Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1565 | February 5, 2020 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brandon E. Murphy

Cannon Bruns & Murphy, LLC

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lauren A. Jacobsen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darrell Derringer,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 5, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1565

Appeal from the Jay Superior

Court

The Honorable Max C. Ludy, Jr., 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

38D01-1802-F6-23

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1565 | February 5, 2020 Page 2 of 9

[1] Darrell Derringer appeals his conviction for Level 6 Felony Operating a Vehicle 

While Intoxicated,1 arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain 

evidence and by precluding Derringer’s counsel from making a specific closing 

argument. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Facts

[2] On February 12, 2018, Jay County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Tyler Hartzell 

initiated a traffic stop of Derringer on US 27 for travelling 38 miles per hour in 

a 20 miles-per-hour zone. As Deputy Hartzell approached Derringer’s vehicle, 

he “detected the odor of burnt marijuana almost immediately.” Tr. Vol. II p. 

74. Deputy Hartzell asked Derringer to exit the vehicle, and Derringer 

complied. Deputy Hartzell noticed that Derringer had “red bloodshot eyes” and 

“slurred speech” and that Derringer “[s]taggered from the vehicle[.]” Id. at 77,

109. After Derringer failed a field sobriety test, Deputy Hartzell handcuffed him

and transported him to the Jay County Security Center.

[3] At the Security Center, Hartzell conducted other sobriety tests on Derringer, 

and Derringer failed all of them. Then, Deputy Hartzell transported Derringer 

to a local hospital to complete a blood draw. The blood was sent to the State 

laboratory for a complete report, which revealed that Derringer’s blood tested 

positive for traces of marijuana.

1

Ind. Code §§ 9-30-5-2(a), -3(a)(1).
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[4] On February 15, 2018, the State charged Derringer with one count of Level 6 

felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. On March 5, 2018, the State also 

filed a notice of intent to introduce the laboratory report into evidence. 

Derringer did not file a demand to confront and cross-examine the preparer of 

the laboratory report. 

[5] During Derringer’s April 25, 2019, jury trial, the State introduced the laboratory 

report as evidence. The State then asked Deputy Hartzell a series of questions 

about the protocol for handling blood samples, the procedure for having blood 

samples tested, the standards of the Indiana Department of Toxicology, and the 

ways in which laboratory reports are compiled and delivered to other State 

officials, such as investigators, the prosecuting attorney, and other deputies. See 

generally id. at 87-90. Deputy Hartzell described his experiences with these 

situations as a law enforcement officer and explained that he had followed the 

proper procedure to the best of his abilities.

[6] Derringer objected, arguing that “the State has failed to lay an adequate 

foundation for the report.” Id. at 90. The trial court overruled Derringer’s 

objection, finding that the State had laid the proper foundation and established 

a chain of custody. Additionally, the trial court noted that Derringer had 

waived any objection to the veracity of the laboratory report by failing to file a 

demand for confrontation and cross-examination of the report’s preparer.

[7] During closing arguments, Derringer’s counsel once again attempted to contest 

the admissibility of the laboratory report. The State objected, arguing that 
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Derringer’s counsel should be precluded from making this argument because 

Derringer had already waived his right to confront and cross-examine the 

preparer of the laboratory report. The trial court sustained the State’s objection, 

precluded Derringer’s counsel from remaking this argument, and admonished 

the jury.

[8] At the conclusion of the trial, on April 26, 2019, the jury found Derringer guilty 

as charged. On June 17, 2019, the trial court sentenced Derringer to two years 

executed in the Jay County Security Center. Derringer now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Admission of Evidence

[9] First, Derringer argues that the trial court erred by admitting the laboratory 

report. “The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound 

discretion of the trial court[.]” Reed v. Bethel, 2 N.E.3d 98, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). Reversal of a trial court’s decision to admit evidence is appropriate only 

where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997). “Moreover, we 

will sustain the trial court[’s] [decision on the admission of evidence] if it can be 

done on any legal ground apparent in the record.” Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 

235, 240 (Ind. 2000). 

[10] Derringer contends that the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for the 

laboratory report’s veracity. Specifically, Derringer argues that the State did not 

establish a chain of custody of the laboratory report to prove that it had not 
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been tampered with and, consequently, that admission of the report was

erroneous.

[11] For laboratory reports, “[t]he State is required to show a chain of custody for 

the purpose of showing the unlikelihood of tampering, loss, substitution or 

mistake.” McCotry v. State, 722 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 

“However, to show a chain of custody, the State need only provide a 

‘reasonable assurance’ that the evidence was undisturbed as it passed from the 

custody of one person to the next.” Id. (quoting Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 

633, 639 (Ind. 1991)). So long as the State presents evidence that “strongly 

suggests” the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times, there is a sufficient 

chain of custody. Id. “To mount a successful challenge to the chain of custody, 

one must present evidence that does more than raise a mere possibility that the 

evidence may have been tampered with.” Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 811, 814 

(Ind. 2002).

[12] Additionally, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-36-11-3, “[i]f the defendant 

wishes for the person who prepared the laboratory report to be present at the 

trial for cross-examination, the defendant must file a demand for crossexamination not later than ten (10) days after the defendant receives the notice 

filed under section 2 of this chapter[.]”

[13] In its assessment of the State’s evidence regarding the chain of custody of the 

laboratory report, the trial court held as follows: 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1565 | February 5, 2020 Page 6 of 9

Exhibit 1, the top page is Indiana State Department of Toxicology 

and has Indiana State Department of Toxicology case number on 

it 18-01233. That’s carried over to the NMS lab report cite number 

18-01233, and it’s – appears to me that the protocol was used to 

send this to the Department of Toxicology in Indiana. And I think 

it’s been known that the State Department of Toxicology has been 

using an out-of-state lab on some things. But I see the report from 

NMS and what came back from the Department of Toxicology 

has the same patient ID number on it. And [Derringer] did not 

request the opportunity to cross-examine the people doing the test 

– the testing itself as required.

So therefore, the test is admissible, and I believe that there’s a 

sufficient foundation at this point in time to allow the report in 

because the protocol was followed. It was sent to the Indiana State 

Department of Toxicology, sent to a Pennsylvania lab, but it still 

has the same patient number on it. It was returned to the 

Department of Toxicology, apparently, and then given to – the 

evidence was the State or the prosecuting attorney’s investigator, 

and then to the deputy. So the objection will be overruled. 

Tr. Vol. II p. 91-92. 

[14] The record shows that based on his expertise and experience with toxicology 

reports, Deputy Hartzell provided reasonable assurance that the evidence was 

undisturbed as it passed from one person to the next. Moreover, the trial court 

reviewed the laboratory report and noted that Derringer had already waived 

any opportunity to contest the report’s validity because he did not file a demand 

to confront and cross-examine the preparer from the laboratory. At every step 

of the process, there was direct and undisputed testimony about which 

individual or entity had control over the blood sample as it passed through 

multiple hands. 
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[15] Irrespective of this analysis and the trial court’s reliance on Deputy Hartzell’s 

testimony, Derringer still insists that “[t]he court was not provided with 

information regarding the storage of the blood sample, its transportation to the 

out-of-state laboratory or the practices of the out-of-state laboratory to ensure 

that the blood was properly analyzed.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9-10. However, the 

State was not required to describe every exact detail of the location of the blood 

sample as described in the laboratory report. Derringer’s attempt to have this 

Court independently search for new evidence disproving the existence of the 

chain of custody is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, 

which we may not do. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err when it 

concluded that the State had met its burden in showing the chain of custody.

Consequently, the trial court did not err by admitting the laboratory report.

Closing Argument

[16] Next, Derringer argues that the trial court erred by precluding Derringer’s 

counsel from making a specific closing argument. “The proper scope of closing 

argument is within the trial court’s sound discretion.” Walls v. State, 993 N.E.2d 

262, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A trial court errs in its decision regarding a 

closing argument only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before it. Id. “In seeking reversal of a conviction, it is 

incumbent upon the appellant to establish not only the trial court’s [error] but 

also any resulting prejudice to his or her rights.” Id.

[17] Specifically, Derringer contends that his counsel should have been able to 

contest the veracity of the laboratory report because the State failed to bring in 
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the preparer of the laboratory report. In other words, Derringer brings up the 

same argument that he made with regards to the admission of the laboratory 

report—namely, that “because the trial court restricted closing argument on an 

important part of the defense’s argument, essentially that the laboratory report 

needed interpretation to prove intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

error was not harmless.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11. 

[18] We find little merit to Derringer’s argument. As we have already mentioned, 

the trial court is afforded sound discretion in how it defines the scope of closing 

arguments. In this instance, the trial court found that Derringer’s counsel 

should not be permitted to essentially relitigate an issue that had already been 

resolved. During the earlier discussion on whether the laboratory report should 

be admitted, the trial court already determined that the State was not required 

to bring in the preparer of the laboratory report to verify its findings because 

Derringer had not requested it. In other words, the trial court was well within 

its right to curtail Derringer’s counsel’s statements on this matter so as not to 

confuse or mislead the jury regarding a settled topic. Further, Derringer proffers 

no evidence showing that the trial court’s decision prejudiced his rights.

[19] Derringer does cite Indiana Code chapter 35-36-11—the Lab Report Statute—

as overarching proof that the State did not follow the proper procedure for 

admission of the laboratory report. However, Derringer neglects to include any 

discussion about the sections of the statute relating to notice of intent, demand 

for cross-examination, and waiver of rights—issues that the trial court already 

addressed and ruled upon earlier in the trial. Vague recitation of Indiana law 
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without any further analysis or supporting caselaw does not a legal argument 

make. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err when it precluded 

Derringer’s counsel from making this specific closing argument. 

[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.