Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-506 | August 20, 2018 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Alexander L. Hoover

Law Office of Christopher G. Walter, 

P.C.

Nappanee, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General 

Chandra K. Hein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Maeson Lee Coffin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 20, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-506

Appeal from the Marshall Superior 

Court

The Honorable Robert O. Bowen, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

50D01-1611-MR-1

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-506 | August 20, 2018 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] Maeson Lee Coffin pled guilty via open plea agreement to level 4 felony 

burglary, level 6 felony auto theft, and level 6 felony theft. The trial court 

sentenced him to a fifteen-year aggregate term. Coffin now appeals his 

sentence, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing

consecutive sentences. He also asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light 

of the nature of his offenses and his character. Finding that Coffin has failed to 

establish an abuse of discretion and has failed to meet his burden of 

demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2016, Coffin was renting a small residence from seventy-nine-year-old 

Richard “Paul” Costello. The residence was situated on a large parcel of land, 

where Costello maintained his own residence and some outbuildings. In 

October 2016, Coffin allowed Gauvin Monaghan to reside with him at his 

rental house. One evening in late October, Monaghan drove Coffin to 

Costello’s residence, where Costello’s brutally beaten and lifeless body lay on 

the ground. Monaghan and Coffin stole Costello’s cell phone and other items 

from his person. Monaghan stated that they needed to move Costello’s body, 

so they chained and dragged the body to a remote outbuilding on the property,

put a plastic barrel over part of the body, and attempted to cover the remainder 

with sheet metal. The two entered Costello’s home and garage and stole several 

items, including power tools and a large TV. They put the contraband in 

Costello’s vehicle and drove to South Bend, where Monaghan’s father lived. 
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They pawned the items they had stolen and drove Costello’s vehicle to New 

York, where Monaghan’s mother lived. 

[3] Costello’s relatives became concerned because they had not heard from him for 

a couple weeks. On November 5, 2016, his brother and sister-in-law went to his 

property, searched the buildings, and discovered Costello’s decayed and 

concealed body outside one of the outbuildings. They notified the county 

sheriff’s department concerning the suspicious circumstances surrounding their 

discovery. The state police were brought in to assist with processing the crime 

scene, and the death was ruled a homicide due to blunt force trauma to the 

head. Among the missing items were Costello’s vehicle and cell phone. 

Through provider records, the cell phone was traced to a location in New York. 

[4] Late that night, after seeing a news report regarding Costello’s death, 

Monaghan’s girlfriend M.P. and her mother went to the police station to 

provide information concerning Monaghan’s whereabouts and possession of 

the stolen vehicle. M.P. reported that she had been present during an incident 

at Coffin’s rental house on October 27, 2016, where Costello had come to 

collect unpaid rent from Coffin and Monaghan, an argument had ensued, and

Monaghan had commented that he should kill Costello and steal his vehicle. 

M.P.’s mother told police that she had contacted Monaghan’s mother, who 

confirmed that Monaghan and Coffin were currently at her New York 

residence and verified the color, make, and model of the vehicle they had 

driven there (an exact match with Costello’s vehicle).
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[5] On November 10, 2016, the State charged Coffin with murder and level 6 

felony auto theft. On December 16, 2016, the State amended the information 

charging Coffin with conspiracy to commit murder, murder, level 4 felony 

burglary, level 6 felony auto theft, and level 6 felony theft. Coffin pled not 

guilty, and a jury trial was scheduled. On December 21, 2017, Coffin entered

into an open plea agreement in which he pled guilty to burglary, auto theft, and 

theft, and the State dismissed the murder and conspiracy counts. 

[6] During sentencing, the trial court heard victim impact testimony from several of 

Costello’s relatives as well as character testimony from Coffin’s relatives. The 

court identified as aggravating factors Coffin’s juvenile record, which includes 

true findings for theft and burglary, his violation of a relationship of trust with 

the victim, his conduct in fleeing the jurisdiction after he committed his 

offenses, and his assistance in covering up a murder crime scene. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 142. The court identified Coffin’s guilty plea as the sole 

mitigating factor and sentenced Coffin to consecutive terms of twelve years for 

burglary, one and a half years for auto theft, and one and a half years for theft. 

Coffin appeals his sentence. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court acted within its discretion in 

imposing consecutive sentences.

[7] Coffin asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 

sentences because it “never made any specific finding that the aggravators 
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outweighed the mitigators.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. The trial court’s written 

sentencing order does make such a finding. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 143. 

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.1

Section 2 – Coffin has failed to meet his burden of 

demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of his offenses and his character.

[8] Coffin asks that we review and revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B), which states that we “may revise a sentence authorized by 

statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [this] Court finds 

that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender.” When a defendant requests appellate review and 

revision of his sentence, we have the power to affirm or reduce the sentence. 

Akard v. State, 937 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind. 2010). In conducting our review, our 

principal role is to leaven the outliers, focusing on the length of the aggregate 

sentence and how it is to be served. Bess v. State, 58 N.E.3d 174, 175 (Ind. 

2016); Foutch v. State, 53 N.E.3d 577, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This allows for 

consideration of all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court 

in sentencing, i.e., whether it consists of executed time, probation, suspension, 

home detention, or placement in community corrections, and whether the 

sentences run concurrently or consecutively. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 

 

1

 In arguing that the trial court was required to make such a finding, Coffin’s reliance on authority predating 

our supreme court’s opinion in Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 

218, is questionable at best.
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1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). We do “not look to see whether the defendant’s 

sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, 

the test is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Foutch, 53 N.E.3d at 581 

(quoting Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied 

(2014)). The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his 

sentence meets the inappropriateness standard. Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 

1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016).

[9] In considering the nature of Coffin’s offenses, “the advisory sentence is the 

starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence.” Green v. 

State, 65 N.E.3d 620, 637-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017). When 

determining the appropriateness of a sentence that deviates from an advisory 

sentence, we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about 

the offense as committed by the defendant that “makes it different from the 

typical offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory 

sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

[10] Coffin pled guilty to one level 4 felony and two level 6 felonies. A level 4 felony 

carries a sentencing range of two to twelve years with an advisory term of six 

years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. The statutory range for a level 6 felony is six 

months to two and one-half years, with an advisory term of one year. Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Coffin’s aggregate fifteen-year term comprises twelve 

years for the level 4 felony, with consecutive one and a half-year terms on each 

of the two level 6 felonies.
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[11] The circumstances surrounding Coffin’s offenses are far more egregious than 

those typically involved when a person commits burglary, auto theft, and theft,

offenses often involving no physical harm to or contact with a victim. Here, 

Coffin assisted Monaghan in chaining and dragging Costello’s newly murdered 

body to a remote location on Costello’s property and hiding it in a barrel and 

under some sheet metal to avoid detection. The two young men then broke and 

entered Costello’s residence to procure items for their getaway. They took 

several items from the house, stole Costello’s vehicle, and fled for New York, 

pawning whatever they could in exchange for money to facilitate their flight. 

Coffin did not merely steal an automobile and personal property from a 

person’s residence; rather, he aided in covering up a brutal murder and then 

facilitated the perpetrator’s escape. The nature of Coffin’s offenses does not 

merit a reduction in his fifteen-year sentence. 

[12] Likewise, Coffin’s character does not militate toward a shorter sentence. We 

conduct our review of his character by engaging in a broad consideration of his 

qualities. Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other 

grounds on reh’g, 11 N.E.3d 571. Coffin began illegally consuming alcohol and 

marijuana at age fifteen. That same year, he had a juvenile delinquency true 

finding for acts amounting to class D felony theft if committed by an adult. His 

probation was revoked when, at age sixteen, he committed acts resulting in six 

true findings – two for acts amounting to class C felony burglary, two for acts 

amounting to class D felony theft, and two for acts amounting to class A 

misdemeanor criminal mischief if committed by an adult. He has no prior 
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record as an adult, as he was only eighteen at the time he committed his current 

offenses. 

[13] With respect to Coffin’s relationship with the victim, we note that Costello was 

Coffin’s landlord and friend who encouraged him and demonstrated patience 

with him concerning rent payments. During sentencing, Coffin acknowledged

Costello’s positive influence on him, stating, “Paul wanted me to better myself 

by following my dreams.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. In contrast, he described

Monaghan as someone he did not know well and had known only for a few 

weeks. Yet, he showed callous disregard for his friend and mentor to help a 

purportedly casual acquaintance cover up a heinous crime and then fled the 

state with the acquaintance while his friend’s body lay decaying and 

undetected. He attributed his actions to fear of Monaghan but admitted that at 

the time of the offenses and in the days before his arrest, “I had plenty of 

opportunities to flee and call the police, but I didn’t.” Id. at 19. 

[14] Coffin asks that we consider his remorse as indicative of his upstanding 

character. Trial courts are uniquely situated to observe a defendant and can 

best determine whether his remorse is genuine. Phelps v. State, 969 N.E.2d 

1009, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. During sentencing Coffin

testified, in reflecting on his actions, “I mentally beat myself up every 

morning.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. Testimonials from his relatives and friends urged 

forgiveness and a second chance. Several of Costello’s relatives submitted 

victim impact letters and testimony during sentencing, many questioning the 

authenticity of Coffin’s remorse and each requesting that Coffin be given the 
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maximum sentence. For example, Costello’s youngest brother testified 

concerning Coffin’s “callous and uncaring” conduct in choosing not to alert 

authorities so that Costello’s body could be found. Id. at 12. Instead, Coffin 

“ransack[ed] and pillag[ed]” Costello’s property, left his body to “rot,” drove to 

New York, and “partied for days until [he was] caught.” Id. at 12-13.

[15] Coffin also asserts that his decision to plead guilty reflects his willingness to 

take responsibility for his actions. The trial court designated his guilty plea as 

the sole mitigating factor in making its sentencing decision. However, we note 

that Coffin initially pled not guilty, sought and was granted a continuance, and 

had his case set for jury trial. Over one year elapsed between the time Coffin 

was charged and the date he decided to plead guilty. Even then, he received a 

substantial benefit in the form of the dismissal of the murder and conspiracy 

charges. The notion that sparing Costello’s family the trauma of a trial 

demonstrates Coffin’s good character rings hollow in the face of Coffin’s abject

disregard for Costello’s frantic family members after he actively concealed and 

left Costello’s body to decompose for over a week after the murder.

[16] In sum, Coffin has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his sentence 

is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

[17] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.