UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MAURICE CHARLES MAXWELL, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-6014

(D.C. No. 5:10-CR-00117-F-1)

(W.D. Oklahoma)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

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Convicted of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, Mr. 

Maurice Maxwell was sentenced to 87 months in prison. After the

sentencing, the U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782, 

which led to a reduction in the guideline range for Mr. Maxwell. U.S.S.G. 

supp. app. C., amend. 782 (2014).

 * The parties do not request oral argument, and the Court has 

determined that oral argument would not materially aid our consideration 

of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we 

have decided the appeal based on the briefs.

Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 2, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court
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Based on this amendment, Mr. Maxwell moved for a sentence 

reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the

motion, concluding that Mr. Maxwell presented a danger to the public 

based on his criminal history and institutional disciplinary record. Mr. 

Maxwell appeals. We ask: Did the district court abuse its discretion by

denying a sentence reduction based on a danger to the public? We conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion; as a result, we affirm. 

I. Standard of Review

In considering the district court’s ruling, we apply the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See United States v Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1238

(10th Cir. 2008). Under this standard, we can reverse only if the district 

court made a clear error of judgment or went beyond the bounds of 

permissible choice. United States v. Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th 

Cir. 1996).

II. Sentencing Reductions Under § 3582(c)(2)

In exercising its discretion, the district court had to conduct a twostep inquiry to determine whether to grant a sentence reduction. Dillon v. 

United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824-25 (2010).

The first step was to determine whether the defendant was eligible 

for a sentence reduction. United States v. McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1292 

(10th Cir. 2010). This step is not at issue here because the government 
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does not challenge Mr. Maxwell’s eligibility. Government’s Br. at 6; see 8 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.

The second step involved consideration of the factors set out in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). McGee, 615 F.3d at 1292. The district court considered 

these factors and found a public danger based on Mr. Maxwell’s criminal 

history and institutional violations. Appellant’s App. at 109-10. 

Considering the need “to protect the public from further crimes,” the 

district court denied the motion. Id. at 109 (quoting § 3553(a)(2)(C)).

Mr. Maxwell argues that the district court gave too little weight to 

his youth, his troubled background and history of mental illness, and the 

institutional punishments already imposed for his infractions. But the 

district court weighed these considerations. Id. at 109, 140–41. In doing 

so, the court acknowledged Mr. Maxwell’s youth and the fact that his most 

recent institutional violation had occurred eleven months earlier. Id. at 

109. Notwithstanding these factors, the court believed Mr. Maxwell 

presented a public danger. Id. The district court had the discretion to 

balance the factors as it did.

The district court could reasonably focus on Mr. Maxwell’s criminal 

history and prison disciplinary records, for federal law requires courts to 

consider the factors under § 3553(a) when determining whether to reduce a 

sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). These factors include the 
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defendant’s history, his characteristics, and the need to provide deterrence 

and protect the public from future crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(a)–(c) (2012); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B)(ii) (2014)

(instructing the court to consider “the nature and seriousness of the danger 

to any person or the community that may be posed by a reduction in the 

defendant's term of imprisonment”); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n. 1(B)(iii) 

(2014) (allowing consideration of “conduct of the defendant that occurred 

after imposition of the term of imprisonment”). Thus, the court acted 

within its discretion in denying Mr. Maxwell’s motion.

III. Generality of the District Court’s Consideration of Public Safety

Mr. Maxwell argues the guidelines and accompanying comments fail 

to tell courts how to consider public safety, creating a “catch-all 

justification” to rationalize a “generalized belief that Mr. Maxwell ought to 

stay in prison.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12. In Mr. Maxwell’s view, the 

district court relied on its generalized belief that more time in prison 

would maximize public safety. Id.

We reject this argument. Regardless of whether the Sentencing 

Commission should have given greater detail, our review is limited, 

focusing solely on whether the district court abused its discretion. The 

guidelines and accompanying comments allow district courts to use their

discretion in considering public safety when asked to reduce a sentence. 
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The court acted within the bounds of its discretion given the existing 

guidelines and comments.

Mr. Maxwell also criticizes the district court for considering the 

infractions committed in prison. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 17-18. We 

reject this criticism, for we have held that a district court can consider 

prison infractions in determining whether to deny a § 3582(c)(2) motion. 

See United States v. Osborn, 679 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(holding that prison disciplinary reports could justify denial of a motion to 

reduce the sentence under § 3582(c)(2)).

IV. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a sentence 

reduction. As a result, we affirm.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach

Circuit Judge