* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designati on.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/20/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JOHNNY JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. LARRY A. FIELDS, DAN REYNOLDS, KEN KLINGER, FRANK MORGAN, JOHN EAST, EDDIE MORGAN,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 95-6354 (D.C. No. CIV-94-1614-T) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, ALARCON, ** and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of-2-

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff filed a civil rights action pursuant to 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment l iberty interests by placing him in administrative segregation. The district co urt granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm. Plaintiff escaped from custody in December 1992 andwas apprehended the following day. He was convicted of escape from a p enal institution. Also, he received a prison misconduct charge for the escape, which apparently was expunged. After a hearing held in April 1994, the administrative segregation review board recommended that plaintiff be reclassi fied and placed in administrative segregation primarily based on his e scape history and threatening behavior. The warden approved the recommendation. Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action allegin g that he was entitled to due process before his reclassification to administrative segregation because prison regulations created a liberty interest prote cted by the Due Process Clause. He also maintained that his liberty interest was vi olated from the time he was apprehended from his escape until the hearing was h eld. He apparently equated his placement in high security with administrative segregation. The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants,-3-

because plaintiff did not have a liberty interest i n remaining in the general prison population and the mandatory regulations merely gav e plaintiff the right to a hearing which he received and did not create a libe rty interest. Also, the magistrate judge determined that even if plaintiff were entitled to a hearing, he received a proper hearing, in compliance with the r equirements of Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539 (1974). After de novo review, the d istrict court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and g ranted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

We review the grant . . . of summary judgment de no vo, applying the same legal standard used by the distri ct court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appr opriate if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996)(quotation omi tted). Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we must con strue his pleadings liberally.
See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). On appeal, plaintiff argues that there is an issue of fact whether defendants violated his liberty interest by placing him in adm inistrative segregation without due process. He claims the conditions of administr ative segregation are atypical to general conditions of confinement, he was subjec ted to administrative segregation for fifteen months without due process, and prison regulations require1 Sandinis applied retroactively. Talley v. Hesse , 91 F.3d 1411, 1413 (10th

Cir. 1996). -4- a hearing prior to placement in administrative segr egation. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff failed t o establish a liberty interest. A recent Supreme Court case provides further support for the court’s decision. In Sandin v. Conner , 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995), 1 the Court held that prison regulations do not create liberty interests unless they protect prisoners from restraints imposing “atypical and significant hards hip on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Such was n ot the case here. See Talley v.
Hesse , 91 F.3d 1411, 1413 (10th Cir. 1996)(“[P]lacement in administrative segregation such as occurred here does not give ris e to a liberty interest.”); see also Orellana v. Kyle , 65 F.3d 29, 32 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995)(unlikely admin istrative segregation can give rise to constitutional claim a fter Sandin ), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 736 (1996). Administrative segregation due to legitimate concerns about plaintiff’s escape history and prison security did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on plaintiff in relation to th e ordinary incidents of prison life.
See Penrod v. Zavaras , 94 F.3d 1399, 1407 (10th Cir. 1996).-5-

The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Arthur L. Alarcon Circuit Judge