Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 6, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00052-CV SHAMIM CHOWDHURY AND LIZA CHOWDHURY, Appellants V. MATT SANDERS AND DRY FORCE LLC, Appellees On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-19347 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Goldstein Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness Pro se appellants Shamim and Liza C howdhury appeal from the trial court’s judgment striking their pleadings, dismissing their claims, and granting judgment on appellees’ breach-of-contract counterclaim. In eight issues, appellants broadly contend the trial court erre d in imposing sanctions a nd rendering judgment for appellees. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND Shamim executed a written contract with Dry Force LLC on October 2, 2018, to remediate water damage to appellants’ house. Shortly after Dry Force began performance under the contract, Shamim aske d Dry Force to terminate its services–2– and remove its equipment from the house. Dry Force did so, and Shamim signed a Certificate of Completion and Satisfaction in which he attested the services “have been completed to my satisf action.” Two days after it te rminated services, Dry Force sent Shamim an invoice for services re ndered. The invoice reflected a payment of $105 and a remaining balance of $2,743.73. Appellants did not pay the balance, and Dry Force filed a mechanic’s lien on appellants’ property. Appellants filed suit on December 31, 2018, against Dry Force and Matt Sanders, Dry Force’s general manager, a lleging that Dry Force did not perform services under the contract, but performed “work as they wished.” Thus, appellants alleged that Dry Force’s mechanic’s lie n was invalid and fraudulent. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment to that effe ct and statutory and exemplary damages. Appellees answered and filed counterclaims for breach of contract, suit on sworn account, promissory estoppel, and quant um meruit. Shortly after filing suit, appellants filed a motion for no-evidence summary judgment on their claims. The motion also included additional, previous ly unpleaded, claims for alleged DTPA violations. The trial court denied appellants’ motion. Appellees issued discovery requests to appellants. When appellants did not respond, appellees’ counsel contacted Sh amim by email to request responses. Shamim indicated that he had mailed the responses to appellees’ counsel. Counsel did not receive the responses as promised, and appellees filed a motion to compel appellants’ discovery res ponses. The trial court gran ted appellees’ motion and–3– ordered appellants to res pond to the discovery reque sts and to pay $1,000 in attorney’s fees. Appellants s till did not produce discovery responses. Appellees filed a motion for sanctions, asking the trial cour t to strike appellants’ pleadings, grant judgment on Dry Force’s breach-of-contract counterclaim, and award damages of $2,743.73 and attorney’s fees of $4,500. Th e trial court held a hearing and granted appellees’ motion in part, issuing a fina l judgment striking appellants’ pleadings, dismissing their claims, and finding that Shamim breached his contract with Dry Force. The trial court did not award cont ract damages, however, but awarded Dry Force $4,500 in attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s order imposing sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See Low v. Henry , 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Shops at Legacy (Inland) Ltd. P’ship v. Fine Autographs & Me morabilia Retails Stores, Inc. , 418 S.W.3d 229, 232 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet. ). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles to the extent the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones , 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Cire v. Cummings , 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004); Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232. We review the entir e record to dete rmine whether the imposition of sanctions constitute s an abuse of discretion. Am. Flood Research , 192 S.W.3d at 583; Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232.–4– Discovery sanctions are authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2. See T EX
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. P. 215.2; Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232. If a trial court finds a party is abusing the discovery process in seeking, making, or resisting discovery, then the trial court may, after notice an d hearing, impose any appropriate sanction authorized by rule 215.2(b)(1)–(5) and (8). T EX
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. P. 215.3; Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232. Appropriate sanctions include those ofte n referred to as “death penalty” sanctions that strike out “pleadings or parts thereof,” dismiss “with or without prejudice the actions or proceedings or any part thereof,” and render “a judgment by default against the disobedient party.” T EX
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. P. 215.2(b)(5). Such sanctions adjudicate claims and preclude pr esentation of the merits of the case. See Cire , 134 S.W.3d at 840–41; TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell , 811 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. 1991); Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232. The trial court may also award attorney’s fees incurred in response to a party’s failure to obey the court’s discovery order. T EX
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. P. 215.2(b)(8). Although the choice of sanction is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, the sanctions imposed must be just. See T EX
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. P. 215.2; TransAmerican , 811 S.W.2d at 916; Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232. There must be a “direct relationship” between the abusive cond uct and the sanction imposed, and the sanction must not be excessive. See TransAmerican , 811 S.W.2d at 917; Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232. The trial court must consider, but need not actually impose, lesser sanctions before i ssuing a “death penalty” sanction. Cire , 134 S.W.3d–5– at 840; TransAmerican , 811 S.W.2d at 917; Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 232– 33. ANALYSIS Appellants bring eight issues on appeal that broadly contend the trial court erred when it sanctioned a ppellants and issued judgment for appellees on their breach-of-contract counterclaim. Appellees contend, however, that the sanctions were appropriate because appe llants flouted the trial cour t’s discovery order and the trial court implemented lesse r sanctions before striking appellants’ pleadings and rendering judgment on appe llees’ counterclaim. A. “Death Penalty” Sanction In five “supplemental” issues, appella nts contend the trial court erred by imposing sanctions for their failure to respond to appellees’ discovery requests. Although not perfectly clear from their brie fing, appellants appear to contend that the trial court erred by failing to issue findings to support its sanction orders, imposing a “fine” and “death penalty” sanc tions, and failing to find that appellees did not properly serve the discovery requests and motions at issue. At the outset, we note that appellants’ briefing is virtually devoid of any cited authority. Although appellants quote portions of rule of civil procedure 21a and Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992), they fail to explain how these authorities apply to their contentions that they did not receive service of appellees’ motions and that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding appellees’ $1,000–6– in attorney’s fees when it granted their mo tion to compel. Appellants fail to cite any authority to support their remaining cont entions, and appellants’ arguments on these points consist only of unsupporte d, conclusory statements. We recognize that appellants are acting pro se and we mu st construe their brief liberally. Amrhein v. Bollinger , 593 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.) (citing Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989)). But our rules of appellate procedure have spec ific requirements for briefing, and the law is well-settled that a party proceeding pro se must comply with all applicable rules.
T EX
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. P. 38.1; Amrhein , 593 S.W.3d at 401; Harris v. Showcase Chevrolet , 231 S.W.3d 559, 561 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). This includes making “a clear and concise argument for the contentio ns made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” T EX
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. P. 38.1(i). In this regard, appellants have failed to adequately brief these issues. Additionally, appellants have failed to preserve error for our review. Our rules for preservation of error preclude a party from raising a complaint for the first time on appeal. Burbage v. Burbage , 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014). To preserve a complaint on appeal, Rule 33.1 of the Te xas Rules of Appella te Procedure requires the record to show that a specific compla int was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion, and that the trial court ruled on th at request, objection, or motion. T EX
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. P. 33.1(a); see also Jurgens v. Martin , No. 11-18-00316- CV, – S.W.3d –, 2021 WL 1033306, at *13 (Tex. App.—Eastla nd Mar. 18, 2021,–7– no pet.) (appellant failed to pr eserve complaint that sanc tions were improperly based on discovery order issued in prior probate proceeding by not objecting on that ground); McCollum v. The Bank of New York Mellon Tr. Co. , 481 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pe t.) (error not preserved be cause appellant failed to object to order striking affidavit); Prade v. Helm , 725 S.W.2d 525, 526–27 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (party waived e rror by failing to specifically object that it received insufficient notice of a sancti ons motion, did not re quest additional time to respond to the motion, and allowed th e sanctions hearing to go forward without obtaining a ruling from the trial court rega rding notice). There is no indication in the record that appellants responded to ap pellees’ motion to compel or motion for sanctions. Appellants likewise fa iled to raise an objection to the trial court’s rulings on these motions. Accordingly, appellants faile d to preserve error regarding the trial court’s sanction orders for our review. See T EX
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. P. 33.1. Regardless, the record reflects that a ppellees served discovery requests on appellants by the eFiling system on February 19, 2018. Appellees’ counsel properly certified service of these re quests, and exhibits attach ed to appellees’ motion to compel discovery reflect that the eFili ng system successfully delivered the documents to Shamim’s email address on record. Yet, a ppellants did not respond to appellees’ discovery requests or the trial court’s order compelling their responses. Moreover, the record reflects that Sham im claimed he had mailed responses to appellees’ counsel, when, in fact, he had not . The record also reflects that appellees’–8– motions were served on appellants in accord ance with the rules of civil procedure, and appellants did not respond . Furthermore, before the trial court ordered “death penalty” sanctions, it imposed lesser sanctions by orderi ng appellants to respond to the discovery requests and to pay $1,000 in attorney’s f ees. Yet, appellants still did not comply. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abus e its discretion in ordering “death penalty” sanctions. See TransAmerican , 811 S.W.2d at 917. The trial court was not required to issue findings of fact to support its order, and the record does not reflect that appellants requested findings. See Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon , 841 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. 1992); Shops at Legacy , 418 S.W.3d at 233. Accordingly, we overrule appellants first, second, thir d, fourth, and sixth supplemental issues. B. Judgment on Appellees’ Counterclaim In their two main issues and their fi fth “supplemental” issue, appellants contend the trial court erre d in granting judgment on appellees’ breach-of-contract counterclaim because the claim was barred by section 16.069 of the civil practice and remedies code and the statute of fraud s, and appellants did not have notice the trial court was going to rule on the claim at the sanctions hearing. Appellees contend that their counterclaim was not barred, and the judgment as a sa nction for appellants’ refusal to respond to appellees’ discove ry requests and obey the trial court’s discovery order was perm itted and appropriate. As with their briefing on issues regardin g the trial court’s order striking their pleadings, appellants fail to cite any authority in support of their issues regarding the–9– judgment on appellees’ counterclaim. Indeed , appellants fail to offer any argument whatsoever on their fifth “supplemental” issue. Thus, appella nts have failed to adequately brief the issues. See T EX
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. P. 38.1(i). Appellants likewise failed to preserve the issues for appeal because they did not object to the trial court’s rulings on appellees’ motions. See T EX
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. P. 33.1(a) Regardless, section 16.069 and the statut e of frauds are inapplicable to appellees’ counterclaim. Section 16.069(a) of the civil practice and remedies code applies only to counterclaims that would be barred by limitations if filed as a separate action. T EX
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. C ODE § 16.069(a). The record reflects that appellees filed their counterclaim within the four-year limitations period ge nerally applicable to breach-of-contract claims. See Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co. , 211 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2006). Additionally, the contract at issue is not a type of contract governed by the statute of frauds. See T EX
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. C ODE § 26.01 (identifying contracts subject to statute of frauds and enforceability re quirements). Thus, appellees’ counterclaim for breach of contract was not barred by section 16.069 or the statute of frauds. Additionally, the trial court had disc retion to render judgment on appellees’ counterclaim based on the presumption th at any defense a ppellants may have asserted lacked merit. TransAmerican , 811 S.W.2d at 918 (“[I]f a party refuses to produce material evidence, despite the imposition of lesse r sanctions, the court may presume that an asserted claim or de fense lacks merit and dispose of it.”).–10– Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ first and second issues and fifth “supplemental” issue. CONCLUSION Appellants have failed to ad equately brief and preserve error on their issues. Regardless, the record does not sup port appellants’ arguments on appeal. Accordingly, we overrule all of appellant s’ issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

200052F.P05 /Robbie Partida-Kipness / ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS JUSTICE–11– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
SHAMIM CHOWDHURY AND LIZA CHOWDHURY, Appellants
No. 05-20-00052-CV V.
MATT SANDERS AND DRY FORCE LLC, Appellees On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-19347.Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Pedersen, III and Goldstein participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellees MATT S ANDERS AND DRY FORCE LLC recover their costs of this appeal from appellants SHAMIM CHOWDHURY AND LIZA CHOWDHURY.
Judgment entered July 6, 2021.