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38–707 2007

MEETING TO DISCUSS THE STATUS OF THE 

INVESTIGATION INTO THE FL–13 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT ELECTION 

MEETING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 

ADMINISTRATION 

TASK FORCE FOR THE CONTESTED ELECTION IN 

THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MEETING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, AUGUST 3, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/administration/ 

index.html 


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COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ZOE LOFGREN, California, 

Vice-Chairwoman 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

SUSAN DAVIS, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan, 

Ranking Minority Member 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

KEVIN MCCARTHY, California 

S. ELIZABETH BIRNBAUM, Staff Director 

WILLIAM PLASTER, Minority Staff Director 

TASK FORCE FOR THE CONTESTED ELECTION IN THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL

DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas, Chairman 

ZOE LOFGREN, California KEVIN MCCARTHY, California 


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STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE 

FL–13 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT CONTESTED ELECTION 

FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 2007 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

ELECTION TASK FORCE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The task force met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Charles A. Gonzalez 

(chairman of the task force) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gonzalez, Lofgren, Ehlers, and McCarthy. 

Staff Present: Liz Birnbaum, Staff Director; Thomas Hicks, Senior Election Counsel; Charles Howell, Chief Counsel; Janelle Hu, 

Election Counsel; Jennifer Daehn, Election Counsel; Matt Pinkus, 

Professional Staff/Parliamentarian; Kyle Anderson, Press Director; 

Kristin McCowan, Chief Legislative Clerk; Daniel Favarulo, Staff 

Assistant, Elections; Fred Hay, Minority General Counsel; Gineen 

Beach, Minority Election Counsel; and Bryan T. Dorsey, Minority 

Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I call the meeting of the task force to order. I 

thought I would briefly go over a chronology to give us a proper 

background as to where we are today in order to receive this report 

from the representatives from GAO. On the 23rd of March, 2007 

the late and wonderful Chairwoman Millender-McDonald, established the three-member ad hoc election panel, two members of the 

majority and one member of the minority, to oversee matters relating to Florida’s 13th congressional district election contest and recommend final disposition to the committee of that contest. 

I was appointed, as well as Representative Zoe Lofgren, to be the 

majority members, with myself serving as the Chair. On the 16th 

of April, Ranking Member Ehlers recommended Representative 

Kevin McCarthy as the minority member. On the 17th of April 

counsel to the parties informally briefed the panel on the status of 

Florida election contest proceedings. Also present at that briefing 

was Congressman Dan Lungren from the minority. On the 2nd of 

May 2007 there was a public task force meeting to initiate an investigation of Florida’s 13th congressional district election, and we 

authorized myself to secure the assistance of the Government Accountability Office, which was requested to design and propose 

testing protocols to determine the reliability of the equipment used 


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in the Florida 13 election taking into account recommendations by 

the contestant and contestee. 

On the 7th of June, there was an internal briefing and planning 

meeting of the task force and GAO to discuss GAO working plans. 

On the 14th of June, there was a public task force meeting to approve the GAO work plan. On the 27th of July there was an internal briefing and planning meeting of the task force members and 

staff with GAO to work on the plan and ascertain its progress. 

Today, the 3rd of August is our follow-up meeting, our public meeting, to ascertain the status of the work being conducted by the 

GAO. The purpose of today’s meeting from the Chair’s perspective, 

of course, is basically a status report from GAO, any determinations that can be made at this time, what remains to be done, and 

also to establish a process for the task force to operate during the 

August recess. 

Anticipating that the work has not been completed by GAO they 

will require more time and there may be requirements or needs 

that will arise during the August recess during which obviously 

members must somehow establish a process where we can come together, even if it is by teleconference, in order to make some determinations and pass on those requests. Appearing before the task 

force today will be Naba Barkakati, senior level technologist; Gloria 

Jarmon, managing director, congressional relations; and Jan Montgomery, assistant general counsel. 

I believe that we will have a statement that is going to be read 

by Mr. Barkakati, but at this time, I would yield to the other members of the task force if they wish to make any opening remarks. 

And I would recognize the minority member, Mr. McCarthy. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I appreciate the chairman for recognizing 

me. I am excited about moving forward as we are. I appreciate the 

update you had given us last week. I will tell you from that update 

that I was very pleased to hear the relationship and the working 

relationship with everybody down in Florida from Sarasota to the 

State. It seems like they had open arms. Everybody wants to get 

to a conclusion here. And so I look forward to today’s hearing and 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much. And the Chair will recognize Ms. Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I would just like to get to the report so I will yield 

back to the chairman. 

STATEMENTS OF NABA BARKAKATI, SENIOR LEVEL TECHNOLOGIST; GLORIA JARMON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS; AND JAN MONTGOMERY, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL 

Mr. GONZALEZ. All right. At this time, the Chair will recognize 

Dr. Naba Barkakati. 

STATEMENT OF NABA BARKAKATI 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Chairman Gonzalez, Mr. McCarthy, Ms. Lofgren, 

I am here today to update you on our progress regarding the Florida 13 voting system review. I want to begin by thanking the task 


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force for its continued support of our efforts, and I also acknowledge the cooperation of everyone else involved in helping us get the 

document and information that we have needed to conduct the 

work so far. We have accomplished a lot in the past few weeks 

from the time when we agreed on the engagement plan on June 14, 

but we still have some work to complete before we can formally 

conclude any conclusions. To conduct our work, we have visited 

Sarasota County, Tallahassee, had discussions with Florida’s Secretary of State, Division of Elections, and then we had talked to 

Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections, ES&S, the manufacturer 

of the system, and the team leader of the Florida system in Florida 

State University’s source code review team, the one who looked at 

the iVotronic source code. 

By analyzing the detailed ballot data that we have received from 

Sarasota County we have verified that 1,499 iVotronic machines 

had recorded 119,919 ballots in the 2006 general election, and of 

these there were 17,846 undervotes in the Florida 13 race, which 

corresponded to a 14.88 percent undervote rate on the iVotronic 

machines. We examined the undervote by machine, precinct and 

ballot style, looking for any patterns. We have not yet noticed any 

apparent patterns, but are continuing with our analysis. 

While we have not completed reviewing all the testing that is 

done so far, there are some observations we can make at this time. 

Of the many different types of testing that one can perform in a 

voting system, we have focused our efforts on two types of tests 

that are called ballot testing and load testing. Ballot testing refers 

to the functional testing of the voting system focusing on the different ways in which the voter may make selections on the ballot 

and then cast a ballot with the iVotronic machine. 

Load testing subjects the voting machine to a large number of 

votes in order to verify that the system can properly handle the expected volume of ballots. Considering all the different ways that 

the iVotronic machine enables a voter to make selections and cast 

a ballot, we counted 112 different ways that the voter could make 

such selections, by navigating through the pages and casting the 

ballot in the Florida 13 race, assuming that is the only race on the 

ballot. We found that the Florida certification tests, the Sarasota 

County’s logic and accuracy tests, and the parallel testing that was 

done under the state audit of the Sarasota County election covered 

13 of the 112 ways of the ones we enumerated. We have not yet 

assessed whether this is significant. 

Load testing was done as part of Florida’s certification testing, 

but the ballots were machine generated using a testing feature 

built into the iVotronic machine, which means that users did not 

touch the screen to make selections and cast ballots. Again, we 

have not fully assessed whether this is significant. 

Last week we obtained access to the iVotronic source code under 

a nondisclosure agreement, and then were able to review the 

source code ourselves and verify some of the items that are reported in the Florida State University’s review of the source code 

that was also done under Florida’s audit of Sarasota County’s elections. We plan to discuss the source code further with the audit 

team, as well as ES&S in the near future. 


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One item to note from the code review report is that the review 

team did not convert the human readable source code into machine 

code, which we call object code, and compare the resulting object 

code to the certified version of firmware for the iVotronic machines 

that were used in Sarasota County. These steps would be necessary 

to assure that the reviewed source code corresponds to the 

firmware in the iVotronics. As part of our review of the State audit, 

we also examined the selection of sample machines for the parallel 

testing and the firmware verification. Ten machines were used for 

parallel testing, and the State audit had examined the firmware 

from six randomly selected machines. Our preliminary analysis indicates that these sample sizes were too small to apply the results 

across the board to all iVotronic machines that were used in the 

2006 general election in Sarasota County. For example, checking 

the firmware in six randomly selected machines is inadequate to 

conclude that the firmware was not compromised on any of the machines that were used in Sarasota County. I want to stress that 

these are just our preliminary observations. It is not clear to us yet 

whether these are items we think will need to be tested. For any 

further testing that we identify we plan to determine the relevance 

and the significance of the test, the test procedures, and estimate 

the resources needed and the time required to conduct the test. 

Besides analyzing potential tests, we are planning to examine 

the testing conducted by ES&S and identify other tests besides ballot testing and load testing that I had mentioned earlier that could 

be used to determine whether the voting system contributed to the 

undervote. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes a summary of my written statement. I would be happy to respond to further questions that you 

and other members of the task force may have at this time. Thank 

you. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

[The statement of Mr. Barkakati follows:] 


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Mr. GONZALEZ. Do either of the other representatives from GAO 

wish to address the task force? Ms. Jarmon. 

Ms. JARMON. No. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. And Ms. Montgomery. 

Ms. MONTGOMERY. No. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Very good. I think I will start off with a couple 

of questions. And we have the luxury right now, I believe that the 

House is still in recess, so we are going to try to accomplish as 

much as possible. I do have some questions. Some of it is so technical, Doctor, I think at your briefing last week we tried to get into 

it. At the end of the discussion, I still have such a layman’s understanding of what you really do in many different ways, but I want 

to start off with ballot testing. 

One concern that you have, and I want to preface everything that 

we go into today that you have not made a determination whether 

this is significant or insignificant. But let us start off with some of 

the areas of concern. Ballot testing, since only 13 of 112 different 

ways the voter could have made a selection in the Florida 13 race 

specifically is an area of concern, and I want to know why would 

it be a concern. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I should probably say that we are trying to stay 

away from saying it is a concern. Mainly because it is just an enumeration of tests that you do. And in the end, we may decide or 

we may conclude from our deliberations that it really doesn’t mean 

much and the functionality of the machine tested fine by doing the 

cases that were done. So in other words, the other possibility also 

remains that even though we have enumerated 112, and in reality 

it could make combinations that can grow even farther by considering other steps, so we may say that, well, that is extraneous and 

doesn’t require to be done. So that is why we haven’t said that it 

is a concern. And also we have kept in mind that between 13 and 

112, all we are saying is different ways of selecting in a two-way 

situation in the ballot, and it probably won’t be too time-consuming 

to do, even if we were to raise it as an item. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I appreciate what you are saying. And the description that it is a concern is the Chair’s description. And we 

could say it has—somehow it has drawn your attention. I don’t 

know how else to say it. For a layman, if you say you have 112 

variations of something, you think, well, you better test as many 

of those as you can. But that is not necessarily true when you get 

into the technical sense, and we will just wait for your expertise 

to be applied. Load testing, one thing that you indicated is that on 

the load testing, during the certification testing that it was machine generated, which means users do not touch the screen to 

make a selection. 

Neither the Florida audit nor Sarasota County’s logic and accuracy testing performed load testing. We have not yet assessed 

whether this is significant. So again, this is something that has 

drawn your attention as to how you test, whether there is the 

human element, the actual touching and so on. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. The machine has a built in feature. It can 

say test for us, you know, casting 9,000 ballots. And it will do it 

for you by almost exercising as much of the software as it can, but 

excluding the part where you have touched the screen. So we were 


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raising it as an issue that to truly test a machine for its ability to 

handle, you know, including the human element of entering the 

vote, it wasn’t there. Basically, that is what the observation is. And 

it may turn out that it might be good to do so or maybe it is not, 

again, not a matter that needs to be pursued further. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. The other item that you, and we are reading from 

your draft of course, is that one of the items noted in the report 

was that the review team did not, one, convert the source code to 

object code; and, two, compare the resulting object code to the object code that was used to run the voting machines in Sarasota 

County. Can you translate that? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. Essentially the software is in a programming language. They call it C, C programming language, primarily. 

And you can read it. A human can read it. I mean, you will be able 

to read it. There will be words that are like English like words, but 

of course they have a special meaning in the computer sense. And 

so programmers should write using that language, and that is what 

we would be reviewing if we were reviewing source code. And those 

programs are going to lay out the intent of the machine, like, you 

know, cast the ballot, do this or that. So we will be able to read 

through the logic and say, oh, this looks good. 

But of course, the machine doesn’t run that. You would be using 

it though like something called Compiler or Linker or things that 

enable you to convert source code into binary, you know, ones and 

zeros that are not readable by us, but that is what the machine is 

going to execute. And that is the version that is going to be loaded 

into a chip. 

You know, they call it EPROM. That is like a flash memory. 

Where it can stay for—even if the power is turned off, it will stay 

on. And that is what the iVotronic always runs. So one of the problems we have is even when I review the source code I would like 

to know that what I reviewed was producing exactly the same binary, which it probably does for all I know, as what is in the machines. And all we are saying is that that step was not done. 

And we have talked to the team and they were saying that they 

were relying on other certifications of that. In other words, like 

independent testing already have done it. And we have not verified. 

I mean, it hasn’t given us complete assurance that we have seen 

the steps performed and confirmed. Especially if you know how this 

is done. It is not going to be a lengthy, long-drawn process. If you 

had the tool, you could do it very fairly reasonably well. Within a 

day maybe you can complete it. So that is where we are wanting 

to see this done basically. And it wasn’t done. But then again, if 

we find that the certifications that are provided by ITA, an independent testing authority, are maybe in our judgment it is okay, 

then perhaps it is all right. But I must say that even the code that 

I reviewed I was always wondering if that is—I mean, I would have 

liked to perform that step myself, except that you need those tools 

from the manufacturer. And we didn’t have that available to do it 

immediately. 

And that is the only point we are making in that they are saying 

it wasn’t done by the team and it was taken as a given, as an assumption. So there is nothing worth faulting the team for that. But 

it would be a critical step to complete to really have an assurance 


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that, okay, the code was reviewed and it was really the same thing 

that drove the machine. That is the idea. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. It was one of the more contentious points, and 

that is access to the source code. But my understanding is you have 

not really had any real objection gaining access. But we are working on, I believe, and Ms. Montgomery might be able to answer it, 

on the finalization of the confidentiality agreement, which will 

allow complete access and use of the source code as you have indicated you wish to do is that correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. I would start, and Ms. Montgomery can add 

also, yes, we were given complete access. We were not allowed to 

take the source code with us, which is understandable because it 

is a proprietary item. But we can look at it as long as we want, 

as much as we want, take notes on it. We have been able to do all 

of that. And for further discussions and further technical information, we do have work going on on another agreement, and perhaps 

you can add. 

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I believe we have an agreement with ES&S 

at this point. In theory the team will be going down very soon in 

the next several weeks to Nebraska to access the internal testing 

information from the ES&S. So I would say we have had very good 

cooperation and we have access to the information we need to do 

this job. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Excellent. Thank you. One of the last points, and 

one that I sort of understand and I think, again, a layperson may 

understand, and this is going to be on page 5 of your draft report: 

As a part of our review of the State audit, we examined the selection of samples for the parallel testing in the review of the Sarasota County election practices. Our preliminary analysis has found 

that these sample sizes are too small to support generalization of 

the results to the overall population. Now, to a layperson that simply means you have 1,500 machines that were used here in the 

election and that a certain number were actually utilized for testing and so on. And further you say: Our discussions with Florida 

officials indicate that such limitations resulted from court imposed 

restrictions on machine access and resource considerations are performed in the testing. So is it really the number of machines that 

were tested? How many out of the 1,500 at this point? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Well, as it mentions here, 10 machines were 

used for parallel testing. But if you remember what happened is 

that they tested five machines that were not used in the election, 

and five from the set that was used in the election. Now, to pick 

the machines that were not used in the election they only had a 

very few left over. They didn’t have the choice to pick from a large 

population. 

So what I am trying to say is that there was such a small set 

of machines that were not used in the election that they could only 

pick five out of that. And then, of course, that forced them to do 

five on the other side to keep it the same. So they were not thinking from the point of I guess generalizing using statistical methods 

and all to the whole population. 

Now, to say one thing in a clarification is that if you want to 

make a statement about the whole population of machines, then 

you have to kind of explain how much confidence you want, you 


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know, say 99 percent confidence, and how much error you are willing to tolerate, meaning how many of those machines, what percentage might still not conform to your test and you are okay with 

that. 

Say, if you want to say with 99 percent confidence out of 1,499 

machines, I want to be able to say that only 5 percent at most have 

an error. You know, whatever the condition is; error in testing or 

error in not having the right version, it doesn’t matter. Then the 

selection would be something like our statisticians say, 89 machines have to be tested. 

So all we are saying is that if you wish to kind of make a conclusion that, okay, we tested the machines and they are all, say, don’t 

have any problem, then you have to pick 89 and perform the test. 

And at the end all you are able to say is that with 99 percent confidence, I know that only 5 percent at the most may have an error, 

so 95 percent is okay, you know, of the population. And based on 

if things seem normal, the machines may be different levels of the 

confidence and different levels of error, but you have to set those 

things and pick a sample and then your conclusions can be essentially statistically significant and everybody can agree that, yes, 

they have tested thoroughly. That is the reason for raising the 

issue. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you. And the last thing I want to point out 

on page 5, you said there may be some other causes, and we covered this in our briefing last week. One would be the effects of provisional ballots. And we understand provisional ballots. The other 

thing that you said was environmental conditions. And in last 

week’s meeting, I didn’t know what you meant by environmental, 

and you pointed out temperature. And that is, for instance, the machines can operate according to certain tolerances, such as temperature and such. When you say environment to a layperson, 

sometimes we think, you know, real life conditions. In other words, 

where they were placed, how long they were sitting there, the 

angle that people had to press their selections and such. But that 

is not what you mean. Environment is something entirely different? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I think either of those factors can come in the 

primary environment of things or more like to be able to handle 

shock, vibration, humidity and temperature. Those are the kind of 

things that come into play there. And those things are done particularly by the independent testing authority. So we may very well 

conclude that that part is taken care of and we don’t need to worry 

about it. But that is what we meant in that instance. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. All right. Thank you. And that concludes my very 

long number of questions. But I know that the other members of 

the task force at this time will have questions. And I do want to 

welcome the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Ehlers. 

Good morning. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. And at this time the Chair will recognize Mr. 

McCarthy. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple questions. Do you have any determination currently about how far 


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along you are in doing the report. I mean, are you 20 percent 

along. Could you put a percentage to it? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I probably couldn’t put a percentage, but I 

should say in terms of our four objectives that we laid out, the preliminary ones like looking at of course the first part, the first two 

are basically figuring out what systems are used and how they are 

used. I would say that part is done. We have gotten all the information from everywhere to figure what machines were used, how 

and all that. The second, including the—we are still analyzing, 

though, the level of problem, like undervote pattern, et cetera, is 

not completely done. We have a little left there. 

Looking at the previous testing was one of the things. You know, 

like previous testing by manufacturer, by Florida State and then 

Sarasota County. We have not looked at the manufacturer testing, 

but we will be looking at that by August 15 or so. Which means 

that could get done soon. And that will settle questions like whether they have maybe internally tested certain things that we haven’t 

seen elsewhere and we could check them off. But I would say the 

most important thing that is remaining are the things that we say 

here that we have not determined the significance of, to have an 

internal discussion and deliberation to figure out if it is important 

or not, and whether we should raise them to the level of tests to 

be done. 

And then, of course, the figuring out whether, you know, how 

much time is needed, how much resource, so we have some information to decide whether even to go forward; if it is cost prohibitive or resource prohibitive, then you cannot do it. 

So in other words, mostly the fourth item where we say figure 

out what tests might be needed and come back to us with detailed 

information about them is the ultimate biggest thing remaining. So 

I am not putting a percentage, but we are devoting our time to basically checking out the testing at ES&S and doing our own internal deliberations and discussions to figure out the testing we 

should be, minimum or more testing that we will be proposing to 

you or listing to you with information that might help you decide 

whether you do it or not. And again with the caveat that maybe 

this is something to say, all checked out there is nothing much you 

can propose. That is a possibility. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Now, you have also studied the audit that the 

State did and you have spoken to some of the PhDs that did the 

study as well. Is that correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. And we did say very briefly that we were 

able to verify certain, like things that they talk about, like the user 

touches the screen and this is how the vote gets cast. We could 

check a few sequences of code and check what they say about the 

code. And they, of course, match what they say. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. So you have a check and balance of that? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. We didn’t check all the details of it, and we 

are going to do a little more. And as a matter of fact, they also 

have been very responsive and he has, the leader has offered to 

help us out if we need to; in other words, because they have already gone through. Although we were trying initially somewhat 

more to do on our own to be independent and see on our own what 

is there. 


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Mr. MCCARTHY. Now, you are so far along and you have done the 

analysis. Is there anything out there that makes it drive you in a 

different direction? Is there, for no better word, is there a smoking 

gun? Is there something out there that says, hey, this is the problem already? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. So far, I would say no, other than the things 

that we raise as far as sample of the machines, you know, like are 

not adequate and all. Those are more along the lines of being able 

to say the same thing that there is no smoking gun. Sure. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. You just take them away. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Right. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. And one thing, and I just draw on what the 

chairman said, you have these 112 ways and only 13 of them had 

been tested. And that kind of raised a question to me last week. 

And when I probed further, I was wondering why the State did 

these 13. And it was described to me the reason you did these 13 

is because the contestee, Ms. Jennings, argued that there was 

something wrong. These 13 are the top analysis if something went 

wrong and denied Ms. Jennings a vote, these 13 would show it. 

That is why they didn’t test 112 because these others that could 

be left would mean if something went wrong in these other tests, 

it would give Mr. Buchanan more votes, and he was already in the 

lead, so why would we test for the sake of saving money, I guess, 

is that correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Basically, the reason for our number being higher is because we think of like, well, the voter could go forward and 

press the page back key and change it again or change it from the 

review screen. There are multiple options of doing things. When 

you take all the combinations it becomes larger. Now, I would 

agree that they were primarily making sure that Ms. Jennings 

could get votes, no matter how you went. And that is what the rationale was given to us. And in that scenario, there could still have 

been a few more to check the other side, which is like you know, 

maybe Mr. Buchanan could also be given votes by changing and 

that would raise it to, I think, 18 or something like that instead 

of 10. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. But these were the top 13? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. And you are testing everything, so it could come 

back that maybe Mr. Buchanan got more votes? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I should really kind of emphasize that those 

tests are going to only confirm that each party is able to get votes 

and no problem. And the logic and accuracy test that the counties 

do is also geared towards making sure that every candidate on the 

list in any race is able to get a vote by the machine. They cast it 

and confirm that it happens. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Now, you say you have looked at the source 

code. And then when we talked last week, you have your own expertise when it comes to programming and a few others. Was there 

anything looking at this source code, I know you haven’t been able 

to run it because you are getting the agreement, anything shoot at 

you just understanding programming and others? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. No. As a matter of fact just as the other team, 

the Florida State University team that had looked at the source 


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code, their conclusion was it is a simple program that is a very sequential processing of what happens, like a user touches something 

it keeps on checking, and it determines what the vote is, marks it 

and saves it when you press the vote cast button. 

So in that sense, I found the same exact thing. It was readable. 

It wasn’t hard to read or understand. And it was simple enough to 

follow that logic essentially. So nothing jumped out when I looked 

at the source code. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. So when you looked at the source code you got 

by looking at it the same thing that the PhDs that looked at it 

from the State and the court did. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. Because they did point out anything that 

they saw in terms of like other flaws and all in a proprietary appendix which wasn’t released to the public, and we could see those 

also. Partially we looked at some of those too. Because they pointed 

out certain things that are not pertinent to undervote. But we will 

explore that a little more. If you recall, there were three appendices 

that were not released to the public. And they included more information, but they were saying that is not pertinent to an undervote 

problem, and we have been looking at that as well. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Normally, and you may not be able to answer 

this, but for our scheduling I know there is a motion that is going 

to come forward, and we are going to a district work period for the 

month of August. Do you believe you may have the final report 

during August when we are out? Do you foresee that happening? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I really think that we would require—I mean, 

since it is only a month we will require this time to really do our— 

there is a little bit of work remaining to figure out testing done by 

ES&S and talk to some of the code review team again. So it looks 

like that most likely it don’t happen that the report will be done. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. The only reason why I ask is mainly for scheduling. I want to make sure we have our public meeting with them 

when that comes back. I am actually very pleased with how everybody is working together. And it sounds like everybody wants to 

get to a conclusion down there. And that is nice to know from the 

manufacturer down to the election officer. So I appreciate your 

work. I yield back, if I had any time left. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much. The Chair will recognize 

Ms. Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you have asked 

all of the substantive questions I had. The only, I guess, remaining 

question I have, is there anything we could do to help you conclude 

this, any effort that we could make that would assist you in getting 

this job done efficiently and as soon as possible. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I would say that the task force was very helpful 

when they initially told everyone they needed everybody’s cooperation. And we have not really had any problem with anyone. So it 

seems that we are in touch with the staff, and nothing is there 

right now that is holding us back, other than the mere fact of like 

looking through everything and deciding on our own. So it is a deliberative process a little bit. And that is kind of expected that you 

would have to do that. So I would say no. If I am wrong and we 

turn out to be needing some help, I think we know how to— 

Ms. LOFGREN. You know how to get ahold of us. 


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Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. That was the only question I had. I think obviously we don’t know the answers yet, but we are on our way to getting whatever answers can be obtained. And that is all we hope to 

do in an objective, fair and expeditious manner. So I think that this 

is a good meeting and a good report. We all wish it were over, but 

it isn’t yet. I don’t know if Mr. Ehlers has comments. I have a motion I would like to offer at the appropriate time. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren. The Chair recognizes 

the ranking member. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry 

I was late, but I skimmed through the report. There is just one 

point I want to raise, and it looks like you are on track and I appreciate your good work on this. I have been involved in elections 

since 1974, which shows how ancient I am. And I was also involved 

in writing HAVA. In fact, I wrote the very first part, which was 

the standards part. And I emphasized to NIST when we did this, 

and we did require this is in the requirements, and that was the 

human factors. 

Because I had observed during my many years working with 

elections, the majority of errors are human errors, they are not machine errors, they are not equipment errors, they are human errors. 

And that we try to accommodate that in HAVA. I don’t think we 

did it nearly as well as we should have, and certainly not as well 

as I wanted to. But we did do some of that. And running through 

your draft here and the discussion I have heard the short time I 

have been here, it is almost entirely about the machines; was the 

source code okay, was the object code okay, was the machine operating properly and so forth. I didn’t hear a word about the human 

factors, which based on my experience I would think would have 

to rank higher in probability than either the machine or the source 

code errors. 

What have you done on the human factors part? Do you have expertise in GAO or are you using experts in GAO to analyze the possible human factors in this case? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. It is true that we have not addressed the human 

factors issue yet here. And of course, we are aware of quite a few 

other studies where they have looked at the human factor and kind 

of tried to draw attention to the fact that there are similarities in 

other counties of similar—layout of ballot and where they might 

have had undervotes, higher rates like this one. We were trying 

very hard to eliminate, you know, stay away from the human side 

because it is so—you know, we couldn’t really figure out how to 

completely quantify that basically. But I would agree completely 

that there are—I mean, it is very much possible that the whole 

reason was human factors. And right now I should say that we are 

trying to—we have not addressed it since a lot—there have been 

a lot of people who have raised the issue. 

We consider—we would probably have to consider this as we go 

forward and before we issue a final report as an element, whether 

either explicitly to say that we are unable to or we could not or did 

not or something else. You know, that we considered it. And maybe 

you can propose something that can be done in that phase too. But 


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we have not done much other than reading the reports that are already out there. 

Mr. EHLERS. I would strongly encourage you to. Because as I 

said, based on my many years of experience that is the most frequent problem. It is not the least likely, it is the most likely. And 

I would consider the report terribly incomplete if you don’t get into 

that as much as you are able to or if we need other experts to look 

at that. I myself, when I saw the ballot for the first time, I missed 

this slot. I went right to the ballot and I missed it. Now, I know 

there are safeguards, you can go back and it catches you and so 

forth. I am not dismissing that. But I have been around this business a long time and I totally missed that line. I am not saying 

that is the cause. I am just saying that has to be examined along 

with all the physical parameters. You do have to look at the human 

factors, whether you have to get outside help or not. But that could 

be a crucial part. 

Now, if you find a lot of other errors, then you have the real 

problem of deciding which it might be. But if you don’t find other 

problems, that is certainly one to look at. And I would very much 

appreciate a detailed study of that. Again, I don’t know to what extent NIST has expertise on that either and whether they could be 

of any help. But it is certainly an issue. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. And we probably have to—we at least can try to 

find out expertise wise who we might be able to consult on this. 

I would say that obviously we cannot probably complete looking at 

the human factors within the remaining time. But as a factor to 

be considered, that is certainly a possible way to handle it. 

Mr. EHLERS. I recognize full well some of this would be almost 

impossible to determine. For example, one newspaper article I read 

speculated that the undervote was because the primary was so 

nasty and some people were angry and said I am not going to vote 

for either one. Well, there is no way you could even measure that. 

But I think there are a number of factors that you can determine 

actually by experiment with groups of people to see if they were 

factors or not. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Ehlers. A couple of 

real quick points. We had already approved pretty much what the 

plan was going to be. And I know that GAO felt it was necessary 

to go into certain areas to get the background information on how 

the election was conducted in the preparation of the machines, the 

instructions and so on. To the extent that human error may come 

and play into it, the only thing I would caution again is that we 

stay with the operating plan, number 1. Number 2, not to go beyond the scope of it, because the resources, time and energy, of 

course, are precious to all of us. 

And lastly, that the burden really does rest with the contestant 

in this case. And on June 22, the representatives, the attorneys for 

the contestant and the attorneys for the contestee provided this 

task force with information they felt was necessary for GAO to take 

into consideration. These are recommendations, suggestions, some 

sort of guidance. To the extent that you believe they are relevant, 

to the extent that you would believe they needed to be addressed, 

that was going to be basically left up to you. I think the whole 

focus from the very beginning, whether it is the actual notice of 


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contest to the June 22 submissions by the attorneys, really truly 

focus on the machines and the malfunctioning of the machines. 

So that is the only caveat. And I understand what Mr. Ehlers is 

saying. The only thing at this point, you know, how relevant it is 

going to be for us to resolve this particular issue predicated on the 

grounds as asserted by the contestant. But I want to make sure, 

again, for both sides, the contestant and the contestee, you have 

had for your review and such the submissions by the attorneys representing the parties, is that correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. And I should quickly add that you are right, 

our plan actually has been very specific to say that we are focusing 

on whether the machine contributed. And you know as much as in 

that scope of course it doesn’t appear, the human factors doesn’t 

appear as an item. On the other question of contestant and 

contestee submissions, yes, we do have access to those and we have 

reviewed those. And in our deliberation of deciding what is going 

to be done or not done, all those are factors to take into account. 

That whatever the contestant or contestee is suggesting, that testing be done or not done are factors that come into play in deciding 

what the final answers are for what it is that could be done to figure out if the machines contributed to the undervote. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Doctor. Sure, I will recognize Mr. McCarthy. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. The only thing I would say, I have a transcript 

here from our first discussion when we were going through what 

the GAO was going to do. And I raised the question because I think 

I actually had a motion to put in ballot design. And the response 

back was, from the GAO, the ballot design is part of the machine. 

Obviously at this point, we are going to look at that. So, I mean, 

I think that was just going in regards to what Mr. Ehlers was saying, that that goes into the whole GAO report as well. Just for clarification. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yeah. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. All right. Anything further? 

Ms. LOFGREN. I have a motion, if we are ready. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. The Chair will recognize Ms. Lofgren for the purpose of making a motion. 

Ms. LOFGREN. After consultation with Mr. McCarthy, I believe 

this is acceptable to all of us. I move that the chairman be authorized and directed to consult the task force by teleconference or 

other appropriate means to consider any GAO request received 

during the district work period and determined by the chairman to 

require task force concurrence. For the purpose of consultation as 

described in this motion all members of the task force must be in 

simultaneous contact. 

To preserve our open process, any consultation under this motion 

will be made open to the public and press through teleconference 

or web technology in the House Administration Hearing Room. No 

final disposition of the underlying Florida District 13 election will 

be made pursuant to this procedure. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. The motion has been made. 

[The information follows:] 


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pwalker on PROD1PC71 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 46 38707A.010
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Mr. GONZALEZ. Any discussion? All right. All in favor signify by 

saying aye. Aye. Any opposed? Around here you never know. Some 

people vote yes before they vote no and so on. The task force meeting stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 10:42 a.m., the task force was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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