NO. 07-03-0077-CV IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D JULY 15, 2003

______________________________ IN THE INTEREST O F T. C. AND BABY BOY C ., CHILDRE N

_________________________________ FROM TH E 320T H DISTRI CT COURT OF POTT ER COUNTY; NO. 64,742-D; HONORABLE D ON EMERSON , JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN and REAVIS an d CAMPBELL, JJ.
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Appellant

Julie Cor

tez appeals from a judgment re ndered follow ing a jur y trial terminating her parental rights to her two sons, T.C. and Baby Boy C. and appointing t he Texas Department of Prote ctive and Regulatory Services (the Department) pe rmanent managing conservator of the childr en. Presenting only one poi ntof error, Jul ie contends reversal is requi red because the pr oceedings w

ere rendered fundament ally unfair by the implication that she behaved impro perly i n failing to fol low the Department’s instructions,1 The rights of the father of the children and the biological fat her of Baby Boy C. were also terminated; however , no appeal was filed by t hem. 2 when its expl icit goal was to terminat e her parental rights. (Emphasis in original ). Based upon therati onale expre ssed he rein, we affi rm.
Because Julie doe s not cha llenge the sufficiency of the evidence, a detailed rev iew of the facts is not necessary . The evidencedid show however , that Julie h ad repeated troubles with the law and w ith substance ab use. Alleging that she wa s uncooperative in its attempts to reuni fy her wi th her childr en, the Department filed its peti tion to terminate Julie’s p arental rig hts to T.C. and Baby Boy C. B y affidavit attached to the peti tion, th e Department

averred t hat removal of the children w as necessary

after Baby Boy

C., who
was born on Ma y 15, 2 000 , tes ted p osit ive fo r amp heta mine s at t he ti me o f de livery. T.C., who was born on February 11, 1998, also tested pos itive for controlled subs tances at the time of his birth. According to the Department, at t he time its peti tion was fil ed, Julie and the children’s father and the biological father of Baby B oy C. were all incarcerated and there wer

e no appropriateor wil ling rel atives to take the child ren. 1
The natural ri ght exis ting between parents and their children i s one of constituti onal dimension. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W .2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). A termina tion decree is complete, f inal , irrevocable, and divests for all t ime that natural right aswell as all legal rights, privil eges, duties , and powers with respect to each other exce pt for the child’ s right to inherit. Wiley

v. Spratl an, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976). Consequentl y, terminat ion3

procee dings must be strictl y scruti nized. In I nterest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980). In proceed ings to terminate the parent-chil d relationshi p, the petitioner must establis h one
or more acts or omissions enumer ated under secti on 161.001(1) of the F amily Code and must additionally

prove that termination of the par ent-child r

elationship i s in the bes t interest of the child. Tex . Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1) and ( 2) (Vernon 2002) . Both elements must be establi shed, and proof of one element does not reli eve the petit ioner of the burden of provi ng the other. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S .W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976).
Pursuant tosection 263.405(b) of the F amily Code, Julie filed a statement of points for appeal assert ing her i ssues on appeal w ould be:
A. W hether the term inat ion of Respondent’sparental rights was procedurally flawed by trial amendments made by Pe titioner w hich so affected the u l timate outcome of the case, s o as to vi olate the consti tutional ri ghts of Respondent. B. Whetherthe termination of Resp ondent’s parental ri ghts was against the great weight of the ev idence. However, by

her sole point her

e, she contends th e underlyi ng proceeding s were r endered fundamen tallyunfair by the implication t hatshe behaved improperly in failing to follow the Department’s instructi ons, when i ts explici t goal was to terminate h e r p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . We disagree. Referencing the testimony of the Department’s

witness es on cro ss-examina tion, Julie contends the first and second serv ice plans submi tted to her by the Department for4

implementation contemplated its ultimate objec

tive was to terminate her parental rig hts and
remo ve her as a p aren t. However, the record does not contain a copy of eithe r service plan for our review. Further, because no complaint was made in the trial court, the point is not preserved for our rev iew. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see also Moser v. Dav is, 79 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Tex.App.--Amar illo 2002, no pe t.); Valdez v. Valdez , 930 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex.App.–H ouston [1st Di st.] 1996, no w rit). Appellant

fu rther argues that employees of the Department “behaved in a most cavalier fashion towar

d [her]” w hich in effect disr egarded her constitutional rights and that this fundamental error can be raised for t he first time on a ppeal. However, asabove noted,
even assuming any consti tutional ri ght is impl icated, a ques tion we donot decide, because the record does n ot includ e a cop y of the reference d service plans, it has not been adequately

presented for re view. Further, J ulie does not contend the alleged unfairness prejudiced or hindered her defens e. F inally, her argument fail s to demonstrate h ow the al leg ed unfairness would undermine the judicial consequences of th e jury verdict, which she does not chal lenge.
Moreover , under secti on 263.405(b) of the F amily Code, Julie was requir ed to file her statement of points on which s he intended to appeal. The point presented here was notincluded in t he statement of pointsfiled. Even though the fili ng of a statement of poin ts does not affect our juri sdiction, becaus e se cti on 26 3.40 5(a) make s app eals

of a2 We do not consider In Interest of W.J.H. Jr., J.J.H., D .D.H., and D .N.H., Chi ldren, No. 02-02-343-CV , 2003 Tex. App. LEX IS 5204 at *7 (Tex .App.–Fort Worth June 19, 2003, no pet. h.), cont rolling because no request for supplementa tion was presented. The Fort Worth Court held that a party’s failure to include a pa rticular point in the statement of points filed under section 263.405(b) does no t waive the right to raise suc h a point on appeal as long as the party

has complied w ith the procedural requirement to file a statement of poi nts and appellee has not been prejudiced. A ls o, Rule Tex. R. App. P. 34.6( c)(1), and (4) discussed in Bennett v. C ochran, 96 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. 2002) is not impli cated here. 5 termination order subject to the “procedures provided by this section,” the poin t has not bee n pre serve d fo r our r eview. 2 Julie’s sole point of err or is overruled. Accordingl y, the judg ment is affirmed.
Don H. Reavis Justice