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38–254 PDF 2007

PERSPECTIVES ON RENEWING 

STATUTORY PAYGO

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JULY 25, 2007

Serial No. 110–16

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget

(

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina, Chairman 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut, 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

[Vacancy] 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin, 

Ranking Minority Member 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

MARIO DIAZ–BALART, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

JON C. PORTER, Nevada 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

[Vacancy] 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

THOMAS S. KAHN, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JAMES T. BATES, Minority Chief of Staff 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, July 25, 2007 .................................................. 1

Statement of: 

Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Budget ..... 1

Hon. Paul Ryan, ranking minority member, House Committee on the 

Budget ............................................................................................................ 2

Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office (CBO) ................... 6

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 8

David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States ...................... 21

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 25

Robert Greenstein, executive director, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities ................................................................................................................. 73

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 75

Hon. Patrick J. Toomey, president, Club for Growth, former Congressman 

from the State of Pennsylvania ................................................................... 82

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 84

Robert L. Bixby, executive director, the Concord Coalition .......................... 86

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 89

Maya C. MacGuineas, president, Committee for a Responsible Federal 

Budget ............................................................................................................ 97

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 98

(1)

PERSPECTIVES ON RENEWING

STATUTORY PAYGO 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr. [Chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Spratt, Edwards, Cooper, Schwartz, 

Kaptur, Becerra, Doggett, Blumenauer, Berry, Boyd, Sutton, 

Etheridge, Baird, Bishop, Ryan, Barrett, Bonner, Garrett, 

Conaway, Campbell, Tiberi, Porter, Alexander, and Smith. 

Chairman SPRATT. Because we have got several witnesses and 

several members who need to leave around ten-thirty to eleven 

o’clock and the sooner we get going, the more we will be able to 

cover this morning. 

This morning’s hearing is about perspectives on renewing statutory PAYGO and we have a most distinguished set of witnesses. 

Our first panel consists of Peter Orszag, Director of Congressional 

Budget Office, and David Walker who is the Comptroller General. 

Our second panel consists of Bob Bixby, Executive Director of the 

Concord Coalition; Bob Greenstein, Executive Director of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; Maya MacGuineas, President 

of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget; and our former 

colleague, Pat Toomey, President and CEO of the Club for Growth. 

Ever since its enactment in 1990, we have been supporters on 

our side of statutory PAYGO and since its expiration in 2002, we 

have been committed to renewing it. Quite simply, the record 

shows that it works. 

When statutory PAYGO was on the books in the 1990s, it helped 

us convert chronic deficits into record surpluses. But after it was 

allowed to expire in 2002 and large tax cuts and offsets were 

passed along with large increases in mandatory spending such as 

for prescriptions, record budget deficits returned. 

At the beginning of this Congress, one of the first steps we took 

was to make PAYGO part of the House rules, a step we could take 

immediately because it did not require negotiation with the Senate 

or approval by the President. 

The House PAYGO rule requires that every bill affecting mandatory spending or revenues be deficit neutral. This rule has been in 

force consistently and followed since its adoption in January despite predictions when it passed that the House would honor it in 

the breach. 

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The budget conference report for 2008 adopted this spring established a similar PAYGO rule in the Senate and expressed the sense 

of Congress that the statutory version of PAYGO be renewed as an 

additional measure, a backup measure, if you will, for fiscal discipline. 

At least one bill extending statutory PAYGO has been introduced 

in this Congress, H.R. 2685, introduced by Mr. Hill and cosponsored by Budget Committee members Mr. Berry, Mr. Boyd, Mr. 

Cooper, and Mr. Moore. 

Before turning to our witnesses for testimony, I want to turn to 

our Ranking Member, Mr. Ryan, for his opening statement. 

Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Chairman, and welcome the gentlemen 

here today. It is nice to have you guys with us again. 

The concept of PAYGO seems like an enforcement tool that no 

one could object to. As the proponents put it, it simply says that 

any new spending Congress adopts has to be paid for. That sounds 

reasonable enough. But as is true with a lot of things, this subject 

is a little more complicated than it first might appear. 

I have made no secret of my concerns with the PAYGO rule 

adopted by the House this year and I will note those concerns 

again right here. 

This year, the Majority passed its version of PAYGO ostensibly 

as a key means for Congress to control the budget. Shortly after 

that, this Committee began to hold hearings, most of which focused 

on the largest economic and budgetary problems that Congress 

faces, and that PAYGO does not touch the project growth of entitlement spending under current law. 

We have two of the nation’s foremost experts on that topic sitting 

right before us today. As both of our expert witnesses today have 

repeatedly warned, the current rate of entitlement spending is already out of control. It cannot be sustained either by the budget 

or by the economy. 

If you could pull up chart one, please.

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You can see from this chart there in the green the currently projected growth of entitlements. PAYGO does not even apply to any 

of that. It applies only to new legislation and new spending increases. It does not touch the underlying problem. Only real fundamental reform can do that. 

PAYGO was never meant to be a substitute for real budget and 

policy decisions. And in that regard, the Majority’s budget this year 

is a real disappointment. It does nothing to address this massive 

entitlement growth, but even worse, it makes $190 billion worth of 

new spending promises in what the budget calls reserve funds 

without any offsets identified. That is not budgeting. That is relying on somebody else to budget. And in all likelihood, that someone 

else is going to be the taxpayers. 

Also, this year is the first time Congress has adopted PAYGO 

without also adopting caps on appropriations. Appropriations still 

make up a large part of the budget, about a third. And as you can 

see from the chart and if the Majority is serious about spending 

control, it has got to look at ways to control all of Congress’ spending. The blue part is the discretionary side. 

That said, I will be the first to admit that we Republicans have 

not always been on the side of the budget angels either. We, too, 

spent more than we should have. And I want to be clear about 

that, but we also made efforts to correct that. We put tight limits 

on nonsecurity appropriations and we took the first steps to reform 

our massive entitlement programs, saving $40 billion for taxpayers 

in the process. 

We managed to do those two things even though there was no 

PAYGO and no discretionary caps. We just made the tough choices 

and passed the necessary measures. 

Finally, no budget enforcement rule or law can work if Congress 

does not take it seriously. And there are certain indications that 


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that is the case with PAYGO. We have seen evidence of this in the 

Education Bill which claimed that Congress would cut student loan 

interest rates in half over the next five years, then in year six, suddenly raise them right back up to the current level, clearly a gimmick to make the bill appear to comply with PAYGO. 

The SCHIP Bill that the Senate just passed employed a similar 

gimmick intended to mask the true cost of the bill and circumvent 

the PAYGO rules to the tune of $40 billion according to the CBO. 

But since the Farm Bill is slated for the floor this week, let us use 

that as an example of how PAYGO is working so far. 

And if you could bring up chart number two, I would appreciate 

that.

This chart summarizes just the Farm Bill as reported by the Agriculture Committee. It is a gross cost, a gross spending increase 

of 14.2 billion over ten years. Now, let us look at how this spending 

increase is supposedly paid for. 

First, there is $8.5 billion in real spending cuts. These are legitimate and CBO has scored them as legitimate savings. Then there 

are $4.7 billion worth of timing shifts. These are quote, unquote 

savings the Agriculture Committee claims from delaying direct 

payments, counter cyclical payments, and payment to crop insurers, and making early collections of crop insurance premiums. 

But even as the Director of CBO has written, quote, all of those 

outlays will ultimately occur in subsequent years, end quote. In 

other words, they are not real savings. 

Third, the bill as reported takes credit for about 400 million in 

savings from provisions aimed at detecting fraudulent payments. 

But under CBO’s usual guidelines, these savings would not be 

counted, but CBO says in its cost estimate for the bill that it was 

directed to give the Agriculture Committee credit for them. 


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So the bottom line is that if you give the Agriculture Committee 

credit only for the legitimate spending cuts and not for the timing 

shifts or the nonscoreable offsets, their bill still increases spending 

by $5.7 billion over ten years. But, again, this is just for the bill 

as reported. 

We keep hearing that the Majority also plans to double the 

spending increases in the bill and turn to other committees to find 

offsets for additional increases. We do not know for sure what those 

offsets are or where they are coming from. Are they tax increases 

or fees or what? More importantly, are they real? All this makes 

me wonder how serious we all are about the PAYGO commitment. 

Now, having said all this, I should also add that I have long supported process reforms and many of us here at this table have 

worked at that to make the budget more transparent and accountable. I believe that process can be used to create incentives for controlling spending and I believe we can do this on a bipartisan basis. 

I think the Majority has made good strides on earmark reform 

in the beginning of the year. Went backwards a little bit on that, 

but I think after we had some episodes on the floor, the Majority 

has come back to making the earmark reform transparent. 

Also, there are a lot of ideas we have had before that were bipartisan. The line item veto passed out of this Committee with a bipartisan vote last year passes on the floor with a big bipartisan 

vote, yet we seem to be having a hard time getting it scheduled for 

a hearing, a markup, or even floor consideration. 

The Blue Dogs have given us good ideas. They have given us a 

lot of good ideas that many Republicans agreed to. These include 

setting aside funds for emergencies which we did in the last Congress which was eliminated in this Congress. We have had votes 

here in this Committee on our markup of the budget resolution trying to incorporate some of the good Blue Dogs’ ideas that were offered in the last Congresses only to see them shut down. 

So my appeal here is let us get back to working together to bring 

real reform to the budget process so we can do this on a bipartisan 

basis. The only way we are ever going to get the budget under control is to stop pretending that there is an easy, magic fix out there 

and to get down to actually doing the work that we know must be 

done. And I certainly hope Congress achieves that realization sooner rather than later. 

And I thank the Chairman for his long indulgence. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Ryan. 

In the interest of time and proceeding with our witnesses, let us 

go straight to Dr. Orszag. 

Dr. Orszag, I believe we have your testimony and we will simply 

make your testimony and David Walker’s testimony part of the 

record so that each of you can summarize your statement as you 

see fit. But the floor is yours. 

6

STATEMENTS OF PETER ORSZAG, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE; DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 

STATEMENT OF PETER ORSZAG 

Mr. ORSZAG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

Ryan, members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify this morning. 

In my oral remarks, I would like to highlight four points. First, 

the BEA, that is the Budget Enforcement Act’s PAYGO requirement helped to enforce multi-year fiscal goals and prevent fiscal deterioration during much of the time it was in effect. When the 

budgetary situation and policy priorities changed, however, the 

PAYGO requirement and discretionary spending caps were often 

superseded or ignored. 

Part of PAYGO’s influence, moreover, may be more apparent 

than real in that any set of rules tends to encourage efforts to design policy changes in a manner that meets only the strict letter 

of the requirement. The bottom line is that rules can definitely help 

to enforce fiscal discipline and CBO believes that they did do so in 

the 1990s, but they are not a panacea. 

Second, even if PAYGO rules were fully successful in achieving 

their objective, that is offsetting the budgetary impact of policy 

changes, they would succeed only in preventing further deterioration of the long-term fiscal imbalance that exists under current 

policies. The nation faces a very substantial long-term fiscal challenge under those sets of policies and PAYGO rules do not address 

that underlying problem. 

This chart which I have shown you before and I will continue to 

show you at every opportunity highlights the basic problem. If 

healthcare costs continue to grow at the same rate over the next 

four decades as they did over the past four decades, Medicare and 

Medicaid will grow from four and a half percent of the economy 

today to 20 percent of the economy by 2050. That is the entire size 

of the federal government today. 

There are significant opportunities to constrain healthcare costs 

over the long term without harming health and that is the central 

long-term fiscal challenge facing the United States. 

These crucial fiscal issues are not directly addressed by PAYGO 

rules and indeed many steps that hold the potential to reduce 

spending over the long term, for example, investing in comparative 

effectiveness research to examine what works and what does not 

in healthcare, actually entails short-term costs that would need to 

be offset under the PAYGO rules. 

Third, both the House and Senate already have nonstatutory 

PAYGO rules in place. One striking way in which the House rules 

differ from the previous statutory PAYGO requirement and from 

the Senate rule is that it applies to each separate House bill rather 

than to a broader collection of legislative proposals. Consequently, 

it does not allow savings from prior bills to cover the cost of a pending bill. 

Relative to the current rules in the House and the Senate, reinstating a statutory PAYGO requirement might provide a more permanent structure and would make possible enforcement mechaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:19 Jan 02, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-16\38254.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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nisms like sequestration that cannot be established under House 

and Senate rules. 

Finally, policy makers may also want to consider how budget 

rules affect the long-term budget picture. Even within the BEA 

PAYGO structure, only medium-term effects on the budget were 

captured and the long-term effects were sometimes quite different. 

Revisiting the issue of a statutory PAYGO requirement might 

provide an opportunity to consider rules governing long-term budgetary effects such as the one currently embodied in the Senate 

PAYGO rule. 

On that note, I wanted to let the Committee know that CBO will 

be devoting increasing resources to such long-term budget effects, 

especially in the critical area of healthcare. 

Later this year, we will be releasing an updated long-term budget outlook and we intend to release a long-term budget outlook on 

an annual basis thereafter to provide this Committee and the rest 

of the Congress with the information that you need to tackle these 

long-term budget challenges. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Peter Orszag follows:]

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Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much, Dr. Orszag. 

Mr. Walker. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WALKER 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ryan. 

Thank you for putting the entire statement in the record. It is good 

to be here today. 

I would like to use a few slides to make a few key points so then 

we can go to Q and A. First slide, please. 


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I think it is important to look back and learn from the past as 

we try to prepare to create a better future. As you can see here, 

since 1962, mandatory spending has grown dramatically and discretionary spending continues to be squeezed and is expected to 

continue to be squeezed. 

Interestingly, if you go back to 1797, the end of the second term 

of President George Washington, you will find that all the major 

functions of government in 1797 are now in discretionary spending. 

So what the major functions of governments were at the beginning 

of our Republic are now getting squeezed, national defense, homeland security, judicial system, Legislative Branch, Executive Office 

of the President, foreign affairs, Attorney General, et cetera. 

Next, please. 

In January of 2001 when I testified before the Senate and the 

House, we had fiscal sustainability for 40 plus years. We were expected to pay off the national debt and, therefore, you can look and 

see that there was no projection for any net interest payments 

going forward because we were projected to pay off the national 

debt. For a variety of reasons, we have changed paths. Here is the 

latest baseline future simulation. Next chart, please. 

This is based upon the CBO baseline extended and CBO does a 

great job. We work together on a very complementary basis. But, 

frankly, CBO has certain restrictions placed on them as to what 

they have to assume for their baseline assumptions. 

For example, that all tax cuts will expire, that discretionary 

spending will grow by the rate of inflation for a period of time, that 

AMT will not be fixed. And so, therefore, if you look at this, things 

really look better than they really are. 

Next, please. 

This represents an alternative fiscal future based upon a more 

realistic set of assumptions. One of the assumptions is that over 

the longer term that the U.S. taxes at historical tax levels, about 

18.4 percent of GDP, it assumes that we do not reform Social Security and Medicare and it assumes that discretionary spending over 

the longer term grows by the rate of the economy. 

As you can see, this is a clearly unacceptable fiscal future. The 

largest growing expense is interest on the rising national debt. And 

by the way, the model which drives this blows up in the 2040s. 

Next, please. 

Or crashes stated differently. If you look at the path that we are 

on, the big three programs, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are set to consume 100 percent of the historical levels of taxation of the federal government by the mid 2040s. 

Next, please. 

This is an alternative way of looking at what the deficit looks 

like going forward under the baseline and alternative simulation. 

Next, please. 

Last week for the first time in history, GAO issued a fiscal simulation for state and local governments in the aggregate. And this 

shows with the red line that when you look at the federal surplus 

or deficit, it is only a portion of the problem because state and local 

governments starting in about 2017, which, by the way, is the year 

that Social Security surplus turns negative and we go to a deficit 

for Social Security on a cash flow basis, they start having serious 

23

problems that grow over time driven primarily by healthcare. 

Healthcare is driving the federal deficit, it is driving state deficits, 

and it is driving the undercutting of the U.S. competitiveness from 

a business standpoint. So healthcare is the big challenge. 

Next, please. 

You know, PAYGO rules, which I will touch on in a second, are 

one positive step, I believe, that could help us to get on a more prudent and sustainable path, but they are only one of many that are 

necessary. 

One of the things that we need to do is we need to improve 

transparency and enhance accountability with regard to where we 

are financially and where we are headed fiscally. We need to recognize that the United States is going to last more than ten years 

and move beyond the flat earth theory for budget analysis and to 

recognize that our real problems are not the next five years or ten 

years. They are not short-term deficits. They are long-range, growing structural deficits and related debt burdens that could swamp 

our ship of state. 

This represents a summary of something that we sent up to this 

Committee and others for consideration to enhance transparency 

and accounting and budgeting. This is a beginning, not an end. 

This is a follow-up to my testimony in January earlier this year. 

We are working with CBO and OMB and others to try to be able 

to address their comments and concerns. 

I am confident that we will be able to do that over a period of 

time, but I think it is important that we recognize that in addition 

to controls, we need more transparency because that is going to be 

necessary in order to not just deal with discretionary spending but 

also to deal with mandatory and the revenue side. 

Now, on the PAYGO, if I can. When I appeared before the Committee, I noted as I have before that GAO believes that it is important to consider reestablishing statutory PAYGO rules on both 

sides of the ledger, on both the spending side and the tax side of 

the ledger. 

As I have said before, we need to learn from the first rule of 

holes and that is when you are in a hole, the first thing you have 

to do is stop digging. Discretionary caps and PAYGO are designed 

to stop the digging, but there are at least two reasons to impose 

PAYGO on both direct spending and the revenue side of the budget. 

The first is obvious. Both affect the bottom line. It is the net of 

revenues and expenditures that affect the bottom line. 

The second is just as important, but not as obvious, and that is 

if you only apply PAYGO on one side of the ledger, then what is 

likely to occur over time is an increase of back-door spending in the 

form of tax preferences. 

Tax preferences or tax expenditures represent back-door spending. They are largely off the radar screen. They are not part of the 

normal budget appropriations process. They are not part of the annual financial report of the U.S. government. They cost us 800 to 

$900 billion a year in foregone revenue. They need more transparency and they should not be off the radar screen. 

They also are like mandatory spending in which they are not 

subject to periodic review. They are not subject to periodic reauVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:19 Jan 02, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-16\38254.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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thorization. They are in the base and they are assumed to continue. It would be very unfortunate if the restoration of the PAYGO 

rule were to lead to an increase in the portion of our financial situation that is on automatic pilot and, therefore, reduce transparency 

and control. 

As has been mentioned by Peter, PAYGO makes a lot of sense, 

but we need other budget controls. And, furthermore, we also are 

going to need to reform entitlement programs as well as engage in 

comprehensive tax reform in order to put our fiscal house in order. 

In closing, our fiscal clock is ticking and time is working against 

us. For the sake of our country, our children, our grandchildren, we 

need to start to act because our future is at risk. And if we want 

to keep America great, we are going to have to start making some 

tough choices. And the longer we wait, the more dramatic the 

changes are going to have to be, the less transition time, and the 

higher level of risk that we might face some crisis which does not 

necessarily promote sound decision making. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of David M. Walker follows:]

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Chairman SPRATT. In light of the fact that Mr. Cooper and Mr. 

Moore and Mr. Boyd have a bill and I believe Mr. Berry is also a 

cosponsor, I would like to turn first to them. I will be the cleanup hitter today and put my questions off until last and let Mr. Cooper lead the questions and make any opening statement he cares 

to make about their legislation. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

important hearing. We Blue Dogs strongly believe that statutory 

PAYGO is necessary. 

We appreciate the fact that we have rules-based PAYGO today 

in the House and the Senate, but we would like to go that extra 

step, so I want to pay particular tribute not only to the lead sponsor of the bill, Baron Hill, but also to the Blue Dog leadership, 


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much of whom are present here today, our leader, Allen Boyd; our 

policy Chairman, Dennis Moore; Marion Berry, an invaluable voice 

on all subjects. 

But we want to make sure that people on the Committee realize 

this is open to all to cosponsor and help. We would particularly invite our friends across the aisle. 

I need not remind you that statutory PAYGO was put in place 

in the Administration of the first President Bush. It worked well 

for twelve years until it was allowed to expire. And none other 

than Alan Greenspan has testified before this Committee that it 

would be the single most important reform that we could undertake to renew statutory PAYGO. 

It is not perfect. Several of the flaws have been pointed out. Our 

excellent witnesses have done that as have folks like Paul Ryan on 

the other side of the aisle. But it is one of the best places we can 

possibly start. 

I hope that we can move forward together and heed the dire 

warnings of the panelists. Sometimes in a hearing like this, it is 

tempting to just assume it is the same old, same old, but they have 

talked about some of the most grave threats that have ever faced 

the United States of America. 

I would like to particularly invite my colleagues to welcome the 

fiscal wake-up tour led by Comptroller General Walker to your district. They came to Nashville, Tennessee last week. They have had 

an astonishing effect on educating and informing the people of our 

area on the real fiscal problems that our nation faces. 

I see Bob Bixby back there with the Concord Coalition. Heritage 

was represented, the Brookings Institute. It is an amazing transformative effect on your district. So please take advantage of it. 

I would like to end by focusing on the fact that every day in this 

job, we face challenges. We faced one with the Ag Bill. I hope that 

we will heed on a bipartisan basis the warning that Paul Ryan 

gave us when he pointed out that the bill may well be $5.7 billion 

short. So we face a moral test to how we are going to meet that. 

Do we put the interest of America first or of a particular industry? And I would be the first to rant it is a vitally important industry for our nation, but America is even more important and we will 

face that challenge just in the next 24, 48 hours. 

So there is no point in partisanship here. There is no point in 

finger pointing. We all have to work on this together for every bill 

to pull America out of the ditch. So I would like to thank the witnesses and particularly thank the Blue Dogs for their remarkable 

record of fiscal leadership. We can do better. We all can do better, 

but statutory PAYGO is a great place to start. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. Let me just pick up where my friend left off. Look, 

when Republicans had the Majority, we did timing shifts, too, and 

a lot of us decried them. So I am not trying to sit here and say 

that, you know, we are so much better than you guys are. 

Congress has fallen down on the job on all of these things. But 

since each of us are going to have to take this vote probably Friday, 

47

I think, on final passage on the Farm Bill, Dr. Orszag, I want to 

go through this with you. 

I have seen timing shifts in the appropriation bills that, you 

know, rank up in the millions, but it seems to me the timing shift 

in this bill is about 4.7 billion, about 5.7 total. 

You sent a letter to us about the size of these timing shifts. 

Could you go through the offsets that are really just timing shifts 

in this bill and the direct scoring that are in the Farm Bill and give 

us a sense of what I tried to get through in my opening statement 

about the Farm Bill? 

I mean, the whole point of the question here is, yes, we have 

PAYGO and you can comply with it on paper technically speaking 

or you can really comply with it in spirit and actually reduce 

spending to pay for priorities. 

And I want to get to whether or not that is being the case here 

with the bill we are all going to vote on in a day or two. And could 

you elaborate on that, please? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Sure. CBO estimates that roughly $4.7 billion is 

shifted out of the budget window through 2017 through changes in 

advanced payments on various different farm programs and 

through speeding up the collection of funds that would otherwise 

be collected after 2017. So that $4.7 billion number that you cited 

is consistent with and I am sure based on CBO analysis. 

In addition to that, there is an estimated $375 million that would 

be collected from efforts to detect fraud in crop insurance programs. 

Traditionally under score keeping rule 14, those savings would not 

be scored. But after consultation with the House Budget Committee, we were directed to include those savings in the CBO estimate that you have received. 

Mr. RYAN. Well, let me move on to that and look at some of the 

other bills that are coming down the pike. For example, the Student Loan Bill, that already passed. That reduced interest rates on 

loan but only temporarily. After four and a half years, they would 

return to their current level allowing Congress to basically say on 

paper that the bill was offset when in reality, the cost would skyrocket and the offsets would not equal their interest deductions if 

they were made permanent. 

I think we have a similar instance in the SCHIP Bill that passed 

the Senate. Did that bill not show a rapid decline in SCHIP funding and eligibility for children in the out years to show that it 

would comply within their budget window? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Yes. The funding in the back five years is significantly reduced relative to the front five. 

Mr. RYAN. And so the policy assumption in that SCHIP Bill is 

that we are going to kick all these children off of health insurance 

in the last five years, in the second five-year window; is that correct? 

Mr. ORSZAG. The Senate finance mark involves significantly 

lower funding than a continuation of the first five years would 

imply. 

Chairman SPRATT. Let me just make clear. You said the Senate? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Yes, I did. 

Chairman SPRATT. Okay. 

48

Mr. RYAN. So we can all comply with PAYGO on paper technically speaking, but the question is, are we actually really doing 

it? And I think the question goes to statutorily. We have a difference of opinion on how exactly to do that. But is it true that if 

you put a mandatory program increase in an appropriations bill 

that PAYGO does not apply to that? 

Mr. ORSZAG. This has been the subject of some discussion. My 

understanding at this point is that a CHIMP, that is a change in 

a mandatory program on an appropriations bill—yeah, I had to 

learn all this kind of lingo—is now supposed to be offset, but there 

is some ambiguity about the handling of that kind of situation. 

Mr. RYAN. Was it offset in the Iraq War Supplemental Bill? 

Mr. ORSZAG. I will have to get back to you with the details of 

that, that supplemental in particular. 

Mr. RYAN. Sure. 

General Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Ryan, let me just note that when you are talking about PAYGO provisions, especially if you are talking about 

statutory provisions, one of the questions you have to address is 

who is going to blow the whistle when people may be complying in 

form but not substance. This is a very, very important point and 

I think that you really need to consider that. Who is in a position 

to blow the whistle and that is something that I think you need 

to focus on. 

Mr. RYAN. I thank you. That is kind of what we are trying to do 

here right now. 

There are many questions. I am trying to comply with the fiveminute rule here, so I assume I have used all that up. So I will 

yield. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Edwards. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Let me first begin by responding as I have in the past to some 

of the comments made by my colleague, Mr. Ryan. He said the 

Democratic budget is, quote, a disappointment. Let me say what I 

think was a disappointment to the American people was a partisan 

Republican plan, budget plan for twelve years in which the Republicans controlled this House, that once combined with a Republican 

in the White House resulted in a free lunch philosophy of tax cuts 

that resulted in taking the largest surpluses in American history 

and turning them into the largest deficits in American history. 

I would also point out that it was his colleagues in this House, 

not Democrats, who passed the largest increase in the Medicare entitlement program in the history of Medicare. Those votes coming 

from the same folks now who are telling us how we should reform 

entitlement spending and keep it under control. 

Mr. RYAN. Would the gentleman care to yield on that point? 

Mr. EDWARDS. I will be happy to discuss it if I have time at the 

end of my comments. The gentleman has had quite a bit of time 

to discuss. 

He then, I thought it was interesting, criticized the Democratic 

plan for temporarily trying to help students get lower cost on student loans. If that is a gimmick, then I would suggest the trillion 

dollar tax cuts that were written purposely to be temporary must 

49

be the mother of all gimmicks. So I hope we would at least be consistent in our definition of what a gimmick is. 

And then, finally, he said let us get back to working together and 

I do welcome that. I would genuinely welcome that. But for the 

facts and the record, let me point out that for twelve years, Republican control in the House, Republican budgets were passed on an 

overwhelmingly partisan basis with very little, if any, input from 

Democrats in the Congress. 

So the implication that let us get back to the way it used to be, 

it sure was not that way during the twelve years of Republican 

control. If we can find common ground now on entitlement reform 

or other things, Mr. Ryan, I would welcome that. 

Dr. Orszag, let me ask you a question. In your judgment based 

on your analysis, had it not been for the tax cuts passed during the 

Bush Administration, would we have a federal balanced budget in 

fiscal year 2007? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Mr. Edwards, we responded to a letter from Mr. 

Spratt on that question and noted that there are no current estimates of the revenue impact from the tax legislation. However, if 

you combined original Joint Committee on Taxation scores for that 

revenue legislation with an estimated macroeconomic impact from 

a variety of models, one gets a budgetary impact on the range of 

about $200 billion which is slightly higher than what we expect the 

budget deficit to be this year. 

Mr. EDWARDS. So if I could summarize that, basically that analysis making the assumptions you make says that if it were not for 

the Republican tax cuts that were passed without Pay As You Go, 

more or less under the free lunch rule, passed tax cuts and we do 

not have to pay for them, if it had not been for those tax cuts, we 

would have a balanced budget today. 

The real debate on the PAYGO is that Republicans, some of them 

in Congress, not so much in the hinterlands of our country, Republicans in Congress are saying Pay As You Go should only apply to 

spending, not to tax cuts. They seem to imply that somebody can 

cut taxes dramatically and not have an impact on the deficit which 

factually is dead wrong and history has certainly proven that in 

the 1980s and again in this decade. 

Dr. Orszag, may I ask you specifically if you cut taxes by one dollar on the American people, is there any credible evidence to suggest that you bring in an extra dollar in federal revenue to make 

up for that tax cut? 

Mr. ORSZAG. No. There is evidence that you offset perhaps some 

of the costs. It depends exactly what kind of tax cut it is and it depends on how it is financed. But a full offset, that is the notion that 

tax cuts pay for themselves, is not supported by serious analytical 

work. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Not supported by serious analytical work. Thank 

you for that. 

In fact, I think some CBO serious analytical work said in some 

cases, tax cuts at the very best, most optimistic assumption might 

bring back 20 to 25 cents for every dollar lost in revenue. 

And it actually went further to say that when tax cuts, as these 

Republican tax cuts have been paid for by borrowing money from 

the Chinese and Japanese and other foreign countries, that actuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:19 Jan 02, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-16\38254.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
50

ally tax cuts actually harm the economy and reduce federal revenues. 

Is that not correct that the CBO has said that tax cuts in some 

cases when paid for by borrowed money could actually hurt the 

economy and economic growth? 

Mr. ORSZAG. That is correct, but that is also a reflection of a variety of studies, not just CBO’s own studies. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I thank the Chairman for this. 

I am now in my third year on this Committee and certain scripts 

never change. And, you know, it is both sides. There seems to be 

a whole lot more interest in whacking each other over things that 

are in the past and really we cannot go back and unwind or 

change. But, yet, we seem to enjoy and revel in that, but it seems 

to be counterproductive. 

Back on the tax cuts, is there a top rate of tax that we could say 

does begin to become counterproductive? In other words, those 

charts show basically 20 percent of GDP as a constant. Can we, in 

fact, raise taxes and continue to enjoy standards of living increases 

and opportunities at a 50 percent of GDP number? Either guy, 

David or Peter. 

Mr. WALKER. That would have serious adverse consequences on 

economic growth, on disposable income, on our competitiveness 

from a global standpoint. I think, you know, the message is clear 

and compelling. The math does not come close to working. 

We are going to have to have additional revenues, about 18.4 

percent of GDP over the longer term. The sooner that Congress 

acts, the lower the level of taxation can be. You are going to get 

the most out of entitlement reform. You are going to get something 

out of imposing these budget controls and reprioritizing discretionary spending, but you are going to have to get more than 18.4 

percent of GDP. 

And, frankly, what is going on right now is taxation without representation. What is going on right now is we are deferring huge 

tax increases absent meaningful reforms that our grand kids——

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me challenge you a little bit there. So the only 

way to fix this wreck is to raise taxes to 50 percent? 

Mr. WALKER. No. Absolutely not. Let me be clear. I think there 

is a multi-pronged approach. One, reimpose tough and meaningful 

budget controls including statutory PAYGO rules that apply on 

both sides of the ledger to slow the bleeding or stop the bleeding. 

Secondly, to reprioritize the base of discretionary spending, a lot 

of which is not very effective. 

Thirdly, reform entitlement programs and, fourthly, engage in 

tax reform, all those. 

Mr. ORSZAG. And if I can just add, I think in addition to PAYGO 

rules to avoiding making the problem worse, by far the most important thing to start tackling is the rate at which healthcare costs 

grow, period. And we are not investing enough in analyzing options 

and exploring policy choices that will help bend that curve. 

If there is anything else that we could possibly do during your 

time in Congress, during my tenure at CBO, if we start to bend 

51

that curve, we are going to leave future generations substantially 

better off than anything else that we could do. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And is there a way to raise taxes to do that, to 

fix that? 

Mr. ORSZAG. It is clear that we are on a path that ultimately——

Mr. CONAWAY. No, no, no. Can you fix healthcare costs curve by 

raising taxes? No. What you have to do——

Mr. ORSZAG. That is on the spending side. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I understand that. But every solution coming from 

many of our folks is that let us just raise taxes, let us just raise 

taxes. And I want to challenge that. 

You have just said that that is a spending issue. Healthcare costs 

is a spending issue and so we have to deal meaningfully with the 

rate of growth of those costs and that spending in order to make 

this work. 

This is not a hundred percent guarantee either way. I mean, neither side has the answer. We cannot cut spending enough to do it 

and you guys cannot raise taxes enough to do it. And so we have 

got to figure out some way to make it work. 

Mr. WALKER. The President did put something on the table that 

I do not think the Congress took seriously enough, quite frankly. 

There is no way you can solve this problem with taxes alone. That 

would be counterproductive. All right? 

But the President put two things on the table in his last budget 

submission that relate to revenues, that relate to healthcare. First, 

that we need to change the tax treatment of the fact that most individuals do not pay income tax or payroll tax on employer-provided and paid healthcare. Number one tax preference growing 

very rapidly. 

And, secondly, we need to look at whether or not the subsidies 

for Medicare, whether or not well-off individuals ought to be paying 

more for Medicare than they are right now. I think it is inevitable 

we are going to have to do those two things. You need to do a lot 

more than that to get the cost curve under control. It is inevitable 

you are going to have to do that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me ask one quick one, David. You mentioned 

who is the whistle blower in this deal. Would enhanced recision be 

helpful or is that just a figment of all of our imagination? 

Mr. WALKER. I think there is a middle ground. You know, obviously line item veto is, you know, a problem from a constitutional 

standpoint because of the change in power. However, expedited line 

item recision that only requires a majority vote by the Congress to 

override, I think, has potential and should be seriously considered. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Doggett of Texas. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Walker, you indicated in your testimony that as bad as 

things are right now, it was not that long ago when they were significantly better. I believe your testimony was that in January of 

’01 when you testified, and which I think happened to coincide with 

President Bush taking the oath of office, that we had fiscal sustainability for 40 years; is that correct? 

Mr. WALKER. That is correct. 

Mr. DOGGETT. And you said for a variety of reasons, we have 

changed that. I took Mr. Ryan’s statement to be essentially that 

52

since that time, Republicans have dug us into such a budget hole 

that statutory PAYGO alone will not solve the problem and I agree 

with him. I think we need that and we need more. 

The suggestion by Mr. Conaway that we cannot go back and 

undo all that has been done and that this is all in the past is true 

to a point. It is just that some of that thinking from the past continues to persist today that we can continue to cut taxes and even 

though the studies are widespread that that will not generate more 

revenue than it costs us, that we can continue to do that. 

I am interested particularly, since I serve on the Ways and 

Means Committee, in the comments that you mentioned about tax 

preferences is back-door spending because they are not only backdoor spending, but they are usually a very blunt instrument to accomplish what they are set out to do. And I have supported many 

of them and I have questioned many of them. 

But if you take something like how to address the problem of uninsured children—my State, as you know, Dr. Walker, is right at 

the top in not caring for its children and providing them access to 

healthcare. And the suggestion that you can cover more of them 

with a tax credit, but it is a very inefficient and cost ineffective 

way to try to get more poor children of the working poor covered 

versus dealing with it with a direct expenditure. 

There has been a tendency in recent years with all the hullabaloo 

over tax cuts as a solution to every problem to think that if you 

can cut taxes for them enough that you can solve that and any 

other problem. 

What do you think is the most effective way to address the problem of the 800 to 900 billion that you say we are losing in revenue 

through tax preferences, back-door spending? Both of you, I would 

welcome your comments. 

Mr. WALKER. We have a number of recommendations in that 

transparency in accounting and budgeting proposal that I mentioned before which is a beginning and we are engaging in discussions with CBO and OMB and a number of members on the Hill 

on that. 

Part of it is that we need to have more transparency over this. 

For example, we ought to have included in the financial statements 

of the government, we ought to have it included in budget documents how much money we are talking about. What are these, how 

much do they cost us. We ought to have a mechanism to try to periodically reevaluate these preferences to understand whether or not 

they are making a difference or not and who is benefitting from 

them. 

And let me give you a perfect example. We spend a lot of money 

on tax preferences for savings. Most of them do not work. America 

has a negative savings rate. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Are we not spending more money on retirement 

tax credits than we get in retirement savings from those credits? 

Mr. WALKER. I cannot talk at that level because you are talking 

about a subset of overall savings. What I can tell you is, and part 

as you know for retirement savings, that is a timing difference. You 

do recapture revenues in the future when people end up getting 

their payments out. So it is a little bit more complicated than that. 

53

But what we do know is we spend a lot of money on current tax 

preferences, but the household savings rate in America for the last 

two years was negative. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Dr. Orszag. 

Mr. ORSZAG. Let me make a couple comments. First, there are 

a variety of tax expenditures that are devoted to policy objectives 

that seem inconsistent with other things that the Congress is simultaneously trying to do. So that is one set of issues that may 

warrant attention. 

Even for those that are aimed at objectives that the Congress 

seems dedicated to, promoting retirement saving, promoting health 

insurance, et cetera, the current design has several inefficiencies 

associated with it. Most prominently, tax expenditures are provided 

in the form of a deduction or exclusion and that means that for a 

lot of tax filing units that do not owe income taxes, they are not 

of any benefit. 

And from a narrow economic efficiency perspective, if you are 

going to be providing an incentive for health insurance or retirement, unless you know that high-income households are more responsive to that incentive or generate larger benefits when they do 

respond, it does not make sense from a narrow economic efficiency 

perspective to have anything other than basically a flat incentive. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one other follow-up 

on this? 

Dr. Walker, you told Mr. Ryan that the big question was who 

will blow the whistle to ensure PAYGO is enforced. Who do you 

think should blow the whistle? How should it be done? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, it depends. One, I do not want to compete 

with CBO and there are a number of things that CBO has the ability to do right now within its authority and you could give them 

more authority potentially. 

But I did hear one word that Peter mentioned. He said he was 

directed, CBO was directed to do certain things. I think, you know, 

one of the things you have to think about is that you have to make 

sure that, depending on how this is structured, that you have parties that are independent of the process and that are not subject 

to being directed because in the analysis, Peter is exactly right. It 

is not just a matter of whether or not it complies in form. It is a 

matter of whether it complies in substance. And that involves taking some risk. You know, a lot of times, people do not want to hear 

that it is okay in form but not in substance. 

Chairman SPRATT. Let me clarify what directed means. In every 

case where CBO was called to give us their judgment as to potential savings from potential proposals, we asked them only to include the savings in the baseline when they themselves determined 

that those savings could be validated. 

For example, the USDA presented in its budget request an estimation that data mining and other fiscal disciplines applying to 

crop insurance would yield as much as $650 million in savings over 

a period of five years. That would have helped greatly in meeting 

our PAYGO requirements for the Farm Bill at that point in time. 

The CBO would only score it at $125 million. 

There were other issues that I could go through. But in every 

case where they gave us a number that they thought was a valid 

54

savings number, then we, when necessary, asked or directed that 

it be included, but we did not direct them to do anything that they 

did not determine themselves. I can see how the word directed 

would give rise to that, but that is the way the processes work. 

Mr. ORSZAG. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one further comment along that note. On score keeping rule 14 and other rules 

governing, rule 14 and rule 3 in particular, there are questions that 

I know that the Budget Committee may want to revisit and that 

CBO could help the Committee revisit in terms of the operation of 

those rules. 

So the most immediate example that was presented involved a 

rule that to many budget observers has some shortcomings associated with it. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you. 

We will now turn to Mr. Alexander of Louisiana. Okay. 

Mr. Smith of Nebraska. Not here. 

Mr. Campbell of California. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of things about which there appears to be no dispute. 

One is that we have a big problem with entitlement spending, that 

that is the biggest long-term problem that we face and we have to 

do something about it or we will have the fiscal train wreck, crash, 

explosion, whatever it was you called it, Mr. Comptroller General, 

and that PAYGO statutory or rules based is not going to cure that 

because it simply, as you said, stops you digging the hole, but does 

not get you out of the hole. 

Given those facts and the purpose of the PAYGO or any PAYGO 

like this is to set a structure that prevents us, Congress, from creating more deficit. Given all those facts, does it not make sense or 

what are your thoughts on that PAYGO, if it is an inaccurate 

structure, that we look at an adequate structure to deal with this 

thing over the long term, something like a spending limit because 

if we continue to increase spending at or above the growth of economy, we will never do anything but increase our deficit unless we 

perpetually increase taxes? 

But if we hold spending long term below the growth in the economy or even at the growth in the economy or even marginally 

above the growth in the economy, that we will eventually get 

around this thing and would that not create a structure that would 

require us, which, frankly, we are going to need to do, require ourselves to make the tough decisions that will get us out of this hole? 

And I ask that for both of you. 

Mr. ORSZAG. I guess I have some concerns or reservations about 

that approach as opposed to one that tackles the underlining drivers of the costs themselves. So in other examples, you know, for 

physician payments, the Congress tried to set an overall cap, the 

sustainable growth rate formula. What happened was, because you 

did not then tackle the underlining driver of the cost affecting physicians, every year, the cap gets lifted. I think it would be much 

better to spend time again investing in figuring out what is going 

to help bend those curves than trying to somehow artificially put 

a cap on top of it. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Dr. Orszag, if I may, the idea is that, yes, I absolutely agree with you. You have to deal with some of these fundaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:19 Jan 02, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-16\38254.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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mental things. But these are tough things for us to deal with, for 

political bodies to do. 

And what we need is the external discipline. I often use as an 

example that people know they should save for their retirement, 

but it is hard to do. There is stuff you want to spend on it now. 

So what do you do? You have your employer take it out of your 

paycheck so you never have the opportunity to see it. You need 

that external discipline to do what you know is right. 

And what I am suggesting and what you are saying, Dr. Orszag, 

is that these are things we know are right, that an overall mandatory and discretionary spending limit would force us to do those 

things. 

Mr. WALKER. Let me come back. First, the real problem is mandatory spending and you need to figure out a way to be able to periodically reconsider those. They are on auto pilot right now. They 

continue to grow. They are outside the budget process, et cetera. 

One way you could do it is to put a hard cap on. Another way 

you could do it is to say we are going to have periodic reconsideration and there may be certain things that were going to happen 

no matter based on the passage of time. 

And if certain triggers are hit with regard to total spending, we 

might accelerate that reconsideration because things were going 

worse than we thought that forces reconsideration at least. And 

you may or may not pass legislation, but it forces it. 

Now, on a cap, I personally believe that in the long term to solve 

our healthcare problem, we are going to have to do four things. 

One, figure out a way to provide basic and essential healthcare 

services to everybody. Basic and essential, I choose those words 

carefully. 

Secondly, impose a cap on healthcare spending by the federal 

government. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Aren’t those two things in conflict? 

Mr. WALKER. No. No. Absolutely not. We could provide basic and 

essential cheaper than what we are doing now, all right, over the 

longer term. 

A cap on what the federal government spends because only the 

federal government can print money and mortgage the future of 

the country with impunity as of present point in time. 

And, thirdly, to move to evidence-based quality standards and, 

fourthly, to improve personal responsibility and accountability. 

So I think there is a role for caps in certain regards, but I think 

there is a lot of things that you can do in the interim before you 

get to that. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Dr. Orszag, in my final ten seconds, anything 

else you have to say on the idea of a spending limit? 

Mr. ORSZAG. I think the history of imposing strict limits, whether 

it is on the deficit under the predecessor to the ‘‘Budget Enforcement Act’’ or under the sustainable growth rate formula, just imposing sort of a blunt cap tends to simply engender efforts to get 

around it. And it would be better to get at the underlining drivers 

of the cost, not that it would necessarily be harmful, but it is not 

particularly productive. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Berry. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I yield back. Thank you. 

56

Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding 

this hearing. I thank you all for being here. 

General Walker, we certainly appreciate you and the message 

you have carried across the country to try to convince as many people as possible that we cannot keep doing what we are doing and 

we are going to have to change our ways. That is my simple way 

of describing what I think you have been doing and I applaud your 

effort for doing that. 

I am curious as to how that is received. When I try to do that, 

the Rotary Club does not like it and then they would just rather 

not hear about it. And I am curious as to how you have been received around the country. I know you have gotten some good Editorial Board reviews and things like that. 

Mr. WALKER. So far, we have been to 21 states, plus the District 

of Columbia. By the end of this year, we will be to at least half the 

states in the union and have other ones scheduled after that. 

Initially the reaction that we got was people were shocked and 

appalled as to what the situation was. They had no idea that it was 

as bad as it was. Now what we are seeing is more people are aware 

that we have a serious problem and it is getting worse with the 

passage of time. And now they are saying what are we going to do 

about it. I mean, what is a possible way forward, if you will. 

You know, candidly what we are trying to do, meaning the participants in the official wake-up tour, Concord, Brookings, Heritage, 

and myself, are trying to make sure that the next President, whomever he or she might be, no matter which party they might be affiliated with, makes fiscal responsibility and intergenerational equity one of their top three priorities. And my personal view is if 

they do not, we are in trouble. 

And by the way, healthcare is a big subset of that. I mean, 

healthcare is the biggest driver. It is not the only one, but it is by 

far the biggest one. 

Mr. BERRY. It has been said here this morning and I have heard 

it said many other times in some cases, you know, nobody has the 

answer. I refuse to believe that. I came here in 1993 and worked 

in the Clinton White House. If I am not mistaken, Peter, you were 

there too. 

Mr. ORSZAG. I was. 

Mr. BERRY. And my response to that is we did it. I do not know 

if our situation then is as bad as it is now, but it was pretty doggone bad and we cut 20 percent of the federal workforce and we 

made some really tough decisions. And I refuse to believe that we 

cannot only cut spending, get control of healthcare costs, and provide better healthcare for the American people all at the same 

time. 

So, you know, I think that this is a doable deal. I think it is 

something we have to do. And I applaud both of you for addressing 

this. I think PAYGO is good. I support it. And at the same time, 

I hold no illusions that that solves all our problems. 

We have got a lot of tough decisions to make, but we are going 

to have to make them and make them soon, at least that is my 

opinion. I am not asking you to associate yourselves with that remark. You will get in enough trouble along the line without having 

to associate yourself with me. 

57

But I thank you for being here and I appreciate the work that 

you do. 

Mr. WALKER. If I could mention real quickly, Mr. Berry, PAYGO 

is definitely something that in my view should be adopted on both 

sides of the ledger. It is not a panacea, but it does not do anything 

by itself to deal with the $50 trillion hole that we are in. And so 

while it would help us, we have got to focus on that 50 trillion of 

which 32 trillion plus is Medicare alone. 

Mr. BERRY. Well, the only time I do not like PAYGO is when 

they score my bills too high. 

Mr. ORSZAG. Yes. I have been experiencing a lot of this sort of 

cognitive dissonance over scoring. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Tiberi. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. 

And thank you, Mr. Walker, for what you are doing around the 

country. You came to central Ohio earlier this year and my dad 

was quite impressed with your presentation. My dad and mom 

came to America for a better life, for the hope and promise of the 

American dream. My dad did not have a credit card until he was 

60 years old. He is still living in good health and retired today. 

And he was a big fan of a guy whose portrait is in this room, 

John Casik, a former Chairman of this Committee, who talked a 

little bit about fiscal discipline when he was a member of Congress. 

And what my dad does not understand from his—my dad is a 

Reagan Democrat, I guess. He does not understand all the talk 

above the room up here when we talk about spending in Washington, D.C. And let me give you an example, Mr. Walker, that I 

would like you to comment on. 

PAYGO, my dad is for PAYGO. You pay as you go literally, everything, everything. You pay as you go in a household. And he 

was shocked to find out this year, this year when I gave a speech 

somewhere and said that the Democrat budget provides for $81 billion over last year of discretionary spending, over last year, $6 billion in an omnibus, $17 billion in nonwar emergency spending, all 

not subject to PAYGO. He scratched his head and he said, well, 

that is not PAYGO. That is fake PAYGO. I do not understand that. 

And it is something that I have talked about at meetings as well. 

In the context of this large debate, we often hear here that keeping 

more of your own money is a bad thing. 

At the same time, when you have every year, literally every year, 

we spend more than the previous year as a government. Government is set up to spend more money. And if we try to slow the 

growth of government, not cut it, but just slow the growth of government, that is always a bad thing. 

So in the context of your message long term, if we have a 

PAYGO system in place, would not the best type of PAYGO system 

be one that former Chairman Casik advocated and the fact that it 

would be one that applies to discretionary spending, which this one 

does not, discretionary caps, which this does not, emergency spending that cannot be simply avoided with a point of order. 

Bottom line, PAYGO applies to everything because as you have 

said better than anybody out on the talking circuit, the thing that 

is really going to kill us is not the $81 billion over last year in disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:19 Jan 02, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-16\38254.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
58

cretionary spending even though to my dad, that seems like a lot 

of money. It is the mandatory spending that is on auto pilot. 

And the budget that this Committee adopted earlier this year 

does nothing with respect to the mandatory spending that is on 

auto pilot with respect to reconciliation of what you pointed out 

were the healthcare costs. 

Is that not truly something that we should more focus on rather 

than have this talk about, what, you know, some have talked about 

in the halls outside of this room is that you are going to have to 

double the tax that—you have not said this—double the taxation 

that Americans pay for my daughter to make sure that she has 

healthcare, Medicare, and Social Security when she is ready to retire? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, several things. First, you know, clearly there 

are debates from time to time about what are true emergencies 

and, therefore, might not be subject to the rules. 

I understand your point that the PAYGO only applies to discretionary and that discretionary is not the major part of the problem. 

The major part of the problem is mandatory. 

Mr. TIBERI. It does not apply to discretionary. It only applies to 

new mandatory; is that correct, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. WALKER. Right. In other words, what you are proposing is 

we also need spending caps in addition to PAYGO, but you are 

talking about a spending cap that is beyond just discretionary is 

what I hear you saying. 

Mr. TIBERI. For everything. 

Mr. WALKER. Yeah. I understand what you are saying. Let me 

tell you one of the concerns that I have about that. I think that 

we need to do better than PAYGO on everything and the reason 

I say that is that back-loads action. We need to reform Social Security and Medicare now. All right? 

And what I am concerned about is I do not want to give a false 

sense of security that if we achieve PAYGO on the short term on 

those programs that we do not have a problem that we need to 

solve because in reality, the $50 trillion hole that we are in goes 

up two to three trillion minimum every year due to the passage of 

time because of demographics, healthcare costs, compounding interest, et cetera. 

And so, you know, my view is that we need to reimpose tough 

budget controls of which PAYGO is one, tougher than we had in 

the early 1990s because we are in worse shape in the longer term, 

and we need to start engaging in reexamining tax preferences and 

entitlement and other mandatory spending. We need to start now 

and I do not know that we do it on a max PAYGO rule. 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Let us bear in mind that the next year, the 

increase in the base defense budget is at 48 to $50 billion and the 

supplemental increase which is included with the fiscal year 2008 

defense budget is $142 billion additional. 

If you add a cap on discretionary spending, you would still have 

to accommodate that or begin to truncate spending substantially 

for Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. Boyd. 

59

Mr. BOYD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And first I 

want to start by thanking you and, of course, Mr. Ryan for accommodating this hearing. We think it is very important. 

And I also want to thank Director Orszag and General Walker. 

You guys are great. General Walker, there is nobody with a louder 

bullhorn on these issues than you in the last number of years. And 

we are very grateful to you. 

Mr. Chairman, I have been listening with a great deal of interest 

and I hear some things that I like. I hear a few things I do not 

like. But I want to first start by applauding Paul Ryan not for all 

that he said but certainly the way he wound up. 

And you said let us get back to working together, and echo the 

comments of Mr. Conaway, too, and I do this an effort to show you 

that there are people in this room that want to work in a bipartisan way. 

As I remind you that the first PAYGO measure was passed by 

a Democratic Congress and signed into law by a Republican President, George Herbert Walker Bush, in 1990. Democratic Congress, 

Republican President. 

It was extended in the 1990s by a Republican Congress, in 1997, 

I think it was, and signed into law by a Democratic President, Bill 

Clinton. 

In April 2001, President Bush declared his support for two-sided 

PAYGO in his fiscal 2002 budget request to Congress. 

Now, there are many in this Congress, Mr. Chairman, who would 

prefer a one-sided PAYGO. Some would want PAYGO to only apply 

to taxes and not to spending. Others would want it to only apply 

to spending and not taxes. But the only way PAYGO works, as 

these gentlemen will tell you, is to have it two-sided. 

I have heard a lot about what has happened in the last few 

months about budgeting, timing shifts, expiration of policies before 

the budget window is completed so that you do not break the bank 

or exceed spending limits. I have heard a lot about CIMPs. 

I want to tell you, Mr. Chairman, the last six years, most of all 

of those gimmicks have been used up. There are not many left to 

use. 

So my plea to you before my question is that we do need to work 

together, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Conaway, and others. And if we are going 

to get this done, the only way we are going to get it done is working together. 

Mandatory spending has to be dealt with. These gentlemen, everybody here knows that. 

Mr. Tiberi, I would remind you that all the things that you said 

are so important. We had it in the statute until 2002 when they 

expired. I do not need to remind you about the details of how that 

happened, who let it happen. 

So my question simply is this to the gentlemen at the table. This 

is a complicated issue. It is politics wrapped all around it, partisan 

politics. Is PAYGO, statutory PAYGO a good start for getting us 

back on to a path of fiscal sanity? 

Mr. ORSZAG. PAYGO helps to avoid fiscal deterioration and statutory PAYGO opens up possibilities that a rules-based PAYGO 

does not have, like sequestration, for example. 

60

Mr. BOYD. Including discretionary spending caps and statutory 

PAYGO? 

Mr. ORSZAG. You could incorporate discretionary spending caps 

into a PAYGO system broadly like the ‘‘Budget Enforcement Act’’ 

did. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, it is a good start, but it is just a start. We 

need to do more. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. Porter. 

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentleman, appreciate your testimony. And not to belabor 

this point, but appreciate but what you are both doing very, very 

much. 

General, you mentioned in the four steps of success of healthcare 

and one of those was figuring coverage of basic and central for everyone. Can you expand upon that for a moment, please? 

Mr. WALKER. Yes. I will give you one potential conceptual framework. If you look at what are basic and essential services that people need versus unlimited healthcare that people want, especially 

if somebody else is willing to pay for it, then I think you can find 

that there are certain key elements. 

First, inoculations against infectious diseases, certain wellness 

services that make sense not only individually but also collectively 

for society. 

Secondly, protection against financial ruin due to unexpected catastrophic illness. Financial ruin varies based upon your means and 

catastrophic illness obviously is unexpected, could occur at any 

time during your life, while avoiding heroic measures. Heroic measures involve being able to just throw technology or whatever at it 

where there is no real meaningful chance to improve or extend the 

quality of life or life expectancy period. 

And, thirdly, guaranteed access to additional healthcare if you 

want, but you will pay for it. You will pay for it either as part of 

your compensation through your employer or you will pay for it 

otherwise out of your pocket. That is the need. 

There are a lot of things we are doing right now that go well beyond need and we do not have adequate incentives, transparency, 

and accountability mechanisms to control cost. And we need to recognize that reality. 

Mr. PORTER. So the basic and essentials, and I think I follow 

what you are saying, how should that be provided? 

Mr. WALKER. One possible way to provide that is recognize that 

the largest risk pool and financing mechanism that exists in the 

country is the federal government to where ultimately you would 

redefine division of responsibilities for healthcare between the federal government, other levels of government, employers, and individuals, and you would have to phase into this over a number of 

years. 

So in some cases, it would mean the federal government would 

be providing something to people it is not now, for example, the uninsured, but on the other hand, over time, it means we would not 

be providing as much as we are in certain segments of society now. 

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I think the last thing we need to keep in mind is there is a difference between whether or not you are covered by a program and 

how much you ought to pay for it. One of the things we need to 

be thinking more, as I mentioned to Mr. Conaway, we need to be 

thinking about it is one thing if you are covered by Medicare, it is 

another as to how much you ought to pay for it. You know, the taxpayers for Part B and Part D pay 75 percent of the cost. 

Should the taxpayers subsidize, should our kids and grand kids 

subsidize 75 percent of the cost for everybody no matter what their 

means is? I would debate that. 

Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much. Again, appreciate both you 

and what you are doing. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Etheridge. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank 

you for holding this hearing and the Ranking Member too. 

You know, we can talk all day about how we got here. Most of 

us know what happened. And I think Mr. Boyd covered it pretty 

well. There were those who decided that they would rather get off 

of PAYGO and spend and not have to pay the bill. And then now 

they are the ones who want to talk about how we do it. 

The truth is, I think, and I want to hear your comment, you 

touched on it already, I think you have covered it. You said we 

need PAYGO on both sides of the ledger, on the spending side as 

well as the tax side. And I happen to agree. 

There has been a lot of comment on the Farm Bill here and let 

me, since I sit on that Committee, I think it is appropriate I have 

something to say because when that bill comes to the floor, it will 

be deficit neutral. We have an obligation to do that as a Committee. 

And the real issues gets between the mandatory and the discretionary piece of most of these issues. And this is a five-year piece 

of legislation. There are those who would like to take rural America 

back to the wood shed for the free spending of some folks who are 

not a part of rural America. And if we take it out of rural America, 

it has been my experience over the years, if rural America falters, 

the rest of us follow pretty quickly behind. Our food and fiber is 

in trouble. 

But my question to you, to both of you, and I thank you for what 

you are doing, and, Mr. Walker, let me thank you for taking the 

message across America. I think it needs a third party. We saw 

that in the early 1990s what happened and I think it is important 

we continue to do that because your leadership is so critical. 

But I think it is important to get some messages out. No matter 

how hard we work, one individual can discredit an awful lot of 

what we are going to do. And let me give an example. 

The Vice President of the United States said deficits do not matter. And a lot of people listened to that and they think that is really true. I happen to believe deficits matter. I think every American 

does. But if they think they are going to get something and it does 

not make any difference, and I appreciate your comments as relates to deficits in the general sense, you have touched on it, because PAYGO in light of the explosion of the foreign debt that is 

now flowing into this country to some extent is helping keep our 

interest rates down because people are investing in America. 

62

At some point, if we do not get our house in order, that is not 

going to happen and we will hit the sunami of rising interest rates, 

the lack of investment in foreign dollars, and escalating tax increases. 

I would appreciate both of your comments on that because I 

think that could be the worst of all worlds and we have not touched 

on that. We have gone around it, but we have not touched it directly. 

Mr. ORSZAG. Deficits matter a lot. 

Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Yeah. I will expand a little. You are correct. The 

Vice President did say that and the question is, what did he mean. 

Did he mean that they did not matter politically or did he mean 

that they did not matter economically? Did he mean that the deficits at the levels that we were running then were not a problem? 

Who knows? You will have to ask him. 

Here is the bottom line. 

Mr. PORTER. They both matter. 

Mr. WALKER. Structural deficits matter, especially when they are 

large and growing. But it is not just the deficits. It is the accumulated debt and related burdens associated with those deficits. 

Part of the problem we have right now is our current level of 

deficits are not a big problem. But what is the big problem is where 

we are headed. We are headed into uncharted territory. 

Now, in fairness, the Administration’s position on deficits has 

changed dramatically in the last year and a half, maybe in part 

due to fiscal wake-up and other efforts. I do not know. Now the 

President says deficits matter. We need to balance the budget within five years, although he is just talking the unified budget, not operating. And we need to make a down payment on the $50 trillion imbal- ance and he proposed about $8 trillion worth of down payments in 

part due to the things I talked about before, changes in how we tax 

or how we give tax preferences for employer-provided healthcare 

and income-related premiums for Medicare, if you will, you know. 

So we also need to keep in mind foreign debt. The biggest risk 

we face is that since we are relying upon foreign investors to finance our excess consumption to an extent that we have never relied upon them before, if they decide that they do not want to continue to finance our debt at the same rates that they have, interest 

rates will go up and when interest rates go up, that will have a 

compounding effect. 

And, by the way, our simulations do not assume any rise in interest rates. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Schwartz of Pennsylvania. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate the 

last couple of comments that were made because I would like to 

bring this back. 

There was a lot of discussion about how we might tackle the 

long-term dilemma about healthcare costs and some of the mandatory programs. 

But really this hearing is supposed to be about our fiscal honesty 

in the way we do budgeting. So I would like to bring it back to that 

if we can. I think the last couple speakers tried to do that. 

63

What we are trying to do here is to make sure that we are very 

clear that we will not spend any money in the budget that we cannot find. And we refer to it as PAYGO, but, you know, I do not 

know if anybody is listening, but if anybody is listening, they may 

not know what that means. 

I mean, simply we want to live within our means and have a balanced budget and figure out how to start paying down our debt and 

deal with our long-term fiscal dilemmas. 

Now, the first step we are saying is that we have to recognize 

where we are and begin to work on the rule, under the rule, and 

that is what we are trying to do is to not spend any money in this 

next year, next five years that we cannot find. So that means that 

we are trying to be really fiscally disciplined when we are dealing 

with that. 

And I am on the Ways and Means Committee, as well as on 

Budget, so we are given the task of finding those dollars within the 

budget. We are doing it under a Medicare Bill that we are going 

to be marking up in a couple of days to find money within Medicare, shift it around in the ways that we think will make a bigger 

difference. 

So the question we have before us is do we set it into law, one, 

and, two, the other side of the aisle is saying they only want 

PAYGO rules. They only want to live within our means under expenditures. They do not want to count taxes so that if we cut taxes, 

they do not want to count. 

Now, if they can be simple answers, I would appreciate that. Is 

it not true that our expenditures in the last six years under President Bush have gone up? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Yes. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. And they have gone up even——

Mr. WALKER. Yes. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ [continuing]. Past inflation? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Yes. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. So when the other side says why have we not 

reined in our spending, we have had six years when they had a 

chance. They were completely in charge. President Bush, Republican House, Republican Senate, did they rein in spending? Maybe 

that has emotion to it and I am not supposed to do that. It did increase——

Mr. ORSZAG. Spending has increased. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you. Okay. 

And in some cases, fairly significantly in discretionary funding, 

and I am not even talking about war funding or emergency funding? I am talking about under our budget. 

Mr. ORSZAG. Nondefense discretionary spending is now higher as 

a share of GDP than it was in 2000. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Right. The number I got was discretionary outlays under the current Administration over the last six years, outlay average annual rate grew by 9.4 percent. Does that sound 

about right? 

Mr. ORSZAG. It seems plausible. I do not have the exact figure. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Okay. And discretionary budget appropriations 

under again President Bush was 8.5 percent. Under President Clinton, just by example, is three percent. So that sounds about right? 

64

Mr. WALKER. I remember some benchmark data going back to 

past administrations and as I recall, Lyndon Johnson’s was the 

only Administration up until about a year ago where spending increased at a more rapid pace. But you do need to break that down 

between how much of it is defense versus nondefense, how much 

of it is structural, how much of it deals with emergencies such as 

the Global War on Terrorism, et cetera. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. The point I am making is that we are really trying to do it differently. We are saying that we are not going to 

spend money that we cannot find, that we cannot identify in another way. 

But let me just say quickly, I only have a short amount of time, 

you have said this already, but at the same time, not only do we 

see an increase in spending, we did see a dramatic cut in taxes. So 

what that means is it is less money coming in to spend than going 

out and we are spending more going out, right? And that has resulted in major new debt. You have talked about that quite a bit, 

General Walker——

Mr. WALKER. Correct. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ [continuing]. About the significant amount of 

money we are now spending just in interest payments on debt. So 

we are creating new debt. We have spent more money and we are 

cutting taxes. 

The point we are trying to make here today, and I really just will 

close by asking you to agree or disagree, that if we are going to get 

serious going forward, that we need to apply these simple budget 

rules not only to spending, which we are trying to do, but also to 

tax policy. And if we do not do that, we will not ever be able to 

tackle both short-term and long-term fiscal discipline and fiscal 

sanity as was referred to. 

Mr. ORSZAG. If the purpose of PAYGO is to avoid fiscal deterioration, there is no differentiation between mandatory spending and 

revenue that would seem to be justified. 

Mr. WALKER. I agree. It needs to be on both sides of the ledger 

or else it is not going to be effective. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, gentlemen. 

First of all, with regard to your fiscal sanity tour, I welcome you 

to come to our great State of New Jersey who is about to start selling off assets to meet its debt and if you join us with your information that you have, it would be helpful. 

Secondly, I would like to go back and compliment the words of 

Mr. Boyd and Mr. Ryan who outside the room saying anything we 

do here has to be done jointly bipartisan if we ever thought we are 

going to try to get this under control. 

And, finally, also, I see Mr. Berry is not here right now, but to 

agree with him and his comment about being in the local rotary or 

what have you. A lot of times when you go home, the people do not 

want to hear some of what you are probably testifying to when you 

go about in the community. I can tell you not only do they not want 

to hear it back at home in the rotary, they do not want to hear it 

here as well. 

65

My main thrust is going to be with regard to mandatory spending which is what we are here talking about today. But even trying 

to do the proverbial drop in the water savings, I am one of those 

guys who goes down to the floor every so often and tries to make 

a drop in a bucket savings with regard to the discretionary side on 

discretionary spending with earmarks or what have you. 

And I am sure you follow this closely or at a distance and realize 

that the majority of those times, any one of those infinitesimal 

small percentages do not get saved as well and therein lies the dilemma on the discretionary side. The problem is even larger, of 

course, on the mandatory side. 

And chart one just shows projected spending growth under current law. Looking at that chart, how much of that chart then comes 

under PAYGO right now under the current rules? 

Mr. ORSZAG. None of it. 

Mr. GARRETT. And so there——

Mr. ORSZAG. But discretionary is not covered by the PAYGO rule. 

Mr. GARRETT. There you go. Well, how much of the—okay. 

Mr. ORSZAG. The mandatory spending that you are showing 

there to the extent that it is the baseline spending level is not covered by PAYGO. It is only changes off of that that would be covered by PAYGO. 

Mr. GARRETT. Exactly. And so as a percentage over that whole 

chart that we are looking at, how much is it that is really covered 

under current PAYGO rules then? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Again, to the extent that is the baseline, it is not 

covered by PAYGO period. 

Mr. GARRETT. Basically not. And therein lies the underlying 

problem that we are facing going forward in these areas. I think 

it was Mr. Tiberi who was making the point that we do see increases, Ms. Schwartz says as well, each year. But those increases 

can come even if we do not do anything, correct? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Well, again, as Mr. Walker and I both emphasized, 

PAYGO is intended to make sure that problem does not get worse, 

but it does not address that problem itself. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. And it makes sure it does not get worse on 

new programs, but it does not do anything as far as making sure 

the problem does not get worse with existing mandatory programs? 

Mr. ORSZAG. That is correct. 

Mr. GARRETT. And so if we really want to try to get our arms 

around this, do we not have to go down that road and make—I 

think you said this, but I do not want to put words in your 

mouth—if we really want to get our arms around this, have 

PAYGO apply simply to everything? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Well, that final step is one that I am not sure about. 

You know, it is up to the Congress to decide how you want to tackle this underlying problem. 

Again, I think the key thing is to get under the hood of, in particular, baseline spending and see what is driving that and how 

can we take cost out, especially in healthcare, without harming 

health. I think there are very substantial opportunities there that 

are difficult to capture but that are possible to capture and having 

the Congress devote more attention to that issue is the best way 

of making sure that that——

66

Mr. GARRETT. Right. 

Mr. ORSZAG [continuing]. Increase is leveled. 

Mr. GARRETT. And I will let you answer that. And the way that 

Congress does that, I know we have done it in the past a little bit, 

is through reconciliation, right, Mr. Walker? 

Mr. WALKER. Right. But what we have said is PAYGO rules on 

both sides of the ledger. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. 

Mr. WALKER. Mandatory reconsideration triggers, so you will—it 

is not a cap, but forces reconsideration of mandatory spending programs and tax preferences when they reach certain triggers because you are correct. You know, the PAYGO rule by itself does not 

deal with the base. And the base is the problem. We want to try 

to stop the bleeding, but that does not solve our $50 trillion problem. 

Mr. GARRETT. But for practical purposes as far as procedurally, 

the way we would get to that reconsideration, as you call it, is 

through our mechanism of reconciliation; is that correct? I mean, 

do we have any other——

Mr. WALKER. De facto, okay? But on your reconciliation, you are 

not reconciling mandatory programs. 

Mr. ORSZAG. Well, you could. I mean——

Mr. WALKER. But we could. 

Mr. GARRETT. I mean, you could, but you are not——

Mr. ORSZAG. In fact, that is what it is designed to do. 

Mr. GARRETT. Yeah. That is what it was put there for, is it not, 

and that would be the only way to do what you are telling us we 

need to do? 

Mr. WALKER. Maybe under the current procedure. I think there 

are other ways you could look at it going forward. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. Appreciate it. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Moore. 

Let me stop here and say I know that both of you are under time 

constraints. And, General Walker, if you need to leave and you 

want to substitute one of your staff in your place. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. I have to leave within about five, ten 

minutes. 

Chairman SPRATT. Peter, you have got to go? 

Mr. ORSZAG. I think we are okay for now. Until otherwise notified, I will remain at your disposal. 

Chairman SPRATT. Okay. Mr. Moore. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MOORE. I apologize. I had to leave for just about half an 

hour, 45 minutes, so I missed this discussion. And I apologize if I 

am asking a question that has already been asked. 

But there was an article in Congress Daily yesterday that says 

that the headline is CBO tax cuts prevent a deficit reduction. Are 

you familiar with that, Dr. Orszag? 

Mr. ORSZAG. I am certainly familiar with the letter upon which 

that story was based. 

Mr. MOORE. In fact, you wrote the letter, I believe; is that correct? 

Mr. ORSZAG. I did indeed, yeah. 

67

Mr. MOORE. All right. And just the first paragraph says a new 

analysis by the nonpartisan CBO, Congressional Budget Office, 

found that projected budget deficits would have been largely wiped 

out and possibly turned into surpluses had it not been for President Bush’s 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. Is that a fair report of what 

your letter said? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Again, what we found is that the tax cuts reduced 

revenue by about $200 billion this year and that is slightly higher 

than our projected deficit for the year. 

Mr. MOORE. All right. Are all tax cuts created equally? 

Mr. ORSZAG. No. 

Mr. MOORE. In terms of economic stimulus? 

Mr. ORSZAG. No. 

Mr. MOORE. All right. And I was at the White House about four 

or four and a half months ago, I think, as a leader of a group called 

Lid’l Commission. In fact, I said, Mr. President, we need to find 

ways to work together, so I appreciate the invitation here. 

And when we were leaving, he said, you know what you said 

there about working together, we can. The President is saying this 

to me. He says probably not on tax cuts, but in other areas. And 

I said, Mr. President, even on tax cuts, it does not have to be all 

or nothing. 

For example, you have asked for total repeal of estate tax. I have 

a bill that would increase the exemption to three and a half million 

dollars a person. I said that would cover 99 percent of the estates 

in this country and the small businesses and family farms you talk 

about. And he said to me, you know, Dennis, maybe we could find 

some areas to work together on tax cuts. 

And what I am saying here is, again, does it have to be all or 

nothing when it comes to repeal of the estate tax? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Certainly that is a policy choice and it need not be 

all or nothing. 

Mr. MOORE. And I am not asking you to make a policy decision, 

but that is going to cost billions and billions of dollars in lost revenues; is that correct? 

Mr. WALKER. That is correct. But it is not just an issue of the 

numbers and they are important. I think the other thing you have 

to think about is what would American society look like 50 to 100 

years from now if you eliminated the estate tax. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. Thank you very much to both of you and I appreciate your candor here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Baird. 

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thanks for the fiscal wake-up tour. 

Mr. Walker, I understand Mr. Orszag addressed this, but I would 

like to hear your very succinct comment. Did the tax cuts that we 

have seen over the last number of years pay for themselves? 

Mr. WALKER. Absolutely not. Very few tax cuts pay for themselves. 

Mr. BAIRD. We can quote you on that as absolutely not? 

Mr. WALKER. Absolutely not. 

Mr. BAIRD. So that the——

68

Mr. ORSZAG. Absolutely they can quote you as saying absolutely 

not. 

Mr. WALKER. Absolutely you can quote me as saying absolutely 

not. 

Mr. BAIRD. So if we have seen a decline in the deficit, the decline 

in the deficit is not a direct result of the tax cuts? 

Mr. WALKER. As Dr. Orszag had said before, some tax cuts, you 

recapture part of the costs of some tax cuts, but the type that we 

have seen recently, they do not pay for themselves. And that is primarily due to economic growth which is why we are seeing revenues go up. 

I think what it is important for you to understand is if we have 

any inflation at all, if we have any economic growth at all, revenues are going to go up if you do nothing. The question is, are they 

higher than otherwise they would have been had the action not 

been taken. 

Mr. BAIRD. And the answer to that question is? 

Mr. WALKER. They do not pay for themselves, so, no, they are not 

higher than they otherwise would have been had the action not 

been taken. 

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you. 

Mr. ORSZAG. If I could just add very briefly, it is important to 

realize that the revenue as a share of GDP resurgence that we 

have seen is concentrated very disproportionately in the corporate 

income tax, not in the individual income tax. Most of the policy 

changes that occurred were in the individual income tax. 

Of the 1.9 percentage increase in revenue as a share of GDP between 2003 and 2006, 1.5 percentage points, the vast majority are 

attributable to the corporate income tax. Corporate profits are significantly up and that is bringing in more revenue. 

Mr. BAIRD. I profoundly wish every talk radio host in America 

could hear what you two gentlemen just said so we get over this 

nonsense that taxes were cut, revenues have gone up, deficit has 

gone down, ergo it was because of the tax cuts. 

Second question. We heard our friends on the other side talk 

about mandatory spending. We have got to deal with mandatory 

spending. 

What do you think will be the estimated increase in the longterm deficit or the deficit spending of this country due to the Medicare Prescription Drug Bill that we passed a few years ago? How 

much did that add to the deficit of the debt? 

Mr. WALKER. The estimated discount at present value of cost of 

that bill for the next 75 years is $8 trillion. In other words, you 

would have to have $8 trillion today invested at treasury rates to 

close the gap between what premiums are expected to bring in and 

what costs are expected to be. And that is worse for more than 75, 

but——

Mr. BAIRD. I have heard it said by folks who supported that bill, 

gee, there was a lot of consternation when we passed it, but now 

75 percent of seniors who participate think it is a pretty good deal. 

Sure, because they are passing $8 trillion of debt on to their kids 

to pay for the short-term apparent discount in the drugs. Is that 

a fair portrayal possibly? 

69

Mr. WALKER. When 75 percent of the costs for most people are 

paid for by future generations, it sounds like a pretty good deal for 

today’s generation, but not a good deal for tomorrow’s. 

Mr. BAIRD. Would a constructive reform dealing with the Social 

Security debt over the long haul be to actually start making our 

deficit figures be, deficit figures including borrowing from Social 

Security, would that at least help us be honest in our budgeting? 

Mr. WALKER. I believe that we ought to modify our financial reporting to be able to show what the operating deficit is and the operating deficit excludes the Social Security surplus because if you 

take, for example, OMB’s latest projection for this year, $205 billion deficit, you got to add another 175 to 180 billion on top of that 

which is the amount of the Social Security surplus we are spending. 

You know, my view is that one thing is for sure. We are going 

to deliver on those bonds and we took the people’s money. We spent 

the people’s money. And I think we need to reconsider the accounting treatment at least as it relates to the current Social Security 

surplus and accumulated related debt. 

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you very much. 

You mentioned triggers for mandatory spending. I 100 percent 

agree with that. We also have revenue triggers. In other words, if 

the deficit reaches a certain level, then there are automatic revenue triggers. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, I think we need to have triggers for tax preferences, okay, which is another form of mandatory, back-door 

spending, if you will. So when tax preferences ended up costing us 

more than we think they are going to cost, then that would cause 

a, you know, fundamental reconsideration of those. 

Mr. BAIRD. One final question. You mentioned the issue of foreign debt. I greatly am concerned about that as well. There is a lot 

of talk in this Congress now about forcing the Chinese to revalue 

their RNB. It seems to me that may have a significant impact on 

their willingness to carry some of our debt. 

Any thoughts on that very briefly? 

Mr. ORSZAG. I guess I have two thoughts. I know this topic came 

up on the foreign debt hearing that this Committee held a couple 

months ago. We are running a risk. It is unclear how big a risk 

it is, but we are running a risk by relying on foreign financing of 

the current account deficit and that requires continued willingness 

of foreign investors to invest in U.S. dollar assets. 

I do not think anyone can tell you, the smartest guy on Wall 

Street or the smartest financier on Wall Street cannot tell you 

what exactly could trigger a collapse in confidence that would undermine the willingness of foreign investors to invest in the United 

States. There are such financiers who are worried about that risk. 

But we are running some risk and what exactly would trigger a potential collapse is unclear. But if that were to occur, the consequences could be quite severe. 

Mr. WALKER. Let me remind you what happened in 1954 when 

NASIR took over the Suez Canal and the UK and France and 

Israel did not like it and wanted to take steps to challenge that. 

And the U.S. was the biggest holder of UK debt and was supporting the pound. A call was made from very high up in the 

70

United States to the UK to ask them to reconsider their action. 

That was an ally. 

It is fundamentally imprudent to rely upon foreign investors to 

the extent that we are today because they hold more of our nation’s 

mortgage. They will have more influence on us. We will have less 

influence of them. Debt payments go overseas to benefit them, not 

to benefit us. And we are increasingly at risk. 

Now, there are some synergies, there is some commonality of interest between us and the Chinese and others. And, frankly, we are 

lucky they are willing to lend us their money because we have a 

savings deficit. So we should be thankful for that. But we need to 

recognize the structural problem and start to deal with it. 

Mr. ORSZAG. If I could just add to that. People have noted that 

there is an incentive for foreign investors to continue investing in 

the United States, but it is unprecedented for the world’s leading 

economic power to be saving only one or two percent of its national 

income. 

And many observers have, therefore, noted that effectively we 

are in a dysfunctional relationship with the rest of the world. And 

the thing about dysfunctional relationships is they can go on longer 

than you expect, but then end faster than you think. And the same 

risk obtains in our large current account deficit. 

Mr. BAIRD. It is interesting how a psychologist can agree with an 

economist in that observation. 

Mr. ORSZAG. There you go. 

Mr. BAIRD. I thank you, sir. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, if we have one more member, I will 

try to take a question from that member, but I have got to go. 

Chairman SPRATT. We understand. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome. I guess I am the member. 

Mr. WALKER. You are a very important member. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I wanted to thank you. I wanted to ask about the 

value of the dollar versus the euro. I have noticed a gravitation of 

investment to the euro away from the dollar. Have you noted the 

same trend? 

Mr. ORSZAG. There has been some increased share of official reserves, for example, held by foreign governments in nondollar assets including in the euro. And that is one of the trends, one of the 

issues for the longer term is we have frankly benefited from the 

fact that foreign central banks and others have used the dollar as 

their sort of medium of exchange and invested their assets in dollar-based assets. 

If that were to shift, and it is not always guaranteed that the 

dollar will be the dominant international asset, if that were to 

shift, that is one of the things that could cause a set of events that 

would be difficult to control. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I was very surprised that the market was jittery 

this week with the statement of only one mortgage company about 

the assets, the mortgages that it held. I thought the drop yesterday 

was, I think, a reflection of the risk you are talking about, that 

statements by one CEO from one company apparently caused that 

blip yesterday. 

71

Would you agree that it was rather unusual that one company’s 

statement could cause such a reaction in the market? 

Mr. ORSZAG. I think there clearly are elevated concerns about the 

housing market and the subprime market in particular. And in 

that context, like in other contexts like our current account deficit 

where there is an underlying concern, a specific comment or set of 

comments can generate a disproportionate response. 

Mr. WALKER. If I could mention real quickly, I think I am very 

concerned about the decline of the dollar to the extent that it has 

declined and whether or not that might be a leading indicator of 

increasing concern with regard to our long-term outlook. You know, 

there are competing potential currencies now that could be used as 

reserve currencies. 

One of the things that we need to keep in mind and one of the 

reasons that oil prices are as high as they are right now is because 

oil transactions in crude are denominated in dollars. And if the dollar is not worth as much, you have to charge more dollars in order 

to have the same purchasing power. 

And so, I mean, we are increasing our risk and there are other 

alternatives available. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I have been following the price of gold also. That 

has been going up progressively, has it not, while the dollar has 

been going down? Am I reading the numbers correctly? 

Mr. WALKER. That is not unusual. Yes, it has been going up. But 

that is not unusual, you know, for that relationship to exist. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I wanted to ask. We are focused on the U.S. government’s budget and we have heard what you have said about 

healthcare and the necessity of increasing savings and so forth. But 

we are looking at the government’s share of spending in this economy which has hovered around what, 19, 20, 21, 22 percent, somewhere in there? 

Mr. WALKER. A little over 20 percent. 

Ms. KAPTUR. For quite a long time. I mean, it varies and it is 

such a massive budget that it, you know, can vary by hundreds of 

billions of dollars. 

But I see one of the real problems is that if you think about a 

ship and it is going into rough waters, there are those people who 

are battening down the hatches and securing the chairs on deck. 

I sometimes feel Congress is doing that and nobody is paying attention to who is down in the engine room and at the controls of the 

direction in which the ship is headed. And I think that is where 

we fail as a country. 

And if one looks at the total economy, it is not performing at the 

level of GDP that it needs to in order to provide the bounce that 

would normally be there for spending, be it private or public. And 

I have been noting with greater trepidation the amount of trade 

deficit this country is racking up which is knocking off quite a significant amount off of our GDP annually, more and more and more. 

Do you gentlemen have any knowledge of that or wish to comment on that as the trade deficit is a drag on the growth of overall 

GDP which inhibits our ability to spend inside this economy? 

Mr. ORSZAG. Two quick comments. One is the current account 

and trade deficits are a reflection of our very low saving rate which 

72

does impose a long-term economic burden or sort of constraint on 

economic growth. 

The second thing is I do think that there is, you were touching 

upon it in some of your comments, a disconnect between macroeconomic performance and the experience that many American 

families are having in part because there has been a marked increase in income concentration, so a significant amount of macroeconomic performance has accrued to a small percentage of the 

population. 

And, secondly, a phenomenon that has received too little attention is that there is a significant amount of income and earnings 

volatility that typical families face. For example, CBO has found 

that one-seventh of American workers experience a 50 percent decline or more each year in their annual earnings. So families seeing 

that kind of volatility and sluggish real income growth in significant parts of the income distribution may not be paying as much 

attention to what is happening to overall GDP growth. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Dr. Orszag, could I just ask, is that one-seventh——

Chairman SPRATT. No. We have got to go because we are going 

to have votes in about ten or fifteen minutes. And I will let you 

lead off with the next panel if that is okay. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is that one-seventh atypical? Is it getting more? 

Mr. ORSZAG. On that question, just very briefly, that looks like 

it has been roughly flat since 1980. There may be other measures 

that are somewhat high, but basically I think it is high and it has 

been high for a while. 

Mr. WALKER. Two things, Mr. Chairman. Number one, we have 

four deficits, a budget deficit, a balance of payments of deficits, a 

savings deficit, and a leadership deficit. 

Last thing, this document which I will leave several copies is a 

document we issued in September of 2005 that talks about the 

growth of tax expenditures, the importance of getting them on the 

radar screen, and the importance of subjecting them to some type 

of budget control and discipline as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you both for your testimony, for your 

forbearance, and for always the excellent advice you give us. Dr. 

Orszag, thank you. General Walker, thank you both for coming. 

Now, let us have our next panel up as quickly as we can. We are 

sorry, but it is in the nature trying to plan anything in this institution. We do have some votes coming up on the floor. Could be in 

ten minutes. I am not sure. I hope it will be a bit longer. 

Bob Greenstein, we will give you the honor of going first. 

We welcome to the next panel Robert Greenstein who is the Executive Director of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; Robert Bixby who is the Executive Director of the Concord Coalition; 

Maya MacGuineas who is the President of the Committee for a Responsible Budget; and our old colleague, Pat Toomey. Thank you 

for coming, all of you, and we will start with Mr. Greenstein. 

73

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT GREENSTEIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES; PAT 

TOOMEY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CLUB FOR GROWTH; ROBERT L. BIXBY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CONCORD COALITION; 

MAYA MACGUINEAS, PRESIDENT, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET; 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT GREENSTEIN 

Mr. GREENSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Let me say we will make your statements 

part of the record. You can summarize and to the extent you can 

talk about the rule itself and making it statutory as opposed to 

having it part of the House rules and any kind of technical implications, I think that would be useful to us. 

Mr. GREENSTEIN. Thank you. 

Let me cover several points. Try and do it very quickly. First, adherence to the PAYGO principle is important because, as you 

know, we face a very serious long-term problem that we cannot afford to make worse. 

The Center on Budget has developed long-term budget projections, drawing heavily on CBO projections. Like others, they show 

current policies are not sustainable. 

We find that expenditures for all items other than Medicare, 

Medicaid, Social Security, and interest payments on the debt are 

actually expected to shrink as a share of GDP in coming decades, 

but that projected increases in cost for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security will swamp the improvements in the rest of the budget and produce deficits if we remain on the current policy course 

of about 12 percent of GDP by 2050 and debt in the vicinity of 

about 115 percent of GDP. 

Now, I should note that those projections I just mentioned assume compliance with PAYGO on both sides of the ledger. 

If, for example, one assumes that the tax cuts enacted in 2001 

and 2003 are made permanent without offsets, but that any entitlement increases are paid for, then the deficit by 2050 is expected to 

equal about 20 percent of GDP and the debt about 230 percent of 

GDP, about double what it would be if the tax cuts—are any tax 

cuts that are expended are paid for. 

[Slide] 

Mr. GREENSTEIN. The key reason for this is simply, and the first 

slide, if it can be put up, show this, the key reason for this is simply that the increase in deficits that the extending the tax cuts 

without paying for them would cause would trigger increased interest costs that would compound over time and make the debt spiral 

much worse. 

In other words, under current policies even with strict adherence 

to PAYGO, deficits and debt are projected to rise to dangerous levels. Without PAYGO or with PAYGO limited to the spending side, 

deficits and debt are likely to explode. 

Looked at another way, eventually Congress is going to have to 

fill the budget hole because it cannot allow a debt explosion to 

occur and adherence to PAYGO is necessary to keep the eventual 

deficit reduction packages from being so huge that they consist of 

draconian budget cuts or confiscatory tax increases. 

74

Point number two, PAYGO was highly effective in the 1990s. The 

record shows that Congress paid for virtually all of the entitlement 

increases and tax cuts up to 1999 including extending of expiring 

measures on both the tax cut and spending side of the ledger. 

I would note that PAYGO was established and maintained in the 

1990s on a bipartisan basis that started with an agreement between a Republican President and a Democratic Congress. It was 

ratified and extended in 1997 by a Democratic President and a Republican Congress. 

A third point is PAYGO is not intended to prevent program expansions or tax cuts. It simply says if a tax cut or a program expansion is worth having, it is worth paying for. There are numerous examples. 

In 1997, you paid for the establishment of the SCHIP Program 

and a major package of tax cuts by a series of savings measures, 

particularly in Medicare provider payments. 

Similarly in the Higher Education Bill recently passed on the 

House floor, the Pay as you Go rule did not prevent you from cutting the interest rate students pay on loans. It required simply that 

it be paid for. 

And to those members who are concerned about unmet needs in 

the country, I would only say that if we do not have a PAYGO rule, 

I think eventually we will end up with cuts so deep that unmet 

needs will increase, not shrink. 

My fourth point I do not have time to cover in the oral testimony. 

It is explained in full in the testimony. And I am happy to answer 

questions on it. It is simply that it is not the case that the PAYGO 

rules would be biased in favor of entitlements and against tax cuts. 

There is much misunderstanding on that. Happy to answer questions on that. Testimony explains it in full. I cannot do it in three 

sentences. 

My last point is about tax cuts and the economy, it is sometimes 

said that we cannot, should not require tax cuts to be paid for because that would damage the economy. Now, there is agreement, 

Mr. Chairman, among mainstream economists that well-designed 

tax cuts can have some positive, although relatively modest, longterm effects on the economy, but there is also agreement among 

mainstream economic analysts that any potential positive effects of 

lower tax rates are swamped by the negative effects of persistent 

large deficits. 

Several years ago, CBO found that a ten percent across the board 

income tax rate cut if deficit financed could reduce economic output. The Joint Tax Committee and the Congressional Research 

Service have both issued an analysis finding the tax rate cuts that 

are deficit financed are likely to reduce economic growth over the 

long run. 

And last year, the Administration issued a study designed to tout 

the importance of making its tax cuts permanent. That study found 

relatively small but some positive long-term economic gain from 

doing so, but that study found the economic gain, the Administration’s own study, only if the cost of making its tax cuts permanent 

was offset. 

In other words, the conclusion is clear that whatever long-term 

economic benefits tax cuts may offer, they are only realized in the 

75

long term if the cost of the tax cuts is offset, that is if it is consistent with PAYGO discipline. 

The potential for some economic benefit from well-designed tax 

cuts if they are paid for offers support for the principle that tax 

cuts along with entitlement expansions should be subject to 

PAYGO rather than for the argument that tax cuts should be exempt. 

Lastly, let me briefly comment on your question of does it add 

to have this in statute in addition to having it in the rule. I believe 

it does and in one particular way. If PAYGO is only a rule, then 

it is not that difficult for a new Congress to wipe away the rule. 

If it is in statute, you would need to pass another statute to repeal 

it. And that would require most likely 60 votes in the Senate and 

a signature by the President. 

So establishing PAYGO in statute makes PAYGO much more 

stable and long lasting than only having it in a rule that may only 

apply in a particular Congress. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Robert Greenstein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT GREENSTEIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER ON

BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES

Chairman Spratt, Congressman Ryan, and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear hear today to explain why I think the pay-as-yougo discipline is important and appropriate, and why establishing a statutory payas-you-go rule to reinforce Congressional rules is a sound idea. 

My testimony will cover the following: 

• Adherence to the pay-as-you-go principle is important because we face an extremely serious long-term budget problem and cannot afford to make that problem 

worse through entitlement increases or tax cuts that are deficit financed, rather 

than offset; 

• The pay-as-you-go rule proved in the 1990s to be a highly effective tool to help 

restore fiscal responsibility; 

• Pay-as-you-go does not prevent Congress and the President from enacting program expansions or tax cuts; it simply requires that the costs of those actions be 

paid for; 

• Pay-as-you-go is not biased in favor of entitlement expansions and against tax 

cuts; 

• There is not a valid argument for exempting tax cuts from pay-as-you-go on the 

grounds that requiring the cost of tax cuts to be paid for will hurt the economy; 

• Establishing a statutory pay-as-you-go procedure backed up by sequestration 

will not produce a dramatic improvement compared with the current Congressional 

pay-as-you-go rules, but it will help to highlight and reinforce the importance of 

pay-as-you-go and, in particular, make it harder for a future Congress to quietly 

back away from pay-as-you-go. 

Let me address each of these points in more detail. 

Pay-as-you-go is Vital Because of the Long-term Fiscal Problem Facing the Nation 

As the members of this Committee know all too well, there are many disagreements about the budget—disagreements about the appropriate level of taxes and 

spending, about priorities among federal programs, and about the kinds of tax and 

entitlement reform that would be appropriate. But virtually all budget analysts 

agree on one thing: the federal budget is unsustainable under a continuation of current policies. The looming retirement of large numbers of baby boomers and—more 

importantly—the continuing rapid growth in the cost of providing health care 

throughout the U.S. health care system will cause federal expenditures to rise more 

rapidly than revenues in coming decades. If changes in policies are not made to slow 

the growth of expenditures (which will primarily entail slowing the growth in health 

care costs), to increase revenues, or to do a combination of the two, federal deficits 

and debt will soar in coming decades to levels that will cause serious damage to 

the economy. 

The Congressional Budget Office has reached this conclusion.1 So has the Government Accountability Office.2 So has the Bush Administration.3

76

The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has developed its own set of long-term 

budget projections (drawing heavily on projections produced by CBO), which, like 

other projections, show that current policies are not sustainable.4

We find that expenditures for all items other than Medicare, Social Security, and 

Medicaid (excluding interest payments on the debt) are actually expected to shrink 

by 3.9 percent of GDP between now and 2050. But projected increases in costs for 

Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security—driven by increases in health care costs 

system-wide and the aging of the population—will swamp the contraction in the rest 

of the budget, result in huge increases in interest payments, and produce deficits 

of approximately 12 percent of GDP by 2050 and debt in the vicinity of 115 percent 

of GDP, which would be the highest level of debt in the nation’s history. (Note: the 

key factor is the expected growth in health care costs per person throughout the 

U.S. health care system, in the private and public sectors alike, which drives up 

costs for Medicare and Medicaid. For the past 30 years, per-beneficiary costs have 

grown at virtually the same rate in Medicare and Medicaid as in private-sector 

health care, a development this is expected to continue.) 

These projections assume that Congress and the President comply with the payas-you-go rule, and that discretionary spending grows at the rate of inflation and 

population, thereby declining somewhat relative to the size of the economy. That 

means these projections rest on an assumption that any increases in entitlement 

program expenditures, such as for expansion of the SCHIP program, will be paid 

for by reductions in other entitlements or increases in revenues. It also means that 

these projections assume that tax cuts relative to current law (including extensions 

of tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003), will be paid for by increases in other taxes 

or reductions in entitlement spending.5

If, however, one assumes instead that the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 are 

made permanent without offsets (while maintaining all of the other assumptions, including that no entitlement expansions are enacted without being paid for), the deficit in 2050 is projected to equal about 20 percent of GDP, and the debt would total 

approximately 230 percent of GDP, or twice what the size the debt will be if those 

tax cuts that are extended are paid for. A key reason the deficit and debt levels 

would be so much higher if the tax cuts were made permanent without their costs 

being offset is that the increase in deficits that the tax cuts cause would trigger increased interest costs that would compound over time and make the debt spiral 

markedly worse. This is the case even though our projections do not assume that 

interest rates would rise; if they do (as is likely), the situation would be even worse. 

In other words, under current policies, even with strict adherence to the pay-asyou-go rule, deficits and debt are projected to rise to dangerous levels. Without payas-you-go policies, deficits and debt are likely to explode. 

It is a cliche to say that when you find yourself in a hole, the first thing you 

should do is to stop digging, but it is a cliche that offers sound advice. We are in 

a hole. We eventually are going to have to start filling that hole in (by slowing the 

overall growth of programs—primarily by slowing the growth in the system-wide 

cost of providing health care—and by increasing revenues). But in the meantime, 

we should not dig the hole even deeper. 

Looked at another way, eventually Congress simply will have to fill the budget 

hole, since it cannot allow a debt explosion to occur. Hence, the figures presented 

here show the projected amount of deficit reduction that Congress will need to enact 

in the future. Adherence to the pay-as-you-go rule is necessary to keep the eventual 

deficit reduction packages from being packages of enormous magnitude that consist 

of draconian cuts in basic programs and services or confiscatory tax increases. Every 

violation of pay-as-you-go will require an offsetting program cut or tax increase to 

be enacted later. A key reason to adhere to pay-as-you-go is to limit to some extent 

the amount of extraordinarily heavy lifting that future Congresses will have to do. 

The laws of budgeting and economics mean that program increases or tax cuts 

eventually must be paid for. The pay-as-you-go rule essentially says that since this 

is so, it is only fair that a Congress that desires a program increase or a tax cut 

also should find the offset. 

PAY-AS-YOU-GO WAS A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE TOOL IN THE 1990S

The pay-as-you-go approach proved very effective in the 1990s, when a statutory 

rule was in effect, along with a Senate procedural rule. Congress paid for all of its 

entitlement increases and tax cuts, including the extension of expiring measures 

such as the ‘‘tax extenders.’’ Along with a vibrant economy (which was likely helped 

by the federal government’s commitment to fiscal discipline), pay-as-you-go helped 

lead to the first federal budget surpluses in nearly 30 years. Pay-as-you-go discipline 

was adhered to without deviation until surpluses reemerged. 

77

In a very real sense, we are in a deeper hole now than we were in 1990, when 

the original pay-as-you-go rule was enacted. Although the deficit is smaller now 

than it was then, we are much closer to the point where rising health care costs 

and demographics will cause deficits and debt to escalate sharply. Reestablishing 

and abiding by the pay-as-you-go rule is a very important first step in beginning 

to deal with that long-term problem. 

It is important to note that the pay-as-you-go rule was established and maintained in the 1990s with bipartisan support. The original rule grew out of an agreement between a Republican President (the first President Bush) and a Democratic 

Congress. The rule was ratified and extended in 1997 by a Democratic President 

(Bill Clinton) and a Republican Congress. Concern over growing deficits motivated 

a significant number of members from both parties to support adoption or extension 

of the pay-as-you-go rule. As noted, the pay-as-you-go statute was adhered to without exception until 1999, when budget surpluses reappeared and seemed to be growing rapidly.6

Support for the rule did not reflect agreement on budget priorities—and did not 

need to. In both 1990 and 1997, many Republicans feared that Democrats would try 

to enact significant increases in entitlement programs, while many Democrats 

feared that Republicans would try to enact large tax cuts. The pay-as-you-go rule 

allowed each side to make sure that the other side could not move ahead with its 

priorities without paying for them. 

PAY-AS-YOU-GO DOES NOT PREVENT PROGRAM EXPANSIONS OR TAX CUTS

Pay-as-you-go is not intended to—and does not—prevent entitlement expansions 

or tax cuts. Rather, it is intended to force proponents of entitlement expansions and 

tax cuts to find ways to offset the cost of their proposals. In the 1990s, it certainly 

prevented enactment of various spending increases and tax cuts that members of 

Congress concluded were not worth paying for, but it did not keep other, higherpriority entitlement expansions or tax cuts from being enacted. This was vividly illustrated in 1997, when entitlement cuts in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 offset 

the cost of establishing the SCHIP program in that Act as well as the cost of tax 

cuts included in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. 

We also see in this new Congress that pay-as-you-go does not prevent action on 

priorities; it simply means that proponents have to find ways to pay for those priorities. We saw this at work in the higher education bill that the House recently 

passed. The pay-as-you-go rule did not prevent that bill from cutting the interest 

rate that students have to pay on subsidized loans, but did require that proponents 

of that policy change find ways to offset the cost. Similarly, the pay-as-you-go rule 

will not prevent Congress from extending alternative minimum tax relief this year, 

but will force the tax-writing committees to search for ways to offset the cost of that 

relief. Pay-as-you-go certainly makes it harder to take action to meet various priorities, but the payoff of not adding to the long-term deficit problem is worth making 

proponents of such actions work harder. If the proposed program expansion or tax 

cut is really worth enacting, it is worth paying for. 

It is also important for proponents of program expansions to realize that adding 

to deficits now by enacting unpaid-for program expansions or tax cuts will increase 

the magnitude of the program cuts and tax increases that will be needed in coming 

years to bring exploding deficits under control. Thus, failing to abide by pay-as-yougo now will make it harder to sustain key programs and meet vital needs in the 

future. 

PAY-AS-YOU-GO IS NOT BIASED IN FAVOR OF SPENDING AND AGAINST TAX CUTS

Despite the fact that the pay-as-you-go rule applies equally to entitlement expansions and tax cuts, the Administration and some others have argued that entitlement expansions are favored under the pay-as-you-go rules because entitlements 

and revenues are treated differently in the budget baseline used in determining the 

cost of legislation. For instance, Office of Management and Budget Director Rob 

Portman concluded last year that there is a bias in the baseline rules for spending 

and against tax relief ‘‘Because we assume that programs go out indefinitely on the 

spending side. * * * Whereas on the tax side, we assume the tax relief would not 

continue.’’

Careful examination shows, however, that this argument is not valid. The general 

baseline rules treat temporary provisions of the tax code exactly the same as temporary provisions of entitlement programs. Moreover, a special rule dealing with the 

few cases where an entire entitlement program expires (such as SCHIP) does not 

give an advantage to those programs either.7

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The general baseline rule for projecting the cost of entitlement programs (direct 

spending) and revenues (receipts) is set forth in section 257(a) of the Balanced 

Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.8 The Act states 

that the projections of entitlement spending and revenues are to be based on the 

assumption that ‘‘Laws providing or creating direct spending and receipts are assumed to operate in the manner specified in those laws for each such year. * * *’’

When CBO or OMB analysts prepare a baseline projection of revenues for the 

next five or 10 years, they base their projection of revenues in each year on the provisions of the tax code that would be in effect in that year. That means they would 

take into account the fact that the 2001 tax legislation reduced most income tax 

rates through 2010, but provided for those rates to return to prior levels after 2010. 

Thus, legislation that changed current law to extend the lower rates beyond 2010 

would be charged with the costs of lowering the rates in those years. 

In general, the CBO analysts do the same thing when they project expenditures 

for entitlement programs; they take into account the provisions governing each program that would be in effect in each year under current law. For instance, since 

Congress has extended Medicaid’s Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA) provisions 

only through September 30, 2007, the baseline projections of Medicaid expenditures 

assume that the TMA provisions will expire on that date. Legislation to extend the 

TMA provisions beyond that date would be charged with the cost of the estimated 

increase in spending that results from extending those provisions. Neither the baseline nor the CBO scoring rules provide an advantage to the legislation to extend an 

expiring entitlement provision over legislation extend an expiring tax provision. 

There is a special baseline rule that applies in the relatively few instances where 

Congress has decided that an entire mandatory program should be reexamined periodically and, to make sure the reexamination occurs, has provided that the entire 

program (as opposed to certain provisions of the program) will expire if legislation 

to extend the program is not enacted. For instance, the SCHIP program is scheduled 

to expire at the end of this year, which has led the current Congress to reevaluate 

the program. In cases where entire programs expire under current law, the baseline 

rules provide that projections of spending for those programs should assume that 

the laws governing those programs will be extended as in effect at the time of expiration.9

There is no similar rule in the case of taxes because the tax code does not comprise a collection of separate programs, and neither the entire tax code nor the entire personal income tax is slated to expire.10 A temporary change in a provision 

within the tax code, such as a temporary provision lowering a particular tax rate, 

is analogous to the temporary extension of Medicaid’s TMA provision, which is assumed to expire in the baseline just as the temporary reductions in certain tax rates 

are. Under current law, income tax rates will change in 2011, but the income tax 

itself will not expire. 

Most importantly, the expiring entitlement programs that are assumed to continue in the baseline receive no overall advantage relative to expiring tax-cut provisions. When estimating the costs of legislation that would establish or extend an entire entitlement program that is assumed to continue in the baseline, CBO scores 

the cost of that legislation for every year of the 10-year ‘‘budget window.’’ Congress 

can not make the cost of that legislation appear smaller by scheduling the new program to expire after a few years; CBO will score the costs in every year regardless. 

In contrast, legislation that schedules a tax-cut provision to expire is scored only 

for the cost of the tax cut in the years it is in effect. If both the program and the 

tax-cut provision are extended, the end result is the same. The full costs of both 

the program and the tax cut over the whole period are scored, although the full 

costs of the program are scored up front when it is established, while part of the 

cost of the tax cut is scored when it is first enacted and the rest is scored when 

the tax cut is extended. 

To understand how this works, consider the following simple example. A new entitlement program and a tax provision are enacted at the same time. Each is scheduled to expire after two years, each is estimated to cost $5 billion over five years 

if extended ($2 billion in the first two years and $3 billion over the last three years), 

and each is then extended for three more years in later legislation. 

• If the entitlement program is assumed to continue in the baseline, the original 

legislation establishing the program will be scored as costing $5 billion over five 

years, even though the program is slated to expire after two years. The subsequent 

legislation extending the program will be scored as having no cost. 

• The original legislation containing the tax-cut provision will be scored as costing 

only $2 billion, while the subsequent legislation extending the provision will then 

be scored as costing $3 billion over the following three years. 

79

• Thus, the new entitlement program and the tax-cut provision will each be 

scored as costing $5 billion over five years. The new entitlement program gained no 

advantage from the baseline assumption that it would be continued. 

If proponents of the tax cuts believe that being charged with the cost of the tax 

cut in two installments is disadvantageous—even though the total cost is no greater 

than if the tax cuts had been treated as permanent in the baseline and the original 

legislation had been scored on that basis—they can avoid that outcome by making 

the tax-cut provisions permanent to start with. In recent years, tax-cut proponents 

often have purposely opted for the installment approach, because they concluded 

that doing so would be to their strategic advantage. Sunsetting a tax cut after a 

few years can make the cost appear lower when the tax cut is first considered, making it possible to pass larger tax cuts than would otherwise be possible.11 Once the 

larger tax cut has been passed, its proponents then argue that it must be extended 

to avoid subjecting the public to a ‘‘tax increase.’’

REQUIRING THE COST OF TAX CUTS TO BE OFFSET WILL NOT DAMAGE THE ECONOMY

The argument that not extending expiring tax cuts will damage the economy, or 

that enacting other new tax cuts will boost the economy, is used by some to argue 

that the pay-as-you-go rule should not apply to tax cuts. In its most extreme form, 

the argument is that applying the pay-as-you-go rule to tax cuts does not make 

sense because tax cuts pay for themselves—that is, that tax cuts boost the economy 

so much that revenues are higher than they would have been without the tax cuts. 

In reality, tax cuts do not have such magical effects. There is agreement among 

mainstream economists that tax cuts generally have relatively modest long-term effects on the economy—other factors are much more important in determining the 

performance of the economy—and that, even under the best of circumstances, they 

do not boost the economy enough to come remotely close to paying for themselves. 

Perhaps most importantly, mainstream economic analysis shows that the potential negative effects on the economy of higher tax rates (or the potential positive effects of lower tax rates) are smaller than the negative effects of allowing persistent, 

large deficits. This point was underscored in a recent response by the Congressional 

Budget Office to questions posed by Senate Budget Committee ranking Member 

Judd Gregg (R-NH) about the effects of raising taxes or cutting spending to achieve 

a sustainable long-term fiscal path. CBO explained: 

‘‘Differences in the economic effects of alternative policies to achieve a sustainable 

budget in the long run are generally modest in comparison to the costs of allowing 

deficits to grow to unsustainable levels. In particular, the difference between acting 

to address projected deficits (by either reducing spending or raising revenues) and 

failing to do so is generally much larger than the implications of taking one approach to reducing the deficit compared with another.’’ 12

This is consistent with CBO’s earlier finding that, if deficit financed, a 10-percent 

across-the-board cut in income tax rates could potentially reduce economic output.13

It is also consistent with the a letter CBO sent to Chairman Spratt last week on 

the cost of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, which concluded that ‘‘at this point in time 

(several years after enactment), * * * the overall impact of the tax legislation [on 

the economy] is likely to be modest. * * *’’ and that, when that impact is taken into 

account, the actual cost of the tax cuts is likely to be about the same as the official 

cost estimates made at the time of the tax cuts’ enactment (which did not take economic feedback effects into account).14 Similarly, in an analysis of the effects of reductions in individual and corporate tax rates that are deficit financed, the Joint 

Committee on Taxation found that: ‘‘Growth effects eventually become negative 

without offsetting fiscal policy [i.e. without offsets] for each of the proposals, because 

accumulating Federal government debt crowds out private investment.’’ 15 And, in 

an analysis of the argument that the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 cost less 

than was estimated at the time of enactment because they boost economic growth, 

the Congressional Research Service concluded in a September 2006 report that, ‘‘at 

the current time, as the stimulus effects have faded and the effects of added debt 

service has grown, the 2001-2004 tax cuts are probably costing more than expected.’’ 16

Even the Bush administration has concluded that the long-term economic effect 

of the tax cuts will be quite small if they are made permanent. A Treasury Department study found that making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent would increase the size of the economy over the long run (i.e., after many years) by only 0.7 

percent—and that even this small growth increment would occur only if the tax cuts 

were paid for in full by unspecified cuts in government programs.17

As an indication of how modest a long-term increase in the economy of 0.7 percent 

would be, if it took 20 years for the increase to fully manifest itself (Treasury offiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 19:19 Jan 02, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-16\38254.TXT HBUD1 PsN: DICK
80

cials indicated it would take significantly more than 10 years but were not more 

specific than that), this would mean an increase in the average annual growth rate 

for 20 years of four-one hundredths of one percent—such as 3.04 percent instead of 

3.0 percent. Such an effect is so small as to be barely perceptible. Moreover, after 

the 20 years (or whatever length of time it would take for the 0.7 percent increase 

to show up), annual growth rates would return to their normal level—that is, they 

would be no higher than if the tax cuts had been allowed to expire. 

Congressional and executive branch economic experts are not the only ones to 

reach the conclusion that deficit-financed tax cuts are unlikely to substantially boost 

long run economic growth. University of California economist Alan Auerbach, a 

noted expert in fiscal policy, simulated the economic effects of the 2001 reductions 

in marginal tax rates, increase in the child tax credit, ‘‘marriage penalty relief,’’ and 

AMT relief under various financing assumptions. He found that the only scenario 

under which the tax cuts increased the size of the capital stock and thus increased 

long-run economic output was one in which they were fully paid for with spending 

cuts at the time they were enacted. Auerbach concluded that ‘‘whatever its benefits, 

the tax cut [enacted in 2001] does not offer the promise of enhancing savings and 

expanding output in the long run.’’ 18

The clear conclusion is that whatever long-term economic benefits tax cuts might 

offer, those benefits will only be realized if the cost of the tax cuts is offset—that 

is, if enactment of the tax cuts is consistent with pay-as-you-go discipline. The potential for economic benefits from tax cuts if they are paid for offers support for the 

principle that tax cuts should be subject to pay-as-you-go, rather than for the argument that tax cuts should be exempt from such fiscal discipline. 

ENACTING A STATUTORY PAY-AS-YOU-GO RULE WOULD HELP PROMOTE ADHERENCE TO

PAY-AS-YOU-GO

Finally, I would like to briefly discuss why enacting a statutory pay-as-you-go rule 

would be helpful. The House and the Senate have already taken the most important 

step toward establishing pay-as-you-go discipline by imposing rules that prohibit 

consideration of legislation that would increase entitlement spending or cut taxes 

if the costs of those actions are not offset. Establishing a statutory pay-as-you-go 

rule backed up by sequestration would not dramatically enhance the effectiveness 

of those rules. (Congress could include a waiver of the statutory pay-as-you-go requirement in future legislation, just as it can waive its own rules to consider legislation that violates pay-as-you-go.) 

Nevertheless, enacting a statutory pay-as-you-go rule could add force to the Congressional rules by emphasizing the importance of adherence to pay-as-you-go and, 

in particular, by making it harder for future Congresses to quietly back away from 

adherence to pay-as-you-go. Once pay-as-you-go was written into law, it could be removed from the law (before its scheduled expiration date if there were one) or set 

aside on a case-by-case basis only by enactment of a statute that would require the 

assent of the President and, most likely, support from a supermajority in the Senate 

to become law. A statutory pay-as-you-go requirement also could have the virtue of 

improving the budgeting culture in Executive Branch agencies by reinforcing the 

idea that, when entitlement expansions or tax cuts are discussed, a key question 

should be ‘‘how will the costs be paid for?’’

CONCLUSION

Enactment of a statutory pay-as-you-go rule would be highly desirable. But 

whether a statutory rule is established or not, what is of most importance is that 

Congress maintain a commitment to adhere to pay-as-you-go discipline even when 

living by that rule is not easy. Given the bleak long-term fiscal outlook for the nation, we cannot afford for Congress to do otherwise. 

ENDNOTES

1 ‘‘The Long-Term Budget Outlook,’’ Congressional Budget Office, December 2005. 

2 ‘‘The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: April 2007 Update,’’ Government Accountability Office, April 2007. 3 ‘‘Mid-Session Review of the Budget of the United States: Fiscal Year 2008,’’ Office of Management and Budget, July 11, 2007, p. 6. 4 Richard Kogan, Matt Fiedler, Aviva Aron-Dine, and James Horney, ‘‘The Long-Term Fiscal 

Outlook is Bleak: Restoring Fiscal Sustainability Will Require Major Changes to Programs, Revenues, and the Nation’s Health Care System,’’ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, January 

29, 2007. 5The projections do assume that current relief from the Alternative Minimum Tax will be extended without offsets, because the AMT would practically replace the regular income tax by 

2050 if the relief were not extended. 

81

6During the 1990s, every entitlement increase and tax cut was paid for. The only exception 

occurred in 1993, at a time when unemployment remained high, when the final six-month continuation of ‘‘extended unemployment benefits’’ was declared an emergency by both Congress 

and the President and for that reason was not subject to the PAYGO statute. 7For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see James Horney and Richard Kogan, ‘‘Key 

Argument Against Applying Pay-As-You-Go to Tax Cuts Does Not Withstand Scrutiny,’’ Center 

on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 22, 2007. 8The current rules were essentially established in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which 

amended the Balanced Budget Act, and are often called the ‘‘BEA’’ baseline rules. 9The special rule only applies to programs that cost more than $50 million a year, and applies 

to a program established after 1997 only if he House and Senate Budget Committees have determined at the time of enactment that the programs should be assumed to continue. 10There is a special rule that says that expiring excise taxes that are dedicated to a trust 

fund should be assumed to continue. This could be viewed as one case where a set of taxes constitute a program. More importantly, these taxes fund highway and transit programs that expire 

under current law but are assumed to continue in the baseline. 11Sunsetting 2001 tax cuts that were intended to be permanent was one of a number of gimmicks used in a process that former Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas described as an effort ‘‘to get a pound and a half of sugar in a one-pound bag.’’ From ‘‘News Conference with Representative Bill Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,’’ 

Federal News Service Transcript, March 15, 2001. 12 Congressional Budget Office, ‘‘Financing Projected Spending in the Long Run,’’ attachment 

to letter to Senator Judd Gregg, July 9, 2007, p. 1. 13 Congressional Budget Office, ‘‘Analyzing the Economic and Budgetary Effects of a 10 Percent Cut in Income Tax Rates,’’ December 1, 2005. 14 CBO estimated that the cost of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, incorporating economic feedback 

effects, is roughly $195 billion to $215 billion (including debt-service costs), compared with the 

official estimate (without feedback effects) of $211 billion. Letter of July 20, 2007, from Peter 

R. Orszag, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, to House Budget Committee Chairman 

John M. Spratt, Jr. 15 Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘‘Macroeconomic Analysis of Various Proposals to Provide 

$500 Billion in Tax Relief,’’ JCX-4-05, March 1, 2005. 16 Jane G. Gravelle, ‘‘Revenue Feedback from the 2001-2003 Tax Cuts,’’ Congressional Research Service, September 27, 2006. 17Department of Treasury, ‘‘A Dynamic Analysis of Permanent Extension of the President’s 

Tax Relief,’’ July 25, 2006. For a more detailed discussion of the Treasury study, see Jason 

Furman, ‘‘Treasury Dynamic Analysis Refutes Claims by Supporters of the Tax Cuts,’’ Center 

on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised August 24, 2006. 18 Alan J. Auerbach, ‘‘The Bush Tax Cuts and National Saving,’’ National Tax Journal, September 2002.


green-1.eps
82

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Greenstein. 

Let us go to our old colleague, Mr. Toomey. 

STATEMENT OF PAT TOOMEY 

Mr. TOOMEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Ryan. I certainly do appreciate the invitation to be here 

and present what I suspect will be the sole contrary view. Being 

in a very small minority, it is nothing new to me. So I appreciate 

this opportunity. 

Let me say that, and I will try to be brief about this, supporters 

of PAYGO have long argued that these rules are necessary to reduce the federal deficit. And at the outset, let me acknowledge that 

reducing the deficit is certainly a well-intentioned objective and not 

something that we at Club for Growth are in disagreement about. 

That said, however, subjecting tax cuts to the PAYGO rule as 

this proposal does may over time actually take us farther away 

from this goal rather than bringing us closer to it and in the process, it could do great harm to the American prosperity. 

Subjecting tax cuts to the PAYGO rules will not only sound the 

death now for future tax cuts but will also result very soon, in fact, 

in the largest tax increase in American history. The resulting tax 

hike will not go unnoticed by the American economy and a reasonably likely economic downturn that could result could very well 

lead to a decline in federal tax revenues which would in turn, of 

course, lead to large deficits. 

Now, opponents of the tax cuts have often resisted the inextricable connection between constructive lower taxes, especially 

marginal tax rates, and economic growth, but even a brief look at 

the economic benefits that have occurred since the 2003 tax cuts 

suggests that any rule that precludes their extension and instead 


green-2.eps
83

forces a reversion to the prior higher rates is quite likely to have 

an effect of inhibiting economic growth. 

A simple comparison of statistics before and after is very informative. In the two years before the 2003 tax relief, American workers lost 2.7 million jobs. During the two years afterwards, the 

American economy gained 4.3 million jobs. Today we have over 

eight million new jobs since August of 2003 and the economy continues to create new jobs today. 

GDP growth prior, in 2001, for instance, 1.1 percent. Two years 

after the tax cuts, GDP growth was 3.8 percent. At the time of the 

2003 tax cuts, unemployment was 6.1 percent. Two years later, at 

5.1. Today at about four and a half. 

Prior to the tax relief, business investment had declined for eight 

straight quarters. After the tax relief, it increased for 15 straight 

quarters and continues to climb today. And since the 2003 tax cuts, 

equity markets in general, the Dow Jones Industrial Average in 

particular, has increased nearly 80 percent. 

We think it is very unlikely that this is all a big coincidence. 

Clearly the 2003 tax cuts played a role in this increased economic 

growth in this country, but the story does not end there. The increased economic growth over time does, in fact, contribute to increasing revenue and, therefore, a reduction in the federal deficit. 

Today, not despite, but in part because of the 2003 tax cuts, federal tax revenue is at an all-time record high. And more importantly, the actual tax revenue being collected today and the last 

couple years exceeds what CBO projected we would be collecting 

this year prior to the tax cuts being enacted. 

Now, I am not going to sit here and tell you that I can tell you 

that I know how much revenue we would have brought in had 

there never been these tax cuts. I would argue that nobody can tell 

you that. But we can look back at what was projected for this year 

prior to the tax cuts’ enactment. And the fact is we are bringing 

in more revenue than what was projected at that time. 

Of course, increased federal revenue all else being equal leads to 

lower deficits, not larger deficits, and we are not on track to finish 

this fiscal year with a deficit on the order of what is really a mere 

$200 billion or about 1.5 percent of GDP, well below America’s 

post-war average. 

So we believe that the relationship between tax cuts, economic 

growth, revenue, and deficits is a strong relationship and subjecting tax cuts to the PAYGO rule severs this relationship by removing an important catalyst for economic growth. 

Ultimately, of course, we view the problem of the proposed statutory version of PAYGO in that it treats tax cuts the same way that 

it treats new government spending by treating these as equivalents. In fact, that view is predicated on a static view of the world 

that we think is patently wrong. The economy is not static. It is 

dynamic in its nature. And as I have mentioned above, new tax 

cuts properly done can expand economic activity. 

But a broader point needs to be made about focusing excessively 

on budget deficits. While shrinking the federal deficit is important, 

we think that it is not as crucial as an end in itself as it is a tool 

to achieve an end and that end is greater prosperity and greater 

economic growth. 

84

At the end of the day, job growth, higher incomes, gains in family 

wealth are more important than the number on the government’s 

ledger. 

Now, some will argue that deficits detract directly from economic 

growth by driving up interest rates. What we have seen in recent 

history suggests that that certainly is not the case in the current 

environment. We went from significant surpluses to significant 

deficits and as we went through that process, interest rates tumbled. 

That simply proves that interest rates clearly are driven by other 

factors and not exclusively and probably not even primarily by federal deficits. What really matters is not the absolute size of the deficit but the size of the deficit as a percentage of the economy. 

And, finally, let me close by saying that the real budgetary crisis, 

and this was raised in the previous panel, the real budgetary crisis 

facing our federal government is not addressed by PAYGO. The 

real crisis is the unsustained projected growth in entitlement 

spending both in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP. Actual total federal government debt owed to others today is about 

37 percent of GDP whereas the unfunded liability of the existing 

entitlement programs is over 370 percent of GDP. 

PAYGO is a very well-intentioned rule, but we think its implementation should not come at the cost of preventing economic stimulating tax cuts and any long-term attempt to deal with our budgetary crisis must begin with reform of our entitlement programs. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Pat Toomey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. TOOMEY PRESIDENT, CLUB FOR GROWTH, 

FORMER REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me. I am 

pleased to be here today to offer my views on the effects of reestablishing statutory 

PAYGO rules. 

Supporters of PAYGO have long argued that PAYGO rules are necessary to reduce the federal deficit. At the outset let me say that reducing the deficit is a wellintentioned objective. That said, subjecting tax cuts to the PAYGO rule—as the Majority’s proposal does—may actually take us farther away from that goal instead of 

bringing us closer to it, and in the process, do great harm to American prosperity. 

Subjecting tax cuts to PAYGO rules will not only sound the death knell for future 

tax cuts, but will also result in the largest tax increase in American history. While 

it is technically possible to extend the current tax rates in compliance with PAYGO 

rules, it is clear that there is no appetite for the reduced mandatory spending that 

would be required. The resulting huge tax hike will not go unnoticed by the American economy. An economic downturn may well result, which could lead to a decline 

in federal tax revenue, leading, in turn, to much larger deficits than the path we 

are currently on. 

Opponents of tax cuts have long resisted the inextricable connection between tax 

cuts and economic growth. But even a brief look at the economic benefits of the 2003 

tax cuts suggests that any rule that precludes their extension and instead forces a 

reversion to prior, higher rates will likely have the unfortunate effect of inhibiting 

economic growth in this country. 

A simple before and after picture does the trick. The before picture is as grey and 

grim as the after picture is bright. Consider the following numbers: 

• Two years before the 2003 tax relief was implemented, American workers lost 

2.7 million jobs—at an average of 100,000 jobs lost per months. Two years after the 

2003 tax cuts, the American economy gained 4.3 million new jobs, an average of 

160,000 per month. Today, we have gained over 8 million jobs since August 2003, 

and the economy continues to create jobs at a similar rate. 

• In 2001, Gross Domestic Product growth was at a meager 1.1%. Two years after 

the tax cuts, GDP growth was at 3.8%. 

85

• At the time of the 2003 tax cuts, the unemployment rate was at 6.1%. Two 

years after the cuts, unemployment sank to 5.1% and currently sits at 4.5%. • Prior to the tax relief, business investment had declined for eight straight quarters. After the tax relief, it increased for 15 straight quarters, and continues to 

climb today. • Since the 2003 tax cuts, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has increased nearly 

80%, recently hitting a record-breaking level of 14,000. • Capital gains income has increased by 153.3% since the end of 2002. • In 2005, capital gains income was $604 billion, just $11 billion below the alltime high set during the boom in the late 1990’s. • In 2005, dividend cash payments grew by more than 11%, marking the third 

straight year of double digit growth of S&P 500 dividend income. • Dividend income ended 2005 at a record level of $154 billion. 

Specifically, the tax cuts on capital gains and dividends earnings in 2003 have 

been a huge boon for shareholders, according to the IRS. Consider these numbers: 

Clearly, the 2003 tax cuts have played a large role in the increased economic 

growth in this country. But the story does not end there. Increased economic growth 

contributes directly to increased revenue and therefore, a reduction in the federal 

deficit. While opponents of the tax cuts argued (and continue to argue) that we could 

not afford the decrease in federal revenue resulting from the tax cuts, we saw huge 

revenue increases very shortly after the tax cuts were implemented, and tax revenues continue to flow into the federal coffers at an astonishing rate. Again, a quick 

before and after picture is instructive. 

After declining from 2000 to 2003, federal tax revenue surged in 2004, 2005, and 

2006. In 2004 and 2005, revenues grew by 14.6% and 11.8% respectively. To understand just how remarkable these numbers are consider that 2005 marks the first 

time since the mid1980’s (following the Reagan tax cuts) that our nation has generated double-digit revenue growth in consecutive years. Fortunately, this positive 

trend is continuing today. For the first eight months of 2007, incoming tax revenue 

has already increased by 6.9%. 

Despite the preponderance of evidence to the contrary, opponents of tax cuts have 

a habit of leaning on the Congressional Budget Office projections to argue the magnitude of revenue losses that will result from tax cuts. But this is like a cripple 

leaning on a faulty crutch. If there is one thing that is clear from the past four years 

it is the CBO’s inability to accurately project revenue. Consider the following numbers: • In 2004, the CBO projected tax revenues to increase by 2%, compared with an 

actual increase of 5.5% • In 2005, the CBO projected tax revenues to increase by 9.4%, compared with 

an actual increase of 14.6%. • In 2006, the CBO projected tax revenues to increase by 7.4%, compared with 

an actual increase of 11.8%. 

• In 2007, the CBO projected tax revenues to increase by 5.6%. Thus far, revenues are up by 6.9%. 

Worse, the CBO radically underestimated the government’s revenue intake from 

capital gains earnings after the 2003 tax cuts. At the time, dire warnings about the 

price of the cuts rang through these very halls. Instead of witnessing the fulfillment 

of those warnings, we have witnessed a sharp increase in revenue from capital 

gains—far beyond what the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Congressional 

Budget Office predicted. 

In January of 2004, the CBO forecasted capital gains revenue to be $42 billion 

for 2003; $46 billion for 2004; $52 billion for 2005; and $57 billion for 2006. Actual 

returns were significantly higher: $51 billion in 2003; $72 billion in 2004; $97 billion 

in 2005; and $110 billion in 2006. In total, the CBO’s forecast on capital gains revenue for 2003-2006 was off by a staggering 68%. Clearly, if we are in need of an 

economic projector, history has a better track record than the CBO. 

The aforementioned numbers are clear and stark. It is no coincidence that federal 

tax revenue from capital gains earnings shot up immediately after the tax rate was 

lowered dramatically. Opponents of the capital gains tax cuts focused on the decreasing tax rates and assumed that tax revenue would follow suit. This is far too 

simplistic of an equation. Revenue taken into government is not solely dependent 

on the tax rates we impose, but on the tax rates as applied to income. If you broaden income by lowering rates, revenue can increase. 

Of course, increased federal revenue—all else held constant—must result in a 

shrinking deficit. As revenue continues to flow into the federal government’s coffers, 

the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget have 

been forced to significantly revise downward their deficit projections for 2004-2006, 

citing robust growth and revenues as a large reason for their revisions. 

86

• In 2004, the OMB projected a deficit of $521 billion. The actual deficit was $412 billion, a decrease of $109 billion, or 21%. • In 2005, the OMB projected a deficit of $427 billion. The actual deficit was $318 billion, a decrease of $109 billion, or 25%. • For 2006, the OMB originally projected a deficit of $423.3 billion. The actual deficit was $247.7 billion, a reduction of $175.6 billion, or 41%. • For 2006, the CBO originally predicted a deficit of $371 billion. The actual deficit was a reduction of 33%. 

The relationship between tax cuts, economic growth, revenue, and the deficit are 

clear. Subjecting tax cuts to PAYGO rules effectively severs this relationship at the 

head by removing the very catalyst that helps the economy grow. If the purpose of 

PAYGO is to decrease the deficit—or at least hold it at bay—then ruling out future 

tax cuts and imposing the largest tax increase in American history is the wrong 

path to take. Rather than decrease the federal deficit, the Majority’s PAYGO rules 

may actually exacerbate the very problem the Majority is trying to solve. Instead, 

PAYGO rules could be tantamount to legislating economic disaster. 

Ultimately, the problem with the Majority’s PAYGO rules is that it treats tax cuts 

and new government spending as equivalent. Supporters of this proposal assume 

that the tax cuts will cost the government a set number of dollars just like a new 

government program. This outlook is predicated on a static view of the world that 

is patently wrong. The economy is not static, but a dynamic creature. As I have 

demonstrated above, new tax cuts (if they are done properly) expand economic activity and can result in an actual increase in new government revenue and a reduction 

in the deficit. The same cannot be said for new government spending which does 

not (except sometimes briefly) expand economic growth—and can even have the effect of retarding it—and results in decreased revenue and an increased deficit. 

But a broader point must be made about focusing excessively on budget deficits. 

While shrinking the federal deficit is important, it is not crucial as an end in itself, 

but only to the extent that it serves as a means to another end—increasing prosperity and economic growth. At the end of the day, job growth, higher incomes, and 

gains in family wealth are more important than the number on the federal government’s ledger. 

Some will argue that deficits contribute directly to the rate of economic growth 

and are therefore worthy of being elevated to such a high priority. Proponents of 

this argument claim that excessive government borrowing crowds out private borrowing and drives up interest rates, thus retarding economic growth. This can be 

true, but the operative word in this argument is ‘‘excessive.’’

A brief stroll down memory lane demonstrates the hollowness of this fear in the 

near term. Over the past five years, the U.S. government went from surpluses to 

deficits, but the interest rates tumbled at the same time. The reason for this is simple. Interest rates are driven primarily by other factors. Certainly, truly excessive 

debt has the potential to boost interest rates and harm economic growth, but we 

are far from approaching this worst-case scenario. It is important to remember that 

the current deficit is only 1.5% of the Gross Domestic Product and decreasing by 

the day. 

What really matters is not the absolute size of the deficit but the size of the deficit as a percentage of the economy. This is true in most facets of life. Consider the 

following simple scenario: An elderly man dies, leaving his son two businesses from 

which to choose his inheritance. The first business is worth $500,000 and carries 

no debt. The second is worth $10 million, but carries $1 million in debt. Clearly, 

the second business is the better choice. The point of this little anecdote is that the 

size of the debt doesn’t tell us the whole story. While no one likes debt, its presence 

out of context should not be the decisive factor in setting economic policy. 

Finally, the real budgetary crisis facing our federal government isn’t addressed by 

PAYGO. The real crisis is unsustainable projected growth in entitlement spending 

in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP. 

While PAYGO is a well-intentioned rule, its implementation should not come at 

the cost of preventing economy-stimulating tax cuts, and any long-term attempt to 

deal with our budgetary crisis must begin with reform of our entitlement programs. 

Thank you again for allowing me to comment on this important issue.

Chairman SPRATT. Go next to Mr. Bixby and then, Ms. 

MacGuineas, we will let you be the cleanup hitter. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. BIXBY 

Mr. BIXBY. Thank you very much, Mr. Spratt, Mr. Ryan, other 

members of the Committee. 

87

I am here representing the Concord Coalition. And in our view, 

reinstating PAYGO in law would be a very positive step in restoring fiscal discipline and preventing the daunting long-term outlook 

from getting any worse. I think it would also encourage a necessary 

discussion of the tough choices that need to be made for a sustainable fiscal future. 

I think it is important to note at the outset that while strong 

budget enforcement rules such as PAYGO can provide very positive 

incentives for fiscal discipline as has been stated, they are not a 

substitute for political will and PAYGO would not address the longterm problems that are on an unsustainable course right now, but 

that does not mean that we should not do it because it would help 

prevent the situation from getting any worse. 

I want to begin by thanking you for having this discussion because there is a general feeling among the American people or 

there is a general feeling anyway that the American people do not 

care about this issue, that the eyes can glaze over. Actually, that 

is not the case. 

As Comptroller General Walker has mentioned, we have been 

going around the country. The Concord Coalition has organized this 

fiscal wake-up tour that includes General Walker and people from 

Brookings and people from Heritage and we have been doing this 

for almost two years now. And we find that people are indeed very 

interested in this. 

We have been to over 20 cities now. They understand the difficulty of the challenge. They understand the need to make sacrifices. What they do not understand is why all of us here in Washington are not able to deal with the problems. 

But I would like to report that as you consider reestablishing 

statutory PAYGO, I think you can be encouraged by knowing that 

the public from our experience instinctively grasps the logic behind 

the rule. It is a common-sense concept that says that we must 

make choices to stop digging a bigger hole for future generations 

to fill in. 

So my overall first point is that the public gets that. People understand that and I think that PAYGO has a public constituency 

out there. 

I am not going to spend any time unusually talking about the 

long-term outlook because everybody has mentioned that. I will 

just say that I agree with the consensus from all sides that the future is unsustainable on the current path. 

So what can budget process reforms do? Well, I would like to 

make a couple of points about PAYGO. I start with the premise 

again that, no, it does not do enough, but we do believe that it is 

important not to dig the hole any deeper. 

PAYGO should definitely apply to both sides of the budget, that 

is to say we believe it should apply to both spending and revenue 

decisions. It goes best with a set of discretionary spending caps as 

it did in the original ‘‘Budget Enforcement Act.’’ That way, all sides 

of the budget have some sort of enforcement mechanism and nothing is exempt. 

PAYGO should also have a credible threat, that is to say the sequestration element of PAYGO is very important. It is really what 

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gives it its teeth and separates it from the rule that both the House 

and the Senate have adopted. 

It is important for the sequestration threat to be credible, however, and I would urge you if you go this route to have a fairly 

broad base of programs. I would frankly make no exemptions. I am 

sure that that would not get too far because people would want to 

exempt Social Security and then you start down a road where what 

do you exempt and what do you not exempt. 

The problem you get into is that if almost all of the mandatory 

side of the budget is exempt, then it makes it almost impossible to 

actually do a sequester because the consequences are too toxic. So 

the broader the base, the more credible the threat, I would think, 

and the fairer the threat because it would be spread more broadly. 

I think that another point you are going to have to consider if 

you go this route is whether there should be any exemptions from 

PAYGO. I do not think that there should be. There is a former rule 

in the Senate that said that, you know, anything that was written 

into the budget rule would be exempt and that is one way of doing 

PAYGO. 

Arguably that makes sense because you could say Congress 

would decide every year what it was prepared to do and then they 

would enforce that rather than just put a PAYGO requirement on 

everything. 

The Concord Coalition has not favored that approached, however, 

and the reason why is that it is a huge exemption and it basically 

allows Congress to enact fiscally irresponsible policies simply by 

writing them into the budget resolution. So that does not really 

provide a whole lot of enforcement. 

I think that if you, a final point on this, is that if you go this 

route, and I would say, by the way, that any sort of rule you have 

can be gimmicked. I mean, Congress has always has a capacity to 

you write the rules, you can change the rules. You can try to get 

around the rules. I do not think it is a reason not to adopt a strict 

PAYGO rule to say, well, you know, you can try gimmicks to get 

around it. 

I think that the important thing is that if you have a statutory 

component to PAYGO, it is going to be more difficult to waive than 

the rule that exists now, particularly the House rule. And it is a 

backup because the House rule works differently and the Senate 

rule works differently. 

With the statutory PAYGO, you would have a backup procedure 

at the end that would look at all of the actions on both the revenue 

side and the mandatory spending side and you would have that 

threat of sequestration hanging over the whole process. So it would 

complement and be a backup to what you have now, so I do not 

think it would be a redundancy in any sense. 

My final point is that if you are going to do some new statutory 

PAYGO, I would consider including some long-term budget targets 

this time, not spending caps, not entitlement caps per se, but the 

Concord Coalition has made a suggestion about including sort of a 

long-term budget component and apply the PAYGO rule to that as 

well, and that might get into some of the look-back things that 

Comptroller General Walker was talking about so that it would 

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bring existing mandatory spending programs within some sort of 

budget enforcement procedure. 

Again, I would not talk about automatic triggers or cuts or anything like that, just a method of bringing everything into the tent 

and under the PAYGO rubric. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Robert L. Bixby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. BIXBY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE CONCORD

COALITION

Chairman Spratt, Mr. Ryan and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the merits of strengthening the budget process by 

restoring statutory ‘‘pay-as-you-go’’ (PAYGO). In my view, reinstating PAYGO in 

law would be a very positive step in restoring fiscal discipline and preventing the 

daunting long-term outlook from getting any worse. It would also encourage a necessary discussion of the tough choices that must be made for a sustainable fiscal 

future. 

I am here representing The Concord Coalition, a nonpartisan organization dedicated to strengthening the nation’s long-term economic prospects through sound and 

sustainable fiscal policy. Concord’s co-chairs are former senators, Warren B. Rudman (R-NH) and Bob Kerrey (D-NE). They, along with Concord’s President former 

Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson and our nationwide membership, have consistently urged Washington policymakers to produce a credible plan for long-term 

fiscal sustainability. 

It is important to note at the outset that while strong budget enforcement rules, 

such as PAYGO, can provide positive incentives for fiscally responsible action, they 

are not a substitute for political will. No strategy for fiscal sustainability will succeed over the long-term unless we find a way to reduce projected costs, particularly 

for health care. A realistic strategy will likely require some mix of spending reductions, and revenue increases—negotiated in a bipartisan process—aimed at preventing total spending, taxes or debt from reaching levels that could reduce economic growth and future standards of living. 

In my remarks, I will begin with brief comments about the budget’s long-term 

outlook, followed by a discussion of measures—such as PAYGO—that could assist 

the Congress in its efforts to restore and maintain fiscal discipline despite the economic and demographic pressures that confront the federal budget. 

But first, I would like to thank you for undertaking this discussion. After all, the 

conventional wisdom is that the American people are largely indifferent to issues 

related the federal budget’s long-term prospects. That is not an accurate assessment. For almost 2 years now, The Concord Coalition has undertaken a Fiscal 

Wake-Up Tour to talk to the American people about what is common knowledge in 

Washington D.C.—that current budget policies threaten the nation’s future economic well-being. 

United States Comptroller General David M. Walker, and experts from The 

Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, and The Committee for Economic 

Development, have joined The Concord Coalition on the tour to explain the issues 

and to hear from communities across the country. As a result of visits to more than 

20 cities, I can report to you that people understand the difficulty of the challenge 

and the need to make sacrifices. What they do not understand is why their elected 

leaders are not making adequate progress on solving the problems we face. 

Members of the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour do not necessarily agree on the ideal levels 

of spending, taxes and debt, but we do agree on the following key points: 

• Current fiscal policy is unsustainable 

• There are no free lunch solutions, such as cutting waste fraud and abuse or 

growing our way out of the problem. 

• Finding solutions will require bipartisan cooperation and a willingness to discuss all options. 

• Public engagement and understanding is vital in finding solutions. 

• This is not about numbers. It is a moral issue. 

We do not recommend specific policy solutions. Indeed, we are upfront about the 

fact that we do not necessarily agree on solutions. However, we remind audiences 

that each of the realistic options comes with economic and political consequences 

that must be carefully weighed, and that there must be tradeoffs. 

Those who want to raise taxes are asked to explain what level of taxation they 

are willing to support and the manner in which the new revenue should be raised. 

90

Those who argue that spending must come down from projected levels are asked 

which programs they would target and how the savings would be achieved. Those 

who are unwilling to do either are asked how much debt they are willing to impose 

on future generations. I mention this because these are precisely the choices that 

you, as elected leaders, must face when making decisions under a PAYGO rule. 

Our experience is that when audiences are told the facts, and shown that if they 

demand their ‘‘rights’’ to programs or policies it will have damaging economic effects 

to other groups or generations represented in the audience, they begin to accept the 

need for tradeoffs. In other words, as you explore the possibility of restoring statutory PAYGO, you can be encouraged by knowing that the public instinctively grasps 

the logic behind the rule. PAYGO is common sense concept. It says that we must 

make choices to stop digging a deeper hole for future generations to fill in. People 

understand that. 

In addition to the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour, the same group of analysts from Concord, 

Heritage and Brookings have been working with Public Agenda and ViewPoint 

Learning, on a project designed to provide insight into how attitudes evolve as people discuss difficult trade-offs with regard to long-term fiscal policy. It is called ‘‘Facing Up to the Nation’s Finances.’’

As part of this project, three intensive day-long ‘‘Choice Dialogues’’ have been conducted in San Diego, Kansas City, Philadelphia and in three locations in Tennessee. 

Public Agenda has released a report on these dialogues1 in which the following observations stand out: 

• The public is strongly averse to big increases in the size of the national debt 

and, with the right kind of leadership, is prepared to accept sacrifices to avoid it. 

• For most people, the overriding concern is not resistance to taxes but a profound lack of trust in government. People are willing to pay for what they want so 

long as they can be satisfied that government will spend the money wisely and for 

the purposes intended. 

• Americans are willing to make changes in entitlements, but again on condition 

that trust and accountability exist. 

• While there is continued strong support for defense spending, it is accompanied 

by the widespread perception that funds are misallocated and often wasted. 

• Americans want to be engaged in addressing these issues and are frustrated by 

the lack of engagement that contributes to their mistrust of government 

Both the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour and the Facing Up project will continue through 

2008. 

OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE FEDERAL BUDGET’S PROSPECTS

The most recent analyses of the Congressional Budget Office, the Government Accountability Office, the Office of Management and Budget, and independent fiscal 

and economic policy experts consistently conclude that current budget policies are 

on an unsustainable path. Since many of those experts are available to you today, 

I do not need to spend much time on the projections aside from noting that The 

Concord Coalition joins with their consensus conclusion. 

I would, however, like to make two observations to emphasize how important it 

is to address the imbalances in current budget policy. First, recent ‘‘good news’’ on 

the budget could be bad news if we use it to conclude that our problems are behind 

us, and second, nothing about the short-term improvement in the deficit represents 

a fundamental shift in the daunting long-term picture. 

The good news may be bad news. 

Clearly, there has been some good news on the budget front. In 2007, for the third 

year in a row, revenues are up and the deficit is down. So why are The Concord 

Coalition and others traveling around the country issuing a fiscal wake-up call? It’s 

because we are not looking in the rear view mirror. We are looking ahead. And it 

doesn’t take a crystal ball to see what’s coming: 

Our nation is undergoing an unprecedented demographic transformation against 

the backdrop of steadily rising health care costs and steadily falling national savings. It is a dangerous combination for the future health of the economy. 

Consider three facts: 

• Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid already comprise 40 percent of the federal budget. That is before the baby boomers begin to retire. 

• Over the next 25 years, the number of Americans aged 65 and up is expected 

to nearly double, growing from 12 percent of the population to 20 percent. The ratio 

of workers paying into Social Security and Medicare relative to the number of beneficiaries will fall by roughly one-third. 

• Demographic change, however, is only part of the problem. For the past 40 

years health care spending has consistently grown faster than the economy. If the 

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same growth rate continues over the next 40 years, Medicare and Medicaid will absorb as much of our nation’s economy as the entire federal budget does today. 

It is true that CBO’s baseline for fiscal years (FY) 2008-2017 projects declining 

deficits followed by budget surpluses in FY 2012 and thereafter. Moreover, the 

President has taken to the road to argue that under his budget policies the deficit 

would disappear by 2012. Taking these projections at face value produces a deceptively benign outlook. 

The ‘‘good news’’ could be bad news for fiscal discipline because it fosters an attitude of complacency. It makes worrying about long-term fiscal imbalance look as out 

of place as wearing a raincoat on a sunny day. In effect, the improved short-term 

fiscal outlook encourages higher spending and deeper revenue reductions—the very 

policy changes that negate the projected improvements to the bottom line of the 

budget. 

A look back at the budget outlooks from 1999 to 2001 reminds us of how seductive 

good news can be. Baseline projections of surpluses ‘‘as far as the eye could see’’ 

kicked off a holiday from budget discipline that has yet to end. Despite CBO warnings that that the short-term projections of surpluses did not resolve long-term fiscal 

imbalances, spending increased at a faster pace than contained in those optimistic 

projections while tax cuts reduced revenues. Subsequent changes in the economy 

and threats to the nation’s security at home and abroad significantly altered the 

budget’s outlook without motivating a return to responsible fiscal posture. 

The following chart (figure 1) illustrates a plausible alternative to CBO’s current 

budget outlook. It assumes: 

• Continue funding while gradually phasing down operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing troops in those missions to 75,000 by 2013 and beyond; 

• Extend all tax cuts expiring in FY 2007-2017; 

• Index the alternative minimum tax for inflation; and 

• Increase spending for regular discretionary programs at the same rate of 

growth as the economy. 

FIGURE 1

Under that set of assumptions the deficit in 2017 would approach 4 percent of 

gross domestic product GDP instead of the surplus of 1 percent of GDP contained 

in CBO’s baseline. Further erosion of the budget’s bottom line would result if the 

PAYGO principal of budget neutrality contained in the FY 2008 Congressional 

Budget Resolution is not enforced as new authorizations for the State Child Health 


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92

Insurance Program (SCHIP), agricultural subsidies, tax cut extensions, and other 

programs are finalized. 

The good times won’t last. 

Even if the CBO projections somehow turn out to be close to target, the growth 

in programs affected by the aging of the population will, under current laws, outpace the growth in the economy and revenues. If policy makers do not act to slow 

the growth in spending for Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, to reduce spending on other programs or to increase revenues, financing the resulting fiscal gap—

net interest costs—grows faster than any other category of the budget including 

Medicare and Medicaid. Recent analyses from the Government Accountability Office 

show that in 2050 net interest costs as a share of GDP could exceed Social Security, 

Medicare and Medicaid combined—obviously an unsustainable outcome.2 Those who 

say that deficits don’t matter are not paying attention to interest costs. Even now, 

net interest is a bigger expense than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or the federal government’s share of Medicaid. 

The country has not yet reached a consensus over the question of whether projected spending is too high or projected revenues are too low. But there is no question that the projected gap between revenues and spending, and the resulting debt 

burden, would put our Nation’s economic security in serious jeopardy and increase 

exposure to the uncertainty of global capital markets. 

So far, there is little evidence that the bond markets are concerned about the potential borrowing needs of the United States government over the long-term—a ‘‘conundrum’’ as it is called by the Federal Reserve’s former Chairman Alan Greenspan. 

Long-term Treasury rates remain comfortably at or below levels seen throughout 

the last 40 years. That has prompted some to believe that the projected fiscal gap 

does not matter because an ample supply of willing lenders exists to fill the gap. 

The favorable interest rate conditions are likely to persist as long as the markets 

doubt, as appears to be the current case, the likelihood of serious federal deficits 

over the long-term. If, however, they have reason to question that assumption, the 

market’s reaction could be swift and costly. There will be no forbearance as policy 

makers attempt to remedy the perception. Acting proactively—not waiting for markets to react—would allow a more gradual shift to the policy adjustments that will 

have to be made. 

Global borrowing conditions in the coming decades almost certainly will be significantly different than they are today. The United States is not alone when it comes 

to long-term fiscal imbalances. Many other countries are facing similar pressures related to the aging of their populations. That implies an overall increase in resources 

required to support older populations that would put upward pressure on global interest rates. Indeed, the populations of many countries—China, Japan, Germany, 

France and the United Kingdom, for example—are aging more rapidly than our 

own. Those countries are among the largest holders of current Treasury debt. Many 

of those same countries provide more extensive public retirement and health benefits. 

It is not possible to predict with any certainty whether future debt issued by the 

U.S. Treasury will retain its attractiveness to global lenders relative to other borrowers. There are some indications, however, that the U.S. may have greater potential risks that could affect borrowing costs. For example, within the European Union 

many governments are making progress towards addressing their own age-related 

fiscal imbalances through reforms for public pension programs, real asset accumulation, and greater attention to health care and long-term care programs.3

In addition, the United States starts at a significant disadvantage when it comes 

to containing future health care spending, which is the primary driver of escalating 

spending projections in the long-term budget. The United States already spends significantly more per capita than any other country, and health spending consumes 

a significantly larger share of GDP than in other countries with advanced economies 

(16 percent in 2006 compared to the 9 percent average for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries).4 Moreover, the annual excess 

growth rate of real health care costs is roughly double that of the OECD (non-U.S.) 

average, indicating that health care could exert greater pressure on the U.S. economy and the budget than in other nations.5 Despite higher spending per capita 

health care, the U.S. does not achieve superior health outcomes (measured in terms 

of infant mortality, healthy life expectancy at age 60, etc.).6

The point is, whatever the world economy looks like two, three, four decades from 

now, the United States will have greater room to maneuver if it acts now to limit 

the growth in future debt levels. Today’s apparent budgetary ‘‘good news’’ should not 

lull policy makers into believing that conditions cannot change. Hard as it is, adopting a more disciplined stance toward the budget will be easier now than later when 

93

the magnitude of required policy adjustment is likely to be greater and far more disruptive to the American people. 

FIGURE 2

BUDGET PROCESS REFORM CAN HELP

The Concord Coalition strongly supports your efforts to strengthen the budget 

process. We have repeatedly urged the Congress and the President to return to the 

statutory rules enacted in the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA). Those measures 

set enforceable limits on discretionary spending and required that changes to entitlement spending and revenue provisions be deficit neutral—the pay-as-you-go, or 

PAYGO requirement. The BEA rules provided the fiscal discipline that helped to 

balance the budget in 1998 for the first time in nearly three decades. The lesson 

that can be learned from that overall success is that budget enforcement can be an 

important tool in achieving long-term budget goals. 

REINSTATING PAYGO

The Concord Coalition encourages the House to adopt measures that strengthen 

its ability to enforce the budget. Reinstituting statutory PAYGO and limits on discretionary spending—both enforced through sequestration—would be a good beginning. Statutory PAYGO would put additional teeth into the PAYGO rule by establishing a mechanism that cannot be easily waived. In addition, because levels established in the Congressional Budget resolution would be written into law, it would 

force the Executive branch to play an earlier role in the congressional budget process. 

We believe that reinstituting two-sided PAYGO, which incorporates both entitlement spending and tax policy changes, is an important first step towards restoring 

fiscal discipline. Not only does PAYGO help to keep the long-term outlook from getting worse, but it also forces explicit acknowledgement of the obvious—someone 

sometime will have to pay for deficit financed increases in entitlement spending and 

tax cuts, if not within the five to 10-year budget window, then sometime in the future through higher taxes or reduced federal programs, benefits and services. 

Restoring a sense of fiscal discipline will be a very difficult challenge. It will be 

virtually impossible without strong budget enforcement mechanisms. There are too 


bix2.eps
94

many claims on too few dollars to declare that formal budgetary restraints are no 

longer necessary. And while it cannot be said that either discretionary spending 

caps or PAYGO worked very well after 1998 when surpluses emerged, it is clear 

that protecting a surplus is not something we’ll need to worry about in the near future. Sadly, the task at hand is to bring the deficit back under control. The track 

record for caps and PAYGO in times of big deficits is one of success. 

There should be no wishful thinking that we will ‘‘grow our way’’ back to budget 

balance. Deficits are back for as far as the eye can see and they are likely to persist 

unless Congress and the President take specific steps to rein them in. 

Unfortunately, quite the opposite has been happening in recent years. The political consensus that once existed in support of running a surplus excluding Social 

Security (i.e., an ‘‘on-budget’’ surplus) has broken down. Rather than setting priorities and making hard choices, Congress and the President have simultaneously increased spending and cut taxes—with little or no regard for how it all adds up. 

It is worth noting in this regard, that the huge $5.6 trillion surplus projected just 

six years ago did not simply disappear because of changing economic projections. According to CBO estimates as of January 2007, legislation and its associated interest 

costs have consumed more than the entire amount. Economic and technical factors 

have reduced it by another $2 trillion—meaning that over the same timeframe, 2002 

to 2011, we now have a projected deficit of $2 trillion instead of a projected $5.6 

trillion surplus. If one looks at just the five-year window (2002-2006), which is no 

longer based on projections, the cost of new legislation (spending and taxes) exceeded the projected surplus by $200 billion. While it would not be fair to attribute the 

breakdown in fiscal discipline entirely to the end of statutory PAYGO, certainly the 

absence of this rule has been a major factor. 

Some have argued that limiting PAYGO to spending would focus enforcement on 

the elements of the budget that are the source of long-term fiscal woes—that is, entitlement programs in general and Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid in particular. Those programs are of particular concern because they will grow as the population ages and health care costs continue to outpace economic growth. Together 

they will comprise larger and larger shares of the budget reducing the share of resources available for all other programs and putting upward pressure on taxes (see 

figure 3). 

As the number of beneficiaries increases, Social Security’s growth is projected to 

be modest (about 2 percent of GDP). Health care entitlements are the source of 

deeper concern. They are projected to grow faster than the growth in eligible beneficiaries and the economy. 

The Concord Coalition has long maintained that it would be a mistake to isolate 

spending from revenue decisions through the application of PAYGO to spending 

alone. Budgeting is a process of allocating resources that requires trade-offs, not 

only among competing spending priorities but also between spending and revenue 

objectives. Spending and tax decisions both affect overall budget deficits or surpluses. Exempting tax decisions risks encouraging the expansion of so-called ‘‘tax 

entitlements’’ (where benefits are funneled through the tax code rather than 

through direct spending) whose benefits are difficult to target and evaluate in terms 

of effectiveness and performance. In addition, subjecting tax changes to PAYGO provides balance to budget deliberations by subjecting those who stand to benefit from 

tax changes to the same level of scrutiny as beneficiaries of entitlement changes. 

Finally, of concern to advocates of limited government, exempting tax cuts from 

PAYGO fosters the false notion that government services are ‘‘free.’’ Debt is not a 

painless alternative to taxation. 

Many key issues would need to be addressed in restoring statutory PAYGO. For 

example, Congress should formally decide whether, or how, the rule should apply 

to projected surpluses, a point left vague by the former law. Another issue is whether there should be exemptions. For example, the Senate’s former PAYGO rule exempted policies assumed in the budget resolution. Arguably, such a rule could provide appropriate flexibility, but in practice limiting PAYGO to those policies not assumed in the budget resolution provides little incentive for fiscal discipline. It essentially allows Congress to enact fiscally irresponsible policies by simply assuming 

them in the budget resolution. That is a loophole much too tempting to permit—

even if proposed in good faith. 

It would also be important to design and enforce strict rules about emergency exemptions. As for sequestration, it would be important to provide the widest possible 

base. The fact that popular programs many be threatened by sequestration is what 

gives PAYGO its punch. If the burden of sequestration falls on too narrow of a base 

the resulting cuts may prove too toxic to enforce. There must be a credible threat 

that is uncomfortable, but plausible. 

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FIGURE 3

BEYOND PAYGO: CONFRONTING THE LONG-TERM FISCAL IMBALANCE

Statutory PAYGO would help enforce budget discipline in the near term. Addressing the projected long-term fiscal gaps, however, will take other measures. PAYGO 

is designed to keep long-term imbalances from getting worse, not to make them better. As discussed earlier, maintaining the status quo leads to deficits and debt that 

spiral upward and out of control. 

Ideally, a new bipartisan fiscal policy agreement should be reached along with 

PAYGO. After all, the original PAYGO law came out of the 1990 bipartisan budget 

negotiations between President George H.W. Bush and the Democratic Congress. 

Such a new agreement would enact budget procedures that would promote closure 

of the long-term gap projected to arise between spending and revenues. At present, 

however, proposals for a budget agreement or enforceable measures to close the 

long-term gap are more conceptual than practical and controversial within the budget community. In any case, there is little political appetite for such measures. 

But the fact that more needs to be done is not an excuse for doing nothing. The 

choice for policymakers is whether to reclaim a measure of fiscal discipline through 

the budget process while a more substantive plan is negotiated, or to sit by while 

deficits drift higher in the absence of any procedural hurdles designed to rein them 

in. 

In Concord’s view the choice is clear. We believe that reinstating strong budget 

enforcement rules, such as PAYGO, is the best step that can be taken immediately 

to stop digging the fiscal hole deeper. 

While this would be a positive step, it falls short of addressing the central longterm budget challenge, which is constraining the cost of existing entitlement programs. PAYGO requires Congress to offset the cost of new programs or expansions 

of existing programs. It does not apply to current-law benefits. 

In fact, there is nothing in the budget process that requires Congress to review 

the current-law budget outlook beyond the next ten years, much less take corrective 

action. 

The current budget process encourages short-term thinking by focusing on a 5 or 

10-year window. Yet, as analysts from all sides generally agree, our truly 

unsustainable fiscal problem stems from commitments that extend far into the future. Congress could greatly improve the transparency of our future obligations and 

encourage actions to deal with them by including in the budget resolution targets 

and estimates of major policy proposals stretching out for at least 40 years. 

A five or ten year budget window may have been adequate back when most federal spending was appropriated annually. It is insufficient when most of the budget 


bix3.eps
96

consists of entitlement programs set on a rising autopilot. It’s time to include the 

long term in the budget process. In that regard, I believe the legislative recommendations (Transparency in Accounting and Budgeting) made by United States 

Comptroller General David M. Walker provide an excellent framework. 

At a minimum, The Concord Coalition believes that lawmakers should have available to them clear and explicit information about the potential long-term consequences of proposed legislation that would expand major entitlement programs or 

reduce taxes. We have proposed an approach that would inject that long-term outlook for the budget into the annual budget process. It makes no pretense of compulsion, but by providing a formal means for the Congress to confront long-term projections would lead to constructive adjustments to entitlement and tax policies. 

In our proposal, Congress should establish long-term targets for revenues and outlays by major spending category as part of the annual budget resolution. It should 

note how major legislative proposals assumed in the resolution would affect these 

targets and how the targets differ, if at all, from current law as projected by the 

CBO. Separate targets could be established, as a share of GDP at five-year intervals 

through 2040, for total revenues, defense spending, domestic discretionary spending, 

Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, other entitlements, and net interest. If the targets differ from current-law projections, CBO could be required to issue a report 

with an illustrative menu of reform options capable of generating the proposed savings. 7

Compelling Congress to go on record about its long-term budget priorities, would 

focus the public (and Congress itself) on the nature of the choices before us—and 

so might pave the way for lasting reform. 

The Concord Coalition proposal is forward looking. It empowers lawmakers by assigning them with an explicit responsibility of evaluating and planning for the future. It charges elected officials with developing strategic vision for the nation. If 

some leaders want to leave revenue levels alone, they would present a plan specifying what measures they would propose to spending or to finance any resulting fiscal gap. If other leaders want to maintain or expand current-law entitlements, they 

would present a plan for financing their proposals. The CBO options would put a 

concrete face on the types of measures that will be necessary, thereby helping to 

educate the public about the size of the problems we face and the real-life implications of necessary adjustments.8

CONCLUSION

Given the difficulty of the challenges presented by long-term budget projections, 

it is not surprising that little progress has been achieved. New budget rules alone 

will not solve the problem. Across-the-board sequestration is not a desirable means 

for addressing deficits. But enforceable budget rules focus attention on the bottom 

line numbers and thereby engineer a debate over the substantive policy issues that 

are at the root of long-term budget woes. 

When budget experts discuss the intricacies of an effective PAYGO rule or craft 

a sequestration threat that is onerous enough to compel congressional avoidance of 

a rule violation, we tend to forget that this is not just a technical debate over an 

obscure internal governmental process. Public participants in the Fiscal Wake-Up 

Tour understand that continued inaction on the long-term challenges in the budget 

and increases the amount of uncertainty about standards of living for themselves 

and their families in the future. They do not understand why their elected officials, 

for whom the long-term budget outlook is old news, are not doing something about 

it. 

Although budget rules alone will never be able to solve the nation’s fiscal problems, enforcement mechanisms can bring greater accountability to the budget process and help provide Members of Congress with the political cover to make the 

tough choices necessary to reduce the deficit. Pay-as-you-go rules (PAYGO) for all 

tax and entitlement legislation is a proven tool for fiscal discipline. 

Yet, no budget rules will be effective if they are not accompanied by a commitment to enforce them. Thus, it is critical that Congress resist the pressure to weaken them by exempting politically popular items, assuming additional costs in the 

baseline or routinely circumventing them with scorekeeping gimmicks when they become inconvenient. This will require policymakers to set priorities and make compromises among competing needs. Many tax and spending initiatives will need to 

be scaled back to fit within the amount of available offsets. The Concord Coalition 

would welcome the opportunity to work with you to develop practical approaches to 

encouraging long-term budget sustainability. 

Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any of your questions 

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ENDNOTES

1See, ‘‘It’s Time to Pay Our Bills,’’ http://www.facingup.org/about-us/new-report-its-time-payour-bills 2See, GAO, Long-term Simulation Data, Alternative Simulation at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/longterm/april2007altsimulation.pdf 3See Directorate-General for Economic Affairs, The Long-Term Sustainability of Public Finance in the European Union, October 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/economy—finance/publications/european—economy/2006/ee0406sustainability—en.htm. 4OECD Health Data 2007, July 2007, http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en—2825—

495642—2085200—1—1—1—1,00.html. 5 Chapin White, ‘‘Health Care Spending Growth: How Different Is the United States from the 

Rest of the OECD?’’ in Health Affairs, May/June 2006. 6 Cathy Schoen, Karen Davis, Sabrina K.H. How and Stephen C. Schoenbaum, ‘‘U.S. Health 

System Performance: A National Scorecard’’ in Health Affairs, November/December 2006. 7See, Concord Coalition Facing Facts Quarterly, December 2006, ‘‘Beyond Paygo: How to Encourage Long-Term Fiscal Discipline,’’ by Richard Jackson. 8 CBO is developing important analytic capability that eventually will allow it to assess in 

greater detail potential impacts of policy changes over the long term. Requiring the agency to 

develop long-term budget options would likely require additional analytic resources. The additional resources have the potential to expand understanding of the long-term budget implications of policy proposals—a result that will be sorely needed as policy makers address long-term 

challenges.

Chairman SPRATT. Now we go to Maya MacGuineas from the 

Committee for a Responsible Budget and the floor is yours to wrap 

it all up. Thank you for coming. 

STATEMENT OF MAYA MACGUINEAS 

Ms. MACGUINEAS. Good morning. Thank you. 

The bipartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget 

whose co-chairs are Bill Frenzel and Leanne Pinetta and many of 

whose members seem to be staring down at me from the walls 

around here believe that statutory PAYGO and tight caps on discretionary spending were instrumental in confronting the fiscal 

challenges of the 1990s and we believe they should be reinstated 

to help address the challenges today. 

We encourage a strengthening of PAYGO including reinstating 

statutory PAYGO to make the principles more consistent, transparent, and effective. I will touch upon some of the possible improvements and I discuss this in more dept in my written testimony. 

We strongly support dual-sided PAYGO. If PAYGO is not applied 

to both sides of the budget, there is a stronger incentive than there 

already is to run spending programs through the tax code further 

distorting our already disastrous tax base. 

This organizational position is unrelated to our position on extending the tax cuts and our board is actually quite divided on this 

question. Some of our board members favor extending all or most 

of the tax cuts. Some of them favor extending some or none of the 

tax cuts. 

But as a group, we believe that tax cuts should not be exempt 

from fiscal controls. And it is worth pointing out that for those who 

would like to control the growth of government, as many of our 

board members would, offsetting tax cuts with spending reductions 

should be seen as a desirable policy, not a problematic one. 

Second, timing issues. Many tax cut and spending proposals have 

relatively modest cost in the shorter-term budget windows but have 

much larger longer-term costs which are not subject to limits. 

PAYGO should be structured to cover the long-term costs as well. 

And on the flip slide, some proposals with near-term costs could 

be justified on the basis that they produce longer-term saving. 

98

Addressing these timing issues involves complex questions about 

how to measure longer-term costs on savings of legislation and increasing uncertainty of estimates over time, we would suggest further studying these issues. 

We believe the treatment of taxes and entitlements should be 

equalized. The most straightforward approach is probably to build 

the cost of major tax cuts and entitlement programs into the baseline requiring that all long-term costs be offset when the legislation 

is created even if the program is assumed to sunset. 

A related issue is whether there is a way to require that if a policy ends up costing more than it was originally projected to, the additional costs should have to be offset. 

Other changes. If statutory PAYGO is reinstated, there are a 

number of improvements that should be made. We would suggest 

broadening the sequestration base. It should be made more difficult 

to suspend sequestration or wipe the score card clean. We should 

be vigilant about what counts as emergency spending and we 

should require that separate votes be taken to exempt legislation 

from PAYGO requirements, making these choices more transparent. 

So, finally, PAYGO could actually be strengthened to encourage 

action to improve the fiscal situation, not just keep it from deteriorating. 

For instance, we could enact a form of a super PAYGO that 

would kick in when the deficit and/or unfunded liabilities reach a 

certain point, requiring that new costs both be offset and paired 

with some level of deficit or unfunded liability reductions. There 

are a lot of ways to be creative as we look forward to PAYGO for 

the future and the new challenges that we face. 

The concept of PAYGO represents the simple truism that budgeting is about tradeoffs. We commend Congress for bringing the 

PAYGO principle back to budgeting. We hope they will maintain it 

throughout this budget cycle. 

We recognize the challenges in doing so, but the stakes are high 

and we fear that a break in the resolve to live by the PAYGO principle will open up the floodgate for debt finance policy requests. 

The bottom line is that PAYGO in any form is only as good as 

the commitment of legislators to follow it. We look forward to working with all of you to strengthen the requirements as well as the 

underlying commitment to the important principle. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Maya MacGuineas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAYA C. MACGUINEAS, PRESIDENT, COMMITTEE FOR A

RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I have been asked 

to comment on the merits of reestablishing the statutory PAYGO law. Thank you 

for the opportunity to testify. It is a privilege to appear before this Committee. 

I am the President of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Our CoChairs are Bill Frenzel and Leon Panetta and our Board is composed of past Directors of the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office, and 

Chairs of the Federal Reserve Board and the Budget Committees. Our focus is the 

federal budget and related process issues. I am also the Director of the Fiscal Policy 

Program at the New America Foundation, a non-partisan think tank here in Washington D.C. 

The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget has a long-standing record of 

supporting the budget reforms in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. We believe 

99

that statutory PAYGO and tight caps on discretionary spending were instrumental 

in confronting our fiscal challenges in the 1990s and we believe they should be reinstated to help address the challenges we face today. We also support a number of 

other budget process reforms detailed in our report, Federal Budget Process: Recommendations for Reform at http://www.crfb.org/pdf/2000/

RecommendationforReform.pdf. We will be publishing a new options book on budget 

process reform in the coming months. 

A clear starting point for us is that budget deficits do matter. They affect the 

economy, they affect budgetary flexibility, they affect future standards of living, and 

they affect generational equity. The Congressional Budget Office’s projections show 

the debt held by the public growing by $450 billion over the next three years. Considering where we are in the business cycle, the amount of debt we have accumulated in past years, and the looming retirement of the baby boomers, this is an unacceptable additional burden that we should not be entering into. We should be 

looking at paying down the national debt, not running it up. Furthermore, we face 

imbalances of trillions of dollars in Social Security and Medicare, our two largest 

entitlement programs. We should be using every fiscal tool we can find in the tool 

box to help meet these challenges. 

The reinstatement of PAYGO—in any form—is a great first step. Clearly, PAYGO 

will not by itself balance the budget or address our long-term fiscal challenges, but 

it will help to bring discipline back to the budgeting process. PAYGO puts the 

breaks on policies that increase the deficit and it provides hurdles Congress has to 

clear before enacting new mandatory spending or tax cut policies. We commend the 

new Congress for bringing the PAYGO principle back to budgeting, and we hope 

they will maintain it throughout this budget cycle. We recognize the challenge of 

doing so, but the stakes are high and we fear that a break in the resolve to live 

by the PAYGO principle will open a floodgate of debt-financed policy requests. 

The concept of PAYGO represents the simple truism that budgeting is about 

trade-offs. PAYGO requires that Congress identify the means for offsetting the costs 

of new tax cuts or mandatory spending programs, thereby allowing Congress the 

flexibility to implement the policies it chooses along with the responsibility of paying 

for those policies. 

Statutory PAYGO was originally introduced in the bipartisan budget agreement 

of 1990. It was extended in the bipartisan balanced budget agreement of 1997 and 

remained in effect through 2002. PAYGO was successful in large part because it 

represented an agreement by both parties to only advance their policy priorities in 

a fiscally responsible way in exchange for the other side agreeing to do the same. 

Unfortunately, PAYGO was a victim of its own success, as the surpluses that it 

generated weakened the resolve of Congress to offset new spending and tax changes. 

Since the expiration of statutory PAYGO, both the House and the Senate have introduced PAYGO rules (the House just recently.) While they operate in a similar manner, statutory PAYGO and a PAYGO rule are not the same. Both forms of PAYGO 

stipulate that an increase in mandatory spending or a decrease in taxes must be 

offset by an equal decrease in mandatory spending and/or increase in taxes, so that 

the legislation does not increase the deficit. The differences arise in the way PAYGO 

is enacted, enforced, and waived. (One-sided PAYGO and post-policy PAYGO obviously differ from the statutory PAYGO of the 1990s in other significant ways as 

well.) 

Statutory PAYGO applies the same rules to the House and Senate and is agreed 

to by the President. This type of PAYGO is binding, and is enforced by the Congressional Budget Office. Under statutory PAYGO, changes to tax or entitlement programs that increase the deficit trigger across-the-board sequestration in certain 

mandatory spending programs. Each individual bill does not have to balance, but 

changes have to balance out over the session. If balance is not maintained, automatic reductions to rebalance the budget are required. Though there were no sequesters in the 1990s, the threat of the blunt reductions affected policy choices and 

helped to control the deficit. 

PAYGO rules lack the force and the breadth of statutory PAYGO. The rules apply 

individually to each chamber and do not bind the other. They establish parliamentary points of order that must be raised by a Member to take effect. To suspend 

them, only the chamber to which they apply must approve. The rules in each House 

and Senate can be quite different. Currently, the PAYGO rules in the House and 

Senate differ in that the Senate relies on a scorecard and allows offsets to be carried 

over from one bill to another, while the House does not. Also, for PAYGO to be 

waived in the House, the Rules Committee must make and pass a specific rule exempting the piece of legislation at issue from PAYGO requirements; in the Senate, 

60 Senators must vote to exempt the bill and overturn the point of order—a release 

lever that we greatly fear will be used all too regularly. 

100

1See ‘‘Closing the $700 Billion Tax Loophole’’ by Maya MacGuineas in Ten Big Ideas for a 

New America http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/ten—big—ideas—for—a—new—

america 

The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget encourages a strengthening of 

PAYGO in any way that would help make the principles more consistent, transparent, and effective. This includes, but is not restricted to reintroducing statutory 

PAYGO. It is helpful to have identical restrictions operating in both the House and 

Senate. The two Chambers should not have to spend their time negotiating PAYGO 

differences at the expense of working on key budget issues such as determining national priorities and finding responsible ways to enact and oversee related policies. 

To keep Congress and the White House from operating on different tracks, it is also 

useful to have a statute to which both Congress and the President have agreed. 

Statutory PAYGO also has the advantage of being self-enforcing. There are always 

ways to get around the law, many of which were employed in the past, but statutory 

PAYGO makes the restriction harder to bypass. The threat of a sequester certainly 

makes Congress think twice about failing to offset the costs of new policies. 

Statutory PAYGO is desirable because of its consistency between both chambers 

and the White House, the default mechanisms that it utilizes, and the added difficulty of ignoring the law. At the same time, there are important improvements 

that could and should be made to the design of PAYGO. 

Dual-Sided PAYGO—Recently, there has been a good deal of disagreement over 

whether PAYGO should apply to both spending and taxes or just spending. The 

Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget has strongly supported dual-sided 

PAYGO in the past and continues to believe that a balanced form of PAYGO is a 

critical component of ensuring budget discipline. It is necessary to apply PAYGO to 

both sides of the budget—taxes and spending—otherwise there will be stronger incentives than there already are to run spending programs through the tax code in 

order to avoid the requirement of offsetting the costs. One merely needs to look at 

the moth-eaten tax base to see that spending by means of the tax code is already 

overused.1 Furthermore, the lack of balance in a one-sided PAYGO system stymies 

the widespread political buy-in from both parties that is needed to make PAYGO 

an enduring and effective instrument of fiscal discipline. 

Timing Issues—It is critical that opportunities to end-run PAYGO be eliminated 

or at least reduced to the extent they can be. The longer a rule exists, the smarter 

those who want to break it get at finding ways to do so. PAYGO is no exception. 

With regards to timing, many tax cut and spending proposals have relatively modest 

costs within the shorter-term budget windows covered by PAYGO rules, but have 

much larger long-term costs, which are not subject to limits. We recently saw an 

example where one tax cut was paid for by another due to timing anomalies. Allowing legislation with permanent costs to be offset by temporary savings that later 

turn into permanent costs clearly defeats the purpose of the principle. PAYGO 

should be structured to cover long-term costs as well as those that are more immediate. Now more than ever, given the long-term budget challenges we face, altering 

the rule so that long-run costs are covered is an important improvement. 

On the flip side, some proposals with near-term costs could be justified on the 

basis that they will produce long-term savings. Some types of Social Security individual accounts that are paired with long-term savings, for instance, could be fiscally responsible, though they would not comply with the current versions of 

PAYGO. Addressing these complex timing issues involves several difficult questions 

about how to measure long-term costs and savings of legislation, the increasing uncertainty of cost estimates over time, and how to balance the relative certainty of 

near-term costs with the less certain prospects for long-term savings. We do not 

have all the answers to these important questions but we firmly believe that they 

need to be studied in order to improve PAYGO and close the loopholes that most 

seriously weaken it. 

Balance Between Spending and Taxes—Some argue that PAYGO is biased against 

tax cuts because the presumption is that entitlement programs will continue—even 

if they are set to expire—but that tax cuts will expire as planned, and must then 

be offset if they are extended. The opposite side of this coin, however, is that entitlement programs are scored as though they will continue, making the original costs 

higher, while tax cuts can be made to look cheaper by truncating the policy time 

frame and assuming the savings associated with expiration. The major tax cuts created in 2001 and 2003 are expiring (and will have to be paid for if they are extended 

under PAYGO) because they were passed in a way that used a sunset provision to 

limit their original cost estimates. 

We believe the treatment of taxes and entitlements should be equalized. The most 

straightforward approach would be to build the costs of major tax and entitlement 

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2The first three waivers were passed in Conference Reports for omnibus appropriations while 

the fourth was passed as a freestanding bill. 

legislation into the baseline. This would mean that extending the policies would not 

‘‘cost’’ anything or require future offsets, but it would be more costly to create the 

policy in the first place and would require long-term offsets even if the policy were 

slated to sunset. Including the costs of extending all policies that are likely to be 

reauthorized presents a more accurate picture of the fiscal future. A related issue 

is whether there is a way to require that if a policy ends up costing more than is 

originally projected, the additional costs would have to be offset. We think this 

would be desirable for both tax and spending policies. 

Our policy position on PAYGO as an organization is unrelated to our personal positions about extending the tax cuts. Our Board is divided on this question: some 

would make permanent most or all of the tax cuts, others would extend only a few 

or none of them. But as a group, we believe that tax cuts should not be exempt from 

fiscal controls. It is worth pointing out that for those who would like to control the 

growth of government spending—as many of our Board Members would, offsetting 

tax cuts with spending reductions should be seen as a desirable policy, not a problematic one. 

Other Changes—If statutory PAYGO is reinstated, there are a number of improvements that should be made. We should broaden the sequestration base. Too 

many programs have been made exempt. Since the exempt programs are generally 

the most popular, this defangs sequestration and it increases the severity of the cuts 

that would have to be applied to the remaining programs. Also, when statutory 

PAYGO was in place, Congress regularly intervened in order to prevent sequesters. 

By passing legislation, it removed the balances on the scorecard in 1999 and every 

year thereafter that the law was in effect.2 It should be made more difficult to suspend sequestration or wipe the scorecard clean to circumvent PAYGO. Additionally, 

Congress tried to use directed scorekeeping to circumvent the law by directing OMB 

to score legislation so that it did not affect the PAYGO scorecard. Though these attempts were not successful, in the future, directed scorekeeping should not be permitted. 

Another avoidance tool Congress used was to stretch the definition of ‘‘emergency 

spending’’ to include things that certainly were not, as a means of avoiding PAYGO 

restrictions. This abuse coincided with the general eruption of the use of the emergency designation to circumvent budget rules. Congress needs to tighten up and enforce the definition of emergency spending to keep this blatant abuses from happening in the future. Finally, to improve transparency, we should require that separate votes be taken to exempt legislation from PAYGO requirements. 

We are in a worse fiscal position then we were in when PAYGO was first enacted. 

The deficit as a share of GDP is not as problematic, but the long-term problems are 

far worse—exacerbated in large part by policies enacted while PAYGO was not in 

place—and the retirement of the baby boomers is much closer. An important question is whether PAYGO could be strengthened so that it does not just keep things 

from getting worse, but rather is designed to encourage, and when necessary, force 

action to improve the fiscal situation. This could take many forms, but one I will 

propose is that when the deficit and/or unfunded liability numbers reach a certain 

point as a share of GDP, perhaps a ‘‘Super PAYGO’’ that would require new costs 

to both be offset and paired with some level of deficit or unfunded liability reduction, would kick in. 

The bottom line is that PAYGO in any form is only as good as the commitment 

legislators have to following it. Congress should not pass PAYGO requirements, declare victory, and then spend its time attempting to bypass the intent of the principle. Too often process is used as a replacement for the hard choices when it is really only one step of many. Process will never on its own be able to do the heavy lifting of rebalancing the budget. 

Nonetheless, PAYGO has a number of desirable benefits. It is based on the common sense principle that we should pay for what we spend. This is something the 

public believes and Congress should support. PAYGO has a bipartisan pedigree—

it was the product of a bipartisan agreement in 1990, was included in the Democratic budget in 1993, and the Republican budget in 1995, and was extended in 1997 

with the support of both parties. It allows Congress the flexibility to pass the legislation it wants as long as the costs are offset, enforcing the notion that budgeting 

is, and should be, about tradeoffs between national priorities. The statutory form 

of PAYGO is stronger and, given its solid track record and the need for fiscal discipline, it should be reinstated, albeit with some technical changes to make it more 

effective and balanced. The rules established by the Budget Enforcement Act made 

a significant contribution to bringing the deficits under control in the 1990s and we 

102

urge Congress to move forward with legislation reinstating these statutory budget 

rules. We applaud Congress for returning to a pay-as-you-go era and we look forward to working with all of you to strengthen the requirements, as well as the underlying commitment to this important principle.

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

And now I am going to yield my time to Mr. Moore as the sponsor of legislation on the Committee and be the baseline we start 

with when we sit down to draw up some legislation. 

And let me further say to all of you what you testified to today 

will be helpful to us as we try to craft a new rule. Thank you very 

much for your input. 

And let us go to Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MOORE. The panel members, thank you for being here and 

for your testimony. 

Were you here and heard the testimony of Dr. Orszag and Mr. 

Walker, please, all of you? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Yes. 

Mr. MOORE. I would ask, Mr. Toomey, you heard the response to 

my question about are all tax cuts created equally. Did you disagree with their answers, Mr. Toomey? 

Mr. TOOMEY. No. We believe strongly that all tax cuts are not 

created equally. 

Mr. MOORE. Okay. And, for example, repeal of the estate tax, is 

that going to pay for itself? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Probably not. I do not recall that I have seen an 

analysis on that itself. 

Mr. MOORE. Is it correct or do you understand it to be correct 

that in the past six years, the national debt of our country has increased about $3 trillion? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Well, it depends on what you are talking about by 

the national debt. I think the only meaningful national debt really 

are two. One is the actual obligation of the government to other 

people. Intergovernmental borrowings and lendings should be netted out. 

And the other one is the big unfunded liability of the big entitlement programs. So I am not sure which of those you are referring. 

Mr. MOORE. Well, at the time, about six years ago, as I recall, 

I believe this is correct, I believe the national debt stood at about 

5.7 or $5.8 trillion and now it is over $8.8 trillion. Do you disagree 

with that? 

Mr. TOOMEY. I would just observe that that includes the intergovernmental borrowings. And if I lend myself money, that is neither an asset nor a liability. So that is not as meaningful as the 

4.9 trillion which is the real obligation to other lenders and the 50 

trillion unfunded liability of our entitlement programs. 

Mr. MOORE. When were the last surpluses in the past, say, 15, 

20 years? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Late 1990s, around 2000. 

Mr. MOORE. And that was when we had PAYGO; is that correct? 

Mr. TOOMEY. That is correct. 

Mr. MOORE. All right. And as soon as PAYGO expired, we started having deficits; did we not? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Of course we had some very calamitous events 

occur in the interim as well including September 11th and an economic recession and some very, very significant budgetary impacts. 

103

Mr. MOORE. And do you really expect that we are going to get 

back into a balanced budget unless PAYGO is reinstituted? 

Mr. TOOMEY. I hope we could, but I think it is going to be a function of if and when Congress and the President jointly agree to restrain spending. You know, for a brief and glorious time in the 

1990s, there was that absolutely historically unprecedented boom 

in investment and innovations that really were on par with the Industrial Revolution when we had the whole internet and the technology sector which was a tremendous driver of the economy and 

revenue. Those are unusual times. 

Mr. MOORE. Did you see Congress Daily yesterday and the article that I referred to when I talked to Mr. Orszag, Dr. Orszag? 

Mr. TOOMEY. I did not. 

Mr. MOORE. All right. I want to read you just the first two paragraphs. A new analysis by the nonpartisan CBO found that projected budget deficits would have largely been wiped out and possibly turned into surpluses had it not been for President Bush’s 

2001 and 2003 tax cuts. 

In addition, quote, the overall impact of the tax legislation on the 

economy is likely to be modest, end quote, said the analysis released late Friday. 

Would you agree or disagree with that? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Well, I would disagree with that and I am not sure 

how they would square that with the fact that back in 2003 prior 

to the tax cuts, the revenue that they were projecting for this year, 

for instance, and for last year was less than what is actually coming in this year and last year. 

Mr. MOORE. But we still have deficits this year and last year; is 

that right? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Yes. My point is, though, they were projecting that 

without the Bush tax cuts, they would have been larger or at least 

the revenue would have been less. So who knows what spending 

would have occurred. That is obviously the other part of the equation. 

Mr. MOORE. You said all tax cuts are not created equally. 

Mr. TOOMEY. Right. 

Mr. MOORE. Which ones do you think contribute to deficits and 

debt? 

Mr. TOOMEY. Well, the way we look at it is there are some tax 

cuts that generate greater economic growth and if they generate 

more economic growth, they expand the base upon which taxes are 

applied and, therefore, can generate more revenue. 

In particular, we think the most pro-growth tax cuts are those 

which lower marginal tax rates on work, savings, investment. 

Lower marginal tax rates increases the incentive to engage in all 

of those activities and you get more of them. That leads to the 

stronger economy and ultimately greater revenue. 

Using the tax code to target benefits on narrow groups, for instance, is not at all conducive to economic growth and that kind of 

tax cut, if one calls it that, we tend to frown upon. 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. We will turn now to Mr. Ryan and then we 

will save a few minutes for questions on this side to wrap it up. 

104

Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. We have a vote, so that is why I think we are going 

to be—I will do this fast. 

Boy, there is a lot I could go into all of this. Let me first start 

with the current House SCHIP Expansion Bill, it is my understanding proposes doing away with the Medicare 45 percent trigger. 

Let me just ask from Bixby and down to Mr. Toomey, do you 

think that is a good idea to repeal the Medicare 45 percent trigger? 

Mr. BIXBY. I do not. I think that some sort of trigger should be 

in place. If the general revenue trigger is not a good idea, then I 

think that somebody should come up with something to replace. 

But, no, I would not favor just simply repealing it. 

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Greenstein. 

Mr. GREENSTEIN. I do favor repealing it. The 45 percent trigger, 

I think, is very distortionary. I do think there is an argument for 

some sort of a trigger, but I think the 45 percent trigger is so badly 

designed that it is actually worse than having no trigger at all. 

Ms. MACGUINEAS. We do not favor repealing it. We think that 

there is a whole lot of use for triggers in the future and we hope 

we will see more of them in the budget. 

I would recommend triggers that kick in usually when spending 

is a share of GDP is probably a better way to craft them. But I 

think getting rid of it would be a huge step in the wrong direction 

and we will be hoping and working with members to keep that trigger in place. 

Mr. TOOMEY. We do not favor repeal of the trigger. We just heard 

about the enormous costs that accelerating healthcare costs are imposing on the economy and the government and this is a mechanism, however flawed, to at least trying to address that. 

Mr. RYAN. Well, I guess three out of four is not so bad. 

This is one of the little speed bumps we have that says, whoa, 

let us pause and take note of the fact that Medicare is on an 

unsustainable path, that it is growing out of control. 

And the idea that we will remove just this little bump in the 

road, this little pause to get Congress to think seriously about entitlement reform, to me, would just be a huge step in the wrong direction which unfortunately I believe this will be passed on to the 

Ways and Means Committee tomorrow, I believe, is the intention. 

Since we have just a few minutes left, I will not take up my full 

five because I know Marcy wants to ask a question. 

I will simply say when we think about PAYGO, for instance, for 

the record, and I think this needs to be settled, in 2004, we had 

a vote on PAYGO. It was one-sided as people described this, 

PAYGO on spending with discretionary spending caps. And the 

votes were 146 Republicans were in favor of it, 72 Republicans 

were opposed to it, most of whom came from the Appropriations 

Committee. And all Democrats were opposed to it. 

So even putting part PAYGO extension and discretionary spending caps when we had the vote on the floor three years ago, it 

failed. 

I would simply say that we have agreement, I think in this room, 

on at least discretionary spending caps. Why do we not bring a bill 

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to the floor with discretionary spending caps. All of us, I think, 

agree on just that. 

So maybe we have a disagreement on PAYGO. I will not go 

through that argument. We have what we think are good arguments. You have what you think are good arguments. But I think 

if you go over through this Committee, you will probably have 

unanimous agreement, maybe two or three people opposed to it, 

that we should have discretionary spending caps. So why do we not 

move forward with that? And that is just an appeal I would like 

to make to my colleagues. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well, I mentioned a minute ago, look at what 

we are spending for defense, $50 billion in the base defense budget 

and $140 billion in the war supplemental. Accommodating that 

under any kind of cap is going to be very awkward to do and it 

would probably have to be fixed from time to time such as to make 

the cap meaningless. Let us go on. We will have that debate again. 

Mr. RYAN. Well, I will not take any more time because I know 

we have to vote. 

Chairman SPRATT. Anyone on our side who would in particular 

like to pose a question at this point? Mr. Edwards, Ms. Schwartz? 

Mr. EDWARDS. I do not want to keep anybody from missing the 

vote. Do we know how many minutes we have left? 

Chairman SPRATT. We have got eight and a fraction. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Very quickly, Mr. Greenstein. As I understand it, 

we always have economic growth when we are coming out of recession. I have also seen numbers that indicated the economic growth 

coming out of the recession of 2000 has been slower than the economic growth coming out of the recessions for the past 40 years in 

this country. That might undermine to some degree the comments 

made by our former colleague, Mr. Toomey, about it was the tax 

cuts that created economic growth. 

Any insights on economic growth coming out of this last recession compared to other recessions where we did not have these trillion dollar tax cuts? 

Mr. GREENSTEIN. We have looked at how this recovery has compared on seven basic measures, GDP growth, net investment 

growth, jobs and salaries, et cetera, et cetera. What you find is that 

on six of seven, everything except corporate profits, the growth in 

the current recession is below the average for all other recovery 

since the end of World War II. And it compares unfavorably with 

the comparable phase of the 1990’s recovery which actually followed a tax increase. 

So I do not think there is an argument to be made there in terms 

of the economic effects of the tax cuts enacted earlier in the decade. 

One more quick comment on tax cuts and this is about Mr. 

Ryan’s question on the 45 percent trigger. Part of my real objection 

to the 45 percent Medicare trigger is that under that trigger, you 

can cut Medicare beneficiaries and you can raise payroll tax rates 

on workers to help meet the trigger, but you are not allowed to 

deal with tax preferences that General Walker talked about. You 

would not be allowed to deal with excesses, for example, in 

healthcare tax preferences. I think there is something wrong with 

a trigger that says payroll tax rate increases are okay and closing 

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tax preferences is not allowed and that is why I think it should be 

repealed. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

We have to rush through the conclusion, but we assure you we 

will consider the legislation and what you have left. And we thank 

you very much. 

I ask unanimous consent that all members be allowed to submit 

an opening statement for the record at this point if they have not 

had an opportunity to make one. And I ask unanimous consent 

that members who did not have the opportunity to ask questions 

may submit questions for the record within seven days. 

The Committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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