39804 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–14–21 Thielert Aircraft Engines 

GmbH: Amendment 39–16366. Docket 

No. FAA–2010–0308; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NE–17–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective August 17, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Thielert Aircraft 

Engines GmbH model TAE 125–01 

reciprocating engines with any of the 

following part number blow-by oil separators 

installed: 

TABLE 1—PART NUMBERS OF AFFECTED BLOW-BY OIL SEPARATORS

02–7250–18100R1 02–7250–18100R2 02–7250–18100R3 

02–7250–18100R4 02–7250–18300R1 02–7250–18300R2 

02–7250–18300R3 02–7250–18300R4 02–7250–18300R5 

These engines are installed in, but not 

limited to, Diamond Aircraft Industries 

Model DA 40, Piper PA–28–161 

(Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. 

SA03303AT), and Cessna 172 (STC No. 

SA01303WI) airplanes. 

Reason 

(d) Service has shown that the small outlet 

of the blow-by oil separators, part number 

02–7250–18100R1; 02–7250–18100R2; 02– 

7250–18100R3; 02–7250–18100R4; 02–7250– 

18300R1; 02–7250–18300R2; 02–7250– 

18300R3; 02–7250–18300R4; or 02–7250– 

18300R5, may cause a blow-by gas pressure 

increase inside the crankcase of the engine in 

excess of the oil seal design pressure limits. 

Leaking engine oil may adversely affect the 

gearbox clutch or the engine lubrication 

system. This condition, if not corrected, 

could lead to in-flight cases of engine power 

loss or ultimately, shutdown. 

This AD results from mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of another 

country to identify and correct an unsafe 

condition on an aviation product. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine 

power or uncommanded engine shutdown 

during flight due to excessive crankcase 

blow-by gas pressure. 

Actions and Compliance 

(e) Unless already done, do the following 

actions: 

(1) Remove the blow-by oil separators 

listed by part number in Table 1 of this AD 

within the next 110 flight hours after the 

effective date of this AD. 

(2) Use the Measures section of Thielert 

Aircraft Engines GmbH Service Bulletin No. 

TM TAE 125–0019, Revision 1, dated March 

5, 2009, to do the removal from service. 

FAA AD Differences 

(f) None. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(g) The Manager, Engine Certification 

Office, FAA, has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to European Aviation Safety 

Agency AD 2010–0020, dated February 8, 

2010, for related information. 

(i) Contact Tara Chaidez, Aerospace 

Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, 

Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New 

England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 

01803; e-mail: tara.chaidez@faa.gov; 

telephone (781) 238–7773; fax (781) 238– 

7199, for more information about this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(j) You must use Thielert Aircraft Engines 

GmbH Service Bulletin No. TM TAE 125– 

0019, Revision 1, dated March 5, 2009, to do 

the actions required by this AD, unless the 

AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Thielert Aircraft Engines 

GmbH, Platanenstrasse 14 D–09350, 

Lichtenstein, Germany, telephone: +49– 

37204–696–0; fax: +49–37204–696- 55; email: info@centurion-engines.com. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

New England Region, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

July 1, 2010. 

Francis A. Favara, 

Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–16618 Filed 7–12–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0274; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–038–AD; Amendment 

39–16367; AD 2010–15–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 757 Airplanes, Model 

767 Airplanes, and Model 777–200 and 

–300 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Model 757 airplanes, Model 767 

airplanes, and Model 777–200 and –300 

series airplanes. This AD requires 

repetitive inspections for damage of the 

electrical terminal at the left and right 

flightdeck window 1, and corrective 

actions if necessary. This AD also 

allows for replacing the flightdeck 

window 1 with a new improved 

flightdeck window equipped with 

different electrical connections, which 

terminates the repetitive inspections for 

that flightdeck window 1. This AD 

results from several reports of electrical 

arcs at the terminal blocks of the 

electrically heated flightdeck window 1. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent smoke 

and fire in the cockpit, which could 

lead to loss of visibility, and injuries to 

or incapacitation of the flightcrew. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 17, 

2010. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of August 17, 2010. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 39805 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail 

me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Louis Natsiopoulos, Aerospace 

Engineer, Systems and Equipment 

Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6478; 

fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain Model 757 airplanes, Model 767 

airplanes, and Model 777–200 and –300 

series airplanes. That NPRM was 

published in the Federal Register on 

March 13, 2008 (73 FR 13483). That 

NPRM proposed to require repetitive 

inspections for damage of the electrical 

terminal at the left and right flightdeck 

window 1, and corrective actions if 

necessary. That NPRM also proposed to 

allow for replacing the flightdeck 

window 1 with a new improved 

flightdeck window equipped with 

different electrical connections, which 

would terminate the repetitive 

inspections for that flightdeck 

window 1. 

Explanation of Revised Service 

Information 

After the NPRM was issued, Boeing 

issued the following service bulletins: 

• Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 757–30–0019, Revision 2, dated 

April 19, 2010, for Model 757–200, 

–200CB, and –200PF series airplanes. 

• Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 757–30–0020, Revision 2, dated 

March 31, 2010, for Model 757–300 

series airplanes. 

We referred to Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 757–30– 

0019, and Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 757–30–0020, both 

Revision 1, both dated December 19, 

2007, as appropriate sources of service 

information for doing the actions 

proposed in the NPRM. 

The actions specified in Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletins 757– 

30–0019 and 757–30–0020, both 

Revision 2, include an additional 

inspection of the J1 and J4 (upper) 

terminals; however, the inspection of 

the upper connections is not included 

in this AD. We find that to delay this 

action to include the inspection of the 

J1 and J4 terminals and to ensure that 

the public has sufficient time to 

consider and comment on the additional 

actions, would be inappropriate in light 

of the unsafe condition identified on the 

J5 terminal. We are considering 

additional rulemaking to require the 

inspection of the J1 and J4 terminals. 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletins 757–30–0019 and 757–30– 

0020, both Revision 2, include a 

reduced compliance time of 500 flight 

hours or 150 days, whichever occurs 

first, for the detailed inspection for 

damage specified in paragraph (f) of this 

AD (paragraph (g) of the NPRM). We 

have not changed this AD to include the 

reduced compliance time. We have 

determined that the compliance time, as 

proposed, represents an appropriate 

interval of time in which the required 

actions can be performed in a timely 

manner within the affected fleet, while 

still maintaining an adequate level of 

safety. We find that to delay this action 

to ensure that the public has sufficient 

time to consider and comment on the 

reduced compliance time, would be 

inappropriate in light of the identified 

unsafe condition. 

For Model 757 airplanes, Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletins 757– 

30–0019 and 757–30–0020, both 

Revision 2, also include a revised 

interval for repeating the detailed 

inspection for damage specified in 

paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD 

(paragraphs (g) and (h) of the NPRM). 

We have determined that extending the 

repetitive intervals, as recommended by 

the manufacturer, is consistent with 

data on in-service failure reports and 

will not adversely affect safety for the 

affected airplane models. Therefore, we 

have changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of 

this AD (paragraphs (g) and (h) of the 

NPRM), to include the revised interval. 

For windows manufactured by GKN 

Aerospace Transparency Systems 

(GKN), the inspection is now specified 

at intervals not to exceed 12,000 flight 

hours or 48 months, whichever occurs 

later. For windows manufactured by 

PPG Aerospace (PPG), the inspection is 

now specified at intervals not to exceed 

6,000 flight hours or 24 months, 

whichever occurs later. We have also 

revised this same repetitive interval for 

Model 767 airplanes, and Model 777– 

200 and –300 series airplanes, as 

explained under ‘‘Requests to Extend 

Repetitive Inspection Interval’’ below. 

The Compliance paragraphs (1.E.) of 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletins 757–30–0019 and 757–30– 

0020, both Revision 2, give additional 

time for doing the corrective action if 

the screw is cross threaded and the 

terminal lug is tight. We have added 

paragraph (h)(1) to this AD to specify 

doing the corrective action within 150 

days or 500 flight hours after the 

inspection, whichever occurs first, 

rather than before further flight. 

We have changed Table 1 of this final 

rule to refer to Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 757–30–0019, Revision 

2, dated April 19, 2010; and Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757– 

30–0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 

2010; as appropriate sources of service 

information. We have also changed 

Table 2 of this final rule to state that 

actions done before the effective date of 

this AD in accordance with Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757– 

30–0019 or Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 757–30–0020, both 

Revision 1, both dated December 19, 

2007, are acceptable for compliance 

with the corresponding requirements of 

this AD. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received from 

the 10 commenters. 

Support for the NPRM 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) fully supports the 

proposed action for the lower (J5) 

terminal. 

Issue a Supplemental NPRM or 

Withdraw the NPRM 

Air Transport Association (ATA) 

agrees with the intent of the proposal, 

but specifies that the NPRM, as written, 

has fundamental and detailed flaws that 

may not resolve the unsafe condition; 

instead, the NPRM focuses on electrical 

connections on another side of the 

terminal block, which likely are not the 

cause of the unsafe condition. ATA 

recommends that we instead issue a 


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39806 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

supplemental NPRM that takes into 

consideration the comments of member 

airlines. 

American Airlines (AAL) indicates 

that the proposed rule is premature and 

should be withdrawn until the NTSB 

has completed its investigation of an 

incident of window heat arcing on a 

Model 757 airplane at the J1 and J4 

terminals. The NTSB also encourages 

amending the NPRM (we infer by 

supplemental NPRM) to include 

inspections of the J1 and J4 terminals on 

all of the affected flightdeck windows. 

The NTSB states that in a small number 

of cases it determined that a loose or 

inadequate connection at the J1 terminal 

or J4 terminal is the most likely cause 

of the smoke and/or fire in the cockpit. 

AAL, Continental Airlines (CAL), 

Delta Airlines (DAL), and United 

Airlines (UAL) request we withdraw the 

NPRM until we do further investigation 

to identify the root cause of the window 

arcing events. The commenters state 

that the proposed AD should mandate a 

comprehensive and worthwhile 

solution; that a credible analysis 

providing the true root cause of the 

failure must be completed first; and that 

further investigation could alter or add 

to the solution, thus rendering it more 

meaningful. Certain commenters suggest 

what the root causes might be, including 

the following: 

• AAL contends that material design 

choices contribute to unintended cross 

threading and apparent lack of screw 

retention over time; and that undertorque of the connector screw as the 

lone primary failure is speculative and 

that a more likely source of heating is 

arcing along the braided power wire 

downstream of the window heat 

connector. In addition, AAL service 

history shows the primary cause of 

failure to be arcing at the heat braided 

power wire at the lower window along 

with delamination between the window 

heat layer and the outer glass. 

• CAL states that it appears the root 

cause attributed to cross threading 

might actually be faulty solder joints, 

and that stripping of the tapped brass 

block due to repetitive application of 

current torque requirements could be a 

driving force behind in-service failures. 

• DAL notes that poor design/ 

manufacture of the flightdeck window 1 

terminal contributes to arcing events 

and that the design does not support a 

long-term robust connection to the 

screw. 

We disagree with the requests to 

withdraw the NPRM or issue a 

supplemental NPRM. 

The incident of window heat arcing at 

the J1 and J4 terminals that was 

investigated by the NTSB is related to 

the unsafe condition addressed by the 

NPRM that preceded this final rule. We 

have reports of four events involving 

arcing of the flightdeck window heat 

system at the upper aft (J1) and upper 

forward (J4) terminals on the first 

officer’s flightdeck window that caused 

the inner pane of glass to fracture. The 

events, which occurred between January 

2001 and August 2008, all occurred on 

Model 757 airplanes. Withdrawing the 

NPRM to include the upper terminals 

for Model 757 airplanes would be 

inappropriate as it would delay this AD 

action, which addresses failures of the 

lower (J5) terminal for Model 757 

airplanes, Model 767 airplanes, and 

Model 777–200 and –300 series 

airplanes. However, we are considering 

additional rulemaking to address arcing 

at the upper (J1 and J4) terminals on 

Model 757 airplanes only. 

Regarding the requests to determine 

the root causes, we disagree with 

withdrawing the NPRM until a different 

root cause is identified. Although we 

agree with the commenters that the 

failure mode that causes a significant 

arcing event is the melting of solder or 

the de-soldering of the terminal 

connection, we disagree as to the cause 

of the de-soldering of the terminal 

connection and subsequent arcing. 

We have received reports that 

attribute the primary cause of the 

overheating of the terminal to a crossthreaded screw, a loose screw, or an 

incorrectly installed screw. We have 

also found that the majority of the 

arcing events happened within 500 

flight hours after the flightdeck window 

was replaced or had undergone 

maintenance. The unintended cross 

threading and apparent lack of screw 

retention over time have been reported 

on flightdeck windows manufactured by 

both GKN and PPG. The failure of the 

moisture seal and the delamination of 

the flightdeck window plies are 

addressed by other ADs and other 

service bulletins; but we point out that 

such failures are detectable. 

We find that the actions required by 

this AD will identify failures of the 

electrical terminals, regardless of the 

root cause, and that the corrective 

actions apply to all detected failures. 

However, if new information becomes 

available to justify revising this AD, we 

will consider further rulemaking. 

For the above reasons, no change has 

been made to the AD in response to the 

requests to withdraw the NPRM or issue 

a supplemental NPRM. 

Requests To Extend Repetitive 

Inspection Interval 

Air France, ATA, and Northwest 

Airlines (NWA) request that we extend 

the interval for the repetitive inspection 

from 6,000 flight hours to 7,800 flight 

hours (Air France) or 8,000 flight hours 

(ATA and NWA). Air France contends 

that the inspections should be matched 

with the schedule for light maintenance 

checks. ATA recommends that we 

extend the interval based on service 

experience. NWA indicates there would 

not be an appreciable effect on safety in 

extending the inspection to an interval 

where the task can be performed during 

a scheduled ‘‘C’’ check in an 

environment more conducive to such 

maintenance. 

We partially agree with the requests to 

extend the repetitive inspection 

interval. We agree with the request to 

extend the interval for GKN flightdeck 

windows. As explained previously 

under ‘‘Explanation of Revised Service 

Information,’’ for windows 

manufactured by GKN, the inspection is 

now specified in this AD at intervals not 

to exceed 12,000 flight hours or 48 

months, whichever occurs later. 

According to reports the failure rate of 

GKN flightdeck windows seems to be 

substantially lower than the failure rate 

of the PPG flightdeck windows, and the 

severity of events of the GKN flightdeck 

windows is less. 

We disagree with extending the 

inspection interval for PPG flightdeck 

windows from 6,000 flight hours; 

however, we have determined that 

specifying the compliance time as 6,000 

flight hours or 24 months, whichever 

occurs later, will provide relief to 

operators. In establishing the 6,000- 

flight-hour interval for those flightdeck 

windows, we considered not only the 

frequency of occurrence of the electrical 

connection failures, the time required to 

perform the inspection, and the 

consequent risk of uncorrected unsafe 

conditions, but also the scheduling of 

the inspections so they can be 

accomplished during regular 

maintenance down time. We 

determined that an interval of 6,000 

flight hours would give the operators 

ample time to schedule the proposed 

actions at a routine scheduled 

maintenance and detect an unsafe 

condition before an event. 

We have changed paragraphs (f) and 

(g) of this AD (paragraphs (g) and (h) of 

the NPRM) to include the revised 

intervals. 

Requests To Clarify Intent of 500 Flight 

Hours for Inspection 

AAL, DAL, and UAL request that we 

clarify the intent of the initial repetitive 

inspection that is proposed within 500 

flight hours after the corrective action 

for certain airplanes. DAL points out 

that as written in the NPRM an operator 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 39807 

could accomplish the detailed 

inspection after one flight hour and be 

in compliance with the proposed rule. 

UAL would like to know if the intent is 

to perform a quality check (which could 

be performed shortly after the 

replacement), or if the intent is to check 

for degradation of the torque value over 

time. UAL states that if the intent is the 

latter, the wording should be ‘‘after 500 

flight hours’’ instead of ‘‘within 500 

flight hours.’’ AAL also states that the 

inspection could be done within an 

hour after the corrective action and asks 

if the intent is simply to do a quality 

check. 

We agree that the 500-flight-hour 

compliance time for the initial repetitive 

inspection for certain airplanes, as 

required by paragraph (g) of this AD 

(paragraph (h) of the NPRM), should be 

clarified. The intent of the inspection of 

certain airplanes ‘‘within 500 flight 

hours after the corrective action,’’ as 

specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, is 

a quality assurance check. The phrase 

‘‘within 500 flight hours after the 

corrective action’’ correctly allows for 

doing the initial repetitive inspection 

before further flight following 

accomplishment of the corrective 

action. According to the majority of the 

reported arcing events, the result of an 

incorrectly assembled screw/lug 

electrical connection (a heated terminal 

and the possibility of subsequent arcing) 

occurred in-service after the assembly of 

the electrical connection. Additionally, 

the phrase ‘‘within 500 flight hours after 

the corrective action’’ would also 

provide sufficient time for operators of 

mixed or large fleets to do the 

inspection without compromising 

safety. We have not changed the AD in 

this regard. 

Requests To Exclude Certain Window 

From Proposed Actions 

ATA, on behalf of its member AAL, 

requests that part number (P/N) 

141T4800 flightdeck windows be 

excluded from the actions proposed in 

the NPRM. AAL has data that confirm 

it has not experienced what they 

deemed a ‘‘catastrophic’’ arcing or smoke 

event on a flightdeck window, 

P/N 141T4800. All of the ‘‘catastrophic’’ 

arcing and smoke events AAL has 

experienced have occurred on 

flightdeck window P/N 141T4801 with 

lug and screw electrical connections. 

AAL states that the P/N 141T4800 

terminal blocks might show minor 

damage; however, the damage is limited 

and contained. AAL further asserts that 

the connection found in the terminating 

action proposed in the NPRM is exactly 

the P/N 141T4800 connection; therefore, 

the AD should exclude flightdeck 

windows that currently have P/N 

141T4800. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters. We agree that the 

performance of the P/N 141T4800 

flightdeck window appears to be better 

than the P/N 141T4801 flightdeck 

window with lug and screw electrical 

connections; its failure rate is lower and 

the failures are not as severe. We 

disagree with excluding the P/N 

141T4800 flightdeck windows from the 

AD because we have received reports of 

arcing events with the P/N 141T4800 

flightdeck windows that require 

corrective action. However, we find that 

some mitigation is appropriate because 

the failure rate of the screw/lug terminal 

equipped PPG windshields to screw/lug 

equipped GKN flightdeck windows is 

about 2 to 1. Therefore, we have 

changed paragraphs (f) and (g) of this 

AD (paragraphs (g) and (h) of the NPRM) 

to specify a repetitive interval of 12,000 

flight hours or 48 months, whichever 

occurs later, for screw/lug terminal 

equipped GKN flightdeck windows. 

Requests To Include Certain P/N as 

Terminating Action 

GKN and AAL state that flightdeck 

window P/N 141T800–13/–14 should be 

included as a terminating action in the 

NPRM. The commenters state that 

service information points to damaged 

solder joints as the primary cause of the 

electrical arcs and point out that the P/ 

N 141T800–13/–14 flightdeck windows 

do not incorporate the design feature 

that causes extreme arcing, an ignition 

source, and melting of the glass; and 

that the design does not incorporate 

features that are subject to assembly 

error. Specifically, the commenters state 

that at the cockpit side, the flightdeck 

window P/N 141T800–13/–14 uses a 

screw connector which is seen as 

superior to the pin and socket connector 

used on the proposed terminating action 

windshield; this superiority is due to 

the high clamping pressure and ability 

to re-tighten or replace the screw in 

addition to the excellent material choice 

for the threaded insert. 

We disagree with the request to 

include flightdeck window P/N 

141T800–13/–14 as a terminating 

action. While we agree that damaged 

solder joints are the primary cause for 

the electrical arcs, we point out that the 

primary cause of loose connections is 

the incorrect torque of the screw or an 

incorrectly installed screw. A loose 

connection increases the heat at the 

terminal, which can cause damage to 

the internal solder joint. A loose screw 

or an incorrectly installed screw is due 

to limited access on the airplane. The 

pin/socket connector, which is the 

design proposed as the optional 

terminating action in the NPRM, is 

assembled in a controlled environment 

on a bench and with full access. The 

screw/lug design proposed by the 

commenters does not provide an 

equivalent level of safety to that of the 

pin/socket design, which is not subject 

to the same assembly errors. Therefore, 

we have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Request for Further Analysis Before 

Terminating Action 

CAL, DAL, and ATA on behalf of its 

member AAL, request that we and the 

manufacturer perform an engineering 

analysis to determine whether pin and 

socket connections, proposed as an 

optional terminating action, offer any 

advantage over screw and lug 

connections. AAL has had considerable 

experience with pin and socket 

connections and states that carrying any 

appreciable current through a pin and 

socket connection is less reliable than a 

ring terminal and screw connection. 

CAL states that it has had problems with 

pin and socket connections; however, it 

applauds the mechanical joining at the 

mesh to block interface. CAL considers 

that more time is needed to determine 

if the pin and socket design is more 

reliable. DAL is unaware of any 

destructive testing that has been 

performed to substantiate the use of the 

new design as the corrective action for 

flightdeck window arcing events. 

We disagree with the need for further 

study. The pin and socket connection of 

the electrical heat terminal was 

designed and qualification tested for 

contact retention and current-carrying 

capacity by the suppliers as part of the 

certification process of the block. The 

testing verified the integrity of the 

design and showed it not to have 

nuisance failures. Further, the pin and 

socket technology is well-established 

and used in a significant number of 

electrical applications on the airplane. 

The pin and socket connectors for the 

flightdeck window heat terminal have 

been in service since 2004 without any 

reported failures. The failures that the 

commenters referred to were due to 

manufacturing error rather than a design 

defect. We have not changed the AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Make Terminating Action 

Mandatory 

The NTSB asks that we make the 

installation of a new flightdeck window 

mandatory rather than optional and 

states that the installation would 

prevent similar events of smoke or fire 

in the cockpit. The NTSB notes that the 

NPRM proposes installation of a new 


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39808 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

flightdeck window that incorporates the 

pin and socket electrical connection that 

provides a more secure connection and 

is less susceptible to installation errors. 

This new flightdeck window design also 

uses a crimped ring terminal that is 

internal to the terminal block; the 

crimped ring terminal connects the 

flightdeck window heat braid wire to 

the terminal, which addresses some of 

the solder issues suspected in the 

NTSB’s investigations around the J1 and 

J4 terminals. 

We partially agree. While we agree 

with the commenter that the installation 

of the new flightdeck window with the 

pin and socket electrical connection is 

more robust because it is not as 

susceptible to assembly errors as is the 

flightdeck window with the screw/lug 

connection, we disagree with the 

request to make the installation of the 

flightdeck window with the new pin 

and socket electrical connection 

mandatory. The repetitive inspections 

and corrective actions required by this 

AD provide adequate means to maintain 

the safety of the screw/lug flightdeck 

windows. Requiring the replacement of 

the flightdeck windows is not necessary 

to address the unsafe condition. We 

have not changed the AD in this regard. 

Request To Improve Access to Terminal 

Block 

CAL notes that access to the terminal 

block on Boeing Model 757 airplanes is 

‘‘atrocious’’; even with small hands it 

cannot be held. CAL does not consider 

it a coincidence that this connection is 

the ‘‘problem child’’ because access is so 

poor. This limited access, coupled with 

poor ‘‘view-ability’’ turns a simple 

installation into a very complex 

installation. CAL requests that certain 

aircraft improvements and 

modifications be addressed, as well as 

human factor items such as special 

tooling to be developed. 

We infer that the commenter asks us 

to address this issue in the AD. We 

partially agree with the request. The 

commenter is correct in saying that 

access to the electrical terminal block 

makes it difficult to achieve the torque 

limits outlined in the airplane 

maintenance manual and that this could 

be the primary reason for incorrectly 

assembled electrical terminations. We 

note that the optional terminating action 

of this AD (pin and socket design) is 

much easier to accomplish in the 

existing limited space. In addition, we 

find that to delay this action to allow 

time for modifications and human factor 

changes would be inappropriate in light 

of the identified unsafe condition. The 

commenter should note that under the 

provisions of paragraph (k) of the final 

rule, we will consider requests for 

approval of an alternative method of 

compliance (AMOC) if sufficient data 

are submitted to substantiate that the 

design change would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Request To Revise Service Bulletins 

AAL requests revisions to the service 

bulletins listed in the table titled 

‘‘Requested revisions.’’ 

REQUESTED REVISIONS

Boeing special attention service bulletin— Revision— Dated— 

757–30–0019 .......................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................. December 19, 2007. 

757–30–0020 .......................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................. December 19, 2007. 

767–30–0041 .......................................................................................................... Original .................................................. December 5, 2007. 

777–30–0012 .......................................................................................................... 2 ............................................................. December 19, 2007. 

AAL lists several editorial changes in 

the service bulletins in its comments, 

and specifies that revisions would 

reduce the burden of processing 

numerous requests for AMOCs. 

UAL requests that we revise Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 777– 

30–0012, Revision 2, dated December 

19, 2007, to clarify the following 

statement: ‘‘There is a time limit on how 

long the old number 1 flightdeck 

window can be used.’’ UAL would like 

to know if the time limit refers to the 

serviceability limit of the old flightdeck 

window, or the availability of the 

flightdeck window, or to future spares. 

We have discussed AAL’s concerns 

with Boeing. In addition, we agree with 

UAL that the statement about the time 

limit is in error and should not be 

included in the service bulletin. We 

have also referred this concern to 

Boeing. We have not changed the AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Add Reference to Table 1 

Boeing asks that we add a reference to 

Table 1 of the NPRM in the paragraph 

titled ‘‘Actions Accomplished 

Previously,’’ for the latest revision of the 

released service bulletins. Boeing points 

out that the service bulletins listed in 

both Table 1 and Table 2 are acceptable 

before the effective date of the AD. 

We disagree with the request to refer 

to Table 1 in the ‘‘Credit for Actions 

Accomplished Previously’’ paragraph of 

this AD. The intent of the ‘‘Credit for 

Actions Accomplished Previously’’ 

paragraph is to list service bulletins that 

are acceptable for compliance before the 

effective date of the AD, but not after the 

effective date of the AD. The service 

bulletins listed in Table 1 of the AD are 

acceptable for compliance both before 

and after the effective date of the AD. 

The acceptable use of the service 

bulletins listed in Table 1 of this AD 

before the effective date is covered by 

the statement in paragraph (e) of this AD 

that says, ‘‘Comply with this AD within 

the compliance times specified, unless 

already done.’’ We have not changed the 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Add Statement to AD 

Regarding Window Manufacturer 

Boeing asks that we add the following 

statement to the ‘‘Alternative Methods of 

Compliance’’ paragraph of the NPRM: 

‘‘These inspections are for the #1 flight 

deck windows regardless of window 

manufacturer.’’ Boeing explains that 

there are two different suppliers for the 

flightdeck windows, but each flightdeck 

window is connected to the airplane 

side wiring in the same manner and 

requires the specified inspections. 

We disagree with the request to 

change this AD to add the statement. 

The AD requires inspection of the 

flightdeck windows according to the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the 

applicable service bulletin. The service 

bulletins listed in this AD apply to all 

flightdeck windows, regardless of 

manufacturer. We have not changed the 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Take Similar Action for 

Model 747 Series Airplanes 

The NTSB believes that we should 

take similar action for Model 747 series 

airplanes because a similar condition 

exists on those airplanes. 

We agree with the NTSB and are 

considering rulemaking to address a 

similar unsafe condition on Model 747 

series airplanes. We have not changed 

this AD in this regard. 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 39809 

Clarification of Service Bulletin 

Information 

The last column in the table in 

paragraph 1.E., ‘‘Compliance,’’ of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757– 

30–0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 

2010, specifies repeating the inspection 

for damage at ‘‘intervals not to exceed 

6,000 flight hours or 24 months.’’ The 

intent of that column is to specify an 

interval ‘‘not to exceed 6,000 flight 

hours or 24 months, whichever occurs 

later.’’ We have included the correct 

interval in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this 

AD. 

In several places of the Compliance 

paragraph (1.E.) of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 757–30– 

0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010; 

and Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 757–30–0019, Revision 2, dated 

April 19, 2010; the ‘‘Action’’ column 

implies that both the left and right 

windows must be replaced. For 

example, ‘‘* * * replace windshield in 

accordance with Work Package 1, step 3. 

and Work Package 2, step 3.’’ The intent 

is to state, ‘‘* * * Work Package 1, step 

3. or Work Package 2, as applicable 

* * *.’’ Operators are to use one or the 

other (or both) work instruction, as 

applicable, to replace the window(s) 

that need replacing. We have included 

this information in paragraph (h)(2) of 

this AD. 

The Action column for Inspection 

Condition 4 in the table in paragraph 

1.E., ‘‘Compliance,’’ of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 757–30– 

0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, 

states ‘‘3. If terminal lug is still loose.’’ 

That statement should be ‘‘3. If terminal 

lug is still loose then disassemble, 

inspect and reassemble the electrical 

connection.’’ 

Explanation of Additional Changes 

We have clarified paragraph (f) of this 

AD (paragraph (g) of the NPRM) to 

specify that Work Packages 1 and 2 

apply to the J5 terminal. As stated 

previously, the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 757–30–0020, Revision 

2, dated March 31, 2010, and Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757– 

30–0019, Revision 2, dated April 19, 

2010, include an inspection of the J1 

and J4 (upper) electrical connections; 

however, the inspection of these 

connections is not included in this AD. 

We have clarified paragraph (g) of this 

AD (paragraph (h) of the NPRM) to 

remove the phrase ‘‘or tightening a loose 

screw’’ from the description of 

corrective actions that requires 

additional inspection within 500 flight 

hours. The only corrective action after 

which the inspection is necessary is 

replacement. 

After the NPRM was issued, we 

reviewed the figures we have used over 

the past several years to calculate AD 

costs to operators. To account for 

various inflationary costs in the airline 

industry, we find it necessary to 

increase the labor rate used in these 

calculations from $80 per work hour to 

$85 per work hour. The cost impact 

information, below, reflects this 

increase in the specified hourly labor 

rate. 

We have removed the ‘‘Service 

Bulletin Reference’’ paragraph from this 

AD. That paragraph was identified as 

paragraph (f) in the NPRM. Instead, we 

have provided the full service bulletin 

citations throughout this AD. 

We also have revised this final rule to 

identify the legal name of the 

manufacturer as published in the most 

recent type certificate data sheet for the 

affected airplane models. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 1,212 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The following 

table provides the estimated costs for 

U.S. operators to comply with this AD. 

The average labor rate is $85 per work 

hour. 

COSTS

Action Work hours Parts Cost per product Fleet cost 

Inspection ....................................... 1 None .................. $85, per inspection cycle ............... $103,020, per inspection cycle. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40113, 44701. 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES
39810 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–15–01 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–16367. Docket No. 

FAA–2008–0274; Directorate Identifier 

2008–NM–038–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective August 17, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to the airplanes 

identified in Table 1 of this AD, certificated 

in any category. 

TABLE 1—AIRPLANES AFFECTED BY THIS AD 

The Boeing Company Model– As identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin– 

757–200, –200CB, and –200PF series airplanes ................................................................ 757–30–0019, Revision 2, dated April 19, 2010. 

757–300 series airplanes ...................................................................................................... 757–30–0020, Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010. 

767–200, –300, and –300F series airplanes ........................................................................ 767–30–0039, dated December 5, 2007. 

767–400ER series airplanes ................................................................................................. 767–30–0041, dated December 5, 2007. 

777–200 and –300 series airplanes ..................................................................................... 777–30–0012, Revision 2, dated December 19, 2007. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from several reports of 

electrical arcs at the terminal blocks of the 

electrically heated flightdeck window 1. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent smoke and fire 

in the cockpit, which could lead to loss of 

visibility, and injuries to or incapacitation of 

the flightcrew. 

Compliance 

(e) Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

Inspection and Corrective Actions 

(f) Within 500 flight hours after the 

effective date of this AD, do a detailed 

inspection for damage (including arcing, 

loose terminal, or heat damage) of the 

electrical terminal (J5 terminal) at the left and 

right flightdeck window 1, and do all 

applicable corrective actions, by 

accomplishing all the actions for the J5 

terminal specified in Work Packages 1 and 2 

of the applicable service bulletin specified in 

Table 1 of this AD, except as provided by 

paragraph (h) of this AD. Except as provided 

by paragraph (h) of this AD, do all applicable 

corrective actions before further flight. 

Except as provided by paragraph (g) of this 

AD, repeat the detailed inspection at the 

applicable interval specified in paragraph 

(f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD. Doing the 

replacement specified in paragraph (i) of this 

AD terminates the repetitive inspection 

requirements of this paragraph for the 

replaced flightdeck window 1. 

(1) For flightdeck windows manufactured 

by GKN with SCREW/LUG electrical 

connections, repeat the detailed inspection 

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12,000 

flight hours or 48 months, whichever occurs 

later. 

(2) For flightdeck windows manufactured 

by PPG with SCREW/LUG electrical 

connections, repeat the detailed inspection 

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 

flight hours or 24 months, whichever occurs 

later. 

(g) For airplanes on which replacement 

with a new window 1 that uses screws and 

lugs for the electrical connections is done in 

accordance with Work Package 1 or 2 of the 

applicable service bulletin specified in Table 

1 of this AD: Do the next detailed inspection 

within 500 flight hours after the corrective 

action, and repeat the inspection thereafter at 

the applicable interval specified in paragraph 

(g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD. Doing the 

replacement specified in paragraph (i) of this 

AD terminates the repetitive inspection 

requirements of this paragraph for the 

replaced flightdeck window 1. 

(1) For flightdeck windows manufactured 

by GKN with SCREW/LUG electrical 

connections, repeat the detailed inspection 

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12,000 

flight hours or 48 months, whichever occurs 

later. 

(2) For flightdeck windows manufactured 

by PPG with SCREW/LUG electrical 

connections, repeat the detailed inspection 

thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 

flight hours or 24 months, whichever occurs 

later. 

Exceptions 

(h) Do the applicable actions specified in 

paragraph (f) of this AD except as provided 

by paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of this AD. 

(1) If, during the inspection required by 

paragraph (f) of this AD, the screw is cross 

threaded and the terminal lug is tight, do the 

applicable corrective action within 150 days 

or 500 flight hours after the inspection, 

whichever occurs first. 

(2) Where paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 757–30–0020, 

Revision 2, dated March 31, 2010, and 

Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 

757–30–0019, Revision 2, dated April 19, 

2010, states in the ‘‘Action’’ column to (for 

example) ‘‘ * * * replace windshield in 

accordance with Work Package 1, step 3. and 

Work Package 2, step 3,’’ the intent of the 

applicable service bulletin is to state, ‘‘ * * * 

Work Package 1, step 3. or Work Package 2, 

as applicable * * *.’’ Operators are to use 

one or the other (or both) work instruction, 

as applicable, to replace the window(s) that 

need replacing. 

Optional Terminating Action 

(i) Replacing a flightdeck window 1 that 

uses screws and lugs for the electrical 

connections with a flightdeck window that 

uses pins and sockets for the electrical 

connections in accordance with Work 

Packages 3 or 4 of the applicable service 

bulletin specified in Table 1 of this AD ends 

the repetitive inspection requirements of this 

AD for that window 1. 

Credit for Actions Accomplished Previously 

(j) Actions done before the effective date of 

this AD in accordance with the applicable 

service bulletin specified in Table 2 of this 

AD are acceptable for compliance with the 

corresponding requirements of this AD. 

TABLE 2—ACCEPTABLE SERVICE BULLETINS

Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin— Revision— Dated— 

757–30–0019 .......................................................................................................... Original .................................................. July 19, 2006. 

757–30–0019 .......................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................. December 19, 2007. 

757–30–0020 .......................................................................................................... Original .................................................. July 19, 2006. 

757–30–0020 .......................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................. December 19, 2007. 

777–30–0012 .......................................................................................................... Original .................................................. April 15, 2004. 

777–30–0012 .......................................................................................................... 1 ............................................................. June 2, 2006. 


jlentini on DSKJ8SOYB1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 13, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 39811 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(k)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Louis 

Natsiopoulos, Aerospace Engineer, Systems 

and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6478; fax 

(425) 917–6590. Information may be e-mailed 

to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(l) You must use the applicable service 

information contained in Table 3 of this AD 

to do the actions required by this AD, unless 

the AD specifies otherwise. If you 

accomplish the optional actions specified by 

this AD, you must use the applicable service 

information specified in Table 3 of this AD 

to perform those actions, unless the AD 

specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, Washington 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1, fax 206–766– 

5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; 

Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

TABLE 3—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin— Revision— Dated— 

757–30–0019 .......................................................................................................... 2 ............................................................. April 19, 2010. 

757-30-0020 ........................................................................................................... 2 ............................................................. March 31, 2010. 

767-30–0039 ........................................................................................................... Original .................................................. December 5, 2007. 

767–30–0041 .......................................................................................................... Original .................................................. December 5, 2007. 

777–30–0012 .......................................................................................................... 2 ............................................................. December 19, 2007. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 6, 

2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–17046 Filed 7–9–10; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–1249; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NM–100–AD; Amendment 

39–16358; AD 2010–14–13] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 777 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Model 777 airplanes. This AD requires 

inspecting the bolt, nut, and downstop 

of the slat track assembly to determine 

if the bolt, nut, or stops are missing and 

to determine if the thread protrusion of 

the bolt from the nut is within specified 

limits and parts are correctly installed, 

and related investigative and corrective 

actions if necessary. For certain 

airplanes, this AD also requires 

inspecting the slat cans at the outboard 

slat number 3 and 12 outboard main 

track locations for holes and wear 

damage, and corrective actions if 

necessary; and replacing the downstop 

hardware for the outboard slats number 

3 and 12 outboard and inboard main 

track locations. This AD results from a 

report of a hole in the inboard main 

track slat can for outboard slat number 

12 on a Model 777 airplane. The hole 

was caused when the bolt securing the 

downstop migrated out of the fitting and 

contacted the slat can. We are issuing 

this AD to detect and correct damage to 

the outboard slat main track slat cans, 

which can allow fuel leakage into the 

fixed wing leading edge in excess of the 

capacity of the draining system. Excess 

fuel leakage could result in an 

uncontained fire. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 17, 

2010. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of August 17, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, Washington 98124– 

2207; telephone 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; e-mail 

me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) 

is the Document Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Duong Tran, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 917–6452; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to 

certain Model 777 airplanes. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on January 7, 2010 (75 FR 950). 

That NPRM proposed to require 

inspecting the bolt, nut, and downstop 

of the slat track assembly to determine 


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