```

[House Document 106-311]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-311

 
    CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
  PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (WEAPONS 
  OF MASS DESTRUCTION) AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS IS TO 
  CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 2000, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 
  1622(d).

    November 14, 2000.--Referred to the Committee on International 
                  Relations and ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-011                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, November 9, 2000.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: On November 14, 1994, in light of the 
dangers of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction''--WMD) and of 
the means of delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 
12938, declaring a national emergency under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under 
section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary 
date of its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior 
to each anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and 
transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency 
is to continue in effect. The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery continues to pose an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I am, 
therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 
1995; November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; 
and November 10, 1999, must continue in effect beyond November 
14, 2000. Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency 
declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures 
incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the 
period May 2000 through October 2000. Additional information on 
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) 
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual 
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential 
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation 
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
    On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended 
section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so that the United States 
Government could more effectively respond to the worldwide 
threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities. 
The amendment of section 4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in 
several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of 
proliferation activity that can subject entities to potential 
penalties under the Executive Order. The original Executive 
Order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts 
of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, 
design, produce or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; 
the amended Executive Order also covers contributions to 
foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable 
of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the 
amendment expands the original Executive Order to include 
attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as 
well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of 
potential penalties to include expressly the prohibition of 
United States Government assistance to foreign persons, and the 
prohibition of imports into the United States and United States 
Government procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United 
States Government greater flexibility in deciding how and to 
what extent to impose measures against foreign persons that 
assist proliferation programs.

                            nuclear weapons

    In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of 
nuclear tests that brought their nuclear weapon programs out in 
the open, in defiance of decades of international efforts to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Since that time, they 
have continued production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons and have flight-tested ballistic nuclear-capable 
missiles. World reaction to these developments included nearly 
universal condemnation across a broad range of international 
fora. The United States and a number of other countries 
respectively imposed sanctions and other unilateral measures. 
The G-8 agreed to new restrictions on lending by international 
financial institutions.
    Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, 
we have worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, 
with the South Asia Task Force, and through the United Nations 
to urge India and Pakistan to move toward the international 
nonproliferation mainstream.
    We have supported calls by the P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security 
Council on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete 
actions designed to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear 
arms and missile race, with possible implications beyond the 
region. The United States has focused most intensely on several 
objectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an 
end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional adherence by 
India and Pakistan to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT); constructive engagement in negotiations on a Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and, pending its conclusion, a 
moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in the 
development of nuclear-capable missiles, as well as their 
nondeployment; and adoption of controls meeting international 
standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology.
    Against a backdrop of international pressure on India and 
Pakistan, intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and 
Pakistan officials have yielded only modest progress, 
principally on export controls. In September 1998, Indian and 
Pakistani leaders, noting that their countries had already 
declared testing moratoria, expressed to the U.N. General 
Assembly a willingness to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under 
certain conditions. Subsequent developments including the 
Indian election, the Kargil conflict, the October coup in 
Pakistan, and the U.S. Senate's vote against providing its 
advice and consent to CTBT ratification further complicated the 
issue during 1999, although neither country renounced its 
commitment. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced during his 
visit to Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain 
its moratorium until CTBT entered into force. Both governments 
have said they would work to build domestic consensus for CTBT 
signature, without which they could not sign. Such consensus 
has not been achieved and, consequently, neither country has 
signed the CTBT thus far.
    India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to 
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 
Conference on Disarmament session, and negotiations got 
underway for a brief time. However, these negotiations were 
unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock over the 
negotiating mandate.
    Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistani 
export controls into closer conformity with international 
standards. India recently instituted new, more specific 
regulations on many categories of sensitive nonnuclear 
equipment and technology and has said that nuclear-related 
regulations will be forthcoming. Pakistan has publicly 
announced regulations restricting nuclear exports and has 
indicated that further measures are being prepared. However, 
both countries' steps still fall well short of international 
standards. We have begun with India a program of technical 
cooperation designed to improve the effectiveness of its 
already extensive export controls, and encourage further steps 
to bring India's controls in line with international standards. 
Similar assistance to Pakistan is prohibited by coup-related 
sanctions.
    The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999 
military takeover in Pakistan resulted in the suspension of the 
Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore. Tensions 
remain high, particularly over insurgent attacks in Kashmir, 
and there are no encouraging signs that talks will resume soon.
    We have agreed to continue regular discussions with India 
at the senior an expert levels, and will also remain engaged 
with Pakistan, as appropriate. Our diplomatic efforts, in 
concert with the P-5, G-8, and in international fora, will also 
continue.
    I discussed these issues with the Governments of India and 
Pakistan during my trip there in March 2000 and with Prime 
Minister Vajpayee when he came to Washington this September. 
With India, we have stressed that our relationship will not be 
able to reach its full potential without progress on our 
nonproliferation and regional security concerns. With Pakistan, 
we also emphasized the importance of progress on regional 
security and nonproliferation, among other pressing issues.
    In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an 
Agreed Framework which, if fully implemented, will ultimately 
result in the complete cessation of the DPRK's nuclear weapon-
related program and its full compliance with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a first step, North Korea froze 
construction and operations at its Yongbyon and Taechon nuclear 
facilities. The freeze remains in place, and to monitor the 
freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
maintained a continuous presence at the Yongbyon site since 
1994. The U.S. spent fuel team completed canning of the 
accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments from the North's 
5-megawatt nuclear reactor in April 2000. The IAEA has 
confirmed that the remaining few rod fragments that are 
currently inaccessible do not represent a proliferation 
concern, and the Agency continues to monitor the canned fuel. 
The U.S. spent-fuel team returned to the DPRK in October 2000 
to continue clean-up and canning at Yongbyon, and to begin 
looking at long-term maintenance.
    Serious U.S. suspicions about an underground facility at 
Kumchang-ni led the United States to raise its concerns 
directly with Pyongyang and to negotiate access to the site as 
long as U.S. concerns remain. In May 1999, a Department of 
State-led team of experts visited the site and judged it, as 
then configured, not suited to house plutonium production 
reactors or reprocessing operations. Based on the data gathered 
by the U.S. team and the subsequent technical review, the 
United States concluded that the activities were not a 
violation of the Agreed Framework. A second Department of 
State-led team conducted a visit in May 2000 and found no 
evidence to contradict the 1999 assessment. In light of a final 
review of these results, the joint communique issued following 
the visit of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington 
stated that ``U.S. concerns'' about the underground site at 
Kumchang-ni had been ``removed.''
    While the Kumchang-ni visit addressed some of our 
nonproliferation concerns, future negotiations with the North 
will seek to discuss ways to allay all of them--in the context 
of assuring full implementation of the Agreed Framework and 
improving overall relations. In May and July 2000, the United 
States and DPRK held rounds of talks concerning Agreed 
Framework implementation and the DPRK's missile program, 
respectively. Another round of talks, which included discussion 
on terrorism issues, was held in New York from September 27 to 
October 2 of this year. During the talks, the DPRK informed us 
that DPRK Special Envoy Marshal Jo Myong Rok would visit 
Washington from October 9 to 12, 2000. The joint communique 
released at the end of that historic visit noted that both 
countries ``are prepared to undertake a new direction in their 
relations.'' Toward that end, the two stated that ``neither 
government would have hostile intent toward the other.'' Both 
sides pledged to ``redouble their commitment and their efforts 
to fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under 
the Agreed Framework.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic 
missile flight test moratorium, and agreed that ``there are a 
variety of available means, including the Four Party talks, to 
reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and formally end the 
Korean war by replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with 
permanent peace arrangements.''
    The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. In May 2000, NPT Parties met in New 
York for the 2000 NPT Review Conference (REVCON). Despite 
predictions to the contrary, the 158 participating nations 
adopted by consensus a Final Document that reviews NPT 
implementation over the past 5 years and establishes a program 
of action for the future. This is the first NPT Review 
Conference to achieve such a Final Document since 1985. The 
Conference met or exceeded all U.S. objectives. It provided an 
important boost to the NPT and to nuclear nonproliferation 
goals in general.
    The IAEA verifies states' compliance with their NPT 
obligations by means of its safeguards system. The discovery at 
the time of the Gulf War of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear 
activities led to an international consensus in favor of 
strengthening the IAEA safeguards system's ability to detect 
undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United States 
and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in the mid-
1990's substantial safeguardsstrengthening measures, including 
the use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the classes 
of nuclear activities states are required to declare, and expansion of 
IAEA access rights. Measures requiring additional legal authority are 
embodied in a Model Additional Protocol approved in 1997. This Protocol 
has now been signed by 54 states and has entered into force for 14. 
Provided the IAEA is given the resources and political support it needs 
to implement its new safeguards measures effectively, proliferators 
will now find it much harder to evade the system.
    The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty on September 24, 1996. As of early October 2000, 160 
countries have signed and 65 have ratified the CTBT, including 
30 of the 44 countries required by the Treaty for its entry 
into force. During 2000, CTBT signatories conducted numerous 
meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) and its 
subsidiary bodies in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid 
completion of the International Monitoring System (MS) 
established by the Treaty.
    On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the 
Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I 
deeply regret the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to 
refuse to provide its advice and consent to ratify the CTBT. 
The CTBT will serve several United States national security 
interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will 
constrain the development and qualitative improvement of 
nuclear weapons; make the development of advanced new types of 
weapons much more difficult; contribute to the prevention of 
nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; 
and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks 
a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat 
and to build a safer world. For these reasons, we hope that at 
an appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty.
    The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize 
implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's requirement to 
apply International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to nuclear 
exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure 
that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to nonnuclear 
weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable material, or 
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for 
the processing, use or production of special fissionable 
material. The Committee maintains and updates a list (the 
``Trigger List'') of equipment that may only be exported if 
safeguards are applied to the recipient facility. The relative 
informality of the Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the 
lead on certain nonproliferation issues that would be more 
difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
    At its March 2000 meeting, the Committee approved the 
Chairman's report of Committee activities to the 2000 NPT 
REVCON. The Committee also agreed to continue consideration of 
possible future adoption of the full-scope safeguards (FSS) 
policy. The Committee also agreed to an informal meeting with 
IAEA staff to discuss procedures for keeping the Agency 
informed on Trigger List changes and the rationale for such 
changes, since the Agency uses the Zangger Trigger list as a 
reference document. A separate working group, chaired by 
Sweden, is considering the addition of plutonium enrichment 
equipment to the Trigger List.
    During the past year, two new members have joined the 
Zangger Committee--Turkey in October 1999 and Slovenia in March 
2000.
    All of the nuclear weapon states, including China, are 
members of the Zangger Committee. However, unlike all of the 
other nuclear weapon states members of the Zangger Committee, 
China is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 
which requires its members to adhere to a FSS policy of 
requiring nonnuclear weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on 
all of its nuclear facilities as a condition of supply to those 
states. China has been reluctant to agree to this policy.
    With 38 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted and 
effective export-control arrangement, which contributes to the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of 
guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. 
Members pursue the aims of the NSG through adherence to the 
Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and through 
exchanges of information on developments of nuclear 
proliferation concern.
    Turkey, Belarus, and Cyprus became the newest members of 
the NSG in May 19, 2000. Slovenia was invited to participate as 
an observer at the 2000 Paris Plenary and has applied for NSG 
membership this year. NSG members often agree to allow 
nonmember nations deemed eligible for NSG membership to 
participate in Plenary meetings as observers. While not an NSG 
member, China has taken a major step toward harmonization of 
its export control system with the NSG part 2 Guidelines by the 
implementation of controls over nuclear-related dual-use 
equipment, material, and related technology.
    In May 2000, the NSG Troika (composed of the past, present, 
and future NSG Chairs--in this case Britain, Italy and France) 
met with representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss 
Iranian criticism of the NSG. The meeting of the Troika 
followed upearlier meetings by the Italian Chair in Tehran and 
on the margins of the 1999 NSG Transparency Seminar in New York. The 
Troika urged Iran to sign the additional protocol with the IAEA that 
strengthens safeguards. Iranian officials offered to provide additional 
confidence building measures to facilitate nuclear exports from NSG 
members. The United States, as the future plenary chair, intends to be 
an active participant in all NSG Troika activities in the coming years, 
though any involvement in Troika contracts with Iran will need to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis prior to the meetings. The United 
States does not believe that the ongoing discussions with Iran can or 
should soften supplier attitudes.
    During the Plenary meetings in Paris in June 2000, the 
Czech Republic presented information on its new legislation 
intended to halt all tangible and intangible supply to the 
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. The Czech delegation 
stated that the new legislation covers direct transfers to 
Bushehr, as well as indirect support through a third party. The 
Italian NSG Chair presented a report of NSG activities at the 
2000 NPT Review Conference.

                    chemical and biological weapons

    The export control regulations issued under the Expanded 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force 
and continue to be administrated by the Department of Commerce, 
in consultation with other agencies, in order to control the 
export of items with potential use in chemical or biological 
weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction.
    Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious 
threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29, 
1997, the convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) 
entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States Signatories 
as original States Parties, including the United States, which 
ratified on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified the CWC on November 
5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 8, 1997. As of 
October 30, 2000, 140 countries will have become States 
Parties.
    The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established on 
April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in The Hague is comprised of 
States parties and international civil servants that are 
responsible for implementing the CWC. It consists of the 
Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and 
the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out the 
verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff 
of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained 
and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities 
throughout the world. As of October 30, 2000, the OPCW has 
conducted over 790 routine inspections in some 37 countries. No 
challenge inspections have yet taken place. The OPCW maintains 
a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S. CW 
destruction facilities in Utah, on Johnston Island, and 
elsewhere. Accordingly, approximately 70 percent of the 
inspection days currently have been at U.S. declared 
facilities.
    The United States is determined to seek full implementation 
of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs 
and risks for states or other entities attempting to engage in 
chemical weapons-related activities. Receiving accurate and 
complete declarations from all States Parties will improve our 
knowledge of possible chemical weapons-related activities. Its 
inspection provisions provide for access by international 
inspectors to declared and potentially undeclared facilities 
and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons 
production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more 
expensive.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
was enacted into U.S. law on October 21, 1998, as part of the 
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). I issued 
Executive Order 13128 on June 25, 1999, to facilitate 
implementation of the Act and the Convention, and published 
regulations on December 30, 1999, regarding declarations and 
inspections of industrial facilities. The United States 
commenced its submission of industry declarations at the end of 
April 2000, and hosted its first industry inspection on May 8, 
2000. Industry inspections are proceeding well. Our submission 
of the industry declarations to the OPCW and commencement of 
inspections, has strengthened U.S. leadership in the 
organization as well as our ability to encourage other States 
Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely declarations.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC have been isolated 
politically and denied access by the CWC to certain key 
chemicals from States Parties. The relevant treaty provisions 
are specifically designed to penalize countries that refuse to 
join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of 
chemical weapons.
    The United States also continues to play an active role in 
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological 
weapons (BW). We participate in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of 
States Parties of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) andToxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the 
Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The AHG is striving to complete 
a legally binding protocol to strengthen the 1972 Convention to promote 
compliance and enhance transparency. This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by 
the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review 
Conference (November/December 1996) urged the AHG to complete the 
protocol as soon as possible before the next BWC Review Conference in 
2001. Work is progressing on a draft text through discussion of 
national views and clarification of existing text. Differences in 
national views persist concerning such substantive areas as on-site 
activities, export controls, declarations, and technical assistance 
provisions. The United States remains strongly committed to the 
objective agreed to in the 1996 Review Conference, but will only accept 
a protocol that enhances U.S. security and strengthens national and 
international efforts to address the BW threat.
    I announced in my 1998 State of the Union Address that the 
United States would take a leading role in the effort to erect 
stronger international barriers against the proliferation and 
use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international 
means to detect and deter cheating. We are working closely with 
industry representatives to obtain technical input relevant to 
the development of U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach 
international agreement on protocol provisions.
    The United States continues to be a leading participant in 
the 32-member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological 
weapons nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the 
most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 2-5, 2000, 
during which the Group reaffirmed the members' continued 
collective belief in the AG's viability, importance, and 
compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members continue to agree 
that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all governments will 
be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on chemical 
and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national 
activities support these goals. At the 2000 Plenary, the Group 
welcomed its newest members, Cyprus and Turkey. At this year's 
plenary, the regime continued to focus on strengthening and 
refining AG export controls and sharing information to address 
the CBW threat, especially from terrorism. The AG also 
reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active outreach 
program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote 
regional consultations on export controls and nonproliferation 
to further awareness and understanding of national policies in 
these areas. The AG discussed ways to be more proactive in 
stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC contexts.
    During the last 6 months, we continued to examine 
intelligence and other information of trade in CBW-related 
material and technology that might be relevant to sanctions 
provisions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions 
determinations were reached during this reporting period. The 
United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners 
and other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation 
concern.

          Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    The United States continues carefully to control exports 
that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons 
of mass destruction, and closely to monitor activities of 
potential missile proliferation concern. We also continue to 
implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In April 2000, we 
imposed sanctions against a North Korean entity and four 
Iranian entities for missile proliferation activities. These 
sanctions followed March 1999 missile sanctions against three 
Middle Eastern entities.
    During this reporting period, the 32 Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) Partners (members) continued to share 
information about proliferation problems with each other and 
with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment 
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing 
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted 
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for 
use in missile programs of concern.
    In March and September 2000, the United States participated 
in two MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact Meetings (RPOC). At the 
RPOCs, MTCR Partners continued their discussions on new ways to 
better address the global missile proliferation threat. They 
also undertook to develop a new multilateral mechanism on 
missile nonproliferation. This mechanism is intended to 
complement the important work of the MTCR and eventually to 
include the participation of both MTCR and non-MTCR countries.
    The MTCR Partners held their annual plenary meeting in 
Helsinki, on October 9-13, 2000. The Partners took decisions 
concerning the substance of a new multilateral mechanism on 
missile nonproliferation and ways to take it forward. They also 
discussed cooperation on halting shipments of missile 
proliferation concern and exchanged information about 
activities of missile proliferation concern worldwide, 
including in South Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East.
    During this reporting period, the United States continued 
to work unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners 
to combat missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to 
export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since 
my last report, we continued our missile nonproliferation 
dialogues with China, India, the Republic of Korea, and North 
Korea, and have raised this issue with Pakistan at senior 
levels. Although regular discussions with Pakistan at the 
expert level have not proceeded since the fall 1999 coup, we 
remain engaged at the diplomatic level, and I addressed our 
nonproliferation concerns during my visit to Pakistan in March 
of this year. In the course of normal diplomatic relations we 
also have pursued such discussions with other countries in 
Central Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
    In July 2000, the United States and the DPRK held a fifth 
round of missile talks in Kuala Lumpur. This was the first 
round of talks after a 16-month hiatus. It provided a useful 
opportunity to assess developments since the March 1999 talks 
in Pyongyang, including the DPRK's June 2000 reaffirmation of 
its moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles of any 
kind. The United States discussed its continuing concerns about 
North Korea's missile activities and again pressed for tight 
constraints on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports. 
Both sides agreed to hold another round of talks as soon as 
possible, and a sixth round occurred September 28-29 in New 
York. The United States continued to urge the DPRK to take 
steps to address U.S. and international concerns about the 
DPRK's indigenous missile programs and its missile-related 
activities. The United States also discussed Chairman Kim Jong-
Il's idea, suggested to Russian President Putin in mid-July, of 
trading missile restraints for launches of DPRK satellites on 
foreign launchers. During the October visit to Washington of 
DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok, the United States and DPRK 
agreed that ``resolution of the missile issue would make an 
essential contribution to a fundamentally improved relationship 
between them and to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific 
region.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic missile flight 
test moratorium ``while talks on the missile issue continue.''
    Secretary Albright met with Chairman Kim Jong-Il in 
Pyongyang October 23-24. They had serious, constructive, and 
in-depth discussions on the full range of U.S. concerns on 
missiles, including both the DPRK's indigenous missile programs 
and exports. They also explored Chairman Kim's idea of 
restraining DPRK missile capabilities in exchange for launches 
of DPRK satellites on foreign boosters. U.S. and DPRK missile 
experts are scheduled to continue discussions in early 
November.
    In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to 
acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's 
missile and nuclear development programs, the United States is 
pursuing a high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding 
ways to work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to 
Iran's ballistic missile development program and its nuclear 
weapon program. Russia's government has created institutional 
foundations to implement a newly enacted nonproliferation 
policy and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has passed 
new export control legislation to tighten government control 
over sensitive technologies and continued working with the 
United States to strengthen export control practices at Russian 
aerospace firms. However, despite the Russian government's 
nonproliferation and export control efforts, some Russian 
entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic missile 
program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond 
the Bushehr Unit 1 nuclear power reactor project, which could 
further Iran's nuclear weapon aspirations.
    Consistent with the Russian government's April 2000 
announcement of administrative action against the Rector of the 
Baltic State Technical University (BSTU) for his involvement in 
training Iranian specialist at BSTU, and following our own 
assessment, the United States announced on April 24, 2000, 
plans to impose trade and administrative penalties on the 
Rector for his involvement with the Iranian missile program. At 
the same time, the United States also announced its intention 
to remove restrictions imposed in July 1998 on two Russian 
entities--INOR and Polyus--which have ceased the proliferation 
behavior that led to the imposition of penalties. However, 
penalties imposed in July 1998 against five other Russian 
entities and in January 1999 against three additional entities 
remain in effect.

               value of nonproliferation export controls

    The U.S. national export controls--both those implemented 
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those 
implemented unilaterally--play an important part in impending 
the proliferation of WMD and missiles. (as used here, ``export 
controls'' refer to requirements for case-by-case review of 
certain exports, or limitations on exports of particular items 
of proliferation concern to certain destinations, rather than 
broad embargoes or economic sanctions that also affect trade.) 
As noted in this report, however, export controls are only one 
of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its 
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation treaties 
and norms, Multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdictions 
of shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions, export 
control assistance, redirection and elimination efforts, and 
robust U.S.military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities 
all work in conjunction with export controls as part of our overall 
nonproliferation strategy.
    Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation 
because every emerging WMD/missile program seeks equipment and 
technology from other countries. Proliferators look to other 
sources because needed items are unavailable within their 
country, because indigenously produced items are of substandard 
quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because imported items 
can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than domestically 
produced ones. It is important to note that proliferators seek 
for their WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral 
lists (like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve 
gas precursors on the Australia Group list) and unlisted items 
(like lower-level machine tools and very basic chemicals). In 
addition, many of the items of interest to proliferators are 
inherently dual-use. For example, key precursors and 
technologies used in the production of fertilizers or 
pesticides also can be used to make chemical weapons; bio-
production technology can be used to produce biological 
weapons.
    The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or 
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or 
technology for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large 
part, U.S. national export controls--and similar controls of 
our partners in the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control 
Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--have denied proliferators 
access to the largest sources of the best equipment and 
technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less 
capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many 
instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have 
forced proliferators to engage in complex clandestine 
procurements even from nonmember suppliers, taking time and 
money away from WMD/missile programs.
    The U.S. national export controls and those of our regime 
partners also have played an important role, increasing over 
time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation 
export controls. For example: the 7-member MTCR of 1987 has 
grown to 32 member countries; the NSG adopted full-scope 
safeguards as a condition of supply and extended new controls 
to nuclear-related dual-use items; several nonmember countries 
have committed unilaterally to apply export controls consistent 
with one or more of the regimes; and most of the members of the 
nonproliferation regimes have applied national ``catch-all'' 
controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation 
Control Initiative. (Export controls normally are tied to a 
specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all'' 
controls provide a legal basis to control exports of items not 
on a list, when those items are destined for WMD/missile 
programs.) The United States maintains a global program, funded 
by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related 
Activities account, to assist other countries' efforts to 
strengthen their export control systems. A principal focus of 
this important effort is Russia and the Newly Independent 
States (NIS), where we also employ funds provided under the 
Freedom Support Act.
    The U.S. export controls, especially ``catch-all'' 
controls, also make important political and moral contributions 
to the nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal 
obligations the United States has undertaken in the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I), Biological Weapons 
Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD activities. 
They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' on 
WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and 
our friends and interests overseas. They place the United 
States squarely and unambiguously against WMD/missile 
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent 
proliferation from the United States itself.
    Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling 
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit 
dual-use exports to proceed under circumstances where, without 
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to 
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries 
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased 
trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation regime, for example, 
has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each member not to make 
an export that another has denied for nonproliferation reasons 
and notified to the rest--unless it first consults with the 
original denying country. Not only does this policy make it 
more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime 
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for 
exporters.

                            threat reduction

    The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system 
expertise has increased in part as a consequence of the 
economic crisis in Russia and other Newly Independent States 
(NIS). My Administration gives high priority to controlling the 
human dimension of proliferation through programs that support 
the transition of former Soviet weapons scientists to civilian 
research and technology development activities. I have proposed 
an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the 
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) that would support 
activities in four areas over FYs 2000-2004: nuclear security; 
nonnuclearWMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and 
military relocation, stabilization and other security cooperation 
programs. Of the $1 billion Congressional ETRI request for FY 2000, an 
estimated $888 million is available: State ($182 million), Energy ($293 
million), and Defense ($467 million). We are seeking $974 million in FY 
2001.

                                expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no specific 
expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities 
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in 
Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the period from May 
16, 2000, through November 12, 2000.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.
                                 Notice

                              ----------                              

    Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared 
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass 
destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. Because 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means 
of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States, the national emergency first 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 
1995, November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, November 12, 1998, 
and November 10, 1999, must continue in effect beyond November 
14, 2000. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the 
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing 
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 9, 2000.

                                  

```