O ra l ar g u m e n t i n this c a se w a s h e a rd A p ril 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 , i n P u la sk i, G iles C o u n ty, T e n n e sse e , as p a rt o f t h is 1 C o u rt’s S .C .A .L .E .S . ( S upr eme C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n fo r S tud e n ts) p ro je c t.

P res um ab l y , t he b i o l o gi cal m o t her agreed t o s urr end er her p arent al ri ght s p ri o r t o t he chi l d ren’ s b i rt h. 2 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 15, 200 5 S es sio n H earda t P ula ski 1 

### I N RE 

### C. K.G ., C. A. G., & C .L. G. Appeal by p erm ission fromthe Court of Appeals, Midd le Section

Juvenile Court of Wil liam son Coun ty No. 38410 Lonn ie R. Hoover , Judge

No. M2003- 01320-SC-R11- CV - F iled October 6, 2005

A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J

. , d i s s en t i n g. Be causemy

views diffe r fr om the majority opinion, I respe ctfully

dissent. At the outset, I am convicted that any resolution rea ched in this case will be temporary only –a s t o p -ga p s olution usable for

this case a lone, pending leg islative action, as the la w ac cele rate s to ca tch up with the ra pid ly e vo lvi ng te c hn olo g y of re pr od uc tio n an d its co ns e qu e nc e s. Stil l, u nle ss o ur le g isl a tur e a c ts, I fe ar that th is narrowly tail ored solution designed f or this specific c ase w ill be use d as pre cede nt f o r o t h e r c a s e s i n v o l v i n g r e p r o d u c t i v e t e c h n o l o g y. My colleag ues have, nevertheless, cobbled toge ther a resolution which wo uldapp e ar at f ir st g lance to be just and rea sonable. But in so doing, they have side-stepped a clea r leg islative mandate: the statutory

definition of “pa

rent.” The ope rative f

acts that this caseprese nts are unusual, though not unique. In short, we ha ve a biological f

ather (her einaf

ter “Dr

. G.”) and a g estational host ( here inafter “Ms. C.”). The c hildren 2 re su lti ng fr om this pr oc e du reha ve thefathe r’ s D NA , b ut h a ve no DN A fr om theg e statio na l ho st. Yet, she de sires to be de clar ed the c hildren’s leg al mother and to re ce i v e ch i l d support from the children’ s father

. The majority

has chose n to use a totality of the ci rc u m s t an ces analy sis to validate the plaintiff’s status in this case. A l t houg h the majority declines to a dopt either an intent test or a g e ne tic te st, the y

re ly he a vil y up onint e nt a s a

prima ry fa c tor . T he in ten t tes t ha s b e e n s ou nd lyI n J ohns on v. Cal ver t , t he i nt ent t o procr eat e t es t was us ed by t he cour t by l oo ki ng at t he part i es ’ i nt ent i ons as 3 em b o d i ed i n t he sur rogac y agreem ent and hel d t hat f rom t he o ut set t he genet i c m o t her i nt end ed t o be t he chi l d ’ s m o t her. 8 5 1 P

. 2 d 77 6 , 78 2

- 8 7 (Ca l

. 19 9 3 ).

“ Fat her , ” “ mo t her , ” a nd “ pare nt ” do not i ncl ude a bi ol ogi cal par ent wh ose par ent al r i gh t s ha ve been t er mi nat ed 4 fo r a chi l d who se parent age i s at i ss ue. T enn. C o d e. A nn. § 3 6

- 2

- 3 0 2 (20 0 4 ).

Sever al cour t s ha ve hel d t hat t he i ndi vi dual provi di ng t he gen et i c i mp r i nt i s t he “ pare nt
. ” Camp bel l , s upr a, 5 § 4 (ci t i ng In re M arri age o f M o schet t a, 3 0 C al

. R p t r. 2 d 89 3 (Ca l

. C t
. A p p . 19 9 4 ) as m o d i f i ed , (June 30 , 19 9 4 ); R o b ert B

. v . Su s an B

. , 135 Cal

. Rpt r . 2d 785 ( Cal

. Ct

. App. 2003) ; Ar r edon do by Ar r edon do v

. N odel man , 622 N

. Y

. S. 2d 181 (N

. Y

. Sup

. C t
. 19 9 4 ); D o e v. N ew Y o rk Cit y B d

. of H e a lth, 7 8 2 N .Y .S .2 d 18 0 (N

. Y

. Sup

. C t
. 20 0 4 ); T urchy n v. C o rnel i us, 19 9 9 W L 6 8 9 2 0 2 (O hi o C t
. A p p . 19 9 9 )) ; s ee al so B el si t o v. C l ark, 64 4 N

. E

. 2 d 76 0 (Ct. C

. P

. O hi o 19 9 4 ). -2- c ri tic ize d. Th us , I su bm it that us ing int e nt e ve n a s ju st a fa c tor fo r e sta bli sh ing pa

re nta g e , is unwieldy , subjective, and questionable. At least three rea sons have been noted why a test base d on intent should be rejec ted. Ar d is L . Campbell, Annotation, Determination of Status as L eg al or Natura l Parents in Contested Surrog acy Births, 77 A.L .R. 5 567, § 3[c] (2004) (ci t i n g Be lsito v. th Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (C.P. 1994)). The se same c riticisms also apply wh en i n t en t i s used so le ly a s a fa c tor . F ir st, it i s d if

fi c ult to a pp ly the“ John so n te st, ” a n in te nt t e st, be c aus e pr oo f i s 3 ha rdto a sc e rt a in, e sp e c ia lly wh e n e a c h p arty pu rp orts an intention to procre ate and raise thechild. I d. Se c on d, pu bli c po lic y are a s of “p ro c re a tio n andpa re nta g e , w hic h in vo lveva lue s th a t areba sic to s oc ie ty ,” areno t s up po rt ed by thi s te st i n established ar eas suc h as “[the] surrender of par ental rig hts [ by agr ee ment], t he best intere sts of children, [and the] stabilit y in the child-par ent re latio ns hip .” I d. Th ir d, thi s tes t doe s not co mpl e te ly re c og nize the ri g ht of theg e ne tic -p ro vid e r t o decidewhether

or not to exercise fundamental rig hts–procre ation and par ental rig hts. I d. Furthermore , a party ’s intent may chang e af

ter c onception, throug h g estation, and a fter birth. Other c ourt s have looke d to the parties’ intent expressed in surrog acy contra cts and ag ree ments, but onlyafte r first utiliz ing a pplicable statutes. See Campbell, supra, § 3[a] . Howeve r, the prese nt c ase is not amena ble to suc h analy sis be cause our statutes expressly def i n e “ p are nt.” “Pare nt” is limi ted to biological, le g al and adoptive pare nts. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-302, 36- 1- 4 102(36) ( 2001 & Supp. 2004). The majority also place s considera ble weight on g estation, noting the historical link betwee n g estation and gen eti cs. Historica lly , there was no sepa ration betwe en the g estational host and the g enetic provider; thus, the g estational host and g enetic provider wer e one in thes am e. Now, technolog y has evolved as we can see in the instant c ase. It is beca use of this sepa

ration we n ow have this and othe r disputes reg arding pare ntag e. The ref ore, be causeof the tec hnologic al advances in r e pr od uc tio n I

be lie ve the ma

jority ’s re lianc e on the his toric a l bin din g of g e statio n to g e ne tic s is not applicable to this ca se and should not be use d. Furthermore , the majority admits that ge station is conspicuously missing from the s tatutes. There fore , we should conspicuously leave g estation out of consider ation in determining pare ntag e. I would resolve this ca se throug h g enetics. It is scientific, certain, and has found a cce ptance in several courts that ha ve a ddre sse d th e iss ue . F urthe rm or e , it is e a sie r t o a

pp ly . M or e ov e r, thi s 5I f t he part i es ha d m ar r i ed, t he pl ai nt i f f coul d cont end t hat s he was t he l ega l m o t her of t he chi l d ren. 6 -3- is the test that our leg islature has a lrea dy ordaine d by

providing that pare ntag e may be esta blished by e ith e r b iol ogy or

a do pti on . I d. I nd e e d, “ c ou rt s h a ve loo ke d at g e ne tic s a s th e prima ry ba sis to d e t e r m i n e w h o i s t h e p ar e n t ” b a s e do n t h e i mp o rt a n c e o f h i s t o ri c al p re c e d e n c e a n dc o m m o n a n c e s try. Camp b e ll , s u p r a , § 2 [a ]. The plaintiff is, a f

ortiori, a non-pa

rent, at least as is determined by the statutory

definitions of “mother ” and “ pare nt” as one who ha s biological ties to the child(ren) . See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-302( 4), 36-1- 102(10), ( 28),(36) (2001 & Supp. 2004). Th e ma jority su g g e sts that th e statut ory pr ov isi on s d e fi nin g “ pa re nts ” (w hic h r e late sp eci fi cally

to p a te rn ity

a nda do pti on ) d o n ot a

pp ly to the c a se un de r r e vie w. Whil e thepate rn ity statute clea

rly contemplates e stablishing pate rnity (identification of a child’s fathe r), section 36-2- 301 expressly

states its purpose: “This cha pter pro v i d es a single c ause of action to e sta bli sh parentage of childre n other than e stablishment by adoption pursuant to chapte r 1 of this titl e, or by acknow ledg ment of par entag e pursuant to § 68-3-203(g ), § 68-3-302 or § 68-3-305( b).” Tenn. Code An n . § 3 6 -2 -3 0 1 (2 0 0 1 an dS u p p . 2 0 0 4 ) ( em p h as i s ad d ed ). T h i s s t at u t e e s t ab l i s h i n g p ar en t age includes a de finition of mother. Tenn. Code A nn. § 36-2-302( 4) (2001 and Supp. 2004).
Mo re over, ou r artif

ic ia l in se min a tio n s tatut e , w hic h le g iti matize s c hil dr e n b orn a s a re su lt of the proce dure, does not apply to the caseat hand be causethe parties werenever marrie d. Tenn.

6 Cod e An n. § 6 8- 3- 30 6 ( 20 01 & Sup p. 20 04 ). Th e ma jority se e ms t o b e lie ve that th is statute assumes t h e e x i s t en ce o f m arri age . Ho we v er , th e s t at u t e o n l y ap p l i es t o th o s e w h o ar e m arri ed

. M arri age c on fe rs c e rt a in b e ne fi ts o n th os e wh o c ho os e it. F or e xamp le , if

a c ou pleis m arrie d, the reis a presumption of par entag e (the husband i s presumed f ather ) whe re the wife c onceive s naturally . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-304 (2001 & Supp. 2004)

. The benef it doe s not assume the existence of therelati on sh ip li ke thema jority a sse rt s, bu t th e re latio ns hip mus t f ir st e xist b e fo rethebe ne fi t is available

. By inquiring–“ Who is the mother of the se childre n? ”–the majority raises the specte r of the “motherle ss child”; that is, the impression has bee n g iven that the childre n will have no mother unless we f

ind a way to confe r those rig hts upon Ms. C. S uch is n o t the ca se. The c hildren do indeed ha ve a mother

. I t j u st happens that the mother ’s identity hereis, as is sometimes the case, un kn ow n. Th e re a l qu e sti onwh ic h s ho uldha ve be e n c onsi dere d and a ns we re d b y thi s c ou rt

is whether the plaintiff is the childre n’s leg al mother. The answe r is appar ently no. The majority , in placing Ms. C. on equal legal footing with the children’s biological and leg al fathe r, Dr. G ., in my

view, is an e x erc ise of lar g esse g one too fa r aw ry . We a

re to a pply the law, and in the proce s s , we ar e neither to unduly

restric t or expand statutes’ cove rag e. See Pre mium Fin. Corp. of Am. v. Crump Ins. Servs. of Memphis, Inc., 978 S.W .2d 91, 93 (Tenn. 1998) . I n my view,-4-

the majority

rea ched be y ond exis ting l aw to produce a palatable re sult. This overrea ching is not ne c e ssa ry in m y op ini on . T hu s, thi s c a se sh ou ld b e re so lv ed un der th e la w a s it c ur re ntl y e xists tod a y . T e nn e sse e statut e s do no t us e g e statio n or int e nt t o c on fe r p are ntal st a tus , in ste a d g e ne tic s, marria g e and a doption are the routes available. Th e re f o re, by revie wing and analy zing the Te nnessee statutes which arebased on biolog y , Ms. C. i s n o t the pare nt nor is she the leg al mother of the c hil dr e n f or pu rp os e s o f this c a se , a nd sh e ha s n o le g a l st a nd ing to s ue fo r c us tod y or su pp ort a s a pare nt. Adoption, neverthe less, remains an option. We, as interpre ters of the law, not maker s of the law, arepowerless, in my view, to re ach a differ ent re solution. Acc ording ly , I would reve rse the judg ment of the Court of Appe als and re mand the cause to the trial court wh ere it would procee d as a c ontest betwee n a par ent and a non-par ent u n d e r s e t t l e dT e n n e s s e e au th o r i t y.

___________________________________ AD OLPHO A. B I RCH , JR.