1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0700n.06 F iled: Septem ber 27, 2006 No. 05-5088 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
J OSHUA HUB BA RD, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. W I L B UR GR OSS , Ind ivi du a lly

and in h is officia l capa city

as a Police Offic er a nd e mpl oy e e of

the Ci ty of

Cy nth iana and its Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, Def endant- Appellee , TE RRY GR

AY , Ind ivi du ally

and in h is officia l capa city

as a Poli ce Offic er a nd e mpl oy e e of

the City of Cynthia

na and its Police Depa

rtment, Def endant- Appellee , CI TY OF CYN TH I AN A, a 4th c la ss municipal corpor ation org anized under the laws of the Commonwea lth of Kentucky , Def endant- Appellee , CYNTHI ANA POL I CE DEPARTMENT, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKYNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 2 - Be for e : M OORE, R OG ER S, a nd M c KEA G UE Ci r c uitJudg e s.
RO GERS, Circuit Jud ge. I n th is § 1 9 8 3 a c ti o n th e r e is n o qu e s ti o n th a t H u b b ard wa s injured by

the police, but he doe s not present e vidence that war rants civil re dress. Af

ter being
arr ested for driving under the influence , the officers broke Hubbard’s hand in a forc eful take down. That beingsaid, the district court pr operly dismiss ed Hubba

rd’s va rious claims bec ause he prese nted
no e vid e nc e to m e e t th e e le me nts of tho se of fe ns e s. Th e mun ic ipa l li a bil ity c la im i s b arr e d a s a
m atter of law bec ause the jury

found that Hubba

rd’s c ivil rights wer e not violated. The various
wr on g fu l us e of

pr oc ess c la ims fa il b e c a us e Hu bb ard do e s n ot p re se nt e vid e nc e that th e a ssa ult
c ha rg e s we re br ou g ht wi th imp ro pe r purp os e or wi tho ut p ro ba ble c a us e . T he “ ou tr a g e ” c la ims fa il beca use there was no outrag eous conduct or intent to cause emotional distress. The district cour t’s evidentiar y decisions wer e not a

n abuse of discretion. Thus, the c ourt aff irms the district court on all issues.
I.
BACK GR OUND
At 2:00 a.m. on May

8, 2002, Cy

nthiana police O ffice r Ter ry Gra y responde d to a ca ll about a seda n being driven recklessly

on the interstate. A ccor ding to the 911 c all, the driver was “ lucky if he didn’t kill himself.” The se dan in question had ne arly collided with a par

ked ca r. Suspecting t h at t h e d ri v er

o f t h e s ed an wa s i mp ai re d , Of fi ce r Gr ay p u l l ed t h e re ck l es s l y dri v en ca r o v er . T h o u gh the driver did not have his lice nse, he identified himself as Joshua Hubbard a nd provided his socialNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 3 - secur ity number. Of

fice r Gra y suspected H ubbard w as drunk. Of ficer Gray

smelled alcohol on Hubbar d’s bre ath and sa

w an open bottle of J im Be am bourbon on the passeng er side of Hubbar d’s vehicle. H ubbard c laims that, though the bottle was half full, he did not drink from it on the nig ht of his arr est.
Gra y a d mi n is te r e d , an d H u

b b ar d f a il e d , thr e e f

ie ld s o b r ie ty te s ts
. G r ay a d mi n is te red, a nd Hubbar d failed, a

breathaly zer test. Acc ording to the breathaly zer, Hubbar d’s blood alcohol leve l
was at least twice the leg al limit. Gray arr ested Hubba

rd.
Gr ay the n tr ans po rt e d H ub ba

rd to H arr iso n M e mor ia l H os pit a l f or a blo od te st. B y the tim e Gra y was re ady

to transport Hubba

rd to the hospital, Offic er Wilbur Gross arr ived on the sce ne and fo l l o we d Gr ay

to the hospital. After unsuc cessf ully attempting to c ontact an a ttorney , Hubbar d ref used to consent to a blood test. Gr ay and Gr o s s then prepa

red to take Hubbar d to the police substation for proc essing . Gra y and Gr oss escor t ed Hubbard in handc uffs to the c ruiser, but
a c c or din g to H ub ba

rd he pa ssi ve ly

re sis te d a nd ne e de d to be c arr ie d. Ac c or din g to G ra y and Gr os s, Hubbar d resisted violently . Pushing, kicking , b l eeding , swelling , swea ring , and a br oken hand ensued.
Hubbar d claims that he wa s assaulted by the offic ers f

or passively resisting . The off icer s claim Hubbard assaulted them and that they used the minimum level of forc e nec essar y to subdue Hubbar d. A jury found that the forc e used was re asonable . A bone in Hubba rd’s ha nd was broke nNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 4 - afte r Gra y and Gr oss “body

slammed” Hubba

rd and spr ay ed him with OC spray (an e y e irritant)
. Hubbar d develope d swelling and blee ding in his hand a nd wrists.
Gra y and Gr oss contend that Hubba rd pushed Office r Gray , attempted to kick the of fice rs as they tried to subdue him, flailed his arms, and head butted Gr ay (i.e., re are d his head ba ck and struc k Offic er G ray ’s fa ce w ith his forehea d). Gra y later develope d a knot on his chee k from the a lleg ed head butt. Hubbar d claims that he did not hea d butt any one, and that Gross neve r witnessed H ubbard head butt Gr ay . Hubbar d claims that neither of fice r ac tually

knew how G ray

was injured ( i.e., that G r ay an d G r o s s f a b r i c a t e d t h e h e a d b u t ts t o r y)
. T h e i s s u e o f

e x c e s s i v e f

o r c e w a s s u

b m i t t e d t o a

j u r y. A jury returne d a ver dict in favor of the offic ers—f

inding that the f

orce used wa s rea sonable.
Th e re is n o d isp ute that Hub ba rd g ot r ou g he d u

p d ur ingthe take do wn , b ut t

he re is a dis pu te as to whethe r Hubba

rd re quested medic al attention or wa s obviously injured. P ictures a

nd testimony sh owthat H ub ba

rd ha d s ome sw e lli ngaro un d h is wr ist s fr om t he c uf fs , a nd sig nif ic ant s we lli ngin his right ha

nd (which, unknown to the offic ers, wa s broken) . Hubbar d claims the off icer s taunted him as he reque sted medical car e. Gra y and Gross claim that he did not a sk for medic al assistance and that witnesses c orrobor ate this. Although G ray

and Gr oss claim they did not know the hand injury was ser ious, the Cy

nthiana jailer would not a dmit Hubba rd without g etting treatment f or his ha nd beca use the jailer

felt Hubba

rd had a “possible broken hand.” Be cause the jailer would not a dmit Hubba rd until he g ot treatmentNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 5 - for his hand, G ray

and Gr oss took Hubbard to the hospital two hours af ter the init ial injury . At the hospital the hand wa s splinted, but Hubbard did not rec eive pa in medication.
Af te r t he sc uf fl e ou tsi de the ho sp ita l, H ub ba rd wa s bro ug ht t o th e po lic e su bs ta tio n. Whil e at the police s u b station, Hubbard wa s rec orded on vide o swea ring profuse ly

and g oading office r Gross to fig ht. After te n minutes of scre aming and swe aring , Hu b b ard g ot up and walke d toward
a c ounte r se pa

ratin g Hu bb ard fr om Gr os s. Th e vid e o r e ve a ls t hat O ff ic e r G ro ss t old

Hu bb ard to “ sit down and be quiet.” Hubba rd did not sit down and responded, “Come on Wilbur [ Gross], y ou g on na ’ make me .” Th is v ide o a lso inc lud e d me nti on s o f H ub ba rd ’s pr ior arr e sts . A t th e se c on d c ivi l tr ia l f o r e xc e s s iv e f

o r c e ( th e f

ir s t e n d e d in a h u n g ju

r y ) , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt p e r

mi tt e d th e ju

r y to see the whole substation video despite the prejudice from mentions of Hubbard’s previous arre sts and unsavory lang uag e; the cour

t ruled that the tape was probative of Hubba rd’s drunk a

nd abusive state.
Hubbar d was c riminally

char g ed with driving under the influence , driving without a driver’ s lic e ns e in h is p os se ssi on , p os se ssi on of an o pe n c on ta ine r of a lc oh ol i n a mot or ve hic le , a nd a ssa ult on a police of

fice r. Hubba

rd pled guilty

to a DUI , and all the char g es but the assault wer e droppe d. A g rand jury found that probable cause exis ted as to the assault. The a ssault char g e we nt to trial, and Hubbar d was found not guilty
. The underlying litigati on
Hubbar d filed a c ivil action aga inst Gra y and Gross in their individual capa cities alleg ing the following torts: ex cessive f orce under the 4th Amendment, deliber ate indiffe rence to a seriousNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 6 - me dic a l ne e d und e r t

he 8th and 14th Am end me nts , f

e de ra l and

state ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on , s ta te abuse of proce ss, and fe dera l and state “ outrag e.” H ubbard f iled suit a g ainst the City

of Cy nthiana alleg ing that a city custom or policy was the driving forc e behind the alleg ed constitutional violations and thus the city

was li able under § 1983. After discovery , the def

endants filed a

summary judgme nt mot ion . A s r e le va

nt t o th is a

pp e a l, t he dis tr ic t cou

rt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or the de fe nd a nts fo r t he fo llo wi ng c la ims : muni c ipa l § 19 83 lia bil ity , fe de ra l and state ma lic iou s pro se c uti on , s ta te law a bu se of pr oc e ss, and fe de ra l and state “ ou tr a g e .” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt pe rm itt e d th e “ de lib e rate ind if fe re nc e ” to a

se ri ou s me dic a l ne e d a

nd e xce ssi ve fo rc e c la ims to g o to tr ia l.
After Hubbar d prese nted his evidenc e in the first trial, the distr i ct co u rt g rante d a dire cted verdic t on the claim for “ deliberate indiffer ence ” to a serious medical ne ed, re asoning that Hubbar d did not present evide nce t h at a two-hour delay is unreasona

ble under the circ umstances a

nd that Hubbar d did not present ver ify ing me dical evide nce tha t the delay

cause d inju ry . The fir st trial resulted in a hungju ry . At a s econd trial on Dec ember 13, 2005, the excessive for ce c laim was submitt ed to a jury . The district cour t struck Hubbar d’s “police p ra ct i ce s ” ex pert witness a nd permitted t h e j u ry

to view all of a

police substation video. The jury rende red a

verdic t for the office rs – finding that the forc e used w as re asonable
. II.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EWNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 7 - For the var ious claims dismi ssed under summary judgme nt or on direc ted ver dict, this court revie ws de novo. The court views all evidenc e in the l ight most favor able to Hubba rd to deter

mine if a mate rial issue of f

act r emains

. Ce lo tex Co rp . v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The evidentiar y ruling s are revie wed unde r an a buse of discr etion standard. United St ates v. Bonds , 12 F .3 d 5 40 , 5 54 (6 th C ir . 1 99 3) . A n a bu se of dis c re tion ex is ts wh e re the re vie wi ngc ourt is f ir mly convince d a mistake ha s been ma de. U n it e d S ta te s v . Ki ngsley , 2 4 1 F. 3 d 828, 835 n.12 (6th Cir. 2001).
III . A. De libe r at e indiffe r e nc e to a s e r iou s m e dic al n e e d.
The district co u rt p roperly direc ted a ve rdict for

the offic ers on Hubba

rd’s c laim that the office rs ac ted with deliberate indiffer ence to a serious medical need beca use Hubbar d did not present evidenc e that the two- hour dela y in rec eiving treatment was unre asonable
. Hubbar d prese nted evidenc e that his injuries wer e obvious and that he actua lly experience d t h e n ee d fo r m edica l treatment. Howeve r, he ne eded a lso to present evide nce that the need w as not addre ss ed in a
rea sonable time frame. Be cause , considering the circumstances, no jury could conc lude that a twohour d e la y is anu n r e a s o n a

b le ti me f r a me to o b ta in

a s p li n t f o r a b r o k e nh an d , th e d is tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y dir e c te d a

ve rd ic t in

fa vo r o f t he de fe nd ants
. Hubbar d had the r ight to re ceive “ade quate” medical care beca use he was a pr etrial de tainee. Roberts v. City of Troy , 7 73 F .2 d 7 20 , 7 23 (6 th C ir . 1 98 5) . Ac on sti tut ion a l clai m for ina de qu a teNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 8 - medical c are has objec tive and subjec tive components. Farmer v . Brennan , 511 U.S. 82 5 , 834 (1994). The objective co m p o n en t re quires the e x istence of a “suf ficiently serious” me dical nee d. Id. Th e su

bject iv e com po ne nt r e qu ir e s an p la int if f t o s ho w t

hat of fi c ia ls h a ve “ a

su ff ic ie ntl y
c ulp a ble state of

min d in d eny ingme dic a l c are ,” wh ic h is no rm a lly de fi ne d a s “ de lib e rate in d if f e r e nce.” Id. Deliber ate indiffe renc e “e ntails something more than mere neg lige nce,” and require s that “the off

icial must both be awa

re of fac ts from which the infe renc e could be draw n that a substantial risk of ser ious harm exist s, and he must also dra w the infe renc e.” Id. at 835, 837.
1. Su bje c tiv e Fa c tor : H

ub ba rd ’s e v ide nc e su

pp or ts a fin din g th at t

he off ic e rs e x hib ite d d

e lib e ra te indifference.
The e vidence prese nted supports a findingthat the offic ers kne w Hubbard was inj ured a nd in pain and that they

did not seek medica l car e. The off i ce rs ar g ue that, eve n if the injury was serious, t he y

w e r e n o t d e li b e r a te ly

in d if f e r e n t b e c a

u s e th e y c o u ld n o t h a v e kn o w nH u

b b ar d w as injured. A revie w of the e vidence submitt ed at tria l shows that a jury could conc lude that the off icer s knew Hubba

rd wa s injured. Thus, there was suff icient evidenc e to support a f inding that the of

fice rs
we re de lib e rate ly

ind if fe re nt.
The e vidence prese nted is sufficient to support a f inding that the of

fice rs should have know n the injury was ser ious and requir ed med i ca l at t enti on. The off icer s claim that they

did not know Hubbar d was s er i o u s l y i n jured. In addition to their own testimony , the offic ers a rg ue that the testimony of Dr. McEldowney (Hubba rd’s treating phy sician) would require a jury to find that theNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 9 - of fi c e rs c ou ld n ot have kn ow n Hu bb ard wa s se ri ou sly inj ur e d. Dr . M c El do wn e y did te sti fy that a lay person mig ht not k now that Hubbar d’s hand wa s broken e ven thoug h it was very swollen. Hubbar d prese nts othe r evidenc e that direc tly contra dicts Dr. McEldowne y ’s testimony and cr eate s a triable issue of fac t. County J ailer Smit h’s testimony sug g ests that a lay

person would know that Hubbar d possibly

had a br oken hand that require d medical c are . Smit h is not a doctor, but base d on
c u r s o r y inv e s ti g a ti o nJa il e r

Sm it h w o u ld n o t a d mi t H u

b b ar d b e c a u s e Sm it h f e lt H u bbard had a “possible broke n hand.” Mr . Smit h testified that he did not admit Hubbard be cause his injury was “bad e noug h that it might require medical attention.” Additionally , Hubbar d testified that he a sked for medic al ca

re nume rous times and complaine d of extreme pain an d s we lling in his hand and
wr ist s. Thus , th e re is s uf

fi c ie nt ev ide nc e to sup po rt a fi nd ing that a lay pe rs on , suc h a s th e of

fi c e rs , wer e aw are of fa cts from whic h they could have known that Hubbar d was ser iously injured.
Thus , th e re is a

ma te ri a l is su e of

fa c t w ithre sp e c t to the su bje c tiv e c omp on e nt. 2. ObjectiveFactor: the two-hour de lay was not an unreasonable delay in providing treatment for Hubbard’s broke n hand. Despite the obviousness of the injury , the district court c orre ctly enter ed a direc ted ver dict be c a us e the fa c ts pr e se nte d do not ri se to the le ve l of a ser iou s injury no t add re sse d in a

re a so na ble time.
Hubbar d’s evidenc e does not show that his broke n hand wa s so serious that a two-hour de lay in r e c e ivi nga

sp lin t is un re a so na

ble
. Hu bb ard c on te nd s that the of fi c e rs sh ou ld have br ou g ht h imNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

As Hu bb ard c on te nd s, it is tr

ue that Nap ie r v . M

ad iso n Co un ty , 238 F.3d 739, 743 ( 6th Cir. 1 2001), does not re quire Hubba rd to pr esent verify

ing me dical evide nce of

the detriment suff

ere d by the delay in treatment, be cause the ev i d en ce i n t his case show s Hubbard’ s broken, swollen, a nd bleedinghand wa s an obvious injury
. Se e Blac k mo re , 390 F.3d at 899-900. - 1 0 - to the hospital more quickly . Hubbar d must present evide nce that “he is inca rce rate d under conditions posing a substantial r isk of serious h arm.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834. Although, H u b b ar d ’ s b r o k e nan d s w o ll e n h an d w a s “ s o o b v io u s th a t e v e n a la y p e r s o nw o u ld

e a s il y r e c o g n iz e the necessity for a

doctor’s attention,” Blac k mo re v . Ka lam az oo Cou nty , 390 F.3d 890, 894, 899- 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (interna l quotations omi tted), Hubbar d did not demonstrate that his “nee d was 1 not a ddresse d within a rea sonable time fr ame.” Id. Hubbar d cannot satisfy the objective pr ong of the deliber ate indiffe renc e ana ly sis.
Hu bb ard ’s c la im f

or de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e to a

me dic a l ne e d f

a ils
. B. St at e abus e of pr oc e ss c lai m
Ab us e of pr oc e ss is the us e of pr oc e ss fo r som e ult e ri or purp os e . Hub ba rd ’s a bu se of pr oc e ss claim fa ils because the offic ers br oug ht char g es ag ainst Hubbard w ithout any ulterior purpose
. Ab us e of pr oc e ss d if

fe rs fr om m a lic iou s p ro se c uti on in t hat ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c on sis ts of c omm e nc ingan a c tio n ma lic iou sly or wi tho ut jus tif

ic a tio n. Ab us e of

pr oc e ss, ho we ve r, c on sis ts of “the employ

ment of l eg al process for some other purpose othe r than that whic h it was intended b y th e la w to e ffe ct.” Raine v. D rasin, 621 S.W .2d 895, 902 (Ky . 1981). A Ke ntucky abuse of p r o c e s s c l a i m r e qu i r e s : ( 1 ) anu l t e r i o r p u r p o s e , an d ( 2 ) a w i l l f

u l a c tt h a tu s e s t h e p r o c e s s i mp r o p e r l y.No. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 1 1 - Sim ps on v . Le y tar t , 962 S.W .2d 392, 394 (Ky . 1998 ) ; see also Pr os se r a

nd Ke e ton on To rt s § 12 1 ( 5th
e d. 19 84 ) ( statin g “ if

the de fe nd ant pr os e c ute s an inn oc e nt pla int if f fo r a c ri me wi tho ut r e a so na

ble g rounds to believe he is guilty , it is malicious prosec ution; if he prosec utes him with such gr ounds to ext ort pay

ment of a de bt, it is abuse of proce ss”). Hubba

rd’s c laim fails beca

use t here was no
u l t e r i o r p u r p o s e a s c o n t e mp l a t e d

b y Simpson , 962 S.W .2d at 394.
Hubbar d does not articulate what ulter ior purpose w as ser ved by the prosec ution. An ulterior purpose is de fined g ener ally to be some illegitimate purpose be y ond mere ly bad intent. Id. (stating

“ the re is n o li a

bil ity wh e re the de fe nd ant h a s d on e no thi ngmor e tha n carry ou t th e pr oc e ss t o it s authorized conc lusion, even thoug h with bad int ention.”). Hubbar d does not articulate any rea son why the officers init iated the char g e of assaulting a poli ce office r for a reason other than to convict him of that char g e. Hubba rd see ms to arg ue that fa

bricating testimony is a

n improper willful ac t and attempting to c onvict someone who is innoce nt is a non-leg itimate use of the pr ocess.
At tem pt in g t o co nv ic t so me on e wh o is inn oc e nt i s n ot a n “ ult e ri or

purp os e ” a s n e e de d to state an a buse of pr ocess c laim. I n M u ll in s v . Richards, 705 S.W .2d 951, 951-52 (Ky . Ct. App. 1986), customer s of an a utomobile repair s h o p co n t ested the qua lity and cost of the repa irs and ref used to pay for the repa irs. After hear ing testimony of t he dis g runtled customers, the g rand jury returne d indictments ag ainst the shop owner for theft by dece ption. A mist rial in the cr iminal action ag ainst the shop owner was declare d afte r t he court hear d testimony of onl y one witness, one of the dis g ru ntl e d c us tom e rs . T he sh op owner th ereupo n b ro ug ht a n a c tio n f or a bu se of pr oc e ss a g a ins t the c us tom e rs . In a ff

ir min g the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the sh op ow ne r’ s a

bu se of pr oc e ss c la imNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

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- 1 2 - by a dire cted ve rdict, t he Kentucky Court of Appeals noted t he fatal absenc e of the cr ucial ele ment of the shop owne r’s a

buse of pr ocess c ase by

stating that “the re co rd contains no evidence that appellee s attempted to use the indictments ag ainst appellant outside the c riminal proce eding .” Id. at 952. Hubbar d’s abuse of proc ess claim similarly fails bec ause the re w as no ulterior pur pose.
C. St at e M ali c iou s P r os e c ut ion Cl aim
Be cause there was proba

ble ca use to believe Hubbar d assaulted a police off icer , Hubbar d’s
ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on

c la im a lso fa ils . H ub ba

rd c on te sts the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a sse rt ion that “ the re is
no signific antly probative evidence that he was maliciously prosec uted.” B eca use Hubba

rd has not shown all the ele ments sufficient to re ach a jury , t h e d i s t rict cour

t corre ctly

g rante d summary jud g me nt f

or the of fi c e rs . Th e ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on tor t c omp e ns a te s fo r ha

rm c a us e d by the mis us e of

le g a l pr oc e ss. The tort ac tion r equire s the following elements: (1) the instit ution or continuation of orig inal judicial proce eding s, in cludi ng criminal proc eeding s, (2) by , or at the instanc e, of the defe ndant, (3) the t er m i n at i o no f s u ch p ro ce ed i n gs i n p l ai n t i ff ’s fa v o r, (4 ) m al i ce i n t h e i n s t i tu t i o n o f s u ch p ro ce ed i n g, (5) want or l ack of

probable cause for the pr ocee ding, a nd (6) damag es. Se e Ra inev . D ra sin , 621 S.W. 2d 89 5, 89 9 ( Ky . 1 98 1) . Ajur y c ou ld c on c lud e that e le me nts 1- 3 a re c le arl y me t be c a us e Of fi c e r G ro ss f

ile d a c ri min a l c omp la int

a g a ins t Hu

bb ard , and the c ri min a l tr ia l e nd e d in a c qu itt a l. Element four , malice, is a jury question and m ay b e i n fe rred from a la ck of pr obable c ause. See Swe e ne yv . H owa rd , 4 47 S .W .2 d 8 65 , 8 65 (K y . App . 1 96 9) . T hu s, the qu e sti on in t his c a se isNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 1 3 - wh e the r t h e r e w a s p r o b a

b l e c a u s e a s a m a t t e r o f l aw . E v e nt a k i n g t h e e v i d e n c e i nt h e l i g h tm o st fa vo ra ble to H ub ba

rd , th e re wa s p ro ba

ble caus e be c a

us e an o ff

ic e r c ou ld r e a so na

bly inf e r t hat a crime oc curr ed.
The fa cts put forth re veal simple confusion about what happene d, but Gray and Gr oss had sufficie nt rea son to be lieve Hubbar d assaulted Offic er Gra y to c onstitut e probable cause . Hubbar d was tried f

or assa ult in the third deg ree . “A person is guilty of assault in the third deg ree when the actor . . . intentionally

cause s or attempts to cause phy sical i njury to
. . . a poli ce of fice r.” K y . Rev. Stat. An n. § 508 .0 25
. Pr ob a ble c a us e re qu ir e s o nly

c on c re te fa c ts f

ro m w hic h o ne c an r e a so na bly infer that a cr ime occur

red. Mc Cur

dy v . M on tgo me ry

Cou nty , 240 F. 3 d 512, 517 (6th Cir. 2001). The “ concr ete f

acts” from which the office rs re asonably conclude d that Hubbar d committed an
a ssa ult inc lud e the fo llo wi ng : H ub ba rd , w ho wa s in toxic a te d, pa ssi ve ly re sis te d th e of

fi c e rs ’ attempts to subdue him and place him in a poli ce c ar; a scuff le betwe en Of

fice r Gra y and Hubba

rd ensued dur ing the proce ss of placingHubbar d in the police ca r; during t h at s cuffle Off icer Gra y suffe red a

trauma to his fa ce w hich was suf ficiently forc eful to ca

use substantial swelling and redne ss. I t is not exactly clea r how Offic er Gray rec eived the injury . Offic er G ray said, “my

head h i tt h e b a c k

o f [ H u b b ar d ’ s ] h e a d
. ” O f

f i c e r G r o s s , t h o u g h n o te n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n ti nh i s t e s t i m o n y, b el i ev edHu b b ar d

i n t en t i o n al l y

h ea d b u t t edGr ay . Hu b b ar d

d en i es i n t en t i o n al l y

head butting

any one. Despite the confusion, the undisputed fac ts show that an office r wa s injured in a take down and that injury appea

red to be from a head- to-fac e contac t by an arr estee who was trying to m ak e r est raint difficult. These fac ts constitute probable c ause to a rre st for assa

ult.No. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 1 4 - Hu bb ard argue s, bu t do e s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y sh ow , th a t th e of

fi c e rs initi a te d th e a ssa

ult prosec ution without probable cause . I t is undisputed that Offic er Gray suffe red a

trauma to his fa ce during the takedow n. I n eff ect, Hubba

rd argues that Offic ers Gra y and Gross fabr icated a story that Hubbar d he a d

b u tt e d G r ay w h e n , in f a c t, th e y h a d n o id e a h o w G r ay

g o t t h e b u mp . H u

b b a r d ’s evidenc e for

this assertion is a conve rsation betwe en Gr ay and Gross in the police substation wher e Of fi c e r G ro ss a sk e d Gr ay ho w he hurt his e y e . Hu bb ard c on te nd s that su c h a n in qu ir y by Gr os s is inc on sis te nt w ithhis te sti mon y be fo re the g ra

nd jur y that he sa

w the he a d b utt . H ub ba

rd su g g e sts that if Gross witnessed the assault, he would not have had to ask Gr ay how he hur

t his ey e.
Hubbar d misconstrues the conve rsation at the police substation because the conve rsation by itself does not support a c ontention that Gross lie d
. T h e v i d eo at the police substation to which Hubbar d ref

ers is almost co m p l et el y

inaudible. Hubbar d contends Gr ay stated, “my

ey e is sore.” Then Gr oss asked what happene d. Gra y responde d, “my

head hit the ba ck o f h i s head.” Offic er Gross re sponded, “I

thought I saw him head butt y ou.” This conve rsation does not cr eate a mater ial issue of fa ct as to whe ther ther e wa s a lack of probable cause . I t doe s reve al that Gross may not have been c ompletely

cer tain of what he saw.
B e c a us e the re wa s p ro ba

ble c a us e , H ub ba

rd ’s ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c la im f a ils
. D. F e de r al M ali c iou s P r os e c ut ion Cl aim
Th e of fi c e rs are e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity be c a

us e the re wa s pr ob a

ble c a us e to p ro se c ute Hu bb ard fo r a ssa ult . T hu s, Hu

bb ard ’s fe de ra l ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c la im f a ils
.No. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 1 5 - Th e thr e sh old

qu e sti on fo r § 19 83 a c tio ns is, “ take n in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he pa rt y
a s s e rt i n g t h e i n

j u r y , d o t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d s h o w t h e o f

f i c e r ’ s c o n d

u c tv i o l a t e d

a c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t ?” Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 5 33 U. S. 1 94 , 2 01 (2 00 1) . U nd e r t he ana ly sis a

bove, th e fa c ts a

re su ff ic ie nt t o constitute probable c ause to a rre st a nd indict H ubbard for third deg ree assault. Thus, there was no constitutional viol ation and qualified i m m u n i ty on the fe dera l malicious prosecution cla im was proper . E. O ut r ag e ous Co nduc t C lai m
Fe de ra l Cla im
Th ere is no c on sti tut ion a l to rt fo r “ ou tr a g e ou s c on du c t.” A s ub sta nti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im may lie for c onduct that “s h o ck s t he consc ience ,” but the off icer s’ conduc t neither “ shocks the conscie nce” nor is “ the most e g reg ious official c onduct.” The ref ore, H ubbard’ s fede ral substantive due proc ess claim for

outrag eous conduc t fails.
Hu bb ard argue s th a t Chavez v. Martinez , 538 U.S. 760 (2003), re cog nized a constitutional tort for be havior that is “outra g eous.” Chavez state s:
The F ourtee nth Amendment provides that no pe rson shall be depr ived “of life, liberty , or prope rty , without d u e process of law .” Convictions based on e vidence obtained by

methods that are “so brutal and so offe nsive to human di g nity ” that they “shoc[k] the conscie nce” violate the Due Proc ess Clause. Ro c hin v . Ca lif or nia , 342 U.S. 16 5 , 1 7 2 (1952) (overturningconviction base d on evidenc e obtained by involuntary stomach pumping) . Although Ro c hin did not establish a civil remedy for abusive poli ce behavior, we recog nized in Cou nty of S ac ra me nto v . Le wis , 5 23 U. S.No. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 1 6 - 833, 846 (1998), that deprivations of l iberty cause d by “the most eg reg ious official conduct” may

violate the Due Process Clause.
Chavez , 538 U.S. at 774 (citations omitted). Contrary to Hu b b ar d’s claim, Cha v e z i s m e r e l y a
re ite ratio n o f t

he “ sh oc ks the c on sc ie nc e ” sta nd ard fr om Rochi n v. Califo rn ia
. Bo dy s l am m i n g a
su sp e c t and

c uf fi nghim in a wa y that br e a ks his ha

nd –w hil e su bdui ng hi m with ou t unre a so na ble fo rc e –d oe s n o t s h o c k t h e c o n s c i e n c e an d i s n o t “ t h e m o s t e g r e g i o u s o f f i c i a l c o n d u c t
. ” N e i t h e r

is alleg edly fabr icating a head butt to bolster an assault cha rg e whe re the re a

re r easona

ble asser tions that the suspect did ca

use ser ious injury

to an offic er dur ing a

takedown.
Sta te Cla im
I n Ke ntu c ky the re is a tor

t fo r “ ou tr a g e ,” or

int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss. Th is tor t ha s th e fo llo wi nge le me nts : (1 ) t he wr on g do e r’ s c on du c t mu st b e int e nti on a l or re c kle ss; (2) the c onduct must be outrag eous and intolera ble in that i t o ff

ends aga inst the g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d

s t an d ar d s o f

d e c e n c y an d

m o r a l i t y; (3) ther e must be a c ausal c onnection betwe en the wr o ng doer’ s conduct a nd the emotional distress; and (4) the e motional dist ress must be seve re. Burgess v. Taylor , 4 4 S. W.3 d 8 06 , 8 11 (K y . Ct . App . 2 00 1) . H ub ba

rd ’s ou tr a g e c la ims fa ils be c a us e the of fi c e rs ’ c on du c t wa s not outra g e ou s, the re is no ev ide nc e of int e nt to c a us e e mot ion a l di str e ss, and Hubba

rd did not suffer

sever e emotional distress. Hubbar d prese nts insufficient e vidence thatNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

Hubbar d names vari ous g overnme nt ag encie s (i.e., City of Cy nthiana, Of

fice rs Gra y and 2 Gross in the ir officia l c apac ities, a nd the Cy nthiana Police Depa

rtment). All these na

med par ties are treated as one entity

(“the city ”) pur suant to Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). - 1 7 - the of fi c e rs ’ s ta te me nts or

a c tions we re ou tr a g e ou s o r i nte nd e d to inf lic t e mot ion a l di str e ss. F ur the rm or e , H ub ba

rd pr e se nts no e vid e nc e that he su ff e re d e mot ion a l di str e ss f

ro m th e of

fi c e rs ’ actions. See id. at 812 (stating that sever e emotional distress consisted of panic attacks, depr ession
uncure d by medication or thera py , and thoughts of suicide requiring medical car e afte r knowing that plaintiff’s “ba

bies wer e dea d”). Thus, H ubbard’ s outrag e cla im fails as a matter of law be cause he did no t pr e se nt e vid e nc e of

se ve re e mot ion a l di str e ss o r s uf fi c ie ntl y ou tr a g e ou s c on du c t.
F . Municipal Liab ility: because a jury det erm ined t h a t no off icer -defendan t had d eprived Hub bard of

any constitutional right, he cannot state a claim against the City. Summary judgme nt on the municipal policy or custom claim was appropriate beca use there 2 was not suffici en t evidence that an off icer committed a constitutional tort ag ainst Hubbard. T he dis tr ic t c ourt

dis mis se d th e c la im a g a ins t th e c ity on the g ro un d th at th ere was no e vid e nc e tha t a municipal policy or custom was the driving forc e behind the a lleg ed depr ivation. Whi le the district court’s a naly sis is correc t, this court does n ot need to conside r Hubba rd’s e vidence on municipal liability . The “ conclusion that no off icer -def endant had deprive d the plaintiff of a ny constitutional ri g ht a fo rti or i defe ats the claim ag ainst the County as we ll.” Sc ott

v . Clay Cou nty , 205 F.3d 867, 87 9 (6t h Ci r. 20 00 ); see also Buk owski v. City of Tol edo , 3 2 6 F
. 3 d 7 0 2 , 7 1 2

- 1 3 ( 6 th Ci r. 2003). A b se nt a vio la tio n o f H ub ba

rd ’s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts by a mun ic ipa l e mpl oy e e , H ub ba rd c ann ot s ta teNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 1 8 - a cla im ag ainst the municipality . Thus, the district court properly g rante d summary

judgme nt on the municipal liability

claim.
G. The districtcourt d id n ot abuse its dis cre tion by exclud ing the expert t estim ony of Hub bard’s “poli ce prac tice s” expert . Finally , the district court did not abuse its discr etion in not permitting the testimony of Dr. Cox on the g ro un d th a t Co x’s t e sti mony wa s unn e c e ssa

ry and c on sis te d o f l e g a l c on c lus ion s.
Dr. Cox does have re levant cre dentials including : being a prof essor of c riminology , study ing
and pu bli sh ingin c ri min a l j us ti ce, ser vin g a s an e le c te d s he ri ff , d e ve lop ingtr a ini ngmanu a ls,
c on du c tin g se min ars on

po lic e mana g e me nt, and

te sti fy ingin o the r c ivi l tr ia ls.
Dr. Cox s oug ht t o o p in e o n w h a t is a r e a s o n a b le u s e o f f

o r c e , an d th a t is s u e is w it h in the
c o mp e t e n c e o f

a l ay j u r y. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtr e a s o n e d t h a tt h e p r o f

f e r e d t e s t i m o n y w a s “ u n n e c e s s a r y” and “w ould consist of leg al conc lusions.” Unneces s ar y ex p er t testimony may be excluded. See Salem v. U

nites States Lines Co. , 3 70 U.S
. 31 , 35 ( 19 62 ) ( statin g , “ e xpe rt te sti mony

no t on ly is
unnece ssary

but indeed may proper ly be excluded in the discre tion of the trial judg e if a ll the primary fac ts can be accurately

and intelligibly

descr ibed to the jury , and if they , as men of c ommon
u n d e r s ta n d in g , a r e a s capa ble of c omprehe nding the primary fac ts and of dra

wing corr ect c onclusions from them” ( internal q uotations omit ted)). B eca use testimony

about whethe r the off

icer s used
re a so na ble fo rc e is a

le g a l c on c lus ion

and may c on fu se the tr ie r of fa c t, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is w ith in its sound dis cre tion to ex clude it. See, e.g., Pe na v. Leombruni , 200 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1999)No. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 1 9 - (holding that a jury

is not assisted by

expert testimony

on what leve l of forc e is appropr iate under the circ umstances) . I f the jury believed that Hubbard w as beingviolent, the jury did not ne ed expert opinion to determine whe ther it was r easona ble to spray , cuff

and re strain Hubbar d. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discre tion in not pe rmitting the testimony of Dr. Cox on the ground that Cox ’s t estimony might conf use the jury

and had little cha

nce of assisting the trie r of fa c t.
H. A dm iss ion of t he e nt ir e pol ic e subs ta ti on v ide o was notan a buse of dis c r e ti on.
Hubbar d objects to the district court’ s decision to allow the jury to see a video taken of Hubbar d at the substation afte r his arr est. I n this video Hubbar d is seen c ursing and beingabusive. The video a lso contains mention that Office r Gross kne w of Hub b ard’ s previous ar rests in the
c on te xt of ph on e pr ivi le g e s af

fo rd e d to Hub ba

rd duri ng his pr e vio us arr e sts . T he de c isi on to a dmi t the whole substation video i s revie wed for abuse of discre tion. United States v. Bonds , 12 F.3d 540, 55 4 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 3) . “ Al tho ug h r e le va nt, e vid e nc e may

be e xclu de d if

its pr ob a tiv e valu e is substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudi ce , confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury , or by

considerations of undue delay , waste of time, or needle ss pr esentation of cumulative evidenc e.” F ed. R. Evid. 403. “This cour t takes a ma x imal view of the pro b at i v e effect of the evide n ce an d a minimal view of its unfairly prejudicia l effe ct, and will hold that the district court
err ed only

if the latter outwe ighs the former .” United States v. Gibbs , 182 F.3d 408, 430 ( 6th Cir.No. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 2 0 - 1999). While it i s true that the video prejudice d Hubbar d, admitting the video w as not an a buse of discretion bec ause the video also had sig nificant probative value.
The unfa ir pr e

judic ial eff

ects we re slig ht. As a g ener al matter, e vidence of unre lated cr iminal activity or bad a cts tends to g ive i mpermissible impression to a jury that a par ticular de fenda

nt has a “ba d” or “ criminal” c hara cter
. See F e d. R. Ev id. 40 4( b)
. I n thi s c a se , th e of fi c e rs did no t im ply that Hubbar d had a c riminal propensity . The unfai r prejudice wa s slight bec ause the mentions of Hubbar d’s arr est wer e brief, bare ly audible, and the office rs never mentioned that Hubbar d had bee n
arr ested in closing arguments or any wher e else in the trial. The probative val u e wa s s u bstantial. The off icer s sought to introduce the video to show Hubbar d’s demea

nor after the arr est, to show that he was drunk, t o show that he wa s combative, a nd to show that Hubbard w as not in pain. The video was direct evidence of exactly what Hubba

rd and the offic ers did at a

signific ant point in the sequenc e of e vents.
I ndeed, the Ninth Circuit has rec og nized that e vidence of police knowledg e of pr ior criminal history may be relevant in excessive for ce c ases. Ruvalcaba v . City of L os Angeles , 64 F.3d 1323, 13 28 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) , h e l d t h a t o f f i c e r s c o u l d t e s t i f

y t o t h e i r kn o w l e d g e ( a t t h e t i m e t he a lle g e dly excessive forc e wa s ap p l i ed ) o f R u v al cab a’ s p re v i o u s arre s t s b ec au s e s u ch i n fo rm ation was proba tive of the re asonable ness of their c onduct under the circ umstances. Ruvalcaba stands for the point of law that office rs can introduce evidenc e of previous encounte rs with a detainee if p revious encounte rs would be r eleva nt t o s h o w how much force is reasona ble in a subseque nt arre st. TheNo. 05-5088

Hu bb ar d v . G ro ss, e t al

.

- 2 1 - Ruvalcaba court h eld that the probative value wa s not substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair pr ejudice. Id. Apply ing the Ninth C i rc u i t ’s rea soning in Ruvalcaba , e vid e nc e tha t G ro ss eit h e r a r r e s te d H u b b a r d befor e or pr ocesse d Hubbar d afte r he w as ar rested is indepe ndently

probative of t he reasonable ness of Of fice r Gross’ s use of for ce in the instant c ase. U nlike Ruvalcaba , wher e the only probative va lue of the e vidence related to rea sonablene ss of forc e, in the instant ca se the vid e o is a lso re le va

nt to sho w that Hub ba

rd wa s row dy and dr

un k. Thus , the vid e o of H ub ba rd is more probative than the evide nce pr esente d in Ruvalcaba , a nd the pr ob a tiv e va lue su

bs tanti a lly
ou tw e ig he d th e un fa ir

pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c ts.
I n sum, unfair pre

judice wa s very

limit ed, and the probative e ffe ct was substantial. The district court did not abuse its d i s cretion when ruling “that the pr obative value outweig hed the prejudicia l effe cts.”
IV.
This court there fore aff

irms the district court in all respe cts.