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THE UNITED STATES AND THE OSCE:

A PARTNERSHIP FOR ADVANCING FREEDOM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 2005

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

[CSCE 109–1–8]

(

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE SENATE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,

Co-Chairman 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,

New York 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas,

Chairman 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

VACANT

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

VACANT, Department of Commerce 

(II) 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE OSCE:

A PARTNERSHIP FOR ADVANCING FREEDOM 

OCTOBER 25, 2005

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ................................. 3

WITNESS 

Hon. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European 

and Eurasian Affairs ............................................................... 4

ADDITIONAL WITNESS 

Ludmilla Alexeeva, Chairperson, Moscow Helsinki Group ..... 14

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith,

Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe .................................................................................. 16

Prepared statement of Hon. Daniel Fried ................................. 18

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Daniel 

Fried by: 

Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman ........................................... 35

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman ............................ 42

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member ........................ 48

(III) 

(1)

THE UNITED STATES AND THE OSCE:

A PARTNERSHIP FOR ADVANCING FREEDOM 

October 25, 2005

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The hearing was held at 3 p.m. in room 124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, and 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member. 

Witness present: Hon. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State 

for European and Eurasian Affairs. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Good afternoon. I’m delighted everybody’s here. 

And my apologies for being late. I had another meeting that I was 

chairing, and we just wrapped up. 

Today’s hearing of the Helsinki Commission is on U.S. policy toward the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or 

the OSCE. 

We have a scheduled a ministerial meeting in December, where 

reforms in the Organization under consideration, numerous human 

rights concerns in parts of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, 

all will be central issues. The view of the State Department on 

these and other matters are of keen interest to the Commission 

and to others who monitor the OSCE region. 

I hope to look at some of these specific issues before us today, 

but I hope we can also take a broader look at where the OSCE fits 

into U.S. policy. How vital is the Organization to the promotion of 

U.S. interests in Europe and around the world? Has it adapted to 

the challenges we face in the 21st century? 

Are we making sufficient use of its assets and capabilities, as we 

once did to advance human rights and freedom? What more can be 

done, and how can the Helsinki Commission and the State Department work together toward that end? This is my first year as 

chairman of the Helsinki Commission. I’ve tried to emphasize two 

aspects of the OSCE as particularly important in hearings and 

other activities during 2005. 

First, while there is plenty of work to do on building democracy 

within OSCE states, OSCE also needs to look at the world around 

it. Terrorism is a global threat. And the OSCE can shape a common regional response. The same can be said about weapons of 
2

mass destruction and the means for their delivery. Certainly 

human rights abuses are a problem in the OSCE and around the 

world. 

The OSCE can respond to these external threats by ensuring 

participating States adhere to OSCE commitments to combat terrorism, to safeguard everything from small-arms stockpiles to nuclear materials, from rogue regimes and groups. The OSCE can 

also serve as a model and resource to address instability and 

human rights violations in other regions, like the Middle East and 

East Asia. 

The need for the OSCE to do these things is why the Commission 

has held hearings this year on the Russian-Syrian connection, as 

well as on the trans-Atlantic response to Iran. That’s why I addressed the conference on the OSCE security dimension in Seoul, 

Korea, earlier this year. 

Co-Chairman Smith and I both have a deep interest in the future 

of Africa and the universal nature of the human desire to be free. 

It means the lessons learned in Europe might resonate in Africa, 

as well. 

The second aspect of the OSCE which I’ve stressed is to keep a 

focus on real people. While one must attend to the diplomatic developments in Vienna, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the 

OSCE is really about the individuals out there struggling to exercise their right to freedom to worship, wanting to voice the concerns of youth, trying to return to a home they fled during conflict, 

hoping simply to be free. 

That’s why this Commission has held hearings this year on the 

Schneerson Collection and on the unregistered religious groups in 

Russia. It’s why we are so concerned about the displaced Roma who 

continue to reside in lead-contaminated camps in Kosovo. 

It’s why we hear testimony from an American who was a domestic trafficking victim. There was a 2-hour program last night—and 

it will be repeated tonight—on human trafficking. I was not able 

to see it last time, but from the reports I’ve heard it is quite good. 

The Helsinki Final Act has always stood as a beacon for the silenced, the trafficked, the tortured, and the displaced. Its brightness fades, however, when the OSCE fails to turn its words into 

deeds or when the OSCE states fail to understand the dialogue is 

not just between one government and another, but between each 

government and the people it is supposed to serve. 

Before introducing today’s witness, I’d like to recognize an individual of particular note, Ludmilla Alexeeva. She’s a founding 

member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, which was formed in 1976. 

That was a bold time to step forward to be a part of a Helsinki 

group. 

I first traveled to Russia—and the only time I’ve been there—

was in 1977. It was not a free place at that time. 

She has remained a respected part of that group. That institution is a key one in the human rights movement in Russia today. 

The creation of this Helsinki Commission was clearly related to 

the formation of the Moscow Helsinki Group, a story that Ludmilla 

tells in her book, ‘‘The Thaw Generation.’’ Our own best efforts 

here can never match the courage and determination that she, Yuri 
3

Orlov, Natan Sharansky, and others displayed in the Soviet human 

rights movement in the 1970s and 1980s. 

We lost Rosa Parks yesterday, one of the key people that stood 

for civil rights in this country. And I don’t know if the comparison 

is fair or not, but you are certainly a person that didn’t give your 

seat up on the bus in Moscow at a very tough time. And I want 

to thank you and recognize you for doing that. 

Would you please stand and let us recognize you, please? [Applause.] 

What you did in 1976 took courage. 

Congressman Cardin, do you have an opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I’m just going to underscore 

the points that you have made, that the Helsinki process is truly 

a unique institution. 

It’s unique in the sense that it’s been, I think, the most effective 

international body in dealing with human rights and the human dimension. Obviously, very important beyond just the human dimension, but I think it is proven to be the most effective in bringing 

out change in countries on human rights issues. 

And it’s unique in the sense that it requires engagement by the 

countries. It’s not a matter of simply enforcing treaty rights. It requires engagement and gives us the right to legitimately challenge 

the actions of all of the participating States. 

It’s also unique in that, here in the United States, it brings together the executive and legislative branches, almost as one entity, 

as one voice. And that’s why I think this hearing is particularly 

useful and important. It carries out a tradition—it continues a tradition of this Commission to hold a hearing, inviting the Assistant 

Secretary to be here. And I very much thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for providing this hearing, an opportunity for us to see how we can 

even improve the effectiveness of the Helsinki process and of our 

Commission in carrying out this very important work. So thank 

you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you, Congressman. 

I want to introduce and welcome our witness today, the Assistant 

Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Daniel 

Fried. 

For more than 25 years, Assistant Secretary Fried either has 

been representing U.S. interests at diplomatic posts in Russia, Central Europe, and the Balkans, or has been responsible for shaping 

U.S. policy in these countries and regions back here in Washington. 

In May of this year, he became the Assistant Secretary, with chief 

responsibilities for shaping U.S. policy toward the OSCE, as well 

as relations with OSCE states. 

Assistant Secretary Fried, I want to thank you for your service 

on behalf of the United States. I look forward to hearing your comments. 

And I want to build on something that I’ve heard Secretary Rice 

say. This is a key time for OSCE. If you look at the movement and 

the changes that are taking place or are possibly taking place, the 

OSCE can really be—should be—one of the lead entities in helping 
4

to shape that region, that was once the Soviet Union and its sphere 

of influence. 

And I think it’s done a remarkable job for the totality of its life, 

but particularly in recent years, in shaping what’s taken place. And 

I look forward to the Helsinki Commission working very closely 

with the State Department on what each of us can do to move forward human rights and freedom in this region of the world. 

Secretary Fried, delighted to have you here. And thanks for your 

years of service. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS 

Sec. FRIED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressmen. 

I am pleased to be here in this year marking the 30th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act to discuss the OSCE and its role in 

advancing not only the interests but the values of our Nation. I’m 

grateful for the leadership and support you and other members of 

the Commission have given to the Helsinki principles and OSCE 

over the years. 

And I, too, feel honored to be here in the presence of Ludmilla 

Alexeeva. I personally, and I think many in this room, have been 

inspired by her work and the work of the Moscow Helsinki Group 

over the decades, which have brought us to a new and better place 

in Europe and the world. 

In his second Inaugural Address, President Bush declared a policy of promoting democracy and freedom throughout the world. The 

OSCE, Mr. Chairman, is the premiere institution for advancing 

freedom in the Euro-Atlantic region. 

On human rights and support for democracy, the so-called 

human dimension, its expertise and accomplishments are unparalleled. Its election observation methodology represents the gold 

standard in this field. And the OSCE’s efforts have been instrumental in advancing democracy. 

The Organization has undertaken groundbreaking work in the 

promotion of tolerance and in combating anti-Semitism and other 

forms of intolerance. The OSCE is a valuable partner in our efforts 

to promote basic freedoms and human rights, including religious 

freedom and freedom of the media. 

Its field missions are vital to the OSCE’s work in many areas, 

and we strongly support their works in promoting security through 

good human rights, strong civil societies, and democratic practices. 

The OSCE also performs important work in the security and economic spheres; it is a key instrument in helping solve regional conflicts, in countering terrorism, and combating trafficking in persons. 

The significant role of the OSCE in promoting democracy and 

freedom was well illustrated during the last year in the impartial 

election observation missions it conducted, most notably in Ukraine 

and Kyrgyzstan. 

Citizens of these countries demanded their leaders’ adherence to 

OSCE commitments and to principles of freedom and democracy. 

They said ‘‘enough’’ to fraudulent elections. OSCE helped them 

voice their opinions and give them a legitimate vote. 
5

Moreover, initial fraudulent elections in Ukraine bore witness to 

the importance of thorough and objective election observation, observation which provided both the international community and domestic citizens with a credible assessment on which to base demands for a legitimate outcome. The OSCE is continuing to work 

with the governments and civil society in Georgia, Ukraine, 

Kyrgyzstan and other countries to help them create and maintain 

democratic and open societies based on the rule of law, which will 

make them stable and secure neighbors. 

Another success this year was the OSCE Cordoba Conference. 

This well-attended event successfully drew high-level attention, not 

only to the problems of anti-Semitism and intolerance, but also to 

best practices for combating them. We believe that the OSCE 

should followup on the 2004 Sofia Tolerance decision and the 2005 

Cordoba conference, through regional seminars or expert-level 

meetings on implementation in 2006. 

These will generate even more enthusiasm among governmental 

and non-governmental experts for implementing OSCE commitments and focus attention on specific ODIHR projects and national 

best practices. We support having high-level conferences along the 

lines of Cordoba and its predecessors every other year, to ensure 

high-level political attention to fulfillment of commitments. Also 

successful was our effort last year, together with NGO partners, to 

have the OSCE establish three personal representatives on tolerance. Throughout 2005, these representatives have traveled wildly 

to raise awareness of OSCE commitments and to support projects 

to assist OSCE states implementation of these commitments. 

We strongly support the work of the personal representatives 

and support their reappointment in January 2006. 

Similarly, we have provided significant political and financial 

support to the activities of the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ODIHR, in these areas of preventing hate 

crimes and discrimination. We recently seconded an expert to the 

post of legal adviser on hate crimes for ODIHR’s Tolerance Program. 

As with Cordoba, U.S. goals for this year’s Human Dimension 

Implementation Meeting, held in Warsaw last month, were successfully met. They included reinforcing our commitments to 

human rights and democracy and showing support for NGO’s working in these fields; generating political will among states for implementing OSCE commitments; responding accurately to criticisms of 

the U.S. about media freedom and human rights and the war on 

terrorism; and building support for U.S. positions on tolerance conferences, the three personal representatives on tolerance, OSCE reform, and other issues. 

In addition to delegations from participating States, a record 

number of over 300 NGO’s also participated in this year’s Human 

Dimension Implementation Meeting, showcasing the OSCE’s special ability to promote civil society through active cooperation. 

I’m grateful for the participation of the Helsinki Commission 

staff, with some of whom I’d had the pleasure of working for more 

years, I’m sure, than they or I would like to recall, as part of U.S. 

delegations. 
6

Not withstanding the OSCE’s successes, the OSCE should continue to adapt, but not at the expense of its effectiveness. One of 

the key tasks facing the OSCE this fall is the question of reform. 

This process got under way with the recommendations made by the 

Eminent Persons Panel earlier this year. 

We are closely examining these proposals that might—and are 

looking especially at those that might enhance the effectiveness 

and efficiency of the organization, but without undercutting its 

work in the human dimension. We are working with the Slovenian 

Chair, the European Union, and all other participating States to 

find ways to do just that. 

The OSCE’s work, through ODIHR and election monitoring, is 

rightly recognized as superb. Unfortunately, there have been calls 

by some states to review and even question election-related commitments and methodology. 

We’re amenable to review in areas where ODIHR’s effectiveness 

could be enhanced; however, we are strongly against any proposals 

that would undermine election commitments or impinge on 

ODIHR’s autonomy or effectiveness. We see no need to change 

something that works so well. 

The issue here is not methodology but rather marshalling the political will among participating States to ensure implementation of 

existing commitments, thus allowing the voice of the electorate to 

be heard. 

One of the OSCE’s most important assets is its institutions and 

the 17 field presences, from the Balkans to Central Asia. We 

strongly support OSCE field work and believe that field offices are 

critical to promoting OSCE commitments, especially democratic 

values and international human rights standards. 

In their work with host governments, NGO’s, and the public, 

field missions perform vital work in numerous fields, from institution-building, promotion of democracy and development of civil society, to coordinating international efforts at conflict prevention, 

post-conflict rehabilitation, and conflict resolution. 

At the Ljubljana Ministerial in December, we will highlight the 

accomplishments of the OSCE in this anniversary year, while 

building support for the important work which still lies ahead. 

While there has been some progress in negotiations between 

Georgia and Russia, we will again strongly urge Russia to fulfill its 

Istanbul commitments. We expect the ministerial to endorse OSCE 

work on promoting tolerance, gender equality, shipping container 

security, small arms and light weapons, MANPADS, and the destruction of excess stockpiles of ammunition and weapons. 

The issue of how the OSCE funds itself is still unresolved, but 

we hope by the ministerial to have agreement on new OSCE scales 

of assessment. Russia is seeking a dramatic reduction in its contributions to the OSCE and remains the lone holdout among 

OSCE’s 55 participating States on new scales. 

The United States stands behind the criteria for adjustment of 

the scales adopted in 2001 and 2002. 

Mr. Chairman, let me turn to Central Asia, which is a region 

where the OSCE has become more active in recent years and where 

it can have an important role in promoting democracy, civil society, 

and respect for human rights, as well as on security and economic 
7

issues. We do have serious concerns about developments in some 

countries in the region. 

The killings in Andijan last May in Uzbekistan and the Uzbek’s 

government reaction to demands for an impartial investigation are 

a particular example. 

We’re also paying attention to Kazakhstan, its upcoming elections. And the degree to which these are judged to be free and fair 

will be a critical element for the international community in observing and assessing Kazakhstan’s development. This election of 

course forms but a part of the overall equation, and Kazakhstan 

has been making important steps forward in many areas. In the 

Caucasus, the United States is working as a co-chair of the OSCE’s 

Minsk Group, as well as independently, to facilitate a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. 

Negotiations are moving in the right direction. In the past year, 

the Minsk Group co-chairs have facilitated numerous meetings of 

the Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers and two meetings 

of the Presidents, most recently on the margins of the CIS Summit 

in Kazan. 

I’m encouraged by my visit last week to the South Caucasus. We 

believe that there is a realistic chance for progress, even in the 

coming months. Much depends on the political will of each side. 

And we do not expect further visible progress until after the November 6th Azerbaijani parliamentary elections. 

Counterterrorism, Mr. Chairman, is an area where there is good 

cooperation among the 55 participating States and a united sense 

of purpose. The OSCE can, as you said, have a multiplier effect by 

the 55 to adopt decisions and standards on security and terrorism 

that many states might have otherwise ignored. 

The State Department has worked closely with the OSCE’s AntiTerrorism Unit to provide expertise for a range of workshops aimed 

at helping other participating States improve their effectiveness in 

areas such as the use of the Internet to recruit terrorists. 

In November, the State Department will co-sponsor a conference 

to be held in Vienna, which will bring together high-level officials 

from capitals to discuss new ways of combating terrorist financing. 

Over the past year, the OSCE has continued to expand and 

strengthen its efforts on combating the modern-day slavery called 

trafficking in persons. In addition to establishment of the special 

representative on combating TIP, the Anti-Trafficking Assistance 

Unit got up and running, headed by a very effective U.S. expert, 

Michele Clark. We want to see this unit and the special representative focus OSCE activities on strategic priorities in the area where 

OSCE can make a difference. 

The OSCE has also taken the lead in the international community in establishing a code of conduct for its mission members to 

ensure that they do not contribute to trafficking in persons. And 

this fall, the United States will again introduce a draft ministerial 

decision to strengthen this work and have OSCE States agree to 

take responsibility for their own peacekeeping troops and mission 

members. 

This year, we have updated it to include the issue of preventing 

sexual exploitation by peacekeepers and international mission 

members. I would like to note the Parliamentary Assembly’s dec-
8

laration in Washington in support of this ministerial decision and 

thank Congressman Smith—express my thanks to Congressman 

Smith for his leadership on this initiative. 

Mr. Chairman, the OSCE has value and has demonstrated its 

value in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives and in the promotion of our common values. In promoting democratic development and respect for human rights, the OSCE is a lead organization in the Euro-Atlantic area. On economic development, the 

OSCE promotes good governance and helps countries put systems 

in place to fight corruption. 

On political-military issues, such as the fight against terrorism, 

border security, small arms and light weapons, and excess stockpiles, the OSCE fills crucial gaps. It has proven itself an effective 

tool. It complements our bilateral, diplomatic, and assistance efforts throughout Europe and Eurasia. 

OSCE’s successes would not be possible without support from the 

Congress and the congressional staff. 

Let me again express my thanks, sir, for your work through the 

Helsinki Commission and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 

And I would like to express also my appreciation for Congressman Hastings’ activism as President of the OSCE Parliamentary 

Assembly. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like, with your permission, to submit a 

more comprehensive version of my remarks for the record. And 

with that, I look forward to answering any questions you might 

have and to a good and stimulating discussion. 

Thank you, sir, for your attention. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Let me back you up. You’ve been in this region 

for 25 years. Take me through some of the places you’ve worked 

over the years, if you could. Just rattle them off. 

Sec. FRIED. Leningrad, in darker days. Belgrade, before the war, 

before the breakup of Yugoslavia. Poland, at the very beginning of 

freedom. Again in Poland as Ambassador in the late 1990s. And, 

in between, in Washington at the Soviet desk, the Polish desk, the 

National Security Council in the 1990s, and the NSC in the current 

administration. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. As you describe that, I just think it’s been nothing short of an absolute profound period of time that you’ve witnessed and been a direct part of it. And as I mention in my written 

statement, I’m impressed, thankful, and you must be thankful to 

have lived during interesting times, although I’m sure it’s given 

you some sleepless nights at many of those junctures along the 

way. 

I want to take you to where we are right now on a couple of the 

election cycles, particularly in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. I know 

Secretary Rice just traveled recently to the Central Asian region, 

delivering a very strong, balanced message, which I think is important for us to do. 

What are the prospects for fair and free elections in those two 

countries? 

Sec. FRIED. There are prospects for free and fair elections. There 

have been some problems, which we have noted. But the Secretary 

in Astana and in my trip last week to Baku, we called for free and 
9

fair elections. We also have worked with both governments to provide specific suggestions and offers of support. 

We want to see, in these countries and throughout the region, 

steady progress toward freer and freer elections, toward greater 

and greater respect for basic human rights, greater and greater 

space for civil society. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be bold and visionary about 

what it is we seek and clear about our vision of democracy. I think 

we also have to work with governments as they seek to do the right 

thing. 

It is foolish to make predictions about events that haven’t happened yet. I hope that these elections will give us the basis to continue our cooperation with these governments and cooperation with 

civil society in both of these countries to advance our objectives. 

But in the meantime, we are doing everything we can with the 

government, with civil society, and through our programs of election support, and with the OSCE, to make sure that these elections 

are as good as can be achieved. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Have the precursor steps been taken to see 

that these are free and fair elections? By that, I mean, in Azerbaijan, have the steps leading up to the elections thus far led one 

to believe that, by and large, these are going to be free and fair? 

Obviously, things can change dramatically, but there’s also a setting-up process. Are candidates being allowed to campaign? Or are 

they arrested in jail somewhere? Do people have access to the 

media? Are those precursor steps to a free and fair election taking 

place in those two countries? 

Sec. FRIED. The situation in both countries is mixed. There are 

active opposition candidates. There is an opposition press. In Baku, 

the opposition candidates have had access to television. 

I met with them. I met with the two leading opposition candidates in the Presidential elections in Kazakhstan, which I visited 

2 weeks prior to Secretary Rice’s visit. I met with opposition figures, including parliamentary candidates, in Baku. 

The picture is mixed. And I said so publicly in my remarks—in 

public remarks in Baku. There is some good, some areas for improvement. We are working with and speaking to the Azerbaijani 

Government about some specific suggestions. 

The most recent news—and we trying to get details—but news 

coming today suggests that the Government of Azerbaijan has 

taken significant steps to resolve one of the concerns the international community had, which was the finger-inking of voters to 

prevent vote fraud, multiple voting. It seems that the Government 

of Azerbaijan wants to pursue this and wants to pull this together 

before the elections. We’re seeking details. 

So the picture, Senator, is a mixed one, but we hope to see elections which are as good as possible, contested elections, and we 

hope to see these elections followed by more progress. And we will 

be very clear, working with the OSCE, in making both recommendations and assessments. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. What specifics can you identify in each of these 

countries that need to be addressed, prior to the election, for these 

elections to be free and fair? 
10

Sec. FRIED. Well, the issue of media access—although, as I said, 

there has been television access for opposition candidates in both 

countries. There are occasionally charges that these state media 

tends to be slanted in favor of the incumbents. There are charges 

that the print media does not have the circulation that it should 

have. 

There have been issues in Azerbaijan about demonstrations. The 

atmosphere in Baku tends to be rather polarized, as is often the 

case in pre-electoral situations. We have urged that the government permit demonstrations. We have also urged that the opposition commit itself to peaceful demonstrations and commit itself to 

behaving as an opposition the way you would want the opposition 

to behave were it in government. 

So there is a great deal of work to be done. And we are in contact 

with both the governments and oppositions, and working with the 

OSCE to convey the recommendations of ODIHR missions, to convey our own suggestions, and work with governments when they 

express a willingness to work with us. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. What is the current state of relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan? 

Sec. FRIED. Difficult, in a word. I was in Uzbekistan about 31⁄2

weeks ago. We were deeply troubled——

Mr. BROWNBACK. Were you able to meet with President 

Karimov? 

Sec. FRIED. I was, sir. My message to the Uzbekistan Government is that we cannot have a one-dimensional relationship with 

Uzbekistan purely based on security. I recalled for my Uzbek interlocutors the joint statement that the Uzbek and the American Government agreed to and issued in 2002, when President Karimov 

visited Washington. 

That statement outlined a broad set of objectives in our relations, 

starting with cooperation to support democracy and civil society. I 

said that my government adheres to that model of relations, a 

broad model, in which we pursue our interests in reform, our interest in counterterrorism and security, and our economic interests 

with Uzbekistan and support its reforms. 

I regret that those reforms have not moved as quickly as we 

would like. The Andijan killings, which it is fair to say did start 

with an attack on government institutions in the prison, turned 

into a killing of civilians, several hundred. The exact number is not 

known. 

And we regret that the Government of Uzbekistan has not to this 

day seen fit to allow a credible outside investigation, which would 

help clarify those events. So I have to say that our relations are 

difficult. I suppose they would not be difficult if we were willing to 

simply give up our democracy and give up our human rights agenda, but we are not. We will continue to speak out about the totality 

of our interests in that country. And I hope that relations improve. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. What was President Karimov’s comments to 

you about the Uzbek-U.S. relationship? 

Sec. FRIED. Well, Senator, I probably shouldn’t characterize a 

leader’s comments to me during a private conversation. But I will 

say that, while we hope to put our relations back on track, on the 

basis of the joint statement of 2002, which, as I said, included de-
11

mocracy and support for democratic reform, I fear we are in for a 

difficult period. 

In the course of the trial of persons arrested in Uzbekistan in 

connection with the Andijan, the prosecution has made accusations 

that the United States was somehow involved, involved, I should 

say, in the initial attacks on the prison. 

I said in Uzbekistan and elsewhere, when I was asked about 

this, that I would find it exceedingly odd that an American Government would be accused of complicity with people who are regarded—who the Uzbek Government regards as Islamist extremists. 

They believe that Islamist extremists were responsible for the attack. I pointed out that it’s rather absurd to accuse the United 

States of complicity with such people. Our government has been 

criticized for various things, but not, to my knowledge, for complicity with Islamist extremists. That seemed to be an utterly fanciful and ridiculous charge. It’s one I regret that has been made. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. What about with Russia and Russia’s commitment to human rights and democratic principles? You’ve been a 

long-term observer of Russia and knowledgeable of developments 

there. Are they headed in the right direction now? Is the trend line 

headed in the right direction or not? 

Sec. FRIED. The answer to that partially depends on where your 

baseline is. If we start with 1976, obviously the founding of the 

Moscow Helsinki Group, the trend line has been very good. This is 

not the Soviet Union. I don’t have the experience of the Soviet 

Union as did Soviet citizens, but I spent some time there. 

In recent years, we have been concerned and have expressed concern about certain trends in Russia, particularly the centralization 

of power. And we have said that it seems to us that one of the hallmarks of democracy is the existence of strong and independent institutions, both institutions of government and institutions independent of government. 

That is a hallmark of—not simply of American democracy, but of 

democracies generally. How the Russians choose to do this is a 

matter for them, but democracies do have things in common. 

We have expressed our concerns. We have done so privately. We 

have done so publicly. Secretary Rice and the President have been 

quite clear about this. 

It’s important to keep in mind that this is not—despite some of 

our concerns—this is not the Soviet Union we’re dealing with. But 

we have to be clear about what it is we seek. We have to be clear 

about where we stand. And we have to be consistent. And I think 

we’ve been so. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Establishing a baseline, which I think is a fair 

point—let us establish a baseline in the year 2000 on Russia. Is the 

trend line going in the right direction on democracy and human 

rights, from a 2000 baseline? 

Sec. FRIED. There are issues of concern from 2000 that we have 

raised. And I think it is important that we continue to speak out 

about our concerns and, at the same time, recognize the progress 

that Russia has made. 

It requires both clarity about where we see problems and perspectives about where we see progress. In the long run, I am opti-
12

mistic about Russia, because I believe that the desire for freedom 

is universal and I believe that modern, well-functioning democracies actually provide better lives for their citizens, and that the 

Russian people, like all people, will insist on accountable government and have been insisting on accountable government at times 

in the past. 

So we look forward to working with you to express both our concerns but also our perspectives. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. You stated it very diplomatically, so there’s not 

a quotable line there. That’s a nice job. 

Sec. FRIED. Well, I am supposed to be a diplomat. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. And well-practiced in it. I would note that 

there’s been concerns by a lot of people, expressed over some period 

of time, that Russia, simply within the last couple of years, has 

really not lived up to its commitment nor its stature in the world, 

nor what it should be doing for its own people in moving forward. 

And I think the trend line has been moving pretty clearly in the 

wrong direction in recent years. And I know the administration is 

concerned about that and I hope can continue to push it. 

I want to ask you about China. Increasingly, we’ve seen recently 

that voracious appetite for natural resources, raw resources, by 

China, and seemingly driving a fair amount of foreign policy decisions by China just simply based upon the desire, the greater consumption need for natural resources. 

Do you see this great Chinese drive for additional raw resources 

having an impact in the region of South Caucasus, Central Asia, 

Russia? 

Sec. FRIED. I see it differently in different places. In the South 

Caucasus, China is not or has not yet been as large a factor as it 

may be in Central Asia. And we have to look still differently on the 

Chinese presence in Eastern Siberia. 

I think that China is interested in Russian energy resources. It 

is interested in Central Asia. China has been increasingly its presence and profile worldwide. I’m not an expert on China. It’s beyond 

my field of expertise. 

I’ll just say it’s certainly in our interest that China’s emergence 

take place in a way that is consistent with international norms, the 

rule of law, and in a way that is compatible with our own interests 

and the interests of our friends. 

When I was in Central Asia, it was clear to me that the leaders 

who think most strategically about the future of their region see 

a challenge in the establishment of sovereignty, considering their 

neighborhood. 

As they put it, we have some very big neighbors to the north, to 

the east. There are some problems to the south, and we are far 

away from you and far away from Europe. 

They are looking for ways to strengthen their sovereignty. My 

advice to my Central Asian friends was that economic reform and 

political reform actually do strengthen your sovereignty, because a 

strong, well-run, successful state has no need of outside patrons because it generates support from within. 

And the greater the sovereignty of a given country, the greater 

its ability to handle challenges from larger neighbors. 
13

Mr. BROWNBACK. I think that’s wise advice. I just would add that 

my experience and observation of China, and particularly in Africa, 

is that it will do whatever it needs to do and work with whomever 

in needs to work in order to access natural resources. 

And China can work with some pretty bad actors in a lot of 

places without much concern at all for human rights, democracy, 

individual freedoms, trafficking, militant Islam. It’s kind of agnostic, apolitical on all of the above, but will desire to try to get as 

much as it can, in the way of a natural resource bases. This is 

something for us to push back against aggressively, if it’s being 

done in a way harmful to the world as a whole. 

I have no problem competing for natural resources, but I do if it’s 

done on the basis of supporting a terrorist regime or—Uzbekistan 

has less in the way of oil resources, but it has other natural resources if China moves in there simply because Uzbekistan has 

been a bad actor and now here’s an opportunity. 

I think that’s something we should pushing back aggressively in 

the region, against the Chinese, which is a different portfolio than 

yours. 

Sec. FRIED. I do agree that an American presence in the region, 

whether it is economic, or military, or political, in support of reforms, can be very useful for these countries as they are finding 

their way. We want good partners in the region with whom we can 

work on a common agenda. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I hope you’ll keep working with us. OSCE is an 

instrument of U.S. foreign policy. But I think, as a bilateral setting, this one’s well-established, well-positioned, and something 

that we can work very closely on regarding Russia, Central Asia 

and elections that are moving forward. 

And I really do hope we can do that, and also push back against 

Russia on some of the OSCE reforms that it’s pushing that would 

gut OSCE overall. And I certainly think we need to use the other 

aspects of OSCE work, security, and economic cooperation as much 

as we can as well. 

But regarding the rhetorical attacks that Russia’s putting on the 

OSCE—and obviously, the OSCE is pushing back against—I’m 

hopeful the administration will be as aggressive and bold as possible in that, too. 

Sec. FRIED. We will resist efforts from any quarter to weaken 

OSCE’s ability to carry out its mandate and especially its mandate 

to observe elections. 

ODIHR is a flexible instrument. It has a great deal of autonomy. 

It has proven itself to be both expert and flexible. And we do not 

want to see any reforms which would weaken ODIHR’s ability to 

do what it has been doing well. 

We don’t think it’s broken. We don’t see a need to fix it. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. You’re right. The Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe is a long-standing entity, and one of the 

peaks in its effectiveness is right now. One of the last things we 

need is to have it gutted, to have some of the juice taken away 

from it. 

These are the reforms that are needed in that region, and this 

is the entity to work through. And I’m glad to hear that strong 

statement from the Administration on it. 
14

Secretary, thank you very much for joining us. I wonder if you 

would mind giving me the pleasure of inviting to the table 

Ludmilla Alexeeva, who helped start the Moscow Helsinki Group, 

just to make some comments. I’d hate to have somebody here in the 

room that’s been such a clear standard-bearer without inviting her 

to make a few comments. 

Would you care to come forward and join us, Ludmilla? I know 

you have no prepared context or any text. 

LUDMILLA ALEXEEVA, CHAIRPERSON, MOSCOW HELSINKI 

GROUP 

Ms. ALEXEEVA. I would like to say that the Soviet Union and its 

allies were totalitarian states, but the Helsinki process focused 

greater attention on forcing totalitarian regimes to fulfill their obligations in humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Accords. 

The Moscow Helsinki Group, which has been mentioned today, 

was founded just to use the mechanism of the Helsinki Final Act 

for that aim, to force a totalitarian state to respect human rights 

and freedoms, to fulfill humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Accords. 

And it has been very successful in that, very much thanks to 

support of the Helsinki Commission and its first chairman, Congressman Dante Fascell. 

I think, in today’s situation, the Helsinki process may be used 

very effectively, too, with the same aim, to force respect human 

rights and freedoms in states participating in the OSCE which 

have totalitarian or at least authoritarian regimes. I mean such 

countries as Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and, unfortunately, 

my country, the Russian Federation. 

As far as Russia, it would be very important to restore the OSCE 

Mission in Chechnya, because, in Chechnya, any legislation is absent of human rights which are violated everyday by very terrible 

men. 

What is also very important—not only for Russian citizens’ sake, 

but for whole world—is to have OSCE observe my country’s elections in 2007 and 2008, parliamentary elections and federal and 

presidential elections. And I would believe you know why I say this 

and why I suggest it. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Well, I just want to recognize and thank you 

for being so bold and courageous. It’s one thing to do it now, but 

you were there in 1976, and have been a very clear, bold leader. 

I know Natan Sharansky fairly well, having worked with him a 

number of times. And I’m always impressed to see him, and to see 

how he stood so long and so firm. Frequently, in these systems, you 

never get to a majority but just a few bold people that are willing 

to stand and speak the truth, and the place falls over time. It 

doesn’t happen immediately. 

Ms. ALEXEEVA. Well, it was like miracle, but I do believe that it’s 

possible to repeat it today, because it’s much easier to make 

changes today in Russia than it was to force the Soviet Union to 

respect humanitarian provisions of the Final Act. 

Of course, the United States took the time to cooperate with and 

coordinate the efforts of all democratic countries that were signatories of Final Act. In today’s situation, it will be difficult, too, but 
15

I remember the first stage of this process. And not one European 

country in the beginning supported the United States and President Carter in pushing the Soviet Union to respect the humanitarian commitments it undertook. 

I think it’s possible today, too, just as it was possible in 1970s. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Well, God bless you. You inspire us all. I really 

appreciate you being here. 

Thank you, Assistant Secretary Fried. Thank you very much. I 

appreciate your testimony and your work. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 4:03 p.m.]
16

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH,

CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Let me join Chairman Brownback in welcoming Secretary Fried 

today. This is the fifth time we have had a hearing featuring the 

Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs to discuss 

the OSCE and U.S. policy. I have found these hearings to be an 

excellent venue not only for building a cooperative relationship 

with the State Department on issues of common concern, but also 

for drawing wider attention to these issues and the OSCE’s useful 

role in addressing them. 

There is no doubt that the OSCE’s most unique strength is its 

human dimension, an integral aspect of the organization’s comprehensive approach to security. Russia and a small grouping of 

other repressive regimes have increasingly attempted to divert attention away from their poor rights records, claiming that the real 

problem is that OSCE is paying too much attention to human 

rights. Simply put, these countries—Belarus and Uzbekistan 

among them—do not want to implement OSCE commitments they 

have freely accepted. 

Russia’s ranting and obstructionist behavior at the OSCE in Vienna has sent scores of diplomats and foreign ministers scrambling 

to fix the ‘‘Russia problem.’’ To their credit, Russian officials know 

how to play the diplomatic game and know their best chance of getting what they want is by going into the details of the organization 

others often overlook. 

Under the guise of ‘‘reforms’’ Moscow and her allies are intent on 

hamstringing the OSCE’s human rights work, seeking to curtail 

the critically important Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, sidelining human rights issues to a closed-door committee, and 

undercutting vital election observation missions. Is reform needed? 

Yes, but not in Vienna. Rather we should look for change in the 

very capitals clamoring for OSCE reforms. The OSCE is a vital element in advancing our values of democracy, human rights and rule 

of law. I trust that the Department will reject any attempts to undercut the human dimension of the OSCE. 

Ultimately, the success of the OSCE as President Gerald Ford remarked in signing the Helsinki Final Act exactly 30 years ago, will 

be judged, ‘‘not only by the promises make, but the promises we 

keep.’’

The Commission has welcomed the extent to which the United 

States has, in recent OSCE ministerial preparations, judged success in terms other than agreement for agreement’s sake. We encourage the United States to hold firm on such things as adherence 

to Istanbul commitments. The Department should support what is 

effective for the organization in achieving its worthy goals rather 

than whatever compromises might provide some short-term relief 

to strained bilateral relations. 

Ultimately, I want to see the OSCE shed light on human rights 

abuses wherever they occur. I want the OSCE to help thwart trafficking in persons and to defend the right of people to practice their 

own faith. I want the OSCE to inspire the new generations emerg-
17

ing in transition countries to make a difference not only for themselves, but for their countries and the world. I want the OSCE to 

counter anti-Semitism and other forms of hatred and intolerance, 

as well as the widespread discrimination against Roma. 

None of this, I would add, is to the detriment of work in other 

areas. Those of us on the Helsinki Commission support, as does the 

United States, a wide variety of initiatives undertaken in the security dimension of the OSCE, including efforts to combat terrorism, 

to control the flow of small arms and light weapons, to destroy excess stocks of ammunition. In the economic dimension, we have 

often looked for needed efforts to combat official corruption and organized crime that stymie foreign investment and economic 

progress. 

Freedom, safety and economic opportunity are mutually reinforcing, and I look forward to hearing the Assistant Secretary 

speak about these areas at today’s hearing.
18

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN

AFFAIRS 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Brownback, Co-Chairman Smith, Senators, Congressmen: I am very pleased to be here in the year marking the 30th 

anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act to discuss the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its role in advancing the interests and values of our nation. The principles enshrined in that Act, linking security among states to respect for 

human rights in states, form the core agenda of the OSCE today. 

They are also at the core of the President’s foreign policy agenda, 

and I know they are of great importance to you. 

In his second inaugural address, the President declared a clear 

policy of promoting democracy and freedom throughout the world. 

In her opening remarks at this year’s OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Secretary Rice reaffirmed President Bush’s deep commitment 

to the OSCE and its important work in advancing freedom. Around 

the globe people are standing up and embracing the values of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in 

the Helsinki Final Act. They are calling on their governments to 

guarantee and respect these inalienable human rights. The OSCE 

is front and center in helping them achieve this goal. I appreciate 

this opportunity to state my personal commitment to working with 

you to pursue the course the Helsinki process charted so many 

years ago: a course to security and stability in Europe and Eurasia. 

The OSCE is a tremendous asset and platform for advancing a 

great range of issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. On human rights 

and support for democracy, the so-called human dimension, its expertise and accomplishments are unparalleled. Its election observation methodology represents the gold standard in this field, and the 

OSCE’s efforts have been instrumental in advancing democracy. 

The organization has undertaken groundbreaking work in the promotion of tolerance and in combating anti-Semitism and other 

forms of intolerance. The OSCE is a valuable partner in our joint 

efforts to promote basic freedoms and human rights, including religious freedom and freedom of the media. Its field missions are vital 

to the OSCE’s work in many areas, and we strongly support these 

presences. The OSCE also performs important work in the security 

and economic spheres; it is a key instrument in helping solve regional conflicts, in countering terrorism and combating trafficking 

in persons. 

The OSCE’s successes would not be possible without support 

from Members of Congress and their dedicated staffs. I want to 

thank you for your work through the Helsinki Commission and the 

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Both have been keys to building a 

consensus for our shared agenda among the legislatures and 

publics of the OSCE’s 55 participating States. We greatly value 

Congressman Hastings’ activism as President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on OSCE issues and the involvement of the 

parliamentary assembly in election monitoring and other important 

work. Congressman Smith, Senator Brownback, your personal efforts have helped keep the OSCE a vibrant, modern organization 
19

with its pioneering work on combating the rising scourge of antiSemitism and other forms of intolerance, and on the despicable 

business of trafficking in persons. 

Since 1989, Europe has undergone a historic transformation and 

the OSCE has played a vital role in advancing freedom from Central Europe to Central Asia, as the frontier of freedom has progressed. Peaceful, democratic transitions in Georgia, Ukraine and 

Kyrgyzstan are testaments to the OSCE’s vital role in promoting 

freedom and democracy. Citizens of these countries demanded their 

leaders’ adherence to OSCE commitments and to the principles of 

freedom and democracy, and said ‘‘enough’’ to fraudulent elections. 

Moreover, those initial fraudulent elections bore witness to the 

importance of thorough and objective election observation—observation which provided both the international community and domestic citizens with a credible assessment upon which to base demands for a legitimate outcome. The OSCE is continuing to work 

with the governments and civil society in those countries to help 

them create and maintain democratic and open societies based on 

the rule of law, which will make them stable and secure neighbors. 

Elsewhere, OSCE election experts watched as the Afghan people 

cast their ballots in Afghanistan’s unprecedented elections. OSCE’s 

election observation methodology is now the gold standard for 

international and domestic election observations. Established democracies such as France, Spain, the United States and U.K. have 

taken OSCE suggestions on board in their efforts to hone the tools 

of democracy. 

The OSCE is going through a process of examining ways to increase its effectiveness, and looking at the Panel of Eminent Persons Report’s suggestions as one source for possible change. I do 

not believe that this is a time of crisis for the OSCE. Rather, it is 

a time of opportunity for participating States to re-commit to fulfilling the agreements we have made and exploring ways to meet 

today’s emerging challenges: trafficking, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, and illegal 

migration. 

We want to preserve and enhance the ability of participating 

States and NGOs to stand up in the OSCE context, whether at the 

Permanent Council meetings or at the HDIM, and speak openly 

and frankly about how we are all living up to our OSCE commitments. Just as we value these exchanges in which countries like 

Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and others are called upon to 

defend their records on human rights, democracy and freedom, we 

value speaking about our own progress and commitments. When 

the U.S. stands up and talks openly about issues in this country, 

we set an example of what can be accomplished when a state opens 

itself to scrutiny and recognizes the value in publicly explaining its 

own behavior. 

We are endeavoring to work constructively with Russia in the 

OSCE and we are consulting with our Russian colleagues on issues 

related to reform, OSCE’s financial arrangements, and areas for cooperation within the OSCE. We have consistently made clear the 

fundamental importance of OSCE’s democracy and human rights 

work, independence of institutions, field missions, extra budgetary 

contributions, election observations, and other issues, and our en-
20

gagement with Russia will not compromise our commitment to 

standing up for OSCE’s core values and principles. 

The OSCE is a unique forum allowing us full engagement with 

Russia, as we raise our concerns about the strength and depth of 

Russian commitment to human rights, democratic reform and the 

rule of law while still working together on many issues that secure 

peace and growth in Europe. We want to work with Russia as a 

partner to support the progress of the countries of Central Asia and 

the Caucasus in becoming more prosperous, democratic and secure. 

As President Bush noted in his 2005 Inaugural Address, peace 

depends upon the expansion of freedom; the work of the OSCE is 

directly related to that objective. I believe the OSCE is very capable of taking on new tasks including a broader role in advancing 

freedom and security in the world. The Helsinki Process, with its 

focus on creating a political space for reformers and reform, did 

great things for Central and Eastern Europe and can serve as an 

inspiration for the governments and people of the Broader Middle 

East and Asia as well. 

The OSCE also has a role to play in helping to win the global 

war on terrorism. Promoting security interests collectively through 

the OSCE allows the United States to share costs and political responsibility with other states and, at the same time, to coordinate 

actions, avoiding duplication and maximizing success. Today, I 

would like to address in detail the OSCE’s value to the United 

States, the OSCE’s recent accomplishments and plans for the future, and calls to refocus and restructure the OSCE. 

IMPORTANCE OF THE OSCE TO THE UNITED STATES

U.S. participation in the OSCE advances U.S. interests and our 

values by promoting democracy, strengthening respect for human 

rights and fundamental freedoms, and advancing arms control, 

confidence- and security-building measures, as well as economic 

prosperity and sustainable environmental policies. The OSCE also 

has a role to play in helping to win the global war against terrorism, and it is a vehicle for the kind of ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ of which Secretary Rice has spoken so often. The OSCE has 

an instrumental role in transforming societies into democratic 

members of the international community. Promoting our interests 

collectively through the OSCE allows the United States to share 

both costs and political responsibility with other states and, at the 

same time, to coordinate actions to avoid duplication and maximize 

success. 

The United States continues to make effective use of the OSCE’s 

flexible and comprehensive approach to security, which recognizes 

human rights, as well as economic and environmental issues as integral factors in fostering security and stability. Common principles 

agreed by consensus give the United States and other OSCE participating states shared values and commitments on which to act. 

The OSCE can bring the weight of 55 nations acting together to 

bear on problems that no one nation can solve alone. 

The OSCE has made a significant contribution in the post-Communist era toward achieving America’s goal of a free, whole, and 

peaceful Europe, though much still needs to be done. The OSCE is 

adapting to new challenges and providing models for addressing 
21

tough issues such as intolerance, border management and control 

of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), models from which the 

United Nations and other international organizations draw. At the 

same time, OSCE resources are modest. It depends on the contributions of its member states. Any new initiatives must represent the 

top priorities of the United States and other participating states. 

REFORM AND FUTURE OSCE ACTIVITIES

One of the key tasks facing the OSCE this fall is the ongoing discussion regarding the scope and nature of reforms of the organization’s structures and activities. We are closely examining those proposals that might enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization and do not undercut its work in the human dimension. 

We look forward to working with the Slovenian Chair, the EU and 

all other participating States to find ways to do just that. 

Our goal will be to preserve the independence and flexibility of 

the institutions and funding and missions that we so value. We 

want the OSCE’s institutions and missions to be adequately funded 

and staffed, with flexible and rational mandates, able to respond 

with resources—both financial and human—to developing situations. We want the OSCE to look forward to what more it can do, 

and what it can do better, and that to us, does not mean more bureaucracy, more meetings, more layers of authority, or more centralized control over institutions or field missions. We welcome 

your ideas and thoughts as we go through the reform process. 

The OSCE’s most important assets are its institutions and the 17 

field presences on the front lines of democracy and human rights 

from the Balkans to Central Asia. The United States strongly supports OSCE field work and believes the day-to-day efforts of OSCE 

field offices are critical to promoting OSCE commitments, especially democratic values and international human rights standards. 

In their work with host governments, NGOs and the public, field 

missions perform vital work in numerous fields, from institutionbuilding, promotion of democracy and development of civil society 

to coordinating international efforts at conflict prevention, post-conflict rehabilitation, and conflict resolution. 

FIGHT AGAINST INTOLERANCE

The OSCE’s pioneering work fighting racism, anti-Semitism and 

other forms of intolerance has become the standard by which other 

international organizations’ efforts—including those of the United 

Nations—are measured. The OSCE’s work to prevent hate crimes 

and discrimination by confronting the roots of intolerance, 

strengthening respect for ethnic and religious diversity, and providing an environment free from fear of persecution or prejudice, 

are top priorities for the United States. The OSCE tackles these 

challenges through programs and projects in the fields of legislative 

reform, law enforcement training, education on the Holocaust and 

anti-Semitism, and projects to combat hate speech on the Internet, 

while still focusing on protecting freedom of expression. The United 

States has provided significant political and financial support to 

the activities of the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights (ODIHR) in these areas, and most recently we sec-
22

onded an expert to the post of Legal Advisor on Hate Crimes for 

ODIHR’s Tolerance Program. 

Thanks to intense efforts by the U.S. Government, in close collaboration with NGO partners, the OSCE established three Personal Representatives on Tolerance in December 2004. Throughout 

2005, these three Representatives—on anti-Semitism, on intolerance against Muslims, and on racism, xenophobia and discrimination, including against Christians and members of other religions—

have traveled to OSCE States to raise awareness of OSCE commitments and to spread support for projects to assist OSCE States implement these commitments. The Representatives work closely 

with ODIHR in a cooperative environment, but are free to travel 

and undertake new projects independent of ODIHR. We will work 

closely with the incoming Belgian Chairmanship to ensure a mandate for these representatives which gives them the tools they need 

to fulfill the mission given to them. 

The OSCE Cordoba Conference, held in Spain in June 2005 drew 

high-level attention not only to the problems of anti-Semitism and 

intolerance, but also to best practices for combating these scourges. 

The conference attracted over 700 governmental and non-governmental participants, including approximately 15 ministerial-level 

participants. The U.S. urged OSCE States to do more to implement 

their commitments to the 2004 Berlin and Brussels Decisions. The 

Cordoba Declaration reiterated one of the most important points in 

the previous declarations, that ‘‘international developments or political issues, including those in Israel or elsewhere in the Middle 

East, never justify anti-Semitism.’’ The declaration committed 

States to ‘‘reject the identification of terrorism and extremism with 

any religion, culture, nationality or race.’’ In these two areas, the 

OSCE is ahead of any other international organization, including 

the UN. 

U.S. goals for this year’s Human Dimension Implementation 

Meeting, held in Warsaw last month, were successfully met. They 

included reinforcing our commitment to human rights and democracy, and showing support for NGOs working in these fields; generating political will among States for implementing OSCE commitments; responding accurately to criticism of the U.S. about media 

freedom and human rights and the war on terrorism, and building 

support for U.S. positions on tolerance conferences, reappointment 

of the three Personal Representatives on Tolerance, OSCE reform, 

and other issues. In addition to delegations from participating 

States, a record number of over 300 NGOs also participated in this 

year’s HDIM—showcasing the OSCE’s special ability to promote 

civil society through active cooperation. 

NEXT STEPS IN COMBATING INTOLERANCE

The series of high-level conferences over the past three years has 

done much to set in motion important OSCE work—particularly by 

ODIHR and the three Personal Representatives—to combat intolerance and promote respect for diversity. At these conferences, 55 nations committed to collect hate crime statistics, share information 

with ODIHR, strengthen education to combat intolerance and consider increasing training for law enforcement officials. ODIHR 

launched an online database to compare national hate crimes legis-
23

lation, track incidents of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and disseminate best practices for combating intolerance. We support 

these initiatives and will work to ensure they continue. We also 

strongly support the work of the Personal Representatives and support their re-appointment in January 2006 to finish the important 

work they have only just begun. 

The success of these tolerance initiatives, of course, depends on 

their full implementation. There is much to be done: many OSCE 

participating states still lack hate crime legislation or systems for 

tracking hate crime, and ODIHR’s law enforcement training program has only been piloted in two countries so far. The U.S. believes ODIHR is the right institution to lead OSCE activities promoting tolerance. With the help of ODIHR experts and the three 

Personal Representatives, however, we believe tolerance activities 

can and should also be mainstreamed into all OSCE work, including in the field missions and the Special Police Matters Unit. 

OSCE tolerance conferences have exemplified the benefits of the 

organization’s flexible and comprehensive approach to security by 

responding to specific and immediate issues of concern, such as the 

rise of anti-Semitism and the increase in intolerance and discrimination against Muslims after September 11. While OSCE States 

and the ODIHR Tolerance Program must continue to confront all 

forms of hate and promote tolerance and respect for members of all 

ethnicities and religions, the framework we have used until now 

has effectively drawn attention and resources to urgent problems 

in the OSCE region. Therefore, we are convinced that future meetings should not diminish the distinct focuses on these problems in 

exchange for a more generic approach. We believe the OSCE should 

follow-up on the 2004 Sofia Tolerance decision and the 2005 Cordoba conference, through regional seminars or expert-level meetings on implementation in 2006. These will generate even more enthusiasm among governmental and non-governmental experts for 

implementing OSCE commitments and focus attention on specific 

ODIHR projects and national best practices, from which all OSCE 

states can benefit. We support the idea of having high-level conferences along the lines of Cordoba and its predecessors every other 

year, to ensure high-level political attention to fulfillment of commitments. 

ANTI-TRAFFICKING EFFORTS

Over the past year, the OSCE has continued to expand and 

strengthen its efforts on combating the modern-day slavery called 

trafficking in persons. In addition to the establishment of the Special Rep on Combating TIP, this year the Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit got up and running, headed by a very effective U.S. expert, Michele Clark. We want to see this unit and the Special Rep 

focus OSCE activities on strategic priorities in this area where the 

OSCE can make a concrete difference. 

Of course, participating States have primary responsibility for 

combating TIP. The OSCE can assist and provide valuable tools 

and training such as legislative assistance, police training, and economic programs. 

The OSCE has also taken the lead in the international community in establishing a strong code of conduct for its mission mem-
24

bers to ensure they do not contribute to TIP. This fall, the United 

States will again introduce a draft ministerial decision to strengthen this work, and have OSCE States agree to take responsibility 

for their own peacekeeping troops and mission members. This year, 

we have updated it to include the issue of preventing sexual exploitation by peacekeepers and international mission members. I would 

like to note the Parliamentary Assembly’s declaration in Washington in support of this Ministerial decision, and thank Congressman Smith for his leadership on this initiative. 

As you know, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of 

Defense briefed the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in November 2004 on the DoD ‘‘zero tolerance’’ policy against activities 

supporting human trafficking. This was the first discussion of 

human trafficking in the OSCE Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC). 

ELECTION OBSERVATIONS

This past year has been a historic one for the ODIHR, and its 

active, energetic contributions include conducting impartial election 

observation missions, most notably in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, in 

partnership with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. ODIHR assisted with expertise to improve presidential and parliamentary 

elections and to provide robust election observation missions that 

documented the degree to which elections met OSCE commitments 

and international standards. In Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, the 

OSCE observation missions provided both the international community and domestic citizens with a credible assessment upon 

which to base demands for a legitimate outcome. OSCE also had 

an observation role in the recent parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, an OSCE Partner for Cooperation. The United States 

was a major contributor to the election support team efforts, and 

we appreciate the financial support from other OSCE participating 

States in helping the Afghan people accomplish a major democratic 

milestone so successfully. 

In keeping with its OSCE commitments, the United States set an 

example by inviting OSCE to observe last year’s general election in 

this country, as we have done every year since 1996, consistent 

with our signing of the 1990 Copenhagen Document. We believe 

election observers from young democracies that emerged from the 

former Communist states of Eastern Europe, who participate in observation missions in the United States and other longstanding democracies, become more powerful advocates of better election practices in their own countries. As we expect other countries to abide 

by their commitments, we must lead by example and be models of 

cooperation with the OSCE. In this spirit, we just hosted two 

weeks ago, an ODIHR team for follow-up discussions on our 2004 

election. 

Upcoming elections in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan will be key 

tests of those countries’ commitment to democracy. The degree to 

which these elections are judged to be free and fair, and the 

progress these elections represent compared to past elections in 

these countries, will be critical to the international community. The 

OSCE observation missions will play an important role in determining election fairness and we call on all OSCE countries to fully 
25

support all of ODIHR’s election observation and democracy promoting activities. 

The OSCE’s work, through ODIHR, in election monitoring is 

rightly recognized as superb. Unfortunately, there have been calls 

by some States to review and even question election-related commitments and methodology. While we are amenable to reviewing 

areas where ODIHR’s effectiveness could be further enhanced, we 

are strongly against any proposals that would undermine election 

commitments or impinge on ODIHR’s autonomy or effectiveness. 

We see little need to change something that works so well. The real 

issue here is not this or that methodology but the lack of political 

will among some participating States to implement existing commitments and allow the voice of the electorate to be heard. 

UZBEKISTAN

Since the May uprising and subsequent crackdown in Andijon, 

Uzbekistan has taken numerous steps away from providing the 

freedom that is essential to long-term stability. Among these have 

been clamp downs on independent media and civil society, including shutting down a number of U.S.-sponsored NGOs and jailing an 

Uzbek RFE/RL reporter. Nevertheless, the OSCE is still operating 

with some effect in Uzbekistan, despite restrictions that have prohibited most work on human dimension issues from its center in 

Tashkent. 

An ODIHR team of experts conducted a preliminary investigation into the Andijon events and published a report in June. According to its report, an attack on police, military units and a prison by a group of armed men, an attack we condemned, escalated 

into a general protest against the Karimov government. Uzbek authorities responded by sending interior ministry troops to quell the 

violence. Press and human rights groups’ reports indicate that 

these security forces sealed off the area and proceeded to shoot indiscriminately, killing hundreds of civilians—many, if not most of 

whom were unarmed. 

The OSCE report indicates that although Uzbek authorities were 

initially battling criminal elements, they ultimately turned on uninvolved civilians. The Uzbek Government’s version of the security 

forces’ response is unsubstantiated at best and requires a thorough 

international investigation. The ODIHR team believes the death 

toll in Andijon to be significantly higher than the official government claim of 173 dead. In addition, the OSCE report cited the socioeconomic situation in Uzbekistan, lack of access to fair trials and 

a general sense of injustice as the focus of the protest against the 

Karimov regime, not the desire to create an Islamic Caliphate as 

the government claims. 

The OSCE’s ODIHR trial experts are the only international observers permitted by the Uzbek government to observe 

Uzbekistan’s current show-trial of the first 15 people accused of instigating the Andijon violence. The Uzbek government has otherwise prevented independent investigations into the cases of the accused. 

These events present a serious challenge to the OSCE, as well 

as an opportunity to advance freedom. Because of its ability to admonish participating states for not upholding their OSCE commit-
26

ments and to investigate human rights violations, the OSCE is 

well-suited to initiate the international response to the tragic 

events in Andijon and to censure the Uzbek government for its 

crackdown on civil society. The OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism is 

being discussed in capitals as a possible tool to encourage the 

Uzbek government to open itself to an international investigation 

in which, as an OSCE member, it has an equal voice. 

BELARUS

Belarus remains an outpost of tyranny in the heart of Europe. 

Its government fails to respect its citizens by denying them their 

human rights and freedom. The repression we reported last year 

has only deepened. New legal measures aim to silence independent 

voices, monopolize information, and obstruct all elements of political opposition and democratization. 

Belarus falls further and further behind in realizing its OSCE 

commitments. Its parliamentary elections last October were neither 

free nor fair. Along with the referendum to end presidential term 

limits, their badly flawed framework testified to the Government’s 

cynical contempt for freedom and democracy. 

The regime in Belarus continues to consolidate its monopoly on 

information. It has intensified its attempts to stifle the besieged 

independent media. Rather than protecting it, the law straitjackets 

free speech. The authorities have suspended newspapers, levied 

crippling fines, and brought specious libel suits to chill dissent. For 

example, in August, the Government conjured up spurious legal 

grounds to deregister the publishers of the independent weekly 

newspapers Den and Kuryer iz Borisova. After raiding homes and 

confiscating personal property of three people allegedly involved in 

posting satirical political cartoons on the Internet, Belarusian authorities proceeded with criminal slander cases against them. In 

his March report, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 

Haraszti offered to assist Belarus in reforming its media laws, including exceedingly harsh provisions on libel used to undermine 

free speech. It should come as no surprise Belarus has ignored the 

findings and recommendations in Mr. Haraszti’s report. 

The government of Belarus continues to make it even more difficult, if not impossible, for NGOs, political parties, independent 

trade unions, and private educational institutions to function. Restrictive legislation adopted this year enhanced the tools available 

to the regime to punish voices of dissent and reform, including suspension and liquidation of organizations. Recent government measures restrict assistance to prepare for elections, referenda, the recall of MPs, the organization and conduct of meetings, street 

marches, demonstrations and strikes, among other activities. 

MOLDOVA AND TRANSNISTRIA

The OSCE, and in particular the OSCE Mission in Moldova, are 

working to find long-term solutions to the situation in the breakaway region of Transnistria. The U.S. strongly supports the work 

of the OSCE in Moldova, which forms part of our own strategy—

as well as that of the EU—for finding a peaceful resolution which 

respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova. The 
27

situation in Transnistria shows little improvement. Thanks to the 

concerted efforts of the OSCE Mission, Tiraspol authorities finally 

relented in their forcible closure of Latin-script-language schools. 

In Dorotskoye, however, Tiraspol authorities refused Moldovan 

farmers access to their fields for this year’s growing season, denying them their livelihood and creating a humanitarian crisis. 

Through the OSCE, we have strongly condemned such actions, 

and reiterated our demand that the Transnistrians grant the farmers access to their fields and restore the normal movement of people and goods. U.S. and the EU visa restrictions remain in effect 

against leading Transnistrian officials, including those directly involved with the Latin-script-language school crisis. We welcomed 

Ukrainian President Yushchenko’s initiative to bring new directions to the conflict settlement process and are consulting closely 

with Ukraine, as well as with Moldova, the EU and Russia, on the 

way forward. We have continued to urge the Russian Government 

to use its influence with the Transnistrian leadership in ways conducive to a just settlement of the conflict. 

The United States has urged all sides to work transparently with 

the OSCE to make concrete progress toward a political settlement. 

We are encouraged by the agreement reached between the sides 

and the existing mediators (the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine) on 

September 27 in Odessa to invite the United States and the EU to 

join the negotiations in the five-sided format as observers, and we 

joined the round of talks scheduled for late October. We support 

the EU’s project for international monitoring of the Transnistrian 

segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border, scheduled to start in December, which we believe should support more effective enforcement of customs laws and regulations. We have also urged the Russian Federation to resume, in cooperation with the OSCE, its withdrawal of forces from the region in accordance with its commitments undertaken at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul. 

TURKMENISTAN

In Turkmenistan, the human rights situation remains extremely 

poor where all fundamental rights are ignored and repressed by an 

authoritarian government. The de facto expulsion of OSCE Head of 

Center Ambassador Badescu in 2004 was a grave disappointment. 

The new Ambassador, Ibrahim Djikic, and his staff labor under difficult circumstances, working for one of the very few organizations 

that can provide the people of Turkmenistan with connections to 

the outside world. 

RUSSIA

We used the OSCE HDIM to raise our concerns over specific developments and trends in the Russian Federation and to urge that 

country to show through constant action how it is advancing democracy, human rights and the rule of law at home and beyond. 

We remain concerned about the freedom of the media, NGOs, political parties, and national and religious minorities, as well as the 

rule of law. In Warsaw, we raised our increasing concern over the 

latest steps in a pattern of harassment against the human rights 

NGO, the Russian Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS), which pro-
28

motes reconciliation between the Russian and Chechen peoples. We 

recognize and condemn without qualification the terrorist elements 

in the conflict and deplore the grievous atrocities committed by separatist forces, but this does not excuse abuses committed by Russian forces, a lack of meaningful accountability for such abuses, or 

discriminatory attitudes on the part of Russian authorities towards 

displaced persons from Chechnya. We again urged the Russian 

Federation to halt these abuses and hold their perpetrators, both 

military and civilian, accountable. The solution needed in 

Chechnya is a political one, not a military one, we have repeatedly 

called on all sides to work toward such a solution. 

OSCE FIELD MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS

Southeastern Europe remains the area with the highest concentration of OSCE field activity, a legacy of the organization’s 

major role before and after the Balkan wars. The OSCE, in fact, 

devotes 72 percent of its total personnel and 53 percent of its total 

budget to the six Balkan missions. 

With a total staff of nearly 1200 international and locally-hired 

personnel, the Mission in Kosovo is the largest OSCE field operation. The Mission is a distinct component of the United Nations 

Interim Administration in Kosovo, and is mandated with 

institution- and democracy-building and promoting human rights 

and the rule of law. The Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 

OSCE’s second largest with 729 total personnel, was created in 

1995 in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accords. The basic function 

of the Mission is to help rebuild Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 

multi-ethnic, democratic society. The four other Balkan missions 

are located in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Albania, and range in size from 338 to 120 personnel. All four are involved in helping to develop democratic institutions and processes, 

in monitoring and protecting human rights, and in promoting 

greater integration and inter-ethnic understanding. 

While the OSCE has been gradually reducing the size of these 

six missions, it must not pull out of the Balkans too quickly. The 

political climate throughout the region remains unstable, while 

democratic institutions and respect for human rights and the rule 

of law are not yet firmly rooted. Organized crime and the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings remain region-wide 

problems. 

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) is the OSCE’s largest field 

mission. It has a record of success there, including through police 

training. As we prepare for final status talks for Kosovo, we must 

also begin to look at the role for the OSCE once those talks are 

concluded. Kosovo Head of Mission Wnendt has suggested that the 

OSCE and OMiK could play a greater role in institution-building 

and monitoring at the municipal level—drawing upon the OSCE’s 

strong field presence in Kosovo and its traditional strengths. 

The OSCE has been involved in Kosovo since it was the CSCE 

in the early 1990s, and its experience will continue to play an important role in building a stable future. 
29

GEORGIA, ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA

The United States supports a peaceful resolution of the South 

Ossetian conflict that respects the territorial integrity of Georgia. 

The situation in South Ossetia has been tense but without major 

outbreaks of violence for most of 2005, compared to 2004. Unfortunately, ten civilians were recently wounded in a mortar attack September 20. We have called on all sides to respect existing agreements and refrain from carrying out any further military activities 

in or near the zone of conflict. Recent tensions underscore the need 

for the sides to move forward with OSCE participation toward demilitarization and a political settlement. We believe the OSCE Mission should be enlarged to enable more comprehensive monitoring 

of the zone of conflict. 

We welcome the ongoing and invigorated efforts of the Georgian 

Government to develop a viable game plan, and call on Tbilisi, 

Moscow and the Ossetians to work together toward a settlement offering Ossetia genuine autonomy within a unified Georgia. 

Progress toward a political settlement of the Abkhaz conflict is 

slow. After a long pause marked by increased tensions and complicated Abkhaz ‘‘presidential’’ elections, the Georgian and Abkhaz 

sides returned to discussions in the ‘‘Geneva’’ format of the UN 

Friends of the Secretary General in May 2005 and participated in 

additional meetings in the Friends framework in Tbilisi. We hope 

for progress in the coming months on security assurances. We urge 

the Georgian Government and Abkhaz leaders to advance confidence building measures and resume a dialogue toward a settlement. We need to use the OSCE Mission in Georgia to assist those 

efforts. We seek Moscow’s support as well. 

We were deeply disappointed by the disbandment, at Russia’s insistence, of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation, which significantly contributed to stability on the Russian-Georgian border. We 

actively supported the 2005 OSCE training mission for border 

guards that filled the vacuum left by the closure of the BMO and 

we encourage the EU to work for a robust program to support monitoring of Georgia’s borders. 

ADAPTED CFE AND FULFILLMENT OF ISTANBUL COMMITMENTS

Regarding the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe, the U.S. and NATO position remains that we will not ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty until all remaining Istanbul commitments on withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova 

have been fulfilled. We welcomed the May 30 Georgia-Russia Foreign Ministers’ Joint Statement setting timelines for the withdrawal of Russian forces from two bases in Georgia. Additional 

steps are needed, including signature of a detailed follow-on agreement. I am happy to note that the initial benchmarks agreed in the 

Joint Statement, including withdrawal of 40 pieces of Russian 

armor by September 1, have been met. The two sides still need to 

resolve the status of the Russian presence at a third base in breakaway Abkhazia. We are urging Moscow to match the recent 

progress in Georgia by restarting its military withdrawal from 

Moldova, where we have seen no progress since 2003. We continue 

to stress that resumption of the military withdrawal process would 
30

send an important political signal to the Transnistrian leadership 

in Tiraspol that the status quo will not last forever. We have told 

the Russians very bluntly that we believe Moscow’s political will is 

the key to making progress. 

ENERGIZING THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

With the 2003 Economic Strategy Document as a tool, OSCE 

field missions and the Secretariat have developed projects focusing 

on boosting entrepreneurship. In addition, the OSCE is continuing 

to work with participating States to combat money laundering and 

terrorist financing. The United States and the OSCE are co-sponsoring a three-day, expert-level conference in November to enhance 

cooperation and share experiences of combating terrorist financing. 

The OSCE has worked with partner organizations to map environmental hot spots and address regionally environmental problems that could cause friction between states. One successful program took place in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan where, despite political tensions, scientists and others worked productively 

together to improve water quality. This is an excellent example of 

the OSCE’s ability to bring states together to work on issues of mutual concern, where the exercise itself serves as a confidence building measure. The OSCE has also been working in conjunction with 

the United Nations to identify situations where environmental 

problems threaten to generate tensions, and then to assist governments in addressing those problems. 

I believe there is more that can and should be done within the 

economic dimension. I am encouraged by the enthusiasm, energy, 

and expertise of the new Economic and Environmental Activities 

Coordinator, Mr. Bernard Snoy. My colleagues at our Mission in 

Vienna tell me he has selected a dynamic team to help him revitalize this important dimension, and I look forward to fresh 

thoughts for what more we can do in this area. Again, Central Asia 

seems the right place to focus new attention in this dimension. 

COUNTERTERRORISM

Counterterrorism is an area where there is universally good cooperation among all 55 participating States and a united sense of 

purpose. At last year’s Ministerial, the OSCE adopted decisions on 

such issues as terrorist financing, travel document security, shipping container security and combating the use of the Internet for 

terrorist purposes. Many of these were U.S. initiatives. It has 

worked with the participating States to ratify all 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols related to terrorism. Thus far, over 

70 percent of the participating States have done so, almost double 

the number when the Plan for Action for Combating Terrorism was 

adopted at the Bucharest Ministerial in December 2002. Work continues on a shipping container security decision for the Ljubljana 

Ministerial in December 2005, which would encourage all participating States to adapt standards set by the World Customs Organization. 

The State Department, through the Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs, the Office of the Coordinator on Counterterrorism 

and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, has 
31

worked closely with the OSCE’s Anti-Terrorism Unit to provide 

much-needed expertise for a range of workshops aimed at helping 

other participating States improve their effectiveness in areas such 

as the use of the Internet to recruit terrorists. In November, the 

Department will co-sponsor a conference to be held in Vienna, 

which will bring together high-level officials from capitals to discuss new ways to combat terrorist financing. The OSCE’s Anti-Terrorism unit is currently headed by a U.S. Foreign Service Officer 

with a deep background in counter-terrorism work. I believe he can 

help shape a forward-looking agenda in this area. 

SECURITY

The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) has continued to play 

a positive role as an instrument of the Political-Military Dimension 

of the OSCE. The FSC made a significant step forward last November when it adopted controls on brokering of Small Arms/Light 

Weapons (SALW), a U.S. initiative that complemented discussions 

during an Economic Dimension seminar on arms trafficking, demonstrating the value of the OSCE’s cross-dimensional work. The 

FSC remains focused on requests for assistance in the destruction 

of excess stockpiles of SA/LW and conventional munitions submitted by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, with the request 

from Tajikistan receiving the most attention in 2005. The United 

States provided $200,000 to OSCE efforts in Tajikistan for weapons 

destruction. 

The FSC is also considering how best to assist several States in 

removing the threat of rocket fuel (me ́lange) left over from the Soviet Union through active involvement of OSCE field presences. 

The OSCE Mission to Georgia successfully completed a project 

turning this toxic, dangerous rocket fuel into fertilizer; the OSCE 

Office in Yerevan, Armenia, is implementing a similar project with 

substantial U.S. support. The Conflict Prevention Center has coordinated with NATO and other regional organizations to examine 

the rocket fuel situation in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia (Kaliningrad) and Ukraine. Such cross-dimensional activities of 

OSCE field presences enhance their value to the host countries. 

The OSCE’s small Secretariat allows for flexibility, while obligating 

the participating States to take on substantial responsibilities in 

project development and execution, in full coordination with the 

EU, NATO and other organizations. 

The FSC continues to promote confidence- and security-building 

measures throughout the OSCE region, with the broad goal of enhancing military transparency and stability. Years of focused efforts to improve implementation were rewarded when Kazakhstan 

recently hosted its first-ever Vienna Document 1999 (VD-99) Military Contacts event. The FSC will also conduct a high-level Military Doctrine Seminar February 14-15, 2006, in Vienna. ThenChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, attended the first such Seminar at OSCE in 1990. 

POLICING

OSCE participating States increasingly recognize that without effective law enforcement and genuine respect for the rule of law and 
32

the institutions responsible for upholding it, social, political, and 

economic stability cannot take root. In this respect, the OSCE has 

established police assistance programs in eight of its seventeen 

field missions: four in the Balkans, three in the Caucasus, and one 

in Central Asia, in Kyrgyzstan. The focus of OSCE police-related 

assistance in these eight field missions is on capacity and institution-building, on developing the day-to-day operational policing 

skills that allow these emerging democracies to meet the risks and 

challenges posed by trans-national and organized crime and by 

trafficking in drugs, arms, and human beings. An equally important goal, however, is to build trust and confidence between the police forces and the people they serve by promoting communication 

between them and by involving local communities in the work of 

the police. The underlying principle is that the police can effectively—or even more effectively—do their job within the accepted 

norms of democratic societies. 

OUTREACH

The OSCE Partners for Cooperation became more active this 

year after a Ministerial decision to enhance OSCE-Partner activities last December. In June, the Partners participated in a sideevent at the Annual Security Review Conference to discuss Security issues that were relevant to them. At the High Level Consultations in September, Mediterranean and Asian Partners made respective statements calling for enhancement of OSCE-Partner ties. 

The U.S. supports Partner efforts to enhance their involvement in 

OSCE activities. We encouraged the Mediterranean Partners to 

make joint proposals to the Organization on ways they could cooperate, to which they responded by presenting ideas on how to enhance their participation in the daily functioning of the OSCE. 

While the U.S is supportive of some of their ideas, such as establishing contact points at OSCE institutions, we would like to see 

them initiate practical cooperation before considering larger scale 

commitments like funding Partner projects or granting them participating state status. First steps could be for them to second personnel to OSCE election observation missions and to send representatives to visit OSCE institutions like ODIHR. 

LJUBLJANA MINISTERIAL

At the Ljubljana Ministerial in December, we will highlight the 

accomplishments of the OSCE in this anniversary year, particularly its success as a platform for the promotion of freedom and democracy. At the same time, we will build support for the important 

work which still lies ahead. We will again strongly urge Russia to 

fulfill all its Istanbul commitments. We expect the Ministerial to 

endorse OSCE work on promoting tolerance, anti-trafficking, gender equality, shipping container security, small arms and light 

weapons, MANPADS, and the destruction of excess stockpiles of 

ammunition and weapons. 

The issue of how the OSCE funds itself is still unresolved but we 

hope by the Ministerial to have agreement on new OSCE scales of 

assessment. Russia is still seeking a dramatic reduction in its contributions to the OSCE, and remains the lone holdout among 
33

OSCE’s 55 participating States on new scales. In our view, proposals to reduce a single State’s contributions radically cannot be 

the basis for the kind of serious discussions needed among OSCE 

States. 

The United States stands behind the criteria for adjustment of 

the scales adopted in 2001 and 2002—assessments based on the political nature of the organization as well as nations’ capacity to pay, 

but within ceilings and floors on contributions. All participating 

states benefit from the OSCE and all use the organization to advance their national interests. The OSCE achieves results at a 

comparatively modest cost. We hope other participating states will 

adopt responsible approaches and negotiate constructively on this 

issue in order to allow the OSCE to concentrate on fulfilling its important mandates. We note the OSCE budget process has improved 

markedly over the past several years and hope we will have agreement on a 2006 budget by the end of December as well. Systems 

put in place last year to track budget allocations and expenditures 

more efficiently are already providing more transparency and accountability. 

CONCLUSIONS

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has 

been a successful vehicle for managing security challenges over the 

past thirty years. Its record of achievements over the past year is 

impressive. With strong U.S. political and financial support, the 

OSCE sent rapid infusions of OSCE election observers, experts, advisors, and political leadership in response to calls for assistance 

from Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during their political transitions. 

Also with strong U.S. support, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office appointed three Personal Representatives in December 2004 to combat anti-Semitism, discrimination against Muslims, and racism. 

These individuals are working to engage with individual governments and non-governmental organizations on OSCE’s tolerance 

work. 

The OSCE’s Conference on Anti-Semitism and on Other Forms 

of Intolerance, held in Cordoba in June 2005, kept the spotlight on 

anti-Semitism as well as other tolerance issues—racism, xenophobia, and anti-Muslim and anti-Christian discrimination. The 

Cordoba Declaration reaffirmed the commitments of OSCE states 

and called for additional work on education, legislation and law enforcement. 

The OSCE plays a unique and vital role in the advance of freedom and democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. On economic development, the OSCE promotes good governance and helps 

countries put systems in place to fight corruption. On political-military issues such as the fight against terrorism, border security, 

small arms and light weapons, and excess stockpiles, the OSCE 

fills crucial niche gaps. It has proven to be an effective diplomatic 

tool that complements our bilateral diplomatic and assistance efforts throughout Europe and Eurasia. 

The OSCE faces new challenges and opportunities ahead, and we 

hope the reform process will result in making its missions and institutions better able to adapt and respond to changing circumstances. The U.S. will continue to work with its partners with-
34

in the OSCE to advance the shared objectives of the trans-Atlantic 

community. Thank you.
35

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. SAM 

BROWNBACK, CHAIRMAN, TO HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN 

AFFAIRS 

While a Member of the U.S. Congress, Alcee Hastings, serves as 

President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE. Historically 

the top positions in the OSCE have not been held by Americans. 

Why is this the case? Do you believe that Americans deserve to have 

an active role and serve in the top ranks of the OSCE? Should the 

U.S. take a more aggressive stance in getting Americans into some 

of the critical positions in the OSCE?

American citizens are generally well-represented at the OSCE. 

U.S. citizens currently hold 10 of 162 positions on the headquarters 

staff, and 87 of 675 positions on the field mission staff. These numbers have been typical of U.S. representation at the OSCE historically. We seek to maintain a level of representation throughout the 

organization (12%) commensurate with our financial contribution 

to the OSCE (overall, 12.5%). 

U.S. identifies key positions within field missions it would like to 

fill with Americans and generally relies upon personnel contractor 

to provide identify and forward those candidates to the OSCE for 

consideration. We work closely with Secretariat to ensure U.S. candidates are given full consideration, and that the OSCE continues 

to select the best candidates for positions. 

In 2004 and 2005, Americans were appointed to senior positions 

in OSCE Secretariat, including the Heads of the new Anti-Trafficking Unit and the Anti-Terrorism Unit. Americans hold senior 

posts within ODIHR, including Director of Democratization. Also, 

an American is Head of Internal Oversight in the Secretariat (a Director Level position). 

At more senior levels, the United States also has a strong record 

of representation. Of the OSCE’s 17 field presences, three are currently headed by Americans: Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 

Ukraine. Three deputy heads of mission are also Americans, in Armenia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia. This represents 18 

percent of the 34 senior field mission positions. 

We are proud to have a U.S. Member of Congress, Alcee 

Hastings, currently serving as President of the Parliamentary Assembly. Rep. Hastings’ leadership in that OSCE body is invaluable.

In your view, has the OSCE become too bureaucratic and inflexible? And if you agree this is a problem, what steps should the U.S. 

take to deal with the problem? How can the United States best influence the organization?

Certainly, any organization must guard against oversized bureaucracy and potential ossification. The OSCE, when compared 

with other large multilateral organizations, is remarkably flexible 

and lean. In the 17 field presences, there are only a total of 654 

seconded and contracted fixed term staff, of which 79 (or 12 percent) are U.S. citizens. 

Another aspect of the organization is noteworthy: all OSCE tenure is temporary. The OSCE constantly rotates all staff, with no 

one serving more than seven years in any one position at mid and 
36

entry levels and no more than fours years for senior-level positions, 

under current staff regulations. OSCE leadership is not immune 

from this term limit, and we believe the organization frequently 

getting ‘‘new blood’’ is one aspect of its dynamism.

Has the United States reenergized and reengaged the security 

components of the OSCE’s mission, especially in this post 9/11 environment?

Yes. Just after September 11, the OSCE developed a comprehensive strategy to address 21st Century Threats. Since 2001, largely 

based on U.S. proposals, the OSCE expanded work on counter-terrorism, suggesting ways participating States could increase travel 

document, shipping container, and border management security. 

The OSCE continued intensified efforts to promote resolution of regional conflicts while working to improve tolerance, basic human 

rights and fundamental freedoms, which are essential to long term 

stability and security. The OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation 

(FSC) has taken concrete steps to address the spread and accumulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) and stockpiles 

of conventional munitions. In particular, the United States has 

forged consensus on standards for SA/LW End User Certificates, 

guidelines for common MANPADS control efforts, and the Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition. The FSC also produced and distributed SA/LW Best Practice Guides, which were favorably received at the UN SA/LW meeting, and has begun work 

on similar guides addressing conventional ammunition.

It is expected that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov will participate in the Ljubljana Ministerial to continue to press for undesirable changes to OSCE. Will Secretary Rice attend the Ministerial to 

ensure that there is a vigorous counter?

The United States is open to changes that improve the effectiveness of the OSCE, but do not subtract from the important work the 

organization is currently doing in the human, political military, 

and economic and environmental dimensions. The Ljubljana Ministerial should be the capstone event of the 30th anniversary year 

of the Helsinki Final Act. We will send a strong delegation to the 

Ministerial to push forward the U.S. agenda, and our delegation 

will combat vigorously any efforts to weaken the OSCE’s core capabilities, particularly in the areas of democracy and human rights 

work. A decision has not yet been made as to the Secretary’s attendance at the Ministerial.

In his 2003 Whitehall speech, President Bush talked about past 

mistakes of supporting stability at the expense of democracy. Can 

you address the tension between stability and democracy in Central 

Asia?

President Bush made clear in his 2003 Whitehall speech, and in 

his Second Inaugural Address, that the security of the United 

States depends upon the spread of freedom and democracy 

throughout the world. In both speeches, the President noted that 

‘‘freedom, by definition, must be chosen, and defended by those who 
37

choose it. Our part, as free nations, is to ally ourselves with reform, 

wherever it occurs.’’

The OSCE, in its 30-year history, has been an excellent forum 

in which to ally with reform. The OSCE allows the United States 

and others to encourage NGOs from 55 participating States to 

stand up and criticize the shortcomings of their own governments. 

The OSCE encourages engagement and dialogue, where all States 

are open to compliment and criticism, and can likewise lay out the 

case for their own actions. 

In engaging with Central Asian participating States, we see the 

advance of the President’s freedom agenda. OSCE observers monitored elections in Central Asia (and elsewhere) in 2005. OSCE 

field missions are involved in activities which support the building 

of civil society, the economic empowerment of youth and women, 

the training of police and government officials, and NGO organizational skills. These activities lend to both the democratization of societies and their long-term stability. The OSCE continues to be a 

tool to advance the President’s freedom agenda while engaging 

with our 54 fellow participating States.

Is the United States willing to support invoking the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism in response to the Andijon massacre? Mahbuba 

Zokirova, a witness at the ongoing Andijon trials, confirmed that 

Uzbek military forces opened fire on unarmed civilians. Is Embassy 

Tashkent monitoring her welfare and whereabouts given the prospects of retribution by the regime? Is the Department at all concerned that Uzbekistan might leave the OSCE? What is the state of 

our relations with Uzbekistan?

Debate within OSCE over possible use of OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism to investigate gross human rights violations in Uzbekistan 

continues. The United States and other OSCE participating States 

are considering the utility of the Moscow Mechanism, along with 

other measures aimed at convincing the Government of Uzbekistan 

that stability derives from legitimacy, which requires democracy 

and respect for human rights. We remain concerned about the 

human rights situation in Uzbekistan, but have not yet made a determination as to whether we would consider invoking the Moscow 

Mechanism. 

The U.S. Embassy in Tashkent has worked closely with the 

wider diplomatic community to monitor the welfare of all witnesses 

in the Andijon trial. We are closely watching Mrs. Zokirova’s situation and will continue to do so. We understand that Mrs. Zokirova 

has returned safely to her home.

Some of the most egregious human rights violations in the OSCE 

region are occurring in Chechnya. What role should the OSCE play 

in addressing the situation in Chechnya?

It remains our position that the conflict in Chechnya requires a 

political solution. We have made this point repeatedly to the Russians and continue to urge Russia to establish meaningful accountability for human rights violations by Russian armed forces in 

Chechnya. The OSCE can play a key role in this process and help 

to highlight what needs to be done in Chechnya. 
38

At the same time, we condemn the acts of terrorism and other 

abuses, such as the Beslan massacre, that have been committed by 

some armed Chechen groups. 

We have urged Russia to take the necessary steps to ensure that 

the Chechen legislative elections scheduled for November 27, 2005, 

will be free and democratic.

What are the Department’s views regarding how the new government in Kyrgyzstan is doing, and what the OSCE is doing to assist? 

Are the Kyrgyz fully utilizing OSCE as a resource during this important time of transition in that country?

On July 10, Kyrgyzstan held a presidential election that, although marred by some violations, reflected the will of the people. 

We are encouraging President Bakiyev and his recently-formed 

government to continue the fight against corruption, forge ahead 

with democratic reforms, in particular constitutional reform, judicial reform, implementation of OSCE electoral recommendations, 

and bringing its media laws and practices in line with international standards. 

The OSCE is actively engaged in working with the Government 

of Kyrgyzstan. 

Following the March 2005 popular uprising that ousted the 

Akayev government, the OSCE developed a Work Plan in coordination with Kyrgyz authorities to advance democratic and economic 

reform in key areas-such as election support, security assistance, 

police reform, and development of independent media. Unfortunately, the Kyrgyz government has made only limited progress on 

these reforms. 

The United States has been a strong supporter of the OSCE Center in Kyrgyzstan and has provided substantial funds in extrabudgetary contributions to the continued operations of the Center 

in the Human, Political/Military as well as Economic-Environmental Dimensions. 

We look to the OSCE to remind the Government and citizens of 

Kyrgyzstan that stability derives from legitimacy, which requires 

democracy.

You mention working with Russia as a partner to support the 

prospects of the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus to become more prosperous, democratic and secure. Given negative trends 

in terms of its own democratic development, how do you see Russia 

playing a positive role in advancing democracy in these regions? 

Has the United States responded to reports that Russia plans to deport back to Uzbekistan a group Uzbek immigrants who oppose the 

regime there?

The U.S. and Russia have complementary interests in Central 

Asia: a stable region, free from terrorism, developing democratically and economically. 

We are both interested in preventing the spread of extremism in 

the region, and we regularly engage our Russian counterparts on 

the importance of vibrant and prosperous societies free of oppression for limiting the appeal of extremism. 
39

To the extent that the United States and Russia can find common ground in the cultivation of such democratic political development, we will. To the extent we must defend our principles alone, 

we shall. 

The United States is aware of the Uzbek dissidents in question, 

continues to monitor their situation, and has been in contact with 

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Helsinki Commission and others have raised continued concern about the lead-contaminated, UN-run camps for several hundred displaced Roma in northern Kosovo. When will these people be 

relocated? When will their original neighborhood be rebuilt?

The United States continues to work closely with the UN Mission 

in Kosovo (UNMIK) to help address the needs of hundreds of 

Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian internally-displaced persons currently 

living in three-lead polluted camps in Northern Kosovo. Officials 

from our mission in Pristina visited the camps on numerous occasions, and are actively working to find a sustainable solution for 

this vulnerable population. 

To date, the United States has committed more than one million 

dollars to address the health needs of this community as well as 

assist UNMIK in attempting to construct a temporary relocation 

site while the Roma’s original homes and apartments are being rebuilt. Unfortunately, due to concerns over environmental conditions 

in a proposed temporary relocation site, plans to move this population were delayed. UNMIK is currently working with a team of 

U.S. Army environmental engineers to locate a new site while simultaneously developing ways to make the Roma’s current living 

conditions safer. 

We are pleased to report however that the Kosovo Protection 

Corps (KPC), with KFOR assistance, has begun to clear the rubble 

from the original Roma neighborhood. UNMIK anticipates rubble 

clearing to be complete next year, and will in the interim continue 

to solicit additional donor funding for the more than 8 million euro 

return project. The United States will look to use its significant 

contribution to this effort to help leverage other EU donors in particular to contribute to this important humanitarian issue.

Is there any genuine progress in resolving the Transniestria secessionist issue in Moldova? How do you respond to criticism that the 

U.S. and the OSCE have been too accommodating to Russia in 

dealing with Transniestria? How does the recently-initiated EU Border Monitoring Mission affect the OSCE role in Moldova? Ukraine 

has proposed a settlement plan according to which elections would 

be held in Transniestria under international supervision. Does the 

United States support this proposal?

The U.S is committed to a peaceful resolution of the Transnistria 

issue that respects Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

The Moldovan government has expressed some concerns about the 

‘‘Yushchenko Initiative.’’ However, the initiative does offer a promising starting point, if combined with effective border control (the 

goal of the EU Border Assistance Mission), real democratization, 

and fulfillment of Russia’s 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit commit-
40

ment to withdraw its forces from Moldova. We continue to urge 

Russia to resume removal of forces immediately, stressing that resumption of its fulfillment of its Istanbul Commitments in advance 

of the OSCE Ministerial in Ljubljana on December 5–6 would send 

a strong signal of progress. 

In an important development, the parties invited the U.S. and 

EU to attend the last round of political settlement negotiations as 

observers in Chisinau and Tiraspol on October 27–28. After a fifteen-month pause, those talks marked a small step forward toward 

a settlement of the conflict. We were pleased that the sides, with 

the assistance of the mediators and observers, were able to reach 

agreement on a number of issues, such as consultations on an 

international assessment mission to evaluate conditions for free 

and fair elections in Transnistria; the exchange of military information; and setting rough parameters for a factory-monitoring mission 

in Transnistria. We look forward to the next meeting in this format 

in Moldova on December 15–16, when the U.S. will continue to participate actively as an observer. We will continue to call on Russia 

to fulfill its Istanbul Commitments immediately and without precondition.

The OSCE is not a traditional international multilateral organization. It doesn’t provide economic aid, engage in military operations or even power politics. Rather, it deals in the power of ideas 

and its influence on civil society. Given that ideas do not recognize 

borders and given that human rights and human dignity are universal, why is the OSCE not engaging with other governments, organizations and entities outside of the OSCE region? Could it work 

creatively in Africa, for example, which would clearly benefit from 

exposure to ideas of human rights and free markets that are the 

stock and trade of the OSCE and the Helsinki process?

The OSCE engages actively in several ways outside the 55 participating States that make up the OSCE. 

Since in 1994, the OSCE has worked with the Mediterranean 

Partners for Cooperation, which includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 

Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. 

In addition to the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, the 

OSCE maintains a special relationship with five Asian states: Afghanistan, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia and Thailand. 

The Partners for Cooperation in Asia began fostering a flexible dialogue with the OSCE in the early 1990s. Japan’s partnership started in 1992, Korea’s in 1994, and Thailand’s in 2000. Afghanistan 

was granted partnership status in 2003, and Mongolia in 2004. 

Both Mediterranean and Asian Partners hold regular Contact 

Group meetings. In addition, annual Mediterranean seminars have 

been organized since 2001. Partner countries also can arrange for 

personnel to make short-term visits to OSCE field misdsions, and 

to participate in election observation missions. 

Of course, there remain other opportunities for OSCE involvement outside the area ‘‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok.’’ The United 

States is open to consideration of such proposals and will support 

initiatives to make available OSCE expertise on broad democratization and human rights issues. 
41

Because the bulk of U.S. funding for the OSCE’s budget and 

extra-budgetary projects comes from the geographically-limited 

FSA and SEED assistance accounts, our ability to support funding 

for projects outside of the Eastern European and Eurasian area is 

limited.
42

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN, TO HON. DANIEL 

FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN 

AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS 

You note the importance of the United States forthrightly addressing criticism of its policies and practices. Those who have devoted 

years of effort to combating torture in OSCE countries and beyond 

are deeply concerned over ambiguity surrounding the U.S. stance on 

the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 

or punishment. How do you respond?

The United States is unequivocally opposed to the use and practice of torture, and fully supports OSCE’s work in the fields of torture prevention. No circumstance whatsoever, including war, the 

threat of war, internal political instability, public emergency, or an 

order from a superior officer or public authority, may be invoked 

as a justification for or defense to committing torture. This is a 

longstanding commitment of the United States, repeatedly reaffirmed at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. 

All components of the U.S. Government must act in compliance 

with the law, including all U.S. constitutional, statutory, and treaty obligations relating to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 

treatment or punishment. The U.S. Government does not permit, 

tolerate, or condone torture, or other unlawful practices, by its personnel or employees under any circumstances. U.S. laws prohibiting such practices apply to employees both within the United 

States and throughout the world. We have moved aggressively to 

hold accountable those responsible for the abuse of detainees wherever they are held in U.S. custody pursuant to the global war on 

terrorism. When allegations of torture or other unlawful treatment 

arise, they are investigated and, if substantiated, prosecuted. Investigations of alleged abuse of detainees in custody are ongoing. 

The United States has discussed our position on torture at several OSCE meetings this year, including at the January 27 Permanent Council meeting, at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly meeting in July, and at the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting 

on terrorism and human rights. On May 6, the United States submitted its latest periodic report to the UN Committee Against Torture. The full text of the report is available on the State Department’s website.

The human rights issues before the OSCE in most instances require political will to resolve. Creating new committees behind 

closed doors with mid-level diplomats will not generate change. The 

venue for raising serious human rights concerns already exists; it’s 

the Permanent Council, which has the direct link back to capitals 

where the political will needs to be generated for change. Committees would give the appearance of doing something, but be powerless, and should be opposed. Do you agree?

We are still evaluating the recommendation from the Eminent 

Persons Panel that the OSCE create three committees beneath the 

Permanent Council. 

We have not yet been convinced of the necessity and/or value of 

establishing these committees; but we don’t exclude that some 
43

steps might help the Permanent Council carry out its work more 

effectively. 

That said, I want to stress that we are committed to protecting 

the effectiveness of existing OSCE bodies, especially ODIHR and 

the FSC, and ensuring the continuation of their good work.

The United States has stated its support for pursuing legal privileges and immunities for OSCE staff but not establishing the OSCE 

as an international institution with legal personality. While there 

may be some advantages to legal privileges and immunities, would 

that satisfy those calling for giving the OSCE legal personality? 

What concretely would be the dangers of seeking legal personality?

We do not support the idea of negotiating a Statute or Charter 

for the OSCE. Such a document would not meaningfully enhance 

the OSCE’s ability to carry out its tasks, and the effort to craft 

such a document would require an unjustified diversion of time, effort and political capital from the organization’s substantive agenda. The burden is on those who want to change OSCE’s status to 

make the case for legal personality. 

Such an initiative could also lead to a need to renegotiate OSCE 

commitments and other documents, with the resultant risk of 

weakened OSCE commitments and capabilities.

The recent Human Dimension Implementation review Meeting in 

Warsaw was a very successful event. In fact, the meeting attracted 

the largest number of NGOs ever (over 300) from throughout the 

OSCE region. Has here been focused follow-up on the meeting and 

the issues raised in Vienna, which is vital to giving the human dimension and interaction with NGOs the political support they deserve and need, and how does the Department view this meeting 

and where do you stand on attempts to shorten the meeting?

Along with giving the human dimension political support, the 

HDIM provides participating States and civil society an excellent 

platform for the exchange of information and serves to facilitate informative discussion. The United States strongly supports the role 

of civil society and NGOs, which play and have played a vital role 

in the Helsinki process over the past 30 years. The U.S. strongly 

supports a proposed Ministerial Statement on the role of civil society and NGOs, which would commit participating States to provide 

opportunities for the increased involvement of civil society in OSCE 

activities. We also support efforts by ODIHR and OSCE field missions to build capacity among NGOs in all OSCE participating 

States. 

We will also follow up on other HDIM results through Ministerial decisions in December on: rule of law—which would promote 

the role of defense lawyers and assist building institutional capacity in this area; tolerance and non-discrimination—a decision that 

would formalize the schedule of OSCE tolerance conferences and 

events through 2009; and human rights education. 

As for shortening the HDIM, we would be open to considering 

trimming its duration by a few days as long as this did not hurt 

the meeting’s effectiveness.
44

You mentioned the role of NGOs in the OSCE context. Ironically, 

OSCE decision-making operates behind closed doors despite the fact 

that it is all about promoting openness and transparency. Is the 

U.S. prepared to press for more openness by allowing NGO and 

public access to meetings as observers?

We support making as many of the OSCE Permanent Council 

sessions open to the public as possible. Our views, however, are not 

shared by all OSCE participating States; there is no consensus on 

greater transparency. 

Many participating States believe that opening Permanent Council sessions to a broader section of the public would diminish the 

likelihood of candid discussions of issues and argue that countries 

would be less likely to raise sensitive matters if the diplomatic confidentiality of the debate were in question. 

The U.S. will continue to encourage the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to invite a broad range of media, students and representatives 

of non-OSCE or OSCE partner countries to OSCE meetings.

In a major speech in Kazakhstan two weeks ago, Secretary Rice 

said: ‘‘We understand that the path to democracy is long, and imperfect, and different for every country.’’ Does this mean that the 

United States has reduced expectations in terms of democracy in 

Central Asia?

Not at all. Secretary Rice’s statement recognizes the varying levels of democratic development within Central Asia, with 

Kyrgyzstan in the vanguard and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 

trailing far behind. 

We look to Kazakhstan to demonstrate its commitment to democracy. Holding a free and fair presidential election that meets international standards and serves as a model for other nations in the 

region will be a very positive step. 

At every opportunity, we remind governments in Central Asia 

that democracy actually contributes to stability and helps to reduce 

the attractiveness of extremism when matched by sound social and 

economic policies. 

Commitment to democracy is not just about having ‘‘good’’ elections. Through our assistance programs not only are we helping 

civil society to monitor elections and undertake political party development, but we are laying the foundation for greater public participation in the political process, including through independent 

media and a vibrant civil society. 

The United States also participates actively in ODIHR election 

observation missions and regularly addresses democratic shortcomings at the OSCE.

Kazakhstan is seeking the OSCE Chair-in-Office for 2009. The 

country has a very poor human rights record, which shows no sign 

of improvement. In fact a leading human rights activist was recently arrested on the very day that Secretary Rice was in the country. With time quickly passing before a decision will have to be 

made on the bid, where does the U.S. stand on a Kazakh chairmanship? Would an unlikely clean presidential election in early Decem-
45

ber suffice, or is the U.S. insisting on a wider range of steps? Is the 

U.S. actively exploring more suitable alternatives for 2009?

Yes, Secretary Rice discussed the matter with President 

Nazarbayev. U.S. officials have stressed to top Kazakhstani officials the importance of a legitimate process leading to free and fair 

elections that meet international standards—including media access on an equal basis for all candidates. 

We have also told the Kazakhstanis on many occasions that the 

international community will turn to the OSCE-organized Election 

Observation Mission for its opinion on the conduct of the elections 

and that quality access for local observers will be important. 

The position of chairman in office can only be filled by a country 

that has demonstrated a consistent record of observing OSCE values and implementing OSCE commitments. 

Kazakhstan’s upcoming election, and the degree to which it is 

judged to be free and fair, will be a critical element for the international community. However, the election forms only a part of the 

overall equation, and we will continue to urge the Government of 

Kazakhstan to work toward a complete fulfillment of its OSCE 

commitments. 

The decision on who will fill the OSCE Chair-in-Office for 2009 

will be decided at the December 2006 OSCE Ministerial.

Talks on the question of Kosovo’s status are soon to begin. Regardless of what these talks produce, how can respect for OSCE 

norms regarding the right of return, the right to freedom of movement, the specific rights of persons belonging to national minorities, 

among others be achieved in Kosovo? How does the United States 

view the role of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo at this time?

The Contact Group has reaffirmed in its guiding principles for 

future status talks that whatever the status outcome, the rights of 

all communities in Kosovo must be protected. While Kai Eide’s recent report on the political situation in Kosovo and progress on 

standards implementation notes some achievements, we believe 

that more must be done, particularly on the return of IDPs/refugees, freedom of movement and security. As part of Kosovo’s effort 

to integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions—regardless of status 

outcome—it will be important that Kosovo continue to make 

progress on the ‘‘Standards for Kosovo.’’

While it is too early to speculate about the nature of a likely follow-on civil presence in Kosovo after conclusion of the final status 

talks, we believe the OSCE will play a key role in helping implement any status agreement and ensuring the protection of minority 

rights. 

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) is currently the OSCE’s 

largest field mission. It has a record of success there, including 

helping assemble and train a multi-ethnic, professional police force. 

As OMIK looks to the future, Kosovo Head of Mission Werner 

Wnendt has suggested that the OSCE and OMiK could play a 

greater role in institution-building and monitoring at the municipal 

level—drawing upon the OSCE’s strong field presence in Kosovo 

and its traditional strengths. The OSCE has been involved in 

Kosovo since it was the CSCE in the early 1990s, and its experi-
46

ence will continue to play an important role in building a stable, 

democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo.

Turkey has systemically set out to eradicate the Greek Orthodox 

Church through property expropriation and administrative fiat. 

Today, there are fewer than 3,500 Greek Orthodox in that country. 

What serious steps is the United States prepared to take, both within and outside the OSCE, to correct this devolution? What recent efforts has the U.S. undertaken to have the Halki Theological Seminary reopened?

Turkey, a long-time NATO ally, is a secular democracy with a 

constitutional government, a free press, and a market economy. 

Over the past five years, the Government has passed significant 

constitutional and legislative reforms that reduce restrictions on 

the freedom of religion, association, and expression, as well as protect against torture and reduce the role of the military in government. Work still needs to be done to fully implement the changes, 

especially in the area of religious freedom. The U.S. has funded 

human rights and democracy programs in Turkey, and encourages 

further reforms in the areas of religious freedom, rule of law, and 

civil rights. 

The United States consistently raises concerns about the property rights of Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian 

Catholic, Baha’i, Alevi, Jewish, Protestant, Suriyani, Yazidi, 

Chaldean, and other religious minorities within Turkey. This is 

regularly reflected in our Human Rights report and Religious Freedom reports for Turkey. 

Continuing restrictions limit the ability of non-Muslim religions 

to operate. We continue to press Turkish authorities to address 

these issues, such as Greek Orthodox Church property issues, and 

reopening the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary, and difficulties in 

establishing new Christian churches. 

In addition to raising the issue of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s 

status with Turkish officials on the highest level, we are keeping 

a close eye on the developments in current policies pertaining to 

the livelihood of religious communities and religious freedom in 

Turkey, and pressing for its implementation with Turkish policy 

makers. 

While we feel that these developments are a step in the right direction for Turkey, our close ally and partner in the Global War on 

Terror, we know that much work remains to be done in order to 

ensure the continuity of religious minority communities in Turkey. 

We feel that the European Union accession process offers Turkey 

the vehicle to continue to make significant progress in providing religious freedom for its citizens and residents. We will continue to 

be vigilant and use our bilateral relationship to push for reforms 

and their implementation to protect religious minority communities 

in Turkey. 

The President and past Secretaries of States have consistently 

met with religious leaders in Turkey while visiting the country. 

Most recently, Undersecretary Karen Hughes met with the Patriarch during her trip to Istanbul in September.
47

The plight of the Greek Roma is well known. Authorities in Athens ignore attempts by the OSCE and the United States to end these 

abuses. What new approach is the United States taking in this matter? Are there other human rights concerns with respect to Greece?

U.S. embassy officers, including the Ambassador, raise the issue 

of the Greek Roma regularly with the GoG. Embassy and Consulate officers visit Roma camps and meet with Roma officials to 

ascertain the situation of Roma communities, and to bring concerns 

of the communities to Government officials. Additionally, they 

maintain close contact with local and international NGOs who 

closely follow Roma integration, education, access to education, 

health, housing, and discrimination issues, among other issues. 

The embassy includes Roma representatives at important representational events, such as the 4th of July event at the Ambassador’s home, giving them additional access both to the USG and 

to GoG representatives. Additionally, the embassy includes all discrimination and abuse cases in the Human Rights Report. In the 

past year, the embassy closely studied the recommendations by the 

Council of Europe’s European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) 

and the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism 

and Intolerance (ECRI) regarding Roma in Greece, and reported 

these findings in the Human Rights Report. 

Other human rights issues of concern to the United States are 

detailed in the Human Rights report. One that the embassy and 

the Greek Government focus a great deal of time and attention on 

is Trafficking in Persons. Another area that the embassy and especially the UNHCR follow closely are issues related to asylum-seekers, especially unaccompanied/ separated-from-family children who 

may be asylum seekers, their detention conditions, and their rates 

of acceptance as refugees.
48

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, TO HON. DANIEL 

FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN 

AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS 

What role will the OSCE Missions play in following war crimes 

trials that are referred by the International Criminal Tribunal in 

The Hague to local courts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia 

and perhaps other countries in the region? Is the United States, directly or through the OSCE, providing assistance that will allow 

these trials to help people in the region to understand what happened in the 1990s and why?

We have worked with our partners to support the ICTY’s Completion Strategy, which seeks to conclude trials by 2008 and appeals by 2010 and was endorsed by the UN Security Council. One 

component of the ICTY’s completion strategy is the transfer of midto lower-level war crimes indictments to competent domestic jurisdictions. The United States supports the idea of transfers, and, together with the international community, has supported efforts to 

build capacity in the region for credible domestic trials. As a general matter, we believe that, where possible and appropriate, domestic prosecutions are the preferable option, and that the primary 

responsibility for deterring and punishing war crimes lies with individual states. 

In May of this year, the OSCE agreed in a Permanent Council 

decision to monitor, within the existing mandates and resources of 

its field missions in the region, war crime cases on behalf of the 

ICTY prosecutor. Each of the OSCE field missions in Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro is 

fully engaged in developing the capacity of domestic prosecutors 

and courts to investigate and try war crimes. The U.S. delegation 

to the OSCE has also supported developing local capacity and increasing public awareness of war crimes through extra-budgetary 

contributions. 

The United States was the single largest contributor to the cre- ation of the Sarajevo War Crimes Chamber, providing $10 million 

in 2004. This money, as well as other USG funding for the Belgrade War Crimes Chamber, helped fund state-of-the-art courtrooms capable of providing necessary protective measures for victims and witnesses. The United States also funds training for regional judges and prosecutors in the region, and has an active Department of Justice Regional Legal Adviser program. Resident 

Legal Advisers provide technical assistance and act in advisory capacity, with strong focus on war crimes issues.

As the Chair of the Second Committee of the OSCE PA, I have 

focused my efforts on combating corruption and promoting entrepreneurship, particularly among small businesses, and minority-owned 

and women-owned businesses. How can we strengthen the economic 

dimension of the OSCE, and what concrete initiatives should the 

OSCE undertake in the next year in this area?

Much continues to be done in the OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension. Concretely, two Draft Ministerial Decisions are 

now being circulated on migration and combating organized crime, 
49

both issues with elements directly related to the economic dimension. A third draft decision, on the 20th anniversary of the 

Chernobyl disaster, recalls the significance of further OSCE cooperation in the environmental sphere. 

The Office of the Economic and Environmental Coordinator is 

also co-sponsoring, with the U.S. Department of State, a conference 

for experts from participating States on combating terrorist financing, November 9–12. 

The overall strengthening of the Economic and Environmental 

Dimension is a subject for the ongoing reform discussions. So far 

there is no consensus on exactly how to increase the capability and 

profile of the Dimension, as some delegations reject calls to increase resources available or to raise the rank and increase the autonomy of the Economic and Environmental Coordinator. 

The OSCE continues to work on economic empowerment of minorities, youth, and women. Examples include: small grants for 

youth business in Albania; support for young Uzbek entrepreneurs; 

the continuing battle against trafficking in all its forms; and OSCE 

Aarhus Centers which serve as a model for environmental cooperation. OSCE work continues in the realm of anti-corruption, including the work of field presences to assist host countries in developing legislation and implementing anti-corruption programs and 

the publication of a best-practices manual.

Æ


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