J-S71008-16

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ELOY SOLORIO-FLORES

Appellant No. 376 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0008424-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, PANELLA AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 19, 2017

Eloy Solorio-Flores appeals from the judgment of sentence of four to 

eight years incarceration plus a concurrent ten-year period of probation 

imposed following a negotiated guilty plea. We affirm. 

During an ongoing investigation into drug trafficking organizations 

operating in Montgomery and Berks counties, Detective Erick Echevarria, 

acting undercover, contacted Jose DeJesus Montilla to purchase cocaine and 

methamphetamine. Over the course of the investigation, Detective 

Echevarria made a series of purchases from a number of individuals 

functioning in concert to deliver the illicit substances. Mr. Montilla operated 

as the point of contact and would communicate with these other individuals 

to arrange the purchases. 
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In August 2013, the detective agreed to buy one and a half pounds of 

methamphetamine for forty-three thousand dollars. In preparation for the 

transaction, officers conducted surveillance on individuals and locations tied 

to suspects in the investigation. While observing the targets, Apellant was 

seen parked in a gray Dodge Charger interacting with some of the suspects. 

On August 31, 2013, Detective Echevarria met with an individual sent 

by Mr. Montilla to facilitate the sale of methamphetamine. Detective 

Echevarria located Mr. Montilla’s courier sitting in a blue Kia and initiated the 

sale. That individual intimated to the detective that other members of the 

organization were observing the meeting, and then looked toward a gray 

Dodge Charger, occupied by Appellant and one other individual, parked in 

the vicinity. After Detective Echevarria provided cash for the product and 

ensured it was on location, officers apprehended the drug-courier, Appellant, 

and the other person sitting in the Dodge Charger. From the Kia, officers 

seized one-and-a-half pounds of methamphetamine, the prerecorded buy 

money, a fully-loaded Glock 9mm, and three cellular telephones. Within the 

Dodge Charger, officers recovered an additional four cellular telephones, one 

of which belonged to Appellant. 

A subsequent search of Appellant’s phone revealed communications 

with the courier and Mr. Montilla and various other phone numbers 

connected to Appellant’s co-conspirators. Notably, Appellant’s phone also 

contained the two numbers utilized by Detective Echevarria during the 
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investigation, despite the fact that the detective never directly 

communicated with Appellant. 

Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with corrupt 

organizations, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver 

(“PWID”), conspiracy to commit PWID, and various other related offenses. 

Appellant filed three pre-trial motions including a motion to bar application 

of mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 

133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), a motion to suppress physical evidence, and a 

motion to sever the trial from co-defendants. Before the court could render 

a decision regarding Appellant’s motions, Appellant agreed to a negotiated 

guilty plea. 

A plea hearing was held on August 11, 2014. Appellant entered a 

negotiated guilty plea to two counts of PWID, and one count of conspiracy to 

commit PWID. The trial court conducted the mandatory colloquy, and 

Appellant’s written guilty plea colloquy was entered into the record. 

Appellant confirmed that he reviewed, understood, and signed the written 

colloquy. The court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea and proceeded directly 

to sentencing. The court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the terms 

of the negotiated plea to four to eight years incarceration and ten years 

probation to run concurrently, plus a fine and costs. Appellant’s counsel 

noted for the record that she had advised Appellant that, as a permanent 
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resident of the United States, he may be subject to deportation as a 

collateral consequence of his plea. 

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking to withdraw his guilty 

plea. The court held a hearing on that motion wherein plea counsel testified 

to the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s plea, including numerous 

conversations regarding the immigration ramifications of a guilty plea. The 

court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion and Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal. Appellant filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement of 

matters complained of on appeal. However, the trial court disregarded that 

error and addressed the merits of Appellant’s appeal in its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion.1 This matter is now ready for our review. 

Appellant presents four issues for our consideration: 

I. Did the Trial Court err when it denied [Appellant’s] 

Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea although the taking 

of the Plea violated constitutional principals [sic] in 

Alleyne v. United States[, supra] and a host of 

Pennsylvania appellate cases as well all because 

[Appellant] was never apprised of the fact that the 

mandatory minimum laws had been ruled 

unconstitutional? 

II. Did the Trial Court err when it failed to permit 

[Appellant] to withdraw his Plea, where the Plea was 

____________________________________________

1 Where an appellant has filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement of 

matters complained of on appeal and the trial court has addressed those 

issues, this Court need not remand and may address the merits of the issues 

presented. Commonwealth v. Brown, 145 A.3d 184, 186 (Pa.Super. 

2016). 
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not entered in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary 

fashion and all where [Appellant] had not been 

properly apprised of the collateral effects of his Plea on 

his immigration status? 

III. Did the Trial Court err when it failed to permit 

[Appellant] to withdraw his Guilty Plea where 

[Appellant’s] plea was not made in a knowing, 

intelligent and voluntary fashion where [Appellant] was 

never told that his pretrial motions, although filed were 

never litigated? 

IV. Did the Court err when it failed to grant [Appellant] 

permission to withdraw Plea and all where [Appellant] 

demonstrated legal cause therefor? 

Appellant’s brief at 3. 

Appellant raises various challenges to the court’s denial of his request 

to withdraw his guilty plea. Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s second 

and third claims of error implicate plea counsel’s failure to inform him of 

purportedly necessary information. We have long held that an attorney 

representing a defendant in a criminal case bears the duty to advise her 

client on important decisions. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 715 A.3d 1121 

(Pa. 1998). The decision to enter a guilty plea or take a case to trial is 

clearly important. Indeed, counsel has a duty to explain the relative 

advantages and disadvantages of accepting or rejecting plea offers. 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 708 A.2d 497, 502 (Pa.Super. 1998). The 

failure to do so may render counsel ineffective. Id. 

Here, although Appellant does not expressly challenge counsel’s 

effectiveness on appeal, his second and third issues raise exactly that claim. 
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In his second issue, Appellant argues that counsel failed to inform him of the 

status of his pre-trial motions. In his third issue, Appellant claims counsel 

failed to advise him of the collateral effects of his guilty plea on his 

immigration status. In each scenario, Appellant concludes that this failure 

rendered his plea involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent. However, 

rather than finding fault in the trial court’s or plea counsel’s administration of 

the plea colloquy, Appellant pinpoints counsel’s alleged failures prior to the 

guilty plea hearing. Thus, these claims properly sound in ineffectiveness of 

counsel. Bradley, supra; Lewis, supra. 

Since Appellant’s second and third claims involve allegations of 

ineffective assistance of plea counsel, they must be reserved for postconviction proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 

764 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating “Our Supreme Court has indicated that it does 

not approve of a piecemeal approach to litigation of ineffectiveness claims 

and prefers that they all be channeled into post-conviction proceedings.”). 

Hence, Appellant’s second and third issues are dismissed without prejudice 

to be raised on post-conviction collateral review. 

We turn now to Appellant’s first issue. Appellant challenges the court’s 

denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea. We observe that once the 

court has imposed a sentence, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea 

“only where necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. 

Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted). Moreover, 
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“post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny since 

the courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing 

devices.” Id. To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently. Id. Thus, “a manifest injustice occurs when a 

plea is not tendered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and 

understandingly.” Id. Since we presume that “a defendant who enters a 

guilty plea is aware of his actions[,] [h]e bears the burden of proving 

otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa.Super. 2015).

When reviewing the validity of a guilty plea, we consider whether the 

court ensured the defendant was properly informed of certain information in 

determining whether the plea was voluntary and that the defendant was 

acting knowingly and intelligently. Thus, we have found that in order to 

accept a guilty plea as valid, the court is mandated to communicate: 1) the 

nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury 

trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the 

plea court’s power to deviate from any recommended sentence. Id. at 782; 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, comment. Furthermore, where a written plea colloquy is 

read, completed, and signed by the defendant and made part of the record, 

it may serve as the defendant’s plea colloquy when supplemented by an 

oral, on-the-record examination. Reid, supra at 782. 

Appellant contends that his decision to plead guilty was premised upon 

his understanding that he faced a minimum mandatory sentence of five to 
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ten years if he went to trial. Appellant asserts that mandatory minimum 

sentences were found unconstitutional in Alleyne, supra. He posits that, 

due to the change in the law during the pendency of his case, he was not 

subject to a mandatory sentence despite his beliefs to the contrary at the 

time of his plea. Thus, Appellant maintains that his guilty plea was not 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered since the court did not 

inform him that the mandatory minimum sentence would not apply to his 

conviction.2 

Instantly, Appellant’s purported belief that he was subject to a 

mandatory minimum sentence when he entered his guilty plea is belied by 

the record. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion seeking to bar the application 

of a mandatory minimum sentence based on Alleyne, supra. As 

Appellant’s position prior to his decision to plead guilty was that he could not 

be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Alleyne, his 

argument now to the contrary rings hollow. Hence, relief is not warranted. 

Appellant’s fourth argument references his first three arguments and 

alleges that on this basis the court’s failure to grant his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea amounts to manifest injustice. Given our disposition on 

____________________________________________

2

Insofar as Appellant’s contentions in this regard implicate plea counsel’s 

duty to inform him of the applicability of a mandatory minimum sentence 

prior to his guilty plea, such a claim would sound in ineffectiveness 

assistance of counsel and must be raised in collateral proceedings as 

discussed infra. 
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Appellant’s first three issues, this challenge necessarily fails. Appellant has 

not established manifest injustice or any other reason to reverse the trial 

court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are dismissed 

without prejudice. Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2017