### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON FE BR U A RY 15, 200 5 S es sio n

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E, D EP A R TM EN T O F C HI LD R EN ’S S ER V IC ES v.

TAKE TA PURYEAR and J OHNNI E B. McNEAL

In t he M at te r of : C

. M cN

. ( d/ o/b 4/1 0/0 0) , J. P

. ( d/ o/b 9/7 /01 ) an d J. M cN

. ( d/ o/b 12/ 18/ 02) , C hi ld re n U nd erEi gh te en Y ea rs of A ge

Direc t Appeal fromthe Juvenile Court for F ayett e County

No. C-110 We ber Mc Gr aw, Ju dge

No. W2004-02878-C OA-R3-P T - Marc h 30, 2005

Th e Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s b e g a n p ro vid ing se rv ic e s to the bio log ic a l pa re nts of three minor children in De cembe r of 2000. Eve ntually
, all three children w ere remove d from the ho me a ft e r the juv e nil e c ou rt de te rm ine d th e y

we re de pe nd e nt and n e g le c te d d ue to the pa re nts ’ failure to provide for

their medica l and nutritional needs. The department cre ated a perma nency

plan for e ach c hild calling for the pa rents to provide a dequate housing, pr ovide for the children’ s medical and nutritional ne eds, underg o a psy cholog ical evaluation a nd follow throug h wi t h t reatment
rec ommendations, and participate in counse ling/par enting classes de signe d to teach the pare nts how to a de qu a te ly pr ov ide fo r the ir c hil dr e n. Th e de pa rt me nt s ub se qu e ntl y

fi le d a pe tit ionto t e rm inate the biologica l pa

rents’ pare ntal rig hts, a lleg ing the g rounds of abandonme n t , s u b s tantial

nonco mp li a n c e w ith th e r e s p o n s ib il it ie s in th e p e r man e n c y p lan s , p e r s is te n t c o n d it io n s , and the mother’s a lleg ed mental i n co m p et ency . Following a trial, the juve nile court e ntere d an orde r terminating the biologica l pa rents’ pare ntal rig hts to their minor children. The juvenile court found that the d e p a

rtment proved by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the pa rents abandoned the c hildren, subs t an t ially

failed to c omply

with the responsibilities in the permane ncy plans, and a llowed cond it io n s to p e r s is t w h ic h ma d e it u n s a f e to r e tu r n th e c h il d r e n to th e p ar e n ts

. I n a d d it io n , the juv e nil e c ou rt fo un d tha t termin a tin g the pa re nts ’ pare nta l rig hts wa s in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st. Only the mother filed an appea l to contest the juvenile court’s judgme nt. We affirm.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S
., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

J . Ba rney Wit hering ton, I V, Covington, TN, f or Appe llant

Paul G . Summe rs , Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r, Sha ro n G. Hu tc hin s, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, Nashville, TN, f

or Appe lleeFa t h er di d n ot f i l e a n ot i ce of

a ppea l i n t h i s c ase, ther ef o re, o n l y M ot h er ’ s pa r en t al r i g h t s a r e at i s s u e on 1

a p p e a l.

-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

Take ta Pur y ea r ( “M o t h er ” o r “ Ap p el l an t ”) an d J o h n n i e M cN ea l (“ Fa t h er ”) ar e t h e b i o l og ical 1 pa re nts of th ree min or

c hil dr e n: C .L .M . ( do b: 0 4/1 0/2 00 0) , J.V .P. (d ob : 09 /07 /20 01 ), a ndJ.L .M

. (dob: 12/18/2002) (collec tively “the Children” ). Mother and Father ha ve bee n toge ther for approximately

eig ht y ear s and ha v e never marrie d. The Children a re a ll considered spe cial nee ds children due to their deve lopmental delay s.

Th e Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt of Chi ldr e n’ s Se rv ic e s be g a n p ro vid ing se rv ic e s to the famil y in Dec ember

of 2000. C.L .M. and J.V.P . came int o t h e prote ctive custody of the Te nnessee Depa rtment of Children’s Service s (“D CS” or “Appe llee”) on Fe bruary 5, 2002, afte r DCS filed a petition alleg ing the se childre n wer e depe ndent and neg lected due to the par ents’ failure to provide for their nece ssary medical and nutritional needs. I n particula r, J.V.P . had to be hospitalized for poor weig ht g ain, and DCS a lleg ed the pare nts f ailed to ta

ke these children to the doct o r w h en they became seriously

ill. J .L .M. came into the protec tive custody of DCS on or around A ug ust 1, 2003, afte r DCS f

iled a petition a lleg ing this c hild to be depende nt and neg lected due to the pare nts’ failure to provide for

her me dical and nutritional needs as we ll.

D CS s u b s e q u e n tl y c r e a te d a p e r man e n c y p lan f o r e a c h c h il d

. T h e p e r man e n c y p lans for J .V.P. an d C. L

. M

. r e q u ir e d M o th e r to d o th e f

o ll o w in g : ( 1 ) p r o v id e f

o r th e me d ic a l an d p h y sical needs of eac h child; (2) provide a s afe , stable home; (3) complete a psy cholog ical eva luation and follow throug h with treatment rec ommendations; and (4) participate in counseling /pare nting c lasses desig ned to teac h Mother how to pr ovide for her children’ s basic needs, nourishment, and medica l

car e. The perma nency

plan for J.L .M. called for Mother to do the following : (1) provide for the child’s medica l and nutritional needs; (2) provide a safe , stable h o m e; and (3) attend par enting classes.

O n D e c e m b e r

5
, 2 0 0 3
, D C S f

i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e J u v e n i l e C o u r to f F a ye t t e C o u n t y, Tenne ssee, se eking to terminate Mother ’s par ental rig hts as to J

. V. P

. an d C

. L .M. The petition alleg ed that J.V.P . and C.L .M. had bee n in DCS custodysince their r emoval in Fe bruary of 2002. DC S a lle g e d th e fo ll owi ng a s g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatin g Mo the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts : ( 1) pu rs ua nt t o section 36-1-113( g )(1) of the Te nnessee Code, Mother’s a bandonment of the se two childre n; (2) pu rs ua nt t o s e c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3( g )( 2) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e , M oth e r’ s su bs ta nti a l no nc omp lia n c ew i th the statement of r esponsibiliti es in the permanenc y plans; (3) pursuant to se ction 36-1-113( g )(3) (A) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e , M oth e r’ s f a ilu re to r e me dy

the c on dit ion s whi c h led to t he re mov a l of

the se children; a nd (4) pur suant to section 36-1-113( g)( 8 ) o f the Te nnessee Code, Mother’s me ntal incompetenc e. In addition, DCS allege d that, pursuant to sec tion 36-1-113(i) of the Tenne ssee Co de,-3-

termination of Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts was in the best interest of J .V.P. and C .L .M. On J une 11, 2004, DCS filed an amende d petition seeking to terminate Mother ’s par ental rig hts as to J .L .M. as well. The amended pe tition s tated that J.L .M. had continuously been in the custody

of DCS since Aug ust of 2003, and DCS reiter ated the g rounds for te rmination listed in the origina l petition.
Spe c if ic a lly , DCS all e g e d tha t, wh ile Mo the r ha d co mpl e te d tw o s e ts o f p are nti ng c la sse s, she fa iled to implement appropriate pare nting tech n i q u es. While Mother did underg o a psy chologi ca l evaluation, DCS contende d that she fa iled to follow throug h with treatment

rec ommendations. DCS also alleg ed that she failed to provide a safe
, stable hom e for the Children. The pe tition s tated that, while DCS attempted to assist Mother with obtaining p u b l i c housing by providing money

for f urniture, the le ase de posit, and rent for the first month, Mother failed to pay for the utili ty deposit. As a result, Mother could not move into the new apartment. DCS also cited bo th p are nts ’ f

a ilu re to d isc los e the ir

prior c ri min a l hi sto ri e s o n th e ho us ing app licati on wh ic h, if dis c los e d, wo uldha ve pr e ve nte d th e m f rom qu a lif

y ing fo r p ub lic ho us ing . Wh ile Mo the r d id consistently

visit with the Children while they wer e in DCS custody , DCS alleg ed that such visitation amounted to token visitation. I n addition, DCS noted that neither pare nt paid child support for the

c hil dr e n w hil e the y

we re in D CS c us tod y . M oth e r fi le d a re sp on se to the pe tit ionde nying the se particula r alleg ations.

The juvenile court conducte d a hearing on the petition f iled by DCS on J une 16, 2004, and enter ed an or der on A ug ust 4, 2004, terminating Mothe r’s pa renta l rig hts to the Chi ldren. The juvenile court found that DCS proved the following g rounds for termination by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e: (1) Mothe r, pursua nt to section 36-1-113(g )(1) of the Te nnessee Code
, ab an d o n ed the Chi ldr e n; ( 2) pu rs ua nt t o s e c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3( g )( 2) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e , M oth e r f a ile d to

su bs ta nti a lly

c omp ly wi th h e r r e sp on sib ili tie s u nd e r the pe rm a ne nc y plans ; a nd(3 ) p urs ua nt t o section 36-1- 113(g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code, the condit i o n s which led to re moval of the Children or other c onditions st ill persisted, thereb y p re v en t ing the ir safe return to Mother . The juvenile court also found that, pursuant to sec tion 36-1-113(i) of the Tenne ssee Code, te rminating Mother’s pa

renta l rig hts was in the Children’s best intere st.

Mother filed an appea l to this Court presenting the following issues for our r eview:

I

. Whether the juvenile c ourt er re d i n finding that DCS proved ea ch g round for terminating Mother’s pa

renta l rig hts to the Chil dren by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e; and I I

. Whether the trial court e rre d in finding that terminating Mother’s pa renta l rig hts was in the Children’s best intere st.

For the reasons set forth more fully here in, we af

firm the juvenile c ourt’s dec ision in all respects.-4- II. S TA N D A R D O F R E V I E W

“A biologica l pa

rent’s interest in the car e, custody
, and control of his or her c hild is among the ol dest of t he judi cially rec og nized fundamental liberty interests.” Ray v. Ray , 83 S.W .3d 726, 7 3 2 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Trox e l v . G ra nv ill e , 530 U.S

. 5 7 , 6 5 (2 0 0 0)). B oth the United States an d Tenne ssee Constitutions rec og nize that parents have a fundamental rig ht to the car e, custody , and contr ol of their childre n. Santosky v . Kramer , 4 5 5 U. S

. 7 45, 754 (1982); Stanley v. Il lin ois , 4 05 U. S. 6 45 , 6 51 (1 97 2) ; Keisling v. Keisling , 9 2 S. W.3 d 3 74 , 3 78 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; In re Swanson , 2 S.W. 3d 18 0, 18 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; Ha wk v . H awk
, 85 5 S.W. 2d 57 3, 57 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; Ray , 83 S.W. 3da t 73 2. Ho we ve r, thi s is no t a ri g ht wh ic h is e nti re ly imm un e fr om s ta te inv olv e me nt. In re Dr inn on v . B ro wn , 7 76 S.W. 2d96 , 9 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp

. 19 88 ). A b iol og ic a l pa re nt’ s rig hts

re g a rd i n g t h e c u s t o d y

o f m i n o r c h i l d r e n w i l l c o n t i n u e s o l o n g a s t h e p ar e n t s h a v e n o tv o l u n ta ri ly relinquished their rights, a bandoned the ir rig hts, or eng ag ed in conduc t requiring the limitation or termination of t heir rig hts. Blair v. Badenhope
, 77 S.W. 3d 13 7, 14 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Sto k e s v . A rn old
, 27 S.W .3d 516, 520 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Procee dings in Te nnessee to terminate the pare ntal rig hts of a biologica l pare nt are g overne d by statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113 (2003); J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 20 02 ); In re C.M.M

. , No. M2003-01122-COA- R3-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 160, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004); In re Z.J.S. , No. M2002-02235-COA- R3-J V, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 415, at *31 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 3, 2003). Aparty see k i ng to terminate a

biologica l pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts must prove two things: (1) the exis tence of one of the statutory g rounds justify ing te rmination by c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e , T e nn . Co de An n. § 36-1-1 13 (c )( 1) (2 00 3) ; In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W. 3d36 0, 36 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W.3 d 539 , 546 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W. 3d46 7, 47 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; a nd(2 ) t e rm inatin g the bio log ic a l pa re nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts is i n th e c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re sts , T e nn . Co de An n. § 36- 1- 11 3( c )( 2) (2 00 3) ; I n r e A

. W. , 114 S.W .3d 54 1, 54 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 3) ; I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d at 475–76.
Terminating a biolog ical par ent’s parental rights i s a harsh result, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113( l )(1) (2003), ther efor e, in orde r t o preve nt the unwar rante d termination of par ental rig hts, the leg islature requires the heig htened c lear and convinc ing e vidence standard of proof. Ray v . Ray , 83 S.W. 3d 72 6, 73 3 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 ); I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W.3 d at 4 74 . T his Cou rt ha s p re vio us ly de sc ri be d th e c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e stand ardin the fo llo wi ng te rm s:

Evidence that satisfies t his heig htened bur den of pr oof eliminates any seriou s o r substantial doubt conce rning the cor rec tness of the

co nclusion to be draw n from the e vidence
, W alton v. Y

oung , 9 50 S.W. 2d 95 6, 96 0 (T enn . 199 7) ; Hodges v . S.C. Toof & Co. , 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992) ; In re C.D.B. , 37 S.W .3d 925, 927 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I t should produce in the f act- finder’ s mind a firm belief or convic tion reg arding the truth of the a lleg ations sought-5- to be established. O’Danie l v. Me ssier , 905 S.W .2d [182, 188 (Tenn. 1995)].
Ray , 83 S.W .3d at 733. “In contra st to the preponder ance of the e vi d en ce s t andard, clea r and convincing evidenc e should demonstrate that the t ruth of t he fa cts asserted is ‘hig hly probable ’ as opposed to mere ly

‘more pr obable’ than not.” I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d at 474 (c i t i n g L et t n er v. Plummer , 5 59 S.W. 2d78 5, 78 7 ( Te nn . 1 97 7) ; Brandon v. W right , 8 38 S.W. 2d53 2, 53 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1992); Go lds mi th v . R ob e rts , 622 S.W .2d 438, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981))

.
Pare nta l te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g s, du e to the ir c omp le xity

a nd th e g ra vity

of the ir conseque nces, r equire individual decision making

. In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999) ; In re M .J.B. , 1 40 S.W. 3d64 3, 65 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4) ; In re S.M

. , 149 S.W .3d 632, 639 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). When review ing a lower c ourt’s dec ision to terminate a biologica l pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts, we utiliz e the f

ollowing standa

rd of r eview:

Be cause of the heighte ned burde n of proof require d by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)( 1), we must adapt Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)’ s
c us tom ary

stand ardof

re vi ew for case s o f this so rt . F ir st, we mus t
re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo in acc ordanc e wi th T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ). Th us , e a c h o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s sp e c if ic fac tual finding s will be presumed to be corr ect unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. Sec ond, we must determine whether the fac ts, eith er as found by the trial court or as supported by the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, cle arly and convinc ingly

establish the

e le me nts re qu ir e d to te rm inate a bio log ic a l pa

re nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts

.
In re M .J.B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654 (c itations omi tted); se e als o J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Ray , 83 S.W .3d at 733.

III

. L AW AND A N A L Y SIS

A. Gr ound s f or Te rminat

ing Mo the r’s P

are nta l Rights
On appe al, Mother attacks the juvenile c ourt’s finding s reg arding eac h g round it relied upon in terminating her pare ntal rig hts. We must aff irm the trial court’s de cision to terminate Mother’ s pare n ta l rig h ts if

th e r e c o r d r e v e a ls th a t an y o n e o f th e s tatu to r y

g r o u n d s f

o r te r mi n a ti o n r e li e d on by the juvenile court has bee n proven by clea r and convincing evidenc e. In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d 53 9, 54 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; I

n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 473–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

The trial c ourt found that clear and convincing evidenc e existed to terminate Mother’ s pa re nta l ri ghts for

a llo wi ng the c on dit ion s w hic h le d to the c hil d’ s r e mov a l or oth e r c on dit ion s to-6-

persist. Section 36-1-113( g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code, commonlyref err ed to as the “ persistent

c on dit ion s” g ro un d, pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:
(3)( A) The ch i l d h as bee n remove d from the home of the par ent or g uardia n by

order of a c ourt for a

period of six (6) months and: (i) The conditions which led to the child’s re moval or other

c on dit ion s w hic h in a ll r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

wo uldc aus e the c hil d to be subjecte d to further abuse or neg lect and w hich, t h er ef o re, preve n t t h e child’s safe r eturn to the c are of the pa rent(s) or g uardia n(s) in the ne ar f

uture; and (ii) Ther e is littl e li kelihood that these c onditions wil l be re medied at

a n e arl y date so that th e c hil d c a n be sa fe ly re turne d to the pa re nt( s) or g uardia n(s) in the ne ar f uture; and (i ii) Th e c on tin uatio n o f the pa re nt or g ua

rd ia n an d c hil d r e la tio ns hip g reatly diminis hes the c hild’s chanc es of e arly integ ration into a safe
, stable and pe rmane nt home.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(3) (A) ( 2003).

C.L .M . a nd J.V. P. we re re mov e d fr om Mothe r’ s cus tod y a ndpla c e d in to the c us tod y of DC S by the juvenile court on Fe bruary 5, 2002, and DCS filed the petition to terminate Mother ’s par ental rig hts as to these childre n on Dec ember 5, 2003. J .L .M. was removed fr om Mother’s custody and place d into the custody of DCS by the j uvenile court on or around Aug ust 1, 2003, and DCS filed

an ame nded petition to include thi s child in its request to terminate Mothe r’s pa renta l rig hts on J une 11 , 2 00 4. Ac c or din g ly
, it is un dis pu te d that th e Chi ldr e n h a ve be e n r e mov e d f ro m Mo the r’ s h ome by order of the juvenile c ourt for a period of six (6) months.

Te rm inatio n of pa

re nta l ri g hts fo r a

pa re nt’ s f a ilu re to r e me dy

the “ c on dit ion s w hic h le d to the c hil d’ s r e mov a l or

oth e r co nd iti on s whi c h in all r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

wo uldc aus e the c hil d to be subjected to further

abuse or neg lect” and would “pre vent the child’s sa fe r eturn to the c are of the pa re nt( s) ” re qu ir e s th a t D CS pr ov e , b y c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e , a ll thr e e fa c tor s se t f orth i n section 36-1- 113(g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code. In re Valentine
, 79 S.W. 3da t 55 0. On app e a l, Mother ar g ues that DCS failed to pr ove the exist ence of ea ch of the se statutory fac tors by

clea r and convincing evidenc e.
Reg arding the first two fac tors, Mother conc edes that, at the time of trial, she did not have a suitable home f

or the Children. How ever , she ar g ues that her failure in this reg ard w as due to a lack of rea sonable e fforts by DCS to assist her in obtaining suitable housing. Particularly , Mother

asserts that, pursuant to an orde r of the juve nile court e ntere d on J une 9, 2003, DCS was re quired to p ro vid e he r w ith a uti lit y de po sit in the a mou nt of $2 20 .0 0 f

or he r n e w a

pa rt me nt. Ac c or din g to Mother, had D CS done so, there is a “strong likelihood” that she would have be en able to remedy the lack of

suitable housing.T h e h o u sin g p ro v id e d b y the W e st V ie w M a n o r A p a rtm e n ts, re fer re d to a s “S e c tio n 8 ” h o u sin g , is p a rt o f a 2
fed era l p ro gra m d esc ribe d as fo l l o w s:

In 1 9 7 4 , C o n g re ss a m e n d e d the U n ited S ta te s H o u sin g A c t o f 1 9 3 7 (H o u sin g A c t)
t o creat e what i s kno wn as t he Se ct i o n 8 ho usi ng pro gram

. T hrough t he Se ct i o n 8 progr am, Co ng r es s hoped t o "ai d l ow- i ncome f ami l i es i n obt ai ni ng a dec ent pl ace t o l i v e, " 42 U

. S. C. § 1437f ( a) ( 1988 ed.
, Su pp. I I I )
, by s u bs i di zi n g pr i v at e l an dl or ds who woul d re nt t o l ow i ncome t enant s

. U nder t he progr am, t ena nt s make r ent al p ayments ba sed o n t hei r i nco m e and ab i l i t y t o pa y ; t he D ep art m ent of H o usi ng and U rb a n D e v e lo p m e n t (H U D ) th e n m a k e s " a ssista n c e p a ym e n ts" to the p riv a te l a n d l o r d s i n a n a m o u n t c a l c u l a t e d t o m a k e u p t h e d i f fe r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e t e n a n t 's

c on t r i bu t i on a n d a " c on t r a c t r e n t " a g r e e d u po n by t h e l a n dl or d a n d HU D

. As

re q u ire d b y the sta tute , t h is c o n tra c t re n t i s, in tu rn , t o b e b a se d u p o n " the fair mark et r ent al " v alue of t he dwel l i ng , al l owi ng for s om e mod es t i ncr eas e ove r

m arket rat es t o acco unt fo r t he ad d i t i o nal exp ense of pa rt i ci p at i ng i n t he Se ct i o n 8 p rogram

. See § 1 4 3 7 f (c)( 1 ).

Ci s ner os v

. Al

pi ne Ri dge G r oup , 5 0 8 U .S . 1 0 , 1 2 (1 9 9 3 ).

-7- Cy nthia McL ain (“ Ms. McL ain”) was the D CS casewor ker a ssigne d to this familyfrom Fe bruary 2002 until J une 2004. I n May of 2003, Ms. McL ain sec ured an application for “Section-8” housing at the West View Manor A partments. Ms. McL ain met with Mother and F ather to go ove r 2 the application and enter ed their r esponses. She a lso filed a reque st w ith DCS for $899.00 to buy furniture for the ne w apa

rtment, pay

for the dow n payment on the lease
, and provide the first month’s

re nt. Du ri ng the ir

me e tin g , M s. Mc L a in i nf orme d M oth e r that DC S wo uldno t pr ov ide the de po sit

nece ssary to have the utilities turned on at t h e ap ar tment and Mother a nd Father would be

re sp on sib le fo r that f

e e . M s. Mc L a in t e sti fi e d th a t Mo the r and Fa the r a g re e d to thi s a rr a ng e me nt. I n fac t, when asked during the t rial about this ag ree ment, Mother st ated that she understood that she and F ather

would be re sponsib l e for paying the utilit y

deposit. Since they

had appr ox imately

one
mon th b e fo re the y

c ou ld m ov e in, Ms. Mc L a in even of fe re d to ho ld M oth e r’ s mo nth ly c he c k to

ensure that she would have sufficie nt funds to pay the utilitydeposit when the time c ame.
Following a hea

ring on May

21, 2003, the juvenile court enter ed an order on J une 9, 2003, which st ated that “[a]n apartment for the f amily will soon be available at West View Cove [sic] and the Depa rtment of Children’s Ser vices will provide f inancial a ssistance for the utilit y hookups and to purcha se beds f

or the c hildren.” Mother

alleg es t hat, s ubsequent to the court’s order , she expected DCS to pay

for the utility

deposit. On J une 10, 2003, Ms. McL ain took Mothe r and Father to view their apa rtment, howeve r, the housing never materia l i z ed. Vicky

Bushe ars ( “Ms. B ushear s”), manag er of

the West View Manor

Apartments, testified that she had an apa rtment rea dy

for Mother

a ndF a the r t o o c c up y

a t a re nta l rate of $3 3. 00 pe r mon th. Ho we ve r, the y we re un able to m ov e int o the new a partment be cause the utilitydeposit had not been paid. Ms. Bushe ars stated that Mother and F ather

wer e subseque ntly

moved to a wa iting list, but she moved them to an inactive list when the deposit was ne ver paid.-8-

Our review of the t estimony of Ms

. McL ain and Mother, as well as the j uvenile court’s order
, reve als that the juvenile court did not order DCS to provide Mother with the utilit y deposit for he r
new ap ar tm e n t. T h e s tate me n t f r o m th e o r d e r r e li e d o n b y M o th e r is f o u n d in th a t s e c ti o n of the

c ou rt ’s or de r s e tti ng fo rth th e fa c ts r e le va nt t o th e he ari ng , a ndthe c ou rt do e s no t spe c if

ic a lly mention the utilit y

deposit when e ntering its order a ddressing the custody and visitation issues before the court at the time. Furthermore , Ms. McL ain testified that, whe n they visited the apartment on June 10 , 2 00 3, sh e me nti on e d th e uti lit y de po sit to Mo the r andF a the r o nc e a g a in. Ms. Mc L a in state d th a t Mo the r andF a the r r e ite rate d th e y c ou ld s e c ur e the mon e y fo r the ut il ity

de po sit

. Howeve r, Mother subse quently told Ms. McL ain t hat s ame day that she had alre ady spent all of the chec k she rec eived a few day s prior on June 1, 2003. Additionally , we note that the trial judg e hea rd and observed Mother and Ms. McL ain as they testified, and we give the trial judge ’s determinations of cr edibilityg reat weig ht on appea l. See I n re S.L.R. , No. M2004-01565-COA- R3-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 880, *34–35 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec . 28, 2004).

At t h e t i m e o f trial, Mother testified that she alternated betwe en living w ith her mother or F a the r’ s p are nts

. I n Mar c h of 200 4, Ms. Mc L a in i ns pe c te d th e ho me of F a the r’ s p are nts , w hic h is wh e re Mo the r andF a the r state d the y int e nd e d to liv e wi th the Chi ldr e n. Up on do ing so , M s. Mc L a in noted that the home wa s not se cure , having larg e cra cks ar ound the door; she obse rved r ats walking on the bac k of the stove; s h e observe d roac hes cr awling inside the home; the only bath tub in the home contained wood and a chainsa w; and Father had to touch two wires tog ether in order to make the toilet flush.

At trial, Mother intro d u ce d a letter dated May

3, 2004, from anothe r apa rtment complex ind ic a tin g that sh e wa s o n a waiti ng lis t f

or a n ap art me nt. Ho we ve r, the lik e lih oo d th a t Mo the r w ill be able to s e c ur e thi s new apa rt me nt, in al l re a so na

ble pr ob abil ity , is minim a l. Th is n e w a pa rt me nt, like the pre vious apartment, is considered “Section 8” housi ng

. The criminal rec ords of Mother and Father we re introduc ed at tria l. Fathe r’s criminal history reve als a prior plea of g uiltyin 1992 to the

c ha rg e of ra pin g a min or , his tw e lve -y e ar- old c ou sin

. I n Ma rc h of 20 04
, Mo the r wa s c ha rg e d w ith being an ac cessory

afte r the fa ct when she attempted to c ash lottery tickets at the same business fr om wh ic h F a the r a lle g e dly

sto le the tic ke ts the pr e vio us day

. On Ap ri l 6, 20 04 , M oth e r p le a d g uil ty to the cha rg e of the ft under $500.00 and rec eived a suspended se ntence

.
Ms. Bushe ar s te s ti f

ie d th a t, p u r s u a n t t o f

e d e r a l l a w , in d iv id u a ls w ith a c r im in a l h is tor y sim ila r t o th a t of Mo th er and Fath er w ou ld n ot b e a llo we d to liv e in “ Se c tio n 8 ” ho us ing . M s. B us he ars state d th a t, at th e tim e of pr oc e ssi ng the ir

app lic a tio n, sh e wa s n ot a wa re of the pa re nts ’ criminal histories. She explained that, even if the y had moved into the apa

rtment, she would have been r equire d to terminate their le ase upon le arning of their prior convictions. Mother admitted at tr ia l th a t sh e ha d n ot i nf orme d th e ma na g e r at the apa rt me nt c omp le x whe re sh e wa s c ur re ntl y attempting to se cure h o u sing of her prior criminal re cord. A ccor dingly , the re cord c lear ly and

c on vin c ing ly

e sta bli sh e s th a t Mo the r h a s f a ile d to se c ure s afe, st able ho us ing , a ndthe re is l itt le likelihood that this condition will be remedie d at an e arly date.-9-

Despite the se rvice s provided since Dec ember of 2000, t he primary

rea son for finding that the Children wer e depe ndent and neg lected and needed to be removed from Mother’s c ustody was her inability to pr operly

provide for

their medica l and nutritional needs. Ms. McL ain testified that she re fer red Mother

to an orig inal series of

pare nting c lasses, which Mother completed. How ever , Ms. McL ain, af

ter observing Mothe r’s sub sequent intera ction with the Children during visitation, fe lt that Mo the r ne e de d a dd iti on a l pa re nti ng c la sse s. Ap pr oximate ly e ig hte e n mo nth s a ft e r C .L .M

. a ndJ.V. P. w e re pla c e d in to the c us tod y of DC S, J .L .M . wa s pla c e d into the c us tod y of DC S be c aus e Mo the r f a ile d to pr ov ide fo r h e r m e dic a l a ndnu tr iti on a l ne e ds a s w e ll. At Ms. Mc L ain’ s r e qu e st, Mother complete d a sec ond set of parenting classes. Howeve r, Ms

. McL ain subseqeuntly observe d that, while Mother showe d aff ection toward the Children, she would g et impatient with the Children, become frustrated, and a llowed them to wande r off during visitation.

Ev e n if we we re to a g re e wi th M oth e r, in that D CS pr e ve nte d h e r f ro m ob ta ini ng su ita

ble housing, Mother overlooks additional conditions pr esent in the rec ord which still persist. Section 36 -1 -1 13 (g )( 3) (A ) p e rm its a c ou rt of thi s st a te to te rm inate a pa re nt’ s pa re nta l ri g hts ba se d no t on ly on a failure to reme dy

the conditions which led to removal but the persistenc e of “ other c onditions which in all re asonable probability would cause the child to be subj ecte d to further abuse or neg lect and which, the ref

ore, preve nt the child’s safe return to the car e of the par ent(s).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( g )( 3) (A ) ( 20 03 ); I n r e S

. Y. , 121 S.W .3d 358, 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

T h er e ar e additional conditions present in this case which have a dire ct bea ring on our
a na ly sis . T he re is e ve ry

ind ic a tio n inthe re c or d th a t Mo the r i nte nd s to c on tin ue he r re la tio ns hip wi th F a t h e r

. In f

a c t , a tt h e t i m e o f t r i a l
, M o t h e r w a s p r e g n a n tw i t h th e i r

f o u r t h c h i l d

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, Mother is curr ently

unemploy ed, a n d rec eives socia l security disabilitybenef

its in t he amount of

a pp ro ximatel y

$6 80 .0 0 p er m on th . Fu rt her, S all y McD on ald (“M s. McD on ald ”), ali cens ed t hera pi st with J .B. Summers Menta l Health Center , testified that she ev al u at ed M o t her and Father at the req u es t o f DC S . Ms. McDonald stated that, during the initial evaluation, Mother wa s “not forthcoming ” and w a s “ g u arde d.” F ollowing their initial evaluation, Ms. McDonald re fer red Mother for f urther psy chiatric evaluation, and Mother wa s subsequently presc ribed medic ation for depre ssion. Mother’s psy cholog ical re cords we re introduced at trial, and Mot her te stified that she fir s t w e n t to J. B

. Su mm e r s M e n ta l H e a lth Ce n te r a s a te e n a g e r f o r c o u n s e li n g a f

te r s he had be en
se xua lly a ssa ult e d at the age o f ten. Re g ard ing he r m os t r e c e nt p sy c ho log ic a l tr e a tme nt, Ms. McDona ld testified that they discharg ed Mother a fter she failed to a ppear for a schedule d appointment. Despite the c oncerns of DCS about M other’s me ntal health, Mother te stified that, at the time of trial, she w as not underg oing the rapy . All of the af oreme ntioned fac t s cl early and convincing ly

establish th at “o t h er conditions” exist in this case that in all likelihood will not be

reme died at an e arly

date.
Reg arding the last fac tor set forth in s ection 36-1- 113(g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code, Mo the r a sse rt s th a t, d e sp ite the e xistin g re la tio ns hip be tw e e n the Chi ldr e n a ndthe ir pa re nts , D e loris Ty is (“Ms. Ty is”) and he r husband, the c urre nt foster pa rents, have expressed a de sire to adopt the Children. Mother ar g ues, there fore , that the continuation of the pare nt/child relationship would not

wo rk to d imi nis h th e Chi ldr e n’ s c ha nc e s o f f indin g a saf

e, st able , a ndpe rm a ne nt h ome wi th M s.-10-

Ty is. W e disag ree

. Requiring the Children to remain in foster car e while Mother

seeks to re medy the c on dit ion s w hich prev ent the ir re turn to he r c us tod y , a s Mo the r a pp e ars to s ug g e st, wo uld rele g ate the Children to a n unpredic table future . We arereluc tant to place c hildren in limbo indefinitely

. Se e Sta te v . S mi th , 7 85 S.W. 2d33 6, 33 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) ; In re Z.J.S. , No. M2002-02235- CO A- R3- JV, 20 03 Te nn . A pp . L EX I S 41 5, a t *5 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . Jun e 3, 20 03 ); In re K.A.H. , No. M1999-02079-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. L EXI S 474, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 21, 2000). Th e re c or d c le arl y a nd c on vin c ing ly re ve a ls that c on tin uin g the pa re nt/ c hil d re la tio ns hip in this c a se will g reatly diminis h the C hildren’s chance s of ea rly integ ration into a saf

e, stable, and perma nent home.

We find that the rec ord supports the trial c o u rt ’s conclusion that DCS has proven by clea r and convinc ing e vidence eac h fac tor set forth in sec tion 36-1-113(g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code jus tif y ing the te rm inatio n o f M oth e r’ s p are nta l r ig hts . Si nc e we so fi nd , w e nee d n ot a dd re ss Mother’s a dditional arg uments relate d to the o t h er gro u n d s relied upon by the juvenile court for terminating her pa

renta l rig hts. I

n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

B. Re as ona ble Ef

fo rts

On a p p ea l
, Mother does not raise, as a se parate and distinct issue, whethe r DCS made

rea sonable e fforts toward re unification in this case. I nstead, Mother arg ues, within the context of h ero t h eri s s u es , t h atDC S fa i l ed t o u s e r ea s o n ab l e e ff o rt s t o as s i s th eri n o b t ai n i n g s u i t ab l e h o u s i n g. Du e to the c on se qu e nc e s o f the deci si on s r e a c he d inc a se s o f this natur e , w e wi ll u nd e rt ake to examine whether

DCS used rea sonable e fforts bey ond the housing issue.
Unless permitti ng a child to re main with the biologica l p ar en t will ex pose the c hild to a substantial risk of harm, DCS must make “ rea sonable e fforts” to “[p] reve nt the need f or re moval of the child” or , if the child has a lrea dy been r emoved, to “[m]ake it possibl e fo r t h e child to return ho me .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 7- 1- 16 6( a ) ( 20 03 ); see also In re C.M.M. , No. M2003-01122-COA- R3- PT, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 160, at *22–23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 9, 2004). The burde n of proving that rea sonable e fforts have be en made in a particula r case falls upon DCS. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1- 16 6( b) (2 00 3) . In me e tin g thi s b ur de n, DC S is re qu ir e d, a s it didin this c a se , to fi le wi th the juv e nil e court a n aff

idavit setting fort h t h e “r easona ble ef forts” ma de by

DCS. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1- 166(c) (2003).

Whether DCS has used rea sonable e fforts in a particular case is a fac t specific inquiry , and

we e xami ne su c h e ff

orts o n a c a se -b y -c a se ba sis . The le g isl a tur e ha s d e fi ne d “ re a so na ble e ff orts”

a s “ the e xer c ise of

re a so na ble c are a nddil ig e nc e by the de pa rt me nt t o p ro vid e se rv ic e s r e la te d to

me e tin g the ne e ds of

the c hil d a nd the famil y .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 7- 1- 16 6( g )( 1) (2 00 3) . Wh ile DCS bears the bur den of pr oving that rea sonable e fforts toward re unification are made in a pa rticular

case , we a

re c og nizant of the fac t that “ [r] eunification of a family is a two-way street, a nd the law does not requir e DCS to carry the entire burden of this goa l.” State v. Be lder , No. W2003-02888- CO A- R3- PT, 20 04 Te nn . A pp . L EX I S 44 1, a t *2 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . July 9, 20 04 ); State v. Malone
,-11-

No. 03A01-9706- J V-00224, 1998 Te nn. App. LEXI S 83, at *5–6 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 5, 1998). The efforts employ ed by DCS in a particular case do not ha ve to be “ Her culea n,” In re C.M.M

. , 2004 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 160, at *25, but they must b e “r easona

ble ef forts.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 37-1- 166(a) (1) ( 2003); Malone , 1998 Tenn. App. L EXI S 441, at *6.

We b e g in w ithMo the r’ s a sse rt ionthat D CS f a ile d to us e re a so na

ble e ff orts to a ssi st h e r i n
se c uring sa fe , sta

ble ho us ing , p art ic ula

rl y that D CS f

a ile d to pay

fo r the uti lit y

de po sit . T he juv e nil e court held that DCS “made rea sonable e fforts to assist R espondents to establish a suitable home for the children, but the Respondents have made no rea sonable eff orts to pr ovide a s u i t ab l e home.” Af te r r e vie wi ng the re c or d, we fi nd that the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l c le arl y a ndc on vin c ing ly

su pp ort s this f

ind ing . A s p re vio us ly

state d, we dis a g re e wi th M oth e r’ s a sse rt ionthat th e juv e nil e court orde red D CS t o provide the utility deposit. Mother testified that the orig inal ag ree ment was for the p ar en t s t o p aythe utilitydeposit, but, after the juvenile court entere d the orde r stating that DC S wo uldpay

the de po sit , s he be lie ve d that DC S wa s re sp on sib le fo r thi s ob lig a tio n. Ev e n if thi s belief w ere well founde d, Ms. McL ain testified that, when they visited the apartment the day afte r the juvenile court issued t h e o rd er , she re iterate d that the utilitydeposit would be the pa rent’s

re sp on sib ili ty . M s. Mc L a in s ta te d th a t Mo the r and F a the r a g re e d to be re sp on sib le fo r the uti lit y deposit subsequent to the court’s or der. The rec ord also re veals that Ms. McL ain sec ured $899.00 fr om D CS to pay

fo r the fi rs t mo nth ’s re nt, le a sede po sit , a ndfu rn itu re fo r the ne w ap art me nt. Ms. McL ain sec ured the application for the apa rtment and assist ed Mot her and Father with filling out the

app lic a tio n. We cann ot sa y that it wa s u nr e a so na ble fo r D CS to re qu ir e the pa re nts in this c a se to supply the utilitydeposit.

The e fforts eng ag ed in by DCS in this case are not isolated to assisting Mother with obtaining adequate housing . DCS has been pr oviding se rvice s to this family since Dece mber of 2000. O ut of

c on c e rnthat Mo the r wa s no t pr ov idi ng fo r the Chi ldr e n’ s nu tr iti on a l a nd me dic a l ne e ds
, the F a y e tte CountyHea lth Department monitored the Children. DCS ref err ed Mother to two se ts of pare nting

c la sse s a ndme nta l he a lththe ra py

. Mo the r te sti fi e d tha t she didno t ha ve a drive r’ s li c e ns e , b ut M s. McL ain stated that she of fer ed to take Mothe r to visitation if she called. DCS has also provide d phy sical and spe ech the rapy to the Children to improve their development, as well as various other social services to this family

. We find that the rec ord conta ins clear and convinc ing e vidence that DCS used rea sonable e fforts toward re unify ing the Children with Mother.

C. Best Int erest of the Children

I n her final issue raised on appea l, Mothe r asse rts that DCS failed to prove that terminating he r p are nta l r ig hts wa s in the be st i nte re st o f the Chi ldr e n. B e fo re a c ou rt in this state c a n te rm inate a biol o gi ca l p arent’s pare ntal rig hts, it m ust find that doing so is in the best intere st of the child. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 2) (2 00 3)

. I n de te rm ini ng wh e the r te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts is in a c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st, the low e r c ou rt mus t c on sid e r the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s:-12- (1) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has m ade suc h an adjustment of circ umstance, c onduct, or c onditi o n s as to make it safe and in the child' s best interest to be in the home of the par ent or g uardia n; (2) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has failed to ef fec t a lasting adju s tm e n t a f

te r r e a s o n ab le e f

f o r ts b y a v a il ab le s o c ia l s e r v ic es ag encie s fo r s uch duration of time that lasting adjustment does not

rea sonably

appea r possible; (3) Whether the par ent or g uardia n has maintained r eg ular visitation or other c ontact with the child; (4) Whether

a mea ningf

ul relation s h ip has otherwise been e stablished betwee n the par ent or g uardia n and the c hild; (5 ) T he effect a c ha ng e of c are ta ke rs a ndph y sic a l e nv ir on me nt i s likely to h av e o n the child' s emotional, psy cholog ical and me dical condition; (6) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n, or other pe rson re siding with the pare nt or guar dian, has shown brutality , phy sical, sexual, emotional

or ps y c ho log ic a l a

bu se , or ne g le c t to wa

rdthe c hil d, or

a no the r c hil d or adult in the fa milyor household; (7 ) Whether the phy sical environme nt of the par ent' s or g uardia n's home is healthy

and saf e, whe ther ther e is criminal ac tivityin the home, or whe ther ther e is such use of alcohol or controlled substanc es as may rende r the pa

re n t o r g uardia n consistently unable to ca

re f or the child in a saf

e and sta ble manner ; (8) Whether

the par ent' s or g uardia n' s mental and/or e motional status would be detrimental to the child or p re v en t the par ent or g uardia n from ef fec tively providing safe and stable c are and supervision for the child; or (9) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n has paid child support consistent with the child support g uidelines p ro m ulgated by the depa rtment pursuant to § 36-5-101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i) (2003). This list is not exhausti ve, and the statute does not re quire the c ou rt to fi nd the e xiste nc e of e ve ry fa c tor be fo re c on c lud ing that te rm inatio n is in a c hil d’ s b e st interest. S ta t e v

. T

. S

. W. , No. M2001-01735-COA- R3-J V, 2002 Tenn. App. L EXI S 340, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May

10, 2002).

Mother take s eac h statutory fac tor and points to instanc es in the rec ord whe re she alleg es that DCS failed to prove the exis tence of a pa rticular f actor . The juvenile court found that, based upon th e s tatu to r y

f a c to r s , te r mi n a ti o n o f M o th e r ’ s p ar e n ta l r ig h ts w a s inth e Ch il d r e n ’ s b e s t i n te r e s t. We must ag ree . As previously discussed, Mot her has not only failed to re medy

the conditions which led to removal, but there are other conditions which st ill persist making it unsafe for the Children to be returne d to her custody

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( i)(1) (2003). We have pr eviously determined that DCS made rea sonable e fforts to assist M oth er i n re u n i t ing w ith the Chil dren, how ever , the-13-

rec ord re v ea l s t h at , despite these se rvice s, Mother has f ailed to make a

lasting a djustment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(i)(2) (2003). Ms. McL ain testified that Mother c ame to eve ry schedule d vis itatio n w ith the Chi ldr e n, Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( i) (3 ) ( 20 03 ), ho we ve r, sh e a lso state d th a t, during the visitation, Mother failed to demonstrate appr opriate pa ren t ing and never

asked f or visitation bey ond the four hour s scheduled e ach month. The Children’s y oung ag e whe n they enter ed DCS custody , the leng th of time they have remaine d in DCS custody , and Mother’ s behavior during visitation all indicate that no meaning ful relationship has been e stablished betwee n Mother and the Children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 4) (2003)

.
The re cord revea ls that the Children ar e deve lopmentally delay ed and a

re unde rg oing spe ech and phy sical thera

py . The re cord also reve als that Mother has been una ble to demonstrate that she

can adequa te ly

pr ov ide fo r the Chi ldr e n’ s me dic a l a ndnu tr iti on a l ne e ds wh ic h n e c e ssi ta te d th e ir

remova l in the first instance. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( i)(5) ( 2003). Additionally , while there is no indication i n t h e record that Mother or F ather has either

sexuallyor phy sically

abused the Children, we must consider that Father ha s previously been c onvicted o f ra ping a minor relative. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 6) (2003) . We cannot eva luate th ep h y sical environme nt of Mother’s home bec ause, as s h e co n ce d ed at trial and on a ppeal, she has y et to secur e stable housing . The ho me that Mo the r w a nte d to raise the Ch ild re n in , th a t of F a the r’ s p are nts , w a s in sp e c te d b y Ms. McL ain and f

oun d t o b e i n s u fficie nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 7) (2003) . DCS refe rre d Mother to a mental health facility for an evaluation, but the facility discharg ed her

afte r she f

ailed to attend one of

her visits. Mother alleg es that the visit she missed was only to m o n i t o r her medication for

depre ssion. W hile the sig nificanc e of this visit may be trivial, we cannot ove rlook the fa ct that Mother failed to attend as require d. Despite conce rns about Mother’s mental health, she fr e e ly a dmi tte d at trial tha t sh e wa s n ot p re se ntl y un de rg oin g c ou ns e lin g . A dd iti on a lly , M s. Mc L a in te sti fi e d th a t, d uring vis it ati on wi th the Chi ldr e n, Mo the r w a s f ru str a te d, imp a tie nt, a ndfaile d to adequately

supervise the Children. Tenn. Code Ann. 36- 1-113(i)( 8) (2003)

.
The rec ord does indicate , as Mother points out, that DCS sti pulated at tria l that they did not of fe r p ro of that Mo the r f

a ile d to pay

c hil d s up po rt

in this c a se . ( T. E. Vo l. 2 , p . 131 ). Th e re fo re , th is fac tor weig hs ag ainst terminating Mother’s pa renta l rig hts. Tenn. C o d e An n . § 36-1-113( i)(9) (2 00 3) . H ow e ve r, thi s sin g le fa c tor c a nn ot c lou d th e fa c t th a t th e re c or d c le arl y a ndc on vin c ing ly demonstrates that termination of Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts is in t he best intere st of the Children.

IV. C ONCL US I ON

For the re asons set forth here in, we af firm the decision of the juvenile c ourt in terminating Appellant’s pa

renta l rig hts. Cost s of this appea l areto be t ax ed t o Appellant, Taketa Pury ear , for which execution may

issue if nec essary

.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE