GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

April 2000 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Need to Revise 

Acquisition Strategy to 

Reduce Risk for Joint 

Air-to-Surface Standoff 

Missile

GAO/NSIAD-00-75

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-75 Defense Acquisition

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283201 Letr

April 26, 2000

The Honorable Jerry Lewis, Chairman

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your request that we review the Air Force’s and the 

Navy’s development of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile and the 

recent extension of the program’s development schedule. The missile is the 

successor of the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile, which was canceled 

because of its high projected unit cost—over $2 million each—and because 

development costs had grown to over $4 billion. Rather than modifying 

another weapon to meet their requirements, the Air Force and the Navy 

believed that they could rely on existing technologies and improved 

acquisition strategies to develop a lower-cost weapon more rapidly than 

previous missile acquisition programs. 

Less than a year after approving the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile’s 

engineering and manufacturing development schedule, the Air Force 

extended the development schedule, delaying the beginning of production 

and increasing the cost estimate. As you requested, we reviewed the 

program to determine (1) what the program’s status is and what the causes 

of the schedule slip and cost increase were and (2) whether the Air Force is 

following the most effective acquisition strategy to reduce the risk of cost 

growth and schedule delays.

Results in Brief Since the program’s inception, the development schedule has lengthened 

from 56 months to 78 months, and total program costs have increased from 

$1.6 billion to $2.1 billion.1

 In the most recent extension, approved in 

1

Initial estimates placed development costs at $675 million and procurement costs between 

$960 million and $1.68 billion because the development contractor had not been selected. 

We used the lower procurement cost because it was closer to the winning contractor’s 

proposal. In the most recent program estimate, development costs were $892 million and 

production costs $1.21 billion. 
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November 1999, the Air Force added 10 months to the missile’s 

development schedule and increased estimated program costs by about 

$90.1 million. Factors leading to the schedule delay varied and included 

prime and subcontractor changes to missile design to (1) correct problems 

discovered during testing, (2) decrease production costs, or (3) improve 

performance. Program officials stated that contractors underestimated the 

time and personnel required to design the missile and prepare for 

production. 

The Air Force employed acquisition reform strategies, such as using 

technologies already proven in other systems and establishing a cost goal 

as an independent requirement, which helped reduce overall development 

time and costs. As a result, the current 78-month development program 

time frame is substantially less than the historical average of 118 months 

for other missile programs. Also, the missile’s production unit cost is 

projected to be well under the price limit. However, the program is still 

vulnerable to significant cost increases and schedule delays because the 

design of some components is not yet stable. Further, the missile 

production prices within the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile contract 

are based on starting production by a specific date but without adequate 

assurance that the missile will be ready for production by that date. The Air 

Force will not have specific, detailed knowledge of the missile’s ability to 

meet its performance requirements until after production is scheduled to 

start. Also, there is much engineering and development work to be done to 

obtain full assurance that the missile production processes are under 

control and that the production line is producing the quality and volume of 

needed missiles.

We recommend that the Air Force revise its acquisition strategy for the 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program to move away from an 

arbitrarily set production date to one that is more closely linked to the 

attainment of knowledge that the missile design is stable, the missile can 

meet performance requirements, and the production line can produce the 

needed missiles. 

Background The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) is an air-delivered, longrange weapon for use outside enemy area defenses. It is a weapon 

expected to be heavily used in the early stages of a conflict to attack targets 

such as communication centers and integrated air defense sites so that 

enemy air defenses can be suppressed. The Air Force and the Navy are 

jointly developing JASSM at a currently estimated cost of $892 million, with 
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the Air Force as the lead service. The Air Force plans to spend about

$1.2 billion procuring 2,400 JASSMs. The Navy has not allocated any 

funding in its future years’ defense planning budgets to procure the JASSM, 

but Navy officials stated that they are still considering the possibility of 

some procurement.

The program has completed the initial phase of development and is over

1 year into the second development phase−engineering and manufacturing 

development.2

 The initial production decision is expected to be made, and 

the contract option exercised, by November 2001. Independent operational 

testing to verify the operational effectiveness of the weapon is scheduled 

from February through December 2002.

In the past, weapon programs often experienced cost overruns and 

schedule delays because they were based on unproven or immature 

technologies, or they made design changes late in development and entered 

production prematurely. In our recent work, we analyzed the practices 

commercial firms use to reduce the time spent developing products and 

bringing them into production.3

 We found that commercial firms center 

their development and production decisions around the attainment of three 

areas of knowledge before production begins: (1) knowledge that the 

technology to fulfil the requirements is mature; (2) knowledge that the 

design is stable and will work as required; and (3) knowledge that the 

design can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality requirements. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has called 

for reforms to substantially reduce the time needed to move a weapon 

system from development to production—the cycle time. Historically, the 

average cycle time for precision-guided missiles has been 118 months. To 

reduce cycle time, the Department of Defense (DOD) has approved a 

2

DOD manages weapon programs in three stages: (1) program definition and risk reduction, 

(2) engineering and manufacturing development, and (3) production. During program 

definition and risk reduction, called Milestone I, the program is defined and various 

concepts and technologies are investigated. During engineering and manufacturing 

development, Milestone II, the design is chosen, manufacturing processes are validated, 

testing begins, and low-rate initial production occurs. At production, Milestone III, testing 

verifies that the weapon is suitable and effective for operations, deficiencies encountered in 

testing are resolved, and fixes are verified. 

3

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires Changes in DOD’s 

Environment (GAO/NSIAD-98-56, Feb. 24, 1998) and Best Practices: Better Management of 

Technology Development Can Improve Weapons System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, 

July 30, 1999). 
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number of acquisition reforms that include reducing the amount of data 

contractors are required to deliver, eliminating the use of military 

standards and specifications, allowing the use of commercial components, 

and forming working groups composed of both government and contractor 

personnel to coordinate development activities such as testing. 

Design and 

Manufacturing 

Problems Have 

Delayed Development 

and Increased Costs

Since the program’s inception, the development schedule has lengthened 

from 56 months to 78 months, and program costs have increased from

$1.6 billion to $2.1 billion. In the most recent extension, approved in 

November 1999, the Air Force added 10 months to the JASSM development 

schedule and increased estimated program costs by about $90.1 million. 

Factors leading to the schedule delay varied and included prime and 

subcontractor changes to missile design to (1) correct problems discovered 

during testing, (2) decrease production costs, or (3) improve performance. 

Program officials stated that the contractors underestimated the time and 

personnel required to design the missile and prepare for production. The 

estimated development cost increased by $38.2 million as a result of the 

time added to the schedule and additional developmental flight hardware. 

Estimated production costs increased by about $51.9 million mostly 

because of the schedule slip that moved the beginning of production past 

the date specified in the contract and required prices of production 

quantities to be renegotiated. 

At the program’s inception, the Air Force planned to develop the missile 

and begin production in 56 months. The Air Force’s strategy was to conduct 

a competitive 24-month program definition and risk reduction phase with 

two contractors. The contractors’ tasks during this phase were to design 

the missile and demonstrate that the design worked. The Air Force was to 

select one of the two contractors to complete development testing, 

establish production processes, and begin production during a 32-month 

engineering and manufacturing development phase. The program 

definition and risk reduction phase actually lasted 28 months, and the 

transition to one contractor was made before the end of that phase. The 

engineering and manufacturing development phase was lengthened to 

40 months in November 1998, when the program was reviewed for approval 

to enter engineering and manufacturing development. Table 1 shows the 

schedule and costs just before and after the latest slip.
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Table 1: Changes in JASSM Schedule and Costs 

Sources: Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, June 1999, and Selected Acquisition Report, 

December 1999.

Program Schedule Delays The schedule delays were caused by a combination of (1) underestimating 

the time and personnel required for the engineering and manufacturing 

development effort, (2) late deliveries of components to the prime 

contractor, and (3) increasing the time between flight tests and adding two 

flight tests. Generally, subcontractor deliveries were late due to design and 

manufacturing problems. Some of these problems originated with the 

prime contractor, others with the subcontractors. Three missile 

components that required significant development efforts−the engine, the 

airframe shell, and the wing deployment actuators−all experienced design 

and manufacturing difficulties, as well as related schedule slips, caused by 

both the prime contractor and the subcontractors.

The prime contractor requested changes to the engine design in order to 

achieve cost goals and improve performance. According to program 

officials, the basic engine design had been used in other missiles, but the 

subcontractor had not developed a new engine in several years and 

underestimated the work needed to make the desired design changes. As a 

result, the subcontractor has not met the delivery schedule, delaying the 

assembly of development missiles.

The subcontractor for another critical missile component−the airframe 

shell−has also been unable to meet the delivery schedule for several 

reasons. First, the prime contractor changed the design of the outer mold 

line to improve the missile’s performance in dropping away from the 

aircraft. Second, the subcontractor had problems with manufacturing 

processes due at least in part to lack of experience with the process used to 

Dollars in millions

Event Program before schedule delay Program after schedule delay

Total development time 68 months 78 months

Engineering and manufacturing development 40 months 50 months

Low-rate production approval January 2001 November 2001

Last developmental test flight March 2001 February 2002

Development cost $853.8 $892.0

Procurement cost $1,157.5 $1,209.4
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build the missile shell. According to program officials, the molding process 

was new to the subcontractor, who could not initially produce missile 

shells with consistent quality, and the shells sometimes had to be handfinished. Third, one of the suppliers had difficulties casting missile frames 

with consistent quality. 

Subcontractors for the wings also spent an unexpectedly long time 

resolving technical issues. According to program officials, one significant 

problem has been stabilizing the production configuration of the wing 

deployment actuators, which control the movement of the missile. During 

testing, designers believed that the actuators allowed the missile’s wings to 

come out with too much force. As a result of this problem, the 

subcontractor spent considerable time redesigning and testing a new 

actuator design. 

Program officials told us that they expected deliveries of all missile subcomponents, including the engine, the shell, and the actuators, to be back 

on schedule by the end of December 1999. As of January 2000, the airframe 

shell deliveries were on schedule, but deliveries of the engine and wing 

actuators had fallen further behind schedule (see table 2). 

Table 2: Status of JASSM Sub-component Deliveries 

Program officials were not definite about when deliveries of the other subcomponents would be back on schedule, but they stated that they expected 

this to happen within a few months. Final assembly of developmental 

missiles will continue to be delayed until these components are delivered.

Sub-component

Deliveries behind schedule

October 1999

Deliveries behinds schedule

January 2000

Engine 2 3

Airframe shell 6 0

Wing deployment 

actuator 13 23
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Program Costs Increased by 

$90 Million

The most recent schedule delay increased JASSM development costs by 

$38.2 million and production costs by $51.9 million. According to program 

officials, development costs increased because of the additional 10 months 

of development effort and the increased contractor personnel needed for 

additional design work and test management. More than two-thirds of the 

$51.9-million production cost increase−$36 million−resulted from a 

negotiated increase in the price of the missiles in the first five production 

lots because the government would not exercise the first production option 

as originally scheduled. The contractor and the government have agreed to 

a 4.99-percent price increase to the fixed price of the first five lots plus the 

cost of extending the schedule for 10 months, for a total of about 

$36 million. The remaining $15.9 million production cost increase was due 

to DOD revising inflation indexes and reducing the quantities of missiles 

purchased.4

 According to the Air Force, reductions or additions to 

quantities in the first five lots will raise the unit cost of each missile in those 

lots.

Acquisition Reforms 

Have Been Used to 

Accelerate 

Development, but 

Significant Risks 

Remain

Although the Air Force employed acquisition reforms to accelerate JASSM 

development and contain program costs within established guidelines, the 

program is still vulnerable to significant cost increases and schedule delays 

because the missile’s design has not yet been stabilized. Further, the missile 

production prices within the JASSM contract are based on a specific 

production starting date but without adequate assurance that the missile 

will be ready for production by that date. Our examinations of best 

practices by commercial firms have shown that the risk of cost increases 

and schedule delays is reduced significantly if production decisions are 

linked to having mature technology, stable designs, and proven 

manufacturing capabilities rather than to specific points in time. 

Acquisition Reforms 

Accelerated Missile 

Development

The Air Force has implemented a streamlined acquisition strategy that 

incorporates reforms intended to reduce time spent designing a weapon 

system by eliminating unneeded military standards and specifications, 

relying on mature technologies, and limiting changes in performance 

requirements. As a result, the current 78-month development time frame 

4

 The Air Force originally planned to procure 1,165 missiles with the first five production 

lots, but it reduced the number to 1,128.
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for the JASSM program represents a substantial reduction from the 

historical average of 118 months for other programs. 

In contrast to many acquisition programs that have required advances in 

technology to meet performance requirements, the JASSM program’s goal 

was to use a derivative of an existing missile design with proven 

technologies rather than new technologies. The initial program definition 

phase was intended to verify the capability of the design to meet 

performance requirements, trade off performance requirements for cost, 

and develop manufacturing processes to build the missile in a cost-efficient 

manner. 

By the end of the program definition phase, the government required 

competing contractors to be ready to build the system for development and 

operational testing. Several major reform initiatives helped contractors 

focus their efforts. For example, in keeping with acquisition reforms that 

stress greater government/private sector coordination and less direct 

government oversight, the Air Force considered the winning contractor 

responsible for missile design, developmental testing and evaluation, and 

tracking design changes. Instead of assuming its traditional oversight role, 

which usually involves requirements that contractors submit large 

quantities of data, the government reduced the amount of data required and 

established teams of government and contractor personnel to resolve 

problems jointly. According to program officials, these teams have proven 

adept at maintaining JASSM development on schedule because they have 

worked to prevent addition of requirements that could drive changes to the 

missile’s design. 

JASSM was also designated as one of the first programs to use the concept 

of cost as an independent variable. The concept gives contractors the 

flexibility to trade off specific performance features to achieve established 

cost objectives. The JASSM program has had success in staying within 

established cost goals because the Air Force and the Navy limited specific 

performance requirements to a few key areas−range, mission effectiveness, 

and suitability for Navy carriers. For example, the JASSM program reduced 

the missile’s cost by not requiring it to be launched under the most extreme 

speed, altitude, or other conditions that each aircraft can generate. Instead, 

a common set of launch conditions was established for a variety of aircraft. 

The operational requirements document established a ceiling of $700,000 

(in base year 1995 dollars) for the average unit procurement price. The 

currently projected average unit procurement price for the first five lots of 

production missiles is about $327,000, well under the price limit.
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Risks of Cost Increases and 

Schedule Delays Remain

Despite the significant steps taken to accelerate the development program, 

the program is not adequately linked to knowledge that the missile design 

is stable, the missile will perform as required, and the manufacturing 

processes are under control. As a result, the program is vulnerable to 

further cost increases and schedule delays. Our past work has shown that 

DOD can reduce cost and schedule risks in weapon system acquisition 

programs by developing an acquisition strategy that centers on the 

government and the contractor obtaining specific and timely knowledge of 

(1) the maturity of the technology needed to meet established 

requirements, (2) the stability of the design and its ability to meet 

performance requirements, and (3) the ability of the production processes 

to deliver quality items within cost and schedule agreements. In response 

to our reports, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 

and Technology agreed with these concepts and stated that DOD would 

establish specific standards for technology design and production 

knowledge points and apply them to weapon system acquisition programs. 

Although the Air Force did not specifically organize the JASSM acquisition 

strategy around these knowledge points, the program has taken steps to 

achieve one of them—knowledge that mature technologies are available to 

meet performance requirements. These efforts have reduced technology 

risk—usually the most problematic one—significantly. The Air Force has 

not achieved the other two knowledge points even though commercial 

firms usually expect to achieve the second point—knowledge that the 

design is stable and will meet performance requirements—about halfway 

through product development. The JASSM program is currently beyond the 

halfway point in its product development phase. This lack of knowledge of 

the missile’s design, while less critical than the first point, is the result of 

the contractor underestimating the efforts required to manage the design 

and is the direct cause of current cost and schedule problems. Further, the 

program cannot expect to obtain knowledge of manufacturing processes 

until the design’s stability and its ability to meet requirements are known. 

Knowledge That the Technology 

Is Mature Was Obtained 

The technologies required to meet the missile’s key performance 

characteristics were mature enough to reduce risk at the beginning of the 

engineering and manufacturing development phase. The Air Force used 

performance-based requirements and allowed the contractor to determine 

how the requirements were to be met rather than having the government 

tell the contractor how to accomplish the required performance. Also, the 

contractor was encouraged to use tested commercial technology, as well as 

technologies already used in other military systems, to complete the 
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design. The major components of the missile have been used in other 

products or are in an advanced stage of development (see table 3). When 

DOD approved the decision to proceed to engineering and manufacturing 

development, the contractor had already achieved this first knowledge 

point. 

Table 3: Production History of Selected Components

Uncertain Design Stability and 

Untested Performance Raise 

Risks 

The contractor has not obtained knowledge that the design is stable and 

meets requirements. Commercial firms expect that halfway through 

product development, they will have conducted a critical design review and 

that 90 percent of all engineering drawings for the entire product and its 

component parts will be completed. According to Air Force officials, a 

design review of JASSM was conducted in March 1999, about halfway 

through product development. The review found that about 80 percent of 

engineering drawings for the entire missile were complete but that only a 

small percentage of drawings for the missile sub-components were. 

Moreover, additional design changes were still being made to some missile 

components in October 1999. 

Although the government and the contractor have conducted extensive 

component-level testing, the contractor is not expected to have specific, 

detailed knowledge of the design’s ability to meet requirements until after 

the decision to begin production has already been made and the contract 

option has been exercised. According to contract provisions, the low-rate 

initial production option is required to be exercised by a particular date to 

maintain prices unchanged, but the date is not based on the accumulation 

of specific knowledge of the product being developed. 

The contractor originally planned to have greater knowledge of how the 

design would work earlier in the program. The program definition phase 

was to include three test flights of a prototype missile, but the flights were 

Component Previous use

Engine Standoff Land Attack Missile—Expanded Response, 

Harpoon

Airframe technology Boating industry

Infrared seeker Javelin command and launch unit

Inertial measurement unit Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Standoff Weapon
B-283201

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postponed. The first flight in April 1999 (after the beginning of engineering 

and manufacturing development in November 1998) failed because an 

electrical current leak from the battery resulted in flight termination. A 

second test flight in August 1999 and a third in November 1999 

demonstrated that the missile separated from the aircraft, acquired 

guidance from the global positioning system satellites, started its engine, 

and flew a predetermined 180-mile course to attack a target. Only after 

these test flights did the contractor have some assurance that the missile 

could meet its basic performance requirements. Getting to this point, 

however, required a series of unanticipated design changes relatively late in 

the missile’s development. 

Production Processes Are 

Unproven

Some components of the missile have stable production processes, but 

others do not yet have them because their production configuration is not 

final. Also, the production processes for the complete missile are not yet 

final. There is much engineering and development work to be done to 

obtain full assurance that production processes are under control, the 

production line is producing the quality and volume of production units 

needed, and the costs are within program projections. For example, engine 

and wing actuator deliveries are still behind schedule (engines are a major 

component of the missile and among the first to be installed). Late 

deliveries delay the development of production processes, creating 

inefficiencies and making it more difficult to control production processes.

Conclusions The Air Force has adopted acquisition reform initiatives that have 

significantly accelerated the development program and contained the 

production price of the missile within established guidelines. The Air Force 

has taken steps to link production decisions for the Joint Air-to-Surface 

Standoff Missile to critical knowledge of the missile’s design stability, 

tested performance, and demonstrated manufacturing capabilities. 

However, if it exercises the current contract options, the Air Force may 

begin production without assurance that the government or the contractor 

will know enough about whether the design meets requirements or can be 

produced. As a result, the program will be vulnerable to future cost 

increases and schedule delays if the contractual provisions are exercised 

before critical knowledge is obtained related to the missile’s design 

stability, tested performance, and demonstrated manufacturing 

capabilities. 
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Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to revise 

its acquisition strategy for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program 

to link production decisions more closely to knowledge points. In revising 

its strategy, the Air Force should take steps to ensure that before beginning 

initial production (1) the missile design is stable; (2) flight testing fully 

establishes the missile’s ability to meet performance requirements; and 

(3) key manufacturing processes are under control so that the quality, 

volume, and cost of their output are proven and acceptable.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with our 

recommendation, stating that the current acquisition strategy for the Joint 

Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile meets the objective of our recommendation 

that production decisions be closely linked to design, performance, and 

production knowledge points. DOD stated that these knowledge points are 

directly linked to specific criteria established for making the low-rate initial 

production decision and that the contractor is required to meet this 

criteria. DOD agreed, however, that there is cost risk associated with the 

missile’s contracts that contain production options to be exercised on or 

before a certain date. DOD stated that it was working with the contractor 

to reduce this risk.

We agree that the Air Force has taken steps to link production decisions for 

the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile to the knowledge points described 

in our report and have revised our report to clarify this point. However, we 

do not believe that the specific criteria established to support the 

production decision are sufficient to minimize cost and schedule risks. For 

example, the Air Force will not have completed developmental flight tests 

related to the missile’s performance (1) against hard targets and (2) when 

launched from the B-52. In addition, although the Air Force may be able to 

demonstrate that missiles can be produced at the production facility, this 

does not necessarily demonstrate—as called for in the third knowledge 

point—that missiles can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality 

requirements. Moreover, we continue to be concerned about the pressure 

to exercise the current contract options to start production at a fixed time, 

even if sufficient knowledge about the missile has not yet been obtained. 

We believe our recommendation is still valid and needed to more closely 

link production decisions to knowledge points.
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We incorporated DOD’s technical comments into our report where 

appropriate. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in 

appendix I.

Scope and 

Methodology

To understand and determine the causes of recent JASSM schedule delays 

and cost increases, we interviewed program officials and contractor 

personnel at Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems and reviewed program 

schedules, program management assessments, and cost performance 

reports. We analyzed schedule variances and obtained explanations for the 

differences.

To determine whether the Air Force is following the most effective 

acquisition strategy to reduce risk, we interviewed program officials and 

officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 

and Technology, about program elements affected by acquisition reform. 

We compared their answers with the description of commercial best 

practices contained in our previous work on the subject. We compared best 

practices criteria to the current program status to determine whether 

JASSM development is following best practices and where following best 

practices would help reduce risk. 

We interviewed officials from the Office of the Director, Program Analysis 

and Evaluation, Cost Analysis Improvement Group, from Lockheed Martin 

Integrated Systems, and from the JASSM Program Office.

We visited the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and 

Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition and Technology, Washington, D.C.; the Navy Aviation 

Requirements Branch, Washington, D. C.; the Aeronautical Systems Center, 

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems, 

Orlando, Florida; and the JASSM Production Facility, Troy, Alabama.

We performed our review from July 1999 through April 2000 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 

committees; the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the 

Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; the Honorable 

Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones, 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Honorable Jacob L. Lew, 
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Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call 

me on (202) 512-4841. Key contributors to this report were Tana M. Davis, 

William R. Graveline, and Carol T. Mebane.

Sincerely yours,

James Wiggins

Associate Director

Defense Acquisition
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-75 Defense Acquisition
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-75 Defense Acquisition

Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-75 Defense Acquisition
Appendix I

Comments From the Department of Defense

(707435) Letr Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-75 Defense Acquisition
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