alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(No. Unassigned

#### *In re*Petition of Louia McDonald

*Opinion filed December 21, 1992.*

Louia McDonald, *pro se,*for Claimant.

Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (James Maher III and Andrew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.

OPINION

Montana, C.J.

This claim is before the Court on the petition for extension of time to file necessary documents to claim compensation under the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 *et seq.),*hereinafter referred to as the Act. Section 6.1(a) of the Act requires that an application be filed within one year of the date of the crime upon which the claim is based. This Court can extend that period up to another year. In an order dated April 4, 1991, this Court determined that Claimant’s petition was not timely. The Claimant then sent a letter to the Court indicating he disagreed with the *459Courts decision. Pursuant to the Act, Claimant was granted a hearing before Commissioner Phillip A. Turner. Commissioner Turner has duly filed his report with the Court.

The issue in this matter is whether Mr. McDonalds claim which was filed on December 31, 1991, more than two years after the crime occurred on June 23, 1987, is timely. The record shows that Mr. McDonald stated he filed his claim when he did because he was not aware of the time limits and because he was under emotional stress caused by the death of his wife, the victim of the crime. Mr. McDonald further stated he was not hospitalized during the period in which he was to file the claim. However, he did see a counselor whom he believed to be a psychiatrist. He also was not taking any drugs which affected his mind. After the death of his wife in 1987 until March 15, 1990, he was working for Coca Cola Bottling Company as a forklift operator. He paid his rent in a timely fashion and generally did not exhibit any behavior from which one could draw the inference that he was insane or had lost his mental capacity.

Section 6.1 of the Act was amended in 1990. The amendments pertinent to this matter state that a person may file a claim within one year of the removal of any legal disability. The historical and statutory notes to the amended section state that the amendments apply to all claims pending or filed after July 1, 1990. However, even if this case were reviewed under the 1990 amendments, Mr. McDonald would nevertheless be barred from proceeding. Mr. McDonald has not provided any evidence that he was under any legal disability, such as being declared a disabled person pursuant to the Illinois Probate Act, or anything of that nature. As a result, his claim must be viewed as having been filed more than two years *460after the occurrence of the crime and is, therefore, untimely.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that Claimants petition for extension of time be, and is, hereby denied.
### §41. Publications and reports; preparation and sale

Except as otherwise provided in section 1318 of title 44, the publications of the United States Geological Survey shall consist of geological and economic maps, illustrating the resources and classification of the lands, and reports upon general and economic geology and paleontology. All special memoirs and reports of said survey shall be issued in uniform quarto series if deemed necessary by the director, but otherwise in ordinary octavos. Three thousand copies of each shall be published for scientific exchanges and for sale at the price of publication, and all literary and cartographic materials received in exchange shall be the property of the United States and form a part of the library of the organization; and the money resulting from the sale of such publications shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior.

(Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 182, 20 Stat. 394; Aug. 7, 1946, ch. 770, §1(10), 60 Stat. 867; Pub. L. 102–154, title I, Nov. 13, 1991, 105 Stat. 1000.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

"Section 1318 of title 44" substituted in text for "section 260 of title 44" on authority of Pub. L. 90–620, §2(b), Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1238, the first section of which enacted Title 44, Public Printing and Documents.

The words "Except as otherwise provided in section 260 of title 44" were originally inserted in text to avoid conflict with the provisions of such section 260 of title 44, as set out prior to the general revision of title 44 by Pub. L. 90–620, derived from Joint Res. May 16, 1902, No. 22.

#### Amendments

1946—Act Aug. 7, 1946, repealed all provisions requiring preparation, and transmission by Secretary of the Interior, of an annual report of operations.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Change of Name

"United States Geological Survey" substituted in text for "Geological Survey" pursuant to provision of title I of Pub. L. 102–154, set out as a note under section 31 of this title.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Transfer of Functions

For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of Department of the Interior, with certain exceptions, to Secretary of the Interior, with power to delegate, see Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1950, §§1, 2, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1262, set out under section 1451 of this title.
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-40216

Summary Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GERYLE EUGENE PETERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. CA-L-92-236

- - - - - - - - - -

December 20, 1995

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Geryle Eugene Peterson appeals from the district court's order

denying his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He contends that he was deprived of

his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at

trial and at sentencing, and that the district court erred in

denying the § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We have

reviewed the record and the district court's memorandum and find no
No. 95-40216

-2-

reversible error. Peterson has not demonstrated that he was

prejudiced by counsel's performance. See Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364

(1993); Spriggs v. Collins, 993 F.2d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1993). And,

an evidentiary hearing was not required. E.g., U.S. v. Smith, 915

F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 96-20186 Conference Calendar

__________________ GEORGE EARL JENKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus DAVID R. GILBERTSON, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-94-CV-3323 - - - - - - - - - - June 27, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * George Jenkins, #621316, has appealed the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his civil rights action. His sole contention on appeal, that the district court lacked the inherent authority to dismiss his appeal for lack of prosecution, is frivolous. See McCullough v. Lynaugh , 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.No. 96-20186 -2- We caution Jenkins that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Jenkins is further cautioned to review any pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are frivolous because they have been previously decided by this court. APPEAL DISMISSED; WARNING ISSUED.
#### § 266.656 Recovery of costs after final claim settlement.

If, after final claim settlement, the HFA recovers additional sums as the result of the sale of the project or otherwise, the total amount of such recovery shall be shared by HUD and the HFA in accordance with the prescribed percentage of shared risk.
### §854. Selections in New Mexico to supply deficiencies of school lands

All the provisions of sections 851 and 852 of this title are made applicable to New Mexico, and the grant of school lands to said State, and indemnity therefor, shall be administered and adjusted in accordance with the provisions of such sections, anything in the Act of Congress approved June 21, 1898, making certain grants of land to the Territory of New Mexico, and for other purposes, to the contrary notwithstanding.

(Mar. 16, 1908, ch. 88, 35 Stat. 44.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Act of Congress approved June 21, 1898, referred to in text, is act June 21, 1898, ch. 489, 30 Stat. 484, which is not classified to the Code.

References to "Territory" of New Mexico were superseded by the admission of New Mexico into the Union by act June 30, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, and Res. Aug. 21, 1911, No. 8, 37 Stat. 39.
#### Marie Tavoletti, as Administratrix of the Estate of Liberto Tavoletti, Deceased, Respondent, v. New York Central Railroad Company, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff’s intestate, a pedestrian, who was struck at a grade crossing by a train, operated by defendant, defendant appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered October 6, 1959 in favor of plaintiff, after a jury trial; and (2) from the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Judgment reversed on the facts and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. Appeal from denial of motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial dismissed. No such order is printed in the record. Intestate and a companion, walking easterly, were stopped on the westerly side of defendant’s north and southbound tracks, by its watchman who was standing on the easterly side, in the center of the street constituting the crossing. After a southbound train had passed and from a position 10 feet west of the tracks, the intestate proceeded toward and across the southbound rails and the intervening space, to the northbound rails. He was there killed by a train which had traversed a long straightaway immediately to the south. During this entire period an automatic bell at the scene was sounding and the watchman was holding aloft a “stop” sign. The defendant adduced proof that the intestate ignored a warning from the watchman and, instead, ran across the tracks. In our opinion, the jury’s verdict, apparently based on evidence designed to show that defendant had lulled intestate into a sense of security, was against the weight of the credible evidence. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Ughetta, Kleinfeld and Brennan, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>


EXHIBIT 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Richard V. Secord, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Computerized Thermal
Imaging, Inc. ("CTI");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) for the registrant and have:

         a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

         b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

         c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and;

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

         (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

         (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting.

May 20, 2005

/s/ Richard V. Secord
-------------------------------
Richard V. Secord
Chairman of the Board and Chief
  Executive Officer
**EXHIBIT 32.4**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Peter J. Anderson,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that Amendment No. 1 to the AnnualReport of Prestige Brands International, LLC on Form 10-K/A for the yearended March 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as applicable, and thatinformation contained in such Annual Report fairly presents in all materialrespects the financial condition and results of operations of Prestige BrandsInternational, LLC.

 
|   |   /s/ PETER J. ANDERSON             |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
|   |   Name: Peter J. Anderson           |
|   |   Title: *Chief  Financial Officer* |

 

----
Editorial Note on Part 5
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 5 appear at 65 FR 16715, Mar. 29, 2000.

§ 5.218 Penalties for failing to disclose and verify Social Security and Employer Identification Numbers. ( a ) *Denial of eligibility of assistance applicants and individual owner applicants.* The processing entity must deny the eligibility of an assistance applicant or individual owner applicant in accordance with the provisions governing the program involved, if the assistance or individual owner applicant does not meet the applicable SSN disclosure, documentation, and verification requirements as specified in § 5.216.
( b ) *Denial of eligibility of entity applicants.* The processing entity must deny the eligibility of an entity applicant in accordance with the provisions governing the program involved; if: ( 1 ) The entity applicant does not meet the EIN disclosure, documentation, and verification requirements specified in § 5.216; or
( 2 ) Any of the officials of the entity applicant referred to in § 5.216(d) does not meet the applicable SSN disclosure, and documentation and verification requirements specified in § 5.216.
( c ) *Termination of assistance or termination of tenancy of participants.* ( 1 ) The processing entity must terminate the assistance or terminate the tenancy, or both, of a participant and the participant's household, in accordance with the provisions governing the program involved, if the participant does not meet the applicable SSN disclosure, documentation, and verification requirements specified in § 5.216.
( 2 ) The processing entity may defer termination and provide the participant with an additional 90 calendar days to disclose a SSN, but only if the processing entity, in its discretion, determines that: ( i ) The failure to meet these requirements was due to circumstances that could not have reasonably been foreseen and were outside the control of the participant; and
( ii ) There is a reasonable likelihood that the participant will be able to disclose a SSN by the deadline.
( 3 ) Failure of the participant to disclose a SSN by the deadline specified in paragraph (c)(2) of this section will result in termination of the assistance or tenancy, or both, of the participant and the participant's household.
( d ) *Cross reference.* Individuals should consult the regulations and administrative instructions for the programs covered under this subpart B for further information on the use of SSNs and EINs in determinations regarding eligibility.
[61 FR 11113, Mar. 18, 1996, as amended at 74 FR 4840, Jan. 27, 2009; 74 FR 68933, Dec. 29, 2009]
#### FLETT, Respondent, v. DIXON et al., Appellants.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, ¡First Department.

February 10, 1905.)

AcItion by George Flett, as administrator, against Alexander Dixon and others. C. S. Petrasch, for appellants. C. Fox, for respondent. No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
OFFICE OF

CHEMICAL SAFETY AND

POLLUTION PREVENTION

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON D.C., 20460

PC Code: 288201 

DP Barcode: 416873

June 30, 2014

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Drinking water assessment for the new use of Pyrimethanil as a post-harvest 

treatment of pomegranates.

To: Hope Johnson, Product Manager

Tamue Gibson, Reviewer

Fungicide Branch

Registration Division (7505P)

Charles Smith, Branch Chief

Jennifer R. Tyler, Chemist

Risk Assessment Branch 1

Health Effects Division (7509C)

From: James K. Wolf, Ph.D., Environmental Scientist

Environmental Risk Branch 3

Environmental Fate and Effects Division (7507P)

Through: Dana S. Spatz, Branch Chief

 Environmental Risk Branch 3

 Environmental Fate and Effects Division (7507P)

Janssen PMP, a Division of Janssen Pharmaceutica NV, has requested a modification to add 

post-harvest dip treatment of pomegranates to the PENBOTEC®400 SC label (EPA Reg. No. 

43813-32)

1

. The active ingredient (a.i.) is pyrimethanil (288201). The post-harvest dip treatment 

of citrus fruits, pome fruits, and some stone fruits is currently included on the PENBOTEC label 

(EPA Reg. No 43813-32). The proposed use rate is 32 fl oz of product per 100 gallons, which 

results in a treatment concentration of 1,000 ppm (a.i.). Currently registered dip treatment 

concentrations range between 500 and 1,000 ppm (a.i.).

Based on the information provided, EFED considers the proposed post-harvest dip use of 

pyrimethanil as an indoor use that would pose minimal exposure to the environment, provided 

 

1

Proposed PENBOTEC 400 SC label EPA Reg No. 43813-32 contain 3.27 lb pyrimethanil per gallon of product (37.14 % a.i.).
2

that release of the chemical and contaminated water are controlled. Therefore, an updated 

drinking water assessment is not needed for this new use. 

Although the petition does not specify how spent treatment solution will be disposed, the product 

label states:

Do not discharge effluent containing this product into lakes, streams, ponds, estuaries, 

oceans or other waters unless in accordance with the requirements of a National 

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit and the permitting authority 

has been notified in writing prior to discharge. Do not discharge effluent containing this 

product to sewer systems without previously notifying the local sewage treatment plant 

authority. For guidance, contact your State Water Board or Regional Office of the EPA.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

April 11, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

133232 Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, RAYMOND O’NEAL, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 133232 

 COA: 274573 

Wayne CC: 05-515351-NH

ST. JOHN HOSPITAL & MEDICAL 

CENTER and DR. RALPH DILISIO, 

Defendants, 

and 

DR. EFSTATHIOS TAPAZOGLOU,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

By order of March 7, 2007, this Court granted immediate consideration and 

ordered a stay of trial court proceedings. On order of the Court, the application for leave 

to appeal the February 8, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant 

to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the 

Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. We further ORDER that the stay 

entered by this Court on March 7, 2007, remains in effect until completion of this appeal. 

On motion of a party or on its own motion, the Court of Appeals may modify, set aside, 

or place conditions on the stay if it appears that the appeal is not being vigorously 

prosecuted or if other appropriate grounds appear. 

WEAVER, J., would deny leave to appeal as she is not persuaded of the need for 

immediate appellate review. 

d0404 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

April 11, 2007 

 Clerk
Cite as 2015 Ark. 308



## SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-15-556 BRANDON MORIN APPELLANT V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES APPELLEE Opinion Delivered July 23, 2015 APPEAL FROM THE UNION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. JV-2014-107] HONORABLE EDWIN KEATON, JUDGE MOTION GRANTED.

PER CURIAM Appellant, Brandon Morin, by and through his attorney, Thomas A. Potter, has filed a motion for rule on clerk. The circuit court entered an order on March 19, 2015, terminating Morin’s parental rights to his three minor children. Morin filed a notice of appeal on March 26, 2015. Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(d) (2014), in dependency-neglect cases, the record shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within seventy days of the filing of the notice of appeal. Here, Attorney Potter tendered the record on June 24, 2015, twenty days after it was due. When an attorney candidly admits fault for failing to perfect an appeal, we will grant the motion for rule on clerk, and a copy of the opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct. See McDonald v. State , 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004). Attorney Potter states in the motion that he accepts full responsibility for failing to ensure that the correct date was calculated for the record due date and for failing to timely lodge theCite as 2015 Ark. 308

record with the court. Accordingly, we grant the motion and forward a copy of this opinion to the Committee. Motion granted.

2
#### Universal Vending Service Company, appellee, v. M. Palumbo, appellant.

Gen, No. 28,591.

Consolidated with No. 28,578 ante. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Henry M. Walker, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed November 27, 1923.

Per Curiam.