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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 110TH CONGRESS

1st Session

S. PRT.

2007

110–35

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE:

‘‘GUNS, DRUGS, AND FRIENDS’’

A REPORT TO MEMBERS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 21, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via World Wide Web:

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v

Background on United States Counter-Narcotics Assistance to Mexico ............. 1

Overall Recommendations ...................................................................................... 2

Analysis .................................................................................................................... 3

The Merida Initiative, How It Came To Be and Why Now .......................... 4

A Committed Friend: Caldero ́n’s Efforts to Fight Narcotics ......................... 6

Areas for Improvement: North-South Arms Trafficking and Funding for

Central America ............................................................................................ 9

North-South Arms Trafficking ................................................................. 9

Central America ........................................................................................ 10

APPENDIXES

Discussions With Individuals in Mexico ................................................................ 13

The Merida Initiative Security Assistance Proposals—Budgets and Item

Breakdown ............................................................................................................ 15

The Central America Security Assistance (CASA) Proposals—Budgets and

Item Breakdown ................................................................................................... 51

Security Strategy for Central America (Translation)—Estrategia de Seguridad

de Centro America (Original) .............................................................................. 79

(III)

(v)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC, December 21, 2007.

DEAR COLLEAGUES: From November 6–8, 2007, I directed my

senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member

for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Mexico City to assess a

$500 million supplemental budget request for Mexico. This request

is intended to support regional efforts to address common threats

to our nations by combating transnational crime and drug trafficking.

The Merida Initiative, as this proposal is called, is an attempt to

seize the opportunity created by Mexico’s invigorated anti-crime

campaign. The Initiative would fund key programs and build

stronger cooperation with the United States.

The proposal recognizes that 90 percent of the cocaine entering

the United States transits Mexico and that our efforts to combat

this drug flow and associated criminal activities depend on a partnership with the Mexican government. It also recognizes that Central America is the primary transit point for people and drugs destined for the United States and Mexico from South America. This

illicit activity threatens regional stability, weakens national economies and exacerbates illegal migration to the United States.

The legislative process to pass the authorization of the Merida

Initiative began after President Bush submitted his supplemental

request of $45.9 billion to the U.S. Congress on October 22, 2007.

The President made this request to continue the Global War on

Terror and address other urgent national security needs. Five hundred million dollars for the Merida Initiative was included as part

of this request. In response to the President’s proposal the SFRC

held a full committee hearing on the Merida Initiative on November 15, 2007. Mr. Meacham’s attached report provides significant

insight into this initiative. While his report’s primary focus is assistance to Mexico, appropriate analysis of Merida’s counterpart

program in Central America, or Central American Security Assistance (CASA), is also provided.

vi

I hope you find it helpful as the U.S. Congress considers support

for the supplemental request for Mexico and Central America. I

look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues and

welcome any comments you may have on this report.

Sincerely,

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

(1)

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE:

‘‘GUNS, DRUGS, AND FRIENDS’’

From November 6–8, 2007, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

minority staff traveled to Mexico City, Mexico on an official oversight visit to assess President George W. Bush’s supplemental

budget request of $500 million for Mexico. During this trip, staff

met with senior officials of the Government of Mexico (GOM),

Members of the Mexican Senate, a senior official of the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry, officials from the Mexican human rights

community, members of the Mexican press, and senior officials at

the United States Embassy in Mexico City. (See Appendix I for

complete list of meetings.)

At the request of Senator Lugar, the purpose of the trip was to:

• Assess the process through which this proposal was formulated;

• Assess the effectiveness of the current proposal and identify

areas for improvement.

BACKGROUND ON UNITED STATES COUNTER-NARCOTICS

ASSISTANCE TO MEXICO

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center somewhere

between 530 and 710 metric tons of cocaine departed South America bound for the United States in 2006. In that year, Mexican and

U.S. law enforcement estimate that 12.7 tons of heroin was freshly

produced within Mexico, to be shipped northwards. That accounts

for more than a 58 percent increase in production from the year before. The United States has been engaged in efforts to combat the

flow of narcotics into the United States from Mexico and Central

America for many years.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), between

fiscal years 2000 and 2006, the U.S. government has provided over

$250 million for counter-narcotics assistance to Mexico. The State

Department provided the bulk of this assistance—$169 million—for

port and border security, law enforcement assistance, interdiction

and eradication support, aviation support and training. USAID provided $30 million for rule of law and anti-corruption training. The

remainder ($58 million) was provided by the Department of Defense through its ‘‘section 1004’’ authority (Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 authorizes

the Department to provide support to counter-drug activities of

other federal agencies overseas). The Drug Enforcement Administration also expended $124 million during this period to support its

field offices in Mexico.

2

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

American politicians on both sides of the aisle have become increasingly concerned about inattention to Latin America. Yet when

President Bush recently announced details about the Merida Initiative, the proposal was greeted with Congressional skepticism.

Some members have complained about a lack of information and

consultation in the formulation of the proposal and have voiced

concern over corruption and alleged human rights abuses in Mexico. Others feel more must be done domestically, both in addressing

the underlying demand for drugs in the United States and the

treatment for drug offenders. There are also those in the U.S. Congress who feel that the proposal for Central America does not go

far enough in funding and equipping efforts to deal with land, air,

and maritime narcotics trafficking. These are all valid concerns. On

human rights, specifically, we are assured that there would be continued efforts in the context of this initiative.

But the risks of proceeding with this agreement are small compared to the large potential payoff of authorizing this proposal

which would include creating the institutional framework for dealing with many of the problems mentioned by Democrats and Republicans alike. Mexico’s historic mistrust of its northern neighbor

has long prevented closer ties that could benefit both sides. President Caldero ́n has taken considerable political risk in reaching out

to the United States. He has done this because it is in Mexico’s

best national security interest and because combating this

transnational threat requires closer collaboration. Furthermore,

Central American willingness to act together in favor of their collective security is an important development that should not have

been overlooked by the Bush administration in putting together

their funding request.

The Merida Initiative represents a rare opportunity to build a

base for sustained cooperation with Mexico on a shared agenda. To

pass on this opportunity would represent a significant blunder that

would have a negative impact on the bilateral relationship, as well

as broader U.S. interests in the region. In order to increase the effectiveness of this initiative the following recommendations should

be considered.

(1) In cooperation with the Mexican government, the U.S. Secretary of State should:

• Define a comprehensive strategy aimed at disrupting the traffic of arms to Mexico, which emphasizes preventive initiatives,

effective controls of the sale of weapons in gun shows, especially along the border.

• Improve effective and timely exchange of intelligence on major

U.S. based trafficking of weapons organizations with links to

Mexican and Central American criminal organizations.

• Work with the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to

work closely with other law enforcement agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in operations to

interdict weapons crossing U.S. borders and devise new programs to share tracing capabilities with the appropriate Mexican authorities, close-off trafficking corridors, expand actionVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:42 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\39644.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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1Other estimates, such as USAID’s ‘‘2006 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment’’ report, cite regional gang membership to be anywhere from 50,000 to 305,000 individuals. 2 According to the Government of Guatemala, the typical entry age to these gangs is 13. It

asserts there have been cases of children as young as 8 involved in extortion, drug distribution

and assassinations.

able, real-time intelligence cooperation, and aggressively pursue prosecutions, interdictions and arrests of individuals seeking to move firearms across the border.

• Establish a specific program to trace and disrupt the trafficking to Mexico of high powered weaponry such as .50 mm

rifles, grenades and grenade launchers.

(2) The Merida Initiative will achieve modest results should substantial assistance for public security, law enforcement, specialized

police training, air, land and maritime interdiction and interception

equipment not be provided for Central American Security Assistance (CASA). Organized crime and narco-trafficking in Central

America could directly threaten gains made against the drug cartels in Mexico. In order to promote a real reduction of violence and

drug trafficking in Central America and ensure broader success in

combating the drug trade in North and Central America, the Bush

administration should find additional funds for Central America in

the FY09 appropriations cycle (funding in the supplemental request

for CASA is $50 million).

ANALYSIS

Along the border between the United States and Mexico, and far

into Central America, there is a war raging. Drug trafficking, arms

smuggling, money laundering, and violence connected to organized

crime are rampant. In the last 10 months alone more than 2,600

Mexicans have lost their lives in police action against the drug trafficking organizations active throughout Central and North America. In response, Mexican President Felipe Caldero ́n and the Mexican Congress have authorized nearly $3 billion and 30,000 troops

to help combat the violence.

In Central America, drug trafficking and its kingpins exacerbate

the declining stability of law and order. Regional street gangs,

which the United States Central Command has estimated may

total 70,000 members, are a major source of violent crime in a region where the numbers of at risk youth are staggering.1 In Guatemala, 70 percent of the population is under the age of 29; 50 percent are under 15 and thus highly susceptible to inducement into

criminal behavior when not presented with better economic opportunities.2

The Merida Initiative was envisioned to help address these

issues. Details of the supplemental request released by the Department of State include:

• Non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, canine units

for Mexican customs, for the new federal police and for the

military to interdict trafficked drugs, arms, cash and persons.

• Technologies to improve and secure communications systems to

support collecting information as well as ensuring that vital information is accessible for criminal law enforcement.

4

• Technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of

justice, such as vetting for the new police force, case management software to track investigations through the system to

trial, new offices for citizen complaints and professional responsibility, and witness protection programs.

• Helicopters and surveillance aircraft to support interdiction activities and rapid operational response of law enforcement

agencies in Mexico.

(See Appendix II for complete breakdown of the Merida Initiative Mexico.)

According to U.S. State Department officials 59 percent of the

proposed assistance would go to civil agencies responsible for law

enforcement, and a smaller share, 41 percent, to operational costs

for the Mexican Army and Navy. While the initial cost for equipment and hardware that the military required is high, it is expected that future budget requests will focus increasingly on training and assistance to civil agencies.

While this request includes equipment and training, it does not

involve any cash transfers or money to be provided directly to the

Government of Mexico or private contractors. ‘‘We won’t be given

one cent,’’ one Mexican official remarked in this regard. ‘‘This proposal provides specific equipment, training and intelligence sharing, it is not a blank check.’’

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE, HOW IT CAME TO BE AND WHY NOW

Since President Caldero ́n assumed office on December 1, 2006, he

has conveyed a deliberate interest in working collaboratively with

the United States in combating mutual threats. In this context, it

does not come as a surprise that the Bush administration would respond to this interest through an emergency supplemental budget

request rather than through the regular budget appropriations

cycle.

Recognizing that the Bush administration is nearing the end of

their term in office, administration officials wanted to move quickly

and seize this window of opportunity. State Department officials

are keenly aware that their time is running out and that

Caldero ́n’s willingness to work with the United States is unprecedented on issues of security, crime, and drugs. Coupled with the

record number of trade agreements signed during his administration and a proposal on biofuels with Brazil, there is a desire to do

as much as possible regarding Latin America. ‘‘The President sees

Latin America as his legacy,’’ mentioned one State Department official.

If authorized by Congress, the Merida Initiative could lay the

groundwork for deeper cooperation between the United States,

Mexico and Central America. This would start to correct an imbalance in U.S. policy that has arisen since the September 11, 2001

attacks, when most U.S. focus was directed towards the Iraq War

and Afghanistan. In addition, this proposal could also counter some

of the resentment that many Mexicans and Central Americans feel

regarding the U.S. Congress’ failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform.

5

3 ‘‘Road Map leading to the Merida Initiative,’’ Government of Mexico, November 2007.

November 2006: During his visit to Washington President-Elect Caldero ́n expresses interest

in strengthened bilateral and regional cooperation against drug trafficking and organized crime.

March 2007: Bilateral Presidential Summit held in Merida. Presidents decide to move forward

to develop a specific plan for enhanced cooperation.

April-May 2007: Mexican interagency coordinating meetings to develop Mexican proposal.

May 22, 2007: Foreign ministers meet in Washington to begin bilateral discussions on the

basis of Mexican proposal.

July 13 2007: President Bush calls President Caldero ́n with positive response.

July 26-27 2007: First bilateral inter-agency meeting held in Washington.

August-September 2007: Four thematic technical meetings held in Mexico City.

September-October 2007: Select consultations are held between the Caldero ́n administration

and select members of Mexican Congress.

October 22, 2007: Supplemental request presented to Congress and release of Joint Statement

on the Merida Initiative.

In this regard, interest in pursuing this initiative expeditiously

through a supplemental request is understandable. Though well intended, this approach has sparked suspicion and intense criticism

in a Democratic-controlled U.S Congress.

Many believe that concern pertaining to the proposal stems from

lack of information and consultation involved in its formulation.

Little information about these negotiations was made available to

either the U.S. or Mexican Congresses until the proposal became

public on October 22, 2007, which exacerbated partisan suspicion

in Washington and popular suspicion in Mexico. Though difficult to

understand from a U.S. legislative branch perspective, from the

Caldero ́n admistration’s standpoint, secrecy regarding the formulation of this proposal was imperative since cooperation with the

United States entails certain political sensitivities.

Mexican Embassy officials in Washington assert that they have

briefed their Congress on the proposal, but that the Merida Initiative is not a treaty or a formal agreement or convention, so it is

not subject to Mexican Congressional approval.

State Department officials only briefed U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff in mid-September after staff threatened to

delay the nomination of David Johnson to be Assistant Secretary

of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. During

the September 22, 2007 briefing, State Department officials provided only an outline of the type of assistance contemplated and refused to provide detailed information or budget data.

Staff learned about this initiative in the media in the late summer of 2007, but the process had started much earlier.

According to GOM sources, during his visit to Washington in November of 2006, President-elect Caldero ́n expressed interest in

strengthened bilateral and regional cooperation against drug trafficking and organized crime. This was followed up by a March 2007

Bilateral Presidential Summit held in Merida, Mexico, where the

presidents decided to move forward to develop a specific plan for

enhanced cooperation. Mexican interagency coordinating meetings

were held between April and May 2007 where the Mexican Government developed its proposal. On May 22, 2007, U.S. and Mexican

foreign ministers met in Washington to begin bilateral discussions

on the basis of the Mexican proposal.3

On Capitol Hill, as a result of the information gap during the

run-up to the proposal’s introduction to the U.S. Congress, ill will

prevails, especially among Democrats. Many question why they

should work with the White House on this initiative in the first

6

4 ‘‘Mexican Authorities Seize the Largest Shipment ever of Cocaine in the State of Colima.’’

Mexican Embassy, Washington D.C. November 2007.

place. Many believe the proposal needs major changes. Others ask

why not wait until a new administration—what’s the rush?

‘‘This is a necessary proposal that suffered from poor marketing,’’

stated a member of Mexico’s legislative branch. ‘‘The focus of this

plan is to help Mexico do a better job fighting the drug traffickers

who send cocaine, heroin, marihuana and precursor chemicals for

methamphetamine into the United States, it’s in all of our interests

to do this.’’

A COMMITTED FRIEND: CALDERO ́ N’S EFFORTS TO FIGHT NARCOTICS

The motivation for president Caldero ́n’s invigorated anti-crime

campaign is in large part domestic: drug-related violence is on the

increase, with an estimated 2,650 killings so far this year already

surpassing last year’s total of 2,120. Equally important, Mexico has

become a drug consuming nation. Narcotics’ corrosive impact has

led to an alarming rise of what Mexicans call narco-menudeo—

small-time drug dealing by ordinary citizens, poor and middle-class

alike.

The Merida Initiative is intended as a vital complement to President Caldero ́n’s own stepped-up efforts against drugs which he

launched when he took office nearly a year ago. Under his leadership, the GOM has accomplished a great deal in the interdiction

and eradication of illegal drugs, stepping up efforts already underway in the previous administration. For example, the policies of

manual eradication have continued, while at the same time interdiction efforts have greatly increased, aided by the new resources

devoted to this mission.

Results include the seizure on October 30, 2007 of more than

23.5 tons of cocaine in the port city of Manzanillo, Colima. This is

the largest single seizure of cocaine ever recorded. Earlier that

same month another 12 tons were interdicted in the city of Tampico.4

U.S. officials also are seeing better law enforcement cooperation

with Mexico—79 criminals have been extradited to the United

States this year, including drug cartel kingpins. But much work remains to be done especially regarding the reform of the judicial system within Mexico that some in the human rights community

argue ‘‘has encouraged the coercion of confessions often through the

use of torture.’’

All together, such reform efforts by the GOM have resulted in

clear security benefits for the United States. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) has noted that ‘‘cocaine availability decreased in several U.S. drug markets during the first half of 2007,

most likely because of a combination of factors that included large

cocaine seizures in transit toward the United States.’’ However, reforms have also caused a response. It is estimated that the major

drug trafficking organizations are currently reorganizing and readjusting to the new challenges facing their trade; as a result, drug

availability is once again on the rise.

One recent development is the consolidation of many of the

smaller drug trafficking organizations into powerful alliances, escaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:42 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\39644.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
7

5 Cook, Collen W., ‘‘Mexico’s Drug Cartels,’’ Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 16, 2007. 6 Ibid.

lating the violence between the groups vying for control of the most

lucrative smuggling corridors into full fledged turf wars. A notable

example of such coalition building is ‘‘The Federation,’’ led by representatives from the Sinaloa, Juare ́z and Valencia cartels.5

Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, November 2007.

In general, the major drug trafficking organizations have reached

a high level of sophistication. Most now maintain their own paramilitary groups or enforcer gangs; violent rivalry between these

gangs accounts for a majority of drug related deaths in Mexico.

Targeted assassinations of police and military personnel are also

high. Over 200 police have been killed so far this year. In several

instances these organizations—the Gulf Cartel’s Zetas perhaps the

most infamous—draw on considerable expertise from former members of law enforcement and special forces units.6

8

7 U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, November 2007.

8 ‘‘Mexico’s Drug Cartels.’’

Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, November 2007.

The scale of corruption in the federal police forces has been used

as justification for the increased use of the military in more traditional law enforcement roles, especially in States that have seen increased levels of drug-related violence as noted in the slide above.

This move has been criticized by several human rights organizations. In Mexico, however, the military remains highly respected

among the general populace; and for its part, the military has accepted every recommendation put forth by Mexico’s National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH), including training on human

rights, drug and alcohol testing for personnel and a commitment to

full investigations and prosecution.7

President Caldero ́n and military leadership know that the military’s participation in domestic law enforcement is temporary. And

in order to hasten a transition of law enforcement responsibilities

back to traditional law enforcement agencies Caldero ́n has moved

to purge those police units most heavily laden with corruption and

to reorganize the federal police entirely. In a relevant CRS report

entitled ‘‘Mexico’s Drug Cartels,’’ the level of penetration from drug

cartels observed is startling, with ‘‘some agents of Mexico’s Federal

Investigative Agency (AFI) believed to work as enforcers for the

Sinaloa cartel, and the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) report[ing]

in December 2005 that one-fifth (1,500 of 7,000) of its officers are

under investigation for criminal activity.’’ 8

9

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT: NORTH-SOUTH ARMS TRAFICKING AND

FUNDING FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

The Merida Initiative is an attempt to seize the opportunity created by President Caldero ́n’s invigorated anti-crime campaign. The

Merida portion, and the funding for Central America through

CASA, recognizes that successful efforts to combat drug trafficking

depend on a partnership with the Mexican government and the

Governments of Central America. Though staff believes these proposals are long overdue, they fall short of what is required in two

important areas: stopping north-south arms trafficking, funding,

and assistance for Central America.

North-South Arms Trafficking

Important concerns remain regarding how the Merida Initiative

would halt arms trafficking from the United States to Mexico.

Though assurances have been made by officials from the U.S. State

Department that more will be done to formulate agreements to

stem the traffic of weapons south of the border, the problem is

worsening as highlighted by the chart supplied by the GOM of confiscated weapons and ammunition below:

North-South Arms Trafficking—December 1, 2006 to November 7, 2007

(Information provided by the Government of Mexico)

Concept PGR

(AFI) SDN SM–AM SSPF(PFP)

SHCP

(AGA–

ACIFA)

Others Joint

Operations Total

Short Weapons

(DRC) 60 417 1 39 1 61 251 830

Short Weapons (OC) 2341,199 7 102 169 632 287 2,630

Assault Weapons

(DRC) 38 746 0 26 0 29 382 1,221

Assault Weapons

(OC) 73 1,511 17 42 274 106 318 2,341

Ammunition (DRC) 6,626 134,634 10 3,569 96 3,537 53,855 202,327

Ammunition (OC) 11,096 191,289 4,826 2,892 115,780 11,618 109,940 447,441

Grenades 10 408 0 3 1 7 99 528

PGR: Procuradurφa General de la Republica

AFI: Agencia Federal de Investigacio ́n

SDN: Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional

SM–AM: Secretaria de Marina—Armada de Me ́xico

SSPF: Secretaria de Seguridad Pu ́ blica Federal

PFP: Policı ́a Federal Preventiva

SHCP: Secretaria de Hacienda y Cre ́dito Pu ́ blico

DRC: Drug Related Crimes

OC: Other Crimes.

American guns pass into Mexico through land ports of entry at

the border every day. According to a Mexican government official,

as many as 2,000 weapons enter Mexico each day and fuel an arms

race between Mexican drug cartels.

Mexican government officials suspect that corrupt customs officials (on both sides of the border) help smuggle weapons into Mexico. The weapons are often bought legally at gun shows in Arizona

and Texas mostly.

Taking these weapons out of the hands of organized crime now

would allow Mexican law enforcement to fight drug trafficking in

Mexico before they reach the U.S. border; more importantly, into

10

U.S. communities. It also takes the Mexican military out of the law

enforcement role it has been assigned.

According to a high level SEDENA (Secretaria de la Defense

Nacional, Mexican Armed Forces) official, ‘‘the military does not

want to be involved in law enforcement any more than it has to,

but it has no choice, regular police cannot compete with Ak-47s and

grenade launchers.’’ As one GOM official noted: ‘‘We understand

your Second Amendment, but along the border states thousands of

gun shows occur a year, and little is done to make sure that those

guns stay in the U.S.’’

American Embassy officials in Mexico confirmed that the U.S. is

a major source of weapons for Mexican gangs and drug runners.

As the Merida Initiative goes forward, U.S. agencies must work

closely with Mexican officials to address this problem. It is not in

the U.S. interest to create a self-defeating situation in which a critical foreign assistance program meant to assist a neighbor and enhance U.S. security is being undercut by an illegal flow of weapons

originating from within our own borders.

Central America

The Bush administration has requested $50 million in equipment

and training for Central America. Over half of this amount ($25.7

million) is currently designated for public security and law enforcement. Within that category, $12.6 million is for the implementation

of anti-gang strategies throughout the region. Another $13.1 million is for specialized police training and equipment. Early estimates of a country-by-country breakdown suggest Guatemala

would be the largest recipient ($9.2 million). Honduras would receive $7.4 million; El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua

and Belize would each receive less than $5 million. These tabulations do not include some $20 million that has been designated for

regional use or non-country-specific expenditures. (See Appendix III

for complete breakdown of CASA.)

As highlighted by the slide below, Central America is the primary transit point for cocaine destined for the United States and

Mexico from South America. Though drugs are brought into Mexico

by sea and land, this slide highlights the severity of the problem

by air.

11

9Seelke, Clare Ribando, ‘‘Gangs in Central America,’’ Congressional Research Service Report

for Congress, August 2, 2007.

Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico, November 2007.

Central American officials feel that they will not be able to confront threats effectively without more assistance. They fear that

gang members and drug traffickers will flee Mexico for Central

America where it will be easier to operate. As one senior Central

American government official stated: ‘‘In this case Mexico’s gain

could be our loss.’’

Central America ‘‘has among the highest homicide rates in the

world, and in recent years murder rates have been increasing in

several countries,’’ according to a recent CRS Report. ‘‘Latin America’s average rate of 27.5 homicides per 100,000 people is three

times the world average of 8.8 homicides per 100,000 people. Based

on the most recent crime trend surveys (CTS) data available from

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Guatemala and El Salvador are among the most violent countries in the

world for which standardized data has been collected.’’ 9

Gangs have emerged as major social forces in the region, and

they have been expanding their influence in relatively ungoverned

areas that they exploit for their drug trafficking operations. Drug

lords now openly finance political campaigns and in some instances

have shown interest in running for public office themselves.

Many of these gang members are prison-hardened former members and associates of U.S. street gangs who were deported directly

back to their home countries in Central America after serving their

sentences. Central American leaders and public opinion—especially

12

10The United States provided a total of $139.4 million in counternarcotics assistance to Central America from FY2000 to FY2006. Just over $77 million in assistance was administered by

the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

(INL). This total includes money provided for Latin America regional programs. State Department does not provide a breakdown of which countries benefitted from overall Latin America

regional assistance. Of the money administered by INL, just over $47 million was provided

through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account and nearly

$30 million was provided through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account.

Nearly $63 million in counternarcotics assistance was provided through the Department of

Defense under its section 124. Section 124 authority designated the Department of Defense as

the lead agency for the detection of aerial and maritime drug shipments.

in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras—have characterized this

situation as a regional emergency requiring an urgent response.

In the past, political wrangling and resource constraints have

hampered Central American governments’ response to the drug

trade.10 Recognizing that they all share these problems, Central

American countries have agreed to strengthen regional security

through the Central American Integration System (CICA). Together they have produced an unprecedented comprehensive regional security strategy demonstrating a new found political will to

work to guarantee their collective security. Unfortunately, the U.S.

financial response has not been commensurate with current Central American political will to come together and fight the drug

trade. (See Appendix IV for Central American comprehensive regional security strategy—original and English translation.)

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A P P E N D I X I

DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN MEXICO

Staff held discussions with the following individuals in Mexico:

Mexican Government Officials

SIGRID ARZT, Office of the President of Mexico (cabinet-level antidrug adviser to President Felipe Caldero ́n)

MARCELA CELORIO (Centro de Investigacio ́n y Seguridad

Nacional—CISEN)

JUAN CARLOS FONCERRADA (CISEN)

JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO VASCONCELOS (Procuradurı ́a General de la

Repu ́ blica—PGR)

CARLOS RICO (Secretarı ́a de Relaciones Exteriores—SRE)

CECILIA ROMERO CASTILLO (Instituto Nacional de Migracio ́n—

INM)

SENIOR LEVEL OFFICIALS (Secretarı ́a de la Defensa Nacional—

SEDENA)

Mexican Legislative Branch

SEN. LUIS ALBERTO COPPOLA JOFFROY (Partido de Accion

Nacional, PAN)

SEN. ELOY CANTA ́ SEGOVIA (Partido Revolucionario Institucional,

PRI)

SEN. SEN. TOMAS TORRES (Partido de la Revolucio ́n Democr ́atica,

PRD)

Officials from Foreign Governments

LUIS FERNANDO ANDRADE, Deputy Foreign Minister for the Republic of Guatemala

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. Embassy Mexico

City, Mexico

TONY GARZA, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (DCM, POL, NAS,

ECON, USAID, DEA, OPAD, CPB, ICE, CONS, LEGAT)

Mexican Human Rights Organizations

COMISIO ́ N NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS

CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTIN PRO JUAREZ

MEXICO UNIDO CONTRA LA DELINCUENCIA

CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS E INVESTIGACIO ́ N EN DESARROLLO Y

ASISTENCIA SOCIAL A.C.

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Mexican Media

DR. JORGE CHABAT, El Universal Newspaper

ANA MARIA SALAZAR, El Universal Newspaper

Consultants and Collaborators

PETER HAKIM, The Inter-American Dialogue

ARMAND PESHARD-SVERDRUP, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

ALEX CURRIE, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations (SFRC)

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A P P E N D I X II

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS—BUDGETS AND ITEM

BREAKDOWN

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A P P E N D I X III

THE CENTRAL AMERICA SECURITY ASSISTANCE (CASA) PROPOSALS—BUDGETS AND

ITEM BREAKDOWN

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A P P E N D I X IV

SECURITY STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA

(Translation)—ESTRATEGIA DE SEGURIDAD

DE CENTRO AMERICA (Original)

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Æ