IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

East Stroudsburg Area School District :

:

v. :

:

RMMI, Inc., Monroe County Board of :

Assessment Revision, Monroe County : 

and Smithfield Township :

: No. 629 C.D. 2018

Appeal of: RMMI, Inc. : Submitted: June 3, 2019

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: June 26, 2019

RMMI, Inc. (RMMI) appeals from the March 20, 2018 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) denying RMMI’s petition to 

open the trial court’s May 24, 2017 judgment. Upon review, we affirm.1

RMMI is the owner of a parcel of property (the Property) located in 

Smithfield Township, Pennsylvania, tax parcel # 16/8/2/21-7. East Stroudsburg 

Area School District’s (District) Trial Court Memorandum of Law at 1, Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 56a. RMMI owns and operates a hotel on the Property. Petition to 

Open Judgment at 2, R.R. at 70a. On or about July 29, 2015, the District filed with 

the Monroe County Board of Assessment Revision (Board) a tax assessment appeal 

against RMMI concerning the Property for the 2016 tax year pursuant to Section 

 

1 Neither the Monroe County Board of Assessment Revision nor Smithfield Township is 

participating in this matter. 
2

8855 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law (CCAL), 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855. 

District’s Trial Court Memorandum of Law at 1, R.R. at 56a. After conducting a 

hearing, the Board denied the District’s appeal by letter dated October 8, 2015. 

District’s Trial Court Memorandum of Law at 1, R.R. at 56a; Board’s Letter, R.R. 

at 13a. On November 4, 2015, the District appealed the Board’s decision to the trial 

court. Trial Court Opinion at 2. The trial court subsequently held a pretrial 

conference for scheduling purposes. Id. The District attended the pretrial 

conference, but RMMI did not. Id. A scheduling order was entered for discovery 

and trial, to which RMMI failed to respond. Id. The trial was continued twice due 

to the delay in discovery. Id. On May 23, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing, 

which only the District attended. Id. The District presented expert testimony. Id. 

The District’s counsel stated that RMMI had partially complied with its discovery 

request. Id. By order dated the same day, the trial court granted the District’s appeal 

and established the fair market value and common level ratio for the Property. Trial 

Court Order, R.R. at 66a-67a. This order was filed on May 24, 2017. Certified Trial 

Court Docket at 4, R.R. at 4a. 

On February 8, 2018, RMMI filed a petition to open the trial court’s 

judgment. Trial Court Opinion at 3. RMMI contended that a petition to open a 

judgment should be granted when the petitioner acts promptly, avers a meritorious 

defense and presents sufficient evidence of that defense to require submission of the 

issues to a jury. Petition to Open Judgment at 5, R.R. at 73a.

2

 RMMI asserted that 

it satisfied all three of these elements. Id. RMMI further contended that the trial

 

2

In support of its position, RMMI cited Pittsburgh National Bank v. Larson, 507 A.2d 867 

(Pa. Super. 1986); Germantown Savings Bank v. Talacki, 657 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Super. 1995); and 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 2959(e). However, the authority cited by RMMI pertains to confessed judgments 

and is, therefore, irrelevant. 
3

court should open its judgment, because Adam Hakky (Hakky), the general manager 

of the hotel located on the Property, placed his own interests ahead of those of RMMI 

and “essentially abandoned his duties and obligations to RMMI,” such that the 

owners of RMMI had no knowledge of the suit or the trial court’s May 24, 2017 

order until receiving its real estate tax bill in December 2017. Petition to Open 

Judgment at 4-5-6, R.R. at 72a-74a. RMMI averred that Hakky handled all 

administrative and civil actions involving the hotel and that he accepted service of 

the complaint. Petition to Open Judgment at 2-3, R.R. at 70a-71a. RMMI noted that 

it “acted swiftly to secure representation” upon learning of the trial court’s order. 

Petition to Open Judgment at 6, R.R. at 74a. RMMI asserted that it should be 

permitted to present evidence of its own assessment of the value of the Property. Id.

On March 20, 2018, a hearing was held on RMMI’s petition to open the 

trial court’s judgment, at which RMMI presented the testimony of Soham Patel, who 

had since replaced Hakky as general manager of the hotel. Trial Court Opinion at 

3; Transcript of Testimony at 3-4. On the same day, the trial court denied RMMI’s 

petition to open the trial court judgment. Trial Court Order, R.R. at 122a. 

RMMI then appealed to this Court. Original Record (O.R.), Notice of 

Appeal. On May 10, 2018, RMMI filed with the trial court a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b). O.R., Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal at 1. RMMI 

raised for the first time the issue of whether the trial court should have considered 

Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area School District, 163 

A.3d 962 (Pa. 2017) in deciding its petition to open the trial court’s judgment. O.R.,

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal at 1. On May 16, 2018, the trial court 

filed an opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). 
4

Trial Court Opinion at 1 & 7. The trial court noted that a petition to appeal a decision 

of the Board is a statutory action under the CCAL and that the CCAL does not 

provide for a petition to open a final judgment. Id. at 4. The trial court also noted 

that a default judgment will not be disturbed on appeal absent an error of law or a 

clear, manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 4. However, the trial court found that its 

order did not constitute a default judgment. Id. at 5. The trial court reasoned that 

“[t]here was a trial held after RMMI received notice of the [District’s] assessment 

appeal and the trial,” but that “RMMI simply did not defend its interests.” Id. The 

trial court found as follows:

Here, duly authorized agents of RMMI were served with 

notice of the pending assessment appeal for sixteen 

months before the case came to hearing. Even if the first 

general manager was negligent in not informing the 

officers of RMMI of the pending assessment challenge the 

second general manager, who apparently was reporting to 

the officers, also became aware of the pending assessment 

hearing well before the time of the hearing. No action was 

taken to participate in the litigation in any way.

Id. The trial court reasoned that principals are generally responsible for the acts of 

agents committed within the scope of their authority. Id. at 5 (citing Todd v. Skelly, 

120 A.2d 906, 909-10 (Pa. 1956); Gordon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 181 A. 574, 577-78 

(Pa. 1935)). The trial court further noted that as “it is the principal who has selected 

and delegated responsibility to those agents,” this “doctrine creates incentives for 

the principal to do so carefully and responsibly.” Id. (quoting Official Comm. of 

Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. 

PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 333 (Pa. 2010)). The trial court also 

reasoned that “[i]mputation . . . serves to protect those who transact business with a 

corporation through its agents believing the agent’s conduct is with[in] the authority 
5

of his principal.” Id. The trial court determined that “the record shows that RMMI 

was receiving proper notice of the appeal throughout the hearing process.” Id. at 6.3

The trial court further found that RMMI’s contention that it should have considered 

Valley Forge lacked merit. Id. at 7. 

On appeal,4 RMMI requests that this Court reverse the March 20, 2018 

order of the trial court5 and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to 

allow the parties to fully brief the underlying substantive issues in advance of a 

hearing on the same. RMMI’s Brief at 11. RMMI argues that the trial court order 

“should be overturned because the District violated the Uniformity Clause,” as set 

forth in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, by “singl[ing] out 

and selectively appeal[ing] the assessments of commercial properties, such as the 

Property[.]” Id. at 8. RMMI notes that in Valley Forge, the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania held that systematically subjecting a sub-classification of property, 

such as commercial property, to tax assessment appeals could constitute a violation 

 

3 We follow the trial court’s line of reasoning to further note that “[i]n accordance with a 

well-established rule of the law of agency, a corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by, 

or notice given to, its officers or agents which is within the actual or apparent scope of their 

authority or employment and which is in reference to a matter to which their authority or 

employment extends.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Michael Moraiti, Upper 

Darby Auto Ctr., Inc., 382 A.2d 997, 998 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978); see also Fidelity Bank v. 

Pierson, 264 A.2d 682, 684 (Pa. 1970) (stating that “it is well-settled law that knowledge of the 

agent is knowledge of the principal”). 

4

“A lower court’s ruling opening or refusing to open [a judgment] will not be reversed 

unless there has been an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse of discretion.” Balk v. Ford Motor 

Co., 285 A.2d 128, 131 (Pa. 1971). 

5

In its appellate brief, RMMI identifies the March 20, 2018 trial court order denying its 

petition to open judgment as the determination in question. RMMI’s Brief at 2. However, RMMI 

concludes its argument by requesting that this Court reverse the May 24, 2017 trial court order 

establishing the fair market value and common level ratio for the property. Id. at 11. We presume 

RMMI intended to request that we reverse the March 20, 2018 trial court order denying its petition 

to open the May 24, 2017 trial court judgment. 
6

of the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 10 (citing Valley 

Forge, 163 A.3d at 978). RMMI therefore contends that the trial court erred in 

failing to sua sponte apply Valley Forge to the instant matter. Id. at 10-11. RMMI 

contends that, as a result, it “has been injured in that it was not afforded a second 

opportunity to challenge the District’s unconstitutional spot assessment of the 

Property.” Id. at 11. 

“It is well settled that an appellate court will not consider on appeal 

issues not raised in the trial court.” Poesnecker v. Ricchio, 631 A.2d 1097, 1102 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (citing Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Tr. Co., 322 A.2d 114 (Pa. 

1974)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). Here, RMMI 

first asserted that Valley Forge supported its petition to open the trial court judgment 

in its statement of errors complained of on appeal, even though Valley Forge was 

decided roughly seven months before RMMI filed its petition to open the trial court 

judgment. More importantly, RMMI raised the issue of a uniformity challenge, for 

which it cites Valley Forge as support, for the first time in its brief filed with this 

Court. Because RMMI did not raise the issue of a uniformity challenge before the 

trial court, it waived any argument it could have made in this regard. See Pa.R.A.P. 

302; Poesnecker.

Further, RMMI fails to identify a legal basis that would permit the trial 

court to open its final judgment. A petition to open a judgment is an appeal to the 

equitable powers of the court. Girard Tr. Corn Exch. Bank v. Sweeney, 196 A.2d 

310, 312 (Pa. 1964). This Court has held as follows:

The law applicable to opening judgments not entered by 

confession or default is clear; judgments regularly entered 

in an adverse proceeding cannot be opened or vacated after 
7

they have become final unless there has been fraud or 

some other circumstance so grave or compelling as to 

constitute “extraordinary cause” which justifies court 

intervention.

Lowery v. E. Pikeland Twp., 599 A.2d 271, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (citing Ins. Co.

of N. Am. v. Bishop, 529 A.2d 33 (Pa. Super. 1987)). After failing to defend its 

interests before the trial court in the assessment appeal, RMMI is essentially asking 

the trial court to open its judgment to provide RMMI the opportunity to argue that 

the District violated the Uniformity Clause (under precedent established in Valley 

Forge, a case decided after the trial court issued its May 24, 2017 order). However, 

RMMI’s wish to argue a constitutional issue not raised at trial, on subsequently 

decided precedent, does not rise to the level of “extraordinary cause” required to 

justify opening a final judgment. See DeMarco v. Borough of E. McKeesport, 556 

A.2d 977, 979 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (defining “extraordinary cause” as “an 

oversight or act by the court, or failure of the judicial process, which operates to 

deny the losing party knowledge of entry of final judgment and commencement of 

the running of the appeal period”) (citing Luckenbaugh v. Shearer, 523 A.2d 399

(Pa. Super. 1987); Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 504 A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. 1986)). 

Accordingly, we affirm the March 20, 2018 trial court order denying 

RMMI’s petition to open its May 24, 2017 judgment, albeit on different grounds.

6

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

 

6

“We may affirm on different grounds where grounds for an affirmance exist.” City of 

Pittsburgh v. Logan, 780 A.2d 870, 878 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), aff’d, 810 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 2002). 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

East Stroudsburg Area School District :

:

v. :

:

RMMI, Inc., Monroe County Board of :

Assessment Revision, Monroe County : 

and Smithfield Township :

: No. 629 C.D. 2018

Appeal of: RMMI, Inc. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of June, 2019, the March 20, 2018 order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge