In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: May 3, 2021

S21A0210. THE STATE v. WALDEN.

 PETERSON, Justice.

Carly Walden is charged with malice murder and other crimes 

for the April 28, 2019, shooting death of her mother, Andrea Walker, 

at Walker’s home. On that date, Walden called police and reported 

a shooting; she claimed an unidentified man was responsible.

Walden was transported to the county sheriff’s office, where she 

made statements to an investigator before being provided warnings 

pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 

694) (1966). On Walden’s motion, the trial court suppressed those 

statements, while declining to suppress others that she had made 

earlier in the day. The State has appealed the trial court’s ruling in 

advance of trial. When — as here — a trial court makes no explicit 

findings in ruling on a motion that does not require such findings to 
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be made, we presume that the trial court implicitly made all the 

findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow. But the 

record in this case does not allow the findings that would be 

necessary to conclude that Walden was in custody when she made 

the statements at issue, and so we reverse the trial court’s 

suppression of Walden’s statements.

“Miranda warnings must be administered to an accused who is 

in custody and subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent.”

State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 617 (1) (797 SE2d 72) (2017). This 

requirement arises “when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2) 

restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. 

Whether the circumstances in a particular case amount to custody 

is assessed objectively. “Thus, the proper inquiry is how a reasonable 

person in [Walden]’s shoes would have perceived [her] situation.” Id. 

“In determining whether a suspect is in custody, we must consider 

the totality of the circumstances without regard for the subjective 

views of the suspect or the interrogating officer.” Licata v. State, 305 

Ga. 498, 501 (1) (826 SE2d 94) (2019). Although there is no one 
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dispositive factor, important considerations include “the location of 

the questioning, its duration, statements made during the 

interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the 

questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the 

questioning.” Id. (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (132 

SCt 1181, 182 LE2d 17) (2012)).

Whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda

is a mixed question of fact and law. See Troutman, 300 Ga. at 617. 

We apply de novo the relevant legal principles to the facts, and we 

accept the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility of 

witnesses unless clearly erroneous, and construe the evidence most 

favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court. See 

Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 625, 627 (2) n.4 (837 SE2d 817) (2020); 

Troutman, 300 Ga. at 617. Where, as here, the trial court was not 

required to make explicit factual findings or credibility 

determinations on the record, and in fact did not do so, we assume 

that the trial court implicitly resolved all disputes of fact and 

credibility in favor of its ruling, and we generally accept such 
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implicit factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Cain v. State, 

306 Ga. 434, 438 (2) (831 SE2d 788) (2019) (assuming that trial court 

credited testimony of officers over defendant where trial court ruled 

that defendant’s statement was voluntary without making explicit 

factual findings). But “when, as here, the controlling facts are not in 

dispute, because they are discernable from a video, our review is de 

novo.” Licata, 305 Ga. at 500 (1) n.2.

Here, the interactions between Walden and law enforcement 

officers were documented by a series of video recordings, which 

showed the following. Deputy Davon Sydnor arrived at the victim’s 

home at about 7:26 a.m. on the morning of the shooting, following 

other officers, in response to a 7:10 a.m. 911 call. A few minutes after 

Deputy Sydnor’s arrival, Walden followed him toward his vehicle, 

carrying a cell phone. She sat in the back seat of the vehicle as she 

talked to Deputy Sydnor, while he stood by the open door of the car. 

Highly agitated, she claimed that some men she had brought home 

from a party that night had tried to rape her and her mother. Deputy 

Sydnor asked her a number of questions about the men, their 
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descriptions, their vehicle, and which way they may have escaped, 

although his interest on that point faded somewhat when she 

mentioned that female companions of the men had danced on top of 

the ceiling fan.

Shortly thereafter, Deputy Sydnor received instructions over 

his radio to “detain” Walden, stop talking to her, and bring her in to 

the sheriff’s office. It does not appear from the video recording that 

Walden noticed the instruction that she be “detained,” however, 

because she was talking in a focused and intense manner when that 

message came across the radio and continued her intense talking 

even after the message had been transmitted. In contrast, a short 

time later another radio message came through that mentioned 

taking Walden to an interview room at the sheriff’s office so she 

could compose herself (but made no mention of detaining her). 

During this message, Walden leaned forward to listen. Deputy 

Sydnor eventually motioned for Walden to stop talking, visually 

checked her for weapons, and asked her to fasten her seat belt. He 

also told her that she was “not in any type of trouble” “right now.” 
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Deputy Sydnor advised Walden, “We’re going to take a ride to the 

sheriff’s office, OK?” Walden nodded and said, “OK.” Deputy Sydnor

got into the driver’s seat before stating, again, “You and I are going 

to take a ride to the sheriff’s office, OK?” Walden responded, “Yes.” 

They headed to the sheriff’s office at around 7:40 a.m.; the drive took 

less than 12 minutes. Walden was not handcuffed as they proceeded 

to the sheriff’s office, and she retained the cell phone that she had 

been carrying. Deputy Sydnor asked her no questions about what 

happened as he drove, although he told her to put her seat belt back 

on when she removed it and to stop moving around.

Upon arrival at the sheriff’s office, Deputy Sydnor helped 

Walden look for the cell phone, which had briefly gone missing, at 

times turning his back to her as she stood in the parking lot. At one 

point, he told her not to touch him and to stop moving around. 

Walden remained unhandcuffed as she and Deputy Sydnor moved 

around the sheriff’s complex, seeking access to an interview room. 

She retained the cell phone for some time as they sat in an interview 

room waiting for an investigator, although Deputy Sydnor told her 
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to slide the phone across the table after she insisted that it was not 

hers. As they waited, with the door open, Deputy Sydnor did not 

question Walden about the circumstances surrounding her mother’s 

death. When Walden volunteered information or asked questions, 

Deputy Sydnor largely did not respond or told her to wait for 

investigators. Walden did not physically attempt to leave the room 

while waiting for the investigator, she cannot be heard on the video 

recordings asking if she could leave, and Deputy Sydnor cannot be 

heard telling her that she could not leave. 

After Walden and Deputy Sydnor waited for about 40 minutes 

in the interview room, Investigator Clinton French entered the 

room. Investigator French asked Walden whether the phone on the 

table was hers, and stepped out to secure it when she claimed that 

it did not belong to her. Investigator French returned and asked 

Deputy Sydnor to step out before beginning the interview at around 

8:45 a.m. At no time prior to beginning the interview can 

Investigator French be heard on the video recording of their 

interaction telling Walden that she could not leave. Investigator 
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French asked some preliminary questions, but did not provide 

Miranda warnings, before asking Walden to tell him what 

happened. She then spoke for less than six minutes, during which 

time she said that she had accidentally shot her mother. 

Investigator French stopped the interview and stepped out of the 

room. Walden never asked or attempted to leave the interview room 

during the time she was speaking with Investigator French. 

Deputy Sydnor returned to the interview room a few minutes 

later to sit with Walden; he did not ask her questions about the 

shooting and left the door open. During this time, Walden attempted 

to get up from her chair at several points, and Deputy Sydnor told 

her not to get up. Left alone for a while, she opened the door and 

attempted to walk out; Deputy Sydnor asked her what she was doing 

and she said she was “getting away from you.” Deputy Sydnor 

directed her back in the room and told her to sit down and stay in 

the room. 

Investigator French returned to the interview room more than

three hours later. After some preliminary questions apparently 
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designed to evaluate Walden’s lucidity, Investigator French read 

Miranda warnings to her before attempting to interview her a 

second time. Walden promptly asked for an attorney, and

Investigator French ended the interview. About two hours later, at 

around 3:00 p.m., Walden was placed in handcuffs and escorted out 

of the interview room.

After being indicted, Walden filed a motion to suppress the 

statements that she made to officers on the date of her arrest. At the 

hearing on her motion, Walden’s counsel narrowed the suppression 

motion to the statements Walden gave in the interview room (all of 

which preceded the Miranda warnings), and agreed that the only

issue was whether she was in custody during that interview. Walden 

withdrew all of the other issues raised by the motion to suppress her

statements, including the voluntariness of her statements. Walden 

testified at the hearing that she had not wanted to sit in the 

backseat of Deputy Sydnor’s vehicle or walk to the interview room 

with him, but she believed that she was in custody and had no 

choice. She claimed that she asked to leave when she got to the 
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interview room, and tried to leave prior to her interview with 

Investigator French, but was told repeatedly that she could not go:

Q BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When you got to the 

CID room prior to your interview with Investigator 

French did you ask to leave, did you try to leave?

A Yes, I tried to leave and I was told repeatedly by 

Deputy Sydnor that I could not leave, that I could not go 

and so.

But she contradicted that testimony on cross-examination:

Q BY [THE PROSECUTOR]: You didn’t ask to leave 

during the time that you were waiting for Investigator 

French to arrive the first time, did you? 

A No, I did not because I was trying to help with the 

investigation that was going on at my home. So I was 

there trying to help them, the officers with anything that 

was going on at the home.

Q You wanted to help, you wanted to tell them what 

you knew?

A Yes.

The trial court made no oral findings at the hearing and asked

the parties to submit letter briefs. The trial court later entered an 

order granting Walden’s motion to the extent it sought suppression 

of any statements she made in the interview room. The trial court’s 

order did not contain any findings or explanation for this ruling. The 
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State appeals this ruling.

The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred by 

suppressing the statements that Walden made in the interview 

room. The State contends that Walden was not in custody at the 

time she gave the statement to Investigator French in which she 

admitted shooting her mother (claiming that it was accidental), and 

that Miranda warnings were not required. We agree with the State 

that the record does not support a conclusion that Warden was in 

custody at the time in question.

Walden emphasizes that she was never told that she was free 

to leave, a factor that may support a determination that a defendant 

was in custody for purposes of Miranda. See, e.g., Troutman, 300 

Ga. at 617-618 (1) (where record supported trial court’s findings that 

defendant was kept at the police station in a non-public area for 

nearly nine hours, was interviewed three times, was never advised 

that he was free to leave, and was explicitly told he was not allowed 

to leave, this Court could not say that trial court erred in 

determining that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would 
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have believed that he was in custody); State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 

108 (1) (686 SE2d 239) (2009) (trial court did not err in concluding 

that a reasonable person would believe he was in custody where the 

record supported the trial court’s findings that defendant was never 

told he was free to leave, was kept either under surveillance or in a 

closed interrogation room for six hours, was explicitly told that the 

evidence pointed at him, and was essentially required to come to the 

police station by officers who waited at his home and ensured that 

he arrived at the police station by following him), overruled on other 

grounds by State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 303-304 (3) (812 SE2d 225) 

(2018). But this factor alone is not dispositive. See, e.g., Teasley v. 

State, 293 Ga. 758, 762-763 (3) (a) (749 SE2d 710) (2013) (trial court 

did not err in concluding that appellant was not in custody where 

detective testified that appellant was never told that he could not 

leave and never asked to leave; no mention of whether appellant was 

affirmatively told that he was free to leave); Henley v. State, 277 Ga. 

818, 820 (2) (596 SE2d 578) (2004) (concluding that the trial court 

did not err in admitting appellant’s pre-Miranda statement where 
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appellant voluntarily agreed to ride with the officers to the police 

station to answer questions, while noting that whether appellant 

was a suspect is not dispositive, without discussing whether

appellant was told that he was free to leave), overruled on other 

grounds by Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 178 (1) (657 SE2d 863) 

(2008). Moreover, a video recording of Walden’s encounter with 

Deputy Sydnor shows that, as he prepared to transport her to the 

sheriff’s office, Deputy Sydnor told Walden that she was “not in any 

type of trouble.” Such a statement may indicate to a defendant that 

he or she is not in custody for purposes of Miranda. See McAllister 

v. State, 270 Ga. 224, 226-228 (1) (507 SE2d 448) (1998) (trial court 

authorized to find that defendant was not in custody where 

investigator assured defendant “that he was not under arrest or 

being detained” and that he was free to leave at any time).

Walden also emphasizes that the trial court made its ruling 

after hearing live testimony and having the opportunity to evaluate 

the credibility of the relevant witnesses. But she also acknowledges 

that, as noted above, a law enforcement officer’s subjective views
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about whether a person being interrogated is in custody are

irrelevant to a trial court’s evaluation of whether the person is 

actually in custody for purposes of Miranda. And the actual mindset 

of the person being questioned is irrelevant to whether that person 

is in custody, as well. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 

271 (131 SCt 2394, 180 LE2d 310) (2011). Thus, we are concerned 

with not what was in the mind of Walden or the law enforcement 

officers whom she encountered, but with what they said and did, all 

of which was captured on video. Walden did testify that she tried to 

leave the interview room and was told that she could not. But the 

video evidence contradicts her testimony, clearly showing that 

Walden never physically attempted to walk out of the interview 

room before she gave the statements in question to Investigator 

French. At no time prior to the statements at issue can Deputy 

Sydnor or Investigator French be heard on the recordings telling 

Walden that she was not free to leave. It generally is difficult to hear 

some of Walden’s words on the recordings, and Deputy Sydnor 

occasionally ignored some of what Walden said or responded by 
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telling her that she needed to wait for an investigator. But we have 

found no point on the recordings of Walden’s time with Deputy 

Sydnor or Investigator French before she gave the statements in 

question in which she spoke words that reasonably could be 

interpreted as a request to leave, and she identifies no such point. 

To the extent that the trial court’s ruling was based on an implicit 

finding that Walden was told that she could not leave the interview 

room prior to making the statements at issue, that finding was 

clearly erroneous.

Walden’s entire encounter with law enforcement, up to and 

including her interaction with Investigator French, is documented 

on video recordings that include audio, allowing this Court to review

that evidence de novo. That evidence is insufficient to support the 

trial court’s ruling. Walden agreed to ride to the police station to 

answer questions, a factor that weighs in favor of finding that she 

was not in custody. See Henley, 277 Ga. at 820 (2). Walden was not

handcuffed or otherwise restrained, and she waited less than an 

hour to speak to the investigator. Walden claims that Deputy Sydnor 
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impeded her exit because he was in uniform, armed, and seated next 

to the door, and the exit was not obviously accessible. But the door 

to the interview room clearly remained open while they waited, and 

Deputy Sydnor did not sit in front of the doorway. And although 

Walden emphasizes that she was interviewed in an interrogation 

room, by an investigator, without any family members present, 

these factors by themselves would not support a finding that she was 

in custody. See, e.g., Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 280-282 (1) (A) 

(1) (695 SE2d 604) (2010) (defendant who was handcuffed and taken 

to sheriff’s office in patrol car, whereupon handcuffs were removed 

and he was told he was not under arrest and questioned in an 

unlocked interview room for two hours, was not in custody), 

disapproved on other grounds by Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 328 

(2) (c) (830 SE2d 195) (2019).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that 

the evidence did not authorize the trial court’s implicit 

determination that a reasonable person in Walden’s situation would 

believe that she was in custody when she was subjected to 
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questioning by Investigator French prior to being given Miranda

warnings. We thus conclude that the trial court erred in concluding 

that Walden’s pre-Miranda statements to Investigator French were 

due to be suppressed. We affirm the order to the extent that the trial 

court declined to suppress any other statements that she made.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the 

Justices concur.