NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APARTMENT ASSOCIATION OF GREATER LOS ANGELES, in its representative capacity on behalf of its association m em

bers; ORIT BLAU, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS, a m unicipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 19-55955 D.C. No. 2:18-cv-06840-PSG-E
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal fromthe United States District Court for the Central District of California Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief District Judge, Presiding A rgued and Subm itted June 15, 2022 Pasadena, California Before: RAWLINSON and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, * * District Judge. 

# FILED
AUG 1 2022 M OLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

* * The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.Apartm ent Association of Greater Los Angeles (AAGLA) appeals the

district court’s dism issal of its second am ended com plaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The com

plaint alleged that a rent stabilization ordinance adopted by the City of Beverly Hills (City) requiring owners of rent-stabilized apartm ents to disclose inform ation concerning their tenants and units violated the owners’ rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Am endm ents. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s judgm e nt. 1. The district court properly dism issed AAGLA’s Fourth Am endm ent claim . “Even if the Fourth Am endm ent is im plicated by certain non-physical intrusions, in that context the plaintiff m ust have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the docum ents before the governm ent’s conduct can be deem ed a Fourth Am endm ent search. . . .” Hotop v. City of San Jose , 982 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation m arks om itted). AAGLA “fail[ed] to allege facts plausibly suggesting that [apartm ent owners] have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the inform ation that must be disclosed” pursuant to the ordinance. Id. at 715. 2. The district court also correctly dism issed AAGLA’s claim s that the inform ation disclosure requirem ents and paym ent of relocation fees to tenants constitute per se takings under the Fifth Am endm ent. See id. at 716 (holding that
2disclosure requirem ents im posed by rent stabilization ordinance did “not work any type of per se taking, for exam ple by a physical invasion or by depriving th e property owner of all beneficial use of the property”) (citations om itted); see also Ballinger v. City of Oakland , 24 F.4th 1287, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 2022) (concluding that the im

position of relocation fees did not result in a per se taking or unconstitutional exaction because “legislative enactm ents regulating the econom ic relations of landlord and tenants are not per se takings”) (citation and internal quotation m arks om itted). 3. The district court properly dism issed AAGLA’s substantive due process claim . AAGLA failed to plausibly allege that the ordinance’s disclosure requirem ents were “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, m orals or general welfare.” Yagman v. Garcetti , 852 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation om itted). Contrary to AAGLA’s conclusory assertions, the City reasonably passed the ordinance in order to address the shortage of available housing. See id. (explaining that “[t] he City’s procedures . . . are presum ed valid, and this presum ption is overcom e only by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality”) (citation and internal quotation
m arks om itted).

3In addition, apartm ent owners are not injured due to infringem ent of “their

tenants’ privacy rights,” and AAGLA failed to plausibly allege “any harm to [landlords’] own liberty or property interests” from disclosure of inform ation concerning their tenants and rent-stabilized units. Hotop , 982 F.3d at 718. 4. AAGLA failed to plausibly allege a violation of its procedural due process rights. “The relevant inquiry is . . . whether the [m unicipal] procedure itself is incapable of affording due process. . . .” Recchia v. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Animal Servs ., 889 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation and alteration
om itted). The m

unicipal code provides “an adm inistrative rem edy for any violation of [the] c ode,” and AAGLA did not plausibly allege t hat it was otherwise incapable of challenging the disclosure requirem ents. City of Beverly Hills Municipal Code § 1-3-301 (2019). 5. Finally, AAGLA failed to plausibly allege a viable equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Am endm ent. “Where a regulation or statute affects only econom ic interests, as here, the state is free to create any classification schem e that does not invidiously discrim inate.” San Francisco Taxi Coal. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco , 979 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation m arks om itted). “We must uphold the law if there are plausible, arguable, or conceivable reasons which m ay have been the basis for the
4distinction.” Id. (citation and internal quotation m arks om itted). In passing the

ordinance, the City determ ined that there was “a shortage of affordable housing that [was] available to all segm ents of the com m unity both within the County of Los Angeles and specifically within the City of Beverly Hills.” It is certainly conceivable that the disclosure requirem ents for apartm e nt owners of rentstabilized units rationally advance a legitim ate interest in confirm ing that landlords are in com

pliance with the ordinance’s m andates aim e d at ensuring available and affordable housing. See Hotop , 982 F.3d at 717 (concluding that rental distinctions revealed in disclosure requirem ents im posed by rent stabilization ordinance “easily . . . survive[d] rational basis review”). 1 AFFIRMED.

1 Because AAGLA failed to plausibly allege that the disclosure requirem ents and relocation fees violated any constitutional right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not apply. See Hotop , 982 F.3d at 718- 19. 5