U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

38–511PDF 2007

HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND INTEGRATION

IN SOUTH-CENTRAL EUROPE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 15, 2006

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

[CSCE 109–2–3]

(

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE SENATE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,

Co-Chairman 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,

New York 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas,

Chairman 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

VACANT

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

VACANT, Department of Commerce 

(II) 
HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND 

INTEGRATION IN SOUTH-CENTRAL EUROPE 

JUNE 15, 2006

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe ...................................... 1

Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 4

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ................................. 4

OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hon. George V. Voinovich, U.S. Senator from Ohio ................. 3

WITNESSES 

Rosemary A. DiCarlo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for European and Eurasia Affairs, U.S. Department of 

State ......................................................................................... 5

Daniel Serwer, Director of Peace and Stability Operations, 

U.S. Institute of Peace ............................................................ 15

Janusz Bugajski, Director of the New European Democracies 

Project, Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies .............................................. 18

Joseph K. Grieboski, President and Founder, Institute for 

Religion and Public Policy ...................................................... 20

Nicolae Gheorghe, Senior Advisor, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 22

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Sam Brownback ........................... 36

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin .................... 38

(III)
Page

IV

Prepared statement of Rosemary A. DiCarlo ............................ 40

Prepared statement of Daniel Serwer ....................................... 48

Prepared statement of Janusz Bugajski ................................... 51

Prepared statement of Joseph K. Grieboski ............................. 56

Prepared statement of Nicolae Gheorghe ................................. 67

Response of Deputy Assistant Secretary Rosemary DiCarlo 

to written questions submitted by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .......................................... 85
(1)

HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND 

INTEGRATION IN SOUTH-CENTRAL EUROPE 

June 15, 2006

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The hearing was held at 2:11 p.m. in room 2226 Rayburn House 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Christopher H. Smith, CoChairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Christopher 

H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe; and Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Other Members of Congress present: Hon. George V. Voinovich, 

U.S. Senator from Ohio. 

Witnesses present: Rosemary A. DiCarlo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasia Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State; Daniel Serwer, Director of Peace and Stability Operations, 

U.S. Institute of Peace; Janusz Bugajski, Director of the New European Democracies Project, Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies; Joseph K. Grieboski, President and Founder, Institute for Religion and Public Policy; and 

Nicolae Gheorghe, Senior Advisor, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. The Commission will come to order, and good afternoon, everybody. In the past 15 years, by the count of the Helsinki 

Commission, we’ve held more than three dozen hearings on one of 

the several countries of south-central Europe. Some of today’s witnesses on the second panel have participated in various initiatives, 

including those hearings, the Commission has undertaken in the 

region. 

The Helsinki Commission can be proud of its record, I believe, for 

standing for principle and for humanity in the face of extreme nationalism, violence and genocide. At this stage, it is appropriate 

that, for once, we look at Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia together. 

With few exceptions, there has been progress throughout the region and many of the outstanding problems are common problems. 
2

For me, the best example of this is trafficking in persons. All countries under consideration today are tier two according to the latest 

State Department report, which means that they have not met 

minimum standards, despite taking steps to do so. 

I hope this hearing can focus attention on what more can be done 

in the region to help victims of trafficking, to punish those responsible for this modern-day slavery and ultimately to prevent the 

crime from occurring in the first place. 

I would note parenthetically that yesterday we held a day-long 

hearing in the subcommittee that I chair, the Africa, Global 

Human Rights and International Operations Subcommittee, on the 

trafficking in persons report. Ambassador Miller was our witness 

from the administration. And we also had Julia Ormond, who is 

the U.N. Ambassador, Goodwill Ambassador for Trafficking, and a 

number of NGOs, as well as people who had been trafficked themselves. 

I do want to express concern about laws and draft laws under 

consideration today in many of the countries which are supposed 

to protect religious freedom, but actually do more to restrict this 

fundamental right. Arbitrary thresholds are placed on what can be 

legally recognized as a religious group. 

Not meeting those arbitrary thresholds often has very real consequences for believers: not being able to obtain appropriate worship facilities or limiting the practice of one’s faith. Ultimately, 

such legal impediments send the signal that it’s OK to discriminate 

against individuals who are not traditional, especially those belonging to new or minority faith communities. 

Discrimination and violence are also felt by Roma, who are often 

purposely stereotyped as society’s outcasts. In practice, in the Balkans, there may actually be more tolerance of Roma than exists in 

several of the so-called Western countries of Europe, but the sad 

fact remains that they still face very significant problems. 

Kosovo remains, in many ways, worthy of more intense Commission focus. The international community should not be proud of 

what has been achieved after 7 years there. In particular, the fact 

that hundreds of displaced Roma remained for so long in 

unhealthy, lead-contaminated camps in northern Mitrovica, run by 

U.N. agencies, is shameful. And the international community and 

local Kosovar Albanian authorities must follow through on their 

commitment to rebuild the original Romani neighborhood there. 

I welcome the recent positive gestures of the new Kosovar leadership, which indicates a willingness and desire to accommodate 

Kosovo’s Serb, Roma and other minority communities. Now is the 

time to go beyond gestures to more meaningful concrete steps. 

Meanwhile, I encourage the Serb minority in Kosovo to remain 

engaged and to seek the best possible outcome for their families. 

I also call on Belgrade to be constructive in supporting this community. It certainly is counterproductive to fan the flames of hatred, 

as a recent ad in ‘‘Roll Call’’ did, by equating an independent 

Kosovo with Afghanistan under the Taliban. 

As someone who has many times criticized the Kosovar Albanians for their attacks on Serbian Orthodox churches and minority 

enclaves, especially in 2004, I think it is abhorrent to label the Al-
3

banians as anti-Western extremists simply because of their faith, 

as Muslims. 

I also want to express my support for the people of Bosnia 

Herzegovina. No people in the region suffered more than they did 

in the 1990s, as noted in the resolutions passed by both Houses 

marking the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica last year. No country, in my view, deserves European integration more. 

I am heartened to see that Bosnia is now looking to move beyond 

the Dayton Agreement, which helped restore peace in 1995, but 

limits the country’s democratic development. The defeat of a recently proposed constitutional reform package is a disappointment, 

but I hope it will not be a long-term setback. 

At least opposition was based on the package not going far 

enough in its reforms, and I hope to hear how the United States 

and the international community can engage the people of Bosnia 

in order to make their government more effective and ultimately to 

make their democracy reflect the will of the citizenry rather than 

simply a balance of ethnicities. 

I also maintain an interest on developments in other countries 

of concern. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Croatia have 

strong records of friendship with the United States. They deserve 

our support for their efforts to establish solid democratic institutions and the respect for the rule of law. 

And while the legacy of Milosevic still haunts Serbia, I do remain 

confident in the ability of the courageous and democratic forces 

there to restore their country to its rightful place in Europe. I believe we should remain firm in our commitment to help the people 

of Serbia as they seek to build a brighter future. 

I note that we have been joined by our distinguished Chairman 

of the Helsinki Commission and, as Co-Chair, I yield the floor to 

our distinguished chairman. 

Mr. BROWNBACK [presiding]. Thank you, Congressman Smith. 

Appreciate that. 

Going in order of appearance, Senator Voinovich, if you want to 

make an opening statement. 

HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO 

Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to sit and listen to the witnesses who are here today. 

As one who has been to the region 10 times and 6 times to 

Kosovo and have spent time with both the negotiating teams in 

Serbia and Kosovo, where I also met Mr. Ahttisari, Mr. Rohan, and 

Mr. Wisner, I am very interested in hearing from our witnesses 

about how they perceive what is going on in that region of the 

world. 

I believe the problems there deal fundamentally with human 

rights. If all of the people living in that part of the world understood that if they practiced the second great commandment, ‘‘love 

thy neighbor as thyself,’’ many of the problems would disappear. 

I’m doing everything I can to encourage the Serbian leadership 

to come to the table and negotiate. I’ve met with the President of 

Kosovo, Mr. Sejdiv, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Ceku and they 

seem to understand that they must address the human rights 
4

issues that have been ongoing in Kosovo, including the protection 

of Serbian minorities and the Serbian Orthodox Churches. 

I am here to listen to what the witnesses have to say and I appreciate the fact that you’ve allowed me to sit with you. 

HON. SAM BROWNBACK, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Well, I’m delighted to have you here and your 

expertise is well known and appreciated, I think, on this set of topics. 

The purpose of the hearing is—and I associate my comments 

with Congressman Smith—is to look specifically at the human 

rights situation and the degree of democratic development in Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 

Serbia in the hope of encouraging these companies to take the additional steps that will make integration possible. 

The hearing is not about debating the future status of Kosovo, 

but about making Kosovo a place where human rights and democratic principles are respected. There is a lot that needs to take 

place before that statement is fulfilled in that region. 

Congressman Cardin, did you have an opening statement you’d 

like to make? 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m just going to just ask 

unanimous consent to put my entire statement into the record. I’m 

sorry I didn’t get here to hear the opening statements of my colleagues. 

I just would observe that Senator Voinovich has been one of our 

real champions here in the U.S. Congress and the issues concerning this part of the world. And I had a chance to be with the 

senator as we talked about this issue at our OSCE meetings and 

I really do believe our commission has played a very positive role 

in the development and that it is very appropriate for us to be 

holding this hearing today. 

We’ve invested an awful lot in the leadership of our nation in 

trying to bring about stability in the Balkans and I want to really 

encourage our commission to continue to take a very active role. I 

think we are making progress. I think there’s still more that needs 

to be done. There are still issues that need to be completed, one, 

of course, being the international tribunal. And I look forward to 

hearing the testimony from the witnesses. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. The first panel is the deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, Rosemary A. 

DiCarlo. 

She currently serves in that position. She’s a career member of 

the Senior Foreign Service, who previously served as Director for 

United Nations Affairs at the National Security Council. She’s the 

Washington Deputy to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the 

U.N. She served in a number of other key positions. 

We’re delighted to have you here today and look forward to your 

statement. We’ll put your full written statement in the record, so 
5

if you want to summarize your position. Thank you very much for 

being here. 

ROSEMARY A. DiCARLO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIA AFFAIRS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you very much, Chairman Brownback, CoChairman Smith, Representative Cardin, Senator Voinovich. Thank 

you for inviting me to testify before the Helsinki Commission 

today. I [off-mike] issues I would like to highlight. I’d like to begin 

by stressing that we witnessed an overall improvement in human 

rights, democracy in the rule of law in south-central Europe over 

the past several years. 

The Balkans today is a very different region from a decade ago, 

but much more work remains to be done. The year 2006 is a crucial 

one for the Balkans. As we move forward to [off-mike] major outstanding issue, the future status of Kosovo, we have the opportunity to put the conflict of the 1990s behind us once and for all. 

But we cannot resolve Kosovo’s status without devoting increased 

attention to the entire region. Therefore, the administration has 

[off-mike] south-central Europe and is committed to pursuing this 

policy that will accelerate the recent integration of [off-mike]. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Ms. DiCarlo, just saying, I don’t know if that 

microphone is working very well. You might want to move it closer 

to you so that you can be heard better. 

Sec. DICARLO. Can you hear me better now? 

Mr. BROWNBACK. No, let’s try the other microphone there to see 

if that one will work. 

Sec. DICARLO. Now can you hear me? I think so. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. That’s much better. Thank you. 

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you. As I said, I would like to stress that 

we witnessed an overall improvement, but we can’t really go forward unless we have increased engagement. We are working to 

help prepare the region for a democratic future within NATO and 

the European Union. 

Euro-Atlantic integration cannot be achieved without progress in 

key areas, especially those taken up by this commission. I’d like to 

give you a few examples of both the problems that we see and the 

progress that’s been made. 

We’re working very closely with NATO candidates Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia on reforms needed to fulfill their aspirations 

to become NATO members in the near future. We stress repeatedly 

to these candidate countries that political and economic reforms are 

as critical as defense reforms for full-fledged membership. They 

have understood our message. 

The people of Albania elected a new government last July in the 

much-improved elections that led to the first smooth transfer of 

power in the country’s post-Communist period. We continue to 

work with the government and political parties to complete electoral reforms so that local elections next year are fully in compliance with international standards. 

Albania is starting to change longstanding patterns of crime and 

corruption, but must do more. The Albanian government has recently signed an agreement with the Millennium Challenge Cor-
6

poration for over $13 million to support initiatives to combat crime 

and corruption and improve the environment for legitimate business. 

On Croatia, with its cooperation in facilitating the December arrests and transfer of Ante Gotovina to the Hague, the Government 

of Croatia took a major step toward addressing the injustices of the 

past. 

Croatia has made progress in judicial reform and combating trafficking in persons. But Croatia must do more to ensure the fair 

treatment of minorities at the local level and create a welcoming 

climate for returns, including addressing the strong societal discrimination against minority returnees and resulting housing 

issues. 

We’re very pleased that the multiethnic coalition government in 

Macedonia has completed enactment of the legislation for the 2001 

Ohrid Framework Agreement and is proceeding with its practical 

implementation. Ongoing challenges include equitable representation of minorities and state structures and decentralization of authorities at the municipal level. 

Macedonia will hold elections in July and we are pressing political party leaders to address the serious flaws evidenced in the 

2005 municipal elections. Elections that meet international standards are critical to Macedonia’s bid for NATO and EU membership. 

We’re also committed to pursuing reform in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina that would lead to more effective governance. Last 

month’s defeat of the constitutional reform package by two votes in 

the Bosnian parliament was disappointing, but we need to recognize that almost two-thirds of the parliament approved the package 

and the majority of the Bosnian people supported these efforts. 

The Dayton constitution was not meant to be set in stone, and 

in order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue its European aspirations, it must modernize its structures and strengthen institutions 

at the national level. Bosnian parties that back constitutional reform have called for a renewed effort after the October elections. 

The United States will strongly support such an initiative. 

I’d like to turn to Kosovo now. The United States and its Contact 

Group partners determined that the status quo in Kosovo was neither sustainable nor desirable. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan 

launched a process to determine Kosovo’s future status in order to 

promote long-term stability in the region. 

Last fall, the Contact Group issued guiding principles for this 

process. Protection of minorities is at the core of these principles, 

and I’ll name just a few. The settlement should ensure a multiethnic Kosovo. It should provide for constitutional guarantees and 

appropriate mechanisms to ensure the implementation of human 

rights for all citizens of Kosovo and to ensure the participation of 

all Kosovo communities and government. 

The promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is at 

the heart of our Kosovo policy. We continue to press the Kosovo 

provisional government to implement U.N. developed standards for 

good governance and protection of minorities. These standards aim 

to enforce property rights, increase freedom o movement, prosecute 

perpetrators of interethnic crimes and provide adequate funding for 

the return of the displaced. 
7

I’d like to stress that a stable, prosperous Serbia is key to stability in the region. The United States is committed to helping Serbia overcome the legacy of the Milosevic area and move forward toward membership in the Euro-Atlantic community. Increased engagement with Serbia is critical as we move to resolve Kosovo’s future status. 

Serbia has made important strides in some areas. Belgrade authorities have made considerable efforts to improve the lives of minorities, particularly in south Serbia, Vojvodina, and the Sandjhak. 

We are, however, following closely government efforts to lessen 

interethnic disputes, especially in southern Serbia, where tensions 

are still significant. 

But Serbia has a lot of work to do to combat more effectively 

trafficking in persons, as traffic has continued to receive light punishments and law-enforcement efforts remain week. 

I’d like to say a few words about the newest state in the region, 

Montenegro. This week, the United States recognized Montenegro 

as an independent state. We congratulate the people of Montenegro 

for the peaceful and democratic manner in which the referendum 

on independence was conducted. 

Montenegro will now have the challenge of strengthening existing institutions and developing new ones to join others in the region on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration. 

There has been progress. Countries of the region have placed significant emphasis on justice and accountability for war crimes of 

the 1990s. Special courts in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

Croatia, established with U.S. assistance, are trying persons accused of atrocities and pursuing indictments locally. 

Of the 161 persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, only six remain at large. Full cooperation in the region remains, however, a serious issue. 

The majority of the six fugitives are believed to be in Serbia or 

the Republika Srpska. Still at large are notorious indictees Ratko 

Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, for whom the tribunal’s doors will 

always remain open. We remain very concerned that Serbia has not 

apprehended and transferred Ratko Mladic to the Hague in compliance with its international obligations. 

Non-cooperation in the region remains a roadblock to full integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions and we continue to engage 

authorities and use congressionally mandated sanctions to encourage compliance with the tribunal. 

Efforts to combat trafficking in persons, an important bellwether 

for crime-fighting success, have been impressive throughout the region, although problems remain. Each of the countries in the region 

is making significant efforts to fully meet the minimum standards 

of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 

The majority of the persons displaced as a result of the Balkan 

conflicts have returned home. The governments must press ahead 

to find durable solutions for the approximately 560,000 remaining 

refugees and internally displaced persons. 

Despite the extreme toll the Balkan wars have taken on the lives 

of the people of the region, they are moving ahead. The international community must remain involved to support their efforts. 

The United States must remain involved and U.S. leadership is 
8

key, but we do not act alone, but in close cooperation with our European allies and multilateral organizations such as NATO and the 

OSCE. 

Again, I’d like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today, and I would be happy to answer any of your questions. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary, for 

your comments and your attention to the region. I think it’s critical 

that it continue to take place, and particularly I appreciate your 

highlighting the trafficking problem in the region, which is well 

known and needs to be emphasized and kept on top of because so 

many peoples’ direct lives are involved with that. 

We’ve got a good panel of members here. I just want to ask one 

question and go to my colleagues. I get a number of people coming 

to my office talking about the continued ethnic cleansing—that’s 

not the right term—ethnic intimidation taking place in the region, 

frequently through attempts to destroy symbolic institutions or 

places. 

You get members from the Orthodox Church coming in and saying, well, the church is being destroyed while forces are in the region and that these are efforts to intimidate and move people out 

of the region. 

I would wonder how you see that set of issues and what can be 

done to address them? 

Sec. DICARLO. Well, first of all, there certainly are vulnerable 

populations, vulnerable religions in the region. We tried very hard 

to work with all the governments in the region in first ensuring 

that they have the proper laws in place, and then in seeing that 

those laws are implemented. 

I will give you an example, in the case of Kosovo, we pushed very 

hard on the provisional government to adopt a zero-tolerance policy 

when it comes to violence against minorities. 

In Macedonia, for example, we have worked very hard with the 

government of Macedonia on its treatment of the Roma. The U.S. 

Agency for International Development funds a number of programs 

and funds a number of programs in not only Macedonia aimed at 

Roma, but throughout the region, to increase awareness, tolerance, 

and proper treatment of minorities and protection of human rights. 

It’s a problem, it’s one that needs to be addressed very seriously. 

It will take a lot of time and obviously will involve also civil society 

organizations, which re really just beginning to grow in south-central Europe. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you. Congressman Smith, and let’s run 

the time clock at 5 minutes, so we can keep everyone informed of 

where they are. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. Thank you. 

Let me just ask, Madam Secretary, there’s a great deal of concern among many of us that large numbers of women are being 

trafficked into Germany for the World Cup. And virtually every 

country under consideration today is a source country. 

Some are countries of transit and to a lesser extent countries of 

destination, but they’re all source countries. I’m wondering if our 

missions in each of these countries are paying special attention. 

Yesterday, we heard from a number of Russian women who had 

been trafficked into Germany and suffered immensely as a result 
9

of their mistreatment. That wasn’t for the World Cup, but we know 

that those flows occur. 

Second, recently, a number of us met with Cardinal Puljic, who 

was concerned that too few Catholics have been able to be reintegrated into Bosnia, and I wonder if you might speak to that 

briefly. 

Next, many of us on this Commission have met numerous times 

and actually had hearings on the missing persons in the Balkans. 

If you could update us, what is being done to track down and to 

provide the most thorough accounting of those missing persons, 

that would be very helpful. 

I do have other questions, which I then would submit for the 

record. 

Sec. DICARLO. OK, thank you. On trafficking, yes, it is a serious 

problem in the region. We’ve seen improvements. We’re seeing improvements. We not only have the countries of the region signing 

and trying to meet minimum standards, but we have seen improvement in law enforcement. We’ve seen improvement in witness protection. 

We have in most of the countries of the region a serious problem 

with the judiciary, and this is where the problem lies, particularly, 

for example, the case of Croatia. That has done a fairly good job 

in investigating but has not been able to try the many people who 

have been indicted. 

Our missions pay a lot of attention to trafficking. They pay a lot 

of attention because it’s an important issue. It’s one that we have 

made very clear is a priority and we’ve made it very clear to the 

countries that are aspirants for NATO that this is an issue that 

must be addressed. This is part of the reforms that we need to see 

them met. 

And thank you for raising the World Cup issue. It’s a key time. 

As far Cardinal Puljic is concerned——

Mr. SMITH. If you could, and this would best be for the record, 

but if you could get back to us—if there’s a heightened look and 

a lookout on the part of our missions, because this would be a time 

when recruitment is at very high levels. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The countries of South East Europe take seriously their 

responsibility in the fight against Trafficking in Persons 

(TIP). We have seen significant progress from governments 

in the region in their efforts to combat TIP, including aggressive law enforcement efforts in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and Albania. 

We have made it a priority to urge authorities to prevent 

trafficking, prosecute traffickers, and protect victims. To 

this end, we continue to provide assistance for rule of law 

capacity building, shelters, and social services through almost $4 million in Support for East European Democracy 

FY05 funds. We have also provided governments with 

strategies to help focus their efforts and improve their 

ability to address TIP. 

Our missions have urged government officials to pay 

particular attention to TIP in connection with the World 

Cup, and report a heightened awareness of the issue by 
10

authorities. For example, in Albania, the government ordered increased vigilance at border crossings, focusing in 

particular on groups and young unaccompanied women. 

Prevention efforts in connection with the World Cup include campaigns to heighten awareness about recruitment 

efforts, and engagement with the Catholic Community in 

Tirana to increase understanding of the risk of trafficking 

and prostitution. In addition to heightened vigilance by police, Serbia aired four anti-trafficking public service announcements on Serbian National Television throughout 

the World Cup. The Provisional Institutions of Self Government in Kosovo produced television advertisements and 

street posters that were displayed during the World Cup.

Sec. DICARLO. Yes, thank you. We will raise that with them. 

Thank you. 

On Cardinal Puljic, he met with a representative from the State 

Department as well when he was here and raised his concerns 

about the number of—the very few Croat Catholics remaining in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina and their unwillingness to return, their 

concern about return. 

It’s a serious issue, we understand. There is an overall problem 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina right now in that economically it is not 

a place that attracts returns. The economy is not so good, unemployment is not good. In the case of the Croats in particular, Croats 

feel they are disadvantages because they don’t have their own entities. 

The other issue that is one I think that detracts from the return 

is that many of them are settled in Croatia, and the Croatian Government does provide incentives and programs for Bosnian Croats 

to settle in Croatia. So, obviously, they have the opportunity to live 

in a country that is on its way to the European Union, has candidate status and they do have some kind of financial assistance 

to do so. This is very much part of the problem. 

Mr. SMITH. And the missing persons? 

Sec. DICARLO. Yes, in missing persons, we have both the international commission that’s looking at it and the Red Cross looking 

at it. A number of efforts have been made to find missing persons. 

It’s quite clear—in Kosovo, I believe still 2,000 that have not been 

identified, not found. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we’re looking at 

about 6,000. 

It’s still a serious issue. Efforts are being made. It’s one that has 

gone very slowly, you’re absolutely right, and we have to continue 

pushing. The United States has provided considerable funding for 

this effort, I think somewhere to the tune of $4 million in the last 

year. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much. 

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Congressman Cardin? 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank you for your testimony and thank you for your 

work. I want to know whether the United States has a view on the 

requests that have been made regarding a new trial for the wartime local Bosnian leader Fikret Abdic. We’ve gotten some inquiries 

on him and I just would appreciate what your view is on that. 
11

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you very much. This just came to our attention, that indeed there were concerns about the Abdic trial, 

which I believe was held in Croatia. We have asked both of our embassies to look into the matter and get back to us. We don’t have 

any information on that at this point, but I will get back to you——

Mr. CARDIN. Would you get back to me on that? 

Sec. DICARLO. Absolutely. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Based on discussions our Embassy in Zagreb has had 

with OSCE and ICTY representatives in Croatia, we believe Fikret Abdic’s case was conducted in a fair and relatively calm manner in Croatia in 2002. 

Abdic is a dual citizen of Croatia and Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (BiH) who could not be extradited to BiH and 

thus was tried in Croatia based on a Bosnian indictment 

and Bosnian evidence. Abdic’s trial in Croatia for crimes 

committed in BiH was possible via an Agreement on Mutual Legal Cooperation in Civil and Criminal Matters 

signed between Croatia and BiH. In July 2002, the county 

court in Karlovac sentenced Abdic to 20 years imprisonment for committing war crimes in the Bihac area of BiH 

during 1993–1995. The Supreme Court later reduced this 

sentence from 20 to 15 years, taking into account Abdic’s 

age and extenuating circumstances caused by the war then 

being fought. He is currently serving out this 15 year sentence in Croatia. 

We remain committed to the principle that all war 

crimes trials proceed in a fair, credible and transparent 

manner.

Mr. CARDIN. Appreciate that. 

I also want to talk about the Serbian compliance with the conditions on the annual certification on its compliance with the war 

crimes tribunal. We’re obviously concerned about Mladic being 

turned over to the tribunal, but there are other issues. So can you 

just share with us the current status in regards to the certification 

process? 

Sec. DICARLO. Well, as of May 31, the secretary decided that she 

was not in a position to certify this year that Serbia was in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal. Since she certified a year ago in June, she felt that not enough progress had 

been made. Not only had we not seen any arrests of fugitives, but 

there had been a problem in handing over documents, other issues, 

to the tribunal. 

Obviously, this is an issue that we treat with great seriousness. 

We think it’s very important that Belgrade officials are in full compliance. We note that a year ago when we did for a period suspend 

some of the funding to the central government, it produced action 

in Belgrade and in Banja Luka and 17 indictees were turned over 

to the Hague. 

Mr. CARDIN. And I appreciate that, because I agree with the last 

observation. It seems to me that we are able to make progress 

when there are deadlines that need to be met and would encourage 

the State Department to continue to use that type of judgment in 
12

this process. We obviously would like to bring an end to this chapter, but there’s still work that needs to be done with the international tribunal. 

And, last, and I’ll be happy if you want to get back to me, but 

I would like your take on what happened with the constitutional 

reforms in Bosnia as to whether it was a good thing or not that 

they were put aside or rejected and what is likely to happen as far 

as the changes as it relates to these issues? 

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you very much. First of all, we were very 

disappointed that the reforms did not pass. Our embassy worked 

very, very hard in lobbying efforts. Our colleagues from the U.S. 

Institute of Peace initiated the project and were very heavily engaged. 

I think we all felt that the reforms put on the table were the very 

first step in what would be a long-term process to reform the Dayton constitution, but they were necessary first steps. We understand that there were some party leaders who felt we did not go 

far enough, others who felt that perhaps there wasn’t highlighted 

enough of a role for, in particular, Bosnian Croats. 

But the point that we made continuously is that this is the first 

step and you have to take the first step to get to the second step. 

We never envisioned constitutional reform in Bosnia being wrapped 

up all at once. It is our intention to support those leaders who want 

to pursue constitutional reform after the October elections. 

Bosnia Herzegovina is now in the electoral period and it’s not the 

time to be raising these issues. Political parties are—we’d like to 

see them focus on issues such as the economy, et cetera, and not 

use constitutional reform as a political football. But after the elections, we are very willing and have expressed our commitment to 

work with those leaders who want to move this forward. 

It’s our view that we have to do this as a project with the European Union. We had very strong European support during this 

process and we would do it jointly with them. Obviously, a lot of 

the reforms that would be taken by the Bosnian Government would 

be to meet European standards such as setting up new ministries, 

a ministry of agriculture, for example. 

We also think that, perhaps, the way to proceed is to have it be 

a broader effort, not only a long-term one but a broader one that 

brings in civil society. 

Mr. CARDIN. I think you may have touched upon that, but as you 

see the constitutional reform moving forward, do you see modifications to what was presented as a way of trying to move this forward? 

Sec. DICARLO. It think that will depend on the Bosnians themselves, what they feel they are comfortable with. They have a package now that works, that improves the functioning of the parliament, streamlines the presidency, gives additional authorities to 

the council of ministers. They can improve upon this. 

I think it depends on what they feel they are able to do after the 

October elections. If they feel they can make improvements on this 

package, then obviously we would support that. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Senator Voinovich? 
13

Mr. VOINOVICH. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do I have to turn 

this on or is it on? 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I think you’re on, there. You’re on. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

First of all, I’d like to thank you and the State Department for 

the effort that you’re making to respond to the recommendations 

of Kai Eide after his last visit to Kosovo in October 2005. These 

recommendations deal with, for example, the Kosovo police and judiciary, which are fragile institutions. The transference of competencies in these areas should be considered with great caution. 

I’m grateful that the State Department understands how important it to establish effective infrastructure for preserving any final 

solution so that the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo can be 

successful. We need to dispel the feeling that once the U.N. leaves 

Kosovo, the minorities are going to pack their bags and leave. 

One of the things that Kai Eide recommended in his 2005 report 

was that future status process must be moved forward with caution 

and artificial deadlines should not be set. I’m really interested in 

your opinion about what’s going to happen now that the U.N. representative in Kosovo, Mr. Jessen-Petersen is going to leave. 

I mean, one of the things that’s of grave concern to me is the fact 

that the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, which doesn’t have a good history 

of doing its job of protecting human rights, is finally doing a much 

better job. Jessen-Petersen has been a great leader, but he’s scheduled to leave, and the European Union is likely to take over. 

They’ll have some 60 people, who are not there right there now. 

I’m worried about a transition from the U.N. mission in Kosovo to 

the European Union and what impact that’s going to have on people’s confidence that once this is over that the institutions are 

going to be in place to make sure the agreements are fulfilled. 

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you. We, too, regret the departure of 

Jessen-Petersen, who’s done an excellent job. Our understanding is 

that Secretary General Annan is now looking at names and hopes 

to announce a successor to Jessen-Petersen in the very near future. 

There is a very able deputy in place, an American citizen, former 

general, Steven Schook. Mr. Schook was the chief of staff to the 

KFOR commander during the March 2004 riots and was the head 

of the NATO office in Sarajevo. He knows the region well and he 

will be in charge until a successor is in place. 

As far as the future, we have decided in the Contact Group that 

no matter what the outcome of Kosovo’s status is there will be an 

international civilian mission on the ground in Kosovo and international military presence. The international civilian mission will 

most likely be an international one, not just an EU one, and that 

is the United States will participate. 

The primary role of this mission will be to supervise implementation of the settlement, and that mission will be in place as long as 

it is needed to be there. And we envision at this point a seamless 

transfer from UNMIK to whatever this new mission is. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. One of the concerns that people have, and I 

talked to General Jones about this, is the rumor that perhaps U.S. 

KFOR forces are going to be diminished after a settlement. I know 

that they’re coming up with some new policies and a more flexible 

force because of the fact that when they had the riots 2 years ago 
14

on March 17, KFOR was not able to move quickly to suppress 

them. 

And, of course, there were NATO caveats, put in place by some 

of the nations, that limited what they could do with their forces. 

There is video footage of the churches that were destroyed and people’s houses that were burned down and nothing was being done 

by KFOR because the nation in charge of that area didn’t have the 

authority to protect property. 

We hope these issues have been worked out. But I think the support from KFOR is very important and I’d like to hear your perspective on how important it is that the U.S. forces remain there 

to give confidence to people who want to live there after this agreement is finished. They need to be there to make sure that the 

human rights provisions are indeed carried out. 

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you. Yes, indeed, we do think it’s important 

for U.S. troops to remain, and my understanding is that at this 

point there are no plans to draw them down. NATO has and is in 

the process of implementing what is called a task-force structure 

where they would be rotating troops and they would be better able 

to deal with the situation of March 2004, of riots, riot control. 

They are also working very closely with the international police 

mission that’s on the ground and local police, as well. This is something that has then I think heightened in the last few weeks. You 

may have read that KFOR is now expanding its presence in the 

north, in the northern part of Kosovo, international civilian police 

as well, because there are concerns for possible unrest in the north. 

I just wanted to clarify, when you referred to the EU mission 

that was on the ground planning now, that’s an EU police and rule 

of law mission, because the EU is going to take over major responsibility for police and police training and training of judges after 

the status is determined. 

However, U.S. international prosecutors will remain, and U.S. 

police as well. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Could I ask a follow up on that? 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Please, go ahead. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. It was my understanding that OSCE has about 

1,000 people stationed at their mission in Kosovo. Is anyone in the 

State Department looking at what the OSCE staff and U.N. mission, which has about 4,000 people, are doing in Kosovo to determine if the work needs to be continued by Europeans or others? 

Sec. DICARLO. Yes, we’re actually working very closely right now 

with the OSCE, with the U.N., with NATO and with the EU on 

what the international presence will look like after status is determined. The OSCE will remain, will continue in some of the areas 

that it has and the capacity-building areas. But we’ll probably do 

extensive monitoring, and, particularly, monitoring of provisions of 

the settlement. 

Not sure what the numbers will be and specific functions, but 

we’re working on that right now. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you. And I do appreciate all of your interest and focus in the region and Senator Voinovich is somebody 

that I certainly turn to on dealing with things in this region, because of his knowledge and his work in it. 
15

I do hope on that last point that that’s something we can emphasize, because one of the big problems, it strikes me, in the region 

has been this ethnic intimidation. And it seems to go on in lots of 

different ways and places, and any time we can be helpful of slowing that or stopping that ethnic intimidation from taking place, it 

seems like that’s to help long-term benefit to have in an ethnically 

diverse area. And not just, OK, we sort this group that way and 

that group sorts this way is not a long-term solution I don’t think 

anybody’s looking for, but yet that seems to be what’s taking place. 

I found it interesting that you talked about the incentives the 

Croatians are putting in place to get people, I guess, there. I did 

not realize that was taking place, but I hope we can be helpful in 

keeping the diversity where it is. 

Secretary, thank you very much for joining us. I appreciate your 

being here and appreciate your good work. 

Sec. DICARLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I call up the second panel now, Daniel P. 

Serwer, Vice President, Center of Post-Conflict Peace and Stability 

Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace; Janusz Bugajski, Director of 

new European democracies project and Senior Fellow of Europe 

program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS; 

Nicolae Gheorghe, Senior Advisor, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Office for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe; Joseph Grieboski, Founder and President, Institute on Religion and Public Policy. 

And that’s an excellent panel that we appreciate people being 

here. 

As I understand that Mr. Gheorghe has landed at the airport, is 

rapidly speeding this way, even as we go forward. We’ll go on with 

the panel and hopefully he’ll be here in time to present as well. 

All of your statements will be placed in the record fully. If you 

would like to summarize them, I will run a time clock at 5 minutes 

each to give you an idea where you are. If you needed to go some 

over that, that’s not a big problem at all, but I want to give you 

some idea of where you are on time. 

Mr. Serwer, thank you very much for joining us and the floor is 

yours. 

DANIEL SERWER, DIRECTOR OF PEACE AND STABILITY 

OPERATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My thanks for this opportunity to testify before the commission, where I first appeared 

in December 1998. Milosevic was then in power, Kosovo was in the 

throes of a violent Albanian insurgency and Serbian crackdown and 

Bosnia was still a place where war seemed possible. No doubt, 

things have improved since then. 

That said, I’d like to be brutally honest about the current situation in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. While none of these places is 

going back to war, none of them has established peace on a firm 

foundation. It’s time to name names as to why. 

In Bosnia, the path to Europe is blocked. Great strides have been 

made. The country now has a single defense ministry and unified, 

if not entirely united, armed forces. But Republika Srpska has 

failed to arrest Radovan Karadzic, too many Croat political leaders 
16

in Bosnia still dream of their own entity and the constitution that 

the United States gave Bosnia at Dayton does not meet European 

standards. 

The U.S. Institute of Peace has for the past year supported a 

Bosnian initiative to revise that constitution in accordance with 

Council of Europe guidelines, and I’m proud to have sitting behind 

me Don Hays, who has led that effort as the State Department employee on loan to the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

Remarkably, Bosnian politicians reached an agreement on 

amendments. Disappointingly, the amendments failed by two votes 

in the Bosnian Parliament. The fault on this issue lies not so much 

with the one Croat and one Bosniak who defected from their parties in the vote, but with Haris Silajdzic, whose entire party voted 

against the constitutional amendments. 

Silajdzic was a wartime prime minister who merits the admiration of all those who sought to extract Bosnia from the maelstrom 

of 1992–95. But in peacetime, he has preferred to campaign quixotically for abolition of the entities that make up Bosnia, the federation and Republika Srpska, rather than support more realistic 

changes that can really be approved in Parliament. 

It’s of course true that the entities which froze in place Bosnia’s 

warring parties make governance there difficult and costly, but 

there is no possibility of eliminating the entities in the foreseeable 

future, and Bosnia faces a challenging year because of developments in Montenegro and Kosovo. 

I hope the constitutional amendments will be brought back to 

Parliament and passed, with Silajdzic’s party abstaining. This 

would solidify Bosnia’s democratic institutions and take the country a giant step closer to European integration. 

Let me turn next to Serbia, were democratic institutions have 

unfortunately failed to complete the revolution that began on October 5, 2001, with the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. 

From that time forward, the question has been whether Serbia, 

the vital center of the Balkans, would hold on to past myths of 

Greater Serbia and all of Kosovo as a Serb Jerusalem or look forward to a future inside the European Union. 

Since Zoran Djindjic’s assassination, Serbia has chosen the past 

over the future. This is why Ratko Mladic, I resist calling him a 

general, is not in the Hague. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, 

who governs with support from those who advocate Greater Serbia 

want to protect Mladic from arrest and the Serbian security services from reform. 

He has refused to govern with support from Djindjic’s more Europe-focused party. I trust Europe, which has more leverage than 

the United States, will succeed in twisting Kostunica’s arm hard 

enough to make Mladic go to the Hague, but that’s on enough. We 

need to see real reform of the security sector, including the police 

and secret services. 

The United States was correct to suspend assistance to Serbia. 

In order to send an even clearer signal, the administration should 

give the $7 million remaining this fiscal year to those in Serbia’s 

courageous civil society, who are insisting that the country come to 

terms with the past through truth and justice, rather than by denying crimes or covering them up. 
17

Kostunica’s backward-looking attitude extends to Kosovo as well, 

where Serbia is determined to maintain governing authority over 

Serbs on a clearly defined territory. This may not be partition, but 

it’s too close for comfort. 

Ethno-territorial separation of this sort would set a precedent 

that Albanians would want to follow in southern Serbia, as well as 

in Macedonia, and it would revive efforts at ethno-territorial separation in Bosnia. To prevent it, the international community will 

have to do more than issue Contact Group statements saying that 

it will not allow partition. 

It will need to have a clear plan for international control of Serbpopulated areas and eventual transition to Pristina’s control. I see 

some signs of technical preparation for this, but little sign of the 

political will needed to prevent Serbia from achieving de facto and 

even de jure partition. 

Turning to Kosovo, the failure of its provisional institutions of 

self governments to get Serbs back to their homes safely and securely is the biggest single obstacle to determining final status, 

which should be done this year. Kosovo’s elected leadership must 

take responsibility for this failure. 

Former President Ibrahim Rugova, who is the living symbol of 

Kosovo’s struggle for independence, former speaker of the Kosovo 

parliament Nexhat Daci and several prime ministers have so far 

failed, despite some with good intentions, to do all that needs to be 

done. 

It’s late in the game, but not too late for recently elected President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Ceku, who will be here next week, 

to correct the mistakes of their predecessors. Otherwise, I fear that 

the final status decision will be far less clear and unequivocal than 

it should be. 

I hear rumblings of giving Kosovo independence but keeping it 

out of the U.N. until it meets more standards. This, some Europeans think, would help democrats in Serbia fend off electoral 

gains by socialists and radicals. Would that all U.N. members were 

subjected to such rigor, but since they’re not, doing so with Kosovo 

would encourage extremists and likely lead to violence. And it 

would not prevent the radicals from coming to power in Serbia, 

which is likely no matter what is done in Kosovo. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a year of decision in the Balkans. The 

question is whether the decisions will bring peace or instability. 

We started well. The unequivocal result of the Montenegrin referendum, slightly more than the 55 percent the EU insisted upon, 

bodes well. 

If Sarajevo chooses constitutional amendments, Belgrade chooses 

to send Mladic to the Hague and reforms the security sector, 

Pristina chooses to get Serbs back to their homes and the Contact 

Group provides for international supervision of the Serbs of 

Kosovo, the year could end well with a clear decision on Kosovo’s 

status. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, sir. We’ve got a vote 

that’s on in the Senate now, and I don’t know if our House colleagues are coming back. 
18

What we’ll do is we’ll put the hearing in recess until either they 

can get back in from the House side or that we’re back from the 

Senate side. It unfortunately takes a little time to walk over and 

get back. And I apologize to our witnesses and those in attendance, 

but just really can’t avoid it any other way. So we will be in recess 

until either Congressman Smith or myself or Senator Voinovich 

gets back here to bring us back out of recess. 

In recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Call the hearing back to order. Thank you all 

for staying with us. I apologize. Both Senator Voinovich and I had 

a vote, Senate side, which we could be called back for probably as 

soon as 30 minutes for an additional vote. So I would ask the presenters, if they can, to stay at their presentations for 5 minutes so 

we can make sure to get through those as much as we possibly can. 

Let’s see, Mr. Bugajski, director of New European Democracies 

Project, senior fellow for CSIS. If you would, thank you for joining 

us. 

JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR OF THE NEW EUROPEAN

DEMOCRACIES PROJECT, SENIOR FELLOW, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to the 

Commission for inviting me. I will try to be as brief as possible, focused on really four countries, the three U.S.-Adriatic Charter 

countries, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, as well as the newly 

restored state of Montenegro. 

And three issues, as specified, as you requested, human rights, 

democratic consolidation, and international integration. In sum, I 

would say, as compared to a decade ago, the eastern Adriatic zone 

has become one of political stability and international cooperation. 

All four of these Adriatic littoral states have made significant 

progress towards ensuring civil and minority rights according to 

prevailing Europe an standards, consolidating their democratic and 

market systems and pursuing beneficial bilateral and multilateral 

ties with their neighbors. 

The next stage of evolution, I think, has to focus on good governments, economic development, international institutional integration and strengthening regional and European security with U.S. 

involvement. 

Very briefly, Albania, human rights, the record has made steady 

progress over the past few years. Albania does meet general European standards. However, and I think we’ll hear this a little bit 

later, as in many other countries in this region and other regions, 

the Roma community continues to suffer from societal discrimination and there is concern by human rights organizations on such 

issues as citizens’ privacy rights, politicization of the media and reported police abuse against prisoners. This isn’t, I must say, just 

Albania, but I’m signaling some of the issues that we need to focus 

on. 

Croatia, I think, has developed a very respectable human rights 

record. Relations between majority Croats and minority Serbs have 

certainly improved over the years. Nevertheless, I think tensions 
19

still persist at local level. I think more can and should be done to 

reintegrate those Serbs who are willing and able to come back to 

Croatia. At the same time, I think Croatia does need international 

assistance, not the least financial, to help provide economic opportunities, housing and so forth, for the incoming minority. 

Macedonia, I think the large Albanian minority has clearly benefited from the implementation of the Ohrid agreement, which terminated the potentially destructive war. Albanians are much more 

equitably represented in all state institutions and they’ve required 

additional collective rights in language use, education and so forth. 

Montenegro. Montenegro has a multiethnic society in which national religious identity has not played a divisive or conflictive role. 

In fact, during the elections, to the information we have, most of 

the minority population, both Albanian and Muslim, did vote for 

independence for Montenegro. 

I think, though, it is important that the sizable Serbian population, which voted against independence, is fully integrated into 

state institutions and does not feel excluded from the process of development after independence. Again, democratic consolidation. 

I think all the governments are clearly making progress as functioning pluralistic democracies. In the case of Albania, clearly this 

political polarization has to be somehow handled and moved beyond over the coming years. And I think there are good indications 

that maybe Albania is getting out of its bipolar disorder, so to 

speak. 

In terms of Croatia, as I said, fully functioning pluralist democracy. Nevertheless, reforms, as in many other countries need to be 

pursued, particularly in the judiciary, police, security service sector 

and so forth. 

Macedonia, as was said, faces elections. A lot of progress has 

been made. Progress is never enough, of course, and there still 

needs to be more done in terms of coping with official corruption, 

with police reform, judicial reform and so forth. 

And, last, Montenegro, which does possess the infrastructure of 

an independent state, now also has to launch its own process of 

further economic and political and structural reform, particularly 

in combating corruption, organized crime that comes across the 

borders and trying to build a stable state in the eastern Adriatic 

region. 

Last is the question of international integration, and here I 

would stress that the prospect of EU and NATO membership is absolutely key, a key stimulant for enhancing human rights and promoting democracy throughout the region. This was the case in Central Europe, and I think this is the case in southeast Europe. Any 

kind of postponement or ambiguity in terms of eventual accession 

I think will send a very negative message, a very counterproductive 

message throughout the region. 

Last, but not least, let me give just one or two of my own policy 

recommendations, things I think need to be accomplished over the 

coming few years. First, I think the U.S.-Adriatic Charter needs to 

become more focused on membership, NATO membership for Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. And I think a very strong signal can 

be sent at the Riga summit, the NATO summit this fall. 
20

Second, I think Montenegro should as feasible be invited to join 

the U.S.-Adriatic Charter. I think this will encourage the new state 

to plug into all the initiatives that the charter has already 

launched and to become a source of stability in the region. 

Third, I think momentum must be given to promote effective 

democratic governments across the region and across board there’s 

combating crime, some of these other questions that were raised 

earlier. 

Fourth, I think each country must aim to ensure administrative 

reform, privatization, legislative reform in order to attract foreign 

investment. And this also would include infrastructure development—I think all the things that are essential to raise living 

standards, because ultimately ethnic conflicts, human rights 

abuses, thrives when there are economic inequalities, wide disparities, poverty, pauperization and so forth. 

I think this is the area that really we need to focus on in the future. In other words, a potential market of 25 million people, how 

to attract investment, how to plug this region into the European 

mainstream. And I think in that way the mission in southeast Europe will be largely completed and we can move on to other critical 

areas—in other words, the Black Sea region, Caspian region and 

the Central Asian region to bring these into the sphere of the 

Trans-Atlantic community. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Very good and quite encouraging. 

Mr. Grieboski. 

JOSEPH K. GRIEBOSKI, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, INSTITUTE 

FOR RELIGION AND PUBLIC POLICY 

Mr. GRIEBOSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

testify today, and thank you as well for the initiative of holding 

this hearing. The status of religious rights in both society and 

under law is challenged significantly in each of the states of the region. 

From active legislative measures to social, public contempt directed at religious minorities, the current condition of religious 

freedom has failed to demonstrate a significant departure from the 

rigid form and draconian practice under the Soviet era. 

Regression of religious rights in the Balkans is a reflection of a 

greater rollback of democratic processes in general in Central and 

southeast Europe that that must be addressed and dealt with 

through political and diplomatic tools readily available to the 

United States, to the OSCE and to the entire international community. 

Two factors in particular are key to understanding the devolution 

of religious rights in the region, particularly in the scope of legislative restrictions. 

First, many of the states in the region have yet to amend the religion laws still on the books from the Soviet era. It is their belief 

that to be a modern European state, the laws must be amended to 

demonstrate their progress away from Soviet-era systems. 

Second, and immediately following on the footsteps, these states 

mistakenly believe that it is imperative that there be religion laws 
21

in the first place, and are using as models restrictive legislation 

found in other areas of Europe. 

In my broader testimony, I have painted a picture of many of the 

states throughout the region but would like to take the opportunity 

to focus on three areas in particular, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, 

and the province of Kosovo. 

The law on freedom of religion and legal positions of religious 

communities and churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina violates 

OSCE and international standards on religious freedom. Not only 

does the law generate a great societal conflict, it perpetuates ethnic 

and nationalistic tensions and cultural and religious intolerance 

among various religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Religious tensions that occasionally erupt in violence against religious communities are directly related to the ethnic lines dividing 

the country. A religious identity, for the most part, is reflected in 

the ethnic identity in the Bosnian population. 

Bosnians, generally, are associated with Islam, Bosnian Croats 

with the Roman Catholic Church, Bosnian Serbs with the Serbian 

Orthodox Church. The Jewish community maintains a very small 

but important presence in Bosnian society. Despite the constitutional and legal provisions protecting religious freedom, discrimination against religious minorities occurs in virtually all parts of the 

country through a high threshold required for registration and penalties associated with free speech expressions. 

These acts are the two predominantly used mechanisms to 

hinder the activities of religious minorities in the country. State favoritism expressed toward particular religious communities contributes to the increase in interethnic tensions in the country. 

The State Department annual report also notes cases of misuse 

of religious symbols for political purposes and instigation of nationalistic sentiments. Moreover, a greater divergence within the society is perpetuated by foreign missionaries preaching a fundamentalist form of Islam unfamiliar to the indigenous Bosnian Muslim 

traditions. This advances a greater division not among various religious communities of Bosnia, but within the Muslim community 

itself. 

In Serbia, the Parliament of Serbia recently passed, and the 

President signed into law, a draconian law on churches and religious communities. The essential objections to this law include inadequate separation of the church from the state, the combination 

of civil law and canon law and discrimination predominantly of 

small religious communities. 

The law, as written, does not guarantee respect for fundamental 

religious freedoms. The law enforces already-existing institutional 

discrimination against religious groups that do not belong to the 

group of, quote, ‘‘traditional and religious communities.’’ Among the 

most serious problems in the legislation are hazy registration requirements, limitations on naming rights, ill-defined state 

deregistration powers, speech restrictions, improper public disclosure requirements and undue deference to registration decisions of 

other European countries. 

Particularly problematic is the adoption of a blatantly discriminatory amendment aimed primarily at minority religious communities. As this commission has commented, that measure removed 
22

safeguards that would have allowed all religious communities currently registered to maintain that status. Regardless of whether 

they already enjoyed registration, all but seven communities would 

need to reregister. 

The law, which was hastily passed through parliament with a 

120–4 vote, without consultation with domestic religious communities, international organizations such as the OSCE or nongovernmental organizations, severely discriminates the smaller religious 

communities by establishing unrealistic registration standards and 

by allotting to the government expansive review power. 

The law passed by the assembly guarantees preferential treatment by creating explicit and limited classes of faith groups that 

advance specific religious communities while marginalizing other 

faith groups. Registration guidelines require burdensome documentation that only serves to stall groups from moving forward 

within the process. 

In the province of Kosovo, the provisional authorities have recently introduced a draft religion law that potentially violates the 

religious rights of individuals and institutions at every level. The 

law, if passed, would represent a substantial interference with the 

rights of minority religious communities and churches unable to 

meet the 10-year rule and population rule under the draft law. 

For example, religious communities unable to meet the duration 

and representation requirements would be deprived of the right to 

charge persons with the provision of spiritual services and to make 

use of appropriate facilities and security forces and hospitals in 

areas of custody or imprisonment, as well as in preventive, cure 

and social restraining facilities. 

The law, as drafted, violates the right to a freedom of religion 

and belief within European standards, international standards and 

U.N. standards. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Grieboski. 

I want to say we’re extremely honored and privileged to have 

Nicolae Gheorghe with us here today. I know he’s made a heroic 

effort to be here, including a flight that was delayed, to come directly from a trip through Kosovo and Macedonia. And he’ll be testifying again tomorrow in front of the Helsinki Commission on the 

human rights of Roma or lack thereof. 

He’s been one of the outstanding advocates for the recognition of 

Roma in international human rights documents and Romani 

human rights issues. 

So I’m delighted to have you here today. Thank for making so 

much effort to be here with us today, Mr. Gheorghe. 

NICOLAE GHEORGHE, SENIOR ADVISOR, OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION 

FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. GHEORGHE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Congressmen for this and members of the Commission for including 

the issue of Roma on the agenda of this hearing and for offering 

me the opportunity to bring this testimony in such a distinguished 

company of scholars and analysts. 

In fact, I just wanted to reconfirm what I sense has been said 

here, that there is progress in the area in many countries on the 
23

way to move toward established democracies and to try to cope 

with the effects of the devastating conflicts and wars just some recent years ago. 

The population that we speak about, the Roma, in many ways 

are benefiting from these changes and enjoying a higher degree of 

rights than in the previous times. Nevertheless, there are major 

issues which I would like to bring into the attention. Most of the 

states which emerged from the former Yugoslavia more or less legitimate themselves on nationalist ideologies with a strong ethnic 

component. 

The political elites of the regions and of each country, they are 

more and more learning the vocabulary of the democracy, of the 

civil rights, of the human rights, including the jargon of the European Union, an organization to which many of them aspire to belong. 

But, in reality, in everyday life, the political elite is maintaining 

a public discourse which is mainly rooted in the ethnic nationalism 

which is traditional in the area. 

And I don’t think that all the troubles in the Balkans are settled. 

We may still witness symptoms of this confrontation between, I repeat, political ideologies and motivations of the ruling classes in 

the regions. 

The Roma are suffering because of that because they are not perceived as a national minority, proper, what is a nation. They lack 

national territory or a key state to defend their rights in theory, 

in constitutions and in laws. In some countries, in Serbia and Macedonia, in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they enjoy—they 

are defined as a national minority with different interpretations of 

the concept—less in Albania, where they are considered to be only 

a cultural or a linguistic minority. 

In practice, this is not enacted, because the reality of the politics 

is that the rights of specific minorities in specific countries are negotiated in the bilateral relations between the states. Of course, almost all of the states in the region, they agree with Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. So, in theory, everything is OK. In reality, it’s a huge gap 

which has to be filled with the reality of making the rights in everyday life. 

I say this, for instance, because I came from Skopje. The issue, 

which has dominated Roma-related activists, NGOs and the media, 

it’s a case of a 16 year-old boy who disappeared in May in very ambiguous, confusing circumstances, but there was an incident with 

the police. Tragically, he lost his life, being thrown in a river after 

so many days. 

The police that were involved in this in different ways which still 

has to be clarified by a proper investigation. But what is frustrating for the people is that after so many days, the family did not 

receive any explanation from the police about the circumstances of 

the death and the responsibility of the police in these circumstances. And there is the suspicion that the involvement of a 

special police unit which is dealing with strict criminality is heavily 

involved with that and their involvement is hidden. 

I say that because, just coming from the airport, I noticed that 

it’s a welcoming address for the travelers and we have been as-
24

sured that we will be treated with courtesy, respect, and dignity. 

Maybe the habits of courtesy in Balkans are different than the 

ones in the United States, but the respect and the dignity of the 

human persons are the same, and what is lacking in that special 

case, it’s the sense of respect and therefore the persons who deserve to have full information about the way that police are conducting investigations. 

What made me also worry about that in the Roma community is 

that it’s a sense of frustration because of this, of a lack of proper 

respect of the rights and in some corners of the civil associations 

of the Roma, I hear discourse which sometimes indicates the possibility that this frustration may culminate in a more radical discourse and eventually a radical action to make their voice heard. 

This is also more specifically the case of Kosovo. We have to cope 

with the reality of tens of thousands of people displaced from their 

homes, houses destroyed, whole neighborhoods destroyed. After 7 

years, for many of them, the prospects of returning to their homes 

is still very far away. 

In Mitrovica, where I spent the weekend, there was one of the 

largest Roma neighborhoods in the Balkans, with about 750 houses 

and 7,000 to 8,000 inhabitants. All of these houses have been destroyed by the Albanian mobs after the entry of KFOR troops in 

Mitrovica in June and the middle of July 1999. 

Until now, the population of that neighborhood is spread in 

northern Mitrovica, most of them in Serbia, tens of thousands and 

many of them in Western Europe. Since seven years, it was not 

possible to find a proper solution to return and reconstruct their 

houses. 

Only recently, under strong political pressure, it was aggreed to 

grant part of the land where the houses have been, and now a modest progress can be noticed. Two blocks of that are starting to grow, 

with the prospect that people may be accommodated for the cold 

season. 

Since 7 years, about 700, 800 people are living in centers for displaced persons in very adverse environments with high degrees of 

lead contamination, which started to impact negatively on the 

health of the people. The results of progress that I witnessed, about 

60 families are moved in the new center, organized to provide 

emergency treatment. 

In spite of that, the prospects for finding a durable solution for 

restoring the property right and the ownership of the people who 

are in northern Mitrovica, it is not yet completely foretold. 

What is lacking is the participation of the people in deciding 

about their future and, again, one of the reasons for coming, the 

effort, and answering the invitation to come here is to appear to 

you, to the State Department and to the Congress, to use the influence that you have for assuring the participation of minorities in 

the discussion about the future status of Kosovo. 

There are lead services, there are attempts to involve minorities, 

but there is no significant mechanism to make the participation 

meaningful in discussion of the future of Kosovo. And without the 

participation of minorities, the prospect of having a multiethnic 

Kosovo is not yet clear. 
25

In the case of Roma, there is also this need to find the other 

mechanism for assuring their participation in discussion and to 

guarantee their rights in future Kosovo, whatever will be the status which will result from negotiation. 

That case illustrates a little bit the tragedy of the people in the 

region, because the Roma in that region, not being hundreds of 

thousands of people, because of the different historical circumstances, enjoyed a degree of social integration and of cultural 

advancements higher than other parts of Europe. 

Actually most of the educated Roma are coming from that region, 

those who managed over the last decades to contribute to the flourishing of their language and of culture. The tragedy of the world 

means that this elite is now—most of them are displaced. 

That had a very negative impact on the capacity of people to self 

organize and to promote their rights and we need a strong effort 

to restore this capacity of the people to be meaningfully integrated 

and to develop the proper leadership. 

And that’s why I think that giving to the Roma of Kosovo the 

rights to be a constituent part of the population and of the future 

society and their future political entity, it might be the guarantee 

that they are looking for in order to have the return assured. 

But in terms of the issue of returns of the refused asylum seekers, from Western Europe, tens of thousands may be returned, in 

Serbia, in particular, where the conditions for accommodation for 

housing, for health, for education, are quite poor. I think that, all 

of us, we may try to make our contribution to assure that this basic 

respect for human rights and for the dignity of each person has 

been assured in spite of the adverse conditions of the last decade. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Gheorghe, and thank you very 

much for your great work that you’ve done in this particular area, 

and I wish you Godspeed in continuing it. That’s very important. 

We’re probably going to be called for a vote here at 4, I’m guessing, but I want to get a few questions in and turn it over to Senator 

Voinovich. 

I get a different resonance here, and tell me if I’m picking it up 

wrong, and, or maybe all of you actually agree and you’re just looking at different pieces of the puzzle here. 

Mr. Serwer and Mr. Bugajski—pardon me—I hear you saying, 

look, things are substantially better in this region, obviously not 

perfect. No place is perfect, but we’re moving really on the right 

track. And I hear Mr. Grieboski saying, look, it’s just not working 

very well here for religious minorities in particular. Do you disagree with him, or is that, no, yes, he’s right, it’s just this is still 

one of the areas that still need to be worked on? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I don’t disagree with him. I don’t know all the details of what he actually is saying in any individual country. I 

haven’t yet read his testimony. I would say, however, that the 

standards that these countries would need to meet in terms of religious and other freedoms in order to enter the European Union, 

and even for NATO membership, are essential. 

In other words, that they have to be kept on track for where 

they’re lacking, for the kinds of freedoms, whether in human or collective or religious freedoms, where there’s still progress to be 
26

made. I’m not saying they have made it, far from it. If you read 

my testimony, I’m not saying the progress is complete. It’s a work 

in progress. 

Nevertheless, the fact that they’re considered to be on track 

through the association process, through candidacy in the case of 

Croatia and hopefully Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo will also get 

on this track—I think that to me indicates that sooner or later 

these countries will make progress on these issues. But we need to 

be able to pressure, both through carrots and through sticks. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. And your policy recommendation is that we’ve 

got the specific measures out there. We’ve just got to keep pushing 

them on these topics, and that the carrot, big carrot at the end of 

this, is joining NATO and EU. 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Those are the two big carrots, and the third big 

carrot I would say is becoming part of the mainstream, in other 

words, to benefit from the modern economy, raising living standards. It’s not going to solve every problem, but I think it would contribute to resolving some of the worst abuses and suspicions and 

paranoias that we’ve seen in the region. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Serwer, any divergence on that thought? 

Mr. SERWER. No, I think it’s not surprising, though, that you 

should find in Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo things lagging behind 

some of the places that Janusz was talking about: Croatia, Macedonia, Albania. Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia have been through 

much worse in the way of conflict and they’re going to take a 

longer time to recover. 

I don’t mean to excuse anything about their laws on religion, by 

any means, but I do think it’s important to recognize that they are 

way behind. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Grieboski, do you disagree with these two 

gentlemen, of what they are saying in the overarching situation? 

Mr. GRIEBOSKI. No, Senator, in the overarching situation, there’s 

been great advancement in the process of democratization throughout the region. However, what’s in the one element for which I was 

asked to testify, that of religious rights, we have not seen that 

same progress. And, very often, this is a result of the international 

community’s lack of attention to the role of religious rights and religious minorities in that overall process. 

As there’s been advancement in freedom of the press, freedom of 

speech, freedom of assembly, very often the international community does not hold these states to the same conditions on freedom 

of religion. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Do you agree, Mr. Serwer, is that accurate? 

Sorry about our lack of technology to spread around here. 

Mr. SERWER. Yes, so far as I know, it’s accurate. It should surprise no one that places that won’t arrest Mladic also have on religion that aren’t very—don’t meet Western standards. They don’t 

meet Western standards in a number of different respects. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. It just seems like that’s such a basic issue in 

that region. It’s a basic issue in so many places of the world, but 

much of the conflict has both an ethnic and religious tie to it that 

if you’re going to defuse the conflict over time you’ve got to defuse 

the ethnic and religious battling, splitting apart on those bases, 

don’t you? 
27

Mr. SERWER. Well, absolutely, you do, and it seems to me that 

there are efforts underway in the way of writing common histories 

of the region, that is, getting ethnic groups to write common histories, truth and reconciliation commissions, things of this sort 

which will help to clear the air and to enable a much better understanding across religions. 

But the fact of the matter is, in Bosnia today, you probably have 

more distance between Croats, Muslims and Serbs than you had 

before the war. That’s a fact of the matter and that’s what we’ve 

got to deal with. And I agree with Mr. Grieboski that the effort of 

the commission and of others to raise the international visibility of 

the religious issue is very important in getting it resolved. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Any additional policy recommendations on resolving this set of issues that any of you would make, other than 

what you’ve already put forward? 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. If I could just add, I don’t know how much influence we would have, but in the case, for example, of the Orthodox 

communities in the Balkans, I think it is essential to have mutual 

recognition. In other words, for the Macedonians Orthodox Church 

and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which is in the process of 

restoring its property, its position and so forth, I think it’s important for the Serbian Orthodox Church to recognize the existence of 

those churches, of those denominations. Because that in itself helps 

to recognize the statehood, the nationality, the history of its neighbors and I think will help in ethnic reconciliation in the region. 

That would be one of my recommendations. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Very good. 

Mr. Gheorghe, again, I really appreciate your work and your testimony on this, and I appreciate what you’ve done for the Roma 

community and I just want that noted for the record in particular. 

Senator Voinovich? 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ve spent a lot of 

time in the region and sometimes I think that I’m an idealist. I believe that if we can get all of the Southeast European countries 

into the European Union and NATO membership for those who 

want it, that it would be the glue or cement to bring them together 

and maintain stability. Until now, the Balkans, or Southeast Europe, has been on the outside. Our foreign policy has been what I 

call the ‘‘barking dog foreign policy.’’ That is, if the region barks, 

we throw it a bone, we ignore it, until it starts barking again. But 

we have a wonderful opportunity at this time to make a difference 

for the region and bring it into Europe. 

What I’d like you to comment on is, No. 1, how important do you 

believe it is that the European Union continue to hold out the prospects of membership in the EU? I’ve talked with Olli Rehn, who is 

in the head of enlargement for the EU. He seems to understand the 

importance of this. I’ve talked to Belgium’s Foreign Minister Karel 

De Gucht. I’ve talked to Germany’s Foreign Minister Mr. 

Steinmeier. They seem to get it, but back in their own respective 

countries, and in other European countries, there is a feeling that 

they’ve expanded enough. The good news is it seems like their leaders understand that the prospect of membership is important. I 

know we’re working forward to trying to get Croatia and Macedonia, Albania into NATO and Montenegro, maybe, Bosnia and 
28

Herzegovina. But EU membership is their priority. In your view, 

how important is EU membership to the stability of the region? 

And, second, in spite of the lack of human rights in Kosovo, do 

you believe that there is a possibility of a multicultural Kosovo, 

where the rights of minorities are protected, and the patrimonial 

sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church are protected, so that refugees can return and that they can achieve a multiethnic country? 

Can Kosovo accomplish something similar to what is occurring in 

Macedonia, where you have the Albanian minority and the ethnic 

Macedonians who have come to some agreement and are working 

together and it appears to be making significant progress. Or something similar to what is happening in Croatia, where it seems like 

Prime Minister Sanader is working to bring the minorities back in 

to Kraina and Slavonia and work with them. So in sum, how important is the EU and NATO membership and do you believe that 

we have a chance of any kind of a multiethnic society in Kosovo? 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Senator, if I could step in just real briefly here. 

I’m going to have to run myself for another engagement that I have 

to do and I’m going to turn the hearing over to you to go as you 

need. This is a great panel and I really appreciate your being here 

and I want to give you the time you need to ask any questions. You 

should. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Really appreciate it. 

Who wants to start? 

[Crosstalk.] 

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I think I’ve already stated, but I think maybe I 

should reiterate that the EU and the prospect of EU and NATO 

membership I think is absolutely essential for two reasons. One, I 

think it promotes the kind of reforms that we would like to see 

across the board, economic, social, political, structural, security, 

and so forth. 

Second, I think it gives the society a stake in those reforms. In 

other words, there’s an end product to this. We’re not simply sacrificing, implementing these reforms just for the sake of it. There is 

an end product, which is being part of the European family, European community, being able to travel to every part of Europe, to 

work there and so on and so forth. 

I think that was clearly the case in Central Europe with the 

eight members that came in a couple of years ago. I think the aspirations of the Balkan people, of people in the Balkans, are no different to those in Central Europe. Soon we’re going to have Bulgaria and Romania in the European Union. 

This region simply cannot be a black hole or a black zone in the 

middle of Europe. The question is, how to get there? 

Obviously, one has to keep pressing for them to conduct the sort 

of reforms that are necessary, but on the other hand, I think it’s 

essential for the European Union to educate their own publics that 

it’s beneficial for them to have a bigger Europe. 

It’s not beneficial for them to become protectionist at this point 

against the rest of Europe. In other words, they have benefited 

from the entry of Poland and Czech Republic and so forth. They 

will also benefit from the entry of a Serbia or a Bosnia or an Albania. 

So that’s I think two messages I think need to be sent. 
29

Mr. SERWER. Senator, you’re my kind of idealist. You’re a realist. 

I think what you described is the only way. I would only emphasize 

that in seeking candidacy to NATO and the EU, there has to be 

a consistent application of standards, that we can’t overlook the 

kinds of things that Mr. Grieboski is talking about. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. It’s interesting that I was not aware of these 

laws that were passed. In fact, I just said to my assistant that 

we’re writing to President Sejdiu and to Prime Minister Ceku and 

indicated to them that I don’t really think that passage of such a 

law is in the best interest of the future of Kosovo, particularly 

when we’re talking about having a multiethnic society, and particularly when they’re trying to negotiate with the Serbian Orthodox 

Church to protect he patrimonial sites. I mean, those kinds of 

things really argue against what we’re trying to accomplish there. 

Mr. SERWER. I would add, on the question of Kosovo being multiethnic, I don’t want to be overly idealistic about this. There are 

very profound problems in Kosovo, an enormous distance between 

Serbs and Albanians. The fact that the languages that they speak 

are mutually incompatible is extremely important. It’s not like central Bosnia, where Serbs, Croats, and Muslims can all understand 

each other. 

There’s an enormous language gap. I have proposed elsewhere 

that that be filled by having a second language in Kosovo being 

English for both Serbs and Albanians, but I won’t go into that. I 

would only say that I think it will take a considerable amount of 

time. 

You’ve got a situation today where the Serbian enclaves are essentially governed directly by Belgrade. And they are very isolated 

from the surrounding Albanian communities. The Serbs in those 

enclaves are required to drive around in cars that bear Serbian license plates, not the license plates of the U.N. that should be the 

legal license plates in Kosovo. 

They’re therefore subject to intimidation. They’re identifiable and 

subject to intimidation throughout Kosovo. And the Albanians who 

drive into Serb areas are also subject to intimidation because they, 

too, are ethnically identifiable. 

We got rid of ethnically identifiable license plates in Bosnia I 

think it was 2 or 3 years after the war, recognizing the problem. 

It is now how may years after the war? It’s seven years after the 

war in Kosovo. We still haven’t gotten rid of ethnically identifiable 

license plates. 

It’s very difficult for people to return in Kosovo. I do not minimize the threat to Serbs in Kosovo, but it’s made worse by the license plate issue, by the isolation of the Serbs in Kosovo and by 

the fact that the communities really aren’t talking to each other 

much. 

The U.S. Institute of Peace has sponsored any number of dialogues between Serbs and Albanians, but they’re a drop in the 

bucket. 

There should have been a much more intense effort in that direction. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. One thing I’d be interested in your commenting 

on is the report from some of our KFOR forces at Camp Bondsteel, 

who are working out in the community. Quite frankly, they had 
30

some really good stories to talk about certain towns where Serbs 

and Albanians were getting together and living peacefully. They 

talked about some towns that weren’t so good, and they attributed 

it, frankly, to Belgrade trying to encourage them not to cooperate 

or work with the Albanian Kosovars. 

And then, of course, the Serbs recently passed, or put an edict 

out, that said that any of the communities there that were getting 

financial help from the Serbs—and, as you point out, they’re getting help—should refuse to take any help from the Kosovar Government. 

What do you think about those kinds of actions on the part of 

the Serbian Government? 

And then, of course, the Serbs recently passed, or put an edict 

out, that said that any of the communities there that were getting 

help from the Serbs—and, as you point out, they’re getting help—

should refuse to take any help from the Kosovar Government. 

And those kinds of actions on the part of the Serbian Government make me wonder, where are they going? 

Mr. SERWER. Well, I think where they’re going is trying to 

achieve ethno-territorial separation. That is, they want the Serbs 

separated from the Albanians on territory that can be governed directly from Belgrade. And, failing that, they want to postpone the 

solution. The proposal they have made is for 20 years. 

But I don’t want to imply that this can all be overcome overnight. We’re going to need an international presence in Kosovo. 

That international presence is going to have to be prepared to 

protect not only Serbs but Roma and other minorities, and it’s 

going to have to be there for a considerable amount of time before 

we can overcome this problem. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. I spent a lot of time with Kai Eide, who I think 

has done a terrific job. He lays it out here in this paper he submitted to the UN Secretary General. These are all of the things he 

said have to be in place if this is going to be successful. But your 

opinion is it’s going to be a long time and it’s going to take a lot 

of work and there’s going to have to be some goodness on the part 

of people to come together and some enlightenment in Belgrade. 

I think that you mention about President Kostunica. I mean, I’ve 

been encouraging him for four years to send Mladic to the Hague. 

I met with Sanader about 2 years ago, and I said, Mr. Prime Minister, you must send Gotovina to the Hague. I said it will be wonderful if you do it, and he did, and things are coming along in Croatia today. And I happen to be of Serbian heritage, but my people 

are from Croatia. I’d like to say the same thing for Serbia. I’d like 

to have them not be the black hole. I’d like to see them be on their 

way to NATO and in the European Union. And it just seems, for 

some reason, President Tadic gets it, but I’m not sure he has the 

willpower or influence over the ministry to stand up and say this 

is the future for Serbia. Unfortunately, President Kostunica, who 

is a wonderful man, his peripheral vision is not very good. And I 

think, as you said, he’s in the past. What they don’t understand is, 

that the boundaries mean nothing if you can move back and forth 

and commerce can move and you can improve the quality of life of 

the people who live in your country and see their economic 

wellbeing improved and there are more jobs and so forth. 
31

And it just seems that getting that across is very difficult. 

Mr. SERWER. President, I hope you won’t President Sejdiu and 

Prime Minister Ceku when they’re here next week, either. They 

need the same message. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Well, I have encouraged the State Department 

to bring President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica here. I 

think that the Serbs need to know that we love them right now, 

I really do. I think they’ve been through a lot and it’s not easy and 

I think we ought to let them know that we still love them and that 

we want to help them. I’ve editorialized too much. I’d like to hear 

from the other witnesses. 

Mr. GHEORGHE. I’d like to add to your idealism. As a matter of 

fact, Kosovo is less multiethnic now than it was before the war, 

and that’s a reality, and we’ll stay with this reality for a while. But 

here and there, the multiethnic landscape of the community I preserved, is there. In Prizren, for instance, I recognize each time that 

the community there is pretty well preserved, and from the point 

of view that the Roma, they are there and they will stay there. 

I think that is with the opportunities opened by the institutional 

reforms, some of them will benefit. There is already some 

embryonics of multiethnic media and of cultural institutions of the 

minorities in that area. 

If you go to Pristina, it’s a different reality. It’s there that the 

number of minorities who are living in Pristina, it’s almost zero 

now. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Zero. 

Mr. GHEORGHE. In Mitrovica, we need, in place of security forces 

and institutional arrangements, I think we need economic incentives. 

That region was one of the most prosperous of the Kosovo and 

of the former Yugoslavia. Eventually, it may become again, if the 

European Union is enough strong to use economic incentives to 

bring people together to work and to reconstruct their visions of 

working together. And of course if your country, too, will use this 

instrument of promoting business and employment of people. 

That’s one of the——

Mr. VOINOVICH. In other words, the whole issue of economics in 

terms of getting people to stay and to return. I know in Croatia, 

in the town where my family was cleansed in Operation Storm, I’ve 

got a cousin that came back, but the rest of the family will never 

come back. And the reason they won’t is because there’s no jobs 

there. They’ve gone to Austria, they’ve gone to Canada, they’ve 

gone someplace else. There’s no future there for young people who 

are currently living in other places. There is no reason to come 

back. 

Now, USAID has been working on little entrepreneurship things. 

For instance, setting up a little business and that kind of thing. Do 

you think that is something that we should really give some consideration to if this is going to be successful? 

Mr. GHEORGHE. Sure. We need good businesspersons, companies, 

also with the motivation for the welfare of the communities in 

order to invest money there and to, again, to bring people to work 

together. When you speak with the common Albanians on the 
32

streets and with the Serbs, they’d like to return to work. They’d 

like to have their jobs. 

So politics is politics and it’s important. Elites are important——

Mr. VOINOVICH. The whole economy is bad, period. 

Mr. GHEORGHE. There is no more economy. Income is hurting, 

both for Belgrade and from Pristina. 

What people have is an identity rooted in work and in the interrelations of work. If I was a little bit optimistic last week when I 

visited the Roma Mahalla is that I see there that the market, it’s 

the downtown shops are moved in an area then. I said, well, that’s 

a good place for a bazaar. If you have a bazaar back in Mitrovica, 

we’ll have Roma commercial dealers taking the advantage and 

eventually the risk to be there. 

And the second idea which I heard and people are speaking 

about is having a multi-linguistic university in Mitrovica, like in 

Tetovo. And the university in Tetovo managed to bring a lot in 

terms of relaxing the tensions between Albanians and Macedonian 

Serbs. A multi-language university in Mitrovica, in northern 

Mitrovica, will help very much people again to be together, the students. 

And this is the political class of trades, not to demand, as we 

said, who is still kept in the course of 1974 constitution of Tito. Because part of the political elite of Serbia and of Kosovo are still 

rooted in that constitution, where they had nations, peoples, ethnic 

communities, and so on. 

Creating a new generation of educated people to stay together 

and to let English, I mean, the language which gives access to the 

business, will help also immensely. I also dreamed that if there will 

be a kindergarten or a grammar school for Roma, to be part of that 

would be university, from the beginning, to learn both Serbian, Albanian, Romani, and English, in order to allow people to read—so, 

with probably a little bit of bold courage and imagination, I see 

that the elements of the culture can be preserved and eventually 

reinvented in the region. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. You’re a real idealist. 

Mr. GHEORGHE. Without that, I think that we cannot do our 

work. I mean, very few people here will accept——

[Crosstalk.] 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Yes, thanks. 

Mr. Grieboski. 

Mr. GRIEBOSKI. Very quickly, Senator, I’d like to touch on the 

EU, NATO question. I’d like to reflect the comments of my colleagues here at the table. They’re absolutely right that the prospect 

of EU and NATO membership as a carrot and as a goal within certain standards is necessary in order to move these states forward. 

My only addition to that would be that the onus should not be 

just on the states themselves, seeking membership, but on the 

international institutions like NATO and the EU to guarantee that 

those standards are truly being followed, not just in theory, but in 

practice, particularly when it comes to the religious freedom question and to the religious minority question, that passing laws is one 

thing, as you well know. 

But the following of those laws is another question, and whether 

or not the religious rights are protected on the ground in these 
33

countries is more important, I think, than just the passage of the 

legislation. And I think that onus is very much on organizations 

like the OSCE and the EU and NATO to guarantee that those 

rights are being protected. 

As far as the Kosovo question, we once again, as I was listening 

to my colleagues, we were talking about the ethnic issue. What we 

are not talking about, and what we are not hearing, is how the ethnic issue is actually being used to cover the religious problems in 

Kosovo. That is, we talk about Serb versus Albanian. 

There’s no discussion of the question of Islam, particularly fundamentalist Islam, rising within Kosovo and being used as a motivating force and a motivating threat throughout the region, but 

also Kosovo itself. Just as an example, since 1999, since the arrival 

of UNMIK and NATO forces, almost 150 Serbian Orthodox churches have been destroyed, none of which have been rebuilt. 

Yet, at the same time frame, over 200 mosques have been built 

in Kosovo, all of which were funded by the Iranians and the 

Saudis—the majority of which, let me rephrase that, have been 

funded by the Iranians and the Saudis. 

This, to me, is an indication of a significant and serious problem 

of Islamist religiosity developing throughout the area. And the interesting thing is, as you know, Senator, you’ve been there many 

times, Kosovar Albanians are not particularly religious people. 

Their religious identity is very much something that they wear 

but not something that they believe. 

What we have heard is that the mosques are irrelevant of whether or not they are used. The majority of these 200 mosques are 

chained and unused. And what we have heard from individuals on 

the ground in Kosovo when we were there is that this is more important for the religious mapping, more important for the religious 

landscape of Kosovo than it is even for the usage of the mosques. 

And so, again, this is one of those situations where I would encourage the international community, where I would encourage the 

United States in particular, to monitor not just the ethnic issues, 

but the religious issues, the draft law of the Kosovo parliament. 

And I learned this morning that there have been some amendments to that and it’s now being sent back to parliament to improve it slightly. But that is really just a billboard for a much larger problem that exists within inter-religious rights within Kosovo. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Well, I know that there’s been some robust discussion between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Kosovars in 

terms of the future. In fact, I had the Bishops Theodosija and 

Grigorevic in my office, and there’s a problem there because it’s a 

difference of opinion between them and Bishop Artemije who’s up 

in Gracanica. 

But they are making progress and they are repairing churches. 

The international community came forward with about $4.5 million 

and when I was there I found out that they weren’t spending it, 

so I wrote to the Patriarch and I said, what’s going on? And they 

looked into it and they had a problem and they are moving forward 

with that. I really think that that’s fundamental to any future, but 

if—and that’s why we’re going to check this law. If this law, that 

flies right in the face of what needs to be done. 
34

Mr. GRIEBOSKI. Senator, we have a copy of the draft law that I’d 

be more than happy to share with your staff. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. I’d like that, yes. If you can get it to me as soon 

as possible. 

Mr. GRIEBOSKI. We’ll do that today, sir. 

Mr. GHEORGHE. Just we have there are lights and shadows. We 

cannot speak only about Serbs, Orthodox, and the Albanian Muslims. 

There’s the situation of Roma living in the Serb enclaves in 

Gracanica. It’s as difficult as in other parts, because there are 

Roma living in Gracanica, in the Serb enclaves. 

They speak Serbian language, but as religion, they are Muslims, 

and they told me that it is difficult for them to practice their everyday religious habits amidst the Serbian minority, so they are——

[Crosstalk.] 

Mr. VOINOVICH. In other words, there are Roma that can speak 

Serbian there in Gracanica, and they have difficulty practicing 

their Roma——

Mr. GHEORGHE. That’s also something we have. They’re a minority from a minority, and this is the intricacy of the situation there. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Well, I started out in saying that—we talked 

about dignity and respect, treating other people like you want to 

be protected. I’ll never forget, I met after the war in 2000, with Mr. 

Thaci and Mr. Rugova and there was one other person there, I 

can’t remember his name. I spent 45 minutes with them, and at 

the end, I said, I know you want independence and you want your 

own Kosovo. Whether you accomplish this goal will depend upon 

how you treat your minorities. If you can get over the past and the 

hatred and treat them like they didn’t treat you, you can be successful. You can start a new chapter for Kosovo and guarantee that 

your children and grandchildren aren’t going to be killed. 

And I saw Mr. Thaci in 2006. He is part of the Kosovo Unity 

Team. And I said, I gave you some good advice and you’d be a lot 

further ahead today if you had listened to me. You haven’t done 

what you’re supposed to do. It’s been 5 years. 

So I’d like to say thank you very much for being here. I appreciate your perspective. I still have this dream and I’m going to keep 

spending time on it. My father died many years ago. He was a Serb 

and a peacemaker. And I would love to be able to say before I die, 

that his part of the world has moved closer together and they’ve 

become part of Europe and the quality of life for the people is what 

it should be. 

And I want to thank each of you for your role in making that 

happen, and do you have any other thoughts that you’d like to 

share with me or the members of this Commission? I’d be more 

than happy to receive them. 

Mr. GHEORGHE. I don’t see the United States as the best to advise the region on what might be the laws regarding national minorities or their rights and freedoms. What you may teach all of 

us, I’m coming from the region, is what means individual human 

rights? What I learned after 1990s, coming from Romania and 

going there, it is this language and these values. And that’s something that is now growing in the region and that’s something that 

you may stress all the time. Because the social categorization, col-
35

lective categorization, religious, ethnic, national, in the region all 

continues all the time to create frictions. 

But what is new and probably for the young generation, it’s 

learning this new language, which contributed a lot to change the 

landscape in Romania, in Bulgaria, in Hungary, Czech Republic, 

and other countries which are more advanced in the transition. I 

think that has to be stressed and re-stressed each time, how these 

values and their respective laws and their respective institutional 

arrangements to put the values and laws in practice can be 

learned, can be in the region by everyone, old and young people. 

The young are the hook. 

Thanks. 

Mr. VOINOVICH. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
36

APPENDICES

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,

CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION

IN EUROPE 

This afternoon’s hearing focuses on what many would call ‘‘the 

Balkans’’ but is more accurately labeled today as ‘‘South-Central 

Europe.’’ This region is geographically to the south but otherwise 

central to Europe and European affairs today. 

A central desire for the people of this region is to become an integrated part of Europe. Membership in the European Union and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a widely held policy priority. 

The ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s made this movement possible, but a subsequent decade of regional conflict delayed 

the reforms necessary to make integration a reality. Now, just as 

some countries in the region have made remarkable strides to recover—encouraging their neighbors to do the same—there is concern that Europe will leave them behind. 

I genuinely hope that this will not be the case and believe the 

candidacy of these countries to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions will be strongest if they have solid democratic credentials. The purpose of this hearing, therefore, is to look specifically 

at the human rights situation and the degree of democratic development in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in the hope of encouraging these countries to 

take the additional steps that will make integration possible. 

This also applies to Kosovo, the status of which has yet to be determined. Whatever the outcome, the same human rights and 

democratic norms must apply, and the authorities in Kosovo should 

expect to be held accountable for their record of compliance. To be 

clear, the subject of this hearing is not about debating the future 

status of Kosovo but about making Kosovo a place where human 

rights and democratic principles are respected. 

On the one hand, it is to the credit of the people in the region 

and many of their leaders that, so soon after the horrendous conflicts that occurred, they are as close to being ready for European 

and Euro-Atlantic integration as they are. On the other hand, there 

is much still to be done. Trafficking in persons remains a problem 

throughout the region, along with the associated evils of organized 

crime and official corruption. Restrictions on religious freedom, in 

law and in practice, indicate a lingering intolerance toward diversity. Discrimination and violence against Roma is a common problem too commonly ignored. 

Beyond the regional problems, there are specific circumstances 

for each: 

Bosnia, for example, must find a way to move beyond the Dayton 

Agreement which restored peace ten years ago but hinders true democracy in that country today. 

Kosovo must consider how to accommodate its minority communities and give those displaced from a conflict seven years ago a 

real opportunity to return if they choose. This is an issue on which 

I have relayed my continuing interest to the State Department, 
37

and I want to thank the Department for its responsiveness to my 

concerns. The situation for minorities in Kosovo, however, remains 

bleak, and intensified efforts are needed if the situation there is to 

improve significantly. 

Macedonia’s next hurdle is the election only a few weeks away, 

which must meet international standards if the country is to maintain its integration momentum. 

Serbia, meanwhile, must get serious about dealing with war 

crimes and the nationalist legacy of Slobodan Milosevic. 

Montenegro, which we welcome as the newest European state 

and soon-to-be 56th participating States in the OSCE, must now 

demonstrate that independence opens the door to further democratic and economic reform. 

Albania must similarly show its reforms are not just nice promises or good intentions but genuine commitment and solid reality. 

Croatia, which has advanced the farthest thus far, has an opportunity to demonstrate that being ahead is not a cause to slow the 

pace, and that democratic governance is not a burden but a blessing for majority and minorities alike. 

To address these issues we have for our first panel the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Rosemary 

DiCarlo, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service valued not 

only for the position she holds in the Department but the knowledge and experience she brings to it. Her presentation of the views 

of the Department of State will be followed by analyses from experts on South-Central Europe and some of the the issues of great 

concern in that region.
38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

I welcome today’s focus on the situation in the Balkans. While 

the situation varies from one country to another, all have made 

some progress toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Still, problems remain, and I want to encourage not only the authorities but the people—from Croatia to Albania—to take additional reform measures. 

I say this not only so they can ‘‘join the club’’, be it NATO, the 

EU or both. I say this, because these same reforms that will improve the eligibility of countries for integration will also lead to the 

real improvement of the daily lives of the citizens of those countries. As an active member of the Helsinki Commission, I have focused considerably on the economic dimension of the OSCE, and 

through this work it becomes obvious how organized crime, official 

corruption and the absence of the rule of law not only threaten 

human rights but thwart economic development, including foreign 

investment, as well. None of the countries we are examining today 

have scored well on Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking no higher than 70th and mostly well below 

that of 158 countries surveyed in 2005. I will continue to encourage 

the OSCE Participating States to sign, ratify, and implement the 

new United Nations Convention against Corruption. 

This will be the subject of the work in the Second Committee of 

the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly annual session, scheduled for 

early July in Brussels. The committee members are focusing on improving regional economic integration, particularly in the Balkans. 

The resolution we will consider in Brussels notes that ‘‘creating 

common interests and de facto solidarities . . . dissuade States 

from resorting to force in order to settle their differences.’’

As Chairman of the committee, I am also working to have the 

Assembly address corruption through initiatives to change parliamentary immunity laws. By depriving public officials of the ability to use their status as elected officials as a shield against prosecution for criminal acts, we help ensure greater integrity. Good 

governance, particularly in national representative bodies, is fundamental to the healthy functioning of democracy. 

I will be sure to bring the transcript of today’s hearing to the attention of my fellow parliamentarians from the countries concerned. In the meantime, I hope to hear how United States policy 

is helping these countries to advance toward full integration in Europe. I also hope our experts provide insight on what more can be 

done, as I am particularly interested in ideas to help the Romani 

communities and others who are economically disadvantaged and 

deprived by discrimination and intolerance of the opportunity to 

better their lives. 

Beyond greater opportunity, I have strongly felt that the people 

of the Balkans also need greater justice. For that reason, I have 

been a strong proponent of full cooperation by all states with the 

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, based 

in The Hague. Whatever criticisms one may have regarding the tribunal’s work, the precedents it has set is one of the few positive 

developments that has come from the aggression and genocide of 
39

the 1990s. While far from certain, no ruthless thug anywhere 

around the globe can completely rule out the possibility of being 

held accountable in a court of law for the horrendous crimes he or 

she committed or helped to orchestrate. 

As the tribunal seeks to implement its completion strategy, it is 

important to realize that this strategy is really the responsibility 

of all. Justice is not something the UN member-states delegated to 

the tribunal; the tribunal is merely a tool through which the member-states seek justice. Justice will not be complete, most of all, if 

Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic and other indictees remain at 

large. The Serbian Government and Republika Srpska authorities 

in Bosnia must do more in this regard. I am sure that, if there is 

sufficient will, we can bring these war criminals to justice. Until 

there is, I continue to support the effort to condition U.S. assistance to Serbia, which remains in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill passed by the House last week. 

The completion strategy also means other governments must do 

their part. I am particularly concerned that Russia is a haven for 

persons indicted by The Hague. One such person believed to be in 

Russia is Vlastimir Djordjevic, who has been accused of organizing 

the murder of three Albanian American brothers arrested by Serb 

authorities in 1999. Their bodies were found in a mass grave in 

2001. 

I hope that the United States has raised this issue with Russian 

authorities and will continue to do so, including at the G–8 summit. 

I also hope that the United States is devoting sufficient resources 

to locating at-large indictees. While our intelligence resources are 

in heavy demand in combating terrorism, I believe we have an interest in seeing this effort completed the right way—with indictees 

in The Hague. And until they are in The Hague, the United States, 

its friend and allies should ensure that the tribunal remains adequately funded. 

Finally, I think it is important to note that some cases are being 

handed to war crimes chambers in the courts of the countries of the 

region. This is a welcomed development; everyone agrees that justice is best served closer to home. These chambers deserve continued international support as well. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
40

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY A. DiCARLO, DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND 

EURASIA AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Chairman Brownback, Co-chairman Smith, thank you for inviting me to testify before the Helsinki Commission today. I am 

pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you about human 

rights, democracy and integration in South Central Europe. 

Our vision for the region is one of peace and stability—where the 

countries of South Central Europe are part of a Europe whole, free 

and at peace. To this end, we have worked to help prepare the region for a democratic future within NATO and the European 

Union. 

As Under Secretary Nicholas Burns stated in his November 8 

testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the year 

2006 is a crucial one for the Balkans. As we move forward to resolve the one major outstanding issue—the future status of 

Kosovo—we have the opportunity to put the conflicts of the 1990s 

behind us once and for all. But we cannot resolve Kosovo’s status 

without devoting increased attention to the entire region. Therefore, the Administration has intensified its engagement with the 

countries of South Central Europe and is committed to pursuing a 

policy that will accelerate the region’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. 

Euro-Atlantic integration cannot be achieved without progress in 

key areas, including the issues taken up by this Commission. We 

have witnessed a marked overall improvement in human rights, 

democracy and the rule of law in South Central Europe over the 

past several years. The Balkans today is a very different region 

from a decade ago, when its people were held hostage by wars, ethnic cleansing, and the forced displacement of approximately four 

million people. The United States has played a major role in helping the region move towards one in which peaceful, stable, and 

democratic multiethnic societies respect and protect the rights and 

fundamental freedoms of all its people. Today the image of the Balkans is no longer that of a dark and dangerous corner of Europe, 

but a place where democratic governments are in place and 

progress is apparent every day. 

Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has significantly improved. Persons indicted for war crimes are increasingly facing justice. Of the 161 individuals indicted by the Tribunal since its inception, only six fugitives—with the transfer of Dragan Zelenovic this past weekend—

remain outstanding. With its cooperation in facilitating the December arrest and transfer of Ante Gotovina, the Government of Croatia took a major step towards addressing the injustices of the 

past. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska improved their cooperation by assisting with or facilitating the transfer of 17 fugitives to The Hague since October 2004. With the ICTY 

concentrating efforts on senior leaders most responsible for wartime atrocities, there is increasing focus in the region on prosecuting other persons indicted for war crimes, including those cases 

transferred from The Hague. We are working with Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia to ensure designated courts are 

capable of handling war crimes cases according to international 
41

standards, and to ensure these cases are tried in a fair and transparent manner. The Sarajevo War Crimes Chamber of the Bosnian 

and Herzegovina State Court opened in March 2005. Four cases 

have been transferred there from the ICTY for prosecution, and 

three others are expected in the near term. The Chamber also has 

cases that have arisen locally. The ICTY Prosecutor’s Office has 

also sent the Bosnian State Prosecutor over 150 cases for review, 

investigation and possible indictment; on April 7, the Chamber 

handed down its first conviction in such a case. At present, there 

are currently over 40 war crimes cases at the Chamber, either in 

the pre-trial, trial or appeals stage. In addition, the State Prosecutor’s Office has referred over 90 war crimes cases to lower courts 

in Bosnia for trial. 

In Belgrade, on May 26, Serbia’s Special Court for War Crimes 

handed down a 20-year sentence to a former Bosnian Serb officer 

accused of using 27 civilians as a human shield. This action followed the Special Court’s first verdict, on December 12, 2005, convicting 14 Serbs of the 1991 murder, torture and inhumane treatment of more than 200 Croatian prisoners of war. Three trials are 

currently underway in the Special Court: one against 5 members 

of the Scorpions paramilitary unit for the 1995 Srebrenica-related 

killing of 6 Bosniak youths, another against 7 Bosnian Serb members of the Zvornik territorial defense indicted for the 1992 forceful 

eviction and killing of 174 Muslim Bosniaks, and a third involving 

8 until-recently-active members of the Serbian police and State Security service (BIA) for the 1999 killing of 48 members of the 

Berisha family in the Kosovo village of Suva Reka. In Croatia, the 

Supreme Court on April 29 confirmed a Zagreb County court conviction of a former paramilitary member who received 15 years in 

prison for his involvement in killings in Srebrenica and for torture 

of prisoners of war near Vukovar. Croatian courts will soon begin 

prosecuting a case transferred from The Hague. While important 

work remains—and the June 3 killing in Belgrade of a key ‘‘protected witness’’ in the Djindjic assassination case highlights important concerns regarding organized crime and witness protection—

these convictions mark a significant step forward for the region in 

the local prosecution of war crimes, and in establishing the credibility and transparency of the criminal justice system. 

To this end, we continue to provide significant assistance: our 

contributions to date to the Sarajevo War Crimes Chamber have 

reached nearly $14 million. We will contribute $1 million in Fiscal 

Year 2006 for training and equipment to increase capacity for Serbia’s Special Court for War Crimes to investigate and prosecute 

cases, including those originating from ICTY case files. With more 

than $1.5 million in assistance to Croatian courts, the U.S. has 

strengthened Croatia’s ability to try these and other domestic war 

crimes cases in accordance with internationally recognized legal 

standards. 

The majority of persons displaced as a result of the Balkan conflicts have returned home. Since the Dayton Accords were signed 

a decade ago, 1,012,970 people have returned to their homes in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina; almost half of them to places where they 

now constitute an ethnic minority—including areas that were the 

worst hit by the conflict. We are pressing governments throughout 
42

the region to assist in finding durable solutions for all remaining 

refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Only by providing 

real opportunities for sustainable returns—through the protection 

of vulnerable populations, the resolution of outstanding property 

issues, and the promotion of viable economic activities—can the region’s long-term stability and integration into Europe be ensured. 

Throughout the region, the rule of law is taking hold, and countries are becoming more effective at fighting crime and administering justice. Efforts to combat trafficking in persons—an important bellwether for crime-fighting success—have been impressive 

throughout the region. We have made it a priority to urge authorities to make progress, including by providing strategies to help 

focus government efforts in all areas of anti-trafficking and using 

our assistance—almost $4 million for the region in Fiscal Year 

2005—to support reforms. Each of the countries in the region is 

now making significant efforts to fully meet the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Albania continues to 

demonstrate strong law enforcement efforts, convicting 54 traffickers in 2005, with Albanian courts issuing significant penalties. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina increased funding for victim protection 

and coordinated with NGOs to screen, identify, and assist victims. 

The Department’s Trafficking in Persons report cited Bosnia’s 

strike force as a best practice. Croatia is implementing a comprehensive awareness and prevention program targeting potential 

victims. Last May, the Macedonian government passed important 

witness protection legislation to provide resources and improve 

safeguards for victim-witnesses. Montenegro made tangible 

progress in prosecution and protection, and Serbia increased efforts 

to protect victim-witnesses. Challenges remain for the region, especially regarding the difficult issues of victim identification, witness 

protection, and official complicity, but given the strength of crime 

networks in the region, South Central Europe has made significant 

progress in fighting trafficking. 

Efforts continue to fight organized crime and corruption which, 

if left unchecked, would threaten the stability of the region and the 

safety of its people. Albania has broken up several notorious smuggling and criminal groups, and is starting to change longstanding 

patterns of crime and corruption. Thanks in part to U.S. assistance 

in improving border security, the illicit transit of people and goods 

across the Adriatic has been reduced to a fraction of what it once 

was. The Albanian Government recently signed an agreement with 

the Millennium Challenge Corporation for $13.85 million in funding to support reforms and initiatives specifically targeting crime 

and corruption and improving the environment for legitimate business. 

Elections throughout the region have generally been judged to be 

free and fair. On May 21, the people of Montenegro voted in favor 

of independence with an exceptional turnout of 86.5 percent. The 

final results have been certified and announced, and the parliament of Montenegro has adopted a declaration on independence. 

We were pleased that the campaign and the referendum were carried out in a peaceful, democratic, and transparent manner; both 

sides of the vote demonstrated political maturity in handling this 

momentous decision. The people of Albania elected a new govern-
43

ment last July in a much improved election which led to a smooth 

transfer of power, the first in the country’s post-communist period. 

We continue to encourage the government and political parties in 

Albania to complete the process of electoral reform so that local 

elections early next year are fully in compliance with international 

democratic standards. 

Important reforms continue in Macedonia, whose multiethnic coalition government has completed the legislative implementation of 

the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement and is proceeding with its 

practical implementation. Ongoing challenges include working toward equitable representation of minorities in state structures and 

decentralization of authorities to the municipal level, which should 

enhance the efficiency and accountability of government, and offer 

greater protections to minorities. Continued and full implementation of the Framework Agreement remains the key to Macedonia’s 

future as a stable, prosperous multiethnic democracy. 

The Balkans have indeed come a long way since Milosevic presided over the worst human rights abuses in Europe after World 

War II, but important work remains. 

Cooperation with the ICTY is still an issue in the region. Five 

of the six remaining fugitive indictees are Bosnian Serbs, and the 

majority of them are suspected to be in Serbia or the Republika 

Srpska. These fugitives include notorious indictees Ratko Mladic 

and Radovan Karadzic—for whom the Tribunal’s doors will always 

remain open. This non-cooperation remains a roadblock to full integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions, and we continue to engage 

authorities and use congressionally-mandated sanctions to encourage compliance with the Tribunal. We will continue to expect all 

authorities in the region to fulfill their international obligations. 

The return of refugees and IDPs constitutes a major unresolved 

issue within the region, and significant efforts are still needed to 

ensure that displaced persons have the freedom and perception of 

security to return to their homes if they so choose. Approximately 

360,000 people remain displaced in Serbia and Montenegro (80,000 

refugees from Croatia, 35,000 refugees from Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, and 225,000 IDPs from Kosovo, according to official 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] estimates), 190,000 displaced persons in Bosnia are still seeking a durable solution. An additional 100,000 Bosnian refugees living outside Bosnia continue to express an interest in return. In Bosnia, 

Croatia and Kosovo, we continuously and strongly encourage authorities to provide a welcoming atmosphere for minority returns, 

including through reconstruction of housing and infrastructure. 

Throughout the region, we continually urge authorities at all levels of government to implement their commitments and to facilitate 

returns. A number of U.S.-funded projects that focus on agricultural producers, microcredits, small business creation and more accountable local government contribute to the sustainability of returns. Democracy Commission small grants contribute to the capacity building of local NGOs, including those who represent minority 

returnee communities. 

Overall returns to Kosovo are far too low, and we are working 

closely with Kosovo’s provisional government to create a more conducive environment for returns. Earlier this month, Kosovo officials 
44

signed a Protocol on Returns with the United Nations Mission in 

Kosovo (UNMIK) and Serbia delineating each party’s responsibility 

for facilitating returns, including defining the parameters for returns to places other than one’s home. The Contact Group has also 

developed with UNMIK a list of 13 priority Standard action items, 

many of which focus on minority rights and call upon Kosovo officials to do more to enforce property rights, ensure funding for returns and prosecute individuals responsible for inter-ethnic crimes. 

We continue to provide assistance to help these vulnerable populations. In Fiscal Year 2006, our Bureau for Population, Refugees 

and Migration will provide $13.8 million for activities related to the 

protection, return, and local integration of displaced persons in the 

Balkans; of this total, $11.3 million will fund UNHCR’s efforts in 

the region, and $2.5 million will go to NGO programs in Kosovo 

and Serbia. For the last three years, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Ambassador’s Fund has provided our embassies in the region with funds for small-scale projects that benefit 

minority communities. These projects have included the contribution of educational materials to schools, as well as the reconstruction of vital community infrastructure (schools and clinics) in sensitive return areas. Through Support for East European Democracy 

funding, we also support economic and democratic development 

necessary for sustainable returns, assist municipalities where local 

government and minority communities work together to foster returns and build a multiethnic society, and fund institutions to resolve outstanding property claims. The United States has also 

granted refugee status to approximately 150,000 individuals displaced from Bosnia and Herzegovina over the last fifteen years. 

Governments are judged on how they treat their most vulnerable 

citizens—and ethnic minorities in the Balkans remain vulnerable 

to discrimination and violence. There are places where ethnic minorities feel unsafe and unwelcome in their communities, as in 

parts of Kosovo. In the Serbian province of Vojvodina minorities 

have experienced in the recent past instances of discrimination, 

hate speech and vandalism to property. Our embassy has kept a 

careful watch there and reports notable improvement. Protection of 

minority rights is a priority U.S. objective throughout the region. 

Just as there can be no true reconciliation until all war criminals 

are brought to justice, there can be no lasting peace until religious 

and ethnic minorities feel welcome and secure. 

The protection of minorities is central to our policy in Kosovo. We 

actively support the ongoing UN-led negotiations to determine 

Kosovo’s future political status this year. The resolution of Kosovo’s 

status must ensure that Kosovo’s minorities are protected and that 

Kosovo remains multi-ethnic. It must also promote stability in the 

Balkans and further this region’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic 

community. Since last November, the United States and other 

members of the Contact Group (including France, Germany, Italy, 

Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) have supported UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s efforts to broker agreements between Serbia and Kosovo that would solidify a multi-ethnic Kosovo where Kosovo Serbs and other minorities are confident 

of their safe, secure and prosperous future. Contact Group ministers agreed last January that every effort should be made to 
45

achieve a negotiated solution in the course of 2006. With our Contact Group partners and in coordination with the U.N. Mission in 

Kosovo, we continue to press the Kosovo government to implement 

U.N.-developed standards for good governance and protection of minorities. These standards aim to enforce property rights, increase 

freedom of movement, prosecute perpetrators of inter-ethnic crimes 

and provide adequate funding for the return of the displaced. The 

promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms remains at 

the forefront of our Kosovo policy, as it has been throughout the 

Balkans for over a decade. 

An especially vulnerable ethnic group, the Roma—along with the 

Ashkalia and Egyptian communities—continues to suffer disproportionately throughout the region. Whether it be physical harassment 

from police, lack of access to basic services such as education, 

health care and housing, or societal discrimination, the Roma are 

among the most marginalized of minorities. Croatia, Macedonia 

and Serbia and Montenegro participate in the Decade of Roma Inclusion. After months of active engagement by our Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina is preparing to apply for membership in the Decade of Roma Inclusion and expects to complete its 

remaining action plans by September 1. As a result of our advocacy, the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees has 

honored its commitment to fund the activities of the Council of 

Roma. We are also providing a $40,000 grant through the Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund for Romani NGOs to 

conduct a nationwide population survey, which will draw attention 

to critical areas that the government must address. Our Embassy 

in Sarajevo has nominated a Romani activist for an international 

visitors program on managing diversity in a multi-ethnic society, in 

addition to awarding a number of Democracy Commission grants 

to Romani NGOs to address human rights issues of concern to Bosnian Roma. The Maryland National Guard humanitarian medical 

mission is also scheduled to set up one-day clinics in July in four 

different Roma communities near Tuzla, providing several thousand Roma with access to basic medical, dental and optometry 

services. 

In northern Kosovo, we continue to closely monitor and support 

UNMIK’s efforts to relocate approximately 500 displaced Roma 

from dangerously contaminated IDP camps. On June 6, representatives from the U.S. Office in Pristina visited 248 Roma now residing at a cleaner, safer temporary facility. Work is also underway 

to rebuild this community’s original neighborhood, to which some 

families may be returning to as early as August. Work is clearly 

underway, one of the three lead-contaminated camps has been 

closed, and lead abatement therapy is expected to begin next week. 

We are transferring $1 million in assistance to help UNMIK meet 

the immediate medical emergency needs of this population, and 

continue to engage UN and Kosovo officials to encourage their active efforts to ensure these individuals have a durable solution. 

While each of the countries in the region generally respects the 

right of religious freedom, we have been closely following recent 

legislative restrictions on religious freedom. We share the Commission’s concerns regarding Serbia’s Law on Churches and Religious 

Organizations, and our Ambassador in Belgrade has led efforts to 
46

engage the government by urging Prime Minister Kostunica and 

President Tadic to pursue positive changes in the legislation. We 

are watching closely for the ameliorative amendments promised by 

the President. In Kosovo, we are pressing the authorities to adopt 

expeditiously the internationally accepted draft religious freedom 

law that would foster increased tolerance in Kosovo. 

We continue to pursue political reform throughout the region. 

Last month’s defeat of the constitutional reform package by two 

votes in Bosnia and Herzegovina was disappointing, but we will 

continue to support the efforts of the Bosnian people to modernize 

their constitution and to streamline their state government. The 

Bosnian parties that back constitutional reform have called for a 

renewed effort after the October elections; we will strongly support 

such an initiative. In advance of Macedonia’s July 5 parliamentary 

elections, we are pressing political party leaders to address the serious flaws evidenced in the 2005 municipal elections as well as 

working with major parties to develop issues-based campaigns and 

enhancing participation by women, youth and other minorities, 

such as Roma. We have provided funding there for smaller NGOs 

to conduct voter education campaigns and worked with the Islamic 

community to gain their public support for free and fair elections 

and guarantees for individual voting rights. We continue to work 

with Government of Croatia to increase transparency, develop 

codes of ethics, and increase public accountability, thereby increasing citizens’ faith in government. The civil society sector is growing 

stronger in the Balkans, and non-governmental organizations are 

proving to be strong partners in the transition to democracy and 

free market economies. But the sector is still in need of support, 

both financial and political, in order to keep the transitions on the 

path to ‘‘irreversible democracy.’’

Our leadership is key to continued progress in the Balkans, but 

the United States works closely with our European allies and 

through multilateral organizations. With our Contact Group partners, we support President Ahtisaari’s efforts to resolve Kosovo’s 

status. Through the OSCE, we advance elections that meet international standards and we work with allies to promote democratization through the observation of elections, expansion of civil society capacities in the region, and monitoring of freedom of the 

media. Through NATO, we continue to help play a key role as a 

guarantor of security in the region. In Kosovo, the NATO-led 

KFOR provides a stabilizing force, which is particularly important 

during the status negotiation process. In addition, the prospect of 

enhanced relationships with NATO, through Partnership for Peace 

or membership in the institution itself, provides the impetus for 

needed political, economic and defense reforms throughout the region. 

Despite the extreme toll the Balkan wars have taken on the lives 

of its people, they are moving ahead. Those who once fought each 

other are now cooperating to advance political and economic reforms, strengthen respect for minorities, ensure opportunities for 

all citizens, aid civil society organizations that support vulnerable 

populations, and resolve post-conflict problems and cross-border 

issues. In this respect, our goals for South Central Europe are coming to fruition, and the United States and the international com-
47

munity, including this Commission, can take pride in our contributions. The promise of stability and Euro-Atlantic integration looms 

closer than ever for much of the region, and those who fear being 

left behind have taken notice. The international community’s continued involvement will be necessary to ensure democratic institutions are strong enough to endure, that tolerance and ethnic reconciliation triumph over past hatreds, and that the countries of the 

region adequately prepare themselves to take their rightful place 

in Europe.
48

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, DIRECTOR OF 

PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF 

PEACE 

Mr. Chairman, my thanks for the opportunity to testify before 

your Commission, where I first appeared in December 1998. 

Milosevic was then in power, Kosovo was in the throes of a violent 

Albanian insurgency and Serbian crackdown, and Bosnia was still 

a place where war seemed possible. No doubt things have improved 

since then. 

That said, I would like to be brutally honest about the current 

situation in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. While none of these places 

is going back to war, none of them has established peace on a firm 

foundation. It is time to name names as to why. 

BOSNIA: MISSED OPPORTUNITY

In Bosnia, the path to Europe is blocked. Great strides have been 

made—the country now has a single Defense Ministry and unified, 

if not entirely united, armed forces. But Republika Srspka has 

failed to arrest Radovan Karadzic, too many Croat political leaders 

in Bosnia still dream of their own entity, and the constitution that 

the U.S. gave Bosnia at Dayton does not meet European standards. 

The United States Institute of Peace has for the past year supported a Bosnian initiative to revise that constitution in accordance 

with Council of Europe guidelines. Remarkably, Bosnian politicians 

reached an agreement, with assistance from my colleague Don 

Hays—on loan to the Institute from the State Department—and 

the staff of the Public and International Law and Policy Group 

headed by Paul Williams. Disappointingly, the amendments failed 

by two votes in the Bosnian parliament. 

Fault on this issue lies not so much with the one Croat and one 

Bosniak who defected from their parties in the vote, but with Haris 

Silajdzic, whose entire party voted against the constitutional 

amendments. Silajdzic was a wartime prime minister who merits 

the admiration of all those who sought to extract Bosnia from the 

maelstrom of 1992-95. But in peacetime he has preferred to campaign quixotically for abolition of the entities that make up Bosnia—the Federation and Republika Srpska—rather than support 

more realistic changes that can be approved in Parliament. 

It is true that the entities, which froze in place Bosnia’s warring 

parties, make governance difficult and costly. But there is no possibility of eliminating the entities in the foreseeable future, and Bosnia faces a challenging year because of developments in Montenegro and Kosovo. I hope the constitutional amendments will be 

brought back to Parliament and passed, with Silajdzic’s party abstaining. This would solidify Bosnia’s democratic institutions and 

take the country a giant step closer to European integration. 

SERBIA: STILL LOOKING BACKWARDS

Let me turn next to Serbia, where democratic institutions have 

unfortunately failed to complete the revolution that began on October 5, 2001 with the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. From that time forward, the question has been whether Serbia—the vital center of 

the Balkans—would hold on to past myths of Greater Serbia and 
49

all of Kosovo as the Serb Jerusalem, or look forward to a future inside the European Union. 

Since Zoran Djindjic’s assassination, Serbia has chosen the past 

over the future. This is why Ratko Mladic—I resist calling him 

general—is not in The Hague. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica 

governs with support from those who advocate Greater Serbia, 

want to protect Mladic from arrest and the Serbian security services from reform. He has refused to govern with support from 

Djindjic’s more Europe-focused party. 

I trust Europe—with more leverage than the U.S.—will succeed 

in twisting Kostunica’s arm hard enough to make Mladic go to The 

Hague, but that is not enough. We need to see real reform of the 

security sector, including the police and secret services. The U.S. 

was correct to suspend assistance to Serbia. In order to send an 

even clearer signal, the Administration should give the $7 million 

remaining this fiscal year to those in Serbia’s courageous civil society who are insisting that the country come to terms with the past 

through truth and justice, rather than by denying crimes or covering them up. 

Belgrade’s backward-looking attitude extends to Kosovo as well, 

where Serbia is determined to maintain governing authority over 

Serbs on clearly defined territory. This may not be partition, but 

it is too close for comfort. Ethno-territorial separation of this sort 

would set a precedent that Albanians would want to follow in 

southern Serbia as well as in Macedonia, and it would revive efforts at ethno-territorial separation in Bosnia. 

To prevent it, the international community will have to do more 

than issue Contact Group statements saying that it will not allow 

partition: it will need to have a clear plan for international control 

of Serb-populated areas and eventual transition to Pristina’s control. I see some signs of technical preparation for this, but little 

sign of the political will needed to prevent Serbia from achieving 

de facto and even de jure partition. 

KOSOVO: CLARITY COUNTS

Turning to Kosovo, the failure of its Provisional Institutions of 

Self Government to get Serbs back to their homes safely and securely is the biggest single obstacle to determining final status, 

which should be done this year. Kosovo’s elected leadership must 

take responsibility for this failure. Former President Ibrahim 

Rugova, who was the living symbol of Kosovo’s struggle for independence until his death earlier this year, former speaker of the 

Kosovo Parliament Nexhat Daci, and several prime ministers have 

so far failed—despite some with good intentions—to do all that 

needs to be done. 

It is late in the game, but not too late for recently elected President Sedjiu and Prime Minister Ceku to correct the mistakes of 

their predecessors. Otherwise, I fear that the final status decision 

will be far less clear and unequivocal than it should be. I hear rumblings of giving Kosovo independence, but keeping it out of the UN 

until it meets more standards. This, some Europeans think, would 

help ‘‘democrats’’ in Serbia fend off electoral gains by the Socialists 

and Radicals. Would that all UN members were subjected to such 

rigor, but since they are not, doing so with Kosovo would encourage 
50

extremists and likely lead to violence. And it would not prevent the 

Radicals from coming to power in Serbia, which is likely no matter 

what is done in Kosovo. 

CONCLUSION: A YEAR OF DECISION

Mr. Chairman, this is a year of decision in the Balkans: the question is whether the decisions will bring peace or instability. We’ve 

started well: the unequivocal result of the Montenegrin referendum—slightly more than the 55 per cent the EU insisted 

upon—bodes well. If Sarajevo chooses constitutional amendments, 

Belgrade chooses to send Mladic to The Hague and reform the security sector, Pristina chooses to get Serbs back to their homes, 

and the Contact Group provides for international supervision for 

the Serbs of Kosovo, the year could end well, with a clear decision 

on Kosovo’s status. 

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author, 

not the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on 

policy.
51

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR OF 

THE NEW EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES PROJECT, SENIOR

FELLOW, EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before the Helsinki Commission and allowing me to present my views on the present and future of South-Central Europe. I will focus attention on the three 

U.S.-Adriatic Charter countries, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, 

as well as the newly restored state of Montenegro, in briefly discussing three issues: the progress of human rights, democratic consolidation, and international integration. 

In sum, as compared to a decade ago the eastern Adriatic or 

Western Balkan region has become a zone of political stability and 

international cooperation. All four of these eastern Adriatic littoral 

states have made significant progress toward ensuring civil and minority rights according to prevailing European standards, consolidating their democratic and market systems, and pursuing beneficial bilateral and multilateral ties with neighbors. The next stage 

of evolution, especially once the outstanding status issue of Kosovo 

is finally resolved by international powers, must focus on good governance, economic development, international institutional integration, and the strengthening of regional and European security. 

HUMAN RIGHTS

Albania: Albania’s human rights record continues to make steady 

progress and more closely meets general European standards. The 

country’s small ethnic minorities are not subject to violations or 

abuse and the country remains renowned for its religious tolerance. 

However, the Roma community continues to suffer from societal 

discrimination and concern has been expressed by human rights organizations over reported police abuses against prisoners, infringements on citizens’ privacy rights, the politicization of the media, 

and violence and discrimination against women and children. All 

these issues will need to be addressed more effectively as Albania 

moves ahead toward potential candidacy status in the EU over the 

coming few years. 

Croatia: Croatia has developed a respectable human rights 

record. However, although relations between majority Croats and 

minority Serbs have improved over the years, tensions still persist 

in some areas of the country amidst complaints that Zagreb has 

not done enough to encourage refugee returns and Serbian reintegration into Croatian society. While some of the criticism is justified, the number of refugees wishing to return to Croatia has also 

declined because of factors beyond the government’s immediate 

control, including limited economic opportunities in rural areas and 

small towns, inadequate financial resources, and Serbian reluctance to return to impoverished areas of the country. Nonetheless, 

in order to enhance inter-ethnic and inter-state reconciliation Zagreb should redouble its efforts to ensure minority representation 

in state institutions at central and local levels and provide more 

employment opportunities for returning Serbs. 

Macedonia: The large Albanian minority in Macedonia has clearly benefited from the implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
52

Agreement that terminated a potentially destructive guerrilla war 

launched by Albanian militants in the summer of 2001. Albanians 

are much more equitably represented in all state institutions and 

have acquired additional collective rights in language use and education, and have a major voice in legislation that affects ethnic minorities. However, the situation of the Roma population remains 

problematic as it does throughout the region, especially in terms of 

discrimination and the absence of affirmative action to enable 

Romanis to escape the cycle of poverty. 

Montenegro: Montenegro has a multi-ethnic society in which national or religious identity has not played a divisive or conflictive 

role in the country’s progress toward independence. Indeed, the 

majority of Montenegro’s Albanian and Muslim communities voted 

together with Slavic Orthodox Montenegrins for an independent 

state. The sizeable Serbian minority, many of whom voted to preserve the union with Serbia, must also remain integrated in all 

state structures and benefit from independence and the new country’s accelerated reform program in line with EU standards. 

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Albania: The new Democratic Party government has committed 

itself to pursuing crucial reforms, including a sustained campaign 

against organized criminality and official corruption, ensuring judicial efficiency and independence, and improving the functioning of 

public administration. Albania’s destructive political polarization 

also needs to be tackled by encouraging parliamentary and national consensus on important reformist measures so that the losers in elections are not losers in the broader political process. Legal 

investigations against corrupt officials should not become a platform for political battles between the two largest parties and must 

be conducted on a strictly non-partisan basis. 

Croatia: Croatia is a fully functioning pluralistic democracy with 

an effective multi-party system and capable executive, legislative, 

and judicial institutions. Since the beginning of the decade Zagreb 

has trimmed presidential powers and vested increasing authority 

in its parliamentary structures. This has reduced prospects for the 

replication of the Tudjman era when a personalistic quasi-authoritarian system was in place. Croatia has an independent mass 

media and numerous civic structures that can freely monitor, comment, and impact on government policy and holds politicians accountable to the rule of law. 

Macedonia: Macedonia has successfully implemented all the stipulations in the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. This has included an administrative reorganization that threatened to provoke 

inter-ethnic conflicts amidst accusations by some militant Macedonians that it would lead to a division of the country. Instead, the 

redistricting has decentralized governmental authority and enabled 

local governments to gain a larger stake in economic development. 

In the long-term, the reforms will benefit inter-ethnic coexistence. 

However, progress still needs to be made on reforming the police 

service and the judiciary and dealing more effectively with official 

corruption. Macedonia faces parliamentary elections later this year 

and they should confirm the progress and stability that the country 

has achieved. 
53

Montenegro: Montenegro possesses the infrastructure of an independent state with functioning administrative, legislative, and judicial institutions, a separate economic system, and the euro as the 

official currency. After the prolonged struggle to achieve statehood, 

Podgorica will now need to focus on meeting the criteria for EU 

candidate status. This will include administrative and judicial reform, combating official corruption, and other measures that are 

being implemented by Montenegro’s Adriatic neighbors. 

INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION

Albania: Albania is engaged in the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The Union called for improvements in 

Tirana’s performance in fighting crime and corruption and in pursuing other reforms in order to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and move toward EU candidate status. 

The SAA was signed on 12 June 2006. Albania also has a European 

Partnership with the EU, which defines short and medium term 

priorities for reform monitored by the European Commission. 

Albania has maintained a close relationship with the U.S. and 

Washington supports the country’s membership in NATO once 

Tirana completes essential military reforms. The Adriatic Charter 

countries have dispatched a joint 12-person medical team to the 

ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, stationed in Kabul. This is the first international mission the Adriatic 

Charter members have conducted jointly. In addition, Albania has 

approximately 120 personnel in Iraq, under U.S. command, 30 soldiers with ISAF in Afghanistan, and about 60 peacekeepers alongside NATO in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 

Croatia: Of the four Adriatic states, Croatia is furthest along toward EU entry as an official candidate country. Zagreb’s improved 

cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 

Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), particularly following the capture of indicted war criminal General Ante Gotovina, enabled the country to 

open negotiations on EU membership in October 2005. It also 

helped to put Croatia on track for NATO accession. Nevertheless, 

issues of minority rights and refugee returns will continue to be 

monitored as Croatia embarks on the process of meeting the voluminous EU criteria for accession. Croatia has upheld good relations 

with the U.S. and with NATO. 50 members of a Military Police platoon serve in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and 30 Croatian 

troops serve as UN peacekeepers in nine different trouble spots. 

Zagreb aspires to NATO membership and will need to complete a 

package of reforms in order to qualify for a formal invitation. 

Macedonia: Macedonia attained candidate status with the EU in 

December 2005, although its accession discussions have not yet 

commenced. These will begin once the country is assessed by EU 

representatives as having reached a sufficient degree of compliance 

with the Union’s membership criteria. A major report on Macedonia’s progress toward EU accession is due to be issued by the close 

of 2006. Macedonia has developed a close relationship with the U.S. 

and has benefited from Washington’s recognition of its constitutional name. Skopje has 35 personnel serving in Iraq with the 

Multi-National Division in Baghdad, and 20 soldiers with the 

NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan. 
54

Montenegro: A peaceful divorce will enable both Montenegro and 

Serbia to focus on their crucial domestic reforms and the arduous 

process of EU integration. Montenegro will no longer be held back 

by Belgrade’s self-isolation due to its inability to arrest the indicted 

war criminal General Ratko Mladic. It can now redouble its commitment to structural reform and will be judged on its own performance. Montenegro entered the SAA process in 2005 as part of 

the EU’s agreement with the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In 

line with the ‘‘twin-track’’ approach, negotiations were launched 

with the State Union and with the two republics in their respective 

fields of competence in October 2005. With the break-up of the 

Union, Montenegro will have its own individual track through the 

SAA toward EU candidate status. Given Serbia’s slowdown in relations with the EU, Montenegro is likely to move faster toward 

membership. Its small size and small economy may make it easier 

to complete necessary reforms, comply with EU standards, and 

move toward accession. 

Independence for Montenegro and Serbia, and eventually Kosovo 

will create the underpinnings of credible states that are domestically legitimate and internationally recognized. This will also 

change the nature of international involvement from that of peaceenforcement and state building to economic investment and institutional integration throughout the Western Balkans. The final dissolution of post-Yugoslavia will also help terminate the rationale 

for the sizeable security apparatus that Serbia and Montenegro inherited from the Milosevic regime. The creation of light modernized 

detachments that can respond to contemporary threats will help reduce lingering security fears throughout the region and direct attention toward economic development and foreign investment. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

CONSOLIDATING REGIONAL SECURITY

• The U.S.-Adriatic Charter needs to become more focused in enabling Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to move toward NATO accession. NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006 provides a valuable opportunity to affirm each country’s progress in preparation 

for formal membership invitations in 2007 or early 2008. 

• Montenegro should be invited to join the U.S.-Adriatic Charter 

as soon as feasible. This will help to engage the new state in a 

number of regional and trans-Atlantic security initiatives. Montenegro also meets the criteria for inclusion in NATO’s Partnership 

for Peace (PfP) program. To attain Alliance membership, Podgorica 

will be required to accelerate its military reform program and comply with NATO’s Membership Action Plans (MAPs). Montenegro 

also needs assistance from the U.S. and NATO in the establishing 

its own Ministry of Defense. Montenegro’s restored international 

role will help the NATO allies in countering security threats along 

Europe’s expanding borders in the Adriatic-Balkan-Black Sea zone, 

including ethnic strife, political and religious terrorism, organized 

crime, and energy insecurity. 
55

PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

• Momentum must be given in promoting effective democratic 

governance across the region and cooperation across borders as witnessed in the most successful parts of Central-Eastern Europe 

where countries were given firm prospects for EU and NATO accession. There are continuing concerns in some states about the performance of government institutions, the level of official corruption, 

and the extent of administrative and legal transparency. 

STIMULATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

• Each country in the Adriatic-Balkan region must aim to ensure 

administrative reform, transparent privatization, and a legislative 

and taxation system that attracts foreign investment and releases 

private enterprise. This will be the most effective impetus for economic development in a region stifled by a confluence of negatives: 

the legacies of communism and statism, the impact of recent wars, 

corruption, criminality, mismanagement, international isolation, 

and institutional dependency. 

• A concerted international investment effort must be undertaken to upgrade, and in some cases rebuild altogether, the basic 

cross-regional infrastructure network such as road, rail, energy systems, and telecommunications. The Western Balkan market of 

some 25 million people can thereby capitalize on more significant 

and targeted foreign direct investments. 

South Central Europe or South Eastern Europe remains a stellar 

example where the U.S. and the EU have worked closely together 

to expand the zone of European security. With its Balkan stabilization mission completed, the Allies will be able to focus more intensively on the next phase of trans-Atlantic enlargement and Allied 

security in the Black Sea, Caspian, and Central Asian regions.
56

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH K. GRIEBOSKI,

PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, INSTITUTE FOR RELIGION

AND PUBLIC POLICY 

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Commissioners, Ladies and gentlemen: 

I would like to thank you in advance for the opportunity to speak 

about the human rights situation of Roma minorities in South Central Europe. My work as the Adviser on Roma and Sinti Issues 

with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has 

allowed me to witness first hand some of the injustices Roma face 

as they attempt to access their political and civil rights. While 

many constructive steps have been taken to address the multifaceted challenges confronting Roma in this region, much work remains to be done. 

As Europe’s largest, trans-national minority, Roma populations 

are unique in the socioeconomic challenges presented to them. 

Roma number in the millions across-Europe’s states, but lack a ‘kin 

state’ or any ‘ethnic-territorial space’. In addition, having limited 

political status, many Roma communities throughout the OSCE region, and particularly the countries of South and Central Europe, 

are viewed by the majority population as a category of ‘‘secondclass’’ humans, and a burden to the states and societies which define themselves and ‘‘others’’ in ethno-national public discourses. 

Even when some Roma do reach income levels on par or above 

their non-Roma neighbours, the stigmatization that they experience impacts upon their ability to buy land, send their children to 

local schools and participate in civic life. 

While the recognition of civil and political rights of Roma in the 

countries of South and Central Europe has improved over the recent years, serious problems remain. These problems where well 

summarized by Livia Jaroka, the first Romani woman Member of 

the European Parliament: ‘‘There are still widespread difficulties in 

enforcing the social inclusion strategies. The anti-discrimination 

(laws) where they are . . . are not fully implemented in practice. . . . public officials and the media frequently make antiGypsy remarks, and Roma are racially targeted for violence and 

verbal abuse.’’

It is safe to say that the issue of racism and discrimination continues to be the underlying cause behind the problems Roma face 

in their access to economic, public and political life of the communities and countries in which they live. Moreover, in recent years, 

discrimination has taken on new forms and I would like to mention 

here just two illustrations of these new phenomena which are referred by the activists as ‘‘anti-gypsyism’’: the rise of the skin-heads 

movements in countries undergoing political and economic transformation, in particular in Russia; and the escalation of hatespeeches targeting specifically the Roma. In relation to this, in 

2005 and 2006, the Football Federation in Romania as well as the 

National Council for Combat of Discrimination resorted to fines 

and other punitive measures against clubs, in order to take decisive action against racial hatred. But what is LACKING: the political condemnation of such phenomena by top political leaders of the 

country, by Members of Parliaments, and by opinion leaders with 

influence on the public mind. 
57

The relations between Roma and police play a significant role in 

this context. They constitute the most visible aspects of relations 

between minority and majority, highlighted by the media, with 

multiple implications for successful minority-majority relations in 

all spheres. 

The methodology deployed by the ODIHR Contact Point is based 

on taking a proactive role in analyzing measures taken by participating States to address points of tension between Roma and nonRoma, which could lead, if neglected, to open conflict. This methodology involves active support of local authorities and Roma communities in participating States to jointly initiate, share practical initiatives, and implement solutions to the root causes of such tensions. This includes strengthening the capacity of Roma and Sinti 

in democratic NGOs and of Romani media. Moreover, this cannot 

be realized without extensive co-operation with NGOs and civil society activists acting to combat racism and xenophobia in general, 

such as those involved in combating anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, 

etc. We are closely cooperating with the OSCE/ODIHR Tolerance 

and Non-discrimination Unit in supporting their programmes and 

data bases on discriminatory issues. 

In implementing its programmes and projects, the ODIHR pays 

special attention to the advancement of fundamental human rights 

for Roma and Sinti, with a special focus on those agreed upon by 

OSCE participating States. The OSCE Action Plan on Improving 

the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area, endorsed 

by all 55 participating States, offers guidelines and detailed recommendations for OSCE participating States to formulate Romarelated comprehensive policies that are: ‘‘. . . aimed at ensuring 

that Roma and Sinti people are able to play a full and equal part 

in our societies, and at eradicating discrimination against them’’. 

Complementary to the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU institutions, some UN agencies, the World Bank , some high profile 

international organizations (among others, the OSI, the project of 

Ethnic Relations etc.) are elaborating and implementing a variety 

of programmes and projects towards improving the situation of 

Roma populations in particular countries, regions, and local communities. 

As a result, there are quite numerous programmes/projects (governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental) addressing 

the alleviation of poverty, income-generation, improving schooling 

or health, building institutions and associations in view of preserving and developing cultural rights, etc. 

Yet, while different political commitments, recommendations and 

programmes/projects are welcome, many of them do not offer the 

means to combat human rights violations of individual Roma persons (and groups). Moreover, in some countries, and in particular 

in relation to political circumstances (as for example, those of the 

accession to the EU of some countries in Central-Eastern and 

South-Eastern Europe), the elaboration and adoption of Roma-related national or ‘‘comprehensive policies’’ became an activity which 

consumed time, human resources , money, etc. and which is advertised mainly among international actors and organizations; this 

policy making exercise (while necessary, as part of imparting social 

knowledge) it is not matched by the corresponding political will. 
58

Political action should be used to build institutional arrangements 

and to provide the needed funding, commitment and promises laid 

down by these ‘‘policy papers’’ to be translated in acts. This would 

reflect the realities experienced by Roma people in their daily lives. 

In the daily life of a Roma people, families and groups are facing 

the destructive effects of racial prejudices and discriminatory treatment enacted by the State and public officers, teachers, medical 

doctors, etc. 

We need to re-focus public policies and the action tools of the 

participating States as well as of the international communities 

working with Roma. This should be done, among other areas, by 

making the combating of racism and respect for human rights, the 

central theme and goal of public action. 

One aim to achieve this objective is to include Roma in all phases 

of the decision-making process. 

If a re-focused approach does not take place, if discrimination in 

Roma populations continues, if violation of human rights remains 

unreported, un-investigated and un-tried. . . . Then we may foresee an increase of frustration for members of Roma communities. 

This could translate, in turn, to a possible radicalization of the discourse and, eventually, of the action employed by activists of these 

communities. 

While the discourse related to Roma and minority rights policy 

has broadened, the underlying problems Roma communities face 

has remained unchanged. If utilizing the poverty discourse allows 

us to have more data available for supporting policies, if by crying 

‘‘national Minority’’ one ensures some form of representation and 

inclusion of Roma in institutions, it does not address the roots of 

the continuous violations of human rights of the Roma. 

I would like to illustrate my presentation of today by addressing 

a recent case of what could constitute Roma rights abuse and action in relation to it relevant for my testimony today. In the 

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in May of this year, a 16-

year old Roma boy went missing after an encounter between two 

Roma boys and the police forces. The boy was found dead in a river 

16 days later. His father questions the cause of his death, while the 

body is still at the Institute for Court medicine at the Medical faculty in Skopje, where the cause of death is still being investigated. 

Beyond the tragedy of the incident, I would like to read here the 

statement of a Roma activist in relation to how the Roma dealt 

with this incident: ‘‘What kind of a nation are we? I see mistakes 

done by all of us; we have to be ashamed of ourselves, what kind 

of activists, what kind of NGOs are we, when we haven’t shown 

unity and firmness. I can tell this that we have become apparatus 

which only has a program and we only work according to that.’’

A number of countries are witnessing the emergence of new 

trends and patterns of abuse of Roma rights. Denial of political 

participation, despite (sometimes reluctant and incomplete) recognition of Roma as a national minority; and mounting intricate 

hurdles on the way of obtaining personal documentation, residence 

and citizenship—which bar Roma from enjoying a host of other 

rights—are examples of persistent and systemic exclusion. Furthermore, the region has experienced a rise in right-wing extremism, 

whose principal targets are often Roma, as well as a rise to power 
59

1Kosovo, in the absence of the settled status, is not a party to international Treaties. Recently, this legal limbo has resulted in a rejection of a case by the European Court for Human 

Rights (‘‘Strasbourg Court’’) due to lack of jurisdiction. The case concerned Roma refugees who 

were settled, initially temporarily, on a heavily poised land, with ensuing severe health problems 2 Representatives of the international community often refer to the aforementioned groups together as ‘‘RAE communities’’. While understanding that this term has been devised merely for 

practical reasons, to facilitate the task of referencing, the Advisory Committee considers that 

such a designation should be avoided as it may be perceived as a sign of lack of acceptance of 

the specific identities of the groups concerned. Para 27, AC FCNM on Kosovo. 

of nationalist politicians and political parties who sometimes score 

points, and votes, on public anti-Romani sentiments. Mass involuntary return of Roma from Western Europe, usually without any infrastructure set up to receive them, and resulting massive social 

problems of Roma, have not helped majority acceptance and integration of Roma. Human trafficking is gradually becoming the 

scourge of the poor and marginalised—which often is the condition 

of Roma. National responses to these new phenomena have been 

largely inadequate, which means Roma rights must remain on the 

agenda of human rights monitors at home and abroad. 

OVERVIEW OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN OSCE COUNTRIES IN

THE BALKAN AREA

Most countries in focus are parties to the principal human rights 

instruments guaranteeing equal access to a range of civil and political rights, such as the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); European Convention for the Protection of 

Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); International Covenant on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).1 Some 

countries are parties to the Framework Convention on National Minorities (FCNM) and also specifically recognised Roma as national 

minorities (Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, and recently Montenegro). Remarkably, several of the West 

Balkan countries were among the first to ratify Protocol 12 to the 

ECHR establishing a free-standing provision against discrimination. 

Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, FYROM and Bosnia-Herzegovina 

specifically recognised Roma as national minorities; however, in all 

of the countries those Roma who are not citizens are not entitled 

to minority protection. This effectively excludes more than half of 

the countries’ Roma from the scope of protection. In Kosovo, international monitors noted inconsistencies concerning the identity of 

some communities, e.g. Roma, Egyptians and Ashkali, without regard for self-identification of members of those communities.2 Albania only recognised Roma (and not Egyptians) and only as a cultural (rather than national) minority, which limits their opportunities for enhanced political participation, granted to other minorities 

there. In BiH, the Advisory Committee on the implementation of 

the FCNM noted that ‘‘serious problems remain in the application 

of the Framework Convention with regard to the Roma. Full and 

effective equality has not been secured for Roma, who continue to 

be exposed to discrimination (in all fields of life).’’

Remarkably, several of the West Balkan countries were among 

the first to ratify Protocol 12 to the ECHR establishing a freestanding provision against discrimination. However in practice, 
60

these commitments often remain on paper and/or are deviated 

from. Only a handful of countries have adopted comprehensive 

antidiscrimination legislation (Kosovo). The rest, despite regular 

and strong recommendations from international monitoring bodies 

have been slow in doing so. But even when the antidiscrimination 

provisions are in place, the lack of proper enforcement and low 

awareness among Roma and public at large of the ban on discrimination result in limited application of the provisions and thus 

render those provisions ineffective. In Kosovo, despite having the 

progressive antidiscrimination legislation, Roma remain de facto 

among the most discriminated communities. 

Romani women across the board remain the most vulnerable category even among the generally disadvantaged Roma. Discrimination on the basis of belonging to Roma minority for them is compounded by gender discrimination. Romani women represent one of 

the most endangered segments of the populations of Europe, as it 

has been pointed out in a recent Report adopted by the European 

Parliament (on 2 June). This is emerging as a serious problem in 

post-communist countries of Southeastern Europe. Although some 

governments took some steps to address disadvantages faced specifically by Roma women, for example Serbia and Albania specifically included a gender component in their respective Strategies, 

this remains on the declaratory level, without any visible improvements. 

In all countries it has been reported that Romani women appear 

to be particularly adversely affected by the lack of personal documents. 

Roma women seem even more disadvantaged than Roma men 

when it comes to political participation. Reportedly, some cultural 

practices result in ‘‘family voting’’ (when husbands vote on behalf 

of the family), or even in mass non-voting of women. 

In addition, women reportedly are afraid to complain to the police in case of domestic violence, as the police officers allegedly 

often respond with further racial abuse. According to the ERRC 

CEDAW Shadow Report on Macedonia: ‘‘. . . of 34 cases in which 

Romani women reportedly informed the police in cases of domestic 

violence, 20—or 59%—of women stated that the police subjected 

them to racial prejudice and degrading treatment: In only 5 out of 

34 reported cases (15%) did the police actually intervene (which 

usually simple meant a verbal warning for the perpetrators). When 

43-year-old D.D. from Stip sought police assistance after having 

been beaten by a member of her family, the police official to whom 

she turned reportedly stated, ‘‘You Gypsies fight amongst yourselves all the time. You have to solve your problems among yourselves.’’

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION

Only a handful of countries have adopted comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation (Bulgaria and Romania). The rest, despite 

regular and strong recommendations from international monitoring 

bodies have been slow in doing so. But even when the antidiscrimination provisions are in place, the lack of proper enforcement and 

low awareness among Roma and public at large of the ban on dis-
61

crimination result in limited application of the provisions and thus 

render those provisions ineffective. 

International pressure has played a serious role in encouraging 

the countries to take measures for improving the situation of 

Roma. In particular, several of the countries aspiring for the EU 

membership have already adopted special integration programmes 

for Roma (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania) or are in progress (Serbia). 

Furthermore, Serbia has made a declaration upon joining the 

Council of Europe to pay a special attention to the integration of 

Roma. Several countries (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, 

Bulgaria and Romania) participate in the Roma Decade. 

However, critics claim that these measures are often void of concrete impact. This is because their implementation is lagging; because there is inadequate financial and administrative support; because the stakeholders were not duly included in the elaboration of 

the programmes concerning them; and because allegedly the governments themselves view such initiatives as a ticket to international acceptance, rather than a genuine commitment. 

EMERGING TRENDS OF ABUSE OF ROMA RIGHTS

CIVIL REGISTRATION

Lack of personal documents and registration presents a very serious obstacle to Romani access to virtually all other rights and benefits. Some Roma have never been registered, others may have 

been registered in a different place but cannot recover their documents. Thousands of returned failed refugees from Western Europe 

do not have papers. Children born to unregistered parents cannot 

be registered, sometimes because their parents are themselves unregistered, sometimes allegedly because mothers cannot pay medical fees, which is perpetuating the vicious circle. 

The lack of birth certificates, ID cards, health cards, working 

booklets etc exclude Roma from access to basic services such as 

education, health care, social welfare and registration with the employment office. In addition, individuals do not appear on voters’ 

lists and cannot exercise their voting rights. The lack of an ID card 

and passport does not allow them to leave their country legally. 

The consequences are further marginalization of Roma persons and 

communities. 

There were initiatives to overcome the problem. In Albania, for 

instance, registration was included among key priorities in the recently adopted National Programme for Roma, and a law was 

adopted to allow speedy and free-of-charge registration for unregistered persons (the estimated majority of whom are believed to be 

Roma) . Many Roma are, in principle, eligible to benefit from the 

law. However, in process Roma encountered serious hurdles, for examples documents required in support of the registration were not 

free or were difficult to obtain; the public servants in charge of registration allegedly were not helpful explaining the procedures and 

requirements; and overall awareness of the law was so low that reportedly only those Roma who were informed and assisted by 

NGOs managed to register. The short duration of the Law (three 

months) meant that many more individuals were bound to be left 

out. 
62

In Serbia, where according to the Amnesty International lack of 

registration has become ‘‘chronic’’ as generations of Roma live without papers, registration was also prioritised in the Draft National 

Strategy. However, since the adoption of the Strategy is being continuously delayed, the implementation of measures contained 

there, including registration, is also stalled. 

In Croatia, the legal provisions of the Citizenship Law evidently 

have a disproportionately negative effect on Roma, who are excluded due to illiteracy, unawareness of the procedures, and other 

factors. 

In FYROM, an exclusionary nationality law has caused statelessness among members of ethnic minorities, and particularly Roma. 

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND VOTING RIGHTS

Even when Roma are eligible to vote and stand in elections, their 

chances for meaningful political participation are very slim. In 

most countries, Roma are able to participate in the elections only 

through mainstream parties (sometimes without disclosing their 

identity, which means their communities do not recognise them). 

When Roma parties are formed, their chances for election are limited by thresholds or methods of allocation of seats that are proven 

disadvantageous toward minority candidates 

In BiH, Roma as a ‘‘non-constituent’’ people are essentially 

barred from having a say in the country’s affairs. Moreover, as the 

government uses outdated and underestimated data on the Roma 

population (from the 1991 census) this makes it more difficult for 

the Roma to participate in the elections. 

In Croatia, according to the new law, in order for minorities to 

vote they have to be registered in advance on the so-called ‘‘minority voting list.’’ The majority of Roma voters were not informed 

about this rule and as a result could not vote. There were alleged 

cases of voter manipulation, especially of those who were illiterate. 

Although Roma are recognised as national or linguistic minorities, authorities in very few countries in focus have made an effort 

to provide electoral material in the Romani language, whether in 

written or oral form (e.g. via TV or radio). For many members of 

Romani population who illiterate, this means they have not had an 

opportunity to make an informed choice. Cases of vote buying 

among Roma communities were reported in several countries (such 

as FYROM and Bulgaria). 

A positive trend is that politicians increasingly take into account 

Romani populations as voters whose ballots can make a difference, 

and reportedly many candidates across the region make visits to 

Romani settlements and encourage Roma to vote for them. However, often the electoral promises are broken. Even though this fact 

of political life is not limited to pledges made to Roma, in case of 

disadvantaged communities failure to deliver has a particularly 

negative reaction. Many Roma claim that politicians promise a 

lot—providing infrastructure to segregated Roma ghettos, creating 

more jobs for predominantly unemployed Roma, and so forth. But 

once elected, politicians often forget Roma exist. As a result, many 

Roma appear to lose faith in the political process. 

Precarious living conditions of Roma are yet another of many obstacles to their political participation. A number of Roma report-
63

edly do not vote because the polling stations tend to be far away 

from their settlements, which are poorly connected and sometimes 

virtually inaccessible. 

Roma women seem even more disadvantaged than Roma men 

when it comes to political participation. Reportedly, some cultural 

practices result in ‘‘family voting’’ (when husbands vote on behalf 

of the family), or even in mass non-voting of women. 

As a consequence of the obstacles to effective political participation, Roma are vastly underrepresented in all levels of government 

and administration across Europe. Roma are often completely excluded from the political life of their respective countries, and 

Romani issues are virtually invisible in the national political discourse, perpetuating the vicious circle of exclusion. 

RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND IDPS

Currently mass return of Roma refugees from Western Europe 

has a destabilising effect on the already fragile social fabric in 

some countries. 

In Serbia, where thousands of refugees are now sent from the 

countries of Western Europe, virtually no infrastructure has been 

set up to receive the returnees, many of whom are Roma. As a result, Roma are forced to settle in makeshift settlements which lack 

elementary human conditions, e.g. cardboard shelters under the 

bridges or along the roads, without water, sewage or other essentials. Such settlements in themselves attract racist attacks by 

skinheads (see the section on Hate Crimes). Recently, the government announced opening a readmission office at the Belgrade airport. On this occasion, a Romani leader, Dragoljub Ackovic, noticed, 

‘‘They open the office now, but it has been already three years that 

Roma are being returned from Western Europe. We expect that approximately 70,000 Roma will be repatriated . . . during the next 

one or two years. . . . There are no conditions for a return of 

Kosovo Roma who do not have a place to return to. Their no conditions for their reintegration in Central Serbia either, where unemployment is a big problem. We are asked to facilitate the return of 

Roma who have lived abroad for 15 years, where they had a job, 

and whose children don’t speak Serbian. Here the children will end 

up rummaging on the communal garbage dumps.’’

In Kosovo, a scandalous and ongoing case of ‘‘temporary’’ settlement of Roma on the lead-poisoned land, in Northern Mitrovica, 

has cost health to many Roma, in particular to children. Moreover, 

among other minorities, Roma are evidently not safe in Kosovo, 

and not so long ago became victims of the ethnic riots there (see 

the section on Hate Crimes). 

In Bosnia, ECRI noted with concern ‘‘reported instances of return-related violence and of manifestations of hostility vis-a ́-vis 

Roma. . . . Verbal abuse and threats of violence have been widely 

reported and physical attacks have also taken place. There have 

also been demonstrations of local residents against plans to establish facilities for Roma. 
64

HATE CRIMES

Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in levels of raciallymotivated crimes, aggravated by patent impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes. Both have a demoralising effect on victims and 

society at large, where mistrust of the justice system and cynicism 

develop about the ability and willingness of both domestic and 

international actors to intervene for the sake of human rights. 

In Croatia, according to the International Helsinki Federation, 

‘‘Violence against the Roma population became almost a daily phenomenon with no public reaction at all.’’

In Serbia, the Minority Rights Centre criticised the Court’s lenient sentencing for a dozen of skinheads who attacked a Roma 

settlement in February 2006. The thugs in black leather jackets in 

combat boots broke windows on several Roma houses shouting: 

‘‘Gipsies, You’re Dead Meat!’’ The perpetrators were fined 10,000 

Dinars, while Roma were fined 15,000 Dinars. In Kosovo, in March 

2004 some 50000 individuals took part in ethnic riots, injuring 

hundreds and displacing thousands of members of ethnic minorities, including a group of returned Askhalia , in Vucitrin. However 

despite the international presence, justice was slow to come: as of 

March 2006, only 426 persons were charged, primarily for petty 

crimes, and only half of those were sentenced. 

POLICE ABUSE

Relations between Romani communities and police have traditionally been strained. However in recent years there have been 

more and more reports that in addition to usual unwarranted stops 

and searches of persons perceived to be Roma, the police use unnecessary force and even resort to practices that in many occasions 

were qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment, and even torture. 

In BiH, ECRI noted that Roma are allegedly ‘‘the objects of disproportionately frequent checks and sometimes of harassment by 

law enforcement officials. Prejudice vis-a ́-vis Roma still appears to 

be widespread and some law enforcement officials have been reported to have held Roma responsible of crimes on the basis of little or no evidence and to have failed to investigate crimes committed against Roma. According to the Advisory Committee on the 

implementation of the FCNM, ‘‘The general lack of confidence in 

law-enforcement authorities by the Roma partly explains why few 

incidents involving police abuse against Roma are reported, a state 

of affairs which is aggravated by the extremely low number of 

Roma employed as police officers. 

In Serbia, the Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) reported physical and verbal abuse by unidentified police officers of Roma children washing car windows on the Belgrade streets. However, allegedly, investigation against the perpetrators has been slow and ineffective. 

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, according to the 

ERRC, in June 2005, two police officers have abused three Roma 

men, after arresting them without providing justification or informing of their legal rights. Medical reports confirmed that the three 

men sustained serious injuries. However, the criminal charges that 
65

3 Amnesty International http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700102004

the victims brought against the police were dismissed by the Public 

Prosecutor. Instead, the victims were advised to file a private lawsuit. As March 2006, proceedings were delayed because the accused 

officers reportedly did not show up at the hearing. 

In addition, women reportedly are afraid to complain to the police in case of domestic violence, as the police officers allegedly 

often respond with further racial abuse. According to the ERRC 

CEDAW Shadow Report, ‘‘(o)f 34 cases in which Romani women reportedly informed the police in cases of domestic violence, 20—or 

59%—of women stated that the police subjected them to racial prejudice and degrading treatment: In only 5 out of 34 reported cases 

(15%) did the police actually intervene (which usually simple 

meant a verbal warning for the perpetrators). When 43-year-old 

D.D. from Stip sought police assistance after having been beaten 

by a member of her family, the police official to whom she turned 

reportedly stated, ‘‘You Gypsies fight amongst yourselves all the 

time. You have to solve your problems among yourselves.’’

TRAFFICKING OF HUMAN BEINGS

Human trafficking is increasingly becoming a lucrative industry 

taking advantage of the poor and marginalised, and the countries 

in the West Balkans, besides serving as a convenient trafficking 

route, also supply large numbers of slaves for human trade. 

In Albania, allegedly a disproportionate number of Roma and 

Egyptian children are victims of this phenomenon, according to 

both governmental and non-governmental sources. This was notes 

by ECRI: ‘‘Trafficked children tend mostly to be exploited as a 

source of labour, for instance sent to beg or sell small items in the 

streets, or to wipe car windows. Sometimes they are also used for 

illegal activities, in particular drug dealing or organised theft. 

Some children, especially adolescent girls, are also exploited for 

prostitution. The children that are most vulnerable come from broken families that also suffer from extreme poverty and high rates 

of illiteracy.’’ Although the Albanian Roma Strategy devotes attention to the issue, there appear to be problems with the actual implementation. 

Recently Kosovo was featured in the international media for 

large-scale trafficking facilitated, disturbingly, by members of the 

international peacekeeping forces. Amnesty International as kept 

track of these media reports,3 the following are two examples: 

‘‘Since the deployment in July 1999 of an international peacekeeping force (KFOR) and the establishment of the United Nations 

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) civilian administration, Kosovo(6) has become a major destination country for 

women and girls trafficked into forced prostitution. 

KFOR and UNMIK were publicly identified in early 2000 as a 

factor in the increase in trafficking for prostitution by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).(35) In May 2000, 

Pasquale Lupoli, IOM’s Chief of Mission in Kosovo, alleged that 

KFOR troops and UN staff in Kosovo had fed a ‘‘mushrooming of 

night clubs’’ in which young girls were being forced into prostitu-
66

tion by criminal gangs. ‘‘The large international presence in Kosovo 

itself makes this trafficking possible.’’

Serbia and Montenegro, according to the most recent US State 

Department report, do not comply even with the minimum requirements for the elimination of human trafficking. An estimated 30–

50 percent of females in prostitution in Montenegro are victims of 

trafficking, and half of them are minors. 

In closing, the challenge for international institutions is to assist 

national governments with large Roma population to re-conceptualize policies towards Roma which emphasize the positive aspects 

of Roma inclusion in majority society. Pursuing larger policies for 

the protection of minorities must not be done at the expense of 

those very individuals whom they aim to protect. For this to take 

place, recognition of Roma civil and political rights by local and national authorities will need to be better articulated and enforced. 

For any lasting changes to take place, their must be a thorough examination of the underlying root causes of human rights abuses towards Roma communities—namely issues of racism and discrimination—and these must be addressed through legislation and with 

the full support of international institutions.
67

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NICOLAE GHEORGHE, SENIOR

ADVISOR, OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND 

HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for taking the initiative to hold this 

hearing on the status of human rights, democracy, and integration 

in South Central Europe. The status of religious rights in both society and under law is challenged significantly in each of the states 

of the area. From active legislative measures to social public contempt directed at religious minorities, the current condition of religious freedom has failed to demonstrate a significant departure 

from the rigid form and draconian practice under the Soviet system. Regression of religious rights in the Balkans is a reflection of 

a greater rollback of democratic processes in general in Central and 

Southeast Europe that must be addressed and dealt with through 

political and diplomatic tools readily available to the United States, 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the 

entire international community. 

Two factors in particular are key to understanding the devolution 

of religious rights in the region, particularly in the scope of legislative restrictions, each of which plays on the other. First, many of 

the states in the region have yet to amend the religion laws on the 

books from the Soviet days. It is their belief that to be a modern 

European state, the laws must be amended to demonstrate their 

progress away from Soviet-era systems. Second, and immediately 

following on the footsteps on the first, theses states mistakenly believe that it is imperative that there be religion laws at all, and 

they are using as models restraining legislation from other European states, including France and Russia. 

In this testimony, I have painted a broad picture of the religious 

freedom status in Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and 

Montenegro, Slovenia, and Turkey. 

ALBANIA 

Article 10 of the Constitution of Albania states no official state 

religion and recognizes the equality of religious communities. However, in practice the traditional religions and predominant religious 

communities, such as Bektashi, Sunni Muslim, Roman Catholics 

and Orthodox Church receive a favorable treatment by the state. 

A draft of the law on religions by the State Committee on Cults 

is in discord with the OSCE and European norms. The positive 

stipulations in the law guarantee basic religious freedom to all religious groups and communities; however, there are several provisions that are intended to undermine freedom of religion in Albania. One of the proposed new provisions sets a high threshold of 

500 followers for a community to register with the state. Another 

condition restricts activities of unregistered religious communities 

and limits free speech, directly contradicting standards of the 

OSCE. 

The new draft of the law on religion is viewed by the OSCE as 

unnecessary, as the Constitution does not warrant for a special law 
68

on religion and the current version better reflects international 

standards for religious freedom. 

There have been isolated incidents of attacks or discrimination of 

religious minorities. Jehovah’s Witnesses came under pressure following the allegations against the religious group’s influence in a 

series of juvenile suicides. Other isolated incidents of mistreatment 

of religious communities reflect a rather weak rule of law in the 

country than the state intent to discriminate against and prosecute 

religious minorities. 

AUSTRIA 

The Government of Austria possesses two laws classifying various religious organizations—the 1874 Law on Recognition of 

Churches and the 1998 Law on Status of Religious Confessional 

Communities. These laws have partitioned faith groups into three 

classifications: state-acknowledged religious societies, confessional 

communities and associations. 

As the only classification recognized by the state as a religion, religious societies hold multiple advantages. The 1874 law guarantees religious societies with tax-related privileges, public freedom of 

expression protection, instruction in public schools by believers’ 

own, government assistance of religious private schools, military 

chaplains of members’ same faith and weekly television air time 

provided free of charge by the government. 

Thirteen religious societies presently operate in Austria: the 

Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant churches (Lutheran and 

Presbyterian, called ‘‘Augsburger’’ and ‘‘Helvetic’’ confessions), the 

Islamic community, the Old Catholic Church, the Jewish community, the Eastern Orthodox Church (Russian, Greek, Serbian, Romanian, and Bulgarian), the Methodist Church of Austria, the 

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Armenian Apostolic Church, the New Apostolic Church, the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Buddhist community, and the Coptic Orthodox 

Church. 

The 1998 Law on Status of Religious Confessional Communities 

created new requirements for organizations to qualify for religious 

society status. Under section 11 of the 1998 law, religious groups 

must meet the following criteria: 

1. be in existence for a period no shorter than 20 years; the 

group must be classified as a confessional community for at 

least 10 of these years; 

2. have a membership equaling 2 persons for every 1000 

Austrian citizens, or 16,000 members; 

3. possess a ‘‘positive attitude toward society and the State;’’

4. not initiate or take part in illegal disruption of relationships of other recognized religious societies or any other religious communities. 

If the thirteen current religious societies in Austria were to abide 

by these standards only four would qualify for state recognition. 

The second tier of religious organizations is the confessional community. In order to be classified as a confessional community, a religious organization must apply through the Ministry of Education 

and Arts. The application process includes providing proof of 300 

group members in residence in Austria, providing documentation of 
69

the group’s belief system and its differences from other already recognized organizations. The Ministry of Education and Arts has the 

power to deny the application on the basis that ‘‘the teachings of 

their application are against the public safety interests of a democratic society, the public order, health and morals, or infringes on 

the protection of the rights and freedoms of another.’’ A six-month 

waiting period before ruling is standard. Only after being approved 

does the community have the ability to legally purchase property 

and engage in contracting services and products. 

The Austrian government recognizes ten religious groups as confessional communities: the Seventh-day Adventists, the Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, the Baha’i Faith, the Baptists, the Evangelical Alliance, 

the Movement for Religious Renewal, the Hindu Religious Community, the Free Christian Community (Pentecostalists), the Mennonites, and the Pentecostal Community of God. 

The third classification of religious groups are associations. 

Under this law, groups who do not meet the criteria for religious 

societies or confessional communities can organize as an association and receive some of the benefits of confessional communities, 

most notably, real estate purchasing. 

Any religion that is not recognized by the Austrian government 

is often viewed by Austrian society as a ‘‘sect.’’ In Austrian cultural 

terms, a sect is a danger to societal balance, as seen by a recent 

poll in which 90% of Austrians believed sects are ‘‘inherently dangerous.’’ This mentality is often aided by the government. Family 

counseling centers have been established to address the so-called 

threat of sects. These centers distribute materials listing religious 

minorities deemed dangerous, including Scientology, Yoga, Transcendental Meditation, and Hare Krishna. 

The Ministry for Social Security and Generations, in conjunction 

with the City of Vienna, also works in similar discriminatory fashion. These groups partner to subsidize a group entitled The Society 

against Sects and Cult Dangers (GSK) with the purpose of counteracting the growth and influence of sects by disseminating information to schools in addition to running a counseling center to aid 

those who have been victims of cults. 

BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 

The Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Position of Religious 

Communities and Churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina violates 

OSCE and international standards on religious freedom. Not only 

does the law generates a great societal conflict, it perpetuates ethnic and nationalistic tensions and cultural and religious intolerance 

among various religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Religious tensions that occasionally erupt in violence against religious communities are directly related to the ethnic lines dividing 

the country. A religious identity, for the most part, is reflected in 

the ethnic identity in the Bosnian population. Bosnians generally 

are associated with Islam, Bosnian Croats with the Roman Catholic Church, and Bosnian Serbs with the Serb Orthodox Church. The 

Jewish community maintains a very small but important presence 

in Bosnian society. Despite the constitutional and legal provisions 

protecting religious freedom, discrimination against religious minorities occurs in virtually all parts of the country through a high 
70

threshold required for registration and penalties associated with 

free speech expressions. These act as the two predominantly used 

mechanisms to hinder the activities of religious minorities in the 

country. State favoritism expressed toward particular religious 

communities contributes to the increase in inter-ethnic tensions in 

the country. State Department annual report also notes cases of 

misuse of religious symbols for political purposes and instigation of 

nationalistic sentiments. Moreover, a greater divergence within the 

society is perpetrated by foreign missionaries preaching a fundamentalist form of Islam, unfamiliar to the indigenous Bosnian 

Muslim traditions. This advances a greater division not among various religious communities of Bosnia, but within the Muslim community. 

BULGARIA 

In 2002, a law was passed in Bulgaria that required all religious 

communities and organizations, except for the Orthodox Church, to 

register with the government. Even though the law requires only 

registration with the Sofia City Court, some religious organizations 

are still harassed by local authorities for not registering with the 

local courts. 

The U.S. State Department reported that many religious communities expressed a very real concern that some missionaries and 

other religious leaders were being denied visas to enter Bulgaria. 

Also being denied by the government were religious leaders trying 

to renew their residency visas to remain in the country. They have 

since resorted to applying for tourist visas but that visa greatly 

limits the time they are allowed to stay in the country. 

Although showing some progress, the Bulgarian government has 

been very slow and reluctant to restore the property that was confiscated under the Communist regime. Many religious organizations still have outstanding claims on property that has not been 

restored to them. 

CROATIA 

The Government of Croatia neither has a state religion nor imposes any restrictions on the religious communities that operate 

freely within their borders. The Croatian government has an agreement with the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim communities, granting both those in the military and those in prison access to religious leaders of their affiliation. 

Catholicism is the main religion taught in the public school system. However, the government does allow other religious education 

courses to take place if there are enough students to merit it. Even 

though this is legally allowed, many school children do not want to 

openly identify themselves as Serbian Orthodox for fear of social 

persecution. 

Proving an increasingly difficult task for the Croatian government is the issue of refugees. Ethnic Serbs have run into problems 

when trying to return to Croatia. The Croatian government has 

often delayed repairing or rebuilding houses and communities 

where ethnic Serbs reside. Also, all new priests from the Orthodox 

Church must frequently renew their permits and residency status 
71

with the government. The U.S. State Department reports that 

many have criticized the re-registration practice as it leaves a 

heavy burden on families to acquire health care benefits and pensions. The State Department also reports that ethnic Serbs are continually being discriminated against in many venues to include but 

not limited to housing and employment. 

During the Yugoslav Communist rule, a large amount of property 

was nationalized or outright confiscated by the Communists. The 

Croatian government had agreed to property restoration or compensation with the Roman Catholic Church, but are very slow, 

even hesitant, to show progress in this area. 

Many other religious communities, who do not have a set agreement with the government, and who also lost their property to the 

Communists during their rule, have complained about the lack of 

cooperation and aggressiveness on the part of the Croatian government to resolve this issue in a timely fashion. For example, the 

State Department reported that in 2004, the Serbian Orthodox 

community only had 10% of their land restored. It was also reported that Jewish property restoration was stalled. Plans for land 

development in the Muslim community have also been suspended. 

Even after a permit to construct a mosque was issued the government continued to delayed the project for over ten years. 

In regards to anti-Semitism, the police nonchalantly investigate 

threats and so forth, but hardly even produce suspects. Even when 

party officials demonstrate anti-Semitic remarks, no action is 

taken. 

GREECE 

Under Article 13 of the Greek Constitution, proselytism is forbidden. Greece is the only member state of the European Union to list 

such a prohibition in its constitution. The Greek Orthodox Church 

has a significant amount of influence over the political and cultural 

environment in Greece. The government provides financial assistance in maintenance of Orthodox Church buildings and also pays 

for salaries and training for clergy. 

Greece does not have a formal application process for recognition 

as a religion. The two components that create distinctions between 

religious organizations are their legal standing and their possession of, or lack there of, house of prayer permits. 

In Greece two categorizations of legal entities exist. ‘‘Legal persons of public law’’ only describe three religious organizations: The 

Orthodox Church, Judaism, and Islam. All other religious groups 

are deemed ‘‘legal persons of private law.’’ As private bodies, these 

religious groups face many limitations. As private organizations 

these religious groups cannot be represented in court as a religious 

entity. They also are not permitted to purchase or own property as 

a religious body; instead, all property must be registered with a 

legal entity with the expressed purpose of property ownership. 

According to Law 1363 from 1938 and Law 1672 from 1939, in 

order to open houses of worship religious groups are required to 

apply for houses of prayer permits from the Ministry of Education 

and Religion. By law the Ministry can consult with local Greek Orthodox Bishops when making a decision on permit applications and 

has done so in recent applications of Scientology and Jehovah’s 
72

Witnesses. The Church of Scientology was denied a permit on the 

grounds that it failed to meet the standards of a religion. As a result, Scientology has registered as a non-profit organization. 

The government has an agreement with the Muslim community 

of Thrace under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne to allow for the establishment of ‘‘wakfs’’—charitable and social organizations in the 

community. The Government also appoints and subsidizes two 

muftis and one assistant mufti in Thrace, arguing such practice 

keeps with procedure in Muslim countries. This has been met with 

opposition by many Muslims who insist that a non-Muslim country 

does not have the right to appoint muftis. 

Another example of the Orthodox Church’s relationship with the 

government can be seen in the building of a church is the case of 

the Evangelical Free Church of Filiatra, on the Peloponese peninsula. Although the government had given its permission, the local 

Orthodox bishop objected to this by declaring the need to prohibit 

illegal proselytism. This opinion of the Orthodox bishop leaves the 

legal situation of these Protestant believers still unclear. 

ITALY 

The Italian government has recently reinitiated efforts to pass a 

religion law involving mental manipulation. If the draft law is to 

be added to Italy’s Criminal Code, it would be detrimental to legitimate conversions. Even though this law is aimed at sects and cults 

operating within Italy, it will be negatively affected other recognized religions in Italy. 

The similarity between the proposed law and the legislation engineered by Mussolini is based upon the definition of ‘‘plagio’’—the 

action of influencing a person so as to undermine their ability to 

make rational decisions. In 1981, the Italian Constitutional Court 

eliminated ‘‘plagio’’ from the Italian Criminal Code as unconstitutional. 

The draft law violates human rights precedents set by the Italian 

courts as well as by the European Court of Human Rights. Specifically, a 1997 decision by the Italian Supreme Court has been frequently cited as a model ruling in terms of upholding democratic 

principles of religious pluralism. In that decision, the Supreme 

Court rejected as unconstitutional exactly what this draft law seeks 

to do—to criminalize religious proselytizing under the pejorative 

term ‘‘mental manipulation.’’ The proposed legislation would jettison that hard-won progress and take Italy back half a century. 

The law’s vagueness could, against the intentions of the promoters, threaten Catholic organizations and movements not 

aligned with the dominating culture. Such a law is open to abuse, 

which is why the Constitutional Court took it off the books in the 

first place. 

MACEDONIA 

The primary religious target in Macedonia remains the Serbian 

Orthodox Church. The most recent judicial measures against it was 

a ban on the establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the 

country, a law endorsed and upheld by Macedonia’s highest court. 

Deterioration of relations between the Macedonian and Serbian 
73

churches followed the initiative by the Serbian Orthodox Church to 

re-unite in 2002 after 45 years of independence from the Serbian 

Orthodox Church by the MOC. 

The impediment to the establishment of the Serbian church in 

Macedonia is rooted in the historical confrontation of ethno-nationalistic sentiments between Macedonia and Serbia. Integral in this 

is Macedonia’s accusation of the Serbian government and the 

church of the imperial attitude and intentions by refusing to recognize Macedonian nationality. 

As an example of the continued opposition to the Serbian church 

in Macedonia, Bishop Jovan has been imprisoned by the Government of Macedonia since 2004 for returning to the religious practices of the Serbian Orthodox Church and charged with the criminal offense of ‘‘causing national, racial and religious hatred and intolerance.’’ Banished by the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Father 

Jovan was appointed in 2003 by the Serbian Orthodox Church as 

the head of the Serbian church within Macedonia. He remains incarcerated by the Macedonian government. The Court’s decision in 

the case of Bishop Jovan demonstrates that a personal decision of 

an individual to join and advance religious beliefs, particularly of 

the Serbian Orthodox Church, in the Republic of Macedonia 

equates to causing religious hatred, dissonance and intolerance as 

sufficient grounds for a criminal conviction. This hence undermines 

the very essence of the religious freedom concept. 

Moreover, the current draft of the Law on Churches, Religious 

Communities and Religious Groups limits each religion to only one 

registered religious community, does not permit foreign citizens to 

form a religious group or a religious community in the country and 

requires the headquarters of the Churches or religious communities 

to be based in the Republic of Macedonia along with other restrictions challenging religious freedom in Macedonia. 

The endeavors to stake out national identity in Macedonia often 

lead to social discrimination of the Serb population and followers 

of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Macedonia. Various incidents of 

discrimination as well as incidents involving police harassment of 

followers have been recorded as well. Other religious minorities 

that have been suffering unequal treatment by the government in 

Macedonia include Macedonian Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

Baptists, Protestant Evangelicals, Seventh-day Adventists and 

Muslims. 

MOLDOVA 

The Government of Moldova passed the Law on Religions in 

1992, which mandated that religious organizations must be registered with the Government in order to function. Those groups 

who fail to register are barred from owning property, employing 

staff purchasing land for public cemetery use or constructing 

houses of worship. 

In 2002 the Parliament enacted amendments to the Law on Religions requiring any group hoping to register to submit a declaration of creation, by-laws, and a justification of the religion’s religious beliefs to the State Service for Religions. Within 30 days the 

religious organization is entered into the Register of Religions. 
74

The 2002 modifications permit the State Service for Religions to 

appeal to a Moldovan court for an annulment of the religious registration for an organization on the grounds that the group ‘‘carries 

out activities that harm the independence, sovereignty, integrity 

and security of the Republic of Moldova, the public order, or are 

connected with political activities.’’ Such vague and broad wording 

leaves minority religious groups vulnerable to persecution protected by law. Religious organizations registered with the Government are also prohibited from listing in their by-laws any conditions that contradict the Constitution or other Moldovan laws. 

Despite intentions for the 2002 amendments to simplify and 

streamline the registration process, numerous religious organizations have been stymied in their efforts. The State Service for Religions has continually denied registration approval to the Church of 

Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, the Spiritual Organization of 

Muslims, the Central Muslim Spiritual Board of Moldova and the 

True Orthodox Church of Moldova. 

In 2003 Parliament passed two laws that have drawn much concern from the international community. The Law on Combating Extremism, the Government has professed, is intended to quell the 

rise and spread of fundamentalist and violent religious thought. 

However, the law can just as easily be used as a source of exploitation of religious groups who have ties to political parties. 

The Criminal Code is another 2003 adoption that could be misinterpreted to take advantage of minority groups by hampering the 

free speech and expression. One article in the code states ‘‘preaching religious beliefs or fulfillment of religious rituals which cause 

harm to the health of citizens, or other farm to their persons or 

rights, or instigate citizens not to participate in public life or in the 

fulfillment of their obligations as citizens’’ is a punishable offense. 

Such wording could be contorted to shift guilt on monastic clergy 

who by their own will and accord seclude themselves from the public arena. 

ROMANIA 

The Government of Romania drafted a new religion law in late 

2005 and began pushing it through its upper and lower houses in 

early 2006. The law would create a three-tiered religious categorization for which groups must register. 

The draft law specifies a number of qualifications that must be 

met in order to obtain the government’s most preferential status—

religious denominations. Membership requires 0.1% of the population of Romania. At first glance this percentage may appear to 

be inconsequential; however, in reality it would require a religious 

group to consist of 23,000 members. This quota is an extremely 

high figure to prove legitimacy of a faith. Such a threshold would 

label Romania with the most restrictive registration system in the 

OSCE region. 

In its current form a religious group must wait twelve years before reaching eligibility for ascension from the second-tier religious 

association. This extensive delay will create a moratorium for new 

communities that arise after such a law is passed. The Romanian 

government would be, in effect, stunting the growth of new religious groups and discouraging them from practicing their beliefs 
75

openly. Groups below religious associations, those who have 300 or 

fewer adult members lack the legal right to own or purchase property, erect houses of worship or employ staff or religious leaders. 

Additionally, the draft religion law would exempt places of worship from rulings handed down by the Romanian court system. In 

effect, this would eliminate any opportunity for religions to reclaim 

property under the control of other faiths. Civil law would also be 

sidelined in terms of internal discipline of clergy and cannon law 

would be the only code to guide and reprove religious leaders. 

The circumstances in which the Romanian legislature has considered the draft law is also a cause for concern. The government 

rushed the bill to parliament in an emergency procedure and the 

Senate failed to take a vote on the bill within 60 days of its introduction. Under Article 75 of the Romanian Constitution if a bill is 

not voted upon within 60 days it is automatically passed in its entirety. The bill awaits a vote in the Chamber of Deputies. 

SERBIA 

The parliament of Serbia recently passed and the President 

signed into law a draconian Law on Churches and Religious Communities. 

Essential objections to this law include inadequate separation of 

the church from the state, the combination of civil law and canonical law, and discrimination—predominantly—of small religious 

communities. The law as written does not guarantee respect for 

fundamental religious freedoms. Further, the law enforces already 

existing institutional discrimination against religious groups that 

do not belong to the group of ‘‘traditional churches and religious 

communities’’. 

Among the most serious problems in the legislation are hazy registration requirements, limitations on naming rights, ill-defined 

state deregistration powers, speech restrictions, improper public 

disclosure requirements, and undue deference to registration decisions of other European Union countries. Particularly problematic 

is the adoption of a blatantly discriminatory amendment aimed primarily against minority religious communities. As this Commission 

commented, ‘‘That measure removed safeguards that would have 

allowed all religious communities currently registered to maintain 

that status. Regardless of whether they already enjoy registration, 

all but seven communities would need to reregister.’’

The law, which was hastily passed through parliament with a 

120–4 vote—without consultation with religious communities, 

international organizations such as the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe, or non-governmental organizations—

severely discriminates against ‘‘traditional’’ and smaller religious 

communities by establishing unrealistic registration standards and 

by allotting to the government expansive review power. 

The Serbian government currently recognizes seven religious 

communities—the Serbian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic 

Church, Slovak Lutheran Church, Reformed Church, Evangelical 

Christian Church, Islamic communities, and Jewish communities. 

These groups enjoy privileged status as recognized faiths. 

The law passed by the National Assembly guarantees preferential treatment by creating explicit and limited classes of faith 
76

groups that advance specific religious communities while 

marginalizing other faith groups. Registration guidelines require 

burdensome documentation that only serves to stall groups from 

moving forward with the process. In the version just passed, the 

government has the ability to demand any documentation it deems 

appropriate during the registration period; another tool to delay 

registration and frustrate applicants. Under the law, the government also judges the beliefs of the religious organization and the 

sources of income of both the religious organizations as a whole 

and its individual members. 

These and additional regulations combine to form a religion law 

that mirrors a recent draft religion law in Kosovo submitted by the 

Kosovo Provisional Authority, which has drawn considerable notoriety and criticism for partiality and extensive religious prejudice. 

SERBIAN PROVINCE OF KOSOVO

The Provisional Authorities of Kosovo have recently introduced a 

draft religion law that potentially violates the religious rights of individuals and institutions at every level. 

Under Section J of the law, Religious Communities and Churches 

can, subject to the conditions set out in this Law, acquire authorization to exercise special rights articulated in J(a)–(d). Registered 

Religious Communities may apply for acknowledgement of the special status pursuant to Article (J) on condition that: 1) they have, 

at the time of application, been legally established for at least 10 

years; and 2) full-age citizens or foreigners with habitual residence 

in the territory of Kosovo belonging to the respective Religious 

Community count more than one per thousand of inhabitants of 

Kosovo according to the last census. 

The law, if passed, would represent a substantial interference 

with the rights of minority religious communities and Churches unable to meet the 10 Year Rule and the Population Rule. For example, religious communities unable to meet the duration and representation requirements would be deprived of the right to charge 

persons with the provision of spiritual services and to make use of 

appropriate facilities in security forces, in hospitals, in areas of custody or imprisonment as well as in preventive cure and social retraining facilities. 

The law, as drafted, violates the right to freedom of religion or 

belief and the right to be free from discrimination based on religious grounds. 

KOSOVO: EUROPEAN CONVENTION STANDARDS

The draft law cannot be countenanced with the right to freedom 

of religion or belief pursuant to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) and the right to be free from 

religious discrimination pursuant to Article 14 of the Convention. 

The clear interferences with Article 9 and 14 rights cannot be 

justified by Kosovo authorities. Whatever the aim (or asserted aim) 

of the 10 Year Rule and the Representation Rule, the authorities 

cannot demonstrate that its enactment would be strictly necessary 

to meet a pressing social need, or that it is narrowly targeted to 

meet that need. The draft law has a disproportionate adverse im-
77

pact on minority religious organizations and communities new to 

Kosovo by depriving them of the right to perform critical religious 

functions in violation of the right to be free from religious discrimination under the Convention. 

The draft law’s approach contravenes the European Court of 

Human Rights’ application of a fundamental human rights policy 

of the European Community to religious freedom issues—‘‘the need 

to secure true religious pluralism, an inherent feature of the notion 

of a democratic society’’. Similarly, the Court has emphasized the 

importance of ‘‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without 

which there is no democratic society’’. 

As the Court has stressed, since religious entities exist in the 

form of organized structures,’’ the autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic 

society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection 

which Article 9 affords’’. It would frustrate this policy of ‘‘true religious pluralism’’ and result in arbitrariness and unfair discrimination to exclude minority faiths from attaining the same rights and 

benefits of other religions simply because they are small or new to 

Kosovo. 

KOSOVO: OSCE STANDARDS

The draft law also violates OSCE standards. The OSCE, in a document entitled Freedom of Religion or Belief: Laws Affecting the 

Structuring of Religious Communities, has determined that population requirements such as Kosovo’s are ‘‘troublesome’’ in relation 

to fundamental human rights standards and that such duration requirements contravene OSCE standards: 

‘‘The wording of this commitment in Principle 16.3 of the Vienna Concluding Document recognizes that the precise form of 

legal personality varies from legal system to legal system, but 

access to some form of legal entity is vital to OSCE compliance. 

This is clearly violated by the refusal to register religious 

groups that do not satisfy the 15-year rule. The drafters of the 

Russian legislation apparently attempted to remedy this defect 

by creating limited entity status, but this also fails to satisfy 

the OSCE commitment, because the limited status does not 

confer rights to carry out important religious functions. Failure 

to grant such status constitutes a limitation on manifestation 

of religion that violates Article 9 of the ECHR. It can hardly 

be said that denial of entity status, simply due to an organization’s failure to ‘exist’ under a preceding, anti-religious, communist government, ‘is necessary in a democratic society’ or a 

proportionate response to a legitimate state interest’’. 

KOSOVO: UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS

Finally, the draft law violates UN standards. The concepts of 

equality under the law and non-discrimination are emphasized in 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As stated in one United Nations study: 

‘‘The important guiding principle is that no individual should 

be placed at a disadvantage merely because he is a member of 
78

a particular ethnic, religious or linguistic group. Above all, in 

any multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic country, 

the strict application of the principles of equality and non-discrimination is an indispensable requirement for maintaining 

the political and spiritual unity of the State concerned and 

achieving understanding and harmonious relations between 

the various components of society.’’

The most important finding by the United Nations on religion is 

Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22 on Article 18 

of the Covenant, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience 

and religion. This General Comment provides the Human Rights 

Committee’s definitive interpretation of the right to freedom of religion. The Human Rights Committee finds that: 

‘‘Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The 

Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a predominant religious community.’’ (Para. 2). 

The Covenant thus clearly prohibits any attempt to discriminate 

against religions because they are small or are newly established 

in a State. 

The General Comment also emphasizes the narrow permissible 

restrictions government may impose on religions, and the need to 

ensure equality and non-discrimination among religions. 

‘‘In interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, 

States parties should proceed from the need to protect the rights 

guaranteed under the Covenant, including the right to equality and 

non-discrimination . . . Limitations imposed must be established 

by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the 

rights guaranteed in Article 18 . . .’’ (Para 3). 

The draft law in governing the ways that religious communities 

acquire rights essential to important religious functions and to economic survival, imposes limitations on the organizational manifestations of religion or belief. Like any other limitation on freedom 

of religion, they must be justifiable under the exacting standards 

detailed in the United Nations Human Rights Committee General 

Comment No. 22. In addition, it must be clear that restrictions are 

not applied with discriminatory purpose or in a discriminatory 

manner. The draft law does not meet these requirements. 

The draft law violates European Convention, OSCE and UN 

standards. 

ON THE GROUND IN KOSOVO

The situation of religious freedom in Kosovo remains utterly intolerable under accepted international standards. 

As the time for talks on the future status of Kosovo draws near, 

the need to examine the record of political and social developments 

in the province to determine the level of preparation of Kosovo for 

either autonomous or independent rule is most urgent. 

The present record of rule of law, protection of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and the return/resettlement of inter-
79

nally displaced people by the Provisional Authority of Kosovo—all 

of which are indispensable for democratic governance—have been 

gravely unsatisfactory in the last six years. We cannot discuss viable political self-rule of Kosovo unless there is a well-demonstrated, 

long-term commitment on the part of Kosovo power holders to the 

preservation of peace and ethnic diversity of the region through 

both legislative and institutional means. As I will expound below, 

since 1999 the Kosovo Provisional Authority on numerous occasions 

acted contrary to pertinent democratic commitments and norms, 

and therefore cannot be trusted as the sole independent guarantor 

of rights and freedoms for all peoples of Kosovo. 

The Institute on Religion and Public Policy led an investigative 

delegation of religious liberty leaders to Kosovo in August 2004 to 

inspect the situation in Kosovo and witness the damage in Pristina, 

Prizren, Dechani and other areas of the province in the aftermath 

of the ethnic violence earlier in March that same year. Admittedly 

it was the first such independent international religious delegation 

to visit Kosovo since 1999. It is both from the findings of the delegation and from the close monitoring of Kosovo by the Institute on 

Religion and Public Policy in the past several years that I am testifying today. 

KOSOVO SINCE 1999: KEY SOCIOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS

Kosovo, the heart of Serbian Orthodoxy since the 12th century 

that largely formed the Serbian national identity in the following 

centuries, by 1999 was home to diverse religious and ethnic groups. 

Kosovo Muslims who inhabited the region since victory in the 

epic battle of Kosovo in the 14th century constituted a significant 

majority in 1990s. Unfortunately, since 1981 no official census has 

been taken, and the demographic stratification of Kosovo is not statistically confirmed. By some estimation it has been increasing over 

the decades of communist rule favoring the wider autonomy for the 

region for the sake of balancing out Serbian influence in larger 

Yugoslavia and has reached nearly 80% of total Albanians living in 

Kosovo by the early 1990s (hence the sentiment of the predominant 

Albanian population for self-rule on ethno-historical and demographic grounds). 

When, in response to demands for greater self-rule and independence in the 1990s, Slobodan Milosevic radically reacted by conducting policies of ethnic cleansing and disfranchisement of Albanian population, the United States and NATO considered the plight 

of the people of Kosovo and engaged through NATO bombing of the 

Serbian capital Belgrade with the aim of forcing Milosevic to stop 

the ongoing ethnic cleansing. Following the bombardment, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the peacekeeping mission UNMIK was established in Kosovo to oversee administrative 

matters of the region, while KFOR was formed as an international 

police force mandated to deter hostilities, establish security in 

Kosovo and daily protect the inhabitants. Under the Constitutional 

Framework for Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo of May 15, 

2001, the Kosovo Provisional Authority was to assume power as the 

indigenous democratic governing body under the supervision of 

UNMIK. This mechanism was envisioned to ensure peaceful transi-
80

tion of Kosovo to the next stage of political arrangement, where 

independence was regarded by some as an option. 

Mr. Chairman, all of these institutions have failed to protect the 

people of Kosovo from violence and instability. 

Since 1999, around 200,000 Serbs have fled Kosovo for fear of 

communal or institutional violence. Largely these families are rarely known to return. Indeed, the refugees have cast their vote with 

their feet. As we have well seen from recent Balkan history, any 

change in demographic balance because of one ethnic group threatening the existence of another is bound to have repercussions in 

places of the region where the same ethnic groups live in close 

proximity to one other (e.g. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

etc). This out flux is critical for regional security balance, to say 

nothing of the day to day needs of fleeing peoples. Unfortunately, 

this problem in no way was adequately addressed by either 

UNMIK or Kosovo Provisional Authority. 

Not only has the fear of violence been driving Serbs out of their 

homes in Kosovo, ethnic Serbs that remain in Kosovo are denied 

treatment in hospitals, denied construction of schools, and are inflicted with increasingly rigid travel restrictions, effectively confining them to Serbian ghettos. With implicit endorsement of the 

UN peacekeeping forces, this practice ensures the isolation of ethnic groups from each other, and thus conveniently creates an artificial environment where ethnic tension can be caged. But peace confined through a cage is no real peace, nor is it a democratic practice 

that allows individuals and communities to develop to their best capacity. True transformation heeds the rights of minorities and fosters diversity is needed, although the Kosovo Provisional Authority 

has not been able to provide it thus far. 

MARCH, 2004 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR FUTURE KOSOVO STABILITY

The most appalling event that demonstrated the incompetence of 

both Provisional Authority, UNMIK, and KFOR to protect the people of Kosovo started on March 17, 2004. On that day ethnic violence erupted involving over 50,000 individuals in at least 30 separate incidents, which claimed the lives of 19 civilians and injured 

over 900 persons, including international peacekeepers and members of the clergy. This violence displaced more than 4,000 persons, 

mainly Serbs, from their homes. The ethnic violence perpetrated by 

Kosovo Albanians resulted in the destruction or serious damage of 

more than 900 houses and 150 vehicles belonging to Kosovo Serbs, 

Roma, Ashkali, and other minorities. Our delegation learned that 

ethnic violence was directed toward the centers of cultural and religious life of Kosovo’s minority communities, more specifically the 

Orthodox, and it resulted in the desecration of approximately 36 

churches and monasteries, many centuries old, added up to the 

total of over 140 churches and other religious places ruined, damaged and desecrated in the past decade. 

Let me illustrate how such atrocities could happen in the presence of multi-thousand regiments of KFOR that were supposed to 

ensure the security in the region. The Monastery of Djakovica is 

the home of several Orthodox nuns, some of them of senior age. 

During the first night of violence, French KFOR troops held back 

the attacking mob from the monastery that historically was a place 
81

of great respect and pilgrimage for the Muslim population of 

Kosovo. On the second night, in the absence of the abbess, French 

KFOR troops forcefully threw the nuns, in the words of one of the 

elderly nuns, ‘‘like sacks of potatoes’’ into an armored vehicle. As 

the troops stood by watching, an angry mob attacked the monastery. French troops were alerted that an elderly nun who had recently suffered a heart attack was recovering in her cell, but responded that there was nothing they could do for her as the mob 

set her room on fire. By the Grace of God, the nun escaped to the 

neighboring forest and lived in the elements for three days with no 

food, shelter or blanket for fear of her life before returning to the 

monastery. 

This is an exemplary story of how KFOR has generally perceived 

its mission: protect people, not property. The result is worth reiterating; 19 people dead, 900 injured. Although Italian and American troops did in some places prevent desecration, in general there 

is great need to reform KFOR policing practices and communication to prevent this from happening again. 

While none of the Churches in Kosovo has yet been restored, the 

number of mosques has grown significantly with funding from 

Saudi Arabia and other Islamic states, as the plaques on these 

mosques indicate. Although many mosques are empty, such process 

of religious mapping in and of itself has symbolic and political repercussions. 

After March 17, 2004 the Serbian population of Kosovo has refused to recognize as legitimate the authorities in Kosovo that 

failed to fulfill their mandate and largely boycotted the 2004 fall 

elections for the Kosovo Assembly. Without further explanation, let 

me simply point out that such a political situation is in no way conducive to either larger autonomy or independence of Kosovo. 

Finally, the Institute on Religion and Public Policy has closely 

monitored the Kosovo Provisional Authority attempt to introduce a 

law on religion which violates significantly internationally accepted 

standards for religious freedom in at least seven of its articles. We 

voiced our objection to UNMIK about this law which was drafted 

to establish tight governmental control over religious groups and 

set limiting conditions of their ability to survive as communities. 

Needless to say such legislative initiatives by the Provisional Authority contradicts democratic standards and can further exacerbate religious stability in the region. 

Clearly, the problem of internally displaced persons, the incapacity of Kosovar provisional institutions to prevent violence, and 

gross mistreatment of religious minorities by legislative and other 

socio-political means by current Kosovo institutions demonstrates 

the lack of democratic infrastructure that would prevent the region 

from further collapse into the very ethnic and religious violence 

that the international community initially intervened to stop and 

avert. Until the above is guaranteed, the independence of Kosovo 

cannot and must not be an option. 

With this in mind, let me offer the following recommendations 

for urgent steps to address the present and future critical situation 

in Kosovo: 
82

• UNMIK must appoint an investigative commission to find and 

render judicial persecution the perpetrators of the March 17 violence; 

• The international community through UNMIK and the European Union must allocate aid to restore the demolished and desecrated churches to their full historical appearance and religious 

functionality; 

• UNMIK must require the Provisional Authority to reverse its 

socio- economic policies toward the minority population of Kosovo 

and begin a legitimate and objective process for resettlement of the 

IDPs while ensuring freedom of movement of the minority population in the enclaves; 

• NATO must permit KFOR to widen its mandate to fully protect all peoples of Kosovo as well as sites of historic and religious 

value and significantly improve communications and the chain of 

command and cooperation within KFOR; 

• Encourage closer cooperation of OSCE and the structures of 

the European Union with Kosovo authorities for the economic reconstruction and supervision of the legislative, executive and judicial process in Kosovo. 

SLOVENIA 

The current law guarding religious freedom and registration of 

religious organizations in Slovenia dates back to 1976, long before 

the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. An attempt to update 

the law began in 1998 with the introduction of a law to parliament, 

but the government withdrew the draft soon after. In 2003 the 

process commenced anew, with the formation of a task force, under 

the direction of the Office for Religious Communities. The present 

state of the draft religion law is unclear, with little progress reported in the past year. 

After the 1998 draft law was removed for consideration from parliament, the government sought to reach agreements with religious 

organizations on an individual basis. In 1999 the Catholic Bishops’ 

Conference came to terms with the state as did the Lutheran 

Church of the Augsburg Confession in 2000. In 2001 the position 

of the Catholic Church in Slovenia was further legitimized with an 

agreement between the Vatican and the State. 

With two-thirds of the majority in Slovenia and with the head of 

the task force assigned to draft the new religion law being a member of the Catholic Sovereign Military Order of Malta, many minority faiths have become wary of the government’s ties with the 

Catholic Church. Some have voiced the fear that the implementation of a new draft law will give the Catholic Church a legally privileged status above other faith groups. 

In addition, a number of minority religions have faced difficulty 

in registering with the Office for Religious Communities in recent 

years. In 2000 the Director of the Office for Religious Communities, 

ceased processing all applications received from the previous year, 

declaring the registration law in place to be too vague in its criteria 

for what constitutes a religious group. The ban was lifted only after 

intense pressure from political groups and the media. 
83

TURKEY 

Turkey has numerous laws in place that fail to reach acceptable 

standards of religious freedom. Although the Constitution provides 

for freedom of religion, the Government plays an active role in protecting the secular ideology of the State. 

Two governmental bodies supervise the state of religious affairs 

in Turkey. The Diyanet, under the control of the Prime Minister, 

oversees the country’s 75,000 mosques and imams, who are categorized as civil servants. The second agency—the General Directorate for Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu)—is responsible 

for oversight of all non-Muslim religious organizations and their 

corresponding places of worship, education and all other related 

areas. 

The General Directorate for Foundations currently recognizes the 

legal status of 161 non-Muslim religious communities or ‘‘minority 

foundations.’’ However, the Government has utilized the Law on 

Foundations as a method to reclaim land for the State from minority religious groups. In recent years a number of these foundations 

have lost properties due to an inability to support the land or insufficient community population in the area. When reclaiming land 

the General Directorate has cited a 1974 High Court of Appeals 

ruling that stated minority foundations did not possess the right to 

obtain land beyond that which was declared in 1936. No legislation 

is currently in place that allows foundations to apply for reacquisition of lost property nor are foundations permitted to claim property listed as owned by a third party, which were often simply 

names of religious saints. 

Many religious communities also have trouble providing education and training in their own faith tradition. In 1997 the Government enacted a law mandating eight years of compulsory secular education. Only after completion of this eight-year term can 

students elect to attend schools with a religious curriculum, such 

as imam hatip high schools, where young men receive education in 

both secular and Islamic theology. In addition, all religious courses 

taught outside of schools are controlled by the Diyanet, restricting 

children under the age of 12 from registering for official Qur’an 

courses. 

Perhaps the most egregious offense to religious freedom in Turkey is commonly referred to as the headscarf law. Since the 1960s 

the Turkish government has periodically outlawed the wearing of 

headscarves for female students and professors in the university 

setting. The argument made by the government was that in doing 

so, it protected the laws of others—of those not wearing religiously 

associated clothing. Such a law maintains secularity and ensures 

that people not wearing headscarves could not be accused of being 

non-religious. 

In 1997 the implementation of the headscarf law increased in intensity with the Turkish military strictly enforcing the law without 

exception. This strict interpretation of the law has barred women 

wearing headscarves from assuming elected positions in parliament, practicing law in court, teaching in private schools and 

universities, and working as state employees. Despite much international outrage over the law, the European Court on Human 
84

Rights upheld Turkey’s implementation of the headscarf law in 

2005. 

CONCLUSION 

As I mentioned at the outset, this testimony reviewed the legislative, executive, and social conditions of religious freedom in the 

countries of the broader region of South and Central Europe. 

Religious freedom is a priority issue within the human rights 

basket of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

and hence the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Consequently, it is vital that the OSCE and the Helsinki 

Commission continue to dedicate the time, energy, and resources 

necessary to advance democracy and fundamental rights throughout the Balkans in particular and the OSCE region writ large. 

As a mechanism to continue to advance the development of fundamental rights, I would like to encourage a significant increased 

investment of resources into the Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief of the Office for Democratic Institutions 

and Human Rights of the OSCE. With a larger staff and further 

capacity to investigate, review, and recommend actions regarding 

religious freedom throughout the region, the issues covered in this 

testimony would be more quickly and effectively managed. 

Further, I would like to recommend that the mandate of the Special Representatives of the Chairman in Office be amended slightly. 

In particular, the mandate of the Personal Representative of the 

Chairman-in-Office on Combating Racism, Xenophobia, and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance against Christians and 

members of other religions is too broad to be maintained by one office/person. In order to guarantee the greater protection and promotion of fundamental rights, I would encourage that a mandate 

for Intolerance against Christians and members of other religions 

be carved out of the current position and established as a separate 

and independent mandate in the person of another Special Representative. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to address 

the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and I am 

happy to take any questions from the Commissioners.
85

RESPONSE OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROSEMARY 

DiCARLO TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Question 1. How does the State Department view the progress 

made by the Albanian Government since the elections held a year 

ago? Is effective action being taken against corruption and organized crime? Is the Department concerned about the government 

using anti-corruption efforts or reform more generally to go after political opponents? Are you concerned about the recent effort to remove the state prosecutor from office? 

Answer: Albania continues to make progress in strengthening its 

democratic institutions and the rule of law. The smooth transition 

of power according to the constitution and laws of Albania following 

the 2005 parliamentary election is a clear indication of Albania’s 

commitment to the rule of law. 

The Government of Albania campaigned strongly on the issue of 

crime and corruption, and placed the issue at the top of its agenda 

after taking office last September. Initial indications, especially in 

the fight against organized crime, have been positive. For example, 

in a major operation in May, seven members of a drug trafficking 

network who were laundering proceeds through construction 

projects were arrested simultaneously in four cities across the 

country. Also in May, a chief of police and three of his staff were 

arrested for producing false passports. Albanian government statistics show an increase in investigations of serious crimes, including 

smuggling, corruption, and human trafficking. Progress has not always been even, however, and crime and corruption remains a serious, ongoing problem and an obstacle to reform and political and 

economic development. 

Albania signed an agreement on April 3 with the Millennium Challenge Corporation for a two-year $13.85 million Threshold 

Country Program specifically targeted at crime and corruption. We 

will be monitoring closely the use of those funds, and we expect Albania to continue making significant strides against organized 

crime, trafficking in persons, and corruption. 

We are aware of the escalating campaign of Prime Minister 

Berisha’s government and his Democratic Party to remove the 

Prosecutor General (PG), a presidentially appointed position. We 

continue to reinforce to the government that democracy is built on 

the strength of institutions, above all the rule of law, and the government and people of Albania must respect and work through 

their institutions, laws, and regulations. We are optimistic that 

given the near universal desire of all Albanians to join Euro-Atlantic institutions, this government and successive governments will 

continue to reform and modernize Albania’s laws and institutions 

along Euro-Atlantic standards.

Question 2. Some Albanian officials have previously been critical 

of the OSCE Presence in Albania. What are U.S. views regarding 

the Presence and its activities? 

Answer: We have always strongly supported the activities of the 

OSCE in Albania and continue to support them. The Presence has 

made considerable effort to improve Albania’s legal framework for 

and administration of elections and this has made a positive im-
86

pact. The Presence has also played a constructive and informative 

role on other issues, such as property restitution, anti-trafficking, 

good governance and human rights. We think these activities will 

continue to benefit Albania both in the near term and well after 

OSCE’s mission there is finished. 

In 2006 the OSCE Presence in Albania operates on a budget of 

$3.8 million and with a staff of 112 in Tirana and four field offices.

Question 3. The development of the youth civic movement ‘‘Mjaft!’’ 

or ‘‘Enough!’’ in Albania is particularly welcomed in light of the 

highly polarized politics which exist in that country. Is there evidence that this organization has a demonstrable impact of government policies of concern to it? Can we expect the further development of civic-society organizations in Albania? 

Answer: Mjaft’s efforts in various ‘‘get out the vote’’ campaigns 

seem to have resonated well, especially with young and first-time 

voters—such a reaction is critical in a country with a very large 

youth demographic. Mjaft has also been actively engaged in raising 

awareness on environmental issues. We have supported them in 

the past and continue to find common cause on the need for a wellinformed and active citizen participation in democratic governance. 

We think further development of civil-society organizations is 

certain and an important part of USG assistance is going to promote the growth and maturation of civil society in Albania. We 

have directed over $3.5 million in FY2005 and FY2006 toward 

strengthening civil society.

Question 4. While it might have been preferable, on net, to have 

passed the package of constitutional reforms recently defeated in 

Bosnia, in light of that defeat it might be useful to look at some of 

the criticisms it received. How would you respond to the allegation 

that accepting this package would have precluded further reforms 

to address the ethnic divisions upon which the country’s structure 

is based? Do you believe there could have been more public debate 

and input? Is it possible at this time to have a better package, and, 

if not, is it better just to leave things as they are? 

Answer: The package of reforms that was defeated by Bosnia’s 

parliament would not have precluded further reforms to address 

ethnic division. The parties themselves recognized that further reforms would be necessary when they announced their commitment 

that the package represented first steps in a multi-phased process. 

Due to the short time frame for enacting the reforms so that they 

could take effect for the October 2006 elections, the political parties 

decided to limit participation in the negotiations to those that 

signed their November 2005 commitment to purse constitutional 

reform. Additional time would have afforded an opportunity for 

more public debate and input. 

The results of the October elections will help determine whether 

changes can be made to the existing package of reforms. The package was the result of painstaking negotiation and compromise 

among Bosnia’s six main political parties and three main ethnic 

groups. We believe it is important for Bosnia to follow through with 

creating a more functional and effective government.
87

Question 5. Was there any agreement by those involved in the negotiations of the constitutional reform package, implicit or explicit, 

that precluded any other constitutional issue from being considered 

in subsequent negotiations? Would the United States have actively 

supported such negotiations had the existing package of reforms 

been adopted? 

Answer: We are not aware of any agreement, implicit or explicit, 

among any of the participants in the constitutional reform negotiations that would preclude discussion of any issues in subsequent 

phase of reform. The United States has stated repeatedly that the 

package of reforms endorsed by the Bosnian political parties that 

participated in the negotiations would only be first steps in a 

multi-phased process and that we were committed to supporting 

further reforms. The political parties themselves have expressed 

their commitment to pursuing further reforms after the first phase 

is completed.

Question 6. What is the United States doing to help locate persons 

indicted for war crimes that may be in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 

Answer: We continue to engage authorities in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, in particular, to urge full, 

active cooperation with the ICTY. They have taken important steps 

to cooperate, but more work is needed, in particular by apprehending and transferring the remaining fugitives. The United 

States continues to support NATO’s efforts to undertake operations 

against Persons Indicted for War Crimes, including via our command of the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo.

Question 7. What does the defeat of the constitutional reform 

package mean for BiH’s NATO and EU integration prospects? 

Answer: The defeat of the reforms represents a setback in BiH’s 

efforts to achieve full Euro-Atlantic integration. While neither 

NATO nor the EU have established ‘‘constitutional reform’’ per se 

as a condition for integration, the EU in particular has made clear 

that a more functional and streamlined government that can effectively interact with European institutions will be necessary for 

membership. The reform package specifically created new state 

ministries of agriculture and environmental protection to address 

EU accession requirements.

Question 8. We know the OSCE Mission in Bosnia has focused extensively on resolving issues relating to the country’s system of education. Can you describe the issues and the success the OSCE and 

other international bodies may have had in addressing them? What 

more can be done? 

Answer: The United States remains supportive of OSCE and 

other efforts to improve education in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

(BiH). BiH’s education system is decentralized and segregated 

along ethnic lines. This results in different curricula, textbooks, 

exams, and standards throughout the country, often determined by 

the ethnic group that predominates in a given area. In many cases, 

Bosnian students are receiving very different versions of their 

country’s history. 
88

Since 2002, the OSCE Mission to BiH has taken the lead on education reform at the request of the High Representative. The OSCE 

Mission’s education reform program focuses on four areas: 1) 

coordination/ political support to reform as required; 2) legislation; 

3) access and non-discrimination; and 4) civic involvement in education reform. Specific activities include supporting textbook commissions to remove bias from national subject textbooks; supporting the establishment of PTAs, student councils, student 

unions; and organizing roundtables on the need for inclusive education and higher education reform. 

On the legislative front, in June BiH’s Council of Ministers 

adopted a draft law on higher education. Once passed by parliament and implemented, this law will establish one state-level set 

of procedures for accreditation and recognition of diplomas. The 

OSCE nonetheless judges that BiH, at state and entity levels, has 

a long way to go in reforming its education system. 

The international community needs to continue to press politicians to support the establishment of a state-level ministry of education and urge greater accountability on education issues.

Question 9. While Croatia has made enormous strides politically 

and economically, particularly since 2000, we still continue to hear 

concerns regarding Serb returns. The number of Serbs who have returned to Croatia is probably higher than expected back in the 

late1990s, but uniquely complex legal issues regarding property, as 

well as lingering resistance and lagging development in some localities, are viewed as obstacles still being overcome. What confidence 

do you have that Croatia is addressing these issues adequately and 

fulfilling its commitments from the January 2005 Sarajevo Declaration signed with Bosnia and Serbia to resolve outstanding refugee 

issues? 

Answer: While high-level political commitment and financial assistance under the Sanader government have increased, we remain 

disappointed in the lack of meaningful progress on the Sarajevo 

Declaration, and believe that the Croatian government needs to be 

more dedicated to fulfilling its commitments. The restoration of 

tenancy rights, amendments to an ineffective Reconstruction Law, 

retroactive recognition of official documents from the 1991–1995 

period (often referred to as ‘‘Convalidation’’), the elimination of barriers to Croatian citizenship, the employment of ethnic minorities 

in both local and national governments, and enhanced transparency regarding the prosecution of ethnic Serb returnees for possible war crimes are all areas that need greater political will and 

follow-up implementation by the Government.

Question 10. What is the position of the leaders of Croatia’s Serb 

communities regarding the country’s European integration? 

Answer: Ethnic Serbs are represented in the Parliament (Sabor) 

by the Democratic Independent Serb Party (SDSS) and have consistently supported Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. SDSS Deputy President Pupovac is a member of the National Board for Monitoring the EU Negotiations. As noted in the 2005 ‘‘New Program 

Direction’’ adopted at the 2005 SDSS Assembly: ‘‘The Serb community in Croatia holds that it is in its own interest for Croatia to 
89

become an EU member as soon as possible, because it considers the 

Union’s values to be its own values, and because it believes that 

this is the best way to ensure the development and strengthening 

of democratic institutions. In this regard, the SDSS will persistently stand side by side with the pro-European political forces in 

Croatia, acting so that accession to the Union is understood as one 

of the party’s main internal policygoals.’’

Question 11. The State Department trafficking report indicated 

that no traffickers were convicted in 2005. There have been, in fact, 

some cases in the courts that were not completed in time to be covered by the report. Is there an update on this particular issue? 

Answer: Currently, three defendants are in detention awaiting 

trial, two defendants are awaiting trial while not in detention, one 

defendant is awaiting Supreme Court determination on case appeal, and four defendants have been released due to lack of evidence.

Question 12. Does the United States support the phasing down 

and eventual closure of the OSCE Mission in Croatia? What have 

been the accomplishments of the mission from the U.S. point of 

view? 

Answer: With the help of the OSCE Mission, Croatia has made 

significant progress with regard to police reform, electoral reform, 

freedom of the media and civil society development. More work still 

remains to be done with regards to refugee returns and integration, 

rule of law and minority rights. 

We believe the OSCE Mission in Croatia is in its final phase and, 

as such, support its eventual closure according to a process of 

benchmarks measuring Croatia’s efforts to undertake the remaining reforms. Our intention is to ensure the mission’s mandate ends 

as soon as its important work is completed. We understand benchmarks still need to be negotiated and agreed upon, but could involve Croatia making specific progress in areas such as refugee returns and minority rights, including resolving the Occupancy and 

Tenancy Rights issue.

Question 13. The Commission has heard from American citizens 

who still have unresolved property claims in Croatia. Apparently, 

Croatia will consider such claims of foreign citizens only if there is 

a bilateral agreement in effect between the Croatia and the country 

concerned. Is the United States pursuing that at the moment, or are 

we urging Croatia to change its laws? 

Answer: We have encouraged Croatia to take action to allow U.S. 

nationals to file claims for expropriated property, including resolving the 60 such cases registered with our Embassy in Zagreb (we 

estimate there may be a couple of hundred additional cases involving U.S. citizens to be resolved). We have urged the government to 

do so in the most expedient way. 

The U.S. has expressed an interest in negotiating such an agreement with the Government of Croatia. Additionally, the Government of Croatia has informed us that it is considering an amendment to the restitution law that would permit foreigners to file di-
90

rectly for compensation and put non-citizens on equal footing with 

Croatian citizens for the purpose of this law. 

As of yet, the Government had not yet submitted that draft 

amendment to the Croatian Parliament, nor had it signed any bilateral agreements with any country that would grant foreign citizens access to the 1997 property restitution law.

Question 14. The relatively new Kosovo government of Agim Ceku 

has made some gestures to the Serb and other minorities that, in 

the context of such little progress in Kosovo to date on these issues, 

looks promising. What has been the Kosovo Serb response to these 

gestures, and how does that differ from Belgrade’s response? Are 

Serbs testing the new government to see if it means what it says 

about Serbs being able to make Kosovo their home even if independence is achieved? What else can be done to test the seriousness of 

Ceku’s gestures? 

Answer: While many Kosovo Serbs would like to fully participate 

in local political institutions, they do not have Belgrade’s support 

to do so. With our partners in the Contact Group, we are pressing 

Belgrade to allow Kosovo Serbs to participate in Kosovo institutions. 

Prime Minster Ceku and President Sejdiu have taken promising, 

initial steps to reach out to Kosovo’s minority communities, including visiting Decani Monastery over Easter, visiting Serb returnees 

and addressing Kosovo Serbs in Serbian. While these symbolic gestures have set the right tone, the Contact Group expects tangible 

results. 

To help Kosovo’s leaders focus their efforts, the Contact Group 

provided Prime Minister Ceku and his government in June a list 

of thirteen priority action items to be completed over the next four 

to six months; this list asks for progress on returns, security for minorities, enforcement of property rights and the rule of law. We are 

encouraged with the seriousness with which Prime Minister Ceku 

has approached this issue, that he has completed two items on this 

list, and note that work has already begun on many of the other 

items. The Contact Group will continue to monitor progress in 

these and other standards to help improve the conditions for minority communities in Kosovo.

Question 15. In correspondence with the State Department, the 

Commission has expressed interest in engaging cooperative parties 

within the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo in order to address 

some of the church’s concerns and hopefully, the displaced or isolated people in Kosovo who the church seeks to help. Can you indicate the degree to which this engagement has taken or is possible? 

Answer: Discussions on how to protect cultural and religious 

sites in Kosovo began in May under the auspices of UN Special 

Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Various representatives from the Serbian 

Orthodox Church participated in this meeting, and negotiations on 

creating special protective mechanisms for religious sites in Kosovo 

are ongoing with the assistance of international experts. Officials 

from the Serbian Orthodox Church continue to work with the 

Kosovo government on the reconstruction of the 30 churches dam-
91

aged during the March 2004 riots; the second phase of this reconstruction is slated to begin this summer. 

In May, Kosovo religious leaders met together as part of an 

Inter-Faith conference hosted by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 

Kosovo and pledged to work together on issues like the draft law 

on religious freedom and continuing a dialogue among religious 

communities. Senior State Department officials, including U.S. 

Special Representative for the Kosovo Talks Ambassador Frank 

Wisner, also continue to meet with Serbian Orthodox Church officials both in Washington and in Kosovo. 

Any church-facilitated return projects should be in accordance 

with the Returns Protocol and coordinated with the Kosovo government and UN Mission in Kosovo.

Question 16. What concerns does the United States have regarding the situation in Mitrovica? Is this situation being addressed at 

the status talks in Vienna? Is there a possibility to eliminate the division of this city? 

Answer: The situation in northern Kosovo, including Mitrovica, 

remains tense but calm. The NATO-led Kosovo Force continues to 

operate in this region, alongside international police and the 

Kosovo Police Service. UNMIK is also working with local authorities to hire additional Kosovo Serb police for Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo. 

UN Principal Deputy Special Representative in Kosovo Steve 

Schook has visited this region several times in recent months to 

meet with community leaders and address their security concerns. 

UNMIK has also begun a Mitrovica Focus Group, which aims to 

bring together local officials and the international community to coordinate on projects to meet this region’s infrastructure and development needs. 

As noted in the Contact Group’s Guiding Principles, there will be 

no partition of Kosovo. 

As part of the decentralization status talks underway, both parties have met and discussed the situation in Mitrovica. While different solutions have been proposed, implementing robust decentralization in the communities in northern Kosovo—as with the 

rest of Kosovo—will be central to any solution in order to provide 

these communities more control over important issues such as appointing local police chiefs and judges, education and healthcare.

Question 17. Kosovar Albanians often seem to perceive calls to respect human rights, including those of minorities, as motivated by 

attempts to delay any determination of Kosovo’s status. This was 

particularly evident when international policy focused so heavily on 

‘‘standards before status’’. Now that there has been some movement 

in at least discussing status issues, do Kosovar Albanians understand that, in fact, standards need to be met regardless of status, 

especially since they represent human rights norms all other European governments have accepted in the OSCE? 

Answer: We believe the prospect of a resolution of Kosovo’s status has helped increase positive momentum on Standards implementation. The government of Prime Minister Ceku has recently 
92

taken steps to fulfill priority elements of the Standards, particularly in the areas of rule of law and protections for minorities. 

In his June report to the UN Security Council, former Special 

Representative Jessen-Petersen.praised the Kosovo provisional government for progress on standards implementation and for the 

overall decrease in ethnic-related violence this year. The Contact 

Group’s Guiding Principles for the status process call for full implementation of the UN Standards and for the settlement to be fully 

compatible with international standards of democracy and human 

rights. We will continue to impress upon Kosovo Albanian leaders 

the importance of complying with these principles.

Question 18. There are what can only be called wild claims about 

Kosovar Albanian support for Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. While these claims seem to have no serious foundation, can you address the extent to which Islamic fundamentalists 

may find a base in Europe in Kosovo or other Muslim-inhabited 

areas of the Balkans? 

Answer: The vast majority of Muslims in the Balkans are secular, Western-oriented and notably pro-American, and tensions in 

the region are rooted in ethnicity not religion. 

We have seen evidence that Islamic extremist groups, including 

some with ties to the Middle East and terrorist groups, have tried 

to establish a presence in Kosovo. Islamic extremist groups have 

not found fertile ground in Kosovo; Kosovo Albanian Muslims generally resent these groups and view their efforts with great suspicion. 

Bosnian authorities have closed down several Muslim NGOs supporting terrorism, and have established a Citizenship Review Commission to revoke the citizenship of foreign fighters with links to 

terrorism who remained in Bosnia after the wars of the 1990’s. 

These foreign fighters and their extremist ideology are incompatible with BiH’s traditionally tolerant Muslim community, and their 

radical doctrines appear to have limited appeal to Bosnian Muslims. The BiH government cooperates closely with the U.S. to combat extremism and terrorism, and is making commendable efforts 

to strengthen its law enforcement institutions and tighten its borders.

Question 19. Is the United States satisfied with the degree to 

which Macedonia accommodates Roma refugees from Kosovo? 

Answer: Roma refugees from Kosovo receive temporary protected 

status (TPS) in Macedonia; they are not being forcibly returned to 

Kosovo at this time and generally receive adequate care, principally from UNHCR. There are weaknesses in the refugee status 

determination process for Roma and other applicants, as well as in 

the appeals system for those who are denied refugee or asylum status. Such status has only been granted in very few cases. 

As reported in the Department’s 2005 Human Rights Report, 

there were credible reports of police harassment and beatings of 

Roma, strong evidence that Roma refugees were discriminated 

against in the refugee status determination process, and general 

societal discrimination against the Roma community. 
93

Embassy representatives continue to work with the Ministry of 

Interior to ensure thorough police investigation into alleged abuse 

cases and implementation of needed police reforms. USAID is implementing a range of programs to address discrimination against 

Roma, including seeking to increase the percentage of Roma in the 

educational system from pre-school to university.

Question 20. Macedonia previously had restrictive citizenship requirements that made stateless some who had resided in the republic before it achieved independent statehood. What changes have 

been made to address this situation, and is it now satisfactory? 

Answer: In 2004, the Macedonian law on citizenship was amended to reflect the principles of the European Convention on Citizenship. Relevant changes included reducing the minimum residency 

requirement from 15 to eight years. This change allows an individual made stateless at the time of independence to apply for citizenship, provided they can prove legal residence in Macedonia for 

at least 8 years and a significant tie to the country. 

According to the amended law, a stateless child or an individual 

granted refugee status must legally reside in Macedonia for 6 years 

from the date of status determination before becoming eligible for 

citizenship. 

In addition, if an individual was a citizen of another former 

Yugoslav republic at the time of Macedonian independence, they 

have two years from the date of implementation of the amended 

law on citizenship to file for Macedonian citizenship, provided they 

have legally resided in Macedonian for at least 8 years and can 

prove a significant tie to the country. The legal deadline for filing 

has passed, and we will be monitoring the situation as the applications are processed. 

Through USAID, we funded an ABA/CEELI Project (targeted primarily at Roma) that helped 1107 long term residents of Macedonia file citizenship applications. The total number of persons 

benefiting from this assistance was 1305 as some individuals are 

eligible for citizenship through a family member’s application. (To 

date, approximately 300 of the applications have been processed 

and received their citizenship. The processing time of applications 

is approximately six to nine months, so we expect many more positive decisions from our group of applicants in the months to come.) 

CEELI also has conducted training and informational workshops 

and outreach throughout Macedonia with NGOs and volunteers 

willing to assist citizenship applicants. Further, it established a 

system to help obtain supporting documents from neighboring 

countries, including Serbia and Kosovo.

Question 21. What is the situation for what were displaced persons and are now refugees in Montenegro from Kosovo? 

Answer: The new Government of Montenegro has thus far not 

recognized the 18,000 displaced persons from Kosovo as ‘‘refugees’’—instead stating that they will effectively maintain their status as IDPs, despite an internationally-recognized border between 

Kosovo and Montenegro. While the unprecedented circumstances of 

this group of displaced persons undoubtedly pose some complex 

legal questions, we believe that the conferral of refugee status on 
94

all displaced persons from Kosovo by the Montenegrin government 

would be appropriate. 

In addition to the displaced from Kosovo, Montenegro hosts 8,000 

refugees from Bosnia and Croatia who also need help in finding a 

durable solution to their displacement. We are therefore encouraging the Government to pass new laws on Asylum and Citizenship 

in the near future, and to ensure that all displaced persons receive 

fair and equitable treatment—both in the actual provisions of the 

laws, as well as in their implementation. This includes allowing for 

full integration into Montenegrin society of those displaced persons 

who choose not to return to their country of origin.

Question 22. How does Montenegro’s recently passed law on National Minorities affect the situation for Roma living in the country? 

One can question the wisdom of allocating certain seats in parliament to minority representatives, especially if they must come 

from ethnically based political parties, but if this is done should not 

the allocation include representatives of the country’s Roma community? 

Answer: The Supreme Court has invalidated as unconstitutional 

portions of the May 2006 law on national minorities that sought to 

create set-aside seats in parliament for ethnic and linguistic minorities. The President of the Court stated that legislators 

impermissibly created new Constitutional rights, namely collective 

electoral rights, without following the prescribed process to amend 

the Constitution. 

We continue to encourage the government of Montenegro to provide affirmative protections for all ethnic minorities in their country through acceptable means.

Question 23. In signing the recently passed law on religion in Serbia, President Boris Tadic indicated that doing so and then amending the law was a preferable course to vetoing it only to be over-ridden by parliament. What action has the United States been pressing 

Serbian officials to take on this issue, and have there been any reports that efforts to amend the law might soon be undertaken as 

promised? 

Answer: We share the Commission’s concerns regarding the Law 

on Churches and Religious Organizations in Serbia. Embassy Belgrade, and Ambassador Polt personally, have been actively engaged 

with the government to urge the law to be amended and brought 

into compliance with international standards. Ambassador Polt has 

urged Prime Minister Kostunica and President Tadic first to not to 

allow passage of the law and then to modify the legislation. Ambassador Polt also hosted a meeting with leaders of minority religious 

communities and representatives from the OSCE and the Council 

of Europe in early May to hear their concerns on the new law. Embassy staff has also met with the Minister of Religion to express 

our disappointment in the religion law and urged the Minister to 

make positive changes through the law’s implementation. 

Following up on Embassy Belgrade’s May meeting with religious 

leaders, the Evangelical Alliance on July 4 submitted to the Presidents Office a list of their proposed amendments and comments on 

the Law on Religion, which Embassy Belgrade is currently review-
95

ing. Embassy Belgrade has met with President Tadic’s staff and is 

working with them and religious leaders to propose positive improvements in the law.

Question 24. Can you assess the human rights situation, as well 

as the degree of tension which exists, in the ethnically mixed areas 

of Serbia, in particular in southern Serbia, Vojvodina and the 

‘‘Sandzak’’ region? Is Belgrade responding to minority concerns adequately? Are the minorities themselves expecting too much? 

Answer: The U.S. continues to monitor the treatment of minorities in Serbia closely, encouraging Belgrade and local authorities to 

respond swiftly to any incidents that may occur and to be proactive 

in addressing the concerns of minorities. Our Deputy Chief of Mission visited Vojvodina last fall, and political officers from both our 

Embassies in Belgrade and Budapest made a joint visit there in 

November. Ambassador Polt visited the Sandzak region this spring, 

and Embassy Belgrade participated in an OSCE-led observer mission of the June 4, 2006 elections in southern Serbia. Southern Serbia, Vojvodina and the Sandzak are also priority target areas for 

U.S. assistance focusing on vulnerable areas in Serbia. 

We are encouraged by the efforts of Serbian President Tadic, Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica and the former Minister for Human 

and Minority Rights (of Serbia and Montenegro) Rasim Ljajic to address these issues, both publicly and in meetings with local leaders. 

Concerns remain, including how well the Government of Serbia is 

addressing grievances within its various minority communities, but 

progress has been made and there have been no specific egregious 

violations of human rights in the last several months. 

In Vojvodina, ethnically motivated incidents have continually decreased since Spring, 2004, and there have been far fewer violent 

incidents against minorities. Most incidents are limited to graffiti 

and vandalism, and the government response even to these incidents has improved. PM Kostunica has moved slowly on his proposal to create a multi-ethnic commission to oversee the handling 

of inter-ethnic incidents, but he has made his ministers available 

to meet with minority leaders on a number of issues. In October 

2005, Minister of Human Rights and Refugees Ljajic met with minority leaders there in October 2005 and announced that perpetrators of ethnically based crimes will face tougher sentences. Minister 

Ljajic also organized a conference in Subotica in November 2005 to 

discuss minority issues in Vojvodina. The Government continues to 

implement its 10-point strategy for improving ethnic relations in 

the province, including education and public awareness campaigns, 

and support for greater representation of minorities in the police 

and judiciary. 

In Southern Serbia, minority rights are ‘‘satisfactory’’ and ‘‘greatly improved’’ from two years ago, according to independent observers. The Serbian Government’s Coordinating Body reports close 

working relationships with local leaders. Despite minor concerns 

about presence of Serbian military in region, there have been no 

reported incidents of human rights violations or mistreatment of 

minorities by the military. Recent municipal elections in Presevo, 

Medvedja and Bujanovic reflected the considerable progress that 

has been made there over the last three years. Monitors of the elec-
96

tion reported minor irregularities, but they were not widespread or 

malicious and all ethnic groups participated as both candidates and 

on election boards/polling station boards, cooperating at polling stations and showcasing firm support for a democratic process. 

In the Sandzak, as throughout the region, ethnic identity and religious identity are closely linked. There have been no reports of serious incidents between the Serbs and the Muslim majority there; 

most of the tension is caused by the extreme rivalry between two 

Bosniak political parties. Violent incidents between Serbs and Muslims in the Sandzak are usually linked to high visibility soccer 

matches. We remain closely engaged with political and community 

leaders in Sandzak to ensure just treatment and representation of 

all ethnicities.

Question 25. The State Department has indicated it cannot certify 

Serbian compliance with conditions that would have allowed certain U.S. assistance to continue past May 31. Is the United States 

also prepared to try to block assistance from international financial 

institutions if needed, in particular to ensure that Ratko Mladic is 

apprehended and transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, located in The Hague? 

Answer: In order to succeed and take its place as a respected 

member of the Euro-Atlantic community, Serbia must confront its 

legacy of Milosevic-era war crimes and honor its international legal 

obligations. By cooperating with the ICTY, Serbia can demonstrate 

that it respects the rule of law—a critical barometer for foreign 

businesses contemplating investing in Serbia’s future. 

After a comprehensive review of actions undertaken by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro that are relevant to the criteria 

laid out in Section 563(a) of the 2006 Foreign Operations, Export 

Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Secretary 

Rice determined that the actions of Serbia and Montenegro as related to their obligation to cooperate with the ICTY did not demonstrate sufficient progress to justify certification. 

Consistent with Section 563(b) of the FY 2006 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations 

Act (FOAA), the U.S. will not support loans and assistance of the 

international financial institutions for the central Government of 

Serbia. In addition, our support for any loans or assistance of the 

international financial institutions for Serbia would also be consistent with the Secretary’s February 9 determination pursuant to 

the ‘‘Lautenberg amendment’’ (Section 561 of the FY 2006 FOAA).

Æ



This is an official publication of the 

Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe.

★★★

This publication is intended to document 

developments and trends in participating 

States of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

★★★

All Commission publications may be freely 

reproduced, in any form, with appropriate 

credit. The Commission encourages 

the widest possible dissemination 

of its publications.

★★★

http://www.csce.gov

The Commission’s Web site provides 

access to the latest press releases 

and reports, as well as hearings and 

briefings. Using the Commission’s electronic 

subscription service, readers are able 

to receive press releases, articles, 

and other materials by topic or countries 

of particular interest.

Please subscribe today.