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38–959 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–190

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN

AFRICA: MOVING FORWARDS OR BACKWARDS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 17, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

JIM WEBB, Virginia

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Albin-Lackey, Christopher, Nigeria researcher, Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43

Amosu, Akwe, senior policy analyst for Africa, Open Society Institute, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 48

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ..................................... 1

Hess, Hon. Michael E., Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict

and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 15

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

Lowenkron, Hon. Barry F., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Department of State, Washington, DC ........ 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana ............................................ 3

Lyman, Hon. Princeton N., adjunct senior fellow for Africa Policy Studies,

Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC ................................................ 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38

Peterson, Dave, senior director, Africa Program, National Endowment for

Democracy, Washington, DC ............................................................................... 61

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63

Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire ................................ 15

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Rothberg, Robert I., adjunct professor and director, Program on Intrastate

Conflict, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and president, World Peace Foundation ............................................................................ 68

(III)

(1)

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: MOVING FORWARDS OR BACKWARDS?

TUESDAY, JULY 17, 2007

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Feingold, Nelson, Lugar, and Sununu.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S.

SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Good morning. This hearing will come to

order and on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee

on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing on the

progress of, obstacles to, and prognosis for democracy on the African Continent.

I look forward to being joined by my colleague and ranking member of the subcommittee, Senator Sununu, and of course I’m delighted to see the ranking member of the full committee, Senator

Lugar, and just after my remarks, I’ll certainly look to Senator

Sununu and Senator Lugar for any remarks they have at the outset of the hearing.

Today marks the third day of ‘‘Captive Nations Week 2007.’’ In

designating it as such last Tuesday, President George W. Bush declared—and I quote—‘‘expanding freedom is a moral imperative,’’

and issue a call ‘‘to reaffirm our commitment to all those seeking

liberty, justice and self-determination.’’ This is a common theme of

the current administration. In his inauguration speech, President

Bush spoke about ‘‘the force of human freedom’’ and stated that it

is a policy of the United States ‘‘to seek and support the growth

of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and

culture.’’

I agree that democracy and good governance are essential to

achieving stability, prosperity, and legitimacy—particularly in

countries emerging from a legacy of colonization and conflict, like

many of the countries in Africa. Unfortunately, I’m concerned that

despite this administration’s strong rhetorical commitment to freedom, systematic, and often violent suppression of democratic prinVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ciples and practices by foreign governments have been only weakly

admonished and are often overlooked.

This disparity between principle and policy is perhaps most evident in Africa, where in theory the promotion of democracy and

human rights remains a top United States objective, but in practice, it receives limited attention and resources and is frequently

subordinated to other strategic necessities.

Although many African countries have little or no experience

with true democracy, people across the continent have shown

unshakable determination to make sure that they have a voice in

their government. Last fall, more than 16 million citizens in the

Democratic Republic of Congo, traveled miles, waited in long lines

and braved torrential rain to participate in that country’s first free

Presidential and parliamentary multiparty elections in almost four

decades. Right now, opposition politicians who were denied fair

pulls in Nigeria in April have renounced violent protests in favor

of fighting for their political rights in court. These are important

benchmarks but as most of you already know, elections are only

the beginning of democratic development and it is what comes after

that is so critical and yet so often overlooked and underresourced.

The most recent edition of Freedom House’s annual survey of

freedom in the world notes that the number of sub-Saharan African

countries categorized as free has grown from just 3, 30 years ago,

to 11 today. However, with 48 countries in the region, 11 is still

insufficient. The same report noted that after several years of

steady advances for democracy, sub-Saharan Africa suffered more

setbacks than gains during the year 2006. This trend of backsliding

is worrisome and demands a reconsideration of United States efforts to promote good governments and democracy in the region.

The purpose of this hearing is to consider how the United States

can maximize the impact of its resources in advancing governance,

democracy, and the rule of law in African countries to help achieve

a wide range of objectives.

Our first panel of government representatives will help shed

light on where, why, and how United States democracy promotion

resources are distributed and how this assistance is tailored to address unique challenges in various African countries.

We are fortunate to have with us Mr. Barry F. Lowenkron, the

Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human

Rights and Labor as well as Mr. Michael Hess, the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Both have long histories of service to the United States in

policymaking capacities so I look forward to hearing their insights

and opinions about what the United States is doing right in terms

of our democracy and government activities in Africa, as well as

their ideas about how we can be even more effective.

We will have a second full panel of distinguished individuals who

will review and seek to derive lessons from recent elections, including the general success of polls in Liberia, the Democratic Republic

of Congo, and Mauritania, as well as from Nigeria’s disappointing

elections and the persistent obstacles to free and fair polls in countries like Angola and Zimbabwe.

3

The Honorable Princeton Lyman is currently an adjunct senior

fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Counsel on Foreign Relations

but his distinguished career includes extensive Africa-related experience including service as the United States Ambassador to South

Africa during that country’s historic transition to democracy. Mr.

Christopher Albin-Lackey is the senior Nigeria researcher at

Human Rights Watch and his most recent work has documented

the human rights impact of local government corruption and mismanagement in the Niger Delta and pervasive human rights abuse

connected to Nigeria’s rigged 2007 elections. As the Open Society

Institute’s Senior Policy Analyst for Africa, Ms. Akwe Amosu facilitates links between Africa-based foundations, initiatives, and

grantees and the international policy community in Washington,

DC, after spending more than two decades as a journalist and radio

producer in leading Africa and Africa-targeted media.

Finally, we will hear from Mr. David Peterson, the senior director of the National Endowment for Democracy’s Africa Program.

Since 1988, Mr. Peterson has been responsible for NED’s program

to identify and assist hundreds of African nongovernmental organizations and activists working for democracy, human rights, free

press, justice, and peace.

Unfortunately, Dr. Robert Rotberg, director of the Kennedy

School of Government’s Program in Intrastate Conflict and Conflict

Resolution was unable to join us this morning but he has written

some compelling testimony on lessons from Africa’s most successful

countries, which I’d like to submit for the record now without objection.

We’re very glad that you’re all here today and we appreciate your

willingness to testify. Thank you and welcome. The timing of this

hearing was designed to promote ongoing discussion about how

best to help Africa nations build sustainable institutions and create

governments that are elected by and accountable to their citizens.

I know that each of you have valuable insight to contribute to this

conversation. I would argue that the promotion of governance and

democracy in Africa is more than a moral imperative; it is in our

national interest to help burgeoning governments beginning legitimate dialog with their citizens enhance public service delivery,

strengthen the rule of law, implement and defend human rights,

and improve their reputation at home and abroad.

Now it’s my pleasure to turn to the ranking member of the full

committee who not only is our former distinguished chairman, but

also had a great deal to do with the freedom that the people of

South Africa enjoy today.

Mr. Lugar.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR

FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and I

thank you once again for your leadership and your dogmatic persistence in pursuing the themes in Africa that are so important.

The democratic theme, which is today’s hearing, is one that has intrigued this committee and Senators for many, many years. The beginnings of the National Endowment for Democracy were not the

beginnings of an interest in democracy in other countries, but this

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organized effort, back in the Reagan administration, brought together the two political parties, the Chamber of Commerce, and the

labor organizations of this country, in a unique way. During that

particular decade and shortly thereafter, many Senators participated as observers in the elections efforts, particularly in Central

and South America.

One theme of that period was that all countries, in one form or

another, embraced democracy, held elections, with the possible exception of Cuba. That theme carried over then with the breakup of

the former Soviet Union and elections that had been somewhat

more difficult have ensured progress in that part of the world.

But it’s also brought a reaction from Russia recently and those

of you who are testifying today are all aware of the difficulties of

the NGOs in Moscow as to their activities as to whether they are

going to be allowed to continue at all. In other words, there is a

pushback now against what seemed to be almost a given in terms

of thoughtfulness around the world for human rights and expansion of democratic ideals that are a part of this session today.

I will be curious as the witnesses testify as to how Africa is the

same or different from the Latin American experience or the breakup of the former Soviet Union and it could very well be that some

of the testimony will simply point out that with over 40 countries

involved, there may be 40 different backgrounds of experience, that

there is not a template for Africa that necessarily works.

But it’s important that we all try to understand this in a much

more sophisticated way and, therefore, I applaud the hearing. I

thank the witnesses for giving us their time and testimony again.

I look forward to hearing from them.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks so much, Senator Lugar and now we

will begin with the first panel.

Secretary Lowenkron.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY F. LOWENKRON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN

RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar.

Thank you for holding this hearing on democracy in sub-Saharan

Africa. If I may, I’d like to ask that my full testimony be entered

into the record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you. I appreciate the subcommittee’s

strong interest in this vast, varied, and vibrant region. The advancement of human rights and democratic principles is crucial to

stability and development in Africa and I would add, as you put it,

Mr. Chairman, this is not just simply a moral imperative but also

a strategic imperative for the United States and for our allies and

friends.

The United States has committed to forging partnerships with

democracies across Africa that seek to build a continent of peace

and prosperity where the rights of all men and women are protected. As Secretary Rice noted, in recent years in Africa we have

seen a democratic transformation sweep the continent.

5

Indeed, Africa today is home to several strong multiparty democracies. South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, and Mali. Indeed, Mali will

host a November ministerial meeting with the worldwide Community of Democracies.

Despite these positive trends, Africa also bears witness to serious

human rights abuses. In Sudan, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and Chad, governments trample basic civil and political freedoms. Now the role

models and the reprobates stand out. The rest—and they constitute

the majority of African countries—struggle somewhere in between.

In Africa as in other regions of the world, gains for human rights

and democracy are hard won and challenging to sustain.

None of us underestimates the challenges that reformers face in

building democratic governance amidst poverty, ethnic tension, and

weak government institutions. But even as we acknowledge these

challenges, we cannot let those who feel threatened by change use

those challenges as an excuse for authoritarian rule.

Mr. Chairman, democracy is not chemistry. You cannot concoct

democracy using a formula. There are three elements that are,

however, essential to any democracy. One, free and fair elections.

As you put it, Mr. Chairman, that is often the first step. It’s not

enough. Two, good governance including the rule of law. And three,

a robust civil society.

If I may, let me illustrate each of democracy’s three essential elements in the context of Africa. First, elections. Elections in Liberia,

the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mauritania give rise to cautious optimism. Several of our key partners, however, have held

disappointing elections. In April, Nigeria squandered an important

opportunity to improve upon its flawed 2003 elections and that Nigeria missed this opportunity is even more disappointing, considering the vibrancy of its civil society, the influence of its active

media, and the strength of its legal system.

There were a few bright spots. The Supreme Court reinstated an

opposition candidate to the ballot and the former National Assembly refused to go along with now former President Obasanjo’s attempt to secure a third term. We have stressed to Nigerian leaders

the need for political and judicial reform. We have also encouraged

Nigeria to expedite election tribunals and to strengthen the independence and the capacity of the Independent National Election

Commission.

The runup to Ethiopia’s May 2005 elections was a time of unprecedented democratic openness. However, the expulsion of NDI,

IRI, and IFES 6 weeks before the Election Day created an atmosphere heavy with suspicion. As rumors of malfeasance grew after

the elections, the Ethiopian Government responded to street protests with lethal force and illegally detained opposition leaders and

tens of thousands of their supporters.

In Addis Ababa earlier this year, I raised the issue with Prime

Minister Meles and met with the families of imprisoned leaders

and journalists. To this day, the crackdown cast a shadow over the

Ethiopian Government, though the Prime Minister announced yesterday that he plans to recommend clemency for the opposition

leaders found guilty on June 11 and sentenced to life imprisonment.

6

Let me now turn to the second essential element of democracy:

Good governance. The rule of law must prevail over politics and

personalities and replace cultures of corruption, which have undermined so many reform efforts in Africa. An important way we encourage and support good governance is through the Millennium

Challenge Account Initiative enacted by the Congress in 2004. Only

countries that have adopted good governance principles are eligible

for MCA development funding. Of the MCA compacts signed to

date, six are with governments in Africa for a total of $2 billion in

assistance.

Good governance also requires the active participation of the

business sector and civil society. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is a good example of a private/public anticorruption effort. A number of African countries have put the initiative’s

practices into effect, most notably, Botswana, South Africa, and

Namibia.

I will now turn to the third essential element of democracy, a vibrant civil society. The worldwide push for democracy is being felt

in Africa. As this trend grows stronger, it is encountering increasing resistance from those who feel threatened by change. I recall,

Senator Lugar, you chaired a very, very significant committee

meeting on the worldwide pressure against NGOs just last year

and Africa is not exempt from this pressure.

A number of African countries apply restrictive laws and regulations against NGOs and the media. They subject human rights and

democracy defenders to extrajudicial measures. In Zimbabwe, as

we all know, civil society remains under heavy siege. Eritrea and

Equatorial Guinea enacted burdensome registration requirements

and apply heavy-handed oversight to make it all but impossible for

NGOs to exist. In some cases, most dramatically in Sudan, when

governments persecute NGOs, what is at stake is not just the preservation of liberties but the protection of lives.

Mr. Chairman, that brings me to the countries that pose some

of the greatest challenges in the region: Sudan and Zimbabwe. In

March, I traveled to Sudan to assess firsthand the appalling situation in Darfur. Fear and anxiety permeated the region. Yet in the

hell of the Kalma IDP camp, I also saw determination. A group of

IDPs had organized themselves into a legal aid society. In the sweltering heat, my team and I talked with these amazing people and

the other IDPs that they were assisting. One man said, ‘‘I am 37

years old and never knew what human rights were until I actually

came to this camp.’’ Before he learned about his rights from this

legal aid society, he said he thought it was normal for police to arbitrarily harass, arrest, and beat people.

The African Union U.N. hybrid force must be deployed to Sudan,

to Darfur, without delay. And yet again, a new Security Council

resolution authorizing the force is being discussed. As Secretary

Rice noted just last week, we must not let the Government of

Sudan continue this game of cat-and-mouse diplomacy, making

promises and then going back on them.

Yet even as the world’s attention focuses on Darfur, it is imperative that we continue to support the 2005 North-South Comprehensive Agreement or CPA. That agreement stopped the war that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 2 million people. But stopping

7

the war is not the same as securing the peace. Sudan’s election is

planned for February 2009. These are critical elements to the peace

process.

In Zimbabwe, it is clear that President Mugabe intends to do

whatever it takes to get reelected. On June 6, the Government of

Zimbabwe violently suppressed a peaceful demonstration by the

NGO Women of Zimbabwe Arise.

This latest aggression against civil society comes on the heels of

violent attacks this spring. In late June, the government and the

opposition agreed on an agenda for negotiations that includes constitutional and electoral reforms, security legislation, and rules of

political engagement. It’s a good step. But given the behavior of

President Mugabe, none of us dares think that the road ahead will

lead easily to stability, prosperity, and liberty for the people of

Zimbabwe.

Dealing with such challenges requires not only American support

but the energetic engagement of Africa’s regional institutions and

the support of other countries and institutions around the world in

helping Africa. We have made it a priority to intensify our relationships with those institutions and with the African Union in particular.

The AU architecture is still evolving but it is promising. It

includes the adoption this January of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the creation of an African

Court on Human and Peoples’ rights. It is very much in our interest and in the interest of other democracies to help strengthen the

capacity of these AU bodies.

To that end, Mr. Chairman, in March, I met with AU commissioners in Addis Ababa. I planted the seeds for formal human

rights and democracy consultations with the AU and in the fall, my

Bureau will host the first such consultations.

Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me briefly respond to your

request to hear about the human rights and democracy assistance

programs that my Bureau is funding. DRL has significantly raised

its level of programming assistance for Africa as a result of the congressionally mandated funding for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund or as we call it, HRDF.

When I arrived in DRL in the fall of 2005, DRL had a little more

than $3 million for all of Africa. With congressional support, we tripled the level to nearly $10 million and have expanded our programmatic reach to critical countries like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and

Burundi. With 2007 funds, we will program approximately $10 million for Africa and we have ongoing FY06 programs that are supporting post-election dialog in Ethiopia and building the capacity of

the judiciary in the Democratic Republic of Congo, combating gender-based violence in Ethiopia and Sudan, fighting corruption in

Coˆte d’Ivoire and Burundi and strengthening civil society efforts in

Zimbabwe.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say that no matter who

suceedes me as Assistant Secretary and no matter what administration follows the current one, the United States must continue to

respond to the pressing demands of Africans for dignity and liberty.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lowenkron follows:]

8

PREPARED STATEMENT BARRY F. LOWENKRON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BU- REAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASH- INGTON, DC

Chairman Feingold and members of the committee, thank you for holding this

hearing on democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. I deeply appreciate the subcommittee’s

strong interest in this vast, varied, and vibrant region.

The Bush administration has put in place dynamic policies and programs that

demonstrate the American people’s generous commitment to Africa. And I have

worked with my counterpart and with the officers of the Africa Bureau at the State

Department to implement that commitment.

Mr. Chairman, as President Bush has said, ‘‘At a time when freedom is on the

march around the world, it is vital that the continent of Africa be a place of democracy, prosperity, and hope.’’

I am sure that my USAID colleague, Michael Hess, will agree that the advancement of human rights and democratic principles is integral—indeed crucial—to stability and development in the region. The United States is committed to forging

partnerships with democracies across Africa that seek to build a continent where

there is peace, where there is prosperity, and where the rights of all men and

women are protected.

Mr. Chairman, this will be my last testimony to Congress before I retire from the

Federal Government after 31 years of public service. I began my government career

at the same time the Bureau I now head was created on the initiative of Congress.

During the three decades of the Bureau’s existence, every administration and each

of my predecessors has been able to count on the bipartisan backing of the Congress. Your support has immeasurably strengthened our capacity to defend courageous men and women around the globe who work, against great odds and at great

risk, to advance the cause of freedom.

Promoting democracy and human rights in Africa has been one of my top priorities during the 2 years I have served as Assistant Secretary. I have no doubt that

my Bureau’s engagement on these issues will be a priority for my successor as well,

for it remains a priority for President Bush and Secretary Rice.

As I prepare to depart the Bureau, I take satisfaction in knowing that I will leave

behind a talented, dedicated, and strong Africa team to carry on this important

work. I am proud to say that we have quadrupled the number of personnel working

on Africa issues and we also now have a separate position devoted to enhancing our

cooperation with the African Union.

Mr. Chairman, in every region of the world—not least in Africa—increasing numbers of men and women are pressing for their rights to be respected and their governments to be responsive, for their voices to be heard and their votes to count, for

just laws and equal justice for all. Indeed, as Secretary Rice has noted: ‘‘in recent

years in Africa, we have seen a democratic transformation sweep the continent.’’

Africa today is home to several strong, multiparty democracies. South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, and Mali serve as models for the continent by virtue of their free

and fair elections, their robust civil societies, and their respect for the rule of law.

Indeed, Mali will host the next ministerial meeting of the worldwide Community of

Democracies in November. It is apt that Mali has chosen as a major focus of the

meeting the close interrelationship between democracy and development, underscoring that democracy and development must go hand in hand, if both efforts are

to succeed.

Despite these positive trends, Africa also bears witness to serious human rights

abuses that demand our active attention. In Sudan, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and Chad,

governments trample basic civil and political freedoms, violating the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Union’s own Charter on Democracy.

The role models and the reprobates stand out. The rest, and they constitute the

majority of African countries, struggle somewhere in between. That should come as

no surprise. In Africa, as in other regions of the world, gains for human rights and

democracy are hard won and challenging to sustain. Even when democratic systems

of government have been established, they take time to deliver on the promise they

hold of a better life for ordinary citizens. Democratic systems with shallow institutional roots or scarce resources can fall far short of meeting their commitments to

citizens. Steps forward can be marred with irregularities. Countries where rulers

are insufficiently committed to reform can revert to authoritarian habits. Democratic transitions can be tumultuous and wrenching. Unbridled corruption can retard democratic development, distort judicial processes, and destroy public trust. Insecurity due to internal or cross-border conflict can threaten advances made for

human rights and democratic government.

9

Progress is seldom linear. That is why, when I meet with Secretary Rice, the

question that comes up the most is: ‘‘What is the trajectory?’’ Is the country more

responsive to its citizens? Is a culture of just laws taking root? Some countries may

remain fragile for quite some time. Others may backslide.

We do not underestimate the challenges that reformers face in building democratic governance amidst the conditions of poverty, ethnic tension, and weak government institutions prevalent still in much of Africa. Africans are engaged today in

trying to simultaneously build their democracies and also their economies, infrastructure, and national identities. But even as we acknowledge and account for

these challenges, we and the millions of Africans who support democratic reform

cannot let those who feel threatened by change use those challenges as an excuse

for continued authoritarian rule. Democracy supported by visionary leaders must be

a central part of the solution to the continent’s other challenges.

A sustained commitment on our part and that of other democracies in the region

and across the international community also is required. We fully recognize, however, that democracy promotion is not chemistry. You cannot concoct democracy

using a formula. Three interrelated elements are, however, essential to any democracy. One element, of course, is elections. Democratic elections are one of the important milestones on the long journey of democratization. But a free election is not

a fair election if in the runup to Election Day the playing field is not level because

the political process is manipulated and basic rights are undermined. A second element must be present for democracy to work: Good governance, including the rule

of law. And the third essential element in a democracy is a robust civil society that

can keep government honest, keep citizens engaged and keep democracy-building on

track. In a fully functioning democracy anywhere in the world, all three elements

must be present—electoral, institutional, and societal.

Let me now illustrate each of democracy’s three essential elements in the context

of sub-Saharan Africa.

First, elections: Democratic elections can help put a country on the path to reform

and lay the groundwork for institutionalizing human rights protections and good

governance. Africa’s record on free and fair elections is mixed. The good news is that

the vast majority of Africans have embraced the concept of elections as a mechanism

for determining the course that their countries will take.

A number of elections have taken place recently that give rise to cautious optimism.

After years of civil war that destroyed the country’s infrastructure, Liberia conducted an historic election in November 2005 that led to the selection of Africa’s

first elected female head of state. Many Members of this body heard President

Sirleaf’s inspirational message on March of last year when she spoke before a joint

session of Congress and declared: ‘‘Our dream has the size of freedom.’’

In 2006, the citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo went to the polls for

the first time in over 40 years, casting ballots in the hope of finally putting behind

them a legacy of brutal dictatorship and violent conflict. The elections, judged free

and fair by international observers, were a remarkable feat for a country half the

size of the United States, yet virtually without paved roads. While there have been

setbacks since the elections, and significant work remains to be done to help Congo

through its post-conflict democratic transition, the elections demonstrated the strong

desire of the Congolese people to live in freedom.

Mauritania, too, held its first fully democratic election in over 40 years in March

of this year. The newly elected government has stated its commitment to enact

democratic reforms and we are working to support Mauritania as it makes its democratic transition.

Several of our key partners in the region, however, have held disappointing elections.

In April, Nigeria—Africa’s most populous nation, an economic powerhouse, the

seat of ECOWAS, and a critical player in matters of peace and security on the continent—squandered an important opportunity to improve upon its flawed 2003 elections and live up to its potential as a democratic leader for the region. That Nigeria

missed this opportunity is even more disappointing considering the vibrancy of its

civil society, the influence of its active media, and the strength of its legal system.

The elections took place under an ill-prepared and partial electoral commission,

and were marred by reports of voter malfeasance and vote-rigging. In certain areas

of the country, polls opened either after significant delay or did not open at all.

There were, however, several bright spots: The Supreme Court reinstated an opposition candidate to the ballot only 5 days before the elections, and the former National

Assembly refused to go along with now-former President Obasanjo’s attempt to secure a third term.

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The United States has stressed to Nigerian leaders the need for political reform

and judicial transparency. We also have encouraged Nigeria to expedite election tribunals and to strengthen the independence and capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission.

The runup to Ethiopia’s May 2005 elections was a time of unprecedented democratic openness, with the ruling party agreeing to a series of key electoral reforms,

and robust civil society engagement on matters of voter education and mobilization.

However, the expulsion of the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 6 weeks

before Election Day created an atmosphere heavy with suspicion. The expulsions

put a halt to valuable training programs for members of civil society, electoral commission staff, and political party leaders aimed at increasing confidence in the electoral process.

Election Day was, for the most part, orderly and peaceful. Yet, in the days and

months following the elections as rumors of malfeasance grew regarding the election

results, the Ethiopian Government responded to street protests with lethal force and

illegally detained opposition leaders and tens of thousands of their supporters.

Among those detained was journalist Serkalem Fasil, the recipient of a Courage in

Journalism Award, who was arrested along with 13 other reporters after publishing

articles critical of the Ethiopian Government. Fasil gave birth in jail to a son, who

was premature and underweight due to inhumane conditions and lack of proper

medical attention. She was released from prison in April, but is now threatened

with re-arrest. If she is found guilty on charges of treason, outrages against the constitution, and incitement to armed conspiracy, she could face the death penalty.

Shortly after I arrived in DRL, I began receiving letters from concerned Members

of Congress and the former colleagues of the jailed Ethiopian democracy advocates

and journalists, many of whom have had distinguished careers here in the United

States and relatives who are United States citizens. Later, when I traveled to Addis

Ababa, I raised the issue with Prime Minister Meles and met with the families of

the imprisoned.

The government has embraced some new reforms, including revising parliamentary rules of procedure to allow for an increased voice for the opposition. But to this

day, the crackdown casts a shadow over the Ethiopian Government, though Prime

Minister Meles announced yesterday that he plans to recommend clemency for the

opposition leaders found guilty on June 11 and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Let me now turn to the second essential element of democracy: Good governance

and the rule of law.

Beyond a free and fair elections process, democracies must have representative,

accountable, transparent institutions of government, including an independent legislative body that can act to ensure that leaders who win elections govern democratically once they are in office. The rule of just law must prevail over politics and

personalities, and replace cultures of corruption, which have undermined so many

reform efforts in Africa.

An important way we encourage and support good governance in Africa is through

the Millennium Challenge Account initiative enacted by Congress in 2004. The initiative is designed to embark on a new approach to delivering foreign assistance.

MCA is a bold progrowth strategy that aims to lift the most people out of poverty

as fast as possible. The MCA reflects the new international consensus that a

growth-based approach to development assistance works best and that countries

which adopt good governance policies and invest in their people are the most likely

to use their development assistance wisely and reach their development goals.

Only countries that have adopted good governance principles are eligible for MCA

funding. Of the 12 MCA compacts signed to date, 6 are with governments in subSaharan Africa, for a total of $2 billion in assistance. We have signed compacts with

Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, Madagascar, and this past Friday, Mozambique.

Lesotho will sign its compact next week. Tanzania, Morocco, Namibia, and Burkina

Faso will sign compacts in the coming months, bringing another $2.6 billion to the

continent to fight poverty. Adequate funding from Congress for the Millennium

Challenge effort is critical so that we do not have to turn away these countries after

they have worked so hard to make the reforms to qualify for Millennium Challenge

assistance and to put together great programs for the fund to support.

Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia currently have

threshold agreements. All of these governments have made democratic advances,

but they continue to be held back, due, in part, to endemic corruption, which they

are taking steps to combat. For example, the Tanzanian Parliament passed sweeping anticorruption legislation in April and Zambia is prosecuting former President

Chiluba on corruption charges.

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The Bush administration also is supporting innovative efforts to strengthen the

rule of law across Africa. For example, in 2004, President Bush allocated $55 million

for the Women’s Justice and Empowerment in Africa Program. The program, which

will operate in Benin, Kenya, Zambia, and South Africa, will train police, judges,

prosecutors, health officials, and others on women’s rights with the goal of protecting women from and punishing perpetrators of gender-based violence. This

program also will assist African governments in developing laws that empower and

protect women.

Meeting the enormous challenge of ensuring accountable government, establishing

the rule of law and combating corruption requires an unprecedented political commitment from African leaders. It also requires the active participation of the

business sector and civil society.

Multisector initiatives continue to show promise. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, launched in 2002 by the United Kingdom and formally established in 2003 with more than 20 participating governments and the endorsement

of the World Bank, is a good example of a private-public anticorruption effort. The

initiative aims to increase public information about revenues from extractive industries such as petroleum to ensure that these public resources are well spent on the

most serious needs of the populations. A number of African countries have endorsed

this effort and put the initiative’s best practices into effect, most notably Botswana,

South Africa, and Namibia. Despite their participation in the initiative, however,

both Angola and the Republic of Congo have cracked down on activists working to

ensure transparency in the oil industry. In February, the Angolan Government detained a prominent British transparency advocate, Dr. Sarah Wykes from the NGO

Global Witness, and charged her with violating national security. She was held for

3 days before being released on bail, and ultimately, allowed to depart the country.

The Republic of Congo continues to harass transparency activists Christian

Mounzeo and Brice Makosso.

I will now turn to the third essential element of democracy: A vibrant civil society.

The worldwide push for greater personal and political freedom is being felt in Africa. As this global trend grows stronger, it is encountering increasing resistance

from those in power who feel threatened by democratic change—2006 was what I

call the ‘‘Year of the Push Back’’ and the phenomenon has continued into 2007.

Last December, on International Human Rights Day, Secretary Rice created a

Human Rights Defenders Fund, which will be administered from my Bureau, to enable the State Department to quickly disburse small grants to human rights defenders facing extraordinary needs as a result of government repression. The Secretary

also announced 10 guiding principles regarding the treatment of NGOs by governments. These core principles are a handy resource for governments, international

organizations, civil society groups, and journalists.

Regrettably, a growing number of countries, including African countries, selectively apply laws and regulations against NGOs and the media. They also subject

human rights and democracy defenders to extrajudicial measures for peacefully exercising the rights of expression, association, and assembly.

In Zimbabwe, civil society—including NGOs, labor unions, and religious organizations—remain under heavy siege. On March 11, opposition leaders and civil society

members, who had peacefully assembled for a mass prayer meeting, were brutally

attacked by security forces. One political activist was shot dead; others were kept

from receiving critical medical care.

Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea have enacted burdensome registration requirements and apply heavy-handed oversight that make it all but impossible for NGOs

to exist. Slightly less burdensome requirements but continued suspicion and harassment have greatly restricted civil society in Ethiopia and Rwanda.

In some cases, most dramatically in Sudan, when governments persecute NGOs

what is at stake is not just the preservation of liberties but the protection of lives.

Physical attacks on humanitarian aid organizations in Darfur, and continued interference in their work, have rendered their mission of alleviating the suffering of internally displaced persons ever more difficult.

Mr. Chairman, that brings me to the countries that pose some of the greatest

challenges we face in the region—Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, and Zimbabwe—and the

ways we are working in partnership with African nations to deal with those challenges, and by so doing, advance democracy and human rights.

In March, I traveled to Sudan to assess firsthand the appalling situation in

Darfur. Fear and anxiety permeated the region. Not only were the internally displaced people coping with continuing violence, international aid workers also were

subjected to an unprecedented level of harassment and attacks. Vital humanitarian

assistance was being obstructed.

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Yet, in the hell of Kalma Camp for internally displaced persons, I also saw determination among its inhabitants. A group of IDPs had organized themselves into a

legal aid society inside the camp. They endure harassment and even assault to defend the rights of their fellow displaced. In the sweltering heat, I sat with my team

and talked with these amazing people and the fellow IDPs whom they are assisting.

I particularly remember one man who stood up and said, ‘‘I’m 37 years old and

never knew what human rights were until I came to this camp.’’ He said that until

he learned about his rights from the legal aid society in the camp, he assumed that

it was normal for police to arbitrarily harass, arrest, and beat people. We saw the

same hunger for dignity and justice in a group of women in South Darfur who were

working to educate the young and empower them to defend their rights. These remarkable women shared more than determination. They also shared the belief that,

as one put it, ‘‘America cares.’’

In the months since my trip to Darfur, the situation has gotten even worse. Just

to cite one alarming indicator: Since early May, due to the unabated violence, the

population of Al-Salam IDP Camp near Nyala has doubled from 14,500 to 30,000.

It is critical that the African Union/United Nations hybrid force be deployed without any further delay. President Bashir again declared his commitment to accept

the force on June 11 during trilateral talks with the African Union and United Nations. Yet again, a new Security Council resolution authorizing the force is being

discussed in New York. The United States is strongly committed to getting that resolution passed. As Secretary Rice recently noted, ‘‘We must not let the Government

of Sudan continue this game of cat and mouse diplomacy; making promises, then

going back on them. It is our responsibility, as principled nations, as principled democracies, to hold Sudan accountable.’’

Even as world attention focuses on the horrors of Darfur, it is imperative that we

continue to support the implementation of the 2005 North-South Comprehensive

Peace Agreement, or CPA. The peace agreement stopped a war that had raged for

over 20 years and resulted in the deaths of an estimated 2 million people. But stopping a war is not the same as securing a peace.

Sudan’s elections, mandated by the CPA and tentatively planned for February

2009, are a crucial element of the peace process. They will be a key indicator as

to whether the country will truly be able to put the civil war behind it and fulfill

the late Dr. John Garang’s vision of a united, peaceful nation. The international

community must not lose sight of this pivotal election and must stay engaged in the

runup to it.

Meanwhile, the continuing crisis in Darfur threatens to destabilize Sudan’s neighbors. Chad, which has its own challenges, hosts approximately 235,000 Sudanese

refugees as well as 50,000 refugees fleeing conflict in the Central African Republic.

One hundred eighty thousand Chadians displaced by insecurity from Chadian rebels

and cross-border Janjaweit militia attacks from Sudan compound the problem, creating still more conditions for unrest. One bright spot in this bleak picture are the

prospects for peace in Uganda. For years, the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels found

a hiding place in south Sudan while it terrorized northern Uganda. Today, the Government of Southern Sudan is an active player in the Juba-based negotiations for

peace in Uganda.

The African-led mediation process in Juba has made progress in addressing the

brutal 20-year conflict in Uganda. The key mediators—Government of Southern

Sudan Vice President Riak Machar and Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano—are deeply

engaged in the process, and have recently added observers from other African countries and the United States to the talks, Over the past year, thousands of internally

displaced persons have been able to leave the camps in northern Uganda and vital

commercial corridors in Sudan and northern Uganda have reopened. The United

States, through USAID and the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees

and Migration, conducts a robust program of humanitarian assistance in northern

Uganda.

In Somalia, a country that has seen more than its share of bloodshed during the

past 15 years of civil war, there is some cause for hope—provided the Somalis take

advantage of the window of opportunity created by the reestablishment of the Transitional Federal Government with the support of the international community.

Somalia does not have the luxury of time. The Transitional Federal Government

opened a National Reconciliation Congress on July 15 and recessed to allow time

to finalize logistical arrangements, such as the issuance of identification badges for

Congress delegates and to allow time for additional delegates to arrive in

Mogadishu. The United States agreed to provide $2.25 million toward reconciliation

through the United Nations Development Program, of which $1.25 million already

has been provided and has been used mainly to support the National Reconcilation

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Congress. The United States remains the leading donor of humanitarian aid to Somalia and has already committed over $40 million for development, humanitarian,

and peacekeeping support this year.

In Zimbabwe, it is clear that President Mugabe intends to do whatever it takes

to get reelected. The runup to the 2008 Presidential elections will be a critical time

for democratic nations in Africa to take a strong stand for democracy in the region.

After the brutal attacks in March that I mentioned earlier, the United States assisted those working for the release of detainees and to secure medical treatment

for the injured. Our Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Christopher Dell, made his presence

felt at police stations and at the courthouse to demonstrate our concern for those

being held. The international attention that we helped to focus on the beatings and

detentions helped to secure the early release of the detainees.

We also have condemned the Government of Zimbabwe’s violent suppression of a

peaceful demonstration on June 6 in Bulawayo by Women of Zimbabwe Arise!

(WOZA!). Police used batons against some 200 demonstrators, detaining seven activists. Among those detained was WOZA! National Coordinator Jenni Williams, the

recipient of Secretary Rice’s 2007 International Women of Courage Award for Africa,

and denying them access to their lawyers.

This latest aggression against civil society, coming on the heels of attacks this

spring, highlights the need for dialog among all stakeholders concerned with halting

Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis. The active engagement of Zimbabwe’s

democratic neighbors will be key to bringing the government and the opposition together to find a way forward for the country. The Southern African Development

Community has mandated South African President Thabo Mbeki to mediate negotiations between the Government of Zimbabwe and the opposition. In late June, the

government and the opposition agreed on an agenda for the negotiations that included constitutional and electoral reforms, security legislation and rules of political

engagement. This is a good step. But, given the behavior of President Mugabe, we

dare not allow ourselves to think that the road ahead will soon or easily lead to

stability, prosperity, and liberty for the people of Zimbabwe.

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Dealing with the complex challenges that these strife-riven countries present requires the energetic engagement of neighboring African nations and of Africa’s regional institutions, as well as the support of the United States and the broader

international community. We have made it a priority to intensify our relationships

with Africa’s regional organizations, and with the African Union in particular on

matters of human rights and democracy.

In late 2006, the United States established a bilateral mission to the AU—the

first of its kind where an AU observer state has had a separate mission dedicated

solely to the AU.

The AU architecture is still evolving, but it is promising. The AU’s 53 member

states have committed themselves to an agenda for advancing democracy and

human rights, and they are developing bodies and mechanisms to move that agenda

forward, including:

• Peace and Security Commission, similar to the U.N. Security Council, which approves the scope and duties of AU peace support operations;

• The adoption in 2003 of the African Protocol on the Rights of Women;

• The adoption this January of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and

Governance, enshrining commitments to political pluralism, free and fair elections, the rule of law and good governance; and

• The creation of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to uphold the

provisions of the Democracy Charter. The Court will work in coordination with

the AU’s existing Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

It is very much in our interest—and in the interest of other democracies—to help

strengthen the capacity of these AU bodies and mechanisms.

To that end, Mr. Chairman, in March I hosted five members of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. We discussed the importance of engaging

with civil society and of addressing urgent human rights concerns. We also agreed

to increase our collaboration.

Later that month, I traveled to Addis Ababa and met with the AU Commissioners

for political affairs, peace and security, and women and gender development. I discussed a range of issues from democratization and the need for a vibrant civil society to the U.N./AU hybrid force in Sudan. I also planted the seeds for formal human

rights and democracy consultations with AU. In the fall, DRL will host the first

such consultations. We will share experiences, define new strategies for partnership

and encourage the forging of relationships between the AU and civil society. We also

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will identify concrete ways to assist the African Commission on Human and Peoples’

Rights, the fledgling Court, and a new AU Elections Observation Unit. The Unit’s

creation is particularly timely in light of the upcoming elections in Ethiopia,

Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Sudan. USAID already has a $1 million program with IFES

to support the creation of the Unit.

In May, I met with eight impressive justices from the nascent Court, who also

serve on the bench in their native countries. They are working pro bono to draft

the rules and regulations governing the Court’s operations and get it up and running. By the end of the year, their hard work should reach fruition and provide an

additional layer of protection for the people of Africa.

Just last week here in Washington, the Organization of American States, the

State Department and the African Union held the first ever OAS/AU Democracy

Bridge Forum—an event that was sponsored by the State Department. Experts from

the AU and OAS, and NGOs from Africa and the Americas exchanged their experiences building regional democratic institutions, planned further cooperation, and established institutional linkages.

Mr. Chairman, clearly there is a lot of work to be done—first and foremost by African democracies—to fully develop the AU and other regional organizations. The

goal is not to build elaborate architecture, but to build effective institutions that

help lock in democratic gains and play real roles in protecting the rights and improving the lives of the people of Africa. As Secretary Rice said last week to the

Chairperson of the AU and former President of Mali, Alpha Konare, the United

States is committed to strengthening the AU, and we look forward to enhancing our

partnership.

DRL DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, let me briefly respond to your request to hear

about the human rights and democracy assistance programs that my Bureau is

funding.

DRL has significantly raised its level of programming assistance for sub-Saharan

Africa as a result of congressionally mandated funding for the Human Rights and

Democracy Fund, or HRDF. HRDF is what I call the venture capital of democracy

programming. DRL uses it for cutting-edge innovative programming that upholds

democratic principles, supports democratic institutions, promotes human rights and

builds civil society in critical countries and regions. We use this fund for pilot

projects that will have an immediate impact but that have potential for continued

funding beyond HRDF resources. DRL coordinates closely with the Bureau of African Affairs, other State Department bureaus, USAID, and our NGO partners to ensure that our HRDF programs support overall United States foreign policy objectives in the region and are not duplicative.

When I arrived in the fall of 2005, DRL had a little more than $3 million in

HRDF for programming in sub-Saharan Africa. With congressional support, we

tripled the level of DRL assistance to nearly $10 million and have expanded our programmatic reach to critical countries like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Burundi.

We are proud of our small, but growing Africa programs portfolio. I will highlight

two which I believe have had a positive impact on human rights:

My Bureau awarded $1.5 million in HRDF to an NGO to establish women’s centers that focus on gender-based violence in nine IDP camps throughout Darfur. The

NGO estimates that we have reached tens of thousands of women through these

centers, providing a range of services from medical and psychological support to literacy and basic income generation skills. The grant also has helped fund a global

Gender-Based Violence Coordinator which has enabled this NGO to conduct rapid

assessments of gender-based violence in emerging conflict situations in Chad, Lebanon, Colombia, Nepal, and the northern Caucasus.

DRL also funded a program to collect scientific evidence of human rights abuses

committed during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The more than 3,600 statements

from witnesses that were collected should prove useful to the country’s Truth and

Reconciliation Commission.

With 2007 funds, we will program approximately $10 million for sub-Saharan Africa. And we have ongoing FY06 programs that are supporting post-election dialog

in Ethiopia, building the capacity of the judiciary in the Democratic Republic of

Congo, combating gender-based violence in Ethiopia and Sudan, fighting corruption

in Coˆte d’Ivoire and Burundi, and strengthening civil society efforts in Zimbabwe.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that no matter who succeeds me as Assistant Secretary, and no matter what administration follows the current one, the

United States must continue to respond to the pressing demands of Africans for dignity and liberty. We must continue to work in partnership with the governments

15

and peoples of Africa to build a continent of hope and freedom, for their sake, and

for the sake of a safer, better world for us all.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Before we turn to Mr. Hess, I’d

like to turn to the ranking member of the committee. I appreciate

his being here, and would like to offer Senator Sununu the opportunity to deliver some opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for arriving a little bit late and I don’t have a lengthy opening statement. I want to thank the Secretary for his comprehensive evaluation of the process and the challenges that we have in front of us.

I think there is a great deal of opportunity across Africa for enormous improvements in the political landscape that was addressed

in your opening statement but also in the areas of economic freedom civil society, which you also touched on.

Corruption, the rule of law and property rights. These are concepts that underpin and provide a foundation for creating economic

opportunity and improving quality of life for the millions of people

across the world and especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. So

this is an important hearing. I certainly appreciate the time devoted to it.

I think one of the most important mechanisms we have for addressing these issues of governance, civil society, and economic opportunity is the Millennium Challenge Corporation and I do want

to underscore how important that has been to changing the approach, the mindset that’s brought to assistance, not just in subSaharan Africa but around the world, because it forces people to

look at these institutions and to think hard about those institutions

of civil society or governance or corruption can undermine all the

good efforts that might come along with funding grants and I think

it’s important that we fund the Millennium Challenge Corporation

to the best of our ability. The appropriation mark that’s been put

forward is below the President’s request and I know a number of

other members of this committee, including Senator Coleman, have

written to encourage a higher level of appropriation in this area

and I think it’s one area that ties directly into a lot of the topics

we’re talking about today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu, and

now Mr. Hess.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HESS. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Members

Lugar and Sununu. It’s a pleasure and an honor to appear before

you this morning.

My task today, as the chairman outlined, covers a lot of territory.

Strengths of democratization, trends in Africa, providing an overview of USAID democracy programming and our experiences in Africa, including why, how much, how, to whom, and for what as well

16

as the lessons learned in coordination with other U.S. Government

agencies, such as DRL, other donors and regional and local actors.

I’ll try to address these briefly so that we can get on to the question and discussion period afterward. I brought two charts today.

One is the map of Freedom House, which I think you have in front

of you, showing the progress of countries and freedom in the subSaharan Africa. As you can see by the green countries, those are

ones that are progressing toward freedom. The red ink countries

are those that are becoming less free and the yellow ones indicate

no change at all. Some of those like Sudan, you can’t get much

lower than they are.

The other chart is an interesting graph from 1972, showing the

progress in freedom and what that shows is this is a long-term

event. The U.S. Government cares about democratization in Africa

and, therefore, we must be in this for the long haul and that graph

clearly shows that while we’ve made progress, it is going to take

a great deal of time to reach our final goals of democratization

across and have those free countries that the chairman referred to

earlier.

In terms of budget and what USAID spends on democratizations, since 1990, USAID has managed over $9 billion for democracy assistance globally and Africa, our assistance has grown from $109

million in 1999 to $138 million in 2005. USAID currently manages

30 democracy programs on the continent, including two regional

programs. In addition to our own programs, USAID manages five

Millennium Challenge Corporation threshold country programs totaling more $66 million.

In terms of lessons learned, post-conflict programming is an area

in which we have significantly expanded the scope and sophistication of our interventions in recent years. Our Africa programs have

drawn from USAID experiences, not only in Latin America, as Senator Lugar points out, but also from our lessons learned in Kosovo,

East Timor, and Afghanistan.

First and foremost is the primacy of supporting the implementation of viable peace agreements as the principle vehicle to restore

order and establish a legitimate government. Where viable agreements have been signed, USAID prioritizes all its assistance

through the lens of supporting successful implementation of those

peace agreements.

We have two examples for you today on post-conflict. First is

Sudan—Southern Sudan. Following the comprehensive peace

agreement that my colleague, Secretary Lowenkron, mentioned, we

worked with the Government of Southern Sudan to draft its constitution and the state constitutions. We assisted in the formation

of the core government institutions and systems; helped develop a

transparent budgeting and funding mechanism; and also helped to

revise the civil service codes.

In terms of anticorruption, we have worked with the Ministry of

Finance in Southern Sudan to design programs that curb corruption through the adoption of transparent financial management

and budget practices. We also provide training and technical assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan’s anticorruption commission and the budget oversight committees for the Southern

Sudan legislative assembly.

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We have also provided government in a box technology so that

their institutions have the capability of standing up at the local,

state, and national levels. These provide just the basic tools so that

they can operate and function as they establish their Government

in Southern Sudan.

We cannot talk about Southern Sudan without mentioning

Darfur. Like my colleague, Secretary Lowenkron, I visited Darfur

as recently as last January. It was a week after the attack of the

southern Darfurian police on the NGO compound on the 19th of

January. It was demoralizing for those workers. We have seen a reduction in humanitarian space in Darfur. We cannot let that continue. We work constantly with our partners and increase our visibility so that we can try to increase humanitarian space so that we

can help those people in Darfur.

I also saw programs in south Darfur where we worked very

closely with the people in the Nyala and the camps surrounding

Nyala so that for the first time, they actually met people in those

camps and had an exchange and a dialog so that they understood

why they were there. And for the first time, the youth groups of

those two camps came together and worked on a mutual solution

and understanding in trying to get civil society growing in that

part of the world. It is a difficult place to work but it’s a serious

challenge and we need to continue that effort.

I also want to cite our work in Liberia, another good post-conflict

example. After coming out of 14 years of civil war, for the first

time, there was an election of a President and we have helped support President Johnson-Sirleaf in the establishment of her government. We worked very closely in the beginning out of our Office of

Transition Initiatives worked closely with youth programs, trying

to clean up the city just for the inauguration but we took those programs and expanded them.

In terms of helping her with the strategic communications program, where she was able to manage the expectations of the people

of Liberia. Monrovia had been without electricity for 20 years. The

people of Monrovia expected that they were going to get electricity

immediately. That obviously was not going to happen and through

a strategic communications program, we were able to manage the

progressive role out of electricity across the city and expanding

across Liberia. We have taken that and expanded that program

into assisting other ministries within the government and have

also helped them reform through anticorruption programs in Liberia. It’s a great program. It’s going to be helping the people of Liberia stand up a successful democratic government.

On the other end of the democratic spectrum, we support Africa’s

consolidating democracies. There are significant challenges all over

Africa’s consolidating democracies: Persistent corruption; uneven

commitment to competitive and fair multiparty systems; limited

citizen participation; and oversight and weak governance capacities.

USAID programs are targeted to help countries like Mali, Senegal, Kenya, and Malawi continue on the path toward democratic

reform. I should note that the democratic consolidation in many of

these countries is critical to sustaining advances in health, education and not to mention opportunities for economic growth that

18

the chairman talked about, resulting in opportunities for assistance

from the Millennium Challenge Corporation that my colleague, Secretary Lowenkron, mentioned.

In conclusion, I’d like to point out that the chairman titled this

session, ‘‘Democratic Developments in sub-Saharan Africa, Moving

Forwards or Backwards?’’ As the map shows, I think we’re making

progress. However, Africa is a large continent and there are problems. We have seen many examples of backsliding. We will continue our work to prevent that backsliding and to help grow civil

society at the same time that we build the capacity of those governments to meet the demands that the civil society places before it.

Whatever the case, USAID is committed to doing all we can to help

Africans choose their destinies through opportunities that are

available in a democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for inviting me to speak and

for calling this hearing about USAID’s democracy work in Africa

and I look forward to responding to any questions that you and

members of the subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU

FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before

you this afternoon. As the USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict

and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), I am particularly pleased to be able to address you today. My task today covers a lot of territory, sharing some democratization trends in Africa and providing an overview of USAID democracy promotion experience in Africa—including why, how much, and how, to whom, and for what—

as well as lessons learned and coordination with other U.S. Government agencies,

other donors, and regional and local actors. I will do my best to address this array

of issues in my testimony and look forward to a broader discussion in the question

and answer period.

DEMOCRATIZATION TREND IN AFRICA—POSITIVE, BUT INCREMENTAL

Examining the democratization trend in Africa provides some context for discussing USAID assistance to the continent. Freedom House has taken measures of

civil liberties and political rights for Africa countries since 1972. The overall trend

in these data is encouraging, with steady progress being made since 1985 (see

graphs at end of statement). There was significant jump in the late 1980s and early

1990s. If one compares the Freedom House scores from 1990 with those from 2006,

37 countries have become more free and only six have become less free. However,

continued democratic progress has slowed and some countries have lost ground. In

the last 5 years, 22 countries became more free while 12 became less free.

These trends illustrate important two points. Africa is making progress in its

democratic development, but has a long way to go before its democracies are consolidated. And, if the U.S. Government cares about democratization in Africa, which we

do, then our commitment needs to be long-term.

WHY DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CARE ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION?

The United States supports democracy and good governance for three primary

reasons. First, we support them as a matter of principle—our political system and

national identity are built on the belief that all people share fundamental rights.

Second, democracy promotion is central to our national security and the fight to

counter terrorism and the extremist ideologies that can lead to terrorist acts, as outlined in the President’s Freedom Agenda and the National Security Strategy. Failed

or authoritarian states pose a threat to the security of the United States, in the

near and long term. Finally, U.S. support for democracy and better governance is

an integral part of our broader development agenda. Functioning, democratic states

directly contribute to sustainable development, economic growth, and the provision

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of crucial services. This is particularly important in Africa where our democracy and

governance programs enhance the effectiveness of the very substantial health and

education investments that United States is making in the continent.

HOW MUCH?

Since 1990, USAID has managed over $9 billion of democracy assistance. In Africa, USAID currently manages 27 democracy programs. Our assistance has grown

from approximately $109 million in FY 1999 to approximately $138 million in FY

2005. In addition to our own programs, USAID is managing five MCC Threshold

Country Programs totaling more than $66 million that address democracy and governance issues.

HOW, TO WHOM, AND FOR WHAT?

Our Africa democracy programs span a wide range of country situations, including

post-conflict and fragile states, semiauthoritarian and authoritarian regimes, as well

as consolidating democracies. Because of this, there is no cookie-cutter approach to

promoting their democratization. A core principle of USAID democracy programming is that activities must be designed to address the specific democratic challenges facing each country. In post-conflict and fragile states, our aim is to achieve

democratic stabilization while addressing the democracy and governance-related

causes of conflict and fragility. In consolidating democracies, USAID programs address on-going democratic challenges and strengthen institutions of democratic and

accountable governance. In semiauthoritarian and authoritarian states, we focus on

opening political space for democracy supporters. To get from these general tenets

to country-specific programs, USAID conducts thorough assessments that identify

the core democracy problems as well as the actors and institutions through which

our assistance is most likely to effect positive change.

Democracy Programs in Post-Conflict and Fragile States

Many of our higher profile Africa democracy programs are in post-conflict and

fragile states, including Sudan, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia.

These programs are vital tools for rebuilding the political, economic, and social fabric of conflict-affected countries and failed states, as well as for mitigating potential

slides into conflict or state collapse.

Post-conflict programming is an area in which we have significantly expanded the

scope and sophistication of our interventions in recent years. Our Africa programs

have drawn from USAID experience both in and out of the region, learning lessons

from Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan as well as from other Africa programs.

First and foremost is the primacy of supporting implementation of viable peace

agreements as the principle vehicle to restore order and establish a legitimate government. Where viable agreements have been signed, USAID prioritizes all its

assistance through the lens of supporting successful implementation. A second example is our expanded public administration assistance. USAID is once again fully

engaged in this sector after having deferred for a time to other donors such as the

World Bank. The ability of post-conflict governments to deliver benefits of peace,

particularly to marginalized populations whose grievances may have driven the conflict, is clearly critical to maintaining peace and too important for any major donor

to ignore. Supporting improved financial and personnel management, as well as

leadership development, are core components of our Sudan and Liberia programs.

Other unique aspects of USAID conflict and post-conflict programming include an

emphasis on stakeholder consensus-building around major peace implementation

issues; access to independent information; supporting civil society, and not just

former warlords, participation in peace processes; and focusing on transparency and

accountability from the outset to reduce opportunities for corruption.

Sudan

In Sudan, the democracy program is designed to support the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the north and south.

As such, our priorities are the establishment of an effective and accountable Government of Southern Sudan—the GOSS—and the conduct of free and fair national elections in 2009 as called for in the CPA. To that end, USAID has supported the drafting of the GOSS Constitution as well as state constitutions, the formation of core

government institutions and systems, transparent budgets and funding mechanisms, and a revised civil service. Our assistance to the Ministry of Finance is designed to curb corruption through the adoption of transparent financial management and budget practices. To same end, USAID is providing training and technical

assistance to the GOSS Anti-Corruption Commission and budget oversight committees in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. In addition to technical assistVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ance, USAID has issued 22 ‘‘government-in-a-box’’ kits to local, state, and national

level offices. These kits provide furniture, supplies, and in many cases a prefab office building, to county governments.

Two critical milestones in CPA implementation are the national census, scheduled

for 2008, and national elections, anticipated in 2009. USAID is providing on-going

support for the southern portion of the census. Data from the census will be used

to adjust power-sharing percentages in the Government of National Unity and will

be a critical ingredient to delimiting election constituency boundaries. We have also

been working with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and other

southern political parties to assist their transformation into competitive democratic

political parties.

USAID recognizes that civil society development must complement strengthening

governments. In Sudan, our civil society focus is on women-led organizations and

organizations that support marginalized groups. We are also supporting increased

access to and availability of public information through media outlets, radio distributions, and radio campaigns to spark public discourse about the CPA, the constitutions, peace-building, tolerance, anticorruption, and the rule of law.

Liberia

Liberia’s emergence from two decades of civil conflict under new and democratically elected leadership presents opportunities for peaceful development, rather

than destabilization in West Africa. USAID recognizes the importance of improved

governance and the rule of law to enhance Liberia’s stability, help address the needs

and aspirations of Liberians, and create the foundation for investment and economic

growth. Ongoing support to the Governance and Economic Management Assistance

Program (GEMAP) has been successful in helping the Liberian Government control

and manage its public finances, a critical departure from the grand corruption that

characterized the government under Charles Taylor. At the same time, USAID assistance focuses on establishing the rule of law and supporting security sector reform to address the personal insecurity that has dominated the country for decades.

As a complement to these activities, USAID is providing assistance to the Liberian

legislature, in conjunction with the House Democracy Assistance Commission initiative, and continues to help civil society organizations develop the capacity to hold

the Liberian Government accountable between elections for their actions.

USAID also provided important assistance for the historic transition elections in

the Democratic Republic of Congo. These were the first democratic elections in over

40 years, and Congolese citizens turned out in great numbers to choose their President and members of their National and Provincial Assemblies. To help the Congolese overcome enormous political and logistical challenges, USAID-funded technical

advisers who served as resource persons in the creation of the electoral framework

and who supported the Independent Election Commission. In addition to providing

election administration expertise, technical assistance included strategic communications and public outreach, which were especially important for counteracting

popular mistrust about the electoral process provoked by repeated delays in the

electoral calendar. USAID-funded civic education reached 2.1 million Congolese

throughout the country and we supported mobilization of tens of thousands of Congolese election monitors. These activities helped ensure that the multiple rounds of

elections were credible and largely peaceful, leading to the inauguration in December 2006 of President Joseph Kabila, a reconstituted National Assembly, and Provincial Assemblies which are a brand new institution in the Congo. In addition, Senators and Governors were indirectly elected over the last year as well, creating for

the first time a bicameral legislature. Now on the horizon is the draft law on decentralization and ensuing municipal elections, which are expected in 2008.

USAID is now in the midst of developing programs to stand up these new institutions and give them a fighting chance to deliver on promises to build a democratic,

inclusive DR Congo, where government is held accountable by the people. Elected

leaders are new; their positions are new; and even many of the institutions of governance are brand new. As in many post-conflict situations, there are tendencies to

consolidate control in the hands of the Executive. USAID is moving quickly with the

supplemental funds that Congress recently made available. We will focus on ending

the lingering conflict that persists in the East as well as on building the institutions

of legitimate governance in the overwhelming majority of the country that is stable.

For example, we will help build the capacity of the Provincial Assemblies—some of

which do not even have tables and chairs, and we will promote the transformation

of the Electoral Commission into a permanent and truly independent body. Our

work over the next few years will also include broad citizen civic education, reinforcing links between elected authorities and constituents, and helping Congolese

define what good governance means in their country. I would like to note that

21

USAID and the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor are coordinating closely to ensure that our programs in the Congo effectively

complement each other.

Somalia

Somalia, unfortunately, is not as far along in its peace and reconciliation process.

In such fragile states, the USAID strategic approach is to promote stabilization, reform, and recovery by building institutions of democratic and accountable governance and the rule of law while also addressing causes of fragility such as ethic grievances and economic exclusion. For Somalia, the first challenge is to establish a

federal government that enjoys legitimacy among all the major clans. In the immediate term, we are providing support to implement the National Reconciliation Congress, which is due to start in the coming days and which the U.S. Government

hopes will constitute an effective venue for clan representatives and other stakeholders to strengthen political inclusiveness of the Transitional Federal Government

and stabilize the country through peaceful dialog. The USAID program is also

launching support for the Transitional Federal Parliament, as the transitional institution that may be said to have the widest basis of support; the program will build

the Parliament’s capacity with a particular focus on its role in conflict management

and its responsibilities under the Transitional Federal Charter.

We are also helping to form and build the capacity of local governments which

will be seen as legitimate by local populations and the leadership of the Transitional

Federal Government (TFG). These governments will have a critical role in delivering

social services, such as health, education, and water, as well as promoting local economic growth. USAID is also poised to provide extensive capacity-building to the

TFG itself, but it is critical that questions of TFG inclusiveness be resolved before

we launch such assistance on a large scale.

In addition to these efforts, USAID has supported Somali media and civil society

for several years. Our current program provides funding and training for civil society and media to actively participate in peace-building and governance. Among its

objectives are to build civil society and media networking capacity, strengthening

their ability to operate effectively in a stateless environment, and to support advocacy for media and civil society regulatory frameworks acceptable to our partners

and government authorities. The rapidly evolving political landscape presents significant challenges and places heavy demands on civil society. USAID support is

aimed at enabling civil society to manage the political space in order to reduce the

risk of violent conflict and promote dialog. USAID partners have acted to protect

free media across Somalia, including in cases of media closures in Mogadishu and

journalist arrests in Somaliland. USAID continues to support civil society engagement in local councils’ formation in Puntland and support for decentralization in selected municipalities. USAID civil society partners are heavily engaged in collaboration with other civic and business actors in a series of initiatives in Mogadishu in

attempts to reduce tensions and build platforms for dialog leading up to the National Reconciliation Congress. In Somaliland, the USAID democracy program focuses on building the conflict management and institutional capacity of the Parliament and building democratic political parties with an eye toward a second round

of free and fair Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008.

Democracy Programs in Support of Consolidating Democracies

On the other end of the democratic spectrum is support for Africa’s consolidating

democracies. These programs are tremendously important for African democratization. Recent work by a team of researchers from Vanderbilt University and the University of Pittsburgh has shown that successful democracies have a significant positive influence on the democratization paths of countries in their neighborhood; this

positive ‘‘diffusion’’ effect was shown to have a greater impact on a country’s democratization than its GDP growth. Significant challenges are present in all of Africa’s

consolidating democracies: Persistent corruption, uneven commitment to competitive

and fair multiparty systems, limited citizen participation and oversight, and weak

governance capacity. USAID programs are targeted to help countries like Mali, Senegal, Kenya, and Malawi continue on paths of democratic reform. I should note that

democratic consolidation in many of these countries is critical to sustaining advances in health and education, not to mention opportunities for economic growth

resulting from Millennium Challenge Corporation compacts.

The overall theme of our lessons learned in these countries is that democratic consolidation is a long process. Corruption is deeply engrained in most African countries. It is telling to note that all five of the democracy-relevant MCC Threshold

Country Programs USAID manages focus on anticorruption. While dramatic improvements in election administration have been made, building competitive, pluralVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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istic political systems takes longer. Several more advanced African democracies remain dominated by a single political party or by a handful of charismatic leaders.

Finally, resource constraints, underdeveloped infrastructure, and human resource

limitations pose long-term challenges to both governments and civil society groups

as they strive to improve their institutional performance.

Mali

Mali’s democracy is one that inspires reformers throughout the region. In fact,

Mali is moving from a regional to a global role model this year by hosting, with support from USAID, the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in November. In addition to this special assistance, the USAID democracy

and governance program focuses on ensuring that Mali’s decentralized system of

government delivers for all citizens at the local level. Activities promote citizen participation in, and oversight of, local governments; strengthen local government financial management skills; develop policies that support the success of decentralized government; and increase women’s role in decisionmaking. As a result of

USAID programs, citizens are demanding that local governments account for their

tax revenue and some local governments have seen their tax revenues go up with

increasing citizen confidence that it is being used well. Mali’s democracy was also

strengthened through election support activities, resulting in free and transparent

Presidential and legislative elections. USAID women leadership activities contributed to a 120 percent increase in the number of female candidates running for office

in the 2007 local government elections over the previous election. The Mali program

also provides access to information by building community radio stations and training local radio producers in the production of radio programming on governance and

decentralization, health (especially HIV/AIDS and malaria), education, and conflict

prevention topics. Today, there are 205 private community radio stations in Mali (44

of which were financed by USAID), and USAID trained over 1,500 radio producers

and presenters in the production of development-related programs. Because of these

efforts, 89 percent of Malians have access to at least one community radio station,

and for a majority of these citizens, radio is their only source of information. The

mission has emphasized radio coverage in Mali’s fragile and northern areas, where

radio programming focuses on preventing or mitigating conflict and broadcasting

vital counterterrorist messages.

I am proud to point out that during the past decade USAID Democracy and Governance programs have helped countries like Mali achieve the effective governance

needed to qualify for and take advantage of the opportunity of an MCC Compact

Agreement. However, we need to remember that effective and accountable governance is an ongoing challenge for all countries, including those in Africa that have

risen above their peers to qualify for MCC assistance. We must not assume that just

because a country has qualified for a Compact Agreement—let alone a Threshold

Agreement—that it has solved all of its governance problems. There remains an important role for USAID DG programs to help these countries consolidate and build

upon the progress they have made.

Democracy Programs in Authoritarian and Semi-Authoritarian States

The toughest environments for us to work in are authoritarian and semiauthoritarian states. The major challenge facing USAID is how to foster political

competition where leaders are opposed to meaningful reform and prepared to use

the resources of the state to cling to power. The USAID strategic approach in these

countries is to strengthen democratic activists outside of government by working

with groups such as democracy and human rights NGOs, watchdog groups, independent media, and opposition political parties. When possible, USAID also supports pockets of reform within government, often times within the judicial branch,

independent electoral or anticorruption commissions, and local governments.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, unfortunately, falls among such countries and is of particular concern

for USAID. Our Zimbabwe program is designed to help civil society organizations

express their views despite the government’s efforts to tighten restrictions on independent media and journalists and curb the work of nongovernmental organizations.

Activities include advocating to Parliament and local authorities, building an effective committee system within Parliament, and supporting local authorities to be

more capable and open to citizen input. USAID support also helps Zimbabwean civic

activists maintain their networks of support and communication with the broader

human rights community in Africa, which is bearing witness to the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe and planning for a return to democracy when Mugabe eventually leaves the scene.

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NIGERIA

An important African country that I have not yet mentioned is Nigeria. Nigeria

is a country that defies categorization. The second Obasanjo administration made

important gains in increasing transparency, yet corruption and patron-client politics

continue to dominate. The country has transitioned, for the first time in its history,

from one civilian leader to another without a military coup, but the election was

widely condemned as failing the Nigerian people, so ridden by fraud that results

could not be said to reflect their will. On-going community violence, particularly but

not exclusively in the Niger Delta, leads to casualty levels rivaling some civil wars.

As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer noted in her

recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on

Africa and Global Health, we were profoundly disappointed with the deeply flawed

elections. Secretary Frazer rightly identified the need for political commitment on

the part of the Government of Nigeria for electoral reform, including substantial reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. Without political commitment, USAID technical assistance will not lead to improved elections.

In this context, USAID conducted a thorough review of its democracy strategy in

Nigeria in the fall 2006. We commissioned an independent country analysis by country experts to assess democratization trends since the transition to civilian government in 1999, current democracy challenges, and opportunities to support democratic reformers. This analysis helped us chart a way forward to address the primary challenge in Nigeria, the lack of accountability in a political system with an

overly powerful executive and high levels of corruption. Our new program focuses

on bolstering Nigerian efforts to increase accountability at both the national and

subnational level, reinforcing areas where political commitment has emerged in the

last few years. At the national level, this entails supporting increased oversight of

the federal budget by the National Assembly to combat corruption, greater independence and capacity in the federal judiciary to promote the rule of law, and

strengthened civil society advocacy and oversight to increase government accountability. At the local level, we are launching a program to enable citizens to hold

their local governments accountable for delivering the social services long-awaited

as a ‘‘democratic dividend.’’ The importance of accountability is only heightened

after this year’s elections, which dramatically undermined the Nigerian people’s

ability to express their will through the ballot box. Given the leading role Nigeria

plays on the continent, bolstering Nigerian democratic reformers remains a critical

priority.

EVIDENCE THAT USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMS WORK

Having discussed USAID approaches to democracy in the various country situations we face in Africa, I would like to discuss the impact of our programs. Beyond

anecdotal evidence, how do we know if the USAID approach to democracy promotion

is effective or not? To answer this question, we now have underway some of the

most exciting and significant work ever carried out to evaluate the impact of the

USAID democracy assistance programs, and it is providing some answers. In this

endeavor, we are working closely with the academic community, other donors, and

the National Academy of Sciences to develop new methods that will lead to findings

on what works and what does not and to make recommendations to expand successful programs and stop ineffective ones.

The first stage of this research was a quantitative, cross-national analysis to see

whether researchers could detect any impact of USAID democracy assistance. We

were very pleased when researchers from Vanderbilt University and the University

of Pittsburgh found that every $10 million of USAID democracy assistance generated a five-fold increase in the rate of democratization in a given country, in any

given year, over the period from 1990 to 2003. While this overall finding is tremendously encouraging, we have asked the team to delve further, exploring finergrained impact in particular program areas. This research will complement countryspecific studies being launched now, as well as the body of knowledge USAID has

amassed on lessons learned and best practices in specific areas of democracy programming. With the findings from these efforts, missions will have at their finger

tips information on which types of democracy programs are most effective and on

how those programs can be designed and implemented in a way that will yield the

biggest impact in a given environment.

CONCLUSION

You titled this hearing with a question, ‘‘Democratic Developments in Sub-Saharan Africa: Moving Forwards or Backwards?’’ I would answer that question by sayVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ing that Africa is a large continent, and we can find progress and backsliding at

the same time. Whatever the case, though, USAID is committed to doing all we can

to help Africans choose their own destinies through opportunities that are only

available in a democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for inviting me to speak about USAID’s democracy promotion work in Africa. I look forward to responding to any questions that

you and members of the subcommittee may have.

25

26

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank both the members of the panel and

we’ll begin with 7-minute question rounds. I’ll start with Mr.

Lowenkron.

How does the State Department coordinate its democracy promotion activities with other U.S. agencies and representatives on

the ground as well as with other donors and national authorities,

international and regional organizations, and civil society organizations?

Mr. LOWENKRON. As regards our parts of democracy funding, we

sit down with our colleagues in the State Department and with

AID and we thrash out, what are the areas that we could best

apply our funding? We then craft proposals and we put them out

27

for open competition for our own NGOs. Once we get their proposals, we then sit together the regional bureaus, AID, and my Bureau—and then we make decisions over which programs that we

will fund. That’s how we do this internally.

In terms of what we do with our partners, we have very good

consultations with the European Union, which devotes a lot of

time, energy, and resources to try to develop democratic institutions in Africa itself.

Second, we also work—we are also laying the groundwork because there is a lot of work to be done, to support the role of the

African Union to take on more and more responsibilities as well as

the subregional organizations such as SADC in Southern Africa as

well as ECOWAS. So we do have these relationships with them.

We do talk about our programs and we do try to hammer out, what

are our objectives? Often times, it means that we work with our

own NGOs to fund their NGOs and step backward and let them

take the lead on our programming.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, can you highlight

some of the notable steps the United States has taken to support

democratic principles and institutions and reform efforts beyond

elections across Africa to ensure, as we’ve both discussed, that

democratic development does not end with multiparty polls?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, several areas. No. 1, for example, we

have a program to help train legislators in Liberia. We have a program to help train judges in DROC. We have a program to work

with various NGOs on gender-based violence in Sudan and Ethiopia and we want to use that as the model and reach beyond Africa

to other parts of the world that are experiencing gender-based violence but they’re not connected in some sort of a net where they

could learn from one another. So these are some of the examples

that we’ve used for our program.

Senator FEINGOLD. Very good; thank you. Mr. Hess, I was

pleased to hear that USAID is demanding that Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government demonstrate a genuine commitment to

inclusiveness before providing extensive capacity-building assistance. What observable indicators are you looking for and how are

you communicating these expectations to the TFG?

Mr. HESS. There’s a couple of mechanisms, Mr. Chairman, that

we’re using to communicate. First, through our post, through Ambassador Ranneberger, who has conversations and connections with

the TFG. We have delivered the message that we want to make

sure that they are inclusive, especially including all members of the

society, not just friends of the TFG. We have worked very closely

with them on the funding of the reconciliation Congress, which

began yesterday. That’s an important first step in being inclusive

and by supporting that through our funding, we think that’s a step

in the right direction. But again, we want to make sure that they

understand that this has to include all parts of Somali society if

it’s going to be successful.

Senator FEINGOLD. This is obviously complex and unfortunately,

many other donors have not put these kinds of conditions on their

support for the TFG. How are you coordinating with them to ensure that international support does not have the effect of merely

emboldening or entrenching the TFG?

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Mr. HESS. That’s a very good point as I met in January with the

members of the EU and DFID, who are probably two of the largest

supporters. Norway and Germany have come a long way in terms

of providing support bilaterally as well. But I met with our representatives and their representatives in Nairobi when we were

talking about this very issue, about conditionality that the TFG

has to be more inclusive and I think the EU has come a long way

in recognizing this and so has DFID in terms of the message that

they are delivering.

It’s important that we work as a donor community in lock steps

so that we send the same message and we don’t present conflicting

messages to this government right now. This is a crucial time.

Things don’t look good in Somalia right now but this is an opportunity and we want to seize this opportunity.

We also work very closely with the United Nations in delivering

this message. UNDP has done a very good job of helping organize

this congress and the message that they are sending, likewise to

the Transitional Federal Government is one of inclusivity—that’s

not a word, is it?

Senator FEINGOLD. Fair enough. We, as Senators on this committee, should take whatever opportunities we have to reinforce

this when we have contact with representatives of those donor

countries.

Finally, before I turn to the other Senators, Mr. Hess, on Sudan,

which you talked about in your testimony. Local elections are set

to be held in 2009 and these elections are expected to pave the way

for the critical 2011 referendum where the Southern Sudanese, of

course, have the option to vote for independence. In order for the

2009 elections to take place, a census in South Sudan needs to be

undertaken and this has not happened. Why? What is the administration doing to push this forward, and finally, what is the administration doing to prepare for the 2009 election?

Mr. HESS. That’s a very good point, sir. We’ve seen that example

in a number of other elections around—in other places that I’ve

mentioned, such as in Bosnia or in Kosovo. The census is key.

[Additional written testimony by Mr. Hess follows:]

There are three major political milestones that are critical to successful implementation of the CPA: The census, the elections, and the referendum. The census

is now due to take place from February 2–16, 2008. Given that the rainy season

starts in April, if this date slips beyond March 2008 it will have a detrimental impact on the election timeline. The Government of National Unity (GNU) has delayed

in providing their portion of funding for the census, sowing doubt about whether

they will honor their commitment.

USAID provides both short- and long-term technical assistance to the South

Sudan Commission for the Census, Statistics and Evaluation and will be providing

a substantial amount of equipment in the next few months.

Since September 2004, USAID has obligated $47,082,000 to support election preparations. Components of the overall program have supported civic education, free

and independent media, electoral law development, political party development, and

preparations for the national census.

Mr. HESS. One challenge is there are millions of IDPs who have

still not returned to Southern Sudan. So we have to begin that registration process in the IDP camps while we’re trying to do it down

south. We’re also working very aggressively with our partners in

the United Nations to make sure that that IDP return happens. It

is not happening as quickly as we want it to happen so we’re trying

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to facilitate that so that they can go home. Unfortunately, those are

simultaneous processes. We have to make sure that they get back

safely to their homes where they are going to reside. There are also

still a number of refugees that reside in northern Uganda, who

have not returned home. So while we try to get the IDPs back to

their homes, we continue to prepare for a comprehensive census.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks so much.

Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I’d like to

begin by asking each of you to comment on what you see as best

practices. Just give one or two examples in each of the following

areas. First, election processes. Where can we find some of the best

practices and best examples in sub-Saharan Africa just for the

process of elections, either at the national or the local level?

Second, judicial independence, which was, I think, mentioned

by both of you as being really essential to maintaining and sustaining improvements in the democratic process, and third, property rights. If I could ask each of you to comment or give an example or two in each of those three areas and then comment generally

on whether or not we’re doing a good job of highlighting the best

practices, either to promote support from institutions here in the

United States and around the world, or to share information with

other countries and other reform-minded groups in sub-Saharan

Africa.

Mr. LOWENKRON. I would start with the best practices for the

electoral process with Liberia. I think that was a case in which we

had a synergy with our aid and with our diplomacy with nongovernmental organizations and with a very, very clear message

that Ellen Johnson certainly presented, which is, in essence, the

time has come to have a clean and honest election. She mobilized

civil society. We supported civil society and the thrust of her campaign was, we’ve got to get governance right. So I go back to the

model of the three elements of democracy. So I would use Liberia,

probably as the most successful.

I would also just add a comment saying that even though there

were many problems, as the chairman put it, I think what happened in DROC was extraordinary. It was challenging. It was an

extraordinary election and I think that the people in that country

should be given credit for pulling together an election, the first

election in over 40 years.

I would say in terms of judicial independence and this may seem

a little odd at the outset. I would actually look at the strength of

the judicial courts in Nigeria, which at the 11th hour, said, ‘‘No,

you cannot disallow somebody from being on the ballot,’’ and which

even today, are raising questions about some of the corruption of

the Nigerian governors and I think that we need to highlight the

importance of the role of the judiciary, especially in the areas

where we had hoped to see greater progress and where they have

been besieged. So I would use that as an example.

I’d have to think a minute about property rights. In terms of

sharing our experiences and engaging in dialog, this is one of the

reasons why we have started this dialog with the African Union

and why we also have quiet dialogs with countries, with governments on the sub-Saharan continent. It is not enough for us to neVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
30

gotiate and to discuss and debate among ourselves what a best

practice is. We need to bring them to the table.

We have discussed this with the European Union. I would also

add something else, which I found quite extraordinary and something we need to build on and that is that last week, there was an

extraordinary event here in Washington. There was a Democracy

Bridge between the African Union and the Organization of American States, headed by both leaders of those organizations to exchange views on best practices and to talk about their—the elements of their Charter. The OAS Charter was in 2001. AU came

6 years later but I think it is important for us to do all that we

can in order to support the efforts of what I call south-south dialog

in exchanging best practices on democracy promotion.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. Mr. Hess.

Mr. HESS. Unfortunately, I have to agree with my colleague that

Liberia is a great example, for all the reasons that Barry mentioned. We worked very hard building civil society, trying to manage those expectations and to deliver good governance for Liberia.

I also want to reinforce though, the DRC. Forty years without

free elections. A country the size of the United States of America

with only four airports, no roads, very little communication infrastructure that’s virtually impossible to navigate. But yet, they went

through two rounds of elections and for the first time, elected a

President in 40 years. I mean, that’s just a remarkable story and

shows the determination of the people in the Democratic Republic

of Congo, to actually participate in the process and carry it

through. It’s just an excellent story that we try to tell in many

other places around.

The judicial independence, obviously it is the Nigerian electoral

judiciary. It did a great job of standing up in the face of what was

pretty severe pressure to cave in and they did stand up.

In terms of property rights, I’d like to cite a couple of examples.

One is Kenya and the other is Ethiopia. In both of those places,

we’re looking at land tenure issues because of agricultural development in both of those areas. As you know, we’ve had some difficulties in the northeast sector of Kenya for the pastorialists. We’ve

worked very closely with the legislatures in both those countries to

try and revise their property rights and help the pastoralists and

the farmers in those regions so they can be more productive. Again,

we work with our donor partners to convey those issues.

We also have sessions with our NGOs where we try to exchange

those ideas and we’ve had two recently on backsliding, for example,

to try and reinforce those messages.

Senator SUNUNU. I want to close with a question to each of you

about moving from best practices to a more disappointing process,

which were the elections in Nigeria. Three brief questions here.

First, what preelection messages did the United States deliver to

the Nigerian Government regarding concerns and in malfeasants

heading into the elections? What was the response from the United

States regarding the outcome and do you think that the criticisms

of the U.S. response as being muted were fair? Do you think that

we could have been more forceful in responding to the many reports of election abuses?

Secretary.

31

Mr. LOWENKRON. In terms of our preelection message, we reiterated time and again, this is an opportunity. This is an opportunity

for the country of Nigeria. We expressed concerns that we did not

believe that the Independent National Electoral Commission was

up to speed in terms of carrying out a successful election. We were

concerned about the efforts to rewrite the constitution to allow for

a third term. So we had a series, a series of conversations with the

Nigerian Government, to say, this is an opportunity. We had our

NGOs on the ground. We had NDI, IRI, and others on the ground

as well as representatives of the European Union.

And it was disappointing. Our reaction to that was built on policies and the statements we made to the Nigerian officials, which

is, this was a historic opportunity and you missed it. It is disappointing. It’s not just the issue of free elections, it’s not what

happens on election day alone. It’s what happens in the lead up to

the election and every step of the way, we found problems, significant problems on that.

I believe that our response to the Nigerian election was clear.

This was a disappointment. What we have also stressed to them

is, you need to do the following things. You need to allow the courts

to adjudicate the electoral disputes, No. 1 and No. 2, you really,

really, really have to tackle your National Electoral Commission

because it was wanting. The problems that were there still remain.

Mr. HESS. Obviously, we worked very closely with DRL in the

whole electoral process and the messaging is synchronized, as

Barry alluded to in the beginning. When we start these operations,

we don’t do it independently. We do them together. So the messages were—our messages were the same as the State Department’s messages and they were delivered by the Ambassador.

One of the areas that we’ve been working on since then, though,

is we believe that you also have to continue to work with the local

governance and civil society organizations. Yes; we had a disappointing result at the national level but we’re going to continue

to push that message through our partners that are working in the

region but we have to continue to build the local networks and the

local organizations that will build from the bottom up, a successful

election next time.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Before I turn to Senator Lugar,

just a comment on the issue of the third term for the President of

Nigeria. I guess we forget sometimes, what impact we can have

without passing legislation. I simply sent a letter to the head of the

Parliament there, saying that we hope they would not pass legislation allowing an additional term, and they were apparently having

a huge altercation and he stopped the proceedings and read my letter, and apparently, that calmed things down. So we forget that we

really can impact leaders and policies in these countries, without

seeming heavy-handed. It was merely a request that they not make

the mistake so many countries have made of allowing somebody to

continue to run time and time again. With that, I turn to Senator

Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to pursue the

comments that you’ve made about the Millennium Challenge. The

press accounts of this are sympathetic and point out that the very

32

nature of the process calls for a great deal of study, and, most importantly, emphasize participation by officials in the countries that

might be assisted, and, maybe even beyond the officials to those in

opposition or others that may be helpful.

One of the dilemmas of all of this is that after a decision is

made—and you point out that 6 of the 12 favorable decisions have

been for African countries—then the process of dispensing the

money depends likewise upon decisionmaking, bureaucracy, and

leadership in the particular countries. The net result of all this has

been, according to at least one account, only about $71 million has

been dispensed by MCC out of several billion dollars that have

been awarded. As you have observed in this committee, as we’ve

had at least two hearings a year on MCC and how things are moving, there has been great impatience by some members of our committee who are saying: Why in the world are we pursuing this type

of thing as opposed to simply foreign aid as we used to do it? That

is, when we voted money that went out to the country and by and

large, it got spent. Somebody might be helped by that method. In

that process, why, a lot of local participation is occurring and democracy-building perhaps, or something. But not much is occurring

here, with the result that, as Senator Sununu pointed out, the administration’s request, which was already well below the $5 billion

level that the President had talked about earlier, is down now to

less than two. And this is not the first year that that has been the

request and who knows what the outcome of that will be and some

would suggest that at the end of this administration, there may be

a reversion back to the old system.

Now, I’ve gone through all of this because I agree with the philosophy of those who are testifying this morning that the

undergirdings for the democratic progress that we hope for, have

to come with some building of institutions, institutions to make decisions about roads and dams and education and health care and

whatever may be the application the country felt was most important for it. And it requires individuals who can dispense the money.

As we’re seeing in Iraq, for example—not an entirely different situation. Money is accumulating in the bank but there is not an infrastructure even of government to dispense the money in any respect,

democracy or not.

What comment can you make as professionals who are dealing

with MCC as well as with democracy, as to what we need to do,

in the Congress or the administration or on the ground in African

countries; not necessarily to hurry up the process. Some have suggested that the very fact that money isn’t dispensed very fast is a

very good discipline that it’s not being splashed around. We’re not

having consequent investigations as to who misspent the money or

sequestered it or put it in a foreign bank account. There is this

transparency that is so important in all of these democracy movements. But can you discuss generally, just in a few minutes, whether the MCC—how does it fit into this situation, not only with the

six countries but with others that are candidates and some who

might be?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, first of all, I agree with you on the

issue that we have been slow. This was a revolutionary concept in

many ways, the MCC, and I think that we spent a lot of time getVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
33

ting the structure right precisely because we wanted to ensure that

if we went down this path, we would do the following: We would

be able to build this infrastructure and be able to tackle corruption

and we’d be able to account to the Congress and the American people where the money is going.

Now, under Ambassador Danilovich, this has been accelerated

and I think it’s critical that this program continue. I do not see this

program, in any way, shape, or form, as holding up some of the

other critical work that we do—supporting NGOs on democracy

promotion, tackling aid under the PEPFAR or ensuring distribution, enough food to the critical parts of Africa, even the countries

that are incredibly mismanaged, regimes like in Zimbabwe.

But it’s a change in culture, it’s a change in attitude. It’s a notion

that, yes; we will support country X and government Y, but you’ve

got to be serious about tackling corruption. You’ve got to demonstrate, what is your plan to build the infrastructure and by the

way, we should be willing to threaten to suspend from the MCC,

as has been the case with some other countries outside of Africa.

So this is very much—this is a significant piece of work. It’s still

a work in progress. I share the frustration of those who say, this

has been up and running. We need to see more results. I do think

the trajectory is good. It is getting better. There are countries in

Africa and elsewhere around the world that not only finally get it

but they are also competing to get into the program.

Senator LUGAR. Um-hmm. Mr. Hess.

Mr. HESS. I’d like to add a little bit to that. I think it is important to recognize that we do work together and the fact that we do

work together, both State AID and the MCC. If we weren’t working

together, then perhaps they would be dispersing funds without the

capacity being there and without our anticorruption programs

being effective and in place and I don’t think that’s what we want

to do.

As Barry points out, we don’t want to be seen as giving money

and as you pointed out, Senator Lugar, and having it end up in

some Swiss bank account some place. It is a new program. It is the

new structure. There are new coordination mechanisms on which

we are working to ensure that the capacity of that country is there,

the decisionmaking processes are in place. These are decisions that

Africans have to make about their own money. These aren’t decisions that we’re going to make for them. We want them to have

that capacity. We want them to be able to do that and then to have

the accountability and the responsibility for those programs. Those

aren’t our issues. Those are their issues and we have to train them,

give them the capacity to do that while we work on these

anticorruption programs. And if we weren’t in sync, maybe we

would be dispensing the money without having these capacities in

place and I don’t think we want that.

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Senator Lugar, I note that the

pretty good attendance at this hearing, I think, is a sign of the

growing interest in the Senate on issues relating to Africa and I

appreciate all my colleagues being here, including Senator Nelson,

34

who certainly has shown strong interest in these matters and I

think has traveled there recently.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning, gentlemen. Let me just say

that in my travels, I have been enormously impressed with USAID

and I have seen some very dedicated folks that basically have exceptional hardship tours and I commend you for that.

I’d like to know, what do you think, does official U.S. silence in

response to an undemocratic state have—how does that impact our

interest in the country in the question and in the region, when we

turn our head? I’m talking about official U.S. silence.

Mr. LOWENKRON. In every day that I have been Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, I have a voice and a vote in our policy and I have insisted that these issues be very clear. They are

clear in terms of—clear in our——

Senator BILL NELSON. Hold on. Try again. Can you use the other

microphone?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Let’s try that. Does that work better?

Senator BILL NELSON. No. Turn yours off.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Mine’s off.

Senator BILL NELSON. OK, try the one on your left.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Better? Thank you. I don’t think we should

ever be in a position to remain silent when elections fall short.

When I meet the Secretary of State, our conversations are always

about trajectories. Where is a country going in terms of elections?

where is it going in terms of civil society? where is it going in

terms of corruption? and our policy is to try to push them in all

three of these areas. A lot of these states are fragile but we need

to speak out clearly when there are shortcomings.

Senator BILL NELSON. Have we done that in Zimbabwe?

Mr. LOWENKRON. I think we’ve been very, very forceful in

Zimbabwe. I think we have spoken out against the attacks on the

opposition in March, against the Women of Zimbabwe Arise Organization; that happened in early June. We also quietly worked with

our friends and allies and partners in Africa and the European

Union. We’ve requested that the AU shine a spotlight on the issues

in Zimbabwe.

Now, I hasten to add, there are some on the outside who think—

some who believe that this may be counterproductive and that we

need to lower our voice in Zimbabwe. I’m not one of those. I think

that when people are being clubbed to death, when people are

being arrested, when you have a regime that when two people

meet, that’s tentatively called a meeting and they’ve got to have 7

days advance notice in order to get permission. And when you have

a rate of inflation that is just beyond one’s imagination, then I do

think we need to speak out.

Senator BILL NELSON. What about Nigeria?

Mr. LOWENKRON. We have flagged the fact that Nigeria had a

historic opportunity and they missed it. They missed an opportunity to advance on their democratic development.

Senator BILL NELSON. What’s your assessment of the job that the

new President is doing?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, I have to say—I mean, I don’t want his

first steps—his first steps I would applaud. He has done a public

35

disclosure of his own finances and he wants that as a model for

other leaders. He is not standing in the way of the judiciary in

terms of adjudicating the electoral disputes and the governors.

There have been some prosecutions of some governors on the basis

of corruption and he has indicated his intention to tackle the

rather weak National Election Council, the NEC. It’s early but at

least a few of those signs are positive.

Senator BILL NELSON. I would agree with that. But there’s one

where we have a lot of personal interest involved because we get

about 12 or 15 percent of our daily oil from Nigeria. But they just

can’t seem to get their hands around all those kidnappings down

there in the Delta.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, I would say, Senator, part of that is because of the culture of corruption in that country and the culture

and the practice in which the wealth of Nigeria does not extend to

all the Nigerian people and that fuels a lot of it, which gets back

to the issue that the election was an opportunity that was missed

and we have to also focus on, can we press the new President, can

we press the Nigerians to get serious about tackling corruption.

Senator BILL NELSON. What about Ethiopia? Yesterday—you

know what happened yesterday. The opposition that protested the

last year’s elections ended up getting sentenced to life yesterday.

Now we’ve certainly gotten along a lot better with this government

than we did with the Mengistu government.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Absolutely.

Senator BILL NELSON. A lot more cooperation. There is a whole

new spirit compared to 25 years ago. But what are we going to do

when opposition is squelched with life sentences?

Mr. LOWENKRON. Well, Senator, we have to press. The Prime

Minister of Ethiopia said that he will move to give these individuals clemency but that doesn’t really roll the clock back to pre-2005

and say everything is fine. What’s important is that as they head

toward elections next year, is there, or is there not, going to be a

level playing field? Can these individuals and others step forward

and engage in an open, competitive, and honest political process?

When I was in Addis Ababa in March, I had 90 minutes with the

Prime Minister and about 85 minutes of that were precisely on the

state of democracy in Ethiopia. And he kept reiterating that we

take this decision because it’s in the interests of the people of Ethiopia. And I told him, it should be in the interests of all the people

of Ethiopia, even those that are in prison and need to be let out.

So we have to keep pressing, privately and publicly, in order to get

the trajectory right in that country.

Senator BILL NELSON. If I were you, I’d raise some cane about

this and I’d do it through our Ambassador. We have an excellent

Ambassador there. He’s a real pro.

Mr. LOWENKRON. He is.

Senator BILL NELSON. But you need to back him up.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Senator, I was told by a foreign official that unlike my colleagues who do economics or political/military officials,

when I arrive in a country, the news is not good and my job is to

raise cane and when I was in Ethiopia, I met with the families of

those who were in prison. I met with organizations. I met with the

media. It’s part of my job and it is a bully pulpit that all of us

36

use—the Congress, every administration has to use. I cannot agree

with you more.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I’d raise more than cane.

Mr. LOWENKRON. OK.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Nelson and I was in

Ethiopia in December and met with the Prime Minister as well and

I want to strongly agree with what Senator Nelson just said in his

own style, that we cannot tolerate a country like that moving in

the wrong direction, if they want to have the kind of relationship

with us that they want to have and that we want to have with

them. I just want to make sure the record is very clear. Despite the

comments that I’m sure were appropriate with regard to the actions of the new leader of Nigeria, these elections were deeply

flawed. There is a serious question of the legitimacy of those elections and of this administration and the chairman of this committee certainly is not giving a free pass of any kind nor am I

sure—I’m also certain that Mr. Lowenkron is not either, that this

does not erase the enormous failure of getting it right and there

is much more to be said about the problems in Nigeria. I don’t

know what’s more than raising cane, Senator Nelson, but I’d say

whatever you can come up with, that’s what needs to happen with

regard to the Nigerian election. If there are no other questions for

this panel, we will now thank the panel and move to the next

panel.

Mr. LOWENKRON. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. All right, we’ll come to order. I was a little

more generous with the time with the first panel but we are running short on time, so I’ll ask that the second panel please keep

their comments to under 5 minutes if they could and we’ll put their

full statements in the record.

Let us begin with the Honorable Princeton Lyman.

STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON N. LYMAN, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW FOR AFRICA POLICY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. LYMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for having this hearing. Thank you, Senator Lugar, very much. I will try

to be brief because a lot of the issues have come up already.

I think this hearing is very timely because with developments in

the Middle East and elsewhere, people are beginning to debate

whether the support of democracy should be an objective of U.S.

policy. I’d like to say at the beginning that I think in Africa, it’s

a terribly important objective and it’s very important to all our objectives on the continent. The reason is that Africans are very

much engaged in pursuit of democracy and open government. After

a generation of disappointing political and economic developments,

most Africans know that without a more open political system and

better economic management, they are not going to be able to address the deep problems of poverty. Those two issues, democracy

and development, are related. I want to come back to that in light

of the discussion on the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).

But let me just emphasize this point right up front, about the importance of African leadership. We talked a little bit earlier in the

37

hearing about South Africa and I am glad you recognized Senator

Lugar’s major role during that period. It was the South Africans

who were in the lead in the negotiations. They were the ones who

wanted to develop not only a peaceful transition but a democratic

constitution. In that environment, the United States could play a

very active role.

The United States, in fact, spent a lot of money during that period of transition. We spent tens of millions of dollars surrounding

the process with all the support we could give it, with experts and

training, in building capacity in civil society. When the election

came along in 1994, Mr. Chairman, we spent $25 million in support of that election, in voter education and all other aspects of

support. It was a worthwhile investment. South Africa is a strong

and vibrant democracy today.

The United States has not made that kind of commitment elsewhere in Africa. Turning briefly to Nigeria, you have talked about

the crushing disappointment when President Obasanjo who was so

promising in the beginning of his administration oversaw an election in 2007 that was really a disgrace. What bothered the Nigerians, I think, more than anything, was the brazenness with which

the rigging and other malpractices took place. Nigeria is right now

no longer a paragon of democracy.

But if you look at U.S. support to the electoral process, and I

have all due respect for all those in our administration who work

hard on democracy issues, I think in all honesty, the administration, heavily engaged in Darfur and Somalia, took a relatively benign view of the developments in Nigeria. There was an attitude

that, ‘‘Yes, there are a lot of problems there but the Nigerians will

muddle through, nevertheless. There will be a lot of grumbling.

People will be disappointed but things will go on.’’

Although one cannot say the United States could have changed

the outcome, because there were a lot of reasons that President

Obasanjo proceeded the way he did, I think we missed an opportunity. The administration had allocated only $15 million over 3

years for democratization programs in Nigeria. That was just not

enough to make a dent in the situation. Even though our Ambassador and others spoke out on this issue, there was not a sufficiently strong commitment to engaging the Obasanjo government

on the importance of elctoral reform and to helping improve the

electoral preparations. Now we have an administration in Nigeria

that has to prove its legitimacy and capability. In sum, I think we

missed an opportunity.

There are other setbacks. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned Ethiopia

and the problems in Ethiopia. Because of our engagement on Somalia and other counterterrorism policies in the region, and our dependence in this regard, if you will, on Ethiopia, I think our influence on those domestic issues is relatively limited. That is a very

serious problem. There was an opening to democracy in Ethiopia

in the elections of 2005. That opening could be closing. The question for the administration is how important is that democracy

versus some of these other policies and programs in which we are

engaged?

There are other countries that do not get enough attention that

deserve our support during the period. I would mention Angola. If

38

I can put in a commercial there is a Council on Foreign Relations

report that has recently been released on Angola. The report emphasizes how important it is for the United States to engage now

with Angola as it moves out of civil war and toward, hopefully,

more democratic government.

The DRC is another critically important country. The United

States has not paid enough attention to that vastly important country. In addition to what the other witnesses have said about the

election there, we should pay respect to the role of the United Nations in helping make that election possible. There was a tremendous job done by the United Nations during that period.

I want to come back just to this question of the relationship of

democratization and development because the poverty issues are

critical in Africa. I would support what Senator Sununu said about

the Millennium Challenge Account. I recognize there have been a

lot of problems getting that instrument up and running. But when

you have countries moving into the right direction—Benin, Ghana,

Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique, and many more—the degree of support from the donor community for those transitional countries

with regard to economic development is going to make a difference

in their ability to solidify the democratic process.

The Millennium Challenge Account is a unique instrument for

exactly this purpose. It puts up a lot of money and it puts it up

front and says it’s guaranteed if the country follows through on its

commitments. MCA grants are not tied to security or similar kinds

of consideration. Thus they represent the best of American principles. I hope therefore we can continue to support the MCA. I hope

the Congress will relook at the budget decisions being made on it

because I think it is quite an important instrument.

In conclusion, the trend—and you have heard all the data—the

trend in Africa is positive, probably more positive on the African

Continent over 15 or 20 years than in any other continent. This despite the problems that still exist and the backsliding. There have

been over 80 leadership elections since 1990. There are several

countries where the opposition has won elections and taken control

peacefully. Civil society is growing very strong in Africa. There are

real partners there to work on. We need to support that and we

need to support it with good, solid economic programs for those

countries doing the right thing.

Finally, wherever we see a serious, serious challenge to that

process, especially in countries as important as Nigeria or Angola

and Ethiopia, we have to make clear that this is running counter

to their interests and our own.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Lyman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PRINCETON N. LYMAN, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for asking me to testify on

this most important subject, the development of democracy in Africa.

This hearing is timely, because there is a growing debate in the United States

about how and to what extent the United States should make the support of democracy a principal element of our foreign policy. Disappointment with the developments in the Middle East and elsewhere has raised doubts about this objective. I

want to say at the outset that the support of democracy in Africa is not only important but justified by the desire and support for democracy by Africans themselves.

39

Africans, in Benin, Mali, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, the

Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries have advocated, demonstrated,

sometimes risked, indeed often lost, their lives, and stood in long voting lines to establish democratic systems of government. These systems are not perfect, and there

has been some serious backsliding in Africa. But the trend has been more consistent

and impressive than in any other region. From 1960 to 1990, there were hardly any

peaceful changes of leaders in Africa. Since 1990, there have been more than 80

leadership elections in more than 40 African countries, several instances of power

passing to opposition parties, and only a handful of military coups, almost all of

them quickly reversed. The Africa Union, the predecessor organization of which was

once a clique of military or otherwise autocratic rulers, today will not seat a government that comes to power by nonconstitutional means and has intervened on several occasions to reverse coups and restore elected government.

This demand for democracy has been sustained because after a generation after

independence of failed political and economic policies, most Africans came to the

conclusion that only an open political system, and a free market economic system,

can generate the growth necessary to overcome Africa’s deep problems of poverty.

Thus support for democracy goes hand in hand with programs to address Africa’s

poverty. That should be an important element in United States policy.

I stress the importance of Africans’ own commitment to democracy. In South Africa, the negotiations to end apartheid, and to establish one of the strongest and most

democratic constitutions anywhere in the world, was led throughout by South Africans. In that environment, the United States was able to play an important

supportive role, and a most active one. Because the process was fragile, and subject

to continuing violence, it was important to take every possible opportunity to

strengthen it. Thus the United States spent tens of millions of dollars in the period

of 1990–94 to strengthen civil society, to provide expertise to the negotiators on

every aspect of constitutional debate—e.g., federalism, fiscal management, affirmative action—to support conflict resolution programs being run by South Africans

throughout the country, and to train the new leadership. In support of the 1994

election alone, the United States spent $25 million on voter education and related

support. It was a worthwhile investment. South Africa remains a vibrant and strong

democracy. Unfortunately, we have not made a similar commitment elsewhere.

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and with South Africa a bellwether of

Africa’s movement to democracy and good governance. Nigeria has been under military rule for most of its independence. Twice civilian government was snuffed out

by military coups. But in 1999, military rule ended with the election of Olusegun

Obasanjo, and a process of true civilianization of leadership has since been under

way. Nigeria’s transition to democracy is especially important. Together with South

Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, President Obasanjo helped fashion the commitment to democracy by the African Union and the principles of good governance and human rights

embodied in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) that the AU

has adopted. Obasanjo personally intervened in Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Mauritania,

and Sao Tome and Principe to reverse coups or threats to elected government. It

was thus a crushing disappointment when his government failed to assure a credible or even reasonably fair election in 2007 to select his successor. There were plenty of warning signs. The so-called Independent Election Commission was neither

independent nor competent. Preparations were woefully inadequate. A fierce dispute

between Obasanjo and his Vice President roiled the political process and upset the

election preparations. What perhaps most discouraged Nigerian and international

observers was the brazenness with which rigging, intimidation, ballot stuffing, and

outright fraud took place during the election itself. Nigeria went from being a paragon of the democratization process to being an uncertain political entity.

It is not certain that external activity could have changed this outcome. Nigeria

was flush with oil money and not in need of foreign aid. Obasanjo was absolutely

determined, at virtually any cost, to be sure that his political rivals would not take

power and, therefore, relatively immune to pleas about the election disaster that

was looming. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Bush administration, heavily

engaged in the crisis in Somalia and the ongoing humanitarian situation in Dafur,

took a relatively benign position with regard to the impending election in Nigeria.

There was a feeling that Nigeria, with all the problems ahead, would ‘‘muddle

through,’’ that Nigerians would grumble, demand better elections next time, but

that there would be no major crisis afterward. By contrast to the $25 million the

United States spent in support of the 1994 election in South Africa, the administration provided only $15 million over 3 years for democratization programs in Nigeria.

Despite the growing electoral crisis that was developing in 2006–2007, the administration did not increase this level. Civil society and other democracy advocates in

Nigeria could have used much more support.

40

Nigeria is not falling apart. And the newly elected President, Umaru Yar’Adua,

has made some good moves in reaching out to the opposition and addressing the

insurgencies in the oil-producing delta region. But Nigeria as a force for democracy

has been weakened. Nor is it yet clear that this new leadership will have the legitimacy and support necessary to carry out badly needed reforms in Nigeria nor the

ability to cut through entrenched interests and bureaucracies to make the desperately needed investments in power and other infrastructure that would keep

Nigeria from slipping further into unemployment and poverty. The United States

can now ask for some signs of good governance, electoral reform, and sound economic management as benchmarks for future cooperation. But the United States

missed an opportunity to speak out strongly and with conviction on democracy when

it was being bruised so badly in such an important country.

The United States faces an even more difficult situation in Ethiopia. This country,

with such a sad history of brutal dictatorship, war, and poverty, had a brief window

of opportunity for democratization in the elections of 2005. The opposition did very

well, adding substantially to seats in the Assembly. But the results were hotly contested by the opposition which insisted that it had, in fact, won the election. Demonstrations grew violent and many demonstrators were killed. The Ethiopian Government arrested 38 opposition leaders and is now threatening to execute them. In

the context of the Somalia situation, and Ethiopia’s central role in United States

counterterrorism policy in the Horn, U.S. influence on the domestic political situation in Ethiopia is very small. What seemed like a democratic opening in one of Africa’s most important countries, the home of the Africa Union, seems thus to be rapidly closing.

These disappointments, and others in Zimbabwe and Uganda, should nevertheless

not deter us from support for democratization across the continent. The trend is basically in favor of democracy. Civil society is vibrant, and growing stronger each

year. But much support is needed to move beyond elections to true democratic

transformation. Parties are weak, the press is in need of training and legal protection, judiciaries need to be strengthened, and electoral systems improved. In sum,

there is much to do. But there are allies in Africa for doing so.

The connection to our other major objective in Africa, overcoming poverty, is also

clear. Without question autocratic governments in Africa have almost all failed economically. When the donor community acts in concert with African democratic

movements and economic reform, the results can be dramatic. Benin, which sent the

first shock waves of democratic revolt through Africa in 1990, benefited from a conjunction of political reform and strong donor economic support to establish a solid

democracy. Ghana is doing the same, as can Mali, Mozambique, and other African

countries.

For this reason, I would stress that in addition to programs directed specifically

to democracy, the United States maintain a strong economic support program for

democratizing and reforming countries. In this regard, I urge the Congress to

rethink its negative attitude toward the Millennium Challenge Account (MCC),

threatening to cut the President’s FY 2008 request in half. It may be that in oil

rich countries like Nigeria and Angola, or in countries embroiled in counterterrorism

programs, this instrument is not relevant. But in democratizing countries like

Ghana, Benin, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, and potentially many others,

the availability of truly substantial economic support can enable democratic administrations to demonstrate real economic progress and thereby solidify public support.

The MCC is an exceptional instrument, more potent in many ways than the sums

for democratization alone, and far beyond normal aid levels. Not encumbered with

security considerations, and linked to political and economic reform, it represents

the best of American intentions and principles. We should capitalize on it as one

of the strongest instruments in support of democracy.

In countries not appropriate for the MCC, we need different instruments. I would

call your attention to a recent report by the Council on Foreign Relations on Angola.

Angola, a major oil producer, has emerged from decades of civil war with the potential to become both economically strong and a force for stability in the region. But

the prospects for steadily more open and democratic governance are uncertain, yet

critical to Angola’s long-term stability. The report calls for a mix of public and private efforts by the United States to help steer that country through the post-war

period and toward a more democratic governing system. The DRC represents another special challenge, being at the very center of Africa and drawing the interests

and involvement of all its neighbors. Years of civil war have taken a devastating

toll, causing over 4 million deaths.

Yet, against all the odds, the DRC has just come through a peaceful and credible

election, thanks to strong U.N. leadership and the determination of the Congolese

people. This most fragile movement toward democracy, in a country of vast economic

41

and political importance, and extraordinarily complex internal challenges, deserves

special attention. Investing in the stability and steadily improved governance of the

DRC should be among the U.S.’s highest priority. I am pleased that the Secretary

of State has put the DRC on her itinerary for her upcoming Africa visit. Up to now

the DRC has not commanded nearly the attention in the United States that it

deserves.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, Africa is perhaps the best region for the United

States to pursue its freedom agenda, its commitment to democracy. Public support

in Africa is strong, the trends are positive, the opportunities great. So too are the

challenges. While the administration has put democracy as one of its priorities in

Africa, and dedicated certain amounts to that cause, the vast bulk of United States

funding for democracy goes elsewhere. In FY 2005 USAID democratization programs in Africa did reach $138 million, with another $66 million for democratization

within five MCC grants. Nevertheless, given the number of countries in Africa, and

the opportunities, the United States could well dedicate much more to this cause

in Africa. It would reap results. There also needs to be more response capacity, i.e.,

to increase resources when critical situations arise. We should also be prepared to

provide substantial economic support when the conditions are right. And wherever

in Africa, we should not let another situation like that in Nigeria in 2007 develop

without a stronger reaction and a more vigorous preventive effort.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. You’ve been a

tremendous resource in the 15 years that I’ve been on this committee and I appreciate it.

Mr. Albin-Lackey.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ALBIN-LACKEY, NIGERIA

RESEARCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. ALBIN-LACKEY. Thank you. I’m going to focus my remarks

mainly on Ethiopia and Nigeria because I think that both of those

countries provide a very stark example of a basic failing of U.S.

policy toward many different African countries and that is that

while the United States has consistently shown itself to be a very

willing and helpful partner in engaging with African governments

that are interested in promoting democracy and human rights,

there is often not nearly as good a job done of designing constructive ways to deal with governments that stand as obstacles to promoting those objectives.

Both Nigeria and Ethiopia are very good examples of that problem. I think there are three basic areas where things could be

approached differently in ways that would make a very dramatic

difference and are completely feasible.

First, the administration should focus more deeply on engaging

with underlying human rights issues as opposed to dramatic onetime events, including elections, which cannot, by themselves, ever

equate to democracy. In Nigeria’s case, the disastrous April elections were not just an anomaly, they were a reflection of a broader

crisis in governance in that country. Irresponsible, corrupt, and

abusive leaders have been thrown up at all levels of government

by fraudulent elections in 1999, in 2003, and now in 2007. That has

crippled the capacity of government to deal with serious underlying

problems and to improve upon respect for basic human rights.

It’s also worth pointing out that the problem in Nigeria that

tends to get the most international attention, the crisis in the

Niger Delta, also has its roots in this very same crisis of governance. Many of the militants and criminal armed gangs in the Delta

that are responsible for the wave of kidnappings and other acts of

violence, got their start as gangs who were funded by politicians

seeking to rig themselves into office during the 2003 elections. All

42

of those politicians have escaped with complete impunity, even as

the details of their involvement with these groups have become

very well known over the past 4 years.

In the case of Ethiopia, the government’s crackdown on leaders

of the opposition has received a great deal of international attention but again, that isn’t an anomaly. In fact, Ethiopia is governed

in a way that is characterized by patterns of repression, harassment of the opposition, many cases of arbitrary detention, and torture. This is especially true in rural areas and it exists at a level

that’s so pervasive that many Ethiopians’ day-to-day experience

with government is such that political activity or political speech

is simply not possible. In fact, what was unusual about Ethiopia’s

elections was not the harsh response of the government to protests

in the wake of the polls but rather, the limited opening—in terms

of time and in terms of scope—that appeared before those elections.

What’s going on with the trial of opposition leaders is, in fact,

much more connected to the basic reality of governance in that

country than anything else.

It’s also very important that the United States display greater

willingness than it has done in leveling forthright public criticism

and finding ways to mobilize other forms of pressure against governments like Nigeria’s and Ethiopia’s that show willingness to disregard basic human rights and a disinterest in promoting democracy and better governance.

One of the earlier panelists said that our message to the Nigerian Government in the runup to the elections was that they had

a historic opportunity and that our message after the elections was

that they—the government—had missed that opportunity. But I

think the basic problem with that approach is that the Nigerian

Government didn’t miss an opportunity so much as perceive a very

different kind of opportunity sitting before it. Many people in Nigeria’s ruling party saw an opportunity to run roughshod over Nigeria’s own constitution to derail its electoral process and to expect

that they could do so free of any meaningful international criticism

or response. Unfortunately, given the muted nature of not just the

United States but the response of other key allies of Nigeria as

well, they have thus far largely been proven right in that very cynical assumption.

This problem is perhaps even more apparent in Ethiopia, where

the administration has been unwilling to criticize patterns of

human rights abuse, including Ethiopia’s systematic and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians in Mogadishu, which caused up

to 400,000 people to flee that city in a matter of weeks this

spring—and this was after the administration’s tacit encouragement helped propel Ethiopia to invade that country to begin with.

I’m running out of time so I’ll just close by also saying that even

where the administration has urged improvement in human rights,

it’s often the case that standards are set far lower than they should

be. Many of the governments that we’re discussing often complain

about setting unrealistic expectations but in fact, those criticisms

are exaggerated. Nigeria can’t be expected to stamp out corruption

and Ethiopia can’t necessarily be expected to become a perfectly

functioning, multiparty democracy overnight. But it’s certainly not

out of line to demand that Ethiopia refrain from imprisoning the

43

leaders of its opposition or suppressing dissent or massacring its

own civilian populations and it’s not unrealistic to demand that Nigeria refrain from subverting its own law enforcement agencies and

electoral institutions to prevent free and fair elections from happening or to hold those responsible accountable.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak. I’m sorry for running over.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albin-Lackey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ALBIN-LACKEY, NIGERIA RESEARCHER,

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Chairman Feingold, and members of the committee, for inviting

Human Rights Watch to participate in this hearing. My name is Chris Albin-Lackey

and I am a senior researcher with the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch. For

the past 2 years, I have worked documenting Nigeria’s deplorable human rights

record across a range of issues. I was in Nigeria before, during, and after April’s

general elections. Previously, I covered Ethiopia for Human Rights Watch, including

during the runup to its May 2005 elections.

This hearing could not be timelier, and Nigeria and Ethiopia both stand as clear

examples of the reasons why. The course of events in both countries today has laid

bare some basic failings of U.S. policy toward Africa. Nigeria’s failed elections in

April were a terrible setback for hopes of democratic reform—and a stark reminder

of the disastrous state of governance in that country. The Ethiopian Government’s

deplorable human rights record has now manifested itself in military atrocities

against its own people in Somali region and against Somali civilians in Mogadishu.

In both cases, the administration’s uncritical acceptance of systemic human rights

abuses has weakened rather than strengthened the incentives for reform.

There is no reason why these failed policies cannot be changed in a way that

would allow Washington to play a more constructive role in promoting human rights

and democracy in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and elsewhere across the continent. Doing so

would require a deeper engagement with underlying human rights issues—and a realization that the mere act of holding elections does not by itself lead to either respect for human rights or genuine democracy. It would also require a shift away

from policies that have seen the United States avoid opportunities to level forthright

public and private criticism, and in some cases targeted diplomatic pressure, around

human rights issues. And finally, the administration must abandon a tendency to

set standards so low that governments can meet them without respecting their basic

human rights obligations at all.

NIGERIA’S 2007 ELECTIONS

Nigeria’s rigged April polls were not unique—all of Nigeria’s elections since the

end of military rule in 1999 have been marred by widespread fraud and violence.

But this year’s elections were particularly shocking because they were brazenly stolen with the collusion of the very government institutions charged with ensuring

their credibility, including Nigeria’s electoral commission and police force.

Many Nigerians were cynical about the government’s intentions long before the

elections were held, arguing they had been ‘‘programmed to fail’’ from their inception. They felt the process was more ‘‘selection’’ than ‘‘election.’’ Nonetheless, many

of the Nigerians with whom I have spoken were truly dismayed at how insulting

and hollow the voting process was in the end.

Another Human Rights Watch researcher and I spent the better part of February

through April in Nigeria and observed the gubernatorial and Presidential polls in

four states. We witnessed ballot boxes stuffed in plain view; gangs of ruling party

toughs interfering with vote collation; voters chased away from their polling units

by gangs armed with cudgels; legions of small children casting ballots; and myriad

other abuses. These observations mirrored those reported by other international and

domestic observers.

The real tragedy of the elections was best symbolized by the futile courage many

Nigerian voters, police officers, and others displayed in trying to salvage the process.

At one polling station in Katsina State, I watched a large group of voters hold their

places in line even after becoming enveloped in a cloud of tear gas. Policemen had

misfired a gas canister aimed at a gang of thugs menacing the polling station and

the voters continued to stand in line even though finding it difficult to breathe or

open their eyes.

44

At another polling station, a frantic police officer pulled me aside to tell me that

the government was stealing the election and to ask if there was anything that

could be done to stop it. And an election observer in Rivers State told me that a

group of ruling party thugs had come to her polling station, chased away everyone

waiting in line, and demanded that the young man in charge hand over the ballots.

When he refused, the thugs locked him and the ballots in the trunk of their car and

drove away laughing as he screamed in panic.

Elsewhere the elections simply did not take place. In Rivers, groups of would-be

voters sat outside all day at their designated polling centers, waiting despondently

for ballot materials and polling officials to arrive. Unfortunately they never did. The

next weekend in a town called Dutsi in Katsina State, I spent hours trying to track

down electoral officials because all the ballot papers had disappeared. In the end,

it turned out that large quantities of ballot materials had been diverted to the home

of the local government chairman. Elsewhere, ballot boxes had been stuffed and

votes counted hours before the polls were scheduled to close. The official results reported an overwhelming majority for the PDP even in places where voting did not

take place at all.

Overall, the elections period was extraordinarily violent, claiming an estimated

300 lives between the campaigns and 2 days of actual voting. Throughout much of

the country, gangs of thugs—sponsored by local politicians—attacked polling stations, sending voters fleeing as they carted off ballot materials. Sometimes, they

simply sat alongside the road stuffing ballot boxes in clear view of passers-by. In

Gombe State, my colleague interviewed a young man who was attacked with machetes and left for dead by PDP thugs who suspected that he was trying to persuade

his elderly grandmother to vote for the opposition. And in Oyo State, voters were

held hostage to the whims of a notorious political ‘‘godfather’’ who openly sponsored

armed gangs to roam the streets attacking opponents of the ruling party and its

candidates.

The United States Government Reaction

In the wake of Nigeria’s April polls, the State Department issued a statement that

expressed ‘‘regret’’ at the conduct of Nigeria’s April elections and also reaffirmed the

administration’s eagerness to build upon its ‘‘excellent bilateral relations’’ with

Abuja and to work with the Nigerian Government to improve the conduct of future

elections. This would have been an appropriate reaction if Nigeria’s April polls had

merely been ‘‘flawed.’’ But in fact the conduct of the polls displayed a determination

on the part of Nigeria’s ruling party not to allow Nigerians any real say in choosing

their next President. This in turn leaves little hope for real democratization, accountable governance, or greater respect for human rights.

The administration’s expressions of concern over April’s open display of contempt

for democratic principles have been so timid that Nigeria’s new government will see

no reason to take them seriously. That reaction seemed to express the very low expectations the administration placed upon the elections in the first place; many diplomats with whom I spoke in Abuja were privately deriding the process as an ‘‘election like event’’ months before the first ballot was cast. If anything, the message

sent by the administration’s response is that countries like Nigeria can avoid international criticism simply by going through the motions of holding periodic sham

elections.

These disturbing events should concern the administration enough to formulate

a more robust and effective response than it has previously. One in seven Africans

is a Nigerian; it is not possible to talk of promoting democracy and human rights

in Africa and ignore Nigeria. Further, the lack of any meaningful international reaction to Abuja’s open abandonment of democratic principles threatens to resonate far

beyond Nigeria’s borders.

MOVING FORWARD: LESSONS FROM CURRENT FAILURES

Rhetorically, support for human rights and good governance is a central component of U.S. policy in Africa. Too often, however, the administration’s efforts to promote democracy and accountable governance have proven scattered, inconsistent,

and unnecessarily timid. The U.S. Government has consistently proven itself a willing and helpful partner to African governments that are genuinely interested in the

promotion and protection of democracy and human rights. But the administration

has not succeeded in dealing with governments that display a palpable hostility toward suggestions of greater political openness or respect for the rights of their citizens to participate in politics. Washington could begin to address that failing, and

have a more positive impact across the continent, by focusing on three distinct policy goals:

45

(1) A Sustained Focus on Broader Human Rights and Governance Issues

Too often, U.S. policy has eschewed complex and sustained engagement with

deeper processes of reform and democratization in favor of a simpler but ineffective

focus on dramatic one-time events such as elections. It has also placed too much emphasis on maintaining good relationships with often-abusive African heads of state

while glossing over systemic problems that run far deeper than any one individual.

In some cases, policymakers give the impression that this is due to resource constraints precluding the development and implementation of more holistic policies.

The end result is shallow policies that simply do not work.

In Nigeria’s case, April’s disastrous elections were largely a reflection of a broader

crisis in governance that has originated from rampant corruption, human rights

abuses, and a basic lack of accountability on the part of government at all levels.

Nigeria’s overall human rights record remains deplorable. Corruption has hobbled

the capacity of government to spur progress despite booming oil revenues. Nigeria’s

police engage routinely in extortion and torture of criminal suspects and ordinary

civilians. Politicians foment political and ethnic violence with complete impunity, recruiting armed gangs themselves or turning religious and ethnic divisions to their

political advantage.

From 1999 until Nigeria’s April elections, U.S. policy focused on encouraging improvement in Nigeria’s electoral processes and expressing support for President

Olusegun Obasanjo, partly on the basis of his perceived commitment to reform and

democratization. The current administration did not condemn underlying patterns

of human rights abuse and corruption. Instead, it essentially treated widespread

patterns of human rights abuse and corruption as, in the words of one U.S. diplomat

in Abuja, ‘‘bumps along the road’’ to progress instead of what they actually were:

Evidence of deep, systemic problems that the Nigerian Government was doing nothing to resolve. The dividends of that approach were on display last April as Nigeria’s

Government made a mockery of its own pretenses to democratic governance through

its brazenly rigged elections.

A similar approach and corresponding results have occurred in Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s Government is one of the most repressive in Africa. The Ethiopian military has

been responsible for crimes against humanity in Gambella region and is committing

serious abuses in neighboring Somalia and its own Somali region. Security forces

routinely subject suspected government opponents to harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and in some cases, extrajudicial execution. Local officials, especially in

rural areas, subject Ethiopians to surveillance and impose a climate of fear and intimidation that discourages free speech of any kind, much less active participation

in politics. Neither the administration nor any other foreign partner of Ethiopia has

engaged robustly with those issues in the years since the current government came

to power. This partly due to a feeling that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was a reformer and a reliable international partner in spite of his government’s record on

the ground.

(2) Criticism, Confrontation, and Pressure

The United States should display a greater willingness to publicly criticize abusive governments in Africa and mobilize other forms of leverage to create pressure

for reform. There is never any ‘‘magic bullet’’ in Washington’s arsenal, but strong

public and private criticism of serious human rights abuses can lend momentum

and credibility to the efforts of domestic reformers and human rights defenders. And

Washington does have more tangible forms of leverage over many African governments, such as the power to condition military aid on meaningful human rights improvements. But these tools are often not deployed and in some cases the administration’s refusal to defend human rights principles, even rhetorically, has reached

harmful extremes.

Again, Nigeria and Ethiopia are good examples of the scale and importance of the

problem. Washington has often treated these governments as reliable partners in

the promotion of human rights and democracy rather than determined impediments.

Not only has this policy failed, but it has also emboldened leaders who have shown

a willingness to undermine basic human rights.

The administration is in no way to blame for the failure of Nigeria’s 2007 electoral

process, but its refusal level meaningful criticism against Nigeria’s corrupt, abusive,

and unaccountable government sent the wrong signals. The administration reacted

to rigged and violent elections in 1999 and 2003 with uncritical acceptance. It also

failed to urge in forceful terms that the 2007 elections be more credible than its

predecessors.

The administration’s acquiescence regarding the rigged elections of years past is

likely connected to the open and shameless manner in which the 2007 elections

were stolen. Fearing no criticism from Washington or other key allies, the Nigerian

46

authorities made little pretense even of concealing the deed. Worse, Nigeria was

proven right in its cynical assumptions about the level of U.S. interest in free and

fair elections; the administration issued only muted criticism following the 2007 debacle. The U.S. Government has also not applied any significant pressure on the

new administration of President Yar’Adua to ensure accountability for past abuses

or prevent similar ones from occurring in the future.

The U.S. Government has also not subjected Nigeria’s Government to meaningful

criticism about more systemic patterns of human rights abuse since the end of military rule in 1999. To name just a few of the most glaring examples: Since 1999,

the Nigerian military has burned several communities to the ground and murdered

several hundred Nigerian civilians. The Nigerian police routinely indulge in the

practice of torture and extortion. And Government corruption has actively fueled

conflict in the Niger Delta because federal authorities turned a blind eye to the efforts of Delta politicians to arm criminal gangs to help them rig the 2003 elections.

None of these abuses has triggered any significant public criticism or other action

on the part of the U.S. Government.

Policies marked by an even greater unwillingness to level criticism or apply diplomatic pressure have equally failed to yield positive results in Ethiopia. The United

States and other partners of Ethiopia have not publicly called upon the Ethiopian

Government to reverse and remedy systematic patterns of repression. Ethiopia held

elections in 2005 that were eagerly embraced by the administration as a sign of

progress in spite of overwhelming evidence that patterns of intimidation, harassment, and violence had made political activity impossible across much of the country. This spring, Ethiopia’s systematic and indiscriminate bombardment of Mogadishu, which caused up to 400,000 people to flee the city in a matter of weeks, failed

to generate any condemnation from Washington—and this after the administration’s

tacit support helped propel Ethiopia toward its decision to invade the country. Just

last week, after the administration was presented with news that Ethiopia’s Government would seek to impose death sentences on Ethiopia’s most prominent opposition

leaders, it only went so far as to express its ‘‘surprise’’ at the news.

The Arguments Against Speaking Out

Some U.S. officials argue that criticism and attempts at deploying leverage are

certain to prove ineffective at mobilizing change. But those sentiments are exaggerated. Washington may not have the power to bring about change on its own in most

countries but it can often lend more significant momentum to reform than any other

single actor. Just as importantly, the administration’s greater willingness to speak

out publicly on human rights issues and use what leverage is available to advance

human rights principles will lend greater credibility to U.S. policies across the continent.

The United States is Ethiopia’s largest bilateral donor of aid that includes substantial IMET and FMF military assistance. Washington is also a key international

ally of both Ethiopia and Nigeria. This does not mean that the United States can

or should dictate policy to either country, but it does guarantee that its opinion will

be taken seriously and that public criticism could lend moral support to individuals

and groups working for positive change within those countries.

By the same token, U.S. silence on human rights issues often undermines the

prospects for change by demoralizing domestic activists. Many Nigerians were dismayed at the lack of any appreciable U.S. reaction to the stolen April polls. Ethiopians hoping for greater freedoms will not be encouraged by the fact that the United

States will not even publicly condemn Addis Ababa’s stated goal of executing its

most prominent opposition leaders on trumped-up charges.

In some cases U.S. officials have also argued against applying targeted diplomatic

pressure or criticism against governments like Ethiopia and Nigeria because of a

fear of damaging relations or ‘‘isolating’’ those countries. Ethiopia is regarded as a

key regional ally in the global war on terror, while Nigeria is an increasingly important source of oil, as well as a partner in regional diplomacy and peacekeeping

efforts.

It is certainly true that the United States relationship with countries like Ethiopia and Nigeria involves real and important interests beyond the promotion of

human rights. But it is not true that the only alternative to the status quo is ‘‘isolation’’ or a complete and sudden breakdown in bilateral relations. Too often it appears that such fears are reflexively trotted out as a boogieman to justify an indefensible policy of doing and saying nothing. And in some cases the situation is even

worse than this; Ethiopia is a good example. Because the administration supported

Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia, its uncritical acceptance of the brutal ongoing military crackdown on civilian populations in the Ogaden and of abuses in Mogadishu

appears to place Washington squarely on the side of a brutally oppressive governVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
47

ment. This in a part of the world the administration already worries may emerge

as a stronghold for terrorist organizations hostile to the United States.

(3) Higher Standards

When Washington does express concern to abusive and unaccountable African regimes about their human rights records, the bar is often set so disappointingly low

that intransigent regimes can clear those hurdles without registering any meaningful progress at all. President Bush has decried what he calls a ‘‘soft bigotry of low

expectations’’ at home in U.S. education policy, but this phrase is an apt description

of the administration’s policies toward key African partners regarding human

rights.

Again, Ethiopia and Nigeria each offer a case in point. Officials within both governments have argued that human rights criticisms of their administrations are

based on unrealistic and undeliverable expectations—that countries require time to

adopt human rights and governance practices akin to what Western critics can expect in their own countries.

Such criticisms lack merit. It may be unrealistic to insist that Ethiopia’s Government transform itself into a functioning multiparty democracy overnight. It is not

out of line, however, to demand that the Ethiopian military stop staging attacks

against civilian populations in Gambella and in the Ogaden, or that Addis Ababa

refrain from executing the leaders of its opposition.

Likewise, it may be unrealistic to call upon Nigeria to stamp out corruption and

poor governance with a stroke of the pen. But it is not unrealistic to demand that

politicians who openly recruit and arm criminal gangs for the purpose of rigging

elections be held to account for the resulting abuses. Nor is it unrealistic to demand

that Nigeria’s Federal Government refrain from manipulating its own law enforcement agencies and electoral institutions for the express purpose of ensuring that

free and fair elections do not take place.

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

There are some obvious first steps the administration could take in improving the

promotion of human rights in both Nigeria and Ethiopia:

Nigeria: Nigeria’s new government came to power in elections that made a mockery of the democratic process. The administration should strongly urge Abuja to undertake urgent reforms with a goal of making government more accountable and to

avoid a similar debacle in 2011. That task is formidable but there are some obvious

starting places. The administration should publicly and privately urge the Yar’Adua

government to:

• Reform its electoral commission to make it more transparent, inclusive, and

independent.

• Act to restore credibility to its Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

(EFCC), whose reputation was badly tarnished by its harassment of the President’s political opposition before the 2007 elections. Nigeria should also conduct

transparent and far-reaching inquiries into allegations of corruption leveled

against former Governors by the EFCC that were allowed to drop. Where allegations have sufficient substance, they should result in prosecution.

• Conduct a transparent investigation into allegations of election-related corruption and improper political manipulation involving the upper echelons of its police force and electoral commission.

• Secure passage of Nigeria’s long-delayed Freedom of Information law, a key

piece of legislation that could tear away the cloak of secrecy that conceals the

shameful details of many government abuses. The bill was effectively vetoed by

President Obasanjo during his last days in office.

The United States does not have substantial economic leverage over the Nigerian

Government. Nigeria does however value its place as a respected member of the

international community. The realization that the government’s corrupt and abusive

behavior at home could impact its standing around the world will matter in Abuja.

Until Nigeria demonstrates a serious commitment to reform by at least beginning

to make tangible efforts at fundamental reform like those listed above, there should

be no bilateral meetings between Presidents Bush and Yar’Adua, and relations overall should not be as warm as they have been since 1999.

Ethiopia: The administration should abandon its current policy of what amounts

to a kind of ‘‘quiet diplomacy’’ on human rights issues, which has yielded no tangible

dividends. Instead the administration should:

• Ensure that the provisions of the ‘‘Leahy Law’’ are fully adhered to, by verifying

that no U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia is benefiting military units that violate human rights with impunity.

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• Demand that Ethiopia not pursue the death penalty against opposition leaders

and activists convicted of undermining Ethiopia’s Constitution, and insist that

the rights of all detainees to due process be respected.

• Publicly call for investigations into and accountability for ongoing human rights

abuses committed by the Ethiopian military in Somali region and Somalia, as

well as past abuses in Gambella.

• Publicly call upon Ethiopia to end systemic patterns of political repression including harassment, arbitrary detention, and torture of suspected government

opponents.

The United States must also abandon its practice of cooperating with the Ethiopian Government in secret renditions of people fleeing the conflict in Somalia and

call on the Ethiopian Government to acknowledge the real number of detainees and

permit access to these individuals by independent international monitors. No U.S.

message about human rights abuses in Ethiopia will be taken seriously so long as

the administration is also asking Ethiopia to cooperate in the illegal detention and

abusive interrogation of terrorism suspects.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria and Ethiopia represent two very different contexts where the same set of

administration policies has failed to promote human rights and genuine democracy.

Abusive, corrupt, and authoritarian governments there and in other parts of Africa

will only be emboldened if these policies are continued. Washington does possess the

means to play a more positive and prominent role in advocating and advancing

democratic reform and respect for human rights across the continent. If the administration begins to speak out about on-going abuses, insist on higher standards of

respect for human rights, and engage more deeply with the broader human rights

issues instead of just elections, there is a real opportunity to play a central role in

bringing about change. And if the administration did take that stand, it could set

an example that other key countries in Europe and elsewhere could follow in reforming their own equally flawed policies.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I appreciate your comments and let me

just say again, with regard to Nigeria, that our administration’s efforts, both prior to the election and after the election, were not absent but they were insufficient with regard to warning Nigeria

about what these elections had to look like and with regard to the

disastrous results of the election. So I think your comments are

right on target.

With regard to Ethiopia, when I met with Prime Minister Meles,

I strongly urged him not to invade Somalia in the way he did, and

he has now admitted that it was a mistake, publicly and frankly.

At least parts of our government did not seem to be sufficiently discouraging him. So there is a real disconnect between what’s happening on the ground and what we—those of us on this committee—can see happening and what the administration is doing,

and somehow this government has to come together with regard to

these issues and put the proper pressure where it needs to be.

So I appreciate your comments very much and of course, the

chairman had to leave in order to meet with the Secretary General

of the United Nations, so I appreciate his attendance.

The next witness is Ms. Akwe Amosu.

STATEMENT OF AKWE AMOSU, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST FOR

AFRICA, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. AMOSU. Thank you very much. We very much appreciate the

opportunity to testify today and I’d like to request that my full

written statement is made a part of the record.

In that statement, I have given our views at length on the course

of democratization in Africa over the past two decades and made

suggestions for how we think the United States can reduce conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tradictions in its Africa policy and strengthen its support for democracy and human rights.

But I’m going to, because of pressure of time, restrict my

remarks to Zimbabwe right now and talk about ways that I think

the United States can help to bring about a positive outcome to the

crisis.

As you know, they are due for a Presidential election in March

2008 and the mediation effort is being led by South African President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of SADC and the objective of that mediation, I would say, is to try and get to the point where the opposition MDC, it’s two factions, can agree sufficiently to participate in

a contest and agree on the outcome.

The problem is that as that mediation continues, the government

is attempting to reshape the political landscape through legislation

by changing the number of parliamentary seats and changing the

electoral rule. Also, a violent campaign of arbitrary arrests and torture is continuing, being waged by security forces against the MDC

and civil society activists, which also makes it very difficult for the

opposition or the civil society groups to respond to the mediation

process.

Then, of course, and this is dominant in everybody’s mind, the

economic situation is spiraling downward. We have seen that the

government’s response to that is to print more money and launch

predatory attacks on the private sector. The speed of deterioration

is so great that even cautious observers are speculating that the regime is unlikely to last another year and some would say even as

soon as Christmas.

Whenever there is finally a collapse or a crunch, the people who

are trying to manage this crisis, I think, are trying to achieve a

number of objectives. First of all, to try and achieve as smooth a

departure from power as possible for Robert Mugabe and to replace

him with a team, an administration that is motivated to restore

order and stabilize the political environment.

Second, to negotiate an agreement with international donors, a

financial package that can fund economic stabilization, manage the

hyperinflation and restore bank and investor confidence. Third, to

depoliticize and reprofessionalize the security forces and the

ZANU–PF militias, that are so key to President Mugabe’s control

of the present situation. Fourth, to repeal the repressive laws that

make free association and open contestation and political life impossible, and fifth, to try and attract home the many hundreds of

thousands of Zimbabweans, particularly the middle classes so that

they can help rebuild.

It’s important to say that President Mugabe has been very successful at playing the race card throughout this period and that

that has made international engagement much more complicated.

I’d say that even his neighbors are nervous about being accused of

being puppets of Western imperialism and, therefore, have not

been nearly as critical as they could have been. But it does seem

to be extremely important that the world should not be intimidated

by that. No nation that wishes to speak up in defense of human

rights should be intimidated from doing so and in that regard, the

United States, which is one of the primary butts of Mugabe’s rhetVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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oric, should not lie low as is so often recommended and was alluded

to earlier.

The civil society organizations that we work with have repeatedly pointed out to us that Ambassador Dell’s loud critique of what

is happening has been absolutely vital in protecting the safety of

many of the individuals who have been targeted by the Security

Forces and so we would strongly recommend that this continue.

We also hear from our civil society partners on the ground that

they believe that the U.S. support for democracy and human rights

groups on the ground is very, very important. They want it to continue and indeed, to increase. They feel very embattled and as the

months go by, they become more embattled.

We see two scenarios ahead. One is that there is an economic collapse before the mediation is able to accomplish anything. In that

situation, we—although obviously suffering on the ground will increase, on the other hand, I think it will open opportunities to find

individuals and previous loyalists who are willing to enter negotiations and in the meantime, we don’t think that the United States

should accede to the demand that they lift sanctions and indeed,

we would like to see the United States continue its international

advocacy, particularly with the EU, ahead of the summit in December, to get everybody to hold the line on Zimbabwe.

The other side—the other scenario, is that the mediation proceeds and that there is an agreement before an economic implosion.

I think on that front, our alarm would be that a quick fix solution

is what is agreed between the opposition politicians and ZANU–PF

government and it’s extremely important, we believe, that there

should be a thorough going transformation. This isn’t just about

moving the deck chairs on the Titanic. This is about trying to reorganize the political space so that all, particularly the nongovernmental actors, feel that they are operating freely and able to pursue free association. From that point of view, we feel strongly that

it’s important for the United States and other international partners to make that point to the South Africans and to the people

in the region.

I know I’ve run out of time but one final point; I think for the

United States, one very major contribution that can be made is to

help donors put together the economic package that will be so critical to managing a smooth transition out of this crisis. That particularly requires that countries that have previously supported

Zimbabwe, like China, should be integrated into that package so

there are not alternative channels through which the ZANU–PF

government can find ways to avoid complying with the international will and managing a safe transition out.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Amosu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AKWE AMOSU, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, OPEN SOCIETY

INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

My name is Akwe Amosu and I am a senior policy analyst at the Washington office of the Open Society Institute. I work across a range of African issues and bring

to my job a history of over 20 years as a journalist focused on African affairs, mostly

at the BBC World Service but also at allAfrica.com, the Financial Times and West

Africa magazine. During my career I have traveled extensively in Africa, living at

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different times in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia, and reporting on and interviewing key individuals and newsmakers. My remarks are founded on those years

of observation and analysis and draw greatly on the expertise of my Africa-focused

colleagues in the Soros Foundation Network.

ADVANCES TOWARD OPEN SOCIETIES IN AFRICA

Africa today is a very different place than it was at the end of the cold war, a

time of military coups, stage-managed and stagnant politics and personality-led regimes propped up for decades without change by outside sponsors. As the world’s

two superpowers lost interest in controlling African allegiances, a political thaw

began, and their local clients lost their power to maintain absolute control over the

political terrain.

By the early 1990s what has come to be seen as a ‘‘wave of democracy’’ was

sweeping the continent, starting in western, francophone Africa with 1991’s Benin

landmark election and resulted in 26 countries holding Presidential elections within

the next 3 years. The end of apartheid in South Africa removed the last and most

entrenched bastion of repression. By 1994 there was not a single one-party state left

in sub-Saharan Africa.

Although political transformation in the 1990s proved to be of variable intensity

and longevity, often turned out to be new wine in old bottles, the change on the continent has been lasting. The incidence of military coups has dropped so far as to

become negligible and there is an indisputable increase in functional democracies.

In 1989 only three countries in Africa could claim to have democratic governments.

This coming November, 13 African countries are expected to be invited to the ministerial meeting of the Community of Democracies in Bamako, Mali, and a further

six, seen as close to meeting the standard, invited as observers.

As I will discuss below, this is not to say that all is well; much of Africa continues

to struggle with major deficits in governance and poverty and the early momentum

for change, so evident in the early mid-1990s, has slowed significantly. But we need

to recognize what has been achieved as much as we need to identify the barriers

to further advance.

An additional critically important development has been the advent of a new generation of intracontinental institutions, above all the African Union, but also the

New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD, and its self-assessment program, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); the African Commission on

Human and Peoples Rights; the Pan-African Parliament; and the forthcoming African Court, to name only a few. As research and debate have thrust governance

issues to the fore, progress has been made in developing normative frameworks for

democratic governance at national, subregional, and continental levels. Africa now

has some of the most progressive constitutional provisions in the world. Human

rights and electoral standards have been developed at subregional and continental

levels, most notably with the recent adoption of the African Charter on Democracy,

Elections and Governance.

Where the Organization of African Unity was barely more than a club for the ‘‘big

men’’ first of African independence and then of cold-war politics, with a gentleman’s

agreement not to interfere in each others affairs, the African Union is an institution

whose statutes affirm the importance of substance, of accountability, of human

rights, and the obligation to uphold those rights not only at home but in your neighbor’s back yard too. Undoubtedly in practice, these aspirational standards are often

not met and the development of these institutions is a work in progress; but the

challenge is no longer the lack of standards but enforcement.

Interstate and civil war, long seen as a huge brake on African progress, has

surged at various periods during the past 15 years, yet the levers for challenging

and bringing those conflicts under control are more numerous, the constituencies

pressing for peace are vocal and more powerful and their leverage is greater. Specifically we have seen cessation of major violent conflicts in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Liberia, the DRC, and

Coˆte d’Ivoire. The United States has played a significant and contributory role in

support of conflict resolution, mitigation, and prevention during the past 15 years.

Thus, even as we lament the suffering and demand a just peace in Darfur, the DRC

or northern Uganda, we may also agree that levels of African mobilization, diplomatic effort, and engagement for peace in Africa are unprecedented.

CIVIL SOCIETY UNLEASHED—A CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT

For the Soros Foundation Network, committed as we are to open societies, perhaps the greatest advance of this period has been the birth and growth of civil sociVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ety, the nongovernmental actors and groupings that we believe are essential to the

functioning of a democracy.

Effectively suppressed by censorship and repression during the cold-war era,

would-be activists for women’s rights and a host of other issues, professionals seeking to raise their standards, lawyers seeking to test and improve their country’s jurisprudence, citizens demanding information about government expenditure have all

come out into the sun and continue to expand their engagement, commitment, and

skills to hold politicians and rulers to account. Their emergence has had a galvanizing effect on wider society.

The importance of this development cannot be overemphasized because despite

the positive political developments listed above, there is a very long way still to go.

The continent continues to be the site of gross injustice, poverty, sectarianism, and

graft. Alarmingly, as globalization advances, some of the gravest problems seem to

entrench and become worse. In particular, countries that are endowed—many would

say cursed—with fossil fuels and other high-demand minerals, are demonstrating

poor governance of the worst kind. But as we acknowledge this, we also note that

one of the most effective, fastest growing civil society networks in Africa today is

the Publish What You Pay coalition. Its constituent members across the continent

work intensely, daily exchanging information and strategies with each other to get

transparency laws passed or gain access to government information, training themselves to interpret budgets and disseminate information about corporate and government malfeasance.

One significant trend has been toward the ‘‘indigenisation’’ of leadership and

staffing in many of the international NGOs that work in Africa. From their old incarnation as foreign-led charities seeking to ameliorate suffering, they are increasingly advocacy organizations, seeking to become smarter and get at the root of problems wherever in the world they may be found, and working collaboratively with

local and international partners.

It is important not to romanticize the growth in civil society and to acknowledge

that alongside the domestic thrust, international donors’ priorities and dollars have

played a significant role in driving the sector. Furthermore, donor enthusiasm for

funding the nongovernmental sector has in some contexts damaged and undermined

the state’s capacity to deliver services, and has sometimes given unaccountable

NGOs too much power in a landscape of weak and underresourced institutions. That

said, the enabling of a cadre of skilled and highly motivated Africans in multiple

sectors to contribute to their countries from outside the official sphere is a huge dividend of the past two decades, shining a light into places and onto issues that are

often not in government, or indeed donor interest, to acknowledge.

PERSISTENT GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES

Some African countries stand out in the strides they have made toward better

governance, for example Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius,

Senegal, and South Africa. Others, such as Mozambique, Madagascar, Kenya, and

Liberia are moving in the right direction. But even as we praise the momentum and

achievements in these countries, we must acknowledge the huge deficits in others

that seem to be going in the opposite direction.

The honeymoon euphoria that accompanied the first ‘‘wave of democratization’’ is

now over. In some countries democratic transition has been stalled, in others it has

been actively blocked, and in yet others it has produced flawed outcomes. In most

instances, the African state is a primary route to resources and rent for ambitious

individuals; this is mostly the case because the institutions that theoretically protect

a state from being captured in this way prove unable to do their jobs. Institutions

of democratic governance such as legislatures, political parties, and civil society formations are usually subordinate to an overbearing and predatory executive, with a

negative impact on policymaking and implementation.

More than half Africa’s countries remain highly autocratic, despite sometimes distracting attention with the fig-leaf of elections and other democracy-associated exercises. Nowhere is this more evident than in countries with mineral wealth. They are

strengthened in their political choices by huge incomes, and assiduous courting by

foreign governments—whether from the West or East—that wish to gain access to

their oil. Oil-rich countries make up nearly half the continent’s authoritarian or

autocratic governments including Angola, Chad, Republic of the Congo (ROC),

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea (EG), Gabon, Guinea,

Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan.

These countries present a predictable mix of contrasting statistics. On the one

hand they display ‘‘growth rates’’ far higher than those of nonproducers of petroleum, sometimes of the order of 20 or 30 percent. Equatorial Guinea, one of the

53

most deplorably underdeveloped countries anywhere on the planet can nonetheless

claim to have the second highest per capita income in the world ($26,000), after

Luxembourg. On the other hand, such riches benefit no one except a tiny elite at

the top of the political food chain. Over half Equatorial Guinea’s 520,000 people

have no access to safe drinking water and three-quarters live on less than $2 a day,

despite annual oil revenues of over $2.7bn per year.

Also typical is a variable degree of political oppression and lack of security for citizens. At the extreme end of the scale, Equatorial Guinea, for example is ranked by

Freedom House alongside countries such as Uzbekistan, Haiti, and Zimbabwe and

boasts an extensive and documented record of human rights abuses. Arbitrary detention, torture, execution, and stifling of political comment or debate are the order

of the day. EG was, in June 2007, added to the U.S. human trafficking black list

as a ‘‘tier 3’’ country for failing to do enough to prevent mainly women and children

being captured and used as slave labor or in forced prostitution. Other oil-producing

countries present a less extreme picture, but demonstrate major political and

human rights deficits nonetheless. In most of these locations it is hard to find major

advances in democratic development.

Of all the countries on the continent, oil producer Nigeria’s commitment to a

democratic path is the most critical. For better or for worse, it is seen as a leader.

Eight years under President Olusegun Obasanjo began with great hope for reform

but ended in profound disappointment and anger. Some reforms were important and

of lasting value, particularly in the financial sector, including a vigorous anticorruption agency which is nonetheless tarnished by clear partisan bias against the former

President’s enemies. For the most part, however, there has been little change. Obscene poverty has continued despite soaring oil and unprecedented oil receipts

($223bn during Obasanjo’s tenure—some two and a half times the receipts of the

preceding 8 years, according to Nigeria analyst Professor Jean Herskovits); the professional middle-class battles to survive as their sectors are starved of investment

or support and infrastructure continues to deteriorate. Major cities limp along without adequate power supply as the country struggles to meet even a fraction of the

demand for refined fuel products, leading to constant shortages; agriculture which

should be the backbone of the economy is largely neglected, and there is negligible

support for indigenous industry—resulting in large-scale closures (1,800 since 1999

according to the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria) as cheap imports deliver a

final knock-out punch.

The Obasanjo government, like its predecessors, failed to share the benefits of the

enclave economy, while allowing politicians to steal mind-boggling volumes of cash.

At the end of the Obasanjo era 31 of the 36 state governors had been investigated

for corruption by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and now that the

official immunity is ended, charges are beginning to be laid. The EFCC has been

widely quoted as saying that $400bn in state revenues has been wasted or lost to

corruption in the 47 years since independence.

A review of Nigeria’s much criticized 2007 poll, the preelection period and the voting exercise itself brings into relief the venality afflicting parts of the political class,

the strong impulse in the incumbent party toward one-party rule and the capacity

deficits—or malfeasance—of some government officials. The course of the election

and nature of its failure is extensively documented elsewhere and will be dealt with

by another witness at this hearing so I will not go into further detail. However, it

is worth noting, in line with the points made about the importance of civil society

above, that the numerous nongovernmental organizations engaged in trying to monitor and strengthen the political transition process played a vital role in exposing

malpractice and defining the standard.

The Alliance for Credible Elections, ACE, a coalition of nearly 20 organizations

focused on religion, gender rights, human rights, legal issues and other sectors, articulated the problems besetting Nigeria’s political system, ensuring that the leading

voice of the critique is domestic and preempting the standard defense used by African governments that they are the victim of foreign prejudice and imperialist designs. Further, some of the most impressive individuals who ran for office have a

long history of working in civil society structures, including activism and leadership

against military dictatorship. Without their participation and commitment, there

would be greater doubt about Nigeria’s chances of eventual progress toward true

democracy.

LIMITATIONS ON U.S. AFRICA POLICY

With the strong message from the start of the Bush administration that the

United States would seek to strengthen and promote democracy, it might be expected that the African human rights and democracy advocates would win strong

54

support from Washington. Indeed, U.S. policy is in many ways excellent: As stated

by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL),

the intention is to strengthen and where necessary, defend good governance and associated transparent and accountable institutions under the rule of law, free and

fair election processes, and robust civil society and independent media. The introduction this year of a Human Rights Defenders Fund and ten guidelines in support

of NGOs were valuable additions to the policy framework and toolset.

In some key locations and instances, the United States has played a key and positive role in supporting a transition from conflict to peace. The U.S. investment in

the peace process in Southern Sudan immediately comes to mind, as does the solid

support given to Liberia and to Sierra Leone. There appear to be some challenges,

however, in the delivery of stated policy that seem to be rooted in conflicting U.S.

interests on two fronts in particular.

The ‘‘War on Terror’’

The first is the ‘‘War on Terror,’’ which impacts relationships in Africa on a number of levels. At one extreme, it can result in serious policy incoherence as one part

of the administration pursues an essentially political approach while another adopts

a military one, as in Somalia. In another example the administration apparently

faces a dilemma as it tries to decide which aspect of its relationship with the

Sudanede Government should take precedence, that of intelligence collaboration

with the Sudanese National Security and Intelligence Service, or pressing Khartoum

to end the Darfur conflict.

Countries that have made a point of overtly aligning themselves with U.S. narratives and policies regarding terrorism appear to have benefited not only from financial and military support but seem successfully to have diverted attention away

from their internal poor governance and human rights abuse, or, at least, have managed to water down complaints. The contrast between heavy international criticism

of the Meles government in Ethiopia when over 190 unarmed civilians protesting

over contested election outcomes were killed by security forces and the comparatively mild critique from Washington registered widely. Collaboration between the

United States and Ethiopia during the latter’s invasion in December of Somalia is

often cited as the other side of the same coin. The conclusion widely drawn is that

U.S. commitment to human rights and good governance is pragmatic. The suggestion is that Washington is willing to take a strong stand on human rights where

it has little or no interest at risk, as in Zimbabwe for example, but it will not do

so with conviction where it has other pressing goals that call for an emollient

approach.

Such tensions are evident in the U.S. relationship with Egypt (which in the African Union is very much viewed as an African country), a U.S. ally in the War on

Terror. Egypt’s record on democracy and human rights according to DRL is profoundly flawed: The State Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices states that ‘‘The government’s respect for human rights and the overall

human rights situation remained poor,’’ going on to cite ‘‘persistent and credible reports of abuse and torture at police stations and prisons, and police violence.’’ The

government made ‘‘no significant progress’’ on its own program of political reform;

instead a culture of impunity protected security personnel accused of abuse, the judiciary was under pressure from the executive, there are arbitrary and mass arrests, corruption and lack of transparency, to name only some of the complaints.’’

Yet, as reported in the Washington Post on Sunday June 10, in a major speech on

democracy, President Bush’s avoided mention of such deficits, commenting only that

Egypt ‘‘has a great distance to still travel.’’ Such a mild remark should have provoked such a furious response from Cairo is its own comment on the level of U.S.

critique in the past. African governments that flout human rights norms repeatedly

delay elections, use violence and repressive laws against opposition voices, and

refuse to be held accountable have drawn their own conclusions.

If the ‘‘War on Terror’’ makes Washington sometimes ambivalent about its priorities in relation to African governments, it conversely tends to harden public attitudes. Global perceptions that the United States is anti-Islam and hostile to Muslim

nations are echoed in Africa. For example, in the recently published Pew Global Attitudes Survey only 32 percent of Nigerian Muslims, (down from 38 percent in

2003), have a favorable view of the United States, compared with 89 percent of

Christians. While the two groups differ in their viewpoints on other issues, nowhere

is the gap as wide or polarized as in their attitudes to the United States. Undoubtedly local tensions between the two communities are revealed in these statistics but

such low approval ratings in such a large sector of the population of a country seen

as so important to the United States should give policymakers pause for thought.

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cent, a particularly high figure by comparison with other non-Western countries, but

apparently boosted by the strongly supportive Christian population. By 2006, support had tumbled to 49 percent.

Too few surveys of public opinion are carried out in Africa to give a reliable indicator of views across the continent. However if commentary carried in media in dozens of countries gives any indication of public sentiment, U.S. unilateralism, U.S.

responsibility for the Iraq war and the perceptions of anti-Muslim bias are widely

held.

The oil factor

A second major area of contradiction lies in U.S. relations with Africa’s oil-rich

nations. The U.S. Government is frank about the importance it assigns to oil supplies, and particularly to the need to diversify toward sources outside the Middle

East. The Gulf of Guinea is a critically important alternative source from where the

United States intends to source some 25 percent of its petroleum needs by 2020.

That imperative has acquired a sharper edge, in the light of China’s intense interest

in the same zone for the same reason.

For illustration, we can examine further the case of Equatorial Guinea. This state

has long been associated with some of the worst governance abuses in Africa, so notorious that the United States had cause in the 1990s to close its Embassy there.

A Senate enquiry in 2004 into the role of Riggs Bank in providing financial services

to EG’s ruling Obiang family revealed graft of striking proportions. To confirm that

this continued to be the pattern we might note that only this year, news has

emerged of the President’s son purchasing a Malibu mansion for $35m; there can

be little doubt that the national treasury was the ultimate source of the funds. The

State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices complains that the

government of President Obiang has both committed and condoned serious abuses,

including: ‘‘Abridgement of citizens’ right to change their government; torture, beating, and other physical abuse of prisoners and detainees by security forces; harsh

and life-threatening prison conditions; impunity; arbitrary arrest, detention, and incommunicado detention; harassment and deportation of foreign residents; judicial

corruption and lack of due process; restrictions on the right to privacy; severe restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press restrictions on the right of assembly, association, and movement; government corruption; violence and discrimination

against women, trafficking in persons; discrimination against ethnic minorities; restrictions on labor rights and child labor; and forced child labor.’’

Yet despite all this, in the same year that these abuses were recorded, Secretary

of State Condoleeza Rice posed for photographers with President Obiang in Washington telling him on April 12, 2006, ‘‘You are a good friend and we welcome you.’’

In response he told her: ‘‘We have extremely good relations with the United States.

Our country has had good relations with the United States for a very long time and

my visit here is simply in order to consolidate and also to establish further ties of

cooperation with your country.’’ Why should the Government of the United States

which has so strongly proclaimed its commitment to democracy and human rights,

seek to do business with Equatorial Guinea? The obvious answer is oil; but for

many, it is difficult to square stated U.S. policy and the pragmatic imperative.

In the case of Nigeria, too, the United States appears keen not to alienate that

country’s rulers. Reviewing the U.S. position on the just-ended two terms of President Olusegun Obasanjo, particularly the clear departures from democratic standards that accelerated toward the end of his term, one is unavoidably led to the conclusion that Washington either pulled its punches or failed to deliver them at all.

Perhaps this might have been excused in the first term. There was an international perception at the time of the 1999 election that deficits in that poll were

acceptable if a successful transition away from military rule was accomplished.

President Obasanjo benefited from enormous confidence expressed by the U.S. Government in that endeavor. But after serious malpractice in the 2003 election, the

administration failed to issue any trenchant condemnation despite multiple critical

reports from international observers and Nigerian civil society monitors. This year,

months before the 2007 vote approached there was clear evidence of intent to rig

the outcome, yet no strong warnings were issued in Washington. At the poll itself,

monitors saw an exercise of such manipulation, conducted with such impunity, that

they could barely bring themselves to call it an election. Only mild criticism followed

from Washington, and come the inauguration of the newly (s)elected President

Yar’Adua, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer traveled

to Abuja to attend. Days later, President Yar’Adua flew to Germany as a guest of

the G–8 before the ink was dry on the falsified returns.

The cynicism in Nigeria about the election outcome was already so deep, not much

could have made it worse. There is, of course, acknowledgement of the huge imporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tance to the United States of maintaining good relations with its most important

ally and oil supplier in the Gulf of Guinea but nothing has been said by Washington

that clearly locates the blame for what happened and the U.S.’s stated commitment

to democracy in Nigeria is seriously undermined. Although the State Department

has promised to engage vigorously with the Nigerian Government to help it improve

its elections in the future, the record of the past undermines the credibility of such

pledges. The rush to consolidate relations with the new regime represents a lost opportunity that could have been used to get commitment on remedial work and a ‘‘to

do list’’ that could have gone some way to restoring confidence. It is not too late

for the U.S. Government to make a more trenchant critique than it has thus far

made of the deficits of recent election in Nigeria and to propose a more thoroughgoing program of political and electoral reform, both nationally and in the oil-producing Delta, than so far elaborated.

HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN STRENGTHEN ITS APPROACH

So how should the U.S. Government respond to democratic reversals and autocratic repression in Africa? The practically minded will assert the U.S. Government

has no choice but to be pragmatic. Up to a point this is true but the law of diminishing returns seems to be in force. The more loudly the USG proclaims its commitment to democracy and human rights, the more potential there is for damage if its

subsequent actions and alliances contradict the stated policy.

Perhaps, too, it is worth asking whether the United States is defining its interests

appropriately. It may be understandable that concern to guarantee oil supplies or

seize a security opportunity leads the USG to prioritize the short-term advantage

and there is doubtless a reasonable chance that some of the advantage gained can

be converted to longer term assets. However the tradeoffs, as described above, can

set back the cause of democracy in these countries and lower U.S. credibility and

leverage elsewhere; in the long run, and this may prove to be the more significant

loss.

The recommendations below are made with a view to reestablishing credibility

and confidence in a consistent message of commitment from the United States to

building African democracy

At home

(a) Define U.S. interests over the long term. There is strong evidence to suggest

there would be greater advantage for the United States in taking a long view in

its Africa relations. The problem of making African political economies more functional, more efficient, and more stable is essentially a challenge of governance. In

their book, ‘‘The Democracy Advantage,’’ Morton Halperin, Joseph Siegel, and Michael Weinstein demonstrate that democratic or quasi-democratic systems function

better across a range of indicators than autocracies and authoritarian governments.

The more effective political or service institutions and business and financial systems, and the freer the press, the more balanced and sustained a country’s economic

growth will be; and the less vulnerable the state will be to hijack by sectional interests who may well be opposed to the United States and its goals.

Conversely, systems that allow or indeed rely on wholesale corruption, and opaque

administration, ethnic or other exclusion, censorship and restrictions on fundamental freedoms, are inherently unstable systems that may at worst encourage

armed rebellion and civil conflict, but at best, hemorrhage funds that are needed

for development and generate politicians that have too little connection with, or

commitment to, the electorate. Hoping such states will turn into democracies is in

vain, whatever rhetoric emanates from their capitals.

These are not articles of faith but demonstrable facts, underpinned by solid data.

While many factors need to be in alignment for forward progress to be achieved, the

longer a country is on the right track, the less likely it is, the research shows, to

slide back. The United States and other foreign governments that, in their own interest as much as anyone else’s, wish to see African countries develop along the

democratic path need to commit to a long-term process. Repeated changes of direction according to short-term imperatives and shifting alliances will not advance the

cause.

(b) Adopt policies that will help the United States to rebuild political capital and

standing in Africa. There is thus an urgent need for Washington to get behind some

clear and principled positions in at least some key problem areas in Africa and stick

to them. This also implies working more openly through multilateral institutions

and frameworks so as to be seen to be upholding those positions, rather than risking

the perception that principles are being traded bilaterally behind closed doors for

mutual advantage.

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The United States has suffered a serious loss of political capital in recent years,

partly because prodemocracy rhetoric is so often undermined by other perceived imperatives. The gap between what Washington says and what it does has widened,

indicating to the least democratically minded that principles can be bargained away.

The related loss of goodwill and convening power is serious, particularly since it

comes as new powers such as China and India are rising, offering weak African

states alternative alliances.

This need not mean inevitable loss of leverage. The United States remains the

most powerful nation, and most African states will wish to maintain good relations

even on tougher terms than are currently being applied. Only in this way will the

United States regain the respect and convening power it used to have; and nowhere

is this truer than in relation to the oil-rich states of the continent.

(c) Address perceived policy incoherence at home. Diverse objectives being pursued

by a mix of Washington agencies present a contradictory picture in Africa. The most

obvious example is that of Somalia where it can be difficult to tell whether the

United States is trying to stabilize the country or pursue a low-level war.

There is also a need for greater clarity about whether military or civilian objectives are defining U.S. policy in particular settings, and whether the appropriate

agency is in the driving seat. Unease about this issue was aired in Senator Lugar’s

report last December to the Committee on Foreign Relations on ‘‘Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign.’’ He noted the apparent expansion in the

mission of DOD activities in line with increased funding and expanding volumes of

foreign assistance delivered by the military; he cited other countries’ concern, revealed in SFRC staff research, about a possible militarization of U.S. engagement

in their countries thanks to the ‘‘War on Terror’’ and warned that this could be damaging to the United States interests and reputation. I believe this danger exists in

Africa where civil society groups I have spoken with express anxiety about the possibility of a greater U.S. military focus on Africa, particularly given the advent of

the Africa Command.

In Africa

(d) Where a crisis of governance is evident, admit it and uphold consistent standards. There is a need for Washington to speak out more firmly on poor practice

wherever it is found, and to be more frank even when its allies are under the spotlight. Equatorial Guinea’s failure to address its people’s poverty and respect their

human rights is deplorable. Repression and immiseration in Zimbabwe are similarly

deplorable. Yet, to judge from U.S. public utterances in relation to the two countries,

EG’s transgression pales into insignificance compared with Zimbabwe’s. The reality

is that the Obiang regime, with its unconvincing election victories, massive diversion of public funds for planes, luxury cars and mansions in fashionable locations,

and a horrific record on torture and political repression deserves to be excoriated

by Washington yet its President is soothed with flattery while the language used

about President Mugabe is exceptionally harsh.

Not only does this undermine U.S. credibility with African observers, but other

major oil-producing states such as Angola, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo take

note of the contrast and gain confidence that their own malpractice will be similarly

swept under the carpet. In Nigeria, the pattern of progressively worsening impunity

in the three past elections suggests that a failure to make clear critiques and demand genuine improvement effectively encourages worsening practice. If the avoidance of criticism is intended to protect U.S. access to Nigerian oil, the evidence does

not seem to suggest it is working; as graft and poor governance inflame protest and

rebel violence in the Delta, with the attendant damage to production (down over a

fifth in 2006), the opposite effect may result.

(e) Incentivise change and commitment toward democratic policies. USG aid

should seek to reinforce and strengthen indigenous efforts to fix problems, rather

than impose externally originated solutions. Where foreign aid is offered as a carrot,

or withheld as a stick, the objective should clearly relate to the recipient’s own interests rather than Washington’s.

In nonemergency contexts, the United States should strengthen programs like the

Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Millennium Challenge Account

(MCA) that offer incentives and rewards for those countries that want to free up

their economies and political environments. The MCA program should be expanded

rather than having to struggle for funds. This kind of assistance rewards success

and ensures that countries that do the hard work to improve their systems can see

the benefits. In line with the MCA approach, the United States could invest in helping to make the AU’s peer review mechanism work well, with a view to making it

the eventual basis on which eligibility for aid is decided. This is the approach that

is taken in the EU strategy for Africa adopted in December 2005 and the European

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Commission’s August 2006 Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development. The policy documents propose a shift from ‘‘conditionality’’

to ‘‘ownership’’ with regard to governance such that the EU decides to work with

countries that seek to implement their own reforms and meet their own high standards rather than those imposed from outside.

In situations where stabilization assistance is appropriate, the United States

should restrict any conditionality to requiring the recipient’s policies to align with

good governance principles and approaches. Aid, or denial of aid should not be used

as a lever to persuade recipient governments to align or comply with the U.S. security or other objectives (as with ‘‘Article 98’’ case when U.S. military aid was made

conditional on governments agreeing not to extradite U.S. soldiers to the International Criminal Court. Long lasting negative feeling toward the United States

was generated by this measure, both among those governments that signed and

those who declined to do so).

(f) Support African regional institutions to play a positive role. The African Union

is an organization with a mandate to advance good governance and political stability and promises that its members will intervene to ensure that not only they but

their neighbors comply. The AU and the subregional organizations such as

ECOWAS, SADC, and others are crucial to making progress on governance and development. While they do not always go as far as the United States would like, or

act with conviction, and while capacity is not as skilled or bold as necessary, much

has been and is being achieved. Institutions are taking decisions that break new

ground in Africa and particularly help to set standards and norms for democracy

and human rights. While the United States has done well to appoint an Ambassador

to the AU it should put increasing effort into supporting and building Pan-African

institutions to play a stronger role vis-a-vis national entities.

One obvious target is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in which African governments subject themselves to self-examination by their own teams and by

bodies outside government, across a range of fronts. OSI’s African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP), a program that among other things seeks

to track the effectiveness of the APRM, has concluded that this program is, despite

some setbacks, a serious effort by African leaders to improve governance on the continent and that peer review has not turned out to be the paper exercise that some

anticipated. The APRM is seen by African leaders as an indigenous program, not

one imposed by the World Bank or other donors. It urgently requires more staff and

more engagement from outside donors. Assistance of this nature clearly avoids suspicion of political manipulation.

CHALLENGES FOR STATES IN TRANSITION: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE

The commentary above has sought to frame a set of opportunities and challenges

for overall democratization in Africa. I believe it is similarly important the United

States adopts broad principles in support of countries exiting from crisis, conflict or

a period of regression and entering transitions critical to the implantation of democracy.

The most significant transition currently unfolding is that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo whose transition program is proving long and slow but has registered real progress. Even though the election is over and a newly elected government is in charge, it is critical that the United States and all other international

partners continue to collaborate in a multilateral framework with the insistence

that the Kabila government allows space for the opposition and is serious about restoring security. In this context, making assistance conditional on compliance is reasonable; the huge international investment made to help the DRC get onto a

healthy path to development in an open society should not be put at risk because

of a reluctance to dictate from outside. Sovereignty is important and must be respected but a country in transition, with institutions that are not robust, often fails

to fulfill its responsibilities. Aid should not flow where the new incumbent seems

intent on reversing such hard-won gains in favor of consolidating his power; international donors should not abandon their multilateral approach and revert to bilateral negotiation since this will doom attempts to apply pressure.

Perhaps the challenge that should most concern policymakers, however, is the crisis in Zimbabwe. Formally, elections are due for March 2008 and a mediation effort

led by South African President Thabo Mbeki, mandated by the regional body, the

Southern African Development Community (SADC) is supposed to persuade President Mugabe and his ZANU–PF party and the opposition in the form of the two

factions of the Movement for Democratic Change to agree on the terms of a political

contest that puts the country on a new path. However even as the mediation effort

continues to apparently little effect, the Mugabe government is attempting to reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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write the political landscape with legislation aimed at expanding the number of parliamentary seats and changing electoral rules. A campaign of arbitrary arrest and

torture has been waged against MDC leaders and civil society cadres making it difficult for the party to respond effectively to the mediation process. All this against

a backdrop of the economy’s accelerating downward spiral, featuring serious food

and fuel shortages, which the government addresses by printing more money and

launching predatory attacks on the private sector. The speed of deterioration is leading even cautious observers to speculate that the Mugabe regime is unlikely to survive another year.

However and at whatever stage the political economy unravels, those hoping to

arrest the crisis are seeking to achieve a number of objectives:

• Achieve a smooth departure from power of Robert Mugabe and his replacement

with a team and administration motivated to restore order and with the authority and ability to stabilize the political environment. A transfer of authority is

widely assumed to be possible through the election scheduled for March 2008

but this imposes a deadline that might not provide sufficient time for a thoroughgoing transition to be achieved.

• Negotiation of an agreement with international donors of a financial package

that can fund overall economic stabilization, end hyperinflation and restore

bank and investor confidence this will allow for service delivery to be restored

and get basic consumer goods and fuel back into circulation.

• Depoliticisation and reprofessionalisation of the security forces, the judicial system and parastatals controlling key services in the economy; demobilization of

militias and hit squads responsible for terrorizing civilians.

• Repeal of the repressive laws that make free political association and open contestation impossible; inauguration as soon as practicable of a new constitution

providing a level playing field.

• Attract the return of Zimbabweans, particularly middle-class professionals, who

have fled to other parts of Africa and further afield to staff the recovery.

President Mugabe’s successful playing of the race card throughout his desperate

campaign to remain in power has made international engagement more complicated

and highly contested. Even neighboring Southern African governments suffering

negative impact from the chaos, particularly in being forced to host millions of refugees, are reluctant to be critical for fear they become identified as puppets of ‘‘Western imperialists.’’ Unfortunately, the deionization of the United Kingdom and

United States from Harare has found fertile ground in a broader international antagonism toward the United States in relation to the war in Iraq and regime

change. This in turn must affect U.S. leverage.

So how can the United States make an effective contribution to ensuring

Zimbabwe’s transition back to economic and political stability in a democratic

system?

No nation that wishes to speak up in defense of human rights should be intimidated from doing so; in that regard, arguing the United Kingdom and United States,

as primary butts of Mugabe’s rhetoric, should lie low cannot be right. Zimbabwean

civil society organizations have repeatedly made the point that outgoing U.S. Ambassador Christopher Dell’s leadership and insistence on bearing witness to security

forces action has probably saved the lives of some opposition individuals. However

Mugabe’s use of divisive ideology to confuse discussion on the Zimbabwe crisis calls

for a sophisticated strategy that, while it may include some trenchant criticism, also

implies work behind the scenes to undermine the racial and sectarian messaging

that has effectively extended Mugabe’s political life.

The United States, working with other international donors, supplies food aid and

also support and training for civil society groups and opposition voices seeking to

improve governance.

The message from groups on the ground is that they wish the latter support to

continue, or indeed increase. Civil society organizations have played a major role in

guarding the little space for assertion of democratic values that remains in

Zimbabwe today. They are now under siege. Capacity has diminished with many

young activists leaving the country due to practical considerations of survival.

Even if Washington has been disappointed by the weak progress of the SADC initiative to date, there needs to be recognition that the United States has few interests and therefore limited leverage over Zimbabwe and the wider region. For that

reason, there are few alternative frameworks through which to work and it is important to keep up diplomatic efforts to engage the SADC governments, African governments elsewhere on the continent and the African Union Commission on the

Zimbabwe issue.

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One possible scenario is that the mediation effort is preempted by economic collapse; in practical terms the government runs out of strategies to extract the resources it needs to maintain the political patronage and repression that is keeping

it in power. The closer we come to that situation, the more likely the divisions already evident in the ruling elite will widen. While this carries risks it may also increase the incentive for reform as hitherto loyal individuals bail out.

The United States should not accede to demands that it lift sanctions. Even

though they are narrowly targeted and do not affect the economy despite the government’s claims, they are having an effect on morale, as borne out by the loud denunciations. U.S. advocacy in Europe to hold the line is also valuable.

The alternative scenario is that the mediation proceeds to a conclusion and its

outcomes are applied. In that case, the most important contribution the United

States can make is to work to ensure that those outcomes will genuinely improve

the situation, rather than perpetuate the current disfunctionality under a new

guise.

One important function for Members of Congress and the European Parliament

is to monitor the mediation’s progress. Civil society groups in Zimbabwe fear that

the SADC-convened process will lead to a ‘‘quick fix’’ political solution in which ruling party and opposition politicians may be accommodated but nongovernmental

voices hoping for more thorough-going constitutional reform will be disappointed.

As the mediation stutters on, there is growing skepticism in the region that an

election in March 2008 can produce a legitimate result. This is partly because there

must be serious doubt as to the feasibility of mounting a fair electoral contest in

so short a time. It is also because the ZANU–PF government continues to push

through legislation rewriting the already manipulated constitution to become even

more favorable to Mugabe and disenfranchise voters. Any election run under the

new rules would be illegitimate. Further, the continuing use of political violence to

demoralize and weaken the opposition and breakdown in rule of law provide a context in which a fair election would be impossible.

While it is natural to show respect for the South African-led mediation process,

the United States can and should express the view conditions do not exist for a legitimate voting exercise in 8 months time unless under external supervision,

whether regional or international supervision.

There is also scope for the United States to lend support to efforts already underway in multilateral settings, working with both governments and civil society organizations in the global south. Engaging countries that cannot be described by African stakeholders as imperialist, yet who believe that Africa should be doing more

to end the crisis is one way forward. In one recent example, a Brazilian NGO lobbied members of the Brazilian Parliament to take a stand on the issue with the result that ratification of an accord with South Africa was delayed in protest at the

lack of progress out of the SADC mediation.

The other major contribution that the United States can make at this time is to

work intensively to support SADC efforts to construct an economic rescue package

backed by international stakeholders. It is important that as wide a group of donors

and partners, including countries such as China that have provided support to the

Government of Zimbabwe, are persuaded to come together; such a plan will provide

an incentive to the political class to abandon the present disastrous course and support a return to rule of law. The package will need to be broad and tackle diverse

problems such as the loss of confidence and skills in the agricultural sector, revitalizing employment (some 80 percent of Zimbabweans are without jobs), stabilizing

the currency and attracting investment (and discouraging asset stripping). International donors should allow SADC to manage eventual delivery of the package; but

it is reasonable to make supply of the funds conditional on the terms and goals of

the plan being met.

At OSI and in our African foundations we continue to believe, in common with

our civil society partners, that there can be no stable and robust future for

Zimbabwe without a new constitution and a thorough overhaul of the country’s key

institutions and those who manage them. The process and sequencing by which this

can be achieved, given the actors involved, remains obscure. Some regional governments and external players may hope to get away with a more superficial transition,

but this runs the risk of entrenching injustices and mismanagement that may undermine the recovery and do lasting damage to the people’s belief in their nation.

We will continue to work for a genuine transformation—not a mere transition—for

Zimbabwe.

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CONCLUSION

We can take satisfaction in knowing that crisis of the proportions seen in

Zimbabwe is relatively rare on the continent today and where it exists is strongly

associated with armed conflict, rather than merely poor or repressive governance.

Reviewing the past 20 years in Africa it is clear that there has been considerable

progress and that there is far better human and institutional capacity in Africa to

address challenges than in the past.

Africa faces a chicken and egg problem; the obstacles to greater democracy and

human rights lie in the lack of development—and vice versa. This conundrum has

spawned much argument about whether forward progress most depends on improving governance or injecting resources—aid or investment—into the mix. Yet it is

precisely the multifaceted nature of Africa’s problems and the need to achieve forward motion on several fronts simultaneously that constitutes the greatest challenge. If the U.S. Government can design its policy with that in mind and recognize

the only sure way to secure democracy is to invest in its long-term development,

U.S. interests in the region will be protected.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Amosu. I’d certainly agree

with Ambassador Lyman’s general comments about the many positive things that have happened in Africa but on this one, I am so

pleased that you devoted your time to Zimbabwe.

I visited there in December 1999. I had a terrible meeting with

President Mugabe, which was a sign of things to come, but we also

met with a civil society group, which was one of the finest group

of people I’ve ever met with, and I often think about the pressure

and brutality that has been foisted upon these people in these past

8 years. This is a real disaster.

Now, I believe that this country is going to come out of this, but

it must be one of our highest priorities.

Mr. Peterson.

STATEMENT OF DAVE PETERSON, SENIOR DIRECTOR, AFRICA

PROGRAM, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you, Senator Feingold. It’s really an honor

to be able to testify here this morning. I want to echo, first off, Ambassador Lyman’s comment that I think the general trend in Africa

is positive. I recently came back from a tour of West Africa and saw

Liberia and Ghana, even in countries like Togo, there is real democratic progress and I think we can’t forget that.

However, on that same tour, I did travel to Nigeria where I monitored the elections with the NDI team and as all of the observer

missions have said, those elections were a shamble. I think it’s important to remember that for most of my Nigerian friends anyway,

it was not a surprise. They have lived in this country and have

seen the way the politicians work. They know the corruption, the

problem with oil and I think that it is possible to find some silver

lining there, as has been noted. The independence of the judiciary,

the independence of their legislature there, the dynamic civil society that continues to gain strength. All is not lost in Nigeria and

I think that if you’re talking about whether democracy is moving

forward or backward, I think Nigeria is, in fact, moving forward

but certainly not fast enough.

When we come to Ethiopia, which is the other country I was

asked to discuss, I think we do have a situation where they are

slipping backward. The Endowment has had a very difficult time

finding civil society partners to support there. One organization

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that we supported for many, many years, the Ethiopian Human

Rights Council, has been decimated by the recent repression. The

president of that organization, Mesfin Wolde Mariam, is one of

those who was sentenced to life in prison and I think that although

we understand the American strategic interest in Ethiopia that

there does need to be a more forceful statement of American interests in the human rights situation in that country.

Finally, I was also asked to talk about Zimbabwe and ironically,

although the Government of Zimbabwe has much worse relations

with the United States than Ethiopia does, the Endowment has actually been able to build a successful program in support of civil

society there, including to the media, political parties, and the

trade unions.

There have been some very difficult challenges, such as the legal

restrictions against NGOs and the monumental inflation there but

I think another issue, in fact, that I was asked to address, is the

question of the conflict between democracy assistance and national

sovereignty. I think this is particularly relevant in the case of

Zimbabwe. It is not the Endowment’s mission to promote regime

change. As distasteful as governments such as ZANU–PF and Robert Mugabe may be to some, our program is committed to democratic reform, no matter who is in power, nor is the Endowment exporting some secret imperialist American agenda, as is sometimes

alleged. NED is strictly committed to peaceful, open and transparent methods of political engagement. We are guided by our partners on the ground.

Every one of our grants, including the recipient and the amount

of funding can be found in our annual report and on our Web site.

Another key aspect of the Endowment’s program in countries

such as Zimbabwe is our independence. For example, through the

American Center for International Labor Solidarity, we’ve been

able to support the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, which is

arguably the most important civil society institution in Zimbabwe.

And yet, the ZCTU has been very careful to remain nonpartisan

and has avoided direct assistance from the U.S. Government.

The Endowment has a number of—about a dozen other partners

in Zimbabwe, such as—I don’t if it’s one of them that you may have

met when you were there, the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Media Institute, which I think OSI also supports, the Crisis Coalition and

many others. They appreciate our willingness to support them with

their vital core costs. It’s the salaries, rent, equipment, which allow

them to continue despite the hardship.

These groups have monitored the elections, monitored human

rights abuses, advocated for constitutional reform and press freedom and kept the hope for democracy in Zimbabwe alive.

Compared to the other three countries, I would say that perhaps

Zimbabwe has reached the low point of its democratic development

but I would also echo the statement of Ambassador Dell, things

will change soon. The Zimbabwe Government has complained about

American inference in their country’s political affairs, has passed

legislation intended to restrict the activities of human rights and

democracy organizations, has beaten up and imprisoned activists,

has effectively prevented the operations of NDI and IRI in ZimVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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babwe and has steadily decreased the political space of Zimbabwean citizens.

Yet, the Endowment has demonstrated it is welcome in the country, that civil society activists are still doing courageous work

against the odds and that they deserve and need our support.

Once again, I thank you for this opportunity to testify and I’m

happy to answer questions.

[Prepared Statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVE PETERSON, SENIOR DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC

It is a great honor for me to testify this morning before the Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs concerning the topic of Democratic Development in Africa. In the long and medium term I can state unequivocally that Africa’s democratic development continues to move forward. When I began

work at the NED almost 20 years ago there were just a handful of small countries

that could lay some claim to being democratic: Botswana, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritius, and ironically, Sudan. These were all essentially liberal, one-party dominant

regimes, with the exception of Sudan, which then had a multiparty system struggling to end a civil war. But since the Republic of Benin’s historic sovereign national

conference in 1990, the continent has been transformed. All of Southern Africa with

the exception of Zimbabwe; and most of West Africa, with just a few exceptions, now

enjoys democratic, if often imperfect, government. In Central Africa, the Democratic

Republic of Congo achieved its first democratic elections last year; and in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania may now be considered full-fledged democracies. Even in

those African countries that remain dictatorships or semiauthoritarian regimes,

most have much greater pluralism, press freedom, opposition political activity, and

respect for human rights than was the case just two decades ago. And I am confident the trend will continue.

But in the short term there have been some disappointments recently, and

throughout the continent, democratic development must be considered a work in

progress. It was suggested that I focus my comments this morning on three country

case studies, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia, with particular emphasis on the role

of civil society and the media in the runup to national elections and their immediate

aftermath, as well as the more general contribution of these organizations and key

individuals in advancing governance and democracy objectives. It was suggested

that I provide a brief analysis of how NED and other U.S. Government implementing organizations seek to support and empower local civil society and what lessons could be drawn from our experience. Last year, with a budget of some $7 million, NED made grants to more than 200 African civil society organizations, many

of which are at the forefront of the democracy movement in their respective countries. I was also asked to highlight the problem of the conflict between democracy

assistance and national sovereignty. This has long been an issue with which NED

and our partners have had to contend.

A few months ago, I did a quick tour of West Africa, assessing the democratic

progress that has been made and the role of our civil society partners. After years

of devastating civil war, I can report that Sierra Leone and Liberia have both made

tremendous strides, and despite the challenges of weak governance and continuing

economic hardship, both countries are at peace, and their citizens are enjoying open

and democratic government. I’m proud to say that NED’s partners in the human

rights movement and the media, such as the National Accountability Group and the

Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Sierra Leone and the Press Union, National Youth Movement for Transparent Elections, and Foundation for Human

Rights and Democracy in Liberia, as well as more than 20 other indigenous partners

have made important contributions to the popular awareness and respect for democracy and human rights in these two countries in the runup and aftermath of elections.

I stopped off in Ghana, which has made remarkable political, as well as economic,

progress in recent years. Working with local partners such as the Institute for Economic Affairs, NED’s Center for International Private Enterprise has made a tangible difference in improving governance in Ghana, and I would also commend the

assistance IFES provided there in helping to build a model electoral system. I

strongly endorse Ghana’s being awarded by the Millenium Challenge Fund. In addition, when I was in the region, I heard about Mauritania’s first successful democratic elections, which received critical assistance from NDI; and I learned about the

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potential breakthrough parliamentary elections soon to be held in Togo, where NED

is supporting a handful of domestic observer groups. Benin, Mali, and Senegal recently held free elections, and I would consider them robust democracies. Even in

troubled Coˆte d’Ivoire and Guinea, one can find cause for optimism. NED partners

are making real headway in these countries. In fact, I was beginning to feel as if

all of West Africa had become a democratic bastion.

Then I arrived in Nigeria, where I observed the Lagos state elections with one

of NED’s domestic partners, the Transition Monitoring Group, and the national elections with the NDI team. I had observed the 1999 and 2003 elections, which left

a lot to be desired, but these were by far the worst yet. Despite the heroic efforts

of Nigerian civil society, including more than 30 nongovernmental organizations

supported by NED, despite the millions of dollars contributed by the United States

and other international donors, despite all of Nigeria’s oil wealth that was invested

into the effort, despite the country’s enormous human resources and talent, despite

all the warnings and studies and diplomatic demarches, despite the clear desire of

Nigerian voters to participate—we saw massive disorganization and incompetence,

blatant corruption and rigging, state-sanctioned repression and violence, chaos, and

in the end, a huge blow to the democratic aspirations of Nigerian citizens. All the

domestic and international reports were unanimous: The elections were a shambles.

In response to all the criticism, the Nigerian Electoral Commissioner, Maurice Iwu,

simply denounced the observers as ‘‘conspirators, they do not mean well for us’’; and

insisted that the elections were fine. The new government of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua

was installed, at least, and as usual, Nigeria seems to be muddling through.

Why, after all the impressive progress in most of the rest of West Africa, did Nigeria, with all its assets and advantages, fail? A consortium of Washington-based

think tanks held an excellent series of events before and after the Nigerian elections

that have sought to address this question. I would also recommend an article that

will appear in the forthcoming issue of NED’s Journal of Democracy by Rotimi

Suberu that provides a more thorough analysis of the problem than I can do justice

to in the few minutes I have this morning. Nigerian oil, and its corrupting influence

in the country, was certainly a significant contributing factor. Few of my Nigerian

friends were particularly surprised by the elections; they had been predicting the

outcome for some time. They knew the personalities, the inadequacy of preparations, the competing interests, the way things work in Nigeria. Obviously, there are

limitations to the impact that international assistance can have, and perhaps the

bigger the country, the more limited the impact. Yet, like my Nigerian friends, I can

also recognize the progress that is still being made, such as the greater independence of both the judiciary and the legislature, the growing awareness among the

grassroots, and the increasing capacity of civil society and the media. NED has been

supporting indigenous human rights, democracy, and media organizations in Nigeria for almost 20 years, and especially during the dictatorship of Sani Abacha, the

repression was intense, many of our partners were in jail, and the situation seemed

pretty hopeless to many on the outside. Today, very few Nigerians want a return

to military dictatorship, and almost everyone appreciates the greater political space

the country now enjoys. So, in the case of Nigeria at least, one might even say that

the country is not necessarily moving backward; it is just moving forward much

more slowly than it should be.

Ethiopia is another story. Democratic development there has definitely slipped

backward. Less than 2 years ago, the country seemed to be on the verge of a democratic breakthrough, when opposition political parties made dramatic gains in national elections. But in the runup to the elections, as I testified before the House

Africa Subcommittee at the time, both of NED’s sister institutes, NDI and IRI, were

expelled from the country. Afterward, when opposition protests became threatening

to the government, a brutal crackdown ensued. NED has supported the Ethiopian

Human Rights Council since 1994, and due to its human rights monitoring and advocacy, the group has intermittently been harassed, including having its bank account frozen. But in the wake of the current crackdown, most of the leadership is

either in prison or exile, and its operations have been largely stifled, despite our

best efforts to help them. Few other civil society organizations or media have been

able to find much space to work with in Ethiopia, and as a result, although the

country remains a priority target for NED, we have found it difficult to find much

to support.

The Ethiopian Government has emerged as a strategic partner of the United

States, but I would urge greater attention to the domestic political environment. Too

often in Africa, our relationships have been based on the personalities of individual

leaders, rather than the nations they govern. It is the Endowment’s special role to

promote democracy around the world, cultivating the respect and goodwill of Africans as something that is in the long-term interests of the United States, rather

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than being concerned only with maintaining friendly relations with the regime of

the day. The Ethiopian political environment is extremely complex, and I would not

be so presumptuous as to claim that NED has all the answers to the problem of

democratic development there, but I do believe that in the last elections the great

majority of Ethiopians expressed their desire for greater freedom, and that resistance to this sentiment would be unwise.

In the case of Zimbabwe, a government which has much worse relations with the

United States than Ethiopia, NED has been much more successful in building a

strong and vital program of support to civil society, including the media, political

parties, and trade unions. But there have also been difficult challenges, such as

legal restrictions on NGOs and Zimbabwe’s incredible inflation. In addition, the

question of national sovereignty is perhaps most acute here. NED has long resisted

any notion that it is involved in ‘‘regime change.’’ As distasteful as governments

such as that of ZANU–PF and Robert Mugabe may be to some, our program is committed to democratic reform, no matter who is in power. NED is also strictly committed to peaceful, open and transparent methods of political engagement. Every

one of our grants, including each recipient and the funding amounts, can be found

in our annual report and on-line. Another key aspect of the Endowment is our independence. Thus, through the American Center for International Labor Solidarity,

NED is assisting the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, arguably the leading institution of civil society in Zimbabwe. Yet the ZCTU has been careful to remain nonpartisan, and has also avoided direct assistance from the U.S. Government.

NED’s local grantees, such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, the

Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the Media Institute, and the Crisis Coalition,

among others, also appreciate our willingness to support vital core costs, such as

salaries, rent, and equipment, which allow groups to survive despite severe hardship, and enable them greater freedom to identify other sources of funding and support. These groups have been able to continue to monitor elections and human

rights abuses, advocate for constitutional reform and press freedom, and keep the

hope for democracy in Zimbabwe alive. Perhaps Zimbabwe has reached the low

point of its democratic development, but I would echo the opinion of the recently

departed American Ambassador, Christopher Dell, ‘‘things will change soon.’’ The

Zimbabwean Government has complained about American interference in the country’s political affairs, has passed legislation intended to restrict the activities of

human rights and democracy organizations, has beaten up and imprisoned activists,

has effectively prevented the operations of NDI and IRI within Zimbabwe, and has

steadily decreased the political space of Zimbabwean citizens. Yet NED has demonstrated that it is still possible to operate in the country, that civil society activists

are still doing courageous work against the odds, and that they need and deserve

our support.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Peterson, I thank you for your good remarks as well and I thank all of the panel members. I have limited

time—this has been a good hearing—but I’m going to ask a few

questions.

Ambassador Lyman, given limited country-specific information

and presence, what do you believe is the best approach to deriving

and applying lessons learned for promoting governance and democracy in African countries?

Mr. LYMAN. Senator, I think as several people have mentioned

here, you want to find and work with the African individuals, institutions, and organizations that are themselves pressing for democracy. There is a lot of civil society out there, there are a lot of

governments in which people are working to improve their own

democratic performance. There are a lot of ways to lend support to

that, with expertise, with political backing, with organizing training, and organizing conferences in those countries that promote the

principles and practices of democracy.

I’ll give you an example from Nigeria. About a year before the

election, there was a major conference on electoral reform led by

a number of Nigerian groups and in collaboration with some American institutions. The conference produced a solid set of recommendations for changing and improving the electoral system. On the

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American side, we wanted to follow that up with the Nigerian Government, the major political parties, and Nigerian civil society. But

there was no funding for followup. I think had we been able to do

so, it would have helped keep up the momentum within Nigeria for

electoral reform.

Support for the judiciary is terribly important. I also hope we can

continue to find ways, because we don’t do it as much anymore, to

improve the operations of a free press. I remember an opposition

politician in Kenya telling me about the investigations of corruption in Kenya. If it weren’t for the free press, he said, it would not

have happened.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. Ms. Amosu, there are reports

that elements of the Zimbabwean judiciary remain independent.

Are those reports accurate? Which elements are these and what

role could they potentially play in achieving democratic reform in

that country?

Ms. AMOSU. Well, I think you’re looking at something that to

some extent, varies from person to person. The suggestion has been

made that the regime has been effective at managing elements of

the Magistery and has frightened away or driven away more senior

members of the judiciary out of the country and those are the

methods by which manipulation has been achieved.

But there certainly are examples of strong judges and individuals

working the judicial system who have stood up for the rule of law

and have made sure that individuals who have been victims of security follow that action are protected and I think it is critical, over

the coming months, that both members of the judiciary who have

been intimidated or have been forced not to practice in Zimbabwe

are able to return and to fulfill their rightful place as judges and

senior members of the community.

Senator FEINGOLD. How can the United States and international

community help empower these elements and strengthen other

players in the struggle for freedom in Zimbabwe?

Ms. AMOSU. I think that it’s difficult because the United States

does not have extensive interests and leverage in that region and,

therefore, to some extent, must work through multilateral institutions and efforts in order to be effective. That said, I think there’s

enormous international consensus on the crisis and what’s needed

to try and make a difference and great leverage is provided

through the need to assemble a major economic package for restabilizing the country. The funds have to come from somewhere. The

United States certainly is in a position to be a leader in pulling

those funds together and certainly, it would be my view that it is

appropriate and necessary that there are conditions attached to

funds that are supplied for this purpose. SADC does need—the

Southern African Development Community does need to make an

effective job of this economic restabilization. It’s going to cost a lot

of money and these reports suggest as much as $3 billion are going

to be needed through whatever mechanism, however the fund is

put together and it seems to me that there, there is great opportunity to set conditions and to negotiate terms for the reconstruction of the country.

Mr. LYMAN. Can I——

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes, sure.

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Mr. LYMAN. Can I add a comment on Zimbabwe? You know, I

think—and I certainly support everything that has just been said—

but, to be honest, we are not going to get a change in the direction

of Zimbabwe as long as Robert Mugabe is President. He is not

going to turn around and become a democrat tomorrow or even

share power. The question is: At what point do his supporters in

ZANU who are the real power holders, find a way to have him step

down? And in that regard, what incentive is there for them to do

that? Because some of the people who are likely to take over are

not great shakes either. So what incentive is there for them to

really change the system. That is where I think we have to be

going. We have to work with the Southern African countries on incentives to the power brokers to come to the conclusion, ‘‘OK, this

country is really going to the dogs. If we take over, it might get

worse. What kind of change are we prepared to make, politically

and economically?’’ In that context, the incentive packages that we

and others put together become important. The inventives have to

be clear and there have to be understandings about what is required from Zimbabwe. But the incentives could help move what

has to be moved. That is, for the power brokers in ZANU to say,

‘‘Mr. Mugabe, it’s time to step down.’’

Senator FEINGOLD. And I’ve often thought, in working on this for

15 years, the good news and bad news is that the United States,

in general, was not a colonizing power in Africa. Of course, we

would not want to have been there but the bad aspect of it historically is, as Ms. Amosu suggests, we don’t have the kind of leverage

and relationships in many places that other countries do. On the

other hand, the positive layer, I think, can outweigh it. It’s what

we do now, positively, post-Mugabe, that will determine how the

United States is seen in that part of the world. Perhaps we’ll be

regarded better, with less suspicion, and as more forward-looking

compared to the focus on protection of long-term economic and

other interests that the colonial powers have had.

So I tend to look at it as a glass-half-full kind of situation in

some of these places and I think it presents interesting opportunities for the United States if we could get adequately engaged in

them.

With that, I’ll ask a final question for both Mr. Albin-Lackey and

Mr. Peterson. It is clear, as you both note, that democratic developments in Ethiopia have been backsliding in recent years. You’ve

spoken about this at length and I’m pleased it has been discussed

today. Why do you think this has occurred? And what should the

United States, particularly given our longstanding relationship

with the Ethiopian Government, be doing to ensure that it doesn’t

slide any further?

Mr. Peterson.

Mr. PETERSON. Well, of course, Ethiopia has had a long history

of authoritarian rule through a series of Emperors and a virtual

Communist dictatorship and so I think the democratic culture

there is still very weak and I think a lot needs to be done in terms

of creating the sort of demand for democracy at the grassroots in

Ethiopia. I think the United States can insist that nongovernmental organizations be allowed to operate freely, that political

prisoners be released from jail, that opposition political parties be

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allowed to function openly. I think, as we’ve seen in many other

African countries, where civil society is allowed, the freedom to organize and to work with the grassroots that a democratic culture

and discourse begins to develop.

It has, I think, always made a big difference. So I think that

would be one thing that the United States could really focus on.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. Mr. Albin-Lackey, you can

conclude.

Mr. ALBIN-LACKEY. I think in some ways, the goal should be getting back to a situation something like what was obtained in the

run up to Ethiopia’s elections in 2005. There was no way that those

elections were going to be anything like free or fair in most of the

country but in some parts of the country, particularly in the capital, the government had allowed a much greater degree of political

openness than it had in the years prior to that. It was clearly open

to some sort of experimentation with greater political openness and

unfortunately, the entire thing, as we all know, ended in catastrophe with the intractable disagreements between the government

and the main opposition party about the results of those elections.

But where Ethiopia is today, it’s difficult even to think about

bringing about a situation anything like what any of us here would

probably like to see. The starting point, I think, would be with

some very basic steps. Allowing Ethiopian civil society groups that

have been trapped in a much more confining space since the fallout

from the elections to operate more freely than they can now. Some

kind of real government commitment to ending military atrocities

against civilians in the Somali region in particular, and to hold

people accountable for similar abuses carried out in Gambella and

other parts of the country, without which any talk of political freedoms is really quite meaningless. And in general, simply to insist

that the Ethiopian Government begin to roll back some of the very

repressive and hard-handed measures that it has put into place in

the last few years.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. I thank all of you. I think this

hearing covered a lot of ground and I also think that we now have

a chance to send some fairly strong messages in a few places that

I really sincerely hope will be more strongly reflected through the

administration’s own communications and efforts with regard to

each of the countries that we talked about.

Thanks so much and that concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT I. ROTBERG, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON INTRASTATE CONFLICT, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD

UNIVERSITY AND PRESIDENT, WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

Seven of mainland sub-Saharan Africa’s 45 nation-states are widely regarded as

being success stories. This written testimony summarizes a much longer and much

more detailed evaluation of those successes. The mixed conclusions of this analysis

are instructive in understanding the dynamics of political and economic achievement in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

Africa’s seven most successful countries are all growing reasonably rapidly. Yet,

job creation still lags behind promises and expectations, underlining the persistence

of serious levels of poverty. Moreover, where there is some indigenous wealth, there

are also severe income inequalities. Several countries will be benefiting from new

69

resource finds, and broad improvements in GDP could eventually flow into our

seven countries from such discoveries. But the exploitation of these finds, and other

commercial advances, is being deterred in every case by serious shortages of electric

energy. Every country has outrun its available power supplies; several years will

pass in each case before these shortages can be met. Moreover, nearly all, except

Botswana and South Africa, have road and rail networks that are inadequate for

the industrial and agricultural growth on which their economic advances depend.

Likewise, each country in our sample is being dragged down economically by the

scourges of tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS.

Good governance is essential for economic growth and the avoidance of conflict.

Among our set of seven countries—Botswana, South Africa, Zambia, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Uganda (in order of 2006 annual GDP per capita)—we

show diverse results. There are countries that demonstrate steady good governance,

lapsed good governance, and questionable levels of good governance. Four are well

unified, with few sectional issues. A few exhibit serious leadership deficiencies. Only

in Botswana is the bureaucracy thoroughly reliable. On the World Bank’s Ease of

Doing Business rankings, Botswana, South Africa, and Uganda rate above the others. Reasonably high levels of corruption persist in all but one nation.

Chinese influence is a new factor in the region, especially in Mozambique and

Zambia. Chinese investors will be contributing significantly to the economic development of both countries, as conceivably in Tanzania as well. In Mozambique and

Zambia, the way in which China operates colonially, extracting and exploiting, has

elicited major protests. Throughout the region, the flood of inexpensive Chinese imports has also undercut domestic industry.

Botswana has achieved a deep-rooted political culture of genuine democracy. It

has institutionalized good governance. Politics is largely fair and participatory

under the country’s current leadership. Rule of law is observed. These truisms will

all be tested, however, when Ian Khama becomes national President in early 2008.

He has authoritarian tendencies that may rile Botswana’s much vaunted and much

deserved reputation for due process and toleration.

Very poor at birth, Botswana is one of the very few African countries that has

managed its resource treasures well, and to the benefit of the nation. Growing at

5 and 6 percent a year, as it has done systematically for almost two decades, Botswana nevertheless still has relatively high unemployment rates. It has also tried

to diversify its economy away from diamonds and other minerals, but with little success (except for tourism). By African standards, corruption is minimal, held in check

by a national framework of accountability and by a persuasive national ethos of

integrity.

Although HIV/AIDS is highly prevalent in Botswana, the government provides

broad social and medical services, and is one of the few countries in Africa that has

the resources and the will to treat the disease medically as well as seek to prevent

its spread. Botswana is conscious, too, of the need to overcome the sense of stigma

that most AIDS sufferers experience.

As deft as South Africa’s handling of the threat of inflation has been in this century, it has been less successful in terms of job creation, small business development, and overall economic growth. It is still growing less rapidly than planned and

less rapidly than it needs to do to empower all of its citizens. Its growth is uneven,

too; pockets of vast new indigenous wealth exist amid wastelands of aspiration and

unfulfilled opportunity.

South Africa has always enjoyed the best infrastructure in Africa—its ports, airports, and rail and road transport systems are advanced by developing world standards. But, because of poor governmental investment decisions, South Africa is as

short of electric power capacity as any of the other six countries discussed in this

report. Given its level of industrialization and prosperity, to be hampered by faltering electricity supply is no testament to good leadership. Indeed, within the past

2 weeks, South Africa exceeded all records for power usage, bumping up against full

capacity. Load-shedding was apparent, and sections of Johannesburg lost power for

long periods. It will be 5 years, if then, before South Africa constructs the new capacity that it needs for a growing economy.

Although South Africa is one of Africa’s handful of democracies, with a strong rule

of law tradition and an independent judiciary, President Thabo Mbeki’s government

frequently seeks to exert executive prerogatives over civil society, its parliamentary

opponents, the media, and—recently—judges. South Africa is much more centralized

and statist than it was a decade ago. Privatization of state enterprises is going forward very slowly and, in some areas, that machinery has ground to a halt. Although

Mbeki personally championed the new African Union and the New Partnership for

Africa’s Development—NEPAD—the latter’s much touted peer review mechanism is

being distorted and undermined within South Africa itself.

70

But the components that hinder South Africa’s successful emergence as an independent, fully free, nation are two: Crime and corruption. With one of the highest

murder and major assault records anywhere, year after year, and with police services that are underpaid, understaffed, and inept, it is no wonder that tourists and

investors cringe. President Mbeki promised this year to do something about crime,

but it will doubtless be left to his successor to seek serious results in this difficult

and intractable area.

If crime reflects poverty and diminished expectations, then corruption reflects enhanced expectations and greed. If everyone is doing it, underlings see taking advantage of their positions as their rightful due. Stanching this drain of public goods is

impossible unless good leadership exerts itself. In South Africa, as with so many

other issues of concern, too much that is shoddy has been tolerated, and—other than

the former Deputy President too few individuals have been singled out for censure

and criminal investigation. Official corruption has grown significantly in the last

decade, especially during Mbeki’s Presidency. Its scale is particularly worrisome at

the provincial and municipal levels, although national parliamentarians and some

ministers have enriched themselves equally and notoriously.

Thanks to very high prices for copper, Zambia is growing rapidly. Its annual per

capita GDP figures trail only Botswana and South Africa in this seven-country sample. Chinese investments in mining and in other sectors could help cushion the

country when commodity prices fall, but Zambia has had too little success so far in

diversifying its economy away from copper and cobalt. It lacks electric power capacity. Agriculture and tourism could conceivably contribute more significantly to national income in the future; the government is committed to spending increased

sums on agricultural improvement (and on irrigation equipment), but more than

half of all Zambians live in cities.

The current government of President Levy Mwanawasa has largely retrieved the

political, economic, and social forward momentum that was lost in the 1990s under

President Frederick Chiluba. But Mwanawasa was elected on rural votes and his

more populist opponent championed the urban poor. This split will continue to

hinder nation-building and unity. Any dramatic fall in copper prices could imperil

Zambia’s assault on HIV/AIDS, on poverty, on new social services, and on employment creation—all necessary achievements if Zambia is to sustain its recent income

and governance gains and improve its human development indicators. Doing more

than at present to reduce high corruption levels would also strengthen Zambia’s attempt to make progress.

Ghana is recovering from about 40 years of bad governance—from the Kwame

Nkrumah era through the Jerry Rawlings period of strong-man rule. Its recovery

is proceeding under the sensible leadership of President John Kufour. Its GDP

growth per year has been averaging close to 6 percent, and inflation has been reduced substantially. But half of all Ghanaians still subsist on less than $1 a day.

Ghana’s annual per capita GDP is a tenth of Botswana’s, and when the prices of

gold and cocoa—the country’s chief exports—fall, Kufuor’s so far credible efforts to

achieve national reconciliation and economic advance may well falter. Already, persistent shortages of electric power cripple the gold mining industry and hinder the

opening of new mines.

Furthermore, Ghana’s recovery from previous leadership abuses of power is not

yet sustainable. Most of the key governance indicators are now trending upward,

although corrosive corruption has not been contained and rule of law is often honored in the breach. Even more worrying for most Ghanaians, Kufuor’s steady and

popular hand on the tiller of state will end at the close of 2008. His potential replacements need not articulate the same broad and statesmanlike policies; several

of his possible successors could take Ghana backward, especially if world commodity

prices slump. Bitter competition in the national elections could also widen Ghana’s

north-south divide, opening up sectional fissures in a country now united.

The last three of the African success stories discussed in greater detail in the full

report are all still poor, per head (in the $300 range), but Mozambique is growing

at more than 7 per cent per year thanks to its aluminum smelter, hydropower exports, and discoveries of oil and gas; Tanzania benefits from high world prices for

gold. Because Uganda is dependent on coffee and fish, and has serious electricity

weaknesses, its growth has slowed recently. Uganda is also still at war, in the north

and west, and its efforts at national reconciliation have been faltering.

Leadership has been a reason for success, and now less success, in each of these

three cases, as well as in the other four. In Uganda, the once lavishly praised leadership efforts of President Yoweri Museveni have been dissipated by his personal

failures to strengthen democracy, mitigate corruption, and rule less autocratically.

Uganda was once a success economically (it still welcomes investors), a victor over

HIV/AIDS, and a country improving governance and building democratic instituVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:17 Nov 27, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 SUBSAHARAN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
71

tions. Invading the Congo, running roughshod over the constitution, and repressing

the political opposition have all reduced Museveni’s local and international appeal

and reduced the sparkle of Uganda’s achievements since 1986.

Disappointment may also be growing in Mozambique, where the Presidential successor to Joaquim Chissano, the gentle Marxist turned democrat, is operating in a

more authoritarian manner. He has returned the ruling political party that he

heads to the centerpiece of government and become more intolerant than his predecessor of dissent and of opposition. Corruption, always rife in Mozambique, is growing under President Armando Guebuza.

It is also undiminished in Tanzania, not least in nearly autonomous Zanzibar. In

all three countries, anticorruption legislation, commissions, and talk from on high

achieves little by way of actual reduction. Nor are many senior officials ever caught

and prosecuted.

Corruption hinders improvements in economic productivity in all three countries,

as well as in the others. One estimate suggests that half of all budgeted sums in

Uganda are lost to such theft and fraud. When these theoretically eradicable drags

on GDP are coupled to infrastructures that are still fragile—especially in Tanzania—porous social safety nets, questionable rules of law, and weak leadership, it

is no wonder that the prospects in these countries for sustainable political and economic advances are still problematic.

Success is relative. Although all of the seven countries are growing, nearly all are

dependent on primary commodity exports, not on invisible earnings or manufactured

products. Unlike the Asian tigers, and arguably Botswana, none has entered a

steady state of sustainability, not even South Africa (where population growth continues to outstrip net new job creation). The Asian tigers perform well for their peoples—they provide quantities and qualities of the seven essential political goods. In

the seven African cases, only Botswana and South Africa begin to match such levels

of performance, and South Africa’s high crime rate makes it the most insecure country among the seven.

The seven African examples are successes only as compared to the rest of Africa,

where good governance is rare, corruption common, and poverty endemic. However,

Ghana, Mozambique, and Zambia should be rewarded particular accolades. They

have made spectacular recoveries from the ravages of war and mismanagement.

Uganda might have received the same praise today if it were not still mired in conflict and if its blemished leadership had not slowed the pace of political and economic advance.

Looking ahead, in every country successors to the current leadership have yet to

take office or be chosen. Because leadership remains critical to the destinies of each

of these countries, and of all countries in the developing world, and because either

current leaders or their potential successors exhibit less-than-fully-democratic traits,

the gains made for governance need not be sustained beyond the near term. The

institutional strength and dominant political cultures of South Africa and Botswana

should prevent too much slippage after 2008, but in the other five countries the institutionalization of good governance is still in process, with continued success

unproven.

Æ