U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

39–987 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–234

EXPLORING A COMPREHENSIVE STABILIZATION,

RECONSTRUCTION, AND COUNTERTERRORISM

STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 6, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

JIM WEBB, Virginia

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, statement ........................ 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening statement ... 1

Frazer, Hon. Jendayi, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. ............ 60

Hess, Hon. Michael, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy,

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, Washington, DC ................. 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17

Menkhaus, Dr. Ken, professor of political science, Davidson College, Davidson,

NC ......................................................................................................................... 42

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45

Morrison, Dr. J. Stephen, executive director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ............................................. 49

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51

Shinn, Hon. David, adjunct professor of international affairs, George Washington, University, Washington, DC ................................................................... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38

Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, opening statement ...................................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

(III)

(1)

EXPLORING A COMPREHENSIVE STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

SD–628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Feingold, Cardin, Webb, Coleman, and

Sununu.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S.

SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Good morning. The hearing will come to

order.

On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to the hearing of this subcommittee in the 110th Congress.

Before we begin, I want to offer a warm welcome to my friend

Senator Sununu in his new capacity as the ranking member of this

subcommittee. I’m excited to have such a dedicated and hardworking Senator as a ranking member, and look forward to working with him on the full range of pressing issues facing the Continent of Africa. And even though the Senator has not been here

for many years, I have had many good opportunities to work with

him and find him to be an excellent person to work with.

As members of this subcommittee know, there are few issues

that we deal with here that are partisan or ideological. On my recent trip to Ethiopia and Kenya, where we were focusing on this

Somalia issue, I told everybody that this subcommittee’s always

been a place where there hasn’t been partisan divides, and it’s a

good example of what can be done. And that was very well received

by everybody in the African countries we visited. We all want to

end violence and promote democracy, defend human rights and reduce poverty, and improve security in a continent beset with challenges but bestowed with almost limitless potential.

So, welcome, Senator Sununu, I look forward to working closely

with you.

With that said, I think it’s only right that we start the 110th

Congress off with a hearing that addresses one of the biggest chalVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
2

lenges we face in Africa today, and that is Somalia. We have entitled today’s hearing ‘‘Exploring a Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Counterterrorism Strategy for Somalia.’’ I look

forward to today’s conversation with the administration and expert

witnesses about how to address the persistent, ongoing, and dangerous instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.

This subcommittee, under the chairmanship of both Republicans

and Democrats, has, for years, been pushing the executive branch

to develop a comprehensive strategy to address instability in Somalia, as well as the security and humanitarian concerns that have

resulted from almost two decades of instability there. As I and my

other colleagues have argued in the past, Somalia actually represents the new types of challenges that face our country and our

friends and allies around the world. It represents the complex

threats that the U.S. Government must learn to identify and contain combat in the post-9/11 world. It is challenging the way our

Government is organized, and is pressing us to make changes to

the way we deal with lawlessness and weak governments, corruption, and humanitarian tragedy.

It is also forcing us to reevaluate how our Government works to

eliminate terrorist safe havens and what tools we have available to

not only defeat terrorists, but also to defeat the conditions that

allow the terrorists to plan, train, recruit, and ultimately attack

the United States or others. If we have learned anything since

9/11, it is that we can no longer ignore instability in places like Somalia. Unfortunately, after traveling to the region, extensive study,

conversations with the administration, briefings and hearings, it is

clear to me that we have yet to effectively organize our Government to deal with these challenges. I hope that this hearing will

help clarify a new strategy for going forward that will seize the

current opportunity to help the Somali people dig themselves out

of almost two decades of chaos.

To that end, I urge our witnesses, and particularly those on our

first panel, to focus on what we’ve learned as a government, what

we’re doing differently and what we expect to get done in the coming weeks, months, and years. I know that both of our first witnesses are working hard on this very difficult issue.

Let me tell you why I’m so concerned about the progress our

Government is making on Somalia. I chaired a hearing on this—

by this subcommittee exactly 5 years ago, on February 6, 2002, on

this exact topic. During that hearing, we discussed policy options,

we discussed terrorism and al-Qaeda, we discussed the absence of

a transitional government, we discussed the need for a more farsighted, comprehensive U.S. Government policy. Most importantly,

and most troubling to me now in today’s context, we also discussed

how important Somalia was to our national security in a post-9/11

context and how it needed to do more. Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa at that time, began his opening

statement by pointing out, ‘‘that it is far easier to prevent failure

than to cope with its consequences.’’ He then admitted on the

record, ‘‘Somalia has not been on the U.S. Government’s radar

screen since, really, about 1994.’’

Now, following the capture of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts

Union last summer, the subcommittee met again on this very same

3

issue. Under the leadership of then-Chairman Martinez, we

brought together most of the witnesses who sit before us again this

morning to get a sense of the administration’s plan for responding

to that major development. In her testimony, Assistant Secretary

Frazer assured us, ‘‘President Bush and Secretary Rice have made

it a priority to confront the ongoing turmoil in Somalia with a multilateral coordinated strategy.’’

Now, we took this statement seriously; so seriously, in fact, that

we legislated on the issue. As you know, Secretary Frazer, I obtained the support of a bipartisan coalition of colleagues, including

my friend from Minnesota, Senator Coleman, to include an amendment in the FY07 defense authorization bill that required the administration to devise and share with Congress a comprehensive

stabilization and reconstruction strategy for Somalia, as you outlined in your testimony in front of the committee last July. The 90-

day deadline for receipt of this report passed last month, with no

sign of the report and no sign of a strategy. We received no sign

or call or letter suggesting that the administration was any closer

to not only complying with the law, but creating a comprehensive

plan for addressing the urgent interrelated challenges we face in

Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.

In other parts of the world, we’ve seen what happens when decisions are made and executed without the benefit of a long-term

comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources and political

commitment. I want our Government to avoid making bad or rash

decisions, or no decisions at all, and I want to ensure that our approach to Somalia takes into consideration the complex nature of

the problem and the need to view Somalia comprehensively, not

just through a counterterrorism lens. Unfortunately, we have only

a very limited amount of time to establish the conditions that will

lead to political stability in Somalia, and that window is closing

fast.

Before I turn to my colleague Senator Sununu, let me note that

my colleagues, both Senator Coleman and Klobuchar of Minnesota,

have joined me today in introducing a bill that addresses these

major challenges and authorizes significant resources to ensure

that this multilateral endeavor to stabilize and secure Somalia is

more successful than the last. The bottom line is that, unless the

United States works aggressively with Somalis, regional actors,

and the international community to create stability in Somalia,

that country will remain what it has been since the early 1990s,

a haven for terrorists and warlords and a source of instability in

a critical region. That is why this hearing is so critical. Whether

and how we respond to the issues at hand will have a profound and

long-lasting impact on the people of Somalia, on stability in the region, and, above all, on our national security.

With that said, let me also introduce our two panels before I turn

to Senator Sununu.

On our first panel, we have two witnesses from the United States

Government. We have Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr.

Jendayi Frazer, and Mr. Michael Hess, the Assistant Administrator

for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. We’ve

asked each of them to address current U.S. Government efforts reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
4

lating to Somalia and to discuss key challenges, resource requirements, and the detailed components of the administration’s strategy for Somalia. To the extent possible, we’d like to avoid general

talking points or generic outlines and hope this can be a frank and

detailed conversation.

We’re very glad that you’re both here today, and we appreciate

your willingness to testimony. Thank you, and welcome.

Our second panel will feature a range of individuals that are well

qualified to speak on the unique challenges related to this complex

country and the impact that developments there have on neighboring nations in the volatile Horn of Africa, as well as on U.S. national security.

We’re privileged to welcome Dr. David Shinn back to the subcommittee. Ambassador Shinn was a U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia

between 1996 and 1999. He has testified in front of this committee

a number of times and always provides a pragmatic and balanced

view of the situation in the region. He currently serves as an adjunct professor of international affairs at George Washington

University.

We look to you, Mr. Ambassador, for analysis of the regional and

international dynamics relating to developments in Somalia, as

well as your opinion of how the United States and international

community can most effectively address the challenges we faced

here.

After him, we’ll hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, also no stranger

to the Senate. Professor Menkhaus is a professor of political science

at Davidson College and has written extensively on the political

and security dynamics in Somalia.

We look to you, Professor, to help paint a detailed picture of dynamics on the ground and the conditions that have emerged as a

result of recent developments. We hope that your analysis will help

this committee have a better sense for the complexities we need to

address.

And finally, we welcome back Dr. Steve Morrison, who’s the executive director of the Center for Strategic International Studies

Africa Program. We’ve asked Dr. Morrison to speak to Somalia-related developments here in Washington, and we hope that he’ll lay

out the challenges and requirements for developing an effective

strategy to address instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn.

I’d like to extend a special welcome to each of you this morning.

I know I speak for my colleagues when I tell you how much we appreciate your coming here today. Your insights will inform and

guide our discussion of immediate actions with serious, lasting implications for the Somali people, for the Horn of Africa, and for the

United States and international security, and I’m looking forward

to hearing from you.

And it is now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished ranking

member, Senator John Sununu.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. And

welcome to our witnesses today. I appreciate the very kind comments in your opening, and look forward to working with you on

5

this subcommittee, the importance of which I think you’ve outlined

very effectively in your opening statement.

I ask consent to submit a more formal written statement for the

record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Senator SUNUNU. But I do want to make a few points. And one

is to underscore how complex the situation in Somalia is. And that

doesn’t mean that it—those complexities are an excuse for not

making more progress or not being clearer about our approach to

the situation, but it means that we can learn a great deal about

dealing with complex situations. The economic, political, religious,

and civil society issues that have to be dealt with in Somalia have

few parallels anywhere else in the world, and we need to understand that. Of course, this hearing is a small part in developing a

better picture of these complexities. But if we develop better methodologies for addressing the failures and the weaknesses in these

areas, then I think we’ll have a framework that can be applied

elsewhere in the world.

And that brings me to the second point, which is the need to develop a better framework and organizational structure, as you described, for addressing failed states around the world, because of

the natural implications that this can have for national security.

There’s been a great deal of discussion about both organizational

and policy changes within State and other organizations in the

Federal Government to better equip those organizations for addressing these problems and the security consequences that can

flow from a failed state. And I hope that our discussions today

might help illuminate the kinds of organizations, emphasis, focus

that might come from our Government and other governments, in

order to be more effective, not just in Somalia, but in other parts

of the world where we see the breakdown of economic structures,

judicial structures, government structures, necessary for stability.

And the third point I’d want to make is how important it is to

develop a regional approach. You mention this in your remarks.

But all of the players in the region have both a responsibility and

an interest in addressing this situation in Somalia, they have different roles to play. And, while it’s true that there are competing

interests in the region, I think all of the regional players are affected by a lack of security, movement of militias, weapons, financing for terrorism, and the instability that results. So, I think

there’s an opportunity for the United States to take the lead in this

effort, but there’s also a very real opportunity for regional players

to become a more significant part of the solution.

So, again, I thank you for putting the hearing together—thrilled

to be a part of this subcommittee and look forward to the witnesses’ testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Sununu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW

HAMPSHIRE

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this important hearing in

order to explore a comprehensive stabilization, reconstruction, and counterterrorism

strategy for Somalia.

6

The Horn of Africa and especially the country of Somalia have been plagued with

violence for a number of years, and attempts to quell the terror have had limited

success. Since the early 1990s, there have been over a dozen conferences, supported

by countries in the Horn, the United Nations, and others to try and bring peace to

the region. As the United States and other countries around the world are engaged

in another theatre, the issues that have plagued Somalia, while not overlooked,

have been somewhat overshadowed.

The United States should continue to stay engaged in efforts to combat terrorism

and bring about a lasting peace in Somalia. I applaud the steps taken by the State

Department toward building a strategy for stabilization, reconstruction, and

counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and it is my hope that they continue these

worthwhile efforts. Achieving peace is vial to the interests of Somalia, the Horn of

Africa, and the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to explore such a timely and important issue, and as this is the first hearing of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I look forward to working with you on many more important issues throughout

the 110th Congress. Finally, I would like to thank the witnesses for taking time out

of their busy schedules to join us here today.

Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.

And now, I’d like to turn to Senator Coleman, who has shown a

strong interest in leadership in this area, for any remarks he has.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MINNESOTA

Senator COLEMAN. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to thank you for your leadership. I am very, very

grateful for the leadership that you have consistently displayed on

this issue. The legislation that we talked about, just introduced,

that—which you championed, will hopefully help us do those things

that have to be done to bring some stability to the region, including, you know, pushing for a special envoy. We’ve got to move Somalia up on the radar screen. We’ve talked about that with State

Department, but this is a way to do that.

So, I simply want to say thank you. Thank you for this hearing,

thank you for your strong voice, thank you for your consistent

efforts. I’m pleased to join with you. We estimate there may be

70,000 Somalians in Minnesota. This is personal for me. This impacts a lot of folks in my community.

If I—just one bit of optimism, with the challenges we face, understanding that Somalia is on the front line in the war on international terrorism today, what happens there does have an impact.

With the recognition that you’ve talked about, that we need to approach this with a broad-range plan—it’s not an isolated piece.

We’d have to have a strategy that—a comprehensive plan to deal

with Somalia, but there is great diversity of the Somalian community back in Minnesota, and I have seen folks come together on

this. And so, if a diverse community back home can come together

with a—the goal, the commitment being greater stability, peace in

the region, then we should figure out a way to work with them to

make that happen.

So, again, I ask unanimous consent to submit a more detailed

formal statement, but I do want to thank you for your leadership

on this issue.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]

7

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

I am privileged to represent the State of Minnesota, which is home to the largest

community of Somalis outside of Somalia. It is estimated that there may be up to

70,000 Somalis back home, and this thriving community has enriched the fabric of

our State through its vibrant culture. It is through my friendship with our Somali

community that I have become familiar with the harsh realities of the situation on

the ground in Somalia, and the tragic implications this has had on the many families that have ultimately sought refuge in our State. It is my hope, and the hope

of our Somali community, that we can help to one day establish a peaceful and stable environment in their homeland. And while I understand that the challenges we

face are very large, the commitment of our Somali Community here in the United

States to work for stability in Somalia provides me with hope that we can make

progress if we all work together.

I have worked to be a voice of the Somali community in Washington, DC, as I

believe the United States should be actively involved in helping Somalia overcome

many years of neglect and civil strife. And I am very happy to participate in this

hearing today with my distinguished colleague, Senator Feingold, who has demonstrated great compassion and leadership on the issue of Somalia.

Over the past year, we have witnessed a great deal of instability, conflict, and

even natural disasters in Somalia. As we will hear from our witnesses today, this

situation stems from a variety of factors, not the least of which include a lack of

functional institutions, economic opportunity, and the involvement of neighbors in

its internal affairs. It has long been my belief that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, which cannot be underestimated, should compel the United

States to be more involved in the country’s affairs. Additionally, however, the

United States has vital national security interests at stake in Somalia. A Somalia

without a functioning government poses a grave risk to its neighbors as well as the

international community. As we saw in the case of Afghanistan, states without a

functioning government can become a haven for terrorists and destabilize an entire

region.

It is for these reasons that I am currently working with my colleague, Senator

Feingold, on legislation addressing Somalia. This legislation not only seeks to focus

greater resources on dealing with this very critical situation, but also works to

shape our overall policy into one that will address the root causes of instability. As

Senator Feingold and I have pointed out repeatedly, we are long overdue for a comprehensive U.S. strategy that aligns all of our objectives in Somalia, which include

political, economic, development, and counterterrorism. Indeed, Somalia has served

as a clear example of the dangers involved in policies that are too narrowly focused

on one objective.

While the events that have unfolded in Somalia over the past year have been extremely unfortunate, I only hope that at the very least they will serve to spark the

United States and international community toward greater concerted action in

Somalia.

I greatly admire the leadership of Senator Feingold on this issue, and am grateful

that he has organized this timely hearing. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Minnesota.

I’d just point out that some of the Somalis that lived in Minnesota have had the wisdom to move to Wisconsin, so——

[Laughter.]

Senator COLEMAN. Must be a warmer climate over there. [Laughter.]

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah. Not today. [Laughter.]

Anyway, thanks to both of you. And now, we’ll turn to the first

panel.

Secretary Frazer.

STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. FRAZER. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold,

Ranking Member Sununu, Senator Coleman.

8

At this first hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, I would like to

congratulate both Senator Feingold and Senator Sununu on your

new positions. I look forward to working closely with you and other

members of this subcommittee during the 110th Congress.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling a hearing on this timely

and important issue, and for your focus on Africa, more generally.

With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you.

I’m pleased to have this opportunity to publicly discuss U.S. policy and engagement with Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Somalia occupies a unique space, both geographically and strategically. The country sits at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa

and the Near East. The region’s overall security is directly affected

by Somalia’s internal situation. And, for the first time in 16 years,

Somalis have a real opportunity to rebuild their nation. We will

assist Somalis to realize this opportunity by restoring effective governance that is representative of the full spectrum of Somali

society.

A lot has happened, and significant diplomacy has been undertaken since I last appeared before this subcommittee in July 2006.

At the time, the United States was encouraged by the June 22,

2006, agreement between the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions and the then-Union of Islamic Courts. The United States supported this agreement, which came to be known as the Khartoum

Declaration, including the points of mutual recognition and cessation of hostilities.

While negotiations initially offered great promise, by late July

the actions of the Islamic Courts (CIC) were beginning to run

counter to the spirit and the reality of dialog. Immediately after

the Khartoum Declaration, the Union of Islamic Courts was renamed the Council of Islamic Courts, and Hassan Dahir Aweys,

designated by both the United States and United Nations as a terrorist, was elected to be the chairman of the CIC Consultative

Council. During the following months, extremist elements within

the CIC, particularly the radical al-Shabaab organization, hijacked

the broader Court’s movement, driving the CIC toward an agenda

of military expansion and aggression.

Despite international efforts to encourage dialog between the

CIC and the TFIs, the CIC chose to repeatedly violate the terms

of the Khartoum Declaration, due to the September 18, 2006, terrorist bombing attack on the Parliament building in Baidoa, the

takeover of Kismaayo on September 25, and military buildups

around Baidoa and Puntland. These were decisive moments. Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in its decision to pursue a military

agenda and to refuse to join the governance process and the TFIs

through peaceful dialog. When the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia launched a counteroffensive against the CIC in

December, the CIC’s structure disappeared rapidly, driven in large

part by the withdrawal of support from the Somali population. The

extremists within the CIC very clearly did not reflect the will of Somalis, as represented by civil society and their government.

9

In the last 2 months, I have traveled to the region twice, conveying the strong commitment of President Bush and Secretary

Rice to the people of Somalia. The most striking lesson I took away

from my trip to the region in early January is this, the Somali people are ready for peace and tired of war. While the TFIs are not

yet ready to stand entirely on their own, they offer a promising vehicle forward for Somalia.

At this moment of opportunity, we are proceeding purposefully.

We are pursuing a strategy to establish stability, move forward

with a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation, and begin reconstruction in Somalia. Under my leadership and that of President Bush’s Special Assistant for Africa, Mr. Bobby Pittman, there

is a growing interagency team working together to advance the

United States policy objectives in Somalia. That interagency policy

team is part of our broader strategy working with the International

Contact Group on Somalia multilaterally and very much coordinating with our regional partners, especially Kenya, Ethiopia, and

Djibouti, but also with Ghana, Yemen, and Tanzania.

While the overall U.S. policy goals remain consistent—to eliminate the threat of terrorism and improve regional stabilities by

supporting the reestablishment of effective governance and respond

to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people—the changing

dynamics inside Somalia require us to constantly adapt to ensure

that our engagement remains effective.

To take advantage of the current window of opportunity available in Somalia, our immediate policy priorities are: Encourage inclusive dialog among Somali stakeholders; mobilize support to build

the governance capacity of the TFIs; provide development and

humanitarian assistance to the Somali people; achieve deployment

of an African stabilization force; and continue to track the terrorists to prevent Somalia remaining a safe haven for terrorism.

These goals are also shared by our partners in the international

community.

The United States believes that the key to long-term stability in

Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation

within the framework of the transitional federal charter. The

United States has encouraged the leadership of the TFIs to make

clear, through statements and actions, that they are committed to

an inclusive process of dialog and reconciliation. We have been

clear. We see a role in the future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and extremism, and we strongly believe that the

TFG must reach out to groups that have previously been marginalized from the political process.

In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda have succeeded in establishing a safe haven

in Somalia. Somalia’s continued exploitation by terrorist elements

threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region. We will,

therefore, continue to take measures to deny terrorists’ safe haven

in Somalia, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia.

The United States Government remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and

citizens in neighboring Horn of Africa countries. The administration will continue working with Somalis, regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation, to eliminate this common threat.

10

As we look ahead to the next 2 years, Somalia’s assistance needs

may look overwhelming. To support our policy objectives and help

achieve a lasting solution in Somalia, the United States has identified three priority areas for U.S. or foreign assistance: Security and

stabilization, No. 1; second, political dialog and reconciliation; and,

third, service delivery and governance capacity.

Sufficient funding is required to enable the United States to successfully and adequately pursue these three important policy goals.

Under the first objective of security and stabilizations, funds

would be used to support the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), security sector reform, and post-conflict

stabilization activities.

Under the second objective, of political dialog and reconciliation,

funds would be used to support reconciliation and dialog through

support for conflict mitigation, civil society, and media freedom.

Last, under our third foreign assistance priority, funding would

be used to improve the ability of the Transitional Federal Institutions to provide social services and build the government’s capacities, other TFIs, at the local, regional, and national level.

To help achieve these objectives, the administration has included

a request for $60 million for Somalia in the President’s supplemental funding request for FY 2007. That $60 million figure includes $20 million in humanitarian assistance and $40 million to

support a peacekeeping operation. We are working to identify additional resources for these efforts, which includes the $40 million

that Secretary Rice announced in January, bringing our total FY07

to $100 million for Somalia.

However, post-conflict institution-building is ultimately a locally

led enterprise. If international donor support is to be effective,

these resources must be linked to progress made by Somalis in

achieving broadbased political dialog and reconciliation on the part

of clans, religious leaders, business people, civil society activists,

women’s leaders, and other political groups. Along with our African

and international partners, the United States will remain engaged

in supporting this much-needed process of inclusive dialog, while

also attending to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

The situation inside Somalia has changed a great deal since July,

when I last testified before this body about Somalia. The United

States, along with our African regional partners and international

partners, have made significant progress toward supporting the

TFIs and moving toward the rapid deployment of a peacekeeping

force since last July. Work remains to be done, but the political

process is going to be inclusive and successful. One important factor continues to work strongly in our collective favor: The Somali

people are tired of war and yearn for what the TFIs offer—namely,

stability, security, and governance. Our comprehensive strategy for

Somalia is already showing promise, and we are likely to see more

progress in the coming months.

Thank you, and I would be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer follows:]

11

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold and Ranking Member Sununu.

At this first hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, I congratulate you both on your

new positions. I look forward to working closely with you and the other members

of this subcommittee during the 110th Congress. Thank you for calling a hearing

on this timely and important issue. I am pleased to have this opportunity to publicly

discuss U.S. policy and engagement with Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Mr. Chairman, given your longstanding interest in Somalia, I am not at all surprised that

this is the subject of the subcommittee’s first hearing.

Somalia occupies a unique space, both geographically and strategically. The country sits at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East. The overall security of the region is affected by Somalia’s continued lack of internal stability. In this

regard, U.S. interests in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa region are to promote

and support regional stability and representative government, to eliminate any platform for al-Qaeda or other terrorist operations, to provide humanitarian assistance

in the wake of drought, flooding, and 16 years of near-constant conflict in southern

and central Somalia, and to work with governments in the region to transform the

countries through investing in people and good governance and promoting economic

growth.

For the first time in 16 years, Somalis face the prospect of rebuilding their nation.

We have a real opportunity to help Somalis restore effective governance that is representative of the full spectrum of Somali society. We are pursuing a strategy to

help establish stability, move forward with a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation, and begin reconstruction within Somalia. Under my leadership, there is

a growing interagency team working together to advance our policy objectives in Somalia.

DECISIVE MOMENTS

A lot has happened since I last appeared before this subcommittee in July 2006.

At the time, the United States was encouraged by the June 22, 2006, agreement

between the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and the then-Union of

Islamic Courts. The United States supported this agreement, which came to be

known as the Khartoum Declaration, including the points of mutual recognition and

cessation of hostilities.

While negotiations initially offered great promise, by late July the actions of the

Islamic courts were beginning to run counter to the spirit and the reality of dialog.

Immediately after the Khartoum Declaration, the Union of Islamic Courts was renamed the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) and Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated by

both the United States and the United Nations as a terrorist, was elected to be the

chairman of the CIC Consultative Council. On July 19, 2006, the CIC attempted to

provoke Ethiopia into a broader conflict by advancing toward the interim capital of

Baidoa. During the following months, extremist elements within the CIC—particularly the radical al-Shabaab organization—hijacked the broader courts movement,

driving the CIC toward an agenda of military expansion and aggression. Despite

international efforts to encourage dialog between the CIC and the TFIs, the CIC

chose to repeatedly violate the terms of the Khartoum Declaration through the takeover of Kismaayo, the September 18, 2006, terrorist bombing attack on the Parliament building in Baidoa, and military buildups around Baidoa and Puntland.

These were decisive moments. Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in its decision

to pursue a military agenda and to refuse to join the governance process and the

TFIs through peaceful dialog. When the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)

and Ethiopia launched a counteroffensive against the CIC in December, the CIC

structure disappeared faster than anyone had anticipated. However, they were also

weakened immensely by the withdrawal of support from the Somali population. The

extremists within the CIC very clearly did not reflect the will of Somalis, as represented by civil society and their government.

A HOPEFUL MOMENT IN TIME

Following these developments, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent me back

to the region to conduct regional diplomatic efforts. My trip included visits to

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen in support of broader efforts to achieve lasting stability in Somalia.

The most striking lesson I took away from my early January trip to the region

is this: Somalis are ready. Somalis are ready for peace; they are tired of war. While

12

the TFIs are not yet ready to stand entirely on their own without international support, they offer a promising vehicle forward for Somalia. While developments on the

ground have maintained a frenetic pace, there are many reasons to be hopeful.

In an effort to make the most of this moment of opportunity, we have engaged

in conversations and negotiations with Somalia’s various stakeholders and regional

governments. This approach is in keeping with Secretary Rice’s Transformational

Diplomacy approach. I have met with my counterparts in African countries and regional organizations, and I have been seeking the advice and counsel of African officials and diplomats to resolve this situation.

During my trip at the turn of the year, I participated in a series of high-level diplomatic meetings, conveying the United States Government’s position on various

issues. I spoke with President Museveni of Uganda and representatives of the African Union in Ethiopia. I also met with the leadership of the TFIs, including President Abdullahi Yusuf, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi, and former Parliament

Speaker Shariff Hassan Sheikh Adan, and representatives of Somali civil society.

On January 5, Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju, Norway’s Deputy Foreign

Minister Raymond Johansen, and I cochaired a meeting of the International Contact

Group on Somalia. This gathering demonstrated the depth of the international community’s commitment to supporting a sustainable political solution in Somalia

through broad-based national dialog and providing appropriate development, security, and humanitarian assistance.

The Contact Group issued a communique at the meeting’s end that recognized the

historic opportunity now within the grasp of the Somali people, as they seek a sustainable political solution based on the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. Further, the Contact Group affirmed the importance of inclusive governance

and additionally emphasized that funding to facilitate the deployment of a stabilization force in Somalia, based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1725, remains

urgent. This communique and the other sentiments expressed by members of the

Contact Group that day demonstrate the unity and common priorities of the international community on Somalia. These themes continued during my consultations

and bilateral meetings on the margins of the January 29–30 African Union Summit

in Ethiopia.

POLITICAL DIALOG

The United States strategy for Somalia includes three major priorities in Somalia.

First, encourage inclusive political dialog between the leadership of the TFIs and

other key Somali stakeholders. Second, mobilize international support to help build

the governance capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions and provide development and humanitarian assistance for the Somali people. And third, although

perhaps most urgent, move forward with the deployment of an African stabilization

force in Somalia.

These objectives remain consistent with the objectives that I articulated to this

subcommittee in July 2006. While the United States does not believe that the nowdefunct Council of Islamic Courts should be reconstituted in order to engage in dialog with the TFIs, the United States believes that the key to long-term stability in

Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation leading to the

formation of an inclusive government of national unity within the framework of the

Transitional Federal Charter.

To a great extent, this process will rely on the government’s willingness to reach

out and create an inclusive political process. This remains the greatest challenge.

The leaders of the TFIs must serve as symbols and architects of this process. The

statement that President Yusuf made to the Contact Group regarding his intention

to engage with Somali stakeholders was a positive step. He further announced at

the African Union Summit the intention of the TFIs to convene a national reconciliation conference inside Somalia involving all key stakeholders in an inclusive process of dialog.

In recent months, the United States has encouraged the leadership of the TFIs

to make clear through statements and actions that they are committed to an inclusive process of dialog and reconciliation. We have been clear—we see a role in the

future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and extremism, and we

strongly believe that the TFG must reach out to groups that have previously been

marginalized from the political process.

The TFIs must reach out to key groups inside Somalia, including: Clan leaders,

business and civil society, women’s groups, and religious leaders, among others.

These groups, particularly those in Mogadishu, must also demonstrate their willingness to engage with the TFIs and to work together constructively. Additionally, this

means that we suggest that the leadership of the TFIs reach out to religious auVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
13

thorities, including the diverse range of local, organic courts affiliated with various

clans. The courts’ members were, of course, also a heterogeneous group from the

outset, so there are moderate individuals who could be drawn into the larger, official

political process.

This is not an either/or proposition. The security and political components of the

policy I have just described must function as two simultaneous efforts, progressing

toward the same end point.

SECURITY AND STABILITY

This dialog must move forward very quickly to reach a sustainable solution, on

the basis of the Transitional Federal Charter, in order to stabilize the situation in

Mogadishu and allow all components of the TFIs to relocate to the country’s capital.

Rapid deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia will help create a secure environment in which this political process can move forward and will help instill confidence in the Somali people that the peace process is moving forward.

The United States is working closely with the African Union (AU), as they prepare for the deployment of a stabilization force to help provide a secure environment

for political inclusiveness and transition. On January 19, the AU Peace and Security

Council endorsed the deployment of this force. Several AU member-states have expressed their desire to contribute troops or provide logistical support for this effort.

Uganda came forward first, offering to deploy 1,500 troops based on United Nations

Security Council Resolution 1725. Ugandan President Museveni’s initial offer has

since been followed by other countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Burundi, expressing a desire to provide troops for this effort.

As a crucial component of our strategy in Somalia, the United States is actively

supporting the deployment of this force, particularly the Ugandan contingent, which

requires support with strategic transportation, equipment, and other logistics. Immediate U.S. support includes $2 million for strategic transportation and $8 million

for equipment for the Ugandan force, as well as technical assistance. With our help,

and following approval by the Ugandan Parliament, we anticipate that the Ugandans can deploy to Somalia as early as this week.

This remains very much an AU-led and AU-coordinated effort. The United States

and other donor partners are working closely with the AU, which recently selected

Ghana’s President John Kufuor as its chair. The AU is already working on plans

to strengthen the Ugandan deployment with further troop deployments, and Kenyan

Foreign Minister Tuju traveled to several African countries last month to solicit additional troop contributions.

Africans have developed a strong record of conflict resolution and peacekeeping

in recent years. As Nigeria took the lead in Liberia and South Africa did in Burundi, we are hopeful that Africans will once again help what President Mbeki has

called one of their ‘‘sister countries’’ move beyond strife and toward reconciliation.

However, it is the Somali people who must be responsible for local-level security

without resorting to the warlordism of the past. We have advised the TFIs to make

development of a civilian police force a priority, and ultimately the political process

should lead to the formation of a unified military representative of all of Somalia’s

clans. For that reason, the United States has supported the call of the International

Contact Group on Somalia to quickly ‘‘establish local-level stability throughout Somalia, effective Somali security forces, including a civilian police force.’’ These efforts will be supported by the deployment of the stabilization force to Somalia,

which will provide a secure environment in which a political process can move forward and effective security institutions can be developed.

In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists associated with alQaeda have succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Somalia. Somalia’s continued

exploitation by terrorist elements threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa

region. We will therefore take strong measures to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia. In this regard, the

United States continues to work with East African countries to build their capacity

to counter terrorism and criminality that originates in Somalia. The United States

Government remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to

all Americans, Somalis, and citizens in neighboring Horn of Africa countries. The

administration will continue working with Somalis, regardless of clan, religious, or

secular affiliation to eliminate this common threat.

SUPPORTING THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Developments in Somalia remain highly fluid. The fragile, nascent TFIs are only

beginning to function and are only beginning to control territory, while spoilers and

extremists continue to undermine stability.

14

U.S. engagement seeks to support the TFIs and encourage reconciliation among

key Somali stakeholders. Given the absence of functioning governance institutions

in Somalia for over 15 years, the rebuilding of governance and security institutions

will largely be starting from scratch and will require significant external assistance.

It is critically important that the United States help enhance the governance capacity of the TFIs, as well as support efforts to build governance capacity at the local

and regional level. In this regard, U.S. assistance aimed at supporting short-term

quick impact and high visibility, will be a critical element in building support for

the TFIs and demonstrating to the Somali people that the TFIs offer a means of

improving their overall quality of life.

At the January 5, 2007, meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia,

I signaled the administration’s intention to take concrete steps to assist Somalia.

We are providing $40.5 million in new assistance for Somalia. This contribution is

a reflection of our commitment to, and engagement with, Somalia’s revitalization.

As announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on January 4, this total includes $16.5 million in humanitarian assistance and $24 million that will be used

to support both deployment of a peace support mission and provide development

assistance for the Somali people. We are also requesting $60 million in FY 2007

supplemental funding for Somalia, including $40 million for peacekeeping and $20

million in humanitarian assistance for those affected by the current humanitarian

crisis in Somalia.

We have signaled clearly that the United States intends to remain engaged for

the long term in Somalia. Other donor partners have also agreed to identify additional resources for Somalia. However, post conflict institution-building is ultimately

a locally led enterprise. If international donor support is to be effective these resources must be linked to progress made by Somalis in achieving broad-based political dialog and reconciliation on the part of clans, religious leaders, business people,

civil society activists, women’s leaders, and other political groups.

We understand that this is an ongoing process, and that we have not reached the

end. Along with our African and international partners, the United States will remain engaged in supporting this much-needed process of inclusive dialog, while also

attending to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

CONCLUSION

The situation inside Somalia has changed a great deal since July. The United

States, along with our international partners, have made significant progress toward supporting the TFIs and moving toward the rapid deployment of African

peacekeeping forces.

Work remains to be done, if the political process is going to be inclusive and successful. While we welcome the positive statements from Somali leaders and encourage them to take positive action, we are cognizant of the challenges we face—which

could include a lack of political will from some elements of the TFIs to engage in

such a process.

One important factor continues to work strongly in our collective favor. The Somali people are tired of war and yearn for what the TFIs offer—stability, security,

and governance. Our comprehensive strategy for Somalia is already showing promise, and we are likely to see more progress in the coming months.

Thank you, and now I would be happy to take your questions.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your remarks.

And now, we turn to Mr. Hess.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HESS. Hopefully this is on.

Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu, and

Senator Coleman. It is an honor to appear before you today to

discuss the U.S. Government assistance and a way forward in

Somalia.

With your permission, sir, I will submit my written statement for

the record.

15

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Mr. HESS. Having just returned from a trip to the Horn of Africa,

where we have a Disaster Assistance Response Team monitoring

the needs in Somalia, in the Somalia region of Ethiopia and the

Kenya/Somalia border, I plan to give you a picture today of the

humanitarian situation in Somalia and a sense of how our humanitarian and development partners on the ground regard the situation. I will also discuss what we see as a way forward and what

USAID is going to assure that the way forward brings peace and

stability to a population that has suffered more in 1 year than most

do in a lifetime.

In July, when I addressed this subcommittee, I spoke about the

disastrous toll that the drought had taken on central and southern

Somalia, and the 1.7 million agropastoralists and pastoralists

whose lives and livelihoods had benefited from the robust U.S. Government humanitarian response and the generosity of the American people. Since July, these same Somalis have experienced some

of the worst flooding they can remember. Although the death toll

has been minimal, 255,000 people were displaced, crops were destroyed, and livestock were lost. Flooding has seriously hindered

the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly food, to the

region. During my trip to the region, I had the opportunity to visit

Dadaab camp. It’s a refugee camp 80 kilometers inside the Kenya/

Somali border, where I heard firsthand from Somalis about the situation in their home country. The camp hosts some 170,000 refugees, 98 percent of whom were Somalis who have fled the country.

However, in the last year, when the Islamic Courts were making

advances in Somalia, nearly 35,000 additional people crossed over

from Somalia and are—now reside in that camp.

There are two points I would like you to remember about this

camp. First, it has been there for 16 years and has a global acute

malnutrition rate of 22 percent, which is 7 percent over the emergency level, even though the people in these camps receive a full

ration. Points out the challenges that we face and what Fred Cuny

taught us a long time ago, that it’s more than just food that prevents malnutrition.

Second, the families with whom I spoke, particularly the women,

were not willing to return to Somalia when peace returned. That

is a striking comment, and one on which we’ll have to work in the

future.

Across the border in Somalia, our partners estimate that the

most recent round of conflict has displaced 40,000 people in south

and central Somalia. Almost all of those have returned to their

homes, and a number of people estimate that the acute food crisis

has dropped by more than half. However, as the rains and

floodings begin to ease, our partners are prepared for an increase

in water and mosquito-born diseases, such as cholera, dysentery,

and malaria, which pose a particularly serious threat to children

under the age of 5, the elderly, and the populations already compromised by undernourishment.

Livelihoods are also at risk. In addition to human disease, animal disease is a threat. Rift Valley fever is suspected in hundreds

of recent animal deaths and several human deaths in southern Somalia, where conflict has made it difficult to collect and transport

16

samples for confirmation. Rift Valley fever can disseminate herds

of cattle and sheep, and it poses a serious health threat to the

human—weakened human population. It is also a potential—disastrous potential economic effect on Somalia and its neighbors. Our

U.N. partners and NGO partners are working together with the

Transitional Federal Government to identify the fever and treat

humans and animals.

So far, in fiscal year 2007, the U.S. Government has provided nearly $16 million to mitigate the impacts of the drought, floods,

and conflict resulting in the displacements in Somalia and across

its borders. This assistance builds on a carryover of resources from

$92 million in 2006. The availability of these resources permitted

our partners to respond immediately and robustly to the flood

emergency in the fall and ensured a strong food pipeline through

the first quarter of this fiscal year.

USAID’s ongoing humanitarian programs are targeted in the

drought- and flood-affected areas of southern and central Somalia

and addresses food insecurity, nutrition, health, water, sanitation,

and hygiene. Our partners have well-established programs and a

thorough knowledge of the local and regional issues affecting the

populations they serve. It is this experience that has enabled them

to continue to serve beneficiaries and implement programs

throughout the political turmoil of the past year.

While in Nairobi, I met with our partners. I was uniformly impressed with their dedication and the knowledge each one brings

to their work. None of the groups felt that the conflict occurring

around the withdrawal of the courts had dramatically increased

humanitarian needs, but they all stressed the need to continue support of drought and flood victims.

Access appears to be improving in many parts of Somalia. The

Government of Kenya has pledged to soon reopen its borders for

humanitarian deliveries into Somalia, and most of our NGO partners are back in Somalia.

I also met with the United Nations country team for Somalia.

They have an impressive team. The head of the UNDP, which returned to Mogadishu—had just returned from Mogadishu, where

he led a U.N. delegation to assess the possibility of the return of

U.N. personnel. It is clear that the United Nations regards the next

few months as a window of opportunity to support Somalis to

achieve peace and security in their country.

The U.N. country team outlined a set of priorities for the next

6 months which bridge humanitarian, stabilization, and initial reconstruction efforts. These priorities also include building the capacity of key Transitional Federal Institutions, strengthening the

security sector, and assisting the Transitional Federal Institutions

in jump-starting urgent basic social services, particularly in education and health. In addition, they will ensure that the livelihood

and job creations launched earlier in this year will be communitybased activities.

Our own priorities are much the same as these, since we helped

them draft the plan. Last year, we programmed $7.9 million in

FY06 development assistance to strengthen the capacity of civil society, support conflict mitigation, address basic education needs, including distance learning and teacher training, to increase access

17

to water through rehabilitation of urban water systems, and development of rural water services.

Also, while I was in Nairobi I met with Admiral Hunt, commander of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, with whom

we have been working very closely throughout the entire Horn. I

am optimistic with—that with the coordination established between the State Department, USAID, and CJTF–HOA, and the Somalia working group in Nairobi, we are creating a coordination

model capable of serving both our national security interests and

the interests of the people of Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

I would like to outline for you our priorities over the next 90

days.

First, we will continue to respond to humanitarian contingencies

which may arise in this volatile area.

Second, we will identify opportunities to increase training and

capacity-building in our current emergency programs, particularly

in nutrition, health, and water services, jump-starting long-term

efforts addressing the delivery of critical public services.

Third, we will develop a post-conflict Somalia livelihoods recovery strategy similar to the lessons learned in the pastorals recovery

and alternative livelihood programming we have been doing in

Ethiopia and Kenya and other parts of Africa.

Fourth, support the efforts made on the part of the United Nations and our nongovernmental partners to ensure that the ongoing

emergency response provides a foundation for recovery and reconstruction.

Fifth, ensure that the protection of humanitarian space becomes

part of the diplomatic dialog with the Transitional Federal Government.

In closing, I want to remind the committee of the dire situation

on which I reported last July, and that, for the people of Somalia,

the situation has only gotten worse. But we are here today talking

about a window of opportunity, when it may be possible to help

Somalia find a pathway out of political chaos, hunger, and suffering. Seizing this opportunity will increase the chances that the

region, as a whole, finds its way to a stable, peaceful, and productive future. The approaches that I have outlined today are our best

efforts at maximizing this opportunity, and we look forward to

working with you and the interagency to make sure that these opportunities are not lost.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, again, for having me back to talk

about Somalia and what we hope to accomplish there. I look forward to responding to any questions you or members of this subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY

FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to

appear before you today to discuss U.S. Government assistance and the way forward

in Somalia.

18

BACKGROUND

Having just returned from a trip to the Horn, where we have a Disaster Assistance Response Team monitoring needs in Somalia, the Somali region of Ethiopia

and the Kenya-Somalia border, I hope to be able to give you a good picture of what

the humanitarian situation currently is in Somalia and a sense of how our humanitarian and development partners on the ground regard the situation. I will also discuss what we see as a way forward and what USAID is doing to assure that the

way forward brings peace and stability to a population that has suffered more in

one year than most do in a lifetime.

In July, when I last addressed this subcommittee, I spoke about the disastrous

toll that drought had taken on central and southern Somalia, and of the 1.7 million

pastoralists and agro-pastoralists whose lives and livelihoods have benefited from a

robust USG humanitarian response and the generosity of the American people.

Since July, these same Somalis have experienced some of the worst flooding they

can remember. Although deaths were minimal, 255,000 people were displaced, crops

were destroyed, and livestock was lost. The worst of it occurred in November and

December, but as recently as last week flooding displaced 1,000 people in the Lower

Shabelle valley. Flooding has seriously hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance—particularly food assistance—with entire convoys being mired for weeks at a

time.

DADAAB

During my trip I had the opportunity to visit Dadaab refugee camp—80 km from

the Kenya-Somalia border—and hear first-hand about the situation in Somalia. The

camp hosts some 170,000 refugees, 98 percent of whom are Somalis fleeing their

country. The majority of them have been there since 1991. The protracted refugee

situation is testimony to the longstanding chaos in Somalia. Just last year, when

the Islamic courts were making advances in Somalia, nearly 35,000 people crossed

over to Kenya into the refugee camps. Owing to security concerns, Kenya closed its

border to new asylum-seekers on January 3 and forcibly returned several hundred

from the border transit center. Acknowledging shared security concerns, the USG

has pressed the Kenyan Government to reopen the border to legitimate asylumseekers.

At the Dadaab camp, I witnessed a food aid distribution—supported in part

through our Food for Peace program—and met with some of the newer arrivals. The

severe flooding that hit Somalia also hit northeastern Kenya, including the refugee

camps where the State Department and Department of Defense worked to support

UNHCR’s flood relief efforts with U.S. military airdrops. In the section for new arrivals, in sparse vegetation and sandy soil, refugees had made homes out of

branches and plastic sheeting. They rely completely on the international community

for their survival. Aid agencies admit that they have not been able to get water

services out to the new arrivals area that has received tens of thousands of people

in the last year, and women now living there asked that I look into the situation.

Digging wells is a difficult job in Dadaab. Water is some 150 meters below the

sandy soil, requiring technical expertise that is not easily found. Emergency refugee

funding made available by the State Department will help alleviate the pressures

caused by increased refugee numbers.

Standing among the women and children gathered in the new arrivals area, I

could only imagine the difficult journeys these families had made to get to this desolate place—most had come from the Juba River Valley or Gedo Region—hundreds

of kilometers away—and the long, hard road that lies ahead for them. When I spoke

to these women, they talked of insecurity, uncertainty, and threats. They spoke of

family members they had left behind in Somalia. They spoke of the hardships they

had fled and their fear of having to return.

NEW THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Across the border in Somalia, our partners estimate that the most recent round

of conflict displaced 40,000 people in south and central Somalia. In contrast, almost

90 percent of those displaced by flooding have been able to return home, and the

number of people estimated to be in an ‘‘acute food security crisis’’ has dropped by

more than one half.

However, as the rains and flooding begin to ease, our partners are preparing for

an explosion of water and mosquito borne diseases such as cholera, dysentery, and

malaria, which pose a particularly serious threat to children under 5, the elderly

and the population already compromised by undernutrition.

19

Livelihoods are also at risk because, in addition to human disease, animal disease

is also a threat. Rift Valley Fever is suspected in hundreds of recent animal deaths

and several human deaths in southern Somalia, where conflict has made it difficult

to collect and transport samples for confirmation. Rift Valley Fever (RVF) can decimate herds of cattle and sheep, and it poses a serious health threat in weakened

human populations. Its potential economic impact on Somalia and its neighbors is

significant: An outbreak in Somalia in 1997 led to a ban on imports of livestock from

all Somali ports to the Persian Gulf States and the loss of as much as $100 million

in revenue within 2 years. To curb rumors of RVF, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) recently announced new regulations regarding the identification and

treatment of the disease in Somalia. Our U.N. and NGO partners have the capacities and resources to assist in controlling the spread and mitigating the impact of

the disease; but in order to do so they will require the ability to collect and share

information and test results in a transparent, proactive fashion. So far in fiscal year 2007, the USG has provided nearly $16 million to mitigate

the impact of drought, floods, conflict, and resulting displacement within Somalia

and across its borders. This assistance builds on carryover resources from $92 million provided in fiscal year 2006. The availability of these resources permitted our

partners to respond immediately and robustly to the flood emergency in the fall, and

ensured the existence of a strong food pipeline in the first quarter of this fiscal year.

USAID’s ongoing humanitarian programs are targeted in the drought and flood

affected areas of south central Somalia and address food insecurity, nutrition,

health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. Our partners have well-established programs

and a thorough knowledge of local and regional issues affecting the populations they

serve. It is this experience that has enabled them to continue to serve beneficiaries

and implement programs throughout the political turmoil of the past year.

PARTNER PERSPECTIVES

While in Nairobi in mid-January of this year, I had the opportunity to meet with

all of our partners. I was uniformly impressed with the dedication and knowledge

each one is bringing to their work. None of the groups I met with felt that the conflict occurring around the withdrawal of the courts had dramatically increased humanitarian needs, but they all stressed the need for continued support of drought

and flood victiDr. After the withdrawal of the Islamic courts, our NGO partners took

a cautious, ‘‘wait and see’’ attitude. Access appears to be improving in many parts

of Somalia, the Government of Kenya has pledged to soon reopen its border for humanitarian deliveries into Somalia, and most of our NGO partners are back in Somalia. However, they made clear that as we move forward, humanitarian space will

need to be protected, and they ask that this become a part of our diplomatic dialog

with the Transitional Federal Government.

I was very impressed with the United Nations Country Team for Somalia, which

includes the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World

Health Program, UNHCR, the World Food Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). They are completely engaged, and they talked openly about the challenging and critical issues

they are currently facing on the ground. The head of UNDP had just returned from

Mogadishu, where he led a U.N. delegation to assess the possibility of a return of

U.N. personnel. It is clear that the United Nations regards the next few months as

a window of opportunity to support Somalis to achieve peace and security in their

country. The U.N. Country Team has outlined a set of priorities for the next 6

months which bridge humanitarian, stabilization, and initial reconstruction efforts.

These priorities also include building the capacity of key Transitional Federal Government Institutions, strengthening the security sector, and assisting the Transitional Federal Government jump-start urgent basic social services—particularly in

education and health. In addition, they will ensure that livelihood and job creation

be launched early in these community-based recovery activities.

USAID PRIORITIES

Our own priorities are much the same. Last year we programmed $7.9 million in

FY06 development assistance to strengthen the capacity of civil society, support conflict mitigation, address basic education needs—including distance learning and

teacher training—and increase access to water through the rehabilitation of urban

water systems and development of rural water services. In 2007—in accordance

with USG policy aimed at strengthening the capacity of governing institutions—development assistance is planned to reinforce the capacity of executive, legislative,

and local authorities. Our assistance will also reinforce the TFG’s capacity to deliver

integrated social services—particularly in the areas of health, water, and eduVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
20

cation—thereby enhancing its credibility among diverse constituencies. Through

support for ongoing reconciliation programming, we are facilitating the broad-based,

inclusive participation of diverse civil society actors in Somalia’s social, political, and

economic decisionmaking. Through these venues, our development assistance programming serves to mitigate the underlying threats and conditions that encourage

extremism, instability, and terrorism.

While I was in Nairobi, I had the opportunity to meet with Admiral Hunt, commander of our Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF–HOA) in the Horn. He reports

that coordination and collaboration between the task force and USAID staff—both

in the Horn and here in the United States prior to his deployment to Djibouti—has

been invaluable to the task force’s civilian-military operations. From a USAID perspective, we feel that the best and most efficient use of USG resources in the Horn

is likely to come from good coordination and a mutual understanding of the roles,

responsibilities, capacities and strengths of our respective agencies and operating

units. Over the past 12 months, USAID, State and the Department of Defense have

worked hard to operationalize an approach in Somalia and the region that truly reflects the three Ds—Diplomacy, Development, and Defense. Defined as pillars to our

national security in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, the elevation of development—as a key pillar—is seen as reinforcing diplomacy and defense, reducing

long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous,

and peaceful societies. I am optimistic that with the coordination established between USAID, State, and CJTF–HOA in the Somalia Working Group in Nairobi, we

are creating a coordination model capable of serving both our own national security

interests and the interests of the people of Somalia and the Horn.

NEXT STEPS

I’d like to share with you USAID’s priorities over the next 90 days. Over this period we will use the resources available to us to:

• Respond effectively to humanitarian contingencies which may arise in this very

volatile situation;

• Identify opportunities to increase training and capacity-building in our current

emergency programs—particularly in nutrition, health, and water services—

jump-starting longer term efforts addressing the delivery of critical public services;

• Develop a post-conflict Somalia livelihood recovery strategy, using lessons

learned in recent pastoralist recovery and alternative livelihood programming

in Ethiopia and Kenya and in post-conflict programming in other parts of

Africa;

• Support efforts made on the part of the United Nations and our nongovernmental partners to ensure that ongoing emergency response provides a foundation for recovery and reconstruction;

• Ensure that the protection of humanitarian space becomes part of the diplomatic dialog with the Transitional Federal Government.

I’ll close by sharing with you something that has been in the back of my mind

ever since I received the invitation to provide testimony today.

On July 11 of last year, I presented a picture of a people who were on the edge

of a precipice, with years of chaos and conflict, catastrophic drought, disease, malnutrition, and a staggering loss of livestock resulting in the near collapse of an entire livelihood system. That was a true picture, and had anyone asked me that day

to imagine that this same, beleaguered population would have to withstand months

of devastating floods followed by renewed conflict, I would have found it nearly impossible to do. It is still hard for me to do, despite knowing that this is exactly what

has happened since July.

But we are here today talking about a window of opportunity when it may be possible to help Somalia find a pathway out of political chaos, hunger, and suffering.

Seizing this opportunity will increase the chances that the region as a whole finds

its way to a stable, peaceful, and productive future. The approaches that I have outlined today are our best efforts at maximizing this opportunity, and we look forward

to working with you and the Interagency, to make sure that these opportunities are

not lost.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having me back to talk about Somalia and

what we hope to accomplish there. I look forward to responding to any questions

that you and members of the subcommittee may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Hess. And thank you, to the

panel, for your testimony.

21

I’ll begin the questioning in a minute, but first I want to say how

pleased I am that Senator Webb has joined us—not only today, but

that he has asked, and has become a member of this subcommittee.

He’s already made the effort to meet with me to talk about the

work of the subcommittee, and I’m extremely pleased to have his

expertise.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure to be

a member of the subcommittee, and I look forward to working with

you on all the issues under its jurisdiction.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator.

And I’ll start up with—we’ll do a 10-minute round.

Secretary Frazer, can you tell us why the administration has

failed to comply with the requirement in law that it provide a report on Somalia, including a strategy for dealing with instability in

Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. Should I just take that question, or are you going

to ask a number of questions?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I’m going to ask you a lot of questions,

but first I’m——

Dr. FRAZER. Well, can I just——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Asking you why you haven’t

complied with the law.

Dr. FRAZER. Sorry, no; I’m used to——

Senator FEINGOLD. I thought I’d start off with that one. [Laughter.]

Dr. FRAZER. I’m used to getting five or six questions at once.

Senator FEINGOLD. Oh, you’ll get some of that, but I——

Dr. FRAZER. But I——

Senator FEINGOLD. This one, I want to hear what you have to

say right away.

Dr. FRAZER. Well, let me just say, sir, that we haven’t failed to

comply with the law. What we’re trying to do is to develop, as you

have asked, and that Congress has asked, a comprehensive strategy. Let me just state that part of developing a comprehensive

strategy is actually responding to the events on the ground and actually implementing the strategy that we have in place. And I

know that we’ve spent quite a lot of time dealing with very fastmoving events in the Horn of Africa, building the multilateral approach that you in our consultations, private and public, have

called for, and building the coalition with our regional partners.

And so, I think that the spirit of the request from the Congress is

to have effective impact on the Horn of Africa, and I think that

we’ve demonstrated that over the past year.

And so, we certainly are working on trying to get that strategy

paper to you, but we’re also very much focused on implementing an

effective strategy, which I think that we have seen in the results

that are taking place in Somalia today. When you requested that

strategy, the Transitional Federal Government was isolated and

sitting in Baidoa; today, it’s in Mogadishu. And so, I think we’ve

got to do both things, and we’re trying to manage both things.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I—you know, I understand that. I am

concerned, though, about, essentially, the lack of communication

about not following the law. I look at it as putting the cart before

the horse. Without the benefit of a shared and coordinated vision,

22

I think it’s difficult to make tactical or daily decisions and respond

to the changing environment. So, this report, which should have

been in by now, would hopefully provide the general goal, the objectives, the tasks, and the contingencies involved in pursuing our interests in the region. It should take into account the changes on

the ground and the fluid nature of the situation.

Look, Secretary, the Congress passed a law and expressed its desire to understand how the administration was going to deal with

instability in Somalia, about how it addressed the terrorist safe havens there, and it troubles me, obviously, as a Senator and somebody who was involved in passing that law, that the administration

would sort of put this to the side without any real communication.

So, I will urge you, Madam Secretary, to take immediate action

to comply with the law that was passed and signed by the President.

Now let me turn to the current situation on the ground. You and

I have talked about this before, and I’d like an update. What is the

status of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops on the ground?

Dr. FRAZER. The Ethiopian troops have started their withdrawal,

Senator. They started withdrawing forces in January. And, as you

know in your discussions, having traveled to Ethiopia and met,

yourself, with Prime Minister Meles, and in my discussions with

him, as well, and in Secretary Rice’s discussions, Prime Minister

Meles said that he wanted to be out of Somalia within 2 weeks.

More than 2 weeks have passed. Many in the international community have urged him to slow down that timeline because of fear

that there would be a vacuum created by the too-rapid withdrawal

of Ethiopian forces. So, the withdrawal has started, but it hasn’t

been completed. We would expect it to be a phased process, as we

phase in the African peacekeeping forces.

Senator FEINGOLD. What percentage of the troops—Ethiopian

troops—have been withdrawn?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, you’d have to have a concrete number of how

many were there in the first place to decide on that percentage,

and that number has varied. Some people have said 2,000, some

people have said up to 8,000 forces. So, I don’t know what the——

Senator FEINGOLD. Is it your sense that most of the troops have

been withdrawn, or just a small percentage?

Dr. FRAZER. It’s not my sense that most of the troops have withdrawn at this point, no.

Senator FEINGOLD. Will the AU peacekeeping force be deployed

before the last Ethiopian troops are withdrawn from Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. That is the idea. And we would hope to soon have

the Ugandan battalion—in particular. President Museveni has

promised to put in 1,500 troops, and we’ve been working with

them. Right now, the Ugandan Parliament has to approve that and

the Minister of Defense put a motion before Parliament on January

31. They take 3 working days to decide. Their opposition was out,

so they’re trying to give opposition time to actually consider the

deployment of those Ugandan forces. As soon as that Parliament

approves the decision, we will be prepared to help them deploy.

Senator FEINGOLD. And I know it’s your strategy to support the

TFG, but what happens if the TFG is unable to create the political

agreements and the consensus needed to govern the country effecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
23

tively? I know it’s hard to discuss this, because that’s not what we

want to happen. But, given this country’s history, I think we need

to be prepared for the possibility. So, would you talk a little bit

about what that strategy might be?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, we’re planning for the TFG to be able to build

the consensus necessary, and we think that they have made good

progress in that regard in a very short period. We continue to see

the Prime Minister reaching out to the various clans. The TFG

President at the African Union Summit announced a reconciliation

conference that would include all stakeholders. They’ve made appointments of the mayor to Mogadishu, and the deputy mayor, that

have been broadly accepted and supported. So, we will continue to

work with them to actually accomplish inclusive governance.

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m pleased——

Dr. FRAZER. That’s going to be——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. To hear that, but what’s the

backup plan if they can’t?

Dr. FRAZER. That’s not going to be easy, as you said, because

they actually are going against the trends of the last 16 years.

Senator FEINGOLD. But what’s the backup plan if they can’t?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, I’m getting to that, Senator, because I think

that the backup plan is based in the effort to actually try to

achieve the inclusive dialog. We would expect that if that’s not

going to happen, the analysis is that it would probably be a very

narrow community—two communities that would create a counter

to this inclusive dialog. That’s a particular sub-sub clan which

needs to be brought into the dialog, and that’s remnants of the

Islamic Courts and foreign terrorists.

So, what would happen? We expect to be able to reach out to that

sub-sub clan and deny those foreign terrorists that support of the

community. If it doesn’t work, it’s very likely going to be because

of outside influence, it’s going to be because of outside support for

terrorists. And we would hope to have, as you know, a peacekeeping force there——

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah.

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. That would help to provide some of the

stability while they create the space to drain the swamp, essentially, of——

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. One—and——

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. Those foreign terrorist elements.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. And on that point, of draining

the swamp—in December, shortly before the Ethiopian incursion,

you stated that the Council of Islamic Courts was, ‘‘controlled’’ by

al-Qaeda in East Africa. And this characterization implicitly compared the CIC to the Taliban, the last regime to be under the control of al-Qaeda. However, DNI head Negroponte was quoted in the

Washington Post, saying, ‘‘I don’t think there are hard-and-fast

views,’’ on the question. Asked whether the CIC was the next

Taliban, he stated, ‘‘I don’t think I’ve seen a good answer.’’ And in

January, DIA Director General Maples testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee that, ‘‘al-Qaeda is assessed to be assisting the

radical Islamist elements of the CIC with leadership and training,

with hopes of establishing a future Taliban-like state.’’

24

Now, that testimony would seem to contradict your assertion

that al-Qaeda had already asserted control of the CIC. Would you

like to take this opportunity to revisit your earlier statement?

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify my earlier

statement and to say that quotes from the newspapers are hardly

quotes at all, because, certainly, people change what one has actually said to them when they write it in newspapers. But what I

specifically said was that the Council of Islamic Courts was a heterogenous group which had been hijacked by terrorist elements,

people like Hassan Abdullah al-Turki, designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 of the United Nations Security Council 1267.

What I said was it is led by Dahir Aweys, designated under U.S.

Executive Order 13224 and under United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1267. What I said was that the al-Shabaab militia specifically was of the extremist order and was led by individuals like

Aden Hashi Ayro, who was trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

prior to 2001, and that those individuals had hijacked what was a

heterogenous Islamic Courts. And so, I was much more specific

than what——

Senator FEINGOLD. All right.

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. Was quoted in the Washington Post.

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. I hope to get back to this in another

round, but thank you for that. And, since I’m running out of time

here, I do want to at least ask a question of Mr. Hess.

And thank you for your patience. After your recent travel to the

region, can you give us a sense for what impact the ongoing humanitarian challenges are having and will have on the political efforts in Mogadishu?

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir. We feel that the humanitarian community is

pulling together with the United Nations, as well, to take this opportunity to work with the TFIs and the TFG to build capacity in

service delivery. And so, this humanitarian assistance that’s being

provided will assist in building that capacity and delivering services to the people who need it the most, especially in terms of education, health, and water and sanitation.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Hess, I hope to return to you,

but now I’ll turn to the ranking member, Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much.

And let me pick up the questioning. Mr. Hess, could you speak,

with a little bit more detail, about the activities of the Disaster Recovery Team, the DART team, that is operating? What’s the size

of the group? You know, what activities have they prioritized at the

highest level? And what are the weaknesses of a DART group like

this? You know, what areas are they not ideally suited to address?

And, obviously, therefore, these are areas that we should, you

know, find other ways to complement their efforts.

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir. We looked at—we don’t take the formation of

a Disaster Assistance Response Team lightly. When you create one

of these, as you know, it sends a signal and a message, which was

exactly what we were trying to do. We were concerned about the

humanitarian situation starting in December, and the fact that it

might deteriorate as people were on the move during a bad time.

Senator SUNUNU. When was the response team first put together?

25

Mr. HESS. In the end of December, sir——

Senator SUNUNU. OK, December——

Mr. HESS [continuing]. During the holiday.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Of 2006, so that it’s only——

Mr. HESS. 2006.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Been in place for a couple of

months. And the——

Mr. HESS. Absolutely.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. And the size?

Mr. HESS. Right now, it’s about eight members.

Senator SUNUNU. OK.

Mr. HESS. But it varies. One of the members is sitting behind me

now. So, they rotate occasionally.

In terms of what they’re focusing on, we look at the primary

basic humanitarian needs. We are concerned about the global acute

malnutrition rates in south-central Somalia, where we have seen

rates of 22, 23, some places high as 30 percent of global acute malnutrition rate, in the Gedo region. Again, we can’t address that

specifically with food, but food insecurity is a large part of that.

And certainly, we look at food as a big component of that. And our

partners—World Food Program and CARE—are doing a good job of

distributing food. But we also have to look at water sanitation, and

they are focused at working—the team is focused very closely on

working with our partners who are rehabilitating wells, digging

new bore holes. And the flooding, unfortunately, especially in the

lower Juba region, disrupted a lot of the work we had been doing

on water and sanitation, so that was a problem. We’re also worried

about the health situation from the Rift Valley fever, malaria, mosquito-born diseases, diarrhea, and cholera, which we were—we saw

some minor outbreak of that—but, again, working with the Disaster Assistance Response Team, had the ability to respond quickly

to cordon off the area where the cholera initially broke out.

The areas where we’d like to see some more work, where we are

looking at, is how we can facilitate more directly the capacity-building of the government. And we have—our Office of Transition Initiatives has a member on that Disaster Assistance Response Team

looking for the opportunity to get in and directly facilitate the

building of that capacity along with UNDP.

Senator SUNUNU. Are—do any of the response team personnel

work directly in Somalia, or are they primarily located in Kenya—

or——

Mr. HESS. They are——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Exclusively located in Kenya?

Mr. HESS [continuing]. All in Kenya. They have not been able to

get in yet.

Senator SUNUNU. You said that the—most of our NGO partners

are back operating again in Somalia. What level of effectiveness

have they reached? And is there more capacity that they can build,

or that we can help them build within the country?

Mr. HESS. The points that we tried to make with the—with our

NGO partners is building local capacity at the same time that they

try to deliver the assistance. As you can imagine, most of what

they do is through local partners, but we’re trying to build up that

capacity so that they can carry on through the challenging period,

26

if you will. And we want to make sure that they have that capacity

specifically on the monitoring side, because if—we’re concerned

about this global acute malnutrition rate, we’re concerned about

the spread of Rift Valley fever and other mosquito-born diseases.

And if we can build that monitoring capacity on the local side, we’ll

be a lot further ahead.

Senator SUNUNU. How is the team’s relationship with the Government of Kenya and/or Government of Ethiopia? Either intentionally or not, have those governments—or do those governments

have anything in place that acts as a restriction on our ability to

have the positive impact?

Mr. HESS. It’s a good point. We have a good working relationship

with both governments, because we’ve had teams and we have had

missions in the area for a long time. One of the areas which we

are working very closely with the Kenyan Government on now is

the Dadaab camp. As I pointed out, the global acute malnutrition

rate is pretty high. One of the things that we’re looking at is using

area around the camps to increase alternate livelihood development

there. What we’re looking at is the planting of alternate crops so

that we can vary the diet of the people in the camps, and also to

drill some more wells in the region. But, as you know, when you’re

talking about a water table that is vulnerable to begin with, that’s

a problem. The Government of Kenya worked very closely with us

during the flooding of the Dadaab camp. As you remember, one of

the sub-camps, Ifo, was wiped out. And the Kenyan Government

worked very closely with us to help alleviate that situation. So,

they have a good working relationship with the government.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Assistant Secretary Frazer, you mentioned the negotiations that

are expected to take place at the end of February and some of the

outreach of the contact participation that needed to take place at

the sub-clan level. What other participants are important to the

success of those negotiations? And are there any parties that have

been reluctant to participate?

Dr. FRAZER. Yes; thank you, Senator. Specifically, the inclusive

dialog is already taking place, with the Prime Minister and the

President reaching out to various stakeholders. The key stakeholders would be, I believe, the Somalia business community, the

business leaders, which provided financing for the courts in the

past and will be an important part of providing the assistance and

support for the Transitional Federal Government. Also, it’s very

clear that the Ayr sub-sub clan, in the past, had been a base of

support for the Islamic Courts, and that there are some concerns

about trying to make sure that they feel that they are adequately

represented, or represented—that they have their own representatives as part of the Transitional Federal Government and part of

the inclusive dialog. So, I think that those are two key sectors.

Somali women are extremely strong and, I think, very much,

reaching out to the women’s groups, and civil society groups will

be key to building that inclusive dialog.

Senator SUNUNU. But you expect each of these groups to be effectively represented in the February discussions?

27

Dr. FRAZER. Yes. I think you’re talking about the National Reconciliation Conference. I would expect them to be represented, most

certainly, as well as the Somali diaspora.

Senator SUNUNU. You spoke a little bit about the troops committed by Uganda; 1,500 troops under the African Union. What

other commitments have been made for troop participation? And

what does the United States do—or what can the United States

do—what have we offered to do to support the logistics and deployment of those troops?

Dr. FRAZER. For the Ugandan troops, we’ve offered—we have

military planners working in Uganda with the Ugandan chief of defense forces and chief of general staff. We will do contract airlift

for the Ugandan forces. We also have planners at the African

Union working at headquarters on command-and-control systems.

The Nigerians have also offered a battalion. The Burundians have

offered a battalion of about a thousand troops, as well. And Malawi

originally was reported to have offered them, but I think that they

need to go through their parliamentary system, as well, to get the

final approval.

Other countries, like Rwanda, Tanzania, have offered to train the

Transitional Federal Government’s national army, and we are hoping that South Africa will provide some type of assistance. Algeria

has also offered to provide airlift to AMISOM. And so, they’re still

in the process of finalizing the troop contributors and the way in

which they will contribute, but we can provide planners. The Ghanaians have offered a few hundred troops, as well. They’ve asked

us for planners to go to Ghana, to Accra, and to work with their

military to prepare them for deployment. We would provide some

equipment, contract airlift, some sustainment support.

Senator SUNUNU. When do you expect deployment to take place?

And at what numbers do you expect will be achieved?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, the first deployment that we’re hoping for is

of the Ugandan forces, and we’re on standby waiting for their Parliament to decide. We can deploy them a day after their Parliament

decides. We also know that they have teams right now in

Mogadishu and in Addis, coordinating their planning within the

AU structure. And so, we’re ready to assist its—the timing, I’m

hoping—I keep hoping, in the next week or two.

Senator SUNUNU. And the total number that you hope to attain?

Dr. FRAZER. For that first deployment, we’re talking about——

Senator SUNUNU. But in the aggregate, including the other commitments that you’ve referenced.

Dr. FRAZER. The AU has said that they want a force of about

8,000. They feel that they have commitments right now for actual

forces——

Senator SUNUNU. They think they can——

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. Of about——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Reach that.

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. 4,000.

Senator SUNUNU. OK, thank you.

Last question, Assistant Secretary Frazer, what should the status of Somaliland be? And what is the official interaction between

the U.S. Government and the governing organizations in

Somaliland?

28

Dr. FRAZER. I think we in the administration, agree with the

sense of Congress that the status of Somaliland should be held off

right now. We have always said that we will follow the lead of the

African Union, and I think that the African Union also feels that

now is not the time to push for decisions on Somaliland. They have

been invited to be part of the National Reconciliation Conference

that President Yusuf announced. I don’t know whether they’ll take

up that offer. We meet with representatives of the Somaliland Government. They have a representative here. We have met with

them. When I was at the African Union Summit, I met, on the

margins of the African Union Summit, with the Foreign Minister

of Somaliland, and have done so in my travels to the region in the

past.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Sununu.

I’m also very pleased to see Senator Cardin here, who is a new

member of the subcommittee and the Senate, but obviously no

stranger to these issues, as a long-time distinguished member of

the House. Welcome.

And normally we would rotate and go to Senator Cardin now,

but, out of courtesy, he has deferred to Senator Coleman, who has

been here for some time.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,

Senator Cardin.

Let me first talk a little bit about the resources we have focused—are dealing with, with this issue. How many State Department folks do we have in Nairobi who are focused on Somalia, just

Somalia? What kind of complement do we have there?

Dr. FRAZER. There are currently six people, full time, working on

Somalia in Nairobi, including a Somalia coordinator, a senior Foreign Service officer, Ambassador John Yates. He is leading that

Somali working group under the leadership of, obviously, our Ambassador Rannenberger, who I’m not including among the six.

Senator COLEMAN. In addition, we’ve talked about the global nature of the war on terrorism and the concerns about Somalia and

being a base for expanded terrorist activity. Is the Bureau of Near

East Affairs—are they—how globally are we looking at dealing

with this situation in Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. Yes, they are involved, and we work closely with

them. I sometimes feel that a lot of it is them suggesting that I

travel to countries in their region, but certainly Assistant Secretary

David Welch raises the Somalia issue, our Ambassadors in the region are constantly reporting, meeting with officials in their countries, and sending in those reports. We have reports in significant

interaction with Yemen, but also from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, from

the Arab League. We’re engaging all of them.

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Feingold, the chairman, talked about

legislation that was introduced today, which myself and Senator

Klobuchar cosponsors. One of the parts of that legislation talks

about a special envoy to Somalia and lays out very specific duties:

Direct U.S. Government efforts to establish a credible, capable government of national unity, provide detailed assessments of challenges and progress on the ground in Somalia and the Horn of

29

Africa, to pursue a truly comprehensive and sustainable peace in

Somalia. What is the administration’s position in regard to the appointment of a special envoy to Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, as I said, we have Ambassador Yates as our

Somalia coordinator. He took up his position, based in Nairobi,

January 2007, and we would expect for him to play the role of the

special envoy that—as outlined, to work in the region to develop

that diplomatic engagement in the region itself.

Senator COLEMAN. Does he have the authority—the recognized

authority to do what a special envoy—does he have the leeway, the

independence to be able to do what a special envoy would be called

upon to do?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, in—yes, Senator, in the context of—the lead on

our foreign policy is, as you very well know, Secretary Rice, and

she’s very much in the lead on our Somalia policy. She convenes

her team, she has been part of this development of the strategy

with the National Security Advisor within the context of the interagency. So, yes, indeed; like our other Ambassadors who have authority in their countries as chief of missions, he is empowered

with helping us to develop that strategy and to implement the

strategy.

Senator COLEMAN. And my concern would not be necessarily

from above, in terms of that, I just want to know that folks on the

ground—I want to know that folks in the Embassy, folks in other

areas, would recognize that he has, then, the ability to pull things

together, to get information to help put in place a plan. That’s my

concern. Is it recognized that he’s going to have those abilities that

we would expect a special envoy to have?

Dr. FRAZER. Senator Coleman, yes, indeed. Ambassador Rannenberger is our chief of mission with responsibility in the region overall to coordinate our policy in the region, and he does so by convening conference calls with the regional Ambassadors, their chief

of mission. Ambassador John Yates works very closely with Ambassador Rannenberger to help us implement that strategy. So yes, he

has the authority, but line authority belongs, in the region, to our

chiefs of mission, and we hold that and guard that very closely.

And, obviously, in Washington, the Secretary of State leads our foreign policy.

Senator COLEMAN. And I recognize that. I mean, my concern is

that the bureaucracy recognize that we’ve got—that we’re focusing

resources or we’re putting somebody in position to pull things together. It’s tough working within a system if people don’t recognize—that’s my concern. We’ve talked about a special envoy rather

than, I’d say respectfully, just a bureaucrat. I want somebody out

there who’s able to say, ‘‘This is important, this is’’—the—we—both

witnesses talked about this window of opportunity. There’s a window of opportunity now, but if we don’t seize it, if we don’t direct

the resources, if we don’t say that this is important, then I don’t

know if we’ll seize that window of opportunity. So, that’s really

where I’m getting to in this line of questioning.

Dr. FRAZER. And I understand it, Senator. And I appreciate it.

And I’ve said that I think that the Ambassador has all of the authority necessary to do that. But you’re hearing me hesitate because I don’t understand why we would want to take—or suggest

30

that the Secretary of State, who is actively engaging and involved

on a daily basis on Somalia, and is a senior diplomat for our Government—why we would suggest that she not stay in that lead

role. Why would we devolve, in some ways, the authority away

from the line responsibility for it, if it’s being carried out. If it’s not

being carried out, a special envoy, I think, can help to manage, but

when the line authorities are managing the policy, I’m left puzzled,

frankly, by the desire to put another person into that line command.

Senator COLEMAN. Well, in part, because the Secretary—we’ll

talk about the Secretary of State, because the Secretary of State is

involved in trying to get support in the region for our efforts in

Iraq. The Secretary of State is involved with trying to deal with the

situation of the—preventing the rearmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Secretary of State is involved with the very delicate negotiations dealing in six-party talks with North Korea, because the

Secretary of State—and I could go on and on—in Venezuela, the

Secretary of State, in the Sudan, in Darfur. And so, my

concern——

Dr. FRAZER. Somalia.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Is—and Somalia—and that’s my

concern, that there are all these critical areas and issues that we

face today. And I just want to make sure that we are putting the

focus, the attention, and the resources with the kind of independence that allow people to do what has to be done, knowing that the

Secretary of State’s attention is going to be diverted by a whole

range of other critical issues. This is also important. And I don’t

want to minimize that importance when—and recognizing that

there are other things going on the world today that are going to

take her attention and her focus.

Dr. FRAZER. The Secretary of State has prioritized Somalia on

her range of issues that she’s dealing with. Anytime we need to go

to see the Secretary of State, she leads our policy on Somalia, she’s

one who decided to give us the $40 million in January, when we

went to the International Contact Group. She’s the one who blessed

and decided on the regional strategy.

Senator COLEMAN. OK.

Dr. FRAZER. So, it’s a priority for her.

Senator COLEMAN. And I appreciate that.

Mr. Hess, I’d like to look a little bit at the resources. I think in

the President’s budget request talked about—was it—$9 million

was the figure for development assistance for Somalia in 2008.

Does this represent all the assistance that we’re providing Somalia

to accomplish all the objectives that you mentioned?

Mr. HESS. No, sir. We have a—we have more money than that.

As you know, in the supplemental there was an increase of $20

million that was asked for. We have additional food aid resources

that will be available as needed. We have 41,000 metric tons on the

ground right now. We did a call forward for another 18,500 tons

in January. So, the pipeline’s in good shape there. But we have

funds available if we need more food resources. We’re looking at

nonfood items, particularly on the water sanitation side, rehabilitation of wells. We have asked our partners to look particularly at

those areas, and also on education.

31

Senator COLEMAN. Do we have a figure as to what your—what

the total costs will be? What do we need to make a difference in

Somalia, understanding that we have a whole range of humanitarian crisis—in flooding, malnutrition, et cetera, et cetera?

Mr. HESS. It’s hard to estimate exactly what that number is right now, but we’re looking at anywhere from $20 to $60 million. But

we need our partners on the ground to come back to us after

they’ve done a thorough assessment, because you don’t want to attach a number to that right now without an accurate assessment.

We need to look primarily at the damage that was done by the

flooding on the wells that we had dug during the drought last year.

Senator COLEMAN. Are you satisfied with the level of international cooperation that we’re getting to deal with the situation

in Somalia?

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir. I’ve met with the donors when we were out

there. That’s a very good question. I met with all the donors.

They’re very seized with the issue. ECHO and the European Union

have done a very good job of coordinating the effort. DFID, our

U.K. partners, are very much engaged in the area, and they meet

on a weekly basis to ensure—because what we’re talking about

here are gaps and where the gaps exist, and we want to make sure

that those gaps are covered, and we work very closely with them

to ensure that we don’t have those gaps. And that’s also the role

of that U.N. Team, OCHA, U.N. Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance, has done a very good job on the coordination

role. They’ve got a good team player out there, and he’s doing a

great job, as well.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator Cardin.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me turn to Senator Cardin, but, just before I do, I want to thank Senator Coleman for the remarks he just

made in the context of special envoy. I know the Secretary indicated she’s puzzled by our request for a special envoy, but I’m puzzled that you would be puzzled. I mean, let’s face it, in Sudan we

had a special envoy, in John Danforth, to try to resolve the dispute

between the north and the south. We currently have a special

envoy with regard to Darfur, Ambassador Natsios. And presumably

Secretary Rice is engaged in those matters. I know she is, I know

she cares about them. It’s just a question of: How much can one

person do with such an incredible range problems, which Senator

Coleman just identified, post-9/11? It’s essentially impossible.

So, you know, I’m loathe to just call for a bunch of special envoys, but we’re in a very unusual situation. Ambassador Rannenberger, an excellent Ambassador who I had a chance to work with

in Kenya, is obviously doing Somalia part-time, because Kenya is

a very important country, and it requires an enormous amount of

his attention. John Yates is a retired temporary appointment. So,

this is about authorities, in part, you’re correct about that, but it’s

also about capacity. Just how much can people do, given the resources? I mean, we had Newt Gingrich, of all people, come before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and say that it had been

a mistake to cut back on our State Department people, and he advocated a significant increase in State Department staff. I mean,

this is the symbol of the Contract with America admitting that he

32

was wrong to do that. So, we are in a different era. And it is not

necessarily an attack on your authority or Secretary Rice’s authority to say, in this particular situation, it may be necessary to have

a special envoy. I hope we can continue the discussion of this special envoy issue in that context and in that spirit.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

let me concur in your comments. Somalia is very important to U.S.

interests and I think a special envoy is appropriate, and certainly

we need the resources if we’re going to be able to be effective.

Administrator Hess, thank you for being here. Secretary Frazer,

appreciate both of your testimonies.

As I understand your testimony, Secretary Frazer, the mission—

or our priorities in Somalia, I think, are without dispute: To encourage political dialog between leadership with the stakeholders;

to mobilize international support to build the governance capacity

clearly for credibility, and we need the international community

working with us; and deployment of an African stabilization force

in order to deal with the humanitarian circumstances. I think all

that is—are goals that we agree with.

I want to concentrate, if I might, on the issue of terrorism within

Somalia and the mission—the air strikes that the United States

participated in, beginning of January. Can you just give us the status of those air strikes—the targets and how successful we were?

Dr. FRAZER. Yes, Senator; I can try my very best. There were two

A–130 air strikes, as you said. They were targeting convoys. They

were in a remote area in Somalia, near the border, between Somalia and Kenya. We don’t have full information on the results at this

point. I think that probably my colleagues from DOD might be able

to help, but I think that there’s also an issue of the fog of war, and

we need greater clarity. We’re fairly certain that some of the terrorists that were targeted have been captured or killed, but I think

that probably time will tell and we’ll be better able to know exactly

who has been killed in those attacks and who has escaped.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I’m certainly interested in that, and perhaps we’ll follow up with DOD. I’m also interested what impact it

has on the other goals. It’s been reported that the Europeans were

not very pleased with these air strikes. Maybe you could give us

a little more information about how the stakeholders have responded to American air strikes.

Dr. FRAZER. Senator, the key stakeholders that we’ve been focusing our strategy on are the Africans themselves, particularly those

in the region who have some leverage and whose interests are most

threatened by these terrorists who are operating in Somalia. We’ve

worked very closely, as I said, with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.

We’ve shared intelligence with them to try to track these terrorists.

We will continue to work with them.

I think that everyone wants to work in coordination and cooperation, and so, we have to maximize that, but I think that we have

a shared goal to try to track these guys and our cooperation with

the key partners, being those neighbor—the countries in the neighborhood, has not been undermined by the strikes, the two air

strikes.

33

Senator CARDIN. Well, I certainly agree with us doing what is

necessary against terrorism. My question is a little broader, as to

what impact that’s having on our overall strategies in Somalia as

it relates to our diplomatic efforts.

Dr. FRAZER. Our diplomatic efforts continue strong. The International Contact Group on Somalia is a focal point for our diplomatic multilateral efforts. We continue to have key institutions and

member countries—key institutions being the African Union, the

United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—that are involved, as

well as key countries, like Norway, the United States, Tanzania,

and others. There has been no diminishing of that multilateral effort. In fact, more countries have asked to join the International

Contact Group on Somalia.

Senator CARDIN. But do you anticipate that additional air strikes

will be necessary?

Dr. FRAZER. That’s really an operational question, sir. It is

clearly tracking these terrorists who continue to threaten American

lives, the Somalis themselves, and their neighbors, is a key priority

for the United States, but that is really an operational question of

the combatant commanders in the field.

Senator CARDIN. I’m trying to get from you, but I’m not succeeding, as to whether this is having any significant impact in our

discussions with our international partners on the goals that you

have articulated in Somalia.

Dr. FRAZER. Clearly, the issue of what actions the United States

takes, in terms of tracking these terrorists, all of our actions—sharing information, air strikes, putting forces on the ground, if we

should do that—are part of the dialog that we have, especially with

Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, our regional partners but also

more broadly. But our focus on the diplomatic effort is to ensure

that whatever we do is coordinated with those key countries

around Somalia that have the greatest leverage over it. Secondary

is working and making sure that we remain coordinated with countries throughout Africa. We do that most effectively through the

African Union (AU). I had dialog with Chairman Konare at the AU.

It was good dialog. I think we’re still latched up. And then, from

there, obviously the international partners, working with the European Union and especially with Norway, who cochairs the International Contact Group on Somalia. So, what I’m saying——

Senator CARDIN. It would seem to me, though, that it—that part

of the diplomatic effort is to work with our European friends and

have a greater understanding on the use of our air support to deal

with terrorism. Was that done?

Dr. FRAZER. Frankly, this just wasn’t—in my interaction with the

Europeans—an issue high on the agenda. It came up in one of my

conversations with one European country. All of the others were focused on the question of conditioning aid specifically to the

AMISOM force and its deployment, whether the EU position, that

until the TFG did more on dialog, would hold up funding for

AMISOM. That was really the focus of attention and the major diplomatic issue that we were addressing on Somalia at the African

Union Summit, in which I had consultations broadly with the European countries. Maybe it’ll come up at the International Contact

34

Group on Somalia, which will meet on February 9. It didn’t come

up at the last one, because, in December—or January, when we

had that meeting, the air strikes took place after the meeting was

over.

Senator CARDIN. It just seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we

would be in a stronger position in carrying out the goals that are—

Madam Secretary, you have announced—if there was a broader involvement in decisions made in regards to the terrorist activities in

Somalia and what we need to do in order bring that under control.

I thank the chairman for the time.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, for

your participation.

And we do need to get to the next panel soon, but I do want to

take a little more time to ask some questions, Secretary Frazer.

And thank you for your patience here.

Thinking more broadly, can you explain how the U.S. Government is working to eliminate the conditions that have allowed the

terrorists to use Somalia as a safe haven for so long? We—as

you’ve indicated, we’ve known that al-Qaeda affiliated individuals

have been in Somalia for years. So, what are we doing differently

now?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, what we’re trying to do is, as I said, of course,

working very closely with the region to share information about the

movement of these terrorists. We’re not going to completely eliminate terrorists in Africa—in the Horn of Africa, or anywhere else

around the globe, unless we work in close partnership with countries themselves—strong, capable countries that can monitor their

own borders. We will continue to work with the United Nations,

and we’re doing so in the Security Council, to try to track terrorist

financing. We also very much work in partnership with the neighboring countries. Obviously, also building a capable, inclusive government in Somalia will be a large part of trying to prevent terrorists from maintaining safe haven there. And I think that we saw

that most dramatically with the CIC and how the Somali people

withdrew their support from the CIC helped it to collapse. And so,

building those strong governance institutions on an inclusive basis,

I think, is part of a longer term strategy, and even a medium-term

strategy, of preventing terrorists from taking hold in Somalia.

Senator FEINGOLD. And then, what is the state of play with the

Islamic Courts right now? Do they actually pose any security risk

to the TFG? Are you confident that the TFG, with international

support, will be able to change the very conditions that led to the

rise of the warlords and then the Islamic Courts in the first place?

Dr. FRAZER. I think the situation is still very dynamic. We’re

clearly working to try to make sure that they don’t. I’ve heard, in

my consultations, two different analyses of the continued insecurity

in Somalia. One is that it’s coming from certain sub-sub clans that

feel that they are not sufficiently part of inclusive dialog. Then

they’re making—they’re attacking to indicate, ‘‘Bring us in.’’ Second, I’ve heard that—analysis that it’s remnants of the Council of

Islamic Courts; as the leadership withdrew, they left behind certain

fighters, they handed out weapons, and it may be those remnants

that are trying to start an insurgency and reconnect with the reconstituted leadership of the CIC.

35

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, and this relates to one of the really

tough questions, which is—obviously, we want this TFG to be as

inclusive as possible for it to work, but are there any specific red

lines or specific groups or individuals that should not be part of the

process? And how do you determine that?

Dr. FRAZER. We’ve stated very broadly that those who renounce

violence and terrorism should be part of the process. The Transitional Federal Government has drawn the lines a bit more narrowly. They have said that those who have invited terrorists into

their country should not be part of an inclusive dialog.

Senator FEINGOLD. But we do not share that narrow view, apparently.

Dr. FRAZER. Well, it’s a sovereign country; and so, we work with

them, and we advise and consult, but they have to make the decisions for their own government, and how they’re going to govern.

But our statement has been fairly broad, which is that those who

renounce violence and extremism should be eligible to be part of

the process. Having said that, I must say that many of our partners have advised us to be careful, and that people say things, but

intend to do something very different. And so, we’re trying not to

micromanage the process of inclusiveness, but to state broadly

what is necessary for that longer term stability.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I can see this is one of the hardest

questions here and in other places. I mean, who can we actually

deal with? Who is irreparably an enemy of the United States? And

who is sort of in between? This is one of the toughest parts of this

job, and I recognize that.

A couple of quick questions on the African Union stabilization

force. We’re all optimistic and hopeful about the deployment of the

AU-led stabilization force, but let me ask you to be as frank as you

can. Is this force going to be deployed in a timely manner? And,

more specifically, as you in the international community plan to

support this deployment, what are the major challenges and shortfalls and gaps that have to be considered?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, I think that we’re hopeful that it will be in a

timely manner. Frankly, I think we’re a little bit behind the timetable that we, the U.S. Government, had hoped for. We had hoped

that that deployment would take place in early January, but other

governments have to go through their own national process.

We expect that the AMISOM force will eventually transition into

a U.N. operation and that, say, within 6 months, that transition

could occur—that UNDPKO would be prepared to take over, to sustain this force over time, and to build it. And so, the AU force

would be an immediate insertion into Mogadishu to prevent that

security vacuum from occurring as the Ethiopians withdraw, but

that it would then get the broader international support of the

U.N. Security Council, and they’re working on a resolution to that

effect now.

Senator FEINGOLD. Have any of the nations that have pledged

forces suggested that they’ll only be involved for a certain period

of time?

Dr. FRAZER. No.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you both for your patience.

We’ll now move to the second panel.

36

[Pause.]

Senator FEINGOLD. All right, let us begin with the second panel.

Dr. Shinn, would you begin, please?

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador SHINN. Thank you very much, Chairman Feingold,

for inviting me again to speak to this committee about Somalia.

And if I may submit a longer statement for the record, I

would——

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Ambassador SHINN. OK.

I want to look briefly at the issue of the neighbors of Somalia.

There are three now, if you include Somaliland, which declared its

independence unilaterally from Somalia in 1991. Fortunately, the

TFG wisely has avoided a confrontation with the authorities in

Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate power in the former Italian Somalia. The other two neighbors with very long borders are Kenya

and Ethiopia, and there’s a longstanding problem here involving

irredentist claims by Somalia concerning the resident Somali populations in Ethiopia and Kenya, which, in the case of Ethiopia, includes about one-quarter of its land area. Unfortunately, this issue

was revived during the period of the Islamic Courts, when at least

one senior member of the Islamic Courts, Hassan Dahir Aweys,

who was chairman of the Shura of the Somali Council of Islamic

Courts, on more than one occasion claimed Ethiopia’s Ogaden as

part of Somalia, although others in the Courts did not subscribe to

this view.

Ethiopia appears, almost from the beginning of its recent military operation, to have planned a brief campaign—one, because of

the high cost of the operation; and, two, I think the fact that even

Ethiopia understood that a continuing presence in Somalia would

incite Somalia nationalism against Ethiopia and lead to further

problems.

The dilemma today for the Transitional Federal Government, as

we have already heard this morning, is that the early departure of

the Ethiopians leaves a potential power vacuum in Somalia. The

TFG has not yet shown a capacity to maintain control on its own

in the country. And although there have been numerous press reports about various warlords and others turning over their arms

and weapons to the TFG, frankly I would take those with a grain

of salt. Somalia remains awash in small weapons. And even though

there may be some control over the larger weapons, you can be assured that there are plenty of handcarried weapons to go around

for years to come, and they’re not going to be turned over to any

authority.

Ethiopia clearly prefers to have a moderate, friendly national

government in Mogadishu. On the other hand, I think Ethiopia

could live with a return to numerous fiefdoms ruled by individual

warlords if that were the other option. Obviously, they do not want

a return to extremist rule coming from any element of the Islamic

Courts.

37

As the Islamic Courts gained power last year, Kenya joined Ethiopia in strong support of the TFG, but Kenya has now more recently turned to a more neutral role on this question. Kenya

remains the chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. During the past year, IGAD members have been

deeply divided on the best way to deal with Somalia. Ethiopia,

Kenya, and Uganda strongly supported the TFG. Eritrea strongly

supported the Islamic Courts. Djibouti began 2006 as a supporter

of the TFG, but shifted its sympathy to the Islamic Courts after

they took control of Mogadishu. Sudan almost certainly sympathized with the Islamic Courts. Because of these past and continuing divisions in IGAD over Somalia, there’s little prospect the

organization can play a leading role in resolving the ongoing differences over the short term. Over the medium/longer term, perhaps IGAD can return to a useful role.

Looking at the wider region beyond IGAD, Yemen has legitimate

interests in Somalia, because a large number of Somali boat people

continue to make their way to Yemeni shores. Egypt has longstanding historical interests along the Somali coast, and is always

concerned about developments involving Ethiopia, which is the

source of 86 percent of the Nile water which reaches the Aswan

dam.

Dubai and the UAE serve as the financial center for both Somalia and Somaliland. There’s been a history of money from Saudi

sources and government-supported Islamic charities finding its way

to both legitimate and illegitimate Islamic causes in Somalia. And

then you have Libya and Iran that just seem to meddle because it’s

an opportunity.

Looking at the African Union and the Arab League, the primary

role of the African Union has been to deploy an African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM, which has been referred to this morning, for a period of 6 months. The AU envisages that AMISOM will

consist of nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each, supported

by maritime, coastal, and air components, appropriate civilian personnel, and a police training team. This mission is expected to

evolve into a U.N. operation, after 6 months, that will support the

long-term stabilization of post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia.

Most of the contributing countries seem to have attached conditions, such as approval only after ratification of its legislative body.

So far, I’m not aware that any country’s legislative body has approved participation.

Estimates suggest that AMISOM will cost $34 million each

month. The United States has promised $14 million to support the

force and the airlift of African troops to Somalia. As we heard this

morning from Assistant Secretary Frazer, the United States is prepared to pledge another $40 million for this purpose. The European

Union has already released 15 million euros, or about $20 million,

for the same purpose.

There is still no date for the arrival of the first troops, and it is

apparent most potential African troop-contributing countries are

concerned about the situation on the ground and whether they will

be entering a friendly or a hostile environment. The Arab League

had an opportunity to make a real contribution to the establishment of peace in Somalia, which is an Arab League member, but,

38

with the defeat of the Islamic Courts, the Arab League seems to

have largely abdicated responsibility for Somalia.

Let me just conclude with a couple of comments about the United

Nations and the international community.

U.N. Resolution 1725 on Somalia, adopted by the Security Council on 6 December 2006, has been largely overtaken by events as

a result of the Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government

military victory. The 19 January 2007 AU communique has effectively replaced the U.N. resolution. The U.N. Security Council, on

February 2, urged the AU to send peacekeepers to Somalia quickly

so that Ethiopia could withdraw its forces. The enormous amount

of energy being devoted by the African Union and the international

community to the raising of a peacekeeping force for Somalia would

be better spent in convincing, maybe demanding, that the TFG and

other parties begin, immediately, a serious process that leads to

power-sharing. This should be the highest priority of the international community, including the United Nations, African Union,

Arab League, European Union, and United States. If meaningful

talks—and I underscore ‘‘meaningful’’—get underway soon, it will

reduce the likelihood of conflict or violence and increase the possibility that African troops can enter the country peacefully.

Yesterday, there was a beginning of a precursor effort to move

forward with this reconciliation conference in Mogadishu. It’s not

clear who attended, but it does appear as though the moderate elements of the Islamic Courts were not invited.

The outcome of this reconciliation effort may well result in a restructuring of the Somali Parliament and Ministries, which are far

too numerous, somewhere in the vicinity of 50, and will certainly

involve power-sharing with some elements of Somali society that

are poorly represented in the TFG. The alternative will be a phantom peacekeeping force that arrives too late to achieve any real

purpose in Somalia. In any event, the TFG probably envisages

AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian guard to keep it in power.

The TFG must prove to the Somali people that it is prepared to

win their respect and support. Only then will there be a meaningful role for AMISOM, and only then will the TFG be in a position

to create a national government that has long-term prospects for

survival. The beginning of a meaningful reconciliation process

should serve as the signal to the international community to increase substantially its humanitarian and development assistance

to Somalia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID H. SHINN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO

ETHIOPIA AND STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR SOMALIA; ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

I thank the subcommittee and Chairman Feingold for inviting me to participate

in this hearing. This is the third occasion in 5 years that I have had the opportunity

to present my views on Somalia before the subcommittee. On this occasion, I have

been asked to discuss the current diplomatic state of play with a focus on both regional and international players.

39

THE IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS

Somaliland was previously known as British Somaliland and from 1960 until it

unilaterally declared its independence in 1991 the northwestern region of the Somali Republic. That part of Somalia now controlled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has since 1991 had three neighbors—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somaliland—and a long Indian Ocean coastline. The TFG claims Somaliland, which has

not been recognized by any state, but has wisely avoided a confrontation with the

authorities in Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate its power in the former Italian Somalia. Once there is a national government in Mogadishu that is widely accepted

and clearly in control of the country there inevitably will be discussions between

Mogadishu and Hargeisa on the future of their relationship. In the meantime, it is

advisable for the TFG to focus on more immediate challenges and leave the question

of Somaliland, which is doing just fine on its own, for another day.

Somalia’s two other neighbors are Kenya and Ethiopia. It was the policy of the

Somali Republic beginning in 1960 to encourage the incorporation into Somalia of

those parts of Kenya and Ethiopia inhabited by the Somali people. In the case of

Ethiopia, this included about one-fourth of its land area in southeastern Ethiopia

known as the Ogaden and Haud that borders Somalia and Somaliland. It also included the Northeastern Frontier District in Kenya that borders southern Somalia.

These irredentist claims led to war on several occasions between Somalia and Ethiopia and considerable conflict along the Kenya-Somalia border. Following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in 1991 and the absence of an effective

national Somali Government, Somali calls for incorporation of this land ended.

Extremist elements in the Islamic Courts that seized power in Mogadishu last

summer and then consolidated control throughout about 50 percent of the former

Somali Republic revived the irredentist policy. Hassan Dahir Aweis, Chairman of

the Shura of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, on more than one occasion

claimed Ethiopia’s Ogaden as part of Somalia. Others in the Islamic Courts did not

subscribe to these views by Aweis. His public statements on Somali-inhabited parts

of Kenya were more ambiguous, but left the impression this territory should also

become part of Somalia. Combined with a call by the Islamic Courts for jihad

against Ethiopia, which had sent military personnel into Somalia in support of the

TFG based in Baidoa, Ethiopia became increasingly concerned about the situation

in Somalia. No one in the TFG has publicly suggested that Somali-inhabited land

in Ethiopia be turned over to Somalia.

Following attacks by the Islamic Courts militia against the TFG and Ethiopian

forces in the vicinity of Baidoa, the TFG requested and Ethiopia agreed to send significant numbers of troops into Somalia to defeat the Islamic Court militias. We all

know the outcome of the Ethiopian intervention. Ethiopia appears from the beginning to have planned a brief campaign because of the high cost of the operation and

the fact that a long Ethiopian presence in Somalia would further incite Somali nationalism against Ethiopia. I believe both of these reasons explain Ethiopia’s desire

to remove its forces quickly from Somalia or, at a minimum, pull them back to the

Ethiopian-Somali border area.

The dilemma today for the TFG and the Ethiopians is the possibility of a power

vacuum, especially in Mogadishu, if the Ethiopian troops leave too soon. The TFG

has not yet shown it has the capacity to maintain control of the capital on its own.

There is a continuing or potential threat from the remnants of Islamic Court militias, Somali warlords with personal agendas, and ordinary-armed Somalis who have

for years survived as hired guns or used their weapons to loot for personal gain.

I would take with a grain of salt the numerous reports that warlords and others

have turned in their weapons to the TFG or joined the TFG. Somalia remains awash

in hand-carried weapons even if some control has been obtained over the larger

pieces of military equipment.

Ethiopia is no doubt weighing carefully requests from the TFG that it remains

in Somalia until the arrival of an African Union ‘‘peace support’’ mission. (Actually

this is a euphemism for a Chapter Seven peacekeeping mission.) For the reasons

already noted, Ethiopia is not likely to be very sympathetic to these requests. In

fact, Ethiopia probably believes that it has accomplished what it set out to do—the

removal from power of the Islamic Courts and especially the destruction or scattering of armed extremists among them. Although Ethiopia clearly prefers to have

a moderate, friendly, national government in power in Mogadishu, it can, if necessary, live with a return to numerous fiefdoms ruled by individual warlords. Ethiopia has an especially close relationship with TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed

Ghedi.

Kenya has traditionally tried to play a neutral role in the Somali conflict and for

years was the designated member of the Intergovernmental Authority on DevelopVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
40

ment (IGAD) to mediate the dispute. As the Islamic Courts gained power last year,

Kenya joined Ethiopia in support of the TFG but made clear that it would not send

Kenyan troops into Somalia. As Ethiopia became more involved militarily in Somalia, Kenya began to return to its more neutral role. After the military defeat of the

courts, President Mwai Kibaki was one of the leaders, however, in efforts to identify

troop contributors for an African peacekeeping force.

Because of the swiftness of the Ethiopian and TFG military victory over the

Islamic Courts, the number of Somali refugees that might normally head toward

Kenya has been mercifully small. Unless the security situation deteriorates significantly or there is a return to severe drought and/or floods, Kenya may escape a humanitarian disaster inside and along its border with Somalia. Kenya will do what

it can quietly to support the TFG. It does not want to see a return to power of extremist elements of the Islamic Courts. In order to minimize refugee movements

into Kenya, it prefers the creation of a moderate, Somali Government that exercises

firm control over the entire country.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT

In addition to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, members of IGAD include Uganda,

Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan. During the past year, IGAD members have been

deeply divided on the best way to deal with Somalia. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda

strongly supported the TFG. Ethiopia and Uganda continue their support while

Kenya seeks to be an honest broker.

Eritrea strongly supported the Islamic Courts, primarily because the courts posed

the biggest threat to Eritrea’s enemy, Ethiopia. In fact, Eritrea sent an undetermined number of military personnel to train and support members of the Islamic

Court militias. The U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia placed the number of Eritrean military personnel in Somalia last fall at 2,000. This figure appears to be exaggerated; a couple of hundred is probably closer to the actual figure. Eritrea also

provided substantial quantities of military equipment to the courts. Even today,

there are unconfirmed reports that Eritrea continues to support remnants of the

Islamic Court militias.

Djibouti, an overwhelmingly Muslim country, began 2006 as a supporter of the

TFG but shifted its sympathy to the Islamic Courts after they took control of

Mogadishu. It received a number of emissaries from the courts and urged the courts

and the TFG to resolve their differences in a process chaired by Sudan as current

chair of the Arab League. Djibouti seems now to be reassessing the Somali situation

but should have no difficulty supporting the TFG if it can establish security

throughout the country.

Sudan played its Somali cards close, in part because it was the designated mediator between the TFG and the Islamic Courts. Khartoum presided over one promising meeting last June when the courts and the TFG agreed to recognize each

other, cease military operations, and meet again to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement. That was the end of progress in the Khartoum process. Sudan almost

certainly sympathized with the Islamic Courts and made clear that it was not prepared to contribute troops to an African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia.

Because of these past and continuing divisions in IGAD over Somalia, there is little prospect the organization can play a leading role in resolving ongoing differences

over the short term. If the situation clarifies in Somalia, there will be a tendency

for IGAD members to mitigate their internal differences. This may allow IGAD to

reengage usefully in the issue.

THE WIDER REGION

There were numerous reports last year that a variety of countries in the wider

region were supporting one side, usually the Islamic Courts, or the other in Somalia.

If they did not actually take sides, they showed unusual interest in a problem that,

except for Yemen, was far from their borders. In addition to Yemen, engaged countries included Libya, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Yemen has legitimate interests in Somalia because of the large number of Somali

boat people who make their way to Yemen’s shores. Potentially, Yemen is in a position to help bring competing Somali groups together. Egypt has longstanding

historical interests along the Somali coast and is always concerned about developments involving Ethiopia, which is the source of 86 percent of the Nile water reaching the Aswan Dam. Dubai in the UAE serves as the financial center for both Somalia and Somaliland. Before the defeat of the courts, Qatar may have been trying to

play a mediating role. There has been a history of money from Saudi private sources

and government-supported Islamic charities finding its way to both legitimate and

41

illegitimate Islamic causes in Somalia. Libya and Iran just seemed to be meddling

because Somalia offered an opportunity.

With the defeat of the Islamic Courts, most of these countries with the notable

exception of Yemen and the UAE, which continues to serve as a Somali financial

center, have shown less engagement in Somali affairs. The involvement last year

of all these countries illustrates, however, the potential to return to Somali affairs

quickly if they find it in their interest or just want to meddle.

THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE ARAB LEAGUE

The primary role of the African Union (AU) has been an effort to deploy an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for a period of 6 months. A 19 January

2007 communique of the AU Peace and Security Council reiterated the AU’s commitment to the unity, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Somalia. It called

for an all-inclusive and genuine process of dialog and reconciliation. The African

Union envisages that AMISOM will consist of nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each supported by maritime coastal and air components, appropriate civilian

personnel, and a police training team. This mission is expected to evolve into a U.N.

operation after 6 months that will support the long-term stabilization of post-conflict

reconstruction in Somalia. The model for the operation is the AU mission in Burundi. The African Union urged the U.N. Security Council to consider authorizing

a U.N. operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration

of its 6-months mandate. The United Nations seems inclined to oblige.

Each day there are new press accounts about African countries that have committed, are considering or rejected the contribution of troops for the standing up of

AMISOM. Most of the contributing countries seem to have attached conditions such

as approval only after ratification by its legislative body. Malawi’s Defense Minister

reportedly promised troops only to have the President rescind the announcement.

It is not clear at this writing which countries are irrevocably providing troops for

AMISOM, although contingents from Uganda and Nigeria seem the most promising.

Estimates suggest AMISOM will cost $34 million each month. The United States

has promised $14 million to support the force and the airlift of African troops to

Somalia. It is not clear if the cost of airlifting troops will come out of the $14 million. The European Union has released 15 million euros to finance the peacekeeping

operation.

There is still no date for the arrival of the first troops and it is apparent most

potential African troop-contributing countries are concerned about the situation on

the ground and whether they will be entering a friendly or hostile environment. The

bad experience of the much larger and better equipped U.S.-led United Task Force

(UNITAF) in 1992–1993 and the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which

took over from UNITAF and remained until 1995, has not been lost on African troop

contributors. It is not realistic to expect there will be a fully equipped and staffed

AMISOM on the ground anytime soon. The African Union deserves considerable

credit for what it is trying to accomplish in Somalia, but it must also face reality.

The Arab League had an opportunity to make a real contribution to the establishment of peace in Somalia, an Arab League member. Under the chairmanship of

Sudan, the Arab League started well with the June 2006 agreement in Khartoum

between the Islamic Courts and the TFG. But as the courts gained power and extended their authority in Somalia, the Arab League seemed to lose interest in the

reconciliation process. If the Arab League had pressed the Islamic Courts harder to

engage in meaningful dialog with the weak TFG, it might have been possible to

avoid a war and to create a government of national unity that included both the

TFG and the courts. Admittedly, this would have left open the possibility of extremists, some of whom have ties to internationalism terrorism, remaining in positions

of authority. There is obviously no room for extremists or supporters of terrorism

in a Somali Government. Close collaboration between the TFG and the moderates

in the Islamic Courts might have been able, however, to solve this dilemma. With

the defeat of the Islamic Courts, the Arab League seems to have abdicated responsibility for Somalia.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

U.N. Resolution 1725 on Somalia adopted by the Security Council on 6 December

2006 has been largely overtaken by events as a result of the Ethiopian and TFG

military victory. The resolution urged dialog between the TFG and the Islamic

Courts and authorized IGAD and the AU to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia known as IGASOM. The 19 January 2007 AU communique has effectively replaced the U.N. resolution. The African Union, the United Nations, and

the international community are now supporting the establishment of AMISOM,

42

which has replaced IGASOM. Presumably the U.N. Security Council will propose a

new resolution on Somalia that takes account of the very different situation on the

ground and the more recent AU communique. The U.N. Security Council on 2 February 2007 urged the AU to send peacekeepers to Somalia quickly so that Ethiopia

could withdraw its forces. It also supported the deployment of a U.N. technical assistance mission to Somalia to make recommendations on security needs.

The non-African parties most engaged in efforts to find a solution to the situation

in Somalia have been the European Union and the United States. Both the European Union and the United States, but especially the European Union, have emphasized the need for creation of a broad-based Somali Government and reconciliation

with disaffected elements of Somali society, including moderate elements of the

Islamic Courts and civil society organizations. TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf has

agreed to the holding of a reconciliation conference, although no place or date has

been set. There are also unsettling reports from other elements of the TFG that

raise questions about its commitment to this objective.

The enormous amount of energy being devoted by the African Union and the

international community to the raising of a peacekeeping force for Somalia would

be better spent in convincing, no demanding, that the TFG and other parties begin

immediately a serious process that leads to power sharing. This should be the highest priority of the international community, including the United Nations, African

Union, Arab League, European Union, and United States. If meaningful talks get

underway soon, it will reduce the likelihood of conflict or violence and increase the

possibility that African troops can enter the country peacefully. This should be a Somali-driven reconciliation process that ideally takes place in Mogadishu. There is no

longer a time or place for another Somali peace conference in three-star hotels in

foreign countries. The outcome may well result in a restructuring of the Somali Parliament and Ministries, which are far too numerous, and will certainly involve sharing power with some elements of Somali society that are poorly represented in the

TFG.

The alternative may well be a phantom African peacekeeping force that arrives

too late to achieve any real purpose in Somalia. In any event, the TFG probably

envisages AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian guard to keep it in power. The

TFG must prove to the Somali people that it is prepared to win their respect and

support. Only then will there be a meaningful role for AMISOM and only then will

the TFG be in a position to create a national government that has long-term

prospects for survival. Its ability to govern will be sharply limited and its longevity

highly doubtful if it remains dependent on the presence of foreign troops.

The beginning of a meaningful reconciliation process should serve as the signal

to the international community to increase substantially its humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia. The United States has been especially generous

in providing humanitarian aid while the European Union has been somewhat more

forthcoming with development and reconstruction activities. U.N. specialized agencies such as the World Food Program, UNDP, and UNICEF have done most of the

heavy lifting in recent years. Real progress on Somali reconciliation should result

in much more effort by all international partners.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor, for a very clear and helpful presentation.

Dr. Menkhaus.

STATEMENT OF DR. KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE, DAVIDSON, NC

Dr. MENKHAUS. I’d like to thank the subcommittee members and

Chairman Feingold for the opportunity to participate in this timely

hearing on Somalia.

And, with your permission, I’d like to submit my written testimony.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Dr. MENKHAUS. Also, with your indulgence, I’d like to speak

loosely off of my notes, rather than read them, in the interest of

avoiding duplication of what other speakers have had to say.

I’ve been asked to provide a brief analysis of Somalia’s recent political developments as a point of departure for discussion of the deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
43

velopment of a U.S. strategy toward Somalia, and I’d like to begin

by discussing the dramatic events in 2006.

Many of those events have already been touched on, but just to

refresh our memory, after 15 years of complete political paralysis

and state collapse in Somalia, we had quite an eventful year, starting with the TFG Parliament reconvening unexpectedly after being

moribund for over a year. At the same time, an Alliance for the

Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, a group of U.S.-backed

militia leaders and businessmen formed a coalition. That alarmed

the ascendant Islamist movement in Mogadishu. A 4-month war

ensued in Mogadishu, which culminated in a dramatic victory on

the part of the Islamists. They consolidated control not only over

all of Mogadishu, but quickly expanded their authority through

most of south-central Somalia, leaving the TFG, at that point in

time, precariously perched in a transitional capital in Baidoa and

holding a few other hinterland areas, but really looking like they

were on the verge of collapse.

It’s important to remind ourselves, too, that the Union of Islamic

Courts, or the CIC later, provided Mogadishu with a level of rule

of law, public order, and governance that it—the city had not seen

in 15 years, and that earned the CIC a fairly strong measure of

public support in Mogadishu.

We also know that—over time, that the CIC, as Assistant Secretary Frazer pointed out, became increasingly radicalized. Its most

reckless policies were those directed toward Ethiopia. And to put

that set of policies in perspective, I think it’s worth pointing out

that hard-liners in this broad umbrella saw fit to mobilize for jihad

against Ethiopia as a way of conflating their Islamist ideology with

pan-Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopianism to increase their

base of support, marginalize the moderates. In the short term, this

was highly effective. In the long term, that bought them a war, a

disastrous war, with the largest standing army in sub-Saharan

Africa.

Dialog during that time between the Council of Islamic Courts

and the TFG was attempted. The United States and other governments sought to bring them together to negotiate a government of

national unity. All agreed that that was the best window of opportunity at the time. All were disappointed with the lack of progress.

And I think as we look back, we’ll see that intransigence on both

sides was very much to blame. The TFG feared negotiating from

a position of weakness, feared losing key positions. Ethiopia was

not entirely sure it wanted to support a process that could lead to

Islamists essentially taking over the TFG as a Trojan horse. And

many of the hard-liners in the Islamist movement saw no reason

to revive a TFG that they thought they were about to defeat from

within, in a matter of weeks or months.

Finally, in late 2006, we had the war. The Ethiopian offensive occurred. Again, the details of that have been provided already, but,

just to reinforce what Assistant Secretary Frazer said, one of the

things that was remarkable about that war was the extent to

which the CIC was not defeated, but was dissolved internally. The

loss of support from inside Mogadishu signaled to many of us that

the hard-liners had gone too far. It’s not entirely sure that they actually sought a war with Ethiopia, they may have just sought moVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
44

bilization for war—were playing brinksmanship, and lost. But a

broad section of the Mogadishu population was very angry at

them—that included clan elders, it included the business community, and it included moderate Islamists—for drawing them into an

unnecessary war, forcing the Islamist leaders to flee southward toward the Kenyan border or melt back into Mogadishu.

That culminated with Ethiopia occupying Mogadishu, another

very unexpected development, and the TFG’s arrival as a fledgling

administration in the capital.

Where do we stand today? The situation in Mogadishu is tense,

it’s fragile, and it’s deteriorating. Ethiopia is intending to partially

withdraw its troops to avoid a quagmire. The good news with that

is that, if they withdraw their forces, they are eliminating the main

target that an insurgency would attack. The downside, as has been

pointed out, is that runs the risk of leaving a vacuum if the African

Union forces are not able to deploy in a timely manner.

The TFG itself still remains very, very weak. It is not providing

basic administration in the capital. The population there compares

now the kind of public security that they earned under the Council

of Islamic Courts to the TFG, and the comparison is not flattering.

The public response to the TFG inside Mogadishu ranges from

tepid and opportunistic support to outright hostility and

rejectionism.

Criminal lawlessness is up dramatically in the city. Warlords

have returned and reassumed their place in their fiefdoms. There

is a rise in sporadic violence targeting both Ethiopian troops and

Transitional Federal Government installations and officials, including the beginnings of what looks like another dirty war, such as we

had in 2004–05, a rise of political assassinations. It’s important to

point out, I think, that that is not, at present, an insurgency, as

we would normally define it. The violence is a combination of criminal violence, of clan-based resistance, of warlord opportunism, and

some Islamist violence directed at Ethiopia and the TFG, as well.

In the midst of this deteriorating situation in Mogadishu, we

have an international response that’s based on three pillars that

have already been described. That is, first, mustering and deploying an African Union peacekeeping force to replace the departing

Ethiopians; second, generating revenue, the funding and support to

build the governance capacity of the TFG; and then, third, the promotion of political dialog to make the Transitional Federal Institutions more inclusive, to make Mogadishu population stakeholders

in the TFG, as opposed to opponents.

Political dialog is not going particularly well. The fact is, when

you take the temperature in Mogadishu, the sense is that the TFG

leadership is seeking a victor’s peace, it is engaged in a variety of

policies that seem designed to alienate and marginalize its key opponents, rather than bring them into the government. Even the

reconciliation conference that has been called for by the President

appears designed more to bring people in who already support the

TFG, rather than the key opponents to the Transitional Government.

Both sides are responsible for the impasse, at this point. The

TFG has certainly done its part in seeking this victor’s peace. But,

on the other side, the Mogadishu opponents seem committed, at

45

this point, to rendering Mogadishu ungovernable. They don’t have

to defeat the TFG. All they have to do is play for a draw, and then

run the clock out while the TFG has only 21⁄2 years left on its mandate. And they appear perfectly capable of doing this. They don’t

need outside help to foil the TFG’s progress. All they need is a base

support in Mogadishu from the population and from some political

elites, and they have that in abundance, at this point.

To the three pillars. In my view, the deployment of African——

Senator FEINGOLD. I’m going to have to ask you to conclude

pretty soon so we can hear——

Dr. MENKHAUS. OK.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. From Dr. Morrison.

Dr. MENKHAUS. Very good.

I would say that, of the three pillars that we are pursuing in

support of peace and reconciliation in Somalia, dialog has to be

privileged. If African Union peacekeepers are sent in the absence

of dialog toward a more inclusive government, they will be viewed

as enemies in Mogadishu, and they are likely to be targeted. If

they aren’t targeted, they are likely to have to pay for their own

protection. Likewise, state-building funds, if they are provided to

the TFG in the absence of dialog, are—were going to be perceived

by opponents of the TFG as having taken sides.

Just as a final point: What happens if we get to that worst-case

scenario, where the TFG, in fact, is not able to bring together a

large consensus and a government of national unity?—the question

that you asked——

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes.

Dr. MENKHAUS [continuing]. Earlier this morning. And I think

one of the scenarios that we have to start looking at is: Can we assist the Transitional Federal Institutions to move forward on the

key aspects and functions of the transition, which is to say, deliberating over a constitution, setting up a referendum, and setting up

elections to end the transitional process and bring in a full-fledged

government in Somalia, even if it has not been able to govern most

of the country. That may sound like an absurd scenario, but, in

fact, we’ve seen that already in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, where the government was essentially paralyzed throughout the entire time, and yet, it muddled through, thanks to a

strong national electoral commission and robust external support.

That’s important, because what that does is, it would send a signal

to the potential spoilers that, ‘‘You can block the government’s capacity to govern in Mogadishu, but if you don’t join the Transitional Institutions, and they’re the only game in town, you lose out

on a voice in the final dispensation of the country.’’

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Menkhaus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE,

DAVIDSON COLLEGE, DAVIDSON, NC

I would like to thank the subcommittee members and Chairman Feingold for the

opportunity to participate in this timely hearing on Somalia.

The task of crafting a comprehensive strategy for Somalia which harmonizes different, sometimes competing U.S. policy priorities in the country will stand a much

better chance of success if grounded in accurate analysis of the nature of both the

crises and opportunities posed by Somalia. To that end, I have been asked by the

46

subcommittee to provide a brief analysis of Somalia’s recent political developments

as a point of departure for discussions of U.S. strategy toward Somalia.

THE SEISMIC CHANGES OF 2006

After 10 years of political paralysis and state collapse, Somalia experienced a dramatic series of political changes in 2006. These developments began with the establishment in February 2006 of a U.S.-backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace

and Counter-Terrorism in Mogadishu. That alliance brought together a group of

rival militia and business leaders with whom the U.S. Government was partnering

in an attempt to monitor terrorist activity in Mogadishu. U.S. concern over possible

misuse of Somalia as a safe haven for foreign al-Qaeda terrorists focused on a small

number of individuals implicated in the 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as a bombing of a Mombasa resort in

2002 and a failed attempt to take down an Israeli chartered flight leaving Mombasa.

Those ‘‘high value targets’’ were enjoying safe haven in Mogadishu under the protection of a small group of hard-line Somali Islamists who held top positions in the

umbrella group known at the time as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, later

renamed the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).

The establishment of the counterterrorism alliance inadvertently triggered an extraordinary chain of events. The Islamists, alarmed at what they viewed as an alliance set up to attack them, launched preemptive attacks against the alliance militias. The 4-month war which ensued culminated in a decisive victory for the

Islamists in June. The UIC quickly imposed effective control over Mogadishu, bringing dramatically improved rule of law to the city, earning a measure of ‘‘performance legitimacy’’ and enjoying widespread support from Somalis both inside and out

of the capital. By July, the UIC expanded its control across most of south-central

Somalia, and emerged as the most powerful and popular political force in the country. Its principal rival, the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government

(TFG), retained nominal control over the provisional capital, Baidoa, and some other

regions in the hinterland, but was in a position of grave weakness and appeared

vulnerable to internal collapse.

External actors, including the U.S. Government, urged the TFG and moderates

within the UIC leadership to engage in political dialog with the aim of creating a

more inclusive transitional government which would be accepted in Mogadishu.

Talks held in Khartoum yielded little, however, and tensions quickly arose. For

their part, the TFG leadership appeared unwilling to engage in serious power-sharing discussions, and Ethiopia was unwilling to risk allowing the Islamists to use the

TFG as a Trojan horse. Ethiopia increased its troop presence in and around Baidoa,

inflaming the Islamists. As for the UIC, hard-liners in the umbrella movement appeared intent on stoking hostilities with Ethiopia, in large part to mobilize support

and marginalize moderates within the movement. Islamist hard-liners such as Hassan Dahir Aweys repeatedly invoked jihad against Ethiopia, called for Ethiopians

to rise up against the Meles regime, and made irredentist claims on Somali-inhabited territory in eastern Ethiopia. The UIC also forged close links to Ethiopia’s rival

Eritrea, and funneled arms to two armed insurgencies inside Ethiopia, the Oromo

Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. In the short term, the

call for jihad against Ethiopia proved to be a very effective political tool for Aweys.

By conflating Islamism, pan-Somali nationalism, and anti-Ethiopianism, he won

broad support from Somalis at home and in the diaspora, including many who did

not subscribe to the increasingly draconian Islamist rule imposed on residents of

Mogadishu. In the long run the tactic bought Aweys and his supporters a disastrous

war against sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and most seasoned standing army.

The UIC’s slide toward radicalization in the latter half of 2006 made war with

Ethiopia likely if not inevitable, and eventually led many external observers to conclude that the many moderates in the UIC movement were too weak to redirect the

movement’s increasingly reckless policies. The position of the U.S. Government

shifted toward greater emphasis on the UIC’s alleged al-Qaeda links and Ethiopia’s

legitimate security concerns, a signal that some observers construed as amounting

to American ‘‘tacit support’’ of an Ethiopian offensive against the UIC. That Ethiopian offensive was launched in late December, and produced not only a decisive victory in initial battles in the open countryside but also an unexpected internal collapse of the UIC back in Mogadishu. There, hard-liners were confronted with widespread defections by clan militias, businesspeople, and moderate Islamists. Local

clan and business leaders also refused to allow the UIC to conduct a guerrilla war

in Mogadishu, on the grounds that that would produce devastating loss of life and

damage to property. Residual UIC forces and leaders, including an undisclosed number of foreign jihadists who had joined the UIC in 2006, were forced to flee southVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jan 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 39986.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
47

ward to Kismayo, where they were again blocked by local residents from using the

city as a base. The remnants of the UIC forces either melted back into Mogadishu,

sought to cross the Kenyan border, or remained hidden in the inaccessible forested

areas along the coastal Kenyan-Somali border area. At least two aerial attacks were

launched by American AC–130 gunships at convoys suspected of containing the

three foreign al-Qaeda suspects sought by the United States. There is no evidence

that those high-value targets were hit in the attacks; U.S. Assistant Secretary of

State Jendayi Frazer reported that eight members of the Somali jihadist militia

known as the shabaab were killed in one attack.

The UIC’s sudden collapse led to the subsequent Ethiopian occupation of the capital and the arrival of the TFG leadership to the capital. Despite efforts by the TFG

to create a police force and name a local administration, the capital quickly slid into

lawlessness and armed criminality. Militia leaders deemed ‘‘warlords’’ by many

Mogadishu residents returned to their neighborhoods and reclaimed their militias.

By January 2007, armed attacks against Ethiopian forces and TFG installations increased, raising the specter of a complex insurgency by a loose combination of

Islamists, warlords, armed criminals, and clan-based militias. Determined to avoid

being drawn into a quagmire, Ethiopia announced intent to withdraw its forces

within weeks and appealed to the African Union to send replacement protection

forces into Somalia.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

As of early February 2007, the situation in Somalia is precarious. Efforts to encourage the TFG leadership to engage in dialog with Mogadishu-based leaders, including moderate elements of the dissolved UIC, have met with frustration. The

TFG coalition remains narrow, and is deeply resented by most Mogadishu groups.

Top TFG leaders appear committed to imposing an elusive victor’s peace on

Mogadishu. Armed attacks against TFG personnel and buildings are on the rise. Efforts to deploy an AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia) peace enforcement force

to Somalia remain the subject of intensive diplomatic energies, but it is not yet clear

that those forces will be mustered in a timely manner, if at all. Somali jihadists

have issued threats to kill foreign peacekeepers should they be deployed.

The mood in Mogadishu is, by all accounts, weary, sullen, and angry. Anti-American sentiment is high. Rightly or wrongly, the United States is held indirectly responsible for the collapse of public order in Mogadishu. Though most residents are

said to be desperate for a return to rule of law and public order, most expect a return to wider violence. Those with the means have relocated their families abroad.

The price of ammunition and small arms has shot up in local markets in anticipation of troubles.

The TFG has made almost no progress in providing improved public security or

other government services in the capital. This record stands in stark contrast to the

performance of the UIC administration, the standard against which the TFG is now

being judged by impatient Mogadishu residents.

Ironically, the end result of the seismic changes of 2006 is to some extent a return

to the status quo ante bellum. Somalia in early 2007 looks very much like Somalia

of 2005, featuring a weak and unpopular TFG facing resistance from a loose coalition of clans, Islamists, and other interests in Mogadishu, in a context of de facto

state collapse.

ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS

The best hope for Somalia at present is initiation of sustained political dialog

which yields a more inclusive transitional government—one which empowers and

reassures key constituencies in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Anything less

than that will leave important segments of the Mogadishu population inclined to

play the role of spoiler. To date, neither the TFG nor the loose coalition of interests

in Mogadishu opposing the TFG have made genuine efforts to pursue political dialog. The TFG leadership has embarked on a series of policies seemingly intended

to alienate its rivals, including ill-advised and unfeasible calls for forcible disarmament of Mogadishu. Most Mogadishu opposition to the TFG appears intent on

pursuing a strategy of making Mogadishu ungovernable as a means of blocking the

TFG. The TFG’s opponents do not need to defeat the TFG; they only need to play

for a draw, prevent the TFG from extending an administration across key part of

the country while waiting for the clock to run down on the TFG’s remaining 21⁄2-

year mandate.

Every effort is being made to simultaneously promote reconciliation, muster, and

deploy AU peacekeepers, and generate funds and support to improve the governance

capacity of the TFG. Ideally, these three goals will be advanced in tandem. But

48

there are real dangers if they do not proceed in unison. In particular, if ANISOM

forces are deployed and robust capacity-building measures are provided to the TFG

in the absence of political dialog, Mogadishu constituencies will view these external

policies as a form of aggression against them, by empowering a government they

reject. In that event, the AU forces will either be subjected to attacks and

kidnappings, or will be forced to pay protection money to local militias to insure

their own safety—a practice that occurred frequently in the ill-fated UNOSOM operation of 1993–94. For this reason, promotion of political dialog and other measures

designed to make Mogadishu clans and constituencies stakeholders in the transitional government must be afforded top priority. Dialog needs to be considered a

precondition for, not a complement to, state-building and peacekeeping initiatives.

The TFG leadership has understandably made passionate appeals to the international community for substantial foreign aid to enable it to build an effective governmental capacity, and many sympathetic external observers have come to equate

robust foreign aid to the TFG with commitment to state-building in Somalia. The

relationship between foreign aid and state-building in Somalia is actually more complex. In the wrong circumstances; high levels of foreign aid has redirected the energies of political elites away from the onerous task of governance toward controlling

and diverting foreign aid. It also tempts political leaders to use cash to play divide

and rule, playing off and splitting rivals, rather than engaging in the more direct

but more sustainable task of real reconciliation and power-sharing. It is worth noting that the three instances of impressive state-building in Somalia since 1991—the

secessionist state of Somaliland, the autonomous state of Puntland, and the UIC’s

6-month administration of Mogadishu and surrounding areas—were all achieved

with minimal external assistance. What this suggests it that external insistence on

a few preconditions for foreign aid—real political dialog, and genuine efforts to begin

basic government services—is vital to ensure the success of the TFG.

In the event that AMISOM forces cannot be deployed in adequate numbers to replace the Ethiopian troops, the TFG is unlikely to maintain a meaningful presence

in Mogadishu. Security incidents directed against the TFG will increase, and its

leaders will pull back to the town of Baidoa or go on extended foreign trips. The

result will be a divided Somalia and a paralyzed TFG. Recent actions and statements by Somali figures make this an unfortunate but increasingly likely scenario,

one for which policymakers in the international community must develop contingency plans. A withdraw or collapse of the TFG need not coincide with a rise of

armed conflict, though it may. External efforts to promote a ‘‘soft landing’’ in

Mogadishu, assisting local authorities to revive at least some semblance of local governance structures from the past, would protect the capital from a free-fall into

armed anarchy and might earn a small measure of goodwill from a Mogadishu population that harbors deep anger at the outside world—and the United States in particular—for its perceived support of an Ethiopian offensive which destroyed a political order that brought public security to the city for the first time in 15 years.

At present, the growing levels of armed violence in Mogadishu do not amount to

an insurgency. The Ethiopian withdraw is depriving would be insurgents of their

principal target, and the TFG is not enough of a threat to require an organized insurgency. The current violence is an admixture of armed criminality, sporadic clanbased resistance to the TFG, warlord adventurism, and Islamist resistance. Of

these, the latter two will be most difficult to contain. The warlords have a vested

interest in creating lawlessness and blocking the TFG; the Islamists have a vested

interest in blocking the TFG before setting up their own administration again, at

which point their alliance of convenience with the warlords will again turn into an

armed rivalry.

The dissolution of the UIC as an organization should not be confused with the

fate of political Islam in Somalia. Political Islam remains an ascendant and diverse

movement in the country and will play a role in any future political dispensation

in Somalia. Treating all Somali Islamists as radicals or al-Qaeda associates would

be a serious error.

The unexpected internal collapse of the UIC revealed deep fissures in the movement between moderates and radicals, and exposed the extent to which hard-liners

lost support of their core constituencies by pursuing confrontation and jihad with

Ethiopia. The fact that business and clan leaders in Mogadishu insisted that the

Islamists not wage a destructive insurgency in Mogadishu offers hope that

Mogadishu-based groups are keen to protect investments there and avoid war, and

may as a result be more open to dialog. The failure of the hard-line Islamists offers

lessons about the fate of any political authority in Somalia that opts to embrace

authoritarianism, concentrates power in the hands of a few, and is noninclusive.

One of the most important questions emerging from the UIC’s collapse in December 2006 is whether and in what form the Islamist movement is likely to regroup.

49

In the past, setbacks to Islamist movements in Somalia have led them to assimilate

back into the local community and remain a loose network of ‘‘alumni’’ until conditions improve. In current conditions, however, the worry is that remnants of the

jihadist militia known as the shabaab will regroup in cells and launch terrorist attacks and assassination attempts both inside Somalia and against soft western targets in the region. It is impossible to know if many or any of these radicalized young

shabaab members will engage in terrorist acts. But we have learned in Somalia that

a small number of committed jihadists have the potential to produce an enormous

amount of fear and instability.

Aside from a handful of warlords, state collapse is not in anyone’s best interest

in Somalia. Most Somali households and businesses would obviously benefit from revived central government; Ethiopia and Kenya would prefer to have a moderate and

functional government on their long borders with Somalia; and the United States

would prefer to have an effective government partner to monitor and prevent terrorist activities inside Somalia. But while state collapse is no one’s first choice for

Somalia, it is almost everyone’s second choice. Ethiopia, the United States, and

many Somali businesses and political leaders have learned to cope with and adapt

to a condition of state collapse in Somalia. This is dangerous, because it means that

if efforts at reconciliation and state-building become too onerous or risky, many interested parties will be willing to walk away and allow Somalia to revert to a state

of collapse.

This latter point has special implications for the subcommittee’s stated aim in this

hearing, the promotion of a comprehensive strategy for Somalia. In the past, U.S.

counterterrorism activities and its stated aim of promoting state-building in Somalia

tended to be delinked and at times even worked at cross-purposes. Though calls to

‘‘deconflict’’ state-building and counterterrorism policies were made, the two remained largely separate enterprises until recently. Since revival of an effective state

authority in Somalia is an essential component of our long-term efforts to combat

terrorism in the country, this really amounts to a tension between short-term versus

long-term counterterrorism measures. Our short-term measures—working through

nonstate actors to monitor and apprehend foreign terror suspects in Somalia—were

questionable in their effectiveness, and in the process created incentives for militia

leaders to block state-building efforts that would in effect put them out of business.

If the TFG fails to consolidate control over Mogadishu, the United States will again

face worrisome short-term threats that the city could provide a safe haven for foreign terrorists, and will be tempted again to contract with local nonstate partners

in the capital. I would submit to the honorable members of the subcommittee that

progress toward a comprehensive strategy for Somalia must find a way to resolve

this tension between short-term and long-term counterterrorism goals.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Doctor, for that excellent, if troubling, report.

Dr. Morrison, thank you for your tremendous patience and for

your work in this area. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. MORRISON. Thank you very much, Senator.

I would request that my full statement be entered into the

record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Dr. MORRISON. I’m going to speak briefly, drawing on the January 17 conference that we organized with the U.S. Institute of

Peace and with the Council on Foreign Relations, at which you,

Senator, honored us by kicking that off.

The most fundamental challenge, it seems to me, for U.S. policy

right now is how to proceed with realism and caution and patience,

and how to blend or integrate the hard counterterrorism equities

that we have there with the softer equities that we have in getting

a broadened compact negotiated for governance in Somalia, for

50

meeting the dire humanitarian needs and beginning some reconstruction.

Right now, there is no clear vision, and there is no strong interagency process that brings those two pieces of the hard and soft together. There’s quite a bit of imbalance in the approach. And

there’s quite a bit of confusion and suspicion, within the region and

beyond, around U.S. intentions. So, in terms of defining a strategy

and a policy, this is, I believe, the core challenge before us.

There are a couple of other key dimensions that I think need

highlighting. One is, not only is establishing a viable governing

system the sine qua non of progress, and has to be the top priority,

but we need to consciously and systematically prepare for at least

an interim failure in the near term. This is a—you know, the probabilities are so strong in that regard.

Second is, we should not allow ourselves to become obsessed with

chasing after an 8,000-person AU force, when the signs are all

there that, at best, we’re going to see a modest deployment that

will probably be concentrated in and around Mogadishu.

Third, we need to move quickly to strengthen U.S. diplomatic capacities and to enlarge the leadership that we can exercise, particularly in the Security Council.

On the key findings that we have identified, that I think should

guide policy, one is that there is great uncertainty surrounding

what is happening on the ground and within the region with respect to the Islamist movement. That means we need to intensify

our analyses and engagement.

Second, the TFG continues to lack capacity and legitimacy, and

has a high probability of folding.

Third, the TFG has, thus far, failed to enlarge its governing coalition, and is moving in that direction, and our leverage on that

score, we need to reexamine and be much more creative in how we

can move the TFG.

Fourth, the Mogadishu security has deteriorated since the removal of the security network provided by the Islamist Courts, and

we have to assume that that trend line will continue.

Fifth, the Ethiopians are withdrawing. They are a lightning rod

within Mogadishu. And their withdrawal will create gaps and will

stimulate a spike in violence within Mogadishu.

Sixth, Islamism remains popular and legitimate. It is a—it has

a strong hand. It is fundamental to whatever governing coalition

is going to emerge. And it can wait out the failures of current leadership.

Seventh, our counterterrorism strikes have put us into a strong

strategic embrace with Ethiopia and the TFG. If we’re going to

counteract and distance ourselves from that, we need a diplomatic

strategy that consciously seeks to do that.

Our recommendations are that, first of all, we—and this is consistent with what David and Ken have said—intensify the pressures upon the TFG to enlarge the governing coalition, make use

of our access in Yemen and Kenya and elsewhere to the Islamist

Court remnants, be very realistic about what we can achieve from

an AU peacekeeping operation, intensify the Security Council engagement. And I would add there, the Chinese were very helpful

in the early phase of putting through 1725, and can be, I believe,

51

helpful in that regard, if we were to turn to the Security Council

to intensify its involvement. We should ensure that we have a robust and sustainable funding flow. And you’ve put forward, Senator, the idea of a trust fund. I think that’s a laudable idea. I hope

that can be moved forward. But key to our leverage and our ability

to really move forward is getting much higher and more sustainable and predictable forces—flows of resources.

Fifth point, that we can—we have institutional capacities that

we are expanding—the humanitarian operations we’ve heard a lot

about today—and those are very laudable. We can add to those expanded work in health and education, in making greater use of the

combined joint task force of the Horn of Africa, for a number of

constructive operations, and by intensifying our analytic capacities.

I agree that we need—have a need for a senior-level figure to

manage the interagency and ride the circuit at a senior level within

the region and in Europe. This person can complement and greatly

augment our capacities. I would add also that Deputy Secretary of

State John Negroponte can play a very important role here in making Somalia a part of his portfolio as he begins his work.

Last point is that we can encourage, within the United States,

greater unity among the Somalia diaspora community. That community has been very exuberant, but remains divided. It is seeking

to unify itself this month. It is making a significant play in that

regard. Remittances are estimated at as high as $1 billion per year

to Somalia from the diaspora. This is an influential, highly gifted

and talented community, which is moving toward unity, and we

should be very strategic in how we make use of that.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AFRICA

PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Senator Feingold, Africa Subcommittee chairman, and Senator Sununu, ranking

minority, I commend you both for holding this timely hearing, and I thank you for

the opportunity to contribute to the discussions here today.

When we last gathered here, on July 11, 2006, it was to discuss what the U.S.

strategy should be toward Somalia, after the Islamist courts had routed the U.S.-

backed warlord coalition in May 2006. Six months later, we are gathered to consider

what strategy makes sense now that the courts have been vanquished by the Ethiopians, with U.S. support.

The wheel has certainly turned, and U.S. engagement has been enlarged conspicuously on several fronts, following a fallow period of virtual nonengagement dating

back to the spring of 1994.

Diplomatically, Secretary Rice has herself weighed in directly at key moments,

while Assistant Secretary Frazer has been very active in Washington, in the Horn

of Africa, and in Europe. Materially, the administration put on the table a $40 million assistance package for Somalia that for the first time in over 12 years reintroduces U.S. commitments to peacekeeping, reconstruction, and development in Somalia. On the security front, U.S. forces have been engaged directly in the air and on

the ground in targeting terror suspects implicated in the August 1998 bombing of

the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the November 2002 attacks on an

Israeli tourist hotel and airliner. In combination, these constitute a dramatic shift

in the U.S. posture toward Somalia.

We also see heightened interest in Somalia in other settings. Congress, thanks in

no small measure to your leadership, Senator Feingold, has become very active on

a promising bipartisan basis in support of expanded U.S. leadership on Somalia.

The U.S. media and the U.S.-based Somali diaspora community have each become

highly engaged. Here in Washington, the Center for Strategic and International

52

Studies, in partnership with the U.S. Institute for Peace and the Council on Foreign

Relations, launched in the fall of 2006 a very active Working Group on Somalia, as

a direct outgrowth of the SFRC African Subcommittee July 2006 hearing, and with

the support of your able staff, Grey Frandsen.

The CSIS Working Group’s January 17 conference, at which Senator Feingold, Assistant Secretary Frazer, several prominent Mogadishu and Kenya-based experts

spoke, was attended by over 200 and widely reported in the media. Its success

hinged also on the contributions made by my colleagues at CSIS, most notably John

Hamre, Jennifer Cooke, and David Henek, and generous input from David Smock,

U.S. Institute for Peace, Princeton Lyman, Council on Foreign Relations, and Howard Wolpe, Woodrow Wilson International Center. The body of my testimony today

is a distillation of what was learned at the January 17 conference.

Before I turn to the January 17 conference, I wish to emphasize that in several

important respects, what was needed in July 2006 in terms of a U.S. strategy is

still very much needed today. What is different is the visibility and urgency of what

is required.

Most fundamentally, the United States continues to be under pressure to define

a coherent strategy that is grounded in realism, caution, and patience. It continues

to lack a clear vision backed by a functioning interagency process that bridges the

United States ‘‘hard’’ counterterrorism equities with its ‘‘soft’’ power interests in promoting a negotiated, broadened compact for governing Somalia, meeting dire humanitarian needs, and beginning reconstruction efforts. As in other parts of the

world where U.S. counterterrorism interests are strongly at play, it is becoming

clear in the Somalia context just how operationally difficult it is to integrate effectively the ‘‘hard’’ and ‘‘soft’’ dimensions of U.S. influence and to explain how those

fit within multilateral processes. Much more can, and should be done in this critical

sphere. So long as integration between ‘‘hard’’ and ‘‘soft’’ is lacking, there will be

substantial confusion in the region and beyond regarding U.S. intentions.

Similarly, we continue to confront the profound weaknesses of the internal parties

in Somalia and the urgent need to systematically test the Transitional Federal Government and to engage and test representatives of the Islamic courts. Establishing

viable governance within Somalia remains the sine qua non for future progress. Our

diplomatic presence inside Somalia is nil, but we do have important access to Somali leaders, including Islamists in Kenya and elsewhere, and we have the ability

to lay out how U.S. support can be structured to support improved governance.

Although there is very active planning and discussion around the possible future

deployment of an African Union 8,000 person force to replace the Ethiopian military, the picture today is not substantially different from July. There is simply little

prospect that an external African Union force will enter Somalia soon that will be

able to shape the security situation on the ground substantially. We need to think

and focus our actions on priorities such as security in and around Mogadishu, and

avoid chasing an unrealizable goal that distracts us from what is really feasible and

urgently required.

As in July, the United States continues to need stronger U.S. diplomatic capacities and enhanced leadership in multilateral channels, especially the U.N. Security

Council. An integral part of that continues to be the need for a broad and aggressive

diplomatic effort aimed at expanding the Somali Contact Group and pressuring

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Egypt, and Eritrea to curb materiel and financial support to radical Islamists and warlords.

OUTCOMES OF THE JANUARY 17 CONFERENCE AT CSIS

On January 17, 2007, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and

the Woodrow Wilson International Center, hosted a major conference in Washington, DC, titled ‘‘Somalia’s Future: Options for Diplomacy, Assistance, and Peace

Operations.’’ The conference brought together expert observers from Mogadishu,

senior U.S. policymakers, representatives from humanitarian assistance organizations, and regional analysts to convey to a U.S. audience the current situation in

Somalia and lay out the challenges before the United States and the broader international community.

Conference participants agreed there is a window of opportunity for the United

States, in collaboration with Somalis and the broader international community, to

effect positive change in Somalia, but that this window may close in the near future.

After 12 years of policy disengagement that followed the failed U.S. military intervention of 1993, the United States has an opportunity to forge a forward-looking,

comprehensive strategy to address immediate security concerns and the longer term

threat of regional instability. In your opening speech at the conference, Senator

53

Feingold, you summarized the challenge: ‘‘We cannot allow our past to overshadow

the pressing security concerns we face in the [Horn of Africa] today. We have an

opportunity to help the Somali people dig themselves out of almost two decades of

chaos and to strengthen U.S. national security at the same time. But if our government does not move quickly and aggressively on all fronts, we can be sure Somalia

will continue to be a haven for terrorist networks and a source of instability that

poses a direct threat to the United States.’’

KEY FINDINGS: THE SITUATION IN MOGADISHU

1. Great uncertainty persists. Regional experts and speakers from Somalia described the great uncertainty that currently pervades Mogadishu and the highly tenuous position of the newly empowered Transitional Federal Government. Major unknowns include the possible emergence of a dual insurgency, emanating at once

from alienated clan militias and from ideologically driven ‘‘jihadi’’ fighters, remnants

of the radical core of the defeated Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Unclear also is

the nature of links between the UIC’s radical leadership, now dispersed in southern

Somalia, Kenya, and the Saudi Peninsula, and Islamist networks within Mogadishu.

2. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) continues to lack capacity and

legitimacy. It is unpopular and fragile, and today sits precariously in Mogadishu,

installed and protected by Ethiopian military forces, who have indicated their intent

to withdraw within weeks and reportedly begun that process in earnest. The conditions that allowed the Islamic courts to emerge and win local support in

Mogadishu—notably the alienation of the Hawiye clan from the structures of the

TFG and the utter lack of security and basic services—today remain very much

intact.

3. The TFG has thus far failed to enlarge its governing coalition. It is internally

fractured, and has sent decidedly mixed signals on its willingness to broaden its

base of support and legitimacy. Its leadership has held some consultations with clan

elders, members of civil society, and former Somali Presidents, and TFG President

Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed has recently committed to a national reconciliation conference, but there is little evidence that these consultations have resulted in an enlarged governing coalition.

The dismissal on January 17 of Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh

Adan, who opposed Ethiopia’s military intervention and called for talks with former

leaders of the UIC, does not bode well for unity and tolerance within the TFG or

broader reconciliation with remnants of the Islamist movement. The TFG’s imposition of martial law, temporary closure of media outlets, and forceful disarmament

of local residents, has left Mogadishu residents uncertain and nervous. As yet the

government has not made a clear distinction between those among the UIC leadership whom it considers criminal and the many residents of Mogadishu who supported the courts for their security and services they provided.

4. Mogadishu’s security has deteriorated since the removal of the security network

created by the Islamic courts. Targeted killings, abductions, and revenge killings are

reportedly on the rise. Mogadishu residents, their expectations raised by the success

of the courts in providing local security, now look to the TFG for an equivalent level

of order. The TFG is currently incapable of providing security, and, until it can forge

some agreement with local Mogadishu groups, must rely on Ethiopian or other external forces who may be introduced in the future to replace departing Ethiopian

troops. The greatest potential flash point for conflict remains in Mogadishu, and

success or failure of stabilization efforts there will determine Somalia’s future.

5. Ethiopian forces have not created the basis for security. They are a lightning

rod. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu is highly divisive, and even if

they currently provide some level of security, the longer they remain in large numbers, the more they will generate popular antagonism and resentment. Ethiopia,

having successfully eliminated its principal security threat by vanquishing the UIC,

has little stake in the longer, more difficult task of stabilizing Mogadishu. Given

Ethiopia’s eagerness to leave and the difficulty of quickly mustering adequate numbers of African Union troops, the handover of security operations will be fraught

with risk and difficulty.

6. Islamism remains popular and legitimate, and will be essential to any stable

governing arrangements. Although the UIC as a political entity has dissolved, political Islam remains very much alive and will need to be accorded a role in deciding

Somalia’s future political dispensation. Islamic charities, businesses, and networks

remain among the most robust and enduring. Mogadishu clan and business networks could become significant spoilers in the reconciliation process, but could also

become powerful allies in restoring basic core services and local authority.

54

7. U.S. counterterror strikes and the U.S. embrace of Ethiopia are highly controversial and have high costs at the popular level within Somalia and across the region.

Still at large are the three ‘‘high-value’’ al-Qaeda associates accused of organizing

the 1998 Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the 2003 hotel and

airline attacks in Mombasa, Kenya. The three were allegedly given shelter by UIC

leadership and were the principal targets of two successive U.S. air strikes in southern Somalia in January 2007. The status of current U.S. efforts to track down these

three individuals and their supporters is unclear, but the air strikes have confirmed

in the minds of many Somalis and regional actors that a close strategic alliance exists among the United States, Ethiopia, and the TFG, and that U.S. security interests predominate, at the expense of ‘‘soft’’ interests such as reaching a negotiated

internal compact, and addressing humanitarian and reconstruction needs. For this

reason, U.S. air strikes remain highly controversial, both in Somalia and among European partners, and feed regional suspicions of U.S. intentions, motives, and commitment to long-term stability. An aggressive U.S. diplomatic strategy will be essential to counteract these sentiments.

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

High risks of regression. The United States, in concert with other Western, African, and Middle East powers, will need to act quickly to avert worst case scenarios:

An absolute vacuum of authority in Mogadishu; a dual insurgency led by clan militias and ‘‘jihadi’’ extremists; a worsening humanitarian catastrophe; and regional

destabilization. But the United States will also need to be cautious in sequencing

and calibrating actions for greatest effect.

Humility and overcoming constraints. Further, the United States will need to

approach Somalia with a degree of humility. After a decade of disengagement,

the United States operates from a tremendous deficit, in terms of policy, institutional capacities, credibility, and leverage over key players. It lacks real-time knowledge and enduring relationships on the ground, and has no full-time senior-level

leadership in Washington or the region charged with directing policy. Beyond humanitarian assistance, which has averaged $90 million annually and sustains approximately 700,000 Somalis, the U.S. Government has lacked serious funding to leverage its aims in Somalia, although the commitment by Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice for an initial downpayment of $40 million to support security operations, humanitarian assistance, and state development is a promising opening for

expanded engagement and high-level attention.

Priorities for U.S. policy in the near term will be to:

1. Press the Transitional Federal Government to resolve its internal differences and

to begin immediately a genuine process of dialog and reconciliation

A first priority must be to create internal governing structures that have some

prospect of hope and legitimacy. The United States and its international partners

must make clear that confidence in—and support for—the TFG will hinge on a demonstrated commitment to build and broaden its base of support, and begin a process

of reconciliation with those groups who have been alienated and excluded. There are

local authorities within Mogadishu—the business community, clans, local Islamic

courts and charities—who can assist the TFG in rebuilding security and basic services and reassuring local residents. The TFG cannot afford to alienate these groups

and should make every effort to earn their cooperation.

U.S. leverage resides not only in its promise of institutional and security support

for the TFG, but also in U.S. access and ongoing dialog with Nairobi-based elements

of the UIC leadership, in particular Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, former chair of the

Executive Council of Islamic Courts. The U.S. Government has made clear to the

TFG that it considers Sheik Sharif a moderate who can play a vital role in reconciling Somali factions.

2. Maintain realistic expectations of an African-Union-led peacekeeping operation

No amount of external peacekeeping forces will have a chance of success in

Mogadishu unless a genuine and credible process of reconciliation and political dialog is under way. Mogadishu’s best hope for security hinges on the TFG’s success

in winning cooperation from local clans and business networks to provide a modicum of authority and order. In the absence of clearly defined conditions or a genuine political dialog by the TFG, African Union forces will fuel popular resentment

and possibly feed an incipient insurgency. Even a full contingent of 8,000 AU troops

will be spread very thin in Mogadishu and will be at strong risk of failure and attack. The international community must remain highly sensitive to this fact as it

urges African countries to contribute personnel.

55

Mounting an adequate AU peacekeeping force will not happen quickly, even in the

best of circumstances, and the international community should be prepared for the

possibility of a sharp spike in violence in Mogadishu, should there be a gap between

Ethiopian withdrawal and AU deployment. The African Union, the international

community, and the Somali people will need a clear and common understanding of

the mandate, mission, and scope of the operation, which must be achievable both

militarily and politically. The African Union is not likely to be able to muster the

full 8,000 personnel any time soon, and even with the full contingent will need to

set clear and achievable priorities for deployment. Efforts must be centered in

Mogadishu, and within the city may have to be limited to protecting critical infrastructures.

3. Urge the U.N. Security Council to elevate Somalia as a priority and identify an

overarching diplomatic structure that can convene all relevant international

players

The United States should urge the U.N. Security Council and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to refocus its attention on Somalia, elaborating the commitments

outlined in U.N. Resolution 1725, reenergizing the Somalia Panel of Experts, and

making clear to the TFG its expectations for dialog and governance. The United

States should also urge the expansion of the International Contact Group for Somalia to bring in international partners who have the necessary clout, commitment,

and neutrality to be helpful. A number of Arab countries, notably Qatar, United

Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, have considerable leverage in Somalia and longstanding engagement in the social services sector. Currently Tanzania is the only

African member of the International Contact Group, and both the African Union

and League of Arab States have observer status. International efforts will need careful coordination, and the United States for the time being will need to play a discreet but transparent role.

4. Ensure robust and sustainable resources to back expanded U.S. engagement

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has committed an initial $40 million for Somalia, a small amount in the context of Somalia’s requirements, but nonetheless a

strong signal that the United States is overcoming a decade of entrenched aversion

and is prepared to actively reengage. Over time, however, there will be a need for

reliable and secure funding flows in order for the U.S. Government to leverage its

long-term policy aiDr. Senator Feingold has suggested a Somalia ‘‘trust fund’’ to

support disarmament and demobilization efforts, infrastructure projects, capacitybuilding and jobs creation. This model could help ensure a sustained and predictable

support flow for Somali reconstruction that will endure beyond the current spike in

public and administration attention to Somalia.

5. Build U.S. institutional capacities

Policymakers should take advantage of the current resurgence of interest in

Somalia and the convergence of opinion between the State Department and Congress to build U.S. capacities for a sustained and comprehensive approach to Somalia. A first step should be to significantly expand Somalia-specific analytic and reporting capacity in the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. The United States should engage

the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in training, security sector reform,

capacity-building, police training and maritime security, although clearly this will

need to be done carefully and in close coordination with other U.S. agencies and

international partners. The United States can increase its humanitarian flows and

work to enhance the coordination of international humanitarian efforts, leveraging

the enduring networks, legitimacy, and community reach of a number of operating

agencies. Finally, the United States can increase its investment in longer term institution-building: In health, education, local authorities, and those elements of the

TFG that demonstrate some commitment to inclusivity and service delivery.

6. Appoint a senior-level figure to coordinate U.S. policy efforts

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, has devoted considerable attention and energy to the crisis in Somalia, as has U.S. Ambassador to

Kenya, Michael Ranneberger. Their efforts and energy are to be commended and

should be bolstered by the appointment of a senior-level figure to manage U.S. interagency efforts and cooperation with international partners on a day-to-day basis.

The stakes for U.S. interests are sufficiently high, and the diplomatic circumstances

more than adequately complex to warrant the appointment of a fully empowered

and resourced coordinator who will report to the Assistant Secretary. Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, should add the Horn of Africa to his priority regions for engagement and transformational diplomacy.

56

7. Encourage unity within the U.S. Somali diaspora

The Somali diaspora within the United States is well-placed and eager to play a

significant role in rebuilding a stable and secure Somalia. Some sources estimate

that remittances to Somalia from the diaspora community worldwide may be as

high as $1 billion annually. And as demonstrated at the CSIS conference, the diaspora community remains highly engaged and passionate about Somalia’s future. In

many ways clan divisions in Somalia are reflected in U.S. diaspora communities.

But many Somali Americans clearly grasp that no one clan or grouping can dominate the Somali political scene for long and that only through broad-based coalitions

is there the possibility of sustained peace. There are a number of efforts currently

under way to bridge the divisions among diaspora communities. Should the Somali

diaspora community come together behind a common set of priorities and goals, they

could prove a powerful force in moving and sustaining effective U.S. engagement in

Somalia.

Senators Feingold and Sununu, I am grateful for the opportunity to share these

thoughts with you today, and am grateful for the leadership and interest you have

shown on this important matter. Somalia and the Horn of Africa matter significantly in multiple ways to U.S. national interests, and Congress is well-positioned

to help enhance the good the United States can achieve in the Horn, and to avoid

the mistakes of the past. I hope my comments have been helpful, and look forward

to continuing to collaborate closely with you and your staff.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Dr. Morrison.

I’ve attended a lot of hearings of this subcommittee in 15 years.

This is one of the most useful and best panels I’ve heard, and I

thank you.

Let me ask a couple of questions, although the hour is late.

You know, Dr. Morrison, you basically anticipated the first question that I want all three of you to answer. I take you as having

essentially just endorsed the idea of a special envoy for Somalia.

Let me ask Dr. Shinn and Dr. Menkhaus their response on that,

in light of Secretary Frazer’s comments today.

Ambassador SHINN. Thank you, Senator. I strongly support the

idea. I know John Yates personally. He’s a good personal friend of

mine. We joined the Foreign Service together. He’s a very fine officer. The fact is, though, that he is not a special envoy. And, as I

understand it, and listening to Assistant Secretary Frazer this

morning, he reports to Ambassador Rannenberger, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, who is preoccupied with Kenyan affairs. So, you do

not, in fact, have someone who is independently, or semi-independently, engaged full time on Somali affairs. And I think this is an

ideal location to do just that. Normally, I’m not enthusiastic about

special envoys, because they tend to conflict with Ambassadors on

the ground. But, in this case, you have no State Department personnel in Somalia, and there is no prospect for conflict.

Senator FEINGOLD. Excellent.

Dr. Menkhaus.

Dr. MENKHAUS. I agree.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. Dr. Shinn, where do U.S. and EU objectives and priorities in Somalia overlap? And what are the most significant areas of divergence?

Ambassador SHINN. I think, in a general sense, they pretty much

overlap. I think where the divergence comes is that the European

Union, as Assistant Secretary Frazer implied, has been much

stronger on pushing the idea on the Transitional Federal Government that they must be more all-encompassing in terms of whom

they bring inside that government. And at one point, the European

Union said it would not provide any funding to the TFG unless the

TFG did engage in a reconciliation process. President Abdullahi

57

Yusuf said that he would start a reconciliation effort. He has done

that. But it remains to be seen whether it’s meaningful or not.

That’s the key. It’s one thing to go through the motions; it’s quite

another to be serious about power-sharing, about revamping, if necessary, Parliament, reducing the number of Ministries from some50 to what probably ought to be about a dozen for Somalia, and

making sure that you have technically competent people in the

jobs.

Senator FEINGOLD. So, you implied that the African Union peacekeeping force, as currently envisioned and authorizes, is unrealistic. What do you see as the minimum level of resources, mandate,

and deployment timetable necessary to stabilize Somalia in the

short and medium term? And do you think this minimum can be

achieved? By when? What needs to happen?

Ambassador SHINN. Short of creating a broadbased Transitional

Federal Government in Somalia, I, frankly, don’t see it working. I

think that’s the bottom line. The first step is to have a government

that is all-encompassing. Once you have that, then the rest, I

think, will flow naturally, and I think you will have much less resistance from the Ayr sub-sub clan of the Habr Gedir sub-clan and

the Hawiye clan. I think you will have less resistance from the

warlords who still have a power role in Mogadishu. I think you will

have more enthusiasm from the businessmen in Mogadishu to support such a government. But I’m not sure that there is any number

of AMISOM troops that is going to be able to secure all of Somalia.

At the height of UNITAF, the American-led operation, there were

25,000 troops there. Some of them, admittedly, were offshore. Even

UNOSOM had far more than 8,000. And we all know the difficulties that they had. They had the most highly sophisticated equipment known to military forces around the world. We’re asking African units, fairly lightly armed, to go in and do something that both

UNITAF and UNOSOM had a great difficulty doing.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. Menkhaus, you’ve written that, ‘‘The United States must not

allow support for counterterrorism efforts abroad to become’’—and

I appreciate your blunt language—‘‘a meal ticket for leaders in

failed states.’’ How can we prevent this in Somalia and the larger

Horn of Africa region, where corruption and the lack of transparency are obviously common?

Dr. MENKHAUS. Well, for starters, again, by pushing for more accountable, transparent good governance in these governments, including the TFG. There has been a tendency to use the

counterterrorism card to try to solicit our unconditional support.

And I think one of the messages in the panel today is that support

to the TFG does very much have to be conditional.

Beyond that, there is an interesting and important problem that

we haven’t spoken about directly, related to counterterrorism and

our partners in counterterrorism, monitoring on the Horn of Africa,

and that is to say that we all agree that a strong, robust state as

a partner in counterterrorism is essential as a long-term goal. But

we also know that that state-building capacity will take a long time

to build up. In the meantime, we’ll have a transitional phase in

which this government is weak, in which it will be easily penetrated, in which, ironically, foreign terrorists will probably be able

58

to better exploit Somalia, rather than less able to exploit Somalia.

The fact is, Somalia today, as a more or less de facto collapsed

state, is not a very conducive environment for many terrorist

activities. They actually prefer Mombasa or other places in the

region.

We have to have a strategy that will simultaneously allow us to

build up that state capacity to monitor criminal and terrorist activities in the country while preventing terrorists from exploiting

that transition period. And I think the answer in Somalia is community policing. Somalis, at the community level, know what’s

going on in their neighborhoods, they know what’s going on in their

districts. They often know before we do where we’re driving, because our driver knows. They’re—it’s difficult to keep secrets there,

but that presumes that the community feels that it’s a stakeholder

in counterterrorism monitoring, and that it has a functional relationship with the state. And that’s been what’s been missing for a

long time.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. What was your reaction to Secretary Frazer’s answers to my questions about how to define the

Islamic Courts and about who should or should not be part of the

political reconciliation process?

Dr. MENKHAUS. Political Islam is ascendant in Somalia, and if

we demonize or criminalize all of them, if we imply that they’re all

linked to al-Qaeda, as some members in the TFG have tried to do,

we run the very strong risk of eliminating a very important and

potentially constructive force in Somalia.

We’ve really been talking—in terms of the foreign al-Qaeda suspects that we have been worrying about, those high-value targets,

we’re talking about a very small number of people. Three is the

number that most often comes to mind. And the handful of Somalis

that we’ve designated as terrorists are also very small. We have to

be careful about the lack of proportionality in our policies in pursuit of that small number of people. A lot of pottery was broken in

the pottery barn in Mogadishu over the past—over the past few

months. A very effective government was overturned in Mogadishu.

And we are, rightly or wrongly, held responsible by the Mogadishu

community for that.

So, I would argue that we need to, first of all, allow Somalis to

make that determination of who represents them in their political

fora. We have to recognize that will take on more of an Islamist

flavor. And, again, as long as they renounce violence and terrorism,

I see no reason not to allow them to participate.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think that’s a thoughtful answer. And

clearly if anybody is al-Qaeda, we have to pursue them, and have

to pursue them vigorously. But let us not overdefine the characteristics of somebody in a way that would prevent us from reaching

out to people who may not be committed to that course at all. I

think this is one of the most important questions internationally,

and Somalia is a great example.

Dr. Morrison, how has the security threat or threats that Somalia poses to the United States changed since your last testimony,

in July? Has the situation improved, worsened, or just changed?

Dr. MORRISON. Well, the advent of the courts—when we were

last together in July, it was at the front end, and it wasn’t clear

59

which direction they were moving. The formation and dominance of

the Shabaab in the intervening period, and the escalation of its

rhetoric, vis-a-vis the surrounding region, and the threats toward

the Ethiopians, the provocations, and the like, and the reports that

came forward in the fall around the amalgam of seven or eight sovereign countries, along with Hezbollah, that were professing their

support, materially and financially and diplomatically, of the hardcore jihadi elements within the Islamist Courts—these developments were very serious ones. And I think they accounted for the

response of the Ethiopians, and drove much of the response of the

United States, in partner—in this strategic partnership.

The Shabaab, it would seem to me, has been decimated and scattered. The threat within the boundaries on the soil of Somalia is

uncertain, but I do not see it as grave and resurgent. I think it

bears careful watching. I emphasized in my comments that there’s

considerable uncertainty around the nature of the—of an Islamist

insurgency and the possibility of a resurgent jihadi element. Also

within the region, in Yemen, in Saudi Arabia, in Eritrea, and elsewhere, there are elements there which have every incentive to seek

to strike new deals with al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliated organizations. And that is a serious consideration, and one that bears very

close watch here.

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, could you go into further detail about

the impact that the AC–130 attacks in Somalia could have on the

broader political efforts in Mogadishu? Does it impact our credibility and our work throughout the region?

Dr. MORRISON. Well, I—it creates a very strong hostility—a

broaden—it has had the impact of broadening this—the suspicion

and hostility toward the United States. Whether this was fully

warranted or not, that has been one of the impacts. And in some

ways that was predictable. The legacy of the U.S. engagement in

the early 1990s, and the abrupt withdrawal after the debacle of

October 1993, there was a sense of abandonment. There’s a sense

now within the general population that the interest in

counterterrorism and arms strikes by air and on land dominate the

U.S. set of concerns at the expense of concerns with reconstruction,

with political accommodation, with the humanitarian response.

And that’s what I mean about the need for a counterbalance or a

recalibration of the approach that would integrate the hard and

soft. Our counterterrorism equities are real in this part of the

world, and are going to continue to be real, and are going to continue to require a response and systematic strategy. But we also

have to much better manage what the fallout is, and protect the

softer side of the agenda, which remains integral to getting Somalia out of its current mess.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I thank all of you for your expertise and

your patience. This has been a long, but, I think, very worthwhile,

hearing.

And that concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

60

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JENDAYI FRAZER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. You mentioned in your testimony that there were six people at Embassy

Nairobi working solely on Somalia full time. When did each of them arrive in

Nairobi? How many of them are there on temporary duty assignments? What are

the exact responsibilities of each of them?

Answer. There are four full-time American employees and two Foreign Service

Nationals working on Somalia at Embassy Nairobi. Since January 2007, retired Ambassador John Yates has served as Counselor for Somali Affairs and as the head

of Embassy Nairobi’s Somalia Unit in close coordination with Ambassador Ranneberger. The three other American employees working on Somalia are mid-level officers, including an FS–02 Political Officer. The two remaining permanent mid-level

Foreign Service positions, including an FS–02 Public Diplomacy Officer and an FS–

03 Political/Economic Officer, have been established and these new officers are

scheduled to arrive in summer 2007.

As a temporary measure until these new officers arrive, two other officers are on

temporary duty assignments that began in January 2007. The Foreign Service National employees working on Somalia include one specializing in Public Affairs and

another responsible for Political Affairs.

Question. Secretary Rice announced $40 million in assistance for Somalia last

month, $14 million of which, Congress is told, will be used for peacekeeping. You

mentioned in your testimony that the administration is seeking an additional $40

million for peacekeeping in Somalia as part of the FY07 emergency supplemental.

How much does the administration project the African Union peacekeeping mission

in Somalia will cost per month? How long will the AU mission be in place before

the United Nations will take over? How much more will we be contributing to the

mission?

Answer. The African Union is in the process of developing their plan for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The AU is still soliciting Troop Contributing Countries,

developing their concept of operations and identifying exact tasks they are going to

accomplish. Without more information, it is difficult to estimate the costs for conducting the mission. Our rough initial estimated costs are $50 million for the first

6 months and between $150 and $200 million for the first year of operations.

On February 20, 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 1744 to authorize the African Union to conduct peacekeeping operations in

Somalia. As a part of that resolution the UNSC requested the U.N. Secretary General to send a Technical Assessment Mission to the African Union and Somalia. The

Technical Assessment Mission will report back to the UNSC within 60 days with

a recommendation for U.N. involvement, including a possible U.N. Peacekeeping

Operation. The African Union has stated that it intends to conduct a 6-month mission before transitioning to a U.N. mission.

The Department has identified $19.6 million in PKO and GPOI funding ($5.6 million above $14 million previously announced) to support the African Union in its initial deployment. Additionally, the Department of State has requested an additional

$128 million for the PKO account in the FY07 emergency supplemental for peacekeeping and stability operations in Somalia and Chad, of which an estimated $40

million would be used for Somalia. The Department has requested that these be 2-

year funds with transferability to the Contributions for International Peacekeeping

Activities account to provide the necessary flexibility to pay the assessed costs of

U.N. peacekeeping missions should they be established in Somalia and/or Chad.

Question. During your testimony you stated that the United States is ready to assist the Ugandans with deployment as soon as the Ugandan Parliament approves

sending troops to Somalia. What contingency plans has the African Union made

should the troops deployed under Phase I need to be evacuated or reinforced? Have

we committed to helping evacuate Ugandan troops if need be? Are the military advisors we have in Kampala going to deploy to Somalia with the Ugandan troops?

Answer. The African Union (AU) has not yet finalized the plans for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including any contingency plans should AU troops require evacuation. However, we expect contingency evacuation to be a part of the

eventual plan. Neither the African Union nor Uganda has requested U.S. assistance

in providing evacuation, and we are not committed to evacuating Ugandan troops

at this time. There are no plans for U.S. military advisors to deploy to Somalia.

61

Question. How, if at all, will the need for troops to serve as part of the mission

in Somalia affect the ability of the African Union to garner additional troops for deployment to Darfur, Sudan?

Answer. In our efforts to resolve conflicts across the African Continent, the task

of generating peacekeeping forces has become increasingly difficult. Several countries already involved in peacekeeping operations across Africa, such as South Africa, have said that they will not be able to provide troops for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) due to existing peacekeeping commitments. However,

the United States continues to urge the African Union to reach out to potential

troop contributing countries and to galvanize support for much-needed equipment,

training assistance, and funding for operational sustainment. We are working within the Department to coordinate outreach to potential troop contributing countries

for various African peacekeeping missions, including Darfur and Somalia. In this regard, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is a critical part of our strategy to expand the number and capabilities of African peacekeepers.

The deployment of a robust peacekeeping operation to Darfur remains a central

policy priority for the Department. In Sudan, we continue to work with the United

Nations, African Union, and international partners to press for a transition from an

African Union mission to a hybrid AU/U.N. force. As part of a hybrid force, countries from outside of the African Continent will be able to contribute troops, thereby

alleviating somewhat the need for African troop contributions.

Æ