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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

DAVID RAY SNYDER, : No. 921 MDA 2016

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, April 29, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County

Criminal Division at No. CP-18-CR-0000367-2011

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2016

David Ray Snyder appeals pro se from the April 29, 2016 order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County which dismissed, 

without a hearing, his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the procedural history of this case, as 

follows:

[Appellant] filed a Motion for Post-Conviction 

Collateral Relief on November 17, 2015. This Court 

entered an Order on December 3, 2015 appointing 

[counsel] to represent [appellant], directing 

[counsel] to file an Amended Petition before 

January 31, 2016, directing the Commonwealth to 

file an Answer to the Amended Petition on or before 

February 28, 2016 and scheduling this matter for a 

hearing on May 4, 2016.

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[PCRA counsel] requested additional time 

which was granted by this Court to file an amended 

petition and on February 29, [2016], [counsel] filed 

a [Turner/Finley1 no-merit] [l]etter indicating that 

all the [appellant’s] issues were meritless. The 

Commonwealth filed a Letter with the Court on 

March 31, 2016 requesting the Court to take action 

on [counsel’s Turner/Finley no-merit] [l]etter. By 

Order of Court dated April 5, 2016, this Court gave 

notice to [appellant] that this Court intended to 

dismiss the Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral

Relief within twenty (20) days.[2] [Appellant] 

responded by Letter dated April 24, 2016, which this 

Court accepted as timely. Said Letter complained 

that [appellant] was not able to complete research at 

the State Correctional Institution in the year 2015. 

This Court by Order of April 29, 2016, dismissed the 

Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief filed by 

[appellant] on November 17, 2015. [Appellant] filed 

a Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2016 and this Court 

by Order of June 1, 2016 directed [appellant] to file 

a statement of matters complained of on appeal.

[Appellant] filed his Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal and indicated the issues 

were [four claims of ineffective assistance of plea 

counsel].

[Appellant] had filed a previous [PCRA] 

[p]etition on September 25, 2012, with an Amended 

Petition filed on November 21, 2012. This Court 

issued an opinion and Order on January 15, 2013, 

which the Court would request the Superior Court to 

review. The Superior Court affirmed this Court’s 

Order of January 15, 2013 by Memorandum Opinion 

of December 13, 2013. [See] number 312 MDA 

2013. It is clear that the issues concerning 

 

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

2 The record further reflects that on April 5, 2016, the trial court entered an 

order granting PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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[appellant’s] trial counsel were raised in the first 

[PCRA] proceeding and were addressed by the 

Superior Court [on appeal].

PCRA court opinion, 6/20/16 at 1-2.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether trial counsel [] was ineffective for not 

withdrawing [appellant’s] plea?

2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not 

objecting to the sentence, which was outside 

the plea bargain?

3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a motion to modify?

4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file post-trial motions?

5. Whether [appellant] filed his petition late[] due 

to interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim, in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or 

the Constitution or laws of the United States?

Appellant’s brief at 2 (capitalization omitted).

All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be 

filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes 

final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “A judgment becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the PCRA’s time restriction is 

constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 
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2004). In addition, our supreme court has instructed that the timeliness of 

a PCRA petition is jurisdictional. If a PCRA petition is untimely, a court lacks 

jurisdiction over the petition. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 

120-121 (Pa.Super. 2014) (courts do not have jurisdiction over an untimely 

PCRA); see also Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120 (Pa. 2005).

Here, the trial court sentenced appellant on July 16, 2012. Appellant 

failed to file a direct appeal to this court, and consequently, appellant’s 

judgment of sentence became final on August 15, 2012, 30 days after 

imposition of sentence and the time for filing a direct appeal expired. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903; Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 

A.3d 759, 763 (Pa.Super. 2013). Therefore, appellant’s petition, filed 

November 17, 2015, is facially untimely. As a result, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, unless appellant alleged and 

proved one of the statutory exceptions to the time bar, as set forth in 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

Those three narrow exceptions to the one-year time bar are: when 

the government has interfered with the appellant’s ability to present the 

claim, when the appellant has recently discovered facts upon which his PCRA 

claim is predicated, or when either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the 

United States Supreme Court has recognized a new constitutional right and 

made that right retroactive. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii); 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa.Super. 2012). 
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The appellant bears the burden of pleading and proving the applicability of 

any exception. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If an appellant fails to invoke a 

valid exception to the PCRA time bar, this court may not review the petition. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

Here, appellant baldly asserts in the table of contents section of his 

brief that he “filed his PCRA petition late due to interference by government 

officials with the with the [sic] presentation of the claim in violation of the 

constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the 

United States.” (Appellant’s brief at i, capitalization deleted.) In the 

argument section of his brief, however, appellant entirely fails to carry his 

burden of pleading and proving that the government-interference exception 

to the time bar applies because (i) he fails to set forth any facts to 

demonstrate how the government interfered with his ability to present the 

claim; and (ii) he fails to advance any argument whatsoever to support the 

application of the government-interference exception. Therefore, the PCRA 

court lacked jurisdiction to review appellant’s petition, and we may not 

review the petition on appeal.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2016