Interviewed 

Program 

Youth"

0.00 0 19.27 21 66.06 72 14.68 16 30.79 109 

NonInterviewed 

Program 

Youth#

23.49 35 5.37 8 54.36 81 16.78 25 42.09 149 

Total 9.89 35 13.84 49 57.63 204 18.64 66 100.0 354 

Table 9.4B 

Characteristics of Interviewed Sample Youth at Time II1 

Gang Membership 

Samples Non-Gang Gang Gang Associate Total 

% n % n % n % N 

Comparison Youth 26.67 16 45.00 27 28.33 17 44.44 60 

Program Youth 21.33 16 68.00 51 10.67 8 55.56 75 

Total 23.70 32 57.78 78 18.52 25 100.0 135 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys: Worker Tracking Forms 

1

 Characteristics of youth interviewed both at Time I and Time II. 

9.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.5A 

Interviewed Program Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period 

Gang 

Status 

Delinquency Rank1 

Total 

None Low Medium High 

% n % n % n % n % N 

Gang 

Member 22.53 16 3.94 23 25.00 18 21.43 15 66.05 72 

Gang 

Associate 31.25 5 25.00 4 18.75 3 25.0 4 14.68 16 

Non-Gang 

Youth 23.81 5 38.10 8 23.81 5 14.28 3 19.27 21 

Total 23.85 26 32.11 35 23.85 26 20.18 22 100.0 109 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 Ba sed o n M esa P olice D epa rtmen t pre-p rogra m-pe riod total arre st history, an nualize d: non e = no arrest; 

low = 0.01 to 0.98; medium = 1.0 to 1.99; high $ 2.00 

9.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.5B 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period 

Gang 

Status 

Delinquency Rank1 Total 

None Low Medium High 

% n % n % n % n % N 

Gang 

Member 49.38 40 13.58 11 13.58 11 23.46 19 54.36 81 

Gang 

Associate 88.00 22 4.00 1 4.00 1 4.00 1 16.78 25 

Non-Gang 

Youth 87.50 7 0 0 12.50 1 0 0 5.37 8 

Unknown 91.43 32 8.57 3 0 0 0 0 23.49 35 

Total 67.79 101 10.07 15 8.72 13 13.42 20 100.0 149 

Source: Worker Tracking Records 

1

 Ba sed o n M esa P olice D epa rtmen t pre-p rogra m-pe riod total arre st history, an nualize d: no ne = n o arre st; 

low = 0.01 to 0.98; medium = 1.0 to 1.99; high $ 2.00 

9.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.5C 

Comparison Youth Gang/Delinquency Status: Pre-Program Period 

Gang Status Delinquency Rank1 Total 

None Low Medium High 

% n % n % n % n % N 

Gang 

Member 41.2 21 27.5 14 19.6 10 11.8 6 53.13 51 

Gang 

Associate 68.0 17 20.0 5 8.0 2 4.0 1 26.04 25 

Non-Gang 

Youth 80.0 16 20.0 4 0 0 0 0 20.83 20 

Total 56.25 54 23.96 23 12.50 12 7.29 7 100.0 96 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 Delinquency rank is based on Mesa Police Department pre-program arrest history annualized period: 

none = no arrest; low = 0.01 to 0.98; medium = 1.0 to 1.99 ; high $ 2.00 

9.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.6 

Gang Membership by Location 

Sample 

No Gang 

Affiliation 

Gang Location 

Program Total

(Powell Junior 

High) 

Comparison 

(Kino/Carson, 

Mesa Jr. High) 

Outside Mesa 

Gang (don’t 

know) without 

Specific 

Locations 

% n % n % n % n % n % N 

Program Youth 21 19.27 40.37 44 15.60 17 11.01 12 13.76 15 53.19 109 

Comparison 

Youth 20 20.83 7.29 7 40.63 39 8.33 8 22.92 22 48.63 96 

Total 41 20.00 24.88 51 27.32 56 9.76 20 18.05 37 100.00 205 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

9.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.7 

Self-Reported Total Offenses1

 at Time I 

Samples N Youth Reporting Offenses Number of Offenses 

Reported 

Percent n Mean Median 

Total Program Sample at 

Time I 109 74.3% 81 49.3 13.0 

Total Comparison Sample 

at Time I 96 53.1% 51 41.4 12.0 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I and 

Time II

 73 66.7% 54 38.0 10.5 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I and 

Time II

 60 51.0% 26 26.7 9.5 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

Only 

36 33.3% 27 71.9 22.0 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

Only

 36 49.1% 25 56.6 19.0 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 See Ap pend ix B for co mplete list of self-reported offenses. 

9.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.8 

Self-Reported Total Arrests1

 at Time I 

Samples N Youth Reporting 

Arrests 

Number of Arrests 

Reported 

Percent n Mean Median 

Total Program Sample at Time I 109 35.8 39 2.3 2 

Total Comparison Sample at 

Time I 96 17.7 17 6.9 2 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I and Time II 73 34.2 25 2.7 2 

Comparison Youth Interviewed at 

Time I and Time II 60 11.7 7 5.9 2 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I Only 36 38.9 14 1.6 1 

Comparison Youth Interviewed 

Only 36 27.8 10 7.7 2 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 See Ap pend ix A for a com plete list of self-reported arrest charges. 

9.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.9 

Self-Reported Total Violence Offenses1

 at Time I 

Samples N Youth Reporting 

Violence Offenses 

Number of Violence 

Offenses 

Percent n Mean Median 

Total Program Sample at Time I 109 51.4% 56 18.5 6.0 

Total Comparison Sample at 

Time I 96 42.7% 41 23.4 4.0 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I and Time II 73 67.9% 38 15.3 5.0 

Comparison Youth Interviewed 

at Time I and Time II 60 48.8% 20 9.3 3.5 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I Only 36 32.7% 18 23.7 11.0 

Comparison Youth Interviewed 

at Time I Only 36 51.2% 21 36.9 7.0 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 Includes serious and less serious offenses: threatened to attack a person with or without using a gun, 

knife, or other dangerous weapon; robbed someone by force or by threat of force with or without using a weapon; 

beaten up or battered someone with or without using a gun, knife, or other dangerous weapon; rape; driveby 

shooting; homicide (see Appendix B for a complete list of self-reported offenses). 

9.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.10 

Self-Reported Total Property Offenses1

at Time I 

Samples N Youth Reporting Property 

Offenses 

Numbers of Property 

Offenses 

Percent n Mean Median 

Total Program Sample at 

Time I 

109 68.8 75 38.3 11.0 

Total Comparison Sample 

at Time I 

96 47.9 46 22.6 12.0 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I and 

Time II 

73 65.8 48 29.4 8.5 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I and 

Time II 

60 38.3 23 18.3 5.0 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I-only 

36 75.0 27 54.1 12.0 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I-only 

36 63.9 23 26.8 14.0 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 Includes: writing gang (or non-gang) graffiti on school property, neighborhood houses, stores, etc.; 

throwing rocks or bottles at persons, vehicles, or property; destroying property worth both less and more than $300; 

arson; theft of a bicycle or bike parts; theft of parts or property from a vehicle (hubcaps, stereo, etc.); theft of a motor 

vehicle; fencing or possessing stolen goods (other than weapons); shoplifting; breaking and entering a house, store, 

or building, to commit a theft; fencing or theft of weapons or firearms. (See Appendix B for complete list of selfreported offenses.) 

9.30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.11A 

Self-Reported Drug Selling at Time I 

Samples N Youth Reporting Drug 

Selling 

Number of Times Per 

Month1 

Percent n Mean Median 

Total Program Sample 

at Time I 109 25.7 28 25.1 22 

Total Comparison 

Sample at Time I 96 18.8 18 25.9 8.5 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

and Time II 

73 21.9 16 21.6 14.0 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

and Time II 

60 15.0 9 26.0 8 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

Only 

36 33.3 12 32.0 27.5 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

Only 

36 25.0 9 25.6 10.0 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 Th e me an and med ian figure s are co mpu ted b ased on the numb er of tim es pe r mo nth the yo uth sold 

drugs. 

9.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.11B 

Self-Reported Drug Selling at Time I – continued 

Samples Type of Drugs Sold 

n and (%) 

N 

Marijuana Cocaine Crack Heroin Methamphetamine PCP LSD Other 

n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 

Total Program Sample at 

Time I 109 25 (22.9) 17 (15.6) 6 (5.5) 1 (0.9) 15 (13.8) 3 (2.8) 8 (7.3) 0 (0) 

Total Comparison Sample 

at Time I 96 18 (18.8) 6 (6.3) 7 (7.3) 2 (2.1) 8 (8.3) 0 (0.9) 5 (5.2) 1 (1.0) 

Program Youth Interviewed 

at Time I and Time II 73 15 (20.5) 11 (15.1) 2 (2.7) 0 (0) 9 (12.0) 3 (4.0) 6 (8.2) 0 (0) 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I and 60 9 (15.0) 4 (6.7) 5 (8.3) 2 (3.3) 5 (8.3) 0 (0) 2 (5.9) 0 (0) 

Time II 

Program Youth Interviewed 

at Time I Only 36 10 (27.8) 6 (16.7) 4 (11.1) 1 (2.8) 6 (16.7) 0 (0) 2 (5.6) 0 (0) 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I Only 36 10 (27.8) 2 (5.6) 2 (5.6) 0 (0) 3 (8.3) 0 (0) 2 (5.6) 1 (2.8) 

9.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.12A 

Self-Reported Drug Use at Time I 

Samples N Youth Reporting Drug 

Use 

Number of Times Per 

Month1 

Percent n Mean Median 

Total Program Sample at Time 

I 109 54.1 59 17.4 11.0 

Total Comparison Sample at 

Time I 96 57.3 55 21.5 16.0 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I and Time II 73 46.6 34 14.6 9.5 

Comparison Youth Interviewed 

at Time I and Time II 60 45.0 27 18.3 11.0 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I Only 36 69.4 25 21.1 12.0 

Comparison Youth Interviewed 

at Time I Only 36 77.8 28 24.7 16.5 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 The m ean and median figures are comp uted base d on the num ber of times pe r month the you th used drug s. 

9.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.12B 

Self-Reported Drug Use at Time I – continued 

Samples N Type of Drugs Used 

n and (%) 

Marijuana Cocaine Crack Heroin Meth- PCP LSD Glue Gas Other 

n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) amphetamine n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 

n (%) 

Total Program Sample at 

Time I 109 55 (50.5) 

32 

(29.4) 

4 

(3.7) 

1 

(0.92) 

22 

(20.2) 

8 

(7.3) 

24 

(11.7) 

3 

(2.8) 

0 

(0) 

3 

(2.8) 

Total Comparison 

Sample at Time I 96 55 (57.3) 

14 

(14.6) 

7 

(7.3) 

2 

(2.1) 

11 

(11.5) 

2 

(2.1) 

14 

(14.6) 

5 

(5.2) 

1 

(1.0) 

3 

(3.1) 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

and Time II 

73 32 

(43.8) 

18 

(24.7) 

2 

(2.7) 

0 

(0) 

12 

(16.4) 

6 

(8.2) 

15 

(20.5) 

1 

(1.4) 

0 

(0) 

2 

(2.7) 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

and Time II 

60 27 

(45.0) 

8 

(13.3) 

3 

(5.0) 

2 

(3.3) 

5 

(8.3) 

1 

(1.7) 

5 

(8.3) 

3 

(5.0) 

1 

(1.7) 

1 

(1.7) 

Program Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

Only 

36 23 

(63.9) 

14 

(38.9) 

2 

(5.6) 

1 

(2.8) 

10 

(27.8) 

2 

(5.6) 

9 

(25.0) 

2 

(5.6) 

0 

(0) 

1 

(2.8) 

Comparison Youth 

Interviewed at Time I 

Only 

36 28 

(77.8) 

6 

(16.7) 

4 

(11.1) 

0 

(0) 

6 

(16.7) 

1 

(2.8) 

9 

(25.0) 

2 

(5.6) 

0 

(0) 

2 

(5.62) 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

9.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.13 

Self-Reported Alcohol Use at Time I 

Samples N Youth Reporting 

Using Alcohol 

Number of Times 

Per Month1 

Percent n Mean Median 

Total Program Sample at Time I 109 69.7 76 9.4 4.5 

Total Comparison Sample at Time I 96 72.9 70 12.2 7.0 

Program Youth Interviewed at Time I 

and Time II 73 67.1 49 7.2 4.0 

Comparison Youth Interviewed at 

Time I and Time II 60 66.7 40 9.8 6.0 

Program Youth Interviewed at Time I 

Only 36 72.2 26 13.4 8.0 

Comparison Youth Interviewed at 

Time I Only 36 75.0 27 15.5 10.0 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

1

 The mean and median figures are computed based on the number of times per month the youth consumed 

alcoh ol. 

9.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.14 

Access to a Handgun at Time I 

Samples N Percent n 

Total Program Sample at Time I 109 60.6 66 

Total Comparison Sample at 

Time I 

96 46.9 45 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I and Time II 

73 58.9 43 

Comparison Youth Interviewed 

at Time I and Time II 

60 38.3 23 

Program Youth Interviewed at 

Time I Only 

36 63.9 23 

Comparison Youth Interviewed 

at Time I Only 

36 63.9 23 

Source: Individual Gang Member Surveys 

9.36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.15 

Arrest Histories: Pre-Program Period1 

Sample Youth with Arrests2 

N 

Percent n 

Time-I-Interviewed 

Program Youth 109 76.1 83 

Non-Interviewed 

Program Youth 149 32.2 48 

Comparison Youth 96 43.8 42 

Source: Mesa Police Department Arrest Data 

1

 The pre-program period is matched in length to the period of program service (or equivalent, for 

comparison youth). 

2

 Of the youth with zero arrests or no arrest history in the pre-program period, 4 Time-I-interviewed 

program youth, 18 non-interviewed program youth, and 0 comparison youth nevertheless had arrests prior to the preprogram period. 

9.37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.16 

Youth on Probation 

Sample N 

Source 

Individual Gang Member 

Surveys1 Worker Tracking Forms2 

Percent n Percent n 

Time-I-Interviewed 

Program Youth 109 80.77 88 91.7 100 

Non-Interviewed Program 

Youth 149 – – 63.8 95 

Comparison Youth 96 30.2 29 – – 

1

 The individual gang member survey asked the youth if he was “ever” on probation. 

2

 Worker tracking records indicate whether Project workers reported that the youth was on probation at the 

time of program entry, or during the program period. 

9.38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.17A 

Type of Arrest Charge: All Program Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Type of Arrest Charge1 Period Totals 

% and (N) 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

Serious Violence 3.6 

(13) 

4.7 

(13) 

4.1 

(26) 

Violence 14.6 

(52) 

13.7 

(38) 

14.2 

(90) 

Drugs 8.7 

(31) 

7.6 

(21) 

8.2 

(52) 

Property 29.7 

(106) 

20.9 

(58) 

25.9 

(164) 

Other 43.4 

(155) 

53.0 

(147) 

47.6 

(302) 

Total Arrest Charges 100.0 

(357) 

99.9 

(277) 

100.0 

(634) 

Number of Youth Arrested2 131 115 159 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

 There were five types of charges for which youth were typically arrested. If an arrest involved more than 

one charge, the most serious charge for that particular arrest is used. The five types of charges are categorized as: 

serious violence, comprising aggravated assault, sexual assault/abuse and armed robbery; violence, including 

robbery, attempted robbery, assault, domestic assault, arson, domestic battery, sex crime, child abuse, street fighting, 

intimidation, telephone harassment and violation of a protection order; drugs, including possession of a controlled 

substance, possession of cannabis/marijuana, and possession of a non-narcotic controlled substance; property , 

including theft, attempted theft, shoplifting, burglary, trespass, possession/receipt/sale of stolen motor vehicle, 

criminal damage to motor vehicle, possession of stolen property, graffiti, and receipt of stolen property; other, 

including motor vehicle act, curfew violation, minor drinking, intoxication of a minor, possession of alcohol/minor 

driving under influence of alcohol/drugs, status offense, unlawful use of weapons, unlawful possession of weapons, 

unlawful possession of firearms, contributing to delinquency of minor, resisting/obstructing a peace officer, reckless 

conduct, loitering, gang loitering, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide, disorderly conduct, and “other” 

(see Appendix A for a complete list of individual police arrest charges). 

2

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or both of the time periods. 

9.39 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.17B 

Type of Arrest Charge: Time-I Interviewed Program Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Type of Arrest Charge1 Period Totals 

% and (N) 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

Serious Violence 2.4 

(6) 

4.1 

(8) 

3.1 

(14) 

Violence 14.6 

(37) 

15.5 

(30) 

15.0 

(67) 

Drugs 6.7 

(17) 

5.2 

(10) 

6.1 

(27) 

Property 30.0 

(76) 

20.7 

(40) 

26.0 

(116) 

Other 46.2 

(117) 

54.4 

(105) 

49.8 

(222) 

Total Arrest Charges 99.9 

(253) 

99.9 

(193) 

100.0 

(446) 

Number of Youth Arrested2 83 68 91 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

 See Footnote 1, Table 917A. 

2

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or b oth of the time perio ds. 

9.40 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.17C 

Type of Arrest Charge: Non-Interviewed Program Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Type of Arrest Charge1 Period Totals 

% and (N) 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

Serious Violence 6.7 

(7) 

6.0 

(5) 

6.4 

(12) 

Violence 14.4 

(15) 

9.5 

(8) 

12.2 

(23) 

Drugs 13.5 

(14) 

13.1 

(11) 

13.3 

(25) 

Property 28.8 

(14) 

21.4 

(18) 

25.5 

(48) 

Other 36.5 

(38) 

50.0 

(42) 

42.6 

(80) 

Total Arrest Charges 99.9 

(104) 

100.0 

(84) 

100.0 

(188) 

Number of Youth Arrested2 49 47 68 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

 See Footnote 1, Table 9.17A. 

2

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or b oth of the time perio ds. 

9.41 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.17D 

Type of Arrest Charge: Comparison Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

Type of Arrest Charge1 Period Totals 

% and (N) 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

Serious Violence 3.6 

(5) 

3.0 

(5) 

3.3 

(10) 

Violence 15.3 

(21) 

7.8 

(13) 

11.2 

(34) 

Drugs 7.3 

(10) 

13.9 

(23) 

10.9 

(33) 

Property 33.6 

(46) 

20.5 

(34) 

26.4 

(80) 

Other 40.1 

(55) 

54.8 

(91) 

48.2 

(146) 

Total Arrest Charges 99.9 

(137) 

100.0 

(166) 

100.0 

(303) 

Number of Youth Arrested2 42 51 66 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

 See Footnote 1, Table 9.17A. 

2

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or b oth of the time perio ds. 

9.42 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.18A 

Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: All Program Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

“Other” Arrest Charge 

Motor Vehicle Act 

Curfew Violation and Status 

Offense 

Alcohol1 

Public Disturbance2 

Other3 

Weapon4 

Total “Other” Arrest 

Charges 

Number of Youth Arrested5 

Period 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

23.2 

(36) 

29.9 

(44) 

25.2 

(39) 

19.0 

(28) 

18.7 

(29) 

22.4 

(33) 

15.5 

(24) 

15.6 

(23) 

11.6 

(18) 

5.4 

(8) 

5.8 

(9) 

7.5 

(11) 

100.0 

(155) 

99.8 

(147) 

83 74 

Totals 

% and (N) 

26.5 

(80) 

22.2 

(67) 

20.5 

(62) 

15.6 

(47) 

8.6 

(26) 

6.6 

(20) 

100.0 

(302) 

113 

1

 Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of 

alcohol/minor. 

2

 Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer. 

3

 Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other 

miscellaneous offenses. 

4

 Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons. 

5

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or both of the time periods. 

9.43 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.18B 

Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Time-I-Interviewed Program Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

“Other” Arrest Charge 

Motor Vehicle Act 

Curfew Violation and Status 

Offense 

Alcohol1 

Public Disturbance2 

Other3 

Weapon4 

Total “Other” Arrest 

Charges 

Number of Youth Arrested5 

Period 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

22.2 

(26) 

34.3 

(36) 

24.8 

(29) 

19.0 

(20) 

18.8 

(22) 

20.0 

(21) 

17.9 

(21) 

16.2 

(17) 

9.4 

(11) 

3.8 

(4) 

6.8 

(8) 

6.7 

(7) 

99.9 

(117) 

100.0 

(105) 

45 55 

Totals 

% and (N) 

27.9 

(62) 

22.1 

(49) 

19.4 

(43) 

17.1 

(38) 

6.8 

(15) 

6.8 

(15) 

100.1 

(222) 

68 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

 Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of 

alcohol/minor. 

2

 Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer. 

3

 Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other 

miscellaneous offenses. 

4

 Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons. 

5

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or both of the time periods. 

9.44 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.18C 

Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Non-Interviewed Program Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

“Other” Arrest Charge 

Motor Vehicle Act 

Curfew Violation and Status 

Offense 

Alcohol1 

Public Disturbance2 

Other3 

Weapon4 

Total “Other” Arrest 

Charges 

Number of Youth Arrested5 

Period 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

26.3 

(10) 

19.0 

(8) 

26.3 

(10) 

19.0 

(8) 

18.4 

(7) 

28.6 

(12) 

7.9 

(3) 

14.3 

(6) 

18.4 

(7) 

9.5 

(4) 

2.6 

(1) 

9.5 

(4) 

99.9 

(38) 

99.9 

(42) 

28 29 

Totals 

% and (N) 

22.5 

(18) 

22.5 

(18) 

23.8 

(19) 

11.3 

(9) 

13.8 

(11) 

6.3 

(5) 

100.2 

(80) 

45 

Totals do not sum due to rounding errors. 

1

 Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of 

alcohol/minor. 

2

 Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer. 

3

 Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other 

miscellaneous offenses. 

4

 Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons. 

5

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or both of the time periods. 

9.45 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 9.18D 

Breakdown of “Other” Arrest Charge: Comparison Youth 

By Pre-Program and Program Period 

“Other” Arrest Charge 

Motor Vehicle Act 

Curfew Violation and Status 

Offense 

Alcohol1 

Public Disturbance2 

Other3 

Weapon4 

Total “Other” Arrest 

Charges 

Number of Youth Arrested5 

Period 

Pre-Program 

% and (n) 

Program 

% and (n) 

51.0 

(28) 

36.3 

(33) 

16.4 

(9) 

17.6 

(16) 

16.4 

(9) 

11.0 

(10) 

9.1 

(5) 

12.1 

(11) 

5.5 

(3) 

19.8 

(18) 

1.8 

(1) 

3.3 

(3) 

100.2 

(55) 

100.1 

(91) 

26 41 

Totals 

% and (N) 

41.8 

(61) 

17.1 

(25) 

13.0 

(19) 

11.0 

(16) 

14.4 

(21) 

2.7 

(4) 

100.0 

(146) 

52 

1

 Minor drinking or intoxication of minor, driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and possession of 

alcohol/minor. 

2

 Disorderly conduct, loitering/gang loitering and resisting/obstructing a peace officer. 

3

 Contributing to delinquency of minor, maintaining a public nuisance, attempted suicide and other 

miscellaneous offenses. 

4

 Unlawful possession of weapons or firearms and unlawful use of weapons. 

5

 The total in the far right column is the total number of individuals who may have been arrested during 

either one or both of the time periods. 

9.46 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 10 

Program Structure and Process: Services, Worker Contacts, and Strategies 

(Rolando V. Sosa) 

Introduction 

The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and 

Suppression Program was based on the assumption that not only the individual, but the 

community and its organizations and programs participate both in the creation and the reduction 

of the youth gang problem. The Comprehensive Gang Program Model assumed that key 

organizations in the community were not adequately coordinated in the development of an 

appropriate program approach of worker contacts and services, and that sufficient resources 

might not have been available for them to target gang-involved or highly gang-at-risk youth. The 

Model required that agencies and grassroots groups address the gang problem by developing and 

rearranging their programs to better control and support targeted youth, particularly through 

school, jobs, and conventional age-appropriate socialization activities. A truly comprehensive 

approach was necessary, one which included different types of agencies and local groups 

concerned with and/or closely related to gang youth, to their families, and to those at highest risk 

of gang delinquency. 

The Projects at the five sites were not only expected to mobilize both agency and 

grassroots elements, but to establish outreach contacts with targeted youth who were partially or 

poorly served, and not socially controlled. From a structural and process perspective, the Model 

required not only a steering committee of community leaders and representatives of key 

10.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
organizations, but also an outreach team consisting of street-level workers from the key 

organizations and community groups concerned with the youth-gang problem. The community 

direct-service or contact team had to include police officers, probation officers, outreach youth 

workers and case managers, as well as teachers, manpower workers and specialized treatment 

workers. The team had to identify not only with the mission and interests of their respective 

agencies and community groups, but also with the concerns of targeted youth and the 

community’s needs for both youth social-development and community protection. 

A critical component of the kind of relationships to be established with program youth 

and their families was worker sensitivity to local and larger-community norms and values. In 

particular, probation and police officers had to be sufficiently interested in social support as well 

as suppression measures to effectively control targeted youth. Ideally, outreach youth workers 

would come from the same gang neighborhoods, have backgrounds similar to the targeted youth, 

and be able to facilitate the youth’s transition to the legitimate society. 

The Model generally required that worker services and contacts be provided through a 

team of agency and community-oriented workers who were to implement the five program 

strategies in accordance with the principles of the Model. The workers were to target selected 

youth from selected gangs and gang segments. They were to implement program strategies – 

particularly social services, provision of social opportunities, and suppression – in an interrelated 

and balanced manner. The targeted youth were expected to be both gang members who were 

chronic delinquents, and youth at high risk for both gang membership and delinquency. Services 

and worker contacts were to extend over a period of months or years, as necessary, with 

especially-frequent contacts with chronic or hardcore gang-delinquent youth, in order to 

10.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
contribute to their social development. Because of the inherent difficulty in modifying existing 

agency policies and professional roles, and in developing interagency and interdisciplinary team 

practice, the workers were expected to be highly skilled, flexible, and committed to 

implementing this complex Model. 

Many Model elements were well-developed in the Mesa program, but others were not. 

Police and probation officers participated substantially in the implementation of the socialdevelopment aspects of the Model. Probation officers were the key source of contacts for the 

majority of youth recruited into the Project, and also, along with the police, probably embodied 

the dominant authoritative character of the program. There were significant outreach contacts 

with schools and other community agencies by case managers, youth workers, and neighborhood 

organizers, but there was little involvement of neighborhood representatives or grassroots 

organizations in the work or direction of the Project. 

A key question was whether the Project and its component agencies were more concerned 

with gang-involved (especially hardcore-delinquent) gang youth, or with those youth at gang-risk 

or peripherally involved with gangs, who committed minor offenses and mainly needed early 

social intervention. Outreach youth workers were not to reach out to gang youth in the 

neighborhood; they were not generally of the same race/ethnicity as program youth, and not local 

to the community. They were not required or permitted to perform as neighborhood-oriented 

outreach workers, based on Model criteria. 

However, communication and coordination among Project workers did occur. Youth in 

the program were provided with an interrelated pattern of services and contacts by the different 

workers. Attention was paid to a differential mix of social-intervention and suppression 

10.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
strategies for youth with different backgrounds. Major focus of the Project was on youth who 

were gang members and gang associates, most of whom were not chronic delinquents, and were 

younger in age as the program progressed. The few females in the program were provided with 

more services than were males. Less-delinquent youth, who came into the program later and 

remained for a shorter period of time, were provided with more services than the delinquent 

youth, who came into the program earlier and stayed longer. 

The discussion in this section, developed from data from the worker tracking forms, 

describes the problems associated with completion of the tracking forms by Project staff, the 

sources of referral of youth to the program, the types of services provided, and the scope and 

nature of worker contacts, including differential patterns of the workers’ coordination with each 

other. Program strategy was the framework for classifying services and worker contacts. The 

social-intervention strategy included group discussion, individual counseling, family counseling, 

and advice or crisis-intervention, provided mainly by probation officers, case managers and 

outreach youth workers and treatment personnel, and to some extent by teachers and even police. 

A limited amount of social opportunities, including educational services (e.g., mediation between 

youth and the schools, crisis-intervention around school behavior problems, as well as tutoring 

and development of a GED program) and vocational services (e.g., training, job referral and 

placement) was provided mainly by outreach youth workers, case managers, and school staff. 

Suppression – including arrest, surveillance, monitoring, detention, and warnings – was provided 

by police and probation officers, and, to a lesser extent, by teachers and outreach youth workers 

(See Appendix C for a Glossary of Services and Worker Contacts). 

10.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The Worker Tracking Form 

The major instrument for obtaining data on services to and contacts with program youth 

by different workers was the 12-page worker tracking form, containing mainly closed-ended 

check-off items and a few open-ended questions. Each Project-related worker was expected to 

summarize the nature and scope of his/her direct contacts with program youth and services 

provided (including referral services) during each three-month calendar quarter. Local Project 

Administrators were at first concerned about the extra time and effort that completion of the form 

would impose, beyond the workers’ regular assignments. However, the National Evaluator 

estimated that it would take the worker approximately 10 or 15 minutes to fill out a form for each 

program youth. Such limited effort could still provide sufficient information for Evaluation 

purposes. 

The form requested the following types of information: identification of the worker and 

his organization; identification of the youth; the youth’s demographics and gang affiliation (and 

estimated rank in the gang); the dates of worker contact with the youth (first program contact, 

initial contact in the reporting period, date of last contact in the period); the number and types of 

contacts with the youth; types of services provided; referrals made on behalf of the youth; a 

rating of the youth’s progress by the worker; identification of services or referrals most helpful to 

the youth; and observations and ratings by the worker regarding the youth’s degree of 

involvement in various gang and non-gang delinquent activities during the reporting period. 

Also very important was an accounting of which other workers were contacted, within the 

Project or in other agencies, in regard to the youth, indicating the nature and level of coordination 

of program strategies. 

10.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The eight major service/activity categories were: case planning, group-oriented services, 

individual counseling, family counseling, school-related services, job-related services, 

suppression, and material support. These categories were particularized into fifty-five services 

for analytic purposes. As indicated, the types of workers expected to supply services to or have 

contacts with youth were: probation officers, case managers, outreach youth workers, police 

officers, school personnel, and various other Project-related workers and workers from outside 

agencies (e.g., treatment, manpower, and detention-agency workers). 

Program strategies were implicit or explicit in the categories of services and contacts, for 

example: social intervention – individual counseling, group discussion and family counseling 

(including crisis intervention); social opportunities provision – vocational or job-related and 

education-related services; suppression – arrest, probation, parole, confinement, detention, 

monitoring surveillance, etc. Also, the strategy of community mobilization was specified at the 

direct-service or worker-contact level as coordination, i.e., the number and types of socialdevelopment services provided or control-related contacts made by any worker in coordination 

with other workers in relation to a particular youth. Special attention was paid to the types of 

coordination-contacts made by workers with other workers about a particular youth, e.g., youth 

outreach-worker contacts with police and/or probation officers (i.e., communication and 

coordinated suppression). Also, the strategy of organizational change and development was 

indicated by the fact that the program focused on older, more-delinquent youth in the first two 

years of the program and on younger, less-delinquent youth in the last two years of the program. 

Forms Completed. One-thousand, six-hundred and fifty (1650) worker tracking forms 

were completed in Mesa for 234 program youth. These 234 youth included 106 who were 

10.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interviewed in an initial individual gang member survey at program entry (Time I), and 128 who 

were never interviewed during the four-year program period, January 1, 1997 through December 

31, 2000 – an average of 7.1 forms per youth. In addition, there were 3 Time-I-interviewed 

program youth and 21 non-interviewed program youth for whom we did not have workertracking data. These 24 youth were excluded from this worker-tracking analyses but are included 

in other analyses in this report using program-entry and exit data, and police criminal-history and 

individual-gang-member-survey data. 

The number and percent of worker tracking forms completed by the different workers 

were: outreach youth workers, youth intervention workers, and case managers (these roles were 

often interchangeable) = 808 (49.0%); probation officers = 619 (37.5%); school personnel = 6 

(0.47%); police officers = 199 (12.1%); the Neighborhood Development Specialist = 18 (1.1%). 

The completion of worker tracking forms was a regular and continual exercise for all the workers 

during the four-year program period. The number of forms completed increased over time: 1997 

– 16.5%; 1998 – 23.8%, 1999 – 28.4%; 2000 – 31.4%. This pattern was evidence of an 

increasing commitment by the Project workers to the program and the Evaluation research. 

Problems of Worker-Tracking 

The data derived from worker-tracking was expected to be substantial, and representative 

of services and worker contacts provided to program youth. However, the data collected might 

not completely reflect the full scope of services or contacts provided in the Mesa program. 

School and police personnel were somewhat reluctant to complete forms; youth workers and 

probation officers completed forms the most frequently and regularly. Staff turnover sometimes 

10.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
hindered the timely completion of forms. This was especially a problem for outreach youth 

workers, who tended to stay on the job in the program for shorter periods of time than did other 

types of workers, although replacement outreach youth workers were hired fairly quickly. 

We are somewhat concerned about the quality of the data on services and contacts 

supplied by workers. There was some question as to whether certain categories of services were 

clearly understood by the different types of workers, although the aggregation of specific 

service/activity elements into summary categories substantially mitigated the possible 

misinterpretation of specific service-subcategory items. It was also possible that identification of 

the kinds of workers providing services might be more meaningful in explaining program effect 

than the specific categories of services provided. For example, an outreach youth worker is not a 

policeman or probation officer, and a policeman is not a teacher or a drug-treatment counselor, 

although certain services might be provided and certain activities might be commonly performed 

by these different types of workers. 

The number of tracking forms completed by a worker might not indicate the precise 

number of contacts he made or services he supplied, per youth, in the reporting period. However, 

the services data provided a gross estimate of categories or numbers of services provided. A 

worker tracking form was not necessarily completed each time a worker had contact with a 

youth, although this did occur at some of the Project sites. A worker who completed a form for a 

particular youth might note one or two contacts with the youth for a certain period; another 

worker who completed a form for the same youth might note ten contacts with the same youth 

over the same period. Both reports could be accurate. Also, some types of workers (such as 

probation officers) could draw information from computerized records of contacts with program 

10.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth required for their agency purposes. These then were used to provide the relevant 

information for purposes of the worker tracking form. 

Sources of Referral of Youth to the Program 

It is important to observe that the large majority of the interviewed youth (94.3%, n = 

103) – for whom we have both worker-tracking data and police histories – were referred to the 

program during the Project’s first two years. The majority of the non-interviewed youth (80.5%, 

n = 120) – for whom we also have both worker tracking data and police histories – were referred 

to the program during the second two years of the Project. The character of the program may 

have changed somewhat based on the different delinquency characteristics of these two programyouth samples and the services provided to them (Tables 10.1A and 10.1B). 

The total youth referred to the program for whom we have worker-tracking data consisted 

of 197 males (84.2%) and 37 females (15.8%). The largest sources of referral of youth to the 

program were from court services (mainly from juvenile probation): interviewed youth – 88.6%; 

non-interviewed youth – 73.9%. Smaller proportions of youth were referred from the schools: 

interviewed youth – 8.5%; non-interviewed youth – 28.1%. Relatively more females in the 

interviewed-youth sample (76.9%) were referred from the court than those in the noninterviewed youth sample (37.5%). Relatively more females in the non-interviewed youth 

sample (37.5%) than in the interviewed-youth sample (15.4%) were referred from the schools. 

Relatively more Latino youth in the interviewed sample (89.0%) than in the non-interviewed 

sample (58.3%) were referred from the courts. Relatively more Latino youth in the noninterviewed sample (29.6%) than in the interviewed sample (7.7%) were referred from the 

10.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
schools (Tables 10.2A and 10.2B). 

An important factor to consider in appraising the nature and impact of the program was 

that the majority of youth referred through court services (mainly through juvenile probation) 

were, nevertheless, generally less-serious offenders. Youth in the program may not have 

represented the full range of delinquent youth-gang members in Mesa; some unknown number of 

more serious offenders may have been sentenced directly incarceration. The fact that most of the 

youth were probationers, and that some had few or no prior arrests (particularly youth from the 

non-interviewed sample), may have influenced the pattern of services and worker contacts 

provided. Alternative and more substantial grassroots-organization and youth-worker streetbased referrals of gang-involved youth to the program might have contributed to the development 

of a more varied sample of delinquent gang-involved and highly at-risk youth, and possibly a 

more differentiated pattern of services and worker contacts than was actually developed. 

Dosages of Worker Services/Contacts 

Since the sheer scope and intensity (as well as the types) of services and contacts 

provided by workers to program youth may have been important in the determination of program 

outcome for youth, we first describe the amount of services/contacts provided to the different 

categories of youth by different types of workers. The interviewed and the non-interviewed 

program youth were provided with different ranges and intensities of services and contacts. A 

total of 10,933 services, 11,893 individual worker contacts and 3140 coordinated contacts were 

10.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
provided to the two samples of program youth.1

 The Time-I-interviewed youth entered the 

program earlier and stayed longer than the non-interviewed youth. They were provided with 

services and contacts over a longer period of time. The mean amount of time the interviewed 

youth were in the program (27.8 months) was almost three times as long as for the noninterviewed youth (9.4 months). While the interviewed program youth were provided with 

services and contacts over a longer period of time, the dosage of services and contacts on a per 

capita, monthly basis was higher for the non-interviewed youth sample. Services and contacts 

were more intense over a shorter period of time for this non-interviewed sample, which was 

provided with 69.6% more services, 50.0% more direct contacts, and 57.1% more coordinated 

contacts (Table 10.3). 

Types of Services 

There was some variation in the pattern of services provided to the interviewed and noninterviewed program youth, and these variations could be significant in later multivariate 

analyses. They could explain differences in the reduction of levels of arrests as well as ratios of 

success/failure of youth in the different program samples. The non-interviewed youth were 

provided with more social-intervention services (group activities, individual counseling, family 

counseling) – 55.8% of total services, compared to the interviewed youth – 46.0% of total 

services. The interviewed program youth sample, comparing older and more delinquent youth, 

1

 The fact that more contacts than services were listed by the Project workers is an artifact of the way the 

worker-tracking-form questions were constructed. The worker was asked to indicate the types of services provided 

and the number of contacts made with youth in the three-month reporting period. There was no attempt to list the 

numb er of types of services per contact. The result is an undercurrent of specific types of services provided. In 

reality, far more services were provided than contacts made. 

10.11 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
was provided with relatively more social-opportunities services (job assistance, school services) 

– 15.0% of total services, compared to the non-interviewed youth – 10.4% of total services. 

Suppression services (arrest, detention, probation violation, etc.), as a percent of total services, 

were more often directed to the interviewed youth sample (23.7%) than to the non-interviewed 

youth sample (19.9%). 

We calculated that the non-interviewed youth were provided with 19.37 services per 

youth compared to the interviewed youth, who were provided with 16.98 services per youth 

during the program-exposure period. Non-interviewed youth were provided with 14.1% more 

services overall than interviewed youth (Table 10.4). Youth from the non-interviewed sample 

were provided with more group services, individual counseling, family counseling, and 

suppression and other services than were youth from the interviewed sample. The exception was 

school and employment services. 

Different Services for Different Youth 

Although females made up only 18.4% of the total youth in the program for whom we 

have worker-tracking data, they were provided with more total services per youth than males. 

This was particularly the case with the non-interviewed females (n = 14), who were provided 

with 67.6 services per youth compared to the males (n = 104), who received 32.3 services per 

youth. The disparity was not so great for the females (n = 14) in the interviewed sample, who 

were provided with 71.4 services per youth compared to the males (n = 92), who received 61.3 

services per youth. In both program samples, the youngest category of youth (12 to 14-year-olds) 

was provided with the most total services per youth. In the interviewed-youth sample: 12 to 14-

10.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
year-olds = 67.7 services per youth; 15 to 17-year-olds = 59.8 services per youth; and 18 to 23-

year-olds = 61.4 services per youth. The pattern was similar, but the youngest age group was 

provided with relatively more services compared to the two older age groups: 12 to 14-year-olds 

= 43.6 services per youth; 15 to 17-year-olds = 29.1 services per youth; 18 to 23-year-olds = 29.1 

services per youth. Of special concern was that the most delinquent group (15 to 17-year-olds) 

was provided with the lowest proportion of services (and did not do as well in the program as the 

other age groups). 

Youth who were moderately delinquent (i.e., youth with records of less than 1, or 1 to 2 

prior arrests) were provided with more services than youth who had no prior arrests or youth who 

were the most delinquent (i.e., with 2 or more prior arrests). In the interviewed sample, youth 

with less than 1 prior (66.3) and 1 to 2 priors (68.6) were provided with more services-per-youth 

than were youth with no priors (56.7) and 2 or more priors (56.6%). In the non-interviewed 

sample, youth with less than 1 prior (55.6) and 1 to 2 priors (54.5) were provided with more 

services-per-youth than were youth with no priors (27.4) and 2 or more priors (36.1). 

The pattern of provision of total services to gang-members, gang-associates, and nongang youth was different. Gang members in each sample were provided with the most total 

services per youth. For interviewed youth: gang members = 67.7 services; gang associates = 

47.0; and non-gang youth = 57.2 services per youth. For non-interviewed youth: gang members 

= 41.8 services; gang associates = 23.5 services; and non-gang youth = 9.7 services per youth. 

Gang members, compared to gang associates and non-gang youth, were also provided with the 

most suppression services – in the interviewed sample, 24.7% of total services, and in the noninterviewed sample, 23.2% of total services. In both samples, gang members were provided a 

10.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
smaller percentage of opportunity services (job and school) than were non-gang youth. In the 

interviewed sample: gang members = 14.7%; non-gang youth = 18.8%; in the non-interviewed 

sample: gang members = 10.1%; non-gang youth = 22.7%. (For a breakdown of services by 

worker type, see Tables 10.5A and 10.5B). 

Types of Contacts 

The pattern of the distribution of Project-worker contacts made with program youth was 

somewhat different from the pattern of the distribution of services provided to program youth. 

Probation officers played a dominant youth-contact role, particularly with the interviewed youth. 

Almost two-thirds (64.4%) of all worker contacts (n = 11,893) were with the interviewed 

program youth. Approximately one-half of all probation-worker contacts (49.6%) were with the 

interviewed youth, and this was more than the 44.0% of probation contacts with the noninterviewed youth. On the other hand, there were relatively more direct police contacts with noninterviewed youth (7.5%) than with interviewed youth (4.6%). Relatively more contacts by 

social-development personnel, case managers and outreach youth workers, were with the noninterviewed youth (47.4%) than with the interviewed youth (37.9%). There were more contacts 

by the Neighborhood Development Specialist (who dealt more with neighborhood organizations 

and development issues than with program-youth issues) that involved interviewed youth (8.0%), 

than non-interviewed youth (1.2%). (For a breakdown of contacts by worker type, see Tables 

10.6A and 10.6B.) 

When we assessed the number of direct worker contacts with youth on a monthly basis, 

the contrast in the relative proportions of contacts by the different types of workers is sharper in 

10.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the interviewed sample than in the non-interviewed sample. Probation officers played a 

relatively more important contact role with the interviewed youth, and outreach youth workers, 

especially case managers, played a less-important role. Outreach youth workers and case 

managers played a relatively more important role in contacting the non-interviewed youth. 

Relatively more social-development services and contacts were provided in the last two years of 

the program than in the first two years. This might have been due to the different nature of youth 

referred to the program in these two periods. It might have also been associated with a shift in 

Project strategy to working with more at-risk and less-seriously-delinquent youth, whether they 

were gang-involved or not. 

The same types of Project workers contacted and provided services to both interviewed 

and non-interviewed program youth. Different types of workers were often in communication 

with each other, but there was a greater tendency for suppression-oriented workers to coordinate 

or communicate with other suppression workers, than for suppression and non-suppressionoriented workers to communicate with each other. There were relatively more suppression-type 

workers than non-suppression-type workers contacting and servicing youth in the interviewed 

program sample than in the non-interviewed program sample (Tables 10.7 and 10.8). 

Different Worker Contacts with Different Youth 

There were somewhat similar proportions of contacts by workers with male and female 

youth in the two program samples. During the program period there were 72.3 contacts per male 

and 71.4 contacts per female in the interviewed program sample, and 32.2 contacts per male and 

37.3 contacts per female in the non-interviewed program sample. In the interviewed sample, the 

10.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
highest proportion of contacts was with the 18 to 23-year-olds; in the non-interviewed sample, 

the highest proportion of contacts was with the 12 to 14-year-olds. 

Again, we observe that Project workers had the most contact with the less-delinquent 

youth (rather than with the least- or most-delinquent youth) in both program samples. In the 

interviewed-youth sample, Project workers had slightly more contacts – 62.4 contacts per youth – 

with non-delinquent youth (i.e., those with no prior arrests) than with the most-delinquent youth 

(i.e., those with two or more prior arrests) – 60.4 contacts per youth. The pattern of contacts was 

better for non-delinquent youth in the non-interviewed sample (26.1 contacts per youth) 

compared to the most-delinquent youth (39.8 contacts per youth). For both samples, youth with 

less than 1 and 1-2 prior arrests were provided with considerably more contacts. 

In general, more worker contacts were provided to gang members than to gang associates 

or non-gang youth in both program samples, i.e., about half of all probation contacts were 

provided to gang members. We are surprised, however, that in respect to the Time-I-interviewed 

youth sample, the relative proportion of police contacts with non-gang youth (4.0%) was almost 

as high as with gang members (4.7%), and that the proportion of probation contacts with nongang youth (50.1%) was about as high as with gang members (51.7%). This would appear to 

suggest a misdirection of Project-worker suppression contacts. The percentage of police contacts 

with non-gang youth seemed to have been more appropriate in the non-interviewed youth sample 

– there were none (Tables 10.6A and 10.6B). 

Coordinated Contacts 

An indicator of the Model strategy of community mobilization at the program level was 

10.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the scope and nature of coordination among the Project workers. A key purpose of the Project 

was to interrelate services for youth, based on the nature of the youth’s problems, with different 

types of Project workers, i.e., provide a set of interrelated control and social-support or socialdevelopment functions depending on the kind of gang problem the youth represented to himself 

and to the community. 

Data from the worker tracking form permitted us to compute the number of contacts each 

type of worker had with the other types of workers, both in the Project and outside the Project. 

Furthermore, we were able to assess the scope and nature of coordinated contacts provided to 

youth as the program shifted its focus from relatively older and more seriously delinquent youth 

in the first two years of the program to younger and less-delinquent youth in the last two years of 

the program. 

In general, there was a high level of coordination (i.e., sharing of information, joint 

planning of services, and joint or complementary action) by Project workers with each other and 

with other workers both in the same agencies and in other agencies. Probation officers, case 

managers, and outreach youth workers were the most active initiators of coordinated contacts 

(Table 10.7 and 10.8). 

Generally, school personnel, the Neighborhood Development Specialists and staff both 

within the same Project-related agencies or from non-Project-related agencies did not often 

complete worker tracking forms, but were in many cases recipients of contacts from Project 

workers. 

What is most significant, and consistent with other services findings of this report, is that 

probation officers initiated relatively more coordinated contacts (41.9%) around interviewed 

10.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program youth in the first two years of the program, but fewer (31.5%) in the last two years of 

the program. On the other hand, case managers (35.5%) and outreach youth workers (7.4%) 

initiated fewer coordinated contacts in the first two years of the program, but relatively more 

coordinated contacts (case managers = 45.5% and outreach youth workers = 11.0%) in the last 

two years of the program. 

A relatively higher level of suppression coordinated contacts was initiated in the first two 

years of the program, and a relatively higher level of non-suppression or social-development 

coordinated contacts was initiated in the last two years of the program. However, the nature of 

suppression and non-suppression (or social-development) coordination was necessarily 

interrelated, since probation officers in particular were often the initiators of both types of these 

functions. 

Probation officers probably provided the greater range of services to program youth, 

followed by case managers. The smallest range of types and amounts of services was provided 

by outreach youth workers, police and the Neighborhood Development Specialist. The patterned 

roles of the different types of workers did not change much over the course of the program, 

whether for interviewed or non-interviewed youth (Table 10.9). 

Under ideal Model conditions, the roles of the different types of workers should have 

been modified over time: with suppression workers providing relatively fewer suppression and 

more social-development services, and social-development workers providing relatively fewer 

social-development services and more suppression or social-control services, consistent with the 

notion of community rather than highly specialized, bureaucratic function. 

10.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Summary 

The description of the services and worker contacts provided to Mesa program youth is 

based on data derived from 1650 worker tracking forms (the 12-page report completed by Project 

outreach youth workers, case managers, probation and police officers, school personnel and 

others), documenting contacts with and provision of services to 234 program youth during the 

program period January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000. The forms were completed every 

three months for each youth, for an average of 7.1 forms per youth. Project staff were committed 

to the completion of the forms on a regular basis. 

A total of 10,933 services, 11,893 direct worker contacts and 3140 coordinated worker 

contacts were provided to all program youth – interviewed and non-interviewed. The largest 

source of referral of youth (197 males and 37 females) was the courts: Time-I-interviewed youth 

= 88.6%; non-interviewed youth = 73.9%. The next largest source of referrals was the schools: 

Time-I-interviewed youth = 8.5%; non-interviewed youth = 19.2%. The Time-I-interviewed 

youth (more delinquent and older) entered the program mainly during its first two years; the noninterviewed youth mainly during the second two years. 

The Time-I-interviewed youth were in the program on average three times longer than the 

non-interviewed youth; however, non-interviewed youth were provided with 69.6% more total 

services, 50.0% more direct contacts and 57.1% more coordinated contacts. Non-interviewed 

youth were provided with relatively more social-intervention services (group activities, 

individual counseling, and family counseling) – 55.8% of total services – than the interviewed 

youth – 46.0% of total services. On the other hand, suppression services (arrest, detention, 

probation violation, etc.) as a percent of total services were more often provided to the 

10.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interviewed youth – 23.7% – than to the non-interviewed youth – 19.9%. 

Females made up only 18.4% of total youth, and were provided with more total servicesper-youth than were males, although the disparity was not so great in the interviewed sample. In 

both samples, the youngest category of youth, the 12 to 14-year-olds, was provided with the most 

services. Youth who were moderately delinquent (i.e., youth with records of less than one, or 1-2 

prior arrests) were provided with more services than youth who had no prior arrests or youth who 

were the most delinquent (i.e., with 2 or more prior arrests). 

In the interviewed sample, gang members were provided with more services than were 

gang associates or non-gang youth, and non-gang youth were provided with more services than 

gang associates. In the non-interviewed sample, gang members were provided with more 

services than were gang associates, who in turn were provided with more services than non-gang 

youth. 

The pattern of the distribution of worker contacts was somewhat different from the 

pattern of the distribution of services. Almost two/thirds of all worker contacts with all youth 

were provided by probation officers. Probation officers played a relatively greater role than 

outreach youth workers and case managers in contacting interviewed youth. The overall balance 

of contacts by probation officers and outreach youth workers/case managers with noninterviewed youth was relatively more equivalent. 

We were surprised to find, in respect to the interviewed youth sample, that the relative 

proportion of police contacts with non-gang youth (4.0%) was almost as high as for gang 

members (4.7%), and that the proportion of probation-officer contacts with non-gang youth 

(50.1%) was about as high as for gang members (51.7%). This would appear to suggest a 

10.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
misdirection of Project-worker suppression contacts. The distribution of police and probation 

contacts with non-gang youth, gang associates, and gang members was more appropriate for the 

non-interviewed program sample. The program seemed to be more appropriately developed in 

terms of services and contacts for the non-interviewed than for the interviewed program youth. 

This could have been because of the different nature of youth in the program between the first 

two years and second two years of program operation, which was due to targeting different youth, 

and probably to better program development. 

Despite the high level of coordination of suppression and social-development workers in 

the Project, and the greater role that social-development workers played with the non-interviewed 

youth in the last two years of the program, the activities and functions of the probation officers, 

case managers, and outreach youth workers in respect to provision of their traditional services 

did not change. 

10.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.1A 

Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

By Year and 6-Month Period 

Year and 6-Month Period 

Source of Referral 

percent and (n) 

1997 1998 1999 2000 To tal % 

(N) 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 

Court Services1 100.0 

(31) 

71.4 

(15) 

93.3 

(28) 

88.9 

(16) 

60.0 

(3) 0 100.0 (1) 0 88.6 

(94) 

School 0 28.6 

(6) 

6.7 

(2) 0 20.0 (1) 0 0 0 8.5 

(9) 

Parent/ 

Family Member 0 0 0 5.6 (1) 0 0 0 0 0.9 

(1) 

Police 0 0 0 5.6 

(1) 

20.0 

(1) 0 0 0 1.9 

(2) 

Self 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Project 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Friend 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Don’t Know/ 

Past Participant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Total2 100.0 

(31) 

100.0 

(21) 

100.0 

(30) 

100.1 

(18) 

100.0 

(5) 0 100.0 (1) 0 99.9 

(106) 

1

 Juvenile and adult probation and parole. 

2

 Percentages do no t sum to 100 .0 due to ro unding erro rs. 

10.22 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.1B 

Non-Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

By Year and 6-Month Period 

Source of Referral 

Year and 6-Month Period 

percent and (n) 

1997 1998 1999 2000 Total % 

(N) 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 1/1 to 6/30 7/1 to 12/31 

Court Services1 50.0 

(1) 

20.0 

(1) 

66.7 

(6) 

77.8 

(7) 

92.3 

(12) 

63.9 

(23) 

65.5 

(19) 

40.0 

(10) 

62.3 

(79) 

School 50.0 

(1) 

80.0 

(4) 

33.3 

(3) 

11.1 

(1) 0 27.8 (10) 

31.0 

(9) 

32.0 

(8) 

27.7 

(36) 

Parent/ 

Family Member 0 0 0 11.1 (1) 0 8.3 (3) 0 4.0 (1) 

3.8 

(5) 

Police 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Self 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.0 

(2) 

1.5 

(2) 

Project 0 0 0 0 7.7 

(1) 0 3.4 (1) 0 1.5 (2) 

Friend 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.0 

(1) 

0.8 

(1) 

Don’t Know/ 

Past Participant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.0 (3) 

2.3 

(3) 

Total2 100.0 

(2) 

100.0 

(5) 

100.0 

(9) 

100.0 

(9) 

100.0 

(13) 

100.0 

(36) 

99.9 

(29) 

100.0 

(25) 

99.9 

(128) 

1

 Juvenile and adult probation and parole. 

2

 Percentages do not sum to 100.0 due to rounding errors. 

10.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.2A 

Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

By Selected Demographic Characteristics 

Source of Referral 

Selected Demographic 

Characteristics 

percent and (N) 

Court 

Services School Parent/ Family Member Police Self Project Friend Don’t Know/Past Participant Total 

Male 90.3 

(84) 

7.5 

(7) 0 2.2 (2) 0 0 0 0 100.0 (93) 

Female 76.9 

(10) 

15.4 

(2) 

7.7 

(1) 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (13) 

Latino1 89.0 

(81) 

7.7 

(7) 

1.1 

(1) 

2.2 

(2) 0 0 0 0 100.0 (91) 

African-American 100.0 

(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (4) 

Non-Latino White 85.7 

(6) 

14.3 

(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (7) 

American Indian 100.0 

(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (2) 

Asian/Pacific Islander 50.0 

(1) 

50.0 

(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (2) 

12 to 14 years old2 67.7 

(21) 

25.8 

(8) 

3.2 

(1) 

3.2 

(1) 0 0 0 0 99.9 (31) 

15 to 17 years old 97.6 

(40) 

2.4 

(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (41) 

18 to 23 years old 97.1 

(33) 0 2.9 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (34) 

Total3 88.6 

(94) 

8.5 

(9) 

0.9 

(1) 

1.9 

(2) 0 0 0 0 99.9 (106) 

1

 Prim arily youth of M exican ance stry. 

2

 Yo uth’s age at time o f prog ram e ntry. 

3

 Percentages do no t sum to 100 .0 due to ro unding erro rs. 

10.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.2B 

Non-Interviewed Youth: Source of Referral to the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

By Selected Demographic Characteristics 

Source of Referral 

Selected Demographic 

Characteristics 

percent and (n) 

Court Services School Parent/Family Member Police Self Project Friend Don’t Know/ 

Past Participant Total 

Male 67.3 

(70) 

26.0 

(27) 0 0 1.9 (2) 

0.9 

(1) 

0.9 

(1) 

2.9 

(3) 

99.9 

(104) 

Female 37.5 

(9) 

37.5 

(9) 

20.8 

(5) 0 0 4.2 (1) 0 0 100.0 (24) 

Latino1 58.3 

(63) 

29.6 

(32) 

4.6 

(5) 0 1.9 (2) 

1.9 

(2) 

0.9 

(1) 

2.8 

(3) 

100.0 

(108) 

African-American 100.0 

(5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (5) 

Non-Latino White 66.7 

(6) 

33.3 

(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (9) 

American Indian 100.0 

(5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (5) 

Asian/ Pacific Islander 100.0 

(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (1) 

12 to 14 years old2 43.5 

(20) 

50.0 

(23) 

6.5 

(3) 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 (46) 

15 to 17 years old 70.0 

(42) 

16.7 

(10) 

3.3 

(2) 0 1.7 (1) 

3.3 

(2) 

1.7 

(1) 

3.3 

(2) 

100.0 

(60) 

18 to 23 years old 94.4 

(17) 0 0 0 5.6 (1) 0 0 0 100.0 (18 

Total3 61.7 

(79) 

28.1 

(36) 

3.9 

(5) 0 1.6 (2) 

1.6 

(2) 

0.8 

(1) 

2.3 

(3) 

100.0 

(128) 

1

 Prim arily youth of M exican ance stry. 

2

 Yo uth’s age at time o f prog ram e ntry. 

3

 Percentages do no t sum to 100 .0 due to ro unding erro rs. 

10.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.3 

Dosages of Services and Contacts 

Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Program Youth 

Program 

Youth 

Months in Program Total 

Services1 

Services 

per Youth 

per Month 

Total 

Direct 

Contacts2 

Direct 

Contacts 

per Youth 

per Month 

Total 

Coordinated 

Contacts3 

Coordinated 

Contacts 

per Youth 

per Month 

Sample Mean Median 

Interviewed 

(N = 106)4 

27.8 27.4 6643 2.3 7648 2.6 1948 0.7 

NonInterviewed 

(N = 128)5 

9.38 8.53 4290 3.9 4245 3.9 1192 1.1 

1

 Includes 55 different types of services provided to program youth. 

2

 By individual Project worker with particular program youth at particular times. 

3

 By workers in coordination with other workers servicing/contacting particular program youth. 

4

 Three of the 109 Time-I-interviewed youth had no worker-tracking records. 

5

 Eighteen of the 128 non-interviewed youth were in the program for less than one month. 

10.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.4 

Interviewed and Non-Interviewed Youth 

Types of Services1 

Program 

Sample 

Type of Service Total 

Case 

Planning 

Material 

Support 

Group 

Services 

Individual 

Counseling 

Family 

Counseling 

Job 

Assistance 

School 

Services 

Suppression Total 

Services 

Services Per 

Youth 

Time-I- 10.7 4.7 27.8 14.8 3.4 4.8 10.2 23.7 6643 16.98 

interviewed 

Youth 

(N = 106) 

Non- 7.5 6.4 33.9 16.6 5.3 2.0 8.4 19.9 4301 19.37 

Interviewed 

Youth 

(N = 128) 

 Based on total counts of services provided during the four-year program period. 

10.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Table 10.5A 

Types of Services1 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests 

Level of Prior Arrests caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services # of Youth Srvs per 

Youth 

No Priors 145 105 456 232 61 48 130 240 1417 25 56.68 

Less than 1 Prior 230 107 643 363 117 132 246 483 2321 35 66.31 

1 to <2 Priors 199 59 451 225 24 88 198 472 1716 25 68.64 

2 or More Priors 134 39 295 162 27 48 104 380 1189 21 56.62 

Totals 708 310 1845 982 229 316 678 1575 6643 106 62.67 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests 

Level of Prior Arrests caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services 

No Priors 10.2% 7.4% 32.2% 16.4% 4.3% 3.4% 9.2% 16.9% 100.0% 

Less than 1 Prior 9.9% 4.6% 27.7% 15.6% 5.0% 5.7% 10.6% 20.8% 100.0% 

1 to <2 Priors 11.6% 3.4% 26.3% 13.1% 1.4% 5.1% 11.5% 27.5% 100.0% 

2 or More Priors 11.3% 3.3% 24.8% 13.6% 2.3% 4.0% 8.7% 32.0% 100.0% 

Totals 10.7% 4.7% 27.8% 14.8% 3.4% 4.8% 10.2% 23.7% 100.0% 

 Based on total counts of services provided during the four-year program period. 

10.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Table 10.5A-continued 

Types of Services 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status 

Gang Membership Status caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services # of Youth Srvs per 

Youth 

Non-gang Youth 139 30 327 152 45 92 134 283 1202 21 57.24 

Gang Associate 69 41 244 124 28 13 62 124 705 15 47.00 

Gang Member 500 239 1274 706 156 211 482 1168 4736 70 67.66 

Totals 708 310 1845 982 229 316 678 1575 6643 106 62.67 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status 

Gang Membership Status caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun 

Non-gang Youth 11.6% 2.5% 27.2% 12.6% 

Gang Associate 9.8% 5.8% 34.6% 17.6% 

Gang Member 10.6% 5.0% 26.9% 14.9% 

familycoun job school supres Total Services 

3.7% 7.7% 11.1% 23.5% 100.0% 

4.0% 1.8% 8.8% 17.6% 100.0% 

3.3% 4.5% 10.2% 24.7% 100.0% 

Totals 10.7% 4.7% 27.8% 14.8% 3.4% 4.8% 10.2% 23.7% 100.0% 

10.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5A-continued 

Types of Services 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Gender 

Gender 

Male 

Female 

caseplan 

629 

79 

matsupp1 

211 

99 

group 

1532 

313 

indcoun 

779 

203 

familycoun 

177 

52 

job 

289 

27 

school 

579 

99 

supres 

1447 

128 

Total Services 

5643 

1000 

# of Youth 

92 

14 

Srvs per Youth 

61.34 

71.43 

Totals 708 310 1845 982 229 316 678 6643 106 62.67 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Gender 

Gender 

Male 

Female 

caseplan 

11.1% 

7.9% 

matsupp1 

3.7% 

9.9% 

group 

27.1% 

31.3% 

indcoun 

13.8% 

20.3% 

familycoun 

3.1% 

5.2% 

job 

5.1% 

2.7% 

school 

10.3% 

9.9% 

supres 

25.6% 

12.8% 

Total Services 

100.0% 

100.0% 

Totals 10.7% 4.7% 27.8% 14.8% 3.4% 4.8% 10.2% 23.7% 100.0% 

10.30


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5A-continued 

Types of Services 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry 

Age Group caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services # of Youth Srvs per Youth 

12 to 14 years old 189 128 645 431 126 54 213 381 2167 32 67.72 

15 to 17 years old 227 127 634 361 58 151 285 547 2390 40 59.75 

18 to 23 years old 292 55 566 190 45 111 180 647 2086 34 61.35 

Totals 708 310 1845 982 229 316 678 1575 6643 106 62.67 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry 

Age Group caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services 

12 to 14 years old 8.7% 5.9% 29.8% 19.9% 5.8% 2.5% 9.8% 17.6% 100.0% 

15 to 17 years old 9.5% 5.3% 26.5% 15.1% 2.4% 6.3% 11.9% 22.9% 100.0% 

18 to 23 years old 14.0% 2.6% 27.1% 9.1% 2.2% 5.3% 8.6% 31.0% 100.0% 

Totals 10.7% 4.7% 27.8% 14.8% 3.4% 4.8% 10.2% 23.7% 100.0% 

10.31


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5A-continued 

Types of Services 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity 

Race/Ethnicity 

Latino 

Non-Latino 

caseplan 

608 

100 

matsupp1 

281 

29 

group 

1598 

247 

indcoun 

862 

120 

familycoun 

208 

21 

job 

262 

54 

school 

581 

97 

supres 

1379 

196 

Total Services 

5779 

864 

# of Youth 

91 

15 

Srvs per Youth 

63.5 

57.6 

Totals 708 310 1845 982 229 316 678 1575 6643 106 62.7 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity 

Race/Ethnicity 

Latino 

Non-Latino 

caseplan 

10.5% 

11.6% 

matsupp1 

4.9% 

3.4% 

group 

27.7% 

28.6% 

indcoun 

14.9% 

13.9% 

familycoun 

3.6% 

2.4% 

job 

4.5% 

6.3% 

school 

10.1% 

11.2% 

supres 

23.9% 

22.7% 

Total Services 

100.0% 

100.0% 

Totals 10.7% 4.7% 27.8% 14.8% 3.4% 4.8% 10.2% 23.7% 100.0% 

10.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5B 

Types of Services1 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)#

Level of Prior Arrests 

No Priors 

caseplan 

119 

matsupp1 

158 

group indcoun familycoun 

756 401 161 

job 

42 

school 

197 

supres 

303 

Total Services 

2137 

# of Youth 

78 

Srvs per Youth 

27.40 

Less than 1 Prior 67 40 253 113 25 9 61 155 723 13 55.62 

1 to <2 Priors 68 42 236 108 23 16 55 161 709 13 54.54 

2 or More Priors 69 36 209 92 19 19 46 231 721 20 36.05 

Totals 323 276 1454 714 228 86 359 850 4290 124 34.60 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)#

Level of Prior Arrests caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total 

Services 

No Priors 5.6% 7.4% 35.4% 18.8% 7.5% 2.0% 9.2% 14.2% 100.0% 

Less than 1 Prior 9.3% 5.5% 35.0% 15.6% 3.5% 1.2% 8.4% 21.4% 100.0% 

1 to <2 Priors 9.6% 5.9% 33.3% 15.2% 3.2% 2.3% 7.8% 22.7% 100.0% 

2 or More Priors 9.6% 5.0% 29.0% 12.8% 2.6% 2.6% 6.4% 32.0% 100.0% 

Totals 7.5% 6.4% 33.9% 16.6% 5.3% 2.0% 8.4% 19.8% 100.0% 

# Four participants were excluded because they were in the program for less than one month. 

1

 Based on the total counts of services provided during the four-year program period. 

10.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5B-continued 

Types of Services 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)"

Gang Membership Status caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services # of Youth Srvs per Youth 

Non-gang Youth 11 9 28 20 7 9 13 0 97 10 9.70 

Gang Associate 19 57 279 128 77 7 54 38 659 28 23.54 

Gang Member 292 206 1139 565 144 65 287 813 3511 84 41.80 

Totals 322 272 1446 713 228 81 354 851 4267 122 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)"

Gang Membership Status caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services 

Non-gang Youth 11.3% 9.3% 28.9% 20.6% 7.2% 9.3% 13.4% 0.0% 100.0% 

Gang Associate 2.9% 8.6% 42.3% 19.4% 11.7% 1.1% 8.2% 5.8% 100.0% 

Gang Member 8.3% 5.9% 32.4% 16.1% 4.1% 1.9% 8.2% 23.2% 100.0% 

Totals 7.5% 6.4% 33.9% 16.7% 5.3% 1.9% 8.3% 19.9% 100.0% 

" Six youth had no worker-reported gang membership status. 

10.34


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

34.98 
Table 10.5B-continued 

Types of Services 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Gender (N = 128) 

Gender 

Male 

Female 

caseplan 

282 

41 

matsupp1 

196 

81 

group 

1081 

375 

indcoun 

548 

167 

familycoun 

160 

68 

job 

76 

10 

school 

277 

83 

supres 

735 

121 

Total Services 

3355 

946 

# of Youth 

104 

14 

Srvc per Youth 

32.26 

67.57 

Totals 323 277 1456 715 228 86 360 856 4301 118 36.45 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Gender (N = 128) 

Gender 

Male 

Female 

caseplan 

8.4% 

4.3% 

matsupp1 

5.8% 

8.6% 

group 

32.2% 

39.6% 

indcoun 

16.3% 

17.7% 

familycoun 

4.8% 

7.2% 

job 

2.3% 

1.1% 

school 

8.3% 

8.8% 

supres 

21.9% 

12.8% 

Total Services 

100.0% 

100.0% 

Totals 7.5% 6.4% 33.9% 16.6% 5.3% 2.0% 8.4% 19.9% 100.0% 

10.35


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5B-continued 

Types of Services 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry (N = 124)h

Age Group at Entry caseplan matsupp1 group 

12 to 14 years old 92 144 756 

15 to 17 years old 144 116 546 

18 to 23 years old 87 10 145 

indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services # of Youth Srvc per Youth 

410 166 8 164 266 2006 46 43.61 

255 60 56 169 399 1745 60 29.08 

47 0 20 24 191 524 18 29.11 

Totals 323 270 1447 712 226 84 357 856 4275 124 34.48 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Age Group at Program Entry (N = 124)h

Age Group at Entry caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun 

12 to 14 years old 4.6% 7.2% 37.7% 20.4% 

15 to 17 years old 8.3% 6.6% 31.3% 14.6% 

18 to 23 years old 16.6% 1.9% 27.7% 9.0% 

familycoun job school supres Total Services 

8.3% 0.4% 8.2% 13.3% 100.0% 

3.4% 3.2% 9.7% 22.9% 100.0% 

0.0% 3.8% 4.6% 36.5% 100.0% 

Totals 7.6% 6.3% 33.8% 16.7% 5.3% 2.0% 8.4% 20.0% 100.0% 

h Date of birth missing for four youth; age at program entry cannot be calculated. 

10.36


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.5B-continued 

Types of Services 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity (N=128) 

Race/Ethnicity 

Latino 

Non-Latino 

caseplan 

249 

74 

matsupp1 

226 

51 

group 

1212 

244 

indcoun 

599 

116 

familycoun 

195 

33 

job 

71 

15 

school 

312 

48 

supres 

697 

159 

Total Services 

3561 

740 

# of Youth 

108 

20 

Srvs per Youth 

33.0 

37.0 

Totals 323 277 1456 715 228 86 360 856 4301 128 33.6 

Percentage of Services by Type of Service and Race/Ethnicity (N=128) 

Race/Ethnicity 

Latino 

Non-Latino 

caseplan 

7.0% 

10.0% 

matsupp1 

6.3% 

6.9% 

group 

34.0% 

33.0% 

indcoun 

16.8% 

15.7% 

familycoun 

5.5% 

4.5% 

job 

2.0% 

2.0% 

school 

8.8% 

6.5% 

supres 

19.6% 

21.5% 

Total Services 

100.0% 

100.0% 

Totals 7.5% 6.4% 33.9% 16.6% 5.3% 2.0% 8.4% 19.9% 100.0% 

10.37


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.6A 

Types of Direct Contacts1 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of D irect Contacts by Type of W orker and Level of Prior Arrests 

Level of Priors Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

No Priors 161 606 101 41 652 1561 25 62.4 

Less than 1 Prior 309 947 265 120 1119 2760 35 78.9 

1 to <2 Priors 253 374 116 94 1222 2059 25 82.4 

2 or More Priors 18 226 128 93 803 1268 21 60.4 

Totals 741 2153 610 348 3796 7648 106 72.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Level of Prior Arrests 

Level of Priors Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

No Priors 10.3% 38.8% 6.5% 2.6% 41.8% 100.0% 

Less than 1 Prior 11.2% 34.3% 9.6% 4.3% 40.5% 100.0% 

1 to <2 Priors 12.3% 18.2% 5.6% 4.6% 59.3% 100.0% 

2 or More Priors 1.4% 17.8% 10.1% 7.3% 63.3% 100.0% 

Totals 9.7% 28.2% 8.0% 4.6% 49.6% 100.0% 

 Based on total counts of contacts made during the four-year program period. 

10.38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Table 10.6A-continued 

Types of Direct Contacts 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status 

Gang Membership Status Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

Non-gang Youth 48 442 182 59 735 1466 21 69.8 

Gang Associate 169 343 19 39 335 905 15 60.3 

Gang Member 524 1368 409 250 2726 5277 70 75.4 

Totals 741 2153 610 348 3796 7648 106 72.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of W orker and Self-Reported Gang Membership Status 

Gang Membership Status Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

Non-gang Youth 3.3% 30.2% 12.4% 4.0% 50.1% 100.0% 

Gang Associate 18.7% 37.9% 2.1% 4.3% 37.0% 100.0% 

Gang Member 9.9% 25.9% 7.8% 4.7% 51.7% 100.0% 

Totals 9.7% 28.2% 8.0% 4.6% 49.6% 100.0% 

10.39


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.6A-continued 

Types of Direct Contacts 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender 

Gender Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

Male 621 1659 576 294 3499 6649 92 72.3 

Female 120 494 34 54 297 999 14 71.4 

Totals 741 2153 610 348 3796 7648 106 72.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender 

Gender Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

Male 9.3% 25.0% 8.7% 4.4% 52.6% 100.0% 

Female 12.0% 49.4% 3.4% 5.4% 29.7% 100.0% 

Totals 9.7% 28.2% 8.0% 4.6% 49.6% 100.0% 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry 

Age Group Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

12 to 14 years old 214 1077 113 130 803 2337 32 73.0 

15 to 17 years old 396 625 154 87 1214 2476 40 61.9 

18 to 23 years old 131 451 343 131 1779 2835 34 83.4 

Totals 741 2153 610 348 3796 7648 106 72.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry 

Age Group Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

12 to 14 years old 9.2% 46.1% 4.8% 5.6% 34.4% 100.0% 

15 to 17 years old 16.0% 25.2% 6.2% 3.5% 49.0% 100.0% 

18 to 23 years old 4.6% 15.9% 12.1% 4.6% 62.8% 100.0% 

Totals 9.7% 28.2% 8.0% 4.6% 49.6% 100.0% 

10.40


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.6A-continued 

Types of Direct Contacts 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity 

Race/Ethnicity Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

Latino 663 1812 533 315 3245 6568 91 72.2 

Non-Latino 78 341 77 33 551 1080 15 72.0 

Totals 741 2153 610 348 3796 7648 106 72.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity 

Race/Ethnicity Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

Latino 10.1% 27.6% 8.1% 4.8% 49.4% 100.0% 

Non-Latino 7.2% 31.6% 7.1% 3.1% 51.0% 100.0% 

Totals 9.7% 28.2% 8.0% 4.6% 49.6% 100.0% 

10.41


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.6B 

Types of Direct Contacts1 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)#

Level of Priors Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

No Priors 91 1046 32 154 710 2033 78 26.1 

Less than 1 Prior 190 158 0 43 291 682 13 52.5 

1 to <2 Priors 120 156 8 79 372 735 13 56.5 

2 or More Priors 175 73 12 42 493 795 20 39.8 

Totals 576 1433 52 318 1866 4245 124 34.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Level of Prior Arrests (N=124)#

Level of Priors Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

No Priors 4.5% 51.5% 1.6% 7.6% 34.9% 100.0% 

Less than 1 Prior 27.9% 23.2% 0.0% 6.3% 42.7% 100.0% 

1 to <2 Priors 16.3% 21.2% 1.1% 10.7% 50.6% 100.0% 

2 or More Priors 22.0% 9.2% 1.5% 5.3% 62.0% 100.0% 

Totals 13.6% 33.8% 1.2% 7.5% 44.0% 100.0% 

# Four participants were excluded because they were in the program for more than one month. 

 Based on total counts of contacts made during the four-year program period. 

10.42 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Table 10.6 B-continued 

Types of Direct Contacts 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)"

Gang Membership Status Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

Non-gang Youth 0 81 0 0 0 81 10 8.1 

Gang Associate 2 499 24 7 85 617 28 22.0 

Gang Member 574 824 28 313 1775 3514 84 41.8 

Totals 576 1404 52 320 1860 4212 122 

*Six youth had no worker-reported gang status. 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Worker-Reported Gang Membership Status (N=122)"

Gang Membership Status Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

Non-gang Youth 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 

Gang Associate 0.3% 80.9% 3.9% 1.1% 13.8% 100.0% 

Gang Member 16.3% 23.4% 0.8% 8.9% 50.5% 100.0% 

Totals 13.7% 33.3% 1.2% 7.6% 44.2% 100.0% 

" Six youth had no worker-reported gang membership status. 

10.43


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

34.5 
Table 10.6B continued 

Types of Direct Contacts 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender (N=128) 

Gender 

Male 

Female 

Outreach 

541 

35 

Case Manager 

938 

496 

Neigh Dev 

40 

12 

Police 

290 

31 

Probation 

1544 

322 

Total Contacts 

3353 

896 

# of Youth 

104 

24 

Contacts per Youth 

32.2 

37.3 

Totals 576 1434 52 321 1866 4249 128 33.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Gender (N=128) 

Gender 

Male 

Female 

Outreach 

16.1% 

3.9% 

Case Manager 

28.0% 

55.4% 

Neigh Dev 

1.2% 

1.3% 

Police 

8.6% 

3.5% 

Probation 

46.0% 

35.9% 

Total Contacts 

100.0% 

100.0% 

Totals 13.6% 33.7% 1.2% 7.6% 43.9% 100.0% 

10.44


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.6B-continued 

Types of Direct Contacts 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry (N=124)h

Age Group Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

12 to 14 years old 234 897 20 141 819 2111 46 45.9 

15 to 17 years old 259 477 32 152 755 1675 60 27.9 

18 to 23 years old 83 38 0 28 292 441 18 24.5 

Totals 576 1412 52 321 1866 4227 124 34.1 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Age Group at Program Entry (N=124)h

Age Group Outreach Case Manager 

12 to 14 years old 11.1% 42.5% 

15 to 17 years old 15.5% 28.5% 

18 to 23 years old 18.8% 8.6% 

Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

0.9% 6.7% 38.8% 100.0% 

1.9% 9.1% 45.1% 100.0% 

0.0% 6.3% 66.2% 100.0% 

Totals 13.6% 33.4% 1.2% 7.6% 44.1% 100.0% 

h Date of birth is missing for four youth; age at program entry cannot be calculated. 

10.45


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.6B continued 

Types of Direct Contacts 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (Varying Ns) 

Number of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity (N=128) 

Race/Ethnicity Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts # of Youth Contacts per Youth 

Latino 449 1240 40 285 1454 3468 108 32.1 

Non-Latino 127 194 12 36 412 781 20 39.1 

Totals 576 1434 52 321 1866 4249 128 33.2 

Percentage of Direct Contacts by Type of Worker and Race/Ethnicity (N=128) 

Race/Ethnicity Outreach Case Manager Neigh Dev Police Probation Total Contacts 

Latino 12.9% 35.8% 1.2% 8.2% 41.9% 100.0% 

Non-Latino 16.3% 24.8% 1.5% 4.6% 52.8% 100.0% 

Totals 13.6% 33.7% 1.2% 7.6% 43.9% 100.0% 

10.46


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.7 

Coordinated Contacts: Interviewed Program Youth 

By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted

Type of Worker Contacted 

percent and (n) 

Type of Worker 

Initiating Contact 

Police Probation/ 

Parole School 

Project 

Case Manager/ 

Youth Worker 

Other 

Agencies 

Within Worker 

Organization 

Total1 

(N) 

Outreach 11.8 

(17) 

35.4 

(51) 

20.1 

(29) 0 0.7 (1) 

31.9 

(46) 

7.4% 

(144) 

Case Manager 11.0 

(76) 

32.3 

(223) 

14.5 

(100) 0 8.1 (56) 

34.2 

(236) 

35.5% 

(691) 

Police 0 70.5 

(93) 0 24.2 (32) 0 5.3 (7) 

6.8% 

(132) 

Probation 25.6 

(209) 0 13.0 (106) 

37.1 

(303) 

15.2 

(124) 

9.1 

(74) 

41.9% 

(816) 

Neighborhood Dev. 

Specialist 

3.0 

(5) 

59.4 

(98) 

6.7 

(11) 0 1.2 (2) 

29.7 

(49) 

8.5% 

(165) 

Total2 15.8 23.9 12.6 17.3 9.4 21.0 100.0 

(N) (307) (465) (246) (337) (183) (410) (1,948) 

1

Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 

2

Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (1,948) from 1,091worker tracking forms for 106 interviewed program youth. 

10.47 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.8 

Coordinated Contacts: Non-Interviewed Youth 

By Type of Worker and Type of Worker Contacted 

Type of Worker Contacted 

percent and (n) 

Type of Worker 

Initiating Contact 

Police Probation/ 

Parole School 

Project 

Case Manager/ 

Youth Worker 

Other 

Agencies 

Within Worker 

Organization 

Total1 

(N) 

Outreach 22.9 

(30) 

33.6 

(44) 

13.0 

(17) 0 0.8 (1) 

29.8 

(39) 

11.0 

(131) 

Case Manager 19.7 

(107) 

21.0 

(114) 

19.6 

(106) 0 5.7 (31) 

33.9 

(184) 

45.5 

(542) 

Police 0 50.4 

(66) 

2.3 

(3) 

26.0 

(34) 

4.6 

(6) 

16.8 

(22) 

11.0 

(131) 

Probation 27.4 

(103) 0 13.3 (50) 

33.8 

(127) 

14.4 

(54) 

11.1 

(42) 

31.5 

(376) 

Neighborhood Dev. 

Specialist 

16.7 

(2) 

33.3 

(4) 0 0 16.7 (2) 

33.3 

(4) 

1.0 

(12) 

Total2 20.3 19.2 14.8 13.7 7.9 24.2 100.1 

(N) (242) (228) (176) (163) (94) (289) (1,192) 

1 Percentages do not always sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 

2

 Percentages are based on the total number of contacts (1,192) from 562 worker tracking forms for 128 non-interviewed program participants. 

10.48 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 10.9 

Types of Services1 by Types of Workers 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Number of Services by Type of Worker Providing Service 

Worker Type caseplan matsupp1 group1 indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services 

Outreach 0 23 174 26 1 22 26 5 277 

Case Manager 161 144 677 483 146 117 255 20 2003 

Police 0 1 79 13 1 0 1 233 328 

Probation 544 120 755 447 45 134 362 1315 3722 

Neigh Dev. Specialist 0 19 166 13 36 43 34 2 313 

Total 705 307 1851 982 229 316 678 1575 6643 

Interviewed Program Youth (N=106) 

Percentage of Types of Services by Type of Worker 

Worker Type caseplan matsupp1 group1 indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services Percent of Total Services 

By Different Types of Workers 

Outreach 0.0% 8.3% 62.8% 9.4% 0.4% 7.9% 9.4% 1.8% 100.0% 4.2% 

Case Manager 8.0% 7.2% 33.8% 24.1% 7.3% 5.8% 12.7% 1.0% 100.0% 30.2% 

Police 0.0% 0.3% 24.1% 4.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 71.0% 100.0% 4.9% 

Probation 14.6% 3.2% 20.3% 12.0% 1.2% 3.6% 9.7% 35.3% 100.0% 56.0% 

Neigh Dev. Specialist 0.0% 6.1% 53.0% 4.2% 11.5% 13.7% 10.9% 0.6% 100.0% 4.7% 

Total 10.6% 4.6% 27.9% 14.8% 3.4% 4.8% 10.2% 23.7% 100.0% 100.0% 

 Based on total counts of services provided during the four-year period. 

10.49 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Table 10.9-continued 

Types of Services by Types of Workers 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (N=128) 

Number of Services by Type of Worker Providing Service 

Worker Type caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services 

Outreach 0 23 144 4 2 9 15 1 198 

Case Manager 69 164 720 438 195 47 194 33 1860 

Police 0 0 58 19 0 0 0 177 254 

Probation 252 87 530 247 31 30 150 645 1972 

Neigh Dev. Specialist 0 1 8 7 0 0 1 0 17 

Total 321 275 1460 715 228 86 360 856 4301 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth (N=128) 

Percentage of Types of Services by Type of Worker 

Worker Type caseplan matsupp1 group indcoun familycoun job school supres Total Services Percent of Total Services 

By Different Types of Workersa

Outreach 0.0% 11.6% 72.7% 2.0% 1.0% 4.5% 7.6% 0.5% 100.0% 4.6% 

Case Manager 3.7% 8.8% 38.7% 23.5% 10.5% 2.5% 10.4% 1.8% 100.0% 43.2% 

Police 0.0% 0.0% 22.8% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 69.7% 100.0% 5.9% 

Probation 12.8% 4.4% 26.9% 12.5% 1.6% 1.5% 7.6% 32.7% 100.0% 45.8% 

Neigh Dev. Specialist 0.0% 5.9% 47.1% 41.2% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 0.0% 100.0% 0.4% 

Total 7.5% 6.4% 33.9% 16.6% 5.3% 2.0% 8.4% 19.9% 100.0% 99.9% 

a Column does not sum due to rounding error. 

10.50


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 11 

Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables 

(Kwai Ming Wa) 

Introduction 

In this chapter, we examine the general effects of the program on youth using arrest 

variables. We are interested in the effectiveness of the program in reducing arrests for youth who 

come mostly from the program area (Powell Junior High School area), compared to youth who 

come mostly from the comparison areas (Kino, Carson, and Mesa Junior High School areas) who 

were not provided with services and worker contacts. We use statistical models to control for 

differences between program-youth and comparison-youth characteristics, and to tell us whether 

youth characteristics rather than program effects account for changes in arrests patterns during 

the program period compared to the pre-program period. We are also interested in whether youth 

in the program do better, worse, or about the same as comparison youth, without reference to 

specific program services or worker contacts provided (which we address in the next chapter). 

In the first set of analyses – the General Linear (GLM) and Logistic Regression models – 

we use the five outcome or dependent variables: total arrest changes, which includes arrests for 

all offenses; total violence arrest changes, which combines serious violence and general violence 

arrests; total property arrest changes; total drug arrest changes; and total “other” arrest 

1 changes. The GLM models estimate differences in the change in the mean number of arrests for 

all program and all comparison youth between the program and the pre-program periods, 

1

Refer to A ppen dix A for a d escription of charg e categories for the d ifferent types of arrests. 

11.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
controlling for several demographic characteristics of the youth.2 The GLM models provide us 

with information to answer the question: Did the mean level of change in arrests decrease, 

increase or stay the same – not only for the program and comparison youth samples, but for 

subsamples based on gender, race/ethnicity, age, gang membership, and prior arrest histories? 

The Logistic Regression equations address a different question: What factors are associated with 

program youth being a success (having a decrease in arrests or staying arrest free), or being a 

failure (increasing or staying at the same level of arrests) in relation to comparison youth with 

similar characteristics? The Logistic Regression models predict how many youth succeeded and 

how many failed, comparing one sample of youth to another. 

For each of the five outcome variables in the GLM models, the number of arrests was 

annualized, in order to control for varying numbers of arrests during varying lengths of program 

periods, which were matched with pre-program periods. The outcome variables measure the 

mean yearly difference in the number of arrests for youth between pre-program and program 

periods.3 

The same six independent variables were generally included in the GLM equations to 

explain variance in the five dependent variables. The independent variables are: project – TimeI-interviewed comparison youth, Time-I-interviewed program youth, or non-interviewed program 

youth (i.e., inclusively, all program and comparison youth, except as otherwise noted); priors – 

2

Even after matching comparison youth with program youth, other differences remained, e.g., number of 

prior arrests (see Chapter 9). 

3

First, the ye arly me an num ber o f arrests wa s calcu lated u sing the to tal num ber o f arrests fo r each youth 

during the program and pre-program periods, divided by the length in years for each period. Second, the mean 

yearly change was calculated by subtracting the mean number of yearly arrests in the program period from the mean 

number of yearly arrests for the pre-program period. 

11.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
level or category of arrests4

 during the pre-program period; age group – age at program entry (14 

years and under, 15 to 17 years, 18 years and over); gang membership – whether interviewed 

comparison youth and interviewed program youth self-reported being a gang member, a gang 

associate, or not being a gang member at their Time I interview (or the Project worker reported 

the non-interviewed program youth as being a gang member, a gang associate, or not a gang 

member, or unknown); gender; race/ethnicity (Latino, White, Other). Interaction terms were 

sometimes added to the models. Youth who had zero prior and zero subsequent arrests (“zerozero”) for the particular arrest categories were excluded from the GLM models, but generally 

were included in the Logistic Regression models. The following sections present the findings of 

“best” GLM and Logistic Regression models. 

Models 

Total Arrests 

GLM Models 

In the first basic GLM model for total arrests – consisting of 66 comparison youth, 91 

interviewed program youth, and 68 non-interviewed program youth who had arrests (N = 225)5 – 

we included six program and control variables – project, gender, race/ethnicity, gang 

membership, age group and prior total arrests category. The model explained 50.1% of the 

variance in the dependent variable, and was significant (p. < 0.001). The prior total arrest 

4

Th e level o r categ ory o f total yearly p rior ar rests wa s ranke d as fo llows: 1 ) non e=n o arre st; 2) low =0 .01 to 

0.99; 3) medium=1 .0 to 1.99; and 4) high $ 2.00. 

5

 Forty-two youth (6 comparison youth, 7 interviewed program youth, 29 non-interviewed program youth) 

with police arrest histories had no arrests in either the pre-pro gram or p rogram periods. 

11.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
category (p. < 0.001) and age group (p. < 0.022) were significant; project was marginally 

significant (p. = 0.057), particularly due to the reduction of arrests for the non-interviewed 

program group; gender (p. = 0.107) and race/ethnicity (p. = 0.059) were marginally significant; 

gang membership was not statistically significant (p. = 0.206). 

In our final, or “best,” model, we included five additional variables: length of time in the 

program (or comparison-sample equivalent); whether probation status made a difference; and 

three interaction terms – project×gender, project×probation, and project×priors). This final 

model explains more variance (R-square = 56.9%) and clarifies the influence of relevant 

variables. 

While the project variable alone was not significant (p. < 0.480) in the “best” model, it 

was highly significant as an interaction term with priors (p. < 0.001). Age group remained 

significant (p. < 0.03). The gender and race/ethnicity variables were no longer marginally 

significant (p. = 0.121 and p. = 0.125, respectively). Priors remained the most significant 

variable explaining outcome. In general, youth with fewer priors increased their arrests in the 

program period, and youth with more priors decreased their arrests in the program period. 

However, there were important differences between the two program groups (the interviewed and 

the non-interviewed groups) and the comparison group. The two program groups showed less of 

an increase in arrests during the program period among youth with no or few priors, and more of 

a decrease in arrests during the program period among youth with more priors. This was 

particularly the case for the interviewed program youth in the no, low, and medium prior-arrest 

categories and the non-interviewed program youth in the low, medium, and high prior-arrest 

categories. Both the interviewed and non-interviewed program youth did better than comparison 

11.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth in three out of the four prior-arrest categories. These differences were not necessarily 

significant. 

Older youth, 18 years and over, reduced their arrests significantly more than the 15 to 17-

year-olds (p. = 0.008), and did marginally better than the 14-years-and-under youth (p. = 0.081). 

Program females, whether in the interviewed or non-interviewed group, did non-significantly 

better (i.e., had fewer subsequent arrests) than comparison females, and had higher levels of 

reduced arrests than any of the male groups, whether comparison, interviewed-program or noninterviewed-program. 

In essence – based on a comparison of program and pre-program arrests and controlling 

for an array of factors – the non-interviewed program sample showed a non-significantly lower 

rate of total arrests than the interviewed program or comparison samples, and the comparison 

sample showed a decrease in total arrests similar to the interviewed program sample. The Mesa 

Project had a significant, positive effect in reducing levels of total arrests, particularly in 

interaction with priors. Factors that did not seem to make any significant difference under 

controlled statistical conditions were gang membership, years in the program, or probation status 

(Table 11.1). 

Logistic Regression Models 

In the next set of models, we focused on the effects of the Project on youth who reduced 

their level of arrests or remained arrest free, including those youth who had no prior arrests in 

both the program and pre-program periods: these two subgroups represent program successes. 

We also focused on the effects of the Project on youth who did not remain arrest free, including 

11.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
those youth who increased their level of arrests or those who did not change their level of arrests, 

in the program period compared to the pre-program period: these two subgroups represent 

program failures. In some of the models we included youth who had no arrest histories in either 

the pre-program or program periods; in other models we excluded them. Our purpose was to 

identify models where the samples containing both youth with arrests and youth without arrests, 

and the samples containing only youth with arrests, may be significantly different due to program 

effects. 

In the present model, we included all youth – comparison, interviewed program, and noninterviewed program – with or without arrests (N = 267). We were interested in 1) the effects of 

the program on the 98 interviewed program youth relative to the 72 comparison youth, and 2) the 

effects of the program on the 97 non-interviewed program youth relative to the same 72 

comparison youth, using separate logistic equations. 

Interviewed Program Youth and Comparison Youth. In this Logistic Regression model 

(Chi Square = 43.81, 6 Df, p. <0.001), 36 interviewed program youth (36.7%) were classified as 

failures and 62 (63.3%) were classified as successes, while 40 comparison youth (55.6%) were 

classified as failures and 32 (44.4%) were classified as successes. Entering the project variable 

and controlling for prior arrests, gender, race/ethnicity, age group, and gang membership, the 

equation was significant (p. < 0.001). The interviewed program youth did 44% better than the 

comparison youth (p = 0.361, not significant; odds ratio 1.44). The most significant predictors of 

outcome were prior total arrests (p. < 0.001; odds 2.37); age group (the 18-and-over group did 

4.6 times better than the 15 to 17-year-olds, and did 18% better than the 14-and-under group; 

gender (females did better than males: p. < 0.01; odds 4.27); and race/ethnicity (Latinos did 

11.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
better than other groups: p = 0.92; odds 2.27) (Table 11.2). 

We found again that prior total arrests was the strongest predictor of success or failure in 

the program period for interviewed program and comparison youth. The oldest age group, the 

females and the Latinos reduced their levels of arrests across the two samples. Whether a youth 

was a gang member, a gang associate or a not a gang member appeared to have little differential 

influence on changing his arrest patterns. Most important for program-evaluation purposes, 

youth in the interviewed program sample were more likely than youth in the comparison sample 

to reduce their level of arrests during the program period compared to the pre-program period, 

although this difference is not statistically significant. 

Non-Interviewed Program Youth and Comparison Youth. The results of the Logistic 

Regression analysis comparing success and failure of non-interviewed program youth with 

comparison youth were highly similar to those of the interviewed program youth/comparison 

youth analysis in respect to change in total arrest patterns between the pre-program and program 

periods. Again, in this second Logistic Regression model (Chi square = 32.57, 6 Df, p. < 0.001), 

38 non-interviewed program youth (39.2%) were classified as failures and 59 non-interviewed 

program youth (60.8%) were classified as successes, while 40 comparison youth (55.6%) were 

classified as failures and 32 comparison youth (44.4%) were classified as successes. 

Controlling for the same variables indicated in the above Logistic Regression model, noninterviewed program youth were 42% more successful than comparison youth (p. < 0.083) in 

maintaining their pre-program zero-arrest histories or reducing their pre-program arrest patterns 

during the program period. Prior arrests, as a regression factor, remained the strongest predictor 

of subsequent success or failure. Those youth with records of higher prior arrests were more 

11.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
likely to be successes, and those youth with records of lower prior arrests were more likely to be 

failures. Again, the oldest youth group, the Latinos and the females were more likely to be 

successes (Table 11.3). 

Total Violence Arrests 

A relatively small number of program and comparison youth were arrested for violence in 

both the pre-program and program periods. Only 14.7% (n= 33) of all youth were arrested for 

serious (felony) violence, and 26.77% (n = 60) of youth were arrested for less-serious 

(misdemeanor) violence – for a total of 41.3% (n = 93) of all youth from all three samples 

combined (N = 225). On the other hand, there was little variability across the three samples in 

certain characteristics of youth arrested for any kind of violence: 91.4% (n = 85) of all such 

youth were males, 84.9% (n = 79) were gang members or gang associates and 80.7% (n = 75) 

were on probation. We eliminated these three variables – gender, gang membership and 

probation status – from the analyses of program effects on violence arrests. Also, since only 

23.7% (n = 22) of non-Latino youth (African-American, Asian, and White/Non-Latino) 

combined were arrested for violence, we classified the race/ethnicity variables as Latino/NonLatino. Further, since there were so few youth arrested for more than one violent act in the preprogram period, we employed only three prior-arrest categories: none = 0, low = 0.01 to 0.49, 

and medium/high = 0.5 to 1.0 and more. 

GLM Models 

Our “best” GLM model for total violence included 93 youth – 25 comparison youth, 45 

11.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interviewed program youth, and 23 non-interviewed program youth – and five variables: project, 

race/ethnicity, age group, length of time in the program (or an equivalent period for comparison 

youth), and prior total violence arrests category. The model explained 67% of variance in the 

dependent variable. Project was not significant (p = 0.763). Comparison, interviewed program 

youth, and non-interviewed program youth all reduced their level of violence arrests about 

equally during the program period. Again, our prior violence arrests variable was highly 

significant (p. < 0.001). The youth with “none” and “low” categories of prior violence arrests 

increased their levels of violence arrests slightly during the program period, and the youth with 

“medium/high” categories of violence arrests reduced their levels of violence arrests. Age group 

was a significant predictor (p. = 0.01). All age groups reduced their levels of violence arrests, 

but the younger group (14-and-under) had a significantly greater decrease than the 15 to 17-yearolds (p. = 0.002), and a greater decrease than the 18-and-over group (p. = 0.067). However, there 

was little difference in decrease between the two older age groups. 

Length of time in the program (or its equivalent for the comparison group) made a 

difference. The longer the length of time, the greater the decline in violence arrests (p. = 0.018). 

We believe we were mainly picking up differences between the interviewed program youth, who 

were in the program more than two years, and the non-interviewed program youth, most of whom 

were in the program less than two years. Race/ethnicity was not a significant predictor of 

reduced total violence arrests (p. = 0.591) (Table 11.4). 

In sum, the program had little or no effect on the reduction of violence arrests. Youth 

who were in the “low” or “medium/high” categories had a slight reduction, overall. Younger 

youth (14-and-under) were able to reduce their patterns of violence arrests more than older youth. 

11.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
This is a surprising finding. A younger age was better than an older age (15 to 17, or 18-yearsand-over) as an abatement factor for the reduction of total violence arrests. Ordinarily, we would 

have expected the oldest rather than the youngest age groups to show a greater reduction in 

violence arrests over time. The finding could be related to the fact that most non-interviewed 

program youth were younger than most program-interviewed and comparison youth and were in 

the program for less than two years. 

Logistic Regression Models 

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth, 58 

comparison youth (80.6%) and 78 interviewed program youth (79.6%) were estimated to be 

successes, mainly because so many had no violence arrests (“zero-zero”) in both the pre-program 

and program periods. In the final model, with the variables, project, gender, race/ethnicity, age 

group, gang membership, and prior violent arrests category , the model (p. = 0.55) and none of 

the variables were statistically significant. Even priors, while important (odds 1.20), was not 

significant. Interviewed program youth did 10% worse than comparison youth6

 (odds 0.890), but 

the estimate was not statistically significant (Chi-square = 0.076, p. = 0.783) (Table 11.5). 

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth, 58 

comparison youth (80.6%) and 86 non-interviewed program youth (88.7%) were estimated to be 

successes (i.e., remained violence-arrest free), or reduced their level of violence arrests in the 

program period (again mainly because so few were arrested for violence in either the program or 

6

 A difference of 10% is due to the fact that 47 comparison youth (65.3%) and 53 program youth (54.1%) 

had no violence arrests. 

11.10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
pre-program period). In the final model, including the same variables as above, the entire model 

(p. = 0.615) and none of the variables were statistically significant. The project variable was 

almost marginally significant (Chi-square = 2.616, p. = 0.106; odds = 1.50). The noninterviewed program youth had a better record of success (50% better) than the comparison 

youth, but the difference was marginally statistically significant (Table 11.6). 

Because so few of the youth in all the samples were arrested for violence in either the 

program or pre-program period, and because the non-interviewed-program youth generally had 

fewer violence arrests than the comparison youth (who had fewer violence arrests in the preprogram period than the interviewed program youth), we excluded all youth with no violence 

arrests from further analyses, to test whether or not the program had an effect on only those youth 

with violence arrests. 

In this Logistic Regression model for total violence arrests, we included only comparison 

and interviewed program youth with violence arrests; 25 interviewed program youth (55.6%) and 

11 comparison youth (44.0%) were estimated to be successes during the program period. Similar 

to the Logistic Regression model above (comparison and non-interviewed program youth), and 

including the same variables, the entire model was significant (p. < 0.001). The prior violence 

arrests variable was significant (p. = 0.002), and the age group variable was almost significant 

(Chi-square = 2.954; p. = 0.086; odds = 2.08). Although the project variable was not significant, 

the interviewed program sample had a 48.4% higher ratio probability of success in the reduction 

of total violence arrests than the comparison sample (Table 11.7). 

Further, in the Logistic Regression model for total violence arrests, in which we included 

only comparison youth and non-interviewed program youth with violence arrests, 12 non11.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
interviewed program youth (52.2%) and 11 comparison youth (44.0%) were estimated to be 

successes during the program period. Again, the entire model was significant (p. > 0.001), but no 

variable – not even prior total violence arrests – was significant. There was no difference in the 

reduction of total violence arrests between the comparison and non-interviewed program samples 

(Table 11.8). The MGIP may have been more successful with the interviewed program youth 

than with the non-interviewed program youth in reducing violence arrests. 

Total Property Arrests 

GLM Models 

In these models, a majority of arrested youth in each of the samples had pre-program 

arrests for a range of property crimes: 39 comparison youth (61.5%); 59 interviewed program 

youth (86.4%); and 33 non-interviewed program youth (69.7%). Property-crime offenses 

included theft, attempted theft, shoplifting, burglary, possession/receipt/sale of stolen motor 

vehicle, criminal damage to motor vehicle, criminal damage to property, possession of stolen 

property, trespass, criminal trespass to land, criminal trespass to property. 

The “best” model, excluding “zero-zero” property offenses, included 131 youth and had 

six variables: project, race/ethnicity, gang membership, age group, length of time in the 

program, and prior property arrests category. We excluded the gender variable, since only 17 

females had property arrests in the program and pre-program periods, and the probation variable, 

since only 3 program (interviewed or non-interviewed) and 21 comparison youth with propertyarrest records in the program and pre-program periods were not on probation. This “best” model 

was statistically significant (R-square = 0.644, p. < 0.001). The prior property arrests variable 

11.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
was highly significant (p. < 0.001), the project variable was significant (p. < 0.041), and the age 

group variable was almost statistically significant (p. = 0.056). The single variable which 

explained the most variance was, again, prior property arrest (p. < 0.001), i.e., the “regression” 

effect. Race/ethnicity, gang membership, and length of time in the program were not significant 

in explaining variance in the dependent variable total property arrests change (i.e., the difference 

between total property arrests in the program period and total property arrests in the pre-program 

period). 

There was a decline in property arrests for each of the samples. The largest decline (mean 

= -0.533) – for the comparison youth – was greater than the decline for the interviewed program 

youth (mean = -0.143, p. = 0.026), but not significantly greater than the decline for the noninterviewed program youth (-0.516; p. = 0.774). The decline for the oldest age group (18-andover) was significantly greater than for the 15 to 17-year-old group (mean = -0.169, p. = 0.033), 

but not significantly greater than the decline for the youngest group (14-and-under) (mean = -

0.459) (Table 11.9). 

Overall, the comparison youth showed a somewhat greater decline in property-crime 

arrests than the program youth, particularly the interviewed program youth. The older youth 

generally showed a greater decline in property-crime arrests than did the younger youth, 

especially compared to the 15 to 17-year-olds. Again (surprisingly) the youngest age group, like 

their older counterparts, showed a decline in property arrests during the program period. The 

only increase was for those who had no prior arrests. This could have been because the noninterviewed program youth, to begin with, were generally less delinquent or were arrested less for 

property crime than youth in the other two samples. 

11.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Logistic Regression Models 

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth, 79 

interviewed program youth (80.6%) and 55 comparison youth (76.4%) were estimated to be 

successful in lowering or remaining at a zero-property-arrests rate during the program period 

compared to the pre-program period. In the “best” model, with the variables project, gender, 

race/ethnicity, age group, gang membership and prior property arrests category, the model was 

statistically significant (Chi-square = 13.460, 6 Df, p. = 0.036). There was no difference in the 

pattern of success or failure for interviewed program youth or comparison youth. However, 

females were four times more likely to be successes than males (Chi-square = 3.723, p. = 0.054; 

odds = 3.85), and Latino youth were three times more likely to be successes than non-Latino 

youth (Chi-square = 5.609, p. = 0.018; odds = 2.91). The older age group was also 62% (but not 

quite significantly) more likely than the younger age group to lower (or remain without) arrests 

for property crime in the program period (Chi-square = 3.055, p. = 0.08; odds = 1.62). Gang 

membership and prior property arrests were not significant (Table 11.10). 

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth, 55 

comparison youth (76.4%) and 84 non-interviewed program youth (86.6%) were estimated to be 

successful in reducing (or remaining without) property arrests in the program period. Again, the 

model was statistically significant (Chi-square = 15.381, 6 Df, p. = 0.018). Non-interviewed 

program youth were 19% more successful than comparison youth, but the difference was not 

statistically significant (Chi-square = 0.470, p. = 0.493; odds = 1.19). Latino youth did 3.2 times 

better than non-Latino youth (Chi-square 6.194, p. = 0.013; odds = 3.20). Gender, age group, 

gang membership, and prior property arrests were not statistically significant (Table 11.11). 

11.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In sum, all the youth samples lowered their arrest rates for property crime. The program 

was somewhat more successful in lowering property arrest levels (or keeping youth arrest-free) 

for non-interviewed program youth than for interviewed program youth, but, overall, comparison 

youth did as well as program youth. The oldest youth were generally more successful in reducing 

their property-crime arrests than were younger youth. 

Total Drug Crime Arrests 

GLM Model 

A small but substantial percentage of youth in the three samples were arrested for drug 

offenses in the program and pre-program periods, mainly for possession of drugs: 21 comparison 

youth (29.2%), 23 interviewed program youth (23.5%), and 18 non-interviewed program youth 

(18.8%). The “best” model includes 62 youth. Only 5 females in the three samples had arrests 

for drugs, so the gender variable is excluded from the analysis. Since only 8 whites, 3 youth 

from the “other” ethnic groups, and 1 youth of unknown race/ethnicity were arrested for drugs in 

the program or pre-program periods, those race/ethnicity categories were combined. The large 

majority of youth arrested for drugs were Latinos (n = 50). Also, since there were only 7 nongang youth and 1 youth with unknown gang membership arrested for drugs, those gang 

membership categories were combined, as were gang members (n = 44) and gang associates (n = 

10). The probation variable was excluded from the analysis since of the 62 youth in the analysis 

only 1arrested youth from the two program samples and all arrested youth from the comparison 

sample were not on probation. 

Six variables were entered into the “best” model (n = 62): project, race/ethnicity, gang 

11.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
membership, age group, length of time in the program (less than two years or two or more years, 

or their equivalent for comparison youth) and prior drug arrests category. The model was 

statistically significant (R-square = 0.487, p. < 0.001). The project variable was not statistically 

significant (p. = 0.871). However, there was a slightly greater increase in drug arrests for 

comparison youth (+0.237) than for interviewed program youth (+0.147), but a very slight 

decrease for non-interviewed program youth (-0.009). Latino youth significantly decreased their 

level of drug arrests in the program period (p. = 0.018). All youth, across all three samples, 

significantly decreased their arrests for drug crime over a two-or-more-year program period. 

The most significant variable in the equation was prior arrests for drug crime. Youth 

with no or low numbers of prior drug arrests increased their level of drug arrests, while youth 

with medium or high numbers of prior drug arrests decreased their drug arrests. Gang 

membership was not significant, although gang members increased their level of arrests (+0.344) 

more than gang associates (+0.059). Non-gang youth showed a slight (non-significant) decrease 

(-0.028) in arrests for drugs. All age groups slightly (though non-significantly) increased their 

level of drug arrests, particularly the 15 to 17-year-olds. The smallest non-significant increase 

was in the 14-and-under group (Table 11.12). The implication of the GLM finding is that the 

drug problem was increasing, at least based on arrests, and that the Project had little effect. 

Logistic Regression Models 

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth 

(including youth with no history of drug arrests), 58 comparison youth (80.6%) and 89 

interviewed program youth (90.8%) were estimated to be successful in lowering (or remaining at 

11.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
zero) drug-arrest rates during the program period. The “best” model included six variables: 

project, gender, race/ethnicity, age group, gang membership, and prior drug arrests category. 

The model was not significant (p. = 0.622). Only the project variable is marginally significant 

(Chi-square = 3.160, p. = 0.076; odds = 2.37). The interviewed program youth had a 2.4 times 

better success rate than the comparison youth. None of the other variables come close to being 

significant (Table 11.13). 

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth 

(including youth with no history of drug arrests), 58 comparison youth (80.6%) and 86 noninterviewed program youth (88.7%) were successful in lowering (or remaining at zero) drug 

arrests during the program period compared to the pre-program period. In this “best” model, the 

same six variables were used. The model Chi-square was again not significant (p. = 0.159). No 

variable was statically significant, although race/ethnicity was marginally significant (p. = 0.095; 

odds 2.32). Latino youth did 2.3 times better than non-Latino youth in reducing their drug 

arrests. Non-interviewed program youth appear to do 23% better (p. = 0.393; odds 1.230) than 

the comparison youth (Table 11.14). Both the interviewed and non-interviewed program youth 

appeared to be slightly but non-significantly more successful in reducing drug arrests than the 

comparison youth. 

As with our Logistic Regression analysis using the dependent variable total violence 

arrests, we also examined program effects on youth with only drug arrests. In the Logistic 

Regression model for comparison and interviewed program youth, 7 comparison youth (33.3%) 

and 14 interviewed program youth (60.9%) were estimated to be successful in lowering drug 

arrests during the program period. The “best” model included the same gender variables 

11.17


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
described above. The model was significant (p. <0 .05). No variable was significant, however 

the interviewed program sample did 3.9 times better than the comparison sample in their success 

rate (Table 11.15). 

In the Logistic Regression model for comparison and non-interviewed program youth, 7 

comparison youth (33.3%) and 7 non-interviewed program youth (38.9%) were estimated to be 

successful in lowering drug arrests during the program period. The “best” model included the 

same gender variables. The model was significant (p. < 0.01), but still no variables were 

significant, and the comparison sample did 41.0% better than the non-interviewed program 

sample (Table 11.16). 

The pattern for the interviewed program sample suggests that the program may have had 

a positive effect in reducing drug crime only for the interviewed program sample. 

All “Other” Arrests 

GLM Models 

In these models, more interviewed program youth, 81.9% (n = 55) than non-interviewed 

program youth, 62.2% (n = 28) or comparison youth, 50% (n = 37), had arrests for “other” 

offenses, either in the pre-program or program periods. “Other” arrests usually included minor 

arrest charges: violation of the motor vehicle act, obstruction of justice, minor drinking, 

intoxication of a minor, possession of alcohol by a minor, driving under the influence of 

alcohol/drugs, drinking, curfew violation, status offense, unlawful possession of weapons, 

unlawful possession of firearms, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, 

etc. More program and comparison youth were arrested for these “other” offenses than for any of 

11.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the more serious offenses such as violence, property crime and drug possession. Youth in each 

of the samples who had prior arrests for “other” offenses reduced their “other” arrest patterns. 

The “best” model, which excluded youth with no history of (or zero-zero) arrests for 

“other” offenses, included 165 youth and seven variables: project, gender, race/ethnicity, gang 

membership, age group, length of time in the program, and prior “other” arrests category. 

Again, we excluded the probation variable, since only 5 program youth (interviewed and noninterviewed) and 32 comparison youth were not on probation. The “best” model was statistically 

significant (R-square = 0.484, p. < 0.001). However, the only variable that was significant was 

prior “other” arrests (p. < 0.001). No other variable came close to significance. 

In terms of arrests for minor offenses – whether the variable was interviewed-program, 

non-interviewed program, or comparison youth; whether the youth was male or female, Latino or 

non-Latino, a gang member, gang associate, or non-gang youth, younger or older, in the program 

for a long or short period – they all had a reduction in “minor” offense arrests over time. Most 

important, there was no program effect on “other” arrests. The dominant change effect was for 

youth who had no pre-program “other” arrests, but had more program-period “other” arrests. 

Youth who had some pre-program “other” arrests had fewer program-period “other” arrests 

(Table 11.17). 

Logistic Regression Models 

More of the interviewed program youth than comparison youth appeared to have been 

successful in reducing their “other” offense arrests in the program period (i.e., youth who reduced 

their arrests or remained at “zero-zero”): 66 interviewed program youth (67.3%) and 35 

11.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
comparison youth ((48.6%) were successes. 

In the “best” Logistic Regression model, the following six variables were used: project, 

gender, race/ethnicity, age group, gang membership, and prior “other” arrests category. The 

equation was significant (Chi-square = 13.845, 6 DF, p. < 0.05). The two variables that were 

significant were project (p. = 0.033; odds = 2.123) and gender (p. = 0.016; odds = 3.712). 

Interviewed program youth were more than two times better than comparison youth at reducing 

their arrests for “other” offenses (Table 11.18). 

In the Logistic Regression equation that includes non-interviewed program youth and 

comparison youth, 71 non-interviewed program youth (73.2%) and, again, 35 comparison youth 

(48.6%) were estimated to be successes in reducing their arrests for “other” offenses. 

In the “best” Logistic Regression model, the same six variables were used. The model 

was slightly more statistically significant than the model for interviewed program youth and 

comparison youth (Chi-square = 16.950, 6 DF, p. < 0.01). The project variable was highly 

significant (p. = 0.003; odds = 1.81). The non-interviewed program youth did 81% better than 

the comparison youth. No other variable in the equation was significant, except that 

race/ethnicity was marginally significant (p. 0.070; odds = 2.06). The Latino youth success rate 

was two times better than the non-Latino youth success rate. Females also did two times better 

than males (p. = 0.150; odds = 2.21) (Table 11.19). 

In sum, while each of the three samples reduced their levels of “minor” offense arrests 

during the program period, more of the program youth – interviewed and non-interviewed – 

successfully reduced their levels (or maintained a “zero-zero” level) of “minor” offense arrests 

than did comparison youth. More non-interviewed program youth than interviewed program 

11.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth were successful, as were females and Latino youth. 

Summary 

Program youth, both interviewed and non-interviewed, did better than comparison youth 

in reducing their levels of total arrests during the program period. About 42% more program 

youth than comparison youth were successful in the reduction of total arrests, or remained 

without arrests during the program period. 

All of the samples reduced their levels of total violence arrests (serious and less serious). 

Few youth had records of serious or less-serious violence. However, about 48% more 

interviewed program youth than comparison youth were successful in the reduction of violence 

arrests in the program period. 

All of the samples of youth reduced their levels of property arrests, but comparison youth 

had a significantly greater reduction than did interviewed program youth during the program 

period. However, there was little difference between the comparison sample and the two 

program samples in the proportions of youth who were successes or failures in reducing their 

levels of property arrests (or of those who remained without property arrests). 

There was an increase in drug arrests in all of the samples, with no difference in levels of 

increase in drug arrests during the program period. However, the number of youth arrested for 

drug crimes was small in each of the samples. In general, more program youth (interviewed 

youth more than non-interviewed youth) reduced their probability of drug arrests relative to 

comparison youth. This was particularly evident for the interviewed program youth, who were 

almost four times more successful than comparison youth. 

11.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Generally, each of the three samples reduced their levels of “other” (minor) arrests. 

Minor arrests comprised the majority of arrests for youth in all three samples in the program and 

pre-program periods. There was no significant difference in the level of reduction of “other” 

arrests for the samples during the program period. However, program youth (interviewed and 

non-interviewed) were about twice as successful in the reduction of “other” offense arrests 

relative to comparison youth. 

In sum, program youth had lower levels of arrests, and were more successful than 

comparison youth in the reduction of arrests – particularly total arrests, violence arrests, drug 

arrests, and “other” arrests. 

11.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.1 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Arrests 

(Controlling for Total Arrests in the Pre-program Period) 

11.1(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.569)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program-Interviewed, 

Program-Non-interviewed 

2 1.362 0.74 0.480 

Gender: 

Male/Female 1 4.469 2.42 0.121 

Race/Ethnicity: 

White, Latino, Others, Unknown 3 3.571 1.93 0.125 

Gang Membership: 

Non-gang, Gang, Associate, Unknown 3 0.730 0.40 0.767 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over 2 6.741 3.65* 0.028 

Program Length (or Equivalent): 

<2 Yrs/ >=2 Yrs 1 0.590 0.32 0.572 

Probation Status: 

Yes/No 1 3.467 1.88 0.172 

Prior Total Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 90.498 49.01*** 0.000 

Project VGender 2 1.282 0.69 0.501 

Project VProbation Status 2 0.193 0.10 0.901 

Project VPrior Total Arrests 6 9.336 5.06*** 0.000 

Within error 198 1.847 — — 

Total 224 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.1(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Total Arrests Covariate 

Prior Total 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 52 1.160 0.305 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 73 -0.133 0.287 2 — 0.001*** 0.000*** 

Medium 51 -1.085 0.323 3 — 0.000*** 

High 49 -2.729 0.337 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.1(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Age Group Main Effect 

Age N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

14 & Under 63 -0.579 0.287 1 — 0.544 0.081 

15 to 17 104 -0.433 0.277 2 — 0.008* 

18 & Over 58 -1.078 0.316 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
‘ ‘

‘

‘ ‘

‘

‘

‘

‘

11.1(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Project×Prior Total Arrests Interaction 

Prior Adjust 

Project¶ Total 

Arrests 

-ed 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 

0 

1 

1 

1 

2 

C None 1.014 0.385 24 1 — * ‡ * ‡ ‡ * ‡ ‡ 

C Low 0.028 0.414 23 2 — ‡ † † * † ‡ 

C Med -0.359 0.494 12 3 — ‡ † ‡ 

C High -2.867 0.568 7 4 — ‡ ‡ * * ‡ ‡ 

Pi None 0.820 0.589 8 5 — * ‡ ‡ ‡ 

Pi Low -0.308 0.438 35 6 — * † ‡ † ‡ 

Pi Med -1.225 0.443 26 7 — ‡ * ‡ 

Pi High -1.481 0.469 22 8 — ‡ ‡ 

Pn None 1.648 0.434 20 9 — ‡ ‡ ‡ 

Pn Low -0.298 0.486 15 10 — * ‡ 

Pn Med -1.671 0.550 13 11 — ‡ 

Pn High -3.839 0.528 20 12 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

¶

C=Comparison; Pi=Interviewed-Program; Pn=Non-interviewed Program Youth. 

11.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.2


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)


on Total Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth


11.2(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 32 40 72 

Program Interviewed 62 36 98 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170). 

11.2(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=43.813 *** with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -5.828 1.416 0.000*** — 

Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program-Interviewed) 1 0.362 0.396 0.361 1.436 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 1.451 0.564 0.010* 4.267 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.761 0.452 0.092 2.139 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.818 0.264 0.002** 2.266 

Gang Membership 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 0.092 0.231 0.690 1.097 

Prior Total Arrests: 

(0=None: 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High) 1 0.864 0.207 0.000*** 2.373 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.3 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

11.3(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 32 40 72 

Program Non-Interviewed 59 38 97 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169). 

11.3(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=32.566 *** with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -3.591 1.339 0.007*** — 

Project : 

(0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed) 1 0.352 0.203 0.083 1.422 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 0.467 0.548 0.374 1.627 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.84 0.430 0.051 2.317 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.585 0.288 0.042* 1.795 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.389 0.293 0.183 0.677 

Prior Total Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High ) 1 0.787 0.193 0.000*** 2.197 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.27 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.4 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Total Violence Arrests 

(Controlling for Total Violence Arrests in the Pre-program Period) 

11.4(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.670)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison, Program-Interviewed, Program 

Non-interviewed 

2 0.126 0.27 0.763 

Race/Ethnicity: 

Latino/Non-Latino 1 0.135 0.29 0.591 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over 2 2.269 4.90** 0.010 

Program Length (or Equivalent): 

<2 Yrs />=2 Yrs 1 2.725 5.88* 0.018 

Prior Total Violence Arrests: 

None; Low; Medium; High 3 23.379 50.45*** 0.000 

Within error 83 0.463 — — 

Total 92 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.4(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Age Group Main Effect 

Age N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

14 & Under 26 -0.676 0.152 1 — 0.002** 0.067 

15 to 17 41 -0.124 0.118 2 — 0.501 

18 & Over 26 -0.253 0.163 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.4 continued 

11.4(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Program Length Main Effect 

Program 

Length 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

<2 Yrs 34 -0.095 0.148 0.018* 

>=2 Yrs 59 -0.607 0.127 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.4(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Total Violence Arrests Covariate 

Prior Total 

Violence 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 34 0.870 0.140 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 23 0.093 0.172 2 — 0.010*** 0.000*** 

Medium 20 -0.488 0.167 3 — 0.000*** 

High 16 -0.879 0.188 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.5


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)


on Total Violence Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth


11.5(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 58 14 72 

Program-Interviewed 78 20 98 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170). 

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=53) are coded 

as “success.” 

11.5(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=4.945 with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 0.143 1.299 0.912 — 

Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program-Interviewed) 1 -0.117 0.423 0.783 0.890 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 0.280 0.579 0.629 1.323 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.305 0.470 0.517 1.356 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.425 0.277 0.125 1.530 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.293 0.271 0.280 0.746 

Prior Total Violence Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High) 1 0.184 0.276 0.504 1.203 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.30 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.6


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)


on Total Violence Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth


11.6(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 58 14 72 

Program Non-Interviewed 86 11 97 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169). 

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=74) are coded 

“ success.” 

11.6(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=4.458 with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 1.004 1.541 0.515 — 

Project : 

(0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed) 1 0.402 0.249 0.106 1.495 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 0.529 0.699 0.449 1.697 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 -0.442 0.545 0.418 0.643 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.481 0.345 0.164 1.617 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.299 0.367 0.416 0.742 

Prior Total Violence Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High) 1 -0.020 0.270 0.940 0.980 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.7 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Violence Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”) 

11.7(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 11 14 25 

Program-Interviewed 25 20 45 

† Total number of youth who have violent arrests for violent crime (N=70). 

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=53) are 

removed from this analysis. 

11.7(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=22.342*** with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -3.180 2.862 0.267 — 

Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program-Interviewed) 1 0.395 0.662 0.551 1.484 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 -2.150 2.025 0.288 0.116 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.650 0.791 0.411 1.915 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.730 0.425 0.086 2.076 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.104 0.404 0.796 0.901 

Prior Total Violence Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High) 1 2.059 0.663 0.002*** 7.834 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.32 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.8 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Violence Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”) 

11.8(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 11 14 25 

Program Non-Interviewed 12 11 23 

† Total number of youth who have violent arrests for violent crime (N=48). 

‡ Youth without violence arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=47, Program=74) are 

removed from this analysis. 

11.8(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=28.594*** with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -13.651 66.822 0.838 — 

Project : 

(0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed) 1 -9.243 46.630 0.843 0.000 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 -7.785 65.282 0.905 0.000 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 -0.448 1.269 0.724 0.639 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.893 0.854 0.296 2.443 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 0.456 1.060 0.667 1.578 

Prior Total Violence Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low; 2=Medium; 3=High) 1 18.551 93.225 0.842 999.000 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.9 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests 

(Controlling for Property Arrests in the Pre-program Period) 

11.9(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.644)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison; Program-Interviewed; Program 

Non-interviewed 

2 1.759 3.28* 0.041 

Race/Ethnicity: 

Latino/Non-Latino 1 1.020 1.91 0.170 

Gang Membership: 

Non-gang, Gang, Associate; Unknown 2 0.088 0.17 0.848 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

14 & under; 15 to 17; and 18 & over 2 1.578 2.95 0.056 

Program Length (or Equivalent): 

<2 Yrs />=2 Yrs 1 0.726 1.36 0.247 

Prior Property Arrests: 

None; Low; Medium; High 3 32.670 61.02*** 0.000 

Within error 119 0.535 — — 

Total 130 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.9(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Project Main Effect 

Project N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

C 39 -0.533 0.149 1 — 0.026* 0.774 

Pi 59 -0.143 0.119 2 — 0.093 

Pn 33 -0.468 0.169 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

¶ C=Comparison; Pi=Interviewed-Program; Pn=Non-interviewed Program Youth. 

11.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.9(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Age Group Main Effect 

Age N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

14 & Under 38 -0.459 0.141 1 — 0.071 0.754 

15 to 17 59 -0.169 0.115 2 — 0.033* 

18 & Over 34 -0.516 0.143 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.9(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Property Arrests Covariate 

Prior 

Property 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 33 0.998 0.137 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 31 -0.174 0.180 2 — 0.072 0.000*** 

Medium 44 -0.532 0.136 3 — 0.000*** 

High 23 -1.817 0.173 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.10 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Property Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

11.10(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 55 17 72 

Program-Interviewed 79 19 98 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170). 

‡ Youth without property arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=33, Program=39) are coded 

“success.” 

11.10(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=13.460* with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -3.329 1.433 0.020* — 

Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed) 1 -0.022 0.431 0.960 0.978 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 1.349 0.699 0.054 3.854 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 1.068 0.451 0.018* 2.910 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.482 0.276 0.081 1.619 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.029 0.255 0.907 0.971 

Prior Property Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High) 1 0.305 0.413 0.460 1.356 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.11


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)


on Property Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth


11.11(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 55 17 72 

Program Non-Interviewed 84 13 97 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169). 

‡ Youth without property arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=33, Program=64) are coded 

“success.” 

11.11(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=15.381* with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -2.380 1.439 0.098 — 

Project: 

(0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed) 1 0.170 0.248 0.493 1.185 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 -0.075 0.590 0.899 0.928 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 1.164 0.468 0.013* 3.204 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.382 0.337 0.257 1.465 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 0.183 0.318 0.565 1.201 

Prior Property Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High) 1 0.697 0.562 0.215 2.007 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.12 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drugs Arrests 

(Controlling for Drug Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

11.12(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.487)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison; Program-Interviewed; Program 

Non-interviewed 

2 0.118 0.14 0.871 

Race/Ethnicity: 

Latino/Non-Latino 1 5.157 6.04* 0.018 

Gang Membership: 

Non-gang; Gang; Associate, Unknown 2 0.626 0.73 0.486 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over 2 0.565 0.66 0.520 

Program Length: 

<2 Yrs/ >=2 Yrs 1 3.715 4.35* 0.042 

Prior Drug Arrests: 

None; Low; Medium/High 2 12.245 14.33*** 0.000 

Within error 51 0.855 — — 

Total 61 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.12(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Race/Ethnicity Main Effect 

Race/ 

Ethnicity 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

Latino 50 -0.277 0.192 0.018* 

Non-Latino 12 0.527 0.305 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11.12(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Program Length Main Effect 

Program 

Length 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean1=Adjusted Mean2 

<2 Yrs 23 0.633 0.340 0.042* 

>=2 Yrs 39 -0.383 0.281 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.12(d) Adjusted Mean Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Prior Drug Arrests Main Effect 

Prior Drug 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 27 0.884 0.229 1 — 0.357 0.000*** 

Low 20 0.537 0.352 2 — 0.002** 

Medium 

/High 

15 -1.046 0.324 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.39 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.13


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)


on Drug Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth


11.13(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 58 14 72 

Program-Interviewed 89 9 98 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170). 

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=75) are coded 

“success.” 

11.13(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=4.407 with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 1.352 1.567 0.388 — 

Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed) 1 0.861 0.485 0.076 2.366 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 0.221 0.703 0.754 1.247 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.137 0.544 0.801 1.147 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 -0.077 0.330 0.816 0.926 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 0.098 0.286 0.732 1.103 

Prior Drug Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High) 1 -0.343 0.641 0.592 0.709 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.40 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.14 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Drug Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

11.14(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 58 14 72 

Program Non-Interviewed 86 11 97 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169). 

‡ Youth without drugs arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=79) are coded 

“success.” 

11.14(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=9.276 with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 0.437 1.827 0.811 — 

Project: 

(0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed) 1 0.207 0.242 0.393 1.230 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 1.551 1.081 0.151 4.714 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.841 0.503 0.095 2.318 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 -0.304 0.330 0.357 0.738 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.587 0.408 0.150 0.556 

Prior Drug Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High) 1 -0.469 0.665 0.480 0.626 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.41 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.15 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Drug Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”) 

11.15(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 7 14 21 

Program-Interviewed 14 9 23 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested for drug crime (N=44). 

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=75) are removed 

from this analysis. 

11.15(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=16.323* with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -40.892 599.1 0.946 — 

Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed) 1 1.356 0.875 0.121 3.879 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 -0.281 1.528 0.854 0.755 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 12.599 267.9 0.963 999.000 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.634 0.601 0.291 1.885 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 0.214 0.529 0.686 1.238 

Prior Drug Arrests: 

(0=None/Low; 1=Medium/High) 1 13.355 268.0 0.960 999.000 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.42 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.16 

Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Drug Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

(Eliminating “Zero-Zeros”) 

11.16(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 7 14 21 

Program Non-Interviewed 7 11 18 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested for drugs crime (N=39). 

‡ Youth without drug arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=51, Program=79) are removed 

from this analysis. 

11.16(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=19.242** with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -35.795 607.6 0.953 — 

Project: 

(0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed) 1 -0.347 0.665 0.602 0.707 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 1.751 495.4 0.997 5.758 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 13.055 124.3 0.916 999.000 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 1.799 1.154 0.119 6.045 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -1.309 0.930 0.159 0.270 

Prior Drug Arrests: 

(0=None/Low; 1=Medium; 2=High) 1 4.603 1.830 0.120 99.800 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.43 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.17 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests 

(Controlling for “Other” Arrests in the Pre-Program Period) 

11.17(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.484)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison; Program-Interviewed; Program 

Non-interviewed 

2 0.749 0.50 0.607 

Gender: 

Male/Female 1 0.046 0.03 0.862 

Race/Ethnicity: 

Latino /Non-Latino 1 3.055 2.04 0.155 

Gang Membership: 

Non-gang, Gang, Associate, Unknown 2 1.157 0.77 0.463 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

14 & under; 15 to 17; and 18 & over 2 0.539 0.36 0.698 

Program Length (or Equivalent): 

<2 Yrs/>=2 Yrs 1 1.793 1.20 0.275 

Prior “Other” Arrests: 

None; Low; Medium; High 3 58.515 39.16*** 0.000 

Within error 152 1.494 — — 

Total 164 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.17(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior “Other” Arrests Covariate 

Prior 

“Other” 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 56 1.065 0.219 1 — 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 66 -0.144 0.244 2 — 0.042* 0.000*** 

Medium 25 -0.760 0.303 3 — 0.000*** 

High 18 -2.803 0.348 4 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.44 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.18


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)


on “Other” Arrests for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth


11.18(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 35 37 72 

Program-Interviewed 66 32 98 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=170). 

‡ Youth without other arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=20, Program=30) are coded as 

“success.” 

11.18(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=13.845* with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -2.995 1.201 0.013 — 

Project (0=Comparison; 1=Program Interviewed) 1 0.753 0.352 0.033* 2.123 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 1.312 0.545 0.016* 3.712 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.474 0.402 0.238 1.607 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent) 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.269 0.239 0.260 1.309 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.072 0.216 0.740 0.931 

Prior “Other” Arrests: 

(0=None; 1=Low/Medium/High) 1 0.136 0.365 0.709 1.146 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.45 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 11.19


Summary of Logistic Regression: Project Effect (Success vs Failure)


on “Other” Arrests for Non-Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth


11.19(a) Frequency Distributions of Project Effect ‡ 

Project Success Failure Total † 

Comparison 35 37 72 

Program Non-Interviewed 71 26 97 

† Total number of youth who have been arrested (N=169). 

‡ Youth without other arrests in the pre-program and program periods (Comparison=20, Program=52) are coded 

“success.” 

11.19(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=16.950** with 6 df) 

Variable df Parameter 

Estimate 

Std. 

Error 

Pr >P2 Odds 

Ratio 

Intercept 1 -2.614 1.265 0.039 — 

Project: 

(0=Comparison; 1=Program Non-Interviewed) 1 0.591 0.196 0.003** 1.805 

Gender (0=Male; 1=Female) 1 0.791 0.549 0.150 2.207 

Race/Ethnicity (0=Non-Latino; 1=Latino) 1 0.720 0.398 0.070 2.055 

Age at Program Entry (or Equivalent): 

(0=14 & Under; 1=15 to 17; 2=18 & Over) 1 0.262 0.277 0.345 1.299 

Gang Membership: 

(0=Non-gang Youth; 1=Gang Associate; 2=Gang 

Member) 

1 -0.101 0.278 0.717 0.904 

Prior “Other” Arrests: 

(0=None: 1=Low/Medium/High) 1 0.055 0.410 0.893 1.056 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

11.46 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 12 

Program Youth Outcomes: Arrest and Service/Worker Contact Variables 

(Rolando Villarreal Sosa) 

Introduction 

In this chapter, we are interested not only in whether services or worker contacts 

contribute to changes in arrest patterns for program youth,1 but also whether different types and 

“dosages” of services provided by different Project workers contribute to increases or decreases 

in levels of arrests, and to probabilities of success and failure for the two program samples – 

interviewed and non-interviewed. 

First we considered how much the different total yearly arrest rates changed between the 

pre-program and program periods due to the effects of different services and worker contacts, 

using GLM model procedures. Second we considered whether the different services and worker 

contacts produced different ratios of program-youth successes versus failures, using Logistic 

Regression procedures. In all models we controlled for the variable prior arrest category, 

gender, age group, gang membership and interview status (interviewed versus non-interviewed). 

In the “best” models, we did not control for gender or gang membership (which produced only 

small cell sizes and insignificant differences). We controlled for race/ethnicity only in the 

property-arrest models. In some models, we did not use interaction terms – particularly in regard 

to social intervention or suppression – because they were not significant. 

1

 Com pariso n youth are ex clude d from this analysis sin ce ou r focus is on the d ifferent effec ts of spe cific 

types of program services and worker contacts on different samples and characteristics of program youth. 

12.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Our dependent, or outcome, variables are the same as in Chapter 11: total arrest changes, 

which includes arrests for all offenses; total violence arrest changes, which combines serious 

violence and general violence arrests; total drug arrest changes; total property arrest changes; 

and total “other” (minor) arrest changes. In the GLM models, we used changes in total yearly 

arrests, violence arrests, property arrests, and “other,” (minor) arrests. In the Logistic Regression 

models, we employed these same dependent variables in determining the ratio of youth success 

to failure in “reducing” arrests. The outcome variables in the Logistic Regression models were 

coded: failure – if the youth had an increase in arrests or remained at the same level of arrests 

between the pre-program and program periods; success – if the youth had a decrease in arrests or 

remained arrest-free during the pre-program and program periods. 

We tested the effects of the strategies of social-intervention services, suppression 

activities, opportunity-provision services, and different types of mobilization or coordination 

(non-suppression and suppression) contacts at the community level, as well as effects of total 

services or total contacts on arrest patterns. In order to construct “dosage” variables, we summed 

the service items and contacts according to the particular program strategies, they divided by the 

number of months program services or contacts were provided by workers, i.e., the time between 

the youth’s first and last date of program exposure. These “dosage” variables were used as 

predictors in the GLM and Logistic Regression models. The program variables with the greatest 

effect on the dependent variables proved to be: 1) social-intervention services2 and suppression 

2

Soc ial-interve ntion a ctivities inclu ded princip ally grou p disc ussion , individ ual co unseling or ad vice, fam ily 

counseling, and crisis intervention, provided mainly by case managers and probation officers, but also by outreach 

workers, school counselors, and even police. 

12.2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
activities3

; and 2) who provided the service – case managers/outreach youth workers (including 

youth intervention specialists) and probation/police. It was possible to statistically test the effects 

of the different strategies – social intervention and suppression – provided by the different types 

of workers, particularly social intervention provided by the probation officers (suppression was 

provided almost exclusively by probation and police). 

Our focus in the analysis was not only on those strategies which contributed to the best 

results (i.e., reduction of arrests for sample youth and higher ratios of successes to failures in 

lowering arrest levels or remaining arrest-free), but also on whether the interviewed youth (the 

relatively more serious offenders) or the non-interviewed youth (the relatively less serious [or 

non] offenders) did better under similar conditions of program strategies and types of worker 

contacts. 

Total Arrests 

In the first basic GLM model, excluding any program-effect variables, focus was on 

change in total arrests for all program youth with arrests in either or both the program or preprogram period (n = 148).4 The control factors included category of prior total yearly arrests5

, 

3

Suppression activities included supervision/surveillance, probation, parole, monitoring, arrest, home 

confineme nt, violatio n of pr oba tion, de tention, a nd o ther formal so cial-control ser vices p rovid ed alm ost exc lusively 

by proba tion and po lice office rs, but also by othe r pro gram work ers (ca se ma nagers, outre ach w orke rs, and the youth 

intervention specialists). 

4

 The sam ple size included 8 8 interv iewed and 6 0 no n-interviewed program youth w ho we re pro vided with 

one month or more of program services, and had at least one arrest during either or both the pre-program or program 

period. The total does not include 5 program youth (2 who were not officially in the program for more than one 

month and/or did not receive more than one month of program services, and 3 who were interviewed but did not 

have any worker-tracking data). 

5

 Level of prior total yearly arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.25 to 0.99 

prior arrests; 3) me dium = 1.00 to 1 .99 prior arrests; and 4) high = 2.00 to 1 1.07 p rior arrests. 

12.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
age group at program entry, gang membership, gender, race/ethnicity, and interview status. The 

model explained approximately 45% of the variance in the dependent variable and was 

significant (p. < 0.001). Prior total yearly arrests category (p. < 0.001) and interview status 

(p. <0.05) were significant: gender approached significance (p. < 0.080).6 Females had larger 

reductions in arrests than males, and non-interviewed youth decreased their yearly arrest means 

more than the interviewed youth. As the level of prior arrests increased, there were larger 

reductions in the number of yearly arrests in the program period, with the greatest decrease 

among program youth with the highest priors. The pattern represented a strong “regression 

effect” which occurred in most of the subsequent GLM and Logistic Regression models (Table 

12.1). 

Next, a series of models were constructed to determine which program variable(s) was 

more significant in predicting arrest changes. In the “best” GLM model, the dependent variable 

was the mean change in total yearly arrests between the pre-program and program periods for 

the two program samples (interviewed and non-interviewed), and the key independent variables 

were social intervention and the interaction term category of prior total yearly arrests × social 

intervention. The model included prior total yearly arrests category as a covariate; the control 

variables were age group at program entry and interview status. The model explained 43.9% of 

the variance in the dependent variable and was significant (p. < 0.001) (Table 12.2). 

Both prior total yearly arrests and age group at program entry were significant (p. < 

0.001). Youth with higher priors (“medium” and “high” categories) had larger reductions, while 

6

 Because only 16 of the 148 youth (10.8%) were female, and the lack of significance of the gender control 

variab le in the m ode l, gender was not included in any of the other G LM mod els in this analysis. 

12.4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth in the “low” or “none” categories had increases. Across all age groups, program youth had 

reduced arrest means. The 18 to 23-year-olds had the largest decrease in total arrests (adjusted 

mean = -1.393) followed by the 12 to 14-year-olds (adjusted mean = -0.780), and the 15 to 17-

year-olds (adjusted mean = -0.377). The difference between the 15 to 17 and 18 to-23-year-old 

groups was statistically significant (p. = 0.004). 

Social intervention, especially as in interaction term with level of prior arrests, 

contributed to a statistically significant reduction in the change in total yearly arrests during the 

program period. Youth with the highest category of prior arrests generally had the highest level 

of reductions in total yearly arrests. There were some anomolies, however. Youth provided with 

the highest levels of social intervention did not necessarily have relatively greater reductions in 

total yearly arrests (Table 12.2e). Controlling for priors, youth with “none” and “low” categories 

of prior arrests who were provided with low levels of social intervention seemed to do better than 

youth with medium levels of social intervention while, overall, youth with “medium” and “high” 

categories of prior arrests generally did better with higher levels of social intervention. 

In the Logistic Regression model for total arrests (N = 169),7 with the key program 

variable social intervention, the model was statistically significant (Chi Square = 30.483, df = 6, 

p. < 0.001). The actual percentage of program-youth successes was 67.5%, while the percentage 

of failures was 32.5%. The prior total yearly arrests variable was statistically significant. From 

the “none” to “low”-level priors to the “high”-level priors, youth improved their odds of being a 

success by 77%. The control variable age group at program entry showed a non-linear pattern. 

7

 The Logistic Regression equations included 21 more youth (14 non-interviewed and 7 interviewed) than 

the GLM model (n = 148). These 21 youth may have had arrest records, but the arrests were before the pre-program 

and pro gram pe riods. 

12.5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Youth aged 15 to 17 years had a non-significant decrease in their odds of success compared to 12 

to 14-year-olds, while the 18 to 23-year-olds were 3.6 times more likely to succeed than the 12 to 

14-year-olds (Table 12.3). In general, the 15 to 17-year-old group did not do as well as the other 

age groups in reducing their level of arrests and had lower success-to-failure ratios across all of 

the models, regardless of arrest-category variables. 

Although the variable interview status was not statistically significant (p. = 0.650), youth 

who were interviewed (more of whom had arrest records) had approximately a 20% greater 

increase in their odds of success (odds ratio = 1.20) compared to non-interviewed youth. This 

finding appeared not to be consistent with the results from the GLM model in which noninterviewed youth had a larger reduction in their yearly arrest mean than interviewed youth. But 

the different results were explained by the fact that the two modeling procedures (GLM and 

Logistic Regression) were measuring two distinct types of outcomes during the program period: 

change in arrest means, and the ratio of youth who succeeded (reduced their arrest rates or 

remained at zero-zero arrests) compared to those who failed (increased or did not reduce their 

arrest rates). In the Logistic Regression models, more interviewed youth had smaller reductions 

in their arrest rates or remained arrest free (odds ratio = 2.39) than non-interviewed youth (odds 

ratio = 1.74). In the GLM models, even though there were few non-interviewed youth who 

succeeded, their overall reduction of total yearly arrests was more than that of the interviewed 

youth; and there were more non-interviewed youth who failed, but their overall increase in total 

yearly arrests was less than that of the interviewed youth. 

The social intervention variable was not significant and had a non-linear association with 

the bivariate dependent variable change in total yearly arrests (i.e., success or failure). Program 

12.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth who were provided with medium levels of social intervention were two times less likely to 

be successful compared to those who were provided with low levels of social intervention. 

However, the likelihood of success for youth who were provided with the highest level of social 

intervention was similar to those who received the lowest level. 

Type of Worker Contact and Social Intervention 

To understand the complex relationship between the variable social intervention and the 

dependent variable change in total yearly arrests, we constructed further Logistic Regression 

models to estimate which types of Project workers provided social intervention to which types of 

youth, and with what result. Social intervention provided by probation and police officers was 

distinguished from social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers 

(including the youth intervention specialists). We were also interested in how youth with 

different levels of prior arrests responded to social intervention provided by different types of 

Project personnel, i.e., rates of increase (or no change) in arrests versus decrease in (or remaining 

without) arrests. We needed especially to analyze the relationship between the two Projectworker providers of social intervention and youth with different prior-arrest backgrounds, as 

predictors of the ratio between success and failure. 

Social Intervention by Probation/Police. In the first series of Logistic Regression models, social 

intervention provided by probation and police officers was the primary independent variable. 

The models included the control variables category of prior total yearly arrests, age group at 

program entry, and interview status. Several models, with probation and police officers as 

12.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
primary independent variables, were constructed with varying numbers of program youth, based 

on whether they had prior arrests or not. 

The first Logistic Regression model, including all 169 youth (with and without priors) 

and all the control variables, was statistically significant (Chi Square = 27.651, df = 6, p. = 

0.001). The findings were similar to the Logistic Regression model above, which did not 

distinguish between who provided the social intervention. Again, category of prior total yearly 

arrests and age group at program entry were statistically significant. Youth with higher prior 

arrests were 2.4 times more likely to be successful compared to youth with lower priors. Youth 

in both the 15 to 17 and 18 to 23 age categories were more likely to succeed; however, this time 

the 18 to 23-year-olds were statistically more likely to succeed than the 12 to 14-year-olds (p. < 

0.01). Interviewed youth did better than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 1.24). The variable 

social intervention provided by probation and police officers was not significant, but higher 

levels of provision of social intervention by them decreased the odds of a youth being a success, 

i.e., increased the odds of failure, from between 22% to approximately 25%, at least when all 

types of youth who were provided with social intervention by probation and police officers were 

considered (Table 12.4). 

In the next Logistic Regression model, including only youth with no priors in the preprogram period who were provided with social-intervention services by probation and police 

officers (n = 42), youth who had no pre-program arrest histories had even lower odds of 

succeeding as social intervention increased. The model was not significant and none of the 

variables was significant, in part due to the small sample size. The model did indicate a 

particular tendency for youth in the non-interviewed sample who had no pre-program arrest 

12.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
background to do worse than youth with no pre-program arrest background in the interviewed 

sample, when provided with social intervention by probation and police (Table 12.5). 

In a further Logistic Regression model, which included only program youth with some 

level of priors (N = 127), the equation was significant (Chi-square = 16.894, Df = 6, p. < 0.01), 

but the only statistically significant variable was prior total yearly arrests (p. < 0.01). However, 

interviewed youth did 50% better than non-interviewed youth. The higher levels of social 

intervention provided by probation and police officers, especially to youth with pre-program 

arrest records, increased the odds of a youth succeeding by 15% (medium level of social 

intervention) to 42% (high level of social intervention), i.e., decreased their arrest rates (Table 

12.6). In other words, increased levels of social intervention by probation and police tended to 

be more effective for youth with prior arrests than for youth without arrest histories. The last two 

Logistic Regression models showed contrasting results of social intervention when applied to 

both delinquent and non-delinquent youth. (From a policy perspective, the value of social 

intervention or suppression – at any level – provided by probation and police to youth who had 

no arrest records ought to be questioned.) 

Social Intervention by Case Managers and Outreach Youth Workers 

A somewhat more favorable pattern for program youth was observed in the series of 

Logistic Regression models using the key program variable social intervention provided by case 

managers and outreach youth workers (including the youth intervention specialists). The same 

set of control variables – category of prior total yearly arrests, age group at program entry, and 

interview status – was used, with focus on the relationship between levels of provision of social 

12.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
intervention by this set of Project workers, and categories of prior arrests of program youth. 

The first Logistic Regression model with social intervention provided by case managers 

and outreach youth workers included all youth, with and without priors (N = 169). The equation 

was statistically significant (Chi square = 29.535, df = 6, p. < 0.001). The control variables 

category of prior total yearly arrests and age group at program entry were statistically 

significant, and had about the same relationships to social intervention provided by probation and 

police officers. Youth with a higher level of prior arrests were 2.35 times more likely to succeed 

than youth with a lower level of priors. Eighteen (18) to 23-year-olds were 4.74 times more 

likely to be successful compared to youth aged 12 to 14 years. 

Although social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers was 

not statistically significant, youth who received a medium level of social intervention were more 

likely to succeed than those who had low levels of social intervention. However, youth who 

were provided with the highest level of social intervention had lower odds of succeeding 

compared to youth with the lowest level of social intervention (Table 12.7).8 The majority of 

program youth were arrested for “other,” or minor, misdemeanor offenses. (Whether these youth 

should have been targeted for entry into the program is a legitimate question.) 

The next Logistic Regression model included only youth with no (or a low level of) priors 

(n = 90), and social intervention provided by case managers and outreach youth workers. Neither 

the overall model nor any of the variables was statistically significant. However, the highest 

level of social intervention compared to the lowest level had a large and negative impact on a 

youth’s odds of being successful. Once again, youth with a medium level of social intervention 

8

These were youth with either low levels of prior arrests (and)/or 12 to 14 years old. 

12.10 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
did a little better than youth with a low level, and considerably better than youth with a high level 

of social intervention. These differences in level of social intervention provided were not 

statistically significant. Again, it is possible that high social intervention was provided to youth 

who had increases in arrests during the program period. Nevertheless, interviewed youth did 

better than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 1.329) (Table 12.8). 

The final Logistic Regression model in this series included youth with medium and high 

level of priors (n = 79). The overall equation was not significant, and the only significant 

variable was age group at program entry. Eighteen (18) to 23-year-olds were 13 times more 

likely to be successful than the 12 to 14-year-olds. More important, youth provided with medium 

and high levels of social intervention were more than twice as likely to be successful than youth 

provided with a low level of social intervention. Of special interest was that interviewed youth 

were likely to do worse than non-interviewed youth. The odds ratio of success to failure was 

1.38 when case managers and outreach youth workers provided social-intervention services to 

non-interviewed youth compared to interviewed youth, regardless of levels of prior arrests (Table 

12.9). 

In general, higher levels of social intervention appeared to be more effective for youth 

with prior arrests when provided by probation and police, as well as by case managers and 

outreach youth workers. The positive effects of probation and police were mainly for the 

interviewed program youth, more of whom were likely to be more frequent and serious 

offenders. The positive effects of case managers and outreach youth workers were mainly for the 

non-interviewed program youth, fewer of whom were more frequent or serious offenders. There 

was a clear tendency for a negative effect when medium and high levels of social intervention 

12.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were provided by probation and police officers to non-interviewed youth and to younger 

(probably less-serious) offenders, particularly those without prior arrests. The effect of the 

provision of social intervention to less-delinquent youth was mixed. High levels of social 

intervention could be associated with an increase in the ratio of success to failure, most 

particularly for the 15 to 17-year-olds. 

Violence Arrests 

In the GLM model with the dependent variable mean change in yearly violence arrests, 

(n = 65), the program strategies of level of suppression9

 and level of social intervention10 and the 

program variables category of prior yearly violence arrests11 , age group at program entry, and 

interview status were entered in two separate equations to determine whether either program 

strategy (under statistically-controlled conditions) had an effect. None of the two programstrategy variables was significant as a main effect in the separate equations, despite the fact that 

each GLM model was significant. The model with the largest R-square (0.710) included level of 

suppression, and the interaction term category of prior yearly violence arrests × level of 

suppression was significant (p. < 0.001) (Table 12.10). 

All youth with prior arrests decreased their violence arrests, regardless of level of 

suppression provided. The most significant variable in the model was category of prior yearly 

9

Level of suppression con tacts pe r mo nth was categorized as: 1) lower = 0 to 1; 2) higher = 1.01 to 7.61. 

10Level of social intervention con tacts pe r mo nth was categorized as: 1) lower = 0 to 1.98; 2) higher = 2.79 

to 13.79. 

11Level of prior yearly violence arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.27 to 0.48 

prior arrests; 3) me dium = 0.50 to 0 .98 prio r arrests; 4) high = 1.0 2 to 5.10 prior arrests. 

12.12 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
violence arrests (p. < 0.001). However, the interaction term prior yearly violence arrests × level 

of suppression was also significant (p. = 0.019). A higher level of suppression generally 

contributed to lower violence arrests for each category of prior violence arrests, except for youth 

who had no history of violence arrests. Table 12.10b clearly shows that youth with a low level of 

prior violence arrests had a slight decrease. We note that all frequencies in the subtable 

illustrating the effect of the interaction term were very small, except for the category of high 

frequencies of prior violence arrests (Table 12.10d). 

In the GLM model using level of social intervention (p. = 0.542) and the interaction term 

category of prior yearly violence arrests x level of social intervention as the key program 

variables, the only significant variable other than the category of prior yearly violence arrests 

was age group at program entry. Neither level of social intervention nor the interaction term 

category of prior yearly violence arrests x level of social intervention was significant as a main 

effect. However, there was a significant (p. = 0.008) reduction in violence arrests for youth 12 to 

14 years old, compared to the slight reduction for youth 15 to 17 years old (Table 12.11). 

The Logistic Regression model for total violence arrests (n = 65) was significant, 

whether we used level of suppression (0 = lower; 1 = higher) or level of social intervention (0 = 

lower; 1 = higher) as key program variables in separate equations. In the slightly stronger model, 

with level of suppression as the key program variable, prior yearly violence arrests (p. < 0.001) 

and age group at program entry, comparing 18 to 23-year-olds to 12 to 14-year-olds (p. < 0.05), 

were significant. All of the odds ratios were positive. There were more successes than failures 

for both interviewed and non-interviewed youth. The odds ratio of success to failure for older 

youth (18 to 23 years) was 7.65 times greater than that for youth 12 to 14 years. The odds ratio 

12.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of success to failure for interviewed youth was 2.44. The odds ratio was about the same, whether 

high or low levels of suppression were used. There was about an equal chance of success at 

either level (Table 12.12). However, in the Logistic Regression model with social intervention 

as the program variable, lower levels of social intervention were more effective than higher 

levels (odds ratio = 1.72); again the difference is not statistically significant (Table 12.13). 

Drug Arrests 

There were only 39 youth with drug arrests in the entire program sample (N = 169), 

including both interviewed youth (n = 22) and non-interviewed youth (n = 17). Our better GLM 

model (R-square = 0.449, p. < 0.01) used level of social intervention (0 = higher; 1 = lower) as 

the key program variable in the equation. Category of prior yearly drug arrests (none, lower, 

higher) was significant (p. < 0.001). Level of social intervention was almost significant (p. = 

0.064). Lower levels of social intervention contributed to a reduction in drug arrests (n = 21), 

while higher levels or “doses” of social intervention contributed to an increase in drug arrests 

(n = 18). This was an anomalous finding, and is explained to some extent in the discussion 

below where we used a Logistic Regression procedure (Table 12.14). 

The GLM model with suppression as the dependent variable was also significant (Rsquare = 0.417, p. < 0.01). None of the variables in the equation other than category of prior 

yearly drug arrests (none, lower, higher)12 (p. = 0.001) was significant (Table 12.15). 

In the Logistic Regression model using level of social intervention as the key program 

12Level of prior yearly drug arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) lower = 0.26 to 0.49 

prior arrests; 3) higher = 0.51 to 2 .69 prio r arrests. 

12.14 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
variable, the equation was significant (Chi-square = 24.48, df = 5, p. < 0.001). Interviewed youth 

(the majority of whom were on probation) were far more likely to be successful in reducing drug 

arrests than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 48.21, p. < 0.006). The success rate for 

interviewed youth was 72.7%, but only 41.2% for non-interviewed youth. However, lower levels 

of social intervention were more likely to have higher odds of success than higher levels (odds 

ratio = 2.23; p. = 0.486); the difference was not statistically significant. Youth in the oldest age 

group (18 to 23) were most likely to succeed in reducing their level of drug arrests (odds ratio = 

15.521, p. = 0.07) when compared to the 12 to 14-year-olds (Table 12.16). 

What seemed to be occurring was that more social intervention was directed to noninterviewed youth than to interviewed youth. More of the interviewed youth arrested for drugs 

were probably on probation, and were provided with suppression services (e.g., probation 

supervision). Social intervention, without controlling for close supervision, may not have been a 

useful predictor of success. 

When we used suppression instead of social intervention as our key program variable in a 

Logistic Regression model (but with the same control variables as in the previous model), we 

obtained results that were somewhat similar. However, the effect of suppression together with 

social intervention explained the seemingly anomalous findings in the above GLM model (Table 

12.14). The Logistic Regression equation with suppression as the key program variable was 

again significant (Chi-square = 24.408, df = 5, p. < 0.001), with an identical pattern of success 

outcomes for non-interviewed and interviewed youth. The most significant variable in the 

equation was category of prior yearly drug arrests (p. < 0.006). Youth in the oldest age group 

(18 to 23) were most likely to be successes in reducing their level of drug arrests (odds ratio = 

12.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
21.856, p. = 0.025) when compared to the 12 to 14-year-olds. Again, interviewed youth were 

more likely to be successes than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 55.361, p. = 0.007). In this 

model, higher levels of suppression were more effective than lower levels of suppression in the 

ratio of successes to failures in reducing drug arrest rates (odds ratio = 1.942, p. = 0.525) (Table 

12.17). 

The GLM and two Logistic Regression models indicate that social intervention tended to 

be more effective than suppression in reducing levels of drug arrests; however, the success rate 

was higher for interviewed youth, most of whom were older and had probation or prior-arrest 

records. Social intervention of a limited “dosage” was more effective than at a higher “dosage,” 

for both interviewed and non-interviewed youth. The higher “dosage” of suppression was more 

effective than lower “dosages.” 

Our sample sizes were small, and the analysis must be regarded at this stage as 

exploratory and tentative. What was suggested, however, was that both social intervention and 

suppression, in different combinations and at different levels, might be effective in reducing 

levels of arrests for drugs when targeted to appropriate youth. Suppression was probably 

required for those youth with higher levels of prior arrests for drugs, yet a certain level of social 

intervention was also important for all youth. 

Property Arrests 

In the GLM model with the dependent variable mean change in yearly property arrests 

12.16


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(n = 90), the variables entered into the equation were category of prior yearly property arrests13, 

age group at program entry (12 to14 years; 15 to 17 years; 18 to 23 years), interview status (noninterviewed versus interviewed), race/ethnicity (Latino versus non-Latino), level of suppression 

(“none;” “some”), and the interaction term category of prior yearly property arrests × 

suppression. The equation was significant (R-square = 0.665, p. < 0.001). Several variables 

were either significant or marginally significant. 

Category of prior yearly property arrests was highly significant (p. < 0.001). Interview 

status was significant (p. = 0.015), as was the program variable level of suppression (p. = 0.035). 

A lower level of suppression was more effective than a higher level of suppression in reducing 

arrests for property crime. The youth who received suppression services, as indicated above, did 

significantly worse (p. = 0.035) than those who did not receive suppression services. The 

interaction term prior yearly property arrests × level of suppression was not significant, which 

indicated that the effect of suppression was similar for all or most of the categories of prior 

yearly property arrests. Non-interviewed youth had a significantly greater reduction in property 

arrests (adjusted mean = -0.496) than interviewed youth (adjusted mean = -0.00346).14 Latino 

youth had greater reductions in property arrests than non-Latino youth (p. = 0.022). The oldest 

age group (18 to 23 years) experienced a significantly greater decrease in property arrests than 

the 15 to 17-year-olds (p. = 0.020) (Table 12.18). 

In a somewhat similar model, we used level of social intervention in place of level of 

13Level of prior yearly property arrests was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.25 to 0.49 

prior arrests; 3) me dium = 0.51 to 0 .94 prio r arrests; 4) high = 1.1 3 to 5.29 prior arrests. 

14This was opposite to findings in the previous drug-arrest model, where increased suppression was more 

effective with interviewed youth and less effective with non-interviewed youth. 

12.17 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
suppression as the key program variable. The equation was statistically significant (R-square = 

0.660, p. = 0.001). The program variable level of social intervention was close to significance (p. 

= 0.065) in reducing property arrests for both interviewed and non-interviewed youth. Noninterviewed youth reduced property arrests significantly (p. = 0.014) more than interviewed 

youth. Higher levels of social intervention were less effective for all youth in lowering property 

arrests. A low level of social intervention appeared to be especially useful for non-interviewed 

youth in reducing levels of property arrests. It was clear that lower levels of social intervention 

or suppression were better than higher levels in reducing property arrests for program youth 

generally (Table 12.19). 

The Logistic Regression model with suppression as the key program variable was 

significant (Chi-square = 26.865, df = 6, p. < 0.001). Category of prior yearly property arrests 

(0 = none to low; 2 = medium; 3 = high) was the strongest predictor-variable in the equation (p. 

< 0.001). Again, the oldest age group (18 to 23 years) had the highest ratio of youth who were 

successes in the reduction of arrests for property crime. More interviewed youth (72.9%) were 

classified as successes in reducing their property arrests compared to non-interviewed youth 

(67.7%). Twice as many interviewed youth compared to non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 

2.045, p. = 0.266) were likely to be successes, controlling for other variables in the equation. 

More Latinos than non-Latinos were likely to be successes, although the difference was not 

statistically significant (odds ratio = 2.340, p. = 0.215). 

Again, we observe that a lower level of suppression was better than a higher level in 

contributing to the success-to-failure ratio in lowering property arrest rates, but the difference 

was not significant (odds ratio = 0.679, p. = 0.517) (Table 12.20). 

12.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In a similar Logistic Regression model with social intervention as the dependent variable, 

the equation was highly significant (Chi-square = 42.756, df = 6, p. < 0.001). Category of prior 

yearly property arrests (0 = none; 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high) was significant (p. < 0.001), 

but no other variable in the equation was significant, except again that youth in the oldest age 

group (18 to 23 years) were most likely to be successes, i.e., reduce their levels of property 

arrests or remain at zero property arrests (odds ratio = 3.813, p. = 0.143). And once again, we 

find that youth with lower levels of social intervention were more likely to be successes than 

youth with higher levels of social intervention (odds ratio = 2.09, p. = 0.295). Also, interviewed 

youth had higher success-to-failure ratios than non-interviewed youth (odds ratio = 1.46, p. = 

0.609) (Table 12.21). 

Overall, a regression effect was most evident in determining property-arrest outcomes for 

program youth, regardless of whether suppression or social intervention was provided. High 

levels of suppression or social intervention had almost no (or a very limited) effect on rates of 

property arrests for youth in the program. Lower levels of suppression or social-intervention 

services, particularly for interviewed youth (who were more delinquent) had some positive effect. 

“Other” (Minor) Arrests 

In the final set of models, analyzing the effects of service variables, our “best” GLM 

model explaining variance in the dependent variable “other,” or minor, arrests (including 

disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, driving without a license and status offenses) was 

significant (R-square = 0.524, p. < 0.001). The variables entered into the equation were category 

12.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of prior yearly “other” arrests15 , age group at program entry, interview status, level of social 

intervention (lower, higher), and the interaction term category of prior “other” yearly arrest × 

social intervention. The program sample size (n = 105) was larger than in the other models, 

except for the total arrests model (n = 148). Most program youth in the model had been arrested 

for an “other,” or minor, offense in either or both the pre-program or program periods 

The most significant variable in the model was category of prior yearly “other” arrests 

(p. < 0.001), followed by the interaction term category of prior yearly “other” arrests × level of 

social intervention (p. = 0.004). The variable level of social intervention was marginally 

significant (p. = 0.086). Neither the age group at program entry nor interview status variables 

was statistically significant (Table 12.22). 

While category of prior yearly “other” arrests was the strongest predictor of 

“other”-arrests change in the program period, the interaction of prior yearly “other” arrests and 

level of social intervention showed noteworthy change patterns. Higher levels of social 

intervention accounted for decreases for youth with higher levels of prior yearly “other” arrests, 

while lower levels of social intervention also accounted for decreases for youth with lower prior 

yearly “other” arrest levels, except for youth with no priors. Evidence was particularly strong for 

the greater effect of higher rather than lower levels of social intervention for youth who had the 

highest levels of prior yearly “other” arrests; however, sample cell sizes were small. The 

tendency for more social intervention to contribute to a greater decrease in arrests was strong for 

those youth who had been arrested for minor crimes at least twice during the pre-program period. 

15Level of prior yearly “other” arrests offenses was categorized as: 1) none = no prior arrests; 2) low = 0.28 

to 0.98 p rior arrests; 3) med ium = 1.0 0 to 1.97 prior arrests; 4) high = 2.00 to 1 1.07 p rior arrests. 

12.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The effect was present for youth in the different age groups. Social intervention had a consistent 

and almost significant effect across control categories in contributing to the reduction of “other” 

arrests. 

The Logistic Regression model with the same variables was significant (Chi-square = 

28.648, df = 5, p. < 0.001). Only the category of prior yearly “other” arrests (p. = 0.026), and 

level of social intervention – particularly at the lowest level (p. 0.025) of provision of social 

intervention (odds ratio = 2.724, p. = 0.089) – were statistically significant. Interviewed youth 

did better, i.e., more of them were successes than failures (odds ratio = 1.217, p. < 0.622) (Table 

12.23). Low and high levels of social intervention contributed to the success of youth in 

reducing arrests for “other” offenses. Compared to a low or high level, a medium level of social 

intervention appeared to be less effective in accounting for success rates, but this difference was 

not significant (p. = 0.230). Interviewed youth were more likely to be successes than failures 

compared to non-interviewed youth, particularly when high levels of social intervention were 

provided. 

Finally, we cannot explain at this time the general lack of social intervention at medium 

levels being effective in the reduction of “other” arrests. This may be a result of the way services 

provided to different youth were recorded. We knew that our program “dosage” (i.e., amount of 

specific service or activity provided by the worker) needed to be further refined, but this would 

have required more frequent completion of worker tracking forms (an extra burden objected to by 

local-Project personnel). Project workers only estimated the number of times they gave certain 

services to a youth over a three-month period, rather than the amount of a particular service or 

activity provided at the particular time when specific contact was made. 

12.21


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Summary 

The GLM models for total arrests indicated that social intervention provided to the moredelinquent program youth (or to those with higher levels of prior arrests) contributed to a greater 

decrease in mean arrest rates; and the Logistic Regression models for total arrests indicated that 

social intervention contributed to an increase in the odds of youth being successes (remaining 

arrest-free or decreasing their rate of arrests). However, there seemed to be a distinction in effect 

among the types of workers providing social-intervention services. The detailed analysis in the 

Logistic Regression models for total arrests showed that the provision of social intervention by 

probation and police officers to non-delinquent program youth increased the youth’s odds of 

failure. The provision of social intervention by probation/police and case managers/outreach 

workers (including the youth intervention specialists) to youth with prior arrests had positive 

results, and increased the youth’s likelihood of success. The provision of social intervention by 

case managers, outreach workers and the youth intervention specialists was more likely to 

increase the odds of a youth’s success, whether or not the youth entered the program with an 

arrests background. 

In the GLM and Logistic Regression models for violence arrests, the provision of 

suppression services by probation and police officers rather than case managers and outreach 

workers played a stronger role in a positive outcome for program youth. Those who had higher 

prior arrests, and who were provided with a higher level of suppression, either decreased their 

violence arrest rate or increased their odds of being a success. On the other hand, youth who had 

prior arrests and who were provided with a lower level of social intervention also either 

decreased their violence arrest rate, or increased their odds of being a success. 

12.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In the models for change in drug arrests, social intervention tended to be more effective 

than suppression in reducing arrest rates; however, the success-to-failure ratio was higher for 

interviewed youth, most of whom were older youth with prior arrests who were on probation. 

Low levels of social intervention were more effective than high levels for youth both with and 

without prior arrests. Higher levels of suppression were also more effective than lower levels in 

reducing drug-arrest rates. 

A regression effect was most significant in determining property arrest outcomes for 

program youth, regardless of whether suppression or social-intervention was provided. Higher 

levels of suppression or social intervention had almost no (or a very limited) effect on rates of 

property arrests. Lower levels of provision of suppression or social-intervention services, 

particularly for interviewed youth (more of whom were delinquent) had some positive effect. 

For youth included in the models for “other,” or minor, offenses, social intervention 

either contributed to a decrease in the youth’s mean arrest rate in the GLM model, or increased 

the odds of a youth being a success (especially for youth with a high level of priors) in the 

Logistic Regression model. Higher levels of social intervention tended to be more effective than 

lower levels in reducing arrest rates for “other” (minor) offenses.

 We also note that it was difficult to make distinctions about who best provided (or 

should have provided) social-intervention services, particularly to youth with prior arrest records, 

since a team of different types of workers in collaboration (or at least in communication) with 

each other provided various types of services during the course of the Project. While some level 

of social-intervention services was better than no social-intervention services (or other types of 

worker activities), it was not clear that higher levels of services (i.e., higher levels of social 

12.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
intervention) were better than lower levels of services for youth generally. 

Social-intervention services had a positive and significant effect on the outcomes of 

program youth, especially in respect to their overall arrest rates. Still, it was difficult to 

disentangle the effect of social intervention from an overall regression effect. Also, while 

suppression had a somewhat positive impact on the outcomes for youth with prior violence 

arrests, it had negative effects on the outcomes for youth with prior drug and property arrests. 

12.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

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---

---

Table 12.1 

Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Covariates (N=148)\

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Yearly Arrests 

for Program Youth with Control Variables 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.446 ; Adjusted R-square=0.405)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 77.593 30.682*** 0.000 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 5.049 1.996 0.140 

Gang Membership: 

Non-gang Youth, Gang Associate, 

Gang Member 

2 2.209 0.873 0.420 

Gender: 

Male vs. Female 1 7.869 3.112 0.080 

Race/Ethnicity: 

Latino vs. Non-Latino 1 4.526 1.790 0.183 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 11.817 4.673* 0.032 

Within error 137 2.529 

Corrected Total 147 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Total 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 21 1.605 0.405 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 48 -0.288 0.347 2 0.005** 0.000*** 

Medium 38 -1.298 0.357 3 0.001*** 

High 41 -2.556 0.364 4 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

\ Twenty-one program participants had no arrests during the pre-program and program periods; they are not 

included in the GLM cell means analysis. 

12.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

Table 12.1-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Gender Main Effect 

Gender N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Male 132 -0.219 0.232 1 0.080 

Female 16 -1.050 0.448 2 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Interview-Status Main Effect 

Interview 

Status N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Non-Interviewed 60 -0.949 0.321 1 0.032* 

Interviewed 88 -0.319 0.289 2 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

---

---

Table 12.2 

Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention (N=148)\

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Yearly Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.439; Adjusted R-square=0.393)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

None/Low, Medium, High 2 87.485 34.151*** 0.000 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 11.176 4.363*** 0.000 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 2.764 1.079 0.301 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low, Medium, High 2 7.804 3.046 0.051 

Interaction: 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests x Level of 

Social Intervention 

4 8.450 3.299* 0.013 

Within error 136 2.562 

Total 147 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Prior Total Yearly Arrests Covariate 

Prior Total 

Yearly Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None/Low 69 0.528 0.214 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Medium 38 -0.864 0.281 2 0.000*** 0.000*** 

High 41 -2.214 0.259 3 0.000*** 0.000*** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

\ Twenty-one program participants had no arrests during the preprogram and program periods; they are not 

included in the GLM cell means analysis. 

12.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.2-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Age-Group-at-Program Entry Main Effect 

Age Group at 

Program Entry N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

12-14 43 -0.780 0.271 1 

15-17 66 -0.377 0.205 2 0.004** 

18-23 39 -1.393 0.285 3 0.004** 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for the Level-of-Social-Intervention Main Effect 

Level of Social 

Intervention N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean (i) = Adjusted Mean 

(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 56 -1.020 0.233 1 0.041* 

Medium 55 -0.331 0.265 2 0.041* 0.035* 

High 37 -1.198 0.293 3 0.035** 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.2-continued 

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Prior Total Yearly Arrests x Level of Social Intervention 

Prior Total 

Yearly 

Arrests 

Level of 

Social 

Intervention 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr > . T .

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i) = Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

None/Low Low -0.357 0.365 

(21) 1   

None/Low Medium 0.822 0.288 

(33) 2 

None/Low High 1.120 0.446 

(15) 3 

Medium Low -0.589 0.405 

(18) 4 

Medium Medium -0.456 0.583 

(8) 5 

Medium High -1.546 0.479 

(12) 6 

High Low -2.115 0.395 

(17) 7 

High Medium -1.358 0.431 

(14) 8 **  

High High -3.170 0.513 

(10) 9 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.29 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.3 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention for 

Total Sample (N=169) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 47 27 74 

TI Interviewed 67 28 95 

†Total program youth with and without arrest histories, but with service data and more than one month of program 

exposure and services (N=169). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=30.483 with df=6)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 0.133 0.358 0.138 0.710 1.142 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 

3=High) 

1 0.572 0.175 10.679 0.001 1.772 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 7.398 0.025 

15-17 2 -0.247 0.406 0.372 0.542 0.781 

18-23 1.280 0.608 4.436 0.035 3.598 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 1 0.181 0.399 0.206 0.650 1.199 

1=Interviewed) 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 4.333 0.115 

Medium 2 -0.773 0.438 3.107 0.078 0.462 

High 0.024 0.529 0.002 0.962 1.024 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.30 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.4 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention 

Provided by Probation and Police Officers (N=169) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 47 27 74 

TI Interviewed 67 28 95 

†Total program youth with and without arrest histories, but with service data and more than one month of program 

exposure and services (N=169). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=27.651 with df=6)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -0.519 0.474 1.201 0.273 0.595 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 

3=High) 

1 0.876 0.251 12.155** 

* 0.000 2.400 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 7.813 0.020 

15-17 2 0.254 0.396 0.411 0.521 1.289 

18-23 1.542 0.552 7.798** 0.005 4.674 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 1 0.211 0.387 0.297 0.586 1.235 

1=Interviewed) 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 0.316 0.854 

Medium 2 -0.242 0.524 0.214 0.644 0.785 

High -0.284 0.520 0.298 0.585 0.753 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.31 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.5 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention 

Provided by Probation and Police Officers (N=42)\

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 14 14 28 

Interviewed 7 7 14 

†Total program youth with no prior arrests, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=42). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=2.224 with df=4) 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 0.363 0.527 0.476 0.490 1.438 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

(0=15 to 17, 1=14 & Under and 

18 & Over, ) 

1 0.443 0.650 0.464 0.496 1.558 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 

1=Interviewed) 

1 -0.169 0.782 0.047 0.829 0.845 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 1.328 0.515 

Medium 2 -0.207 0.983 0.044 0.833 0.813 

High -0.849 0.794 1.143 0.285 0.428 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

\ This subsample includes 21 program participants who had no priors and 21 who remained arrest free during the 

pre-program and program periods. 

12.32


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.6 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention 

Provided by Probation and Police Officers (N=127)\

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 33 13 46 

Interviewed 60 21 81 

†Total program youth with at least one prior arrest , service data, and more than one month of program exposure 

(N=127). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=16.894 with df=6)** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -0.638 0.664 0.922 0.337 0.528 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

(1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High) 1 0.822 0.289 8.069** 0.005 2.275 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

14 & Under 4.489 0.106 

15 to 17 2 -0.312 0.504 0.382 0.537 0.732 

18 & Over 0.916 0.636 2.074 0.150 2.500 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 1 0.404 0.475 0.724 0.395 1.498 

1=Interviewed) 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 0.289 0.866 

Medium 2 0.137 0.624 0.048 0.826 1.147 

High 0.351 0.691 0.258 0.612 1.420 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

\ This subsample comprises 127 program participants who had at least one prior arrest. 

12.33 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.7 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention 

Provided by Case Managers and Outreach Workers (N=169) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 47 27 74 

Interviewed 67 28 95 

†Total program youth with and without arrest histories, service data, and more than one month of program exposure 

(N=169). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=29.535 with df=6)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -0.461 0.479 0.928 0.335 0.631 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 

3=High) 

1 0.854 0.252 11.530*** 0.001 2.349 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 7.570* 0.023 

15-17 2 0.379 0.426 0.793 0.373 1.461 

18-23 1.556 0.571 7.420** 0.006 4.738 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 1 0.051 0.379 0.018 0.893 1.052 

1=Interviewed) 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 2.155 0.340 

Medium 2 0.463 0.453 1.046 0.306 1.589 

High -0.202 0.523 0.149 0.700 0.817 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.34 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.8 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention 

Provided by Case Managers and Outreach Workers (N=90)\

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 19 22 41

 Interviewed 28 21 49 

†Total program youth with no arrests or a low level, service data, and more than one month of program exposure 

(N=90). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=8.949 with df=6) 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 0.095 0.364 0.067 0.795 1.099 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

(0=None, 1=Low) 1 -0.418 0.524 0.638 0.424 0.658 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 4.356 0.113 

15-17 2 -0.833 0.540 2.385 0.123 0.435 

18-23 0.356 0.791 0.203 0.652 1.428 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed, 1 0.284 0.490 0.336 0.562 1.329 

1=Interviewed) 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 3.651 0.161 

Medium 2 0.211 0.566 0.139 0.709 1.235 

High -0.983 0.689 2.038 0.153 0.374 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

\ This subsample includes program participants with no priors or a low level of priors. 

12.35 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.9 

Logistic Change in Total Yearly Arrests and Social Intervention 

Provided by Case Managers and Outreach Workers (N=79)\

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Total Yearly Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 28 5 33 

Interviewed 39 7 46 

†Total program youth with medium or high level of arrests, service data, and more than one month of program 

exposure (N=79). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=6.930 with df=6) 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 2.239 0.600 13.935*** 0.000 9.388 

Prior Total Yearly Arrests: 

(0=Medium, 1=High) 1 -0.096 0.690 0.019 0.890 0.909 

Age Group at Program 

Entry: 

14 & Under 4.401 0.111 

15 to 17 2 0.438 0.767 0.326 0.568 1.549 

18 & Over 2.599 1.268 4.203* 0.040 13.450 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 1 -0.325 0.717 0.205 0.651 0.723 

1=Interviewed) 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 0.984 0.612 

Medium 2 0.720 0.779 0.855 0.355 2.055 

High 0.718 1.035 0.481 0.488 2.049 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

\ This subsample includes program participants with a medium or high level of priors. 

12.36 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.10 

Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Suppression (N=65) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Violence Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Suppression 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.710; Adjusted R-square=0.656)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 19.053 33.702*** 0.000 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 0.864 1.528 0.226 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 0.513 0.907 0.345 

Level of Suppression: 

Lower, Higher 1 0.01016 0.018 0.894 

Interaction: 

Prior Total Yearly Violence Arrests x 

Level of Suppression 

3 2.028 3.587* 0.019 

Within error 54 0.565 

Corrected Total 64 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Yearly Violence Arrests Covariate 

Prior Yearly 

Violence 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 23 1.065 0.178 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 14 -0.07793 0.228 2 0.000*** 

Medium 15 -0.380 0.237 3 0.000*** 

High 13 -1.782 0.225 4 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.37 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.10-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Suppression Main Effect

 Level of 

Suppression N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Lower 37 -0.280 0.151 1 

Higher 28 -0.308 0.152 2 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Prior Total Yearly Violence Arrests x Level of Social Intervention 

Prior 

Yearly 

Violence 

Arrests 

Level of 

Suppression 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std 

Err 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean (i) = Adjusted Mean (j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

None Lower 0.666 0.225 

(14) 1 * 

None Higher 1.464 0.257 

(9) 2 

Low Lower -0.123 0.309 

(7) 3 

Low Higher -0.03279 0.307 

(7) 4 

Medium Lower -0.397 0.242 

(11) 5 

Medium Higher -0.364 0.389 

(4) 6 

High Lower -1.266 0.350 

(5) 7 * 

High Higher -2.298 0.290 

(8) 8 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.38 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.11 

Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Social Intervention (N=65) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Violence Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.687; Adjusted R-square=0.629)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 18.801 30.780*** 0.000 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 2.424 3.968* 0.025 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 0.386 0.631 0.430 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Lower, Higher 1 0.230 0.377 0.542 

Interaction: 

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests x 

Level of Social Intervention 

3 1.253 2.051 0.118 

Within error 54 0.611 

Corrected Total 64 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Yearly Violence Arrests Covariate 

Prior Yearly 

Violence 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 23 0.949 0.185 1 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 14 -0.09596 0.258 2 0.000*** 

Medium 15 -0.582 0.267 3 0.001*** 

High 13 -1.863 0.231 4 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.39 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

Table 12.11-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Violence Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Age-Group-At-Program-Entry Main Effect 

Age Group at 

Program Entry N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

12-14 22 -0.733 0.206 1 0.008** 

15-17 28 -0.06026 0.156 2 

18-23 15 -0.401 0.226 3 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.40 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.12 

Logistic Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Suppression (N=65) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Violence Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Suppression 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 13 8 21 

Interviewed 25 19 44 

†Total program youth with an arrest for violence, service data, and more than one month of program exposure 

(N=65). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=33.041 with df=5)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -3.602 1.431 6.335* 0.012 0.027 

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 

3=High) 

1 2.440 0.672 13.189*** 0.000 11.472 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 4.754 0.093 

15-17 2 0.067 0.763 0.008 0.930 1.069 

18-23 2.035 1.016 4.009* 0.045 7.654 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 

1=Interviewed) 

1 0.892 0.913 0.955 0.328 2.440 

Level of Suppression: 

(0=Lower and 1=Higher) 1 0.027 0.715 0.001 0.970 1.027 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.41 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.13 

Logistic Change in Yearly Violence Arrests and Social Intervention (N = 65) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Violence Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 13 8 21 

Interviewed 25 19 44 

†Total program youth with an arrest for violence, service data, and more than one month of program exposure 

(N=65). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=33.582 with df=5)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -3.521 1.341 6.896** 0.009 0.030 

Prior Yearly Violence Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 

3=High) 

1 2.400 0.661 13.177*** 0.000 11.027 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 3.939 0.140 

15-17 2 -0.060 0.784 0.006 0.939 0.942 

18-23 1.805 1.043 2.996 0.083 6.080 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed; 

1=Interviewed) 

1 0.794 0.909 0.764 0.382 2.213 

Level of Social Intervention: 

(0=Lower) and 1=Higher) 1 -0.538 0.729 0.543 0.461 0.584 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.42 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

---

---

Table 12.14 

Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Social Intervention (N=39) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.449 ; Adjusted R-square=0.346)** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: 

None, Lower, Higher 2 14.330 10.712*** 0.001 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 0.850 0.636 0.536 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 2.169 1.622 0.212 

Level of Social Intervention: 

0=Lower, 1=Higher 1 4.915 3.674 0.064 

Within error 32 1.338 

Corrected Total 38 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Yearly Drug Arrests Covariate 

Prior Yearly 

Drug Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 14 1.174 0.322 1 0.034* 0.001*** 

Low er 15 0.07470 0.367 2 0.031* 

Higher 10 -1.266 0.409 3 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.43 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

Table 12.14-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t 

Test for Level of Social Intervention Covariate 

Level of Social 

Intervention N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Lower 21 -0.435 0.297 1 0.064 

Higher 18 0.424 0.294 2 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.44 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

---

---

 Table 12.15 

Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Suppression (N=39) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Drug Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Suppression 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.417; Adjusted R-square=0.308)** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: 

None, Lower, Higher 2 12.288 8.678*** 0.001 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 0.276 0.195 0.824 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 0.688 0.486 0.491 

Level of Suppression: 

0=Lower, 1=Higher 1 2.410 1.702 0.201 

Within error 32 1.416 

Corrected Total 38 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Drug Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Yearly Drug Arrests Covariate 

Prior Yearly 

Drug Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

None 14 1.117 0.330 1 0.025* 0.000*** 

Lower 15 -0.06964 0.364 2 

Higher 10 -1.017 0.395 3 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.45

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.16 

Logistic Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Social Intervention (N=39) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 7 10 17 

Interviewed 16 6 22 

†Total program youth with a drug arrest, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=39). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=24.480 with df=5)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -2.811 1.186 5.614* 0.018 0.060 

Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High) 1 5.216 1.880 7.700** 0.006 184.192 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 3.578 0.167 

15-17 2 1.408 1.138 1.530 0.216 4.088 

18-23 2.742 1.491 3.382 0.066 15.521 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed) 1 3.875 1.403 7.632** 0.006 48.205 

Level of Social Intervention: 

(0=Lower and 1=Higher) 1 -0.803 1.152 0.485 0.486 0.448 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.46 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.17 

Logistic Change in Yearly Drug Arrests and Suppression (N=39) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Drug Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Suppression 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 7 10 17 

Interviewed 16 6 22 

†Total program youth with a drug arrest, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=39). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=24.408 with df=5)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 -2.792 1.200 5.415* 0.020 0.061 

Prior Yearly Drug Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High) 1 4.945 1.804 7.512** 0.006 140.427 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 5.218 0.074 

15-17 2 1.578 1.135 1.935 0.164 4.847 

18-23 3.084 1.378 5.009* 0.025 21.856 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed) 1 4.014 1.480 7.354** 0.007 55.361 

Level of Suppression: 

(0=Lower and 1=Higher) 1 0.664 1.045 0.403 0.525 1.942 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.47 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.18 

Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Suppression (N=90) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Suppression 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.665; Adjusted R-square=0.618)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Yearly Property Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 25.398 41.515*** 0.000 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 1.786 2.920 0.060 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. 

Interviewed 

1 3.819 6.242* 0.015 

Race/Ethnicity: 

Latino vs. Non-Latino 1 3.324 5.434* 0.022 

Level of Suppression: 

Lower, Higher 1 2.816 4.603* 0.035 

Interaction: 

Prior Yearly Property Arrests x Level 

of Suppression 

3 0.771 1.260 0.294 

Within error 78 0.612 

Corrected Total 89 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Yearly Property Arrests Covariate 

Prior Yearly 

Property 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 16 1.410 0.209 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 21 -0.234 0.215 2 0.000*** 

Medium 34 -0.428 0.177 3 0.000*** 

High 19 -1.746 -1.746 4 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.48 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

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---

---

---

---

Table 12.18-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Age-Group-at-Program-Entry Main Effect 

Age Group at 

Program Entry N Adjusted Mean 

Std 

Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted 

Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

12 -14 27 -0.273 0.183 1 0.020* 

15 -17 37 0.005764 0.155 2 

18 -23 26 -0.481 0.166 3 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Interview-Status Main Effect 

Interview 

Status N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Non-Interviewed 31 -0.496 0.162 1 0.015* 

Interviewed 59 -0.00346 0.134 2 

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Race/Ethnicity Main Effect 

Race/Ethnicity N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Latino 70 -0.492 0.105 1 0.022* 

Non-Latino 20 -0.00687 0.188 2 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.49 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

Table 12.18-continued 

(f) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise 

t Test for the Level-of-Suppression Main Effect 

Level of 

Suppression 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Lower 55 -0.455 0.151 1 0.035* 

Higher 35 -0.04406 0.143 2 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.50 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.19 

Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Social Intervention (N=90) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly Property Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.660; Adjusted R-square=0.612)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Yearly Property Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 25.399 40.867*** 0.000 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 1.366 2.198 0.118 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 3.926 6.317* 0.014 

Race/Ethnicity: 

Latino vs. Non-Latino 1 4.318 6.948** 0.010 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Lower, Higher 1 2.181 3.509 0.065 

Interaction: 

Prior Yearly Property Arrests x Level 

of Social Intervention 

3 0.559 0.900 0.445 

Within error 78 0.622 

Corrected Total 89 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Yearly Property Arrests Covariate 

Prior Yearly 

Property 

Arrests 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 16 1.410 0.211 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 21 -0.271 0.248 2 0.000*** 

Medium 34 -0.390 0.172 3 0.000*** 

High 19 -1.636 0.190 4 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.51 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

---

---

---

---

Table 12.19-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Interview-Status Main Effect 

Interview 

Status N Adjusted Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Non-Interviewed 31 -0.474 0.166 1 0.014* 

Interviewed 59 -0.03039 0.135 2 

(d) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Race/Ethnicity Main Effect 

Race/Ethnicity N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Latino 70 -0.496 0.107 1 0.010* 

Non-Latino 20 0.05177 0.189 2 

(e) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly Property Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Level-of-Social-Intervention Main Effect 

Level of 

Social Intervention 

N Adjusted 

Mean Std Err 

Pr>|T| 

Ho:Adjusted 

Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 

Lower 55 -0.409 0.140 1 0.065 

Higher 35 -0.03521 0.161 2 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.52 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.20 

Logistic Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Suppression (N=90) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Property Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Suppression 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 21 10 31 

Interviewed 43 16 59 

†Total program youth with property arrests, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=90). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=26.865 with df=6)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 1.369 0.431 10.096*** 0.001 3.932 

Prior Yearly Property Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 3=High) 1 1.836 0.470 15.280*** 0.000 6.270 

Age at Program Entry: 

12-14 5.409 0.067 

15-17 2 0.566 0.630 0.806 0.369 1.761 

18-23 1.854 0.800 5.364* 0.021 6.383 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed, 1=Interviewed) 1 0.716 0.644 1.236 0.266 2.045 

Race/Ethnicity: 

(Non-Latino=0, Latino=1) 1 0.850 0.685 1.540 0.215 2.340 

Level of Suppression: 

(0=Lower and 1=Higher) 1 -0.387 0.597 0.420 0.517 0.679 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.53


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.21 

Logistic Change in Yearly Property Arrests and Social Intervention (N=90) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly Property Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 21 10 31 

Interviewed 43 16 59 

†Total program youth with property arrests, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=90). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=42.756 with df=6)*** 

Source df 

Parameter 

Estimate 

(B) 

Std. Error Wald Pr Odds 

Ratio 

Constant 1 -0.586 1.224 0.229 0.632 0.557 

Prior Yearly Property Arrests: 

(0=None, 1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High) 1 1.910 0.420 20.660*** 0.000 6.754 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 3.327 0.189 

15-17 2 -0.174 0.752 0.054 0.817 0.840 

18-23 1.338 0.913 2.148 0.143 3.813 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed, 1= Interviewed) 1 0.376 0.736 0.261 0.609 1.457 

Race/Ethnicity: 

(Non-Latino=0, Latino=1) 1 1.115 0.804 1.923 0.165 0.328 

Level of Social Intervention: 

(0=Lower and 1=Higher) 1 -0.738 0.704 1.097 0.295 0.478 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.54


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
--- ---

--- --- ---

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---

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Table 12.22 

Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests and Social Intervention (N=105) 

An Analysis of Variance of Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests 

for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.524; Adjusted R-square=0.473)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr>F 

Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests: 

None, Low, Medium, High 3 55.793 31.898*** 0.000 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14, 15-17, 18-23 2 1.637 0.936 0.396 

Interview Status: 

Non-Interviewed vs. Interviewed 1 0.809 0.463 0.498 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Lower, Higher 1 5.265 3.010 0.086 

Interaction: 

Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests x Level of 

Social Intervention 

3 8.165 4.668** 0.004 

Within error 94 1.749 

Corrected Total 104 

(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Total Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests Covariate 

Prior Yearly 

“Other” Arrests N Adjusted Mean Std Err Pr>|T| Ho:Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 

None 23 1.333 0.289 1 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

Low 47 -0.08825 0.236 2 0.000*** 

Medium 20 -0.652 0.298 3 0.000*** 

High 15 -3.114 0.373 4 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.55 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
---

---

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---

Table 12.22-continued 

(c) Adjusted Mean Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests (and Standard Error) and 

Pairwise t Test for the Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests x Level of Social Intervention 

Prior 

Yearly 

“Other” 

Arrest 

Level of 

Social 

Interventio 

n 

Adjuste 

d 

Mean 

Std Err 

(N) 

Pr>|T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

None Lower 1.018 0.373 

(13) 1 

None Higher 1.649 0.432 

(10) 2 

Low Lower -0.161 0.241 

(36) 3 

Low Higher -0.01541 0.401 

(11) 4 

Medium Lower -0.472 0.415 

(11) 5 

Medium Higher -0.832 0.447 

(9) 6 

High Lower -1.784 0.440 

(10) 7 *** 

High Higher -4.445 0.605 

(5) 8 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 

12.56 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 12.23 

Logistic Change in Yearly “Other” Arrests and Social Intervention (N=169) 

Summary of Logistic Regression of Project Effect (Success vs Failure) 

on Yearly “Other” Arrests for Program Youth with Level of Social Intervention 

(a) Frequency Distributions by Interview Status 

Interview Status Success Failure Total† 

Non-Interviewed 55 19 74 

TI Interviewed 69 26 95 

†Total program youth with an arrest history, service data, and more than one month of program exposure (N=169). 

(b) Logistic Regression Summary (Model P2 for covariates=28.648 with df=5)*** 

Source df Parameter 

Estimate (B) Std. Error Wald Pr Odds Ratio 

Constant 1 0.937 0.305 9.451** 0.002 2.552 

Prior Yearly “Other” Arrests: 

(1=None to Low, 2=Medium, 

3=High) 

1 0.963 0.432 4.971* 0.026 2.619 

Age Group at Program Entry: 

12-14 3.388 0.184 

15-17 2 -0.734 0.453 2.620 0.106 0.480 

18-23 -0.121 0.546 0.049 0.825 0.886 

Interview Status: 

(0=Non-Interviewed, 1 0.196 0.397 0.244 0.622 1.217 

1=Interviewed) 

Level of Social Intervention: 

Low 7.375* 0.025 

Medium 2 -0.492 0.410 1.439 0.230 0.611 

High 1.002 0.589 2.892 0.089 2.724 

For differences between groups: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 

12.57


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 13 

Mediating Variables 

(Kwai Ming Wa) 

Introduction 

The findings of the GLM and the Logistic Regression models thus far have indicated that 

the program and comparison samples had a reduction in arrests. A key difference was that the 

reduction in arrests was greater for the non-interviewed program youth than for the interviewed 

program youth or comparison youth. The program strategy of social intervention1

 was more 

successful than the strategy of suppression in contributing to a reduction of arrests, particularly 

for the non-interviewed program youth. 

For both the interviewed and non-interviewed program-youth samples, social-intervention 

services (group discussion, individual counseling, and family counseling) were particularly 

effective with moderately delinquent youth, i.e., those who had been arrested less than twice in 

the pre-program period. Suppression services (arrest, surveillance, warning, detention, etc.) 

contributed to an increase in arrests for the less-delinquent, non-interviewed program youth, but a 

decrease in arrests for the more delinquent interviewed program youth. The greatest predictor of 

a reduction of (or an increase in) arrests was prior total arrests category (the control variable). 

We were interested not only in outcomes for youth in the three samples and whether 

1

 Social-intervention services were successful when provided by probation officers to youth with prior 

arrests, and when provided by outreach youth workers and case managers to youth without prior arrests. However, 

when social-intervention services were provided by probation officers and police to youth without prior arrests, the 

results showed a n increase in arrests. 

13.1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program-strategy variables were associated with any of these outcomes, particularly for the 

program youth, but also in certain life-course or life-space changes that the program could have 

distinctly affected. We regarded as mediating variables such factors as changes in school status, 

job status, the youth’s personal legal income, the youth’s household legal income, the youth’s 

illegal income, the household’s illegal income, personal crises, family crises, drug use and the 

youth’s degree of gang involvement. These life-course or life-space changes in turn were 

expected to contribute to a change in delinquency patterns. In other words, it was possible that 

the program acted both directly and indirectly through these mediating variables to reduce the 

youth’s delinquency, as indicated by arrest rates or self-reported offense rates. 

The mediating variables were based on data derived from responses to the individual 

gang-member survey, and from program effects on these life-space or life-course factors, and 

therefore we could only use the interviewed program-youth sample and the comparison-youth 

sample in our analysis. Furthermore, the youth interviews were administered during the first half 

of the program period, and represented the possibility of change over the brief period (an average 

of 1 to 1-1⁄4 years, S. D. = 0.4) between the Time I and Time II interviews. Nevertheless, we 

assumed that program effects on the mediating variables might also be evident in changes in 

arrest patterns over the full program-exposure period. If changes in self-reported offenses over 

the shorter interview period paralleled changes in arrest patterns over the longer programexposure period, we preferred to examine program effects based on arrest data. Therefore, our 

decision was to examine the effect of program strategies on changes in mediating variables and 

their subsequent effect on changes in arrest rates over the full program-exposure period for 

interviewed program youth (or its equivalent for comparison youth). 

13.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
In the analyses below, we first determine whether the findings using self-reported offense 

data parallel those using arrest data. Second, we examine whether changes in life-course and 

life-space, or mediating, variables occurred during the Time I/Time II interview period for both 

the interviewed program and comparison samples. Third, if such changes in favor of the 

interviewed program sample occurred, we determine whether program-strategy variables account 

for such changes. Fourth and finally, we test whether such mediating-variable changes – in 

relation to specific levels of program services (particularly social-intervention and suppression 

services) – account for differences between interviewed program and comparison youth samples, 

or at least a subset of these samples that provides evidence for change in arrest patterns. Our 

analysis is handicapped by small sample or subsample sizes. 

Self-Reported Offense Outcomes 

In our earlier GLM and Logistic Regression analyses comparing arrest patterns during the 

program and pre-program periods, we find no statistically significant differences in findings for 

the matched interviewed program-youth and comparison-youth samples. Similarly, we find no 

significant differences in GLM models when we use self-reported offense data and similar 

control variables. Interviewed program and comparison youth reduce their levels of self-reported 

total offenses, total violence offenses, total property offenses and total drug offenses between the 

Time I and Time II interviews. Since the self-reports did not include “other” (minor) offenses 

generally, a comparison of such results using self-reported offenses and Mesa police arrest data 

could not be made. 

The reduction in self-reported offenses is usually greater for comparison than interviewed 

13.3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program youth, but the differences are not statistically significant. We also find no difference in 

patterns using the Logistic Regression models. The major differences in arrest patterns is 

between the non-interviewed program sample and the comparison sample. (Obviously, we 

cannot analyze the effects of the program on mediating variables for the non-interviewed youth, 

because they had no interviews.) 

Mediating Variables 

We compared patterns of change in the mediating variables for interviewed program 

youth (n = 75) and comparison youth (n = 60). In general there was little change in mediating 

variables between the Time I and Time II interviews for youth in either the program or 

comparison sample. However, there were a minority of youth in each sample who did have 

changes in their life-course or life-space conditions. It is to these youth that we pay special 

attention. In general, for this subsample, program youth do better (or are more successful) than 

comparison youth. A variety of factors (such as age, gender, race/ethnicity) are not generally 

controlled for in this part of the analysis. 

School Status. The majority of program youth (61%) and comparison youth (58.8%) who were 

in school at Time I remained at school at Time II. There was little difference between program 

and comparison samples in the odds of youth who were in school at Time I remaining in school 

at Time II. However, of the 25 program-youth dropouts at Time I, 10 had returned to school at 

Time II (odds = 0.667); of the 15 comparison-youth dropouts at Time I, 4 had returned to school 

at Time II (odds = 0.444). Program youth did 1.5 times better than comparison youth (Table 

13.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
13.1). 

Jobs. Of the 15 program youth who were not in school and without a job at Time I, 12 had jobs 

at Time II and 3 did not (odds = 4.0). Of the 8 comparison youth who were not in school and 

without a job at Time I, 4 had jobs at Time II and 4 did not (odds = 1.0). Program youth did 4 

times better than comparison youth. However, the comparison sample did 25% better than the 

program sample in keeping youth with jobs in school at both Time I and Time II (Table 13.2). 

Youth Income Directly from Legal Sources. A substantial number of program and comparison 

youth were earning money legally at either Time I or Time II. This was monthly income that was 

earned or came directly from legal or legitimate sources, such as regular employment, legal odd 

jobs, and public aid. While 41.3% (n = 31) of the program youth increased their level of legal 

income, 38.7% (n = 29) remained at the same level, and 21.5% (n = 15) decreased their level of 

legal income. The pattern was not as favorable for the comparison youth: while 43.3% (n = 26) 

increased their legal income, 30% (n = 18) remained at the same level and 26.7% (n = 16) 

decreased their level of legal income. If we focus our odds on the relationship between youth 

with increased legal income (successes) and those with decreased legal income (failures), 

program youth did 26% better than comparison youth (Table 13.3). 

Youth “Legal” Income from Household Members and Friends. Based on youth self-reports of 

personal “legal” monthly income from parents/family and/or friends (boyfriend/girlfriend), there 

was an increase in income for 21.3% (n = 16) of program youth, a report of no change for 44.6% 

13.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(n = 33), and a decrease for 35.1% (n = 26). The pattern for the comparison-youth income from 

the same sources was: an increase for 31.7% (n = 19) of the households, no change for 33.3% 

(n = 20), and a decrease for 35% (n = 21) of the households. The odds of an increase in this 

source of “legal” or “legitimate” income was 0.577 for the program youth, and 0.907 for the 

comparison youth. Comparison youth showed a 57% greater improvement in this source of 

income than did program youth. In both cases, however, such sources of income were still 

declining, but more so for program-youth than comparison-youth households (Table 13.4). 

Youth Illegal Income. Most program youth (73.3%; n = 55) and comparison youth (76.7%; n = 

46) reported no illegal monthly income at the Time I and Time II interviews. However, a smaller 

percentage of program youth (9.3%; n = 7) than comparison youth (10%; n = 6) reported an 

increase in illegal monthly income, and a higher percentage of program youth (13.3%; n = 10) 

than comparison youth (11.7%; n = 7) reported a decline in illegal monthly income. Thus, 

program youth reported a higher percentage of illegitimate-income change. The odds for both 

program and comparison youth was 1.0 (Table 13.5). 

Household Legal Income. Less than half of the program youth (45.0%; n = 49) and comparison 

youth (38.4%; n = 37) reported household yearly legal income. Among the program youth, 

18.4% (n = 9) indicated an increase, 63.3% (n = 31) indicated no change, and 18.4% (n = 9) 

indicated a decrease. Among the comparison youth, 13.5% (n = 5) indicated and increase, 59.9% 

(n = 22) indicated no change, and 27.0% (n = 10) indicated a decrease. The odds of an increase 

in household legal yearly income for program youth relative to an increase for comparison youth 

13.6


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
was 1.64, or 64% better (Table 13.6). 

Household Illegal Income. An even smaller number of program and comparison youth reported 

household illegal yearly income. Nine youth in each sample reported no change or an increase in 

household illegal yearly income (4 youth in each sample did not respond to this item at both 

interviews). Six program youth, but only 3 comparison youth, reported decreases in household 

illegal yearly income. Both samples were very small, but the program youth had a higher ratio of 

decrease to increase (or no change) in household illegal yearly income than did the comparison 

youth. Program-youth households had a two-times better relative improvement than the 

comparison-youth households in the reduction of household illegal yearly income (Table 13.7). 

Drug Use. A higher percentage of program youth (49.3%; n = 37) than comparison youth 

(33.3%; n = 20) reported they never used drugs, at Time I and Time II. A slightly greater 

percentage of comparison youth (42.1%; n = 16) than program youth (40.0%; n = 16) reported 

decreased drug use, and a higher percentage of program youth (42.7%; n = 17) than comparison 

youth (32.5%; n = 13) reported no change in drug use. Program youth (n = 5) reported a 13.2% 

increase in drug use, while comparison youth (n = 11) reported a 27.5% increase. The odds of 

success versus failure (i.e., decrease versus increase) was 2.2 times greater for the program youth 

than for the comparison youth (Table 13.8). 

Personal Problems/Crises. Both program and comparison youth reported a relative decrease in a 

range of personal problems or crises between the Time I and Time II interviews (e.g., serious 

13.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
illness, drug abuse, domestic violence, gang-crime victimization, family relationships, jobs, 

income, and school problems). There was a greater decrease relative to an increase in these 

problems for program youth (30 decreases; 10 increases) compared to comparison youth (22 

decreases; 13 increases). In terms of odds, program youth did 77% better than comparison youth 

in the reduction of such personal problems or crises (Table 13.9). 

Family Problems/Crises. Both program and comparison youth reported reductions in family 

problems or crises between the Time I and Time II interviews. Again, there was a greater 

decrease relative to increase in family problems of program youth (24 decreases; 11 increases), 

compared to families of comparison youth (20 decreases; 18 increases). In terms of odds, 

program youth reported a 96% relatively greater success-to-failure rate in the reduction of family 

problems or crises than did comparison youth (Table 13.10). 

Gang Involvement. We developed a comprehensive and perhaps more useful scale to measure 

changes in gang involvement than the simple determination of whether the youth was a gang 

member or non-gang youth at Time II compared to Time I (see Appendix D). The scale was 

based on the calculation of changes (yes/no) in regard to whether relatives were involved in gang 

activities, whether the youth was afraid to walk the streets due to gang activity, whether the youth 

or his family was exposed to a gang crisis, whether the youth was an active gang member, spent 

time with or had friends who were gang members, knew the size of the gang, intended or did not 

intend to leave the gang, and whether the youth was involved in inter-gang violence. Using a Ttest procedure, we found that there was a slightly greater non-significant decline in gang 

13.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
involvement among program youth compared to comparison youth between Time I and Time II 

(program = -0.733, comparison = -0.417; p. = 0.42). 

Using the odds calculation, the number of program youth who decreased their gang 

involvement (n = 38) versus those who increased their gang involvement (n = 25; odds = 1.52), 

was the same as the number of comparison youth who decreased their gang involvement (n = 26) 

versus those who increased their gang involvement (n = 17; odds = 1.53). Twelve program youth 

and 17 comparison youth had no change in their gang involvement, reporting “no involvement” 

or “slightly involved” with gangs (Table 13.11). 

Program youth generally did better than comparison youth, i.e., improved social 

adjustment in a range of life-space or life-course factors which could be associated with a 

decrease in delinquent activity. This pattern was based on changes in a relatively small number 

of program and comparison youth, excluding gender, race/ethnicity, age category or other 

statistical controls. The changes took place over the short 1 to 1-1⁄4-year period between the two 

Time I and Time II interviews. 

Program Strategies and Changes in Mediating Variables 

Separate GLM models were developed for Time-I-interviewed program youth with arrest 

records (n = 72), using social-intervention services (group discussion, individual counseling, and 

family counseling, combined) at low (1), medium (2), and high (3) levels to predict apparent and 

meaningful changes in each selected mediating variable in separate equations: school (increase or 

decrease in level of education); jobs (lost or got a job); personal legal income (increase or 

decrease); personal illegal income (increase or decrease); household legal income (increase or 

13.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
decrease); household illegal income (increase or decrease); gang involvement. Again, youth who 

reported no change were removed from the models to maximize the possibility of program effect 

over the 1 to 1-1⁄4-year period between the Time I and Time II interviews. 

For each of the mediating or dependent variables in this model, the prediction variable 

was level of total social-intervention services, and the control variables, or covariates, were prior 

category of total arrests (for the pre-program period – to provide for maximum period of effect), 

gender, and age category. The results overall were not promising. 

The only useful model in which social intervention services predicted a mediation 

variable was change in education level (increase or decrease). Only 41 program youth had an 

education-level change. This particular GLM model, with a subsample of program youth, was 

statistically significant (p = 0.0135; R-square = 0.425). The significant variable in the equation 

was prior total arrests category (p = 0.030). Generally, youth with higher total prior arrests 

decreased their level of educational achievement, those with lower priors increased their level of 

educational achievement, the youngest age category (14 and under) did better than the other two 

age categories (p = 0.035), and total social-intervention services was marginally significant (p = 

0.086). Those youth who were provided with more social-intervention services increased their 

level of educational achievement, and those with medium or low levels of social-intervention 

services decreased their level of educational achievement (Table 13.12). 

In our earlier series of GLM models, social-intervention services had been significant in 

predicting reduced total arrests for the Time-I-interviewed and the non-interviewed program 

sample. No other program variables were significant in these earlier models. 

13.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Odds. In a further analysis using an odds calculation that included only Time-I-interviewed 

program youth who increased or decreased their level of educational achievement between the 

Time I and Time II interviews, we found that higher levels of social-intervention services were 

effective in contributing to an increase in educational achievement. 

We compared Time-I-interviewed program youth who decreased their level of 

educational achievement (e.g., dropped out): n = 27, and those who increased their level of 

achievement (e.g., went from dropout to school attendee, or from one grade to a higher grade 

level): n = 14. Again, we eliminated all youth (n = 34) for whom there was no change (i.e., 

stayed in school, n = 25; finished school, n = 9) between Time I and Time II. We determined 

whether the youth was provided with a low, medium or high amount of social-intervention 

services. We compared youth who were provided with a medium/high amount of services to 

youth who were provided with a low amount of services who were likely to have increased their 

educational-achievement level. 

Of the 14 youth who increased their level of educational achievement, 9 were provided 

with medium/high levels of social-intervention services, and 5 were provided with low levels of 

social-intervention services, for an odds of 1.8. Of the 27 youth who did worse in their 

educational achievement, 11 were provided with medium/high levels of social-intervention 

services, and 16 were provided with low levels of social-intervention services, for an odds of 

0.69. Comparing the two rates (no demographic or other controls were used), those program 

youth provided with higher levels of social-intervention services were 2.6 time more likely to do 

better at reaching higher levels of educational achievement than youth who were provided with 

low levels of social-intervention services (Table 13.13). 

13.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Program and Educational Effects on Arrests 

With the possibility that the Project could have distinctively affected a change in 

educational level which might have contributed to a reduction in total arrests, we introduced the 

change in education level mediating variable, as well as two interaction terms – change in level 

of education × project, and change in level of education × age category – in a GLM model, with 

gender and prior total arrests category as control variables. We could not use socialintervention services directly for Time-I-interviewed program youth and non-social-intervention 

services for comparison youth as variables. Instead we assumed that what distinguished the two 

samples was that the program youth were provided with some level of program social services, 

and the comparison youth were not. 

We included age category as a control variable, because younger youth (12 to 14 years) 

were less likely to drop out of school than the 15 to 17-year-olds; and older youth (18 and above) 

were more likely to remain as dropouts than the 15 to 17-year-olds. We also made the 

assumption that the Project could have had an effect on change in education level between the 

Time I and Time II interviews (which occurred early in the program period), and consequently 

this change could have affected total arrests during the full program period. 

Several GLM models were constructed. The “best” model included interviewed program 

and comparison youth (n = 108) to test whether education-level change for program and 

comparison youth had different effects on total arrests. (Note that program youth did 1.5 times 

better than comparison youth in a previous analysis; see Table 13.1). Youth in the odds analyses 

did not necessarily have prior-arrest records; all youth in the GLM analyses did have prior-arrest 

13.12


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
records. 

Our “best” model included the following variables: project, prior total arrest category, 

change in education level, gender, age category, and two interaction terms: project × change in 

education level and age category × change in education level. 

This model was significant (p. > 0.001), with two insignificant two-way interaction terms, 

with an R-square of 0.453. The Project main effect was not significant. Both program and 

comparison youth decreased their total arrests. Change in education level alone was marginally 

significant as a main effect in the model (p. = 0.094). Youth who either dropped out or remained 

as dropouts at Time II did worse than those who stayed in school, went back to school, finished a 

GED or high school, or got higher degrees. 

What is of special interest is that while the program and comparison youth do not differ 

overall in changes in education level, there are differences within the program sample. The 

Project is associated with a decrease in total arrests for those who stay in school or achieve a 

higher education level. The program youth who dropped out, or remained as dropouts, at Time II 

showed less of a decrease in total arrests (Table 13.14). It is possible, therefore, if not likely, that 

the Project, particularly in its provision of social-intervention services, had a positive effect on 

raising educational levels for Time-I-interviewed program youth, and both the socialintervention-services and the increased-educational-achievement variables may have been 

associated with a decrease in arrest rates. 

In sum, our analysis of the effects of the mediating variables does not reveal any overall 

differences in findings. Our sample sizes are too small. Nevertheless, there is some suggestive 

evidence that the Project, and probably the provision of social-intervention services by Project 

13.13


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
workers, had a positive effect not only on lowering arrest rates directly, but also on assisting 

youth to make a better social adjustment at school and to move ahead. The increase in 

educational-achievement level was also associated with a decrease in total arrest rates. 

13.14


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.1 

Summary of School Status Change for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.1(a) School Status at Time I and Time II: 

Project Dropout In School GED HS 

Graduate 

Higher 

Degree Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 25 41 4 4 1 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 27 34 7 5 2 75 

Comparison, Time I 15 34 4 7 0 60 

Comparison, Time II 20 22 7 10 1 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.1(b) Change in School Status for Time-I Dropout Youth: 

Project Time II 

Dropout 

Time II 

In School 

Time II 

GED 

Time II 

HS 

Graduate 

Time II 

Higher 

Degree 

Total‡ 

Program-Interviewed, 

Time I Dropout 

15 9 0 1 0 25 

Comparison, Time I Dropout 11 2 2 0 0 15 

‡ Total number of youth who were dropouts at Time I (N=40). 

13.1(c) Change in School Status for Time-I In-School Youth: 

Project Time II 

Dropout 

Time II 

In School 

Time II 

GED 

Time II 

HS 

Graduate 

Time II 

Higher 

Degree 

Total‡ 

Program Interviewed, 

Time-I In School 

12 25 3 0 1 41 

Comparison, 

Time-I In School 

9 20 2 3 0 34 

‡ Total number of youth who were in school at Time I (N=75). 

13.15 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.2 

Summary of Job Status Change for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.2(a) Job Status at Time I and Time II: 

Project In School & Job Employed Unemployed Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 45 15 15 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 38 26 11 75 

Comparison, Time I 42 10 8 60 

Comparison, Time II 28 20 12 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.2(b) Change in Job Status for Time-I Unemployed Youth: 

Project Time II 

In School & Job 

Time II 

Employed 

Time II 

Unemployed Total‡ 

Program-Interviewed, 

Time-I Unemployed 

6 6 3 15 

Comparison, 

Time-I Unemployed 

0 4 4 8 

‡ Total number of youth who were unemployed at Time I (N=23). 

13.2(c) Change in Job Status for Time-I Employed Youth: 

Project Time II 

In School & Job 

Time II 

Employed 

Time II 

Unemployed Total‡ 

Program-Interviewed, 

Time-I Employed 

3 5 2 10 

Comparison, 

Time-I Employed 

3 12 0 15 

‡ Total number of youth who were employed at Time I (N=25). 

13.16 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.3 

Summary of Change in Youth Legal Monthly Income 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.3(a) Youth Legal Monthly Income at Time I and Time II: 

Project $0. $1. to $500. > $500. Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 29 23 23 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 28 14 33 75 

Comparison, Time I 21 18 24 60 

Comparison, Time II 12 22 26 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.3(b) Change in Youth Legal Monthly Income for All Youth¶ : 

Project Increase No Change ¶ Decrease Total † 

Program-Interviewed 31 29 15 75 

Comparison 26 18 16 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

¶ “No Change” includes 17 program and 4 comparison youth whose Time-I personal legal monthly income from 

household members was $0 and remained $0 at Time II. 

13.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.4 

Summary of Change in Youth “Legal” Monthly Income 

from Household Members and Friends 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.4(a) Youth “Legal” Monthly Income from Household Members and Friends at Time I 

and Time II: 

Project $0. $1. to $500. > $500. Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 31 42 2 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 44 25 7 75 

Comparison, Time I 26 32 2 60 

Comparison, Time II 32 22 6 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.4(b) Change in Youth “Legal” Monthly Income from Household Members and 

Friends for All Youth¶

 : 

Project Increase No Change ¶ Decrease Total † 

Program-Interviewed 16 33 26 75 

Comparison 19 20 21 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

¶ “No Change” includes 22 program and 14 comparison youth whose Time-I personal “legal” monthly income from 

household members and friends was $0 and remained $0 at Time II. 

13.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.5 

Summary of Change in Youth Illegal Monthly Income 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.5(a) Youth Illegal Monthly Income at Time I and Time II: 

Project $0. $1. to $500. > $500. Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 61 11 2 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 65 6 4 75 

Comparison, Time I 52 7 1 60 

Comparison, Time II 53 6 1 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.5(b) Change in Youth Illegal Monthly Income (Excluding Youth¶ without Illegal 

Monthly Income at Time I and Time II): 

Project Increase No Change ¶ Decrease Total ‡ 

Program-Interviewed 7 3 10 20 

Comparison 6 1 7 14 

‡ Total number of youth who had illegal income at either Time I or Time II (N=38).


¶ “No Change” excludes 55 program and 46 comparison youth whose Time-I illegal monthly income was $0 and


remained $0 at Time II.


13.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.6 

Summary of Change in Legal Household Yearly Income 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.6(a) Legal Household Yearly Income at Time I and Time II: 

Project $1. to $30K > $30K Missing Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 32 17 26 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 29 20 26 75 

Comparison, Time I 20 17 23 60 

Comparison, Time II 23 14 23 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.6(b) Change in Legal Household Yearly Income (Excluding Youth¶ with Missing 

Response at Time I and Time II): 

Project Increase No Change ¶ Decrease Total ‡ 

Program-Interviewed 9 31 9 49 

Comparison 5 22 10 37 

‡ Total number of youth who reported legal household yearly income at Time I and Time II (N=86). 

¶ “No Change” excludes 26 program and 23 comparison youth whose Time-I and Time-II legal household yearly 

income was missing. 

13.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.7 

Summary of Change in Illegal Household Yearly Income 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.7(a) Illegal Household Yearly Income at Time I and Time II: 

Project $0. $1. to $30K > $30K Missing Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 60 9 2 4 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 62 7 2 4 75 

Comparison, Time I 48 8 0 4 60 

Comparison, Time II 47 9 0 4 60 

† Total number of youth who was interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.7(b) Change in Illegal Household Yearly Income (Excluding Youth¶ Reporting “Zero” 

or with Missing Responses at Time I and Time II): 

Project Increase No Change ¶ Decrease Total ‡ 

Program-Interviewed 4 5 6 15 

Comparison 4 5 3 12 

‡ Total number of youth who reported illegal household yearly income at Time I and Time II (N=127). 

¶ “No Change” excludes 56 program and 44 comparison youth whose Time-I household illegal yearly income was $0 

and remained $0 at Time II. 

13.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.8 

Summary of Change in Drug Use for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.8(a) Drug Use at Time I and Time II: 

Project Never to 

< 1 day 1 to 2 days 3 to 4 days > 4 days Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 59 11 3 2 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 57 8 5 5 75 

Comparison, Time I 42 7 4 6 60 

Comparison, Time II 45 2 5 8 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.8(b) Change in Drug Use (Excluding Youth¶ Reporting “Never” at Time I and Time 

II): 

Project Decrease No Change ¶ Increase Total ‡ 

Program-Interviewed 16 17 5 38 

Comparison 16 13 11 40 

‡ Total number of youth who reported drug use at Time I and/or Time II (N=78). 

¶ “No Change” excludes 37 program and 20 comparison youth whose Time-I Drug Use was “Never Used” and 

remained “Never Used” at Time II. 

13.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.9 

Summary of Change in Personal Crises 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.9(a) Personal Crises at Time I and Time II: 

Project None Low Medium High Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 9 16 21 29 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 12 23 22 18 75 

Comparison, Time I 8 25 10 17 60 

Comparison, Time II 7 26 17 10 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.9(b) Change in Personal Crises (Excluding Youth¶ Reporting “None” at Time I and 

Time II): 

Project Decrease No Change ¶ Increase Total ‡ 

Program-Interviewed 30 29 10 69 

Comparison 22 25 13 58 

‡ Total number of youth who reported some personal crises at Time I and/or Time II (N=147). 

¶ “No Change” excludes 6 program and 2 comparison youth whose Time-I personal crises were “None” and 

remained “None” at Time II. 

13.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.10 

Summary of Change in Family Crises 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.10(a) Family Crises at Time I and Time II: 

Project None Low Medium High Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 15 34 15 11 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 22 32 11 10 75 

Comparison, Time I 22 22 10 6 60 

Comparison, Time II 18 31 7 4 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.10(b) Change in Family Crises (Excluding Youth¶ Reporting “None” at Time I and 

Time II): 

Project Decrease No Change ¶ Increase Total ‡ 

Program-Interviewed 24 29 11 64 

Comparison 20 15 18 53 

‡ Total number of youth who reported some family crises at Time I and/or Time II (N=137). 

¶ “No Change” excludes 11 program and 7 comparison youth whose Time-I family crises were “None” and remained 

“None” at Time II. 

13.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.11 

Summary of Change in Gang Involvement 

for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth 

13.11(a) Gang Involvement at Time I and Time II: 

Project None Low Medium High Total † 

Program-Interviewed, Time I 9 26 23 15 75 

Program-Interviewed, Time II 8 37 18 12 75 

Comparison, Time I 10 25 23 2 60 

Comparison, Time II 15 24 19 2 60 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=135). 

13.11(b) Change in Gang Involvement (Excluding Youth¶ Reporting “None” at Time I 

and Time II): 

Project Decrease No Change ¶ Increase Total ‡ 

Program-Interviewed 38 9 25 72 

Comparison 26 11 17 54 

‡ Total number of youth who reported some gang involvement at Time I and/or Time II (N=126). 

¶ “No Change” excludes 3 program and 6 comparison youth whose Time-I gang involvement was “None” and 

remained “None” at Time II. 

13.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.12


An Analysis of Variance of Change in Education Level/School Status,


Controlling for Total Arrests in the Pre-Program Period (N=41)¶


13.12(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.425)* 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Gender: 

Male/Female 1 1.590 2.40 0.131 

Age at Program Entry: 

14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over 2 2.476 3.74* 0.035 

Social Intervention: 

Low; Medium; High 1 1.753 2.65 0.086 

Prior Total Arrests: 

None; Low; Medium; High 3 2.244 3.39* 0.030 

Within error 32 0.662 — — 

Total 40 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .


¶ “Change in Education Level/ School Status” includes Remained as High School Dropout (n=15), Dropped Out at
 Time II (12), Gone Back to School (n=10), Earned GED or Higher Degrees (n=4). 

13.12(b) Adjusted Mean Change in Education Level/School Status (and Standard 

Error) and Pairwise t Test for the Social-Intervention Main Effect 

Social 

Intervention 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Low 21 -0.728 0.284 1 — 0.882 0.031* 

Medium 16 -0.773 0.360 2 — 0.039* 

High 4 0.443 0.421 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.13 

Summary of Change in Education Level/School Status 

for Interviewed Program Youth 

13.13(a) Education Level/School Status at Time I and Time II: 

Education Level/School Status 

Time I/Time II 

High School 

Dropout In School 

GED / High 

School Diploma 

or Higher 

Total † 

High-School Dropout 15 9 1 75 

In School 12 25 4 

GED/High-School Diploma or 

Higher 

0 0 9 

† Total number of youth who were interviewed twice (N=75). 

13.13(b) Change in Education Level/School Status (Excluding Youth¶ who Remained In 

School and Graduated from High School at Time I and Time II): 

Social Intervention Increase No Change ¶ Decrease Total ‡ 

Low 5 Stayed In School 16 21 

Medium 6 

(n=25) and 

Earned GED/ 10 16 

High 3 

School Diploma 

or Higher (n=9) 1 4 

Total 14 34 27 75 

‡ Total number of youth who reported an increase or decrease in education level/school status (N=41). 

¶ “No Change” includes those program youth who stayed in school and earned a GED, a high-school diploma or a 

higher degree at Time I and Time II. 

13.27


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 13.14


An Analysis of Variance of Change in Total Arrests,


Controlling for Total Arrests in the Pre-program Period,


for Interviewed Program and Comparison Youth (N=108)¶


13.14(a) GLM Summary Table (R-square=0.453)*** 

Source Adjusted 

df 

Adjusted 

MS F Pr > F 

Project: 

Comparison/Program-Interviewed 1 1.580 1.28 0.260 

Gender: 

Male/Female 1 2.166 1.76 0.188 

Age at Program Entry: 

14 & under; 15 to 17; 18 & over 2 1.969 1.60 0.207 

Change in Education Level ¶: 

Decrease; No Change; Increase 2 2.981 2.42 0.094 

Prior Total Arrests: 

None; Low; Medium; High 3 18.326 14.90*** 0.000 

Project × Change in Education Level 2 0.071 0.06 0.944 

Age at Program Entry × Change in 

Education Level 4 1.395 1.13 0.345 

Within error 92 1.230 — — 

Total 107 — — — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 . 

13.14(b) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for the Change in Education-Level Main Effect 

Change in 

Education 

Level ¶ 

N Adjusted 

Mean 

Std Err Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 

Increase 22 -0.723 0.294 1 — 0.951 0.080 

No Change 44 -0.703 0.239 2 — 0.047* 

Decrease 42 -0.132 0.232 3 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; ** p < .01; and *** p < .001 .


¶ “Change in Education Level/School Status” includes: a) Increase (i.e. went back to school); b) No Change (i.e.,
 stayed in school or earned GED/higher degrees ); and c) Decrease (i.e., dropped out or remained as dropout at 

Time II). 

13.28 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
‘

Table 13.14-continued 

13.14(c) Adjusted Mean Yearly Total Arrests (and Standard Error) and Pairwise t Test 

for Project × Prior Total Arrests Interaction with Change in Education Level 

Project¶ 

Change in 

Education 

Level ¶ 

Adjusted 

Mean 

Std 

Err N 

Pr > |T| 

Ho: Adjusted Mean(i)=Adjusted Mean(j) 

i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 

C Increase -0.861 0.480 8 1 — 

C No Change -0.823 0.316 17 2 — 

C Decrease -0.338 0.310 17 3 — * 

Pi Increase -0.584 0.355 14 4 — 

Pi No Change -0.583 0.284 27 5 — 

Pi Decrease 0.074 0.295 25 6 — 

For differences between groups: * p < .05; † p < .01; and ‡ p < .001 . 

¶ “Project” includes: C=Comparison Youth; Pi=Interviewed Program Youth. 

¶ “Change in Education Level/ School Status” includes: a) Increase (i.e., went back to school); b) No Change (i.e., stayed in school or earned GED/higher degrees ); and c) Decrease (i.e., dropped out or remained as dropout at 

Time II). 

13.29


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 14 

Gang and Community-Level Crime Changes 

Our Evaluation of the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, 

Intervention, and Suppression Program in Mesa focused on the effects of the program at the 

individual-youth level. We were not sure that changes in the behavior of program youth, 

individually, would be reflected in changes in gang structure and activities at the gang level, or in 

the scope and nature of the problem at the community level. Also, we could not easily 

demonstrate a causal connection between changes in individual program-youth behavior and 

changes in the gang to which the youth belonged. Focus of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

(MGIP) was on individual youth, with little consideration given to changes that might affect the 

nature and structure of gangs in the area. There were no outreach youth workers to contact the 

youth and understand the scope and nature of the gang-as-a-unit (i.e., the particular gang or 

aggregate of gangs) problem in the neighborhood. Efforts at community outreach and 

development were largely oriented to providing services to families and neighborhood groups, 

usually without reference to the general gang problem or specific gangs. 

The Evaluation design and the data collected did not permit us to make a clear connection 

between the effect of the program on youth and changes, if any, that resulted at the gang or 

community levels. Yet some data were available at the individual-youth level which would 

permit us to make judgements about whether gang youth were identified less, or more, or the 

same with their gangs after exposure to the MGIP. Substantial numbers of program youth were 

located (hung out) outside as well as inside the program area. We could determine whether 

14.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program youth did better or worse, if they hung out in the program or non-program areas. More 

importantly, if they were delinquent gang members, we could determine if they did better or 

worse in terms of reduction in arrests if they came from the program or comparison area. 

Interviewed program and comparison youth also estimated changes in gang size at 

different time periods. The Mesa Police Department gang specialists provided information about 

changes in gang size and criminal activity over time. Thus, Mesa Police Department aggregatelevel area crime statistics could be used to determine changes in the level of crime incidents on 

an area basis. It was possible that parallel changes were occurring at individual-youth, gang, and 

community levels, and that this would permit us to make inferences about program effects (or 

connections). The direction or cause of change might not be clear, however. 

We had access to three sources of data which would give us information about changes in 

the nature of aggregate gang or general-crime changes in the program and comparison areas: the 

self-reports of youth in our interview samples about gang membership patterns, the observations 

and data of police gang specialists about gang characteristics, and official police statistics about 

crime incidents in the program and comparison areas over various time periods. Distinctions 

between gang and non-gang incidents could not be readily determined. 

In this discussion, we first examine changes in the youth’s gang-membership and the 

youth’s perception of changes in gang size, based on self-reports at the Time I and Time II 

interviews (approximately a 1 to 11⁄4-year interval); then we determine if the youth’s hanging out 

in the program or the non-program area is related to outcome. Finally, we look at changes in 

gang size and severity of types of crime by specific gangs, as reported by police gang specialists 

in four interviews, each occurring about 7 to 9 months apart over a 38-month program period – 

14.2


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
the Police Time I-Time IV interviews. We also look at changes in crime patterns over the fouryear program and four-year pre-program periods, based on Mesa Police Department statistics. 

Self-Reported Gang Membership Changes 

An objective of the Comprehensive Gang Program was to get program youth to reduce 

their attachment to the gang. Based on normal social-developmental factors, we expected that 

fewer youth would be gang members at Time II, but we also expected that the program would 

have an additional socializing effect. We also thought that if enough program youth said they 

were no longer gang members at Time II, this could be a sign that a particular gang’s size was 

reduced, if we also assumed recruitment of other youth was not occurring at the same time. 

Smaller gang size would or should be associated with a reduction in offenses for particular 

gangs. 

At the Time I interview, each interviewed program and comparison youth was asked three 

questions related to gang membership: if he or she 1) had ever been in a gang (or associated with 

a gang); 2) had associated with a gang in the prior six months; or, 3) was currently a gang 

member. The structuring of the questions permitted youth to avoid saying they were currently 

gang members, when in fact they were, or had been. The analysis focused on whether youth said 

they were ever gang members. 

If the youth answered “yes” to the question: “Have you ever been in a gang or associated 

with a gang?,” then the next question was: “what is/was the name of your present (or most 

recent) gang?” We computed the number of youth who said they were gang members associated 

with the particular gangs, the mean and median change scores per gang, and the mean and 

14.3


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
median change scores for the aggregate of gangs in the program and comparison areas between 

the Time I and Time II interviews. 

At Time II, most program youth (n = 61) answered the questions asking whether they 

were ever a gang member and to what gang they belonged; fewer of the comparison youth 

answered the question (n = 48). Only three program youth did not provide answers; relatively 

more of the comparison youth (n = 14) did not answer the question. At Time I, 18 program 

youth said they were non-gang youth, and only 18 program youth (24.7%) said they were 

members of the program area’s major gang (South Side Mesa). Smaller numbers of program 

youth said they were members of other well-known gangs in the city – Los Varrios Locos (n = 6), 

West Side Mesa (n = 5), and Wetback Power (n = 4). The comparison youth who said they were 

gang members from the larger gangs at Time I were not concentrated in one particular gang – 

Wetback Power (n = 5), Los Varrios Locos (n = 8), South Side Mesa (n = 4), and West Side 

Mesa (n = 3). 

In other words, at Time I a majority of youth from both the program or comparison 

interview samples declared they were either non-gang youth or were from smaller gangs. At 

Time II, the pattern changed for both the program and the comparison youth. Slightly more of 

the program youth said they were gang members at Time II (78.2%) compared to Time I (73.4%). 

There were slight increases in membership in both the major gang (South Side Mesa) and in the 

minor or smaller gangs, and a decrease in the number of non-gang youth (from 14 to 10). The 

changes were different for the comparison sample. Fewer of the comparison youth said they 

were gang members at Time II (40.3%) compared to Time I (50.0%). There was an increase in 

the number who said they were members of the smaller gangs (from 17.7% to 25.8%), hardly any 

14.4


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
increase or decrease in membership of other gangs, and a relatively large increase in the number 

who said they were non-gang youth (from 27.4% to 37.1%). 

In other words, the program was associated with an increase in gang membership, and not 

being in the program was associated with a decrease in gang membership during the 1 to 1-1⁄4-

year interview period. In both samples, an increasing number of youth at Time II had become 

identified with smaller rather than major gangs. Still, many program youth remained affiliated 

with the major program-area gang (South Side Mesa). 

The Project was apparently not successful in reducing the identification of program youth 

with their gangs. At the same time, it was important to recognize that a higher proportion of 

youth in the program were gang-involved (91.2%) than was the case with the comparison youth 

(80.0%); program youth also had more extensive arrest backgrounds, particularly at Time I. 

Similar patterns of change (or non-change) were reflected in gang identification among program 

youth, regardless of gender. Program youth – males and females – were more likely to be gang 

members at Time II than at Time I, and comparison youth – males and females – were less likely 

to be gang members at Time II than at Time I. 

Gang Size. We attempted to discover whether the program was associated with a change 

in the size of the gang the program youth “hung out with.” The expectation was that youth in the 

program would disaffiliate themselves from the gang, therefore causing a decline in the gang’s 

membership, and consequently a decline in the number of gang youth who could commit crimes. 

This did not necessarily occur. The size of the gang that youth “hung out with” (whether males 

or females) increased somewhat for program youth and declined slightly for comparison youth. 

The questions asked of program and comparison youth, both males and females, at Time I 

14.5 

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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
and again at Time II, were: “How many active male gang members are currently in the gang 

group you hang with?” and “How many active female gang members are currently in the gang 

group you hang with?” Program-youth responses indicated that male gang size had increased: 

between Time I (median = 80) and Time II (median = 150); program female gang size had also 

increased between Time I (median = 15) and Time II (median = 20). Comparison-youth males 

reported that the size of their gangs had increased slightly between Time I (median = 30) and 

Time II (median = 32.5); comparison female gangs, however, had decreased in size from Time I 

(median = 15) to Time II (median = 10). 

There was consistency in the pattern of change in gang identification (membership) and 

gang size for both program and comparison youth. Gang identification (membership) and size 

seemed to grow among program youth, at least those interviewed at both Time I and Time II. 

Gang identification (membership) and size seemed to stabilize or decline among comparison 

youth interviewed at Time I and Time II. Based on police arrest records at Time I, we knew that 

program youth were somewhat more likely to be gang members and delinquent than were 

comparison youth. The samples were not exactly equivalent, and, because of small sample sizes, 

we did not assess changes controlling for age or race/ethnicity variables. Our focus was on 

aggregate changes in program and comparison-youth gang identification and gang size. 

Furthermore, it is possible that the interviewed youth may not have been fully representative of 

the gangs of which they were members (but only of particular segments), and had limited 

knowledge of the gang as a whole. 

Whether such increases or declines in gang membership were associated with changes in 

the scope of crime committed by the gangs or gang segments to which the interviewed youth 

14.6


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
belonged is not clear, at least in the program area. Based on the discussions in Chapters 11 and 

12, in which the distinction between gang members, gang associates and non-gang youth in the 

program and comparison samples is not significant, the pattern of increased gang membership 

and gang size at the individual level or in the program area may not necessarily be associated 

with an increase in crime. 

Gang-as-a-Unit Changes and Police Gang-Specialist Perceptions – Lorita Purnell-James 

We sought the views of the gang specialists in the Mesa Police Department regarding the 

history of specific gangs, and changes in their size and criminal nature. The interviews with the 

gang specialists commenced in November 1999 and extended through January 2002, 

approximately one year after OJJDP funding for the MGIP ceased. The police gang specialists 

were interviewed four times, at 7 to 9-month intervals over a 38-month period. A member of the 

National Evaluation team conducted interviews by telephone: the first three with one gang 

specialist, and the fourth with a different gang specialist. Repeat telephone interviews were 

necessary to clarify or verify estimates. 

The police gang specialists were asked to use gang-membership lists and to refer to actual 

arrest data in providing estimates; emphasis was on estimates being as reliable as possible. The 

gang specialists generally estimated the size of specific gangs as larger than did the program and 

comparison youth. This could have been the result of several factors. The police estimate could 

have covered a longer period of time than that reported by the interviewed youth. Police 

estimates also could have included certain youth, or sections of the gang, with whom the 

interviewed youth were not familiar. 

14.7


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang History. Several of the gangs operate in more than one part of the city, but they 

usually predominate in one particular area. The largest gang operating in the program area is the 

South Side Mesa gang, which has been visible in Mesa since 1987. The gang recruits in the 

Broadway-McDonald area of Mesa, and its membership has increased since 1998. 

Predominantly Hispanic, the gang has two factions headed by families involved in a power and 

territorial struggle. One faction (Garibo) wants the gang to maintain a low profile in order to 

facilitate the sale of more drugs, while the other faction (Velasquez) wants visibility and more 

aggressive action toward rival gangs. 

Of the 28 documented gangs in Mesa in January 2002, the largest gang is the Wetback 

Power/Doble gang in one of the comparison areas. The gang has operated in Mesa since 1990, 

and its size has increased due to recruiting efforts by its members. The gang is predominantly 

male-Hispanic, with 5% female participation. Some of the members are Mexican national 

citizens and undocumented residents in the United States. The gang-membership numbers 

decline in the summer when the nationals return to Mexico, and increase in the fall when the 

school term starts. Wetback Power/Doble has members throughout Mesa, but operates mainly in 

the Mesa Junior High School area, which has shown the largest increase in gang membership. 

The predominant gang in the Kino/Carson comparison areas is the La Victoria Locos/East 

Side La Victoria Locos (LVL). Originally from Tempe, Arizona, the La Victoria Locos are an 

older gang and have been present since 1981; the East Side La Victoria Locos are a younger 

faction of LVL, and have been visible in Mesa since 1993. The LVL factions are multigenerational, predominantly Hispanic, organized, and very sophisticated; both factions recruit. 

Native American youth who attend school outside of the reservation are also becoming members 

14.8


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
of LVL. 

The West Side Mesa gang also has its largest contingent in the Kino/Carson comparison 

areas, but operates as well in the program area. West Side Mesa has been very active during the 

last ten years, and involved in repeated violent rivalries with South Side Mesa and Wet Back 

Power. The West Side Mesa gang is predominantly Hispanic, and is known for large-scale drug 

sales of marijuana and crack cocaine, auto theft, burglaries, and vandalism. 

Other, smaller gangs (such as Barrio Pobre, East Side Chandler, East Side Mesa, East 

Mesa Locos, Mesa Vario Locos, Los Compitas Mesa and others) are growing, and operate 

mainly in the comparison areas, especially the Mesa Junior High School area (see Table 14.1). 

Gang Size. The police-reported changes in gang size were based on the differences in 

estimates between their first and fourth interviews (Police Interview Times I-IV). Based on 

police estimates for 14 of Mesa’s documented gangs located in the program and comparison 

areas, the total number of gang members increased by 42.5% in all the areas between November 

1998 (Time I) and January 2002 (Time IV). The size of gangs operating in the program area 

increased 33.0% in the same period (176 members at Time I; 234 members at Time IV). The 

number of gang members in the combined comparison areas of Kino Junior High School and 

Carson Junior High School increased 11.6% (250 members at Time I; 279 members at Time IV). 

A second comparison area (the Mesa Junior High School area) was added in 2001 to 

account for 25 additional comparison youth from that area who had been interviewed. From 

Time I to Time IV, the number of gang members in the Mesa Junior High School comparison 

area increased 82.3% (237 members at Time I; 432 members at Time IV). When the Mesa 

Junior High comparison area is combined with the original Kino/Carson comparison area, the 

14.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
number of gang members increased 46.0% between Time I and Time IV (487 members at Time 

I; 711 members at Time IV). 

In other words, based on estimates of the Mesa Police Department gang specialists, the 

increase in gang membership was greater in the program area than in the first (combined) two 

comparison areas, but less than in the third comparison area. Thus, the increase in all of the 

comparison areas together (46.01%) was greater than the increase of gang members in the 

program area (33.0%). 

The increase in size of membership in the predominant or largest gangs varied in each of 

the areas. The largest gang in the program area (South Side Mesa) increased 47.7% (from 111 to 

164 members). The largest gang in the Kino/Carson Junior High School comparison areas (West 

Side Mesa) decreased 5.3% (from 170 to 161 members). The largest gang in the Mesa Junior 

High School comparison area (Wetback Power/Doble) increased 31.3% (from 150 to 197 

members). However, the major increases in membership seemed to occur in the smaller gangs in 

the comparison areas, particularly in the Mesa Junior High School area. The Project seemed to 

have little effect in limiting the growth of the predominant gang – South Side Mesa – in the 

program area. Overall, the estimates of the growth in gang size by the police gang specialists 

seemed to parallel the estimates of growth in gang size by the interviewed youth, particularly the 

program youth (Table 14.1). 

Severity of Gang Crime. Each of the police gang specialists was also asked to rate the 

severity of three categories of crime (violence, drugs, and property) attributable to each of the 

major gangs in the area over the 38-month police interview period. The ratings ranged from 0 

(no involvement) to 10 (serious and frequent involvement). The ratings for violence, drugs, and 

14.10


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
property crime were not very different across the areas, particularly at Time I, although the 

ratings were slightly lower for the South Side Mesa gang in the program area than for the West 

Side and Wetback Power gangs in the comparison areas. At Time IV, there was generally an 

increase in the ratings of severity of the drug problem in all of the areas, and the ratings for 

property crime decreased in all of the areas. 

In the program area, the severity of crime levels for the 4 major gangs increased for drug 

crimes (+1.5), and decreased for violence crimes (-2.5) and property crimes (-5.5). The severity 

of the crime levels for the most dominant gang (South Side Mesa) in the program area increased 

for violence crimes (+2.0) and drug crimes (+3.0), and decreased for property crimes (-6.0). 

The severity of the crime levels for the 4 documented gangs operating in the Kino/Carson 

areas increased for drug crimes (+0.75), and decreased for violence crimes (-2.2) and property 

crimes (-3.75). The severity of crime levels for the most dominant and largest gang in the area 

(West Side Mesa) decreased for violence crimes (-6), drug crimes (-1), and property crimes (-4). 

Overall, there seemed to be little difference in these estimates across areas. 

The severity of the crime levels for the 6 major gangs operating in the Mesa Junior High 

comparison area between Time I and Time IV increased for violence crimes (+0.33) and drug 

crimes (+1.67), and decreased for property crimes (-1.88). The severity of the crime levels for 

the largest and most dominant gang in the area (Wetback Power/Doble) decreased for violence 

crimes (-4.0) and property crimes (-3.0), and increased for drug crimes (+1.0). Changes in the 

severity of these crimes increased in this area more than in the program area or in the original, 

combined comparison areas (Kino/Carson). 

The patterns of change in severity of crime for the gangs in the different areas, as 

14.11


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
estimated by the police gang specialists, did not vary much between the program area and the 

Kino/Carson Junior High School comparison areas. The program area showed slightly more 

declines in violence and property crimes, but more of an increase in drug crimes among its 

documented gangs. Violence was still increasing in the Mesa Junior High School comparison 

area. A comparison of the dominant gangs in all the areas revealed that the South Side Mesa gang 

in the program area had more of an increase in violence and drug crimes compared to West Side 

Mesa and Wetback Power/Doble in the comparison areas. However, the South Side Mesa gang 

was estimated to show more of a drop in property crimes than the dominant gangs in the two 

comparison areas (Table 14.2). 

Summary 

The views of police gang specialists about change in the size of gang membership 

indicated an increase overall in the program area, although several gangs there showed declines. 

The increase in the program area was due mainly to active recruiting efforts by South Side Mesa, 

the dominant program-area gang. The gang-membership-size problem was larger to begin with 

in all the comparison areas, but over time grew at a faster rate in the Powell Junior High program 

area (at least compared to the Kino/Carson areas) but not as fast as in the Mesa Junior High 

comparison area, where the city’s largest gang (Wetback Power/Doble) was concentrated. The 

size of the increase in gang membership was smallest in the Kino/Carson Junior High School 

combined comparison areas. 

The police estimates of the severity of gang crime indicated that drug crimes increased 

across all the areas. The drug-crime problem seemed to increase slightly more among the gangs 

14.12


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
in the program than in the comparison areas. However, the program area registered the most 

noticeable declines in violence and property crimes, relative to the gangs in the comparison areas. 

The Project did not have a significant effect on the reduction of gang membership in the 

program area, but might have had some dampening effect on the level of violence and property 

crimes among gangs in the program area. There was consistency in the estimates of the gang 

specialists and the interviewed youth regarding the growing size of gang membership in the 

program and comparison areas. However, gang-specialist estimates may or may not be 

consistent with official police crime-incident statistics. Gang-specialist estimates of changes in 

gang size and severity of gang incidents reflected changes that took place during the program 

period only. Also, the Project could still have had a significant effect on the reduction of arrests 

for program youth located in the program area, but less of an effect for program youth not in the 

program area. 

Gang-Member Location and Project Effect 

In Chapter 9, observing characteristics of program and comparison youth samples, we 

found that 44 program gang youth hung out mainly in the program area, but that 17 program gang 

youth also hung out in the comparison areas. In addition, there were 21 non-gang youth and 12 

gang youth who hung out with gangs outside of Mesa, and 15 youth for whom we have no 

locational or gang membership information (totaling the 109 program youth interviewed at Time 

I). 

If we compare youth who hung out with gangs in the program area with all other program 

youth (whether gang or non-gang youth, but all located outside of the program area) in a GLM 

14.13


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
model controlling only for prior arrests, we find no program effect on total arrests (the dependent 

variable). The model (n = 90 youth) has R-square of 0.278 (p. > 0.001). Only the prior arrest 

category is statistically significant (p. > 0.001). 

However, if we restrict the youth in the model to only those program youth with arrests 

who were gang members located in the program area (n = 44), and to program gang members in 

the comparison areas (n = 17), we find that the model (n = 50) has an R-square of 0.292, and is 

somewhat less statistically significant (p. > 0.003). Priors are slightly less significant (p. = 

0.004), but the project variable is almost significant as a main effect (p. = 0.063). Both the 

program gang youth located in the program area and the program gang youth in the comparison 

areas increase their level of arrests, but the level of increase is almost three times greater for the 

program gang youth in the comparison areas (adjusted mean = 0.804) compared to the program 

gang youth in the program area (adjusted mean = 0.027). The difference, again, is almost 

statistically significant (p. = 0.063). 

It is not likely that the difference is due to gender or race/ethnicity variations, although 

the fact that there are relatively more program youth 18-and-over in the program area than in the 

comparison areas may have made a difference. Actually, a higher proportion of older program 

youth in the comparison areas have higher priors than do older program youth in the program 

area. Because our cell sizes are so small, we cannot identify conclusively a special program 

effect on program youth located in the program area, although we observe below that the 

program area experienced a greater reduction in rates of general criminal incidents (including 

those committed by youth) than was the case in any of the comparison areas. There was both a 

relative decline in individual-youth arrest rates for program youth in the program area, and an 

14.14


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
absolute decrease in program-area crime rates. All of this could be directly correlated with the 

effects of a large number of probation and police officers operating in a comprehensive, 

collaborative and intensive way to target the gang and crime problem for both program and nonprogram youth in the program area, compared to the non-targeted efforts of probation and police 

that affected program and non-program youth in the comparison areas. 

Crime Incident Changes – Rolando V. Sosa 

We were unable to obtain aggregate gang-incident or gang-related arrest data on a citywide or program or comparison-area basis. A system for identification of gang incidents or gang 

arrests (distinguished from non-gang arrests) had not yet been operationally established by the 

Mesa Police Department. However, general crime-incident data (gang and non-gang together) 

was available on an area basis for the four-year pre-program period (January 20, 1993-January 9, 

1997) and the four-year program period (January 10, 1997-December 31, 2000). 

We classified offenses during these periods into four categories and computed incident 

rates per 1000 population: 1) violence offenses (murder; non-negligent and negligent 

manslaughter; rape by force and attempted rape; robbery and strong-arm robbery; assault with a 

firearm; assault with a knife or cutting instrument; assault with hands, fists, etc.; other simple 

assault; arson of an inhabited or uninhabited single residence; arson of an inhabited community 

or public building; arson of other type of property); 2) property offenses (burglary and forcible 

burglary of a residence and non-residence; motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or 

other vehicle; vandalism; buying or possession of stolen property); 3) drug offenses 

(possession/manufacture/sale of marijuana, opium or cocaine derivative, synthetic narcotic or 

14.15


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
non-narcotic, other dangerous non-narcotic); 4) other offenses (forgery or counterfeiting; fraud; 

embezzlement; offense against family or child; prostitution or commercial sex; other sex offense; 

curfew or loitering law violation; runaways or agency runaways; carrying, etc. of a weapon; 

disorderly conduct). 

We also analyzed offenses during the same pre-program and program periods that were 

most likely to be committed by gang youth (particularly in Mesa), based on the observations of 

MGIP and MPD personnel as well as on our own research experience. For this analysis, we 

developed five instead of four categories of selected offenses, separating “status” offenses from 

“other” offenses, and eliminating offenses less likely to be officially reported or committed by 

gang youth (e.g., forgery or counterfeiting, and sex offenses). The 5 selected offense categories 

are: 1) violence offenses (murder; non-negligent and negligent manslaughter; assault with a 

firearm; assault with a knife or cutting instrument; assault with hands, fists, etc.; other simple 

assault); 2) property offenses (motor vehicle theft of a car, truck, bus, motorcycle or other 

vehicle; vandalism); 3) drug offenses (possession/manufacture/sale of marijuana, opium or 

cocaine derivative, synthetic narcotic or non-narcotic, other dangerous non-narcotic); 4) other 

offenses (inclusive of carrying, possession, etc. of a weapon; disorderly conduct; curfew or 

loitering law violation; runaways or agency runaways); and 5) status offenses only (curfew or 

loitering law violation; and runaways or agency runaways). 

The results of these two separate analyses are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The patterns 

are similar. Using general offense categories over the program period compared to the preprogram period, the decline is similar but sharper in the program area than in any of the 

comparison areas. Furthermore, the differences between the areas, using the selected offense 

14.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
categories likely to be committed by gang youth, are even sharper, with the program area 

showing mainly a pattern of declining offenses and the comparison areas a pattern of increasing 

offenses. 

Offense Change. The Powell Junior High School program area, with the highest rate of total 

offenses in the pre-program period, shows the highest decline in total offenses (-11.9%) during 

the program period. The rate of decline for all categories of offenses in the program area 

compared to the average for the three comparison areas is 5.0%. The program area shows the 

highest decline in violence offenses (-22.9%), a high level of decline in property offenses 

(-12.8%; about equivalent to the 12.9% decline in the Mesa area generally), the lowest level of 

increase in drug offenses (+7.2%) and a decline in other offenses (-7.1%; not as great a decline 

as in two comparison areas: Kino/Carson Junior High (-9.0%) and Mesa Junior High (-8.7%). 

The largest decline in offenses appears to be in respect to violence offenses, and the lowest 

increase in offenses appears to be in respect to drug offenses. Nevertheless, we need to recognize 

that the level of all categories of offenses is absolutely higher in the Powell Junior High School 

program area at all time periods (Table 3). 

The pattern is a little different and in some respects sharper when we examine changes in 

rates of selected categories of offenses (such as disorderly conduct, obstruction of justice, 

vandalism, motor-vehicle-act violations, as well as selected violence and drug offenses) 

committed more typically by youth, especially gang youth, in the program and comparison areas 

during the same program and pre-program periods. There is a greater relative decline in other 

offenses (including status offenses) when we focus on those offenses primarily committed by 

14.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
youth. 

The program area again shows the highest rate of change, a decline of 8.9% of total 

offenses during the program period. The change in the comparison areas ranges from -6.0% to 

+4.2% and +5.4%. The rate of decline for all selected categories of offenses in the program area 

compared to the average for the three comparison areas is 10.4%. The program area has the 

sharpest decline (-21.9%) in respect to violence offenses, which in the comparison areas ranges 

from -8.0% to -18.5%. While the program area has an increase (+7.0%) in drug offenses, the 

increase in the comparison areas is greater and ranges from 25.2% to 51.6% (Table 14.4). 

It is difficult to attribute these greater absolute declines or lower increases in types of 

offenses directly to the effects of the Project. But the evidence of a greater decline in arrests at 

the individual level for program youth relative to comparison youth is matched by declines in 

offenses at the aggregate-area level. We cannot make a direct connection between these change 

patterns, since we employed different units of analysis without variables that connect these 

individual-youth and aggregate-area levels. The connection is suggestive, however, since the 

pattern of change is greater and more pronounced when using selected offense categories more 

typically committed by youth (particularly gang youth) than when using general offense 

categories. 

Graphs 

We see similar patterns of change when we graph the rates of total offenses, especially 

between 1993 and 2000 (the police Time I and Time IV interviews). Again, we observe that the 

level of offenses for the program area is much higher when we use a total-offense-rate analysis 

14.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(Figure 1). However, the decline after the beginning of the program period seems sharper using 

both the total and selected offense-rate analyses comparing the program area to the comparison 

areas. There appears to be an even sharper decline in offenses if we define the program period as 

beginning between mid-1995 or 1996, when Project-planning and worker assignments were 

made. Program services for youth began in January, 1997. The level of offenses seems to have 

abated more in the program area than in the comparison areas (Figures 14.1 and 14.2). The 

moderating effect in the levels of offenses in the program area in contrast to the comparison areas 

may well have been due, directly or indirectly, to Project operations. The Project contributed not 

only to a concentration of social-intervention services to program youth, but to a greater presence 

and effort to control crime (particularly gang crime) on a community basis. 

Summary 

The results of the analysis at the gang and area levels indicate that the program probably 

had a positive effect in containing the gang problem, particularly in reducing violent crime and, 

to some extent, other types of crime. The program may have been less successful in reducing the 

number of youth who became gang members, although the size of gang membership in the 

program area grew less than in the average of the three comparison areas. In other words, the 

Project appears to have contributed to a greater reduction in crime by program youth 

individually, and by youth generally in the program area, than would have occurred otherwise. 

The greater reduction in crime, however, did not correlate with a decrease in the number of 

program youth, or other youth in the program area, who were identified with gangs. 

14.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.1 

Gang Membership of 14 Gangs1

: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews 

Program and Comparison Areas 

Gang Gang M embership 

Total Gang Powell Jr. High Kino/Carson Mesa Junior High 

Membership Program Area Junior High Comparison Area 

Comparison Area 

Time I Time Time I Time Time I Time Time I Time 

IV IV IV IV 

South Side Mesa 111 174 111 164 0 0 0 10 

La Victoria Locos/ 

East Side LVL 70 59 20 9 50 50 0 0 

Doble/Wet Back 

Power 150 227 0 30 0 0 150 197 

South Side Chandler 5 30 0 0 0 0 5 30 

Barrio Pobre 15 26 0 0 0 10 15 16 

West Side Mesa 210 184 40 12 170 161 0 11 

East Side Mesa 25 53 0 2 0 15 25 36 

East Side Chandler 5 30 0 0 0 4 5 26 

East Side Mesa 

Locos 15 37 5 5 0 5 10 27 

Mesa Varrio Locos 20 44 0 12 20 32 0 0 

Los Compitas Mesa 15 35 0 0 0 0 15 35 

West Side City Crips 10 2 0 0 10 2 0 0 

Mesa Home Boys 5 25 0 0 0 0 5 25 

South Side Mexican 

Locos 7 19 0 0 0 0 7 19 

Totals 663 945 176 234 250 279 237 432 

1

 Although Mesa has more than 14 gangs, the gangs used in this analysis represent the dominant gangs in 

Mesa from 1998-2002, and those for which the Mesa Police Department has gang data. 

14.20 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.2 

Police Perceptions1

 of Gang Crime2: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews 

Program and Comparison Areas 

Gang 

South Side 

Mesa 

La Victoria 

Locos/ East 

Side LVL 

West Side 

Mesa 

Doble/Wet 

Back Power 

Barrio Pobre 

East Side 

Mesa 

East Side 

Mesa Locos 

Date 

Time I (11/1998) 

Time IV (1/2002) 

Time I 

Time IV 

difference 

Time I 

Time IV 

difference 

Time I 

Time IV 

difference 

Time I 

Time IV 

difference 

Time I 

Time IV 

difference 

Time I 

Time IV 

difference 

Time I 

Time IV 

difference 

Powell Jr. High 

Program Area 

V D P 

6 6 6 

8 9 0 

2 3 -6 

5 5 5 

5 9 0 

0 4 -5 

8 8 8 

0 7 0 

-8 -1 -8 

8 8 8 

4 9 5 

-4 1 -3 

Kino/Carson Jr.High 

Comparison Area 

V D P 

5 5 5 

5 9 0 

0 4 -5 

8 8 8 

2 7 4 

-6 -1 -4 

0 9 0 

1 9 4 

3 3 3 

6 9 3 

3 6 0 

Mesa Jr. High 

Comparison Area 

V D P 

8 8 8 

4 9 5 

-4 1 -3 

10 10 10 

0 9 0 

-10 -1 -10 

1 6 4 

1 9 4 

0 3 0 

3 3 3 

6 9 3 

3 6 0 

1

 Based on police gang-specialist estimates. 

2

 Police gang specialists ranked the gangs on the severity of the violence offenses (V), drug offenses (D) 

and property offenses (P) in which they were involved, on a scale of 0 (no involvement) to 10 (serious involvement). 

14.21 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.2-continued 

Perceptions of Gang Crime: Time I-Time IV Police Interviews 

Program and Comparison Areas 

Gang Date 

Time I (11/1998) 

Powell Jr. High 

Program Area 

Kino/Carson Jr. High 

Comparison Area 

Mesa Jr. High 

Comparison Area 

Time IV (1/2002) 

V D P V D P V D P 

East Side 

Chandler 

Time I 0 6 0 

Time IV 0 0 0 

difference 

Mesa Vario 

Locos 

Time I 0 5 3 

Time IV 

difference 

Los Compitas 

Mesa 

Time I 0 5 0 

Time IV 6 3 2 

difference 6 -2 2 

South Side 

Mexican 

Locos 

Time I 1 0 0 

Time IV 

difference 

South Side 

Chandler 

Time I 0 0 0 

Time IV 7 3 0 

difference 7 3 0 

West Side 

City Crips 

Time I 6 6 6 

Time IV 0 0 0 

difference -6 -6 -6 

All Gangs: Average Difference -2.5 +1.75 -5.5 -2.25 +0.75 -3.75 +0.33 +1.67 -1.83 

14.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 14.3 

Offense Rate1 per 1000 by Type of Offense 

By Area and by Pre-Program Period (1/20/93 – 1/9/97) and Program Period (1/10/97 – 12/31/2000) 

Offenses Powell Jr. High School 

Program Area 

Kino Jr. High School 

Comparison Area 

Carson Jr. High School 

Comparison Area 

Mesa Jr. High School 

Comparison Area 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

Violence 121.2 93.4 -22.9 106.7 96.3 -9.7 108.1 98.0 -9.3 98.4 82.5 -16.2 

Property 595.6 519.3 -12.8 477.0 432.5 -9.3 405.4 356.7 -12.0 348.6 303.7 -12.9 

Drug 40.0 42.8 +7.0 36.9 46.2 +25.2 36.6 53.6 +46.4 31.8 48.2 +51.6 

Other 235.6 218.8 -7.1 221.6 219.7 -0.9 223.7 203.5 -9.0 192.8 176.1 -8.7 

Total 992.4 874.3 -11.9 842.1 794.7 -5.6 773.7 711.8 -8.0 671.7 610.4 -9.1 

 Population estimates were calculated for each year between 1990 and 2000 using 1990 and 2000 US Census data. Yearly population estimates during 

the 4-year pre-program and 4-year program periods were based on continual population growth. The offense rates were calculated by dividing the 4-year 

aggregated number of arrests for each type of offense by the 4-year averaged population totals. 

14.23 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Table 14.4 

Offense Rate1 per 1000 by Selected Type of Offense 

By Area and by Pre-Program Period (1/20/93 – 1/9/97) and Program Period (1/10/97 – 12/31/2000) 

Offenses Powell Jr. High School 

Program Area 

Kino Jr. High School 

Comparison Area 

Carson Jr. High School 

Comparison Area 

Mesa Jr. High School 

Comparison Area 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

PreProgram 

Period 

Program 

Period 

Percent 

Change 

Violence 104.0 81.2 -21.9 93.4 84.3 -9.7 93.9 86.4 -8.0 89.0 72.5 -18.5 

Property 85.1 99.1 +16.5 82.6 100.4 +21.5 70.0 91.7 +31.0 63.8 74.3 +16.5 

Drug 40.0 42.8 +7.0 36.9 46.2 +25.2 36.6 53.6 +46.4 31.8 48.2 +51.6 

Other 32.9 23.4 -28.9 27.4 21.9 +20.1 29.3 23.6 -19.5 25.7 18.0 -30.0 

Status 26.4 16.0 -39.4 54.3 54.4 0.0 37.1 26.1 -29.6 41.5 23.7 -42.9 

Total 288.4 262.6 -8.9 294.6 307.1 +4.2 266.9 281.4 +5.4 251.8 236.7 -6.0 

 Population estimates were calculated for each year between 1990 and 2000 using 1990 and 2000 US Census data. Yearly population estimates during 

the 4-year pre-program and 4-year program periods were based on continual population growth. The offense rates were calculated by dividing the 4-year 

aggregated number of arrests for each type of offense by the 4-year averaged population totals. 

14.24 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
Figure 14.1 

Total Offense Rates1 

By Year and By Program and Comparison Areas 

1. Based on yearly population growth estimates from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and Mesa Police Department total arrests for each year during the program 

and pre-program periods. 

2. Staff selection, use of a centrally-located office in the program area, and selection of youth for the program began in 1996. 

3. Actual youth program-entry dates and participation in a range of Project activities began in January, 1997. 

14.25 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Figure 14.2 

Selected Offense Rates1 

By Year and By Program and Comparison Areas 

1. Based on yearly population growth estimates from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and Mesa Police Department total arrests for each year during the program 

and pre-program periods. 

2. Staff selection, use of a centrally-located office in the program area, and selection of youth for the program began in 1996. 

3. Actual youth program-entry dates and participation in a range of Project activities began in January, 1997. 

14.26 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 15 

Lessons Learned (and to Be Learned) 

Evidence indicates that the Mesa Gang Intervention Project (MGIP) was effective in 

reducing the delinquency problem (i.e., arrests) for individual youth in the program, and for 

youth generally in the program area. The effectiveness of the program was due in large measure 

to the social-intervention services provided by Project workers, to the quality of Project 

leadership, to staff cohesion and commitment to the Model (as adapted) and to the high level of 

collaboration of Mesa institutions – City Council, Mesa Police Department, Maricopa County 

Juvenile Probation Department, United Way Agencies, and the School District – in respect to the 

emerging gang problem. Community leaders (policy makers and leaders of established agencies) 

were committed to the social development of gang at-risk and gang-involved youth. A Gang 

Prevention Steering Committee was formed (prior to the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program 

grant) to expand community resources and programs to address the youth-gang problem, 

particularly at the level of prevention and early intervention. 

The OJJDP grant made possible the development of the MGIP and the further 

collaboration of key agencies under the leadership of the Mesa Police Department. Initial focus 

of the program was on gang youth who were on probation and who had moderate arrest records, 

usually for non-violent offenses. Later in the program, the MGIP shifted its focus to youth who 

were even less delinquent (or non-delinquent) and to greater collaboration with schools and 

youth agencies, although the juvenile court and probation were still the dominant source of 

referrals of youth to the program. 

15.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Project Administrators were highly capable and influential in modifying existing criminal 

justice system policy, as well as emphasizing a community-agency outreach approach. They 

developed a coordinated range of social-intervention services as well as suppression activities for 

youth in the program. A team of workers – police and probation officers, case managers, 

outreach youth workers, and neighborhood development specialists – housed together in an 

office located in the program area facilitated the development of the comprehensive approach. 

Although the MGIP’s program did not incorporate all of the key elements and principles 

of the OJJDP Model, and it did not target hardcore, gang-delinquent youth, did not use youth 

workers to reach out to gang youth in the gang neighborhoods, or involve grassroots 

organizations (including local churches and business groups) in the development or operation of 

the program, it nevertheless was effective in developing a substantially comprehensive, 

community-wide approach that contributed to the containment and reduction of the gang 

problem. 

Characteristics of Youth in the Program 

1. Youth in the program were generally from low-income, economically- and sociallymarginalized families located in increasingly-segregated, social-problem areas. They were 

probably representative of the less-delinquent, gang-involved and at-risk youth known to the 

Mesa Police Department and the Maricopa County Juvenile Court Probation Department. While 

most youth in the program were gang members and gang associates, 42.8% of the gang-related 

youth in the program had no prior arrest histories. Nevertheless, those gang-involved youth who 

were delinquent more often had arrest records and were chronically delinquent than were non15.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang-involved delinquent youth. 

The full nature and scope of the gang problem may not have been clearly identified in 

Mesa. A great deal of inappropriate labeling of youth (particularly minority youth) as gang 

members (who were therefore expected to be prone to delinquency, particularly serious 

delinquency) may have occurred. This tendency was balanced by a strong commitment to a 

social-intervention approach on the part of criminal-justice and social-agency personnel. 

In general, 15 to 17-year-olds tended to be more at risk for delinquency than were 

younger or older youth. Based on arrest and self-report data, youth in the program and 

comparison samples, regardless of age group, became less delinquent over time, which was 

probably a function of aging and social maturation. The MGIP had the effect of speeding up this 

process. 

2. In general, females were less delinquent and did better in reducing delinquency 

patterns than males over the course of the program. It was difficult to determine whether 

race/ethnicity of youth in the program was an important factor, since the majority of youth in 

both the program and comparison samples were Latinos. However, Latino youth did better than 

non-Latino youth in reducing levels of property arrests and “other” (minor) arrests. 

3. Gang membership (i.e., whether the youth was a gang member or not) did not predict 

whether the youth would do better or worse in the program. Prior delinquency record in 

particular, and age group generally, were the strongest predictors of reduced arrests for various 

offenses. Youth with high levels of prior arrests were arrested less often, and youth with low 

levels of prior arrests were arrested more often, during the program period compared to the preprogram period. The youngest age group (14-years-and-under) and the oldest age group (18-

15.3


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
years-and-over) did better than the 15 to 17-year-olds in reducing their arrest patterns. 

Services and Contacts 

1. Data assessment systems were not adequate for determining which youth, gang or nongang, were at greatest risk for delinquent behavior. Youth gang membership and its varied 

relationships to delinquency problems were not sufficiently articulated in criminal-justice and 

social-agency procedures for purposes of identifying those youth most appropriate for referral to 

the program. Outreach youth workers and neighborhood informants could have aided in better 

targeting gang-delinquent youth and those at high risk for gang involvement. 

2. The provision of social-intervention services, particularly in the context of a 

community-based program involving a variety of disciplines (including probation officers and 

social-development workers together) appeared to have been effective in the reduction of the 

delinquency problem for youth in the program. 

3. Criminal-justice personnel, especially police and probation officers, were focused on 

addressing the gang problem in its various delinquent and non-delinquent manifestations. Youth 

agencies and school personnel were somewhat less involved in targeting the problems of ganginvolved youth. 

4. Probation and police officers appeared to be best prepared to address a range of 

individual-youth gang-delinquency problems through a combination of rehabilitation, 

suppression, and referrals. Social-agency youth workers tended to focus on younger, less 

delinquent and less troubled youth. The MGIP did not encourage outreach-youth-worker contact 

and work with the more-delinquent gang youth in the open community. School personnel were 

15.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
knowledgeable about the gang problem, but not substantially engaged in the development of 

special school programs to enhance the social and educational potential of gang-at-risk and ganginvolved youth. 

5. The MGIP’s community-oriented approach to the youth-gang/delinquency problem 

was effective, particularly in its emphasis on social-intervention services. A key value of a 

social-intervention approach appeared to be not only its contribution to the improvement of the 

youth’s level of school achievement, and consequently the greater likelihood of his reduced 

delinquency behavior (i.e., lower arrest rates), but also its combination with a suppression 

approach (particularly by probation officers) in controlling the violent- and drug-crime behavior 

of offenders who had already been arrested for such crimes. 

Nevertheless, a high level of social-intervention services for program youth was not 

necessarily more effective in the reduction of delinquency patterns than a low level of socialintervention services. Much depended on the level of prior arrests of program youth. Those 

youth with fewer priors were less likely to respond positively to increased levels of socialinteraction services than were youth with more prior arrests. 

Value of the OJJDP Model 

Based on the evaluation of the MGIP’s experience over the five-year program period, we 

found that their adaptation of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program Model was sufficient to 

contribute to the reduction of the gang problem in their emerging gang-problem community. A 

further test of the Model would be to focus on and include more delinquent gang or hardcore 

youth who are present in Mesa. Rather than being referred to gang programs, such youth 

15.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
presently go directly to correctional institutions, particularly if convicted of serious and/or violent 

offenses. 

It was also possible to argue that a less-comprehensive, community-oriented, 

institutional-focused effort (e.g., a probation approach committed to a restorative philosophy) 

would have been sufficient in an emerging gang-problem context to achieve positive results at 

less cost, at least with moderately-delinquent youth. However, a probation-approach alone 

would not be able to address the problem of youth at risk for delinquent gang involvement who 

are not yet detected or officially identified, or the problem of hardcore gang-delinquent youth in 

the community who have not yet been arrested. Furthermore, if police or probation become the 

primary institutions for socializing gang youth who may not be delinquent or arrested, socialjustice, civil-rights, and constitutional issues could be raised. 

Although the better development of an outreach-youth-worker approach in Mesa would 

have been useful in reaching hardcore youth and integrating them into established rehabilitation 

systems, this approach alone would not have been sufficient to protect the community from gang 

depradations. A control approach involving some level of collaboration with the criminal justice 

system was required. A greater commitment by the schools to provide programs that better serve 

the interests and educational and training needs of gang-at-risk or gang-delinquent youth 

(particularly in association with supervised work programs) probably would have further served 

to reduce and control the gang problem. However, an effective school-based approach would 

still have required some level of involvement with social-service and justice systems, as well as 

with parents. 

A further test of the value of a comprehensive, community-wide approach to the gang 

15.6


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
delinquency problem requires comparison with alternative approaches which emphasize 

(somewhat separately) the efforts of justice-system, social-agency or educational-system 

personnel in less comprehensive program contexts. Such alternative approaches may or may not 

create the synergy necessary to address complex community or institutional policies that 

contribute to gang problems, and may or may not be cost-effective. In any case, a clear 

understanding of youth-gang-delinquency problems as a function of the interaction of deviant 

youth with a problematic social environment, especially with inadequate institutional policies 

and procedures, is required. Modification of both youth and institutional behaviors, in 

interaction with each other, is necessary. 

Of special concern is that the community’s institutions, including grassroots 

organizations (whether separately or in combination) learn to use appropriate and effective 

combinations of control and social-development services for different kinds of youth, who are 

often from minority, low-income and socially-handicapped families in “segregated’ parts of the 

community. These larger, contextual social/economic/political problems must also be addressed. 

The key lessons learned in the course of the Evaluation of the Mesa Comprehensive 

Community Gang Project were: 

1.	 Not all gang youth were delinquent or at high risk for gang delinquency. 

2.	 Generally, youth in the program committed few serious offenses either before or during 

their time in the program. The trend for program and comparison youth was a reduction 

in total arrests. 

3.	 Nevertheless, the program was effective in reducing the level of total arrests of program 

youth by 18%, compared to similar youth not in the program; and in reucing the level of 

15.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
program-area youth offenses, including gang-related offenses, by 10.4% more than in 

highly comparable areas. 

4.	 The provision of social-intervention services was particularly effective in the Project’s 

efforts to address gang delinquency problems. Suppression activities, per se, were 

generally not effective. 

5.	 Probation played a key role in the reduction of the delinquency problem, particularly for 

gang youth with prior arrest records. 

6.	 Special attention needs to be placed on the provision of social-intervention services to 

gang youth, particularly in relation to the problems they have with school and job 

achievement, and with social development. 

7.	 An efficient system for identifying youth who are delinquent gang-youth requiring Project 

services needs to be developed in Mesa, and elsewhere. 

8.	 The most important ingredients in the successful Mesa Comprehensive Gang Program 

were the cohesion and commitment of community leaders from criminal-justice agencies 

(particularly police and probation), schools, social agencies, and city government as they 

developed a relatively well-balanced and interactive social-intervention and communitycontrol approach to the youth-gang problem. 

9.	 A fuller test of the Comprehensive Gang Program requires the greater involvement of 

schools, grassroots organizations and neighborhood-based outreach youth workers, along 

with criminal-justice and social-agency personnel, in targeting delinquent gang youth and 

those at high risk for gang-delinquency involvement. 

15.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Chapter 16 

General Summary 

Background 

Before the OJJDP grant for the Comprehensive, Community-Wide Approach to Gang 

Prevention, Intervention and Suppression Program Model (the Comprehensive Gang Program) 

was awarded in 1995, a well-developed leadership structure already existed in Mesa, comprising 

representatives of social and criminal-justice agencies, schools, businesses, faith-based 

organizations and government, all concerned with and actually addressing youth socialdevelopment issues, including problems of youth at risk for gang involvement. The gang 

problem had not been clearly assessed, and focus was on younger youth in the context of schools 

and youth agencies. The criminal justice system was just beginning to address the city-wide gang 

problem, which seemed to be growing. OJJPD funding for the Mesa Gang Intervention Project 

(MGIP) was viewed initially as an opportunity to further develop and implement plans for at-risk 

and moderately delinquent gang youth. Control and suppression of gang-involved youth seemed 

to be of lesser long-term importance than prevention of the gang problem itself. 

The Gang Prevention Steering Committee (GPSC) of Mesa became the policy-making 

body of the Mesa Gang Intervention Project. It was chaired by a City Council member and later 

by the Superintendent of Schools. Although the GPSC was not a Mesa City Council committee, 

it made recommendations to the City Council as well as to the Mesa Public School District and 

Mesa United Way. The scope of GPSC’s interests was broader than the OJJDP initiative in 

Mesa. There was little evidence of a violent gang problem in Mesa, but in order to obtain OJJDP 

16.1


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
funding, the Mesa-community and Project leadership stated that MGIP would concern itself with 

the reduction of violent gang crime by current gang members through social intervention. Mesa 

would also need to show that they were going to do intensive intervention involving the Mesa 

Police Department (MPD). The MPD became the lead agency, utilizing a combined socialintervention and suppression approach in close alliance with the Maricopa Juvenile Probation 

Department, and with the support of the United Way. 

Program Development 

The MGIP emphasized certain components of the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Program 

Model, especially community mobilization, i.e., the collaboration and involvement of key 

established agencies, particularly the police Gang Unit, juvenile and adult probation, the schools, 

United Way administration, and the Boys and Girls Club near the Project site. It tended to avoid 

contact with grassroots or faith-based organizations, and the use of outreach youth workers 

focused on contacting gang youth on the streets. The Project team was housed in an office 

located in the Project area (the Powell Junior High School area). It utilized a case-managementteam approach involving a Project Director and a Case Management Coordinator, as well as gang 

detectives, probation officers, outreach youth workers, a Youth Intervention Specialist, and a 

Neighborhood Development Specialist. Initial focus was on probationers referred to the program 

from Juvenile Court. The key program objective was to provide social-intervention services as 

well as suppression and intensive probation services for gang-involved and other at-risk youth. It 

was expected that frequent interaction and information-sharing among police and probation 

would also facilitate a greater knowledge of participants’ criminal activities. 

16.2


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A Mesa Police Department Commander was selected as the first Director on the Project. 

At the start, the staff consisted of a senior adult probation administrative supervisor (who became 

the Case Management Coordinator), two police officers and two juvenile probation officers, a 

United Way neighborhood-development specialist and a case manager from a social agency 

(PreHab) who was to be the lead outreach youth worker (or supervisor), as well as two part-time 

outreach youth workers (student interns from the Arizona State University School of Social 

Work). The outreach youth workers were available between 3:00 PM and 7:00 PM, and were 

used mainly to liaise with the schools and the Boys and Girls Club or to conduct group sessions 

with youth at the Project office. The outreach youth workers and the neighborhood development 

specialist workers (especially case managers) referred program youth to a great variety of 

agencies for services. In due course, community agencies, schools, and especially juvenile 

probation began to refer youth to the program who may or may not have been gang members or 

at-risk for serious delinquency and/or gang involvement. 

The MGIP paid less attention to the provision of access to social opportunities (such as 

educational and job-related services) than to social services (e.g., individual counseling, family 

counseling and group discussion). A computer lab was established at the MGIP offices to 

enhance the academic skills of program participants. Limited attention was given to improved or 

better utilization of public-school and charter-school educational programs. Project management 

did not invest resources in developing staff specializing in job preparation or job placement for 

gang-involved or at-risk youth. 

Originally, the Project operated within a framework of “zero tolerance” against criminal 

activity. The goals of the MPD, as stated in its first-year application for Project funding (1994), 

16.3


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
were to increase suppression of criminal gang activities; to encourage legislative, judicial, and 

law enforcement reform to ensure that the criminal justice system works as an effective deterrent 

to, and control of, gang activity; and to encourage and support legislation to stiffen penalties for 

gang-related violence and repeat offenders. In due course, the police (particularly Project gang 

officers) modified its “hard nosed” approach. There was recognition that only a small percentage 

of violent crime (5%) was committed by gang members. The MPD accommodated the OJJDP 

Community Gang Program approach. It made the Project an integral component of its Gang 

Unit. The MPD’s strategy was to develop closer relationships with neighborhood residents and 

social agencies, while still emphasizing law enforcement and control of the gang problem. 

According to the police chief, it modeled its comprehensive approach to the gang problem on the 

notion of community-oriented policing. 

In the fifth-year OJJDP funding application (1999), the MGIP stated it was holding youth 

accountable for crime and misbehaviors in accordance with law, social policy, and the interests 

of community. The Project Director and Case Management Coordinator expressed concern that 

patrol officers and Project gang detectives often harassed gang members by taking away their 

driver’s licenses for minor infractions. Youth were also subjected to heavy City fines when they 

tried to retrieve their licenses. Project Administrators were trying to address these practices. 

The Maricopa County Juvenile and Adult Probation Departments played a key role in 

support of the Project, and emphasized that the Project strategy should include the provision of 

access to community-based services. Both juvenile and adult probation were committed to a 

restorative justice philosophy, and they provided extensive manpower resources directly and 

indirectly in support of the Project. Intensive probation, regular probation, school probation, and 

16.4


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
probation surveillance officers came to be directly involved in, or associated with, Project 

operations. 

Participation in the Project enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of the Maricopa 

County Juvenile Probation Department. The Project office housed a juvenile intensive probation 

supervision (JIPS) team which, in interaction with Project personnel, provided a greater level of 

supervision of youth in the program than would have been possible otherwise. This arrangement 

allowed Project probation officers to handle larger caseloads of standard probationers who could 

be identified as gang members or as at risk for gang membership. Some of the program youth on 

probation did not necessarily have arrest records, but were known to the juvenile court for 

truancy or other misbehaviors. 

A close, cooperative relationship developed between Project probation and police 

officers. They frequently rode together on tours of duty in the Project target area. Project 

probation officers provided Project police with up-to-date information on outstanding warrants of 

program youth; in turn, police provided information on where youth could be located. They 

shared information on the probationer’s family situation, work, and school status. Probation 

made available information from their data base which assisted Project police in the investigation 

of crime in which program participants were (or might have been) involved. 

Characteristics of Program and Comparison Youth Samples 

The Evaluation of the MGIP program utilized three youth samples: interviewed program 

youth (n = 109), non-interviewed program youth (n = 149), and comparison (non-program or 

non-served) youth (n = 96). Information on characteristics of youth from the three samples was 

16.5


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
drawn from three sources of data: youth interviews (including self-reported offenses), police 

arrest records, and worker-tracking records (services provided and contacts made). Self-reported 

offense charges and selected mediating variables were derived from the interviews of program 

youth and comparison youth during the first two years of the program. (Non-interviewed program 

youth mainly entered the program in the last two years of Project operations.) However, the 

analyses of Project effects were based largely on police arrest records of all youth in the three 

samples during the complete program and pre-program periods. 

The demographic characteristics of youth in the three samples at program entry (or its 

equivalent for comparison youth) were as follows: 

Males comprised 85.3% of the interviewed program sample, 81.9% of the noninterviewed program sample, and 77.1% of the comparison sample. Latinos comprised 86.2% of 

the interviewed program sample, 84.3% of the non-interviewed program sample, and 58.3% of 

the comparison sample. The largest proportion of white youth was in the comparison sample 

(31.3%). Between 5.5% and 9.5% of youth of other races were included in the various samples. 

The youth fell into three age groups: two juvenile groups (12 to 14, and 15 to 17 years 

old), and one young-adult group (18 to 23 years old). The age distribution of the samples was: 

interviewed program sample: 14-years-and-under = 32.1%; 15 to 17 years = 37.6%; 18-yearsand-over = 30.3%; non-interviewed program sample: 14-and-under = 36.1%; 15 to17 years = 

45.8%; 18-and-over = 18.1%; comparison sample: 14-and-under = 27.1%; 15 to 17 years = 

46.9%; 18-and-over = 26.0%. There were considerably more juveniles in the non-interviewed 

program sample than in the other two samples. 

Gang Membership. Interviewed program and comparison youth were classified as either 

16.6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
gang members, gang associates, or non-gang youth based at the Time I interview; classification 

of non-interviewed program youth was based on consensus identification from Project workers. 

The distribution of the gang-membership classifications in the interviewed program sample was: 

66.1% gang members, 14.7% gang associates, and 19.3% non-gang youth. The distribution in 

the non-interviewed program sample was: 54.4% gang members, 16.8% gang associates, 5.4% 

non-gang youth, and 23.5% unknown (for purposes of our analyses, we placed the “unknowns” 

in the non-gang-youth category). In the comparison sample, the distribution was: 53.1% gang 

members, 26.0% gang associates, and 20.8% non-gang youth. There was no shift in gang 

membership status in the interviewed program sample, but there was a shift downward in the 

comparison sample – to 45.0% at the Time II interview. We do not know to what extent the noninterviewed program sample’s gang membership distribution shifted. 

Gang Membership and Delinquency. Gang members were more often delinquent and 

chronic delinquents than gang associates or non-gang youth. More delinquent gang members 

were in the interviewed program sample (77.5%) than in either the comparison sample (58.8%) 

or the non-interviewed program sample (50.6%). The highest proportion of non-gang, nondelinquent youth (87.5%) was in the non-interviewed program sample. The smallest proportion 

of non-gang, non-delinquent youth (23.8%) was in the interviewed program sample. The highest 

proportions of chronic gang-member delinquents (i.e., medium and high rates of delinquency) 

were in the interviewed program sample (46.4%), followed by the non-interviewed program 

sample (37.0%). There were significant proportions in each sample of youth identified as gang 

members who had no arrest records: interviewed program sample, 22.5%; non-interviewed 

program sample, 49.4%; comparison sample, 41.2%. 

16.7


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Probation Status. The probation status of youth in the three samples varied: interviewed 

program youth = 80.8%; non-interviewed program youth = 63.8%; and comparison youth = 

30.2%. There were non-interviewed program youth who were on probation who had no arrest 

records, and comparison youth with arrests who had no probation records. We cannot explain 

these different patterns (especially between comparison and non-interviewed program youth, 

since more comparison youth had arrest records), other than that some non-interviewed program 

youth on probation were probably status offenders, and that some arrested comparison youth had 

“luckily” avoided probation. 

Gang Affiliation and Location. Most program youth, particularly interviewed program 

youth, were affiliated with the South Side Mesa Gang located primarily in the program (Powell 

Junior High School) area. Almost all comparison gang youth were affiliated with the Wetback 

Power, East Side or West Side Mesa gangs, located in the Carson, Kino, or Mesa Junior High 

School comparison areas. We were interested in whether program youth who were in the same 

gang but who lived in different areas (program and comparison) had different arrest rates. Of 

special importance was to determine whether declines in individual program-youth arrests might 

be associated with declines in area arrest rates, especially rates for gang youth. 

Self-Reported Offenses. Since self-report data was not available for non-interviewed 

youth, these analyses could only include interviewed program and comparison youth. In general, 

a higher percentages of program youth than comparison youth self-reported having committed 

higher levels of total offenses, violence offenses, property offenses and drug-selling offenses. 

Youth who were interviewed at Time I only were more likely to self-report a greater variety of 

offenses, and were more likely to be chronic offenders than were program and comparison youth 

16.8


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
who were interviewed at both Time I and Time II. Slightly more comparison youth (57.3%) than 

program youth (53.2%) interviewed at Time I reported they used drugs. Drugs of choice for use 

in both samples were: marijuana (50.5%), cocaine (29.4%) and methamphetamines (20.2%). 

Slightly more program youth (26.6%) than comparison youth (21.9%) interviewed at Time I said 

they sold drugs. Drugs of choice for sale in both samples were: marijuana (22.9%), cocaine 

(15.6%) and methamphetamines (13.8%). More comparison youth (72.9%) than program youth 

(69.7%) reported using alcohol. More program youth (60.6%) than comparison youth (46.9%) 

had access to a handgun. 

Arrests. The gang problem in its delinquent character was emerging in Mesa and may not 

have been much different from the non-gang delinquency problem. There was little difference in 

the character of arrests committed by youth in the three samples in both the pre-program and 

program periods. Between two thirds and three fourths of arrests were for property offenses, and 

for minor offenses such as driving without a license, disorderly conduct, possession of alcohol, 

and curfew violations. Serious violence comprised 3.8% of all arrests, total violence (including 

felony and misdemeanor violence) comprised 14.5%, and drug offenses comprised 8.0% of all 

arrests across the three samples, during both the pre-program and program periods. 

Program Structure and Process: Strategies, Services, and Worker Contacts 

Youth workers, probation officers and police officers, as well as case managers, outreach 

youth workers and other staff in the MGIP collaborated to provide contacts and services to 

program youth, whether interviewed or non-interviewed. The Project staff completed 1650 

worker tracking forms (each a 12-page report) documenting services to, and worker contacts 

16.9


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
with, 224 individual program youth (106 Time-I-interviewed; 128 non-interviewed) during the 

program period (January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2000). The forms were completed every 

three months, for an average of 7.1 forms per youth. Project staff completed the forms on a 

regular basis. 

A total of 10,933 services, 11,893 direct worker contacts and 3140 coordinated contacts 

involving different types of workers were recorded for all program youth. The largest source of 

referrals of youth to the program (197 males and 37 females) was the court (particularly juvenile 

court): Time-I-interviewed youth = 88.6% and non-interviewed youth = 73.9%. The next largest 

source of referrals was the schools: Time-I-interviewed youth = 8.5% and non-interviewed youth 

= 19.2%. The Time-I-interviewed youth (more delinquent and a little older than the noninterviewed youth) were referred to the program mainly during the first two years; the noninterviewed youth entered mainly during the second two years. 

The Time-I-interviewed youth were in the program an average of three times longer 

(mean = 27.8 months) than the non-interviewed youth (mean = 9.4 months). However, on a 

monthly basis, non-interviewed youth were provided with 69.6% more total services, 50.0% 

more direct contacts, and 57.1% more coordinated contacts (i.e., contacts involving 

communication, planning and possible action with other Project workers). Non-interviewed 

youth were provided with more social-intervention services (group activities, individual 

counseling, and family counseling) – 55.8% of their total services – compared to Time-Iinterviewed youth, who were provided with less social-intervention services – 46.0% of their 

total services. On the other hand, Time-I-interviewed youth were provided with more 

suppression services – 23.7% – than were non-interviewed youth – 19.9%. 

16.10


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Time-I-interviewed females were provided with more services per youth (71.4) than were 

males (61.3); the youngest age group (14 and under) were provided with more services per youth 

(67.7) than the 15 to 17-year-olds (59.8), or those 18 years and over (61.4). Youth who came 

into the program with annualized “moderate” levels of prior arrests were provided with more 

services per youth (less than 1 prior = 55.6 services; 1-2 priors = 54.5 services) than were both 

the non-delinquent youth (no priors = 27.4 services) and the most-delinquent youth (2 or more 

priors = 36.1 services). However, gang members were provided with more services per youth 

(67.7) than non-gang youth (57.2) or gang associates (47.0). Non-interviewed youth, although 

they were less delinquent, were provided with more group, individual, and family services than 

were Time-I-interviewed youth. However, interviewed program youth were provided with more 

suppression-type services, particularly by probation officers who were the primary providers of 

services: 49.6% for the Time-I-interviewed youth; 44.0% for the non-interviewed youth. 

Outreach youth workers provided only 9.7% of total services to Time-I-interviewed youth, and 

13.6% of services to non-interviewed youth. Case managers provided 28.2% of total services to 

Time-I-interviewed youth and 33.8% of total services to non-interviewed youth. 

Program and Comparison Youth Outcomes: Arrest Variables 

We were interested in the effectiveness of the MGIP in reducing the level of arrests for 

program youth relative to comparison youth. We were also interested in the ratio of successes to 

failures of program youth relative to comparison youth. We used a General Linear Modeling 

(GLM) procedure to determine differences in levels of arrests and a Logistic Regression 

procedure to establish success/failure ratios. 

16.11


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Total Arrests. In our “best” GLM model (R-square = 56.9%), the project variable was not 

statistically significant, but was highly significant as an interaction term with prior category of 

arrests (p. < 0.001) in the main equation. Prior arrests remained the most significant variable 

explaining arrests in the program period compared to the pre-program period. The two program 

samples (interviewed and non-interviewed) each had less of an increase in arrests among youth 

with “no” or “low” prior arrests, and more of a decrease among youth with more prior arrests 

during the program period compared to the pre-program period, than did the comparison sample 

(controlling for gender, race/ethnicity, age group, and gang membership status). We estimated 

that program youth (interviewed and non-interviewed, together) with prior arrests had an 18% 

greater reduction in arrests, on average, than similar comparison youth during the program 

period. 

Older youth (18 years and older) reduced their arrests significantly more than the 15 to 

17-year-olds (p. = 0.008), and did marginally better than the 14-years-and-younger group. 

Program females, whether in the interviewed or non-interviewed sample, on average did 

somewhat but not significantly better (i.e., had fewer subsequent arrests) than comparison 

females; program females also had a greater reduction in level of arrests than program males, 

whether in the interviewed or non-interviewed samples. Factors that did not seem to make a 

difference in outcome – under controlled statistical conditions – were: whether the youth was a 

gang member, gang associate, or non-gang youth; years in the program; or probation status. 

In the Logistic Regression models, we tested whether the program samples were likely to 

have a higher ratio of successes to failures than the comparison sample, in respect to the 

reduction of total arrests. Again, controlling for category of prior arrests, gender, race/ethnicity, 

16.12


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
age group, and gang membership status, the model was significant (p. < 0.001). Interviewed 

program youth did 44% better than comparison youth, although the difference was not 

statistically significant (p. = 0.361). The most significant predictor of outcome was prior arrests 

(p. < 0.001). Females, again, did better than males (p. < 0.01). 

In the Logistic Regression analysis comparing non-interviewed program youth with 

comparison youth, the same variables were entered and the results were almost the same. Noninterviewed program youth did 42% better than comparison youth, and the difference was almost 

statistically significant (p. < 0.083). Prior arrests remained the most powerful predictor of the 

ratio of success to failure. Again, the oldest age group and the females were more likely to be 

successful in avoiding or reducing arrests than were the younger youth and the males. 

Total Violence Arrests. In all three samples, only 14.7% of youth were arrested for felony 

violence, and 26.8% were arrested for misdemeanor violence, during both the program and preprogram periods. There was little variability among youth arrested for violence: 91.4% were 

males, 73.1% were gang members, and 80.7% were on probation (these variables were 

eliminated from the model). Also, very few youth had committed more than one prior violent 

act. In our “best” GLM model (R-square = 0.670), the project variable was not significant (p. = 

0.763); prior arrests category was the most significant variable (p. < 0.001). Age group was a 

significant predictor (p. = 0.01). All age categories reduced their levels of violence, but younger 

youth (14 and under) had a significantly greater decrease than the 15 to 17-year-olds (p. = 0.002), 

and a greater decrease than the 18-and-over group (p. = 0.06). 

In the Logistic Regression model for interviewed program and comparison youth 

16.13


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
(including youth with any arrests), 80.6% of comparison youth and 79.6% of interviewed 

program youth were estimated to be successes. However, none of the variables was significant, 

although the non-interviewed sample did 50% better than the comparison sample. Because so 

few youth were in the sample, it is questionable whether an adequate test of the Project’s effect 

on violence arrests was achieved. 

In a Logistic Regression model for interviewed program and comparison youth which 

included only those youth with pre-program violence arrests, 30.6% of comparison youth, but 

69.4 % of interviewed program youth, were estimated to be successes. The final model was 

significant (p. < 0.001), with the following variables in the equation: project, gender, 

race/ethnicity, age group, gang membership, and prior violence arrests category. While prior 

violence arrests was significant (p. = 0.002), age group was marginally significant (p. = 0.09), 

and the other variables were not statistically significant; the odds ratio of Project success to 

failure in respect to violence arrests for program youth was 48% higher than for comparison 

youth. The Project, therefore, did have some degree of success in reducing violence arrests for 

interviewed program youth with prior violence arrests. 

Total Property Arrests. In these models, a majority of arrested youth in each of the three samples 

had prior arrests for property crime (comparison youth = 61.5%, interviewed program youth = 

86.4%, and non-interviewed program youth = 69.7%). In the “best” model (R-square = 0.644), 

the project variable is significant (p. = 0.041) as a main effect; age group is almost statistically 

significant (p. = 0.056), but the prior property arrest category variable explains the most 

variance (p. = < 0.001). There is a decline in property arrests in each of the samples, with the 

16.14


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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
largest decline in the comparison sample (-0.533) – greater than in the interviewed program 

sample (-0.143). The difference is statistically significant (p. =0.026). The decline in the noninterviewed program sample (-0.516) is not significantly different from the decline in the 

comparison sample. The oldest age group shows the greatest decline in property crime arrests, 

compared to the 15 to 17-year-olds (p. = 0.033). 

In the Logistic Regression model, there was no difference between interviewed program 

or comparison youth in the ratio of successes to failures regarding reduction of property arrests. 

Females were four times more likely to be successes than males (p. = 0.054), and Latino youth 

were three times more likely to be successes than non-Latino youth (p. = 0.018). The oldest age 

group (18 years and over) was 62% more likely to be successful than the two younger groups, but 

the difference was marginally significant (p. = 0.08). Gang membership status was not 

significant in this model. 

In the Logistic Regression model comparing non-interviewed program youth and 

comparison youth, the non-interviewed program youth were 18% more successful than the 

comparison youth, but the difference was not statistically significant (p. = 0.493). Gender, age 

group, gang membership status, and prior property arrests category were not significant. In sum, 

all of the samples lowered their arrest rates for property crime. The comparison sample did 

somewhat better than the interviewed program sample in lowering their levels of arrests for 

property crime, but the non-interviewed program sample had slightly more youth who were 

successes than did the comparison sample. 

16.15


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Drug-Crime Arrests. A small but substantial percentage of youth in the three samples were 

arrested for drug offenses – mainly for drug possession – during both the program and preprogram periods: comparison youth = 29.2%; interviewed program youth = 23.5%; and noninterviewed program youth = 18.8%. Few females (n = 5) in the three samples had arrests for 

drugs. The gender factor was not considered in the analysis. The “best” GLM model was 

significant (R-square = 0.487). The project variable was not significant (p. = 0.871). There was 

a slightly greater increase in drug arrests for comparison youth (+0.230) than for interviewed 

program youth (+0.147), and a slight decline for non-interviewed program youth (-0.009). Latino 

youth significantly decreased their level of drug arrests (p. = 0.018). Gang membership, again, 

was not significant. Generally, youth who were in the program two or more years decreased their 

arrests for drug crime, while youth who were in the program less than two years increased their 

arrests for drugs. 

Nevertheless, the most significant variable in the model was prior drug arrests category 

– the regression variable (p. < 0.001). The main effect was that all groups, regardless of age, 

showed a slight increase in drug arrests over the program period. The implication of the GLM 

finding was that drug arrests were increasing in Mesa, and that the Project had a limited effect on 

the problem. 

The Logistic Regression model which included all interviewed program youth and 

comparison youth (with and without drug arrests) was not statistically significant, although the 

project variable was marginally significant (p. = 0.076). The interviewed program sample did 

2.4 times better than the comparison sample in the success-to-failure ratio. None of the other 

variables in the equation, including prior drug arrests, was statistically significant. The Logistic 

16.16


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Regression model which included non-interviewed program youth and comparison youth (with 

and without prior drug arrests) was also not statistically significant. No variable came close to 

being significant, although non-interviewed program youth did 23% better in their success-tofailure ratio than comparison youth. The program appeared to have a slightly positive effect, 

mainly in preventing youth from getting arrested for drugs. 

Furthermore, in the Logistic Regression model for drug arrests which included only 

interviewed program youth and comparison youth with drug arrests, the model was significant 

(p. = 0.003), and the odds ratio indicated that interviewed program youth were 3.8 times more 

successful than comparison youth in reducing their likelihood of drug arrests. No variable was 

significant in this model. 

In the Logistic Regression model for drug arrests, the Project was not effective with noninterviewed youth who had prior arrests for drugs. When only non-interviewed program youth 

and comparison youth (both with drug arrests) were included, the model was also significant (p. 

= 0.003), but non-interviewed program youth did 14% worse (odds ratio = 0.707) than 

comparison youth. No variable was significant in the equation, except for prior arrests for drugs 

(p. = 0.0119).

All “Other” Arrests. More interviewed program youth (81.9%) than non-interviewed program 

youth (62.2%) or comparison youth (50%) had arrests for “other,” usually minor, offenses in the 

program and pre-program periods. Youth from each of the samples reduced their “other” arrests 

over the program period. The “best” model is statistically significant (R-square = 0.484), but no 

variable was significant except their prior “other” arrests category. The MGIP was not 

16.17


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
associated with any specific effect on “other” or minor arrests. In the Logistic Regression 

models, the success to failure rate of interviewed program youth and non-interviewed program 

youth was significantly greater than for comparison youth. No variable other than project was 

significant in the equations, not even prior arrests for “other” offenses. The failure rate for 

comparison youth was greater than the success rate. Both program samples were each twice as 

successful as comparison sample in the proportion of youth who reduced their “other” offenses. 

In sum, the Project was effective in the reduction of arrests for a range of offenses. 

Generally, the Project had little distinctive effect on gang members versus gang associates or 

non-gang youth. Females, younger youth (14 and under) and Latino youth showed relatively 

greater reductions in levels of crime, and were more likely to have a higher ratio of success to 

failure in reducing arrests compared to males, non-Latinos and older youth (especially the 15 to 

17-year-olds). 

Program Service Effects 

Social-intervention services (individual or family counseling and group discussion) – 

whether provided by probation officers, case managers or outreach youth workers – accounted 

for the most positive program effects, i.e., lower levels of arrests and higher ratios of successes to 

failures in reducing arrests among program youth. Suppression activities by Project probation or 

police – whether arrests, surveillance, supervision or probation violations – were generally less 

effective. Overall, contacts by the various types of Project workers – coordinated suppression or 

non-suppression services and total services – were also less important. 

16.18


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A series of GLM and Logistic Regression models were developed to determine which 

type and level of program service or worker contact was effective for interviewed and noninterviewed program youth, under statistically controlled conditions (i.e., controlling for prior 

category of arrests, age group at program entry, gender, race/ethnicity, gang membership and 

whether the youth was in the interviewed or non-interviewed sample). 

We were interested in the effects of specific program components on changing rates of 

total arrests, total violence arrests, total property arrests, drug arrests, and “other” arrests. The 

variables in the models and the procedures used were similar to those reported above, with the 

addition of the service/activity – social-intervention or suppression – variables. Prior category 

of arrests continued usually to be the most predictive variable determining outcome, regardless 

of services/activity provided. 

Nevertheless, a high level of social-intervention services, particularly for youth with high 

categories of prior arrests, produced the greatest reduction in total arrests. A low level of socialintervention services was most effective with youth with no (or a low level of) prior arrests. 

Also, non-interviewed program youth with prior arrests did significantly better through the 

delivery of social-intervention services than did interviewed program youth (p. = 0.032). The 

oldest age group (18 and over) significantly reduced its level of total arrests; females had a 

marginally significantly greater reduction in total arrests than males. 

Social-intervention services provided by probation and police officers tended to be more 

effective in increasing the odds of success to failure in lowering total arrest rates for youth with 

prior arrest histories (odds ratio = 1.50), particularly for the interviewed youth, who were more 

often delinquent than the non-interviewed youth. Higher (in contrast to lower) levels of social 

16.19


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
intervention provided by probation and police officers did not contribute to an increased odds 

ratio of success to failure for youth with no pre-program arrests, particularly the non-interviewed 

youth. On the other hand, higher (in contrast to lower) levels of social intervention provided by 

case managers and outreach youth workers did contribute to an increased odds ratio of success to 

failure in total arrests for those youth with medium or high levels of pre-program arrests (odds 

ratio = 1.30). 

Different levels of social intervention or suppression did not contribute significantly to a 

lowering of violence arrests among program youth. However, higher levels of suppression did 

predict greater decreased levels of violence for youth with higher rather than lower levels of prior 

arrests for violence – an interaction effect between levels of suppression and levels of prior 

arrests. Few youth had pre-program or program-period violence arrests to begin with. 

As with violence, the program was less effective in reducing drug arrests for program 

youth (compared to total arrests and “other” arrests) . Neither different levels of social 

intervention nor of suppression were significant in the GLM models. Still, the program 

contributed to a significantly higher success-to-failure ratio in respect to drug arrests for 

interviewed program youth compared to non-interviewed program youth. This was particularly 

the case for older interviewed youth (18 and older) who had prior drug arrests, and who were on 

probation. The findings of the Logistic Regression model also indicated that a higher level of 

suppression activities was better than a lower level of suppression activities in increasing success 

rates in lowering drug arrests. 

Lower levels of suppression and social intervention were associated with a lower level of 

arrests for property offenses. Again, the most significant variable in the equation was category of 

16.20


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
prior property arrests. Youth with higher levels of prior arrests for property offenses reduced 

their levels of arrests during the program period. Those youth with no (or low levels of) prior 

property arrests increased their arrests for property offenses. Non-interviewed youth and Latino 

youth had significantly lower property arrests than did interviewed youth and non-Latino youth 

during the program period. 

Finally, higher levels of social-intervention services were effective in lowering levels of 

“other” (minor) arrests (the most typical offenses committed by program youth), particularly for 

youth with medium or high levels of prior arrests for “other” offenses. Higher levels of socialintervention services also resulted in a marginally higher probability of success for program 

youth. 

Regression effects largely accounted for changing levels of all types of offenses and 

higher probabilities of success to failure for program youth during the program period. However, 

the statistical notion of regression to the mean is insufficient to explain the differential overall 

positive effect of the program relative to comparison youth in respect to total arrests. Social 

intervention had an important and generally consistent effect in accounting for positive changes 

in program youth’s reduction in arrests, and in their success rates. 

Although the program seemed to be more effective with non-interviewed youth 

(particularly in lowering their levels of arrests), it was associated with a higher probability of 

success (odds ratio) for the interviewed sample than for the non-interviewed sample. This 

pattern was accounted for by the fact that, although fewer non-interviewed youth had arrests and 

were included in the GLM models, they had more prior arrests than the average for the 

interviewed program youth. Again, suppression activities, total services or worker contacts and 

16.21


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
various types of worker coordination were generally less effective (or not effective) with program 

youth. Social-intervention services were more effective when provided by probation officers 

than when provided by case managers or outreach youth workers, particularly for youth with 

prior arrest histories. 

Mediating Variables 

We were interested in whether the program was effective in changing certain life-course 

factors of youth which would in turn result in a reduction of arrests. We examined a range of 

mediating variables applicable only to interviewed program youth which might have been 

significantly affected by the level of social-intervention services provided. In a subsample of 40 

youth who were program dropouts after the Time-I interview, youth provided with high levels of 

social-intervention services increased their educational achievement more than those youth 

provided with medium/low levels of social-intervention services (controlling for age and preprogram arrests). The equation was significant (p. = 0.014; R-square = 0.425). 

Furthermore, we knew from an earlier analysis that the Project was associated with a 

decrease in total arrests for program youth who stayed in school or achieved a higher grade level. 

Therefore it was possible that the Project, particularly through its provision of social-intervention 

services, had a positive effect on raising educational levels, particularly among the interviewed 

program youth; and that the Project, by raising levels of education for program youth, to some 

extent contributed to a reduction in levels of total arrests. 

16.22


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Gang and Community-Level Crime Changes 

Data were available which permitted us to make judgements about the effects of the 

MGIP at individual-youth, gang, and area levels, and to some extent about their interrelationship. 

The Project was not particularly effective in reducing the identification of program youth with 

their gangs. More program youth remained identified with gangs than did comparison youth. 

More program youth than comparison youth also perceived that their gangs had grown in size 

between the Time I and Time II interviews. 

Mesa Police Department gang specialists also perceived that gang membership had 

increased in the program area (33.0%), but not so much as in the combined comparison areas 

(46.0%), during a 38-month police-evaluation program period. The gang specialists also 

estimated that gangs in the program showed a greater relative decline in property and violent 

crime, but an increase in drug crime, relative to gangs in the comparison areas. 

There was evidence of a special program effect on youth who “hung out” in the program 

area compared to program youth who “hung out” in the comparison areas. This subsample of 

program youth (n = 17) from the comparison areas had a three-times-greater increase in total 

arrests compared to the subsample of program youth (n = 44) who “hung out” in the program 

area. 

The Project was associated with a greater reduction of reported criminal incidents in the 

program area compared to the comparison areas between the four-year pre-program and four-year 

program periods. The program area had the highest rate of decline in total offenses (-11.9%) 

relative to any of the three comparison areas, where rates of decline ranged between -5.6% and -

9.1%. The program area had the highest rate of decline for violence offenses (-22.9%) relative to 

16.23


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
declines in the comparison areas, which ranged from a decrease of -9.3% to an increase of 

+16.2%. The greatest contrast was in regard to drug offenses. The program area increased 

(+7.0%) relative to the comparison areas, where the increases ranged from +25.2% to +51.6%. 

Similarly, the program appeared to have had an effect on the change in area rates of 

offenses typically committed by youth, including gang youth (e.g., incidents such as disorderly 

conduct, obstruction of justice, vandalism and motor vehicle act violations, as well as selected 

violence and drug offenses). The program area, again, showed the highest rate of decline for 

these youth-typical offenses during the program period (-8.9%). The change in the comparison 

areas ranged from a decrease of -6.0% to increases of +4.2% and +5.4%. The program area had 

the sharpest decline in respect to these selected violence offenses (-21.9%), which declined in the 

comparison areas from -8.0% to -18.5%. While the program area had an increase in drug 

offenses (+7.0%), the increase in the comparison areas ranged from 25.2% to 51.6%. 

When we graphed changes in rates of general and selected youth-typical offenses for the 

pre-program and program periods, we saw similar patterns of greater decline in the program area 

compared to the comparison areas. The positive effect of the program seemed to be particularly 

strong at the time of program startup and during the following three years of operation. 

In sum, this aggregate-level analysis indicated that the Project probably had a positive 

effect in containing the gang problem, particularly in the reduction of violent crime (though there 

was a relatively small increase in drug crime) and with some reduction in other types of crime 

usually committed by juveniles. The Project was less effective in reducing the number of 

program youth who were committed to gang membership, although the size of the aggregate 

gang-membership increase was generally lower in the program area than in the average of the 

16.24


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
three combined comparison areas. In other words, the Project appeared to have contributed to a 

greater reduction of crime among program youth individually, and among youth generally 

(including gang youth) in the program area than would have occurred otherwise. Gang 

membership status was apparently not a significant factor in changes in the crime level in the 

program area. 

Lessons Learned (and To Be Learned) 

Evidence indicates that the Mesa Gang Intervention Program was effective in reducing 

the youth delinquency problem for individual youth in the program, and for youth generally in 

the program area (including gang youth). The effectiveness of the program was due in large 

measure to the range of social-intervention services provided by Project staff, the high quality of 

Project leadership, commitment to the Model, and to the high level of collaboration among Mesa 

institutions – City Council, Mesa Police Department, Maricopa County Juvenile Probation 

Department, United Way agencies and the District school system – in respect to the emerging 

gang problem. 

Youth in the program were representative of less-delinquent, gang-involved and at-risk 

youth. The majority of program youth had no prior arrest records, although many were gang 

members. Many youth should not have been referred to the program. Inappropriate labeling of 

these youth as delinquent or potentially delinquent gang members may have occurred. This 

tendency was mitigated by a strong commitment to a social-intervention approach on the part of 

Project staff and criminal-justice and social-agency personnel in Mesa. 

Probation (and to some extent police) seemed relatively better prepared than other social 

institutions to address a range of individual and community-area youth-gang problems, 

16.25


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
particularly problems of those gang youth moderately involved in delinquency. Greater youth 

outreach work with neighborhood gangs, and more effective involvement of social agencies, 

schools, and grassroots organizations and groups would have been required to better identify 

high-risk and delinquent gang-involved youth, and to involve them in the Project. 

Conclusion 

The Mesa Gang Intervention Project has to be regarded as successful due to the high 

commitment to, and support of, the Project by established agency and local governmental 

leadership, and to effective Project-team involvement of criminal-justice and social/educational 

personnel in addressing the problems of moderately-delinquent and at-risk youth (who were 

mainly gang members), particularly through the provision of social-intervention services. 

Key lessons learned were that: 

1.	 Not all gang youth are delinquent, and a better assessment system needs to be developed 

for identifying highly at-risk and gang-involved delinquent youth in comprehensive, 

community-wide gang programs. 

2.	 A fully-effective approach utilizing social intervention and controls by local grassroots 

organizations, in combination with established youth-serving and criminal-justice 

agencies, should be developed to address the range of problems of different kinds of gang 

youth. 

3.	 Special emphasis needs to be placed on the provision of social-intervention services for 

those gang youth with special needs related to school and job success and social 

development. 

16.26


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix A 

Police Arrest Charges 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Crime Charges 

Serious Violence Murder (M) Armed Robbery (AR) 

Attempted Murder (AttM) Armed Violence (AV) 

Manslaughter (MNS) Drive-By Shooting (DBS) 

Aggravated Battery (AB) Criminal Sexual Assault/Abuse (CSA) 

Aggravated Assault (AA) 

Violence Battery (B) Child Abuse (CA) 

Robbery (R) Street Fighting (SF) 

Kidnapping (KDN) Mob Action (MA) 

Arson (AN) Educational Intimidation (EI) 

Assault (A) Hate Crime (HTC) 

Home Invasion (HI) Stalking (STK) 

Attempted Aggravated Battery (AttAB) Telephone Harassment (TH) 

Attempted Robbery (AttR) Intimidation (INT) 

Hijacking/Motor Vehicle (HJK/MV) Ethnic Intimidation (ETHI) 

Domestic Assault (DA) Racial Incident (RI) 

Domestic Battery (DB) Unlawful Restraint (UR) 

Sex Crime (SXC) Protection Order (PO) 

Property Burglary (BG) Possession of Mislaid Property (PMP) 

Auto Theft (AT) Criminal Damage to Property (CDTP) 

Theft (T) Criminal Damage to Land (CDTL) 

Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Criminal Damage to (Motor) Vehicle (CDTV) 

Receipt of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Graffiti (GR) 

Sale of Stolen Motor Vehicle (PSMV) Vandalism (VDL) 

Theft of Lost Property (TLP) Trespass (TR) 

Attempted Burglary (AttBG) Criminal Trespass to Residence (CTTR) 

Attempted Theft (AttT) Criminal Trespass to Land (CTTL) 

Shoplifting (SHP) Criminal Trespass to Property (CTTP) 

Possession of Stolen Property (PSP) Criminal Trespass to (Motor) Vehicle 

Receipt of Stolen Property (RSP) Possession of Burglary Tools (PBT) 

Appendix A - Page 1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Crime Charges 

Drugs Manufacture/Distribution/Delivery of 

Controlled Substance (M/D/D-CS) 

Under the Influence of Cocaine (UICO) 

Possession of Controlled Substance (PCS) Under the Influence of Meth (UIM) 

Possession of Cannabis/Marijuana (PC) Under the Influence of Cannabis/Marijuana 

(UIC) 

Possession of Non-Narcotic Controlled 

Substance (PNCS) 

Driving under the Influence of Drugs (DUID) 

Weapon Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW) Unlawful Possession of Weapons (UPW) 

Aggravated Discharge of Firearm (ADF) Possession of Firearm and Ammo (PF/A) 

Unlawful Sale of Weapons (USW) Unregistered Gun Carriage (UGC) 

Unlawful Possession of Firearms (UPF) No FOID (UGC) 

Public 

Disturbance 

Resisting/Obstructing a Peace Officer (R/O-PO) Gang Loitering (GL) 

Disorderly Conduct (D/C) Gang Assembly (GA) 

Reckless Conduct (RC) Unlawful Assembly (UA) 

Curfew Violation (CV) Contempt of Court (C/C) 

Loitering (L) Obstruction of Justice (OJ) 

Alcohol Driving under the Influence of Alcohol/Drugs 

(DUI) 

Possession of Alcohol/Minor (PAM) 

Sale of Alcohol/Minor (SAM) Possession of Alcoholic Beverage (PAB) 

Minor Drinking (MDR) Drinking (DR) 

Intoxication of Minor (IOM) Transportation of Open Alcohol (TOA) 

Other Other (OTH) Child Neglect (CN) 

Status Offense (SO) Child Care Referral (CCR) 

Attempted Suicide (AttSU) Forgery (FO) 

Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) Bank Fraud (BF) 

Fraudulent/Unlawful ID (FID) 

Contributing to Delinquency of Minor (CDM) 

Exhibitionism (EX) 

Public Indecency (PI) 

Maintaining a Public Nuisance (MPN) 

Appendix A - Page 2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix B 

Self-Report Offenses 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix B 

Self-Reported Offense Categories: Total Offenses and Drug Selling 

Total Offenses includes 26 offenses divided into four sub-categories of offenses: Total Violence (including 

Serious Violence) Property, Sex and Other Offenses. 

I. Total /Serious Violence O ffenses includes 9 items: 

1. Threatened to attack a person without using a gun, 6. Beaten up or battered someone using a gun, knife or 

knife or other dangerous weapon other dangerous weapon 

2. Threatened to attack a person using a gun, knife or 7. Forced someone to have sex with you (rape) 

other dangerous weapon 

3. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force 8. Participated in a driveby shooting 

without using a weapon 

4. Robbed someone by force or by threat of force using 9. Participated in a homicide 

a weapon 

5. Beaten up or battered someone without using a gun, 

knife or other dangerous weapon 

No te tha t Serious Violence Offenses exclu des 3 of the 9 items a bov e (i.e. item s 1, 3, a nd 5 ). 

II. Property Offenses includes 13 items: 

1. W ritten gang graffiti on school property, 7. Stolen a bicycle or bike parts 

neighborhood houses, stores, etc 

2. W ritten non-gang graffiti on school property, 8. Stolen parts or property from a vehicle (e.g., 

neighborhood houses, stores, etc hubcaps or stereo) 

3. Thrown rocks or bottles at persons, vehicles or 9. Stolen a motor vehicle 

property 

4. Destroyed property worth less than $300 10. Fenced or sold stolen goods (other than weapons) 

5. Destroyed property worth $300 or more 11. Shoplifted 

6. Set fire to building or property (arson) 12. Entered a house, store, or building to commit a 

theft 

Note that Item 13 (i.e. Broke into a house, store or building to commit a theft) is removed from Time II survey. 

III. Sex Offenses includes 2 items: 

1. Made money pimping 2. Had sex for money or drugs (prostitution) 

IV. Other Offenses includes 2 items: 

1. Fenced or sold weapons or firearms 2. Participated in other offenses 

Drug Selling O ffenses includes selling 8 different types of drugs: Marijuana, Cocaine, Crack, Heroin, 

Methamphetamine/Speed/Ice, PCP/Wicky Stick, LSD/Acid, and others. 

No te tha t Drugs Selling Offenses is not inclu ded in Total Offenses for calcula ting self-reported total offenses. 

Appendix B - Page 1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix C 

Glossary of Services/Worker Contacts 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Glossary of Services1

/Worker Contacts 

1. Contact/Service Planning 

a. Assessment, Contact/Service Planning - Includes activities usually done at an initial 

contact to assess the history, current situation and needs of individuals for services. Specific 

activities include tasks such as obtaining a psychosocial history of the individual, evaluating the 

individual's strengths, problems and needs, prioritizing the problems and needs of the individual, 

formulating goals and determining services to meet client needs. 

b. Monitoring of Contact/Service Planning - Includes actions taken to monitor a client's 

compliance and/or progress related to service plans. Activities may include contacts with the 

client, significant others, and service providers to determine how the client is doing, whether 

contact was made, services received and so on. 

c. Other - Other activities, apart from those listed above, related to contact and service 

planning with individuals receiving services. 

2. Group (Gang) Contact/Service 

a. Crisis Intervention - Crisis intervention activities in a group context include activities

which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services directly to a 

group of individuals (gang members) who are in an immediate or pending crisis situation. 

Examples of activities include intervening in inter or intra-gang exchanges that are escalating 

toward violence, counseling gang members who are tempted to engage in violence or illegal 

activities, or forestalling arrest for activities such as gang loitering. 

b. Mediation - Mediation activities include steps taken to move a dispute between two

parties or groups to a peaceful and mutually agreed upon resolution. It may include actions 

typically involved in conflict resolution such as provision of feedback, increasing opportunities 

for dialogue between disputing parties (gangs and/or other groups of individuals), and other 

similar activities. It may or may not be used as a crisis intervention technique. 

c. Supervision/Surveillance - Supervision and surveillance activities reported here

should include any actions taken to increase awareness of group activities whether directly 

through visual observation or through overt or covert intelligence-related activities. These 

activities may be part of and/or result in social intervention, suppression or community 

mobilization. 

d. Explaining Service - Encompasses activities related to clarifying the purpose and 

function of the project and its various services and components to groups of youth. May include 

providing definitional information about services as well as giving specific examples. 

e. Rapport Building - Activities related to building rapport and understanding between 

staff and youth participating in the program. May involve actions such as “hanging out” on the 

 Portions of this glossary were taken from the Cooperative Agreements for Research Demonstration Projects on 

Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Treatment for Homeless Persons, Glossary of Service Activities, NIAAA, 

Washington, DC., 1992. 

Appendix C - Page 1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

1
street with groups of individuals, attempts to engage youth in casual conversations, meeting 

parents, teachers, friends and other actions focused on building a working, i.e., purposeful 

project-related relationship between program youth, staff and others. 

f. Statutory Notice - Actions performed in order to give notice to individuals related to 

complying with statutory regulations such as curfew laws or nuisance ordinances pertaining to 

gang congregating/loitering. 

g. Recreation - Includes spontaneous or scheduled group recreational or social activities 

such as trips to the movies, attending sports events, organizing activities like baseball or 

basketball, camping trips and other group events. This category does not include activities 

usually done alone like reading or individual exercise unless the latter is done in a group context. 

h. Community Service - Activities which are conducted with a group of individuals 

(gang members) that involve acts of service to the community such as graffiti paint outs, 

neighborhood clean ups, housing repairs, tutoring of community youth by gang members, and so 

on. Activities which are performed may be voluntary or ordered by the court. The youth 

engaged in providing services should not be paid for their activities. Further, the services should 

be aimed at improving the community in some way. 

I. Group Discussion - Includes activities designed to facilitate and carry out 

conversations in a group format, whether spontaneous or scheduled, in which specific issues or 

problems are discussed. Topics may include any issue of interest from gangs to health or 

personal issues. Discussions can be educational, therapeutic or otherwise as long as there is 

some attempt to encourage group participation and discussion of the topic presented. 

j. Other - This category should include any other activities conducted in a group setting 

which are not delineated above. Please be specific. 

3. Counseling (Interpersonal Helping) - Individual 

Counseling activities, at the individual level, regardless of focus, are generally process 

oriented and are intended to change the individual's attitudes, beliefs, affective responses and/or 

behaviors. 

a. Individual Counseling Related to Gangs - Includes activities in which an individual 

receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as other

assistance during one-to-one “therapeutic” interaction with a professional or paraprofessional 

staff person in order to help the individual with a gang-related problem, including his or her 

desire to leave the gang; removal of tatoos; friction between individuals in the same gang, etc. 

b. Individual Counseling Related to Family Issues - Includes activities in which an 

individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as

other assistance during a one-to-one “therapeutic” interaction with a professional or 

paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem related to family 

issues. This may include issues related to the individual's family of origin as well as his or her 

family of procreation. 

c. Individual Counseling Related to Other Issues - Includes activities in which an 

individual receives advice, encouragement, support, behavior management instructions as well as

other assistance during a one-to-one “therapeutic” interaction with a professional or 

Appendix C - Page 2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
paraprofessional staff person in order to help the individual with a problem other than gangrelated or family issues. Other issues may include problems such as school-related issues or 

problems pertaining to non-gang friends. Specify the issues discussed most often if more than 

one problem was addressed. 

d. Family Counseling Related to Gang Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided 

to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in 

order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues that are 

related to gangs. This may include, but is not limited to issues related to leaving the gang. 

Family members who participate may be members of an individual's family of origin or 

procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present. 

e. Family Counseling Related to Family Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided 

to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in 

order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with family-related 

problems. This may include problems with an individual's family of origin as well as his or her 

family of procreation. Family members who participate may be members of an individual's 

family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not necessarily be present. 

f. Family Counseling Related to Other Issues - Therapeutic services that are provided 

to individuals and their families in the same session by professional or paraprofessional staff in 

order to inform, motivate, guide and assist a family member in dealing with issues other than 

gang-related or family problems. This may include, but is not limited to school problems, 

substance abuse or problems with non-gang friends. Family members who participate may be 

members of an individual's family of origin or procreation or both. The gang youth may not 

necessarily be present. 

g. Crisis Intervention - At the individual or family level, crisis intervention includes 

activities which provide information about the availability of services and/or provide services 

directly to a person who is in a crisis situation. Examples of activities include referring a person

for emergency mental health care or an appropriate treatment unit, helping an individual who is 

being treated for a substance abuse problem to avoid use of alcohol or illegal drugs when he or 

she is tempted, preventing or forestalling an individual's eviction from housing or his or her 

committing an act of violence against another individual. 

h. Other - Includes other counseling or helping activities to individuals and/or their 

family members not listed above. 

4. Prevocational and Vocational Services --Individual 

Note that the activities in this category may all be performed in the course of obtaining 

employment for an individual and may overlap at times. 

a. Job Preparation - Activities conducted with the goal of preparing individuals to look 

for and secure employment. May include activities such as providing information about dress 

codes, conducting mock interviews, helping individuals fill out employment applications, 

assisting with résumé writing and instructing individuals on how to compile a list of job

references. 

b. Job Training - Activities conducted for the purpose of preparing someone for a 

specific job or occupation. Includes actions taken to evaluate an individual's current 

Appendix C - Page 3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
employability and job skills as well as activities and/or structured programs designed to help 

individuals acquire or improve job skills. 

c. Job Development - This includes activities such as searching for jobs or contacting 

employers in agencies to identify a range of jobs for which program youth might possibly qualify. 

In addition, job development activities involve the use of explanation as to the purpose and 

nature of the program and persuasion of potential employers to contact or each out to gang youth 

in the program. 

d. Job Placement - Activities that are performed as part of placing individuals in 

employment situations. In contrast to job referral, job placement involves actually knowing 

about a specific job and placing an individual in the position. 

e. Other - Includes other activities performed in the course of providing job-related or 

vocational services. 

5. Educational Services - Individual 

a. Advocacy (e.g., school transfer/returns) - Encompasses activities performed to 

support or promote individuals related to educational matters, including individuals' 

opportunities to complete elementary, special school or high school programs. Actions may

involved working with school administrators or school counselors to facilitate returns to school

for individuals who have been suspended or expelled or helping with transfers to alternative 

educational programs. 

b. School Placement - Activities related to placing individuals in schools, including

alternative school programs. 

c. GED Program - Activities performed in relation to placing individuals in GED 

programs. Includes gathering information about programs, helping with applications, and so on. 

d. Continuing Education - Activities performed, whether formal or informal, which 

facilitate individual's obtaining continuing education or specialized skills, often on a part-time 

basis. Actions may include providing information about programs, helping individuals gain 

admission, or directly providing continuing education programs. 

e. Junior College Placement - Activities related to placing individuals in junior or

community college programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as

well as helping individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities 

intended to facilitate placement. 

f. College Placement - Activities related to placing individuals in four-year college 

programs. Actions may involve providing information about programs as well as helping 

individuals complete applications, obtain financial aid and other activities intended to facilitate 

placement. 

g. Other - Other activities, not included above, related to education including tutoring or 

other similar activities. 

Appendix C - Page 4 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
6. Criminal Justice - Individual 

a. Advocacy/Legal Assistance - Activities undertaken to support or defend individuals 

related to legal problems. Includes services provided by a lawyer or trained legal 

paraprofessional to assist with an individual's legal problems. 

b. Arrest - Includes arrest by sworn law enforcement officials. 

c. Home Confinement - Includes actions related to enforcing and carrying out sentences 

involving home confinements for individuals when they have been mandated. 

d. Monitoring - Includes activities related to ensuring compliance of individuals with 

mandated activities, such as home confinement, community service, or other judicial 

requirements that are part of sentencing decisions. Actions may include contacts with the 

individual him or herself as well as significant others to determine how the individual is doing. 

e. Probation - Activities performed as part of court mandated overseeing of an 

individual's probation. Pertains to sworn probation officers only. 

f. Parole/Aftercare - Activities conducted as part of overseeing an individual's parole or 

aftercare plan, i.e., usually when the individual is released from the jurisdiction of a correctional 

institution. Includes all actions undertaken as part of executing the plan such as counseling, job 

referral, housing location and so on. (However, you should report such activities in the 

appropriate sub-categories as well, i.e., also under housing location or counseling, if applicable). 

g. Violation of Probation - Activities performed in relation to violating a probationer

(i.e., revoking probation). Pertains to sworn probation officers only. 

h. Detention - Actions undertaken related to placement of an individual in detention, 

whether the detention is in a city, county, state or federal facility. Pertains to sworn law 

enforcement personnel only. 

I. Prosecution (Assisting With) - Activities related to prosecuting individuals for alleged 

criminal activities. Includes investigating, locating and obtaining testimony from victims, trail 

activities, recommending dispositions and so on. 

j. Witness Protection - Includes actions taken to protect individuals who have served as 

witnesses in criminal proceedings. Activities include assisting with relocation as part of the 

protection effort, helping to secure necessary identification documents as well as actions directed 

against persons who may or actually do intimidate witnesses. 

k. Other - Includes other activities related to criminal justice matters not included above. 

7. Benefits, Assistance, and Money Management - Individual 

a. Welfare Assistance - Includes activities undertaken to obtain resources, services or 

benefits such as Social Security, unemployment or victim's compensation, general assistance 

programs, food stamps, family assistance programs, or Veteran's Administration benefits for 

individuals. Involves acts such as helping individuals to apply for benefits; arranging a transfer 

of records; gathering information about potential welfare programs; completing required referral 

forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual for benefits; working with 

Appendix C - Page 5 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
other organizations or professionals or staff within your own agency/program to plan and/or 

coordinate services related to welfare benefits on behalf of a specific individual; and interceding 

or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or return necessary benefits. 

b. Medical Insurance - Involves actions related to securing medical insurance for 

individuals including linking individuals to resources, helping them to contact agencies to apply 

for insurance, arranging for transfers of records, gathering information about potential programs, 

completing required referrals forms or providing necessary information to qualify an individual 

for benefits, interceding or advocating on behalf of an individual to obtain or retain necessary 

insurance and referring individuals to insurance programs. 

c. Money Management - This category includes activities related to assisting individuals 

with money management issues and can involve actions helping an individual to open and

manage a personal bank account; working with an individual to budget personal expenses and 

pay bills; and becoming the officially designated representative payee for an individual directly 

receiving Social Security and other income on behalf of that individual. 

d. Practice Supports (concrete provision) - Includes actions taken to directly provide to 

individuals concrete and necessary supports such as food, clothing, laundry facilities, bathing 

facilities, cash or vouchers, access to a telephone or mail service. 

e. Other - Includes any other activities performed in the course of helping individuals to 

obtain benefits and other assistance or to manage their money. 

8. Housing Location/Provision - Individual 

Actions taken to assist individuals in securing temporary or long-term housing. Specific 

activities can include locating affordable housing units, talking with landlords and management

companies, assisting individuals with rental applications or housing subsidy applications, or 

directly providing housing, either temporary or long-term. This category does not include 

referrals to residential treatment programs. 

9. Alcohol/Drug Abuse Treatment Services - Individual 

Includes activities taken in order to provide alcohol and/or drug abuse treatment services 

to individuals. May include initial assessment, physical evaluation, initiation and/or provision of 

recovery activities (i.e., running AA meetings), ongoing treatment, treatment planning and 

monitoring related to substance abuse problems. Referrals for substance abuse treatment should 

also be included as should referrals to residential treatment programs (as referrals for service). 

10. Medical Services - Individual 

Includes diagnostic and treatment services provided by licensed physicians, nurses or 

other health care professionals or technicians. Also include activities related to prescribing, 

administering and monitoring of medication as well as the provision of educational information 

about health care issues such as birth control, HIV/AIDS education and other health matters. 

Referrals for medical services should be counted as referrals in this category. 

Appendix C - Page 6 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
11. Other Services Individual 

a. Transportation - Activities conducted for the purpose of transporting (or 

accompanying) individuals to a service activity, service agency, job interviews and so on, or

providing individuals with cash or bus tokens for them to use on public transportation. 

b. Child Care - Activities including the supervision, care and execution of ageappropriate activities for children of individuals who are participating in the program. 

c. Other - All other activities not included in any of the above categories. Specify. 

Appendix C - Page 7 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix D 

S/W Gang Involvement Scale 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
S/W Gang Involvement Scale 

There is an extensive literature that consistently demonstrates that gang members commit 

more crime, and more serious crime (especially violence), than either delinquent non-gang youth 

or non-delinquents. However, many self-report, survey, and cohort studies simply ask the youth 

respondent whether he or she is or has been a gang member, which then becomes the allimportant independent variable predicting highly-frequent and/or serious levels of crime 

participation. Gang membership in this type of quantitative (although not observational or 

ethnographic) study is viewed as a categorical variable. The youth is a gang member – an 

invariable status – at a particular point or set of points in time. However, for purposes of 

program development, based on the youth’s life-course changes (Sampson and Laub 1993), it is 

important to emphasize the variability of this status. 

The reality is that there are different degrees of gang membership, and different 

circumstances which influence the youth’s gang status and role over time. The degree of the 

youth’s commitment to the gang role may determine his gang delinquent behavior. The 

variability of gang membership and its relationship to delinquency, within and across time 

periods, has not been adequately factored into gang research, policy, program development and 

evaluation. It is critically important, therefore, to test the proposition that all gang members are 

not the same; that they all have not been and will not be subjected to the same influences; that 

they all are not and will not be involved in gang structures and processes to the same degree over 

time; and, consequently, that the nature and levels of their delinquent behaviors identified as 

gang-related can be expected to vary. In other words, while it is important to know whether the 

youth is a gang member or not, this fact alone is not sufficient to account for or to predict the 

Appendix D - Page 1 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
level of the youth’s subsequent delinquency. It is important also to assess the changing nature 

and processes of the youth’s specific context of gang involvement which, along with other 

variables such as his changing patterns of educational achievement, employment status, and 

sources of income, may more substantially account for his level of delinquency. 

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale may be useful for determining the youth’s level of risk 

for gang delinquency, and may provide guidance for policy and program planning as to what 

measures to take in the prevention, intervention, and suppression of the youth’s actual or 

potential gang behavior, after he has been initially identified as a gang member. The nature of 

gang involvement must be broken down into components that characterize the youth’s prior and 

current gang status, and the prior and current conditions that proximately contribute to it. These 

temporal and contextual factors continuously interact with each other, and may have an effect on 

the youth’s delinquent behavior. 

The S/W Gang Involvement Scale, for research purposes, provides the Evaluators with a 

way to measure effects of the program in terms of the youth’s degree and context of gang 

involvement, at different points in time, which may result in delinquent behavior. It is important 

not only to measure the effect of the program on the youth who may or may not have been a gang 

member when he entered the program, but also to measure to what extent the program was 

successful in preventing or reducing the youth’s gang involvement during the program period. 

The S/W Scale has not yet been tested or validated, and is used in an exploratory way in the 

present analysis to measure changes in the youth’s gang involvement, which, in turn, may have 

caused changes in the youth’s total offenses during the course of the Mesa program. 

The present scale contains 11 items obtained from the Individual Gang Member Survey: 

Appendix D - Page 2 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
whether parents, siblings, or anyone else in the current household has ever been a gang member 

(yes = at least 1, no = not in the household); ratio of close gang friends to non-gang friends (yes = 

a few and some, no = none or no close friends); time spent with gang friends (yes = some, no = 

none); areas in neighborhood where the youth was afraid to walk alone because of gang-related 

concerns (yes, no); whether any close relative of the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, 

no); whether the youth has been a victim of gang crime (yes, no); whether the youth is currently 

an active gang member (yes, no); the most recent rank of the youth in the gang (yes = leader, 

core, regular; no = peripheral, associate, wannabe); the youth’s knowledge of current gang size 

(yes, no); whether the youth has ever received a gang violation (yes, no); if the youth thinks he 

will ever leave the gang (yes, no). 

Scores are established for the Time I and Time II interview responses. A maximum score 

of 11 is possible at each interview, if all responses are “yes.” A difference score between Time II 

and Time I measures the amount of change in gang involvement that has occurred. We anticipate 

that the difference score will enable us to predict program effects on gang involvement of the 

youth, and that changes in gang involvement will help us predict changes in levels of offenses. 

Appendix D - Page 3 

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 

been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.