IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1293

Filed January 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAMES WILLIAM THIEL SR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Patrick A. McElyea, 

Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his two convictions for involuntary 

manslaughter. AFFIRMED.

Leon F. Spies of Spies & Pavelich, Iowa City, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Heard by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2024).
2

BULLER, Judge.

A jury found James Thiel guilty of two counts of involuntary manslaughter. 

The convictions stem from a two-boat crash on the Iowa side of the Mississippi 

River. On appeal, Thiel claims the State violated his right to due process by 

suppressing two draft diagrams drawn by an expert witness before trial. He also 

argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. And he asserts 

the verdict was inconsistent and against the weight of the evidence. On our review, 

we affirm Thiel’s convictions. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

One August 2020 afternoon, Craig Verbeke, Anita Pinc, and their black 

Labrador Retriever Lily met people for lunch after Sunday church, as was weekly 

tradition. On this particular day, the couple dined with family, including two of 

Verbeke’s daughters. The group chose that location because it was close to the 

Mississippi River, and they planned to boat that afternoon on Pinc’s nineteen-foot 

Bayliner speed boat. After lunch, Verbeke and Pinc went out on the Bayliner, 

accompanied by Lily. A spectator tubing on the river later described the Bayliner 

nearly hitting a rock pile and idling in the path of boat traffic. 

Thiel, his wife, their three sons, and an employee’s family had a similar 

afternoon. The group got on the Thiel family’s boat—a thirty-five-foot Triton—just 

after noon and had lunch upriver. Throughout the day, Thiel’s fifteen-year-old son

was operating the boat. Thiel described his son as “a different breed when it 

comes to boating” who “always wanted to jump up in the seat with me and drive.” 

Thiel’s son got his boater’s license at twelve, and Thiel thought him to be “an 

extremely responsible and capable boater,” with experience operating the Triton. 
3

Thiel’s group was joined by some friends in a Scarab jet boat shortly after 

lunch. Both groups boated on the river and met up again later in the afternoon 

near some sand pits. After that, the Scarab group invited the Triton group to their

cabin for brisket. The Scarab group left “a little bit before” the Triton group, with 

Thiel’s son piloting the Triton. 

The groups initially took diverging paths: the Triton went down the main 

channel of the river, and the Scarab took shallower backwaters. But the two boats 

converged before long, as they made their way into LeClaire. 

According to the Scarab’s pilot, they were going 45 miles per hour (mph) as 

they approached the Riverboat Twilight (Twilight), a large ferry boat near a boat 

ramp. Thiel’s son recalled he was piloting the Triton around 40 mph. Thiel 

reported he was standing in the back of the boat, behind the console, and wasn’t 

giving his son any instructions: his son was “always in control of the boat.” 

According to Thiel’s son, the Scarab “was always a ways ahead of” them. Another 

passenger on the Scarab echoed this, claiming the Triton was following in the 

Scarab’s wake, which is “the safest place to be when you’re driving back.” Thiel 

and that passenger both testified the two boats were never side-by-side or racing. 

But disinterested witnesses on and around the river that day told a different 

story. These witnesses saw the Triton and the Scarab racing as they came into

town—close to shore—with “[p]robably a boat’s distance between each other” and 

the Scarab in the lead. The witnesses used varied and colorful language to 

describe the racing, but they were unanimous in describing the danger they 

perceived on the water: 
4

A witness along the waterfront: “I told [the police the Triton and 

Scarab] were hauling ass . . . .” 

A woman sitting on a bench next to the river: “Because the speed 

of how fast they were going . . . [it] felt like neck and neck, you know 

what I mean? Like, the one flew by, then the bigger one was right 

behind it. It just—and it was very excessive, the speed. And like I 

said I don’t know what the mile per hour is but it was very fast.”

A motorcyclist along the river: “[A]s we were approaching the 

Twilight there was two boats that came flying by at a high rate of 

speed next to the river. It actually startled me on the bike. And then 

at some point in time we heard a noise and the wife tapped me on 

the shoulder and said, ‘You better turn around.’ So we turned 

around.” 

The motorcycle passenger: “[T]hey were side by side going the 

same speed and almost like neck and neck. So it appeared to me 

that they were racing.” 

A passenger on another boat on the river: “I mean, for lack of a 

better way to say it, it seemed like they were almost scissoring at 

each other, just kind of going at each other, you know, racing and 

maybe taunting each other.” 

Another passenger on that same boat: “[T]hey were going at a 

good rate of speed. They were moving very fast and what I 

remember the most is seeing all the multicolored life jackets up in the 

front of the [Triton]. Appeared to be a bunch of children up in the 

front. We kind of had a conversation, you know, ‘why would you be 

driving like that with all those kids in the boat?’”

A teacher eating at a restaurant along the river: “I heard two boats 

open up which means they were just flooring it. They were going at 

a high rate of speed and it drew my attention. So I looked over my 

shoulder and I saw two boats side by side close to each other and 

close to the shore. And I remember making a comment to my wife, 

‘Look at those idiots racing past the boat landing that close.’” 

A woman eating dinner with her husband near the boat-ramp 

parking lot: “I said, ‘My God, he’s flying.’ And then as they went 

past us both of us said, ‘Oh, my God, he’s going to hit him.’” 

A passenger on another boat: “I’m sure that we made a lot of 

comments that I don’t know if you want me to elaborate on here [in 

the courtroom], but one of them was definitely, ‘They’re going to kill 
5

someone.’ I just don’t think any of us expected that to happen a few 

minutes later.” 

While the Scarab and the Triton approached the Twilight, an aluminum 

fishing boat was moving downriver. One of the fishing boat’s passengers saw the 

Scarab go by “a little fast for a heavy populated boat area.” After the Scarab, the 

men in the fishing boat saw Verbeke pilot the Bayliner “across the [Scarab’s] 

waves” upriver “straight” into their path. But then the Bayliner “veered off . . . very 

close” to the fishing boat, toward the other side of the river. Some witnesses 

described the Bayliner as “just kind of tootling along, not moving very fast”; others 

described the vessel as “sitting sideways in the middle of the river.” After this 

change in direction, the Triton and the Bayliner collided. 

Thiel and his son claimed to see the Bayliner hitting waves a “little bit like 

near” the Twilight before the collision. Thiel’s son testified the Bayliner then “cut 

across our path like they were cutting us off,” so he began to slow down and call 

for Thiel to come up from the back. “I was like, ‘Dad, I don’t know what these guys 

are doing. They’re driving crazy.’ And I was just yelling for him to come up and 

that’s what he did.” But Thiel testified he didn’t make it in time. According to Thiel’s 

son, the Bayliner “show[ed its] nose like it was going to the right of us” so he 

“instinctively turned left to try and avoid them.” But despite trying to “avoid the 

Bayliner at all costs,” Thiel’s son claimed the boat “turned back into us” leading to 

a collision. 

Other witnesses gave differing accounts of the collision. Some testified the 

Bayliner hit the Triton: “It’s my opinion that the little boat went right in the direction 
6

of where the [Triton] was going . . . .” And some witnesses testified the other way: 

“The big [boat] slammed into the little one.” 

The collision launched Thiel from the Triton into the river. He surfaced near 

the Bayliner and swam on board. Thiel discovered Verbeke near the Bayliner’s

console “slumped over the side of the boat” and could not tell if he was breathing. 

Thiel attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on Verbeke. 

Meanwhile, on the Triton, Thiel’s son “was shook.” He testified that, “once 

[the Bayliner] hit us it was like a blank in my mind, and then when I came back to 

it [Thiel] was just gone and I didn’t know where he went. I was freaking out.” One 

of the Triton’s passengers called 911 and gave Thiel’s son the phone. He told the 

operator: “We were going really fast and this boat pulled out in front of us. And we 

hit them.” 

Multiple law enforcement agencies, including the Iowa Department of 

Natural Resources (DNR), responded. Once the Bayliner was towed to shore, 

Thiel disembarked so firefighters could board. The firefighters declared Pinc dead 

at the scene. A medical examiner later determined her cause of death was blunt 

force injuries to the head, neck, and trunk. Verbeke still had a pulse, and first 

responders took him to the hospital. He died three days later from injuries 

sustained in the collision. 

Thiel spoke with police shortly after the crash and gave his version of 

events: 

We’re coming down the river. And all of a sudden, out of nowhere, 

this boat turns left into us. And I’m sitting at this helm with my son 

. . . and he’s like “dad, dad, dad!” and I said “well shut it down, shut 

it down.” And he comes and he hits us. And I’m on the right side of 

the boat and knocks me out of the boat. And I get up . . . I look 
7

around and all of a sudden I see this boat. And I climb up in this boat 

and I didn’t know there was anybody in it or not anybody in it. I 

jumped in and I found the driver. So I started giving him CPR. And 

I gave him CPR all the way . . . my friends pulled him back in. And 

I’m giving him CPR all the way back in man . . . I’m telling you we 

were going straight down the river and he came, we could not avoid 

him. 

That night, Thiel and others on the Triton maintained the Bayliner crashed

into them. And Thiel continued to say he was right next to his son at the helm 

during the collision. Thiel’s son told a DNR officer the Triton was “a little bit behind” 

the Scarab at the time of collision. And the Scarab’s pilot told the DNR’s lead 

investigator, Officer Travis Graves, they were “to the side” of the Triton before the 

collision. Both the Bayliner and Triton had coolers filled with alcohol on board. 

Verbeke’s blood alcohol content was .102—over the .08 legal limit. Thiel recalled 

he’d had at least seven drinks that day, starting around noon. 

Following a DNR investigation, the Scott County Attorney charged Thiel with 

four counts of involuntary manslaughter. Two counts alleged involuntary 

manslaughter by commission of a public offense, class “D” felonies in violation of

Iowa Code section 707.5(1)(a) (2020). The other two counts alleged involuntary 

manslaughter by acting in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury, 

aggravated misdemeanors in violation of section 707.5(1)(b). 

Based on results from the investigation, a DNR officer opined the damage 

to the Bayliner was inconsistent with it hitting the left side of the Triton. And a

Wisconsin DNR officer helping with the investigation concluded the damage 

instead showed the Triton struck the Bayliner. Relying on global positioning

system (GPS) data from the Triton, the Wisconsin DNR officer surmised: “there 

was no evasive action [by the Triton], no change in speed. If there was a course 
8

direction of change it was very minimal . . . I feel there was no evasive action to 

avoid that collision.” The Wisconsin officer could not say, however, whether the 

Bayliner turned into the Triton’s path. 

Employees of the company that manufactured the Triton’s center engine 

extracted and analyzed data from the engine’s electronic control unit. Based on 

this data, the employees concluded the Triton was at “full throttle” for most of the 

100 seconds right before the collision, traveling approximately 56.9 mph. They 

also found the Triton’s engine likely reduced speed in the final seven or eight 

seconds of operation. 

Iowa DNR Officer Graves, who testified as an expert for the State at trial,

concluded the Triton went over the top of the Bayliner at the time of collision. And 

he found this “override or ramping” motion indicated the Triton was operating at a 

high speed. Based on the Triton’s GPS data, Officer Graves calculated the boat 

was 100 yards from the Twilight and going 54.99 mph one minute before collision. 

Officer Graves estimated the Bayliner was going 25 to 35 mph. And he opined the 

Triton’s speed was not safe given “[t]he size of the boat, the location, where the 

incident happened at, [and] the amount of other boats in the water that day.” 

A focus of Officer Graves’s cross-examination was a diagram from his

report, referred to as Exhibit S4. According to Officer Graves, S4 “was used as a 

working document just to kind of paint a picture of where everyone was at just to 

provide a better understanding of the incident.” He generally agreed S4 was 

important to the investigation but “wouldn’t say it was the most important document 

in [his] investigation.” The diagram was based on a “compilation of GPS data, 
9

physical boat damage and eyewitness statements.” Based on that compilation, 

the diagram depicted the Bayliner turning right before the collision. 

A retired United States Coast Guard officer testified as Thiel’s expert. He

concluded Thiel’s son “was doing what was required” under the circumstances 

when he turned the Triton left. Based on his review of Officer Graves’s report and 

the underlying witness statements and data, Thiel’s expert determined “the vessels 

were not that close except, of course, when they collided. But had they maintained 

the course and speed before the collision they would have passed roughly 100 

feet apart.” He opined the Bayliner likely “reversed course” and turned into the 

Triton’s path. And he submitted Verbeke’s intoxication was the cause of collision. 

Thiel’s expert explained his analysis was based on his opinion that S4 was Officer 

Graves’s “best determination of where the” boats were. 

In rebuttal, Officer Graves testified that S4 was of “very little” importance in 

his overall investigation. And he reiterated that the diagram was not to scale. 

According to his testimony on rebuttal, the only thing certain on S4 was the position 

of the Triton because of its GPS data. The position of all other boats, paths, and 

distances was based on the recorded damage and witness testimony. 

For the first time on rebuttal cross-examination, Officer Graves testified 

there were “working documents” or earlier drafts of S4 that he had provided to the 

county attorney’s office. Before the case went to the jury, Thiel moved for 

production of any draft diagrams Officer Graves “prepared and furnished to the 

county attorney.” Thiel’s attorney made a record that he had not received any draft 

documents in discovery and indicated he might move “to reopen the record if 

there’s anything of substance about these additional documents.” The district 
10

court denied the motion based on the county attorney’s statement he provided 

everything received from Graves to the defense. The county attorney’s statement

ultimately proved inaccurate: he provided the defense with Graves’s entire 

investigative report but not the draft diagrams, which had apparently been e-mailed 

separately.

The jury found Thiel not guilty on both counts of involuntary manslaughter 

by public offense but convicted on both counts of involuntary manslaughter by 

conduct likely to cause death. Thiel polled the jury but made no other requests 

when the verdict was returned. 

Thiel later moved for a new trial. In his motion, he alleged a violation of his 

due process rights by the county attorney’s failure to disclose the draft diagrams 

before trial, asserted the verdicts were inconsistent, and asked the court to find the 

evidence heavily preponderated against the verdict and warranted a new trial. The 

district court orally denied Thiel’s motion for new trial at sentencing and ordered 

him to serve concurrent sentences of one year in jail with all but ninety days 

suspended for each count. 

Thiel appeals. 

II. Discussion

Thiel advances four arguments on appeal. First, he reiterates his claim the 

State violated his due process rights by not turning over the two draft diagrams. 

Second, he asserts his convictions are not supported by substantial evidence. 

Finally, he makes two challenges to the ruling on the motion for new trial, asserting 

the verdict was inconsistent and it was against the weight of the evidence. The 
11

State responds to each argument on the merits but also raises error-preservation 

and wavier concerns. We address each of Thiel’s claims in turn.

A. Due Process and the Draft Diagrams

A prosecutor’s potential failure to produce exculpatory evidence can violate

due process. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1963). We review alleged 

Brady violations de novo. State v. Leedom, 938 N.W.2d 177, 185 (Iowa 2020). 

To show a Brady violation related to the draft diagrams, Thiel had to prove

three elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. The prosecution suppressed evidence;

2. This evidence was favorable to the accused; and

3. The evidence was material to the issue of guilt.

Cornell v. State, 430 N.W.2d 384, 385 (Iowa 1988) (citation omitted). The district 

court found Thiel proved none of the three. For purposes of this appeal, we focus

on materiality. See State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 552 (Iowa 1996) (opting to 

only address one prong of the analysis). On this element, the district court found 

the draft diagrams were not material to guilt because they had little impact on trial 

preparation, strategy, or the ultimate weight of the evidence. 

Suppressed “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); 

accord Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 523 (Iowa 2003). This “reasonable 

probability” does not require proof the defendant would “more likely than not” have 

been acquitted. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). But the evidence 

must do more than show the “reasonable possibility” of a different outcome. 

DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 105 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). In short, 
12

we ask whether the suppressed evidence so “undermine[s] our confidence in the 

jury verdict” as to warrant a new trial. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d at 552.

In conducting the materiality analysis, we “examin[e] a counterfactual of 

how the trial would have played out with timely disclosure.” State v. Cahill, 972 

N.W.2d 19, 29 (Iowa 2022). We consider the suppressed evidence collectively, 

not “item by item.” Aguilera v. State, 807 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Iowa 2011) (citing 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436–37). When it comes to impeachment evidence, a new trial 

is not warranted when “the impeachment value of [allegedly suppressed] evidence 

was merely incremental.” Romeo, 542 N.W.2d at 552. 

Thiel’s claim on materiality is largely speculative, arguing he could have 

done a better job impeaching Officer Graves if he had the draft diagrams. But 

Thiel’s own expert, who reviewed the same underlying substantive evidence that 

went into the diagrams, opined that Officer Graves’s final diagram was “one of the 

best pieces of work I’ve seen in forty-one years relative to combining all the 

information, all the witness statements in coming up with a report.” And Thiel does 

not identify any evidence he believes Officer Graves ignored, misunderstood, or 

failed to include in the final diagram. 

Thiel’s reply brief posits the draft diagrams might have enabled his expert 

to “address more accurately the thoroughness of the law enforcement 

investigation” or potential bias. But this is a general assertion made without citation 

to the record and without the support of additional testimony or a report from his

expert. See State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 905 (Iowa 2003) (finding defendant’s 

claims that suppressed evidence “hindered the defense team’s trial preparation” 

to be “generalized assertions” when defendant did not specify how that evidence 
13

“would have called his guilt into question or changed his trial strategy”), overruled

on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Iowa 2010)).

The district court below correctly pointed out the State did not offer or rely 

on the final diagram at trial, which suggests it had limited value to the prosecution’s 

overall case. Although Officer Graves conceded the exhibit was important to his 

investigation and the diagram was his best attempt at compiling the facts, he 

testified the real purpose of the diagram was “to help paint a picture” for readers 

of his report. The trial was replete with testimony from many of the eyewitnesses

relied on by Officer Graves in creating the diagram, and the witnesses consistently 

described how Thiel’s boat was operated at a reckless speed before the fatal 

collision. See Aguilera, 807 N.W.2d at 257 (noting we consider whether the 

suppressed evidence “would change the defendant’s trial strategy” in assessing 

materiality). These witnesses were subject to well-prepared cross-examination, 

and Thiel offers no concrete explanation for how that testimony would have 

unfolded differently with timely disclosure of the draft diagrams.

Overall, we find Thiel did not carry his burden to prove “the trial would have 

taken on a different dynamic” if he had received the two draft diagrams in 

discovery. DeSimone, 803 N.W.2d at 106. To the extent the drafts may have 

helped better cross-examine Officer Graves or supplied additional ammunition for

Thiel’s expert to undermine Graves, any impeachment value would be “merely 

incremental” and does not shake our confidence in the verdict so as to warrant a 

new trial. See Romeo, 524 N.W.2d at 552; see also Watkins v. Medeiros, 36 

F.4th 373, 390–91 (1st Cir. 2022) (finding no Brady violation in a federal habeas 

case when State failed to produce a “crime scene diagram” created by police that
14

was “not drawn to scale” and “would have a nominal effect on impeaching” the 

State’s key witness). Finding a failure of proof on the materiality prong of the 

analysis, we affirm the district court’s rejection of Thiel’s Brady claim.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Thiel next argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

verdict on his two manslaughter convictions. We review sufficiency claims for 

correction of legal error. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d at 27. While reviewing, “[w]e are 

highly deferential to the [fact-finder]’s verdict” because it “binds this court if the 

verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 967 

N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021)). In deciding whether evidence is substantial, “we 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate 

inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the 

record evidence.’” Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 339 (quoting State v. Tipton, 987 N.W.2d 

653, 692 (Iowa 2017)). 

Before the merits, we address the State’s claim Thiel waived this argument

by failing to adequately brief it. Thiel’s opening brief sets out a sufficiency 

challenge in the second heading, and he recites the correct standards of review at 

the start of his discussion section. But according to the State, Thiel failed to offer 

an “argument containing [his] contentions and the reasons for them with citations 

to the authorities relied on and references to the pertinent parts of the record” within 

the body of his challenge. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3). In his reply brief, 

Thiel points us to pages where he says he challenged sufficiency. But even those 

pages blur the sufficiency and weight-of-the-evidence analyses. See State v. 

Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003) (explaining the difference between 
15

these arguments); State v. Rivers, No. 18-0365, 2019 WL 2150807, at *1 n.2 (Iowa 

Ct. App. May 15, 2019) (reiterating that a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge

and a weight-of-the-evidence challenge are “free-standing substantive 

argument[s]” that require more than “boilerplate citations to legal authorities”). 

Assuming without deciding Thiel did not waive his sufficiency argument, we 

address the merits. 

A person commits misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter “when the 

person unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of 

an act in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury.” Iowa Code 

§ 707.5(1)(b). Under our case law, recklessness is also required. State v. Conner, 

292 N.W.2d 682, 686 (Iowa 1980). As marshaled, the State had to prove:

1. On or about the 16th day of August, 2020, [Thiel] recklessly 

allowed the vessel to be operated in an unsafe manner.

2. [Thiel] did the act in a manner likely to cause death or 

serious injury.

3. By doing the act, [Thiel] unintentionally caused the death of 

Craig Verbeke [and Anita Pinc] . . . . 

The jury instructions guide our sufficiency analysis. See State v. Canal, 773 

N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009). As marshaled, causation is met if Thiel’s actions 

were “a substantial factor” in Pinc and Verbeke’s deaths and their deaths “would 

not have happened except for [his] acts.” On recklessness, the instructions 

required proof Thiel “willfully disregard[ed] the safety of persons or property,” which 

is “more than a lack of reasonable care which may cause unintentional injury” and

instead requires proof he acted “consciously . . . with willful disregard of the 

consequences.” The jury was also instructed “the danger must be so obvious that 
16

the actor knows or should reasonably foresee that harm will more likely than not 

result from the act.” 

Thiel’s argument on appeal boils down to his view the jury believed the 

wrong witnesses and came to the wrong conclusion. He highlights that some 

witnesses on the Triton and Scarab testified the boats were not racing and that his 

expert found his son’s turn left turn proper under the circumstances. He also 

emphasizes witness testimony describing the Bayliner’s dangerous boating activity 

earlier in the day to support his claim the Bayliner crossed into the Triton’s path. 

(We assume without deciding this argument about the Bayliner does not run afoul

of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404’s bar on propensity evidence.) Finally, he flags 

Verbeke’s potential intoxication as a cause of the collision.

Accepting or rejecting testimony is the role of the jury—not our appellate 

courts. See State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006). Jurors could have 

chosen to believe Officer Graves’s testimony that the Triton should have turned 

right to avoid colliding with the Bayliner. The jury was also free to believe the host 

of witnesses on the river who saw the Triton and Scarab as “idiots racing,” “hauling 

ass” like “they’re going to kill someone.” Analysis of the Triton’s GPS and engine 

data bolstered this eyewitness testimony by demonstrating the Triton was going 

dangerously fast. Finally, the jury could accept or reject observations about how 

the Bayliner was operating that day and still find Thiel allowing his son to race the 

Triton in busy waters was reckless. Given this record, substantial evidence 

supports the convictions and Thiel has given us no basis for disturbing the jury 

verdict.
17

C. The Post-Trial Inconsistent-Verdicts Challenge

Thiel next claims the jury returned an inconsistent verdict when it acquitted

him of manslaughter by public offense but convicted him of manslaughter by 

conduct likely to cause death. He argues he is owed a new trial. We address 

error-preservation concerns voiced by the State before moving to the merits. 

1. Was the inconsistent-verdict challenge preserved? 

The State’s error-preservation argument is twofold. First, it asserts the 

district court failed to rule on Thiel’s inconsistent-verdict argument when denying 

his weight challenge, leaving us with no ruling to review. And second, the State 

argues “a post-verdict motion for new trial is not the preferred mechanism for 

identifying and correcting inconsistent verdicts” and Thiel failed to preserve error 

because he did not raise the issue before the jury was discharged.

Starting with the first argument, Thiel maintains the district court’s oral 

denial of his weight challenge encompassed his inconsistent-verdict argument, on 

the theory that the court ruled “the motion for new trial is denied” and implicitly 

rejected all claims made in the motion, even though the court did not expressly 

address inconsistent verdicts. Given our disposition of this issue on the merits, we 

assume without deciding error was preserved.

Moving to the second error-preservation hurdle, Thiel candidly 

acknowledges raising an inconsistent-verdict challenge before discharging the jury 

“may be the preferred method.” But he insists the challenge is properly before us 

based on how similar claims have been treated in the past. See State v. Halstead, 

791 N.W.2d 805, 807 n.1 (Iowa 2010) (noting the State conceded error 

preservation); State v. Hernandez, 538 N.W.2d 884, 888–89 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) 
18

(reviewing an inconsistent-verdicts claim first brought by post-trial motion while 

recognizing the claimed error arose when the verdict was returned). Our case law 

recognizes this remains a murky issue and we’ve avoided deciding whether raising 

the challenge before discharge of the jury is required. See State v. Merrett, 842 

N.W.2d 266, 276 (Iowa 2014) (declining to rule on whether the doctrine of invited 

error applies); see also State v. LuCore, 989 N.W.2d 209, 219 & n.9 (Iowa Ct. App. 

2023) (“[s]idestepping” error-preservation issues for an inconsistent-verdicts claim 

following a bench trial, but noting the State’s position that a post-trial motion would 

preserve error there). We opt again to reach the merits, leaving this thorny errorpreservation question for another day when it may be dispositive. See State v. 

Doorenbos, No. 19-1257, 2020 WL 3264408, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2020) 

(opting to review an inconsistent-verdicts claim despite the State making a similar 

preservation argument).

2. Were the verdicts legally inconsistent? 

“The consequence of a potentially inconsistent jury verdict is a question of 

law” that implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights. Merrett, 842 N.W.2d 

at 272; see also Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 814–16. Our review is de novo. Merrett, 

842 N.W.2d at 272–73.

When we examine jury verdicts for inconsistency, we ask whether the 

verdicts are “so logically and legally inconsistent as to be irreconcilable within the 

context of the case.” State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 101 (Iowa 2004). In doing 

so, we liberally construe the verdicts “to give effect to the intention of the jury and 

to harmonize the verdicts if it is possible to do so.” State v. Goodon, No. 19-0174, 

2020 WL 2060301, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020). 
19

In returning a guilty verdict for involuntary manslaughter by conduct likely to 

cause death, the jury needed to find Thiel “recklessly allowed the vessel to be 

operated in an unsafe manner.” Thiel alleges the inconsistency lies in the jury 

simultaneously acquitting him of involuntary manslaughter by public offense, which 

means the jury found one or more of these elements was not proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt:

1. On or about the 16th day of August, 2020, the Defendant, 

or someone he aided and abetted, recklessly committed the crime of 

Prohibited Operation of a Vessel . . . .

2. When the Defendant committed the crime, he 

unintentionally caused the death of Craig Verbeke [and Anita 

Pinc] . . . . 

The marshalling instructions defined prohibited operation of a vessel to mean 

“operating any vessel in a careless, reckless or negligent manner so as to 

endanger the life, limb or property of any person.” 

Based on the elements, Thiel argues the verdicts are legally inconsistent 

because the jury had to believe Thiel or someone he aided and abetted operated 

the Triton in a “careless, reckless, or negligent manner.” Thiel equates the jury’s 

finding that he did not aid and abet in the reckless operation of the Triton with its 

conclusion that he “recklessly allowed the [Triton] to be operated in an unsafe 

manner.” According to Thiel, for the jury to find he “recklessly allowed” his son to 

operate the Triton unsafely, it would necessarily need to find he aided and abetted 

another in operating the boat in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner. See 

Doorenbos, 2020 WL 3264408, at *4 (noting many inconsistent-verdict challenges 

involve offenses with overlapping elements). 
20

As our case law recognizes, and the jury here was correctly instructed, a

person aids and abets in the commission of a crime when they knowingly approve 

and agree to a “criminal act either by active participation or by some manner 

encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission.” State v. Lilly, 930 

N.W.2d 293, 308 (Iowa 2019) (citation omitted); see also State v. Allen, 633 

N.W.2d 752, 754 (Iowa 2001). In contrast, the word “allow” carries no precise legal 

definition and no explanation in the jury instructions. A legal dictionary’s definition

of “allow” identifies eleven different meanings. See Allow, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019). Two notable definitions include the more-passive “[t]o put no 

obstacle in the way of; to suffer to exist or occur; to tolerate” and the more-active 

“[t]o give consent to; to approve.” Id. A non-legal dictionary offers eight definitions, 

including “to let do or happen; permit,” “to make provision for,” and “to admit; grant.” 

See Allow, American Heritage Dictionary 96 (2d college ed. 1985).

Despite this deluge of definitions, we need not choose one to the exclusion 

of all others. State v. Ellison, 985 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Iowa 2023) (words in a jury 

instruction need not be defined when they are not “beyond the lexicon of a 

reasonable juror”); Thongvanh v. State, 494 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 1993) (words 

do not require definition when they are “a term of common usage and readily 

understandable”). Even assuming jurors understood “allow” to carry a more-active 

meaning—that Thiel recklessly consented to, approved of, or permitted the 

reckless operation of the Triton—the jury could have concluded that fell short of 

the active participation or encouragement required to prove aiding and abetting. 

See Lilly, 930 N.W.2d at 308; Allen, 633 N.W.2d at 754. We are mindful that we 

need not delve into the facts in resolving an inconsistent-verdicts challenge. See 
21

Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815. But we think the facts support our conclusion that 

the elements are not legally inconsistent. The jury here could have found both that 

Thiel did not actively participate in or encourage his son’s recklessness (so he did 

not aid and abet) and that Thiel knew his son was operating the boat at a reckless 

speed and did nothing to stop him (so he permitted reckless operation). Because 

we can harmonize the verdicts, we reject Thiel’s plea that we peer into “Pandora’s 

box by probing into the sanctity of jury deliberations.” See id.

We also find a second legal distinction between elements of the allegedly

inconsistent manslaughter offenses: the required manner of operation. For the 

jury to find Thiel guilty of manslaughter by public offense, jurors had to find the 

Triton was operated “in a careless, reckless or negligent manner so as to endanger 

the life, limb or property of any person.” But for Thiel to be convicted of

manslaughter by conduct likely to cause death, the jury only had to find the vessel 

was operated in an “unsafe manner.” Thiel asserts that “operating a boat in an 

‘unsafe manner’ is the same as operating it carelessly or negligently.” But Thiel 

cites no case law supporting this conclusion, did not argue it to the jury, and never 

requested an instruction to that effect. When we liberally construe the verdicts in 

search of harmony, we find the jury could have concluded Thiel’s son operated the 

boat in an unsafe manner that was less than careless or negligent. See Goodon, 

2020 WL 2060301, at *3 (on harmonizing verdicts). The verdicts were not legally 

inconsistent.

D. Weight of the Evidence

Thiel concludes by contending the jury’s verdict was “contrary to the weight 

of the evidence.” See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(6) (2021). When evidence 
22

“preponderates heavily” against a verdict, the district court may grant a new trial to 

avoid a miscarriage of justice. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa 1998)

(citation omitted). This standard requires the district court to “weigh the evidence 

and consider the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 658 (citation omitted). But on our 

review, we don’t independently re-weigh evidence or judge a witness’s credibility

for ourselves—we review the district court’s exercise of discretion, only reversing 

when a ruling rests on plainly untenable grounds or was clearly unreasonable. 

State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 134 (Iowa 2004).

Much of Thiel’s argument on this ground is a repackaged challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence. He points to allegedly conflicting testimony and urges 

that the greater weight of credible evidence favored acquittal rather than 

conviction. In rejecting this claim below, the district court found: 

[T]his case was pretty clearly a credibility determination for the jury, 

and . . . they made their determination that the Thiel boat was being 

driven unsafely and in a manner likely to cause death or serious 

injury. That they found the conduct was reckless. And in addition to 

the subjective evidence of the witnesses that were presented, the 

jury also clearly found the objective evidence credible such as the 

GPS and speed information as well as to the damage of the boats. 

And so the Court finds that their finding is supported by the weight of 

the evidence.

Thiel offers no reason to believe this analysis was clearly unreasonable or 

untenable. While there was some conflicting evidence over whether the Triton was 

racing and whether the Bayliner crossed into the path of the Triton, every 

eyewitness other than those in the Triton or Scarab saw the Triton racing, and their 

accounts speak directly and colorfully to recklessness. Based on the uniformity 

among disinterested witnesses and the “objective evidence” described by the 

district court, this is not an “exceptional case[ ]” where “the evidence 
23

preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 202 (citation 

omitted). The district court was in a better position than we are to assess 

credibility, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the new-trial ruling.

III. Disposition 

We leave the error-preservation and waiver questions concerning 

inconsistent verdicts for another day and reject Thiel’s challenges to his 

convictions on the merits.

AFFIRMED.