1Ms. Sharkley’s first name is variously spelled in the record as “Valisa” and “Vilisa.” Because the spelling

in the indictment is “Vilisa Sharkley,” that spelling will be used in this opinion.

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 19, 2002 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES ALFRED CAREY

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sumner County

No. 966-1999, 968-1999, 4-2000 Jane Wheatcraft, Judge

No. M2001-02003-CCA-R3-CD - Filed July 31, 2002

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II

controlled substance, and to three counts of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced the

Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years incarceration for the drug conviction and to

eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions. The trial court ordered that

the sentences be served concurrently, but consecutive to a prior sentence. The Defendant now

appeals, arguing that he was improperly sentenced. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERTW.WEDEMEYER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID G.HAYES and ALAN

E. GLENN, JJ., joined.

Randy P. Lucas, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the Appellant, James Alfred Carey.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General; Jennifer L. Bledsoe, Assistant AttorneyGeneral;Lawrence Ray

Whitley, District Attorney General; and Dee David Gay, Assistant District Attorney General, for the

Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. FACTS

In December 1999, the Sumner County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, James Alfred

Carey, for one count of selling cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in an amount more than

0.5 grams; for one count of domestic assault against Vilisa Sharkley;1 and for one count of attempted

first degree murder against Satonya Fitts. In January 2000, the Sumner County Grand Jury indicted
-2-

the Defendant for one count of assault against Kiley Bittis. On March 15, 2001, the Defendant pled

guilty to the reduced offense of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. On May 4, 2001, pursuant

to a plea agreement, the Defendant entered pleas of guilty to three domestic assault charges, one of

which was a reduction of the attempted first degree murder charge involving victim, Satonya Fitts.

On June 12, 2001, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing to determine the length and

manner of service of the Defendant’s sentences. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

determined that the Defendant was a multiple offender, qualified for a sentencing range of six to ten

years for the felony cocaine sale. The court found no mitigating factors and applied three

enhancement factors. The court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the Defendant serve

ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony sale of cocaine under 0.5 grams.

The court further ordered that the Defendant serve eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of

the three misdemeanor assault charges. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served

concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of

Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior felony sentence. This appeal ensued.

The facts underlying the Defendant’s convictions, as set forth in the indictments and from

evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, are as follows: On July 9, 1999, the Defendant sold

crack cocaine to an undercover agent in Gallatin, Tennessee. Tennessee Bureau of Investigation

laboratory tests revealed the amount of cocaine to be under 0.5 grams. On June 5, 1999, the

Defendant assaulted Vilisa Sharkley by holding her down by the face, choking her, beating her about

the head, and pulling her hair out during an argument concerning telephone numbers stored in her

pager. On June 5, 1999, the Defendant assaulted sixteen-year-old Satonya Fitts. Fitts was eight

months pregnant with the Defendant’s unborn child at the time. On August 31, 1999, the Defendant

assaulted Kiley Bittis by picking her up and dropping or throwing her in a ditch. 

The evidence presented at the sentencing hearing was as follows: Sergeant William Sorrells

of the Gallatin Police Department testified that he arrested the Defendant on August 31, 1999. He

testified that Kiley Bittis approached him and stated that she and the Defendant had formerly been

involved in a romantic relationship, but that she had ended their relationship about six months

before. According to Sorrells, Bittis also told him that the Defendant had tried to stop her while she

was walking on Pemberton Circle, but Bittis did not stop because she was afraid of the Defendant.

Sorrells further testified that, according to Bittis, the Defendant became angry when she would not

stop, called her names, picked her up over his head, and threw her into a ditch. Bittis also stated to

Sorrells that as she was trying to get out of the ditch, the Defendant hit her in the back of the head

with his fist. Sorrells testified that he observed various injuries on Bittis, including scrapes on her

elbows, a large abrasion on her back, and a large knot on the back of her head. Sorrells testified that

Bittis was nineteen years old at the time. Sorrells testified that he spoke with a witness, Mahogany

Talley, who was walking with Bittis at the time and who corroborated Bittis’ story. 

Officer Gail Humes of the Gallatin Police Department testified that on June 5, 1999, she

obtained two warrants against the Defendant. She testified that she and several other officers

responded to a “shots-fired call” in the area of Alexander Court and Lackey Circle at approximately
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7:29 p.m. There they encountered sixteen-year-old Satonya Fitts along with a number of other

people. Fitts, who appeared distressed, told them that she was pregnant with the Defendant’s unborn

child and that approximately five minutes prior to the officers’ arrival, she and the Defendant had

a verbal altercation. She stated that she had asked the Defendant to leave because she was afraid of

him and because she had heard that he had previously beaten another girlfriend earlier. Humes

testified that Fitts then stated that the Defendant told her that he “wasn’t going to let anyone run his

life,” whereupon she asked him again to leave. At that point, according to Fitts’ report to Humes

at the scene, the Defendant, who was about fifteen feet away, pulled a chrome handgun from his

waistband, pointed it at Fitts and fired one shot directly at her before walking away and getting into

a vehicle of unknown make and model. Humes testified that a .22-caliber shell casing was recovered

near the area where Fitts said the Defendant had been standing. 

The State introduced an affidavit sworn out at the office of the Defendant’s attorney by Fitts

subsequent to the night of the offense. In the affidavit, Fitts swore that the Defendant never fired

a weapon at her, that she never saw a weapon, and that she never told the police that the Defendant

had fired a weapon at her. Humes acknowledged that no laboratory analysis had been performed on

the shell casing to determine from what weapon it was fired, nor was it tested for fingerprints.

Humes further testified that she was aware of Fitts’ affidavit and that no .22-caliber weapon

consistent with the facts as alleged originally by Fitts was, at any time, recovered from the

Defendant. Humes, however, reaffirmed her testimony that Fitts did tell her that the Defendant had

a weapon and that he fired it at her. 

Officer Humes also testified about a separate incident on the same day involving the

Defendant. When Humes returned to the Gallatin Police Department to obtain warrants for the

assault against Fitts, another victim, Vilisa Sharkley, came to the Police Department. Sharkley told

Humes that the Defendant had assaulted her at the residence of Patrina Franklin on Lackey Circle.

Sharkley stated that the Defendant arrived at the location, demanded her pager, and started looking

through the numbers. According to Sharkley, the Defendant then “head-butted” her and told one of

the witnesses to leave and come back in about ten minutes so that he could beat Sharkley. Sharkley

reported that the Defendant then choked her, beat her about the head, pulled out her hair, and left.

The officer testified that she observed a mark on the victim’s forehead and “obvious choke marks

around her neck.” Humes testified that although it is customary to photograph victims who display

visible signs of violence, no photographs were taken in this case. Humes explained that such marks

do not show up well in photographs of someone who has dark skin. She also testified that the victim

declined Humes’ suggestion that she obtain medical treatment. 

Officer Humes testified that the Defendant was not arrested that evening. Humes noted that

an arrest report stated that the Defendant was arrested on the Sharkley charges in October 1999 and

that she was not the arresting officer. Humes testified that she had an encounter with the Defendant

on a prior occasion, in 1998 or early 1999, when she witnessed the Defendant in possession of a

stolen weapon. Humes also related knowledge of an occasion when the Defendant was taken into

custody as he fled from a residence in which a weapon was found immediately afterward. She

recalled another incident where the Defendant had shot a victim in the leg on Blakemore Street, and
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she stated that the Defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault. Humes testified that she was

not personally involved in the latter two incidents, but relied on information received from others.

Following Humes’ testimony, the State introduced into evidence certified copies of the Defendant’s

prior convictions for aggravated assault and for possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent

to sell.

Michelle Thurman, the Defendant’s adoptive mother, testified that she had known and cared

for the Defendant since he was three months old. She testified that since the Defendant had been in

jail, he seemed like a different person because he had calmed down a lot and “talked better.”

Thurman also testified that she was aware that the Defendant was working on his G.E.D. She

believed he could turn his life around. Thurman stated she wanted the Defendant to come home.

Helen Morehead, the Defendant’s legal grandmother who raised him, expressed her hope that the

Defendant would be able to come home soon. Morehead testified that the Defendant, if given the

chance, could become a productive citizen. 

The Defendant testified that he had readily admitted his involvement in the crimes to which

he was pleading guilty. He maintained that he committed the crimes because of stress and because

he was involved with drugs. The Defendant stated that he had been in trouble of one kind or another

since he got involved with drugs at the age of sixteen or seventeen. He also said that he sometimes

got into trouble because someone else provoked it. The Defendant testified that he had served eight

months of a five-year sentence for probation violations. He testified that since becoming

incarcerated, he had tried to “turn his life around” by enrolling in anger management classes. He

stated that he was working toward his G.E.D. in prison, having been expelled from Gallatin High

School. The Defendant explained that he looked forward to sending a picture of himself graduating

to his mother when he completed his G.E.D. He also confirmed that he had signed up for drug and

alcohol classes, but had been placed on a waiting list. He testified that his experience in the

penitentiary system made him want to change and return home to his family. When asked if he was

sorry for everything he had done, the Defendant said, “Yes, I regret everything.” 

The Defendant maintained that he never assaulted Fitts with a gun. He testified that she

made the claim about the gun because she was angry that he had “messed” with a lot of women. He

stated he had three children, ages four, two, and one, and that he did not want his children to grow

up knowing he is in prison. He testified that after he stopped using drugs, he gained weight and

could think better than he could when he was on drugs. He also testified that he wanted an

opportunity to become a productive citizen. The Defendant stated he was not married and that each

of his three children had a different mother. He testified that none of his children lived with him and

that he had not supported them financially. He stated that he was expelled from Gallatin High

School for “fights and all kind of things.” However, he claimed that blame was cast on him, without

investigation, for a number of altercations at school. 

Regarding his employment history, the Defendant testified that he worked for a period of

time at Duncan’s Diner as a dishwasher until the restaurant closed in 1996 and that he then worked

for William’s Disposal for five months in 1998. He testified that his only other means of support
-5-

since leaving high school was selling drugs and that he supported himself by selling drugs from 1996

until his arrest, a period of three to four years. The Defendant stated that he sold cocaine and

marijuana, but he maintained that he did not sell pills or other drugs. He testified that he got his

drugs from two sources and that he sold drugs to the same fifteen people during the entire period.

The Defendant admitted that he knew that selling drugs could kill people, but he stated that at the

time he was doing it, he cared only about the money. He stated that he made between $600 and

$1,000 per week and that he had never reported the income to the Internal Revenue Service. 

Regarding his prior record, the Defendant admitted that in July 1998, he was convicted of

driving on a suspended license, possession of a 9-millimeter weapon with intent to go armed, and

possession of drugs. He confirmed that he was placed on probation for those convictions. The

Defendant also confirmed that, while he was still on probation, he pled guilty to shooting Mark

Vincent in the leg on September 26, 1998. However, at the hearing, the Defendant claimed that he

did not have a weapon that day, that he did not know how the victim got shot, and that he pled guilty

only because he “didn’t know the system” and “just took anything to get out on the street as soon

as [he] could.” The Defendant explained, “If I knew better, I would have tried to beat it.” The

Defendant also admitted that on November 1, 1998, while still on probation, he was caught with 2.5

grams of cocaine in his pocket, and he stated he was also smoking marijuana at the time of his arrest.

He confirmed that he pled guilty on March 15, 1999, after serving four months in jail, and received

five years’ probation. Furthermore, he confirmed that two days later, on March 17, 1999, he violated

his probation by testing positive for cocaine and marijuana. Finally, he confirmed that he was on

probation when he committed the present offenses. 

The Defendant testified regarding the assault on Sharkley as follows: “I went over. I asked

for her pager, like they said. We had words, you know. She struck me, so I just grabbed her by the

face and pushed her away on the couch. She come up swinging. I pushed her down by her face

again just to keep her from hitting me. And my ride came back and I ran up out of the house and

left.” The Defendant also testified that he briefly saw Satonya Fitts on June 5, 1999. He confirmed

that she was sixteen years old and eight months pregnant at the time, but denied that they had an

altercation. The Defendant guessed that he had angered her when he struck Sharkley. The

Defendant then testified that on August 31, 1999, he assaulted another former girlfriend, Bittis. He

said,

[S]he stopped on the street and she came to me. We talked for a minute, and the

conversation got heated up so it turned into an argument. So I put my hands on her.

. . . I grabbed her and she struggled away from me and thumped a cigarette and it

burned my face. So, you know, I grabbed her again and she swung and hit me with

her fist in my mouth. So I picked her up, but I didn’t body slam her. I just laid her

down in the ditch and held her where she couldn’t swing at me. And she was just

kicking me and I let her go in the ditch. . . . I did drop her but I never slammed her.

Lastly, the Defendant testified that he knew he had a severe problem, but maintained that he did not

believe he was a menace to society. 

II. ANALYSIS
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The Defendant pled guilty to one count of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C

felony, for which he was sentenced to ten years incarceration. The Defendant also pled guilty to

three counts of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven

months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions. The Defendant now challenges the

length and manner of service of his sentence, raising three issues on appeal. First, the Defendant

asserts that the trial court erred by failing to apply mitigating factors and in its application of

enhancement factors. In addition, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to

consider alternatives to incarceration in sentencing him.

When a criminal defendant challenges the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence,

the reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of the sentence with a presumption that the

determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). This

presumption, however, “is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court

considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823

S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). In the event that the record fails to show such consideration, the

review of the sentence is purely de novo. State v. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1992).

In making its sentencing determination, the trial court, at the conclusion of the sentencing

hearing, determines the range of sentence and then determines the specific sentence and the propriety

of sentencing alternatives by considering (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the

sentencing hearing, (2) the presentence report, (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to

sentencing alternatives, (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, (5)

evidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating factors, (6) any

statements the defendant wishes to make in the defendant's behalf about sentencing, and (7) the

potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-210(a), (b), -103(5); State v.

Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

The presumptive sentence to be imposed by the trial court for a Class B, C, D or E felony is

the minimum within the applicable range unless there are enhancement or mitigating factors present.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). If there are enhancement or mitigating factors, the court must start

at the presumptive sentence, enhance the sentence as appropriate for the enhancement factors, and

then reduce the sentence in the range as appropriate for the mitigating factors. Id. § 40-35-210(e).

The weight to be given each factor is left to the discretion of the trial judge. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d

at 123. However, the sentence must be adequately supported by the record and comply with the

purposes and principles of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act. State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 237

(Tenn. 1986).

When imposing a sentence, the trial court must make specific findings of fact on the record

supporting the sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209(c). The record should also include any

enhancement or mitigating factors applied by the trial court. Id. § 40-35-210(f). Thus, if the trial

court wishes to enhance a sentence, the court must state its reasons on the record. The purpose of
-7-

recording the court’s reasoning is to guarantee the preparation of a proper record for appellate

review. State v. Ervin, 939 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). On appeal, the defendant

bears the burden of showing the impropriety of the sentence imposed. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169.

A. LENGTH OF SENTENCE

The Defendant alleges that the trial court erred because it refused to find any mitigating

factors despite the evidence presented. The mitigating factors that the Defendant contends the trial

court should have applied are not among the statutorily defined mitigating factors set out in

Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-113. Rather, they are mitigating factors that have been

recognized in other cases under a catch-all subsection which includes “[a]ny other factor consistent

with the purposes of this chapter.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13).

Specifically, the Defendant alleges that the court should have found his “free” admission of

guilt as a mitigating factor. The Defendant relies on State v. Butler, 900 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. Crim

App. 1994), to support the proposition that the admission of guilt is a mitigating factor. In Butler,

the defendant voluntarily came forward and confessed his guilt, and the court noted that the case

would not have been solved if the defendant had not come forward. Butler, 900 S.W.2d at 314. This

case is distinguishable from Butler, because, in the instant case, the Defendant’s guilt could still have

been proven without the admission. Moreover, the Defendant did not confess his guilt until after

he had been caught. The Defendant was arrested on the drug charge when he sold the cocaine to an

undercover agent. With regard to the three assaults, the Defendant was not arrested until October

1999, four months after the first two offenses and nearly two months after the last assault.

Additionally, the record clearly shows that the trial court did consider the Defendant’s “free”

admission of guilt and rejected it as a mitigating factor. The court found that the Defendant refused

to take responsibility for his actions. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant testified that “stress

and drugs” made him commit the crimes. He testified that Sharkley had attacked him first and that

he had acted in self-defense. He also testified that Bittis attacked him, and he stated that he dropped

her in the ditch to prevent her from hitting him. In addition, the Defendant, while pleading guilty

to the charge of domestic assault against Fitts, did not plead guilty to attempted first degree murder,

the original charge, and still maintains that he did not have an altercation with Fitts, even though he

pled guilty to the reduced charge. Consequently, we find no error in the trial court’s finding that the

Defendant’s admission of guilt was not a mitigating factor in this case.

The Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred by not finding the Defendant’s

expression of remorse as a mitigating factor. Genuine, sincere remorse is a proper basis upon which

to mitigate a defendant’s sentence. State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 83 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1995). However, “the mere speaking of remorseful words or a genuflection in the direction of

remorse will not earn an accused a sentence reduction.” Id. The Defendant relies on State v.

Antonio Coach, No. 02C01-9805-CC-00160, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App.LEXIS279 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Jackson, Mar. 25, 1999), to support the proposition that remorse is a mitigating factor in Tennessee

criminal jurisprudence. While the Coach court did mention in passing that remorse may be used as
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a mitigating factor, it failed to conclude that the defendant qualified for a sentence reduction because

of mere remorseful words. Id. at *8-9.

Nothing in the record suggests that the Defendant’s statements demonstrated genuine

remorse. The Defendant’s expression of remorse was perfunctory and non-specific. At the

sentencing hearing, he was asked, “Are you sorry for what you’ve done?” The Defendant replied,

“Yes, I regret everything.” The Defendant gave the overall impression to the court that he did not

take responsibility for his actions and that his remorse was, therefore, not genuine. 

The Defendant also alleges that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors.

The trial court in this case found that enhancement factor (1) applied. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

35-114(1). That factor is a history of prior convictions and a history of criminal convictions or

criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the range. The court also found

Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-114(8) applicable, namely, the Defendant’s previous history of

unwillingness to comply with a sentence involving release into the community, as evidenced by the

Defendant’s prior probation violations. Finally, the court found that Tennessee Code Annotated §

40-35-114(13) was applicable, in that the present felony was committed while the Defendant was

on probation. The court concluded that these three factors justified enhancing the sentence to ten

years. The weight to be given to both enhancement and mitigating factors is left to the sound

discretion of the sentencing judge. State v. Alexander, 957 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

The record supports the trial court’s finding that these three enhancement factors applied. The trial

court properly noted that “the Defendant has a previous history of unwillingness to comply with

sentencing involving release into the community. [The Defendant] has been twice on probation and

picked up charges, [and] continues to use drugs while . . . on a community-based sentence. He just

doesn’t appear to take seriously his obligation to the criminal system.” The record also supports the

trial court’s determination that the Defendant is “a danger to society and someone from whom we

need protection.” We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in enhancing the sentence to ten

years, the maximum sentence within the appropriate range. 

B. ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING

Finally, the Defendant alleges the trial court erred by refusing to consider alternatives to

incarceration in sentencing the Defendant. Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-102(5) provides as

follows: 

In recognition that state prison capacities and the funds to build and maintain

them are limited, convicted felons committing the most severe offenses, possessing

criminal histories evincing a clear disregard for the laws and morals of society, and

evincing failure of past efforts at rehabilitation shall be given first priority regarding

sentencing involving incarceration . . . . 

A defendant who does not fall within this class of offenders “and who is an especially mitigated

offender or standard offender convicted of a Class C, D, or E felony is presumed to be a favorable

candidate for alternative sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-35-102(6). Furthermore, unless sufficient evidence rebuts the presumption, “[t]he trial
-9-

court must presume that a defendant sentenced to eight years or less and not an offender for whom

incarceration is a priority is subject to alternative sentencing and that a sentence other than

incarceration would result in successful rehabilitation . . . .” State v. Byrd, 861 S.W.2d 377, 379-80

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a). 

However, all offenders who meet the criteria are not entitled to relief; instead, sentencing

issues must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. See State v. Taylor, 744

S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (citing Moss, 727 S.W.2d at 235). Even if a defendant

is presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated

§ 40-35-102(6), the statutory presumption of an alternative sentence may be overcome if

(A) [c]onfinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant

who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) [c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the

offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to

others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) [m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently

been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). In choosing among possible sentencing alternatives, the

trial court should also consider Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-103(5), which states, in pertinent

part, “The potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant should

be considered in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term to be imposed.” Id. § 40-

35-103(5); see also State v. Dowdy, 894 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

The Defendant misstates the law in contending that a multiple offender convicted of a Class

C felony is presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options under Tennessee

Code Annotated § 40-35-102(6). It is, rather, the especially mitigated or standard offender who is

presumed to be a favorable candidate for such sentencing considerations. See Tenn. Code Ann. §

40-30-102(6). 

Furthermore, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that the

Defendant was a twenty-one-year-old man who had two prior felony convictions and numerous

misdemeanors convictions, which concerned the court because the Defendant’s prior offenses

involved drugs and weapons. The court also noted that the Defendant had a poor social history and

a history of violence. The court determined that the Defendant was a danger to society and that he

was someone from whom society needed protection. The trial court found that the Defendant had

not assumed responsibility for his actions because he maintained that each of his assaults was, in

some measure, self-defense. We conclude that the record supports these findings by the trial court.

The record in this case indicates that the trial court adequately considered the enhancement

and mitigating factors as well as the underlying facts. Our review also reflects that the trial court

followed the statutory sentencing procedure, that the court imposed a lawful sentence after having

given due consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the sentencing
-10-

law, and that the trial court’s findings of fact are adequately supported by the record. We find that

the Defendant has not met his burden of showing any impropriety in the sentence imposed. 

Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

___________________________________ 

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE