J-S53012-16

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KABRIL I. WILLIAMS-KEYES

Appellant No. 1431 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 1, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000877-2015

CP-40-CR-0004138-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2016

Kabril I. Williams-Keyes appeals from the aggregate judgment of 

sentence of ten to twenty years of incarceration imposed following his entry 

of guilty pleas in two criminal cases. We affirm. 

Both cases involve Appellant’s physical abuse of Ernestine Pearson. 

The following facts are taken from the affidavits of probable cause. The first 

incident occurred on the evening of August 5, 2014. While visiting Ms. 

Pearson’s apartment, Appellant repeatedly punched and kicked her. She 

attempted to call 911, but Appellant took her phone. Appellant doused her 

with grease and alcohol, and threatened to light her on fire with an aerosol 

can and lighter. The abuse continued throughout the evening until the next 

day, when Ms. Pearson was able to escape. A passerby observed her 
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fleeing, with Appellant chasing. The witness saw Appellant dragging Ms. 

Pearson by her hair back to the apartment. The bystander immediately 

called police, who went to the apartment complex. Appellant, however, had 

fled. Emergency personnel transported Ms. Pearson to the hospital, where 

Officer Matthew Bonawits of the Edwardsville Police Department interviewed 

her. The officer noted Ms. Pearson had suffered multiple injuries and one 

eye was swollen shut.

For the aforementioned crimes, Appellant was charged via written 

complaint on August 6, 2014. On November 19, 2014, one count of 

aggravated assault, graded as a felony of the second degree, was held for 

court, and docketed at criminal number 4138 of 2014. Appellant posted bail 

the same day, with the condition that he refrain from entering Ms. Pearson’s 

residence. 

Appellant did not abide by this condition. On the evening of December 

31, 2014, Ms. Pearson picked up Appellant to go shopping and pay some 

bills. The two returned to her residence. Over her objection, Appellant 

stayed the evening. In the morning, he confronted Ms. Pearson regarding 

text messages he saw on her phone. He punched her in the head and bit 

her finger. Appellant then retrieved a knife, and threatened Ms. Pearson. 

Appellant’s mother was present, as well as Ms. Pearson’s two small children, 

one of whom was fathered by Appellant. Appellant told his mother to leave, 

stating, “You don’t want to be a witness to this.” Appellant’s mother called 
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the police and went outside to flag down the responding officer, Edwardsville 

Police Department Officer Michael Lehman. The officer proceeded to the 

residence; however, Appellant had fled with Ms. Pearson and the two 

children in a vehicle. Appellant led police on a high-speed car chase. The 

pursuit ended when Appellant drove his vehicle into a guardrail, telling Ms. 

Pearson that he would not go to jail and she should kiss her children 

goodbye. Twenty separate criminal counts were filed against Appellant for 

this incident, all of which were held for court and subsequently docketed at 

criminal number 877 of 2015. 

On May 19, 2015, Appellant entered a guilty plea at both cases. At 

criminal case 4138 of 2014, Appellant pled guilty to the sole count of 

aggravated assault. At action number 877 of 2015, the Commonwealth 

withdrew seventeen of the counts. Appellant pled guilty to one count of 

aggravated assault for the crimes committed against Ms. Pearson and two 

counts of attempted aggravated assault against a person less than thirteen 

years old, for the crimes against the two children. Sentencing was deferred 

to enable preparation of a pre-sentence report. 

On July 1, 2015, the parties appeared for sentencing. Appellant 

received a sentence of thirty-six to seventy-two months at the sole count of 

aggravated assault at action number 2014-4138. At the other action, 

Appellant received sentences of forty-two to eighty-four months of 

imprisonment at each count of attempted aggravated assault against a child, 
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and a sentence of thirty-six to seventy-two months of incarceration at the 

remaining aggravated assault count. All three sentences were imposed 

consecutively to each other and concurrent to the 2014 case. Thus, 

Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 120 to 240 months 

incarceration. 

Appellant thereafter filed, on July 9, 2015, a post-sentence motion 

requesting a sentence modification, in which he complained that the 

imposed sentence was above the applicable mitigated guideline ranges, and 

that the court failed to consider several mitigating factors. Motion for 

Reconsideration, 7/9/15, at 1-2. 1 The motion was denied July 22, 2015. 

Appellant lodged a timely notice of appeal on August 19, 2015. 

Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement, and the court issued its responsive opinion on December 

22, 2015. The matter is now ready for our review. Appellant raises four 

claims.

1. Whether the [s]entencing [c]ourt imposed an improper 

sentence under the law[?]

____________________________________________

1

 This motion was filed by private counsel, Stephen Molitoris, Esquire, who 

entered his appearance on July 21, 2015. At the time of the post-sentence 

motion, Appellant was represented by the office of the public defender, who 

also filed a post-sentence on Appellant’s behalf. The public defender 

subsequently withdrew. 
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2. Whether the [s]entencing [c]ourt erred in denying 

Appellant’s post-sentence Motion for 

Reconsideration/Modification of Sentence[?]

3. Whether there exists a substantial question that the 

sentence imposed is inappropriate in that imposition of the 

sentence occurred with an application of the sentencing 

guidelines that resulted in a clearly unreasonable aggregate 

sentence[?]

4. Whether there exists a substantial question that the 

sentence imposed is inappropriate in that imposition of the 

sentence resulted in a manifestly excessive and unreasonable 

aggregate sentence[?]

Appellant’s brief at 5. All four of these challenges implicate the discretionary 

aspects of the sentence. 

Preliminarily, we note that “there is no absolute right to appeal when 

challenging the discretionary aspect of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. 

Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886 (Pa.Super. 2008). An appellant must first 

satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We examine 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief 

has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). As we have set forth, the first two requirements have been met.

We next assess whether Appellant’s failure to include a separate 

concise statement as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) is fatal. The Rule states:
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(f) Discretionary aspects of sentence. An appellant who 

challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal 

matter shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a concise 

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal 

with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. The 

statement shall immediately precede the argument on the merits 

with respect to the discretionary aspects of the sentence.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Since the Commonwealth has not objected to the 

statement’s absence, we decline to find the claim waived on that basis. 

Commonwealth v. Brougher, 978 A.2d 373, 375 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

We now address whether Appellant has presented a substantial 

question. Since Appellant has not included a Rule 2119(f) statement, and 

mindful that we may not review the merits of the question at this juncture, 

we have examined other portions of the brief. Commonwealth v. Dodge, 

77 A.3d 1263, 1271 (Pa.Super. 2013) (court may look to statement of 

questions presented). 

We determine the existence of a substantial question on a case-bycase basis. A substantial question exists only when

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the 

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process. 

Additionally, we cannot look beyond the statement of questions 

presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists. 

Commonwealth v. Diehl, 140 A.3d 34, 44–45 (Pa.Super. 2016) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Appellant’s statement of questions presents a boilerplate allegation 

that the sentence violates two precepts. He argues, “Instantly, by failing to 

properly consider and weigh the relevant sentencing factors under the 

Sentencing Code and guidelines, the sentence imposed was a result of an 

inconsistent application of the Sentencing Code and ran afoul of the 

fundamental norms underlying the substantial question.” Appellant’s brief at 

10. This allegation does not raise a substantial question. Commonwealth 

v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 567 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“A claim that a sentencing 

court failed to consider certain mitigating factors does not raise a substantial 

question that the sentence is inappropriate.”); Commonwealth v. Haynes, 

125 A.3d 800, 807 (Pa.Super. 2015) (assertion that the trial court failed to 

consider his mental health issues and rehabilitative needs does not raise 

substantial question). 

Secondly, Appellant contends that the sentence, while within the 

guidelines, is excessive and unreasonable because the sentences in the 2015 

matter were imposed consecutively. Where, as here, the sentences are 

within the applicable guideline ranges, the sentencing judge’s decision to 

impose consecutive sentences standing alone does not raise a substantial 

question. As we stated in Dodge, supra: 

 

To make it clear, a defendant may raise a substantial question 

where he receives consecutive sentences within the guideline 

ranges if the case involves circumstances where the application 
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of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an 

excessive sentence; however, a bald claim of excessiveness due 

to the consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 

162, 171–172 (Pa.Super. 2010) (“The imposition of consecutive, 

rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial 

question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where 

the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature 

of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.”)[.] 

Id. 1270 (emphasis in original). 

These cases do not raise even a scintilla of doubt that applying the 

guidelines to these crimes was reasonable. Over the course of an evening, 

Appellant viciously beat Ms. Pearson, a woman with whom he had an infant 

child, and prevented her from calling 911. When she was able to escape the 

next day, an eyewitness observed Appellant forcibly dragging her back to 

the apartment. Despite being ordered to have no contact with the victim, he 

returned to her residence, stayed overnight, threatened her with a knife, and 

led police on a high-speed chase with Ms. Pearson and her two children in 

the vehicle. 

Appellant argues that this subsequent contact is a point in his favor. 

[T]he sentence of [Appellant] reflected harsh punishment for 

having contact with the victim (a violation of his bail conditions 

at the time), without consideration for his love for his family or 

the initiation of the contact by the victim (contact, which, as set 

forth by [Appellant], often occurred at the request of the victim, 

who often asked [Appellant] to stay with her and her children or 

to babysit the children while she worked. 

Appellant’s brief at 7. Appellant had the duty to abide by the conditions, not 

his victim. Considering the nature and circumstances of these crimes and 
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the length of incarceration imposed, we do not hesitate in holding Appellant 

has failed to raise a substantial question that the application of the 

guidelines and the imposition of consecutive sentences in light of this 

conduct was unreasonable. 

Next, we review Appellant’s claim that a substantial question is 

presented because the sentencing court did not consider a litany of factors 

justifying a lesser sentence. See Appellant’s brief at 11-12 (Appellant pled 

guilty and has demonstrated remorse, he suffers from addiction and mental 

health issues, has a family, has a consistent employment history, and his 

actions were uncharacteristic and fueled by substance abuse and anger 

management issues). A claim that the trial court failed to consider relevant 

sentencing criteria does raise a substantial question. Dodge, supra at 1273 

(“Appellant’s claim that the sentencing court disregarded rehabilitation and 

the nature and circumstances of the offense in handing down its sentence 

presents a substantial question for our review.”). Additionally, “This Court 

has also held that ‘an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an 

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a 

substantial question.’” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 

1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014)).

Having determined Appellant raised a substantial question, we review 

the merits of his sentencing challenges. This Court’s standard of review 
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limits our ability to vacate and remand in cases where the court sentenced 

within the guidelines. We may reverse only if applying the guidelines would 

be clearly unreasonable under the circumstances. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2); 

See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 777 (Pa.Super. 2009) 

(defining unreasonable as decision that is either irrational or not guided by 

sound judgment). The sentences were within the guidelines at all counts 

and the choice to apply them was rational. Section 9781(d) of the 

Sentencing Code provides that when we review the record, we must have 

regard for:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d). Appellant’s claim that the sentencing court failed to 

consider a host of factors is belied by the record. “Our Supreme Court has 

ruled that where pre-sentence reports exist, the presumption will stand that 

the sentencing judge was both aware of and appropriately weighed all 

relevant information contained therein.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 

A.2d 1, 8 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 

12, 18 (Pa. 1988)). The judge specifically stated that he had reviewed and 

considered the report. N.T., 7/1/15, at 27. We have already discussed the 
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nature and circumstances of the offense, and the court placed findings on 

the record. Appellant’s real issue is not that the court failed to consider 

these issues; rather, he simply disagrees with the judge’s weighing of these 

factors. Hence, we find no abuse of discretion. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/27/2016