ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACTAPPEALS Appeals of

-- Pyrotechnic Specialties, Inc.

Under ContractNo. W52PIJ-04-C-0098

APPEARANCES FORTHE APPELLANT: ) ) ) ) )

APPEARANCES FORTHE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA Nos. 57890, 58335, 59103

M. Devlin Cooper, Esq. Kenneth E. Barton III, Esq.

Cooper, Barton & Cooper Macon, GA Raymond M. Saunders, Esq.

Army ChiefTrial Attorney Robert B. Neill, Esq.

Trial Attorney

OPINION BYADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PAGE ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION Appellant Pyrotechnic Specialties, Inc. (PSI, contractor or appellant), timely moved for reconsideration ofthe Board's decision in 

### Pyrotechnic Specialties, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 57890, 58335, 59103, 17-1 BCA 

### ,i 36,696 1; the government (Army or the government) opposes the motion. That decision upheldthe government's termination for default ofthe underlying contract, its rejection ofLot 3-3A, and the government's entitlementto recovery. Familiarity with that decision, which addressed entitlement only, is presumed. We deny the motion.


### 1. Standard/orDecidingMotions/or Reconsideration

We adhere to a familiar standard in evaluating these motions. Reconsideration "is not the place to present arguments previously made and rejected. '[W]here litigants have oncebattled for the Court's decision, they should neither be required, nor without goodreason permitted, to battle for it again."' 

### Relyant, LLC, ASBCA No. 59809, 18-1 BCA

### ,i 37,146 at 180,840-41. These motions "do not afford litigants the opportunity to take a 'secondbite at the apple' orto advance arguments thatproperly shouldhave been presentedinanearlierproceeding.' 

### Id. (quotingDixonv. Shinseki, 741 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); 

### see alsoAvantAssessment, LLC, ASBCA No. 58867, 15-1 BCA 

### ,i 36,137 at 176,384. Having said that:

1Furtherreferences to the decision are to volume and page number, 

### e.g., "17-1 at 178,700.''[I]fwe have made mistakes in the findings offact or conclusions oflaw, or by failing to consider an appropriate matter, reconsideration may be appropriate. 

### See Robinson Quality Constructors, ASBCA No. 55784, 09-2 BCA 

### ,i 34,171 at 168,911;

### L&CEuropa Contracting Co., ASBCA No. 52617, 04-2 BCA 

### ,i 32,708. In short, ifwe have made a genuine oversight that affects the outcome of the appeal, we will remedy it. 

### Relyant, 18-1 BCA ,i 37,146 at 180,840-41.


### 2. Background

The facts ofthese appeals, which are lengthy and technical, involve PSI's production (with varying degrees ofsuccess) ofmultiple lots ofsignal flares. Some background is useful. Firm-fixed-price ContractNo. W52PIJ-04-C-0098 with the Army called for PSI to manufacture and provide "MK 124 Mod OSignal, Smoke and Illumination" (MK 124, signal flare, device, or unit). The purpose ofthe device was to produce a visible distress signal to allow military personnel to summonthe attention of reconnaissance aircraft. 17-1 at 178,661, findings 1, 2. The four stages ofproduction
were called "Interfixes" 1, 2, 3, and4; lots within each were serially identified as Lot 1-1, Lot 1-2, etc. 17-1 at 178,669.

The MK 124 is a cylindrical canister about five inches long and 1.7 inches in diameter. Each end ofthe MK 124 is crimped to ensure stability. 17-1 at 178,663, findings 10, 12, 14. Among contract requirements in the Technical Data Package is Drawing 3139733, which identifies additional required characteristics ofthe MK 124. Note 10 ofthe drawing provides in relevant partthat "[a]fter crimping, [both igniters] shall not be damaged and shall be capable ofwithstanding a torque of20 inch-pounds min[imum] with [the outercontainer] withoutrelative movement [commonly referred to as 'norelative movement]." This note is precededby the indicator "(Ml03),"which "identifTies] it as a Majorcharacteristic"that is importantto the integrity ofthe signal. 17-1 at 178,668, finding 28. The contract was terminated for default after PSI repeatedly had problems timely and successfully producing lots acceptable to the government. 17-1 at 178,687-90, findings 168-77.


### 3. PSI'sArguments in Support of Its Motionfor Reconsideration

PSI asserts that "[c]ritically, there are three key reasons that the Board's decision is in error and shouldbe reconsidered." These are that the "testimony at the hearing does not support the factual findings ofthe Board's Order"; the "Board ultimately and

2

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improperly shifted the burden ofproofto PSI"; and, the "Board should reconsider its decision and allow PSI to presentthe full evidence in its possession ofthe Government's bad faith." (Appellant's Briefin Support ofits Motion for Reconsideration (app. br.) at 2) Examples given by PSI in which hearing testimony allegedly does not support the decision concern the torque test; PSI's crimpingproblems; and trigger assembly separation defects. 

### It also asserts that the CO mistakenly citedthe number offlares from Lot4-1 with excessive smoke times. (Id. at 2-8)

a. Appellant'sAllegations Concerning the Torque Test

The contract required PSI to demonstrate that there was "no relative movement" ofthe ends ofthe device as part ofinspection. While the contract did not specify a particular means to verify this, appellant internally developed the torque test, which involved twisting canister ends using a torque wrench, as a measurement. The governmentthen allowedthis to be used in acceptance testing. See, e.g, 17-1 at 178,674-79, findings 84-116. The protocol for PSI's rework ofLot 3-3 as Lot 3-3A included "100%torque [testing] oftheunits." 17-1 at 178,674, finding 84. Also atthat time, the governmenthadthe contractorbeginto draw a vertical line on the end ofthe canisterto more easily detect whetherthere was movement when torqued. See 17-1 at 178,679, findings 114-16.

While the decision evaluated and rejected this argument (see, e.g., 17-1 at 178,693-96), PSI maintains on reconsideration that the decision is based upon erroneous findings offact concerningthe torque test which led the Board to the wrong legal conclusion. With respect to finding 90, appellant contends that the government reviewed and approvedthis testpriorto the rework ofpreviously-rejectedLot 3-3. Next, it contends that findings 97 and 116 are inconsistent regarding whetherthe government had reservations aboutthe efficacy ofthe torque test. Third, appellant asserts that the government's specifications are defective because PSI manufactured the MK 124s properly and thus its inability to pass inspection was the result offlawed testing. (See app. br. at 2-5, also app. post-hearing br. at 9-12)

1. Finding 90 Finding 90 reads in relevant part: "However, there is no evidence that the torque test was reviewed or approved by the government atany timeprior to Lot3-3's rework. The record does not include a proposed orapproved quality managementplan or [Acceptance Inspection Equipment] AIE submission, and no government witness could rememberthe torque testbeing submitted for approval." 17-1 at 178,675 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Appellant maintains that "this conclusion is directly in contradiction to the evidencepresented attrial," as testimony from CO Pierce shows

3that he "eventually acknowledged" that "the Relative Movement Torque Test was approved as the AIE submission" (app. br. at 2-4 (citing tr. 4/113-14)).

When his testimony is read in full, CO Pierce responded "I don'trecall" when asked whether the contractorhad "an approved AIE plan for this contract'' (tr. 4/113). Although he answered affirmatively to another question regarding whether PSI had been "conductingtorque testing in accordance with aplan from [the] Rock Island [District]" (tr. 4/113-14), this falls short ofestablishing that the torque test was made part ofthe AIE orthat this occurredpriorto the reworking ofLot 3-3 as Lot 3-3A. CO Pierce further testified that this reference to the Rock Island plan pertainedto the "[b]eginning of[Lot] four" (tr. 4/114), which tookplace afterthe rework ofLot 3-3. 

### See 17-1 at 178,674-87, findings 81-167.

PSI also attempts to buttress its allegation that the torque test "was the approved testing procedure" with testimony from Mr. Cowart, one ofthe government's quality
assurance representatives. As noted in finding 116, Mr. Cowart "testified that the government did not have a problem with the PSI torque test to assess the crimping process until the trigger assemblies started separating (tr. 4/10)." (App. br. at 2-4) We do not agree that Mr. Cowart'stestimony supports appellant's contention.

The testimonies from CO Pierce and Mr. Cowart are inadequate to establish that the torque test was part ofthe AIE, especially priorto the rework ofLot 3-3. 

### See, e.g., 17-1 at 178,675, finding 92 ("The first time a torque test was performed during a LAT was during the modified LAT for Lot 3-3A."), and finding 89 ("The torque test was not one ofthe tests required by Specification 13697N"but was developed ·'by PSI
as part ofits own quality inspections."). Finding 84 acknowledged that PSI was allowed to use the torque test in evaluatingthe reworking ofLot 3-3 and in later lots. 

### See, e.g., 17-1 at 178,674-75, findings 84-90. While the government told PSI "to update its AIE afterthe torque test procedure was revised during Interfix 4," appellant cites nothing else in the record to supportthat it did sopriorto Lot 3-3 orthat the torque test was made partofthe AIE. 17-1 at 178,707 n.17.


### 2. Findings 97and 116

PSI next asserts that findings 97 and 116 ofthe decision are "internally

...inconsistent" regarding whether the government had concerns overthe contractor's use ofthe torque test to assess whether there was relative movement at the canister's ends (app. br. at 4). Finding 97 notes Mr. Bowen's testimony that the government was concerned over whether "PSl'storque test would be able to show a gross failure ofthe contract requirement that there be no 'relative movement' betweenthe trigger assembly and the outer container" because "there was no datum collectedto verify the absence ofmovement." 17-1 at 178,676-77, finding 97. In finding 116, and as discussed above, Mr. Cowart's testimony



### 4at transcript 4/10 is consistent with the government's allowing PSI to use the torque test until trigger assemblies began falling offduring testing ofLot 3-3A. 17-1 at 178,679, finding 116.

Ifit is appellant'spointthat findings 97 and 116 are in conflict and this error warrants reconsideration, we disagree. These relate to different stages ofproduction, and reflect the government's increasing concerns overPSI's inability to consistently make MK 124s in accordance with the contract. The government allowed PSI to use the torque test until trigger separation failures brought into question the effectiveness ofthis test to detect relative movement. Once more, the testimony appellant relies upon from CO Pierce and Mr. Cowart is unpersuasive; these witnesses simply did not go so far as PSI would have us find. As noted in finding 89, the decision acknowledges that the torque testpreviously had been used internally by PSI and that Mr. Cowart was aware ofthis, but appellant furnishes no proofthat the test was made part ofthe contract orAIEpriorto Lot 3-3A, orthatpassing it guaranteed a unit's acceptance. 17-1 at 178,675, finding 89, 

### see also findings 90-92.

b. 

### Appellant'sAllegations of Factual Error in the Contracting Officer's FinalDecision (COFD)
PSI asserts that finding 176, which "quotes from the CO's final determination of26 September 2011, terminating the contract for default," is in error. Appellant observes that the COFD states that "'While it is true that Lot 1was accepted on deviation for ONE long display time on the smoke end ofthe signal, that was the extent ofthe quality problems in that Lot."' According to PSI, the "COwas incorrect"
as "Lot 1was accepted on deviation with 7 long display times, as admitted by PSI. That is in the record, and why a contractorwould admitto more unacceptable display times than necessary remains unansweredby the Government." (App. br. at 4-5)

PSI is correct that there were seven signals in Lot 1that exhibited this flaw (app. br. at 4-5), as acknowledged elsewhere in the decision. 

### See 17-1 at 178,684, finding 146. IfPSI's argument regarding finding 176 is that the Board erred, then it has not proven its case as the record shows that the Board correctly quoted the COFD,
even ifthe CO should have indicated thatthere were seven long smoke times and not just one. 

### Compare 17-1 at 178,684 and 178,689-90, findings 146 ~nd 176. This minor mistake bythe CO does not form a basis for reconsideration or a need to revise the decision, particularly in light ofthe serious shortcomings on the part ofPSI that justified defaulttermination.

5c. 

### Appellant'sAllegations Concerning Crimping

PSI criticizes two statements by the Board that deal with crimping the canisters. First, it quotes from the decision that "·appellanthas failed to carry its burden of proving that its crimps were proper and were not the cause ofthe failure''" (app. br. at 5 (citing 17-1 at 178,695)). Appellant asserts that "the critical defect with Lot 3-3
was poor crimping, allowing the igniter to separate from the canister and shoot downrange in one instance. As a result, the entire lot was re-crimped, and Lot 3-3A
was then audited very closely by the Government, which watched over all ofthe recrimping and gave permission for that re-crimping." (App. br. at 5) Although not clearly articulated by PSI, we understand it to assert that government monitoring ofthe re-crimping process is proofthat the crimping was done properly or perhaps that the government somehow became responsible for the work. Regrettably for PSI's purposes, it does not furnish a cite to the record for the proposition that the government closely "audited" the re-crimping ofLot 3-3. Nor does it prove that the re-crimping was properly done, orthat any government oversight relieves appellant ofits burden ofproofto show the default was improper.

The second statementthat PSI takes exception to relates to the contract's "no relative movement" requirement. It quotes from the decision: "[n]o evidence was presented aboutthe efficacy ofthe torque testto proveproper crimps for both purposes, and the record raises serious questions aboutthe torque test's ability to demonstrate that a MK 124 is crimped sufficiently to hermetically seal the signal." (App. br. at 5 (quoting 17-1 at 178,695)) According to 

### PSI, the decision errs because "afterLot 3-3A, DC[M]A introduced the Vertical Line Test. Until then, the Torque Testwas the approved check for Relative Movement, as acknowledged by [CO] Pierce in the testimony

.... In fact, he explains the development ofthat process perfectly." PSI also alleges that: "There
was never a dispute as to how to test for Relative Movement, and Torque Testing was approved by [the] AIE. So, ifthe test was notworkingproperly and it was annotated
on the plan sheet as testified to by Mr. Pierce, then, in fact, PSI provedthatthere were, in fact, defective specifications provided for the MK 124 by the Government." (App. br. at 5) As we understand PSI, its argument is predicated on the torque test having been made part ofthe AIE; this is rejected in section 3.a above. It is unclear how appellant urges this quote to evidence factual error on the part ofthe Board, nor does PSI adequately explain how the added use ofa "vertical" or "reference" line proves its point. In the decision, the Boardheld that PSI failed to prove the specifications were defective. 

### See 17-1 at 178,693-98.

6d. 

### TriggerAssemblySeparation Defect

PSI's ''final example ofthe Board's incorrect factual conclusions leadingto improper legal conclusions occurs [at 17-1 at 178,705] in the Board's discussion of Separation Defects, which underlaid [sic] the Board's discussion ofPSI's claims for an equitable adjustment for Lot 3-3A." It singles out the following portion ofthe decision:

The LATreports for Lots 2-1 and 2-2 recorded igniter assembly separations. In both instances, the reports stated the "[i]gniter assemblies separated from the can, post function." (Findings 63, 64) The summary LATreport for Lot 3-2 did not mention a trigger assembly separation. However, the individual test data sheets included notations statingthat "housing fell off," which indicates a trigger assembly separation. There is no indication about the timing ofthe separation. (Finding 77)
(App. br. at 5-8 (citing 17-1 at 178,672-74), 

### see also 17-1 at 178,705, § D.1, Separation Defects)
Appellant maintains that the Board erred by not acknowledgingthat the government was aware ofpost-functioning separations in Lot 3-3A and beforehand. PSI maintains that the government "certainly kne·w ofand allowed rescreening efforts throughout Interfix 1" (app. br. at 8). Accordingto PSI, the Board mistakenly concludedthat this information did not establish when the separations occurred. It maintains thatthe governmentwas aware ofone separationthat occurred during functioning and anotherthat occurredpost-function in Lot 3-2. Appellant asserts that for Lot 3-2, as well as Lots 2-1 and 2-2, "Therewas substantial evidence at the trial establishingthat the separations occurredboth during and post-function, andthe documentary evidence collected contemporaneously by PSI and by the Government's inspectors confirmed this." (Id. at 6)

Thetiming ofthe separations is critical, as rejection is warranted for violating the requirement that "[d]uring function igniter shall not separate from the outer container." 17-1 at 178,664, finding 16. The decision had determined that PSI "failed to provethat priorto Lot 3-3A, the governmentknowingly failed to objectto trigger assembly separations like the one witnessed during Lot 3-3A." 17-1 at 178,705.

Twothings stand out in reviewing appellant's argument. First, several paragraphs onpages 7 and 8 ofPSI's briefin support ofits motion are the same language found in appellant's initial post-hearing briefatpages 30 and 31. The Board

7fully considered those assertions and related argument in the decision, and PSI furnished no new evidence or other reason to compel reconsideration. Second, the transcript relied upon by PSI's motion does not support its contention that the government allowed rescreening as early as Interfix 1. When Mr. Bowen was asked whetherthe government agreed previously to ··rescreen any other lot than that lot, Lot 3-2 for leakers," he responded that "[w]e discussed that option in [Lotl 1-10; but I don't know as it was everofficially submitted for that" (tr. 3/157). Similarly, testimony from Mr. Goodrich, an engineering team leader for PSI (tr. 2/154), spoke generally about retesting lots that failed the leak test (tr. 2/157), but did not establish this as a regularpractice approved by the government.

The testimonies ofMr. Bowen and Mr. Goodrich fall short ofconvincingus to reconsider. There is insufficientproofthatthe parties entered into a wider agreement that PSI would be permittedto rescreen lots any time there was a sealing test failure. Although the government permitted appellant to do so in Lot 3-2, there was a bargained-for exchange resulting in the government's obtaining additional units. There was also insufficientproofofthe timing ofthe separations, and that the government knewthese had occurred during functioning. Further, the "government had the discretion to determine thatthe benefit ofadditional units was not worth the time ofthe government employees to witness the screening." 17-1 at 178,705.

PSI's argument fails. The decision found that appellant failed to prove that the government was aware ofallegedpost-functioning separations orthat it failed to object to these priorto Lot 3-3A. 

### See 17-1 at 178,705-06. The evidence relied upon here by appellant was fully considered and weighed in making the decision; PSI simply disagrees with the conclusion reached by the Board.



### 4. PSJ'sAllegationsRegarding the ShiftingBurden of Proof

In addition to the alleged factual errors discussed above, PSI contends that the Board improperly shifted the burden ofproofto appellant. It cites the transcript at the outset ofthe hearing, in which Judge Page explained that the "governmentbears the burden ofproofin showing that [the] termination was appropriately done [and that appellant has] the right to rebut the government's assertions regarding the propriety of the termination."Both Mr. Karlson (a corporate officerrepresenting PSI) and government counsel assured the Boardthat they had no questions regarding these relative burdens ofproof. (App. br. at 8-9 (citing tr. 1/14)) However, appellant now complains that "throughoutthe Opinion byAdministrative Judge Page, the Board improperly shifts the burden ofproofto PSI" (id. at 9).

The decision sets forth the standard ofreview, which recognizes that a termination for default is a "drastic sanction that should be imposed only for 'good

8grounds and on solid evidence."' 17-1 at 178,692 (quoting

### JD. Hedin Construction Co. v. UnitedStates, 408 F.2d 424, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1969)). While "[t]he government bears the burden ofproving the propriety ofthe default termination," once "the government satisfies its burden ofproving that the termination for default was justified, then appellant mustprove that its default was excusable, caused by the government's material breach, orthatthe CO'stermination decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse ofdiscretion." 

### Id. (citing

### Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1987); and 

### US. CoatingSpecialties & 

### Supplies, LLC, ASBCA No. 58245, 15-1 BCA

### ,I35,957 at 175,707); 

### see also UnitedHealthcare Partners, Inc., ASBCA No. 58123, 16-1 BCA 

### ,I36,374 at 177,312; 

### Lan-Cay, Inc., ASBCA No. 56140, 12-1 BCA ,-J 34,935 at 171,761.

As detailed in the decision's findings, the government established a

### prima facie basis for terminating the contract for default due to the contractor's failure to timely and acceptably perform. The CO properly adhered to regulation and policy in effectuating the termination. 

### See, e.g., 17-1 at 178,687-90, findings 168-177, at 178,692-700, § I, discussion. Under ourprecedent, once a

### prima facie case ofthe propriety ofthe default was establishedby the government, PSI then became responsible for provingthat the termination for default was wrongful and should be converted to a termination for the convenience ofthe government. 

### See, e.g., 17-1 at 178,692 and cases citedtherein. PSI's argument that reconsideration is appropriate because the Board improperly shifted the burden ofproofis unconvincing, as it failed to adequately rebut the government's evidence ofthe contractor's default.

5. 

### Appellant'sAllegationsRegardingBadFaith and Various EvidentiaryRulings

Before trial, PSI did not articulate bad faith as a legal theory underlying its right to
recover. PSI attempted at the hearing to examinewitnesses regarding alleged government bad faith, but had mixed results in having that testimony admitted. Afterthe government objected to PSI including this argument in its initial post-hearing brief

### (see 1st app. br. at 62-75), the parties were ordered to briefthe issue of jurisdiction. The Board foundjurisdiction, butheld that appellant failed to prove that the government acted in bad faith. 17-1 at 178,700-02.

In seeking reconsideration, PSI asserts: "Nowthat the Board has determined that evidence ofthe Government's bad faith in dealing with PSI is relevant and admissible, the Board should reopen the record in the matterto allow PSI to present all ofthe relevant evidence in its possession ofthe government's bad faith" (app. hr. at 9). After noting that government counsel "objectedcontinuously and consistently to the presentation ofany evidence by PSI as to the Government's bad faith," appellant said that "Judge Page, correctly, allowed PSI to tender some evidence ofthe Government's bad faith (but not all ofthe evidence that PSI was prepared to present)" 

### (id.).

9The contractormakes four main contentions in support ofits position. These are that "therulings from the Board as to the admissibility ofthe evidence are inconsistent, and sometimes wrong"; "the nature ofthe rulings shifts throughoutthe trial, allowing
more and more ofthe evidence in, at least for its probative value, but no effort is made to correctthepriorrulings excluding some ofthe same evidence"; "the Government's long speaking objections often indicated to witnesses exactly how they should respond to the questions from PSI"; and, "the sometimes-confusing colloquies and rulings prevented the Board from truly understanding the interplay ofthe several contracts being
overseen by the same Government officials and the bias and bad faith than ran rampant throughout the administration ofall ofthose contracts." (App. br. at 16-17)

PSI fails to cite a Boardrule, Federal Rule ofEvidence (FED. R. EVID.), or other authority thatthe Boardhas violated,2 nor does it adequately explain for each example how the Board erred. The contested questioningwas notrejected because it dealt with bad faith perse, but because PSI failed to lay a proper foundation; demonstrate the relevance ofthe attempted examination; or establishthat it was not eliciting unacceptable hearsay from a nondeclarant (see, e.g., examples cited by PSI at tr. 1/45-48, 72-74, 95-96). Appellantwas allowed to proceed after laying at least a minimal foundation and the testimony was accepted for its probative value (see, e.g., further examples attr. 1/73-74, 98-99) and after narrowing the scope ofcross-examination to matters raised during direct questioning (tr. 4/131-34). We have fully considered the examples urged by appellant as erroneous or inconsistent evidentiary rulings, and find that these do not warrant re-opening the hearing.

2 See, e.g., ASBCA Rule 10 HEARINGS, ,-f (c) NATURE OF HEARINGS; FED. R. EVID. 104(b) RELEVANCE THAT DEPENDS ON AFACT; FED. R. EVID. 401 TEST FOR RELEVANT EVIDENCE; FED. R. EVID. 602NEED FOR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; FED. R. EVID. 80l(c) HEARSAY; FED. R. EVID. 80l(d) STATEMENTS THATARE NOT HEARSAY; and FED. R. EVID. 802 THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY. The Boardis not boundbythe Federal Rules, but looks tothese for guidance. See ASBCA Rule IO(c); Laguna Constr. Co., ASBCANo. 58324, 14-1 BCA ,i 35,748 at 174,947-80. In addition to appropriate evidence admissible underthe Federal Rules, "the Board will consider evidence admissible in the sound discretion ofthe presidingjudge." KBJ, Inc., ASBCA No. 58512, 16-1 BCA 

### ,i 36,289 at 176,983. At its discretion, the Board may accept evidence for its probative value. The ultimate weight afforded such evidence may be influenced by such factors as the reliability and credibility ofthe witness. That analysis need not be articulated on the transcript or in the decision, as "to do so would result in in interminable and unreadable decisions" and transcripts. Northrop Grumman Corp., ASBCANo. 52178 etal., 05-2 BCA ,i 32,992 at 163,523-24.

10CONCLUSION

PSI largely seeks reconsideration by attempting to re-litigate assertions and arguments that were rejected in the Board's decision. 

### It also raises presumably inconsistent or erroneous evidentiary rulings on the part ofthe Board in an attempt to reopen the hearing, without sufficiently articulating a basis for reconsideration. We have considered all evidence and assertions in support ofPSI's motion. Adhering to the guidance set forth in 

### Relyant, 18-1 BCA, 37,146 at 180,841 (and related opinions) and for the reasons stated herein, we deny PSI's motion.

Dated: April 10, 2019

I concur 

# tt\
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--:t;'CHARDSHACKLEFORD Administrative Judge Acting Chairman Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals Administrative Judge Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals

I concur 

# Oa-N---

Administrative Judge Vice Chairman Armed Services Board ofContractAppeals

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Opinion and Decision ofthe Armed Services Board ofContractAppeals in ASBCANos. 57890, 58335, 59103, Appeals of Pyrotechnic Specialties, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter.

Dated:

11 JEFFREYD. GARDIN Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals