This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of

new books are listed in the first FEDERAL

REGISTER issue of each week.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

39617 

Vol. 77, No. 129 

Thursday, July 5, 2012 

1See Public Law 111–203, section 1011(a) (2010). 

2See Dodd-Frank Act section 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. 

5511(a). 

3See Dodd-Frank Act section 1025(b)(1), (d), 12 

U.S.C. 5515(b)(1), (d); see also Dodd-Frank Act 

section 1029A, 12 U.S.C. 5511 note (stating that this 

provision becomes effective on the designated 

transfer date, established by the Secretary of the 

Treasury as July 21, 2011). 

4See Dodd-Frank Act section 1061, 12 U.S.C. 

5581. The prudential regulators are the Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), 

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 

the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), 

and the former Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 

See Dodd-Frank Act section 1002(24), 12 U.S.C. 

5481(24). Although the prudential regulators 

retained primary authority to supervise smaller 

depository institutions and credit unions for 

compliance with Federal consumer financial law, 

the Bureau has certain supervisory authorities with 

respect to these institutions, as well as the service 

providers to a substantial number of such 

institutions. See Dodd-Frank Act sections 

1061(c)(1)(B), 1026(b), (c), (e), 12 U.S.C. 

5581(c)(1)(B), 5516(b), (c), (e). 

5See Dodd-Frank Act section 1021(b)(4), 12 

U.S.C. 5511(b)(4). 

6See Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(b), 12 U.S.C. 

5514(b). The Bureau also has supervisory authority 

over service providers to such institutions. See 

Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(e), 12 U.S.C. 5514(e). 

7See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 

Supervision and Examination Manual, Overview at 

3 (‘‘CFPB Examination Manual’’), available at www.

consumerfinance.gov/guidance/supervision/

manual/. 

BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL 

PROTECTION 

12 CFR Part 1070 

[Docket No. CFPB–2012–0010] 

RIN 3170–AA20 

Confidential Treatment of Privileged 

Information 

AGENCY: Bureau of Consumer Financial 

Protection. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Consumer 

Financial Protection (Bureau) is 

amending its rules relating to the 

confidential treatment of information by 

adding a new section providing that the 

submission by any person of any 

information to the Bureau in the course 

of the Bureau’s supervisory or 

regulatory processes will not waive or 

otherwise affect any privilege such 

person may claim with respect to such 

information under Federal or State law 

as to any other person or entity. In 

addition, the Bureau has amended its 

regulations to provide that the Bureau’s 

provision of privileged information to 

another Federal or State agency does not 

waive any applicable privilege, whether 

the privilege belongs to the Bureau or 

any other person. 

DATES: This rule is effective August 6, 

2012. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John 

R. Coleman, Senior Litigation Counsel, 

Office of General Counsel, Bureau of 

Consumer Financial Protection, 1700 G 

Street NW., Washington, DC 20552, at 

(202) 435–7770. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act 

(Dodd-Frank Act) established the 

Bureau as an independent agency 

within the Federal Reserve System 

responsible for regulating the offering 

and provision of consumer financial 

products and services under the Federal 

consumer financial laws.1 The Bureau’s 

mission is to ‘‘implement and, where 

applicable, enforce Federal consumer 

financial law consistently for the 

purpose of ensuring that all consumers 

have access to markets for consumer 

financial products and services and that 

markets for consumer financial products 

are fair, transparent, and competitive.’’ 2

Congress equipped the Bureau with a 

number of tools to achieve this mission, 

including: broad authority to 

promulgate rules to regulate the 

consumer financial marketplace; a 

mandate to educate and inform 

consumers to make better informed 

financial decisions; the ability to bring 

enforcement actions to remedy 

violations of Federal consumer financial 

law; and the authority to supervise 

institutions for compliance with Federal 

consumer financial law. 

This final rule amends the Bureau’s 

rules relating to the confidential 

treatment of information, 12 CFR part 

1070, subpart D, in order to facilitate the 

exercise of the Bureau’s authorities by 

ensuring that the confidentiality of 

privileged information is not vitiated by 

any person’s disclosure of such 

information to the Bureau in the course 

of its supervisory or regulatory 

processes, or by the Bureau’s exchange 

of privileged information with another 

Federal or State agency. 

The Bureau is in the process of 

reviewing comments received on other 

aspects of the interim final rule that 

governs the Bureau’s disclosure of 

records and information. See 76 FR 

44242 (July 22, 2011) (codified at 12 

CFR part 1070). The Bureau intends to 

issue a final rule in response to those 

comments in the future. 

II. Section-by-Section Analysis 

A. Addition of 12 CFR 1070.48 

Background 

The Bureau has authority to supervise 

and examine insured depository 

institutions and credit unions with total 

assets of more than $10,000,000,000 as 

well as their affiliates and service 

providers, in order to assess their 

compliance with Federal consumer 

financial law, to obtain information 

about their activities subject to such 

laws and their associated compliance 

systems or procedures, and to detect 

and assess risks to consumers and to 

markets for consumer financial products 

and services.3 This supervisory 

authority, and all related ‘‘powers and 

duties,’’ transferred to the Bureau from 

the prudential regulators on July 21, 

2011.4 In addition, in accordance with 

the goal of ensuring that Federal 

consumer law is ‘‘enforced consistently, 

without regard to the status of a person 

as a depository institution, in order to 

promote fair competition[,]’’ 5 Congress 

also provided the Bureau with nearly 

identical authority to supervise certain 

nondepository institutions.6 The entities 

subject to the Bureau’s supervisory 

authority are referred to herein as 

‘‘supervised entities.’’ 

The Bureau’s supervision program is 

focused on supervised entities’ ‘‘ability 

to detect, prevent, and correct practices 

that present a significant risk of 

violating the law and causing consumer 

harm.’’ 7 Thus, while the Bureau is 

committed to remedying violations of 

Federal consumer financial law, the 

primary goal of the Bureau’s supervision 

program is to prevent violations of law 

or consumer harm from occurring. To 


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8CFPB Examination Manual, Compliance 

Management Review (CMR) at 1. 

9 Id. The Bureau has adopted the Federal 

Financial Institution Examination Council’s (FFIEC) 

Uniform Consumer Compliance Rating System. 

Institutions are eligible for the highest rating in this 

system only if the Bureau determines that they have 

‘‘[a]n effective compliance program, including an 

efficient system of internal procedures and 

controls.’’ CFPB Examination Manual, 

Examinations at 9. 

10CFPB Examination Manual, CMR at 8–12. 

11The final rule applies to ‘‘any privilege’’ that 

applies to information obtained by the Bureau. 

12See In re Pacific Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 

1127 (9th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 

13CFPB Bulletin 12–01, at 2, available at 

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/01/ 

GC_bulletin_12-01.pdf. 

14See Dodd-Frank Act section 1061(b), 12 U.S.C. 

5581(b). 

15See 77 FR 15286, 15286 (March 15, 2012) 

(hereinafter ‘‘notice of proposed rulemaking’’). 

16 Id. at 15287. 

17 Id. at 15289. 

18See How Will the CFPB Function Under 

Richard Cordray?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 

TARP, Fin. Serv. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private 

Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 

Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (Statement of Richard 

Cordray). 

19See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 

(2001) (‘‘Congress * * * may not have expressly 

delegated authority or responsibility to implement 

a particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet 

it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally 

conferred authority and other statutory 

circumstances that Congress would expect the 

agency to be able to speak with the force of law 

when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills 

a space in the enacted law, even one about which 

‘Congress did not actually have an intent’ as to a 

particular result.’’) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 

(1984)). As noted, the Bureau’s exercise of 

rulemaking authority is consistent with Congress’s 

broad grant to the Bureau of all powers and duties 

‘‘relat[ing]’’ to the prudential regulators’ transferred 

supervision authority, and by its emphasis on the 

need for consistent regulatory treatment of 

depository and nondepository institutions. 

20See 77 FR at 15288 & n. 16 (citing Boston 

Auction Co. v. W. Farm Credit Bank, 925 F. Supp. 

1478, 1481–82 (D. Haw. 1996) (no waiver where 

documents provided to examiners from the Farm 

Credit Administration because disclosure not 

voluntary); Vanguard Sav. & Loan Assn v. Banks, 

No. 93–cv–4267, 1995 WL 555871, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 

Sept. 18, 1995) (holding that the disclosure of work 

product privileged information to state bank 

regulator is ‘‘involuntary’’ and, therefore, does not 

waive the privilege); United States v. Buco, Crim. 

No. 90–10252–H, 1991 WL 82459, at *2 (D. Mass. 

May 13, 1991) (holding that ‘‘the public interest 

served by encouraging the free flow of information 

this end, supervised entities are 

expected ‘‘to have an effective 

compliance management system 

adapted to [their] business strategy and 

operations.’’ 8 Indeed, every ‘‘CFPB 

examination will include review and 

testing of components of the supervised 

entity’s compliance management 

system.’’ 9

An independent audit program and 

regular self-testing for violations of 

Federal consumer financial law are 

essential elements of a strong 

compliance program.10 Supervised 

entities sometimes rely upon counsel to 

conduct these analyses. As a 

consequence, in exercising its 

supervisory authority, the Bureau may 

request from its supervised entities 

information that may be subject to one 

or more statutory or common law 

privileges, including the attorney-client 

privilege and attorney work product 

protection.11 Certain supervised entities 

have expressed concern, based on cases 

decided outside of the supervisory 

context,12 that compliance with the 

Bureau’s supervisory requests for such 

information may result in a waiver of 

any applicable privilege with respect to 

third parties. 

On January 4, 2012, the Bureau issued 

a bulletin, CFPB Bulletin 12–01, in 

which it stated its view that ‘‘because 

entities must comply with the Bureau’s 

supervisory requests for information, 

the provision of privileged information 

to the Bureau would not be considered 

voluntary and would thus not waive any 

privilege that attached to such 

information.’’ 13 Further, the Bulletin 

observed that the prudential regulators’ 

authority to examine very large 

depository institutions and credit 

unions, and their affiliates, for 

compliance with Federal consumer 

financial law, as well as all related 

powers and duties, transferred to the 

Bureau on July 21, 2011.14 The Bureau 

interprets this transfer of authority as 

including the ability, codified at 12 

U.S.C. 1785(j) & 1828(x), to obtain 

privileged information without waiving 

any applicable privilege claimed by the 

provider of the information. 

On March 15, 2012, in order to 

provide further reassurances to its 

supervised entities, the Bureau 

published a notice and request for 

comment regarding its proposal to add 

a new section to its rules relating to the 

confidential treatment of information 

that would provide that any person’s 

submission of information to the Bureau 

in the course of the Bureau’s 

supervisory or regulatory processes will 

not waive any privilege such person 

may claim with respect to such 

information as to any other person or 

entity.15 The proposed rule was 

intended to provide protections for the 

confidentiality of privileged information 

substantively identical to the statutory 

provisions that apply to the submission 

of privileged information to the 

prudential regulators, and State and 

foreign bank regulators.16 The notice of 

proposed rulemaking reiterated the 

position set forth in CFPB Bulletin 12– 

01 that the submission of privileged 

information to the Bureau would not, 

under existing law, result in a waiver of 

any applicable privilege, and explained 

that the Bureau was exercising its 

rulemaking authority to codify this 

result in order to provide maximum 

assurances of confidentiality to the 

entities subject to its supervisory or 

regulatory authority. As a result, the 

proposed rule was intended to govern 

any claim, in Federal or State court, that 

a person has waived any applicable 

privilege, including the privilege for 

attorney work product, by providing 

such information to the Bureau in the 

exercise of its supervisory or regulatory 

processes.17

Response to Comments 

The Bureau received 26 comment 

letters regarding the proposed rule. 

These comments were submitted on 

behalf of twenty trade associations (one 

letter was submitted on behalf of five 

trade associations), eight individual 

financial institutions, and two 

individuals. A majority of the comments 

supported adoption of the proposed 

rule; however, several commenters 

recommended that the Bureau not adopt 

the proposed rule, but wait for Congress 

to address institutions’ concerns 

regarding privilege waiver through the 

enactment of legislation. Although the 

Bureau has expressed support for 

legislation codifying the Bureau’s view 

that the submission of privileged 

information to the Bureau does not 

result in a waiver,18 the Bureau does not 

believe such legislation is necessary. As 

discussed below, Congress has 

delegated to the Bureau the authority to 

issue regulations to ensure the 

confidentiality of information submitted 

to the Bureau and to facilitate the 

exercise of its supervisory authority. 

Delegated rulemaking authority is 

designed to relieve Congress of the 

obligation to anticipate and address 

every issue that arises in an agency’s 

administration of the laws entrusted to 

its care.19 Accordingly, while the 

Bureau continues to support appropriate 

legislation, the possibility of future 

congressional action does not counsel 

against the Bureau’s exercise of its 

existing authority to protect the 

confidentiality of information it obtains 

in the course of its supervisory or 

regulatory processes. 

Some commenters disagreed with the 

Bureau’s position, stated in the notice of 

proposed rulemaking, that the Bureau 

has the authority to compel privileged 

information and that the submission of 

privileged information to the Bureau 

pursuant to this authority does not 

waive any applicable privilege because 

it is not voluntary.20 Commenters 


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between the banks and their Federal regulators is 

substantial; a rule which provided that a bank 

generally waived its attorney-client privilege as to 

materials submitted to federal regulators would 

substantially impair that interest.’’). 

21See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter, 1991 WL 

338409 (Dec. 3, 1991); Statement of Scott Alvarez, 

General Counsel of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, before the H. Fin. Servs. 

Comm. at 2 (May 17, 2012) (‘‘The Federal Reserve 

examines, on a regular basis, institutions for which 

we have been granted supervisory authority by 

Congress and, through that authority, has complete 

and unfettered access to an institution’s most 

sensitive financial information and processes, 

including information that would otherwise be 

privileged and not subject to public disclosure.’’) 

available at http://financialservices.house.gov/

UploadedFiles/HHRG-112-BA00-WState-SAlvarez20120517.pdf. 

22See supra n. 20. Reliance upon case law outside 

of the supervisory context is misplaced as doing so 

ignores the ‘‘well established distinction between 

supervision and law enforcement.’’ Cuomo v. 

Clearing House Assoc., 557 U.S. 519, 129 S. Ct. 

2710, 2717 (2009). 

23 Indeed, the Bureau intends the rule to also 

govern claims of waiver related to the voluntary 

submission of privileged information to the Bureau. 

24See 77 FR at 15288. 

25 Id. at 15290. 

26 Id. 

27 Id. 

28See id. at 15289–90 (quoting Dodd-Frank Act 

section 1022(c)(6)(A), 12 U.S.C. 5512(c)(6)(A)). 

29See id. at 15290 (citing Dodd-Frank Act 

sections 1022(b)(1), 1024(b)(7)(A), 12 U.S.C. 

5512(b)(1) 5514(b)(7)(A)). 

30See, e.g., In re Subpoena Served Upon the 

Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec’y of the Bd. 

of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 

634 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (‘‘Because bank supervision is 

relatively informal and more or less continuous, so 

too must be the flow of communication between the 

bank and the regulatory agency. Bank management 

must be open and forthcoming in response to the 

inquiries of bank examiners, and the examiners 

must in turn be frank in expressing their concerns 

about the bank. These conditions simply could not 

be met as well if communications between the bank 

and its regulators were not privileged.’’) 

argued that, for this reason, the rule will 

not effectively preserve the privileged 

nature of information submitted to the 

Bureau. The Bureau continues to adhere 

to the position that it can compel 

privileged information pursuant to its 

supervisory authority. The prudential 

regulators have consistently taken the 

view that they can compel privileged 

information pursuant to their 

supervisory authority,21 and the case 

law that directly addresses the issue 

supports the view that the submission of 

privileged information to a supervisory 

agency is not voluntary and therefore 

does not result in a privilege waiver.22

The Bureau’s authority in this regard is 

not, however, a prerequisite to its 

authority to promulgate the rule. 

The validity and effectiveness of the 

rule depends on the scope of the 

Bureau’s rulemaking authority, not on 

the Bureau’s authority to compel 

privileged information.23 In the 

preamble to the proposed rule, the 

Bureau noted that it had issued CFPB 

Bulletin 12–01, which took the position 

‘‘that, like the prudential regulators, its 

supervisory authority encompasses the 

authority to compel supervised entities 

to provide privileged information and, 

therefore, a supervised entity’s 

submission of privileged information to 

the Bureau in response to a request is 

not a voluntary disclosure that would 

result in the waiver of any applicable 

privilege.’’ 24 Consistent with this view 

of the law, the Bureau observed that the 

effect of the proposed rule would be to 

codify the result courts considering 

claims of waiver would reach in the 

absence of the rule; thus, the rulemaking 

would give further assurance to 

regulated entities regarding the issue of 

waiver.25 The Bureau was clear, 

however, that the proposed rule would 

protect the privileged nature of 

information submitted to the Bureau 

even assuming courts would have 

reached a different determination under 

existing law.26 Thus, the Bureau did not 

indicate in the notice of proposed 

rulemaking that its authority to 

promulgate the proposed rule depends 

on its authority to compel privileged 

information, or that the proposed rule 

would codify the Bureau’s claimed 

authority to compel privileged 

information. To the contrary, the Bureau 

stated that ‘‘the rule does not impose 

obligations on covered persons to 

provide information; rather, any 

requirement to provide information 

stems from the Bureau’s authority under 

existing law.’’ 27

In fact, the rule is authorized by the 

rulemaking authority delegated to the 

Bureau in the Dodd-Frank Act. In the 

notice of proposed rulemaking, the 

Bureau cited three sources of 

rulemaking authority that support the 

rule. First, the Bureau relied on ‘‘its 

authority to ‘prescribe rules regarding 

the confidential treatment of 

information obtained from persons in 

connection with the exercise of its 

authorities under Federal consumer 

financial laws.’ ’’ 28 The Bureau also 

relied upon ‘‘its general rulemaking 

authority to ‘prescribe rules * * * as 

may be necessary or appropriate to 

enable the Bureau to administer and 

carry out the purposes and objectives of 

the Federal consumer financial laws, 

and prevent evasions thereof,’’ and its 

authority to ‘‘prescribe rules to facilitate 

the supervision of [nondepository 

institutions] and assessment and 

detection of risks to consumers.’’ 29 As 

the Bureau noted, the proposed rule is 

an appropriate means to facilitate the 

Bureau’s supervision program because, 

by providing supervised entities greater 

assurances that their privileges will be 

maintained, it encourages the free flow 

of information that is essential to an 

effective supervision program.30 With 

respect to large depository institutions 

and credit unions and their affiliates, 

the rule is also supported by the 

Bureau’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank 

Act section 1061(b) as including within 

its grant to the Bureau of all powers and 

duties relating to the prudential 

regulators’ transferred supervisory 

authority the power, codified at 12 

U.S.C. 1785(j) & 1828(x), to receive 

privileged information from supervised 

entities without effecting a waiver. The 

rule is intended to codify the Bureau’s 

interpretation of section 1061 in this 

respect. 

Commenters generally agreed that an 

effective supervision program requires 

that the Bureau be able to obtain 

privileged information, and that the 

proposed rule would facilitate such 

access. As one trade association 

commenter observed, ‘‘the Bureau needs 

to have a trusting and open relationship 

with its supervised entities, which 

includes having appropriate access to 

certain privileged information.’’ A large 

financial services provider agreed that 

the proposed rule would ‘‘yield 

numerous benefits, chief among them 

encouraging the free flow of information 

between supervised persons and their 

counsel and between supervised 

persons and the CFPB.’’ Another trade 

association agreed that ‘‘the 

preservation of existing legal privileges 

* * * is vitally important to the 

functioning of an effective regulatory 

and supervisory framework.’’ 

Commenters also generally agreed with 

the Bureau that the same standards 

should apply to entities supervised by 

the Bureau as to entities currently or 

formerly supervised by the prudential 

regulators. These comments confirm the 

Bureau’s judgment in the exercise of its 

rulemaking authorities that the rule will 

ensure the confidentiality of 

information it obtains in the course of 

its supervisory or regulatory processes 

and is necessary or appropriate to 

administer or facilitate the exercise of 

its supervisory responsibilities. 

No commenters argued that the rule 

was not within the plain text of the 

rulemaking authority upon which the 

Bureau relies, but some commenters 

suggested that Congress’s failure to 

amend 12 U.S.C. 1828(x) to include the 

Bureau when it enacted the Dodd-Frank 

Act raises the negative inference that 

Congress did not intend the Bureau to 

accomplish the same end through an 

exercise of its rulemaking authority. The 

text of both the Federal Deposit 


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39620 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 129 / Thursday, July 5, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

31See Dodd-Frank Act section 1021(b)(4), 12 

U.S.C. 5511(b)(4). In similar circumstances, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 

expressly refused to ‘‘infer an intention to prohibit 

[a] selective waiver rule from Congress’s’’ failure to 

enact a statutory selective waiver provision sought 

by the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philipines, 

951 F.2d 1414, 1427 n.15 (1991). 

32See Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(a); 12 U.S.C. 

5512(a). 33See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427 (suggesting 

that it would not have found a waiver if the SEC’s 

confidentiality rule had ‘‘justified a reasonable 

belief on Westinghouse’s part that the attorneyclient privilege w[ill] be preserved.’’). 

34See Dodd-Frank Act sections 1061(c)(1)(B), 

1026(c); 12 U.S.C. 5581(c)(1)(B), 5516(c). 

35See Dodd-Frank Act section 1026(b); 12 U.S.C. 

5516(b). 

36See 77 FR at 15286. 

37The protection afforded to information subject 

to the work product doctrine is often referred to as 

a privilege, albeit a qualified one. See Edna S. 

Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work 

Product Doctrine, 792 (5th ed. 2007) (‘‘The words 

‘doctrine,’ ‘immunity,’ and ‘privilege’ (among 

others) have been used in naming the protection 

given work product. Any of the terms is probably 

appropriate.’’); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 

U.S. 225, 237 (1975); Solis v. Food Emp’r Labor 

Relations Ass’n, 644 F.3d 221, 231 (4th Cir. 2011); 

Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th 

Cir. 2010). 

38See CFPB Bulletin 12–01 at 3. 

39See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the 

Currency, Access to Privileged Information, 2000 

WL 226431 (Feb. 2000). 

Insurance Act and the Dodd-Frank Act 

suggest otherwise. First, 12 U.S.C. 

1828(x) itself cautions against 

construing the protections it affords to 

information submitted to the Federal 

banking agencies as suggesting that ‘‘any 

person waives any privilege applicable 

to information that is submitted or 

transferred under any circumstance to 

which [it] does not apply.’’ 12 U.S.C. 

1828(x)(2)(A). Second, nothing in either 

the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or the 

Dodd-Frank Act suggests that Congress 

intended depository institutions or 

credit unions with more than 

$10,000,000,000 in assets, or 

nondepository entities subject to 

supervision by the Bureau, to be entitled 

to less protection for the confidentiality 

of their information than smaller 

depository institutions or credit unions 

supervised for compliance with Federal 

consumer financial law by the 

prudential regulators or state bank 

regulators. To the contrary, Congress 

explicitly authorized the Bureau to 

exercise its authority—including the 

rulemaking authority relied upon here— 

to ensure that ‘‘Federal consumer 

financial law is enforced consistently, 

without regard to the status of a person 

as a depository institution, in order to 

promote fair competition.’’ 31 Thus, the 

Bureau does not believe that Congress’s 

silence regarding this provision of the 

Federal Deposit Insurance Act suggests 

that the Bureau lacks the rulemaking 

authority to promulgate section 1070.48. 

Congress has entrusted the Bureau with 

administering and implementing Title X 

of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Consumer 

Financial Protection Act of 2010,32 and 

the Bureau is adopting section 1070.48 

pursuant to the rulemaking authorities 

expressly provided under that law. 

Accordingly, section 1070.48 is a valid 

exercise of the Bureau’s rulemaking 

authority and will govern third parties’ 

claims of waiver based on the 

submission of privileged information by 

any person to the Bureau.33

Several commenters asked the Bureau 

to make clear that the rule would apply 

to the submission of privileged 

information by insured depository 

institutions or credit unions with 

$10,000,000 or less in assets, as defined 

in section 1026(a) of the Dodd-Frank 

Act. As the commenters note, although 

the prudential regulators retain primary 

supervisory authority over these 

institutions, the Bureau has authority, at 

its discretion, to participate in the 

prudential regulators’ examinations of 

these institutions on a sampling basis.34

The Bureau may also require reports 

from smaller depository institutions and 

credit unions as necessary to support its 

implementation of Federal consumer 

financial law, to support its examination 

of these institutions, and ‘‘to assess and 

detect risks to consumers and consumer 

financial markets.’’ 35 Although the need 

for the rule has arisen primarily in the 

context of the Bureau’s supervision of 

larger depository institutions and credit 

unions, the term ‘‘person’’ used by 

section 1070.48 is not intended to be 

limited to such institutions, but is 

intended to be interpreted broadly in 

accordance with the definition of that 

term in 12 CFR 1070.2. Accordingly, to 

the extent smaller depository 

institutions or credit unions submit 

privileged information to the Bureau in 

the course of the Bureau’s supervisory 

or regulatory processes, section 1070.48 

will govern any claim, in Federal or 

State court, that such submission 

resulted in a waiver of the privilege. 

Commenters also sought clarification 

as to whether the rule would apply to 

claims that institutions have waived 

protections afforded to attorney work 

product by submitting such information 

to the Bureau. The Bureau does intend 

the rule’s reference to ‘‘privilege’’ to 

encompass ‘‘any privilege’’ that applies 

to information submitted by the Bureau, 

including the attorney work product 

protection. In fact, in discussing the 

need for the rule in the notice of 

proposed rulemaking, the Bureau began 

by observing that it ‘‘will at times 

request from its supervised entities 

information that may be subject to one 

or more statutory or common law 

privileges, including, for example, the 

attorney-client privilege and attorney 

work product protection.’’ 36 The 

Bureau believes that interpreting the 

term ‘‘privilege’’ as including the 

protection afforded by the work product 

doctrine is consistent with courts’ 

treatment of the term,37 and with the 

purpose of the rule. Section 1070.48 is 

intended to facilitate the free flow of 

information between the Bureau and its 

supervised institutions by reassuring 

such institutions that the submission of 

information to the Bureau will not affect 

the institutions’ ability to protect it from 

disclosure to third parties. This purpose 

is served by construing the term 

privilege, as used in the section 1070.48, 

to include attorney work product. 

Accordingly, the Bureau interprets the 

term ‘‘privilege’’ to include the 

protection afforded by the work product 

doctrine. 

Several commenters asked the Bureau 

to reaffirm its policy, as expressed in 

CFPB Bulletin 12–01, that it will request 

privileged information only in limited 

circumstances. As noted in CFPB 

Bulletin 12–01, the Bureau recognizes 

the important interests served by the 

common law privileges, in particular 

the attorney-client privilege. The Bureau 

understands that compliance with 

Federal consumer financial law is 

served by policies that do not 

discourage those subject to its 

supervisory or regulatory authority from 

seeking the advice of counsel. 

Accordingly, the Bureau continues to 

adhere to its policy to request 

submission of privileged information 

only when it determines that such 

information is material to its 

supervisory objectives and that it cannot 

practicably obtain the same information 

from non-privileged sources. The 

Bureau also continues to adhere to its 

policy of giving ‘‘due consideration to 

supervised institutions’ requests to limit 

the form and scope of any supervisory 

request for privileged information.’’ 38

The Bureau believes that its policies 

regarding requests for privileged 

information are consistent with those of 

the prudential regulators.39

In light of these policies, the Bureau 

disagrees with the contention of several 

commenters that the final rule will have 

the effect of chilling attorney-client 

communications within supervised 

entities. To the contrary, the final rule 

encourages and strengthens 

communications between supervised 

entities and their attorneys by providing 

additional protections for the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 129 / Thursday, July 5, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 39621 

40CFPB Bulletin 12–01, at 5. 

41 Id. 42See 12 U.S.C. 1821(t). 

43See 77 FR at 15289. 

44See 12 CFR 1070.47(a). 

45 Id. 

confidentiality of those 

communications. As the Bureau made 

clear in the notice of proposed 

rulemaking, the rule itself does not 

require the submission of privileged 

information, but instead merely 

provides protections for privileged 

information that is submitted to the 

Bureau, voluntarily or otherwise. As 

stated above, to the extent the Bureau 

requests privileged information from 

supervised entities, it will do so only 

when it determines that such 

information is material to its 

supervisory objectives and that it cannot 

practicably obtain the same information 

from non-privileged sources. 

Commenters also expressed concern 

regarding the Bureau’s disclosure to 

other agencies of attorney-client or work 

product privileged information 

submitted to the Bureau in the course of 

its supervisory process. The Bureau’s 

policy for the treatment of confidential 

supervisory information generally is 

expressed in CFPB Bulletin 12–01, 

which states, in pertinent part: 

[T]he Bureau will not routinely share 

confidential supervisory information with 

agencies that are not engaged in supervision. 

Except where required by law, the Bureau’s 

policy is to share confidential supervisory 

information with law enforcement agencies, 

including State Attorneys General, only in 

very limited circumstances and upon review 

of all the relevant facts and considerations. 

The significance of the law enforcement 

interest at stake will be an important 

consideration in any such review. However, 

even the furtherance of a significant law 

enforcement interest will not always be 

sufficient, and the Bureau may still decline 

to share confidential supervisory information 

based on other considerations, including the 

integrity of the supervisory process and the 

importance of preserving the confidentiality 

of the information.40

This policy applies to the Bureau’s 

treatment of all confidential supervisory 

information, including the instances in 

which the Bureau is asked to share with 

a law enforcement agency confidential 

supervisory information that is also 

subject to the attorney-client or work 

product privileges. The Bulletin’s 

presumption against sharing 

confidential supervisory information 

would be even stronger in such 

instances. 

As stated in CFPB Bulletin 12–01, 

‘‘[b]y articulating its policy regarding its 

treatment of confidential supervisory 

information, the Bureau does not intend 

to limit its use of such information in 

administrative or judicial proceedings, 

subject to appropriate protective 

orders.’’ 41

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Bureau 

adopts the proposed rule without 

modification. 

B. Amendment of Section 1070.47(c) 

On July 28, 2011, the Bureau issued 

an interim final rule providing that 

‘‘[t]he provision by the CFPB of any 

confidential information pursuant to [12 

CFR part 1070, subpart D] does not 

constitute a waiver, or otherwise affect, 

any privilege any agency or person may 

claim with respect to such information 

under federal law.’’ 12 CFR 1070.47(c). 

In the notice of proposed rulemaking, 

the Bureau proposed readopting this 

rule in modified form to create a nonwaiver provision substantively similar 

to that codified in section 11 of the 

Federal Deposit Insurance Act,42 with 

the exception that the rule will also 

apply to the disclosure of privileged 

information to State agencies in 

addition to Federal agencies. The 

primary purpose of the proposed rule is 

to protect the privileges of the Bureau in 

the context of a joint investigation or 

coordinated examination. The rule will, 

however, also foreclose claims that any 

other person’s privilege has been 

waived by the Bureau’s disclosure of 

that person’s privileged information to 

another Federal or State agency. 

The Bureau received comparatively 

few comments related to its proposed 

revision of section 1070.47(c). As noted, 

some commenters expressed concern 

regarding the Bureau’s treatment of 

attorney-client and attorney work 

product privileged information obtained 

in the course of its supervisory or 

regulatory processes, including whether 

the Bureau intends to provide such 

privileged information to other Federal 

or State agencies. One commenter 

suggested that the term ‘‘State agency’’ 

in section 1070.47(c) be defined to 

exclude State attorneys general, and 

suggested that the Bureau should not 

share with a State agency the privileged 

information of a regulated entity that 

relates to pending or anticipated 

litigation between the State agency and 

the entity. 

As addressed above in the discussion 

of section 1070.48, the ordinary 

presumption that the Bureau will not 

share confidential supervisory 

information is even stronger when the 

confidential supervisory information is 

also subject to the attorney-client or 

work product privilege. Although 

section 1070.47(c) will protect any 

person’s privileged information from 

claims of waiver, it is primarily 

intended to protect the Bureau’s 

privileges—including, for example, its 

examination privilege, its deliberative 

process privilege, and its law 

enforcement privilege—in the context of 

a coordinated examination or joint 

investigation.43 For this reason, the 

Bureau declines to define the term 

‘‘State agency’’ as excluding State 

attorneys general. If the Bureau were to 

share privileged information obtained 

from a person in the course of its 

supervisory or regulatory functions with 

another agency, for example a 

prudential regulator, the information 

would remain the property of the 

Bureau.44 The agency receiving any 

person’s privileged information from the 

Bureau would be required to maintain 

the confidentiality of the information 

and would be prohibited from further 

disclosure of such information without 

the Bureau’s consent.45

Several commenters raised a specific 

concern regarding whether the corporate 

entity created by State regulators to 

administer the National Mortgage 

Licensing System (NMLS) will be 

considered a ‘‘State agency’’ for 

purposes of section 1070.47(c). 

According to the commenters, State 

regulators often use the NMLS to 

exchange confidential information of 

related companies. The Secure and Fair 

Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act 

(S.A.F.E. Act) protects the 

confidentiality of information 

exchanged by State and Federal 

agencies through the NMLS, and 

expressly provides that information 

provided to the NMLS ‘‘may be shared 

with all State and Federal regulatory 

officials with mortgage industry 

oversight authority without the loss of 

privilege or the loss of confidentiality 

protections provided by Federal or State 

laws.’’ 12 U.S.C. 5111(a); see also 12 

CFR 1008.3 (implementing regulation). 

One commenter expressed concern that 

a court could find that this provision 

does not extend to the sharing of 

information relating to nonbank lenders. 

To address this concern, the commenter 

suggested adding an additional rule of 

construction to section 1070.47(c) to 

make clear that the term ‘‘State agency’’ 

includes any entity employed by a state 

agency to carry out its statutory 

responsibilities. The Bureau declines to 

adopt this suggestion because, in its 

view, the confidentiality provisions of 

the S.A.F.E. Act and its implementing 

regulations provide the necessary 

assurances of confidentiality. 


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39622 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 129 / Thursday, July 5, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

46See Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(c)(6)(A); 12 

U.S.C. 5512(c)(6)(A). 

47See Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(b)(1), 12 

U.S.C. 5512(b)(1); see also Dodd-Frank Act sections 

1012(a)(10), 12 U.S.C. 5492(a)(10) (authorizing the 

Bureau to establish policies with respect to 

‘‘implementing the Federal consumer financial laws 

through rules, orders, guidance, interpretations, 

statements of policy, examinations, and 

enforcement actions * * * ’’). 

48See Dodd-Frank Act section 1021(b)(4), 12 

U.S.C. 5511(b)(4); see also Dodd-Frank Act section 

1021(a), 12 U.S.C. 5511(a). 

49See Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(b)(7)(A), 12 

U.S.C. 5514(b)(7)(A). This rulemaking does not 

concern supervisory requirements or coordinated 

registration systems for nondepository institutions. 

Accordingly, the Bureau has determined that 

consultation with state agencies is not appropriate. 

See Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(b)(7)(D), 12 U.S.C. 

5514(b)(7)(D). 

50Specifically, section 1022(b)(2)(A) calls for the 

Bureau to consider the potential benefits and costs 

of a regulation to consumers and covered persons, 

including the potential reduction of access by 

consumers to consumer financial products or 

services; the impact on depository institutions and 

credit unions with $10 billion or less in total assets 

as described in section 1026 of the Act; and the 

impact on consumers in rural areas. The manner 

and extent to which the provisions of section 

1022(b)(2) apply to a rule of this kind that does not 

establish standards of conduct is unclear. 

Nevertheless, to inform this rulemaking more fully, 

the Bureau performed the described analyses and 

consultations. 

51Notably, section 1070.48 does not require the 

submission of information; rather, any requirement 

to provide information stems from the Bureau’s 

authority under existing law. 

Commenters also sought clarification 

that section 1070.47(c), like section 

1070.48, would apply to attorney work 

product, as well as other types of 

privileged information. For the reasons 

set forth in the discussion of section 

1070.48, the Bureau affirms that section 

1070.47(c) is intended to apply to 

attorney work product and other 

privileged information. 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Bureau 

adopts the proposed rule without 

modification. 

III. Legal Authority 

A. Rulemaking Authority 

The final rule is based on the Bureau’s 

authority to ‘‘prescribe rules regarding 

the confidential treatment of 

information obtained from persons in 

connection with the exercise of its 

authorities under Federal consumer 

financial laws.’’ 46 As explained above, 

section 1070.48 will ensure that the 

confidential nature of privileged 

information obtained by the Bureau in 

the course of any supervisory or 

regulatory process is not waived, 

destroyed, or modified by compliance 

with the Bureau’s requests for 

information. The revised version of 

section 1070.47(c) ensures that the 

sharing of information with Federal and 

State agencies mandated or authorized 

by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act does 

not affect the confidential and 

privileged nature of the information. 

This protection is an appropriate use of 

the Bureau’s authority to prescribe rules 

regarding the confidential treatment of 

information. Where any privileged 

information or material is submitted to 

the Bureau or shared by the Bureau as 

described in the final rule, the final rule 

prohibits discovery or disclosure of that 

information or material as if, and to the 

extent that, the privilege had not been 

waived. 

In addition, the Bureau relies on its 

general rulemaking authority to 

‘‘prescribe rules * * * as may be 

necessary or appropriate to enable the 

Bureau to administer and carry out the 

purposes and objectives of the Federal 

consumer financial laws, and to prevent 

evasions thereof.’’ 47 The supervision 

and other authorities provided by Title 

X of the Dodd-Frank Act are 

components of ‘‘Federal consumer 

financial law.’’ As explained above, the 

final rule is a necessary and appropriate 

measure to ensure that the Bureau is 

able to implement these authorities, and 

to do so consistently ‘‘without regard to 

the status of a person as a depository 

institution, in order to promote fair 

competition.’’ 48 As explained above, 

the final rule will promote candid 

dialogue between supervised entities 

and the Bureau, again furthering the 

purposes and objectives of Federal 

consumer financial law. In addition, by 

providing greater certainty to supervised 

entities, the final rule will also prevent 

evasions of the Bureau’s supervisory 

and other authorities because 

supervised entities might improperly 

attempt to rely upon the risk of waiving 

privilege in order to evade or hamper 

the Bureau’s supervision. The final rule 

is also meant to codify the Bureau’s 

interpretation of section 1061(b) of the 

Dodd-Frank Act as granting the Bureau 

the prudential regulators’ authority, 

codified at 12 U.S.C. 1785(j) and 

1828(x), to obtain privileged 

information from very large depository 

institutions and credit unions and their 

affiliates without effecting a waiver. 

Finally, the Bureau also relies on its 

authority to ‘‘prescribe rules to facilitate 

the supervision of [nondepository 

institutions] and assessment and 

detection of risks to consumers.’’ 49 For 

the reasons discussed above, the final 

rule will facilitate the Bureau’s 

supervision of nondepository 

institutions and thereby enhance the 

Bureau’s ability to assess and detect 

risks to consumers. 

B. Section 1022(b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank 

Act 

In developing the final rule, the 

Bureau considered potential benefits, 

costs, and impacts, and has consulted or 

offered to consult with the prudential 

regulators and the Federal Trade 

Commission, including regarding 

consistency with any prudential, 

market, or systemic objectives 

administered by such agencies.50 The 

Bureau did not receive comments 

regarding the notice of proposed 

rulemaking’s analysis of the proposed 

rule’s potential benefits, costs, and 

impacts. 

Section 1070.48 of the final rule 

provides that the submission by any 

person of information to the Bureau in 

the course of the Bureau’s supervisory 

or regulatory processes does not waive 

or otherwise affect any privilege such 

person may claim with respect to such 

information under Federal or State law 

as to any other person or entity. Section 

1070.47(c) of the final rule provides that 

the Bureau’s provision of privileged 

information to another Federal or State 

agency does not waive any applicable 

privilege. 

As explained above, the Bureau 

anticipates that section 1070.48 will 

most often apply in the context of a 

supervised entity’s involuntary 

submission of privileged information to 

the Bureau.51 In these circumstances, 

the final rule will not result in a 

determination regarding the privileged 

nature of information different than that 

which would have been reached in the 

absence of the rule, and would not be 

expected to impose costs on consumers 

or to impact consumers’ access to 

consumer financial products or services. 

In circumstances in which section 

1070.48 results in a determination 

regarding the privileged nature of 

information different than that which 

would be reached under existing law, 

the final rule will benefit covered 

persons by preserving any applicable 

privilege a covered person may claim in 

response to a third party’s claim of 

waiver. Furthermore, in that scenario, 

the final rule could impose a potential 

cost on consumers or covered persons 

involved in subsequent third-party 

litigation regarding a supervised entity 

to the extent the rule, as opposed to 

existing law, prevents them from 

discovering or using privileged 

information subject to the rule pursuant 

to a theory of waiver. The final rule 

could also benefit consumers, however, 

by facilitating the Bureau’s ability to 

supervise covered persons and service 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 129 / Thursday, July 5, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 39623 

providers and thereby detect and 

prevent risks to consumers. 

The Bureau also believes that courts 

applying the principles of the common 

law would be unlikely to find a waiver 

of any applicable privilege in most 

circumstances in which it will share 

privileged information with another 

Federal or State agency. For example, 

the Bureau believes it unlikely that a 

court would find a waiver if it were to 

share its privileged deliberative work 

product with Federal or State agencies 

in the context of a coordinated 

examination or joint investigation. In 

circumstances in which the rule does 

result in a determination regarding 

waiver different than that which would 

be reached under existing law, section 

1070.47(c)’s only effect would be to 

preserve the confidentiality of 

privileged information and, therefore, 

would not impose material costs on 

consumers or covered persons for the 

same reasons as set forth above in 

relation to section 1070.48. Accordingly, 

section 1070.47(c) is not expected to 

impose material costs on consumers or 

covered persons or to impact 

consumers’ access to consumer financial 

products or services. 

Finally, although the final rule would 

apply to privileged information 

submitted by depository institutions or 

credit unions with $10,000,000,000 or 

less in assets as described in section 

1026 of the Dodd-Frank Act, it has no 

unique impact upon such institutions. 

Nor does the final rule have a unique 

impact on rural consumers. 

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 

as amended by the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 

1996, requires each agency to consider 

the potential impact of its regulations on 

small entities, including small 

businesses, small governmental units, 

and small not-for-profit organizations. 

The RFA generally requires an agency 

to conduct an initial regulatory 

flexibility analysis (IRFA) and a final 

regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) of 

any rule subject to notice-and-comment 

rulemaking requirements, unless the 

agency certifies that the rule will not 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. 

The Bureau did not perform an IFRA 

because it determined and certified that 

the proposed rule, if adopted, would not 

have a significant economic impact on 

a substantial number of small entities. 

The Bureau did not receive any 

comments regarding its certification, 

and is adopting the proposed rule 

without change. 

A FRFA is not required for the 

proposed rule because it will not have 

a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The proposed rule does not impose 

obligations or standards of conduct on 

any entities. In any event, as noted, the 

submission by any person of any 

information to the Bureau in the course 

of the Bureau’s supervisory or 

regulatory processes or the Bureau’s 

later disclosure of such submitted 

material generally does not waive or 

otherwise affect any privilege such 

person may claim with respect to such 

information under Federal or State law 

as to any other person or entity. The 

final rule is intended to codify this 

result in order to give further assurance 

to entities subject to the Bureau’s 

authority. Any requirement to provide 

information stems from the Bureau’s 

authority under existing law, not the 

final rule. To the extent that the final 

rule alters existing law, it protects any 

applicable privilege under Federal or 

State law that a covered person that 

provides information to the Bureau may 

claim. 

Accordingly, the undersigned hereby 

certifies that the final rule will not have 

a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 1070 

Confidential business information, 

Consumer protection, Privacy. 

Authority and Issuance 

For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble, the Bureau amends 12 CFR 

part 1070, subpart D, as set forth below: 

PART 1070—DISCLOSURES OF 

RECORDS AND INFORMATION 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 1070 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 3401; 12 U.S.C. 5481 

et seq.; 5 U.S.C. 552; 5 U.S.C. 552a; 18 U.S.C. 

1905; 18 U.S.C. 641; 44 U.S.C. ch. 30; 5 

U.S.C. 301. 

Subpart D—Confidential Information 

■ 2. Amend § 1070.47 by revising 

paragraph (c) to read as follows: 

§ 1070.47 Other Rules Regarding 

Disclosure of Confidential Information. 

* * * * * 

(c) Non-waiver. (1) In general. The 

CFPB shall not be deemed to have 

waived any privilege applicable to any 

information by transferring that 

information to, or permitting that 

information to be used by, any Federal 

or State agency. 

(2) Rule of construction. Paragraph 

(c)(1) of this section shall not be 

construed as implying that any person 

waives any privilege applicable to any 

information because paragraph (c)(1) 

does not apply to the transfer or use of 

that information. 

■ 3. Add § 1070.48 to read as follows: 

§ 1070.48 Privileges not affected by 

disclosure to the CFPB. 

(a) In general. The submission by any 

person of any information to the CFPB 

for any purpose in the course of any 

supervisory or regulatory process of the 

CFPB shall not be construed as waiving, 

destroying, or otherwise affecting any 

privilege such person may claim with 

respect to such information under 

Federal or State law as to any person or 

entity other than the CFPB. 

(b) Rule of construction. Paragraph (a) 

of this section shall not be construed as 

implying or establishing that— 

(1) Any person waives any privilege 

applicable to information that is 

submitted or transferred under 

circumstances to which paragraph (a) of 

this section does not apply; or 

(2) Any person would waive any 

privilege applicable to any information 

by submitting the information to the 

CFPB but for this section. 

Dated: June 26, 2012. 

Richard Cordray, 

Director, Bureau of Consumer Financial 

Protection. 

[FR Doc. 2012–16247 Filed 7–3–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 33 

[Amendment No. 33–33] 

Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft 

Engines; Technical Amendment 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; technical 

amendment. 

SUMMARY: This amendment clarifies 

aircraft engine vibration test 

requirements in the airworthiness 

standards. The clarification is in 

response to inquiries from applicants 

requesting FAA engine type 

certifications and aftermarket 

certifications, such as supplemental 

type certificates, parts manufacturing 

approvals, and repairs. We are revising 

the regulations to clarify that ‘‘engine 

surveys’’ require an engine test. The 

change is not substantive in nature, and 

will not impose any additional burden 

on any person. 


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