Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 25, 2020 / Notices 75323 

Form No: N/A. 

Type of Review: New collection. 

Respondents: Business or other forprofit entities. 

Number of Respondents: 4 

respondents; 4 responses. 

Estimated Time per Response: 12 

hours. 

Frequency of Response: On occasion 

reporting requirement and Third-party 

disclosure requirement. 

Obligation to Respond: Required to 

obtain or retain benefits. The 

Commission has statutory authority for 

the information collection requirements 

under 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 154(j), 

155(c), 201, 302, 303, 304, 307(e), 309, 

and 316. 

Total Annual Burden: 48 hours. 

Total Annual Cost: $2,200. 

Privacy Act Impact Assessment: No 

impact(s). 

Nature and Extent of Confidentiality: 

There is no need for confidentiality 

pertaining to the information collection 

requirements in this collection. 

Needs and Uses: On March 3, 2020, 

the Commission released a Report and 

Order and Order of Proposed 

Modification titled, ‘‘In the Matter of 

Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 

GHz,’’ GN Docket Number 18–122 (FCC 

20–22). This rulemaking, which is 

under the purview of the Commission’s 

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 

is hereinafter referred to as the 3.7 GHz 

Report and Order. 

The Commission believes that C-band 

spectrum for terrestrial wireless uses 

will play a significant role in bringing 

next-generation services like 5G to the 

American public and assuring American 

leadership in the 5G ecosystem. The 

agency took action to make this valuable 

spectrum resource available for new 

terrestrial wireless uses as quickly as 

possible, while also preserving the 

continued operation of existing Fixed 

Satellite Services (FSS) available during 

and after the transition. 

In the 3.7 GHz Report and Order, the 

Commission concluded that a public 

auction of the lower 280 megahertz of 

the C-band will best carry out our goals, 

and the agency will add a mobile 

allocation to the 3.7–4.0 GHz band so 

that next-generation services such as 5G 

can use the band. Relying on the 

Emerging Technologies framework, the 

Commission adopted a process to 

relocate FSS operations into the upper 

200 megahertz of the band, while fully 

reimbursing existing operators for the 

costs of this relocation and offering 

accelerated relocation payments to 

encourage a speedy transition. The 

Commission also adopted service and 

technical rules for overlay licensees in 

the 280 megahertz of spectrum 

designated for transition to flexible use. 

Among other information collection 

requirements in the 3.7 GHz Report and 

Order, the Commission has adopted 

several requirements, described in the 

text, related to the protection of TT&C 

earth stations and coordination with 3.7 

GHz Service licensees. In a section of 

the 3.7 GHz Report and Order titled 

‘‘Adjacent Channel Protection Criteria’’ 

the Commission sets out the following 

requirements: 

Pursuant to paragraph 388 of the 3.7 

GHz Report and Order, the Commission 

requires that the TT&C operators make 

available certain pertinent technical 

information about their systems upon 

request by licensees in the 3.7 GHz 

Service to ensure the protection of 

TT&C operations. In addition, paragraph 

389 of the 3.7 GHz Report and Order 

includes the requirement that, in the 

event of a claim by a TT&C earth station 

operating in 4.0–4.2 GHz of harmful 

interference by a 3.7 GHZ operator, the 

earth station operator must demonstrate 

that that have installed a filter that 

complies with the mask requirement 

prescribed by the Commission. This 

requirement will facilitate an efficient 

and safe transition by requiring earth 

station operators to demonstrate their 

compliance with the mask 

requirements, thereby minimizing the 

risk of interference. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26098 Filed 11–24–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 

Change in Bank Control Notices; 

Acquisitions of Shares of a Bank or 

Bank Holding Company 

The notificants listed below have 

applied under the Change in Bank 

Control Act (Act) (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and 

§ 225.41 of the Board’s Regulation Y (12 

CFR 225.41) to acquire shares of a bank 

or bank holding company. The factors 

that are considered in acting on the 

applications are set forth in paragraph 7 

of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)). 

The public portions of the 

applications listed below, as well as 

other related filings required by the 

Board, if any, are available for 

immediate inspection at the Federal 

Reserve Bank(s) indicated below and at 

the offices of the Board of Governors. 

This information may also be obtained 

on an expedited basis, upon request, by 

contacting the appropriate Federal 

Reserve Bank and from the Board’s 

Freedom of Information Office at 

https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/ 

request.htm. Interested persons may 

express their views in writing on the 

standards enumerated in paragraph 7 of 

the Act. 

Comments regarding each of these 

applications must be received at the 

Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of 

the Board of Governors, Ann E. 

Misback, Secretary of the Board, 20th 

Street and Constitution Avenue NW, 

Washington DC 20551–0001, not later 

than December 10, 2020. 

A. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 

(Colette A. Fried, Assistant Vice 

President) 230 South LaSalle Street, 

Chicago, Illinois 60690–1414: 

1. Tamara L. Danover, Marion, Iowa; 

Terry D. Cooper, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 

both individually and as co-trustees of 

the Delhi Bancshares, Inc. Subtrust, and 

the Delhi Bancshares, Inc. Subtrust, 

both of Marion, Iowa; Barbara A. 

Cooper, individually and as trustee of 

the Delhi Bancshares, Inc. Revocable 

Trust and the Delhi Bancshares, Inc. 

Revocable Trust, all of Robins, Iowa; 

Tad C. Cooper, Cedar Rapids, Iowa; and 

Tony A. Cooper, Batavia, Illinois; as a 

group acting in concert and to retain 

voting shares of Delhi Bancshares, Inc., 

and thereby indirectly retain voting 

shares of Heritage Bank, both of Marion, 

Iowa. 

B. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 

(Dennis Denney, Assistant Vice 

President) 1 Memorial Drive, Kansas 

City, Missouri 64198–0001: 

1. L. Bruce Boehs and Sherry Boehs, 

both of Fairview, Oklahoma; Jared 

Boehs, Piedmont, Oklahoma; Tess 

Boehs Wicks, Edmond, Oklahoma; 

Randall Boehs, individually, and as 

trustee of the Randall Boehs Living 

Trust, both of Enid, Oklahoma; Jordan 

Boehs, individually, and as trustee of 

the Jordan Boehs Revocable Living 

Trust, both of Edmond, Oklahoma; to 

become members of the Boehs Family 

Group and to retain voting shares of 

Fairview Bancshares, Inc., and thereby 

indirectly retain voting shares of 

Farmers and Merchants National Bank, 

both of Fairview, Oklahoma. 

In addition, L. Bruce Boehs, 

individually, Donald Lee Martens and 

Norlene Joyce Martens, both 

individually and as co-trustees of the 

Donald Lee Martens Revocable Trust 

and the Norlene Joyce Martens 

Revocable Trust, all of Fairview, 

Oklahoma; to become members of the 

Boehs-Martens Control Group and to 

retain voting shares of Fairview 

Bancshares, Inc., and thereby indirectly 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
75324 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 25, 2020 / Notices 

1 Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur 

Anderson’s Fall From Grace Is a Sad Tale of Greed 

and Miscues, Wall St. J. (June 7, 2002), https://

www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023409436545200; Ben 

Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New York 

Regulator Moves to Suspend Promontory Financial, 

N.Y. Times: DealBook/Business & Pol’y (Aug. 3, 

2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/ 

business/dealbook/new-york-regulator-moves-tosuspend-promontory-financial.html; Jeff Horwitz, 

US to fire monitor overseeing formerly for-profit 

colleges, The Seattle Times (Mar. 14, 2016), https:// 

www.seattletimes.com/business/trouble-remainsfollowing-failed-for-profit-schools-revival-3/. 

2See Nitasha Tiku, Facebook’s 2017 Privacy 

Audit Didn’t Catch Cambridge Analytica, Wired 

(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/ 

facebooks-2017-privacy-audit-didnt-catchcambridge-analytica/; see also Dissenting Statement 

of Commissioner Rohit Chopra In re Facebook, Inc., 

Comm’n File No. 1823109 (July 24, 2019), https:// 

www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_

statements/1536911/chopra_dissenting_statement_

on_facebook_7-24-19.pdf. 

3Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent 

Orders to Aid Public Comment, In the Matter of 

Stryker/Wright Medical, File No. 191–0039; see also 

About Us, Mazars (last visited Nov. 2, 2020), 

https://mazarsusa.com/about/. 

4See Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra 

Regarding Miniclip and the COPPA Safe Harbors, 

Comm’n File No. 1923129, (May 18, 2020), https:// 

www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_

statements/1575579/192_3129_miniclip_-_

statement_of_cmr_chopra.pdf. 

5See Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra In 

the Matter of Uber Technologies Inc., Comm’n File 

No. 1523054, (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/ 

system/files/documents/public_statements/ 

1418195/152_3054_c-4662_uber_technologies_

chopra_statement.pdf. 

6See In the Matter of Federal Trade Commission, 

Plaintiff, v. Herbalife International of America, Inc., 

Applications for Compliance Auditors, (Aug. 31, 

2016), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2016/ 

08/applications-herbalife-independent-complianceauditor. 

retain voting shares of Farmers and 

Merchants National Bank. 

2. Austin P. Buerge, individually, as 

managing member of APB Investments, 

LLC, and as trustee of The Robin K. 

Buerge Spouse’s 2020 Trust and The 

Austin P. Buerge 2020 Separate Property 

Trust, all of Tulsa, Oklahoma; to 

become members of the Buerge Family 

Group, a group acting in concert, to 

acquire voting shares of Grand Capital 

Corporation, and thereby indirectly 

acquire voting shares of Grand Bank, 

both in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 

System, November 20, 2020. 

Michele Taylor Fennel, 

Deputy Associate Secretary of the Board. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26114 Filed 11–24–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 

[File No. 201 0014] 

Stryker and Wright Medical; Analysis 

of Consent Orders To Aid Public 

Comment 

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed consent agreement; 

correction. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Trade 

Commission published a document in 

the Federal Register of November 9, 

2020, concerning the proposed consent 

agreement in the Matter of Stryker and 

Wright Medical. That document did not 

contain the Statement of Commissioner 

Rohit Chopra regarding this matter. This 

document corrects the omission. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jonathan Ripa (202–326–2230), Bureau 

of Competition, 600 Pennsylvania 

Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20580. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Correction 

In the Federal Register of November 

9, 2020, in FR Doc.2020–24813, on page 

71343, in the first column, after the 

signature of April J. Tabor, Acting 

Secretary, add the following: 

Statement of Commissioner Rohit 

Chopra 

Independent monitors and watchdogs 

are shadow regulators that promise to 

impartially report to the government. 

These individuals are typically paid by 

companies engaged in alleged 

wrongdoing as part of a settlement. 

Monitors typically have relevant 

expertise in an industry and are often 

former government officials. 

In this matter, the Federal Trade 

Commission is resolving allegations that 

the merger between Stryker and Wright 

is unlawful by requiring divestitures 

and other provisions that will be 

overseen by an independent monitor. I 

write separately to detail some of my 

ongoing concerns regarding the lack of 

adequate protections against 

independent monitor conflicts of 

interest in FTC orders. 

Monitor Independence 

Over the last twenty years, there has 

been substantial concern about whether 

auditors and other third parties are truly 

independent, or whether they are 

influenced by seeking additional fees for 

future business.1 When it comes to 

monitors of settlements, an independent 

monitor ideally believes its primary 

responsibilities are to the government 

agency that relies on their work to 

ensure compliance with a settlement or 

order. 

Unfortunately, they are not always so 

independent, given potential incentives 

for their firms to seek additional 

business with companies subject to 

monitoring. For example, in the FTC’s 

investigation of Facebook for 

compliance with its privacy obligations 

under a 2012 Commission order, the 

FTC alleged major violations of the 

order even though 

PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was 

supposedly providing an independent 

assessment of the company’s 

compliance.2 In fact, I am unable to 

identify any recent case where a 

monitor has identified a material order 

violation that led to a subsequent 

penalty action. 

The Commission’s practice is to have 

the party alleged to have engaged in a 

law violation propose a monitor, subject 

to Commission approval. The party is 

also responsible for paying the 

monitor’s fees, which can be substantial. 

In this matter, the Commission has 

appointed a monitor who is an 

employee of a French-based global 

advisory business, Mazars, which 

provides consulting, accounting, tax, 

and other services.3 The agency’s order 

requires the monitor to simply selfreport any potential conflicts of interest. 

While this is better than nothing, it is 

not adequate, particularly when the 

monitor is employed by a large firm that 

offers a wide array of consulting and 

compliance-related services to 

companies like the targets in this matter. 

For example, will the monitor need to 

self-report a conflict when other units of 

Mazars bid for business with the merged 

entity? Many of these questions are 

unclear. 

Protecting the Public From Conflicts of 

Interest 

The Commission should strengthen 

the conflict-of-interest and transparency 

provisions in our orders related to 

monitors across the FTC’s mission by 

exploring whether to: 

• Require monitors and their 

employers to agree to non-solicit 

provisions for a period of time after the 

completion of a monitoring 

engagement.4

• Publish certain work products of 

monitors that detail their activities to 

ensure order compliance.5

• Create open application processes 

for potential monitors to detail their 

qualifications, as the Commission 

pursued in the Herbalife matter.6

• Require monitors to attest, under 

penalty of perjury, that they hold no 

financial interests in the industry of the 

companies subject to monitoring. 

I am skeptical that the Commission 

can truly remedy anticompetitive harm 

with complex settlements that require 

independent monitors. While many 

monitors certainly provide independent 

advice and analysis, it is critical that 

their actions are never distorted by any 

real or perceived conflicts of interest. 


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