Report to

the National Commission

on Terrorist Attacks upon the

United States:

The FBI’s

Counterterrorism Program

Since September 2001

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

April 14, 2004
Report to 

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 

the United States 

The FBI’s 

Counterterrorism 

Program 

Since September 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................1

II FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART................................................. 3

III TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT REFORMS AND

INITIATIVES SINCE 9/11/01.......................................................... 4

IV INTRODUCTION......................................................................................6

V PRIORITIZATION....................................................................................7

The New Priorities.........................................................................................7

1 Protect the United States from Terrorist Attack..........................................7

2 Protect the United States Against Foreign Intelligence Operations and 

Espionage........................................................................................7

3 Protect the United States Against Cyber-based Attacks and

High-Technology Crimes..................................................................8

4 Combat Public Corruption at all Levels.......................................................8

5 Protect Civil Rights......................................................................................8

6 Combat Transnational/National Criminal Organizations and Enterprises...8

7 Combat Major White-Collar Crime..............................................................8

8 Combat Significant Violent Crime...............................................................8

9 Support Federal, State, Municipal, and International Partners...................9

10 Upgrade Technology to Successfully Perform the FBI's Mission...............9

Implementing the New Priorities.............................................................9

1 Communication of Priorities........................................................................9

2 Priorities in the Budgetary Process...........................................................10

3 Enforcement of Priorities...........................................................................11

VI MOBILIZATION.......................................................................................12

Personnel Mobilized.....................................................................................

Expanded Operational Capabilities.......................................................

1 Counterterrorism Watch............................................................................13

2 National Joint Terrorism Task Force...........................................................

3 Terrorism Financing Operations Section.......................................................

4 Evidence Exploitation..................................................................................

5 Fly-Away/Rapid Deployment Teams............................................................

6 Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.........................................................

7 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Group..........................................................

8 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Unit...................................................

9 Language Translation.................................................................................

10 Special Technologies and Applications Section..........................................

11 Investigative Technology Division................................................................

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
 Counterterrorism Analysis Branch....................................................................22

 VIII INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION..............................................23

 Integrating Criminal and Intelligence Operations.......................................23

Integrating Intelligence Processes in our Operations...............................24

1 Initial Deployment of Analysts....................................................................25

2 Office of Intelligence..................................................................................25

3 Intelligence Program..................................................................................25

EAD Intelligence...............................................................................26

Concepts of Operations....................................................................26

Field Office Intelligence Operations.....................................................

Requirements Process.....................................................................28

Baselining of Sources.......................................................................29

Analytical Assets................................................................................

Intelligence Production Board...........................................................30

4 Intelligence Workforce................................................................................31

Recruitment.......................................................................................31

Special Agents Career Track............................................................31

Training.............................................................................................32

Program Evaluations........................................................................34

Special Agent Evaluations................................................................35

Evaluation of Special Agents in Charge...........................................36

 IX COORDINATION.................................................................................37

 State and Municipal Law Enforcement.....................................................37

1 Task Forces...............................................................................................38

2 Office of Law Enforcement Coordination...................................................39

3 Terrorist Screening Center........................................................................39

4 Law Enforcement Online...........................................................................40

5 Alert Notification System............................................................................41

6 Intelligence Bulletins..................................................................................41

7 Information Sharing Pilot Projects..............................................................41

8 Security Clearances...................................................................................41

9 New Counterterrorism Training Initiatives..................................................42

 10 Behavior Analysis Unit...............................................................................43

11 Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Program....................................43

Intelligence Community..........................................................................................43

1 Terrorist Threat Integration Center................................................................43

2 Exchange of Personnel......................................................................................44

3 Joint Briefings.....................................................................................................44

4 Secure Networks................................................................................................44

VII CENTRALIZATION............................................................................20

Investigative Operations Branch.......................................................................21

Operational Support Branch...............................................................................22

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5 Compatability of Information Technology Systems..............................44

6 Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center....................................

Department of Homeland Security...................................................................45

 Foreign Governments.....................................................................................................46

1 International Investigations........................................................................46

2 Expansion of Legal Attaché Offices...........................................................46

3 Joint Task Forces and Operations.............................................................47

4 Fingerprint/Identification Initiatives............................................................47

5 International Training Initiatives.................................................................48

Private Sector ..................................................................................................................49

1 Community Outreach.................................................................................49

2 Infragard....................................................................................................49

3 Financial Sector Outreach.........................................................................50

4 Railroad Initiative.......................................................................................50

 X INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY............................................51

Centralized Management..........................................................................51

Trilogy...........................................................................................................52

Data Warehousing......................................................................................53

Analytical Tools..........................................................................................54

Putting It All Together...............................................................................56

 XI ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM..................................................57

 Strategic Planning......................................................................................57

 Realigning the Workforce.........................................................................57

1 Revised Personnel Selection Process ......................................................58

 2 Streamlined Hiring Process.......................................................................59

 Training..........................................................................................................

 Executive Leadership Initiatives................................................................59

 Records Management...............................................................................60

1 Centralizing Records Management...........................................................60

2 Turning Paper into Searchable Data.........................................................60

3 New Records Control Schedule................................................................61

4 Improving Efficiency..................................................................................61

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XII ASSESSMENT OF OUR PROGRESS...........................................

Development of Human Assets.......................................................63

Number of FISAs ..............................................................................64

Number of Intelligence Reports Generated....................................64

Quality of Daily Counterterrorism Briefings...................................65

Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Operations..............................67

Respect for Civil Liberties..........................................................................70

1 Statutory Limitations...................................................................................71

2 Oversight Mechanisms...............................................................................71

3 Self Regulation and Enforcement......................................................72

XIII CONCLUSION............................................................................................74

DIRECTOR’S NOTE.....................................................................................74

Security Management...............................................................................

1 Information Assurance Plan........................................................................

2 Enterprise Operations Center.....................................................................

3 Audits and Reviews...................................................................................

4 Security Officers..........................................................................................

5 Security Education.....................................................................................

6 Disaster Recovery Planning..........................................................................

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Executive Summary 

Since the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the men and women of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) have implemented a comprehensive plan that fundamentally transforms the 

organization to enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism. We overhauled our 

counterterrorism operations, expanded our intelligence capabilities, modernized our business 

practices and technology, and improved coordination with our partners. 

Our plan consists of seven basic elements: 

1 Prioritization 

We replaced a priority system that allowed supervisors a great deal of flexibility with a set of 10 

priorities that strictly govern the allocation of personnel and resources in every FBI program and 

field office. Counterterrorism is now our overriding priority, and every terrorism lead is addressed, 

even if it requires a diversion of resources from other priority areas. 

2 Mobilization 

To implement these new priorities, we increased the number of Special Agents assigned to 

terrorism matters and hired hundreds of intelligence analysts and translators. We also established 

a number of operational units that give us new or improved capabilities to address the terrorist 

threat. These include the 24/7 Counterterrorism Watch and the National Joint Terrorism Task 

Force to manage and share threat information; the Terrorism Financing Operation Section to 

centralize efforts to stop terrorist financing; document/media exploitation squads to exploit 

material found overseas for its intelligence value; deployable “Fly Teams” to lend counterterrorism 

expertise wherever it is needed; and the Terrorist Screening Center and Foreign Terrorist Tracking 

Task Force to help identify terrorists and keep them out of the United States (U.S.). 

3 Centralization 

We centralized management of our Counterterrorism Program at Headquarters to limit “stovepiping” of information, to ensure consistency of counterterrorism priorities and strategy across 

the organization, to integrate counterterrorism operations here and overseas, to improve 

coordination with other agencies and governments, and to make senior managers accountable 

for the overall development and success of our counterterrorism efforts. 

4 Intelligence Integration 

We are building an enterprise-wide intelligence program that has substantially improved our 

ability to strategically direct our intelligence collection and to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our 

terrorism-related intelligence. After the USA PATRIOT Act, related Attorney General Guidelines, 

and the ensuing opinion by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review removed the 

barrier to sharing information between intelligence and criminal investigations, we quickly 

implemented a plan to integrate all our capabilities to better prevent terrorist attacks. We then 

1
elevated intelligence to program-level status, putting in place a formal structure and concepts 

of operations to govern FBI-wide intelligence functions, and establishing Field Intelligence Groups 

in every field office. We recently issued a series of new procedures that fundamentally transform 

our approach to hiring, training, and career development to cultivate and instill a capacity and 

understanding of intelligence processes and objectives within the entire Bureau workforce. 

5 Coordination 

Understanding that we cannot defeat terrorism without strong partnerships, we have enhanced 

the level of coordination and information sharing with state and municipal law enforcement 

personnel. We expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, increased technological 

connectivity with our partners, and implemented new ways of sharing information through vehicles 

such as the Intelligence Bulletin, the Alert System, and the Terrorist Screening Center. To 

improve coordination with other federal agencies and members of the Intelligence Community, 

we joined with our federal partners to establish the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, exchanged 

personnel, instituted joint briefings, and started using secure networks to share information. We 

also improved our relationships with foreign governments by building on the overseas expansion 

started under Director Louis Freeh; by offering investigative and forensic support and training; 

and by working together on task forces and joint operations. Finally, we expanded outreach to 

minority communities, and improved coordination with private businesses involved in critical 

infrastructure and finance. 

6 Information Technology 

We are making substantial progress in upgrading our information technology to streamline our 

business processes and to improve our ability to search for and analyze information, draw 

connections, and share it both inside the Bureau and out. We deployed a secure high-speed 

network, put new or upgraded computers on desktops, and consolidated terrorist information 

in a searchable central database. We developed, and are preparing to launch, the Virtual Case 

File, a state-of-the-art case management system that will revolutionize how the FBI does business. 

7 Administrative Reform 

Re-engineering efforts are making our bureaucracy more efficient and more responsive to 

operational needs. We revised our approach to strategic planning, and we refocused our 

recruiting and hiring to attract individuals with skills critical to our counterterrorism and intelligence 

missions. We developed a more comprehensive training program and instituted new leadership 

initiatives to keep our workforce flexible. We are modernizing the storage and management of 

FBI records. We also built, and continue to improve, an extensive security program with 

centralized leadership, professional security personnel, more rigorous security measures, and 

improved security education and training. 

These improvements have produced tangible and measurable results. We significantly increased 

the number of human sources and the amount of surveillance coverage to support our counterterrorism 

efforts. We developed and refined a process for briefing daily threat information, and we considerably 

increased the number of FBI intelligence reports produced and disseminated. Perhaps most 

important, since September 11, 2001, we have participated in disrupting dozens of terrorist 

operations by developing actionable intelligence and better coordinating our counterterrorism 

efforts. 

It is a testament to the character and dedication of the men and women of the FBI that they have 

implemented these reforms and realized this progress, while continuing to carry out their responsibility 

to investigate and protect America from criminal, counterintelligence, and terrorist threats of virtually 

unprecedented dimensions. 

2 
3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY

DIRECTOR

SAC ADVISORY

COMMITTEE

CHIEF OF STAFF

INSPECTION DIVISION

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

OFFICE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Executive Assistant

Director for

INTELLIGENCE

Executive Assistant

Director for

CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIONS

Executive Assistant

Director for

LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

Executive Assistant

Director for

ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE

OF

INTELLIGENCE

COUNTERTERRORISM

DIVISION

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DIVISION

CYBER

DIVISION

CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIVE

DIVISION

TRAINING

DIVISION

LABORATORY

DIVISION

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

INFORMATION

SERVICES DIVISION

INVESTIGATIVE

TECHNOLOGY

DIVISION

FINANCE

DIVISION

OFFICE OF

STRATEGIC

PLANNING

RECORDS

MANAGEMENT

DIVISION

OFFICE OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT

COORDINATION

OFFICE OF

INTERNATIONAL

OPERATIONS

CRITICAL INCIDENT

RESPONSE GROUP

SECURITY

DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE

SERVICES

DIVISION

INFORMATION

RESOURCES

DIVISION

Executive Assistant

Director for

COUNTERTERRORISM/

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
4
5
INTRODUCTION 

During the past 31 months, the FBI has undergone a transformation in all areas of its operations. 

The transformation has involved both the institution of new functions and capacities as well as 

refinements of existing processes and programs to modernize our operations. 

an overview of that reform process. 

We have always had responsibility for the counterterrorism mission, and the Bureau has a history 

of impressive accomplishments in the war against terrorism. 

Theodore Kaczynski, to the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the 1993 World 

Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1998 East Africa Embassy 

bombings, the FBI has investigated terrorist acts and helped to bring many of those responsible to 

justice. 

commission, as evidenced by the foiling of the Millennium Plot to plant explosives at Los Angeles 

International Airport, the apprehension and prosecution of Ramzi Yousef and others for conspiracy 

to bomb United States commercial airliners, and the arrest and prosecution of Sheik Omar Abdel 

Rahman and his co-conspirators before they could carry out their plan to bomb office buildings, 

bridges, and tunnels in New York City. 

Throughout his tenure, Director Louis Freeh and his executives took steps to build that preventive 

capacity within the Bureau. 

Division and staffed it with analysts who were tasked with identifying and predicting criminal and 

terrorist threats. 

in other countries by nearly doubling the number of Legal Attaché offices overseas. 

devised and implemented a strategy for developing a counterterrorism capability in each FBI field 

office. 

The FBI responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with a clear recognition that we needed 

both to build on the progress of the past decade and to enhance our operations and focus to meet 

the deadly challenge of modern terrorism. 

have been reforming our organization, operations, and long-term objectives to make the prevention 

of terrorist attacks the Bureau’s overriding priority. 

This new operational focus required that we fundamentally transform our organization to 

enhance our ability to predict and prevent terrorism. 

transformation that has seven basic elements: 

• Prioritization 

• Mobilization 

• Centralization 

• Intelligence Integration 

• Coordination 

• Information Technology 

• Administrative Reform 

These elements are the foundation of an effective Counterterrorism Program. 

each element of the plan in some detail. 

6 

This report provides 

From the apprehension of Unabomber 

In addition, the Bureau has participated in preventing many terrorist acts before their 

They established an Intelligence Section within the Investigative Services 

They greatly enhanced our ability to coordinate investigations with our counterparts 

Also, they 

In a process that started on September 11, 2001, we 

We have followed a plan for this 

The following describes 
PRIORITIZATION 

In 1998, the FBI established a five-year strategic plan to set investigative priorities in line 

with a three-tiered structure. Tier 1 included those crimes or intelligence matters – including 

terrorism – that threaten our national or economic security. Tier 2 included offenses involving 

criminal enterprises, public corruption, and violations of civil rights. Tier 3 included violations that 

affect individuals or property. This priority structure allowed supervisors substantial flexibility in 

applying the priorities to their decision making. Consequently, though a top-tier priority, the 

Counterterrorism Program did not receive a sufficiently significant increase in focus or resources. 

On September 11, 2001, the prevention of further terrorism became the Bureau's dominant priority. 

On May 29, 2002, we formalized this prioritization by issuing a new hierarchy of programmatic 

priorities, with counterterrorism at the top. We developed these priorities by evaluating each 

criminal and national security threat within the Bureau’s jurisdiction according to three factors: 

1) the significance of the threat to the security of the United States, as expressed by the President 

in National Security Presidential Directive 26; 2) the priority the American public places on the 

threat; and 3) the degree to which addressing the threat falls most exclusively within the FBI's 

jurisdiction. 

The New Priorities 

The FBI has ten top priorities. Priorities one through eight are program areas, and they 

are listed in the order in which they must be addressed. Priorities nine and ten are objectives that 

are key to the accomplishment of the programmatic priorities. The priorities are: 

1 Protect the United States from Terrorist Attack 

Every FBI manager, Special Agent, and support employee understands that the prevention 

of terrorist attacks is the FBI's overriding priority and that every terrorism-related lead must be 

addressed. Counterterrorism is the top priority in the allocation of funding, personnel, physical 

space, and resources, as well as in hiring and training. No matter their program assignment, 

all FBI field, operational, and support personnel stand ready to assist in our counterterrorism 

efforts. 

2 Protect the United States Against Foreign Intelligence Operations

and Espionage 

The FBI is the lead federal agency with a mandate to investigate foreign counterintelligence 

threats within our borders. During the past 31 months, we have created a nationally-directed 

program for counterintelligence, staffed by a highly trained specialized workforce with enhanced 

analytical support, and with closer ties to the Intelligence Community. The program’s focus 

is on: 1) preventing hostile groups and countries from acquiring technology to produce weapons 

of mass destruction; 2) preventing the compromise of personnel, information, technology, and 

economic interests vital to our national security; and 3) producing intelligence on the plans and 

intentions of our adversaries. 

7
3 Protect the United States Against Cyber-Based Attacks 

and High-Technology Crimes 

We continue to see a dramatic rise in both cyber crimes, such as denial of service attacks, and 

traditional crimes that have migrated on-line, such as identity theft and child pornography. The 

FBI is the only government entity with the wide-ranging jurisdiction, technical resources, 

personnel, and network of relationships necessary to address the threat from multi-jurisdictional 

cyber crimes and cyber terrorism. Accordingly, the FBI created a national cyber program with 

a Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters and cyber squads in the field offices. The program 

focuses on identifying and pursuing: 1) individuals or groups who conduct computer intrusions 

and spread malicious code; 2) intellectual property thieves; 3) Internet fraudsters; and 

4) on-line predators who sexually exploit or endanger children. 

4 Combat Public Corruption at All Levels 

The FBI has extensive experience investigating public corruption. Our public corruption 

investigations focus on all levels of government (local, state, and federal) and address all types 

of judicial, legislative, regulatory, and law enforcement corruption. 

5 Protect Civil Rights 

The FBI is the federal agency with responsibility for investigating allegations of federal civil 

rights violations and abuses. In pursuit of this mission, the FBI investigates allegations of 

brutality and related misconduct by law enforcement officers as well as hate crimes. Recently, 

our civil rights program has focused particularly on hate crime cases related to Muslim, Sikh, 

and Arab-American communities that suffered threats and attacks in the aftermath of 

September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

6 Combat Transnational and National Criminal Organizations and Enterprises 

As the world grows smaller and investigations become more international, the FBI increasingly 

uses its expertise and relationships with foreign counterparts to dismantle or disrupt those 

major criminal enterprises that are responsible for cross-border criminal activity. 

7 Combat Major White-Collar Crime 

The FBI has expertise in the investigation of white-collar criminal activities that are international, 

national, or regional in scope. During the past two years, we have dedicated scores of agents 

to the investigation of corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and others, and focused 

our criminal analytical capabilities on major health care fraud and bank fraud threats. At the 

same time, we are scaling back our investigations into smaller bank frauds and embezzlements 

that are ably handled by other agencies and our state and municipal partners. 

8 Combat Significant Violent Crime 

Most violent crime in the U.S. is investigated and prosecuted by state or municipal authorities. 

While federal statutes give the FBI jurisdiction over many types of violent crime, we choose 

our investigations carefully so as not to duplicate the tremendous job being done by our state 

and municipal partners. We concentrate our efforts on those criminal targets – such as 

organized criminal enterprises and violent narcotics gangs – that pose a significant threat to 

our society. We participate in the fight against violent crime wherever we bring something 

special to the mix, whether it is special capabilities, resources, or our jurisdiction to enforce 

applicable federal statutes. 

8
9 Support Federal, State, Municipal, and International Partners 

Our preventive mission requires a high level of engagement with state and municipal law 

enforcement, other federal agencies, members of the Intelligence Community, and our 

international counterparts. Accordingly, we have made it a top priority to improve information 

sharing and coordination, and to provide training and other support to our partners. 

10 Upgrade Technology to Successfully Perform the FBI's Mission 

We are upgrading our technology by deploying a state-of-the-art secure network, putting 

new computers with new software on desktops, and building centralized databases. We are 

expanding our capabilities to fully exploit digital information and to share the results internally 

and externally. We also are educating our workforce to ensure that everyone understands 

how technology can help us do our job better. 

Implementing the New Priorities 

To ensure adherence to the new priorities, we reduced the flexibility that was built into 

the old three-tiered system. Instead of allowing field offices to choose how to allocate 

resources within broad priority areas, the new system dictates that managers satisfy 

operational needs in the strict order of their priority. Special Agents in Charge (SACs) making 

deployment decisions must first dedicate sufficient resources to handle priority one before handling 

priority two, and so forth. Similarly, Headquarters managers must provide services – such as 

training, hiring, and technology improvements – to operational programs in order of priority. 

Communication of Priorities 

Understanding that successful implementation of the new priorities requires universal 

commitment to them, we embarked on a multi-faceted education campaign. We significantly 

increased the number of SAC conferences where we discuss the new priorities and task 

the SACs to communicate the message to their personnel in the field. Senior Headquarters 

executives regularly discuss the priorities in speeches, congressional testimony, published 

articles, employee e-mails and meetings. The FBI's intranet and employee publications, 

such as The Investigator magazine, provide continued updates and guidance on the new 

priorities to our employees. Also, a number of senior executives have begun traveling 

to each field office to deliver a multimedia presentation that educates employees about 

the current status of our new priorities and associated organizational reforms. 

9
Priorities in the Budgetary Process 

Our commitment to these priorities is reflected in our budget and resource management. 

Counterterrorism and intelligence-related funding and personnel needs have been the top 

priorities in our budget requests to the Attorney General, the President, and the Congress 

since the events of September 11, 2001. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, approximately 32 

percent of the FBI’s annual appropriation was dedicated to national security programs 

(counterterrorism and counterintelligence). For FY 2004, that number is 40 percent of the 

overall budget. 

Construction 

$16,650,000 

Forensic 

$138,279,000 

Security 

$38,364,000 

National 

Security 

$1,050,354,000 

Criminal 

$1,588,544,000 

Cyber

Investigations 

$31,835,000 

Criminal 49% 

National 

Security 32% 

1% 

4% 

1% 

Technology 

12% 1% 

FY 2001 Appropriations 

Technology Investments 

$381,106,000 

Construction 

$11,056,000 

Forensic 

$198,047,000 

Security 

$203,725,000 

National 

Security 

$1,851,663,000 

Criminal 

$1,583,535,000 

Cyber

Investigations 

$234,471,000 

Technology Investments 

$523,752,000 

<1% 

Criminal 34% 

Technology 

11% 

5% 

Cyber 

National 

Security40% 

5%4% 

FY 2004 Appropriations 

For FY 2005, the President has submitted a budget proposal that calls for further increases 

in the resources available for counterterrorism activities and expands the percentage 

of the FBI’s budget dedicated to national security matters to 44 percent. Compared to 

FY 2001, this more than doubles the amount of funding for counterterrorism and 

counterintelligence and equates to an 80 percent increase in the number of people devoted 

to the counterterrorism and counterintelligence missions. 

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$1,638,867,000

$2,241,114.000

Construction

$1,242,000

Forensic

$166,615,000

Security

$262,083,000

Technology Investments

National

Security

Criminal

$522,308,000

Cyber

Investigations

$283,041,000

<1%

Criminal 32%

Technology

10%

5%

Cyber

National

Security 44%

5%3%

FY 2005 President’s Request

 Enforcement of Priorities

Senior managers at Headquarters and in the field have been instructed that they must

address and resolve every counterterrorism lead, even if it requires a diversion of personnel

or resources from other priority areas. 

that a field office’s operations appeared inconsistent with this directive. 

sent to these field offices to conduct a thorough audit and to determine whether the office

was complying with the new priorities. 

inspectors made recommendations for correcting the problem, and these recommendations

were promptly implemented.

We are revising our performance metrics and inspection criteria to better evaluate

performance and resource allocation in accordance with the new priorities. 

are discussed in more detail under Intelligence Integration (page 34).

11

On two occasions, Headquarters received indications

Inspectors were

In the one instance where a problem was found,

These measures
Mobilization 

In accordance with the new priorities, we mobilized and substantially reallocated resources and 

personnel to the counterterrorism mission. We increased the number of counterterrorism agents, 

intelligence analysts, and translators, and established a number of new operational components 

dedicated to the counterterrorism mission. Each of these components represents a new capacity, 

or an enhanced capacity, for the Bureau in the war against terrorism. In addition, FBI personnel 

who do not work on counterterrorism matters full-time stand by to support our number one priority 

as needed. 

As of February 29, 2004, the FBI has just over 28,000 employees, of which 11,881 are Special 

Agents. These men and women provide a surge capacity that enables the FBI to respond to 

terrorism threats and to ensure that every terrorism lead is followed to its resolution. In the autumn 

of 2001, approximately 67 percent, or more than 4,000 of our agents in the field who previously 

worked on criminal investigative matters were diverted to investigate the September 11, 2001, 

attacks or the subsequent anthrax attacks. Analysts from the Counterintelligence and Criminal 

Investigative Divisions also were deployed to assist in these counterterrorism efforts. 

Today, all Special Agents are adept in the use of the investigative tools used in counterterrorism 

investigations and can be mobilized to assist counterterrorism efforts when needed. The fact that 

counterterrorism is the top priority for the Criminal Investigative Division ensures that all of its 

personnel will be made available when this surge capacity is required. Standardized processes 

for conducting analysis and producing intelligence products allow for all FBI analysts to lend 

assistance to the Counterterrorism Program. The flexibility to leverage and mobilize all our 

personnel in this manner is critical to our ability to respond quickly to evolving threats. 

Personnel Mobilized 

Special Agents 

Since September 11, 2001, we have 

increased the number of Special Agents 

working terrorism matters from 1,351 to 

2,398. 

September 11, 2001 

2500 

2000 

1500 

1000 

500 

0 Present 

Counterterrorism Agents 

3000 

2398 

1351 

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Intelligence Analysts 

We have increased the number of analysts 

supporting our counterterrorism mission. 

Immediately after September 11, 2001, we 

transferred analysts from other divisions to 

counterterrorism and integrated analysts detailed 

from other agencies – including 25 analysts and 

an analyst supervisor detailed from the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA). Since then, we have 

made progress toward building a strong 

analytical cadre through targeted recruitment 

and enhanced training and career development. 

FBI ANALYSTS 

YEAR 

FY 2001 

FY 2002 

FY 2003 

3/4/2004 

Grand 

Total 

TOTAL 

1023 

1012 

1180 

1197 

42 

96 

250 

72 

460

HIRED 

Translators 

Our Counterterrorism Program relies heavily on linguistic capabilities for translation services,

interview support, and surveillance activities, and these needs are growing. Since September

11, 2001, electronic surveillance collection in Arabic, Urdu, Pashto, and various other Middle

Eastern languages has increased by 75 percent or more. To meet this growing need, since

the beginning of FY 2001, we have recruited and processed more than 30,000 translator

applicants. These efforts have resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators, including

both FBI employees and contract linguists.

More than 95 percent of our translators are native speakers of the foreign language. Their

native proficiencies equip them with both a firm grasp of colloquial and idiomatic speech, and

an understanding of the religious, cultural, and historical references needed to effectively

perform the wide range of services required of an FBI linguist. To further ensure the quality

of translations, on December 1, 2003, we instituted a national quality control program. All

material produced by translators on board for

less than three months is subject to accuracy

and content reviews by senior staff, and their

products are subject to periodic audits thereafter.

Our translator corps is complemented by well

over 1,000 Special Agents and intelligence

analysts with foreign language proficiencies at

the minimum working level or higher.

Expanded Operational 

Capabilities 

Counterterrorism Watch 

On September 11, 2001, we formed the Executive

Watch, later renamed the Counterterrorism Watch

Unit (CT Watch). CT Watch receives threat

information from a variety of sources, including

FBI Headquarters divisions, field offices, Joint

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), the intelligence and homeland security communities, and state

and municipal law enforcement. CT Watch assesses information for credibility and urgency,

and tasks appropriate FBI divisions to take action on or further investigate that information.

Arabic 

Farsi 

Pashto 

Urdu 

Chinese 

French 

Hebrew 

Korean 

Kurdish 

Russian 

Turkish 

70 

24 

1 

6 

67 

16 

4 

18 

0 

78 

2 

MAJOR 

LANGUAGE 9/11/01 Present Net Change 

207 

55 

10 

21 

119 

34 

11 

25 

5 

100 

10 

+137 

+31 

+9 

+15 

+52 

+18 

+7 

+7 

+5 

+22 

+8 

INCREASED LANGUAGE 

TRANSLATION CAPABILITIES 

to Support Counterterrorism 

13
National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, an ad hoc group of representatives 

from federal agencies began meeting, sharing information, and working together in the 

FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) at Headquarters. On July 18, 2002, 

we formally created the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to act as a liaison 

and conduit for information on threats and leads from FBI Headquarters to the local JTTFs 

and to 38 participating agencies. The NJTTF now includes representatives from members 

of the Intelligence Community; components of the Departments of Homeland Security, 

Defense, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, Energy, State, and the Interior; 

the City of New York Police Department; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Railroad 

Police; U.S. Capitol Police; and others. 

All members are provided with access to the FBI intranet, including its internal e-mail 

system, and to the FBI’s investigative database for purposes of counterterrorism investigations. 

In turn, members provide access to their organizations’ respective databases. In addition, 

Daily Secure Video Conferences, coordinated by the National Security Council, are held 

within SIOC and attended by NJTTF members, ensuring that all member agencies of the 

NJTTF receive the latest threat briefings. 

The NJTTF also works with the FBI’s Office of Intelligence to coordinate inter-agency 

intelligence-gathering initiatives, such as the following: 

Foreign Flight Crew Vetting 

In September 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requested assistance 

in vetting certain foreign flight crew members who have access to commercial aircraft 

cockpits while in U.S. airspace. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

provided 6,200 names and dates of birth to the National Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

The NJTTF ran the names against a number of FBI and Intelligence Community 

databases and identified 184 possible matches. The NJTTF then assembled members 

from several federal agencies to review the findings and to determine if any possible 

matches posed a threat to aviation using the TSA’s baseline for a "No Fly List" 

candidate. After a thorough review, 25 names were placed on the "No Fly" list. 

Maritime Initiatives 

The NJTTF is spearheading the Maritime Threat Project – a multi-agency, cooperative 

effort to prevent or disrupt potential maritime attacks. The Maritime Threat Project 

consolidates information on suspicious activities – such as persons conducting 

surveillance around ports – and forwards appropriate leads to local JTTFs and other 

agencies for additional investigation. As a part of this Maritime Threat Project, for 

example, the NJTTF sent leads to all JTTFs with instructions for them to canvass 

diving schools in their areas to identify suspicious activity and potential leads. 

A related effort is “Operation Drydock,” in which the Coast Guard Investigative Service 

and the NJTTF collaborated to identify and appropriately respond to national security 

concerns related to merchant marine documents and licenses. This initiative addresses 

the use of fraudulent credentials by individuals seeking to work aboard commercial 

ships, and recently identified 11 individuals with ties to terrorist organizations. 

14
 Operation TRIPWIRE 

Operation TRIPWIRE is designed to improve the FBI's intelligence base with a specific 

goal to aid in identifying potential terrorist sleeper cells within the U.S. It puts in place a 

roadmap for developing intelligence and collection requirements targeting terrorist training, 

financing, recruiting, logistical support, and pre-attack preparation within the U.S. 

Examples of TRIPWIRE operations are as follows: 

Agricultural Aviation Threat Project 

The FBI, through the NJTTF, identified and interviewed agricultural aviation owners 

and operators throughout the country. The FBI reviewed a list of over 11,000 

aircraft provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and interviewed 

3,028 crop duster owners and operators. To date, this effort has led to the initiation 

of several counterterrorism investigations. 

Correctional Intelligence Initiative 

Another initiative being coordinated through the NJTTF aims to detect and interdict 

efforts by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups to recruit within the U.S. prison inmate 

population. All JTTFs have been tasked to coordinate with the correctional agencies 

within their respective geographic regions to exchange intelligence and recruit 

human sources. JTTF members are identifying existing or former sources who 

are now incarcerated and reactivating them to infiltrate any radical elements. To 

date, these efforts have identified approximately 370 connections between particular 

inmates and domestic and international terrorism investigations, and have identified 

a number of instances of potential terrorism-related activity within the prisons. 

Terrorism Financing Operations Section 

On September 13, 2001, we created the Financial Review Group, later renamed the Terrorism 

Financing Operations Section (TFOS), to consolidate our approach to dismantling terrorist 

financing operations. TFOS works not only to identify and track financial transactions and links 

after a terrorist act has occurred; it exploits financial information to identify previously unknown 

terrorist cells, to recognize potential terrorist activity or planning, and to predict and prevent 

potential terrorist acts. 

TFOS is both an operational and coordinating entity. Operationally, TFOS has been involved 

in the financial investigations of more than 3,000 individuals and groups suspected of financially 

supporting terrorist organizations, and joint efforts with its partners have resulted in the blocking 

or freezing of millions of dollars in assets. TFOS works closely with our experts in criminal 

money laundering, and leverages the resources of our Financial Crimes Section in the Criminal 

Investigative Division as needed. 

As a coordinating entity, TFOS ensures that a unified approach is pursued in investigating 

terrorist financing networks. TFOS coordinates financial aspects of FBI terrorism investigations, 

establishes overall initiatives and policies on terrorist financing matters, and coordinates with 

the National Security Council's Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorist Financing, the 

Department of Justice (DOJ), and the financial services sector. Also, terrorist finance coordinators 

participate in every JTTF. Through TFOS, the FBI has succeeded in building strong working 

relationships with all law enforcement and intelligence agencies that are fighting the war on 

terror. 

15
Evidence Exploitation 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI and its partners lacked sufficient procedures for 

systematically exploiting paper documents, electronic media, and forensic evidence for its 

intelligence value. The National Media Exploitation Center was established in late 2001 to 

coordinate FBI, CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency 

(NSA) efforts to analyze and disseminate information gleaned from millions of pages of paper 

documents, electronic media, videotapes, audiotapes, and electronic equipment seized by the 

U.S. military and Intelligence Community in Afghanistan and other foreign lands. These 

exploitation efforts have produced approximately 20,000 investigative leads, and forensic 

evidence such as fingerprints and DNA from documents and items recovered from suspects 

overseas have proven critical to a number of terrorist apprehensions and disruptions. 

We have since established groups that specialize in the analysis of particular types of information. 

On December 4, 2002, we created a Communications Exploitation Section to coordinate the 

analysis of documents, electronic media, and forensic evidence, as well as telephone and 

electronic communications. Soon thereafter, we established a specialized Document Exploitation 

Unit to exploit terrorist-related documentary material and to extract threat and intelligence 

information for the FBI and the Intelligence Community. In December 2003, we began 

preliminary operations at the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center at the FBI Laboratory 

in Quantico, Virginia. This new center, described in more detail on page 45, coordinates the 

efforts of multiple federal agencies to collect, analyze, forensically exploit, and disseminate 

intelligence related to improvised explosive devices. 

Fly-Away/Rapid Deployment Teams 

On June 6, 2002, the FBI created the Fly Away/Rapid Deployment Team Unit to manage and 

support the field office-based Rapid Deployment Teams and the newly created Headquartersbased "Fly Squads." These specialized teams and squads lend counterterrorism knowledge 

and experience, language capabilities, and intelligence analysis support to FBI field offices 

and Legal Attachés whenever they are needed. Since September 11, 2001, the Headquartersbased Fly Squads have been deployed on 38 different occasions, and have assisted in 

operations from Buffalo, New York, to the Gaza Strip. 

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force 

On October 29, 2001, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive

No. 2, directing the Attorney General to create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

(FTTTF) to keep foreign terrorists and their supporters out of the U.S. through entry denial,

removal, or prosecution. FTTTF participants include the FBI, CIA, and the Departments of

Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy. The FTTTF also maintains a close liaison

with intelligence and law enforcement services in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and

other countries. On August 6, 2002, the Attorney General directed the consolidation of the

FTTTF into the FBI.

To fulfill its mission, the FTTTF implemented information sharing agreements among participating

agencies to assist it in locating suspected terrorists and their supporters. It now has access

to over 40 sources of data containing lists of known and suspected foreign terrorists and their

supporters, including the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Offenders File (VGTOF) and the

State Department’s TIPOFF watch list.

16
Relying on this base of information, the FTTTF performs two primary analytical functions: 

Tracking and Detection The FTTTF analyzes immigration records, other law enforcement 

data, and public and proprietary source information to detect the presence of terrorists in 

the U.S. This service supports the activities of JTTFs and other counterterrorism investigators 

by helping identify the current and previous locations of suspected terrorists in the U.S. 

To date, this process has generated more than 200 leads to the potential location of 

terrorists. 

Risk Assessment The FTTTF uses human analysis and analytical software to assess 

the risk of specific categories of foreign nationals attempting to enter the U.S. In 

compliance with the Aviation Transportation and Security Act, the FTTTF also conducts 

background records checks and risk assessments on foreign nationals seeking flight 

training on aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more. As of December 2003, the FTTTF 

has done more than 58,000 such checks. In accordance with the Century of Aviation 

Reauthorization Act, passed on December 12, 2003, we will soon be transferring this 

function to the DHS’s Transportation Security Administration. 

Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Group 

Pursuant to the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002, the 

FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS) now conducts background 

checks and risk assessments on individuals who have or seek access to specific biological 

agents and toxins. To meet this new mandate, CJIS established procedures for completing 

the assessments, set up a database for tracking the assessments, and reassigned and 

hired additional personnel. As of January 26, 2004, assessments were finalized for 7,848 

individuals, and 41 were determined to be “restricted persons” as defined by the Bioterrorism 

Preparedness Act. “Restricted persons” cannot be allowed by the employing lab to possess, 

use, transport, or have access to select agents or toxins. 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Unit 

In November 2002, we created a specialized unit within the Office of General Counsel to 

support and streamline functions related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 

process. The new unit coordinates with FBI field offices, FBI Headquarters, and DOJ to ensure 

that FISA packages are prepared and reviewed in an expeditious and consistent manner. The 

FISA Unit, in coordination with other appropriate Headquarters personnel, is overseeing the 

development and implementation of the new FISA management system that will enable us 

both to transmit a FISA document between field offices, the operational units at FBI Headquarters, 

the Office of General Counsel’s National Security Law Branch, and DOJ’s Office of Intelligence 

Policy and Review, and to track its progress during each stage of the review and approval 

process. An automated tracking system will identify delays and chokepoints in the process, 

and the FISA Unit will remedy identified problems by sending reminders or resolving outstanding 

questions. 

Language Translation 

Connecting Translation Capabilities 

The FBI’s approximately 1,200 translators are stationed across 52 field offices and 

Headquarters, and are now connected via secure networks that allow a translator in one 

17
FBI office to work on projects for any other office. We implemented network enhancements 

to ensure that collected intelligence can be transmitted to the appropriate translator on a 

near real-time basis, and we developed work flow management software to track, monitor, 

and account for any collected data and the corresponding translation product. 

Language Services Translation Center 

Shortly after September 11, 2001, we established the Language Services Translation 

Center (LSTC) at FBI Headquarters to help ensure that translation services are available 

whenever and wherever they are needed. The LSTC acts as a “command and control” 

center to coordinate translator assignments, and to ensure that our translator resources 

are aligned strategically with operational and intelligence priorities. In addition, the LSTC 

has an on-site population of 20 FBI translators and 29 contract translators who render 

immediate translation assistance to field offices and Legal Attaché offices when required. 

National Virtual Translation Center 

To provide similar capabilities to the larger Intelligence Community, in accordance with 

Section 907 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Director of Central Intelligence established the 

National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC) on February 11, 2003, and designated the FBI 

as its Executive Agent. Like the FBI’s LSTC, the NVTC serves as a clearinghouse to 

provide timely and accurate translation of foreign intelligence for Intelligence Community 

agencies. The NVTC taps into the FBI’s pool of contract linguists and matches excess 

translation capacity with the translation needs of other Intelligence Community agencies. 

The FBI further supports the NVTC by handling recruiting and applicant processing for 

NVTC linguists. 

Although it will not be fully “virtual” until later this spring, the NVTC has already successfully 

completed translation tasks for CIA, DIA, and the FBI. With its Director from NSA, and 

its Deputy Directors from CIA and the FBI, the NVTC is truly a Community-wide effort. 

Special Technologies and Applications Section 

In November 2002, we created a Special Technologies and Applications Section within the 

new Cyber Division to support counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal investigations 

involving computer intrusions and digital or electronic media evidence. The Section provides 

technical investigative analysis, helping to extract and decrypt volumes of data and making it 

easily searchable by investigators and intelligence analysts. The Section also designs automated 

tools, acts as a clearinghouse for new technologies developed by other agencies and the 

private sector, and coordinates with research and development entities inside and outside 

government. These efforts help ensure that the FBI is prepared to fully exploit digital evidence 

for its intelligence value and to respond to new computer intrusion-related threats and incidents. 

18
Investigative Technology Division 

Recognizing that the effective and focused use of applied science and engineering resources 

is critical to our efforts, especially our efforts to protect the U.S. from a terrorist attack, we 

created the Investigative Technology Division (ITD) out of components of the Laboratory 

Division in August 2002. The mission of ITD is to develop and provide state-of-the-art technical 

support and expertise to enhance the FBI’s investigative efforts. ITD also oversees forensic 

services related to the collection and processing of computer, audio, and visual media to ensure 

such evidence is fully exploited for its intelligence value. 

The ITD develops, procures, and supports technologies which are broadly applicable to all FBI 

investigative programs within ITD's designated technology program areas (namely, Electronic 

Surveillance, Physical Surveillance, Digital Forensics, Surreptitious Entry, Tactical 

Communications, and Defensive Programs). 

The refocusing of the FBI's efforts to proactively 

address terrorism and foreign intelligence 

threats has resulted in a 64 percent increase 

in, and a substantial realignment of, ITD’s 

workload. This chart depicts the alignment 

of the tactical workload of ITD entities in 

FY 1996 (historical) and FY 2003 (current). 

DISTRIBUTION of 

TACTICAL WORKLOAD 

Fiscal Year 

Grand Total 

Criminal 

Investigations 48% 

Counterintelligence 

Counter- terrorism 

FY 1996 FY 2003 

42% 

10% 

100% 

15% 

42% 

43% 

100% 

19
CENTRALIZATION 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the Bureau had no centralized structure for the national management 

of its Counterterrorism Program, and terrorism cases were routinely managed out of individual 

field offices. An al-Qa’ida case, for example, might have been run out of the New York Field Office; 

a HAMAS case might have been managed by the Washington Field Office. This arrangement 

functioned for years, and produced a number of impressive prosecutions. 

Once counterterrorism became our overriding priority, however, it became clear that this arrangement 

had a number of failings. It “stove-piped” investigative intelligence information among field offices. 

It diffused responsibility and accountability between counterterrorism officials at FBI Headquarters 

and the SACs who had primary responsibility for the individual terrorism investigations. It allowed 

for field offices to assign varying priorities and resource levels to terrorist groups and threats. It 

impeded oversight by FBI leadership, and it complicated coordination with other federal agencies 

and entities involved in the war against terrorism. For all these reasons, we decided that the 

Counterterrorism Program needed centralized leadership. 

In December 2001, we reorganized and expanded the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) at 

Headquarters and created the position of Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Counterterrorism 

and Counterintelligence. (The Assistant Director of CTD reports to the EAD.) We now have the 

centralized management to run a truly national program – to coordinate counterterrorism operations 

and intelligence production domestically and overseas; to conduct liaison with other agencies and 

governments; and to establish clear lines of accountability for the overall development and success 

of our Counterterrorism Program. With this management structure in place, we are driving the 

fundamental changes that are necessary to accomplish our counterterrorism mission. 

We divided the operations of the Counterterrorism Division into branches, sections, and units, 

each of which focuses on a different aspect of the current terrorism threat facing the U.S. These 

components are staffed with intelligence analysts and subject matter experts who work closely 

with investigators in the field and integrate intelligence across component lines. This integration 

allows for real-time responses to threat information and quick communication with decision-makers 

and investigators in the field. 

20
Investigative Operations Branch

The Investigative Operations Branch supports, coordinates, and manages terrorism-related

investigations. It is comprised of four sections.

The International Terrorism Operations Section I (ITOS I)

ITOS I supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international counterterrorism

operations related to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni extremist groups.

The International Terrorism Operations Section II (ITOS II)

ITOS II supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international counterterrorism

operations related to other groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,

as well as the terrorist threat from state sponsors of terrorism.

The Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS)

DTOS supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI domestic counterterrorism operations.

In addition, DTOS’s Special Events Unit plays a major role in planning, coordinating, and

managing support to field offices charged with counterterrorism responsibilities for special

events such as the Super Bowl or Olympic Games.

The Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section

The Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section oversees the dissemination of raw intelligence

reports and executes policies and procedures established by the Office of Intelligence.

COUNTERTERRORISM

DIVISION Executive Staff

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Counterterrorism Division

CT OPERATIONS

DEPUTY AD

CT OPERATIONS

ASSOCIATE DEPUTY AD

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

CT

ADMINISTRATIVE

UNIT

CT BUDGET

COORDINATION AND

SECURITY UNIT

FBI DETAILEES TO

OTHER GOVT.

AGENCIES

Financial

Intelligence

Analysis Unit

Program

Coordination &

Management

Unit

Arabian

Peninsula Unit

Global Extremist/

Financial

Investigations

Unit

Radical

Fundamentalist/

Financial

Investigations

Unit II

National

Joint

Terrorism

Task Force

Fly

Away/RDT

Unit

Military

Liaison &

Detainee

Unit

CT Watch

Unit

Terrorist

Watch &

Warning

Unit

Threat

Monitoring

Unit

Counterterrorism

Analysis

Radical

Fundamentalist

Extremist

Collection,

Evaluation,

Dissemination

Unit

WMD/

Unconventional

Countermeasures

Unit

Radical

Fundamentalist/

Financial

Investigations

Unit I

TERRORIST

SCREENING CENTER

FOREIGN TERRORIST

TASK FORCE

Strategic

Information

& Operations

Center

Reports Policy

and Asset

Vetting Unit

Global ME

Extremist

Collection,

Evaluation,

Dissemination

Unit

WMD

Unconventional

Threat Collection,

Evaluation,

Dissemination

Unit

Domestic

Collection,

Evaluation,

Dissemination

Unit

Communications

Analysis

Unit

Domestic Sunni

Extremist

Analysis Unit

Section

Communication

Exploitation

Section

National

Threat

Center

Section

CT

Operational

Response

Section

Terrorism

Financing

Operations

Section

Terrorism

Reports and

Requirements

Section

International

Terrorism

Operations

Section I

Shia/

Middle East

Analysis Unit

DOCUMENT

Exploitation

Unit

Foreign Links/

Global Targets

Analysis Unit

Domestic

Terrorism

Analysis Unit

WMD and

Emerging

Weapons Unit

Electronic

Communication

Analysis Unit

CT ELSur

Operations

Unit

Unit I

Unit II

Unit III

Unit IV

Regional/

Extraterritorial

Unit

Conus I

Conus II

Conus III

Conus IV

Special

Events

Unit

Section I

Domestic

Terrorism

Operations

International

Terrorism

Operations

Section II

DEPUTY AD

Stand Alone

Global Extremist

Located on all teams

key

Domestic Team

Radical Fundamentalist Team

COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYSIS

DEPUTY AD

21
Operational Support Branch 

The Operational Support Branch handles administrative responsibilities for CTD, and 

administers the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the 

Terrorist Financing Operations Section (all of which are described in detail elsewhere in this report). 

This branch also runs two critical components of our counterterrorism operations. 

National Threat Center Section 

The National Threat Center Section administers CT Watch and other units related to threat 

management: 1) the Public Access Center Unit that receives threat information from the public 

and forwards it to the appropriate unit; 2) the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit that produces 

finished intelligence products for the law enforcement community (such as Intelligence Bulletins 

and Special Event Threat Assessments); and 3) the Threat Monitoring Unit that collects threat 

information, looks for patterns and connections, and provides “raw” threat-related intelligence 

reports. This Section also runs SIOC, the 24/7 command and crisis response center at FBI 

Headquarters. 

Counterterrorism Operational Response Section 

The Counterterrorism Operational Response Section lends critical support in three areas. It 

supports the National Joint Terrorism Task Force; it coordinates deployment of the Headquartersbased “Fly Teams” and the field office-based Rapid Deployment Teams; and it conducts liaison 

with the Department of Defense (DOD) and manages FBI personnel working with the military 

in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Afghanistan. 

Counterterrorism Analysis Branch 

The Counterterrorism Analysis Branch oversees the bulk of the CTD’s intelligence functions, 

including analysis, evidence exploitation, and the preparation and dissemination of finished 

intelligence products and briefing materials. Today, the Counterterrorism Analysis Branch operates 

with the guidance and oversight of the FBI’s Office of Intelligence and is a vital part of the FBI’s 

enterprise-wide intelligence program. It is comprised of two sections. 

Counterterrorism Analysis Section 

The Counterterrorism Analysis Section includes five units whose areas of focus mirror those 

of the units in the Investigative Operations Section. These units examine the composition, 

activities, tradecraft, ideology, and linkages of terrorist groups, and they assess terrorist activities 

and threats to assist FBI managers in making decisions about deployments and the allocation 

of resources. 

Communications Exploitation Section 

The Communications Exploitation Section processes information and disseminates information 

derived from the full range of media. It is an integral participant in the National Document 

Exploitation Center process. 

22
INTELLIGENCE


INTEGRATION


The Bureau is designed, and has always operated, as both a law enforcement and an intelligence 

agency. It has the dual mission: 1) to investigate and arrest perpetrators of completed crimes (the 

law enforcement mission); and 2) to collect intelligence that will help prevent future crimes and 

assist policy makers in their decision making (the intelligence mission). History has shown that 

we are most effective in protecting the U.S. when we perform these two missions in tandem. 

Agents long ago recognized that investigations could produce intelligence benefits beyond arrest 

and prosecution. Starting with the Ku Klux Klan cases in the 1960's and the Mafia cases of the 

1970's, our agents began to view criminal investigations not only as a means of arresting and 

prosecuting someone for a completed crime, but also as a means of obtaining information to 

prevent future crime. Their goal was not simply to arrest individual members of the Klan or the 

Mafia, but to penetrate and dismantle the whole criminal organization. 

As agents adopted this approach, they further developed the intelligence tools – such as electronic 

surveillance and the cultivation of human sources – that are critical to predicting and preventing 

criminal activity. They also learned to think strategically before making arrests, sometimes opting 

to delay a suspect's arrest to allow more opportunity for surveillance that might disclose other 

conspirators or other criminal plans. We have used this approach to great effect in organized 

crime cases and espionage investigations, and members of our Safe Streets Task Forces use it 

in their fight against street gangs. 

This is the approach that is needed to prevent terrorism. As of September 11, 2001, however, 

we were handicapped in our ability to implement this approach in the counterterrorism arena for 

two primary reasons. 

First, judicial rules and DOJ internal procedures prohibited our counterterrorism 

agents working intelligence cases from coordinating and sharing information with 

criminal agents who often were working investigations against the same targets. 

Second, we had not developed the institutional structure and processes necessary 

for a fully functioning intelligence operation. 

We started to address each of these problems immediately after the September 11, 2001, attacks. 

Integrating Criminal and Intelligence Operations 

By definition, investigations of international terrorism are both “intelligence” and “criminal” 

investigations. They are intelligence investigations because their objective, pursuant to Executive 

Order 12333, is “the detection and countering of international terrorist activities,” and because 

they employ the authorities and investigative tools – such as Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

warrants – that are designed for the intelligence mission of protecting the U.S. against attack or 

other harm by foreign entities. They are criminal investigations since international terrorism against 

the U.S. constitutes a violation of the federal criminal code. 

Over the past two decades, a regime of court rules and internal DOJ procedures developed 

surrounding the use of FISA warrants that barred FBI agents and other Intelligence Community 

personnel working intelligence cases that employed the FISA tool from coordinating and swapping 

leads with agents working criminal cases. As a result of this legal “wall,” “intelligence” agents 

23 
and “criminal” agents working on a terrorist target had to proceed without knowing what the other 

may have been doing about that same target. In short, we were fighting international terrorism 

with one arm tied behind our back. 

The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted on October 26, 2001, eliminated this “wall” and authorized 

coordination among agents working criminal matters and those working intelligence investigations. 

On March 6, 2002, the Attorney General issued new Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign 

Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI (Intelligence 

Sharing Procedures) to capitalize on this legislative change. The new procedures specifically 

authorized agents working intelligence cases to disseminate to criminal prosecutors and investigators 

all relevant foreign intelligence information, including information obtained from FISA, in accordance 

with applicable minimization standards and other specific restrictions (originator controls). 

Correspondingly, they authorized prosecutors and criminal agents to advise FBI agents working 

intelligence cases on all aspects of foreign intelligence investigations, including the use of FISA. 

On November 18, 2002, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issued an 

opinion approving the Intelligence Sharing Procedures, thereby authorizing us to share information, 

including FISA-derived information, between our criminal and intelligence investigations. With this 

opinion, we finally were free to conduct our terrorism investigations with the full use and coordination 

of our criminal and intelligence tools and personnel. 

To formalize this merger of intelligence and criminal operations, we have abandoned the 

separate case classifications for "criminal" international terrorism investigations (with the classification 

number 265) and "intelligence" international terrorism investigations (classification number 199), 

and we have consolidated them into a single classification for "international terrorism" (new 

classification number 315). This reclassification officially designates an international terrorism 

investigation as one that can employ intelligence tools as well as criminal processes and procedures. 

In July 2003, we codified this approach in our Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy, which 

was issued to all field offices and has been the subject of extensive field training. 

With the dismantling of the legal "wall" and the integration of our criminal and intelligence 

personnel and operations, we now have the latitude to coordinate our intelligence and criminal 

investigations and to use the full range of investigative tools against a suspected terrorist. On the 

intelligence side, we can conduct surveillance on the suspected terrorist to learn about his 

movements and identify possible confederates; we can obtain FISA authority to monitor his 

conversations; and/or we can approach and attempt to cultivate him as a source or an operational 

asset. On the criminal side, we have the option of incapacitating him through arrest, detention, 

and prosecution. We decide among these options by continuously balancing the opportunity to 

develop intelligence against the need to apprehend the suspect and prevent him from carrying 

out his terrorist plans. This integrated approach has guided our operations during the past 31 

months, and it has successfully foiled terrorist-related operations and cells from Seattle, Washington, 

to Detroit, Michigan, to Lackawanna, New York. 

Integrating Intelligence Processes in our Operations 

Although we are now able to coordinate our intelligence collection and criminal law 

enforcement operations, we can only realize our full potential as a terrorism prevention agency 

by developing the intelligence structure, capabilities, and processes to direct those operations. 

Without an effective intelligence capacity, we cannot expect to defeat a sophisticated and 

opportunistic adversary like al-Qa’ida. 

24
For a variety of historical reasons, the Bureau had not developed this intelligence capacity 

prior to September 11, 2001. While the FBI has always been the world's best collector of information, 

we never established the infrastructure to exploit that information fully for its intelligence value. 

Individual FBI agents have always analyzed the evidence in their particular cases, and then used 

that analysis to guide their investigations. But the FBI, as an institution, had not elevated that 

analytical process above the individual case or investigation to an overall effort to analyze intelligence 

and strategically direct intelligence collection against threats across all of our programs. 

The attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need to develop an intelligence process 

for the Counterterrorism Program and the rest of the Bureau. Since then, we have undertaken 

to build the capacity to fuse, analyze, and disseminate our terrorism-related intelligence, and to 

direct investigation activities based on our analysis of gaps in our collection against national 

intelligence requirements. That effort has proceeded in four stages. 

Stage 1 Initial Deployment of Analysts 

Our first step was to increase the number of analysts working on counterterrorism. Immediately

after the September 11, 2001, attacks, we temporarily reassigned analysts from the Criminal

Investigative Division and Counterintelligence Division to various units in the Counterterrorism

Division. In July 2002, 25 analysts were detailed from the CIA to assist our counterterrorism

efforts. Many of these analysts provided tactical intelligence analysis; others provided strategic

"big picture" analysis. All of them worked exceptionally hard and helped us analyze the masses

of data generated in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. These deployments

were a temporary measure, but the progress made, the confidence gained, and the lessons

learned during this period started us down the road toward a functioning intelligence analysis

operation. We also established the College of Analytical Studies to help train and develop our

own cadre of analysts.

Stage 2 Office of Intelligence


On December 3, 2001, we established the Office of Intelligence (OI) within the Counterterrorism

Division. The OI was responsible for establishing and executing standards for recruiting, hiring,

training, and developing the intelligence analytic workforce, and ensuring that analysts are

assigned to operational and field divisions based on intelligence priorities. Recognizing that

intelligence and analysis are integral to all of the Bureau’s programs, in February 2003, we

moved the OI out of the Counterterrorism Division and created a stand-alone OI, headed by

an Executive Assistant Director, to provide centralized support and guidance for the Bureau’s

intelligence functions.

Stage 3 Intelligence Program 

The next step in our intelligence integration was to elevate intelligence functions to programlevel status, instituting centralized management and implementing a detailed blueprint for the 

Intelligence Program. 

We articulated a clear mission for the Intelligence Program – to position the FBI to meet current 

and emerging national security and criminal threats by: 1) aiming investigative work proactively 

against threats; 2) building and sustaining enterprise-wide intelligence policies and capabilities; 

and 3) providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security, 

homeland security, and law enforcement communities. We then set out to embed intelligence 

processes into the day-to-day work of the FBI, from the initiation of a preliminary investigation 

to the development of FBI-wide strategies. 

25
The Intelligence Program has the following elements: 

EAD Intelligence 

In May 2003, our first Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I), an intelligence 

expert with 25 years of experience in the Intelligence Community, joined the three other 

Executive Assistant Directors in the top tier of FBI management. The EAD-I is responsible 

for managing the national Intelligence Program, and for institutionalizing intelligence 

processes in all areas of FBI operations. 

Primary responsibilities of the EAD-I are to: 

• Establish, administer, and evaluate policies, guidelines, and standards governing all 

processes and products of the FBI Intelligence Program. 

• Oversee the FBI's national collection requirements process; prioritize intelligence 

requirements; and evaluate field office performance against these priorities. 

• Serve as the FBI's primary interface for the sharing of information with members of 

the intelligence, law enforcement, and international communities. 

The EAD-I and the Assistant Director for the Office of Intelligence run the OI. The OI has 

two sections divided into units: the Intelligence Operations Section based at Headquarters, 

and the FBI contingent at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), currently operating 

out of CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. TTIC is discussed in more detail in the 

section on Coordination (page 43). 

Plans and Administration Department 

Threat Database Group

Strategic Analysis Unit 

Career Intelligence Unit 

Intelligence Operations Section 

Intelligence Requirements 

& Collections Mgmt Unit 

Oversight Unit 

Executive Support Unit 

Administrative Support Unit 

Assistant Director 

Other Gov't 

Agency Detailees 

Executive 

Assistant Director 

Deputy 

Assistant Director 

FBI Personnel at

Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

Analysis and Production Department 

Office of

Intelligence

Concepts of Operations 

Between June and October 2003, we developed Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) for 

the various functions of the Intelligence Program. As these functions already were integral 

parts of established divisions, the OI brought together representatives from all parts of 

the FBI to assist in developing documents that satisfy needs throughout the Bureau. 

26
The purpose of each CONOP is to build a shared vision of how the FBI will execute each 

intelligence function. The CONOPs identify guiding principles and policies, describe 

standards and procedures, allocate intelligence responsibilities, and create a shared 

intelligence vocabulary. 

The CONOPs include: 

• Intelligence Requirement and Collection Management Process CONOP (August 

2003) – defines the process for promulgating intelligence needs and the collection 

taskings to meet those needs. Intelligence needs are articulated by many consumers, 

including the intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement communities. 

• Intelligence Assessment Process CONOP (August 2003) – defines a methodology 

for intelligence assessments that can be applied to any analytical product and is 

designed to ensure that FBI analytical products draw from all available sources, add 

value, and meet the needs of specific consumers. 

• Field Office Intelligence Operations CONOP (August 2003) – defines a practical 

strategy for the implementation of intelligence processes in field divisions. 

• Human Talent for Intelligence Production CONOP (September 2003) – lays out 

a strategy to continually develop, motivate, and retain the analytic work force. It 

describes our specific plans for the recruiting, hiring, career development, and training 

of analysts. 

• FBI Intelligence Production and Use CONOP (October 2003) – defines authorities 

and responsibilities, and outlines a common approach, for producing intelligence within 

the FBI. It prescribes a common set of products and services that should be provided 

by FBI intelligence components, such as uniform Bureau-wide templates for Intelligence 

Assessments and Intelligence Bulletins. It also defines intelligence production policy. 

• FBI Information Sharing CONOP (March 2004) – presents guiding principles and 

operational approaches for sharing information internally and externally. 

• Budget Formulation for Intelligence CONOP (February 2004) – defines the budget 

formulation process for the FBI’s Intelligence Program. The new process extends 

beyond the resources needed by the OI to do its job and includes those resources 

required by operating divisions to complete intelligence functions. It replaces the old 

process whereby intelligence-related resources were “stove-piped” within each 

operational division, and replaces it with an enterprise-wide approach to resource 

allocation based on an integrated threat forecast. 

• Intelligence Program CONOP (February 2004) – provides a general overview of the 

Intelligence Program and spells out goals, objectives, and metrics for measuring 

success. 

• Customer Relations CONOP (nearing finalization) – defines the FBI approach to 

working with consumers of FBI intelligence. Core principles include writing our products 

at the classification level of most use to the consumer. 

Beginning in October 2003, managers from the OI and the operational divisions have met 

on a weekly and monthly basis to facilitate implementation of these CONOPs. Managers 

provide feedback on implementation problems and challenges, identify implementation 

tasks requiring cross-organization support, and ensure the consistency of policy guidance 

in all divisions. 

27
Field Office Intelligence Operations 

In order to ensure that FBI-wide collection plans and directives (requirements, collection 

tasking, analysis, and dissemination) are incorporated into field offices, on September 12, 

2003, we directed all field offices to establish a Field Intelligence Group (FIG). We followed 

up that directive with the issuance of formal guidelines for implementation and operation 

of FIGs on October 18, 2003. All field offices have established and are now operating 

FIGs. 

The FIG is the centralized intelligence component in each field office, responsible for the 

management, execution, and coordination of intelligence functions. FIGs vary in size and 

structure according to the size of the division and other factors. An Assistant Special 

Agent in Charge (ASAC) in each field office is assigned responsibility for intelligencerelated functions and has oversight of the FIG. The three field offices headed by an 

Assistant Director in Charge (the New York, Los Angeles, and Washington Field Offices) 

must have both an SAC and an ASAC so designated. 

FIG personnel analyze and disseminate the intelligence collected in their field office. They 

conduct intelligence assessments and generate intelligence products in accordance with 

the FBI's Intelligence Assessment Process CONOP and other intelligence production 

guidelines. They also support the 24-hour intelligence cycle of the FBI by employing all 

appropriate resources to drive the collection and dissemination of threat information, 

investigative developments (urgent reports), and other significant intelligence to meet the 

information needs of all consumers. 

Requirements Process 

FBI agents have always been excellent collectors of information, but this ability to gather 

information was never fully integrated into an FBI-wide process for identifying and collecting 

needed intelligence. The Counterintelligence Division has long operated according to a 

centralized requirements-driven process for the collection and analysis of intelligence, 

and that capacity has been critical to its successes over the years against Soviet spying, 

economic espionage, and other efforts to steal our national secrets and penetrate our 

institutions. However, because counterintelligence traditionally was conducted without 

significant overlap with other Bureau programs, that intelligence capacity largely remained 

limited to the Counterintelligence Program. 

Since September 11, 2001, we have expanded this requirements process by establishing 

a formal FBI-wide process for promulgating intelligence requirements and issuing appropriate 

collection taskings to operational divisions both at Headquarters and in the field. These 

requirements derive from the National Intelligence Priorities Framework as approved by 

the National Security and Homeland Security Councils. The new requirements process 

ensures that a continuing cycle for determining where we have intelligence gaps and 

targeting our information collection activities to fill those gaps. This cycle takes place at 

both the field and Headquarters levels and has four steps: 

Step 1 – Finding out what we know and don’t know 

First, we survey all available intelligence across the organization, including 

intelligence from outside partners, to determine where we have intelligence gaps. 

These gaps, also known as intelligence requirements, are unanswered questions 

that we need to answer if we are to have a complete picture of threats in priority 

areas. The OI consolidates these gaps and communicates them to supervisors 

and analysts throughout the Bureau. Analysts in Headquarters operational divisions 

and in each FIG, tap into all available sources to try to resolve the gaps. 

28
Step 2 – Directing collection to fill the gaps

After the analysts have completed this process, the next step is to collect the

information we need to resolve the intelligence gaps that remain. At Headquarters,

the OI issues reports listing the remaining gaps. Based on these lists, investigators

on squads, in resident agencies, and on task forces are then tasked to collect the

needed information using all available investigative tools, including cultivation of

new sources. In instances where a national information gathering effort is required,

collection may be coordinated through the NJTTF, bringing the significant resources

of our federal, state, and municipal partners to bear on the problem.

Step 3 – Answering the questions

Once we have gathered sufficient information to resolve a particular gap, agents

and analysts consolidate and analyze the information collected and generate

intelligence products for the widest possible audience. Intelligence Information

Reports (IIRs) are issued to share raw intelligence. Intelligence Assessments

are issued to share value-added assessments of criminal or national security

threats.

Step 4 – Ensuring the answers get to the right people

The final step is to share those intelligence products as widely as possible.

Dissemination is coordinated by Headquarters intelligence entities and by FIGs

in the field.

Baselining of Sources 

On December 15, 2003, we directed all field offices to enter information into a database 

on every collection source they have, the source’s history and motivation for working with 

us, and what information that source is providing. This effort is helping us to know what 

sources we have, what we should be reporting in intelligence products from those sources, 

and where we have key gaps in our collection capability that must be filled through targeted 

collection strategies. 

Analytical Assets 

Since September 11, 2001, we have taken a number of important steps to build an analytic 

workforce capable of addressing the new threat environment. 

Hiring—We have hired 460 analysts, and we are working to hire hundreds more 

in 2004. We also implemented a comprehensive recruitment strategy for analysts 

that includes a targeted marketing plan, development of a team of 20 analysts 

trained to serve as analyst recruiters, and a new tuition reimbursement plan. 

Training—We created the College of Analytical Studies to provide analysts with 

a formal training program. The curriculum was developed with recommendations 

and participation from the CIA’s Sherman Kent School, the Joint Military 

Intelligence College and private educational institutions. In FY 2003, the College 

of Analytical Studies trained 932 FBI and 14 DOJ personnel. The training 

consisted of basic and advanced courses at Quantico, as well as CIA courses 

for FBI personnel in the field. 

29
 The Analyst Position—There are three separate roles for the analyst position: 

• Operations Specialists provide critical front line intelligence support to 

investigations in the field and at FBI Headquarters, as well as case 

management assistance. 

• Reports Officers identify and extract essential information and analysis 

from FBI Investigations and intelligence products, and they synthesize 

the information into disseminable reports that are shared with appropriate 

FBI entities, law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community. 

This new position in the FBI is vital to our efforts to maximize the amount 

of information shared with our partners. 

• All-Source Analysts examine data to find patterns and associations, 

use that knowledge to predict threats, and generate products to help 

investigators and decision-makers better understand and respond to 

present and future threats. 

The Analyst Career Track—We instituted an analyst career track that offers analysts 

three choices. After analysts reach a certain level of seniority (the GS-11 level), they 

are asked if they are interested in: 1) building expertise in a specific program area (such 

as al-Qa’ida); 2) gaining broader experience that will prepare them to work in a number 

of program areas; or 3) working toward becoming a supervisor or manager in the 

Intelligence Program. Training and temporary assignments appropriate to a particular 

track are first offered to analysts in that track. 

Supervision—The OI establishes and implements standards for recruiting, hiring, 

training, and developing our analysts, and ensures that they are assigned to operational 

and field divisions based on intelligence priorities. Operational and field divisions are 

responsible for day-to-day supervision of analysts and for adhering to the standards 

for analyst development established by the OI. 

On February 1, 2004, we established a reporting structure that institutionalizes this 

shared responsibility, ensuring that the OI has sufficient supervisory authority over 

analysts, and particularly over the analyst supervisors. Under this structure, analysts 

report to and receive their annual evaluations from their operational supervisors, and 

the OI reviews and signs off on those evaluations. Section Chiefs who oversee analysts 

at Headquarters report to and receive their annual evaluations from officials in the OI, 

and their evaluations are reviewed by supervisors in the Headquarters investigative 

division into which they are integrated. 

This reporting structure ensures that analysts remain embedded in their investigative 

units and responsive to operational needs while also being subject to supervision and 

deployment in accordance with the Bureau’s overall intelligence requirements process. 

It also gives the OI the necessary authority to implement its intelligence processes 

through the analyst supervisors. 

Intelligence Production Board 

We established an FBI Intelligence Production Board to ensure that timely decisions are 

made regarding the production and dissemination of all analytical products. The Board 

is made up of representatives from each Headquarters operational division, the OI, the FBI 

Laboratory, the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, and DHS representatives, and 

is chaired by the EAD-I. The Board holds daily meetings to review significant threats, 

developments, and issues emerging in each investigative priority area, and to identify topics 

for intelligence products. 

30 
Stage 4 Intelligence Workforce 

Now that the Intelligence Program is established and developing, we are turning to the next 

stage of transforming the Bureau into an intelligence agency – reformulating our personnel and 

administrative procedures to instill within our workforce an expertise in the processes and 

objectives of intelligence work. 

We recently issued five directives that will fundamentally reorient the development of our entire 

workforce toward the intelligence mission. From recruitment to training to career advancement 

to the evaluation of personnel and programs, these initiatives will transform our administrative 

and personnel systems to ensure that intelligence objectives are paramount in our plans and 

performance. Some components of these initiatives have already been implemented; some 

are in advanced stages of development; and others are in the early planning stages. 

The following summarizes these initiatives: 

Recruitment 

We are targeting our recruitment efforts to attract agent and analyst candidates with 

Intelligence Community or other intelligence experience, or with backgrounds in international 

studies and international finance. We sought input from other Intelligence Community 

agencies to determine “best practices” for successfully recruiting individuals with intelligencerelated skills, and we incorporated these best practices into new recruiting plans for Special 

Agents and analysts. We are recruiting at colleges and universities with outstanding 

academic programs in intelligence-related disciplines. In addition, since one of the richest 

fields for intelligence backgrounds is military intelligence, we are soliciting the services 

of an experienced contractor who specializes in placing military officers and enlisted 

candidates who possess intelligence expertise. 

Special Agent Career Tracks 

Traditionally, the Bureau has recruited, trained, rewarded, and promoted its agents primarily 

for law enforcement work. This approach was adequate so long as the Bureau's mission 

was perceived largely as law enforcement. It is no longer adequate now that intelligence 

work has assumed such a central role in our efforts to prevent terrorism. 

On March 22, 2004, we established a new career path for Special Agents designed with 

three objectives. First, the career path will give all agents experience with intelligence 

and analysis. Second, the career path will give agents an opportunity to develop specialized 

skills, experience, and aptitudes in one of the four program areas: 1) Intelligence; 

2) Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence; 3) Cyber; or 4) Criminal. Third, it makes intelligence 

expertise and experience a prerequisite for elevation to senior supervisory ranks. 

This plan will produce a cadre of agents who are proficient in the processes of intelligence 

collection, but who also have the law enforcement powers to take advantage of our 

integrated operational approach. 

This career track will take Special Agents through the following stages: 

First Assignment 

We reinstituted the FBI’s traditional Rotational Transfer Policy to expose new agents 

to a wide range of field experience, and then help them progress to more specialized 

skills to handle complex investigative and intelligence responsibilities. Most new agents 

will be assigned for the first three years to one of the smallest 41 FBI field offices. 

Assignment to smaller offices and to positions in each of the four program areas will 

31
give them exposure to a wide range of training and experiences and help them develop 

core investigative and intelligence competencies under the guidance of experienced 

agents. This initial tour of duty will ensure that all agents have strong intelligence 

backgrounds and are well versed in all of the FBI’s operational programs. 

As part of their broad training during the first three years, new agents will be required 

to complete an assignment in a FIG or a Headquarters intelligence entity. This will be 

an important step in an agent’s development. It will sensitize them to the importance 

of analysis and analysts, and it will give them an understanding of the tools and 

processes of intelligence analysis and production. 

Second Assignment 

After approximately three years, agents will be transferred to one of the 15 largest FBI 

field offices with primary assignment to an area of specialization. They will receive 

continuing advanced training tailored to their areas of specialization and become familiar 

with handling the substantial threats we encounter in large metropolitan areas. An 

increasing number of these agents will specialize in intelligence or counterintelligence/ 

counterterrorism. 

Intelligence Officer Certification 

We will also develop and implement a process for Special Agents to receive a formal 

Intelligence Officer Certification. Drawing on the model in the Intelligence Community, 

this process will grant certification to Special Agents who complete a set of minimum 

requirements related to advanced training, assignments and experience, and/or formal 

education. The experience requirement can be met through a combination of intelligence 

training and a detail assignment with another member of the Intelligence Community, 

assignments to the OI or FIGs, or prior intelligence experience or education. This 

certification can be earned by any agent who meets the requirements, regardless of 

their primary areas of specialization. For example, an agent on the criminal career path 

can complete the requirements for Intelligence Officer Certification and use the knowledge 

and expertise he or she gains to integrate intelligence into criminal investigations. 

Promotion to Upper-Level Management 

Once the Intelligence Officer Certification process is established, this certification will 

become a prerequisite for promotion to the rank of Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

or to a Section Chief position in any investigative division at FBI Headquarters or the 

OI – entry positions to the FBI’s upper-management. This requirement constitutes a 

revolutionary change in our promotion policies, and will ensure that all future entrants 

to the FBI’s upper management are fully trained intelligence officers. 

Training 

Training programs that focus on the skills and knowledge necessary for counterterrorism 

and counterintelligence investigations and intelligence functions are a critical element of 

the FBI’s transformation. With numerous initiatives either already implemented or in the 

works, we are making intelligence-based training a part of FBI agents’ and support 

employees’ careers from their first day on the job to their last. 

32
Training initiatives to date include the following: 

New Agents Training 

We extended new agents training from 16 weeks to more than 17 weeks to allow for the 

expansion of classroom instruction in counterterrorism and counterintelligence from 55 

hours to 110 hours. We reworked the traditionally law enforcement-focused program to 

emphasize how intelligence and criminal investigative techniques are used in tandem as 

part of the FBI's re-ordered strategic mission. We are emphasizing development of an 

intelligence base through the operation of human sources and liaison with other agencies. 

We are inserting the following areas of instruction into the new agents training 

curriculum: 

• FBI intelligence mandates and authorities 

• Overview of the intelligence cycle 

• Introduction to the U.S. Intelligence Community 

• Intelligence reporting and dissemination 

• FBI intelligence requirements and the collection management process 

• Role of intelligence analysts 

• Validating human sources 

In addition, advanced intelligence and national security training integrated with the 

College of Analytical Studies will be required for agents with Intelligence and 

Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence skill designations. 

In-Service Training 

We have developed a number of training programs for on-board employees, including the 

following: 

FISA/USA PATRIOT Act Training 

The FBI partnered with the DOJ and the CIA to develop and present a multimedia 

curriculum that has trained approximately 3,800 FBI agents and analysts, members 

of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and Assistant United States Attorneys on new legal 

and operational requirements, processes, and tools related to counterterrorism and 

other national security investigations. 

Language Training 

In fiscal year 2003, the FBI’s Foreign Language Training Program provided training 

and/or self-study materials to almost 1,800 employees in 32 languages. We also 

partnered with the Foreign Service Institute to develop and sponsor language training 

and foreign-duty instruction that has provided 6,200 hours of training to 172 FBI 

employees over the past two years. 

Human Source Recruitment 

All FBI Special Agents recently received a mandatory three-hour block of "Back to 

Basics" refresher training on human source recruitment, development, and management. 

University Education Program 

The FBI established a tuition reimbursement program to enable qualified employees in the 

Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, and Security Programs to get advanced 

degrees. 

33
Looking forward, we are in the process of implementing the following: 

• We are incorporating into new agent training more practical exercises in which trainees 

task intelligence analysts and use intelligence products in the course of their mock 

investigations. 

• We are developing specialized and advanced training for Special Agents, tied to 

Intelligence, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Cyber, and Criminal career paths. 

This training is being developed and presented on a phased-in basis, with the 

intelligence career path training as the first priority. 

• We are designing a training development plan for advanced and specialized intelligence 

training necessary for Intelligence Officer Certification. 

• We are working to integrate intelligence-related topics throughout all in-service agent 

training. 

• We are developing computer-based training on the integration of intelligence and 

policing. This effort is a collaboration among federal, state, and municipal law 

enforcement representatives, who will put forth a "model" to be used by all law 

enforcement as the benchmark for intelligence and policing. The planned CD/DVD 

will be a key distance learning resource for agents and other FBI employees, as well 

as for the FBI’s partners in state and municipal law enforcement. 

• We are developing new courses supporting counterterrorism operations that will be 

delivered through a combination of classroom instruction and web-based training on 

our intranet. Classes currently under development include: 

Developing Sources 

Understanding Islam and the Arab Culture 

Reports Officers and Counterterrorism 

Advanced Surveillance and Counter-surveillance Techniques 

National Security Investigation Attorney General Guidelines 

National Security Investigation Tools and Techniques 

Terrorism Screening Center Tools 

Program Evaluations 

If the FBI's continuing transformation is to succeed, it is vital that we provide not only the 

necessary tools, but also appropriate guidance and motivation. We can no longer evaluate 

our programs solely on the basis of case-focused measures such as the number of indictments 

and convictions. Accordingly, we have developed new standardized metrics to evaluate the 

performance of the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, and Criminal Investigative 

Programs. The new metrics will encourage the proactive activities, information gathering, and 

coordination with partners needed to build a strong intelligence base. For example, the 

Counterterrorism Program now will be evaluated, in part, on the quality of its threat assessments, 

the development of human and other sources of information that contribute to the intelligence 

base, and its information sharing and liaison activities. Beginning in October 2004, program 

coordinators in each field office will be required to conduct semi-annual program reviews using 

the new metrics. 

34
The new semi-annual program reviews will be used in several ways. Field office and program 

managers will use them to assess their performance and to identify the strengths and weaknesses 

of their programs so that they can institute improvements. Program managers at Headquarters 

will examine the results of these reviews, identify national or individual field office performance 

issues, and recommend corrective action as needed. The Inspection Division will analyze the 

semi-annual reviews in preparation for regularly scheduled inspections. The Inspection Division 

also will use the reviews to determine if there are any performance anomalies that may require 

an unscheduled inspection. 

Similarly, we modified the inspection criteria for field offices to include performance metrics 

for their intelligence programs. The intelligence components in each field office will be monitored 

to ensure that intelligence information is managed and disseminated quickly and in a format 

for use by other members of the Intelligence Community. 

Special Agent Evaluations 

Special Agents currently are evaluated according to specified performance criteria related to 

eight "critical elements." These elements provide guidance and define the activities we expect 

an agent to undertake and master. 

On March 22, 2004, the Director approved a proposal to revise the evaluation criteria for all 

Special Agents to emphasize intelligence objectives. The proposal would create a new Critical 

Element 7, “Intelligence Collection and Reporting,” to require that each agent demonstrate and 

effectively apply knowledge, authorities and mandates governing intelligence functions. We 

also propose revising Critical Element 8, “Developing an Intelligence Base,” to ensure that 

agents effectively cultivate and exploit intelligence sources. 

Proposed Critical Element 7: Intelligence Collection and Reporting 

• Demonstrates and independently applies effective knowledge of authorities 

and mandates governing the intelligence functions of the FBI. 

• Demonstrates and independently applies broad knowledge and awareness of 

the needs of FBI intelligence customers and partners in other federal law 

enforcement agencies; the state, local, and tribal law enforcement communities; 

the U.S. Intelligence Community; and/or friendly foreign services, and serves 

these needs effectively. 

• Independently collects intelligence of value in accordance with prevailing sets 

of intelligence requirements, using all appropriate investigative and intelligence 

collection techniques. 

• Independently ensures that collected raw intelligence is reported in accordance 

with established guidelines to relevant customers, both internally and externally, 

through all appropriate means, to include effective interaction with the Field 

Intelligence Group. 

• Independently ensures that intelligence analysts receive all relevant collected 

intelligence to effectively support the FBI's intelligence analysis and production 

responsibilities. 

Proposed Critical Element 8: Developing an Intelligence Base 

• Independently identifies and effectively operates human sources in accordance 

with prevailing sets of intelligence requirements, and makes sound judgments 

regarding the value of their contributions. 

35
• Independently establishes and maintains effective liaison relationships with individuals 

or organizations to facilitate the intelligence process, and in accordance with prevailing 

sets of intelligence requirements. 

• Independently obtains, analyzes, and reviews information (record checks) regarding 

the suitability of individuals for use in intelligence collection and investigations. 

• Independently submits accurate and timely documentation, reports, and communications 

regarding human source operation and intelligence collection through liaison. 

These new critical elements will go into effect only once they are reviewed and validated 

according to the procedures governing our personnel evaluation process. 

Evaluation of Special Agents in Charge 

Historically, the Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative Division has served as the 

rating official for SACs and Assistant Directors in Charge (ADICs) of the Los Angeles, New 

York and Washington Field Offices. In February 2004, we issued a new policy whereby 

the responsibility for rating ADICs and SACs will rotate annually among the ADs of the 

operational divisions, with input provided from the AD of the Office of Intelligence. The 

rating official for ADICs and SACs will be the AD for Counterterrorism the first year; the 

AD for Cyber the second year; the AD for Counterintelligence the third year; and the AD 

for Criminal Investigations the fourth year. This change, scheduled to go into effect on 

October 1, 2004, will afford more broad-based performance oversight and eliminate any 

undue emphasis on any one investigative program. 

36
COORDINATION 

A major element of the Bureau's transformation is our increasing integration and coordination with 

our partners in the U.S. and international law enforcement and intelligence communities. More 

than any other type of enforcement mission, counterterrorism requires the participation of every 

level of local, state, national, and international government. A good example is the case of the 

Lackawanna terrorist cell outside Buffalo, New York. From the police officers who helped to identify 

and conduct surveillance on the cell members; to the CIA officers who provided information from 

their sources overseas; to the diplomatic personnel who coordinated our efforts with foreign 

governments; to the FBI agents and federal prosecutors who conducted the investigation leading 

to the arrests and indictment, everyone played a significant role. 

We recognize that a prerequisite for any operational coordination is the full and free exchange 

of information. Without procedures and mechanisms that allow information sharing on a regular 

and timely basis, we and our partners cannot expect to align our operational efforts to best 

accomplish our shared mission. Accordingly, we have taken steps to establish unified FBI-wide 

policies for sharing information and intelligence. 

The Role of the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence 

To ensure a coordinated, enterprise-wide approach, the Director recently designated the 

EAD-I to serve as the principal FBI official for information and intelligence sharing policy. In 

this capacity, the EAD-I serves as advisor to the Director and provides policy direction on 

information and intelligence sharing within the FBI and outside the FBI with the law enforcement 

and intelligence communities, as well as foreign governments. 

Information Sharing Policy Group 

On February 20, 2004, we formed an information sharing policy group, comprised of Executive 

Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors and other senior executive managers. Under the 

Direction of the EAD-I, this group is establishing FBI information and intelligence sharing 

policies. 

Department of Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council 

On February 11, 2004, the Attorney General announced the creation of the DOJ Intelligence 

Coordinating Council. The Council is comprised of the heads of DOJ agencies with intelligence 

responsibilities, and is currently chaired by the FBI’s EAD-I. The Council will work to improve 

information sharing within DOJ and to ensure that DOJ meets the intelligence needs of outside 

customers and acts in accordance with intelligence priorities. It will also identify common 

challenges (such as electronic connectivity, collaborative analytic tools, and intelligence skills 

training) and establish policies and programs to address them. 

Beyond these information sharing initiatives, we are increasing our operational coordination with 

our state, federal, and international partners on a number of fronts. 

State and Municipal Law Enforcement 

We have taken many steps to continue to improve our relationships with the approximately 

750,000 men and women of state and municipal police departments around the country. Many 

37
have started to take note of these efforts. For example, New York City Police Commissioner 

Raymond W. Kelly testified at the Commission’s March 31, 2003, public hearing as follows: 

“I have been in law enforcement a long time, both on the federal and the 

local level. And clearly there were some issues in the past with the flow 

of information. I can tell you that has changed significantly in the aftermath 

of September 11th ....There is a palpable difference in [the FBI’s and CIA’s] 

approach to doing business. They want to get that information out. They 

are getting it out.” 

This critical improvement is the direct result of new and expanded collaborative efforts, 

innovative approaches to information sharing, new policies and technologies, and above all a 

commitment to support our partners in law enforcement. We have worked closely with our partners 

as we developed and implemented these changes, seeking input and feedback each step of the 

way. 

While there is still progress to be made, these efforts have produced a higher level of 

coordination in our working relationship with state and municipal law enforcement. This coordination 

is reflected in the following areas: 

Task Forces 

The FBI has long relied on strong operational relationships with state and municipal law

enforcement. We work in partnership on a wide range of task forces, to include Safe Streets

Task Forces that fight violent street gangs, Crimes Against Children Task Forces, Financial

Institution Fraud and Identity Theft Task Forces, Health Care Fraud Task Forces, Organized

Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces

(OCDETF), Major Theft Task Forces,

Safe Trails Task Forces that fight violent

crime in Indian Country, and case specific

task forces related to serial murders,

hate crimes, and other types of criminal

activity. FBI personnel on these task

forces work side-by-side with their local

counterparts to solve crimes and improve

the level of safety and security in their

communities. This day-to-day interaction

has forged relationships that we rely on

in our joint efforts to combat terrorism.

Those established relationships have

been the foundation of our Joint Terrorism

Task Forces, which are the keystone of

our counterterrorism efforts.

566 

675 

1492 

614 

155 

143 

3000 

2500 

2000 

1500 

1000 

500 

0 

Pre 9/11 FY 03 

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE MEMBERS 

2733 

912 

State & Local 

Other Federal 

FBI 

3500 Total 3371 

832 

746 

1793 

Total 

Total 

Present 

JTTFs team up police officers, FBI agents, and officials from over 20 federal law enforcement

agencies to investigate terrorism cases. Since September 11, 2001, we have expanded the

JTTFs to every field office in the country and to 28 resident agencies – increasing the total

number of JTTFs from 34 to 84. We have also established Executive Boards in each field

office made up of FBI executive managers and the heads of law enforcement agencies

represented on the JTTFs. These JTTFs have been a resounding success, and they play a

central role in virtually every terrorism investigation, prevention, or interdiction within the U.S.

38
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination

We established the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC) in the spring of 2002 to

strengthen relationships between the FBI, state and municipal law enforcement, and other

federal law enforcement agencies. The OLEC works closely with law enforcement groups

such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police,

provides a voice for these groups within the Bureau, and gives them a place at the decision

making table when law enforcement and prevention strategies are being developed.

We selected a former Chief of Police to be Assistant Director in charge of OLEC and located

him in an office near the Director. The Assistant Director has decades of experience in law

enforcement and has earned a reputation for building bridges within the law enforcement

community. He has developed a number of initiatives to enhance coordination through his

office, including:

Director's Law Enforcement Advisory Group (DLEAG) 

The DLEAG, comprised of the heads of the national law enforcement organizations, 

meets regularly with senior FBI executives to provide input on various issues of common 

concern. Issues discussed at recent meetings include: 1) the issuance of Homeland 

Security "alerts" and the impact on state and local agencies when threat advisory levels 

are raised; 2) the FBI’s investigative priorities; 3) state and local law enforcement 

counterterrorism needs; 4) ways to enhance communication within law enforcement; 

and 5) recommended improvements of the training at the National Academy. 

FBI Police Executive Fellowship Program (EFP) 

In 2002, OLEC started the EFP to give high-ranking state and local law enforcement 

managers an opportunity to spend six months working in an FBI Headquarters program 

such as the NJTTF or the Office of Intelligence. The four officers who have participated 

to date have brought vital law enforcement perspectives to Headquarters and have 

made important contributions to our information and intelligence sharing efforts. 

Community Oriented Policing Training 

OLEC has worked closely with the Training and Development Division to revise the new 

agents training curriculum to incorporate Community Oriented Policing concepts. Agent 

trainees learn that a high level of involvement with the community is expected and required 

if they are to succeed in their jobs. 

Terrorism Quick Reference Card (TQRC) 

One small, but practical, initiative is our TQRC reference guide. The guide is designed 

to fit into the overhead visor of police vehicles and lists suspicious factors that may indicate 

ongoing terrorist activity. To date, 430,000 TQRCs have been distributed to state and 

municipal law enforcement officers. 

Terrorist Screening Center 

On September 16, 2003, the President directed the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland 

Security, Secretary of State, and Director of Central Intelligence to develop the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC) to consolidate information from terrorist watch lists and provide 24-

hour, seven-days-a-week operational support for law enforcement, consular officers and other 

officials. The FBI was directed to lead this effort and to begin operations by December 1, 2003. 

Thanks to significant contributions by all participating agencies, operations began – and continue 

to develop – on schedule. 

39
The TSC performs the following functions: 1) it receives identity information of potential 

terrorists (name and identifying information) from different government agencies; 2) it merges 

that identity information into the Terrorism Screening Database, which is used to assist the 

police officer, border official, or consular official in making a positive identity match with a 

known or suspected terrorist; and 3) if there is a potential match with a known or suspected 

terrorist, the TSC passes the information to the Bureau’s CT Watch, which then coordinates 

the operational response through the local JTTF. 

For example, when a police officer on patrol encounters an individual and runs his or her 

name through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system, the system now includes 

a check against TSC’s list of persons with known or suspected links to terrorism. If that officer 

gets a “hit” or match against the database, the officer receives prepared instructions such as 

“arrest,” “detain,” or “question the individual.” The officer is also instructed to call the TSC’s 

24/7 call center, which assists in the identity match of the person encountered, and connects 

the officer to CT Watch and the appropriate JTTF for further actions and investigation. 

From December 1, 2003, through March 23, 2004, the TSC received 2,045 calls from state, 

federal, and local law enforcement personnel, based on potential matches with known or 

suspected terrorists. These calls resulted in 835 positive identifications, some of whom have 

been apprehended on various charges while others have been developed into informants or 

subjected to surveillance. The following two are examples: 

• A local department contacted the TSC following a an NCIC “hit” after an arrest 

on a minor charge. TSC contacted the local JTTF, who interviewed the subject 

regarding his involvement with a domestic terrorist group. The subject agreed 

to cooperate with the FBI and is now an informant on domestic terrorism matters. 

• Local police arrested the subject of a an NCIC “hit” and found evidence in his 

vehicle that indicated surveillance of a possible terrorist target. They contacted 

TSC, who confirmed the person’s identity and contacted the local JTTF, which 

then expanded its existing investigation. 

Law Enforcement Online 

Law Enforcement Online (LEO) is a 24 hours a day, seven days a week, real-time, interactive 

computer communications and information service – an Internet for the law enforcement, 

criminal justice, and public safety communities. Over the past 31 months, we have expanded 

our use of LEO to facilitate information sharing with state and municipal law enforcement and 

first responders. For example, the NJTTF and all of the JTTFs have established Special 

Interest Groups on LEO, accessible to all law enforcement personnel, to facilitate the exchange 

of terrorism information nationally and locally. We also interfaced LEO with two other law 

enforcement networks: 1) the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), 

an information sharing network that connects state, municipal, and federal law enforcement 

and justice agencies; and 2) the Regional Information Sharing Systems Network (RISS), that 

provides law enforcement users with database pointer systems, investigative leads bulletin 

boards, and encrypted e-mail. 

40
Interconnectivity among the combined users of LEO, NLETS, and RISS gives us the means 

to share information with more law enforcement partners, more quickly, and with greater ease 

than ever before. 

Alert Notification System 

In June 2003, we launched a new Alert Notification System to notify police chiefs or local 

command centers of alerts, threats, or other critical information. Push technology pops 

messages up on computers – like instant messaging, but in a secure environment – and sends 

alert notifications to the chiefs’ cell phones and pagers. The system can deliver the message 

selectively to specific groups (as dictated by geography or function, such as border states or 

airport security) or broadcast it to all possible recipients. Messages can include text, photos, 

and maps. 

Intelligence Bulletins 

Since September 11, 2001, the Counterterrorism Division has issued over 100 Intelligence 

Bulletins to state and municipal law enforcement agencies through the NLETS, e-mail, or 

facsimile. These weekly Intelligence Bulletins share information from all sources that may aid 

the recipients in preparing for and responding to security threats in their areas. The information 

in the bulletins is primarily intended for use by patrol officers and other law enforcement 

personnel who may encounter situations or information through their direct contact with the 

general public. 

Information Sharing Pilot Projects 

Ongoing pilot projects are helping us test new concepts for improving information sharing and 

coordination with our state and local partners around the country. 

•- The Gateway Information Sharing System integrates unclassified FBI criminal 

information with various forms of data – including police reports and narratives and 

calls for service records – from participating federal, state, and local agencies in the 

St. Louis region. This effort provides participating law enforcement entities with a 

single source for investigative lead material from a wide region, and the ability to 

search the text of various records for names, addresses, phone numbers, vehicles, 

and other data. 

•- The Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) is an information tool that 

serves as an index and pointer to help investigators make the most of data in existing 

repositories to examine relationships between criminal incidents. A prototype system 

has been designed and is scheduled for delivery in June 2004. 

• The Counterterrorism Reporting System on Suspicious Surveillance (CROSS) 

is a new database being piloted in the National Capital Region. CROSS documents 

instances where individuals appear to be engaged in suspicious surveillance. The 

data is entered into the system via LEO and can then be analyzed and checked against 

other intelligence information by the local JTTF. 

Security Clearances 

In most cases, the FBI can provide information to our law enforcement partners in an unclassified 

form that can be widely distributed. However, there remain instances where law enforcement 

personnel require a Secret or Top Secret level clearance in order to perform their duties. 

Secret and Top Secret security clearances can only be granted after a thorough background 

check is conducted. These checks are labor intensive and require the skills of experienced 

investigators. 

41
In December 2002 we 

established a new policy to grant 

Between September 11, 2001, and 

February 19, 2004, the Security Division 

received and processed the following: 

State and Local Law Enforcement Executives 

2,707 security clearance requests received 

2,351 successfully processed 

(87 discontinued or administratively closed) 

269 open cases currently pending 

Joint Terrorism Task Force Members 

1,589 requests for Top Secret clearance 

1,414 successfully processed 

175 open cases currently pending 

prospective JTTF members and 

law enforcement executives an 

interim security clearance while 

the background check for 

permanent clearance is 

conducted. To expedite the 

background checks, in February 

2003, we created a new unit 

within the Security Division to 

focus on security clearance 

processing for law enforcement 

executives and JTTF members. 

We also put new procedures 

in place and reassigned 

personnel from other FBI 

security programs. These priority 

requests for clearance are now 

completed, in most cases, within 180 days. 

New Counterterrorism Training Initiatives 

Following September 11, 2001, we recognized the need to train not only our own employees, 

but also our state and municipal law enforcement partners, to meet the challenge of international 

terrorism. Several new or updated training efforts are helping us share counterterrorism 

expertise and knowledge about terrorist activities. 

State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT)

mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act. 

)—SLATT is a new training initiative 

In partnership with DOJ’s Bureau of Justice 

Assistance and the Institute for Intergovernmental Research, we developed a national 

counterterrorism “Train the Trainer” program. From February 2003 to May 2003, 

Institute instructor teams provided 200 FBI instructors with a counterterrorism “Train 

the Trainer” course. These 200, in turn, trained 25,036 police officers from April 1, 

2003, through December 31, 2003, with minimal cost. This highly successful initiative 

not only raised the level of counterterrorism expertise among our state and municipal 

partners; it also gave our field agents an opportunity to interact with local officers and 

improve their professional relationships. 

National Academy—Since 1935, the FBI has offered the National Academy program 

to experienced law enforcement managers nominated by their agency heads because 

of their leadership qualities. Over the past 31 months, 2,220 state, municipal, and 

federal law enforcement personnel have received training – including counterterrorism 

instruction – through the National Academy. 

42
Field Office Initiated Training— Counterterrorism training is being provided by 

individual field offices to state and local law enforcement personnel in their regions. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Training— FBI personnel are providing 

training related to WMD at the DHS’s Center for Domestic Preparedness. 

Behavioral Analysis Unit 

The FBI has long provided the law enforcement community with behavioral analysis support 

and advice in a variety of investigative matters, such as child abduction cases and serial 

murders. We are now lending similar expertise and assistance in terrorism-related matters. 

In July 2003, we established a new behavioral assessment unit in the Critical Incident 

Response Group at the National Center for Analysis of Violent Crime, to provide behavioral 

analysis support on matters involving terrorism and threatening communications, bombings, 

stalkings, arsons, and anticipated or active crisis situations. It also provides training and 

identifies behaviorally focused anti-terrorism research projects to enhance operational, 

investigative and preventive measures. In addition, we established a Communicated Threat 

Assessment Database (CTAD) which, when populated with historical and current case 

information, will serve as the repository for all communicated threats submitted to the new 

unit for analysis and as a resource to help evaluate new threats. Currently, the CTAD 

contains approximately 1,000 communicated threats received for analysis. 

Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory Program 

The Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory (RCFL) Program is another ongoing initiative 

designed to enhance our working relationships with state and municipal police departments 

around the country. This program establishes laboratory facilities that conduct forensic 

examinations of digital media to support investigations and prosecutions. RCFLs also 

conduct training. In FY 2003, the four operational RCFLs conducted 68 separate classes 

and trained 1,432 law enforcement officers. RCFLs are operated jointly by the FBI and 

other law enforcement agencies operating within a geographic area. The FBI opened new 

facilities in Chicago and Kansas City in 2003, and we have announced plans to establish 

five new RCFLs this year and three more in the near future, bringing the total number of 

FBI-sponsored RCFLs to 14. 

The Intelligence Community 

We have established much stronger working relationships with the CIA and other members 

of the Intelligence Community. From the Director’s daily meetings with the Director of Central 

Intelligence and CIA briefers, to our regular exchange of personnel among agencies, to our joint 

efforts in specific investigations and in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the Terrorist Screening 

Center, and other multiagency entities, the FBI and its partners in the Intelligence Community are 

now integrated at virtually every level of our operations. 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center 

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is a good example of our collaborative relationship with 

the CIA and other federal partners. Established on May 1, 2003, at the direction of President 

Bush, TTIC coordinates strategic analysis of threats based on intelligence from the FBI, CIA, 

43
DHS, and DOD. Analysts from each agency work side-by-side in one location to piece together 

the big picture of threats to the U.S. and our interests. Each day (except Sunday), TTIC 

analysts synthesize government-wide information regarding current terrorist threats and produce 

the Presidential Terrorism Threat Report for the President. The FBI personnel at TTIC are 

part of the Office of Intelligence and work closely with analysts at Headquarters. If TTIC sees 

a gap in the intelligence it receives, it notifies analysts at Headquarters, who in turn develop 

appropriate collection taskings and pass them to appropriate FIGs for execution. 

Exchange of Personnel 

The FBI currently has 34 people detailed to CIA entities, including 16 in the CIA’s Counter 

Terrorism Center. We also have FBI agents and intelligence analysts detailed to the NSA, the 

National Security Council, DIA, the Defense Logistics Agency, DOD’s Northern Command, 

and the Department of Energy. 

CIA personnel are working in key positions throughout the Bureau. The Associate Deputy 

Assistant Director for Operations in the Counterterrorism Division is a CIA detailee. Four CIA 

officers are detailed to the Security Division, including the Assistant Director, the Chief of the 

Personnel Security Section, and managers working with the SCI program and the FBI Police. 

An experienced manager from the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology now heads 

the Investigative Technologies Division, and a Section Chief in that division is on rotation from 

CIA. 

This exchange of personnel is taking place in our field offices as well. In 33 field locations, 

the CIA has officers co-located with FBI agents at JTTF sites, and there are plans to add CIA 

officers to several additional sites. The NSA has analysts detailed to FBI Headquarters, the 

Washington Field Office, the New York Field Office, and the Baltimore Field Office. 

Joint Briefings 

Each morning, the Director is briefed by a CIA briefer. The Director of Central Intelligence and 

the FBI Director jointly brief the President on current terrorism threats. In addition, CIA and 

DHS personnel attend the Director’s internal terrorism briefings every weekday morning and 

afternoon. 

Secure Networks 

The FBI is now using secure systems to disseminate classified intelligence reports and analytical 

products to the Intelligence Community and other federal agencies. The FBI hosts a web site 

on the Top-Secret Intelink/Joint World-Wide Intelligence Community System (JWICS), a fullyencrypted system that connects more than 100 Department of Defense, CIA, and other 

Intelligence Community sites. We also host a web site on SIPRNET, a similar system used 

by DOD for sharing information classified at the Secret level. In addition, a new TS/SCI network 

known as “SCION” is being piloted in several field offices. SCION will connect FBI Headquarters 

and field offices to the CIA and other members of the Intelligence Community, and will increase 

opportunities for inter-agency collaboration. 

Compatibility of Information Technology Systems 

Improving the compatibility of information technology systems throughout the Intelligence 

Community will increase the speed and ease of information sharing and collaboration. 

Accordingly, the FBI’s information technology team has worked closely with the Chief Information 

Officers (CIOs) of DHS and other Intelligence Community agencies, as we developed our 

recent and ongoing technology upgrades. This coordination has affected our decisions 

44
on several key technology upgrades. For example, we chose an Oracle 9i Relational Database, 

in part, because this is the system used by the CIA. 

To facilitate further coordination, the FBI CIO sits on the Intelligence Community CIO Executive 

Council. The Council develops and recommends technical requirements, policies and procedures, 

and coordinates initiatives to improve the interoperability of information technology systems 

within the Intelligence Community. It was established by Director of Central Intelligence directive 

and is chaired by the CIA’s CIO. 

Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center 

According to a recent State Department report, more than 85 percent of all terrorist attacks 

against U.S. citizens and interests during the past five years involved improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs), otherwise known as homemade bombs. Unlike manufactured military ordnance, 

these bombs often reflect the unique characteristics, or signature, of the terrorist organizations 

or individuals who made them. A systematic examination of IEDs can help the Intelligence 

Community draw linkages between terrorist devices and the individuals involved in their 

construction, and thereby improve our chances of preventing a terrorist attack. Until recently, 

there was no single federal agency responsible for the worldwide collection, complete forensic 

analysis, and timely dissemination of intelligence about terrorist IEDs. 

In December 2003, the FBI Laboratory began preliminary operations of the Terrorist Explosive 

Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) to coordinate and manage a unified national effort to gather 

and exploit information on IEDs recovered both inside and outside the U.S. While the FBI 

manages the TEDAC, the CIA, DIA, NSA, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives all contribute to its intelligence efforts. 

TEDAC has several functions. It collects unexploded IEDs, post blast debris, and bomb making 

material recovered from bombing scenes and suspected terrorist caches from all over the 

world. TEDAC personnel thoroughly examine this material to gather as much information as 

possible regarding its design and components and any forensic evidence of the builder, such 

as fingerprints, hairs, or DNA. TEDAC then analyzes and shares that information with domestic 

law enforcement authorities, intelligence and homeland security agencies, and foreign law 

enforcement and intelligence service counterparts. TEDAC also uses the knowledge gained 

from its examinations and analysis to assist in the investigation of terrorist bombing attacks, 

to develop new countermeasures to defeat IEDs, and to train first responders on terrorist IED 

techniques. 

Department of Homeland Security 

DHS plays a critical role in assessing and protecting vulnerabilities in our national infrastructure 

and at our borders, and in overseeing our response capabilities. We have worked closely with 

DHS to ensure that we have the integration and comprehensive information sharing between our 

agencies that are vital to the success of our missions. The FBI and DHS share database access 

at the TTIC, in the National JTTF at FBI Headquarters, in the FTTTF and the TSC, and in local 

JTTFs in our field offices around the country. We worked closely together to get the new Terrorist 

Screening Center up and running. We hold weekly briefings in which our CTD analysts brief their 

DHS counterparts on current terrorism developments. We coordinate all FBI warnings with DHS, 

45
and we now coordinate joint warnings through the Homeland Security Advisory System to address 

our customers’ concerns about multiple and duplicative warnings. We designated an experienced 

executive from the Transportation Security Administration to run the TSC and detailed a senior 

DHS executive to the FBI’s Office of Intelligence to ensure coordination and transparency between 

the agencies. 

On March 4, 2003, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 

Director of Central Intelligence signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

establishing policies and procedures for information sharing, handling, and use. Pursuant to that 

MOU, information related to terrorist threats and vulnerabilities is provided to DHS automatically 

without DHS having to request it. Consistent with the protection of sensitive sources and methods 

and the protection of privacy rights, we now share as a rule, and withhold by exception. 

Foreign Governments 

With terrorists traveling, communicating, and planning attacks all around the world, 

coordination with our foreign partners has become more critical than ever before. We have steadily 

increased our overseas presence since September 11, 2001, and now routinely deploy agents 

and crime scene experts to assist in the investigation of overseas attacks, such as the May 2003 

bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco. As of January 7, 2004, 413 FBI personnel were assigned 

overseas, over 200 of whom are permanently assigned. Their efforts, and the relationships that 

grow from them, have played a critical role in the successful international operations we have 

conducted over the past 31 months. 

International Investigations 

Bureau personnel have participated in numerous investigations of terrorist attacks in foreign 

countries over the past 31 months. Our approach to those investigations differs from the 

approach we traditionally have taken. Prior to September 11, 2001, our overseas investigations 

primarily were focused on building cases for prosecution in the U.S. Today, our focus is more 

broadly to provide our foreign partners with investigative, forensics, or whatever type of support 

will enhance our joint efforts to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. Our partners have 

embraced this approach, and it is paying dividends with greater reciprocal cooperation and 

more effective joint investigations. 

By way of an example, our Legal Attaché office in Islamabad, Pakistan, was extensively involved 

in the investigation of the abduction and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. 

The FBI conducted a forensic examination of a lap top computer seized by the Pakistani police 

that revealed a draft of the demand note for Pearl's release. FBI agents later returned to 

Pakistan and testified in the trial of Omar Sheikh and his co-conspirators, resulting in their 

convictions and a capital sentence for Sheikh. 

Expansion of Legal Attaché Offices 

Director Freeh recognized the need for greater operational collaboration with foreign government 

services, and during his tenure the FBI expanded the number of Legal Attaché offices from 

23 to 44. Since September 2001, we have opened three more Legal Attaché offices, in Beijing, 

China, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and Sanaa, Yemen. We plan to open an office in 

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with the arrival of the Legal Attaché in May 2004. Construction and 

certification of our office in Tbilisi, Georgia, will soon be complete, and the office will open with 

the arrival of our Legal Attaché in June 2004. We also expect to open an office in the new 

U.S. Embassy building in Sofia, Bulgaria, this fall. We have gained Congressional approval 

and appropriations for offices that are currently in the design or construction bidding phases 

46
in Rabat, Morocco, and Jakarta, Indonesia, and we expect to be in the design phase for a new 

office in Sarajevo, Bosnia, in April 2004. We are also in the design phase for sub-offices in 

Bonn, Germany, and Milan, Italy. 

Joint Task Forces and Operations 

The FBI is working with its international partners in new ways, including task forces, new 

information sharing initiatives and, in some cases, joint operations. 

The following are a few examples: 

U.S. / Saudi Joint Task Force on Terrorist Financing – On August 31, 2003, the 

FBI, other federal agencies, and the Saudi Mabahith formed an unprecedented task 

force to identify persons or entities suspected of providing financial support to terrorist 

groups overseas and to develop strategies to stem the tide of such support. Personnel 

from the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section have been sent to Saudi Arabia 

to participate. 

Riyadh "Fusion Cell" – The bombings of three western residential compounds on 

May 12, 2003, prompted a new and much improved level of cooperation between the 

FBI’s Legal Attaché in Riyadh, other elements of the U.S. government represented 

in Riyadh, and the Saudi government. In May 2003, a team deployed from FBI 

Headquarters, in concert with our Legal Attaché in Riyadh, agreed to work jointly in 

investigating the attacks and the threat to the U.S. emanating from al-Qa’ida members 

in the Arabian Peninsula. 

The result was a “fusion cell” that gave the Saudi government a single point of contact 

for U.S. elements assisting in the investigation. The fusion cell coordinates requests 

for information, concentrates resources for interviews and debriefings, and serves as 

a coordination point for information from all sources. 

Indonesian Joint Operation – The FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, in conjunction 

with the New York and Los Angeles Divisions, has deployed personnel to Indonesia 

since October 2002 as part of an initiative with the Indonesian National Police and the 

Australian Federal Police to investigate the October 12, 2002, Bali bombings and the 

August 5, 2003, J.W. Marriott Hotel Bombing. The FBI participates in regular coordination 

meetings with both agencies, and we are lending extensive investigative support to 

the initiative, including technical assistance, laboratory testing, and forensic support. 

Fingerprint/Identification Initiatives 

Critical to our counterterrorism efforts is the use of biometric and biographical information to 

establish a person’s identity conclusively. Several new initiatives are helping us expand our 

intelligence base with critical identifiers, such as fingerprints, DNA, photographs, and biographical 

information from foreign sources. The FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division 

has led several overseas deployments to gather and exchange fingerprints of known and 

suspected terrorists. CJIS has obtained fingerprints and other identifying information for more 

than 10,000 terrorist suspects and detainees from more than 16 countries. DOD and CJIS are 

adding selected enemy combatant fingerprints to existing fingerprint databases and making 

them available for military, law enforcement, and homeland security needs. CJIS is also 

working closely with DOD, the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps to provide identification services 

and assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lastly, CJIS personnel have provided basic training 

to foreign law enforcement entities on how to take viable and legible fingerprints that can be 

used reliably by the FBI and our partners. 

47
International Training Initiatives 

We are increasing training opportunities for our foreign partners at the FBI National Academy 

and at the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) in Hungary and Thailand. Since 

September 11, 2001, the Bureau has trained over 20,000 international law enforcement students 

on topics ranging from management principles to law enforcement communications to forensic 

science. In addition, we have several new initiatives: 

• At the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, FBI, DHS, State Department, 

and other DOJ personnel traveled to Baghdad, met with law enforcement and Coalition 

Provisional Authority officials, assessed their needs, and developed a comprehensive 

training plan. The plan includes training in counterterrorism and post-blast investigations, 

major case management, fingerprinting, organized crime investigations, and the 

development of an internal affairs apparatus. The plan is awaiting approval by the 

Coalition Provisional Authority. 

• The Middle Eastern Law Enforcement Training Center (MELETC), located at the Dubai 

National Police Training Academy in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, is a bilateral 

partnership between the Government of the Emirate of Dubai and the FBI. Through 

the MELETC, the FBI provides training and assistance in counterterrorism and other 

disciplines to officers from the Dubai National Police and other Gulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC) countries. To date, over 400 police officials from the GCC have 

received training at MELETC. 

• In a new program funded by the State Department, experts from our Terrorist Financing 

Operations Section and the Internal Revenue Service offer a course on terrorist 

financing and money laundering for foreign law enforcement officers and banking 

regulators. The course has been offered to officials from 10 countries since February 

2003, and training is planned for eight additional countries in 2004. 

• The Cyber Division conducted 12 specialized courses outside the U.S. (involving 

almost 500 students) this past year to raise the expertise and analytical abilities of 

foreign personnel involved in investigating computer intrusions and cyber crime matters. 

• The FBI-supported forensic training laboratory in the ILEA in Budapest opened in 

January 2004. The FBI provided laboratory equipment for this new training center, 

and FBI Laboratory experts serve as instructors. The center will help raise the overall 

level of forensic expertise in Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia as students 

return to their home countries to combat crime and terrorism. 

• The FBI’s Training and Development Division is spearheading “Leadership in the 

Counterterrorism Environment,” an international training initiative for certain North 

American and United Kingdom law enforcement agencies. The program is focused 

on developing and refining strategic leadership skills for intelligence and counterterrorism 

missions. Training is tentatively scheduled for sites in Scotland and Northern Ireland 

this summer, and at the FBI Academy this fall. 

The relationships fostered by these training initiatives have borne fruit in improved operational 

coordination. In the aftermath of the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that killed 

nine Americans, we received unprecedented cooperation from Saudi officials. One reason 

was the fact that the FBI National Academy had recently trained more than 100 Saudi police 

in the science of evidence collection. As a result, our forensic technicians and their Saudi 

48
counterparts were using the same terminology and methods of evidence collection. As our 

Saudi partners told us, “We were taught together, now we can work together.” 

The Private Sector 

The FBI increasingly looks to partnerships with the private sector to enlist support for its law 

enforcement and intelligence missions. Among those partnerships are the following: 

Community Outreach 

If the FBI is successfully to predict and prevent terrorist attacks, it is imperative that we build 

and maintain close ties to key minority communities. The Muslim, Iraqi, and Arab-American 

communities have contributed a great deal to our successes to date, and we are grateful for 

their assistance and for their ongoing commitment to preventing acts of terrorism. 

Beginning in late 2001, Director Mueller has met bi-annually with a group of leaders from the 

Arab American, Muslim American, and Sikh American communities to discuss issues including 

counterterrorism efforts, terrorism-related money transactions, "no-fly" lists, training on cultural 

awareness, and recruiting. In addition, each FBI field office was tasked with establishing 

contacts with Arab-American, Muslim, and Sikh community organizations and leaders in their 

territories. Since September 11, 2001, high-level field managers have attended over 1,880 

town hall, community, or association meetings; participated in over 900 meetings with Muslim, 

Sikh, or Jewish groups; and attended over 300 meetings with civil rights leaders to address 

their concerns. Field managers also sponsored over 130 sessions of training by representatives 

of Middle Eastern groups in order to improve our agents’ cultural awareness and sensitivity. 

These efforts to reach out to Muslim and Arab American communities assist our counterterrorism 

efforts by improving the level of cooperation and the number of tips received from these 

communities. Outreach efforts also support long-term recruitment goals and the overall public 

understanding of terrorism. 

InfraGard 

InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and the private sector designed to foster the 

exchange of information between law enforcement and the owners and operators of our nation's 

critical infrastructure. Using a secure web site, InfraGard members receive sensitive, but 

unclassified, information such as Alerts, Advisories and Information Bulletins from the FBI and 

DHS. In turn, members provide information relevant to FBI investigations. 

InfraGard currently has 10,000 members and 79 chapters throughout the 56 field divisions. 

These members primarily represent small and medium-sized businesses in all of the critical 

infrastructure sectors. Over the past year InfraGard membership increased by 44 percent. 

InfraGard chapters meet regularly to discuss cyber crime, terrorism, and criminal threats to 

critical infrastructures, and often include representatives from state, municipal and federal 

government, academia, and law enforcement agencies. At a time when the failure to report 

cyber crimes remains a major obstacle to stopping these crimes, InfraGard helps us build trust 

and encourages reporting. The program allows us to alert companies to threats so they can 

better protect themselves, and ultimately helps us identify and counter those groups and 

individuals who threaten our critical infrastructures. 

49
Financial Sector Outreach 

Expanding upon long established relationships between the FBI’s white-collar crime program 

and the financial services industry, the Terrorist Financing Operations Section conducts 

extensive liaison with the financial community through a series of national and international 

initiatives – including the training efforts referenced above. In addition, in spring of 2003, we 

established Special Agent Terrorism Financing Coordinators in each JTTF to share information 

and improve relationships with financial institutions in their areas. 

Railroad Initiative 

As evidenced by the recent bombings in Madrid, Spain, America’s rail companies have significant 

critical assets that, if compromised, could cause a serious disruption to our national infrastructure. 

To enhance our liaison with this critical sector, we invited a railroad police officer, who represents 

the nation's railroad police, to join our National Joint Terrorism Task Force. In August 2003, 

a Supervisory Special Agent from the Norfolk Southern Railroad Police Department reported 

to the NJTTF. Working through this representative, we now provide training to JTTFs that 

have critical railroad assets in their areas, familiarizing them with those assets and the various 

measures for their protection. 

50
INFORMATION


TECHNOLOGY


The foundation of a centralized and effective counterterrorism operation is the capability to 

assemble, assimilate, and disseminate investigative and operational information both internally 

and with fellow intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This capability requires information 

technology (IT) that makes information easily accessible and usable by all personnel while protecting 

the security of that information. 

On September 11, 2001, the Bureau's information technology was inadequate to support its 

counterterrorism mission. In preceding years, substantial investments were made to upgrade 

technologies that directly supported investigations, such as surveillance equipment and forensic 

services like the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. Insufficient attention was 

paid, however, to technology related to the more fundamental tasks of records creation, maintenance, 

dissemination, and retrieval. In 2001, many employees still used vintage 1987 386 desktop 

computers. Some resident agencies could only access data in their field office via a slow dialup connection. Many Bureau programs were using computer systems that operated independently 

and did not interoperate with systems in other programs or other parts of the Bureau. 

We also had a deficient information management system. The FBI's legacy investigative information 

system, the Automated Case Support (ACS), was not very effective in identifying information or 

supporting investigations. Users navigated with the function keys instead of the “point and click” 

method common to web-based applications. Simple tasks, such as storing an electronic version 

of a document, required a user to perform 12 separate functions in a "green screen" environment. 

Also, the system lacked multimedia functionality to allow for the storage of information in its original 

form. Agents could not store many forms of digital evidence in an electronic format, instead having 

to describe the evidence and indicate where the evidence was stored in a control room. 

Thanks to the character and resolve of its personnel, the FBI was able to achieve numerous 

investigative successes, in spite of these obstacles. It was clear as of September 11, 2001, 

however, that we needed an integrated IT infrastructure to manage our information. We brought 

on-board a highly skilled team of experts and set out to create an IT infrastructure that is fast and 

secure, and that ties together the applications and databases used throughout the Bureau. We 

also designed user-friendly, web-based software applications to reduce reliance on paper records 

and to streamline investigative workflow. These improvements are enhancing our ability to collect, 

store, search, analyze, and share information. 

Centralized Management 

The shortcomings of the FBI’s IT prior to September 11, 2001, were due in part to a 

lack of centralized management. Decisions related to IT were made at various levels and by 

various divisions throughout the Bureau with no overarching strategy or plan. To correct this 

problem and ensure that future decisions related to IT are consistent with a clear plan to meet 

51
FBI-wide needs, we have centralized decision-making related to IT. In July 2002, the 

Director appointed the first full-time Chief Information Office (CIO) for the FBI. The CIO is 

responsible for the FBI's overall information technology efforts, including: 1) developing our 

IT strategic plan and operating budget; 2) developing and maintaining the FBI's technology 

assets; and 3) providing technical direction for the re-engineering of FBI business processes. 

In December 2003, Director Mueller appointed a Chief Technology Officer who is responsible 

for guiding the information technology research and development functions of the FBI. He 

is currently focused on centralizing our current IT development projects, ensuring the optimal 

use and sharing of Bureau intelligence data on common platforms. We also created an 

Enterprise Architecture Board made up of 14 representatives from eight FBI divisions. The 

Board meets regularly to review technical proposals for new FBI information systems. 

Trilogy 

The first step in our modernization efforts is the Trilogy Program, a multi-year effort 

to enhance our effectiveness through technologies that allow us better to access, organize, 

and analyze information. The Trilogy Program is aimed at providing all FBI offices, including 

Legal Attaché offices, with improved network communications, a common and current set 

of office automation tools, and user-friendly web-based applications. Trilogy upgrades also 

incorporate controls to provide an enhanced level of security for FBI information. Trilogy 

has proceeded in three stages or components: 

1 Transportation Network Component 

We replaced old local area and wide area networks with a state-of-the-art, secure, 

high-speed communications system that links desktops and databases throughout 

the FBI. This component was completed on March 28, 2003, with deployment of a 

new wide area network to 591 sites, 622 local area networks, and 1,202 local area 

network switches. We launched a highly secure network connected to the nation’s 

Intelligence Community in order to facilitate the transmission and sharing of Top 

Secret (TS) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). We also created an 

Enterprise Operations Center to manage data, the network, hardware, software 

applications, and security access. 

2 Information Presentation Component 

We upgraded antiquated computers with new desktops, fast black and white and 

color printers, scanners, new office automation software and e-mail, and modern 

server technology for data storage and sharing. Employees now work with modern 

desktops and connectivity, facilitating their ability to input, retrieve, manipulate, and 

present information in text, image, audio, and video formats. To date, we have 

deployed 29,889 new desktop computers, over 7,500 upgraded desktop computers, 

3,689 printers, 1,580 scanners, 465 servers and 1,382 routers. 

3 User Application Component—The Virtual Case File 

The final component is the complete replacement of the outdated investigative 

information system, the Automated Case Support System. As an intermediate fix, 

we created a more user-friendly, web-based interface for ACS. This interface 

significantly reduces the number of keystrokes needed to perform routine functions, 

allows users to search multiple databases within ACS simultaneously, and eliminates 

the need to convert documents to a new format prior to uploading. 

52
We then designed, and are now working to implement, a completely new system, known as 

the Virtual Case File (VCF). VCF is a web-based information and case management tool that 

will re-engineer the FBI's workflow and significantly enhance the analytical capabilities of each 

Special Agent and analyst. The VCF will be a "point and click," "drag and drop" environment 

with the ability to access cases, leads, and evidence from the desktop. The VCF represents 

a revolutionary shift away from paper case files to digital files that can quickly be accessed 

by agents, analysts, and supervisors throughout the Bureau. Agents investigating a complex 

case will be able to view evidence and documents related to the investigation instantly, 

regardless if they are in different offices or even different countries. The VCF will allow for 

quicker, smoother collaboration across the organization, and will also simplify information 

sharing with outside partners. At the same time, VCF will enhance security by making it easier 

to control and monitor who has access to the system and its information. 

The VCF will replace numerous forms and the multi-step functions of ACS with simple webbased processes. As depicted in the following diagram, for example, the VCF’s single “Intake” 

function will allow agents or their supervisors to perform numerous functions – receive new 

information, open and assign a case, refer items to another agency, send intelligence to a 

central location, or request additional investigation to gather intelligence. 

VCF Business Process Re-Engineering Example: INTAKE 

All of These FBI Serve All These Are Replaced by 

FD-71 

FD-430

Handwritten 

EC 

FD-801 

FD-159 

FD-630 

Forms... Functions and... This Single VCF 

Component

1 Receive New Information 

2 Open and Assign Case 

3 Refer to Another Agency 

4 Send to Intelligence 

Repository 

5 Refer Internal 

6 Request Additional 

Investigation/Intelligence 

INTAKE 

FD-610 FD-822 

FD-467 

FD-71 

Deployment of the VCF was originally scheduled for December 2003, but has been delayed 

due to a failure on the part of a contractor to complete certain engineering tasks by October 

2003, as specified in their contract. We have renegotiated the contract, and we now expect 

to have VCF tested and deployed later this year. We are using the interim to continue our 

training efforts, so that FBI personnel are ready to hit the ground running when VCF comes 

online. 

Data Warehousing 

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, we saw the need to provide counterterrorism 

investigators and analysts with quick, easy access to the full breadth of information relating to 

terrorism. We developed a three-step plan that would provide immediate support to 

53
counterterrorism investigators and analysts, and then incrementally increase the range and 

effectiveness of that support for other criminal investigations. This plan transitions us away 

from separate systems containing separate data (ACS, TelApps) towards an Investigative 

Database Warehouse (IDW) that contains all data that can legally be stored together. The 

IDW provides the Bureau with a single access point to several data sources that were previously 

available only through separate, stove-piped systems. By providing consolidated access to 

the data, for the first time analytical tools can be used across data sources to provide a more 

complete view of the information possessed by the Bureau. 

1 SCOPE 

The initial step toward the IDW was the implementation of the Secure Counterterrorist 

Operational Prototype Environment (SCOPE) program. Under the SCOPE program we 

quickly consolidated counterterrorism information from various data sources, providing 

analysts at Headquarters with substantially greater access to more information in far less 

time than with other FBI investigative systems. The SCOPE database also gave us an 

opportunity to test new capabilities in a controlled environment. This prototype environment 

has now been replaced by the IDW. 

2 Investigative Data Warehouse 

The IDW, delivered in its first phase to the Office of Intelligence in January 2004, now 

provides analysts with full access to investigative information within FBI files, including ACS 

and VGTOF data, open source news feeds, and the files of other federal agencies such as 

DHS. The IDW provides physical storage for data and allows users to access that data 

without needing to know its physical location or format. The data in the IDW is at the Secret 

level, and the addition of TS/SCI level data is in the planning stages. 

Later this year, we plan to enhance the IDW by adding additional data sources, such as 

Suspicious Activity Reports, and by making it easier to search. When the IDW is complete, 

agents and analysts using new analytical tools will be able to search rapidly for pictures of 

known terrorists and match or compare the pictures with other individuals in minutes rather 

than days. They will be able to extract subjects’ addresses, phone numbers, and other data 

in seconds, rather than searching for it manually. They will have the ability to identify 

relationships across cases. They will be able to search up to 100 million pages of international 

terrorism-related documents in seconds. 

3 	Master Data Warehouse 

Ultimately, we plan to turn the IDW into a Master Data Warehouse (MDW) that will include 

the administrative data required by the FBI to manage its internal business processes in 

addition to the investigative data. MDW will grow to eventually provide physical data storage 

for, and become the system of record for, all FBI electronic files. 

Analytical Tools 

We are introducing advanced analytical tools to help us make the most of the data stored 

in the IDW. These tools allow FBI agents and analysts to look across multiple cases and multiple 

data sources to identify relationships and other pieces of information that were not readily 

54
available using older FBI systems. These tools 1) make database searches simple and effective; 

2) give analysts new visualization, geomapping, link-charting and reporting capabilities; and 3) 

allow analysts to request automatic updates to their query results whenever new, relevant data 

is downloaded into the database. 

The following are fictional examples that illustrate how some of these tools can assist 

analysts in drawing connections between discrete pieces of information: 

Analysts can create 

high-level diagrams 

showing linkages 

between organizations 

to reveal front 

organizations 

suspected of being 

involved in terrorist 

financing. 

Analysts can 

diagram the 

relationships 

between people, 

locations, and 

money transfers. 

55
They can also 

depict different 

groupings of 

individuals to 

establish which 

individuals are 

common to 

multiple groups. 

Putting it all together 

As the first part of our IT modernization efforts nears completion, FBI agents, 

analysts, and support personnel are already enjoying new capabilities and applying those 

capabilities to their counterterrorism mission. They have up-to-date desktops, fast and secure 

connectivity, a user-friendly interface to the ACS case management system, the ability to 

access and search consolidated terrorism-related data, and new capabilities for sharing 

information inside and outside the Bureau. 

In the coming year, the Virtual Case File will revolutionize work processes related 

to case and information management. It will be easier than ever to resolve leads, find 

connections, and ensure that information finds its way to the agents, analysts, and managers 

who need to see it in real time. 

While there is still much to be done, these efforts are starting to deliver the technology 

we need to stay ahead of evolving threats. Upgrading our technology will remain an FBI priority 

for the foreseeable future, and our new IT management will ensure that we continue to improve 

our systems. 

56
ADMINISTRATIVE 

REFORM 

We realized at the outset that our plan for developing a strong counterterrorism capability would 

succeed only if we also develop the infrastructure and the administrative functions to support that 

operation. Without strategic planning, we cannot direct the distribution of resources necessary 

for our operations. Without a streamlined recruiting and hiring process, we cannot staff our new 

counterterrorism units. Without modern records management, we cannot make full use of our 

technology upgrades, and without a comprehensive security apparatus, we cannot adequately 

assure the integrity of sensitive investigative information and operational plans. 

Recognizing that the business and administrative practices in place on September 11, 2001, were 

not adequate to support our counterterrorism mission, we initiated an effort to re-engineer our 

administrative infrastructure. We undertook a series of re-engineering projects that address 

discrete areas of our operations. These reforms – some now fully developed and some still in 

progress – are making the Bureau more administratively nimble and responsive to operational 

needs. 

Strategic Planning 

We have reworked the FBI's strategic planning process. We have produced – and are 

currently revising with input from the General Accounting Office – a five-year Strategic Plan that 

will guide our executive management decisions. The FBI’s Strategic Plan provides clear goals 

and objectives, but also has the flexibility necessary to allow us to adjust quickly to evolving threats. 

The strategic planning process translates these goals and objectives into actionable and measurable 

activities in order to track our progress. Annual implementation plans provide performance goals 

and measures to incrementally achieve the FBI’s strategic goals, and completion dates are assigned 

and tracked to ensure deadlines are met. Comprehensive program evaluations are conducted 

to measure whether we have met the performance goals and objectives set forth in the Strategic 

Plan. 

As our Intelligence Program continues to mature, we expect our strategic planning to 

become increasingly sophisticated. We will rely on our intelligence base to develop a comprehensive 

assessment of future national security and criminal threats. Then, we will use it to develop short 

and long-term proactive strategies to deal with each threat, to determine how our operations and 

capabilities must change, and to calculate how we should manage, deploy, and acquire new 

resources to counter those threats. 

Realigning the Workforce 

The FBI’s greatest strength is its people, and their investigative and analytical skills remain 

our greatest weapons in the fight against terrorism. If the FBI’s transformation is to succeed, 

57
however, we need to continue developing a workforce with critical skills and the experience and 

flexibility to adapt quickly to changing priorities. Accordingly, we have made a number of changes 

to the way we recruit, hire, train, and promote our personnel – changes which are in addition to 

the recent personnel initiatives (discussed above) that focus specifically on intelligence capabilities. 

These new efforts to realign our workforce will help ensure that the FBI is ready to address evolving 

threats well into the future. 

Revised Personnel Selection Process 

In the years prior to September 11, 2001, Special Agent hiring efforts focused primarily on 

individuals with law enforcement, military, accounting, and legal backgrounds. For example, 

of the 285 agents hired in 2001, 19 had law degrees, 15 had a background in accounting, 26 

had language skills (mostly Spanish to assist with narcotics trafficking investigations), and the 

remainder were primarily from law enforcement or military backgrounds. This hiring approach 

produced tremendous investigators, whose efforts and dedication have been the building blocks 

of the FBI’s reputation for excellence. 

Now that the FBI’s mission and the threats we face are changing, there is a new need for 

certain specialized skills, such as intelligence, engineering and language capabilities. While 

we continue to draw from traditional sources in our hiring, we are augmenting our recruitment 

efforts and personnel selection process to ensure that we hire more individuals with the specific 

skills and experience that match our priorities and overall intelligence efforts. We devised a 

new recruitment strategy that includes: 1) initiating a major marketing campaign; 2) recruiting 

at colleges and universities with outstanding programs in critical skills areas; 3) partnering with 

the U.S. Copts Association to recruit individuals with Arabic language skills; 4) changing the 

FBI’s web site to focus on job opportunities in the intelligence and counterterrorism fields; and 

5) modifying the Presidential Management Fellows Program and the Honors Internship Program 

to recruit only candidates who possess critical skills. 

In February 2003, SACs were given guidance and instruction on leading targeted recruitment

efforts. Since that time, the SACs have been evaluated on their recruitment efforts on a

quarterly basis.

changing the list of critical skills we are

looking for in candidates to include:

intelligence background (including

experience in the Intelligence Community

or significant expertise in international

studies); languages helpful to our

missions; information technology and

computer science; engineering; physical

sciences; accounting; and international

business. We similarly changed the

screening criteria on which candidates for

Special Agent positions are evaluated at

each stage of the hiring process. The result has been a significant increase in the number of

new Special Agents with expertise in these areas.

We also revised the hiring process itself by 

counterterrorism and/or counterintelligence 

2002 

65 

66 

72 

68 

48 

Special Agents hired 

with critical skills 

Critical Skills: 

Intelligence 

experience/expertise 

Computer Science/IT 

Physical/Life Sciences 

Engineering 

Foreign Languages 

123 

171 

105 

82 

72 

2003 

58
Streamlined Hiring Process 

The FBI has historically had an overly lengthy and cumbersome hiring process that has impeded 

our ability to bring on the personnel to meet emerging threats and needs. Thanks to a concerted 

effort by the Administrative Services Division, the average time for the background investigation 

process has been reduced from over six months to less than three months, which has helped 

us hire significantly more support personnel. We hired a total of 1,145 support employees in 

2003 (including over 200 analysts) compared to a total of 365 in 2002. 

To improve efficiency further, we purchased new software to automate the hiring process, and 

plans are in the works for a Centralized Processing Center that will house all major functions 

related to processing applications for certain positions in the FBI. Having functions such as 

testing, personnel security interviews and polygraphs in the same facility will keep the hiring 

process consistent, help us keep applicants informed of progress, and create efficiencies to 

move successful applicants quickly into the background check process. 

Training 

Traditionally, the FBI’s Training Division focused on two flagship programs based at the 

FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia – training for new Special Agents and the National Academy 

for non-FBI law enforcement officers. For a variety of reasons, including inadequate resources 

and fragmented training responsibilities, limited progress was made in support of career development 

for on-board employees. 

To address this issue, we significantly expanded the resources and responsibilities dedicated 

to workforce training, and we instituted a new training management structure. We replaced the 

old Training Division with the more expansive Training and Development Division, and we are in 

the process of recruiting an Assistant Director who will be responsible for the development and 

distribution of training for all FBI employees. The Assistant Director will be supported by a new 

staff of training professionals in the Office of Training Development (OTD) at Headquarters, a 

Special Agent in Charge who will manage day-to-day operations at the FBI Academy, and a Senior 

Executive Service-level Dean of Academics who will focus on developmental training for on-board 

employees. 

Executive Leadership Initiatives 

The FBI has an extremely talented cadre of supervisors both in the field and at Headquarters. 

To keep this cadre as strong as possible, we have launched several new initiatives. These efforts 

help our leaders manage changes related to the FBI's transformation, and ensure that managers 

have the broad range of experience and flexibility needed to adapt quickly to changing priorities. 

Leadership Skills Assessment (LSA) – As part of our efforts to develop senior managers 

and prepare individuals with high potential for executive leadership roles, we instituted a 

new Leadership Skills Assessment for all employees interested in pursuing supervisory 

positions within the Bureau. The LSA is a live telephonic role simulation in which candidates 

play the role of either a squad supervisor or an ASAC, and it evaluates eight core competencies 

determined to be essential for successful performance as a mid-level manager in the FBI. 

59
These core competencies are: Leadership, Interpersonal Ability, Liaison, Organizing and 

Planning, Problem Solving/Judgment, Flexibility/Adaptability, Initiative, and Communications. 

Management Training – Our Senior Executive Service personnel are going through an 

executive development program that was created in partnership with the Kellogg School of 

Management, one of the country’s leading business schools. In an intensive one-week 

course, FBI executives receive guidance on managing change, with a particular focus on 

the FBI’s transition to new intelligence, investigative, and case management processes. 

As of February 13, 2004, 260 FBI executive managers have completed the training, including 

12 Assistant Directors and 54 SACs. 

Records Management 

In the spring of 2001, FBI personnel located over 3,000 Bureau records relating to the 

Timothy McVeigh investigation that had not been previously identified, collected, and disclosed 

to McVeigh’s defense counsel. This oversight was not intentional; it was the result of a deficient 

system for the storage and cataloguing of our investigative records. 

Records management is at the heart of the FBI's effectiveness and integrity as a law 

enforcement organization. The ability to maintain, access, and retrieve documents is critical to 

our investigative mission and is a fundamental element of our analytical capability. Over the past 

31 months, we have taken significant steps to overhaul our FBI-wide records management 

capabilities, to increase accountability for compliance with established records procedures, and 

to train our employees about the advantages of a paperless environment. 

Centralizing Records Management


On January 7, 2002, we created the Records Management Division (RMD) to direct and oversee

all records policy and functions. RMD is headed by an Assistant Director who serves as the

FBI’s Records Officer. RMD consolidates all records operations to ensure consistency,

thoroughness, and accountability.

As we evaluated our records management process, it became clear that a central location

would improve general efficiency and facilitate compliance with National Archives and Records

Administration (NARA) standards. We are finalizing plans to consolidate the RMD and all the

files currently stored in 265 storage locations at one facility outside of FBI Headquarters. This

facility will provide central management and storage for all active and inactive case files,

allowing the field offices and FBI Headquarters to get out of the file storage business.

Turning Paper into Searchable Data 

Until very recently, the Bureau used a records management system that relied primarily on the 

filing and retention of paper copies of investigative reports and other relevant documents. The 

FBI has made substantial progress moving from paper files to an electronic records system 

that Bureau personnel can access from their desktop computers. New documents and files 

are now routinely uploaded into our electronic case management system. We are also 

converting our legacy paper files by scanning documents to create digital images. The digital 

images are then converted into searchable digital text or tagged so they can be retrieved during 

searches. 

60
New Records Control Schedule 

In March 2004, we announced a new proposed records control schedule for FBI investigative, 

analytical, and administrative case files. The control schedule is the legal authority governing 

the length of time that FBI investigative and administrative case records are kept before they 

are destroyed or transferred to the NARA. The schedule was developed in partnership with 

NARA as part of their Targeted Assistance Program. The proposed schedule is subject to 

public notice and comment before it can be formally approved, and will soon be published in 

the Federal Register. The schedule is an important milestone in our efforts to modernize our 

records management process, replacing authorities that have been out of date for more than 

a dozen years. 

Improving Efficiency 

Re-engineering efforts are improving productivity and efficiency in our records management. 

For example, we established a Service Request Center to coordinate Freedom of Information 

Act and the Privacy Act (FOIPA) requests. The backlog of pending FOIPA requests has 

dropped 40 percent, from 2,650 in October 2002 to 1,600 today, and pending FOIPA appeals 

have dropped 67 percent, from 780 to 257. We also improved the efficiency of our Name 

Check Program. In late 2001, with new visa screening requirements, we were overwhelmed 

by the increase in names to be checked. To address the resulting backlog, we developed and 

implemented an internal tracking system, modified our software to provide detailed metrics, 

and increased the personnel by 65 percent. The backlog was all but eliminated. 

Security Management 

The FBI has built, and continues to improve, a comprehensive and centralized security 

program. On December 3, 2001, we created the Security Division headed by an Assistant Director. 

Since then, the Security Division has consolidated personnel security, physical security, and 

information security functions that were previously distributed across diverse FBI activities. The 

Division has put in place the following initiatives, among others: 

Information Assurance Plan 

The FBI developed a comprehensive information assurance plan, modeled on the best practices 

of the Intelligence Community, and considerably enhanced the security of its information 

systems. For example, the new Trilogy network provides a high level of security and new 

capabilities, such as the ability to track unauthorized access to files. A key part of this program 

is the involvement of security experts in the development of the FBI’s IT infrastructure to ensure 

that information assurance is part of the FBI’s IT architecture. 

In summer of 2002, we created the Information Assurance Section within the Security Division. 

We have since tripled the size of its Accreditation Unit, which conducts security risk assessments 

of IT systems from the planning and procurement stages, through the operation and eventual 

de-commissioning of each system. IT systems are certified and accredited if they meet federal 

information security standards. In fall of 2001, only 20 of the FBI’s IT systems were accredited. 

Today, more than 100 have been accredited, improving our security and facilitating information 

sharing with other federal agencies. 

61
Enterprise Security Operations Center


The new Enterprise Security Operations Center (ESOC), which began operations on October

22, 2003, is tasked with protecting FBI information systems from external attacks and insider

misuse through techniques such as real time network monitoring, intrusion detection, and data

auditing. The ESOC is operated by security analysts around the clock. 

Audits and Reviews 

To help deter and detect espionage activities, the FBI instituted a number of new audits and 

reviews. We expanded our polygraph program to include all employees who have access to 

highly sensitive information or who are heading to or returning from a permanent overseas 

assignment. We developed and are implementing a Financial Disclosure Program that will 

ultimately include all FBI employees and contractors with SCI access. We also enhanced 

reviews of reinvestigation results for employees with the most sensitive security access. 

Security Officers 

The FBI has taken steps to build a Bureau-wide force of full-time, career-track security 

professionals. An important part of the security career track will be the new full-time position 

of Chief Security Officer, who will serve as the senior security representative in each field office 

and in each Headquarters division. Security Officers report directly to their division head or 

SAC. 

Security Education 

The FBI is implementing a comprehensive security education, awareness, and training program. 

FBI employees routinely receive e-mail security updates, and an internal web site now provides 

regular guidance on security measures. All employees recently took a refresher course on 

security matters. Security training for new Special Agents has been increased, and an updated 

security briefing for new employees, task force personnel, and contract personnel is being 

developed. 

Disaster Recovery Planning 

Each field office and Headquarters division has developed a plan to ensure continuity of 

operations in the event of an emergency. Efforts have also been made to ensure that vital 

records are secure in such an event. 

62
ASSESSMENT OF OUR 

PROGRESS 

With the recent directives implementing the intelligence agent career track and the administrative 

reforms related to building an intelligence workforce, we have in place the essential structural 

elements of an intelligence-driven counterterrorism operation. The challenge now is to refine and 

continue to develop that operation – an effort that will require additional resources, continued 

attention by FBI leadership, and constant training of FBI personnel in intelligence processes and 

objectives. 

While we have clearly made substantial progress over the past 31 months, it is difficult to come 

up with an exact measurement of the current effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts. Besides 

citing the absence of successful attacks on the homeland since September 11, 2001, there is no 

single measure that completely captures the progress we have made. There are several yardsticks, 

however, that demonstrate the effectiveness of the core functions of a Counterterrorism Program. 

These yardsticks include the following: 

• Development of human assets 

• Number of FISAs 

• Number of intelligence reports generated 

• Quality of daily briefings 

• Effectiveness of counterterrorism operations 

• Continued protection of civil liberties 

An application of these yardsticks demonstrates the progress we have achieved since September 

11, 2001. 

Development of Human Assets 

The FBI has long recognized that human source information is one of the most important 

ways to investigate criminal activity. We have long-standing expertise in recruiting and using 

human sources, and we have used those skills to great effect across a wide range of investigative 

programs, including organized crime, drugs, public corruption, and white collar crime. 

While we also have developed sources over the years in the Counterterrorism Program, 

the September 11, 2001, attacks highlighted the shortage of human intelligence reporting about 

al-Qa’ida both in the U.S. and abroad. With the U.S. government having relatively few assets who 

were able to penetrate and report on al-Qa’ida's plans, we were vulnerable to surprise attack. 

The Bureau has placed a priority on developing human intelligence sources reporting on 

international terrorists. We have revised our training program, our personnel evaluation criteria, 

and our operational priorities to focus on source development. While we continue to grow this 

63
capacity, we have already seen a marked increase in the number of human intelligence sources in the 

Counterterrorism Program. Between August 30, 2001, and September 30, 2003, the number of sources 

related to international terrorism increased by more than 60 percent, and the number of sources related 

to domestic terrorism increased by more than 39 percent. 

One effort to develop operational intelligence and long-term sources was the Iraqi Interview 

Project. In three weeks during the spring of 2003, in anticipation of a possible military conflict in Iraq, 

the FBI, along with our law enforcement partners, conducted more than 10,000 voluntary interviews 

with U.S.-based Iraqis. Many of the persons we interviewed – who included engineers, scientists, and 

even former leaders in the Iraqi government – had fled Iraq in fear of its then dictator. They were 

contacted by the FBI because of their possible knowledge of the Iraqi leadership, Iraqi military facilities, 

and Iraq's potential involvement with terrorism. 

These interviews netted significant intelligence and operational 

information. As a result of these interviews, approximately 250 reports 

were provided to the U.S. military to assist in locating weapons 

production and storage facilities, underground bunkers, fiber optic 

networks, and Iraqi detention and interrogation facilities. Department 

of Defense representatives have stated that the information was 

timely, excellent, relevant, and greatly assisted in bridging gaps in 

other intelligence. 

The interviewers also asked all subjects to report any incidents 

where they faced hostilities or attacks because of their ethnic 

background. As a result of these interviews, 36 hate crime incidents 

were reported and referred to DOJ’s Civil Rights Division. 

Number of FISAs 

Since 

September 

2002, the 

number of FBI 

sources 

reporting on 

Iraqi matters 

increased 

270% 

FISA coverage has increased significantly since September 11, 2001, reflecting both our 

increased focus on counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations and improvement in 

the operation of the FISA process. From 2001 to 2003, the number of FISA applications filed 

annually with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court increased by 85 percent. We have seen 

a similar increase in the use of the emergency FISA process that permits us to obtain immediate 

coverage in emergency situations. In 2002, for example, the Department of Justice obtained a 

total of 170 emergency FISA authorizations, which is more than three times the number of 

emergency FISAs we obtained in the 23 years between the 1978 enactment of FISA and September 

11, 2001. 

Number of Intelligence Products Generated 

In the past year, the FBI produced more than 3,000 intelligence products, including “raw” 

reports, intelligence memoranda, in-depth strategic analysis assessments, special event threat 

assessments, and focused Presidential briefings. We also conducted numerous intelligence 

briefings to members of Congress, other government agencies, and the law enforcement and 

intelligence communities. These efforts mark a new beginning for the FBI’s intelligence operation. 

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Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI produced very few raw intelligence reports. In FY 

2003, we produced and disseminated 2,425 Intelligence Information Reports containing raw 

intelligence derived from FBI investigations and intelligence collection. The majority contained 

intelligence related to international terrorism; the next greatest number contained foreign intelligence 

and counterintelligence information; and the remainder concerned criminal activities and cyber 

crime. These IIRs were disseminated to a wide customer set in FBI field offices, the Intelligence 

Community, Defense Community, other federal law enforcement agencies, and U.S. policy entities. 

In addition to these individual reports, the FBI developed and issued in January 2003 a 

classified comprehensive assessment of the terrorist threat to the U.S. This assessment focuses 

on the threats that the FBI sees developing over the next two years, based on an analysis of 

information regarding the motivations, objectives, methods, and capabilities of existing terrorist 

groups and the potential for the emergence of new terrorist groups and threats throughout the 

world. This threat assessment is used as a guide in the allocation of investigative resources, as 

a useful compilation of threat information for investigators and intelligence personnel within and 

without the FBI, and as a resource for decision-makers elsewhere in the government. A 2004 

threat assessment is scheduled to be released in April 2004. 

We are preparing to produce, in the near future, the FBI Daily Report and the FBI National 

Report to provide daily intelligence briefings to personnel in the field and external customers. One 

will be produced at the classified level and limited in distribution to upper-level field managers. 

The other will be unclassified and widely distributed to field office personnel and our partners in 

the law enforcement community. 

A good example of our ability to exploit evidence for its intelligence value and share that 

intelligence is our use of the al-Qa’ida terrorism handbook. A terrorism handbook seized from an 

al-Qa’ida location overseas in the mid-1990’s was declassified and released by DOJ shortly after 

the events of September 11, 2001. We determined that intelligence gleaned from the handbook 

could provide useful guidance about al-Qa’ida’s interests and capabilities. Accordingly, we produced 

and disseminated a series of intelligence products to share this intelligence with our personnel 

in the field and with our law enforcement partners. Nine Intelligence Bulletins were based in whole 

or in part on this intelligence. In addition, we used information derived from the al-Qa’ida Handbook 

to update our counterterrorism training, including the Intelligence Analyst Basic Course at the 

College of Analytical Studies, the Introduction to Counterterrorism Course at the National Academy, 

and sessions on Terrorism Indicators and Officer Safety in our SLATT training. The unclassified 

version of the handbook is now maintained as a reference in the FBI Library and is accessible to 

all the students at the Academy. It also is included in the reference manual CD-Rom distributed 

as part of SLATT training. 

Quality of Daily Counterterrorism Briefings 

One telling measure of our improved counterterrorism operations is the development of 

our capability to brief the daily terrorist threat information. The development of this capability 

reflects the maturing of our centralized Counterterrorism Program. 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI lacked the capacity to provide a comprehensive daily 

terrorism briefing – to assemble the current threat information, to determine what steps were being 

taken to address each threat, and to present a clear picture of each threat and the Bureau's 

response to that threat to the Director, senior managers, the Attorney General, and to others in 

the Administration who make operational and policy decisions. With a decentralized program in 

which investigations were run by individual field offices, the Bureau never had to develop this 

specialized skill. With the need for centralized management after September 11, 2001, however, 

it became an imperative. 

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Initial Capabilities 

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, we were asked to begin sending to the 

White House each morning daily reports on counterterrorism-related events. We had no 

mechanism in place for collecting that information, so preparation of the reports was initially 

haphazard. For the first few months, the Director’s Chief of Staff was responsible for preparing 

the daily report that would be delivered to the President. Throughout the day, he monitored 

developments, gathered urgent reports, attended briefings, and noted any item that might be 

worth including in the next morning’s report. If there were questions he thought needed 

answering, he would either contact the appropriate person or ask SIOC to follow up and e-mail 

him an answer by 4:00 a.m. the next morning. He would arrive at 4:30 in the morning and 

update that morning’s report based on any other overnight reports in SIOC and any e-mails 

that had come in overnight. 

CT Watch then took that report and packaged it in a daily briefing book. Working with limited 

personnel, unreliable color printers, and few supplies, they managed to produce 15 to 20 

briefing booklets per day. 

New Capabilities 

During the past 31 months, with the assistance of veterans from the Intelligence Community, 

we have established the infrastructure and the cadre of professionals to produce effective daily 

briefings and to share briefing materials more widely within the Bureau and with our partners. 

In 2002 we established the Presidential Support Group within the Counterterrorism Division 

to prepare daily briefing materials. In the summer of 2003, this group was renamed the Strategic 

Analysis Unit and moved to the Office of Intelligence. Beginning in August 2003, the Strategic 

Analysis Unit began producing the Director’s Daily Report (DDR), a daily intelligence briefing 

that includes information on counterterrorism operations, terrorism threats, and information 

related to all areas of FBI investigative activity. To produce the DDR, the Strategic Analysis 

Unit consolidates and refines information provided in a standardized format by intelligence 

personnel in each division. Each morning, information about new threats is added, and 

information about threats that have been thoroughly vetted during the night is removed. The 

DDR is produced Monday through Friday and is distributed to executives in all operational 

divisions. The Director uses the DDR to brief the President nearly every weekday morning. 

The FBI also produces the Presidential Intelligence Assessment, a finished FBI intelligence 

product covering topics of particular interest to the President, and its personnel at TTIC contribute 

to the formulation of the daily President’s Terrorist Threat Report. 

Director Mueller holds threat briefings twice a day: an intelligence briefing at 7:15 a.m. and a 

case-oriented briefing at 5 p.m. At these briefings, a briefer and the operational executive 

managers provide a summary of the current threats and our operations. With CIA and DHS 

representatives in attendance, these meetings also serve to ensure that all threat information 

is appropriately passed to those agencies. 

The development of this daily briefing operation is a tangible measure of the progress we have 

made since the day when terrorism investigations were run by individual field offices and little 

effort was made to centrally direct or coordinate them throughout the Bureau and with the other 

agencies involved in protecting the U.S. against terrorism. 

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Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Operations 

The Bureau historically measured its performance, to a large extent, by the number of 

criminals it arrested. While useful for traditional law enforcement, where the primary objective is 

arrest and prosecution, this standard is under-inclusive as applied to counterterrorism, where the 

primary objective is to neutralize terrorist threats. It only captures that subset of terrorist threats 

that are neutralized by arresting terrorists and prosecuting them with charges of criminal terrorism. 

It fails to capture the terrorist threats we neutralize through means other than formal terrorism 

prosecutions – such as deportation, detention, arrest for non-terrorism charges, seizure of financial 

assets, and the sharing of information with foreign governments for their use in taking action 

against terrorists within their borders. 

A more useful measure is one we have used in organized crime cases – the number of 

disruptions and dismantlements. This measure counts every time we – either by ourselves or with 

our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities – conduct an operation which 

disables, prevents, or interrupts terrorist fundraising, recruiting, training, or operational planning. 

Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has participated in dozens of such operations, disrupting a 

wide variety of domestic and international terrorist undertakings. 

While the number of disruptions is significant, the most telling measure of our progress is 

the manner in which we have conducted individual operations consistent with our prevention 

mission. The extent of our transformation is most clearly seen in the approach we take when 

confronting specific terrorist threats. Our approach to these operations demonstrates the extent 

to which coordination and prevention through the development of actionable intelligence have 

become our guiding operational principles. 

The following is a sampling of our investigative activities that show the various dimensions 

of our counterterrorism capabilities. The particulars of the first two operations have been publicly 

discussed, and the last two have resulted in criminal charges and have thereby been made public. 

While we have briefed Congressional Committees and the Commission on other investigations 

and terrorist disruptions that resulted in no criminal prosecutions and have thus remained classified, 

we cannot discuss them in this unclassified document. 

The first two examples show our coordinated responses to periods of heightened threat. 

End of Summer Task Force 

During the investigation into the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, significant 

intelligence was developed suggesting the existence of a plot to attack the U.S. homeland. 

This information, combined with other threat indicators, pointed to an increased threat of terrorist 

attacks for the end of summer. 

• In response, we established the “End of Summer Task Force” made up of agents 

and analysts to examine the threat. The Task Force worked closely with other members 

of the Intelligence Community to coordinate operational and intelligence elements. 

• FBI and Intelligence Community entities held bi-weekly meetings to share significant 

findings, operational information, and intelligence assessments. 

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• The Task Force met with document exploitation experts from the FBI and other 

Intelligence Community agencies to discuss the exploitation, dissemination, and 

tracking of leads from materials seized in the raids in Saudi Arabia in May and June 

of 2003. 

• The Task Force received quality analytical assessments that were produced through 

timely information sharing between all the agencies involved, regular meetings and 

consultation among analysts from all the agencies, and close peer-to-peer coordination 

of analytic assessments across those agencies. 

Response to Terrorist Threats Over the 2003 Holiday Season 

In December 2003, the U.S. Intelligence Community became concerned about the possibility 

of near-term attacks in the homeland from al-Qa’ida. Strategic and tactical intelligence pointed 

to the possibility of attacks during the holiday season, and raised concerns about the use of 

foreign flights, threats to the energy sector, and the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological, 

or nuclear attacks. The FBI response was quick, thorough, based on centrally controlled, 

intelligence-based investigations, and focused on disrupting possible terrorist activity in the 

homeland. 

We undertook the following steps to address the heightened threat environment: 

• As soon as FBI Headquarters received the threat information, we immediately stood up 

a command post in SIOC to provide around-the-clock threat analysis and to maintain 

contact with appropriate JTTFs and Legal Attaché offices. 

• Counterterrorism analysts immediately began a full review of all Sunni and Shia international 

terrorism cases from the past six months to determine if there were any previously 

unrecognized links. We used all the software search tools at our disposal, including link 

analysis, to ensure that there was no evidence of a connection to any existing terrorism 

case. 

• We directed all 56 FBI field offices to take specific actions, including standing up 24/7 

command posts, gathering intelligence through interviews and other means, and working 

with local agencies to increase security, share information, and assist the investigation. 

• Senior Headquarters executives, including the Director, the Deputy Director, and CTD 

managers, regularly communicated with the SACs in each of the affected field offices via 

secure video teleconferencing. 

• We issued several bulletins and advisories relating to these threats to state and municipal 

law enforcement. 

• We established a Headquarters task force to vet the passenger manifests of certain inbound and out-bound flights to identify potential terrorists. Representatives from DHS, 

CIA, and NSA met at FBI Headquarters and established a protocol for vetting flight 

manifests through the NJTTF. Task force members used the FBI data warehouse and 

NSA, CIA, and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) databases in the 

vetting process. 

• The NJTTF facilitated frequent communications with domestic and foreign intelligence 

and law enforcement partners. We regularly met with representatives of the French and 

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British governments during the threat period, and we gave them demonstrations of the 

manifest vetting system. 

• We sent information from Headquarters to field offices and JTTFs with "tear sheets" to 

facilitate information sharing with local law enforcement. 

• JTTFs in those cities determined to be at particular risk took additional proactive steps, 

maintained enhanced liaison with federal partners and certain private sector interests, 

and kept Headquarters managers advised of their activities through daily reports and video 

conferences. 

Our multi-faceted, proactive response to this holiday threat environment highlights many of our 

reforms. We centrally coordinated our operations from Headquarters with regular contact with 

the field. We increased personnel levels to staff command posts and task forces at Headquarters 

and throughout the field. We relied on our information technology – our software search tools 

and consolidated databases – to analyze and quickly share the relevant information. We 

worked closely with our foreign, federal, state, and local partners in assessing and responding 

to the threat indicia. And, on January 29 and 30, 2004, we organized and sponsored an afteraction review with representatives from CTD, the NJTTF, other federal agencies, and several 

foreign services to assess our response and identify lessons that will help us improve our 

response to future threat periods. 

Iyman Faris 

The investigation of Iyman Faris is a good example of how the FBI works cooperatively with 

our partners to investigate and neutralize a specific threat. This investigation was initiated and 

developed as a result of close coordination with our international, federal, state, and municipal 

partners. 

Faris initially came to our attention when information from a foreign source linked Faris to 

terrorists who had plotted attacks to coincide with Millennium celebrations. With help from FBI 

Headquarters, agents and other JTTF members in our Cincinnati field office undertook an 

extensive investigation and ultimately interviewed Faris in March 2003. During the interview, 

Faris admitted that he had personal contact with several individuals tied to terrorism. At about 

the same time, another foreign source indicated that an Ohio-based truck driver had been 

tasked to attack U.S. bridges, and particularly the Brooklyn Bridge. Once that information 

came together, we quickly composed a targeted plan for Faris’ interview team, assigned 

operational leads to field offices and JTTFs around the country, and teamed up with NYPD 

investigators and analysts. 

As a result of these activities, Faris was arrested, and he ultimately pled guilty to the charge 

of Providing Material Support or Resources to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. 

On October 28, 2003, Faris was sentenced to 20 years in prison. He has been interviewed 

subsequent to his sentencing as part of his cooperation agreement with the government. 

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 Investigation of Criminal Enterprises Supporting Hizballah 

As discussed above, a critical part of our counterterrorism strategy is the use of traditional 

criminal investigation and prosecution to disrupt terrorist activity. A good example is the 

recent joint investigation targeting criminal enterprises that raise money to support Hizballah, 

a foreign terrorist organization. To support Hizballah, these criminal enterprises, primarily 

based in the Detroit area, are engaged in a wide range of offenses, including credit card 

fraud, bank fraud, mail fraud, mortgage fraud, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, 

contraband cigarette trafficking, trafficking in counterfeit cigarette tax stamps, transportation 

of stolen property, and trafficking in counterfeit goods. 

A team made up of investigators from several FBI JTTFs, Legal Attachés, and our partner 

agencies has used an integrated strategy of intelligence collection and criminal investigative 

techniques to identify, disrupt, and defeat Hizballah support networks. To date, that strategy 

has produced 18 complaints, 37 indictments, 19 arrests, and 10 convictions. Here are two 

recent developments in that investigation: 

• In January 2004, Elias Mohamad Akhdar of Dearborn, Michigan, was sentenced to 

70 months in prison after pleading guilty to violations of the Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for his role in running a multi-million dollar enterprise 

involved in the smuggling of untaxed and low-taxed cigarettes between Michigan, 

North Carolina, and the Cattarangus Indian Reservation in New York. The Akhdar 

enterprise, which resulted in the evasion of approximately $2 million in Michigan state 

cigarette taxes, had two connections to Hizballah. First, one of the largest suppliers 

of contraband cigarettes to the racketeering conspiracy was Mohamad Hammoud of 

the Charlotte, North Carolina, Hizballah Cell, who was convicted of providing material 

support to Hizballah. Also, Hassan Moussa Makki, a key player in this enterprise, 

pled guilty in September 2003 to providing material support to Hizballah. 

• In January 2004, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, formerly of Dearborn, Michigan was 

indicted for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Hizballah. Kourani is charged 

with conspiring with his brother, the Hizballah Chief of Military Security for Southern 

Lebanon, and other unnamed co-conspirators to provide material support to Hizballah. 

Kourani is an alleged member, fighter, recruiter, and fundraiser for Hizballah. If 

convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment and a $250,000 

fine. 

Respect for Civil Liberties 

It is the FBI’s job to protect Americans, not only from crime and terrorism, but also from 

incursions into their constitutional rights. That effort starts with our own commitment to scrupulously 

protect privacy rights and civil liberties in the course of our investigations. With the tragedy of 

September 11, 2001, and the ensuing imperative to protect America against further attack, some 

questioned whether the Bureau would forsake civil liberties and personal privacy rights for the 

sake of investigative expediency. Thanks to the professionalism of our personnel and the respect 

for civil liberties institutionalized within the Bureau, our operations of the past 31 months have 

been carried out with full adherence to the Constitution and the principles of personal liberty and 

privacy. 

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The reason for this strict adherence to civil liberties lies in the regime of oversight, legal 

limitations and self-regulation that governs our investigative activities within the U.S. This regime 

is comprehensive, and it has many facets, including the following: 

Statutory Limitations: 

The following statutes, among others, help to guarantee that the Bureau’s operations remain 

clearly within the bounds of the Constitution and of propriety: 

• The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978—This law established a process 

for obtaining judicial approval of electronic surveillance and physical searches for the 

purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information. 

• The Whistleblower Protection Acts of 1989 and 1998—These laws protect 

whistleblowers from retaliation. 

• The Freedom of Information Act of 1966—This law provides the public with effective 

access to all FBI documents not covered by a specific statutory exemption. 

• The Privacy Act of 1974—This law forbids the FBI and other federal agencies from 

collecting information about how individuals exercise their First Amendment rights, 

unless that collection is expressly authorized by statute or by the individual, or is 

pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. 

Oversight Mechanisms: 

• Congressional Oversight—Committees of the U.S. Congress, primarily the House 

and Senate Judiciary, Intelligence, Appropriations, and Government 

Reform/Governmental Affairs Committees, have broad oversight authority over the 

FBI. These committees – along with others – exercise regular, vigorous oversight 

into all aspects of the FBI’s operations. This oversight has significantly increased in 

breadth and intensity since the 1970’s, and it provides important additional assurance 

that the FBI conducts its investigations in accordance with the law and the Constitution. 

• Counterintelligence Oversight—The FBI’s counterintelligence operations are subject 

to significant outside oversight beyond that conducted by Congress. DOJ’s Office of 

Intelligence Policy and Review, which was established in 1981 as required by Executive 

Order 12333, monitors intelligence and counterintelligence investigations conducted 

by U.S. intelligence agencies and provides Congress a series of semi-annual reports 

on various aspects of the FBI’s counterintelligence operations. The FBI also is subject 

to oversight by the Intelligence Oversight Board. Established in 1993, the Intelligence 

Oversight Board is comprised of four members appointed from the membership of 

the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Among its other responsibilities, 

the Intelligence Oversight Board reviews all violations of national security law, Executive 

Order or Presidential Decision Directive by the FBI and the other intelligence agencies, 

and issues reports thereon to the President and the Attorney General. 

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Self-Regulation and Enforcement: 

• Attorney General’s Crimes Guidelines—The Attorney General’s Guidelines on 

General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

(General Crimes Guidelines) have been in effect, in one form or another, since the 

mid-1970’s. These Guidelines govern all investigations by the FBI of crimes and 

crime-related activities. They set forth the standards and requirements under which 

an investigation may be initiated, and they define the permissible scope, duration, 

subject matters, and objectives of an FBI criminal investigation. They are designed 

to provide Special Agents with a framework that maintains the proper balance between 

the public’s need for effective law enforcement and terrorism prevention, on the one 

hand, and the preservation of individual rights and liberties, on the other. Among the 

provisions that specifically serve to protect individual rights are the following: 1) the 

prohibition against initiating investigations directed solely at the exercise of First 

Amendment rights or other constitutionally protected activity; and 2) the requirement 

that agents consider using the least intrusive method necessary to achieve their 

investigative goals. In short, the Guidelines translate the Department’s respect for 

individual rights and liberties into practical policy, and thereby prevent investigative 

abuses. 

• Attorney General’s National Security/Foreign Intelligence Guidelines—The 

Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign 

Intelligence Collection (National Security Guidelines) were first issued in 1976, and 

recently updated in October 2003. These classified guidelines govern the manner 

in which the FBI conducts its counterintelligence investigations – those investigations 

that focus on protecting the U.S. from external threats. The National Security Guidelines, 

like the domestic General Crimes Guidelines, were designed to maintain the proper 

balance between the public’s need for effective counterintelligence and the imperative 

to respect and protect individual rights. The National Security Guidelines contain a 

number of provisions designed to ensure that individual rights and liberties will be 

protected, such as the prohibition on investigations of First Amendment activities and 

the rule that a U.S. person may be the subject of a counterintelligence investigation 

only if circumstances indicate that he or she might be acting for or on behalf of a 

foreign power. 

• Internal Enforcement—The FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility and the DOJ’s 

Office of the Inspector General investigate allegations of misconduct. 

• Internal Safeguards—Internal safeguards include the Privacy Council, which reviews 

the plans of any record system that is proposed within the FBI for compliance with 

the Privacy Act and related privacy policies, and the Criminal Undercover Operations 

Review Committee, which is comprised of senior DOJ and FBI officials and reviews 

all proposed undercover operations that involve sensitive circumstances. There also 

is a Criminal Informant Review Committee, comprised of senior FBI and DOJ officials, 

which provides oversight over several categories of human sources, such as highlevel criminal informants and long-term sources. 

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• Training—The Bureau’s training program emphasizes respect for the constitutional 

rights and dignity of individuals. Agents receive extensive instruction on constitutional 

law and criminal procedure, and all new agents visit the Holocaust Museum to learn 

the consequences of government oppression and persecution. Then, throughout their 

careers, agents receive quarterly training from the Chief Division Counsel in each field 

office to keep them up to speed on the latest guidelines, changes to laws and 

regulations, and judicial decisions related to constitutional rights and liberties. 

This comprehensive infrastructure of legal limitations, oversight and self-regulation effectively 

ensures that the Bureau’s operations always are carried out within Constitutional and statutory 

parameters. 

A number of outside entities and individuals have studied our operations since September 

11, 2001, and have found no indication that we have conducted them with less than full regard 

for civil liberties. The DOJ’s Inspector General, for example, has issued three semi-annual reports, 

indicating that his office had received no complaints for each six month period alleging misconduct 

by DOJ employees related to their use of a substantive provision in the USA PATRIOT Act. 

At an October 21, 2003, hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding the 

use of USA PATRIOT Act authorities, one senator said that "the tide of criticism" being directed 

against the USA PATRIOT Act "is both misinformed and overblown," and that the Justice Department 

has "done a pretty good job in terms of implementing" the law's provisions. Another senator said, 

“I have never had a single abuse of the Patriot Act reported to me. My staff e-mailed the ACLU 

and asked them for instances of actual abuses. They e-mailed back and said they had none.” 

Similarly, the General Accounting Office (GAO) examined our implementation of the new 

Attorney General Guidelines. In its June 18, 2003, report on FBI Reorganization, the GAO found 

that there were no reported allegations that appeared to involve noncompliance with or abuse of 

the new investigative authorities granted under the Guidelines. 

We take great pride in our record of protecting both civil liberties and national security since 

September 11, 2001. It is a testament to the vitality of the existing regime of constitutional, legal 

and regulatory protections and to the commitment of individual Bureau employees to the protection 

of individual rights. 

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CONCLUSION 

The September 11, 2001, attacks awakened all of us to the deadly threat of modern 

terrorism and to the need for bold action. We in the FBI have undertaken that bold action 

over the past 31 months. While there is still much work to be done, we have made 

significant progress with the reform efforts described in the foregoing report. With these 

efforts, and with the unwavering support of the American people, we are confident that 

we will prevail in our war against terrorism. 

Director’s Note 

The transformation described above 

has been a tremendous effort, and the 

dedicated men and women of the FBI 

deserve great credit for 

the progress we have made. 

FBI personnel have consistently 

sacrificed and placed duty over 

self-interest as they have embraced 

the Bureau’s new mission and adapted 

to the necessary changes. 

Their professionalism has made this 

transformation possible. 

I cannot thank them enough. 

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