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Filed 6/26/13 P. v. Barajas CA4/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

JUAN TRUJILLO BARAJAS, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 E054746 

 (Super.Ct.No. FWV1001187) 

 OPINION 

 APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Stephan G. 

Saleson, Judge. Affirmed. 

 William A. Elliott for Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Carlton and Joy Utomi, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 

 Defendant Juan Trujillo Barajas appeals from his conviction of continuous sexual 

abuse (Pen. Code,1 § 288.5, subd. (a)), two counts of lewd acts on a child under the age 

of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), 13 counts of committing a lewd act on a 14- or 15-year-old child 

(§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), six counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and two counts of 

oral copulation of a child under the age of 16 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)) and his resulting 58-

year prison sentence. 

 Defendant contends (1) the prosecutor violated a court ruling in closing argument 

by referring to statements the victim’s aunt made to the victim during a telephone 

conversation, and (2) the trial court improperly excluded the victim’s statement during a 

pretext telephone call to defendant and defendant’s response to that statement. We find 

no error and we affirm. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Defendant was victim Jane Doe’s stepfather. Doe was born in 1994. Until high 

school, she shared a room with defendant, her mother, and two younger siblings, in a 

home they shared with other relatives in Montclair. After Doe turned 12 years old, 

defendant began to fondle her vaginal area over her clothing; he did that at least 10 times. 

When she was 13, defendant began to have penile-vaginal sex with her; that occurred 

once or twice a week until she was 15. The abuse usually happened after Doe got home 

from school when no other adult was at home or during the night when everyone else was 

 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code except as otherwise 

indicated. 
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asleep. Defendant would pull Doe into a bedroom, tell her to undress, and have sex with 

her. He usually stood next to the bed with Doe lying in front of him, and he pulled her 

legs apart. After penetrating her, he would withdraw and ejaculate into napkins he kept 

in his pocket. After Doe turned 14, he orally copulated her twice and ordered her to 

orally copulate him once. He sometimes used his fingers to penetrate her vagina. He 

also had sex with her in Doe’s mother’s car and in the restaurant where he and Doe 

worked. 

 Defendant repeatedly told Doe not to tell anyone about the molestations. He said 

no one would believe her, and she would be kicked out of the house. Doe did not report 

the molestations for years because she believed her siblings loved defendant, and she did 

not want to destroy the family. In a telephone conversation, Doe eventually told her Aunt 

Sandra, who lived in another state, about the molestations. The aunt told Doe that if she 

told anyone, she should tell only a trusted friend. The aunt also said Doe could live with 

a relative if she was kicked out of the home. Doe told school friends about the abuse, the 

friends told school officials, and the police were called. 

 The jury found defendant guilty of one count of continuous sexual abuse (§ 288.5, 

subd. (a)); two counts of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)); 13 

counts of committing a lewd act on a 14- or 15-year-old child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)); six 

counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); and two counts of oral copulation of a child 

under the age of 16 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)). The trial court sentenced him to 58 years in 

prison. 

 Additional evidence is set forth in the discussion of the issues to which it pertains. 
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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

Defendant contends the prosecutor violated a court ruling in closing argument by 

referring to statements the victim’s aunt made to the victim during a telephone 

conversation. 

1. Additional Background 

Defendant moved in limine to exclude statements Doe’s aunt made to Doe in 

telephone conversations. In a first conversation, the aunt questioned Doe about what 

defendant had done to her. In a second conversation, the aunt said that Doe could stay 

with a relative if she were kicked out of the house and that she should tell only a trusted 

friend about the abuse. The trial court preliminarily ruled it would exclude the aunt’s 

portion of the first conversation because she was not available as a witness. 

Later, the trial court ruled the second conversation would be admissible: “I will 

allow the part about that she, you know, could stay with somebody and if you are going 

to tell somebody, because that gives the context.” The court added, “Well, to the extent 

that there is an objection to the part about that [Doe] could go live someplace else, that is 

overruled. If there is an objection to the part about, ‘If you are going to tell anybody, tell 

a close friend,’ that part is overruled. But I will instruct the jury, as I just did a few 

minutes ago when you objected to hearsay, that those statements are not going to be 

admitted for the truth of the matter.” 

As recounted above, at trial Doe testified that she reported the abuse to school 

friends shortly after a telephone conversation with her aunt. 
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During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “She’s on the phone with Aunt 

Sandra. Aunt Sandra has a conversation with Jane Doe, and in response to something 

Sandra says, the victim told her, the very first person the victim ever told about the 

molestation. Sandra said she’d take care of it, she’d find the victim a safe place to live 

and to only tell close friends.” No objection was raised. 

2. Analysis 

Defendant bases his argument on the trial court’s ruling to exclude evidence of the 

first telephone conversation. However, the trial court expressly allowed the second 

conversation into evidence, and the prosecutor’s argument referred to that second 

conversation. Consequently, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct. 

B. Exclusion of Evidence 

Defendant contends the trial court improperly excluded the victim’s statement 

during a pretext telephone call to defendant and defendant’s response. 

1. Additional Background 

At the direction of police, Doe made a pretext telephone call to defendant, during 

which the victim falsely stated she was pregnant. Defendant responded by saying, 

“‘Who’s the boy that did it to you.’” Defendant sought to admit Doe’s statement that she 

was pregnant and argued that his own response was hearsay. He argued Doe’s statement 

would impeach her credibility because she was not actually pregnant, and the statement 

showed she was willing to set defendant up for a crime. The trial court excluded Doe’s 

statement on the grounds it was irrelevant and misleading, but stated it would reconsider 

its ruling if defendant testified. 
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2. Standard of Review 

We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the 

deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 

827.) 

3. Analysis 

Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) “Relevant 

evidence” is evidence that reasonably tends to prove or disprove any disputed material 

fact. (Evid. Code, § 210.) The trial court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence if 

its probative value is outweighed by the likelihood of prejudice, of confusing the jury, or 

of undue consumption of time. (Evid. Code, § 352.) 

Defendant sought to introduce Doe’s statement to attack her credibility. However, 

Doe made the statement during a pretext telephone call at the direction of police officers. 

Thus, the trial court could properly determine that the conversation was of marginal 

relevance to Doe’s credibility. Moreover, the trial court could reasonably determine that 

introduction of the conversation would have necessitated further evidence as to the 

circumstances under which it was made, including evidence that a law enforcement 

officer had originated the ruse. And, as the prosecutor pointed out, introduction of the 

statement would have required disproving that Doe was pregnant. We conclude the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the proffered 

evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would 

confuse the issues or lead to undue consumption of time. (See, e.g., People v. Valdez 

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 133-134.) 
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Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that his own response to Doe’s 

statement should have been admitted as a spontaneous declaration. Although his counsel 

stated in the trial court that defendant’s statement was spontaneous, his counsel also 

stated he was not trying to admit that statement. We conclude defendant has forfeited his 

argument.

IV. DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 HOLLENHORST 

 Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 RICHLI 

 J. 

 MILLER 

 J.