U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

A Review of the FBI’s 

Investigative Activities Concerning 

Potential Protesters at the 2004 

Democratic and Republican 

National Political Conventions 

Office of the Inspector General 

Oversight and Review Division 

April 27, 2006

 
I. INTRODUCTION 

In August 2004, newspaper articles reported that the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) had questioned political demonstrators across the United 

States in advance of threatened violent and disruptive protests at the July 

2004 Democratic National Convention and the August 2004 Republican 

National Convention.1 The initial articles stated that “dozens of people” had 

been interviewed in at least six states, including past protesters and their 

friends and family members, and that anarchist groups reported being 

“harassed” by federal agents. The articles also stated that grand jury 

subpoenas had been issued to several individuals calling for them to appear 

before the grand jury during the Democratic convention, thereby preventing 

them from attending the convention.2 In these articles, civil liberties groups 

alleged that the FBI was attempting to chill protesters from exercising their 

First Amendment rights.3 In response, the Department of Justice (Department 

or DOJ) suggested that the interviews were largely limited to efforts to disrupt a 

threatened bombing at the Democratic convention, and law enforcement 

officials placed the number of interviews at no more than 24.4

After publication of the initial news articles, three members of Congress 

asked the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to initiate an investigation into 

“possible violations of First Amendment free speech and assembly rights by the 

Justice Department in connection with their investigations of possible protests 

at the Democratic and Republican political conventions in Boston and New 

York and other venues.”5 At the time of the request, the OIG was conducting a 

review of the FBI’s compliance with the Attorney General’s Investigative 

Guidelines which govern domestic terrorism, criminal intelligence, and general 

crimes investigations. We determined that there were authorities available to 

 

1 See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers, The New York 

Times, Aug. 16, 2004; Tom Hays, FBI Tracks Potential GOP Protesters, Associated Press, Aug. 

16, 2004. 

2 Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I Goes Knocking for Political Trouble makers, The New York Times, 

Aug. 16, 2004; Eric Lichtblau, Inquiry Into FBI Questioning is Sought, The New York Times, 

Aug. 18, 2004; Tom Hays, FBI Tracks Potential GOP Protesters, Associated Press, Aug. 16, 

2004. A FOIA request led to the release of some FBI documents relating to the pre-convention 

interviews. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Protesters Subject to ‘Pretext Interviews,’ Washington Post, 

May 18, 2005; Eric Lichtblau, Large Volume of F.B.I. Files Alarms U.S. Activist Groups, The New 

York Times, July 18, 2005. 

3 Tom Hays, FBI Tracks Potential GOP Protesters, Associated Press, Aug. 16, 2004; Eric 

Lichtblau, Inquiry Into FBI Questioning is Sought, The New York Times, Aug. 18, 2004. 

4 Eric Lichtblau, Protesters at Heart of Debate on Security vs. Civil Rights, The New York 

Times, Aug. 28, 2004. 

5 Letter to Inspector General Glenn A. Fine from Congressmen John Conyers, Jr., 

Robert C. Scott, and Jerrold Nadler, Aug. 17, 2004. 
the FBI to prepare for the 2004 political conventions in addition to the 

Investigative Guidelines, and we therefore decided to examine the allegations 

regarding the FBI’s convention interviews in a separate review.6 This report 

describes the results of our review of the FBI’s interviews and investigative 

activity related to potential protesters in connection with the 2004 Democratic 

and Republican national political conventions. 

A. Scope and Methodology 

This review was conducted by attorneys in the OIG’s Oversight and 

Review Division. The OIG team conducted over two dozen interviews of FBI 

Headquarters and field personnel, including personnel from the 

Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division and the Office of the General 

Counsel. The OIG team also examined approximately 10,000 pages of 

documents produced by the FBI in response to our document requests. Among 

the information analyzed were FBI investigative case files, information retrieved 

from FBI databases, correspondence, guidance memoranda, and manuals. 

Our review concentrated on the FBI’s investigative activities involving 

persons with an alleged nexus to planned protest activity at the 2004 

Democratic and Republican national political conventions. In light of the 

request from members of Congress, our review also paid particular attention to 

the FBI’s justification for interviews that were widely reported in the press prior 

to the Republican convention. The FBI identified other threats to the 

conventions that were addressed pursuant to the FBI’s international 

counterterrorism program, such as threats to the physical security of the 

convention venues. However, because we identified no convention protesterrelated interviews arising from the exercise of the FBI’s counterterrorism 

authorities, our review did not include an examination of interviews relating to 

these different threats. 

The FBI does not maintain a centralized database of interviews 

conducted in relation to a particular special event. Rather, interviews are 

recorded in various investigative or “Special Event” administrative files that are 

opened pursuant to the Attorney General Guidelines or other authorities 

governing that particular activity.7 Over the period of this review, the OIG 

asked the FBI to provide information concerning interviews conducted in 

connection with the two conventions, whether recorded on the FBI’s routine 

 

6 The OIG released its report on the Investigative Guidelines in September 2005. The 

report, entitled The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Compliance with the Attorney General’s 

Investigative Guidelines, is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0509/index.htm. 

7 We discuss the FBI’s role in connection with specially designated Special Events in 

Part II of this report. 

2 
interview form (FD-302) or elsewhere. At the end of our information-gathering 

process, the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Terrorism 

Operations Section (DTOS) in the Counterterrorism Division confirmed that we 

had identified all the interviews the FBI conducted to address protester-related 

domestic terrorism threats to the 2004 political conventions. 

Our review did not examine the role of non-federal law enforcement 

agencies acting independently of the FBI which, according to press accounts, 

also engaged in investigative activities such as interviews and surveillance at 

protest events, including the two 2004 political conventions.8

B. Findings 

Our review did not substantiate the allegations that the FBI improperly 

targeted protesters for interviews in an effort to chill the exercise of their First 

Amendment rights at the 2004 Democratic and Republican national political 

conventions. We concluded that the FBI’s interviews of potential convention 

protesters and others that we reviewed were conducted for legitimate law 

enforcement purposes. We also determined that the Department’s assertion 

that the FBI’s pre-convention interviews were largely limited to efforts at 

disrupting a single threat to bomb media vans at the Democratic Convention 

was not correct. Instead, we found that the FBI’s interviews of potential 

convention protesters were based upon a variety of threat information reflecting 

possible bomb threats and other violent criminal activities. 

Nearly all of the FBI’s protester-related investigative activity was devoted 

to addressing 17 distinct threats to the conventions falling within the FBI’s 

domestic terrorism program. We concluded that the FBI addressed each threat 

in accordance with the Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, 

Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (General 

Crimes Guidelines). In addition, our review identified seven terrorism 

enterprise investigations (TEIs) not initiated in connection with the conventions 

that generated convention-related criminal intelligence. We concluded that the 

investigative techniques utilized to obtain this intelligence were a logical 

outgrowth of the underlying investigations and that the investigative activity 

was undertaken in a manner consistent with the requirements of the General 

Crimes Guidelines. 

With respect to the protester-related interviews, our investigation 

revealed that the FBI identified 74 persons and the residents of 3 addresses for 

 

8 See, e.g., Larry Neumeister, Rights Group Challenges NYPD Videotaping of 

Demonstrators, Associated Press, Nov. 30, 2005; Jim Dwyer, NYPD Conducted Covert 

Surveillance at Protest Rallies, The New York Times, Dec. 22, 2005. 

3 
contact who satisfied the following criteria: 1) they were likely convention 

demonstrators or, through affiliation with one or more organizations or 

persons, were individuals with access to information about potential protest 

activity at the conventions; and 2) they were persons whom the FBI reasonably 

believed had, or might have, knowledge about planned criminal acts at the 

conventions. In addition, the FBI contacted and interviewed eight individuals 

in an attempt to locate persons who satisfied the two criteria above. Of the 

individuals targeted for contact, the FBI was successful in locating 60 persons 

in 9 states, 41 of whom consented to interviews and provided the FBI with 

information. All of these contacts occurred in response to the 17 threats of 

criminal activity described above. 

We describe our findings in greater detail in Section IV of this report. 

Prior to that, we provide background information on the FBI’s Special Events 

mission, including an overview of the DOJ guidelines that govern investigative 

and counterterrorism activities relating to such events, followed by a 

description of the FBI’s preparations for the Democratic and Republican 

national conventions. Our analysis of the FBI’s investigative activities prior to 

and during the two conventions is described in Section V of this report. 

II. BACKGROUND ON THE FBI’S SPECIAL EVENTS MISSION 

The FBI has responsibilities with regard to security at “special events” 

that, due to their importance or high public profile, pose attractive targets for 

terrorist attack.9 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 establishes the U.S. 

Policy on Counterterrorism, which assigns to the Department of Justice, as 

delegated to the FBI, lead agency responsibilities for countering threats or acts 

of terrorism within the United States.10 As described in more detail below, the 

FBI has established a Special Events subprogram largely as a result of PDD 39 

 

9 The FBI defines a “Special Event” as “a significant domestic or international event, 

occurrence, circumstance, contest, activity, or meeting which, by virtue of its profile and/or 

status, represents an attractive target for terrorist attack.” Manual of Investigative Operations 

and Guidance (MIOG) 300-1(2). 

10 PDD 39 was issued by President Clinton on June 21, 1995, and is classified. See 

also 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (“The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall . . . [e]xercise 

Lead Agency responsibility in investigating all crimes for which it has primary or concurrent 

jurisdiction and which involve terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist activities 

within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States. Within the United States, this would 

include the collection, coordination, analysis, management and dissemination of intelligence 

and criminal information as appropriate.”). 

4 
and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2332b (f) & (g).11 The FBI’s responsibilities for Special Events that are 

designated as National Special Security Events (NSSEs) warranting stringent 

federal security measures are set forth in another classified PDD.12 Both the 

Democratic and Republican national political conventions in 2004 were 

designated NSSEs. 

In addition, the FBI has criminal jurisdiction involving Special Events 

based upon numerous federal criminal statutes that address crimes such as 

those involving riots and civil disorders,13 solicitation to commit a crime of 

violence,14 and interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of 

racketeering.15

Below we provide a brief overview of the FBI’s classification of, and level 

of involvement with, Special Events, several of the FBI units with Special 

Events responsibilities, and authorities governing the FBI’s activities at Special 

Events. 

A. Types of Special Events Warranting FBI Participation 

The FBI employs a Special Events Readiness Level (SERL) rating system 

to determine the amount of administrative and operational support it should 

dedicate to Special Events. Each event is classified on a four-part scale based 

upon several factors, including whether high-level U.S. and foreign government 

officials will participate, whether previous terrorist incidents are associated 

with the event or similar events, the degree of media attention, and the current 

level of domestic and global terrorist activity. 

The FBI’s SERL system ratings range from I to IV. The highest SERL 

designation – SERL I – is reserved for Special Events that require the full 

 

11 This Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(f), provides that “the Attorney General shall have 

primary investigative responsibility for all Federal crimes of terrorism. . . .” More recently, 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, issued by President Bush in February 2003, 

describes the FBI’s responsibility to coordinate counterterrorism activities: “Generally acting 

through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other 

Federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall 

also coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to 

detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States.” 

12 PDD 62, issued by President Clinton in May 1998, addresses the coordination of the 

federal government’s counterterrorism resources at events of national interest. 

13 18 U.S.C. § 2101 and 18 U.S.C. § 231. 

14 18 U.S.C. § 373. 

15 18 U.S.C. § 1952. 

5 
support of the U.S. government, and likely require the prepositioning of 

counterterrorism resources. The Attorney General or his or her designee must 

certify SERL I designations after receiving the recommendation of the FBI 

Director. In 2004, the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia was designated a 

SERL I event. SERL II events require the limited pre-deployment of U.S. 

government assets related to counterterrorism preparedness. In 2004, the 

State Funeral of President Ronald Reagan and the Democratic and Republican 

national political conventions were designated as SERL II events. Each of these 

2004 events also were designated as NSSEs.16 NSSEs, as with SERL I or II 

events, require extensive security preparations by the U.S. government. 

PDD 62, which is classified, addresses these security preparations. 

In addition to its SERL rating system, the FBI has created a special case 

management classification code for counterterrorism activities at Special 

Events – the 300A classification. The FBI’s MIOG provides that this 

classification is administrative and that no active criminal investigation should 

be conducted under it. In the event a criminal act occurs at a Special Event, 

the MIOG provides that a separate investigative file should be opened under 

the substantive violation. MIOG 300-1(5)(b). Intelligence and investigative 

information resulting from leads that do not result in the opening of 

preliminary inquiries or full investigations may be retained under the 300 

classification in accordance with applicable guidelines and regulations. 

B. FBI Components with Special Events Responsibilities 

Many Headquarters units in several FBI Divisions are involved in the 

planning and provision of security support to Special Events, including 

investigative, intelligence, technical, tactical, and logistical assistance. The G-8 

Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, for example, required the assistance of more 

than 900 FBI personnel from approximately 20 different FBI components.17 

Both the Democratic and Republican national political conventions required 

comparable support in 2004. Although our review focused largely on field-level 

investigative activity carried out by agents assigned domestic terrorism duties 

at the two political conventions, we reviewed the work of several FBI 

Headquarters and field components with missions relevant to the FBI’s 

interviews of protesters and related investigative activities. 

 

16 The decision to identify an event as an NSSE is made by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security after consultation with the Homeland Security Council. The first NSSE after the 

September 11 terrorist attacks was the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. 

17 Examples of the FBI components involved include the Crisis Management Unit, the 

Hostage Rescue Team, the Hazardous Materials Response Unit, and the Bomb Data Center. 

6 
At the field level, the FBI’s New York and Boston Divisions assigned 

responsibilities to one or more Joint Terrorism Task Force Squads (JTTFs) 

comprised of squads of FBI agents and others, such as non-FBI federal, as well 

as state and local law enforcement personnel, designated as “Task Force 

Officers,” to investigate domestic terrorism matters related to the conventions. 

These domestic terrorism squads received assistance from the field-based FBI 

Chief Division Counsel on legal matters, as well as from their respective Field 

Intelligence Groups (FIGs), which provided intelligence support.18 The squads 

also worked in close cooperation with their state, local, and federal law 

enforcement partners.19

At the Headquarters level, the FBI’s convention support was overseen 

primarily by the Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS) in the 

Counterterrorism Division, the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and the Office of 

the General Counsel (FBI-OGC). Within DTOS, the FBI has a specialized unit 

devoted exclusively to the management of Special Events – the Special Events 

Management Unit (SEMU). This Unit oversees planning and various 

administrative tasks related to Special Events, such as identifying the 

appropriate SERL rating, coordinating threat assessments, and “provid[ing] 

appropriate Special Event support to the host field division.” MIOG 300-1(3). 

In preparation for the conventions, SEMU organized Headquarters briefings for 

agents and managers assigned convention-related duties. 

With respect to investigations, the Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit 

(DTOU) provides programmatic and operational oversight in cases that involve 

threats of domestic terrorism. In the planning for the 2004 conventions, DTOU 

was heavily involved in forwarding convention-related threat information 

obtained from ongoing FBI investigations to the domestic terrorism squads. 

Intelligence support for Special Events is also provided by the DI, in 

conjunction with field division FIGs. The Directorate of Intelligence has 

identified intelligence requirements for Special Events, but it is not involved in 

planning investigative activities undertaken to fulfill these requirements. 

FBI-OGC provides support to the Chief Division Counsel in the FBI’s 56 

field divisions and responds to requests for legal advice and guidance from FBI 

personnel. In preparation for the conventions, FBI-OGC assisted with training 

and providing legal support to the Boston and New York Divisions. 

 

18 In each FBI field division, a FIG is responsible for the management, execution, and 

coordination of intelligence functions, including the dissemination of intelligence. 

19 JTTFs, composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, respond to 

terrorism leads and conduct terrorism investigations. In addition, JTTFs pool the resources 

and expertise of multiple agencies to collect and share counterterrorism intelligence. 

7 
C. Authorities Governing Criminal Investigative and 

Counterterrorism Activity Related to the FBI’s Special Events 

Mission 

Under applicable authorities, including PDDs 39 and 62 and the 

Attorney General’s Investigative Guidelines, and the Attorney General’s 

Guidelines on FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence 

Collection (NSI Guidelines), the FBI is permitted to collect, retain, and 

disseminate investigative information and criminal and foreign intelligence 

relevant to its law enforcement mission at Special Events, which includes the 

detection and prevention of terrorist acts. The Attorney General’s Guidelines 

on General Crimes, which govern investigations of acts of domestic terrorism 

and crimes such as riots and civil disorders, state that the FBI must be 

proactive in executing its counterterrorism responsibilities. See General 

Crimes Guidelines, Part VI.20 The Guidelines also state that investigations 

initiated to prevent criminal conduct should “not be based solely on activities 

protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights 

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” General Crimes 

Guidelines, Part I. 

FBI field supervisors told the OIG that the FBI’s investigative activity 

related to convention protesters was conducted under the authority of the 

General Crimes Guidelines and that the FBI did not rely upon its Special 

Events authorities (such as the PDDs) to fulfill its investigative responsibilities 

related to the conventions. The General Crimes Guidelines authorize three 

levels of investigative activity: the “prompt and extremely limited checking out 

of initial leads,” preliminary inquiries, and full investigations. General Crimes 

Guidelines, Introduction. In addition, the General Crimes Guidelines authorize 

certain counterterrorism activities that can be conducted in the absence of 

other authorized investigative activity. General Crimes Guidelines, Part VI. 

The first level of investigative activity permitted under the General 

Crimes Guidelines, the checking of initial leads, may be undertaken after 

receipt of information indicating that some follow up regarding the possibility of 

criminal activity is warranted. Leads may be generated from new information 

coming to the FBI as well as from the analysis of intelligence already in the 

FBI’s possession. Unlike the Guidelines provisions governing preliminary 

inquiries, the provisions governing leads checking do not expressly prohibit the 

use of particular investigative techniques, cautioning only that the activity 

 

20 For background on the Attorney General’s General Crimes Guidelines, see the OIG 

report entitled, The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Compliance With the Attorney General’s 

Investigative Guidelines, Sept. 2005, referenced in note 6, supra. 

8 
must be “prompt and extremely limited.” See General Crimes Guidelines, 

Introduction, A. Other provisions in the Guidelines authorize use of certain 

investigative techniques without authorization from a supervisory agent. These 

techniques include the examination of FBI indices and files, the review of 

public records, and interviews of the complainant and potential subject. 

General Crimes Guidelines, § II.B.6. According to the Guidelines, an important 

objective of pursuing such leads is to determine whether further investigation 

(either a preliminary inquiry or a full investigation) should be conducted. 

The next level of investigative activity authorized under the General 

Crimes Guidelines is a preliminary inquiry. A preliminary inquiry is authorized 

when information or an allegation indicates the possibility of criminal activity, 

and responsible handling requires further scrutiny beyond checking initial 

leads. See General Crimes Guidelines, Introduction, A. A preliminary inquiry 

allows the FBI to determine whether a full investigation should be opened. The 

range of investigative techniques in a preliminary inquiry is broad, and the 

Guidelines state that the FBI should not hesitate to use any lawful techniques 

in a preliminary inquiry, even if “intrusive,” where “the intrusiveness is 

warranted in light of the seriousness of the possible crime or the strength of 

the information indicating its existence or future commission.” General Crimes 

Guidelines, § II.B.4. 

The third level of investigative activity is the full investigation. The 

Guidelines define full investigations either as general crimes investigations or 

criminal intelligence investigations. General crimes investigations may be 

opened where facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime 

has been, is being, or will be committed. General Crimes Guidelines, 

Introduction, B. The standard for initiating a general crimes investigation is 

“substantially lower than probable cause,” and may be satisfied when the 

objective of the investigation is to prevent future criminal activity, in addition to 

investigating a completed criminal act. General Crimes Guidelines, § II.C.1. 

The second type of full investigation is a criminal intelligence 

investigation. There are two types of criminal intelligence investigations: 

racketeering enterprise investigations (REIs) and terrorism enterprise 

investigations (TEIs). A racketeering enterprise, which is not pertinent to this 

review, involves racketeering activity as defined in the Racketeer Influenced 

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. A terrorism 

enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances 

reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for 

the purpose of: 1) furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through 

activities that involve force or violence and a federal crime; 2) engaging in 

terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) or (5) that involves a federal crime; 

or 3) committing any offense described in 18 § U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). General 

Crimes Guidelines, § III.B.1.a. 

9 
Part VI of the General Crimes Guidelines authorizes law enforcement 

activities that can be carried out in the absence of checking leads, or initiating 

a preliminary inquiry or full investigation. These authorizations involve tools 

that are available to obtain information about both terrorism and nonterrorism-related crimes. Subpart A of Part VI authorizes the FBI to engage in 

two types of “counterterrorism activities”: 1) utilizing information systems, 

which the FBI may operate or participate in, to identify and locate terrorists 

and alien supporters of terrorist activity; and 2) visiting public places and 

events on the same terms and conditions as members of the public “for the 

purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities.” In Subpart B, the FBI is 

authorized to conduct topical research, use online resources “for the purpose of 

detecting or preventing terrorism or other criminal activities,” and prepare 

reports and assessments. Prior to issuance of the revised General Crimes 

Guidelines in May 2002, the FBI’s authority to engage in these activities 

generally was interpreted to be limited to the investigation of crimes or the 

collection of criminal intelligence only when agents had a sufficient evidentiary 

basis to check leads, conduct a preliminary inquiry, or conduct a full 

investigation. 

III. THE FBI’S PREPERATIONS FOR THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC AND 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL POLITICAL CONVENTIONS 

The FBI’s preparations for the 2004 political conventions were extensive 

and began nearly two years in advance of the first convention (the Democratic 

National Convention in July 2004). Based on its past experience, the FBI 

anticipated that both conventions would likely attract threats from persons 

seeking to carry out criminal acts in order to disrupt the proceedings and bring 

attention to extremist political causes. Many of the agents that we interviewed 

stated that violence and the destruction of property at the conventions were a 

significant concern, and that the experience gained from recent violent 

protests, such as those described in the next paragraph, heightened the need 

for vigilance in identifying and evaluating threat information. 

In addition to the threats posed by international terrorists, the FBI was 

especially concerned about the threats posed by anarchist groups, some of 

whose members had committed violent acts at demonstrations prior to the 

2004 political conventions. These included the 1999 World Trade Organization 

ministerial meeting in Seattle, Washington, which resulted in violence leading 

to several hundred arrests and property destruction exceeding $3 million; the 

November 2003 annual Free Trade Area of the Americas meeting in Miami, 

Florida; and the 2000 national political conventions. Through observation and 

analysis of these and similar events, the FBI identified tactics employed by 

violent demonstrators that it believed might be utilized at the 2004 national 

political conventions. These included the use of bombs, incendiary devices, 

spray canisters filled with caustic liquids, weapons such as bats and sling10
shots, “anti-horse” tactics (e.g., rolling marbles in front of mounted police 

officers), and telephonic bomb and fire threats. 

To improve its intelligence capabilities regarding threats to the 

conventions, the FBI undertook various preparations, including convening 

organizational meetings, conducting training, creating planning documents and 

materials, evaluating threats, and canvassing its agents and databases for 

available information. As we discuss below, however, the FBI also issued 

guidance documents concerning the need to ensure that it’s investigative and 

data collection activities did not unlawfully impinge upon civil liberties. 

Beginning in late 2003, the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism Operations Section 

organized meetings to prepare for Special Events upcoming in 2004, which 

included the G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, and the Democratic and 

Republican national political conventions. A domestic terrorism squad 

supervisor told the OIG that an important objective of one of the early meetings 

was to ensure consistency in the FBI’s approach to the 2004 Special Events. 

He said that a consensus was reached that the FBI should examine available 

information on persons with a history of committing violent acts at any 

demonstration. The agent stated that once this information was identified, 

field supervisors would decide whether additional investigative activity, such as 

interviews, was warranted. The agent stated that the FBI’s operational 

approach with respect to investigative activity related to the conventions was 

decentralized, and that field supervisors were responsible for determining what 

preparations were necessary to ensure that intelligence was collected and 

investigative activity completed to prevent or minimize the potential for acts of 

violence during those events. 

 

Early in these preparations, some FBI field offices recognized a need for 

clear guidance and training on legal restrictions concerning the collection, 

maintenance, and dissemination of law enforcement information related to 

Special Events. Both the Boston and New York field offices furnished 

instruction to their personnel regarding the lawful monitoring of First 

Amendment-related activity in anticipation of the two conventions. In the 

Boston field office, for example, the domestic terrorism squad assigned to the 

Democratic convention requested legal instruction on convention intelligence 

issues over a year in advance of the convention’s start. The requested training 

was provided in October 2003 by the Boston Division’s Chief Division Counsel 

and, as described in a memorandum documenting the training, “included a 

detailed discussion of First Amendment case law, relevant portions of the 

Privacy Act of 1974, [and the Attorney General Guidelines].” In January 2004, 

the FBI’s Boston field office provided additional training on legal issues related 

to criminal intelligence collection to approximately 200 law enforcement 

11
personnel who would be providing protection at the convention. This training 

was provided in conjunction with the U.S. Secret Service and the Boston Police 

Department.21

The FBI also issued special bulletins in October and November 2003 

relating to the potential for violent or terrorist acts in connection with Special 

Events held prior to the 2004 conventions. The FBI’s first bulletin, Intelligence 

Bulletin No. 89, Tactics Used During Protests and Demonstrations, was issued 

in October 2003, 10 days before expected marches in Washington, D.C. and 

San Francisco to protest the Iraq war.22 It recounted some of the violent and 

disruptive tactics used at past demonstrations and stated that “law 

enforcement agencies should be alert to . . . possible indicators of protest 

activity and report any potentially illegal acts to the nearest FBI Joint 

Terrorism Task Force.” 

In November 2003, the FBI issued a related Intelligence Bulletin, the day 

before the commencement of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 

Annual Meeting in Miami.23 After recounting the history of past FTAA 

meetings and referencing Intelligence Bulletin No. 89, the bulletin stated: 

The FTAA is expected to attract anywhere from 20,000 to 100,000 

demonstrators from across the United States. Many of the 

protestors are openly planning to disrupt the conference through 

violence rather than merely conducting organized 

demonstrations. . . . Law enforcement agencies that develop 

information regarding possible terrorist threats or threats of violent 

 

21 One Special Agent who played a prominent role in requesting and organizing training 

in anticipation of the Democratic National Convention told the OIG that it was difficult to 

obtain specific guidance from FBI OGC concerning precisely what information agents could 

collect, maintain, and disseminate. A May 20, 2003, memorandum from this Special Agent in 

the Boston field office requesting the training described the FBI’s focus on those who might try 

to disrupt the Democratic convention through criminal acts, and specifically asked for training 

regarding “the Attorney General Guidelines, the Privacy Act and other applicable legal 

requirements concerning the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence.” 

22 The FBI’s Intelligence Bulletins pertaining to NSSEs are distributed to agencies 

charged with securing the event, members of the intelligence community, and law enforcement 

agencies in the vicinity of the event venue. A newspaper article stated that the FBI had 

“collected extensive information on the tactics, training and organization of antiwar 

demonstrators” and had “advised local law enforcement officials to report any suspicious 

activity at protests to its counterterrorism squads.” F.B.I. Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies, The New 

York Times, Nov. 23, 2003. The FBI publicly disputed these accounts of the FBI’s activities in 

preparation for these events and released on its web site the text of Intelligence Bulletin No. 89. 

23 FBI Intelligence Bulletin No. 94, Potential for Criminal Activity at Free Trade Area of 

the Americas (FTAA) Annual Meeting, Nov. 12, 2003. The FBI has not publicly released this 

document. 

12
or destructive civil disturbance directed against the FTAA should 

forward this information to the nearest Joint Terrorism Task 

Force.24

FBI-OGC and DTOS issued other guidance documents during the Spring 

of 2004 relating to the surveillance of protest groups. FBI-OGC’s guidance, 

entitled Protection of Civil Liberties dated March 19, 2004, identified the 

circumstances under which agents may attend and conduct surveillance at 

public events. While the guidance emphasized that agents may perform such 

activities provided there was an established investigative purpose as set forth 

in the Attorney General’s Guidelines, it also stated that other authorities, such 

as those supporting the FBI’s Special Events mission, may provide the requisite 

authorization.25 With respect to the protection of First Amendment rights, the 

guidance repeated the applicable General Crimes Guidelines prohibition on the 

monitoring of First Amendment activity for that purpose alone: “Agents may 

not conduct surveillance of individuals or groups solely for monitoring the 

exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.” FBI-OGC also provided 

detailed responses to written questions and hypothetical questions posed by 

the New York Office of Chief Division Counsel in advance of the Republican 

convention. These questions addressed issues related to permissible 

investigative activity in advance of a Special Event and the circumstances in 

which the FBI lawfully could retain information received in preparation for 

such an event. 

 

24 Shortly after issuance of these bulletins, the OIG received a request from an FBI 

agent requesting an investigation of whether the two Intelligence Bulletins violated the First 

Amendment or otherwise unconstitutionally blurred the distinction between lawful protest 

activity and illegal terrorist acts. In response, the OIG referred these questions to the 

Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), whose duties include providing legal opinions to 

Executive Branch agencies. In an April 2004 opinion, which has been publicly released, OLC 

stated that the bulletins “did not mandate any systematic, covert, or electronic surveillance” 

but “simply requested reports from various protests on observed public acts that might be 

illegal . . . .” OLC stated that the bulletins limited reports to potentially illegal acts or threats of 

violence, and they “were limited to criminal activity that falls outside the First 

Amendment. . . .” OLC concluded that, “Given the limited nature of such public monitoring, 

any possible ‘chilling effect’ caused by the bulletins would be quite minimal and substantially 

outweighed by the public interest in maintaining safety and order during large-scale 

demonstrations.” Memorandum for Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, from Jack L. Goldsmith, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Constitutionality of Certain FBI 

Intelligence Bulletins. 

25 Following the conventions, in September 2004, DTOS issued supplemental guidance 

concerning the monitoring of protest groups. The guidance stated that Field Division legal 

counsel must review the predication for initiating any domestic terrorism matter that may 

involve investigation directed at groups or persons who may be planning “criminal or terrorist 

activity in relation to their exercise of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.” The guidance 

further provided that the opening communication must fully explain the predication for 

initiating the case and document legal counsel’s concurrence with its sufficiency. 

13
DTOS issued two policy memoranda regarding the 2004 Special Events. 

The most detailed of the two, entitled Guidance to Atlanta, Boston and New 

York Divisions Concerning Information Collection, Maintenance, and 

Dissemination for G-8, DNC and RNC Special Events, 2004, dated April 26, 

2004, described the legal authority underlying the FBI’s collection and use of 

information pertaining to Special Events. It also identified limitations on this 

activity imposed by the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)), and the Attorney 

General Guidelines. With respect to the types of information that the FBI can 

collect in preparation for and during Special Events, the guidance concluded: 

[I]nvestigative information and criminal and foreign intelligence 

that is pertinent to and within the scope of the FBI’s planning, 

development, and implementation of its efforts against potential 

acts of terrorism at Special Events can properly be collected, 

maintained and disseminated under the Privacy Act. 

The second DTOS policy memorandum provided guidance concerning the 

proactive collection of intelligence related to Special Events. After summarizing 

relevant provisions of the Privacy Act, the General Crimes Guidelines, and the 

NSI Guidelines, the memorandum stated that the intelligence requested should 

be limited in scope to information pertinent to a Special Event or sufficient to 

predicate an authorized preliminary inquiry or full investigation. The 

memorandum also stated that leads requesting such information should 

contain language requesting “positive intelligence from sources with knowledge 

of planned activity by individuals, domestic or international groups under open 

preliminary inquiries or full investigations, as well as intelligence from any 

source indicative of unlawful activity or other acts of violence.” DTOS 

Guidance to FBI Field Divisions Concerning Information Request, Collection 

and Dissemination for Special Events, dated May 14, 2004. 

 In addition, both the Boston and New York Divisions created planning 

documents to guide convention security efforts. The Boston field office created 

a document identifying 33 intelligence initiatives designed “to enhance the 

ability of the Boston Division to detect terrorism threats to the 2004 

Democratic National Convention.” The Special Agent who prepared the Boston 

document said that it functioned as the Boston office’s intelligence operations 

plan for the Democratic convention. The Special Agent told the OIG that he 

thought it was important to create the document “so that our actions in the 

end run were measured and done with an analysis as accurate as we thought it 

could be.” Documents generated by the Boston Division’s domestic terrorism 

squad assigned to the Democratic convention showed that the plan played a 

significant role in guiding the squad’s efforts to collect criminal intelligence 

before and during the convention, and it assisted the squad in attempting to 

comply with applicable guidelines and procedures. 

14
Prior to the Democratic National Convention, agents in the Boston field 

office performed checks of FBI databases of persons who had been arrested for 

criminal activities at demonstrations that had turned violent, including the 

2000 national political conventions.26 From this list, the FBI identified persons 

with a nexus to Boston, including those who resided in, were arrested in, or 

were known to be traveling to the city for the Democratic National Convention. 

The Boston field office considered but rejected proposals to contact and 

interview individuals on this list who had a history of violence at previous 

demonstrations. According to a Special Agent on the domestic terrorism squad 

assigned to the convention, nothing more was done with the list because the 

FBI’s analysis showed that there was no threat of the nature that had been 

seen at other events, such as the desire of particular individuals who had 

engaged in violence at other demonstrations to attend the convention. The 

Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who rejected the proposal to contact and 

interview individuals solely on the basis of a history of violence at previous 

demonstrations told the OIG that he made this decision based on his concern 

that engaging in such work so close to the date of the convention might have a 

chilling effect on First Amendment rights. The SSA further stated that the 

agents on his squad did not undertake investigative activity in advance of the 

Democratic National Convention unless it pertained to a credible threat of 

violent or criminal activity. 

 In addition, the FBI sought information from its existing sources about 

the upcoming conventions. For example, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of 

the Boston field office approved a memorandum that was distributed to the 

Boston Division in May 2004, and to all FBI field offices, Legal Attaché Offices, 

and the Counterterrorism Division in June 2004. The memorandum requested 

field offices to canvass assets and sources for information pertinent to the 

Democratic National Convention. The memorandum stated that “the 

intelligence solicited should not pertain solely to threats but encompass any 

DNC [Democratic National Convention] related information. This approach is 

being pursued as the significance of a seemingly innocuous piece of intelligence 

may not be apparent until it is incorporated into the broader intelligence 

picture.” 

This language is broader than the language used in DTOS’s May 14, 

2004 guidance, which limited source collection to the three categories of 

information described above. It also is broader than the language contained in 

DTOS’s solicitation for source information related to the conventions, which 

 

26 The Boston office requested 2000 Republican convention arrestee booking data, 

photographs, and incident reports from the Philadelphia Police Department of arrestees who 

reported Massachusetts residency. 

15
was limited to criminal intelligence.27 However, we did not identify problems 

with the broad request for source reporting resulting from Boston’s solicitation. 

Our review of source information that was documented in the FBI’s files 

indicated that the source information provided to the FBI was legitimate law 

enforcement information pertinent to the FBI’s security mission at the 

conventions. 

We found that the New York field office did not distribute memoranda to 

the field and others seeking intelligence equivalent to Boston’s May 2004 

memorandum, opting instead to rely upon the earlier memoranda that had 

been sent by FBI Headquarters. The SSA who supervised the New York 

counterterrorism squad assigned to the Republican National Convention told 

the OIG that the New York field office did not actively collect information about 

groups that were planning on coming to New York to protest, although the 

office identified persons in the New York area who had a previous history of 

criminal activity at any demonstration. FBI agents assigned to the FBI’s New 

York field office conducted searches of FBI databases for eight people who were 

identified as having committed violence at earlier demonstrations. According to 

the SSA, no interviews were conducted as a result of this research. The FBI 

contacted the probation officer for one of the eight individuals, however, to 

determine whether the person had been abiding by the terms of the probation. 

According to the New York SSA, the FBI in New York relied upon local 

law enforcement to address domestic threats posed by persons who were not 

the targets of open FBI investigations. This reliance on local law enforcement 

was apparent with respect to the collection and dissemination of intelligence as 

well. For example, during the Republican National Convention, the FBI did not 

deploy its own crisis management software (the ICON system) to manage threat 

and public safety information, but instead relied upon a comparable service 

maintained by the New York Police Department which connected law 

enforcement agencies throughout the state.28

Lastly, in the months leading up to the two conventions, DTOS identified 

threat information from ongoing investigations that was relevant to security at 

the conventions. For example, in July 2004 it sent a request to all field offices 

 

27 DTOS sent a memorandum in May 2004 to all field offices requesting the offices to 

forward intelligence “from sources with knowledge of planned criminal activity by individuals, 

domestic or international groups under preliminary inquiries or full investigations, as well as 

intelligence from any source indicative of unlawful activity or other acts of violence regarding” 

the 2004 NSSEs. 

28 By contrast, the FBI’s Boston Division deployed computer software that facilitated 

the collection and dissemination of convention security information. The FBI’s New York Field 

Division was prepared to deploy the ICON system to manage the flow of information in the 

event of a terrorist attack or large scale crisis. 

16
seeking information concerning the movements of subjects of terrorism 

investigations known to be traveling to Boston or New York during the period of 

the conventions. The FBI also issued written threat assessments that 

evaluated potential threats to the conventions and shared intelligence with 

other law enforcement agencies. 

IV. FBI INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RELATED TO POTENTIAL 

PROTESTERS AT THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN 

NATIONAL CONVENTIONS 

In this section, we describe the results of our review of the FBI’s 

investigative activity related to potential protesters at the Democratic and 

Republican national conventions. Our review determined that in addition to 

the preparatory actions described above, the FBI carried out various domestic 

terrorism-related investigative activities in advance of and during the 

conventions that concerned potential violent convention protesters, including 

name searches in FBI databases, mail covers, interviews, and physical 

surveillance. We concluded that in each instance the FBI conducted this 

activity for legitimate law enforcement purposes pursuant to the General 

Crimes Guidelines which authorize the checking out of leads and the opening 

of preliminary inquiries and full investigations. We identified no investigations 

initiated based upon authorities contained in classified PDDs or other legal 

sources.29 

We found that the FBI’s investigative activities designed to address 

domestic terrorism threats to the conventions focused on 17 distinct protesterrelated threats, 14 of which resulted in interviews of 1 or more individuals. 

The nature of these threats varied. For example, in four cases the FBI received 

information indicating that persons who intended to demonstrate in Boston or 

New York also were planning on bombing sites at the conventions. The FBI 

was also made aware that a group with an extensive criminal history was 

known to be planning violent confrontations with police in one of the 

convention cities. In another matter, a convicted domestic terrorist was 

believed to be attempting to obtain a dangerous chemical, potentially for use 

against the police. 

The FBI’s response to the threat information it obtained prior to and 

during the conventions varied depending on the specificity and seriousness of 

 

29 We exclude from this universe the FBI’s routine tapping of existing sources to 

identify possible threats. The FBI told the OIG that it did not open any new confidential 

informants solely in connection with addressing threats to the two conventions or otherwise in 

connection with convention preparations. 

17
the threat. Six of the threats led the FBI to open either a preliminary inquiry or 

full investigation, while in three instances the FBI opted to address threats 

through interviews conducted as part of the limited checking of leads. The 

remaining eight threats were addressed through investigative activity 

undertaken in ongoing investigations that were not initiated in connection with 

the 2004 conventions. 

With respect to interviews, we determined that the FBI identified 74 

persons and the residents of 3 addresses to contact who satisfied the following 

criteria: 1) they were likely convention demonstrators or, through affiliation 

with one or more organizations or persons, were individuals with access to 

information about potential protest activity at the conventions; and 2) they 

were persons whom the FBI reasonably believed had or might have knowledge 

about planned criminal acts at the conventions. The FBI also contacted and 

interviewed an additional eight individuals in an attempt to locate persons who 

satisfied the two criteria above. Of the individuals targeted for contact, the FBI 

was successful in locating 60 persons in 9 states, of whom 41 agreed to be 

interviewed. The following table presents the total numbers of interviews 

related to the 17 protester-related threats that the FBI investigated. 

18
Protester-Related Interviews Associated with the 

2004 Democratic and Republican National Conventions 

Threat No. 

No. of Persons 

Identified for 

Interviews 

No. of 

Persons 

Contacted 

No. of Persons 

Providing 

Information 

Interviews Conducted Pursuant to 

Preliminary Inquiries and Full Investigations 

(Threats 1-6) 

1 40 27 16 

Address 1 NA (6)* (6)* 

Address 2 NA 6 0 

Address 3 NA 0 NA 

Subtotal for Threat 1 40 33 16 

2 11 8 8 

3 NA 2 2 

4 1 1 1 

5 2 2 2 

6 6 4 4 

Subtotal for Inquiries 

and Investigations 60 50 33 

Interviews Conducted Pursuant to Leads 

Checking (Threats 7-9) 

7 4 4 4 

8 2 2 1 

9 1 1 1 

Subtotal for Leads Checking 7 7 6 

Interviews Conducted Pursuant to Terrorism 

Enterprise Investigations Not Associated 

With the Conventions (Threats 10-17) 

10-13 6 2 1 

14 NA NA NA 

15 NA NA NA 

16 NA NA NA 

17 1 1 1 

Subtotal for Other Investigations 7 3 2 

TOTAL 74 60 41 

TOTAL Less Interviews Conducted to Locate 

Persons With Knowledge of Potential 

Criminal Activity 

67 52 33 

*Six persons identified for interviews concerning Threat 1 were located at Address 1. To avoid 

double counting, we did not include these six persons in the number of individuals contacted 

or who provided information. 

19
In one instance that we discuss in more detail below, the FBI and the 

Department of Justice attempted to compel testimony of three witnesses 

through a grand jury. The FBI also conducted physical surveillance in eight 

cases where persons were expected to travel to the conventions and to 

participate in protest activity. The FBI informed the OIG that it did not initiate 

any undercover operations directed at the conventions or open new sources for 

the purpose of infiltrating convention protest groups. 

In a limited number of cases the FBI’s investigative work on matters not 

associated with the conventions generated convention-related criminal 

intelligence that did not result in the opening of an independent inquiry or 

investigation. An example of this kind of information is source reporting to the 

FBI regarding persons who were the subjects of ongoing FBI investigations and 

who intended to attend one or more of the conventions. 

The FBI told the OIG that it did not utilize its authority under Part VI.A.2 

of the General Crimes Guidelines to attend convention-related public events for 

the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activity. In both Boston and 

New York, the monitoring of crowd movements and demonstration activities at 

the conventions was conducted and managed by local law enforcement. 

However, the FBI had agents pre-positioned at both convention venues, such 

as hazardous materials response teams, to identify and respond to terrorist 

threats. We were told by the FBI that their purpose was not to monitor the 

exercise of First Amendment rights or to engage in activities that are the 

function of local law enforcement, such as crowd control and public safety. 

In the following sections, we describe in greater detail the FBI’s 

investigative activities related to potential convention protesters. For each 

threat we identify the level of investigative activity (such as checking leads or 

initiating a preliminary inquiry or full investigation) and the characteristics of 

the information that prompted the FBI to initiate the investigative actions.30 

We first describe convention-related threats that the FBI addressed in one of 

three ways: 1) through the opening of a new preliminary inquiry or full 

investigation; 2) through the limited checking of leads; or 3) through ongoing 

investigations not associated with the conventions. We then examine FBI 

investigative activities that generated convention-related criminal intelligence 

(not rising to the level of a threat) from ongoing investigations not associated 

with the conventions. 

 

30 In this report, because of sensitivity concerns we do not describe the sources and 

methods that the FBI utilized to identify the protester-related threats to the conventions. We 

also have limited the information we provide about the targets of the FBI’s investigations for 

privacy reasons and because certain of the investigations described in this Section are ongoing. 

We therefore present threat information generically (e.g. “Threat 1”) rather than identify the 

source of the threat or target by name. 

20
A. Convention-Related Threats Addressed Through the Opening 

of a Preliminary Inquiry or Full Investigation 

Of the 17 convention-related threats that the FBI investigated prior to or 

during the Democratic and Republican national political conventions, 6 

resulted in the opening of a preliminary inquiry or full investigation in 

accordance with the General Crimes Guidelines. In each of the cases below 

(Threats 1-6), the FBI received information indicating that violent criminal 

activity was being planned for one or both of the conventions. Of the 60 

protester interview-related contacts that the FBI initiated, 50 occurred in 

response to 1 of the 6 threats described below. 

 

1. Threat 1 

In June 2004, the FBI learned that a group was planning acts of violence 

at one or both of the political conventions (Threat 1). The FBI considered the 

information it received to be credible and the potential for harm serious. After 

consultations with local law enforcement, the FBI identified 40 persons and the 

residents of 3 addresses for interviews pertaining to this threat. The FBI 

eventually located and contacted 33 persons in 3 states, 17 of whom refused to 

answer questions from the agents, and 16 whom agreed to furnish information. 

Of all the protester-related interviews that the FBI conducted in advance of the 

conventions, more than one third were associated with Threat 1. As discussed 

below, the three primary targets of the FBI’s investigation later were 

subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury following their refusal to cooperate 

with the FBI. 

After the FBI became aware of Threat 1, the Domestic Terrorism 

Operations Unit (DTOU) at FBI Headquarters coordinated efforts to learn more 

details about the identities and intentions of the individuals believed to be 

associated with the threat. Various conference calls and meetings were held 

between FBI Headquarters and field offices to devise a strategy to obtain more 

information. In July 2004, an FBI field office initiated a full investigation. In 

an attempt to identify the scope of the planning, the FBI obtained subpoenas 

for certain Internet subscriber account information that the FBI believed could 

contain information about the threat. The decision to initiate interviews was 

made by the leadership of DTOU in consultation with management of the FBI’s 

Counterterrorism Division and FBI-OGC. Prior to conducting interviews, the 

FBI, at times in conjunction with the Department of Justice, considered and 

rejected the use of more intrusive investigative methods. 

 

According to the four FBI agents who were principally involved in 

investigating Threat 1, the persons who were identified for interviews either 

were believed to be involved in planning violent acts at the conventions, resided 

or associated with persons who were believed to be making such plans, or 

21
otherwise reasonably could be expected to be in a position to hear about the 

plans. The FBI documents we reviewed confirmed that the FBI agents assigned 

to this matter sought to interview only persons who had, or were believed to 

have had, information about threats of violence to the conventions. Several of 

the persons identified for interviews had criminal records associated with 

violent demonstrations, while others were known to be attempting to acquire 

firearms. Two persons identified and located for interviews were arrested for 

outstanding criminal warrants at the time they were interviewed. 

The FBI instructed its agents to ask the interviewees associated with 

Threat 1 three questions that focused exclusively on potential criminal activity. 

The memorandum to the field July 22, 2004, setting leads for the interviews 

instructed agents to ask the following three questions: 

1. Are you aware of any persons who are planning disruptive 

behavior, of a criminal nature, at the 

- Democratic National Convention 

- Republican National Convention 

- Presidential Debates 

- Elections 

- Other events? 

2. If yes – provide details. 

If no – Would you tell me if you were aware of any such 

plans? 

3. Are you aware that persons assisting others in planning or 

preparing for a criminal act may be charged with a crime? 

As its investigation progressed, the FBI learned that three persons were largely 

responsible for Threat 1. The FBI asked these individuals the questions above, 

but each declined to provide any information. 

Because the FBI considered the threats posed by the three individuals to 

be serious, the FBI initiated physical surveillance of the three and sought 

assistance from an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) to compel their 

testimony before a grand jury. One FBI agent told us that a conference call 

was held between DTOU and several FBI field offices to assess what to do given 

the threat and the targets’ refusal to talk to the FBI. The call took place at the 

end of the week preceding the Democratic National Convention, which started 

the week of July 26, 2004. 

The AUSA in the district which initiated the full investigation of this 

threat told the OIG that he thought it was his idea to bring the three 

individuals before a grand jury. The AUSA stated that the return date on the 

subpoenas for testimony was set for the earliest possible open appearance time 

22
before the grand jury, because time was of the essence. The AUSA also said 

that it was not his goal or that of the FBI to prevent the three from attending 

the Democratic National Convention by requiring their testimony before the 

grand jury. He said that the FBI and DOJ wanted to be able to assess the 

threat before it had an opportunity to develop at the convention. The 

subpoenas, along with target letters, were issued and served on the three 

individuals on Monday, July 26, the same date that the Democratic National 

Convention began. The subpoenas required the three to appear before the 

grand jury on Thursday, July 29 at 11:00 a.m. All three came to the grand 

jury and declined to testify citing their Fifth Amendment privilege against 

compelled self-incrimination. The FBI continued its surveillance until it was 

satisfied that the three were not traveling to Boston during the Democratic 

National Convention. 

Following this investigation, in anticipation of the Republican National 

Convention, the FBI initiated preliminary inquiries on four other persons who 

were believed to be familiar with the above-described plans to disrupt one or 

both conventions. One of these individuals was interviewed by the FBI. 

2. Threat 2 

The FBI received information indicating that a group of individuals 

planned to gather from around the country at several locations near a 

metropolitan area to plan activities in preparation for travel to one of the 

political conventions. The information also indicated that persons participating 

in these gatherings would be preparing to engage in criminal activities at the 

convention. The FBI earlier was made aware that one of the expected 

participants had made public statements to the effect that he intended to 

organize events to disrupt the convention, such as by harassing delegates, 

damaging property, and conducting cyber attacks. Based on this information, 

the FBI opened a preliminary inquiry. Agents interviewed the individual prior 

to the convention, and he stated that he did not intend to engage in activity 

other than peaceful demonstrations. 

The FBI conducted physical surveillance of the gathering sites and 

several locations which the participants were believed to frequent. As a result 

of investigative activity conducted during the gatherings, local law enforcement 

arrested three participants on various charges, including vandalism and theft 

of property from local retail establishments. Property stolen during the 

gatherings was recovered and returned to its owners. The FBI also became 

aware that one of the participants had acquired PVC pipe and a flammable 

liquid and had made statements that he intended to build a pipe bomb. That 

person was interviewed by the FBI and local law enforcement. 

23
3. Threat 3 

The FBI received information indicating that an individual with a lengthy 

arrest record for civil disobedience was planning to travel to one of the 

conventions. The FBI was also made aware that this individual had been 

contemplating committing a violent act to draw attention to a particular 

political cause. Based on this information, the FBI opened a preliminary 

inquiry. The FBI initiated physical surveillance of the individual, and agents 

and task force officers interviewed the individual and one of his colleagues in 

the convention city. 

4. Threat 4 

The FBI field office in one of the 2004 convention cities learned that an 

individual with a history of committing serious crimes, including acts of 

domestic terrorism, was meeting with persons who were believed to be 

planning for criminal activity at the convention. The FBI also received 

information that the individual was attempting to acquire a weapon for his “self 

defense” and to “safeguard” his associates. Based on this information, the FBI 

opened a preliminary inquiry. The local Joint Terrorism Task Force conducted 

surveillance of the individual, and task force officers interviewed him during 

the week of the convention. 

5. Threat 5 

The FBI received information about an individual with a mental illness 

who had told an acquaintance that he planned to protest at one of the 

conventions and expected in the near future to sustain life-threatening 

physical injuries. The individual had a history of participating in 

demonstrations across the United States and at one time was known to have 

made inquiries about the properties of an incendiary material. The FBI opened 

an investigation and interviewed the individual and a relative. 

6. Threat 6 

The FBI in one of the convention cities learned that a group of persons 

was attempting to violently disrupt the upcoming convention. This group was 

the subject of an ongoing domestic terrorism investigation. The FBI initiated 

physical surveillance and employed other investigative techniques targeted at 

the group during its investigation. As a result of this work, the FBI learned 

that an individual who associated with the group had made statements 

indicating an intention to carry out criminal acts at the convention. The FBI 

interviewed the individual prior to the convention. In addition, based on 

information provided by a local police department, the FBI directed agents to 

locate three persons whom the police believed could be preparing to carry out 

24
violent acts at the convention. The FBI visited the residence of two of the 

suspects but did not locate them there. 

7. OIG Analysis 

Each of the threats described above resulted in the FBI’s initiation of a 

preliminary inquiry or full investigation after determining that the information 

showed either the possibility of criminal activity at one or more of the 

conventions or reasonably indicated that a federal crime had been, was being, 

or would be committed. For each case, we reviewed the opening 

documentation that identified the basis for the inquiry or investigation and the 

information that the FBI relied upon to establish the necessary predication. 

Our review concluded that the information supporting the opening of these 

cases was particularized and appeared to be based on established or otherwise 

reliable sources. 

The most resource-intensive threat was Threat 1, which accounted for 

more than half of all the protester interview-related contacts the FBI conducted 

in advance of the conventions. Shortly after learning about this threat, the FBI 

started a full investigation under the General Crimes Guidelines. The basis for 

opening the investigation was information indicating that persons were 

planning acts of violence at one or more of the political conventions. We believe 

this information satisfied the “reasonable indication” standard of the 

Guidelines. The persons subsequently identified for interviews during the 

investigation were believed by the FBI to possibly have knowledge concerning 

the identified threat. According to the FBI, as documented in its files, the 

persons identified for interviews either were believed to be involved in planning 

violent acts at the conventions, residing or associated with persons who were 

believed to be making such plans, or otherwise reasonably could be expected to 

be in a position to hear about the plans. This last group of persons consisted 

of persons whom the FBI believed were acquainted with the targets of the 

investigation and would be likely to hear about any plans for violence either 

directly or indirectly through social contacts. In all, the FBI identified 40 

persons and the residents of 3 addresses for interviews, and eventually located 

and contacted 33 persons in 3 states. These interviews yielded information 

suggesting that further investigative activity was warranted. 

Likewise, we found no evidence indicating improper investigative activity 

arising from the FBI’s and the Department’s decision to subpoena the targets 

and compel their appearance before a grand jury the week of the Democratic 

convention. The AUSA assigned to the matter stated that the return date on 

the grand jury subpoenas was set for the earliest possible open appearance 

time before the grand jury after he learned that the targets would not cooperate 

with the FBI’s interviews. 

25
Threat 2 also involved multiple interviews, all of which were conducted 

pursuant to a preliminary inquiry opened under the General Crimes 

Guidelines. As with Threat 1, the FBI received information indicating that 

certain individuals might have been planning violent, criminal activity at one or 

both conventions. Interviews for Threats 3 through 5 were focused on three 

individuals on whom the FBI had opened two preliminary inquiries and one full 

investigation. In each case, the FBI obtained information that the individuals 

possibly were involved in preparing for violent, criminal activity at one of the 

conventions. Threat 6 involved a group that was the subject of a domestic 

terrorism investigation. Our review of the FBI’s records in this investigation 

revealed that one of the interviews conducted was of an associate of the group 

after the FBI learned that the person had made statements indicating an 

intention to commit criminal acts at one of the conventions. For Threats 2 

through 6 we determined that the FBI had information establishing a 

reasonable indication of criminal activity warranting the initiation of 

investigative activity under the General Crimes Guidelines. 

We also determined that the FBI employed physical surveillance in all 

but one of the cases described above. The documentation describing these 

surveillances indicated that they were related to the objectives of the 

investigations. 

B. Convention-Related Threats Addressed Through the Checking 

of Leads 

The following three threats (Threats 7-9) did not result in the opening of 

a preliminary inquiry or full investigation. In each matter the FBI responded to 

information it obtained by contacting the persons who were the primary 

subjects identified from the information. The limited checking of leads revealed 

that no further investigative activity was warranted with regard to threats 

directed at one of the 2004 conventions.31 Of the 60 domestic terrorismrelated contacts initiated in advance of or during the conventions, 7 were 

undertaken in connection with one of the 3 threats described below. 

 

31 With respect to leads that did not result in interviews, we also identified situations 

where field personnel determined from the checking of leads that the threat of criminal activity 

was not present and thereafter refrained from further investigative activity. For example, in 

one matter we found that field personnel contemplated conducting an interview of an 

individual because the FBI had received information that he was providing training to others to 

commit criminal acts at one of the conventions. After receiving additional information 

indicating that the individual was not providing this training, the field personnel decided not to 

proceed with an interview. The FBI stated in a memorandum November 8, 2004, that “[s]ince 

no evidence of potential criminal and/or violent activity was apparent, [the individual] was not 

interviewed.” 

26
1. Threat 7 

The FBI field office in one of the convention cities was contacted by the 

local U.S. Attorney’s Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council regarding the arrest by 

local law enforcement of three persons at a location away from the convention 

venue. According to the FBI, materials found on the individuals raised 

concerns with the arresting officers that the individuals might have been 

involved in planning acts of domestic terrorism at the convention. The FBI 

interviewed the individuals and an acquaintance who assisted them. Based on 

the results of the interviews, the FBI took no further action with respect to the 

possible threat against the convention. 

2. Threat 8 

An FBI field office obtained information indicating that representatives of 

an organization that was the subject of an ongoing FBI terrorism enterprise 

investigation would be attending one of the conventions. The organization was 

known to provide instruction in violent demonstration techniques and was 

believed to have trained an individual who resided in one of the convention 

cities in preparation for the convention. The FBI learned that the individual 

had a criminal arrest record resulting from a recent demonstration and was 

believed to be associating with an individual who, according to the FBI, was 

affiliated with domestic terrorist groups and had a long history of violent 

activity. FBI agents told the OIG that agents contacted the person because the 

person could have information about planning for criminal activity at one or 

more of the conventions, or be intending to participate in such activity. The 

FBI also wanted to determine if the person would share knowledge, which was 

believed to be extensive, about groups that were involved in significant violence 

at some of their demonstrations, and whose members were expected to attend 

the conventions. The person did not agree to be interviewed. The FBI also 

contacted and interviewed an acquaintance of that person to determine the 

circumstances surrounding the person’s prior criminal activity at a recent 

demonstration. The FBI took no further action on this lead. 

3. Threat 9 

The FBI was aware that a convicted felon with a lengthy arrest record 

that included crimes of violence had made public statements calling for 

criminal activity at one of the conventions. During the convention, the FBI 

obtained information indicating that the individual may have been near the site 

of the convention preparing to commit crimes. The FBI contacted the 

27
individual at his residence to confirm his location.32 The FBI took no further 

action on this lead. 

4. OIG Analysis 

The FBI addressed these three threats through the checking out of leads. 

We reviewed the information available to the FBI when it decided to interview 

the subjects and agree that the information pointed to possible criminal 

activity. Based on our review, we believe that the FBI’s actions in these 

matters were in conformity with the General Crimes Guidelines. 

C. Convention-Related Threats Addressed Through Investigations 

Not Associated with the Conventions 

Unlike matters that prompted the initiation of preliminary inquiries or 

full investigations focused on specific threats to the conventions, in several 

instances the FBI’s investigative efforts were conducted as part of ongoing 

investigations that were initiated prior to the time the FBI learned of possible 

links to the 2004 conventions. These account for eight of the threats that the 

FBI addressed prior to and during the conventions. 

1. Threats 10-13 

Threats 10 to 13 concerned potential threats posed by four violent 

groups. All four groups were the subjects of ongoing terrorism enterprise 

investigations. The FBI received information indicating that extremists related 

to the groups were planning to attend one of the conventions. Based on past 

actions of the groups, the FBI was concerned that their members would 

attempt to violently disrupt the convention. In light of the information it had 

received, the FBI in one of the convention cities directed agents to investigate 

whether local chapters of the four groups and their leaders posed a threat to 

the convention. Of the six persons identified for contact, the FBI located two 

prior to the convention, one of whom provided information while the other 

declined to be interviewed. All of the investigative activity related to these 

individuals was conducted pursuant to terrorism enterprise investigations that 

previously had been opened on the four groups. 

 

32 A preliminary inquiry was later opened on this individual concerning conduct the 

FBI believed could constitute solicitation to commit an act of violence in accordance with 

18 U.S.C. § 373. The basis for the inquiry was not related to the individual’s earlier potential 

appearance at one of the conventions. 

28
2. Threat 14 

The FBI was made aware that a group of individuals associated with an 

organization with an extensive criminal history was preparing to engage in 

violent confrontations with the police at one of the conventions. Agents from 

an FBI field office conducted physical surveillance of the individuals as part of 

its ongoing investigation of the group. 

3. Threat 15 

During its investigation of a group for possible violations of numerous 

federal criminal statutes, including manufacturing explosive material without a 

license and solicitation to commit a crime of violence, the FBI learned that one 

of the group’s members was traveling to a location near one of the convention 

sites. The FBI initiated physical surveillance of the individual as part of its 

ongoing investigation of the group. 

 

4. Threat 16 

The FBI learned that a convicted felon likely had been in possession of a 

firearm and was contacting persons who were either under investigation by the 

FBI for domestic terrorism offenses or had previously been convicted of crimes 

of violence. The FBI opened an investigation on the individual and 

subsequently learned that he attended an event where plans were discussed to 

violently disrupt one of the conventions. The FBI initiated physical surveillance 

of the individual and conducted other investigative activities. 

5. Threat 17 

The FBI was aware that an individual had made public statements 

calling for criminal activity at various public events. The individual had a 

lengthy arrest record and was believed to have formed an organization that 

supported the use of violence to achieve its goals. The FBI interviewed an 

acquaintance of the individual after opening a preliminary inquiry and asked 

whether he had left the area to attend one of the conventions. 

6. OIG Analysis 

The FBI addressed eight threats pursuant to open investigations that 

were not initiated in connection with the two 2004 political conventions. For 

each of these threats the FBI had information indicating either that criminal 

acts were being planned or were possible in light of the actions of the targets of 

the investigation. Of the eight cases, six were terrorism enterprise 

investigations (TEI) of groups that advocated violent tactics to advance 

particular political causes. The evidence indicates that these investigations 

were properly predicated and that the purpose of the FBI’s convention-related 

29
investigative activity was reasonably related to the goals of the underlying 

investigation. The investigative techniques employed by the FBI to address the 

threats posed to the conventions were undertaken in a manner consistent with 

the requirements of the General Crimes Guidelines. The remaining threats 

involved the activities of two convicted felons, and the FBI’s investigative 

activity of them also fit within the scope of the underlying investigations and 

the requirements of the General Crimes Guidelines. 

D. Convention-Related Criminal Intelligence Generated from 

Investigations Not Associated with the Conventions 

Our review of the FBI’s investigative work in preparation for the 

Democratic and Republican national political conventions also identified five 

terrorism enterprise investigations not associated with the conventions that 

generated convention-related criminal intelligence not warranting the opening 

of a separate inquiry or investigation. The focus of much of this intelligence 

was on the identities of persons who were subjects of, or referenced in, ongoing 

FBI investigations who were planning to attend the conventions. None of these 

matters resulted in interviews or physical surveillance by FBI agents of persons 

intending to demonstrate at the conventions. 

Two other terrorism enterprise investigations generated intelligence that 

contributed to the opening of a preliminary inquiry and a full investigation 

respectively. These matters both concerned threats to the conventions 

described in Section IV.A above and involved interviews and physical 

surveillance of potential convention protesters.33 

For all seven terrorism enterprise investigations, we identified no 

investigative technique that generated convention-related criminal intelligence 

that was undertaken in violation of the applicable Attorney General Guidelines. 

E. Alleged Pretext Interviews of Potential Convention Protesters 

 

Another aspect of the FBI’s investigative activities that generated 

controversy was the alleged use of “pretext interviews” in the period 

immediately preceding the Democratic National Convention. Citing documents 

released in civil litigation, a news article reported in May 2005 that members of 

“leftist protest groups” had been subjected to “pretext interviews” by the FBI 

before the two 2004 national conventions.34 

 

(continued) 

33 There were 24 protester-related interviews conducted in these 2 domestic terrorism 

matters. 

34 Dan Eggan, Protesters Subject to ‘Pretext Interviews,’ Washington Post, May 18, 2005. 

As reported in the article, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, the FBI’s antiterrorism task forces were “collecting information about peaceful protestors and dissenters and 

30
The term “pretext” in common parlance can have a pejorative 

connotation, and several individuals contacted for interviews by the FBI were 

quoted in news articles questioning whether the FBI had singled them out for 

an interview for improper purposes, such as to prevent them from traveling to 

the conventions to protest peacefully or to exercise other protected First 

Amendment rights. 

In response to these concerns, the FBI stated: 

The interviews reflected in these isolated documents were based on 

a specific and credible threat received by the FBI regarding 

potential violent and criminal activity that could have caused death 

or serious bodily injury and was to occur during the Democratic 

National Convention. . . . It is the FBI’s top priority to prevent any 

act of terrorism, which requires special agents of the FBI to 

thoroughly investigative every credible threat received.35

The term “pretext interview” is not defined in the FBI’s current Manual of 

Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) or in any recent guidance 

issued by the FBI-OGC. However, guidance on file with FBI-OGC from 1980 

states that “[a] pretext interview is a legal and proper investigative technique 

used when it is necessary to accomplish an investigative end without disclosing 

the FBI’s interest and the reasons for the inquiry.”36 The current version of the 

MIOG references the acceptable use of “pretext interviews” in several contexts, 

including domestic terrorism cases.37 

 Our review examined several documents that referred to the use of a 

“pretext” when the FBI contacted individuals to be interviewed in connection 

with the 2004 conventions. The first, an EC dated July 22, 2004, from the 

St. Louis field office, set leads for interviews, stating: 

Additional Anarchist affiliated persons would be interviewed in 

Missouri, Kansas, and Colorado. The pretext of the interview will 

be to gain general information concerning possible criminal activity 

 

targeting people for attention on the basis of constitutionally protected association and 

advocacy.” Id. 

35 Id. 

36 FBI-OGC Guidance, dated April 9, 1980. 

37 See §§ 58-5(3)(Predication); 194-4(3)(Predication); and 266-1(4)(c)(Acts of Terrorism – 

Domestic Terrorists). Pretext interviews are to be distinguished from interviews in which 

someone falsely claims to be an officer or employee of a department or agency of the United 

States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912. FBI-OGC Guidance, dated April 9, 1980. 

31
at the Democratic National Convention, Republican National 

Convention, Presidential debates, and the election. The purpose of 

the interviews will be to increase intelligence in this area and 

discourage the interviewees from traveling to any of the above to 

criminally disrupt the event. 

The second reference to the term “pretext” we found was in a 

memorandum responding to the St. Louis EC. In its August 2, 2004, response, 

the Denver field office explained that it had covered several leads and repeated 

the St. Louis EC’s characterization that the interviews requested by the 

St. Louis field office were “pretext interviews:” “Referenced EC set several leads 

for the Denver Division to conduct pretext interviews to gain general 

information concerning possible criminal activity at the upcoming political 

conventions and presidential elections.” 

Following the Republican National Convention and press coverage 

concerning the FBI’s interviews of potential convention protesters, FBI-OGC 

prepared an analysis in September 2004 related to the pretext interview 

issue.38 The FBI-OGC memorandum noted that the leads set by the St. Louis 

field office for “pretext” interviews had three objectives: to seek intelligence 

about criminal activity, to prevent individuals from carrying out their plans to 

commit criminal acts at the Democratic National Convention, and to protect 

FBI sources and methods. The memorandum stated: 

The interviews conducted in this case served several purposes. In 

the referenced [July 22, 2004] St. Louis EC, the interviews are 

described as “pretext” interviews, suggesting that they were 

conducted for purposes other than to seek the requested 

information. Even though pretext interviews are an authorized 

technique and would have been justified for the second and third 

reasons stated [above], it appears that they were only pretext in 

part. The interviews did seek valuable information from persons 

who were reasonably believed to possess it. Therefore, although 

they served an ulterior purpose as well, they were not purely 

pretextual in nature. 

We determined that the agents conducting the interviews in response to 

the St. Louis lead did not use a false identity or false pretense to hide the fact 

that they were seeking convention-related threat information. The FBI Special 

Agent who drafted the July 22, 2004, St. Louis EC told the OIG that the “main 

objective” of the interviews was to gather information about a potential threat 

 

38 FBI-OGC memorandum entitled Investigative Law Unit - Constitutional Rights Control 

File, dated September 16, 2004. 

32
to the conventions. The EC’s explanation that “the pretext of the interview will 

be to gain general information concerning possible criminal activity at the 

[conventions]” therefore is not accurate because the gathering of such 

information was the primary purpose of the interviews, not a “pretext.” The 

agent told the OIG that, in hindsight, his use of the word “pretext” in the 

St. Louis EC was a “poor choice of words” and was not accurate. In his view, a 

pretext interview is one in which the FBI does not reveal the “real reason for 

the interview,” and this was not the case with respect to the reported 

interviews. Rather, the leads that he set required agents to pose specific 

questions that revealed that the interviews were being conducted to ask 

specific questions in order to collect information about possible criminal or 

terrorist activity at the conventions. 

The Special Agent who drafted the St. Louis EC stated, however, that the 

interviews could be understood to be a “pretext” since the questions that the 

agents posed did not reveal the extent of the FBI’s knowledge of the threats 

under investigation or the sources of their information, but instead were cast 

as general questions about potential criminal activity. Both the St. Louis lead 

and the FBI-OGC memorandum describe how the requested interviews could 

serve to protect FBI sources and methods. The St. Louis Special Agent stated 

that in his view the “pretext” of the requested interviews was to conceal how 

the FBI was acquiring intelligence about a threat to the convention. This 

interpretation was shared by the author of the September 2004 FBI-OGC 

memorandum, who explained in the memorandum that the interviews were 

“pretext in part” because agents were justified in relying upon a pretext 

(pretending not to know specific details about the potential threats) in order to 

conceal the sources and methods that prompted them to conduct the 

interviews. 

FBI documentation of the interviews set by the St. Louis lead also used 

the term “pretext” in referencing a possible consequence of the planned 

interviews: to deter people who may have been planning violent or other 

criminal activity from carrying out criminal acts. This interest also was not 

explicitly disclosed by the FBI when interviewing people before the Democratic 

National Convention in response to the St. Louis lead. However, the FBI-OGC 

memorandum recognized the FBI’s interest in deterring criminal activity as 

justification for use of a “pretext” in the interviews. 

Although the interviews may have resulted in preventing 

individuals from traveling to the DNC, the interviews were not 

conducted for the purpose of preventing the exercise of protected 

First Amendment activity, but rather, were focused on the 

prevention of criminal activity.

The Special Agent who drafted the St Louis EC similarly told us that a benefit 

of interviewing persons who planned on committing criminal acts at the 

33
Democratic convention “was the hope that . . . if they are confronted about it 

[i.e., the criminal activities], they wouldn’t do it.” 

What generated controversy regarding the FBI’s reliance on “pretext 

interviews” in advance of the political conventions was the concern that agents 

were illegitimately conducting interviews in order to chill potential protesters 

from exercising their protected First Amendment rights. Based on our review, 

we do not believe that the interviews conducted by the FBI in response to the 

St. Louis EC were “pretext interviews,” either as defined to us by FBI-OGC or 

as understood colloquially to mean the improper use of interviews to chill 

exercise of the interviewees’ First Amendment rights. FBI agents did not use 

false identities during the interviews and made no attempt to conceal the fact 

that they were seeking information about possible criminal or terrorist 

activities at the conventions. In addition, they interviewed persons they had 

reason to believe possessed relevant information about potential criminal or 

terrorist activity. 

Our review determined that the interviews were conducted because the 

FBI was addressing what it believed was a serious threat of violence, and that 

but for that credible threat the interviewees would not have been approached 

by the FBI. We also found no evidence that the FBI was attempting by these 

interviews to prevent anyone from traveling to the conventions to exercise 

protected First Amendment rights. As explained elsewhere in this report, the 

FBI’s investigative activities, including these interviews, were focused on the 

prevention of criminal and terrorist acts at the two conventions. 

 That said, the various references we identified in FBI documents to 

“pretext interviews” were confusing and inconsistent and, given the pejorative 

connotation of the term, understandably generated concern about whether the 

FBI had impermissibly violated First Amendment rights. In a vacuum, without 

understanding that agents were attempting to conceal the sources and 

methods it used to obtain this threat information, the references could be 

misconstrued to refer to the fabrication of a reason to approach the 

interviewees. However, based on our interviews and examination of FBI 

documents, we concluded that the reference to “pretext” referred to the FBI’s 

efforts to protect the way it was collecting intelligence about a particular 

convention threat in order to prevent criminal or terrorist acts at the 

conventions. In sum, we concluded that these interviews were not conducted 

for any improper purpose. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Our review examined the FBI’s investigative activity leading up to and 

during the 2004 Democratic and Republican national political conventions, 

including interviews, physical surveillance, and other investigative techniques. 

34
The evidence indicated that the FBI engaged in these investigative activities 

because the threat of criminal activity existed. We found that the FBI’s 

conduct was consistent with the applicable Attorney General Guidelines. We 

also found no evidence that the FBI’s actions were undertaken for the purpose 

of discouraging the exercise of First Amendment rights. We concluded that all 

of the interviews we reviewed were conducted for legitimate law enforcement 

purposes. 

Nearly all of the FBI’s protester-related investigative activity was devoted 

to addressing 17 distinct threats to the conventions. The nature of these 

threats was diverse, though all involved the potential for violence, including 

potential bombings. In response to six of the threats, the FBI opened a 

preliminary inquiry or full investigation after determining that the information 

presented showed either the possibility of criminal activity at the conventions 

or reasonably indicated that a federal crime had been, was being, or would be 

committed. 

 The FBI addressed eight other threats pursuant to open investigations 

that were not initiated in connection with the political conventions. For each 

convention-related threat in this category, the FBI had information indicating 

either that criminal acts were being planned, or were possible, if not likely, in 

light of the actions of the targets of the investigation. 

The FBI addressed three threats through the checking of leads that 

resulted in interviews. Our review found no cases where the FBI improperly 

continued investigative activity after determining that the threat of violent, 

criminal activity was absent or unsubstantiated. 

In addition to investigative activity directed to the 17 threats described 

above, our review of the FBI’s preparations for the Democratic and Republican 

national political conventions identified 7 terrorism enterprise investigations 

(TEIs) not initiated in connection with the conventions that generated 

convention-related criminal intelligence. The investigative techniques utilized 

to obtain this intelligence appeared to be a logical outgrowth of the underlying 

investigation. We also found no indication that the intelligence was collected in 

a manner inconsistent with applicable DOJ guidelines and policies. 

We were also informed by the FBI that it did not rely upon its 

counterterrorism authorities in Part VI.A.2 of the General Crimes Guidelines to 

visit public places and attend public events at the conventions for the purpose 

of detecting or preventing terrorist activities. Officials in the FBI’s New York 

and Boston field offices told us that monitoring of crowd movements and 

demonstration activities at the conventions was managed by local law 

enforcement. 

35
In sum, our review did not substantiate the allegations that the FBI 

improperly targeted protesters for interviews in an effort to chill the exercise of 

their First Amendment rights at the 2004 Democratic and Republican national 

political conventions. We concluded that the FBI’s interviews of potential 

convention protesters and its related investigative activities were initiated and 

conducted for legitimate law enforcement purposes and did not violate 

applicable Attorney General Guidelines. 

36