U.S. Department of Justice

REPORT FROM THE FIELD:

THE USA PATRIOT ACT AT WORK

JULY 2004
Table of Contents

I. Introduction........................................................................................................................1

II. Enhancing the Federal Government’s Capacity to Share Intelligence .........................2

III. Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism ..................................................9

IV. Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism..........................................................15

V. Updating the Law to Reflect New Technology ..............................................................18

VI. Conclusion........................................................................................................................28
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I. Introduction

Immediately after the brutal terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, both Congress and 

the Administration reexamined the legal tools available to investigators and prosecutors in the 

fight against terrorism. Taking into account the lessons learned from past experience, they found 

these tools to be inadequate. Acting swiftly and responsibly to correct numerous deficiencies, 

Congress and the Administration set out to update, strengthen, and expand laws governing the 

investigation and prosecution of terrorism within the parameters of the Constitution and our 

national commitment to the protection of civil rights and civil liberties. As a result of those 

efforts, Congress overwhelmingly passed, and on October 26, 2001, the President signed the 

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 

Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT Act” or “Act”).1 This legislation provided our 

nation’s law enforcement, national defense, and intelligence personnel with enhanced and vital 

new tools to bring terrorists and other dangerous criminals to justice. As President Bush stated 

upon its signing, the Act “takes account of the new realities and dangers posed by modern 

terrorists. It will help law enforcement to identify, to dismantle, to disrupt, and to punish 

terrorists before they strike.”2

The USA PATRIOT Act equips federal law enforcement and intelligence officials with 

the tools they need to mount an effective, coordinated campaign against our nation’s terrorist 

enemies. The Act revised counterproductive legal restraints that impaired law enforcement’s 

ability to gather, analyze, and share critical terrorism-related intelligence information. The Act 

also updated decades-old federal laws to account for the technological breakthroughs seen in 

recent years. For example, terrorists routinely use cell phones to plot their atrocities; under the 

Act, law enforcement and intelligence officials are no longer hindered by statutes written in the 

era of rotary telephones. Finally, the Act enhanced America’s criminal laws against terrorism, in 

some cases increasing the penalties for planning and participating in terrorist attacks and aiding 

terrorists. The Act also clarified that existing laws against terrorism apply to the new types of 

attacks planned by al Qaeda and other int ernational terrorist organizations. 

Since the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted, the Department of Justice – ever cognizant of 

civil liberties – has moved swiftly and vigorously to put its new tools into practice. As of May 5, 

2004, the Department has charged 310 defendants with criminal offenses as a result of terrorism 

investigations since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and 179 of those defendants have already 

been convicted. This report provides an overview of how the Act has been instrumental in the 

effort to combat terrorism and make Americans safer. As described above, the report focuses on 

the four key areas in which the Act has had the greatest impact: (1) enhancing the federal 

government’s capacity to share intelligence; (2) strengthening the criminal laws against 

terrorism; (3) removing obstacles to investigating terrorism; and (4) updating the law to reflect 

 

1 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

2 See Remarks by the President at Signing of the Patriot Act, October 26, 2001, available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011026-5.html.
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new technology. The Department has used these improvements in the law to better combat 

terrorism and continues to work to enhance the coordination, information sharing, and other 

investigative efforts the USA PATRIOT Act has made possible. Some of the examples in this 

report do not involve terrorism but instead detail how the Department has used certain provisions 

in the USA PATRIOT Act to combat serious criminal conduct, such as child pornography and 

kidnapping. Congress chose not to limit certain authorities contained in the USA PATRIOT Act 

only to the context of terrorism, and the examples contained in this report demonstrate the 

wisdom of that decision. Of course, where Congress did choose to limit USA PATRIOT Act 

authorities to the terrorism or national-security context, the Department has limited the use of 

those authorities as required by the Act. 

For a variety of reasons, this report cannot describe every case in which the USA 

PATRIOT Act has been instrumental. Some of these cases, for instance, are ongoing and cannot 

be publicly discussed. Others, particularly including a number of terrorism-related cases, cannot 

be discussed usefully without disclosing classified information. Therefore, this report is not a 

comprehensive discussion of the use of USA PATRIOT Act authorities, but is instead an 

unclassified overview of the usefulness of those authorities. 

As the Attorney General has affirmed, “The fight against terrorism is now the first and 

overriding priority of the Department of Justice.”3 The Department’s efforts over the past twoand-a-half years have been characterized by an unwavering commitment to two complementary 

objectives: securing the United States against the threat of terrorist attacks and preserving the 

rights and liberties that are guaranteed to every American. Security and liberty are interrelated 

and mutually reinforcing, not conflicting, goals. Under the leadership of the President and the 

Attorney General, the Department of Justice has been, and remains, dedicated to using the USA 

PATRIOT Act in service of both aims.

 

3 See Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors Conference, October 25, 2001, available at 

http://www.usdoj.gov:80/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10525.htm.

II. Enhancing the Federal Government’s Capacity to Share Intelligence

The USA PATRIOT Act authorizes government agencies to share intelligence so that a 

complete mosaic of information can be compiled to understand better what terrorists might be 

planning and to prevent attacks. Prior law, as interpreted and implemented, had the effect of 

sharply limiting the ability of law enforcement and intelligence officers to share information, 

which severely hampered terrorism investigators’ ability to “connect the dots.” However, the 

USA PATRIOT Act, along with changes in Attorney General Guidelines and Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court procedures, brought down this “wall” separating 

intelligence from law enforcement and greatly enhanced foreign intelligence information sharing 

among federal law enforcement and national security personnel, intelligence agencies, and other 

entities entrusted with protecting the nation from acts of terrorism. This increased ability to 
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share information has been invaluable to the conduct of terrorism investigations and has directly 

led to the disruption of terrorist plots and numerous arrests, prosecutions, and convictions in 

terrorism cases. 

The recent investigation and prosecution of members of an al Qaeda cell in Lackawanna, 

New York illustrates the benefits of the increased information sharing brought about by the USA 

PATRIOT Act. This case involved several residents of Lackawanna, who traveled to 

Afghanistan in 2001 to receive training at an al Qaeda-affiliated camp near Kandahar. The 

investigation of the “Lackawanna Six” began during the summer of 2001, when the FBI received 

an anonymous letter indicating that these six individuals and others might be involved in 

criminal activity and associating with foreign terrorists. The FBI concluded that existing law 

required the creation of two separate investigations in order to retain the option of using FISA: a 

criminal investigation of possible drug crimes and an intelligence investigation related to terrorist 

threats. Over the ensuing months, two squads carried on these two separate investigations 

simultaneously, and there were times when the intelligence officers and the law enforcement 

agents concluded that they could not be in the same room during briefings to discuss their 

respective investigations with each other. 

The USA PATRIOT Act, however, took down the “wall” separating these two 

investigations by making clear that the sharing of case-sensitive information between these two 

groups was allowed. As a result of key information shared by intelligence investigators, law 

enforcement agents were able to learn that an individual mentioned in the anonymous letter was 

an agent of al Qaeda. Further information shared between intelligence and law enforcement 

personnel then dramatically expedited the investigation of the Lackawanna Six and allowed 

charges to be filed against these individuals. Five of the Lackawanna Six pleaded guilty to 

providing material support to al Qaeda, and the sixth pleaded guilty to conducting transactions 

unlawfully with al Qaeda. These individuals were then sentenced to prison terms ranging from 

seven to ten years. 

Sections 218 and 504

Before the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, applications for orders authorizing 

electronic surveillance or physical searches under FISA had to include a certification from a 

high-ranking Executive Branch official that the purpose of the surveillance or search was to 

gather foreign intelligence information. As interpreted by the courts and later the Justice 

Department, this requirement meant that the “primary purpose” of the collection had to be to 

obtain foreign intelligence information rather than evidence of a crime. Over the years, the 

prevailing interpretation and implementation of the “primary purpose” standard had the effect of 

limiting coordination and information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement 

personnel. Because the courts evaluated the government’s purpose for using FISA at least in part 

by examining the nature and extent of such coordination, the more coordination that occurred, 

the more likely courts would find that law enforcement, rather than foreign intelligence, had 

become the primary purpose of the surveillance or search. 
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During the 1980s, the Department operated under a set of largely unwritten rules that 

limited to some degree information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement officials. 

In 1995, however, the Department established formal procedures that more clearly separated law 

enforcement and intelligence investigations and limited the sharing of information between 

intelligence and law enforcement personnel more than the law required. The promulgation of 

these procedures was motivated in part by the concern that the use of FISA authorities would not 

be allowed to continue in particular investigations if criminal prosecution began to overcome 

intelligence gathering as an investigation’s primary purpose. To be sure, the procedures were 

intended to permit a degree of interaction and information sharing between prosecutors and 

intelligence officers, while at the same time ensuring that the FBI would be able to obtain or 

continue FISA coverage and later use the fruits of that coverage in a criminal prosecution. Over 

time, however, coordination and information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement 

investigators became even more limited in practice than was allowed in theory under the 

Department’s procedures. Due both to confusion about when sharing was permitted and to a 

perception that improper information sharing could end a career, a culture developed within the 

Department sharply limiting the exchange of information between intelligence and law 

enforcement officials.

In recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. 

Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, recounted from personal experience how this 

“wall” between law enforcement and intelligence personnel operated in practice:

I was on a prosecution team in New York that began a criminal 

investigation of Usama Bin Laden in early 1996. The team – prosecutors and FBI 

agents assigned to the criminal case – had access to a number of sources. We 

could talk to citizens. We could talk to local police officers. We could talk to 

other U.S. Government agencies. We could talk to foreign police officers. Even 

foreign intelligence personnel. And foreign citizens. And we did all those things 

as often as we could. We could even talk to al Qaeda members – and we did. We 

actually called several members and associates of al Qaeda to testify before a 

grand jury in New York. And we even debriefed al Qaeda members overseas 

who agreed to become cooperating witnesses.

But there was one group of people we were not permitted to talk to. Who? 

The FBI agents across the street from us in lower Manhattan assigned to a parallel 

intelligence investigation of Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda. We could not learn 

what information they had gathered. That was “the wall.”4 

The USA PATRIOT Act brought down this “wall” separating intelligence officers from 

law enforcement agents. It not only erased the perceived statutory impediment to more robust 

information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement personnel, but it also provided the 

 

4

 Statement of Patrick Fitzgerald Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, October 21, 

2003, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=965&wit_id=2741.
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necessary impetus for the removal of the formal administrative restrictions as well as the 

informal cultural restrictions on information sharing. 

Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act eliminated the “primary purpose” requirement. 

Under section 218, the government may conduct FISA surveillance or searches if foreignintelligence gathering is a “significant” purpose of the surveillance or search, thus eliminating 

the need for courts to compare the relative weight of the “foreign intelligence” and “law 

enforcement” purposes of the surveillance or search, and thereby allowing for increased 

coordination and sharing of information between intelligence and law enforcement personnel. 

Section 504 buttressed section 218 by specifically amending FISA to allow intelligence officials 

conducting FISA surveillance or searches to “consult”with federal law enforcement officials to 

“coordinate” efforts to investigate or protect against international terrorism, espionage, and other 

foreign threats to national security, and to clarify that such coordination “shall not” preclude the 

certification of a “significant” foreign intelligence purpose or the issuance of an authorization 

order by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 

The Department has moved aggressively to implement sections 218 and 504 of the USA 

PATRIOT Act and bring down “the wall.” Following passage of the Act, the Department 

adopted new procedures designed to increase information sharing between intelligence and law 

enforcement officers, which were affirmed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 

Review on November 18, 2002. The Attorney General also instructed every U.S. Attorney to 

review intelligence files to discover whether there was a basis for bringing criminal charges 

against the subjects of intelligence investigations; thousands of files have been reviewed as part 

of this process. The Attorney General likewise directed every U.S. Attorney to develop a plan to 

monitor terrorism and intelligence investigations and to ensure that information about terrorist 

threats is shared with other agencies and that criminal charges are considered in those 

investigations.

These efforts to increase coordination and information sharing between intelligence and 

law enforcement officers, which were made possible by the USA PATRIOT Act, have yielded 

extraordinary dividends by enabling the Department to open numerous criminal investigations, 

disrupt terrorist plots, bring numerous criminal charges, and convict numerous individuals in 

terrorism cases. 

Examples:

ÿ The removal of the “wall” separating intelligence and law enforcement personnel 

played a crucial role in the Department’s successful dismantling of a Portland, 

Oregon terror cell, popularly known as the “Portland Seven.” Members of this 

terror cell had attempted to travel to Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 to take up 

arms with the Taliban and al Qaeda against United States and coalition forces 

fighting there. Law enforcement agents investigating that case learned from one 

member of the terror cell, Jeffrey Battle, through an undercover informant, that 

before the plan to go to Afghanistan had been formulated, at least one member of 

the cell had contemplated attacking Jewish schools or synagogues and had even 
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been casing such buildings to select a target for such an attack. By the time 

investigators received this information from the undercover informant, they had 

suspected that a number of other persons besides Battle had been involved in the 

Afghanistan conspiracy. But while several of these other individuals had returned 

to the United States from their unsuccessful attempts to reach Afghanistan, 

investigators did not yet have sufficient evidence to arrest them. 

Before the USA PATRIOT Act, prosecutors would have faced a dilemma in 

deciding whether to arrest Battle immediately. If prosecutors had failed to act, 

lives could have been lost through a domestic terrorist attack. But if prosecutors 

had arrested Battle in order to prevent a potential attack, the other suspects in the 

investigation would have undoubtedly scattered or attempted to cover up their 

crimes. Because of sections 218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, it 

was clear that the FBI agents could conduct FISA surveillance of Battle to detect 

whether he had received orders from an international terrorist group to reinstate 

the domestic attack plan on Jewish targets and keep prosecutors informed as to 

what they were learning. This gave prosecutors the confidence not to arrest Battle 

prematurely while they continued to gather evidence on the other members of the 

cell. Ultimately, prosecutors were able to collect sufficient evidence to charge 

seven defendants and then to secure convictions and prison sentences ranging 

from three to eighteen years for the six defendants taken into custody. Charges 

against the seventh defendant were dismissed after he was killed in Pakistan by 

Pakistani troops on October 3, 2003. Without sections 218 and 504 of the USA 

PATRIOT Act, however, this case likely would have been referred to as the 

“Portland One” rather than the “Portland Seven.”

ÿ The Department shared information pursuant to sections 218 and 504 before 

indicting Sami Al-Arian and several co-conspirators on charges related to their 

involvement with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). PIJ is alleged to be one of 

the world’s most violent terrorist outfits. It is responsible for murdering over 100 

innocent people, including Alisa Flatow, a young American killed in a bus 

bombing near the Israeli settlement of Kfar Darom. The indictment states that AlArian served as the secretary of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s governing council 

(“Shura Council”). He was also identified as the senior North American 

representative of the PIJ. 

In this case, sections 218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act enabled prosecutors 

to consider all evidence against Al-Arian and his co-conspirators, including 

evidence obtained pursuant to FISA that provided the necessary factual support 

for the criminal case. By considering the intelligence and law enforcement 

information together, prosecutors were able to create a complete history for the 

case and put each piece of evidence in its proper context. This comprehensive 

approach was essential in enabling prosecutors to build their case and pursue the 

proper charges. The trial in this case is currently scheduled to start in January 

2005. 
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ÿ Prosecutors and investigators also used information shared pursuant to sections 

218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act in investigating the defendants in the socalled “Virginia Jihad” case. This prosecution involved members of the Dar alArqam Islamic Center, who trained for jihad in Northern Virginia by participating 

in paintball and paramilitary training, including eight individuals who traveled to 

terrorist training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan between 1999 and 2001. 

These individuals are associates of a violent Islamic extremist group known as 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), which primarily operates in Pakistan and Kashmir and 

has ties to the al Qaeda terrorist network. As the result of an investigation that 

included the use of information obtained through FISA, prosecutors were able to 

bring charges against these individuals. Six of the defendants have pleaded 

guilty, and three were convicted at trial in March 2004 of charges including 

conspiracy to levy war against the United States and conspiracy to provide 

material support to the Taliban. These nine defendants received sentences 

ranging from a prison term of four years to life imprisonment. 

ÿ The information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement personnel 

made possible by sections 218 and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act was useful in 

the investigation of two Yemeni citizens, Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad and 

Mohshen Yahya Zayed, who were charged last year with conspiring to provide 

material support to al Qaeda and HAMAS. The complaint against these two 

individuals alleges that an FBI undercover operation developed information that 

Al-Moayad had boasted that he had personally handed Usama Bin Laden $20 

million from his terrorist fund-raising network and that Al-Moayad and Zayed 

flew from Yemen to Frankfurt, Germany in 2003 with the intent to obtain $2 

million from a terrorist sympathizer (portrayed by a confidential informant) who 

wanted to fund al Qaeda and HAMAS. During their meetings, Al-Moayad and 

Zayed specifically promised the donor that his money would be used to support 

HAMAS, al Qaeda, and any other mujahideen, and “swore to Allah” that they 

would keep their dealings secret. Al-Moayad and Zayed were extradited to the 

United States from Germany in November 2003 and are currently awaiting trial. 

ÿ The Department used sections 218 and 504 to gain access to intelligence, which 

facilitated the indictment of Enaam Arnaout, the Executive Director of the 

Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation (BIF). Arnaout conspired to 

obtain charitable donations fraudulently in order to provide financial assistance to 

Chechen rebels and organizations engaged in violence and terrorism. Arnaout 

had a long-standing relationship with Usama Bin Laden and used his charity 

organization both to obtain funds illicitly from unsuspecting Americans for 

terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, and to serve as a channel for people to 

contribute money knowingly to such groups. Arnaout ultimately pleaded guilty to 

a racketeering charge, admitting that he diverted thousands of dollars from BIF to 

support Islamic militant groups in Bosnia and Chechnya. He was sentenced to 

over 11 years in prison. 
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ÿ The broader information sharing and coordination made possible by sections 218 

and 504 of the USA PATRIOT Act assisted the prosecution in San Diego of 

several persons involved in an al Qaeda drugs-for-weapons plot, which 

culminated in several guilty pleas. Two defendants admitted that they conspired 

to distribute approximately five metric tons of hashish and 600 kilograms of 

heroin originating in Pakistan to undercover United States law enforcement 

officers. Additionally, they admitted that they conspired to receive, as partial 

payment for the drugs, four “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles that they then intended 

to sell to the Taliban, an organization they knew at the time to be affiliated with al 

Qaeda. The lead defendant in the case is currently awaiting trial.

ÿ Sections 218 and 504 were critical in the successful prosecution of Khaled Abdel 

Latif Dumeisi, who was convicted by a jury in January 2004 of illegally acting as 

an agent of the former government of Iraq, as well as two counts of perjury. 

Before the Gulf War, Dumeisi passed information on Iraqi opposition members 

located in the United States to officers of the Iraqi Intelligence Service stationed 

in the Iraqi Mission to the United Nations. During this investigation, intelligence 

officers conducting surveillance of Dumeisi pursuant to FISA coordinated and 

shared information with law enforcement agents and prosecutors investigating 

Dumeisi for possible violations of criminal law. Because of this coordination, law 

enforcement agents and prosecutors learned from intelligence officers of an 

incriminating telephone conversation that took place in April 2003 between 

Dumeisi and a co-conspirator. This phone conversation corroborated other 

evidence that Dumeisi was acting as an agent of the Iraqi government and 

provided a compelling piece of evidence at Dumeisi’s trial. 

Section 203

Other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act besides sections 218 and 504 have also 

facilitated the sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence personnel. 

Before the USA PATRIOT Act, for example, federal law was interpreted generally to prohibit 

federal prosecutors from disclosing federal grand jury and wiretap information (including “wire, 

oral, or electronic communications”) to intelligence and national defense officials even if that 

information indicated that terrorists were planning a future attack, unless such officials were 

assisting with the criminal investigation itself. Sections 203(a) and 203(b) of the USA 

PATRIOT Act, however, now allow for the dissemination of that information to assist federal 

law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, and national security 

officials in the performance of their official duties, such as protecting the nation’s security, even 

if their duties are unrelated to the criminal investigation. Section 203(d) further specifies that 

any foreign intelligence information obtained by investigators and prosecutors as part of a 

criminal investigation may be disclosed to such officials. The Department has made disclosures 

of vital information to the intelligence community and other federal officials under section 203 

on many occasions. For instance, such disclosures have been used to support the revocation of 

visas of suspected terrorists and prevent their reentry into the United States, track terrorists’ 

funding sources, and identify terrorist operatives overseas. 
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The Attorney General issued guidelines in 2002 that establish procedures for carrying out 

these sharing provisions including, under section 203(c), for sharing grand jury and wiretap 

information that identifies a United States person with the Intelligence Community. These 

guidelines provide important safeguards to United States citizens identified in information 

disclosed to the Intelligence Community under the USA PATRIOT Act. These procedures 

require that precautions are taken to ensure the information is used appropriately. All such 

information must be labeled by law enforcement agencies before disclosure to intelligence 

agencies and must be handled by intelligence agencies pursuant to specific protocols. 

Section 905

 

Additionally, section 905 of the USA PATRIOT Act requires all federal law enforcement 

agencies to disclose expeditiously to the Director of Central Intelligence any foreign intelligence 

acquired in the course of a criminal investigation. Section 905 makes such information sharing 

mandatory unless the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director of Central 

Intelligence, determines that disclosure of certain foreign intelligence would jeopardize an 

ongoing law enforcement investigation or impair other significant law enforcement interests. On 

September 23, 2002, the Attorney General released guidelines that formalized the sharing 

procedures and mechanisms for the Department of Justice and other federal law enforcement 

agencies that acquire foreign intelligence in the course of a criminal investigation.

III. Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism

The USA PATRIOT Act is one aspect of the Department’s overarching strategy to 

remove terrorists from the streets. The Department aims to use its prosecutorial discretion –

investigating, prosecuting, and punishing crimes that in the past might have been overlooked – in 

order to incapacitate suspected terrorists and thereby prevent terrorist attacks. The Act has 

enhanced the Department’s ability to pursue this strategy by strengthening the nation’s criminal 

laws against terrorism, providing the Department with a solid foundation to pursue what has 

become the Department’s highest priority. 

For example, before the Act, it was a federal crime to provide material support to 

individuals or organizations that commit various terrorism crimes. The definition of “material 

support,” however, did not clearly include providing expert advice and assistance – for example, 

a civil engineer’s advice on how to destroy a building or a biochemist’s advice on how to make a 

biological agent more lethal. The law also did not explicitly state that providing “monetary 

instruments” to a designated foreign terrorist organization constituted material support. Section 

805 of the USA PATRIOT Act bolstered the ban on providing material support to terrorists by 

clearly making it a crime to provide terrorists with “expert advice or assistance” and by 

clarifying that “material support” includes all forms of money, not just hard currency. In 

addition, section 810 increased the maximum penalty for providing material support to a terrorist 

or a terrorist organization from 10 years to 15 years in prison. The Department has successfully 

used the material support statute in a number of recent cases, such as those involving terror cells 

in Lackawanna, New York and Virginia. Between September 11, 2001 and May 5, 2004, the 
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Department charged over 50 defendants with material support offenses in 17 different judicial 

districts. 

Terrorist Financing

The USA PATRIOT Act also strengthened the criminal laws against terrorism by making 

it easier to prosecute those responsible for funneling money to terrorists. Under previous federal 

law, 18 U.S.C. § 1960, those who operated unlicensed money transmitting businesses were 

entitled to rely on the affirmative defense that they had no knowledge of applicable state 

licensing requirements. Some of these businesses, called hawalas, have funneled extensive 

amounts of money to terrorist groups abroad. Section 373 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended 

federal law by eliminating this loophole requiring that the defendant know about state licensing 

requirements and also by broadening the statute to make it illegal for a person to transmit or 

transport funds that are the proceeds of criminal activity or funds that are intended to be used for 

criminal activity. This improved statute has been used in numerous federal prosecutions.

Examples: 

ÿ Prosecutors in Florida used section 373 to charge Libardo Florez-Gomez, a 

money courier who, based upon documentation found on his person, was 

suspected of laundering an estimated $1.3 million per month for the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), a leftist rebel group 

designated by the State Department as a foreign terrorist organization. After 

intercepting him at the Miami International Airport with $182,000 in euros, U.S. 

Immigration & Customs Enforcement agents learned during an interview with 

Florez-Gomez that he intended to convert the euros to dollars in Miami and then 

transfer them to unknown bank accounts. Because Florez-Gomez was in the 

business of money transmission, he was arrested and charged with being an 

unlicensed money transmitter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960, as amended by 

section 373 of the USA PATRIOT Act. On April 3, 2003, Florez-Gomez pleaded 

guilty and was subsequently sentenced to serve 18 months in prison, followed by 

two years of supervised release, and required to forfeit $151,000. In this case, 

the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement agent who investigated FlorezGomez was familiar with the statutory registration requirements for money 

transmitting, which prompted him to focus his interrogation of Florez-Gomez on 

details pertinent to that violation and not on the elusive element of FlorezGomez’s “knowledge” of the registration requirements – as would have been 

required prior to enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. 

ÿ Prosecutors in New Jersey have used section 373 of the USA PATRIOT Act to 

bring charges against Yehuda Abraham, an unlicensed money transmitter whose 

services were used by Hemant Lakhani, an individual attempting to sell shoulderfired surface-to-air missiles to terrorists with the understanding that they were 

going to be used to shoot down American commercial airliners. Lakhani 

employed Abraham’s money transmitting services to funnel, from the United 
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States to an overseas account, money being paid by a cooperating witness, acting 

under the direction of federal law enforcement officers, as a down payment on the 

first missile. As a result of the USA PATRIOT Act, prosecutors were able to 

quickly put together an effective case against Abraham for operating an 

unlicensed money transmitting business, avoiding the often fatal issues that 

plagued such cases prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. As a result of 

the strength of the case against him, Abraham entered a plea of guilty to a 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 on March 30, 2004. At sentencing, Abraham could 

receive up to 37 months imprisonment and a $250,000 fine. 

ÿ Prosecutors have also secured convictions of individuals operating unlicensed 

money transmitting businesses that sent money from the United States to Iraq, 

Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and India. In Boston, for example, the 

successful prosecution of Mohammed Hussein, the co-operator of an al-Barakaataffiliated money transmitting business, was based on both pre- and post-USA 

PATRIOT Act violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. In 2000 and 2001, Barakaat 

accepted approximately $3 million in customer deposits and wired those funds to 

the United Arab Emirates without a license. Based on those transactions, Hussein 

was sentenced on July 22, 2002, to one-and-a-half years in prison, to be followed 

by two years of supervised release.

Forfeiture 

In an effort to stem the flow of money to terrorists, section 371 of the USA PATRIOT 

Act made bulk cash smuggling a serious criminal offense. Section 371 specifically forbids 

concealing more than $10,000 in currency or other monetary instruments and transporting it out 

of or into the United States with the intent to evade relevant reporting requirements. Violators 

are subject to five years in prison and forfeiture of any property involved in the offense. Prior to 

the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, federal law required anyone transporting monetary 

instruments of more than $10,000 into or out of the country to file a report but did not make 

currency smuggling itself a crime. The U.S. Supreme Court therefore had ruled that defendants 

violating that law could not be required, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, to forfeit large 

amounts of money since the crime was merely a reporting offense. The criminal offense of bulk 

cash smuggling is designed to remedy this ruling. Prosecutors have used section 371 of the USA 

PATRIOT Act to obtain the forfeiture of millions of dollars connected with terrorism and drug 

dealers. 

Example :

ÿ Alaa Al-Sadawi, a New Jersey imam with ties to a designated foreign terrorist 

organization, was charged with and convicted of violating section 371. AlSadawi had enlisted the help of his elderly parents in attempting to smuggle 

$659,000 in cash to Egypt. Specifically, customs agents discovered the currency 

in a box of Ritz crackers, two boxes of baby wipes, and a box of Quaker Oats 

inside a suitcase carried by his father on a commercial flight. Previously, this 
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conduct could only have been prosecuted as a reporting offense, and prosecutors 

would not have been able to obtain forfeiture of all the unreported currency. 

Because of section 371 of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, the United States is 

currently seeking forfeiture of the entire $659,000 that Al-Sadawi was attempting 

to smuggle out of the country.

 

In addition to allowing the federal government to obtain greater forfeitures from cash 

smugglers, section 806 of the USA PATRIOT Act bolstered federal law by expressly making 

terrorists’ property subject to forfeiture. Specifically, the provision authorizes the government to 

seize property belonging to an individual or entity that plans or engages in domestic or 

international terrorism against the United States, acquired for use in future terrorist attacks, or 

representing the fruits of an act of terrorism. Prosecutors in Oregon recently used this provision 

to seize the assets of three defendants in the case of the Portland, Oregon terror cell discussed 

above. 

Beyond making more assets subject to forfeiture, Congress also provided the Department 

in the USA PATRIOT Act with a new tool to seize those assets subject to forfeiture under 18 

U.S.C. § 981 or under the Controlled Substances Act. Such assets include both terrorism-related 

assets and various other assets connected with illegal activity. Section 319 authorizes the 

government to seize funds subject to forfeiture that are located in a foreign bank account by 

authorizing the seizure of foreign banks’ funds that are held in a correspondent U.S. account. 

This is true regardless of whether the money in the correspondent account is directly traceable to 

the money held in the foreign bank account. The Department has used section 319 in several 

significant cases. 

Example :

ÿ On January 18, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted James Gibson for offenses 

including conspiracy to commit money laundering and mail and wire fraud. 

Gibson had defrauded his clients, who were numerous personal injury victims 

including widows, orphans, and those in need of expensive medical care, of 

millions of dollars by fraudulently structuring settlements. Gibson and his wife, 

who was indicted later, fled to Belize, depositing some of the proceeds from their 

scheme in two Belizean banks. The Department’s efforts to recover the proceeds 

initially proved unsuccessful. Although Belize’s government initially agreed to 

freeze the money, a Belizean court lifted the freeze and prohibited the government 

from further assisting American law enforcement agencies. Efforts to break the 

impasse failed, while the Gibsons systematically drained their accounts in Belize 

by purchasing luxury items. Following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, a 

seizure warrant was served on the Belizean bank’s correspondent account in the 

United States pursuant to section 319, and the remaining funds were recovered. 

The government intends to return the recovered $1.7 million to the victims of 

Gibson’s fraud scheme. 
-13-

Biological Weapons

The USA PATRIOT Act also bolstered criminal laws aimed at preventing terrorist 

attacks involving biological weapons. Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, federal 

law prohibited the use of biological agents or toxins as a weapon. Recognizing the inherent 

dangers posed by biological agents or toxins, section 817 of the USA PATRIOT Act broadened 

the biological weapons statute to ensure that biological agents or toxins are only in the hands of 

those with a valid reason for having them. In particular, section 817 both outlaws the possession 

of biological agents or toxins that cannot be justified by a peaceful purpose, such as research, and 

makes it a federal crime for certain individuals, such as convicted felons, to possess them. 

Prosecutors in Connecticut have used section 817 to charge a graduate student who was directed 

to dispose of laboratory samples of anthrax. While he discarded certain samples, the student 

took other samples and hid them. Although there was no evidence that he planned to use anthrax 

as a weapon, neither was there any indication that he sought to possess anthrax for a valid 

peaceful purpose, such as research. In this particular case, the defendant was allowed to 

complete a pretrial diversion program. But in future cases, section 817 may serve as a valuable 

weapon in the prosecution of those possessing biological agents or toxins under more suspicious 

circumstances. 

Cyber-terrorism

The USA PATRIOT Act also strengthened criminal laws protecting against cyberterrorism. Section 814 of the USA PATRIOT Act increased the maximum penalty for 

intentionally damaging a federally protected computer from a prison term of five years to a 

prison term of 10 years and raised the maximum penalty from a prison term of 10 years to a 

prison term of 20 years for intentionally or recklessly damaging a federally protected computer 

after having previously been convicted of computer abuse. 

In section 814, Congress also broadened the scope of protection provided to federally

protected computers. Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, criminal or civil liability 

for damaging a federally protected computer was triggered only if the damage fell into one of 

four categories, such as causing a loss of five thousand dollars or more. Section 814, however, 

added a fifth category for triggering criminal or civil liability: damage affecting a computer 

system used by or for the government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national 

defense, or national security. 

Example :

ÿ Prosecutors in Wisconsin recently used this provision of the USA PATRIOT Act 

in a case involving Rajib Mitra, a man who jammed the Madison, Wisconsin 

police department’s emergency radio system 21 times from January 2003 to 

August 2003 and for three hours on October 31, 2003, a day on which public 

safety concerns were heightened because of Halloween. Mitra’s conviction in 

March 2004 was based in part on section 814’s extension of protection to 
-14-

computers used in the administration of justice, national defense, and national 

security. Mitra was sentenced in May 2004 to a prison term of eight years. 

Section 814, furthermore, clarified that the meaning of “loss” under the computer crime 

statute includes the reasonable costs of responding to the offense, conducting a damage 

assessment, and other consequential losses from the computer hacking. This change helps 

ensure that those who intentionally invade and damage computer systems are held responsible 

for the full economic consequences of their actions.

Mass Transportation Protection

Finally, before the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, the federal prohibition on attacking 

transportation carriers was a patchwork of federal statutes with gaps that had the potential to 

hamper terrorism investigations. Section 801 of the Act filled in these gaps by creating a new 

crime of attacking a mass transportation system. Among other things, it now is illegal to destroy 

a mass transportation vehicle or place a biological toxin near a mass transportation vehicle. 

Since the passage of the Act, the Department has used section 801 in at least two cases.

Examples:

ÿ Section 801 was used to prosecute a cruise ship passenger for leaving two 

threatening notes aboard the cruise liner “Legend of the Seas” during a voyage 

from Mexico to Hawaii. In these notes, which were left in a restroom aboard the 

ship, the passenger stated that American passengers and crew members would be 

killed if the ship, with 1,600 passengers and 700 crew members, ported in the 

United States. After 120 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers of the 

Hawaii Joint Terrorism Task Force investigated the threat and searched the ship, 

it was eventually discovered that the notes were a hoax. Because section 801 was 

judged most applicable to the situation at hand, the passenger in question was 

charged with two violations of that provision of the USA PATRIOT Act. She 

later pleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced to a prison term of two years. 

ÿ Prosecutors in California used section 801 of the USA PATRIOT Act to indict a 

one-time Orange County resident who phoned in from overseas several threats to 

blow up John Wayne Airport. Because of these threats, parts of the airport were 

shut down on several occasions, and police department bomb teams and other 

emergency personnel were called out to the airport several times to investigate the 

situation. While the perpetrator has not yet been located and arrested, a warrant 

for his arrest has been issued, and the threats have ceased.

Additionally, the Department attempted to use section 801 in its prosecution of Richard 

Reid, commonly referred to as the “shoebomber.” Reid was arrested on December 22, 2001, 

after attempting, while aboard an international flight bound for Miami, Florida, to ignite a bomb 

hidden in his shoes. A federal grand jury indicted Reid on nine charges, including the newly 

created charge of attempting to destroy a mass transportation vehicle. A federal judge in Boston 
-15-

later dismissed this charge, concluding that airplanes did not fall within the meaning of “mass 

transportation vehicle” as that term is defined in section 801 of the USA PATRIOT Act. After 

the judge’s decision was published, however, Congress amended the statute to clarify that 

aircraft are covered by the provision.

IV. Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism

In addition to facilitating the coordination and sharing of information in terrorism 

investigations and strengthening the criminal laws against terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act 

also removed a number of significant legal obstacles that prevented law enforcement from 

effectively investigating terrorism and related criminal activity. It has greatly improved the 

Department’s ability to disrupt, weaken, thwart, and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist 

organizations, to prevent or thwart terrorist attacks, and to punish perpetrators of terrorist acts. 

Frequently, time is of the essence in terrorism investigations, as law enforcement officers 

may have only a very brief window of opportunity to prevent a terrorist attack. In the past, 

investigators had to waste precious time petitioning multiple judges in multiple districts for 

search warrants related to the same case. The USA PATRIOT Act, however, streamlined this 

process, making out-of-district search warrants available to law enforcement in terrorism cases. 

Section 219 of the Act now permits a federal judge with jurisdiction over the offense to issue 

search warrants that can be executed in other specified judicial districts. Section 219 was used in

the investigation of eight members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad later indicted for conspiring 

to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, the individuals prosecuted in the 

Virginia Jihad case, and the man who drove a tractor onto the National Mall in Washington, D.C. 

and threatened to detonate a bomb in 2003. Law enforcement has also used this authority on 

numerous other occasions. 

Examples:

ÿ A noteworthy use of section 219 occurred during the ongoing anthrax 

investigation, when FBI agents applied for a warrant to search the premises of 

America Media, Inc. in Boca Raton, Florida – the employer of the first anthrax 

victim. Using section 219, agents were able to obtain a search warrant from the 

federal judge in Washington, D.C. overseeing the wide-ranging investigation. 

Investigators saved valuable time by petitioning the local federal judge who was 

most familiar with the case. 

ÿ In 2002, a package intended for a New Jersey man was mistakenly delivered to 

another person. Inside the package were fraudulent identification documents. 

Law enforcement investigators learned that the identification documents had been 

sent by a man in Texas who was found to possess a large quantity of weapons, 

including chemical weapons such as sodium cyanide. A subsequent search of the 

New Jersey man’s residence revealed many guns and gas masks, numerous knives 

including those made to avoid setting off a metal detector, a crossbow, and 

thousands of rounds of ammunition including hollow point and armor piercing 
-16-

bullets. As a result of section 219, law enforcement agents were quickly able to 

secure a search warrant in New Jersey for a search of Vermont properties 

associated with the New Jersey man, rather than having to go through the 

additional time and effort necessary to secure such a warrant in Vermont. The 

searches in Vermont subsequently revealed over 10,000 rounds of ammunition 

and over 70 firearms including an AK-47 gun, an Uzi firearm, and the barrel of a 

.50-caliber weapon. Investigators believe that their ability to search the Vermont 

properties quickly was important in the recovery of the weapons and ammunition. 

The New Jersey man subsequently pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the 

transportation of false identification documents. 

ÿ The Justice Department recently used section 219 in an investigation that led to 

the prosecution of several individuals for acting as unregistered agents of the Iraqi 

intelligence service in 2003 before and during our military action in Iraq. The 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York obtained a search 

warrant from a Magistrate Judge in New York authorizing the search of the 

premises of a suspect in Maryland who was to be arrested in conjunction with the 

execution of the search warrant. The suspect was charged with, among other 

things, participating in illegal financial transactions with a state sponsor of 

terrorism, specifically Iraq. Prosecutors report that the ability to use section 219 

was crucial in coordinating the successful multi-district plan of arresting one of 

the defendants and executing the search simultaneously. Because of the highprofile nature of the particular defendant, section 219 was also critical to the 

Department’s ability to limit the number of people who had knowledge of the 

operation prior to its execution, which helped to assure its success. The fruits of 

the search in Maryland revealed critical additional evidence against the suspect, 

and she is currently awaiting trial. 

In addition to allowing law enforcement to secure evidence quickly against terrorists, 

section 219 has been useful in enabling authorities to uncover terrorism hoaxes rapidly, thus 

preventing or minimizing the disruption that such hoaxes cause. 

Example :

ÿ Several Atlantic City casinos received a letter on the same day indicating that a 

chemical or biological agent would soon be released into their ventilation 

systems. After learning the identity of the sender of these letters, the government 

obtained a search warrant in New Jersey to authorize the search of a home in 

Ohio, enabling agents to execute the search warrant within 24 hours of receiving 

the letters. Once investigators completed their search, they were able to 

determine that the suspect had sent the letters as a hoax in order to induce the 

casinos to pay him money later for providing a “tip” about an imminent terrorist 

incident. 
-17-

The USA PATRIOT Act has also improved the effectiveness of FISA. Under FISA, a 

federal court – the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) – reviews 

Department requests for physical searches and electronic surveillance of foreign powers and their 

agents. Under prior law, the Department could only conduct FISA searches of agents of foreign 

powers for periods lasting up to 45 days prior to having to seek renewal of such authority from 

the court. That limitation required federal authorities to waste valuable time and resources by 

frequently renewing court orders, even when there was no question about the legal sufficiency of 

a particular case. Section 207 of the USA PATRIOT Act now permits the FISC to authorize 

physical searches of certain agents of foreign powers (including U.S. persons) for 90 days, and 

authorizes longer periods of searches and electronic surveillance for certain categories of foreign 

powers and non-U.S. persons who are agents of foreign powers. In particular, for foreign 

governments and other foreign powers, non-U.S. person officers or employees of certain foreign 

powers, and non-U.S. person members of international terrorist groups, initial orders authorizing 

searches and surveillance may be for periods of 120 days, and renewal orders may extend for 

periods of one year. While the details of FISA operations are classified, the FISC has authorized 

90-day and year-long surveillance of foreign powers and their agents pursuant to section 207 of 

the USA PATRIOT Act. Therefore, the Act has not only provided additional time to 

government investigators targeting potential terrorist activity, it has also helped the government 

and the FISC to focus their efforts on more significant and complicated terrorism-related cases.

Coordination is often the key to a successful investigation. Section 506 of the USA 

PATRIOT Act enables the Justice Department and other agencies to cooperate fully and 

integrate completely their investigations in certain areas. It does so by extending the jurisdiction 

of the Secret Service and FBI to investigate computer fraud. It also gives the FBI primary 

authority to investigate a number of specific computer fraud offenses, including those involving 

espionage, foreign counterintelligence, and the unauthorized disclosure of national defense 

information. 

The USA PATRIOT Act also enhanced the Department’s ability to use DNA technology 

in terrorism and other criminal investigations. Collecting DNA from terrorists will make it 

possible to solve crimes by matching their DNA profiles to biological residues found at crime 

scenes and by including terrorists’ DNA in the criminal information databases that are available 

to law enforcement and immigration officials. Previous federal law did not authorize officials to 

collect DNA samples from federal prisoners who had been convicted of terrorism offenses, 

including hijacking an airplane or bombing a building, even though officials could take samples 

from prisoners convicted of less destructive crimes, such as robbery. Section 503 of the Act 

removed this loophole by permitting federal officials to take DNA samples from any federal 

prisoner convicted of a crime of terrorism or violence. The Department issued regulations on 

December 29, 2003, to implement this additional authority and to enhance further our use of 

DNA technology in the investigation and prosecution of terrorists.

Another tool that previously was more widely available in common criminal 

investigations than in terrorism investigations was the use of rewards. Before the USA 

PATRIOT Act, federal law strictly limited the amounts of rewards the Attorney General could 

pay to those who help investigators combat acts of terrorism. The State Department’s authority 
-18-

to pay rewards in terrorism investigations similarly was limited. These limitations hampered the 

government’s ability to punish the guilty by limiting incentives that could be offered to gain the 

support of foreign countries and the general public. Section 501 of the Act abolished these 

restrictions by authorizing the Attorney General to pay rewards of whatever amount he 

determines is necessary to combat terrorism. Section 502 of the Act likewise enhanced the State 

Department’s ability to pay rewards in such investigations.

The USA PATRIOT Act also allows law enforcement officials, in limited situations, to 

access information about suspected criminals who are enrolled in educational institutions. 

Previous federal law generally prohibited educational institutions from releasing information 

from student education records without the student’s consent – a requirement that impeded the 

government’s efforts to undertake terrorism investigations involving students. Sections 507 and 

508 allow for a limited override of this prohibition, by court order, if the educational records 

contain information related to the investigation of an act of terrorism. They also permit 

investigators to obtain information from the National Center for Education Statistics. The 

Department, with assistance from the Secretary of Education, is currently drafting guidelines 

designed to ensure the confidentiality of educational records that are disclosed under sections 

507 and 508.

V. Updating the Law to Reflect New Technology

Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, law enforcement had been operating at a technological 

disadvantage in the war against terrorism. Agents often were forced to use outdated legal 

authorities to fight terrorists who were using modern technology. In short, we were waging a 

21st century war with mid-20th century weapons. Thankfully, however, the Act has modernized 

and strengthened key tools needed to accomplish the Department’s now-central mission: 

preventing acts of terrorism before they take place. The USA PATRIOT Act’s modernization of 

federal law falls into three broad categories. First, the Act gives federal officers new tools to 

fight terrorists who use modern technologies to plot their attacks. Second, it enhances existing 

investigative tools, such as wiretaps and pen register and trap and trace (“pen/trap”) devices, to 

bring them up-to-date with changing technology. And third, the USA PATRIOT Act helps 

officials to obtain the cooperation of third parties, such as communications providers, in the war 

against terrorism.

Providing New Tools to Fight Terrorists and Criminals Using Electronic Forms of 

Communications

The USA PATRIOT Act extends our capacity to collect information related to 

communications in the digital world. Terrorists and other criminals have used the Internet as an 

easy method of communication. As a result, in section 210 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress 

authorized the use of administrative and grand-jury subpoenas to obtain information about 

temporarily assigned network addresses and users’ billing records from electronic 

communications service providers without requiring investigators first to undertake the timeconsuming step of applying to the courts. (As is true of all subpoenas, recipients of a section 210 

subpoena are free to go to court to quash it.) The speedy acquisition of this information has 
-19-

allowed authorities to identify perpetrators more easily and keep pace with terrorists and other 

criminals. In addition, it has been extremely helpful in combating the sexual abuse of children. 

Examples:

ÿ Section 210 of the USA PATRIOT Act was used to obtain information related to 

the investigation of a Columbine-like attack that was supposed to occur on a 

specific date in early March 2004. The information obtained through section 210 

was used to identify the suspect quickly. He was then interviewed by the FBI and 

confessed before any attack could take place. 

ÿ In 2003, the Indiana State Police was informed that child pornography portraying 

a 13-year-old girl from Southern Indiana had been posted to an Internet website. 

After an initial investigation, investigators suspected the father of the victim as 

being the offender partially visible in one of the photographs. As a result, taking 

advantage of the authority provided by section 210 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 

grand jury subpoenas were issued requesting relevant Internet subscriber 

information. This information confirmed investigators’ suspicion that the 

victim’s father was the perpetrator. Consequently, ten days after the initial report 

to the Indiana State Police and using the information obtained by the subpoena to 

the Internet company, a search warrant was executed at the father’s home, and 

numerous items of child pornography were seized. The girl was interviewed and 

admitted that she was being sexually abused by her father on an ongoing basis and 

that he was filming and photographing these sexual acts. The father was 

subsequently arrested and pleaded guilty to five counts of producing child 

pornography. He was sentenced earlier this year to a prison term of 

approximately 10 years. By using the authority contained in section 210, Indiana 

State Police investigators were able to speed up significantly their investigation, 

thus enabling the girl to be removed from her family’s house more quickly and 

preventing future molestations by her father. 

ÿ In Operation Hamlet, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents used 

section 210 to assist in dismantling an international ring of active child molesters, 

many of whom were molesting their own children. In the process, they rescued 

more than 100 child victims. The perpetrators photographed and videotaped the 

abuse and then exchanged it amongst the ring of child molesters over the Internet. 

In some instances, the abusers molested the children while simultaneously 

running a “live-feed” via a webcam so that the other molesters could watch the 

abuse occurring in real-time. In other cases, the abusers traveled to each others’ 

homes so that they could molest the children together. Subpoenas were issued to 

Internet service providers during the investigation requesting relevant 

information. With this information, much of which could not have been obtained 

quickly prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, investigators were able to identify many 

members of this molestation ring and obtain search and arrest warrants. As a 
-20-

result, twenty-one people have been indicted in the United States, resulting in 

nineteen convictions. Two more are awaiting trial. 

ÿ In Operation Artus, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, working 

with the German National Police, used section 210 to assist in dismantling a child 

pornography group whose aim was to obtain and exchange recently produced 

child pornography that had not yet been publicly disseminated. The group 

consisted of approximately 46 individuals exchanging child pornography on the 

Internet. To be admitted into the group, a prospective member had to demonstrate 

that he had new, previously unavailable, images of child pornography. 

Investigators issued subpoenas to Internet service providers during the 

investigation, requesting relevant information. With this information, 

investigators were able to identify many of the members of this ring and obtain 

search and arrest warrants. As a result, 10 participating countries, including the 

United States, executed search warrants simultaneously in March 2002. To date, 

there have been 11 searches, eight indictments, and five convictions in the United 

States as a consequence of this investigation. 

ÿ In Kentucky, a multi-agency task force of local, state, and federal law 

enforcement used section 210 of the USA PATRIOT Act in its investigation of an 

individual linked to several sexual assaults of children at public libraries and local 

parks. Just before the individual in question became the primary suspect in the 

case, he attempted to rape and abduct a six-year-old girl at a playground in Boone 

County, Kentucky. Once the man was identified as the primary suspect, an 

informant provided the investigating officers with some information about the 

suspect. Investigators then used section 210 to subpoena additional key 

information from an Internet service provider. Within 20 minutes of receipt of the 

subpoena, the investigative team obtained information that was ultimately a 

pivotal part of a search warrant affidavit that led to a search of the suspect’s 

residence. Without the information that was obtained pursuant to section 210, it 

is unlikely that sufficient information would have been available to obtain the 

search warrant. Evidence located in the house was then used to arrest the suspect 

and his wife within 24 hours of obtaining the information from the subpoena. The 

couple was prosecuted pursuant to a 100-count federal indictment for the receipt 

and possession of child pornography. The federal investigation and prosecution 

has also led to information tying the couple to multiple sexual assaults in 

Kentucky and Virginia. The defendants were convicted of the receipt and 

possession of child pornography and were sentenced to prison terms of 

approximately 30 years and 90 years respectively. 

The USA PATRIOT Act also improved the speed of obtaining search warrants for 

electronic mail. Prior to the Act, law enforcement’s access to vital electronic information was 

often impeded by the fact that a court sitting in one district could not issue a warrant that was 

valid in another district. As a result, investigators’ access to critical Internet-related information 

was unnecessarily delayed, as Internet service providers often are located thousands of miles 
-21-

from the scene of the crime under investigation, and officers were forced to apply for a warrant 

in the jurisdiction where the search would be conducted. In section 220 of the USA PATRIOT 

Act, Congress adapted federal law to changing technology by allowing courts to order the release 

of stored communications through a search warrant valid in another specified judicial district. 

The enhanced ability to obtain this information efficiently has proved invaluable in several 

terrorism investigations, such as the Virginia Jihad and “shoebomber” cases described above, as 

well as time-sensitive criminal investigations, such as the following situation involving a 

dangerous fugitive. 

Example :

ÿ A man, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, abducted his estranged wife and sexually 

assaulted her. Then, after releasing his wife, he fled West Virginia in a stolen car 

to avoid capture. While in flight, he continued to contact cooperating individuals 

by e-mail using an Internet service provider located in California. Using the 

authority provided by section 220, investigators in West Virginia were able to 

obtain an order quickly from a federal court in West Virginia for the disclosure of 

information regarding the armed fugitive’s e-mail account, rather than wasting 

additional time obtaining such an order from a California court. Within a day of 

the order being issued, the Internet service provider released information to the 

government revealing that the fugitive had contacted individuals from a public 

library in a small town in South Carolina. The very next day, Deputy U.S. 

Marshals went to the town and noticed a carnival set up next to the public library. 

Since they were aware that the fugitive had previously worked as a carnival 

worker, the Deputy Marshals went to the carnival and discovered the stolen car. 

They waited, and then arrested the fugitive as he approached the car. He later 

pleaded guilty in state court and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 

years. In this case, the fast turn-around on the order for information related to the 

fugitive’s e-mail account, made possible by section 220 of the USA PATRIOT 

Act, was crucial to capturing the fugitive.

In addition to allowing law enforcement to gain access to information quickly in timesensitive investigations, Congress also significantly improved the Justice Department’s ability to 

mount large-scale child pornography investigations by including section 220 in the USA 

PATRIOT Act. The ability to obtain search warrants in the jurisdiction of a child pornography 

investigation rather than in the jurisdiction of the Internet service provider is critical to the 

success of a complex, multi-jurisdictional child pornography case. In the absence of section 220, 

law enforcement agents would either have to spend hours briefing other agents across the 

country to obtain warrants or travel hundreds or thousands of miles to present a warrant 

application to a local magistrate judge. In practice, one of two things would often occur in light 

of limited law enforcement resources: either the scope of the investigation would be narrowed or 

the case would be deemed impractical at the outset and dropped. 

Section 220 has also dramatically reduced the administrative burdens in judicial districts 

that are home to large Internet service providers. Before the USA PATRIOT Act, these districts 
-22-

were inundated with search warrant requests for electronic evidence. For example, prior to the 

passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Alexandria, Virginia, was 

receiving approximately 10 applications each month from United States Attorney’s Offices in 

other districts for search warrants for records from a particular Internet service provider. For 

each of these applications, an Assistant United States Attorney in Virginia and a law 

enforcement agent in the district had to learn all of the details of another district’s investigation 

to present an affidavit to the court in support of the application for the search warrant. The result 

was that agents and attorneys spent many hours each month processing applications for 

investigations conducted in other districts. Because of section 220, however, these attorneys and 

agents can now spend their time on more important tasks than processing paperwork for other 

districts’ investigations. 

Investigations of terrorism and other crimes have also long been frustrated by the failure 

of federal law to permit agents to gain access to voice-mail messages with a search warrant. 

Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, federal law required officers to waste critical time and 

resources going through the burdensome process of obtaining a wiretap order (rather than a 

search warrant) to obtain unopened voice-mail. This was so despite the fact that authorities 

could use a search warrant, for example, to obtain messages stored on the suspect’s own 

answering machine. Section 209 of the USA PATRIOT Act has modernized federal law by 

enabling investigators to access more quickly suspects’ voice-mail by using a search warrant. 

The speed with which voice-mail is seized and searched can often be critical to an investigation 

because stored voice-mail is regularly deleted by service providers and thus lost forever. 

Warrants pursuant to section 209 have been used to obtain key evidence in a variety of criminal 

cases, including voice-mail messages left for those participating in a large-scale ecstasy 

smuggling ring based in the Netherlands. 

Since 1986, law enforcement officials have been able to obtain multiple-point wiretaps to 

keep pace with drug dealers and mobsters who, for example, frequently switch cell phones to 

evade surveillance. Prior to enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, such authority was not 

available under FISA for cases involving terrorists. Section 206 of the Act, however, now 

permits officers in international terrorism investigations to obtain a court order that applies to the 

suspect, rather than a particular phone or phone company. This new authority has put 

investigators in a better position to avoid unnecessary cat-and-mouse games with terrorists, who 

are trained to thwart surveillance. While particular examples of the use of multiple-point 

wiretaps pursuant to section 206 remain classified, the following hypothetical illustrates the 

utility of this authority.

Suppose, for example, that investigators become aware of an al Qaeda plot to launch a 

bomb attack. Investigators also discover a recent cellular telephone number for the suspected 

bomber, for which they immediately obtain a FISA surveillance order. When they attempt to 

begin surveillance of the suspect, however, they discover that he has changed cellular telephone 

numbers and providers in order to thwart surveillance. Because of section 206, in cases where 

the subject’s actions may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a service provider, 

investigators can now obtain a FISA multiple-point surveillance order and immediately serve it 

on the suspected bomber’s new cellular provider, allowing undercover agents to monitor his new 
-23-

cellular telephone number immediately. Without section 206, however, investigators in such 

cases would be forced to waste valuable time returning to the FISA court just to obtain a new 

order containing the new provider's name. 

Like several of the other technology-related problems that law enforcement faced prior to 

the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, investigators were often delayed or restricted in 

gaining access to records relating to telephone and Internet services when the provider of those 

services was a cable company. These delays occurred because of confusion as to whether cable 

companies, when providing communications as compared to pay television services, would be 

governed by the Cable Act. The federal Cable Act set out extremely restrictive rules governing 

access to cable company records, while all other communications providers were clearly subject 

to search warrants, court orders, and subpoenas. The cable companies, faced with arguably 

conflicting legal obligations, often sought clarifications from the courts, which delayed and 

sometimes jeopardized criminal investigations. In one particular case, law enforcement was 

investigating a suspected pedophile who not only distributed images of child pornography 

online, but bragged that he was sexually molesting a minor girl. Agents obtained a court order 

directing the cable company to disclose his name and other information. The cable company 

refused to comply with the court order, citing restrictions in the Cable Act. Investigators were 

forced to pursue other leads for two weeks before eventually identifying and arresting the 

suspect. 

Section 211 of the USA PATRIOT Act eliminated this problem by clarifying that federal 

wiretap and electronic communications statutes, and not the federal Cable Act, govern cable 

companies’ disclosures relating to their customers’ use of telephone and Internet services. Cable 

companies are now subject to search warrants, court orders, and subpoenas to the same extent as 

all other communications carriers, thereby ensuring that terrorists and other criminals are not 

exempt from investigations simply because they choose cable companies as their 

communications providers. The Cable Act, however, continues to protect information related to 

subscribers’ television-viewing habits. This clarification has already proven valuable in several 

investigations. 

Example :

ÿ Section 211, for example, enabled investigators to obtain information that was 

crucial to identifying an individual who had sent over 200 threatening letters, 

laced with white powder, to various government agencies, businesses, and 

individuals in Louisiana. These letters paralyzed the town of Lafayette, Louisiana 

for days in 2002 as law enforcement agencies with a limited number of Haz-Mat 

units frantically tried to respond to numerous requests for assistance. The letters 

also shut down the local post office for 24 hours as well as all local courthouses, 

many government offices, and scores of local businesses. As a result of 

information provided by a cable company pursuant to section 211 of the USA 

PATRIOT Act, the perpetrator was eventually arrested, convicted, and sentenced 

to a prison term of 30 years. 
-24-

Enhancing Existing Investigative Tools

To be effective against the tactics used by today’s criminals, including terrorists, many 

existing laws needed only to be updated. For instance, investigators had used “pen/trap” devices 

for many years to determine the source or destination of communications, such as numbers 

dialed by, or received by, a particular telephone. When Congress first enacted the law governing 

the use of pen/trap devices in 1986, however, it could not have anticipated the dramatic 

expansion in electronic communications that has occurred since then. The statute therefore did 

not expressly apply to the full range of communications media, such as the Internet. Moreover, 

the original statute did not address the increasingly mobile nature of communications, and 

therefore limited the effect of a pen/trap order to the territorial boundaries of the federal district 

in which it was issued. In Section 216 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress amended the 

pen/trap statute to authorize a district court to issue an order that is valid throughout the United 

States, and it clarified that the pen/trap provisions in criminal investigations apply to 

communications via means other than telephones, such as the Internet. 

With this new tool, officials no longer have to apply for new orders each time an 

investigation leads to another judicial district and may trace terrorists’ and other criminals’ 

communications regardless of the manner in which they communicate. The Department has used 

the newly-amended pen/trap statute to track the communications of: (1) international terrorist 

conspirators, such as those in the Portland terror cell and the Virginia Jihad case; (2) domestic 

terrorists, such as an individual believed to be responsible for damaging electrical towers in 

Oregon and California; (3) major drug distributors; and (4) thieves who were able to obtain their 

victims’ bank account information and loot the accounts. Section 216 has also proven extremely 

useful in other terrorism cases and in combating computer crime. 

Examples:

ÿ Section 216 was critical in disrupting a plot to use cocaine to purchase Soviet bloc 

weapons for the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, which has been 

designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. 

Investigators used the authorities contained in section 216 of the USA PATRIOT 

Act to secure a pen/trap on targets of the investigation. The information obtained 

through the pen/traps, coupled with a wire intercept, then allowed investigators to 

secure a court order to intercept the communications of one of the targets. These 

intercepted communications, in turn, provided substantive evidence against 

several of the targets. As a result of this investigation, an indictment was returned 

against four defendants charging them with conspiring to provide material support 

to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to distribute five kilograms or 

more of cocaine. All four defendants have been arrested. Two defendants have 

pleaded guilty to both counts of the indictment, and one has pleaded guilty to the 

material support count. The final defendant, who was recently extradited from 

Costa Rica, is awaiting trial. 
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ÿ Investigators recently used section 216 and other USA PATRIOT Act authorities 

to combat credit card fraud perpetrated over the Internet. In this case, customers 

of an Internet service provider were being target by “phishers.” The phishers sent 

e-mail messages that appeared to be from the Internet service provider, asking the 

customer to click on a link to enter new or updated credit card information. Once 

the customer clicked on a link, he or she was sent to what appeared to be an 

official site of the Internet service provider but was really a website created by the 

phisher. Once the customers entered their credit card information, the website emailed the data to a web-based e-mail account. Phishers then used this 

information for their financial benefit, and the loss to the customers of the Internet 

service provider from this activity has been estimated in the millions.

Because fraudulent e-mail accounts and websites go up and down quickly, the use 

of USA PATRIOT Act authorities by investigators was critical to the 

identification and prosecution of one of the phishers. Investigators used section 

216 to obtain pen/traps for Internet service providers located in another state, used 

section 210 to issue subpoenas to Internet service providers, and used section 220 

to obtain search warrants for e-mail content from out-of-district Internet service 

providers. These USA PATRIOT Act authorities allowed investigators both to 

apprehend the phishers and to identify retailers who had been defrauded. One 

defendant has already pleaded guilty to charges as a result of this investigation, 

which would never have been successfully brought without the authorities 

contained in the USA PATRIOT Act.

ÿ Investigators in California successfully used section 216 in their investigation of a 

hacker group committing distributed denial-of-service attacks on Internet service 

providers. These attacks flooded the targeted sites with meaningless messages 

and effectively shut them down. Significantly, some of the computers 

compromised by this hacker group were on military networks. At the start of the 

investigation, limited information was ava ilable to investigators concerning the 

identities and locations of the members of the hacking group. Investigators 

learned, however, that the distributed denial-of-service attacks were being 

accomplished from a certain server. Investigators therefore applied for and 

obtained authorization to use pen/traps to track down members of the hacking 

group, one of whom was later arrested and charged with hacking into a military 

network. The pen/traps were critical in furthering the investigation because they 

allowed investigators to obtain important information on a real-time basis and 

before any records were destroyed as part of the service provider’s routine 

business. 

The USA PATRIOT Act also has updated federal pen/trap law under FISA by making the 

legal requirements for obtaining court permission for pen/trap orders in international terrorism 

investigations more similar to the standards that apply in ordinary criminal cases. Previously, 

FISA-authorized pen/trap orders were available in terrorism investigations only if the suspect 
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was, or was communicating with, an “agent of a foreign power.”5 FISA thus prevented officials 

from using pen/trap devices in many settings that might have revealed information relevant to a 

foreign intelligence investigation. Under section 214 of the Act, however, the government now 

can obtain a pen/trap order when the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence 

information or is relevant to investigations intended to protect against international terrorism or 

“clandestine intelligence activities.” While specific examples of the use of pen/trap devices 

pursuant to section 214 remain classified, the Department has utilized section 214 on several 

occasions in international terrorism investigations, including investigations of suspected al 

Qaeda operatives in the United States, and the streamlined pen/trap authority has made it easier 

to identify additional subjects in terrorism investigations. 

Section 201 of the USA PATRIOT Act brought the federal wiretap statute into the 21st 

century. Before the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, law enforcement had the authority to 

conduct electronic surveillance – by petitioning a court for a wiretap order – when investigating 

many ordinary, non-terrorism crimes, such as drug crimes, mail fraud, and passport fraud, and 

some crimes that terrorists often commit. But wiretaps were not available to investigate other 

crimes likely to be committed by terrorists, such as chemical weapons offenses, killing United 

States nationals abroad, using weapons of mass destruction, and providing material support to 

terrorist organizations. Section 201 closed this gap by making wiretaps available in those 

investigations as well. Several recent wiretap orders have been based on this expanded list of 

terrorism offenses, including one involving a suspected domestic terrorist, who was subsequently 

charged with unlawfully making an explosive bomb, as well as another involving an individual 

with suspected ties to Columbian terrorists. 

Cooperation of Third Parties

The cooperation of third parties in criminal or terrorist investigations is often crucial to a 

positive outcome. Third parties, such as telecommunications companies, often can assist law 

enforcement by providing information in emergency situations. Previous federal law, however, 

did not expressly allow telecommunications companies to disclose customer records or 

communications in emergencies. Even if a provider believed that it faced an emergency 

situation in which lives were at risk, if the provider turned over customer information to the 

government, it risked, in some circumstances, being sued for money damages. Congress 

remedied this problem in section 212 of the USA PATRIOT Act by allowing electronic 

communications service providers to disclose records to the government in situations involving 

an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person. Section 212 has already 

amply proved its utility. 

Examples: 

ÿ Section 212 was used in the investigation of a bomb threat against a school. An 

anonymous person, claiming to be a student at a high school, posted on the 

Internet a disturbing death threat singling out a faculty member and several 

 

5

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1978).
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students to die by bomb and gun. The operator of the Internet site initially 

resisted disclosing to law enforcement any information about the suspect for fear 

that he could be sued if he volunteered that information. Once a prosecutor 

explained that the USA PATRIOT Act created a new provision allowing for the 

voluntary release of information in emergencies, the owner turned over evidence 

that led to the timely identification of the individual responsible for the bomb 

threat. Faced with this evidence, the suspect confessed to making the threats. 

The operator of the Internet site later revealed that he had been worried for the 

safety of the students and teachers for several days, and expressed his relief that 

the USA PATRIOT Act permitted him to help.

ÿ Section 212 was recently used to apprehend quickly an individual threatening to 

destroy a Texas mosque before he could carry out his threat. Jared Bjarnason, a 

30-year-old resident of El Paso, Texas, allegedly sent an e-mail message to the El 

Paso Islamic Center on April 18, 2004. In this message, he threatened to burn the 

Islamic Center’s mosque to the ground if hostages in Iraq were not freed within 

three days. In their investigation of this threat, FBI agents utilized section 212 to 

obtain information quickly from electronic communications service providers 

leading to the identification and arrest of Bjarnason before he could harm the 

mosque. Absent section 212, however, it is not clear that investigators would 

have been able to locate and apprehend Bjarnason in time. 

ÿ Section 212 was invaluable in swiftly resolving a cyber-terrorist threat to the 

South Pole Research Station. Last year, the National Science Foundation (NSF) 

received an e-mail reading: “I’ve hacked into the server of your South Pole 

Research Station. Pay me off or I’ll sell the station’s data to another country and 

tell the world how vulnerable you are.” The e-mail message further contained 

data only found on the NSF’s computer systems, proving that the threat was real. 

The hacked computer also controlled the life support systems for the South Pole 

Station that housed 50 scientists “wintering over” during the South Pole’s most 

dangerous season. At this time, aircraft could not land at the South Pole for 

another six months due to the harsh weather conditions. After receiving this email message, investigators used section 212 of the USA PATRIOT Act to 

identify the hackers quickly. Due in part to the quick response allowed by section 

212, FBI agents were able to close the case quickly with the suspects’ arrest 

before any harm was done to the South Pole Research Station. 

ÿ Section 212 has further proven to be extremely useful in cases involving abducted 

or missing children. The provision, for instance, was instrumental in quickly 

rescuing a 13-year-old girl from Western Pennsylvania who had been lured from 

her home and was being held captive by a 38-year-old man she had met online. 

In early 2002, FBI agents received a report from the local police department that 

the girl had disappeared the previous day from her parents’ home. The agents 

interviewed the parents and the girl’s friends, one of whom reported that the girl 

had discussed leaving home with a man she had met online. In the next couple of 
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days, an anonymous caller contacted the FBI and stated that he had chatted online 

recently with an individual claiming to have taken a girl from Pittsburgh. Based 

on information provided by the anonymous caller, FBI agents in Pittsburgh 

quickly requested information from an Internet service provider pursuant to 

section 212. With the information provided in response to that request, agents 

were able to locate the perpetrator. They immediately went to his residence in 

Herndon, Virginia, and rescued the child victim. The suspect subsequently was 

arrested, pleaded guilty to charges of travel with intent to engage in sexual

activity with a minor and sexual exploitation of a minor, and was sentenced to a 

prison term of over 19 years.

ÿ Section 212 and other USA PATRIOT Act authorities were also critical to the 

safe recovery of an 88-year-old Wisconsin woman who was kidnapped and held 

for ransom in February 2003. Investigators swiftly used sections 210, 212, and 

220 of the USA PATRIOT Act to gather information, including communications 

provided on an emergency basis from Internet service providers, that assisted in 

identifying several suspects and accomplices and then quickly locating the elderly 

victim. When the victim was found, she was bound in an unheated shed during a 

cold Wisconsin winter several feet from a suspect’s residence. Thankfully, the 

victim fully recovered from her ordeal, which had lasted for several days. 

Without a doubt, the information obtained using section 212 and other provisions 

of the USA PATRIOT Act was instrumental in solving the case quickly and thus 

saving the victim’s life. The suspect was eventually arrested and was prosecuted 

and convicted by Wisconsin authorities after it was determined the victim was not 

transported across state lines and thus could be more effectively prosecuted in 

state court. 

The USA PATRIOT Act also empowered Internet service providers and others to enlist 

the help of law enforcement to monitor the activities of hackers who unlawfully access their 

computer networks. Section 217 of the Act allows victims of computer attacks by cyberterrorists and others to ask law enforcement officers to monitor trespassers on their systems. 

Section 217 thus places cyber-intruders on the same footing as physical intruders: hacking 

victims can seek law-enforcement assistance to combat hackers just as burglary victims can 

invite police officers into their homes to catch burglars. 

VI. Conclusion

As the Attorney General affirmed on November 8, 2001, the Department of Justice has 

been called to “the highest and most noble form of public service—the preservation of American 

lives and liberty.”6 Now, more than two years after the attacks of September 11, the Department 

continues to respond to this call with enthusiasm, and with a profound respect for this country’s 

 

6 See Attorney General Ashcroft and Deputy Attorney General Thompson Announce 

Reorganization and Mobilization of the Nation’s Justice and Law Enforcement Resources, November 8, 

2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks11_08.htm.
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tradition of civil rights and liberties. In prosecuting the war on terrorism, the Department has 

taken every appropriate step to prevent acts of terrorism and to protect innocent American lives. 

The Department also continues this campaign with a constant awareness of its obligation to 

preserve freedom and with scrupulous attention to the legal and constitutional protections for 

civil liberties. 

The USA PATRIOT Act has played a vital role in the Department of Justice’s efforts to 

preserve America’s system of ordered liberty for future generations. Since the Act was passed 

over two years ago, the Department of Justice has deployed its new authorities urgently in an 

effort to incapacitate terrorists before they can launch another attack, and, as demonstrated by the 

examples contained in this report, the Act’s successes already are evident. The USA PATRIOT 

Act has facilitated the prosecution of terrorists and their supporters across the nation. It has 

authorized law enforcement and intelligence officers to share information and coordinate with 

one another. It has provided intelligence and law enforcement officials with the tools they need 

to fight terrorism in a digital age. It has assisted in curtailing the flow of funds to terrorists and 

terrorist organizations. And it has helped the Department to combat serious criminal conduct, 

such as child abduction and child pornography. For all of these reasons, the USA PATRIOT Act 

has made Americans safer over the course of the past two-and-a-half years, and the Department 

of Justice fully expects that the Act will continue to enhance the security of the American people 

in the future.