NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MORIAH ZEIGLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO; 

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; 

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY SHERIFFS 

DEPARTMENT; TERI WARKENTIN; 

DIANA STEINHAUER, an individual; 

LINDA GENDRON, an individual; 

DESILYN TRAHAN, an individual;

JOCELYN MCCURRY, an individual; 

GREGORY ROACH, an individual; 

ALFREDO CAMPOS, an individual

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23-55381 

D.C. No. 

2:17-cv-09295-MWF-AFM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 6, 2024**

Pasadena, California

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 21 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Before: WARDLAW, CHRISTEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Moriah Zeigler appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the County of San Luis Obispo (“County”) and individual defendants Teri 

Warkentin, Diana Steinhauer, Linda Gendron, and Desilyn Trahan. Zeigler alleges 

a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

state law claims arising from the County’s warrantless removal and placement of 

her one-year-old son E.Z. into protective custody. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not err by concluding that exigent circumstances 

justified E.Z.’s warrantless removal. See Mabe v. San Bernadino Cnty., Dep’t of 

Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2001). The undisputed evidence 

demonstrates that Warkentin and Steinhauer had ample “information at the time of 

the seizure that establishe[d] ‘reasonable cause to believe that the child [wa]s in 

imminent danger of serious bodily injury.’” Id. (quoting Wallis v. Spencer, 202 

F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000)). On April 24, 2017, Sean Dover (“Mr. Dover”), 

called the County’s Child Welfare Services’ (“CWS”) child abuse hotline and 

reported that Zeigler was hitting E.Z. and that he thought the situation was going to 

worsen. In response, Warkentin and Steinhauer visited Zeigler at her home that 

afternoon. Zeigler’s younger brother told Warkentin that he had seen Zeigler hit 

E.Z. on multiple occasions, that he feared for E.Z.’s safety, and that Warkentin
3 

should take a closer look at E.Z.’s back because Zeigler had hit E.Z. that morning. 

Both Warkentin and Steinhauer found an injury on E.Z.’s back that looked like red, 

swollen fingermarks, for which Zeigler offered inconsistent explanations. Because 

the social workers had reasonable cause to believe that E.Z. was in imminent 

danger and because the earliest the County could have obtained a warrant would 

have been the next day, E.Z.’s warrantless removal from the home was lawful.1

See Rogers v. City of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“Serious allegations of abuse that have been investigated and corroborated usually 

give rise to a ‘reasonable inference of imminent danger sufficient to justify taking 

children into temporary custody’ if they might again be beaten or molested during 

the time it would take to get a warrant.”) (quoting Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 

1311 (9th Cir. 1997)).

2. Nor did the district court err by concluding in the alternative that the 

social workers are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the two-pronged qualified 

immunity test, we ask whether the facts show that an official violated a 

constitutional right, and whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of 

the alleged violation. Demaree v. Pederson, 887 F.3d 870, 878 (9th Cir. 2018).

1 Although Cassandra Dover (“Mrs. Dover”), Zeigler’s mother, was also present in 

the home, it remained necessary to remove E.Z. because Mrs. Dover refused to 

believe that E.Z. had been abused and appeared to be hostile towards the 

investigation. Thus, it was reasonable for the social workers to believe that Mrs. 

Dover would not protect E.Z. from imminent injury. See Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1110.
4 

As of April 24, 2017, it was “well-settled that a child [cannot] be removed without 

prior judicial authorization absent evidence that the child was in imminent danger 

of serious bodily injury.” Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 792 (9th 

Cir. 2016) (en banc). But no case has addressed what constitutes “imminent” 

danger in circumstances like those that occurred here—involving corroborated 

allegations of repeated physical abuse. Thus, “[n]o matter how carefully a 

reasonable social worker had read our case law, she could not have known that 

seizing [E.Z.] would violate federal constitutional law. Without that fair notice, 

the social workers in this case are entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 793.

3. The district court properly concluded that Zeigler failed to show that 

Gendron and Trahan committed judicial deception by submitting a report to the 

juvenile court that stated that E.Z.’s head was “slightly flat, which is indicative of 

lying in a crib for long periods of time.” To survive summary judgment on a claim 

of judicial deception, a plaintiff “must (1) establish that the warrant affidavit 

contained misrepresentations or omissions material to the finding of probable 

cause, and (2) make a ‘substantial showing’ that the misrepresentations or 

omissions were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.” Bravo 

v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). Gendron, a County 

social worker, drafted E.Z.’s detention report, which Trahan, her supervisor,

cosigned. Gendron based her report on her interview with Buffy Ramirez, the lead 
5 

nurse at the medical office where Dr. Sam Slishman conducted E.Z.’s Suspected 

Child Abuse and Neglect (“SCAN”) exam. There is no dispute that Ramirez told 

Gendron that E.Z. had a slightly flat head from lying down for a prolonged period. 

Accordingly, Gendron merely included information in E.Z.’s detention report that 

was conveyed to her by Ramirez, who had knowledge of E.Z.’s SCAN exam.

Thus, Gendron and Trahan’s report does not rise to the level of a deliberate 

falsehood, or a statement made in reckless disregard for the truth. See Devereaux 

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“Failing to follow 

guidelines or to carry out an investigation in a manner that will ensure an error-free 

result is one thing; intentionally fabricating false evidence is quite another.”).

4. Because Zeigler fails to show that Gendron or Trahan committed judicial 

deception, the district court properly concluded that Zeigler was barred from 

bringing claims based on E.Z.’s continued detention after the juvenile court’s April 

27, 2017 order. See Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 765 

(9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that officials who execute valid court orders are 

absolutely immune from liability for damages in civil rights actions challenging 

conduct authorized by the order).

AFFIRMED.