U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General

A Review of the September 2005 

Shooting Incident Involving the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

Filiberto Ojeda Ríos

DRAFT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Office of the Inspector General 

August 2006
I. Background 

On September 23, 2005, agents from the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) attempted to arrest long-time fugitive Filiberto Ojeda 

Ríos (Ojeda) at a residence on a rural hillside near Hormigueros, Puerto Rico. 

Ojeda was one of the founders and leaders of the Ejército Popular Boricua, also 

known as the “Macheteros” (Cane-Cutters), an organization that claimed credit 

for various violent crimes during the late 1970s and 1980s in pursuit of 

independence for Puerto Rico. 

A team of FBI agents attempted to enter the residence to arrest Ojeda at 

4:28 p.m. The operation resulted in a brief but intense exchange of gunfire 

between Ojeda and the FBI. Three agents were shot and one was seriously 

wounded; Ojeda was not hit. The agents did not enter the house or complete 

the arrest. The gunfight was followed by a standoff during which Ojeda’s wife 

surrendered and FBI agents engaged in a dialog with Ojeda. At 6:08 p.m., an 

FBI agent saw Ojeda through a window and fired three shots at him. Several 

agents heard Ojeda cry out and fall. The FBI did not enter the house until 

shortly after noon the next day, at which time the agents found Ojeda on the 

floor, dead from a single bullet wound that punctured his lung. 

Journalists, elected officials, and activists in Puerto Rico criticized the 

FBI for using excessive force to capture Ojeda, for conducting the operation on 

El Grito de Lares (a holiday of great significance to the Puerto Rican 

independence movement), and for waiting 18 hours after Ojeda was shot before 

entering the house, thereby allowing Ojeda to bleed to death. 

On September 26, FBI Director Robert Mueller requested that the Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG) conduct an investigation to determine the facts 

and circumstances of the Ojeda shooting incident and to make 

recommendations regarding what actions, if any, the FBI should take in 

connection with it. The FBI and the United States Attorney General also 

received written requests from several United States Representatives and other 

elected officials for an independent investigation of the circumstances of 

Ojeda’s death.

The OIG initiated this investigation after receiving Director Mueller’s 

request. In August 2006, we completed a 172-page report detailing our 

findings and recommendations. This Executive Summary, which is also being 

made available in Spanish, summarizes the full report. 

II. The Methodology of the OIG Investigation 

The OIG’s objective in conducting this review was to investigate the facts 

relating to the incident, and: (1) to determine whether the FBI agents involved 

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in the operation complied with the Department of Justice’s Deadly Force Policy; 

(2) to assess the FBI’s decision to conduct an emergency daylight assault of the 

Ojeda residence in light of other potential options for apprehending Ojeda; (3) 

to assess the FBI’s planning for and conduct of negotiations with Ojeda during 

the standoff; (4) to determine the reasons the FBI waited 18 hours after the 

shooting to enter the residence; and (5) to evaluate communications between 

the FBI, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the public regarding the 

operation. As the investigation proceeded, the OIG identified several additional 

issues that are addressed in this report, including anonymous allegations that 

the FBI had bypassed numerous opportunities to arrest Ojeda under 

circumstances less likely to result in violence. 

The OIG investigation was conducted by a team of attorneys and OIG 

Special Agents. In the course of the investigation, the OIG interviewed over 60 

individuals, including personnel from the FBI Counterterrorism Division in 

Washington, D.C., and agents from the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group 

(CIRG) in Quantico, Virginia. These interviews included all of the agents who 

discharged their weapons or otherwise participated in the assault on Ojeda’s 

residence, as well as other CIRG agents who planned, participated in, or had 

knowledge of the operation. We also interviewed personnel from the San Juan 

Division of the FBI (San Juan FBI) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

District of Puerto Rico who were involved in the Ojeda matter. OIG 

investigators interviewed officials from the Department of Justice of the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Police of Puerto Rico (POPR). We also 

spoke with several persons living in the area near the Ojeda residence. 

The OIG reviewed thousands of pages of documents generated by the FBI 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office relating to the Ojeda matter, including draft and 

final Operations Plans and Orders, investigative files, court filings, 

photographs, logs, intelligence reports, text messages, and relevant FBI 

policies, procedures, and training manuals. 

In addition, the OIG reviewed relevant forensic reports prepared by the 

Instituto de Ciencias Forenses (the Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences) 

related to the Ojeda incident. These reports included the autopsy report, bullet 

and shell casing analyses, trajectory analysis, shooting reconstruction, and 

blood pattern analysis. We also conducted three lengthy interviews of 

Dr. Pio R. Rechani López, the Executive Director of the Institute, and other 

scientists involved in preparing the forensic reports. The OIG acknowledges 

the cooperation of Puerto Rico Attorney General Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos and 

Dr. Rechani in making the forensic reports and scientists available to us. 

The OIG also consulted with the U.S. Department of Defense Armed 

Forces Institute of Pathology, Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner 

(OAFME), regarding how long Ojeda survived after being shot. The OAFME 

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provided a written report on this issue and responded to questions from the 

OIG. 

In addition, the OIG recruited three experts in tactical police operations 

to provide expert input and guidance on the FBI’s tactical decisions in the 

Ojeda operation and the agents’ compliance with the Department of Justice 

Deadly Force Policy: (1) Ronald M. McCarthy, a former Field Supervisor for the 

Los Angeles Police Department Tactical Unit who previously served on the U.S. 

Department of Justice Waco review committee and who has testified before the 

United States Congress as an expert in police special operations; (2) Michael S. 

Foreman, the former Chief of the Sheriff’s Office for Orange County, Florida, 

who has 24 years of experience in the field of special weapons and tactics as a 

team leader and SWAT commander; and (3) Gary Van Horn, the Assistant 

Director in the Office of Law Enforcement and Security at the U.S. Department 

of the Interior, who has over 30 years of law enforcement experience. 

During the course of its review, the OIG was unable to interview 

some witnesses and obtain some potentially relevant written materials. 

The attorney for Ojeda’s widow declined our request to interview her as 

well as our request for access to the Ojeda residence. The Department of 

Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico declined our request for 

access to statements collected from approximately 40 witnesses, 

including individuals living in the neighborhood near the Ojeda 

residence, as well as an expert report prepared for the Commonwealth 

regarding the survivability of Ojeda’s wound. A Commission of the 

Puerto Rico Bar Association conducted an investigation of the Ojeda 

incident, but the Bar Association did not respond to written and 

telephonic requests from the OIG for information collected in that 

investigation. We believe, however, that although this information might 

have been useful to the OIG’s investigation, our findings and conclusions 

were not materially affected by our inability to obtain access to it. 

III. Planning the Operation 

In this section of the Executive Summary, the OIG summarizes historical 

information regarding Ojeda and the Macheteros, and then describes the FBI’s 

planning for the Ojeda arrest operation. 

A. Historical Background Regarding Ojeda and the Macheteros 

Ojeda was born in Puerto Rico in 1933. In the mid-1970s Ojeda helped 

to organize the Macheteros. The publicly stated goal of the Macheteros is to 

obtain the independence of Puerto Rico by armed struggle against the United 

States government. The FBI considers the Macheteros to be a terrorist 

organization. Ojeda was the leader of and spokesman for the Macheteros. 

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The Macheteros have claimed responsibility for various acts of violence in 

Puerto Rico, such as the murder of a police officer in Naguabo, Puerto Rico, in 

August 1978 and the killing of U.S. Navy sailors in Puerto Rico in 1979 and 

1982. 

The Macheteros have also claimed responsibility for numerous bombings 

in Puerto Rico. On October 17, 1979, the Macheteros conducted eight bomb 

attacks against various federal facilities across Puerto Rico. In January 1981, 

the organization used bombs to destroy nine U.S. fighter aircraft at the Muñiz 

Air National Guard Base in Carolina, Puerto Rico. Later the same year, the 

Macheteros bombed three separate buildings of the Puerto Rico Electric 

Company. In 1983, the Macheteros fired a Light Anti-Tank Weapon (commonly 

called a LAW rocket) into the U.S. Federal Building in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, 

damaging the offices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the FBI. In 

January 1985, the Macheteros fired a LAW rocket into a building in Old 

San Juan that housed the U.S. Marshals Service and other federal agencies. 

 

The Macheteros also conducted robberies to finance their activities, 

including the theft of $7.1 million from a Wells Fargo facility in West Hartford, 

Connecticut on September 12, 1983. The Wells Fargo robbery was one of the 

largest bank robberies in U.S. history. 

On August 30, 1985, the FBI conducted a large-scale operation in 

Puerto Rico to arrest Ojeda and other alleged members of the Macheteros in 

connection with the Wells Fargo robbery. According to contemporaneous FBI 

accounts, Ojeda did not respond to loud announcements from the agents of 

their presence and intent to execute a warrant at his residence. When the FBI 

entered Ojeda’s residence, Ojeda fired several shots down a stairway at the 

arrest team. One of the shots ricocheted and struck an agent, permanently 

blinding him in one eye. Ojeda fired more shots and threatened to shoot 

anyone who attempted to climb the stairs. After a dialog with the agents, 

Ojeda allowed his wife to surrender to the FBI. A few minutes later, Ojeda 

appeared at the base of the stairs holding a pistol in his left hand and an Uzi 

shoulder weapon in his right hand. The agents instructed him in Spanish and 

English to drop his weapons. According to the agents, Ojeda then raised the 

pistol. One of the agents fired at Ojeda. The shot struck Ojeda’s pistol and 

knocked it from his hand. Ojeda dropped the Uzi and was subdued by the 

agents. 

Ojeda represented himself in his 1989 trial in Puerto Rico on the charge 

of assaulting the FBI agents during the arrest operation, arguing self defense. 

He was acquitted by a jury. 

Ojeda was released on bond pending trial in Connecticut on charges 

relating to the Wells Fargo robbery. On September 23, 1990, Ojeda cut off his 

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electronic monitoring device and announced that he had gone back 

underground to continue the struggle against the government of the United 

States. Ojeda thereby violated the conditions of his release and became a 

federal fugitive. The United States District Court in Connecticut issued an 

arrest warrant the next day, charging Ojeda with bond default. In July 1992, 

Ojeda was tried in absentia in Connecticut and found guilty on 14 counts 

related to the Wells Fargo robbery, fined $600,000, and sentenced to 55 years 

in prison. 

After becoming a fugitive in 1990, Ojeda periodically gave interviews to 

the media in Puerto Rico, and his recorded speeches were played at proindependence rallies. According to media accounts and FBI files, in these 

statements Ojeda reiterated that the Macheteros remained active as an 

organization and he continued to advocate an “armed struggle” for 

independence. In 2003, Ojeda issued a letter condemning an FBI “wanted” 

advertisement that included a photograph of his wife. Ojeda described the 

Macheteros as “indestructible” and urged supporters to send him the names of 

FBI agents in Puerto Rico for future publication. 

B. The FBI Locates Ojeda in Hormigueros 

The Ojeda arrest operation was the culmination of a major investigative 

effort by the San Juan FBI that was led by Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Luis 

Fraticelli. In early September 2005, the San Juan FBI determined that Ojeda 

and his wife were likely living in a house located on a rural hillside in 

Hormigueros, on the west side of Puerto Rico. At this point, the San Juan FBI 

had not seen Ojeda at the house. The San Juan FBI was concerned that the 

remote location and rugged terrain would make it difficult to confirm Ojeda’s 

presence using conventional surveillance techniques. 

C. Deployment of the Hostage Rescue Team 

 On September 13, 2005, FBI Headquarters approved a request from SAC 

Fraticelli for the deployment of the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) to 

conduct a tactical assessment for the purpose of arresting Ojeda. Based in 

Quantico, Virginia, the HRT is a full-time, national level tactical team that, 

among other missions, deploys in support of FBI field division operations. HRT 

is a component of the Tactical Support Branch in the FBI’s Critical Incident 

Response Group (CIRG), which also includes the Operations and Training Unit 

and the Tactical Helicopter Unit. The Operations and Training Unit supports 

HRT by providing operations management, planning and oversight during HRT 

deployments. The Tactical Helicopter Unit provides aviation support.

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The San Juan FBI sought the assistance of highly specialized HRT 

“sniper-observers” to conduct covert surveillance to determine whether Ojeda 

was present and to gather intelligence relevant to an arrest.1 In addition, SAC 

Fraticelli said he sought HRT’s expertise in conducting the arrest because he 

was concerned that Ojeda would likely “shoot it out” with the FBI again and 

that Ojeda might use grenades or explosives. 

D. The Surveillance and Arrest Plans 

Agents from the HRT and the Operations and Training Unit prepared 

plans for a two-phase operation: a surveillance phase followed by an arrest 

phase. During the surveillance phase, a team of HRT sniper-observers would 

conduct covert surveillance of the residence, with emphasis on confirming 

Ojeda’s presence. The sniper-observers would also collect other information 

relevant to a potential arrest operation, such as identifying the location and 

composition of “breach points” where the arresting agents could enter the 

residence. 

The plan also called for a Quick Reaction Force to be made up of agents 

from HRT and the San Juan FBI in vehicles stationed at a location a short 

drive from Ojeda’s residence. The function of the Quick Reaction Force would 

be to extract the sniper-observers in the event of compromise and to be 

prepared for arrest contingencies. 

 The FBI planners did not make detailed plans for the arrest phase in 

advance of the operation because they expected that the specific tactics would 

depend in large part on the results of the surveillance phase. HRT’s preference 

and primary focus was to make the arrest outside of the residence, such as in 

a vehicle stop while Ojeda was leaving or approaching the residence. 

The FBI plan did not address a scenario in which the FBI would 

surround the residence and call for Ojeda to surrender, even as a least 

preferred course of action. SAC Fraticelli told the OIG that he wanted to avoid 

a standoff or “barricaded subject scenario” because he was concerned that 

Macheteros sympathizers would assemble near the scene in large numbers and 

that it would be difficult to control the situation. 

In preparing for the operation, the HRT Commander and Deputy 

Commander decided not to include negotiators from the CIRG Crisis 

Negotiation Unit (CNU) in Quantico as part of the team. However, SAC 

 1 Within the FBI, a “sniper-observer” is an agent highly trained in marksmanship, field 

skills, and observation. Deployed sniper-observer teams are responsible for collecting and 

relaying intelligence about a target, responding to imminent threats, and supporting tactical 

assaults. 

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Fraticelli made arrangements for two trained negotiators from the San Juan 

FBI to be available during the operation. 

Consistent with FBI crisis management guidelines, the plan for the Ojeda 

operation provided that SAC Fraticelli was at the top of the Tactical Chain of 

Command, followed by an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) from the 

San Juan FBI, the HRT Deputy Commander, and the HRT Squad Supervisor.

In planning the arrest operation, the FBI took into account the annual 

celebration of El Grito de Lares on September 23. San Juan FBI investigators 

believed that Ojeda might leave his residence and attend the celebration in the 

city of Lares, thereby presenting an opportunity for a safe arrest away from the 

residence. 

On September 19, HRT set up a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at a 

location approximately 25 miles from Ojeda’s residence. In general, the TOC 

was staffed throughout the operation by the HRT Deputy Commander and 

other CIRG personnel. The agents in the field communicated with the TOC by 

radio and cell phone. The San Juan FBI set up a Command Post on a different 

floor in the same building. In addition, the San Juan FBI Command Post was 

staffed by SAC Fraticelli, two ASACs, and various agents from the San Juan 

FBI. 

As part of its surveillance plan, the FBI assigned color designations to 

the four sides of Ojeda’s house in order to facilitate communications. Facing 

the house, the front side was designated “White,” the left side was designated 

“Green,” the right side was designated “Red,” and the rear side of the house 

was designated “Black.” 

E. The Role of the Police of Puerto Rico 

 

The POPR was aware that the FBI had been attempting to locate Ojeda, 

and had provided some assistance to the FBI in this effort. However, the FBI 

did not give advance notice to the POPR that the FBI had located Ojeda in 

Hormigueros and was planning to arrest him there. SAC Fraticelli stated that 

he did not provide advance notice to the POPR because he wanted to keep the 

operation secret and limit the possibility of leaks. The POPR did not receive 

notice of the arrest operation until after the FBI began the attempt to arrest 

Ojeda and the exchange of gunfire, which we describe below, at which time 

POPR officers responded to the scene and established an outer security 

perimeter. 

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IV. Chronology of Events in the Operation 

In this section of the Executive Summary, the OIG sets forth a detailed 

chronology of events in the implementation of the Ojeda surveillance and arrest 

operation. 

A. Events on September 22 

A team of FBI sniper-observers initiated surveillance of the Ojeda 

residence before dawn on Thursday, September 22. During daylight hours, the 

sniper-observers withdrew to a position under cover of vegetation a short 

distance from the residence. 

Later that day, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto 

Rico issued a search warrant for the residence. The warrant authorized the 

FBI to execute the search at any hour of the day or night for evidence of 

violations of several criminal statutes. The original arrest warrant issued in 

1990 for Ojeda’s failure to appear at trial for the Wells Fargo robbery remained 

outstanding. 

B. Overnight Events on September 22-23 

The sniper-observers resumed surveillance of the residence after dark on 

September 22. As one of the sniper-observers moved along a fence around the 

residence, two dogs began barking excitedly. Lights came on inside the 

residence and at a neighboring residence. The sniper-observer saw a woman 

on the porch and heard her talking to a man who was in the yard inside the 

fence, with a flashlight. The man walked close to where the sniper-observer 

was hiding, but apparently did not see him. The sniper-observer described the 

man as elderly, with white hair and a medium build, which met the description 

of Ojeda provided by the San Juan FBI. The sniper-observer stated that he 

could not see the man’s face clearly, but based on the San Juan FBI 

description and other information, he concluded the man was Ojeda. This 

information was relayed back to the TOC at 11:43 p.m. on September 22. 

SAC Fraticelli and the HRT Deputy Commander considered whether to 

order an immediate operation to arrest Ojeda on the morning of September 23. 

They ultimately concluded that the available information regarding the house 

was inadequate to assure a successful breach of the front door without killing 

or injuring the occupants. 

The FBI was hopeful that Ojeda would depart the residence by car later 

that morning to attend the El Grito de Lares celebration, and that he could be 

apprehended by the Quick Reaction Force at that time. Fraticelli and the HRT 

Deputy Commander doubled the size of the Quick Reaction Force team on duty 

between 6:00 a.m. and approximately 10:00 a.m. on September 23, using all 

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available agents from HRT together with SWAT Team agents from the San Juan 

FBI. In addition, numerous agents from the San Juan FBI were assigned to 

maintain surveillance coverage at all potential vehicle exit routes near the 

residence. However, the FBI did not observe Ojeda again that morning. 

C. Plan for a Pre-dawn Arrest Operation on September 24 

Based on information about the residence provided by the sniperobservers and advice from the HRT Deputy Commander, Fraticelli decided on a 

deliberate assault of the residence to arrest Ojeda in the pre-dawn hours of 

September 24, when Ojeda was expected to be sleeping. At approximately 

10:00 a.m. on September 23, all of the HRT agents serving on the Quick 

Reaction Force returned to their base to rest and prepare for the assault the 

next morning. Agents from the San Juan FBI SWAT Team assumed Quick 

Reaction Force responsibilities. 

The HRT and Operations and Training Unit agents prepared a plan for 

the assault. The plan called for the sniper-observers to approach the house 

late on September 23 to confirm Ojeda’s presence. Early on September 24, the 

assault units would be delivered by vehicle to a location near the residence, 

and they would advance toward the house surreptitiously on foot. The assault 

units would approach the White side of the house, proceed through the front 

yard, and advance up onto the porch. One group would breach the residence 

at a door near the Red/White corner, and another group would breach the 

house at the large window on the Green side. Because the FBI had a “noknock” search warrant, HRT did not plan to announce itself before breaching. 

Once inside, the agents would conduct a rapid room-to-room maneuver, called 

a “clear,” until they captured Ojeda and secured the residence. 

D. The Compromise of the Sniper-Observers 

At approximately 2:30 p.m. on September 23, the sniper-observers were 

at their daytime position of cover, in the woods away from the house. One 

sniper-observer saw a vehicle stop near a trailhead leading toward their 

position. A second vehicle arrived several minutes later. The sniper-observer 

heard people talking but could not understand what they said because he does 

not speak Spanish. Other sniper-observers who were positioned further away 

from the road also told the OIG that they heard vehicles and voices, but they 

could not make out what was said. The first sniper-observer moved into 

position to observe what the speakers were doing, and he saw someone 

pointing at the ground and toward the trailhead. 

The sniper-observers became concerned that the person gesturing 

toward the trailhead had detected evidence that the sniper-observers had used 

the trail and their presence had been detected. The sniper-observers’ concern 

was heightened by the fact that the barking dog incident had occurred the 

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night before and by the belief that the local population included Macheteros 

sympathizers. The sniper-observers reported these events to the TOC by radio 

and recommended to the TOC that the Quick Reaction Force “get here ASAP 

and hit the house.” Several of the sniper-observers told the OIG that their 

primary concern was that Ojeda would receive warning of their presence and 

would escape and return underground. 

Fraticelli and the HRT Deputy Commander discussed a course of action 

in response to the reported compromise of the sniper-observers. The accounts 

of the deliberations differed somewhat between the participants. However, it is 

undisputed that, based on the recommendation of the HRT Deputy 

Commander, Fraticelli decided to proceed immediately with the arrest plan that 

HRT had devised for the pre-dawn hours of September 24. The primary 

modification of the plan was to transport the arrest team by helicopter to a 

small banana field in front of the house and have the team “fast rope” to the 

ground. Fraticelli told the OIG that he was concerned that the FBI would lose 

the advantage of surprise in this kind of daytime assault by helicopter, but that 

after consulting with the HRT Deputy Commander he became convinced that 

an immediate assault on the house was the best option. 

E. Transportation to the Target 

Fraticelli made the final “go” decision for the emergency daylight assault 

at approximately 3:45 or 4:00 p.m. on September 23. Ten HRT assaulters 

boarded two helicopters. The agents were equipped with helmets, standard 

issue body armor bearing “FBI” identifiers, and HRT-issued .223 caliber M4 

carbine shoulder weapons. 

The San Juan FBI SWAT units were at that time stationed in Quick 

Reaction Force vehicles a few minutes away from the house. The TOC 

instructed two of the agents to link up with HRT assaulters when they were 

dropped by helicopter at the banana field and to assist in the assault. The 

remainder of the Quick Reaction Force was assigned to address any threat 

posed by any persons at or near a neighboring residence, including those who 

had been seen or heard near the location of the sniper-observers. Numerous 

other agents from the San Juan FBI, including two negotiators and an ASAC 

who was also a negotiator, were summoned to assist at the scene. The HRT 

sniper-observers moved to various locations around the house and awaited the 

helicopters. 

 

The HRT helicopters departed for the scene at approximately 4:00 p.m. 

As the HRT helicopters were approaching the GPS coordinates the pilots had 

been given for the Ojeda residence, they passed over an open area that ended 

approximately 1/10 of a mile south of the target coordinates. The pilots could 

not see the target residence. One pilot sought assistance from the sniperobservers on the radio but did not hear anything. The lead pilot did not want 

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to fly over the target residence, so shortly after passing over the edge of the 

open area he made a clockwise turn back toward it. The second helicopter 

made a similar turn. The assaulters completed a rope drop into the open area, 

which was on a steep slope. 

On the ground, the 10 HRT assaulters realized that they were not at the 

planned banana field landing zone. They moved quickly up a steep hill to a 

road, where they encountered an agent from the San Juan FBI at a vehicle 

surveillance point in an SUV. The assaulters got into the SUV or climbed on its 

running boards and rear bumper, and the agent drove them quickly to the 

Ojeda residence. 

F. The Assault on the Ojeda Residence 

At 4:28 p.m., the SUV carrying the 10 HRT assaulters approached the 

residence. As the SUV approached, two sniper-observers moved closer to the 

house, and they were detected by dogs inside the fence, which began barking 

loudly. Another sniper-observer moved forward to open the closed driveway 

gate to the residence, but the vehicle crashed through the gate toward the 

house without stopping. The SUV came to a stop in the front yard, near a low 

cement wall. 

A break in the wall lead to cinder block steps running up a short but 

steep embankment to an open balcony porch along the White (front) side of the 

house. The front door was at the top of the steps, and there was another 

doorway covered by a wooden gate near the Red/White corner of the house. 

Between the front door and the gated doorway there was a kitchen window with 

slatted panes. 

Figure A shows the front of the house much as the agents would have 

seen it when they approached, with many features of the residence obscured by 

vegetation. Figure B is a photograph taken after the foliage was removed, with 

several important features of the residence labeled. Figure C is a threedimensional rendering of the interior of the residence, with important features 

labeled. 

When the SUV was approaching the residence, a sniper-observer who 

was already positioned near the house threw a non-lethal “flash-bang” grenade 

toward the Green/Black corner of the house as a diversionary tactic. Several 

HRT assaulters told the OIG that they thought they heard small arms semiautomatic gunfire from the house even before the SUV stopped. Other 

assaulters told us they perceived small arms fire coming from the kitchen 

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FIGURE A 

View of the Front of the Residence (Before Foliage Rem

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FIGURE B 

Selected Features on Front (White) Side of Residence (Foliage 

Gated Doorway 

Alcove

Kitchen Window

Front Door 

G

Embankment 

Steps 

Low Cement Wall

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Front Door 

Kitchen Window 

Balcony Porch Roof 

Gazebo 

Alcove 

Gated Doorway 

Refrigerator 

Narrow Hallway 

FIGURE C 

3-D Diagram of Interior of the Residence

Kitchen Doorway 

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window as they left the SUV and approached the front of the house.2 The 

agents moved through the gap in the low cement wall up the cinder block 

steps. A dog that had been frightened by the flash bang came running toward 

the steps and an agent shot it to prevent an attack. 

Several of the agents reached the porch, and two agents moved to a gated 

doorway into the house near the Red/White corner. (See the “gated doorway” 

labeled in Figure B.) The remaining assaulters took various positions on the 

steps and the embankment to each side of them but did not proceed forward 

because of the gunfire from the house. 

As one of the agents began preparing to open the locked wooden gate in 

front of the doorway near the Red/White corner, he saw that someone had 

“goose-necked” a pistol from a door on the left interior side of the hallway. (See 

the “kitchen door” labeled on Figure C.) The agent said he heard several shots 

and felt impacts on his ballistic vest. He sought cover on the porch beneath 

the kitchen window and soon realized that he had been wounded in the 

abdomen. Another agent near the gated doorway also saw a handgun being 

fired from the kitchen door behind the gate. The agent returned semiautomatic fire into the hallway with his M4 carbine, firing a full magazine of 

approximately 28 rounds. 

While the wounded agent was seeking cover beneath the kitchen window, 

a gun was fired from inside the kitchen window. One shot struck the wounded 

agent’s helmet from behind, but did not penetrate it. Another agent was struck 

twice in the ballistic vest as he moved down the porch to attempt to assist the 

wounded agent, but the other agent was not wounded. Several HRT agents 

told the OIG that thy saw or heard a burst of automatic gunfire coming from 

inside the kitchen window. At some point during the gunfight, an agent 

located on the embankment below the porch was struck in the battery pack of 

his helmet, but he was unhurt. 

Eight different HRT agents reported that they returned fire at the kitchen 

window from various positions on the front porch or the embankment below it. 

Collectively, the agents estimated that they fired approximately 80 rounds at 

the kitchen window. Several agents told the OIG that near the end of the 

gunfire exchange they perceived that several shots were fired from inside the 

 2 According to several media accounts, Ojeda’s wife, Rosado, claimed that the FBI 

agents fired first. However, Rosado declined to be interviewed for this investigation. As we 

explain in this report, we concluded, based on the evidence and the testimony, that Ojeda fired 

at the agents first.

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house through the front door, making holes in the door and shattering the 

wood.3 

Many of the agents reported that during the exchange of gunfire they 

perceived that at least two different weapons were being fired from inside the 

residence, possibly by two different subjects. Several factors were cited as the 

basis for this belief: 1) several agents reported that they heard both automatic 

and semi-automatic fire from inside the residence, leading them to believe that 

two different guns were being fired; 2) agents reported that early in the 

exchange shots were fired both out the kitchen window and out the kitchen 

door toward the gated doorway, leading some agents to believe that there might 

be two different subjects; and 3) as noted above, several agents misperceived 

semi-automatic fire coming through the front door of the residence at a 

moment simultaneous or nearly simultaneous with the bursts of automatic 

gunfire coming from the kitchen window. 

The exchange of gunfire concluded at 4:30 p.m., about two minutes after 

it began. One FBI agent was wounded. Ojeda was unhurt and the FBI had not 

entered the house or made the arrest. 

G. Events Following the Exchange of Gunfire

After the firing subsided, the wounded agent was evacuated from the 

porch and the other agents withdrew off the porch and the embankment to 

positions offering better cover. The wounded agent was driven to a hospital 

and later airlifted to San Juan, where he underwent emergency surgery. 

At approximately 4:48 p.m., a few minutes after the agent was evacuated 

from the scene, someone inside the residence yelled in Spanish, “someone is 

coming out.” The front door of the residence opened and Ojeda’s wife, Elma 

Beatríz Rosado Barbosa (Rosado) emerged with her hands empty and extended 

in front of her. An agent placed her face down on the ground and handcuffed 

her. Rosado refused to speak to the San Juan FBI agents who attempted to 

question her about conditions inside the house, including how many people 

and weapons were in the residence, whether there were explosives, and if 

anyone was injured. She was driven to the Metropolitan Detention center in 

Guaynabo, and was released the next day without being charged. 

After the unsuccessful attempt to talk to Rosado, a San Juan FBI SWAT 

agent began talking to Ojeda in Spanish. From behind the low cement wall 

below the residence, the agent yelled for Ojeda to exit the residence with his 

 3 As explained below, the Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences determined that 

these holes were made by shots originating from outside into the residence. The OIG was 

unable to determine which agent fired these rounds. 

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hands raised. Ojeda asked who everybody was, to which agent responded, “the 

FBI.” Ojeda responded that the agents were criminals, imperialists, 

colonialists, and the mafia. The agent repeated that it was the FBI and asked 

Ojeda whether he was injured. Ojeda stated that he wanted to talk to the 

press. The agent told Ojeda that the press was not coming. Ojeda refused to 

tell the agent whether anyone else was in the house and said that he would 

only talk to a particular reporter, Jesus Dávila.4 The agent told him that 

Dávila was not coming and again asked Ojeda whether he was injured. Ojeda 

responded, “I’m here.” 

Ojeda continued to refuse to surrender and began speaking in 

revolutionary slogans that, according to the San Juan SWAT agent, sounded 

like a rehearsed speech. The agent continued to attempt to communicate with 

Ojeda, but Ojeda eventually said words to the effect of, “you know what I want, 

shut up.” 

A negotiator from the San Juan FBI arrived at the scene and attempted 

to open a dialog with Ojeda, but Ojeda repeated his demand for Dávila several 

times. The negotiator contacted SAC Fraticelli by cell phone to report the 

conversation. Fraticelli refused the request to bring Dávila, telling the 

negotiator no one would be brought to the scene because it was too dangerous. 

The negotiator did not tell Ojeda of Fraticelli’s decision but continued 

calling out to Ojeda. At some point, Ojeda responded, “I am not going to 

negotiate with any of you until you bring the journalist Jesus Dávila. Then we 

can talk about my surrender.” It is not clear that Ojeda’s use of the word 

“surrender” ever reached Fraticelli, who told the OIG that he did not recall 

hearing that Ojeda had discussed surrender. However, Ojeda’s statement was 

relayed to HRT agents in the TOC. 

The San Juan FBI negotiator continued to call out to Ojeda, but Ojeda 

did not respond further. Based on the TOC log and the agent’s statements, the 

negotiator’s communications with Ojeda took place between approximately 

5:30 and 6:00 p.m. 

Reports of the incident at Ojeda’s residence were broadcast on local radio 

shortly after the exchange of gunfire between Ojeda and the HRT. Citizens, 

including members of the press, soon gathered on a road near the scene. 

Agents from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, as well as 

officers from POPR, arrived to provide outer perimeter security. 

 4 Dávila is a journalist for El Diario La Prensa, a Spanish language newspaper that 

covers events in Puerto Rico. 

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H. Ojeda Struck by a Shot from the Perimeter 

Following the evacuation of the wounded agent at approximately 

4:40 p.m., HRT agent Brian moved to a position on a hillside to the right of the 

residence, behind a retaining wall.5 Figure D is a photograph taken from 

Brian’s approximate position. From this location Brian was able to keep watch 

over both locations from which shots had previously been fired at the FBI: the 

kitchen window and the gated doorway. Brian told the OIG he could see the 

side of a light-colored refrigerator inside the left half of the kitchen window. 

The refrigerator took up about half of his field of view inside the window. The 

other half was in darkness. Brian told the OIG that while in his position on 

hillside behind the retaining wall, he saw the refrigerator door open and the 

refrigerator light go on. Brian said he saw an individual crouched down with a 

gun in his left hand pointing out the window. He could not see the individual’s 

eyes or tell where he was looking. Brian stated that the individual clearly had 

the weapon pointed in the direction of Brian and other FBI agents, but he was 

unsure whether the individual was sighting the gun at anyone in particular. 

No other agent reported being in a position to see what Brian saw in the 

window. 

Brian told the OIG that at that moment he realized that the individual 

was armed and that Brian was visible to him. Brian was aware that another 

agent had been wounded earlier by a shot from inside the house and that Brian 

himself had been struck (but not wounded) by at least one shot from inside the 

house during the original gunfight. Brian said he was also aware the 

individual had previously fired his weapon from the window he was currently 

positioned at and had shot Brian from that window. Brian stated that he 

concluded that the individual posed an imminent threat to himself and other 

agents. 

Brian said he took his weapon off the “safe” setting, sighted the weapon 

where he believed the person’s center mass to be, and fired three rounds in 

rapid succession in single-fire mode. Brian estimated that about three seconds 

elapsed between the time he saw the refrigerator light come on and the time he 

fired his weapon. Brian told the OIG he did not see the refrigerator light after 

he took the shots and that it was possible that the individual was closing the 

door of the refrigerator at the time Brian took the shots. The shots were fired 

at approximately 6:08 p.m. 

Several agents told the OIG that immediately after hearing three shots 

from the perimeter, they heard Ojeda scream “ay, ay, ay” and a noise like 

someone falling down. One agent stated that he heard a moan after the 

 5 “Brian” is a pseudonym. Brian was a member of the arrest team, not a sniperobserver. 

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Gated 

Doorway 

Kitchen Window 

Front Door

Gazebo Roof 

FIGURE D 

View of Residence from Approximate Position of Shoo

19
screams. No witnesses reported hearing any other sounds from Ojeda. Several 

agents told the OIG that they heard Brian state over the radio that he thought 

he had hit the subject. 

I. The Decision Not to Enter the House on September 23

After the three shots were fired from the perimeter, the FBI began 

making preparations to enter the Ojeda residence. The agents at the scene 

wanted to enter the residence immediately. However, SAC Fraticelli and the 

HRT Deputy Commander moved cautiously because of concern that Ojeda 

might not have been disabled and the possibility that there was a second 

gunman inside the house. 

At 6:34 p.m., the San Juan FBI contacted the power company to arrange 

to cut off electricity to the residence, in order to provide a tactical advantage to 

the HRT agents, who were equipped with night vision goggles.6 At 6:49 p.m. an 

HRT agent detonated an explosive charge that had been placed on the locked 

wooden gate at the doorway near the Red/White corner of the residence. HRT 

agents also detonated flash bangs at other locations to create a diversion. An 

agent opened the wooden gate. There was no reaction from anyone inside the 

house. The agents looked into the hallway behind the gate but did not see 

anyone. They did not enter the house during this “limited breach.” 

The events in Puerto Rico were being monitored by the HRT Commander 

in Quantico, Virginia. The HRT Commander told the OIG that shortly after 

hearing about the limited breach of the gated doorway, he ordered the HRT 

Deputy Commander in Puerto Rico not to enter the residence that night. The 

HRT Deputy Commander did not recall receiving such an order, however.7 

Both the Deputy Commander and SAC Fraticelli told the OIG that the FBI 

continued to make plans for entering the residence that night. By 7:41 p.m., a 

team of HRT agents at the scene was equipped and ready to enter the 

residence. 

By this time, however, senior officials in the Counterterrorism Division of 

the FBI in Washington, D.C. had become concerned about how events were 

unfolding in Puerto Rico. Willie Hulon, the Assistant Director for the 

Counterterrorism Division, had already received telephone reports from SAC 

Fraticelli regarding events at the scene. Hulon related these conversations to 

his superior, Gary Bald, the Executive Assistant Director for the National 

 6 The power to the residence was not cut off until 8:09 p.m. 

7 We could not reconcile the versions of events provided by the HRT Commander and 

Deputy Commander. We note that the HRT Commander in Quantico was not part of the formal 

chain of command at that point, and we found no evidence that the Commander’s order was a 

factor in deliberations regarding the entry decision in Puerto between 6:08 and 8:05 p.m. 

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Security Branch. On the basis of Hulon’s description of Fraticelli’s demeanor 

during these telephone conversations and SAC Fraticelli’s repeated inquiries 

regarding the status of his request that FBI Headquarters send another SAC 

familiar with Puerto Rico to assist in the operation, Bald became concerned 

that Fraticelli needed assistance in managing the situation. Bald felt his 

concern was confirmed when he received the impression from Hulon that 

agents at the scene were acting inconsistently with Hulon’s recommendation 

that they hold the perimeter. Bald believed that there was confusion regarding 

who was in command of the scene and that HRT was making decisions 

independent of Fraticelli. On the basis of these concerns, Bald instructed 

Hulon sometime shortly before 8:00 p.m. that any entry of the residence would 

have to be approved by Hulon. 

At 8:05 p.m., Hulon called Fraticelli and told him that there would be no 

entry of the residence without Hulon’s approval. During this call, Fraticelli and 

the HRT Deputy Commander recommended that a nighttime entry be 

conducted to take advantage of the darkness. Hulon instructed them to 

submit a written entry plan to FBI Headquarters for consideration. 

A short time after the 8:05 call, Hulon and Bald discussed the 

comparative merits of entering the house that night or the next day, and they 

decided the entry should be postponed until the next morning. Therefore, 

before the agents in Puerto Rico had completed a written plan for a nighttime 

entry, Hulon told Fraticelli that Headquarters had decided against a nighttime 

entry and that a new HRT team was being sent from Quantico to conduct the 

entry the next day. Late in the evening, however, Fraticelli called Hulon’s 

deputy, John Lewis, to make a final appeal for approval of a nighttime entry. 

Fraticelli stressed the security concerns created by crowds of Macheteros 

sympathizers assembled near the scene, and the possibility that Ojeda might 

still be alive and in need of medical attention. Fraticelli told us that Lewis 

called back approximately 15 or 20 minutes later and told him that Hulon had 

rejected the proposal. 

At 11:33 p.m., the agents at the scene were told that there would be no 

entry of the residence that night. Many of the HRT agents at the scene told the 

OIG that they strongly disagreed with the decision. 

J. Notification of the Puerto Rico Department of Justice 

During the course of the operation, the FBI provided periodic updates to 

the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) for Puerto Rico Between 

approximately 6:45 p.m. and 7:15 p.m., the Criminal Chief for the USAO 

contacted Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos, the Attorney General for the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Pedro G. Goyco Amador, the Chief 

Prosecuting Attorney for the Commonwealth, to notify them of the shooting and 

to request that local prosecutors be sent to the scene. Sánchez told the OIG 

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that this was the first notification that the Puerto Rico Department of Justice 

received from the FBI regarding an operation to apprehend Ojeda. Sánchez 

and Goyco both told the OIG that they inferred from the USAO’s request that 

Ojeda was seriously injured or dead. When the local prosecutors arrived at the 

scene, at approximately 8:36 p.m., the FBI did not permit them to approach 

the house, and at some point the FBI informed them that there would be no 

entry that evening. 

K. Entry of the House on September 24

 The relief team of HRT agents from Quantico arrived in Puerto Rico at 

approximately 5:00 the next morning, September 24. Agents in the TOC 

drafted a written plan for a daytime entry and faxed it to FBI Headquarters. 

Hulon and Lewis reviewed the draft and recommended minor changes by 

telephone. At 9:29 a.m., Hulon called Fraticelli and told him the revised plan 

was approved. 

The daytime entry was not conducted until three hours after the plan 

was approved. The entry plan called for inserting a POPR dog into the 

residence to determine the location or activity of any occupants. The POPR dog 

did not arrive until about 11:54 a.m., and stayed only briefly because the 

handler received instructions from POPR Superintendent Pedro A. Toledo 

Dávila not to participate in the operation. Toledo told the OIG that he denied 

the FBI permission to use POPR’s dog because he understood that the FBI 

feared there might be explosives in the residence and Toledo did not want to 

put POPR’s dog handler at risk. Hulon approved Fraticelli’s request for 

permission to conduct the entry without a dog at 12:22 p.m. 

The HRT entry team walked up the road adjacent to the Red side of the 

residence. At approximately 12:34 p.m., three diversionary flash-bang 

grenades were thrown as the team climbed over a retaining wall, entered the 

residence through the breached wooden gate, and then advanced through the 

kitchen door into the kitchen. The agents discovered Ojeda’s body near the 

front door, face down with a loaded and cocked Browning Hi-Power 9 mm 

handgun on the floor nearby. Blood from the body had flowed under the door, 

forming a single narrow stream down the face of the doorstep and creating a 

bloodstain on the floor of the exterior balcony porch. 

Ojeda was dressed in a camouflaged cap, a sleeveless body armor vest, 

camouflaged overalls, and black combat boots. An FBI emergency medical 

technician was unable to get a pulse from the body and observed that rigor 

mortis had set in. After searching the house for any additional occupants, the 

entry team reported at 12:37 p.m. that the residence was secure and there 

appeared to be a single dead subject. 

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The entry team did not immediately turn Ojeda’s body over because of 

concern that a grenade could be under Ojeda’s torso or in his left hand, which 

was under his body and not visible. A winch was attached to Ojeda’s vest and 

the body was pulled out over the front door step onto the porch. Ojeda’s hand 

fell free and no explosive device was found. The process of pulling the body out 

the door caused a substantial amount of accumulated blood to be pushed over 

the doorstep and increased the amount of blood visible on the face of the 

doorstep. 

The FBI’s bomb technicians turned their attention to two items in the 

house identified as possible explosive threats. A case with protruding wires 

was removed and opened using the winch. It contained a trumpet.8 A large 

rucksack found in the bedroom was inspected visually, and no explosive 

hazards were observed. 

At approximately 2:44 p.m., the San Juan medical examiner pronounced 

Ojeda dead. The scene was turned over to investigators from the Puerto Rico 

Institute of Forensic Sciences for processing. These investigators removed 

Ojeda’s body from the residence at approximately 5:00 p.m. A search of the 

residence was concluded at 9:30 p.m. According to the Evidence Recovery Log, 

the FBI seized over 100 items from the residence, including a substantial 

amount of computer equipment, books, and other documents. 

V. Findings of the Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences

In this section of the Executive Summary, the OIG summarizes the 

findings of the Puerto Rico Institute of Forensic Sciences relevant to this 

investigation. The Institute assumed the lead role in processing the scene and 

conducting the forensic analyses relevant to the Ojeda matter. The Institute’s 

findings were based entirely on the physical evidence; the Institute was not 

aware of the contents of the agents’ statements to the OIG. 

One reason that the FBI deferred to the Institute for the forensic analysis 

was to avoid allegations that the FBI had manipulated the scene. Dr. Pio R. 

Rechani López, Executive Director of the Institute, told the OIG that the 

Institute found no evidence that the FBI had manipulated or tampered with the 

scene. 

 8 At least one Puerto Rico newspaper reported a rumor that the FBI took the trumpet 

from the scene as a “trophy.” This is not accurate. Investigators from the Puerto Rico Institute 

of Forensic Sciences took custody of the trumpet when they processed the scene. Dr. Rechani 

told the OIG that the item will be returned to Ojeda’s family when it is no longer needed for the 

Commonwealth’s investigation of the Ojeda shooting incident. 

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A. Findings on the Scene 

The Institute’s report of Findings on the Scene stated that a Browning 

9 mm pistol was found on the floor of the residence near Ojeda’s body. The 

pistol was loaded to capacity, with 13 unfired bullets inside its magazine and 

one in the chamber, indicating that it had been re-loaded. The pistol hammer 

was found cocked. The pistol had been modified to fire in both automatic and 

semi-automatic mode. Also found at the scene were 107 spent shell casings 

from .223 caliber bullets and 19 spent casings from 9 mm bullets. 

B. Autopsy 

 According to the Autopsy Report, Ojeda died of a single gunshot wound 

that entered his body just below his right clavicle, perforated the right lung, 

and exited the middle of his back on the right side. There were no other 

wounds. The bullet was recovered from inside the “flak jacket” vest Ojeda was 

wearing. 

The autopsy report did not specify a time of death. Dr. Francisco Cortés, 

the Forensic Pathologist who performed the autopsy, told the OIG that based 

on the size of the wound and reasonable assumptions about Ojeda’s heart rate 

and blood pressure, he estimated that Ojeda expired from loss of blood 

approximately 15 to 30 minutes after being shot. He opined that Ojeda could 

have survived the wound if he had received immediate first aid and surgical 

care. Dr. Cortés noted that he does not treat live patients, so that his views on 

the survivability of Ojeda’s wounds and his estimate of the length of time that 

Ojeda might have survived were based on his experience as a pathologist and 

on his review of the medical literature. 

The OIG also consulted with the U.S. Department of Defense Armed 

Forces Institute of Pathology, Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner 

(OAFME), regarding how long Ojeda survived after being shot. Based on its 

review of the autopsy records and other pertinent materials, the OAFME 

concluded that the wound from the bullet was not immediately fatal, but that it 

was not possible to determine exactly how long Ojeda would have survived. 

When the OIG inquired whether Ojeda could have survived longer than two 

hours, the Medical Examiner responded that it was unlikely. 

C. Bullet and Shell Casing Examinations 

 The Institute conducted microscopic comparisons of bullets and bullet 

fragments recovered from the scene with bullets fired from Ojeda’s pistol and 

from the carbines discharged by the HRT agents during the operation. The 

Institute determined that the .223 caliber bullet recovered from inside Ojeda’s 

vest was fired from an M4 carbine that the FBI had provided for comparison 

testing. According to the HRT, this was the carbine used by Brian. The 

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Institute determined that the 9 mm bullets recovered from the abdomen and 

helmet of the wounded agent were fired from Ojeda’s Browning pistol. 

Based on distinctive marks left on the casings by the various weapons’ 

firing pins, the Institute was able to match all 107 of the .223 shell casings 

found at the scene to particular HRT weapons. The Institute provided sketches 

indicating the location where the .223 casings were found at the scene. With 

one exception, the OIG did not find any significant discrepancies between this 

forensic evidence and the statements of the agents to the OIG regarding the 

rounds they fired. The Institute determined that two rounds were fired from a 

weapon that the OIG determined was assigned to an HRT agent who did not 

initially report firing any rounds during the gunfight. Neither of these rounds 

struck Ojeda. When we sought to inquire about these rounds, the agent 

declined to provide a voluntary follow-up statement to the OIG. 

The Institute determined that all 19 shell casings found inside the 

residence were from 9 mm bullets fired from Ojeda’s pistol. 

D. Trajectory Analysis 

The Institute estimated the bullet trajectories for many of the 111 bullet 

holes and 76 bullet impacts found in the residence. The OIG found that the 

location of the holes and impacts as reflected in Institute sketches and crime 

scene photographs, together with the Institute’s trajectory analysis, were 

consistent with the FBI agents’ statements in many important respects. Most 

significantly, the Institute’s analysis identified the trajectories of the three 

perimeter shots fired by agent Brian, including the shot that struck Ojeda. The 

forensic evidence also confirmed that Ojeda fired shots from two locations: 

from the narrow hallway toward the gated doorway, and from the kitchen 

window. The trajectory evidence was also consistent with the agents’ 

descriptions of their locations during the gunfight, including the statements of 

three agents who reported firing into the kitchen window from positions on the 

balcony porch and other agents who reported that they fired from positions on 

the embankment below. 

The OIG found only one set of trajectory estimates by the Forensic 

Institute that conflicted with the statements provided by the FBI agents. 

Several agents reported perceiving shots from inside the house coming through 

the front door. No agents reported firing shots at the door. The Institute 

found, however, that there were three holes in the front door from rounds fired 

from a location outside the door and from below (from down the cinder block 

steps), not from inside the house. The Institute also found three impacts in the 

living room ceiling that corresponded to the holes in the door and confirmed 

the upward trajectory. We sought voluntary follow-up interviews from several 

agents who we believe might have fired these shots, but they declined our 

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request. Consequently, we have been unable to determine which agent or 

agents fired these three rounds through the front door. 

E. Shooting Reconstruction 

The Institute concluded that the bullet that struck Ojeda was one of 

three shots that originated from a location near the retaining wall at the right 

side of the house at a distance of approximately 19 feet. The Institute found 

that the three bullets passed through the kitchen window, penetrated the left 

side of the refrigerator, and exited the front of the refrigerator. Two of the shots 

presented impacts or final penetrations within the residence, while the third 

(the round that struck Ojeda) did not. The third trajectory exited the 

refrigerator at a height of 49 inches, which the Institute found to coincide with 

the position of the bullet wound on Ojeda’s body, assuming a crouched 

position. 

F. Blood Patterns 

 The Institute found that Ojeda’s flak vest prevented an immediate spatter 

of blood at the location where Ojeda was wounded. The Institute concluded 

that Ojeda took one or two steps toward the front door before falling to the 

floor, with his head near the door. Two large pools of blood formed, one near 

Ojeda’s head coming from the wound near his shoulder, and the other near the 

bottom of his vest further away from the door. 

 The blood pattern report concluded that the front door was closed at the 

time the blood was flowing, but that the slope of the floor and the pattern of 

blood were consistent with slow movement toward the door, forming a stream 

on the doorstep. Institute personnel told the OIG that the bloodstain on the 

doorstep was greatly increased when Ojeda’s body was turned over and pulled 

out the front door onto the porch in order to check for explosive devices. The 

much larger and more obvious stain appeared in photographs published in 

some local newspaper reports on Ojeda’s death. 

VI. Compliance with the Deadly Force Policy 

 In this Section, the OIG summarizes its analysis of whether the shots 

fired by the FBI agents during the Ojeda operation were in compliance with the 

Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy. The Deadly Force Policy states that 

a Department of Justice law enforcement officer may use deadly force 

only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable 

belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of 

death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another 

person . . . . If feasible and to do so would not increase the danger 

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to the officer or others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority 

of the officer shall be given prior to the use of deadly force. 

The FBI’s Manual of Investigative and Operational Guidelines (MIOG) sets forth 

a definition of the meaning of “imminent danger”: 

 “Imminent” does not mean “immediate” or “instantaneous,” but 

that an action is pending. Thus, a subject may pose an imminent 

danger even if he is not at that very moment pointing a weapon at 

the Agent. For example, imminent danger may exist if Agents have 

a probable cause to believe . . . [t]he subject possesses a weapon, 

or is attempting to gain access to a weapon, under circumstances 

indicating an intention to use it against Agents or others . . . . 

The FBI’s Instructional Outline for the Deadly Force Policy states that the 

Policy “shall not be construed to require Agents to assume unreasonable risks 

to themselves,” and that “[a]llowance must be made for the fact that Agents are 

often forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” 

 The FBI’s MIOG also contains related policies regarding “fire discipline” 

which require that all use of firepower be preceded by the acquisition of a 

known hostile target. 

 The OIG divided its review of the agents’ use of deadly force during the 

Ojeda operation into two parts: an assessment of the agents’ conduct during 

the initial intense exchange of gunfire between 4:28 and 4:30 p.m., and an 

assessment of Agent Brian’s conduct in firing three rounds from the perimeter 

at approximately 6:08 p.m., including the shot that struck Ojeda. 

A. Assessment of the Initial Exchange of Gunfire 

 Ojeda fired 19 rounds during the initial gunfight, 8 of which struck FBI 

agents. One agent was wounded seriously in the abdomen. FBI agents fired 

approximately 104 rounds during the initial gunfight, none of which struck 

Ojeda. 

 Based on our review of the evidence, we concluded that Ojeda opened fire 

on the FBI agents as they attempted to enter the residence, before any agents 

discharged their weapons. We based this conclusion on several factors, 

including the statements of numerous agents at the scene. In addition, 

because of the elevated position of the residence’s doors and windows, the 

heavy vegetation obscuring them, and the fact that the interior of the house 

was darkened, the agents would have had no clear target before Ojeda opened 

fire. In contrast, Ojeda’s position afforded him a much clearer view of the 

agents as they approached in the daylight. 

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 Ojeda’s widow, Rosado, declined the OIG’s request for an interview but 

alleged in statements to the media that the FBI fired first. We believe, however, 

that Rosado may have interpreted the explosion of a “flash-bang” grenade 

outside the house as gunfire initiated by the FBI. As previously discussed, an 

FBI agent detonated the grenade near the Green/Black corner of house as a 

diversionary tactic as the arresting agents approached, before any gunfire 

began.9 

 We concluded that once Ojeda began firing, he clearly posed an 

imminent threat to the agents. Providing a verbal warning to Ojeda at that 

point was not feasible. Once the agents realized they were under fire, they 

were justified in applying deadly force to address the threat, without pausing to 

warn Ojeda. 

Ojeda fired at the agents from two positions: from the kitchen door 

toward the gated doorway, which the agents were attempting to open, and from 

the kitchen window at agents on or below the porch. We found that the vast 

majority of the 104 rounds fired by the FBI during the initial gunfight were 

fired at these two targets, and that these shots were consistent with the 

Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy. The Instructional Outline for the 

Deadly Force Policy states that “[w]hen the circumstances justify the use of 

deadly force, Agents should continue its application until the imminent danger 

is ended . . . .” The fact that the agents fired over 100 shots without hitting 

Ojeda reflected Ojeda’s superior position of cover and elevation, and did not 

necessarily reflect inadequate fire discipline. 

 On the basis of forensic evidence, however, the OIG found that the FBI 

fired three shots through the front door of the residence that may have violated 

the Deadly Force Policy. None of these shots struck Ojeda or his wife. Nothing 

in the available witness statements or the forensic evidence suggested that 

these three shots addressed an imminent threat posed by a person located 

directly behind the door. However, the agents who we believe may have fired 

these shots declined to provide voluntary follow-up interviews to the OIG. 

B. Assessment of the Perimeter Shots 

The OIG also assessed the three shots that Agent Brian fired into the 

kitchen window at approximately 6:08 p.m. (the “perimeter shots”). One of 

these shots struck Ojeda and resulted in his death. We concluded that these 

shots did not violate the Deadly Force Policy. 

 9 This discussion should not be construed as a finding that Ojeda would not have 

opened fire on the FBI if the flash-bang had not been detonated. Ojeda had clearly made 

preparations to offer violent resistance to the FBI before the agents arrived. 

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Brian told the OIG that he saw an individual in the kitchen window, 

illuminated by the interior light of the refrigerator. Brian stated that the 

individual was crouched down with a gun in his left hand pointing out the 

window. Brian said he sighted his carbine where he believed Ojeda’s center 

mass to be, and fired three rounds in rapid succession in single fire mode. 

We found that the forensic evidence reported by the Puerto Rico Institute 

for Forensic Sciences was consistent with Brian’s description of where he was 

and what he saw. Ojeda’s pistol was found on the floor at his side, loaded and 

cocked, confirming that Ojeda was holding the gun at the moment he was 

wounded. His wound was also consistent with a crouching position, with his 

shoulders generally squared toward Brian. Although Brian’s view of Ojeda was 

partially obscured by the refrigerator at the moment of impact, the forensic 

evidence indicates that the left side of Ojeda’s body, including his left hand 

(which Brian said was holding the gun), could have been visible to Brian at or 

immediately prior to the moment that Brian fired the shots. Based on the 

trajectory of the three perimeter shots, we believe that at the moment of impact 

Ojeda may have been moving to his right, behind the refrigerator, possibly 

because he realized he had revealed himself in the refrigerator light. 

In reaching our conclusion about the use of deadly force, we took into 

account the fact that Ojeda had already fired several rounds out the kitchen 

window, and had evidenced an intention to kill or injure the FBI agents 

attempting to arrest him. He had already shot three different agents. In 

addition, Brian and other agents covering the house were in exposed positions. 

The discussions between Ojeda and the FBI during the standoff did not 

mitigate the threat that Ojeda presented at the moment Brian fired. Ojeda had 

refused the FBI’s instructions to come out of the house. He appeared at the 

kitchen window with a gun. Even if Brian had understood Ojeda’s offer to 

discuss surrender if a reporter were brought to the scene, Ojeda could have 

resumed firing at the FBI agents at any instant. 

For all of these reasons, the OIG concluded that at the moment Brian 

fired these three shots, he had a reasonable belief that Ojeda posed an 

imminent danger of death or serious injury to Brian or to other agents, and he 

therefore did not violate the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. The OIG’s expert 

consultants agreed with this assessment. 

VII. Assessment of the Decision to Conduct an Emergency Daylight 

Assault

In this Section, the OIG summarizes its assessment of the decision by 

SAC Fraticelli, in consultation with the HRT Deputy Commander, to order an 

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emergency daylight assault on the Ojeda residence on the afternoon of 

September 23. 

When the sniper-observers reported their belief that they had been 

discovered by unidentified persons, Fraticelli had to select among several 

options for action, taking into account the risk that these persons might alert 

Ojeda to the presence of the sniper-observers or otherwise assist him in 

evading or resisting arrest. Fraticelli approved a plan proposed by the HRT 

Deputy Commander to transport ten HRT agents to the residence in two 

helicopters and conduct an emergency daylight assault on the residence to 

arrest Ojeda. We concluded that this plan was dangerous to the agents and 

not the best alternative available to the FBI. In reaching this conclusion, the 

OIG relied extensively on the assessments provided by its outside experts. 

A. Foreseeable Risks from a Daylight Assault

 We found that it was readily foreseeable that Ojeda would be armed and 

prepared to offer violent resistance to the FBI assault that began at 4:28 p.m. 

on September 23. Moreover, if Ojeda had been armed with a higher power 

firearm or with an explosive device such as a grenade (which would have been 

consistent with the FBI’s prior experience with the Macheteros), several FBI 

agents likely would have been killed or seriously wounded in the operation. 

 The HRT Deputy Commander stated that when he proposed the daylight 

assault he believed the FBI would still have the advantage of surprise and 

could get into the house without a gunfight. After hearing the Deputy 

Commander’s advice, Fraticelli ordered the daylight assault. We found, 

however, that the belief that the FBI could surprise Ojeda with a helicopter 

assault was unrealistic and inconsistent with the primary justification for 

ordering the assault: the concern that whoever had detected the sniperobservers would alert Ojeda to the FBI’s presence. The assault team did not 

arrive at the residence until almost two hours after the sniper-observers 

reported the compromise, providing ample time for someone to warn Ojeda and 

for him to prepare resistance. In addition, the FBI should have recognized that 

a plan for delivering the HRT agents by helicopter into a small field located in 

plain view of the front of Ojeda’s residence would generate a great deal of noise 

and take enough time to permit Ojeda to arm himself in anticipation of the 

FBI’s arrival. 

The FBI’s plan for an emergency daylight assault was adapted from a 

plan being prepared for a surreptitious nighttime assault. It was poorly suited 

to daylight conditions, without the advantage of surprise. Once Ojeda knew 

the FBI was coming, he had the advantage of high ground, superior cover, and 

superior visibility. Moreover, the plan called for the agents to approach the 

house and pass directly in front of the front door and the kitchen window to 

reach the breach points, which exposed the agents to close range gunfire. 

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The FBI Critical Incident Handbook describes an “Emergency Assault 

Plan” as an “immediate measure designed to regain control or stabilize a 

rapidly deteriorating crisis situation that poses imminent danger to the lives of 

innocent people.” We concluded that the reported compromise of the sniperobservers and the resulting possibility that Ojeda would escape did not rise to 

this level of urgency, particularly in light of the available alternatives. 

The HRT Deputy Commander told the OIG that after the sniper-observers 

reported the compromise, no consideration was given to options other than a 

direct assault on the residence to arrest Ojeda. In light of the risks associated 

with this option, we concluded that other alternatives should have been given 

greater consideration. 

Although the OIG is critical of the decision to conduct an emergency 

daylight assault, it is important to note that we are not suggesting that this 

decision was the cause of Ojeda’s death. Ojeda was not killed or injured during 

the assault. Ojeda was shot approximately 100 minutes later when he 

presented a threat of imminent harm to the agents, not because the FBI had 

selected the emergency daylight assault option. 

B. The Surround and Call-out Option 

In consultation with its experts, the OIG determined that a superior 

option was available to the FBI for attempting to arrest Ojeda after the reported 

compromise: (1) establish a perimeter around the residence sufficient to 

prevent Ojeda from escaping, (2) demand Ojeda’s surrender with a short 

deadline for responding, and (3) if Ojeda refused to surrender, use chemical 

agents (such as tear gas and smoke) to force Ojeda from the residence. Ojeda’s 

positional advantage would have been reduced or neutralized in this scenario. 

The sniper-observers had already provided relevant information regarding the 

residence, including the limited number of exit points from the house that 

would have to be covered. This information was sufficient for the FBI to adopt, 

or at least consider, this plan. 

The reasons given by the FBI for rejecting or not considering this strategy 

were troubling. It appears that a major consideration in the advice given to 

SAC Fraticelli was the fact that several days earlier, during the planning phase 

of the Ojeda operation, Fraticelli had stated a preference to avoid a “barricaded 

subject scenario” because of the potential for crowds of sympathizers to 

assemble near the scene. But the reported compromise of the operation and 

the loss of the advantage of surprise changed the circumstances and the 

comparative risks associated with each option so significantly that the 

surround and call-out option should have received serious reconsideration. We 

believe that the mindset of avoiding a barricade situation caused the FBI to 

ignore that option when the circumstances changed. 

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We acknowledge that the surround and call-out option presented risks. 

If the agents attempting to establish a perimeter could not establish positions 

of adequate cover, they might be exposed to gunfire from the residence, 

particularly if the subject was armed with a rifle. The agents also faced 

uncertainty regarding whether they could establish a safe perimeter in an area 

believed to be populated with Macheteros sympathizers. (As it happened, the 

FBI successfully established such a perimeter after the agent was wounded.) If 

it had been necessary to launch chemicals into the house, some agents might 

have been exposed to fire during that procedure. However, these risks to agent 

safety were not as great as the risks from a foreseeable exchange of gunfire 

with Ojeda firing from a position of cover at agents approaching the house 

directly, or exposed on the porch, at very short range. 

C. The Extract and Withdraw Option 

We also are concerned that the FBI gave little or no consideration to the 

option of extracting the sniper-observers without taking immediate action to 

arrest or surround Ojeda at the residence. In raising this concern, we are not 

making a finding that the “extract and withdraw” option should have been 

selected in this case. However, when a subject is not creating a crisis situation 

that poses imminent danger to innocent people, and the available options for 

immediately arresting or containing the subject present major risks to agents 

or others, FBI incident commanders should at least consider seriously the 

possibility of withdrawing. In this case, we do not believe this option was given 

more than cursory consideration. 

D. Modification of the Approach Route

We also found that the FBI could have modified the assault plan to 

reduce the risk to the agents associated with daytime conditions and loss of the 

element of surprise. The assault route that the FBI borrowed from a plan for a 

surreptitious pre-dawn raid – up the front steps and in front of the door and 

windows on the front side of the house – maximized the exposure of the agents 

to close-range fire from inside the house. As the FBI was aware, the Red and 

Black sides of the house had no doors or windows. An alternative approach to 

the breach point from the Red/ Black corner of the property would have 

reduced the exposure of the agents to gunfire from the house. 

E. Conducting the Assault on El Grito de Lares 

 We found no support for the allegation made in some media reports that 

the FBI conducted the arrest operation on El Grito de Lares (September 23) for 

symbolic reasons, such as to intimidate supporters of Puerto Rican 

independence. The operation took place in September because that was when 

the FBI found Ojeda’s house. The FBI actually planned to arrest Ojeda early 

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on September 24 the day after the holiday. It conducted the emergency assault 

on September 23 only because of the reported compromise of the sniperobservers. 

VIII. Assessment of the FBI’s Decisions Regarding Entry 

 In this Section we summarize the OIG’s assessment of the FBI’s 

decisions regarding the delay in entering the Ojeda house after the perimeter 

shots were fired at 6:08 p.m. The FBI has been criticized for failing to enter the 

residence for 18 hours after Ojeda was wounded. We divide this analysis into 

two parts: decisions made before 8:05 p.m. on September 23 while SAC 

Fraticelli remained in charge of the operation, and decisions made after 

8:05 p.m. when FBI Headquarters assumed approval authority over any plan to 

enter the house. 

A. FBI Entry Decisions in Puerto Rico before 8:05 p.m. 

We found that between 6:08 p.m. and 8:05 p.m., the FBI in Puerto Rico 

was following a cautious, methodical approach in preparing to enter the Ojeda 

residence. The FBI executed a limited breach of the gated doorway at 

6:49 p.m. and was preparing to enter and clear the residence after darkness 

fell and the electricity was cut off. The primary considerations driving this 

approach were the concern that Ojeda might not be incapacitated and might 

still present a threat to the agents, and the belief, based on perceptions during 

the initial gunfight, that there might be a second gunman inside the residence. 

This approach was designed to exploit HRT’s tactical advantage in the dark. It 

also provided time to gain intelligence about the situation inside the residence 

and to ensure the entry team was fully prepared. We concluded that if 

Fraticelli had retained control of the entry decision, the entry probably would 

have occurred shortly after 8:09 p.m. when electric power to the residence was 

cut off. 

The available forensic evidence indicates that Ojeda likely expired from 

blood loss before 8:09 p.m. As a result, even if Fraticelli’s plan had been 

implemented, Ojeda was likely dead by the time the FBI would have entered the 

residence. 

We concluded that the FBI’s approach was motivated by considerations 

of agent safety, not by any desire to withhold medical treatment from Ojeda. 

One allegation made after Ojeda’s death was that the FBI knew Ojeda 

was seriously injured because of the appearance of a large bloodstain on the 

front doorstep and the balcony porch floor. Several Puerto Rico media outlets 

published images of the bloodstain. However, crime scene photographs show 

that most of the staining occurred on September 24, when Ojeda’s body was 

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turned over and pulled out the front door to check for explosives. Moreover, 

the agents at the scene likely would not have been able to see the blood that 

accumulated before Ojeda’s body was moved, because their view of the 

doorstep would have been obscured by heavy foliage or by the balcony railing, 

as shown in Figures A and D. In addition, it is not clear that Ojeda’s blood had 

yet flowed onto the doorstep before 8:09 p.m., when the power was cut and the 

porch was in darkness. None of the agents we interviewed reported seeing a 

bloodstain on September 23. 

B. Entry Decisions made at FBI Headquarters 

 At 8:05 p.m., Assistant Director Hulon informed SAC Fraticelli that any 

plan to enter the Ojeda residence would have to be approved in advance by the 

Counterterrorism Division in FBI Headquarters. When Fraticelli and the HRT 

Deputy Commander proposed a nighttime entry, Hulon instructed him to 

submit a written entry plan. Later that evening, before any written plan had 

been submitted, Hulon and Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald decided 

that there would be no entry until a team of relief agents from Quantico arrived 

the next day. We reviewed both the procedural decision to require 

Headquarters approval of an entry plan and the substantive decision to reject a 

nighttime entry operation. 

 1. The decision to require Headquarters approval 

 Bald made the decision to assume Headquarters control over the entry 

decision. A significant factor in Bald’s decision was his assessment of 

Fraticelli’s demeanor and lack of confidence, based on Hulon’s description of 

conversations with Fraticelli. Bald stated that this assessment was confirmed 

by what he believed were indications that HRT was acting independently of 

Fraticelli. The decision to require Headquarters approval for the entry was 

made in the context of a shared belief among senior Headquarters officials that 

Headquarters involvement was needed to provide balance and perspective to 

decision-making at the scene. 

 It was difficult for the OIG to evaluate Bald’s assessment of Fraticelli’s 

demeanor and confidence. Hulon told us that Bald’s assessment was fair in 

light of the description Hulon had given to Bald of Hulon’s conversations with 

Fraticelli. In particular, Bald was disturbed by Fraticelli’s request for 

assistance from another SAC and repeated inquiries regarding the status of 

this request. However, we did not find evidence, based on the decisions made 

in Puerto Rico between 6:08 p.m. and 8:05 p.m., that Fraticelli was 

overwhelmed or lacked sufficient confidence to manage the situation. Under 

Fraticelli’s command, the FBI in Puerto Rico was proceeding cautiously and 

methodically toward a nighttime entry of the residence after the power was cut 

off. Moreover, we found that Fraticelli’s explanation of his reason for 

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requesting help from a particular SAC with experience in Puerto Rico in the 

event of a protracted crisis was objectively reasonable. 

We also did not find any evidence to confirm Bald’s perception that there 

was any command confusion between HRT and the SAC in Puerto Rico. Bald’s 

perception was based on a misunderstanding of the actions that were taking 

place at the scene, probably because accuracy was lost in the multiple layers of 

reporting from the agents at the scene to Bald. In addition, Bald’s perception 

of command confusion was also based on an incorrect statement made by the 

HRT Commander (who Bald thought was in Puerto Rico but who in fact was 

still in Quantico) that HRT had the lead. We found no indication that HRT had 

in fact assumed ultimate command control over the operation or that HRT was 

operating in a manner contrary to SAC Fraticelli’s instructions. 

Ultimately, however, we did not find that Bald’s decision to require 

Headquarters approval for an entry plan to be improper. Headquarters’ 

authority to assume such control is not in dispute. Bald’s decision to exercise 

that authority in this case was based primarily on a subjective evaluation of 

Fraticelli’s demeanor that was difficult for the OIG to assess after the fact. 

Headquarters was ultimately responsible for the outcome of the operation, and 

senior officials can offer experience and perspective to a crisis situation. While 

we found that some of Bald’s understandings regarding conditions at the scene 

were inaccurate, we cannot say that his decision to require Headquarters 

approval of an entry plan was improper. 

However, we found that FBI Headquarters’ requirement that the entry 

plan be submitted in writing was unnecessary and unduly bureaucratic, 

particularly in light of the fact that FBI Headquarters officials, including Hulon, 

knew that agents at the scene believed that Ojeda was wounded and on the 

floor. We note, however, that Hulon ultimately rejected the plan for a nighttime 

entry before it was submitted in writing, so that the writing requirement had a 

limited practical impact in this case. 

2. The decision not to enter the residence 

We found that Headquarters’ decision not to approve entry of the 

residence on the night of September 23 was motivated by a concern for agent 

safety and a desire to avoid additional casualties, not any desire to let Ojeda 

die. The following considerations were important factors in the Headquarters’ 

decision: 1) agents at the scene had reported the possible presence of a second 

shooter in the residence; 2) the lack of certainty regarding Ojeda’s condition 

and whether he was still a threat; 3) the belief that Ojeda’s intimate knowledge 

of the interior of the residence mitigated HRT’s nighttime tactical advantage; 

4) the HRT agents at the scene were fatigued, and a fresh team of HRT agents 

was being flown to Puerto Rico; and 5) there might be improvised explosive 

devices inside the residence that would be more difficult to detect at night. In 

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the judgment of Hulon, in consultation with Bald, these considerations 

outweighed his concern that Ojeda might need medical treatment. We believe 

that the decision Hulon made with the information then available to him was 

not improper.

However, we found that the distance and multiple layers of reporting 

between the agents at the scene and the FBI Headquarters officials in 

Washington affected the information that was the basis of the decision not to 

enter the house during the evening of September 23. The agents at the scene 

believed on the basis of what they heard from the house that Ojeda had been 

seriously wounded or killed, and over the course of the evening they became 

less concerned about the possibility of other subjects in the house. But their 

assessments did not reach Hulon, who made his decision based on the belief 

that Ojeda still posed a threat and might have an accomplice. 

Yet, Headquarters’ decision to delay entry until the next day likely had 

no impact on the outcome of the operation, or on the death of Ojeda. The 

forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy estimated that Ojeda died from 

blood loss approximately 15 to 30 minutes after being shot, which would place 

the time of death between 6:23 and 6:38 p.m. This indicates that Ojeda was 

dead before Headquarters assumed control over the entry decision. Indeed, 

according to the estimates from the Forensic Institute, the only chance to save 

Ojeda’s life would have been for the agents to enter the residence shortly after 

6:08 p.m. and evacuate Ojeda immediately. Given that an agent had been 

seriously wounded in the prior effort to enter the residence, the uncertainty 

regarding Ojeda’s condition, and the belief that more than one weapon had 

been fired from inside the house during the gunfight, an immediate effort to 

enter the house would have been a risky action and we cannot fault the FBI for 

taking a more cautious approach. 

IX. The FBI’s Preparation for and Conduct of Negotiations 

 The OIG also reviewed the FBI’s preparation for and conduct of 

negotiations with Ojeda. During the standoff with Ojeda after the initial 

gunfight, two San Juan FBI agents (one of whom was a certified negotiator) 

attempted to communicate with Ojeda and convince him to surrender. Ojeda 

demanded that the FBI bring a particular reporter to the scene, but SAC 

Fraticelli immediately rejected this proposal. 

Prior to deploying to Puerto Rico, HRT had declined an offer from the 

FBI’s Crisis Negotiation Unit in Quantico to provide negotiators for the Ojeda 

operation. We concluded that this was a mistake and was also inconsistent 

with the guidance provided in the FBI’s MIOG and Critical Incident Handbook. 

The CONOP clearly contemplated that this operation was not merely a 

surveillance mission but rather was directed at resulting in an arrest of Ojeda. 

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Given Ojeda’s history of violent resistance and the challenging operational 

environment, it was foreseeable that the arrest operation could result in a 

barricaded subject scenario requiring negotiations. 

SAC Fraticelli recognized the possible need for negotiators and made 

some contingency plans by arranging for two San Juan FBI negotiators to be 

available during the operation. However, Fraticelli and his tactical advisors 

inadequately integrated the negotiation component into the operation. The 

negotiators were effectively excluded from HRT’s tactical planning and did not 

have any meaningful interaction with the HRT agents regarding the negotiators’ 

possible role in the operation. In addition, the negotiators did not function as 

FBI Crisis Management Program guidelines provide. The FBI failed to adhere 

to its two-negotiator standard by sending only one negotiator to talk with 

Ojeda. 

In addition, Fraticelli told the negotiator to reject Ojeda’s demand for the 

reporter and to tell Ojeda to come out with his hands up. Fraticelli’s abrupt 

approach was contrary to CNU training, which teaches that a negotiator should 

never reject a demand outright, because doing so can cause the subject to stop 

talking. We believe it is unlikely these mistakes would have occurred if HRT 

had deployed with a CNU negotiation team it had experience working with, or 

had at least coordinated its tactical planning with the San Juan FBI 

negotiation team. 

However, although we are critical of certain aspects of the FBI’s 

preparation for and conduct of negotiations with Ojeda during the standoff, we 

cannot conclude that they affected the outcome. A Spanish-speaking 

negotiator was in fact sent to the scene and negotiated with Ojeda for over half 

an hour. Ojeda had reason to know that his peaceful surrender would be 

accepted, as evidenced by his wife’s safe surrender. We do not believe his 

decision to remain barricaded in his residence was a consequence of the way 

the FBI’s negotiations were conducted. 

Moreover, even if the FBI had acceded to Ojeda’s demand, it would have 

taken hours to bring the reporter to the scene and to prepare him. At 

6:08 p.m., long before any reporter could have been brought to the scene, 

Ojeda was seen in the kitchen window with a weapon and the fatal shot was 

fired. Ojeda presented a threat at that moment, and we cannot conclude that a 

different decision regarding the reporter would have likely altered the outcome. 

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X. Miscellaneous Issues

A. The FBI’s Communications with the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico

The FBI was criticized for failing to notify Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 

officials in advance of the Ojeda arrest operation. Fraticelli told us that he did 

not notify local officials, the Police of Puerto Rico in particular, because he 

wanted to keep the operation secret to limit the possibility of compromising 

leaks.10 

FBI regulations provide the SAC discretion in whether to notify local 

authorities of operations in his jurisdiction. Restricting who is aware of or 

involved in an operation where success depends on the element of surprise is a 

legitimate precaution, and we did not find Fraticelli's exercise of the discretion 

improper in this case. 

The FBI was also criticized for providing Puerto Rico government officials 

incomplete and unsatisfying information concerning the reasons for the 

delayed entry. The explanations provided to officials by the FBI – a lack of 

personnel and technical equipment, and agent fatigue – also resulted in 

accusations that the FBI’s lack of adequate preparation for the operation 

resulted in Ojeda needlessly bleeding to death. As we described above, we 

determined that the delay was primarily attributable to good faith concerns for 

agent safety based on the belief there might be a second shooter in the 

residence and that Ojeda might still be a threat. By missing several 

opportunities to provide a better, more complete explanation for the delay to 

Puerto Rico officials, including these safety concerns, the FBI contributed to 

the criticism of its conduct. 

 B. Prior Opportunities to Apprehend Ojeda

 In the weeks after the incident, allegations were raised that the FBI may 

have had sufficient information regarding Ojeda’s whereabouts and habits over 

a period of years to enable it to safely arrest Ojeda away from his home. We 

determined that although the FBI had previously received information 

suggesting Ojeda’s possible presence in Hormigueros, the FBI did not 

intentionally bypass opportunities to arrest Ojeda at a different location. 

 10 The Puerto Rico Police were generally aware that the FBI had been attempting to 

locate Ojeda, and had provided some assistance to the FBI in this effort. 

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XI. Recommendations

Our review identified a number of deficiencies in the FBI’s conduct of the 

Ojeda surveillance and arrest operation. In our report, we make ten 

recommendations addressing these findings. Most of the recommendations are 

intended to highlight lessons that we believe should inform the planning and 

related training for future FBI operations. Other recommendations address 

specific policy or tactical issues. We summarize the ten recommendations 

below. 

A. Recommendations Regarding Compliance with the DOJ Deadly 

Force Policy and Related Issues 

Recommendation No. 1: Conduct an inquiry relating to the three rounds fired 

by an unidentified FBI agent and the two unreported rounds fired by a known 

agent. 

After the criminal investigations into this incident have been concluded, 

the FBI should conduct an inquiry relating to the three rounds fired by an 

unidentified FBI agent through the front door of Ojeda’s residence and the two 

unreported rounds fired from a known agent, in order to determine whether 

these rounds were fired in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. 

Recommendation No. 2: Review the use of flash bangs in outdoor operations. 

The FBI should review the use of flash bangs in outdoor environments 

and under circumstances in which their use could have the unintended effect 

of alerting the subject or providing the mistaken impression that the FBI is 

opening fire on a subject. 

Recommendation No. 3: Adopt a “standard load” procedure for HRT agents. 

The FBI’s HRT should adopt a standard load procedure that would 

enable accurate post-incident accounting of the number of rounds fired by 

each agent. Other components of the FBI should adopt similar procedures to 

the extent they are not already in place. 

B. Recommendations Regarding the Decision to Conduct an 

Emergency Daylight Assault 

Recommendation No. 4: Adequately consider all available options in 

emergency situations as time permits. 

We found a lack of consideration given to alternative courses of action 

following the reported compromise of the FBI sniper-observers, despite the 

dramatically increased risk to the FBI agents associated with an emergency 

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daylight assault of Ojeda’s residence. This case highlights the importance of 

adequately considering options in emergency situations, including revisiting 

options that may have been discarded in the initial plan (such as the surround 

and call-out option), and being prepared to consider how changed 

circumstances affect the viability of original plans. 

Recommendation No. 5: Enhance the Spanish language capability of HRT’s 

sniper-observer teams. 

In light of the prevalence of Spanish as the primary language of most 

Puerto Ricans, including Ojeda and his wife, and the need to identify Ojeda, we 

believe the FBI should have anticipated that the HRT sniper-observers might 

need to understand conversations in Spanish. It therefore would have been 

useful to have had some Spanish-speaking agents on the sniper-observer 

team. HRT should consider this need in future operations and enhance the 

Spanish language capability of its sniper-observer teams. 

C. Recommendations Regarding the FBI’s Entry Decisions 

Recommendation No. 6: Ensure that, if decision-making in critical incidents is 

assigned to FBI Headquarters, there is adequate communication between the 

field and Headquarters concerning the situation at the scene and the decisions 

that are made in Headquarters. 

FBI Headquarters’ involvement can bring significant operational 

experience to crisis incidents and can provide perspective regarding how 

decisions in one incident might impact FBI operations more broadly. 

Headquarters’ involvement can also bring a measure of deliberation and 

caution to crisis incidents that might not otherwise exist. However, this case 

demonstrated how managers’ remoteness from the scene of a crisis incident 

can affect the substance and process of decision-making. In response to the 

Ojeda operation, the FBI should carefully consider the conditions under which 

it will assume control over a crisis incident. The FBI should also evaluate how 

it ensures that adequate information flows to the Headquarters officials who 

must approve operational decisions, and how the FBI will ensure adequate 

communication between FBI Headquarters and the on-scene commanders. 

Recommendation No. 7: Ensure that the apparent miscommunication between 

the HRT Commander and Deputy Commander and the chain of command 

discrepancy are not repeated. 

Management from CIRG and HRT should review the chain of command 

discrepancy demonstrated by the HRT Commander’s order to the Deputy 

Commander that HRT not enter Ojeda’s residence, as well as the apparent 

miscommunication between the Commander and Deputy Commander 

concerning this order. Fraticelli, the Puerto Rico SAC, was the commander for 

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the operation, and the HRT Commander did not have authority to make tactical 

decisions or give orders such as this. The FBI should take appropriate steps to 

ensure this situation is avoided in future HRT operations. 

Recommendation No. 8: Provide guidance regarding the circumstances under 

which operational plans from the field should be presented to Headquarters for 

approval orally or in writing. 

Assistant Director Hulon required SAC Fraticelli and HRT to present 

their proposal for a nighttime entry of Ojeda’s residence in writing under 

circumstances where an oral proposal would have been sufficient and 

appropriate. One of the reasons Hulon required that the proposal be in writing 

was that he considered it standard procedure. FBI policy permits the use of 

oral briefings in lieu of written arrest orders in “exigent circumstances.” The 

FBI should consider providing further guidance regarding what circumstances 

should be considered “exigent” for this purpose. 

D. Recommendations Regarding the FBI’s Preparations for and 

Conduct of Negotiations 

Recommendation No. 9: Adequately assess whether an arrest operation could 

result in a scenario requiring negotiations. 

The FBI should use this case in future operations planning and training 

to illustrate the importance of carefully considering whether negotiators should 

be deployed under circumstances where a scenario requiring negotiations is 

reasonably foreseeable, even if undesirable. 

Recommendation No. 10: Ensure that negotiators are integrated into the 

tactical planning where there is a potential need for negotiations. 

Recognizing that negotiators might be needed in an operation is only the 

first step in planning for their potential use. As FBI guidelines provide, 

effective negotiation requires that the negotiators be integrated into the tactical 

planning of an operation. This was not done in this case. The FBI should us 

this case to reinforce the importance of integrating negotiators into the tactical 

planning of operations where negotiations might be needed. 

XII. Conclusion 

In this report, we examined the FBI’s operation to arrest Ojeda and 

various issues related to it. We concluded that the FBI agents’ use of deadly 

force, including the shot that struck and killed Ojeda, did not violate the DOJ 

Deadly Force Policy. We also examined the FBI’s decisions to delay entry into 

the residence until 18 hours after Ojeda was shot. We found that the decisions 

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were motivated by considerations of agent safety, not by a desire to deny 

medical care to Ojeda or to let him die. The decision by FBI Headquarters 

officials to delay entry until the next day reflected a good-faith balancing of the 

information known to them, although we determined that Headquarters 

officials’ perception of the threat of entry differed significantly from the 

perception of the agents at the scene. 

We examined other aspects of the operation, including the planning for 

the assault on the residence and the FBI’s negotiations with Ojeda. We found 

problems in the decision-making in these areas. We concluded that the 

decisions suffered from inadequate consideration of alternative options and 

inadequate preparation for foreseeable scenarios. 

While we did not conclude that any of the actions of FBI officials 

constituted misconduct, we found several of their decisions deficient because 

they reflected an inadequate assessment of the known circumstances, or were 

either contrary to or inconsistent with applicable FBI guidelines. For these 

reasons, we highlighted several of these decisions as performance issues that 

we believe the FBI should examine.

 Finally, in the report we make ten systemic recommendations relating to 

problems we found in the Ojeda arrest operation. Our systemic 

recommendations are intended to improve the planning and conduct of future 

FBI arrest operations. We believe that, if implemented, they may help the FBI 

avoid some of the problems that occurred in the Ojeda arrest operation. 

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