UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4667

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALVIN LEE EDGE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., District Judge. (3:11-cr-00301-RJC-DSC-1)

Submitted: June 23, 2014 Decided: June 27, 2014

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Denzil H. Forrester, THE LAW OFFICES OF DENZIL H. FORRESTER, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, 

United States Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Alvin Lee Edge was convicted by a jury of possession 

of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable 

by more than one year of imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g) (2012). The district court sentenced Edge to 120 

months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 

Edge appeals his conviction and a special condition of the 

supervised release component of his sentence. We affirm.

Edge first argues that the district court erred in 

denying him a fair opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution 

witness by prohibiting inquiry into a prior larceny conviction. 

The Government responds that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion, and that even if the court erred, the error is 

harmless in light of the evidence of Edge’s guilt. A district 

court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 

2007).

If a party seeks to attack “a witness’s character for 

truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction . . . for any 

crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be 

admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing 

the elements of the crime required proving — or the witness’s 

admitting — a dishonest act or false statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 

609(a)(2). “A trial judge has no discretion to exclude evidence 
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that qualifies under this rule. Because the admission of such 

evidence is mandatory, however, Rule 609(a)(2) covers only a 

narrow class of crimes which by their nature bear directly upon 

the witness’ propensity to testify truthfully.” Kelly, 510 F.3d 

at 438 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

elements of larceny in North Carolina “are: (1) taking the 

property of another; (2) carrying it away; (3) without the 

owner’s consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of 

the property permanently.” State v. Sheppard, 744 S.E.2d 149, 

151 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).

Edge’s reliance on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 

(1974), is misplaced. In that case, the defense was barred from 

revealing the fact that a witness was on probation for a 

juvenile adjudication for burglary – the same type of crime for 

which Davis was on trial. Id. at 319. The defense sought to 

show that the witness might have a motivation to cooperate with 

police or testify falsely to divert attention from himself. Id. 

In this case, however, no such direct link exists between 

Brandt’s prior larceny conviction and his testimony against 

Edge, and Edge sought to admit the conviction merely for general 

impeachment and credibility purposes. We conclude that the 

prior larceny conviction did not directly impugn the witness’s 

truthfulness, and the district court did not abuse its 
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discretion in prohibiting cross-examination regarding the 

conviction.

Edge next argues that the special condition of 

supervised release prohibiting contact with his girlfriend, Ms. 

Smith, without approval of the probation officer violates his 

fundamental right to marry because it prohibits him from 

marrying Ms. Smith. He acknowledges that the court did not 

prohibit him from marrying Ms. Smith, but ordered him to have no 

contact with her without approval of the probation officer. 

“District courts have broad latitude to impose conditions on 

supervised release, and as such, we typically review such 

conditions only for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “A particular restriction does not require an 

‘offense-specific nexus,’ but the sentencing court must 

adequately explain its decision and its reasons for imposing 

it.” Id.

“[C]onditions that interfere with a defendant’s 

constitutional liberties, such as raising his child or 

associating with a loved one, must be adequately explained or 

else their imposition undermines the fairness and integrity of 

our judicial proceedings.” Id. at 408. Our review of the 

record leads us to conclude that the district court’s 

restriction on contact with Smith is sufficiently related to 
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“the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1), the need to deter future criminal conduct by Edge, 

§ 3553(a)(2)(B), and the need “to protect the public from 

further crimes of the defendant, § 3553(a)(2)(C). See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(d)(1) (2012) (listing factors to be considered in 

imposing special conditions on supervised release). Moreover, 

the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing 

the special condition, which is not an absolute prohibition, but 

merely requires the authorization of the probation officer. The 

district court did not abuse its discretion.

Accordingly, we affirm Edge’s conviction and sentence. 

We note, however, that the written judgment erroneously lists 

the “no contact” condition in the imprisonment section of the 

judgment rather than as a special condition of supervised 

release. We therefore remand for correction of the judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED