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35–235PS 2007

BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A HEALTHY

AND STRONG NASA WORKFORCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 2007

Serial No. 110–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

HON. MARK UDALL, Colorado, Chairman

DAVID WU, Oregon

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

MIKE ROSS, Arizona

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

BART GORDON, Tennessee

TOM FEENEY, Florida

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JO BONNER, Alabama

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director

PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member

KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member

ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member

DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

May 17, 2007

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space

and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of

Representatives .................................................................................................... 13

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking Member,

Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ......... 15

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16

Witnesses:

Ms. Toni Dawsey, Assistant Administrator, Human Capital Management;

Chief Human Capital Officer, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19

Mr. John G. Stewart, National Academy of Public Administration Fellow;

Member, Panel on NASA Multi-sector Workforce

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26

Dr. David C. Black, President Emeritus, Universities Space Research Association; Adjunct Professor, Physics and Astronomy Department, Rice University; Co-Chair, Committee on Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space

Science and Engineering Workforce, National Research Council, The National Academies

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 28

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 30

Biography .......................................................................................................... 38

Dr. Lee Stone, Legislative Representative, NASA Council of IFPTE Locals,

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 38

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 40

Discussion

Opinions on NASA’s Response to National Academies’ and NAPA’s Reports 53

How NASA Is Achieving Workforce Goals ......................................................... 55

Suggested Resources for Funding NASA ........................................................... 56

Introduction of Mr. Feeney as Ranking Member .............................................. 58

Suggestions for Utilizing the Current Pool of Workers and Developing a

Workforce for the Future ................................................................................. 60

Future Vision for NASA ...................................................................................... 61

Age Demographics of the NASA Workforce ....................................................... 63

Workforce Implementation Plan ......................................................................... 65

Importance of In-house Scientists at NASA ...................................................... 65

Ratio of Permanent and Nonpermanent Civil Servants ................................... 67

Page

IV

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Ms. Toni Dawsey, Assistant Administrator, Human Capital Management;

Chief Human Capital Officer, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) .......................................................................................................... 70

Mr. John G. Stewart, National Academy of Public Administration Fellow;

Member, Panel on NASA Multi-sector Workforce 79

Dr. David C. Black, President Emeritus, Universities Space Research Association; Adjunct Professor, Physics and Astronomy Department, Rice University; Co-Chair, Committee on Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space

Science and Engineering Workforce, National Research Council, The National Academies .................................................................................................. 82

Dr. Lee Stone, Legislative Representative, NASA Council of IFPTE Locals,

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers ................. 85

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Supplemental Information for the Record by Dr. John Stewart, Academy

Fellow and Member of the NASA Multi-sector Workforce Panel ..................... 92

NASA: Balancing a Multi-sector Workforce to Achieve a Healthy Organization,

A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration,

February 2007 ...................................................................................................... 95

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BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A HEALTHY

AND STRONG NASA WORKFORCE

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Udall

[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Building and Maintaining a Healthy

and Strong NASA Workforce

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 2007

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

On Thursday, May 17, 2007 at 10:00 am, the House Committee on Science and

Technology, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a hearing to examine

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) workforce issues and the

recommendations of independent review panels for ensuring the health and vitality

of the NASA workforce in the 21st century. This is the first in a series of NASA

workforce hearings. Later hearings will address Shuttle transition workforce issues

and specific legislative proposals.

Witnesses:

Witnesses scheduled to testify at the hearing include the following:

Ms. Toni Dawsey

Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management, NASA

Mr. John G. Stewart

Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration, Member, NASA Multi-sector

Workforce Panel

Dr. David Black

Co-Chair, Committee on Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for

Space Exploration, National Research Council

Dr. Lee Stone

Legislative Representative, NASA Council of IFPTE Locals, International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers

Background

Potential Issues

The following are some of the potential issues that might be raised at the hearing:

• Is NASA’s Workforce Strategy the Right Approach for Building the

NASA Workforce?—NASA is undertaking a sizable shift of programmatic

activities as the Agency endeavors to carry out the President’s Vision for

Space Exploration. Specifically, NASA is in the midst of the following

changes:

Æ Implementing the Vision for Space Exploration;

Æ Retiring the Space Shuttle by 2010;

Æ Completing the International Space Station;

Æ Developing the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and the Ares Crew

Launch Vehicle (CLV);

Æ Refocusing the aeronautics program;

Æ Dealing with a flatter funding profile than previously assumed; and

Æ Encountering a growing, retirement-eligible workforce.

These changes will have a significant impact on the NASA workforce in large

part because the Agency has not developed a human space transportation

system in over 25 years. Pursuant to the NASA Authorization Act of 2005,

the Agency has developed a Workforce Strategy to ensure that NASA possesses a workforce of the appropriate size and skills to carry out its programs.

4

However, the strategy only covers the period through FY 2011. Is NASA’s Workforce Strategy the right approach for building NASA’s future workforce?

How well does the strategy address the two recent independent reports on

NASA’s workforce—the National Academy of Public Administration’s (NAPA)

NASA: Balancing a Multi-sector Workforce to Achieve a Healthy Organization

and the National Academies’ Building a Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the

Workforce Needs for the National Vision for Space Exploration? What, if any,

gaps or shortcomings do the reports identify in the Workforce Strategy, and

what actions does NASA plan to take in response?

• NASA’s Workforce Strategy and Long-Term Planning—NASA’s Strategy

states that ‘‘The workforce strategy allows NASA to deal effectively with the

critical issues now facing the Agency, particularly a significant amount of uncovered capacity [workers whose time is not allocated to projects at 100 percent]. . .. NASA does recognize that some future events, such as the termination of the Space Shuttle Program, require long-term planning. . ..’’ On the

other hand, the Strategy notes that ‘‘Planning is a task requiring sensitivity

to ongoing changes in programs, budgets, political priorities, and the labor

market.’’ What are the underlying assumptions on which the strategy was developed? Was the strategy aimed at responding to near-term workforce challenges, and if so, is the existing strategy sufficient for long-term planning?

NASA has developed a strategic plan that outlines the Agency’s goals and

programs for the next decade. Does NASA have a workforce strategy and implementation plan that supports the Agency’s strategic plan? How robust is

the Workforce Strategy against potential changes in resources and priorities

that Congress or a new Administration might have for NASA?

• Workforce Strategy and NASA’s Contract Workforce—NASA’s Workforce Strategy reflects an analysis of competencies and approaches for building and strengthening the Agency’s 18,000 civil servant workforce. However,

the Agency also relies on some 44,000 contractors to execute its projects. The

National Academies report states that ‘‘in the short-term, NASA does not possess the requisite in-house personnel with the experience in human space

flight systems needed to implement the VSE [Vision for Space Exploration]. . .. Much of the workforce on which NASA has historically relied, and

will continue to rely, exists outside the Agency. . .’’ in industry and at universities. Does NASA plan to include contractors and academic researchers in

its strategic workforce decisions? How is NASA making long-term decisions

about the number of contractors it may need, at which centers, and for which

competencies, skill areas, and positions it will need those contractors? Does

NASA have the right infrastructure and in-house skills for managing contracts and procurements?

• The Pipeline of NASA Workers—NASA, like other government agencies,

has used hiring freezes to control the size of its workforce and avoid Reductions in Force (RIFs). Opportunities to bring entry level civil servants into the

workforce depend, in part, on attrition, buy-outs, or acceptances of early-retirement offers. This practice has led to a NASA workforce that is comprised

of an increasing number of retirement-eligible workers and an insufficient

number of younger workers who can rise to leadership positions in the future.

The National Academies report notes that NASA will suffer a long-term

shortage of in-house technical expertise in human space flight systems if the

Agency does not take steps to improve the pipeline of future leaders and managers. What steps is NASA taking to ensure a pipeline in its workforce? The

independent reports also recommend improvements to NASA’s mentoring, internship, cooperative education, and graduate fellow programs in the interest

of attracting new talent to NASA. In addition, the National Academies recommends that small science space flight programs be used as opportunities

to train younger workers and build the skills in program/project management

and systems engineering the Agency has says it needs. Does NASA plan to

make any changes to its training and recruitment programs? How effective

are buy-outs and early-retirement offers in opening positions for younger

workers, and how is NASA ensuring that those offers do not eliminate individuals with skills that are difficult to replace?

• The Workforce Strategy and NASA’s Aeronautics and Science Programs—NASA’s workforce strategy identifies a moderate diminished need for

Full-Time Equivalents [FTEs] in space sciences, biological sciences, physical

sciences, among other competencies. The National Academies report recommends that ‘‘NASA should assess whether the skill levels of in-house sciVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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entists at each field center are appropriate to fulfilling that center’s scientific

leadership and service responsibilities and should ensure that appropriate efforts are made to maintain the scientific competency and currency of each

center’s scientific workforce.’’ How well does the strategy address the need to

develop and maintain healthy science and aeronautics programs? Were

NASA’s assessments of needs in the space, biological, and physical sciences

based on the Agency’s understanding of the core capabilities needs and the

number of individuals that can meet those core capabilities? Or rather, were

NASA’s assessments based on the projected resources available for those disciplines in view of the Agency’s other priorities? Does NASA have mechanisms for assessing the research and engineering capabilities needed from

universities to support current and potential NASA programs?

• Other Challenges Facing NASA’s Workforce—During the June 2006

Science Committee workforce hearing, a NASA official testified that the Agency had reduced the problem of ‘‘uncovered capacity’’ (workers whose time is

not allocated to projects at the 100 percent level) by two-thirds, but still carried significant uncovered capacity. Furthermore, NASA had instituted retraining programs to enable uncovered workers to take on new tasks. What

are the causes of uncovered capacity? What is the status of the Agency’s un- covered capacity and how effective have the retraining programs been? Are

NASA’s approaches to handling uncovered capacity adequate over the longterm? NASA has reported difficulty in tracking uncovered capacity and the

NAPA report notes that NASA does not have a transparent process for monitoring its uncovered capacity; there is no accounting code or tracking of when

an employee is uncovered or working on tasks outside his/her competencies.

Does NASA plan to make any changes in response to improve its monitoring

of uncovered capacity?

• Is ‘‘Ten Healthy Centers’’ a Good Idea?—NASA’s Workforce Strategy embraces the goal of maintaining a fully productive workforce at all of its field

centers in what it calls ‘‘Ten Healthy Centers.’’ Centers have been given new

exploration roles but face challenges as they shift from a focus on research

or aeronautics, for example, to exploration projects. The National Academies

report notes that, ‘‘According to NASA, the immediate problem with employees whose primary skills are not currently needed is most significant at the

three aeronautics centers (Ames, Glenn, and Langley).’’ In addition, these centers have been identified as carrying the highest percentages of uncovered capacity. The NAPA report questions ‘‘whether the pursuit of ten healthy centers will yield a healthy NASA.’’ What is NASA’s definition of a healthy center? What are the long-term implications of the ‘‘Ten Healthy Centers’’ approach?’’

• Supporting Strategic Decisions about the NASA Workforce—NASA has

assessed its requirements for the categories of workers the Agency needs to

support its programs. The Agency has used an information system—the Competency Management System (CMS)—devoted to workforce planning to conduct this assessment. The independent reports assert that NASA needs more

information for its workforce planning, question the adequacy of the CMS,

and recommend that NASA develop models for projecting future competency

and skill requirements. In particular, the National Academies recommends

that more information is needed about the current skills, experience levels

and expected attrition of the center workforce. Competencies and experience

levels need to be translated into specific positions. What is the status of the

CMS and does NASA plan to make any changes to CMS? Will NASA workforce decisions and future planning be based on robust, transparent data and

analyses? What information does NASA plan to acquire to support both shortterm and long-term workforce decisions and plans?

• Looking Beyond NASA to Build the Future NASA Workforce—The

NAPA and National Academy reports seem to suggest that NASA’s workforce

planning would benefit from the same innovation and external partnerships

that make the Agency’s space missions so successful. The National Academies

state that ‘‘the solution to NASA’s workforce issues is not to be found by considering NASA in isolation from the rest of the aerospace ecosystem [NASA,

Department of Defense, industry, and universities].’’ NASA should conduct

workforce planning in cooperation with other government agencies, industry,

and universities. Both independent reports recommend that NASA use interagency partnerships and improve internships and cooperative programs to attract new talent. The National Academies recommends that NASA invest in

6

nontraditional approaches such as the Centennial Challenges program to

build public support and train the next generation. NAPA recommends that

NASA consider detailing highly skilled technical experts to other agencies

during periods when NASA projects do not require those employees’ skills.

How would such interagency transfers work? How open is NASA to looking

beyond itself to address its workforce challenges? What plans does NASA

have, if any, for undertaking innovative approaches to strengthen and build

its workforce?

BACKGROUND

This section provides summary information on 1) NASA’s current workforce, 2)

the NASA Workforce Strategy, 3) the National Academies and National Academy

of Public Administration’s reports on NASA’s workforce, 4) the 109th Congress,

Committee on Science’s hearing on NASA’s workforce held on June 13, 2006, and

5) on the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004.

Current NASA Workforce Demographics

As detailed in Attachment 1, NASA’s workforce includes a total of 18,343 civil

servants (as of April 2007) and approximately 44,023 contractors (as of April 2006).

The largest numbers of civil servants and contractor employees are retained at

Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and

Goddard Space Flight Center, respectively.

Summary of NASA’s Workforce Strategy

Pursuant to the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, NASA prepared a Workforce

Strategy. The Strategy serves to assess and build a NASA workforce that can

achieve the Agency’s objectives for the Vision for Space Exploration, scientific activities, and aeronautics research. Specifically, the Strategy identifies the factors affecting NASA’s workforce:

• Implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration

• Retiring of the Space Shuttle by 2010 and development of the Crew Launch

Vehicle and Crew Exploration Vehicle

• A refocusing of aeronautics research program away from technology demonstration and toward long-term basic research

• Increasing numbers of retirement-eligible workers

• Change to full cost management and a resulting need to balance human resources with center workload and project life cycles

Elements of the Workforce Strategy include:

• The objective of 10 Healthy Centers that maintain a workload to sustain a

productive workforce.

• A workforce planning process that involves all levels of management, including center management, and serves as a central component of NASA’s strategic, business, and resource planning.

• A set of workforce planning tools including a Competency Management System (CMS) to identify and monitor NASA’s knowledge base. According to the

NASA workforce strategy, ‘‘Competencies are used to categorize the capabilities of an employee, identify the knowledge requirements of a position or

those associated with projects and programs, and forecast the Agency’s workforce requirements.’’ In addition, a Workforce Integrated Management System

(WIMS) collects and manages NASA’s data on the workforce and competency

planning.

• An assessment of supply and demand for specific competencies in the workforce between 2006 and 2011, including a projection of the number of FTEs

needed at each NASA center from FY 2005–FY 2011, based on expected requirements and anticipated funding.

Æ NASA identified, based on the assessment, competencies in increasing

demand: 1) program/ project management; 2) systems engineering and integration, and 3) mission operations. Primary competencies in decreasing

demand are: 1) engineering and science support; 2) management competencies; and 3) paraprofessional business operations, among other functions.

Æ The Strategy discusses a problem with ‘‘uncovered capacity,’’ that is, employees whose work time is not allocated at 100 percent to project tasks.

7

• Identified steps for addressing the gap in required competency areas, including approaches for recruiting new talent and for retaining employees who possesses competencies required to fulfill the Agency’s objectives.

The Workforce Strategy emphasizes the need for flexibility to reflect new information and changes in policies, plans, resources, and political situations.

Building a Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the

National Vision for Space Exploration (National Academies, 2007)

In September 2005, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Program Analysis and

Evaluation requested that the National Academies ‘‘study the long-range science

and technology workforce needs of NASA and the larger aerospace science and engineering community to achieve the Vision for Space Exploration. . ..’’ The report’s

key conclusions and recommendations are summarized below:

No National Shortage of Skilled Employees to Support the Vision

• There is ‘‘no looming national shortage of skilled scientists and engineers to

implement the VSE over the long-term.’’

• Low numbers of entry-level NASA workers (25–29 year age range) who can

build the experience necessary to implement the Vision over the coming decades raise concern.

• The workforce that NASA has relied on in the past and will continue to rely

on resides outside of the Agency in universities and industry. NASA will need

to approach its outside scientific workforce differently than its outside engineering workforce, because while industry personnel can move among defense, commercial aerospace, and NASA projects, university research talent

will be lost if NASA stops supporting scientific research.

NASA Needs to Collect More Data In Order to Assess its Workforce

• NASA has conducted a top-down, headquarters-led assessment of the Agency’s needs and skills to meet its workforce demands but needs to conduct a

bottom-up, center-led ‘‘assessment of the current skills, experience levels, and

projected attrition of the workforce for each individual center.’’

• This information should be used to develop a model that will allow the Agency to project the skills it needs to develop as well as the competencies and

experience levels NASA requires. NASA should translate such competencies

and experience levels into specific positions and projected timeframes of when

each center will require those positions.

• NASA should also apply the model to project the mix of skills that could be

conducted internally or externally in industry.

Increased Need for Program/Project Managers and Systems Engineers

NASA’s requirements for both internal and external scientific and engineering

workforce share the common need for ‘‘highly skilled program and project managers

and systems engineers.’’ Approaches for increasing these capabilities include:

• Leveraging workers with systems engineering and technical experience acquired from robotic science programs for human spacecraft development;

• Providing opportunities for junior-level workers to obtain hands-on flight development experience through low-cost sounding rocket, balloon, and aircraft

research projects to develop the program/ project management and systems

engineering skills that NASA needs now and in the future.

• Retaining existing employees with much needed program/project and systems

engineering skills while also recruiting employees from outside the Agency

that possess those capabilities.

• Using the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 and working with Congress and the

executive branch to reduce the barriers that enable the flow of skilled employees between industry and NASA.

NASA Should Help Train Its Future Workforce

• NASA should become involved in training its potential workforce, because the

Agency cannot rely on other government agencies or external institutions to

provide ‘‘the skills that are unique to the work the Agency conducts.’’

• NASA training programs have languished and need additional support and

restructuring. The Graduate Student Research Program (GSRP) establishes a

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strong link between NASA and university scientists, but similar connections

do not exist for engineering and human exploration.

• NASA’s Education Program could be used to fund workforce programs including hands-on training opportunities in suborbital programs and small mission

programs such as Explorers.

• Nontraditional means of inspiring and training the future workforce such as

the Centennial Challenge prizes should also be considered. Many of the programs it mentions—sub-orbital, GSRP, and Centennial Challenges—do not

require large investments and will yield training benefits many times more

than the necessary investments.

NASA Workforce Within the Broader Context

• The stability of support for and funding for the Vision will be important to

industry’s ability to attract and maintain skilled and younger workers to support exploration projects.

• NASA’s workforce is not an internal matter but must be considered as part

of a national strategy with input from national security government agencies,

industry, and universities.

NASA: Balancing A Multi-sector Workforce to Achieve a Healthy Organization (National Academy of Public Administration, 2007)

In March 2006, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee and NASA asked the

National Academy of Public Administration to conduct a study on NASA’s workforce

that would focus on 1) the challenges of transitioning from the Shuttle Program to

the Vision, and 2) acquiring the right balance within its multi-sector workforce of

approximately 18,000 civil servants and 44,000 contractors.

Some of the NAPA study panel’s specific concerns are summarized below:

NASA’s Dedication to ‘‘Ten Healthy Centers’’

• The panel noted that ‘‘NASA has not established a comprehensive evaluation

process to assess and monitor the long-term health of each center.’’ The report

introduces a guide for assessing the health of each center and recommends

that NASA’s Program Analysis and Evaluation Office use the guidelines to

evaluate each center annually.

• The panel warns that ‘‘. . .the potential danger of the ten healthy centers approach is that actions intended to help the struggling centers could harm the

other centers. Therefore, supporting all ten field installations could come at the

expense of NASA as an agency.’’ The panel added that ‘‘The current and longterm health of the three NASA research centers (Ames, Glenn, and Langley)

is questionable and should be a core concern of NASA headquarters.’’

Multi-sector Balance

• The panel noted that interpretations of responsibilities that are ‘inherently

governmental,’ and therefore should be conducted by civil servants, differ

across the government. The report presents guidelines for deciding whether

a position should be filled with a civil servant or a contractor. For decisions

on civil servant hires, the report introduces guidelines for determining what

kind of appointment should be used: tenured permanent or multi-year term.

• NASA’s Workforce Strategy is limited to the civil service workforce. It does not

address the contractor personnel that comprise two-thirds of the Agency’s

total workforce. ‘‘Although the Strategy is consistent with historical approaches to civil service workforce planning, it was a narrow interpretation of

the Congressional mandate for a human capital strategy to ensure a workforce

of the appropriate size and with the appropriate skills.’’

• NASA’s Competency Management System (CMS) covers only civil service employees, however, NAPA notes that ‘‘other federal organizations have developed systems to capture aggregate contractor competencies. In June 2006, for

example, the Department of National Intelligence (DNI) began to develop a

comprehensive competency-based inventory for its civil servants and its ‘‘embedded’’ (on-site) contractors who are doing core work.’’

Contracting Officer Technical Representatives

• The NAPA panel observes that there is ‘‘An inconsistent definition of the federal acquisition workforce, which often excludes and, by implication may

undervalue, Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs). COTRs

are an agency’s technical link to ensure that contractors deliver quality prodVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ucts meeting agency specifications, schedules, and costs.’’ ‘‘The Panel believes

that NASA must have more comprehensive information regarding who its

COTRs are, what training they have had, what training they need, what parts

of their contracting work they are doing effectively and timely, and what responsibilities are perhaps not getting adequate attention.’’

• The report also calls attention to a December 2005, NASA Inspector General

(IG) report that identified a list of ‘‘trouble areas’’ relating to the contracting

process, including problems with the financial management system in tracking contract spending; insufficient transparency in work performed by subcontractors; sizable cost overruns in some NASA programs, among other concerns. The IG recommended an improved internal control framework, as well

as establishing institutional procurement officials accountable for acquisition

integrity.’’

Centralization of Human Resources

• The report notes that ‘‘Until recently, each NASA center had its own tools and

processes for workforce strategy and planning, which made it difficult to track

uncovered capacity, skill mismatches, and other human capital issues and

take appropriate corrective actions.’’ Recently NASA has moved to centralize

and make uniform its human resources activities through its NASA Shared

Service Center. ‘‘By consolidating these services, NASA intends to improve

operational efficiency and overall customer service and focus more on its core

competencies. NASA has projected annual savings of up to $6.6 million from

NSSC, with more than 200 civil service FTE across the four redirected functional areas.’’

Human Resource Tools

• To efficiently manage the anticipated workforce transitions, the NAPA report

calls for workforce flexibilities, including ‘‘modified RIF rules, blanket buy-out

authority with a higher dollar value incentive, and limited statutory authority

for emergency retirement reform.’’

Workplace Planning Scope

• The NAPA panel believes that, in light of the considerable uncertainty in mission direction that NASA will receive, NASA’s workplace planning should expand from a one to two-year to a five year horizon.

• The panel endorsed a recommendation from a 2005 GAO report (GAO–05– 230) to use scenario planning. The planning should be focused and ‘‘Identify

the driving forces underlying each likely scenario; Incorporate the scenarios

into strategic actions; Identify key events that would indicate a particular scenario is unfolding; Create mechanisms to monitor the environment; Make adjustments to agency strategies based on environmental monitoring; and Identify and coordinate overall agency competencies, schedules, and facilities

across programs by scenario.’’

• NAPA learned in October 2006 that NASA’s Office of Human Capital Management (OHCM) is working to incorporate scenario planning into the workforce planning process across the five-year budget cycle.

Maintaining Core Skills

• Drawing upon workforce studies conducted by RAND, the Panel emphasized

the importance of identifying, sizing, and maintaining core competencies. This

process requires long-term planning, and according to RAND, analysis of the

demand for labor at the skill level over time; understanding and definition

of core capabilities; and planning over the long-term to maintain such capabilities.

Human Capital Flexibilities

• The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 enlarged NASA’s workforce flexibilities, yet

the Panel notes ‘‘While these flexibilities are important, they are much more

modest than those given to the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). NASA is subject to such Title 5 requirements as staffing, position

classification, compensation, and performance management. For example, it is

not authorized to implement pay-banding or performance-based compensation

strategies.’’

• The panel recommends that NASA ‘‘Pursue additional statutory and regulatory authorizations to obtain other flexibilities needed to strategically manage the workforce. . ..’’ For example, the Panel’s 2005 Human Capital FlexiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
10

bilities report recommended that NASA be able to alter its agency’s career life

cycle by modifying retirement rules ‘‘to allow the Agency to separate an employee eligible for optional retirement if doing so would help it achieve workforce reshaping or downsizing goals.’’

The Competency Management System (CMS)

• Since 2003, NASA has used a Competency Management System (CMS) to document the workforce competencies required by NASA positions and possessed

by NASA employees. As NASA has defined it, a competency is not a role or

function, but a base level of knowledge relevant to the Agency’s mission that

defines for a position what knowledge is needed and how it is applied.

• The report notes that ‘‘As presently constituted, CMS is not always as helpful

to centers at the personnel hiring level because it does not track directly to positions.’’ The panel recommends that NASA ‘‘Strengthen the CMS by integrating it with existing budget tools. . .with a methodology for translating

competency surpluses and deficits into FTE needs.’’

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on

Science, June 13, 2006. ‘‘The NASA Workforce: Does NASA Have the

Right Strategy and Policies to Retain and Build the Workforce It

Will Need?’’

During the 109th Congress, the House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on

Space and Aeronautics examined issues related to NASA’s workforce during a hearing held in June 13, 2006.

• Ms. Toni Dawsey, NASA Assistant Administrator for Human Capital Management testified on NASA’s workforce challenges including the Agency’s uncovered capacity and efforts to ensure that employees with critical skills are

not lost during buy-outs or early retirement offers. She also discussed the

Agency’s workforce strategy and the importance of human capital tools and

flexibility such as the NASA Flexibility Act, cooperative education programs,

and intern programs in attracting new talent into the Agency.

• Dr. Lee Stone, Legislative Representative from IFPTE and an employee of

NASA Ames Research Center testified that NASA does not have the right

strategies or policies to build the workforce it needs and that the Agency’s efforts in workforce planning can only provide short-term solutions. The only

long-term solution to building a healthy workforce is to reverse the trend in

budget cuts to aeronautics, science and exploration programs.

• Dr. David Black, Co-Chair of the National Academies’ report on NASA’s

Workforce testified that, in the view of the Academy committee, NASA’s work

is incomplete and represents a top-down approach that does not properly reflect the workforce needs of individual centers. He also noted that the lack

of support and budget for the Vision for Space Exploration affects the Agency’s ability to find the best and brightest employees. Dr. Black noted that if

NASA elects to build its workforce internally rather than use outside contractors, the Agency will over the next five years face a gap in expertise that cannot be addressed through new hires or in-house employees.

• Mr. John Douglass, President, Aerospace Industries Association testified that

aerospace workforce is aging and that industry is in the process of rebuilding

its workforce for the future. He spoke about the use of contractors for shortterm projects and civil servants for basic research and development efforts.

Mr. Douglass testified that competition for systems engineering skills among

industry and other government agencies is of concern. He said that the aerospace industry can absorb more NASA work.

Uncovered Capacity

Subcommittee Members probed the issue of uncovered capacity. Ms. Dawsey reported a total of 1000 FTEs were uncovered, which equates to 828 employees.

NASA’s approach to addressing the problem is to reassign work to those centers

with the most significant uncovered capacity and to retrain workers for explorationrelated tasks. The union asserted that NASA’s uncovered capacity problem had little

to do with workforce and much to do with full cost accounting. Dr. Lee Stone testified that NASA managers were diverting labor funds to support hardware procurements, thus creating the problem in uncovered capacity.

11

Competency Management System (CMS)

The IFPTE union called attention to the deficiencies in NASA’s CMS system. The

system was originally intended to include several databases but so far only includes

one. The database in use only captures primary competencies and cannot reflect an

employee’s secondary skills. In addition, competencies have not been assessed and

translated into specific positions.

Balance of In-House Civil Servants and Contractors

The Subcommittee also examined the process for making decisions on NASA’s use

of in-house civil servants versus contractors and the balance between these elements

of its workforce. Ms. Dawsey noted that the Agency was seeking guidance on this

issue from the National Academy of Public Administration. Dr. Black suggested that

NASA look beyond itself and consider the question with the broader aerospace and

research community. Dr. Lee Stone referred to the Columbia Accident Investigation

Board (CAIB) report and its cautioning on NASA’s reliance on contractors for technical support, use of experienced managers for contract oversight rather than technical leadership, and use of inexperienced engineers for management roles.

A Funding Crisis, Not a Workforce Crisis

Members and witnesses alike referred to the fact that NASA’s expanding responsibilities are not being met with appropriate resources. As a result, the Agency will

lose capabilities in science programs, especially life and micro-gravity sciences and

astrobiology, which cannot be easily replaced. Insufficient funding to execute

NASA’s multiple missions does not present a strong signal to graduate students and

young workers who might be considering NASA or NASA-related work as a means

to build and grow their careers.

The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 (P.L. 108–201)

The NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 granted a range of increased flexibilities for

strengthening NASA’s workforce. Under the Act, term appointments could last

longer, and conversion from term to permanent appointments was made easier. Recruitment, relocation and retention bonuses were increased, and redesignation bonuses were added. Authority was granted for hiring distinguished scholars and for

critical position hiring. The time period for an Intergovernmental Personnel Act

(IPA) assignment limit was increased. Travel and transportation reimbursement capabilities, and change of position incentives, were enlarged. Annual leave, and Senior Executive Service (SES), eligibilities also were enlarged. The maximum allowable rate of pay for NASA-excepted (NEX) employees was increased. A scholarship

program was established.

The NASA Transition Act of 2007

The NASA Transition Act of 2007 proposes to amend the Space Act of 1958 and

the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. The Transition Act includes two new workforce

management tools:

• Authority to offer a permanent employee an incentive for voluntarily converting to a time-limited appointment; and

• Authority to pay the government’s share of the Federal Employees Health

Benefits Program (FEHBP) premium for employees who separate because

their positions are being eliminated or transferred out of the commuting area.

This is expected to result in a greater number of employees being willing to

separate voluntarily.

• Specific provisions of the legislation would terminate in 2010.

12

13

Chairman UDALL. The hearing will come to order.

I want to welcome all our witnesses here today, and before I

make my opening remarks, I did want to tell everybody who is

gathered that we have got a tight schedule this morning. I apologize in advance. We may be disrupted 45 or 50 minutes into the

hearing, because we have a series of votes, but we will move with

some dispatch, because we really do want to hear from this distinguished panel.

I look forward to getting your views on this important issue of

how best to ensure that NASA will have the workforce that it

needs to accomplish its various challenging missions. It is obvious

that NASA’s workforce is critical to the success of its missions, and

yet, it should be equally obvious that the continued health and

strength of NASA’s workforce cannot be taken for granted. It needs

to be nurtured, supported, and given the tools and resources it will

need to carry out the complex and challenging mission that it has

been asked to undertake in science, aeronautics, and human space

flight.

That is why I am keenly interested in hearing the findings and

recommendations of the two recent independent assessments of

NASA’s workforce needs, as well as NASA’s response to them.

However, I envision today’s hearing as only the first step in a continuing examination of the health of NASA’s workforce by our subcommittee.

In particular, I hope to have a follow-on hearing later this year

to examine some of the particular civil service and contractor workforce challenges that are associated with the upcoming retirement

of the Space Shuttle, and in addition, I would like the Subcommittee to review the proposed legislative provisions that have

been provided to Congress by NASA to address some of these workforce challenges.

Thus, I hope that this hearing will be one in a series of hearings

on this topic. We owe it to both the highly talented NASA employees, as well as to the broader aerospace community, to make sure

NASA and Congress get it right in attempting to shape NASA’s future workforce.

As I have said, and many others have acknowledged it, NASA’s

civil service workforce consists of some of this nation’s ‘‘best and

brightest.’’ In most cases, they have made a long-term commitment

to public service. I respect them for that commitment, and I think

that whatever workforce strategy NASA develops should build on

the strengths that these individuals bring to the Agency, because

if those skills are discarded, whether for short-term budgetary reasons, or for some other reason, we would find out at a later date

that it is difficult, if not impossible to recapture skills that the Nation discovers it needs. And at the same time, NASA must work

to attract and properly utilize the young men and women who will

provide the scientific, engineering, and project management expertise required for NASA’s future missions decades into the future.

Doing all of that would be a tall order under the best of circumstances, and it will be doubly difficult if NASA is not provided

resources that are equal to the missions that it has been asked to

undertake.

14

Now, I am sure Judge Hall would agree with me that money

alone will not ensure that NASA will have the strong and vital

workforce that it needs, but insufficient funding will undercut

whatever workforce initiatives are put in place.

We have got a lot to talk about today, and I want to again welcome our witnesses, and I am at this time honored to yield whatever time he deems necessary to my good friend, Congressman

Hall, the Ranking Member of the entire Committee.

Judge Hall.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Udall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MARK UDALL

Good morning.

I’d like to welcome all of our witnesses to today’s hearing.

We have a distinguished panel, and I look forward to getting your views on the

important issue of how best to ensure that NASA will have the workforce it needs

to accomplish its various challenging missions.

Before I say more, however, I’d like to take a moment to congratulate Mr. Feeney

on his selection as the new Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, replacing my

good friend and colleague Ken Calvert, who has moved over the Appropriations

Committee.

Welcome Mr. Feeney, I look forward to working with you in your new capacity

in the days and weeks ahead.

Now it’s obvious that NASA’s workforce is critical to the success of NASA’s missions.

Yet it should be equally obvious that the continued health and strength of NASA’s workforce cannot be taken for granted.

It needs to be nurtured, supported, and given the tools and resources it will need

to carry out the complex and challenging missions it has been asked to undertake

in science, aeronautics, and human space flight and exploration.

That is why I am keenly interested in hearing the findings and recommendations

of the two recent independent assessments of NASA’s workforce needs, as well as

NASA’s response to them.

However, I envision today’s hearing as only the first step in a continuing examination of the health of NASA’s workforce by this subcommittee.

In particular, I hope to have a follow-on hearing later this year to examine some

of the particular civil service and contractor workforce challenges that are associated with the upcoming retirement of the Space Shuttle.

In addition, I would like the Subcommittee to review the proposed legislative provisions that have been provided to Congress by NASA to address some of those

workforce challenges.

Thus, I hope that this hearing will just be one in a series of hearings on this

topic—we owe it both to the highly talented NASA employees as well as to the

broader aerospace community to make sure NASA and Congress ‘‘get it right’’ in attempting to shape NASA’s future workforce.

As I have said in the past, NASA’s civil service workforce consists of some of this

nation’s ‘‘best and brightest.’’ In most cases, they have made a long-term commitment to public service.

I respect them for that commitment, and I think that whatever workforce strategy

NASA develops should build on the strengths that those individuals bring to the

Agency. . .

. . .Because if those skills are discarded, whether for short-term budgetary reasons or for some other reason, we could find out at a later date that it is difficult

if not impossible to recapture skills that the Nation discovers it needs.

At the same time, NASA must work to attract and properly utilize the young men

and women who will provide the scientific, engineering, and project management expertise required for NASA’s future missions.

Doing all that would be a tall order under the best of circumstances.

It will be doubly difficult if NASA is not provided resources that are equal to the

missions that it has been asked to undertake.

Money alone will not ensure that NASA will have the strong and vital workforce

that it needs, but insufficient funding will undercut whatever workforce initiatives

are put in place.

Well, we have a lot to talk about today.

I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony.

15

Mr. HALL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think I would be

remiss if I didn’t say I was honored to be sitting by a member of

really a great American family, and one that has lived a life of public service, and the guy is so dang handsome, I ask unanimous consent if I could sit down there, I didn’t have to sit by him.

Chairman UDALL. Judge Hall, you are out of order, and——

Mr. HALL. All right, here I go. And I do thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this meeting, because I always like to welcome the

witnesses, and thank them for coming today, because they are giving up their time. It takes time to get here. I think that I saw Mr.

Stewart coming in this morning, and I thought he was Norm Augustine. I almost said hello, Norm, how are you doing. And Ms.

Dawsey, good to see you again, and welcome, and thank you.

NASA has a unique and interesting set of missions, and all of us

on this committee want you to successfully accomplish the missions

that we have laid out, and I don’t think we ought to give any on

the program that is laid out, we ought to hold what is laid out. We

shouldn’t have to take any suggestion that we are not in a good

economy, because that wouldn’t be true, and we don’t need to start

surrendering any of the gains that we have laid out, and that the

President’s vision has set out, and that we have accepted. We need

just to carry it out and to follow it.

And the workforce is so important in that. Everything that

NASA does depends on its ability to maintain a really highly qualified and competent workforce, and developing the right mix of

skills, and keeping people engaged in the challenging work, as

budgets and program priorities change, I think, requires just a very

continuing commitment, a commitment that I have noticed in

NASA from the time I have been here.

You face a number of workforce challenges over the next few

years, including retiring the Space Shuttle in 2010, while simultaneously completing the International Space Station, and developing

the new Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and Ares Launch System.

NASA’s aeronautics program has been refocused, shifting away

from technology demonstrations and toward long-term basic research.

NASA’s vital science programs have faced difficult changes as

well. Furthermore, in addition to technical, scientific, and engineering challenges, the Agency also faces daunting financial management challenges that it has been largely unable to address, in part

because of a lack of qualified financial auditors and administrators,

I am told.

These pressures are unlikely to go away. In fact, they will almost

certainly continue in the future. Things are always changing, that’s

the nature of science and technology, but the workforce has to

adapt to these changes, and the Agency bears responsibility to employees and to its stakeholders including Congress to develop a

strategy to effectively address these changes.

In April of 2006, NASA released its Workforce Strategy document, as required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. The National Research Council and the National Academy of Public Administration have each reviewed NASA’s strategy, and offered very

thoughtful perspectives on it. I look forward to hearing from them

16

today, and I also look forward to hearing from the International

Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers.

Workforce is so vital to NASA’s mission, NASA has to constantly

evaluate its future needs, and be ready to take preemptive action

when necessary to ensure the right people are there to do exciting

and challenging missions, and continue to accomplish extraordinary scientific discoveries.

I look forward to hearing from you today, from the witnesses,

and with that, I thank the Chairman, and yield back my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RALPH M. HALL

I want to thank Chairman Udall for holding today’s important hearing. I’d also

like to welcome the witnesses, and thank them for coming before us today to help

us better understand NASA’s workforce challenges and the strategy to address

them.

NASA has a unique and interesting set of missions, and all of us on this committee want NASA to successfully accomplish the missions that have been laid out.

Everything that NASA does depends on its ability to maintain a highly-qualified

and competent workforce. Developing the right mix of skills, and keeping people engaged in challenging work as budgets and program priorities change, requires a continuing commitment.

NASA faces a number of workforce challenges over the next few years including

retiring the Space Shuttle in 2010 while simultaneously completing the International Space Station, and developing the new Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and

Ares launch system. NASA’s Aeronautics programs have been refocused, shifting

away from technology demonstrations and toward long-term basic research. NASA’s

vital Science programs have faced difficult changes as well. Furthermore, in addition to technical, scientific, and engineering challenges, the Agency also faces

daunting financial management challenges that it has been largely unable to address in part because of a lack of qualified financial auditors and administrators.

These pressures are unlikely to go away. In fact they will almost certainly continue in the future. Things are always changing—that’s the nature of science and

technology—but the workforce must adapt to the changes, and the Agency bears a

responsibility to employees and its stakeholders, including Congress, to develop a

strategy to effectively address the changes.

In April 2006, NASA released its Workforce Strategy document as required by the

NASA Authorization Act of 2005. The National Research Council and the National

Academy of Public Administration have each reviewed NASA’s strategy and offered

thoughtful perspectives. I look forward to hearing from them today. I also look forward to hearing from the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers.

The workforce is so vital to NASA’s mission. NASA must constantly evaluate its

future needs, and be ready and able to take preemptive actions when necessary to

ensure the right people are there to do the exciting and challenging missions, and

continue to accomplish extraordinary scientific discoveries.

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses. And with that, I yield back the

balance of my time.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Judge Hall.

At this point, if there are Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your statements will be added to the

record, and without objection, so ordered.

And at this time, I wanted to introduce the panel of witnesses,

and I will introduce all of you, and then we will start on my left

with Ms. Dawsey and her testimony, but let me welcome all of you

again, and say a little bit about each one of you.

Ms. Toni Dawsey is the NASA Assistant Administrator for

Human Capital Management. Mr. John Stewart, next in line, is a

Fellow at the National Academy of Public Administration, and was

a member of its NASA Multi-sector Workforce Panel.

17

Dr. David Black recently co-chaired the National Research Council’s Committee on Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National

Vision for Space Exploration, and we have to his left Dr. Lee Stone,

the Legislative Representative from the International Federation of

Professional and Technical Engineers, who serves on the NASA

Council of IFPTE Locals.

Welcome. I think most of you, if not all of you, are professionals

at this. You have been in front of the Committee and the Subcommittee before, and you know you have five minutes, and then,

we will turn to questions, so that we can further drill down into

the expertise you have in your perspective.

So, Ms. Dawsey, the floor is yours for five minutes.

STATEMENT OF MS. TONI DAWSEY, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT; CHIEF HUMAN

CAPITAL OFFICER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

Ms. DAWSEY. Thank you Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss

NASA’s workforce.

Implementing the Vision for Space Exploration clearly represents

a great management challenge, now and for many years to come.

In particular, the retirement of the Shuttle, the completion of the

International Space Station, and the development of the multiple

elements of the Constellation Program involve a daunting series of

transitions both programmatic and institutional.

The NASA Workforce Strategy submitted to Congress in April

2006 laid the foundation for the actions the Agency must take to

maintain the knowledgebase of the current workforce, and to acquire the skills necessary to accomplish NASA’s mission.

The document articulates three principles underlying our workforce strategy: building and sustaining ten healthy centers, maximizing the use of NASA’s people, and evolving to a more flexible,

scalable workforce.

We have developed a comprehensive plan based on these principles, with three primary goals to implement them. The first goal

is to understand mission requirements, both near and long-term.

The second goal is to align the skills of the workforce with mission

needs, and the third goal is to enable more effective and efficient

human resources operations, through the delivery of comprehensive

and authoritative workforce information.

The first goal, understanding mission requirements, requires an

especially strong workforce planning capability. Recognizing that it

is critical that all levels of management be involved in workforce

planning. In January, the Agency established a workforce planning

governance structure, comprised of key agency managers, to identify workforce risks, and to develop joint solutions to issues as they

emerge. We have also integrated workforce planning with the development of program and project budgets. With an enhanced

workforce planning capability, NASA will be better able to determine the demand for and supply of individual workforce skills.

The second goal, to align the workforce with the mission, requires strengthening the technical and leadership excellence of our

employees, and reshaping the workforce to better serve future misVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
18

sion requirements. In addition, as more of our experienced employees reach retirement eligibility, it is imperative that we attract and

develop new talent.

To strengthen technical excellence, the Agency is providing workforce retraining and skill development through a number of programs designed to develop program and project managers and engineers to transfer knowledge across NASA, academia, industry, and

international partners, and to ensure that lessons learned are captured for the next generation. In order to build leadership ‘‘bench

strength,’’ NASA has created a corporate leadership framework

that provides succession planning and executive development.

Another challenge is to reshape the existing workforce to better

serve current and future requirements. The use of buy-out/early

out authority to encourage voluntary attrition has been critical to

NASA workforce reshaping. Since the start of Fiscal Year ’04, over

1,300 employees in targeted areas of surplus took buy-outs or early

outs. This is over one third of the total attrition of 3,500 during

this period.

We continue to monitor this program to ensure that experienced

employees with needed and critical skills are not leaving the Agency, and that safety of the Space Shuttle or the International Space

Station is not compromised. To replace normal attrition, since

2004, we have hired nearly 2,500 employees. Of this number, 700

are recent college graduates.

The tools provided by the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 continue

to be vitally important to us as we reshape our workforce. They

provide over a dozen tools that include enhanced recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses, expanded use of term appointments,

and benefits for new hires.

In March, NASA submitted legislative proposals to provide the

Agency with additional flexibilities that it needs to better implement the transition from Shuttle to Constellation. To effectively

manage change, NASA must leverage information technology also

to provide more responsive, reliable information to support decision-making. This is our third goal.

NASA is working toward full integration of human resources information across the Agency. NASA also is converging business

systems, expanding access throughout the Agency, and increasing

tools and applications. These efforts will form a human capital information environment that will provide a foundation for total business systems integration and provide near real-time comprehensive

information to enable an informed decision-making at all levels.

The initial operating capability for this environment is planned

for the summer of 2007, with final implementation during the fall

of 2008. In summary, in implementing the NASA Workforce Strategy, NASA is positioning itself to deal effectively with the critical

issues now facing the Agency on an integrated, agency-wide basis.

NASA is putting in place approaches that not only will alleviate

the Agency’s current imbalances, but also will provide a structure

that allows such issues to be resolved in the future, as part of a

deliberate, systematic process.

The foundation that NASA is building is a big picture view that

will facilitate and institutionalize long-term planning and agencylevel coordination.

19

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dawsey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TONI DAWSEY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity

to appear before you today to discuss NASA’s workforce.

Implementing the President’s Vision for Space Exploration clearly represents a

great management challenge, now and for many years to come. In particular, the

retirement of the Space Shuttle, the completion of the International Space Station,

and the development of the multiple elements of the Constellation Program involve

a daunting series of transitions both programmatic and institutional in nature. The

issues associated with these transitions are complex and our planning, already well

underway, will be an iterative, evolutionary process featuring tight integration between these efforts and NASA’s ongoing Science and Aeronautics Programs.

The NASA Workforce Strategy, submitted to the Congress in April 2006, laid the

foundation for the actions the Agency must take to maintain the knowledge base

of the current workforce, as well as broaden, reinvigorate, and acquire new skills

necessary to accomplish NASA’s Exploration, Science and Aeronautics missions. The

document articulates three principles underlying our workforce strategy: building

and sustaining ten healthy Centers; maximizing the use of NASA’s current human

capital capabilities; and evolving to a more flexible, scalable workforce. We remain

committed to these principles and view them as essential to mission success. Our

comprehensive plan for managing NASA’s current and future workforce is based on

these principles, and we have developed three primary goals to implement them.

• The first goal is to understand mission requirements, both near- and longterm, to enable the identification and matching of needed skills to program

tasks through a robust, comprehensive workforce planning process.

• The second goal is to align the skills in the workforce with mission needs by

strengthening technical and leadership excellence and by reshaping the existing workforce.

• The third goal is to enable more effective and efficient human resources operations through the delivery of comprehensive and authoritative workforce information for decision-making through integrated human resources, financial

and other business support systems.

Recently, both the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) and the

National Research Council (NRC) released reports of recommendations for addressing our overall workforce challenges, as well as for addressing more specific issues

relating to the aforementioned transitions. To a large degree, these reports confirm

our assessments of the challenges facing us in the workforce arena and validate the

actions that we have initiated to address the most critical and encompassing issues.

All of the information, findings and recommendations contained in the reports will

continue to inform implementation of our basic workforce strategy, and will help ensure that we remain focused on the key issues.

Below, I have highlighted some of the key initiatives we’ve undertaken over the

past year in support of implementing the Workforce Strategy through the stated

goals.

Understand the Mission Requirements

Workforce Planning

Implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration requires an especially strong

workforce planning capability—a capability that will allow Centers and the Agency

to identify and assess areas of workforce risk so that viable solutions to mitigate

those risks can be developed and implemented.

Recognizing that it is critical that all levels of management be involved in workforce planning, the Agency’s first Workforce Planning Governance Structure was established in January 2007. The Governance Structure comprises key management

officials from across the Agency who, in collaboration with the human resources

community, work together to identify Agency workforce risks and develop solutions

to workforce issues as soon as they emerge.

We have also integrated and synchronized workforce planning with the development of program and project budgets. This new approach—planning and integration

among all levels of management—helps NASA determine the best application of

workforce to projects as they proceed from formulation through development and

mission operations. With an enhanced workforce planning capability, NASA will be

better able to determine the demand for, and supply of, workforce skills based on

20

current and projected work requirements and to identify areas of potential risk in

matching workforce to work. This will allow more time to develop strategies to mitigate these risks. In addition, we’ve enhanced our ability to analyze workforce data

necessary to support effective workforce planning. We have begun to develop measures to monitor multiple dimensions of workforce capability at the Centers and to

identify areas of strengths and weaknesses.

Shuttle Workforce Transition

With the retirement of the Shuttle in 2010, NASA will shift from the current primary focus on operations to one in which we develop new systems, with the capability for human space exploration missions to the Moon, on to Mars and beyond.

These changes have significant workforce implications—for both civil servants and

contractors. The nature of the work will change as we transition from Shuttle operations to research and development-focused activities like planning, design, development, testing and verification for Constellation systems. This presents unique challenges to the Agency. NASA must retain the skills necessary to safely execute the

remaining Shuttle missions, manage the transition of skilled Shuttle employees into

Constellation development, and retain skills between FY 2010 and FY 2015 necessary to safely execute Constellation flight operations.

The National Research Council noted that ‘‘NASA has undertaken a commendable

top-down analysis of current agency needs and the skill levels of its current workforce that the committee believes is an excellent first step’’ (Finding 1). We acknowledge that more work is needed, though. As the Constellation Systems Requirements

Reviews are completed this year, NASA will gain a much clearer understanding of

the demand for future workforce skills, which will form the foundation for making

any future decisions.

We are engaged in many initiatives to manage this transition. We are striving to

give our employees opportunities to build on their existing skills by moving appropriate work packages across the Centers to match resident workforce skills, by

building ‘‘virtual’’ project teams within and across Centers, and by offering temporary details. Through such initiatives, many employees will be prepared to easily

transition into new positions when the exploration systems development work comes

on-line. We are developing a mapping of current available skills among the Shuttle

workforce with the skills we will need for future work so that we can better plan

and implement workforce reassignments. We are supporting retraining to ensure

that employees have the skills to be successful in the new work. We are making

good use of temporary and term appointments to get the flexibility to better align

to the time-phased workload.

As we work through this transition, NASA remains committed to working with

our industry, supplier, and research partners to minimize disruption, upheaval, and

economic impact, while maximizing support vital for Shuttle missions and program

requirements. A Shuttle Human Capital Council convened recently to bring together

the civil service and contractor Human Resources Directors to surface and address

common workforce issues, share best practices in resolving issues, and strengthen

the human capital network.

Workforce Flexibilities

In March 2007, NASA submitted legislative proposals to the Subcommittee to provide the Agency with additional workforce flexibilities to better implement the transition from the Space Shuttle era to the new era of exploration.

Several years ago, NASA gained important new workforce flexibilities through the

enactment of the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. Those flexibilities have made a difference already, and will be vitally important to the Agency over the coming years

in competing for top talent and maintaining the knowledge base of the workforce.

However, the authorities in the NASA Flexibility Act represent, for the most part,

tools for attracting and retaining high-quality employees. They do not address a different—but equally critical—human capital challenge: managing attrition in a strategic, effective, and compassionate manner. The need for attrition management tools

is particularly important to NASA as we face the challenges associated with retaining Shuttle skills through completion of the Program, and then effectively

transitioning that workforce.

In many cases, skill misalignments can be addressed by retraining or reassigning

the employees whose skills cannot be utilized effectively in their current assignments. NASA has been aggressive in this regard over the past several years with

hundreds of people now productively and enthusiastically engaged in the Constellation Program. But not all skill misalignments can be resolved by retraining and redeployment. Furthermore, NASA historically has had an exceptionally low attrition

rate, rendering reshaping of the workforce difficult and slow.

21

As such, NASA needs to manage attrition in a targeted manner to achieve better

alignment of the workforce with the mission without creating unwanted losses, skill

imbalances, and disruption in the general workforce. But that is not the only objective. The method by which attrition is achieved is just as important. NASA must

manage attrition in a way that does not demoralize the workforce, create an environment of uncertainty, generate a lack of trust in management, or stimulate the

departure of the workforce the Agency needs to retain. If attrition is not managed

in the right way, NASA’s outstanding image as a leading employer of choice will

be eroded, resulting in a long-term negative impact on the Agency’s ability to attract

and retain the workforce it needs.

NASA has submitted proposals for two new workforce authorities in its legislative

package—a conversion incentive and temporary continuation of coverage of health

benefits—in order to manage attrition more effectively and strategically. The conversion incentive would allow the Administrator to pay a permanent employee a

monetary incentive for voluntarily converting to a time-limited appointment. The

purpose of this financial incentive is to offset the risk the employee assumes by giving up the right to continued permanent employment. The incentive may not exceed

$25,000 or 25 percent of the employee’s annual salary, whichever is less, for each

12-month period of service for which the incentive is paid. Unlike a buy-out, an employee who converts to a term appointment and receives the conversion incentive

is not precluded from securing full time federal employment and retaining the incentive.

This authority is particularly tailored to managing the Shuttle workforce. A conversion incentive serves as both an incentive for the employee to remain with the

program to the date needed by management (similar to the concept of a retention

incentive) while allowing management to plan for an orderly release of employees

on a defined date without the need to resort to involuntary actions such as a reduction-in-force.

The other workforce provision in the legislative proposals, the temporary continuation of coverage of health benefits, would permit NASA to pay the government’s

share of the Federal Employees Health Benefits premiums for certain NASA employees who elect temporary continuation of health benefits coverage upon separation from NASA. Eligible employees would be those who are separating because

their positions are being eliminated. This provides a ‘‘soft landing’’ benefit to employees who desire continued health coverage while they seek other employment and

are not otherwise eligible for the Federal health benefits without paying the full cost

of the premiums. We believe that this benefit will expand the pool of employees who

would be willing to resign voluntarily from the Agency.

Align the Workforce with the Mission

NASA is filled with highly educated, dedicated employees at all levels who love

what they do and are inspired by the challenging and exciting environment. Our

current diverse workforce represents a wealth of skills and valuable experience. In

order for the Agency to accomplish its aggressive mission, it is critical that this

workforce be aligned with the mission by strengthening the technical and leadership

excellence of our employees and by reshaping the workforce to better serve future

mission requirements. In addition, as more of our experienced employees reach retirement eligibility, it is imperative that we attract and develop the new talent that

is needed to implement the Agency’s Exploration, Science and Aeronautics missions.

To do so, we must create, sharpen, and use all the tools that are needed to enable

current and future employees to support the work of this agency.

Technical and Leadership Excellence

One of our challenges is to strengthen the technical and leadership excellence of

the NASA workforce. In so doing, we have a number of tools at our disposal to ensure that our workforce continues to excel technically and that we are building

‘‘bench strength’’ in both our technical disciplines as well as in our leadership roles.

To strengthen technical excellence, the Office of the Chief Engineer supports

NASA’s field centers in workforce retraining and in current and future workforce

skill development through its Academy of Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL), the NASA Engineering Network (NEN), and the NASA Engineering

Safety Center (NESC) Academy. These programs are designed to both develop and

enhance the professional knowledge of NASA program/project managers and engineers at all career levels; to capture and transfer knowledge from seasoned program/

project managers and engineers across NASA as well as from industry, academia,

and international partners; and to ensure that lessons learned are captured for the

next generation.

22

In order to build leadership ‘‘bench strength,’’ we have developed a corporate, integrated approach to leadership development. NASA has created a leadership strategy

which is used both agency-wide and at the Centers as a framework for designing

and implementing leadership programs. This framework provides continuity

through succession planning and executive development—creating a skilled pipeline

for leadership within NASA. It includes a variety of components: workforce planning

and analysis, career paths, formal agency-wide leadership development programs,

formal and informal coaching and mentoring programs, and leadership training.

Many of these Programs are supplemented by Center-level development activities.

Our formal Agency-wide programs reflect a life cycle approach to leadership development with programs targeting entry, mid and senior level employees as they prepare for leadership responsibilities.

Reshaping of the Workforce

Another challenge is to reshape the existing workforce to better serve current and

future requirements. This involves not only some reductions in aggregate workforce

size, but also a build up in areas of greater need and reduction in areas that are

surplus to evolving mission requirements.

The use of buy-out/early out authority to encourage voluntary attrition has been

critical to NASA workforce reshaping. Since the start of FY 2004, over 1,300 employees in targeted areas of surplus took buy-outs or early outs. This is over onethird of the total attrition of 3,500 during this period. We continue to monitor this

program to ensure that experienced employees with needed and critical skills are

not leaving the Agency and that the safety of the Space Shuttle or the International

Space Station is not compromised.

To replace normal attrition and strengthen areas with increased requirements, we

have hired nearly 2,500 employees with a range of experiences and skills. Of this

number, 700 are workers hired either directly out of colleges and universities, or

shortly thereafter. NASA Centers make good use of programs such as the student

employment program and the Federal Career Intern Program to recruit new talent

into the Agency. NASA Centers have cooperative education program (co-op) agreements in place with multiple universities. Across the Centers, we have maintained

a constant average of 450 students participating in the co-op Program. These students have an opportunity to get ‘‘hands-on’’ experience in their technical field, and

to demonstrate their abilities on the job. The best of them are converted to entry

level engineers, scientists and business professionals upon graduation. The Federal

Career Intern Program also has allowed us to hire recent college graduates. The fact

that these interns are brought in as term appointments, with the ability to convert

them to permanent positions, provides additional flexibility in managing our workforce. Of the 700 entry level hires, 400 have been outside hires and the other 300

are conversions from either our co-op pool or from temporary or term appointments.

We are also refining our recruitment strategy by conducting more targeted recruitment on mission critical occupations and with under-represented groups; working with NASA’s Office of Education to enhance and expand student programs that

can serve as a pipeline into our workforce; and developing partnerships and relationships that can be beneficial in future recruitment efforts.

The tools provided by the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 continue to be vitally important as we reshape our workforce. They provide targeted solutions to multiple

challenges—the need to recruit new talent and the need to leverage the talent of

the current workforce. Along with the government wide flexibilities, they provide

over a dozen tools that include enhanced recruitment, relocation and retention bonuses, expanded use of term appointments, pay authority for critical positions, and

enhanced travel and annual leave benefits for new hires. We make use of the full

range of these flexibilities and find that combining them to create incentive packages tailored to the needs of specific candidates has been a particularly successful

strategy.

Enable Effective and Efficient Human Resources Operations

To effectively manage change while attending to our critical resource, our people,

NASA must leverage information technology to provide more responsive, reliable information to support decision-making.

Workforce Information Systems

Our current human resources information systems (HRIS) environment is quite

robust, providing automated solutions for the majority of our human capital programs, and providing a wealth of information to managers and workforce planners.

NASA is working toward full integration of the HRIS environment and improvement of capabilities that will provide the full range of information required to most

effectively manage our changing environment.

23

Over the years, NASA has invested in a number of Agency-wide systems such as

our Staffing and Recruitment System and our Competency Management System

(CMS). CMS enables NASA to assess the demand for, and supply of, workforce skills

based on current and projected work requirements. CMS captures the competencies

for every civil service position and multiple personal competencies for each individual NASA employee. Management of personal competencies enables the identification of expertise across the Agency and provides the capability to integrate this

information for use in planning the workforce.

Competencies are the common thread that tie the elements of workforce management together. CMS is a relatively new system that we are continually working to

improve. By integrating CMS with other workforce planning tools, we are able to

not only identify the critical current and future competency gaps and surpluses, but

we can weave that competency information throughout the workforce management

process.

Recognizing the almost limitless possibilities of information technology (IT), NASA

is converging business systems, expanding access to managers, supervisors, and employees, and increasing the capabilities of tools and applications. These efforts will

form a Human Capital Information Environment (HCIE) that will provide a foundation for total business systems integration, foster Agency-wide collaboration, provide

tools and information to assist our management team in their strategic planning efforts, and provide near real-time comprehensive information to enable and inform

decision-making at all levels.

Developing an HCIE is the first step in instituting a fully integrated, strategically

focused, business environment for online, near real-time access to reliable, comprehensive information that managers need for rapid and accurate decision-making.

The HCIE will inter-operate seamlessly with NASA’s financial management authoritative data repository (ADR), and provide dependable integrated workforce and financial information to all organizational elements. A common, robust data repository will remove the need for redundant systems because the ADR will furnish the

wealth of information needed to meet the demands of this mission-driven, projectoriented Agency.

Information will be presented through a secure, web-based workforce services portal accessible from the user’s desktop computer, enabling managers to formulate

workforce plans and manage employees; manage and plan based on workforce indicators, including competency, demographic and trending information; and conduct

analyses and run reports using common and timely information. The initial operating capability for HCIE is planned for the summer of 2007 with final implementation during the Fall of 2008. The capabilities of HCIE are enormous, limited only

by our ingenuity in identifying the boundless ways in which information can be

woven together to drive decisions and enable success.

Summary

In implementing the NASA Workforce Strategy and associated workforce management goals, NASA is positioning itself to deal effectively with the critical issues now

facing the Agency on an integrated, Agency-wide basis. NASA is putting in place

approaches that not only will alleviate the Agency’s current imbalances, but also

provide a structure that allows such issues to be resolved in the future as part of

a deliberate, systematic process. To quote the NASA Administrator, ‘‘. . .it is clear

that an understanding of the broad issues, the big picture, is so much more influential in determining the ultimate success or failure of an enterprise than is the mastery of any given technical detail. The understanding of the organizational and technical interactions in our systems, emphatically including the human beings who are

a part of them, is the present-day frontier of both engineering education and practice.’’ The foundation that NASA is building is a big picture view that will facilitate

and institutionalize long-term planning and Agency-level coordination. As stated in

the NRC report, though, some of the issues NASA faces are ‘‘not unique to NASA’’

and require ‘‘a national approach’’ to solve them. NASA plans to be in the forefront

in developing such approaches.

Last year NASA presented its Workforce Strategy which outlined the steps to

manage the transitions associated with implementing the Agency’s Exploration,

Science and Aeronautics missions. Since then, we have made significant progress,

with specific human capital initiatives aimed at three key goals: understanding mission requirements, aligning workforce to mission, and enabling effective and efficient human resources operations. The NRC and NAPA reports confirm the actions

we’ve initiated, and will continue to inform further implementation of the Strategy.

I would be please to respond to any questions the Subcommittee may have.

24

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Ms. Dawsey. Mr. Stewart, five

minutes.

Mr. STEWART. I would be personally remiss, Mr. Chairman, if I

didn’t say how much I admired your father, and had a chance to

work with him on occasion back in the old days, but a truly great,

great public servant, and I am not just—— Chairman UDALL. On that note, I would put Judge Hall in that

same category, as a great public servant, and somebody who has

roots in that area, and Judge Hall has helped to, in his own way,

keep that spirit alive, so—— Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Chairman UDALL. I would be happy to yield to my good friend

from Texas.

Mr. HALL. I knew Mo Udall, and I’m no Mo Udall. I would say

this, that I learned more from Mo, my first office was directly

across from him back 27 years ago, and I learned more from him

the first 30 days than I had learned in the last ten years in the

Texas Senate.

Chairman UDALL. You are out of order again twice in one day.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN G. STEWART, NATIONAL ACADEMY

OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FELLOW; MEMBER, PANEL ON

NASA MULTI–SECTOR WORKFORCE

Mr. STEWART. Well, anyway, I had better get going here.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, Sally Anne

Harper, our panel chair, very much wanted to present this testimony. She is the Chief Administrative Officer at the Government

Accountability Office, and her duties there this morning made her

appearance not possible, and so they have to go to the bench, and

I am here to stand in for Sally Anne Harper.

Our panel had six major conclusions and recommendations. First,

we said that NASA should make greater use of strategic planning

mechanisms to position itself for programmatic and scheduled

changes. The agency needs to adopt a longer range, risk-based

planning strategy to anticipate and respond effectively to future

program needs, budget shortfalls, and schedule revisions for its

total multi-sector workforce.

Despite declining overall budgets for aeronautics, as well as reductions in some scientific programs, NASA has retained most of

its aeronautic and scientific workforce. Although many of these individuals can continue working on existing aeronautics and scientific programs, or transition to new programs, it is unrealistic to

expect that all will be able to do so. Essentially, NASA needs to determine the number and type of employees that would constitute

a critical mass for its aeronautics and scientific responsibilities, as

well as a critical mass to develop the various systems needed to

achieve the Vision for Space Exploration.

Second, NASA must broaden its workforce planning to encompass its multi-sector workforce. The process should inventory the

key components and skills available for both civil servants and contractor organizations, including the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. In

the initial version of the NASA Workforce Plan, it dealt solely with

civil servants, and we felt that this was an omission that needs to

be acted on.

25

Third, NASA must integrate its acquisition and human capital

planning processes. This is really important. Contracts provide

surge and long-term support capacity, as well as the ability to shift

people and competencies as the mission dictates. So, NASA has

made a good start at establishing a new acquisition process that

begins with a strategic discussion of whether and how to contract

for major programs and projects, but this should be further developed. Such integration will help NASA better understand the workforce implications of contracting decisions. To help facilitate this

process, the Panel designed two rules to help managers focus on

the critical common factors to consider in making civil service

versus contractor decisions.

Fourth, NASA should strengthen its human capital function, and

use a formal process to decide when to hire a permanent civil servant or a term employee. As one of NASA’s most critical internal

support capabilities, human capital needs to be a full participant

in all agency decisions, with important workforce implications, including high level planning for the total workforce. And NASA is

moving in that direction, let me just interject, which is good. And

to be effective, human capital professionals must have the ability

to identify skill mismatches, promote the effective use of existing

flexibilities, and collaborate with others to craft other needed flexibilities. In addition, NASA needs to be more strategic in how to

make civil service hiring and conversion decisions, and we have developed a tool to assist NASA decision-making in these areas.

Fifth, the Panel has concerns about the long-term health of

NASA’s research centers, and believes that the Agency should use

a more comprehensive framework to evaluate them. The panel

found NASA’s approach to healthy centers to be people-focused,

which to some degree is fine, but with an emphasis on fully funding civil servants to assist NASA in this area, the Panel developed

a detailed 12 factor framework covering such areas as center’s mission, program performance, civil service, contractor workforce, and

organizational structure. This framework should help NASA balance changing mission requirements and budget constraints.

Sixth, NASA must make maximum use of existing human capital

flexibilities, while seeking new authorizations for necessary reform,

and of course, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 gave NASA some

flexibilities. They are being used, but not as fully as they could be,

and we think there are some more that are needed.

And more controversially, and we know this is controversial, the

Panel believes that Congress should provide NASA with limited

emergency authority to invoke a fully eligible individual’s retirement to meet work restructuring needs, if some or all of the following criteria are met, and we list those criteria, and we can talk

about them in the question period. And I want to emphasize that

these statutory recommendations that we are making cannot be

implemented by NASA alone. They require action by Congress and

OPM in the face of likely political resistance. They are controversial. And let me just say for the record, we understand that NASA

understands the nature of this problem. It has taken some initial

steps, and we have made some suggestions to help them move further down the right road.

26

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I will

answer questions when that time comes.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stewart follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN G. STEWART

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity

to testify today. I represent a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration that recently completed, a comprehensive study of the workforce challenges facing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). That study was

done at the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee. As the former Staff

Director of the Senate Science, Technology, and Space Subcommittee, I recognize the

importance this committee attaches to addressing critical aeronautics and space

issues.

Also, as a former member of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, I strongly believe NASA’s mission to advance space exploration, scientific discoveries, and

aeronautics research is critical to our nation. Thirty-eight years after the Apollo 11

mission, NASA remains the only organization in the world to have landed a person

on the Moon. Now, with the Congressionally-authorized Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is tasked with expanding our presence in the solar system and establishing a permanent human outpost on the Moon.

Our Panel was asked to examine several critical questions:

• How should NASA decide whether to obtain the services and products from

a contractor or hire a civil servant?

• If NASA decides to hire a civil servant, what kind of appointment should it

use (tenured permanent or multi-year term)?

• What is a healthy center? How should NASA measure it?

In responding, we primarily focused on issues facing NASA as it transitions from

the Shuttle program to the Vision. The Panel had six major conclusions and recommendations.

First, NASA should make greater use of strategic planning mechanisms to

position itself for programmatic and schedule changes.

The Agency needs to adopt a longer-range, risk-based planning strategy to anticipate and respond effectively to future program needs, budget shortfalls, and schedule revisions for its total multi-sector workforce. Despite declining overall budgets

for aeronautics, as well as reductions in some scientific programs, NASA has retained most of its aeronautics and scientific workforce. Although many of these individuals can continue working on existing aeronautics and scientific programs or the

transition to new programs, it is unrealistic to expect that all will be able to do so.

Essentially, NASA needs to determine the number and type of employees that would

constitute a critical mass for its aeronautics and scientific responsibilities.

Second, NASA must broaden its workforce planning to encompass its multisector workforce.

This process should inventory the key competencies and skills available for both

civil servants and contractor organizations. Although contractors constitute approximately two-thirds of NASA’s total workforce of 58,000 employees, the Agency’s April

2006 Workforce Strategy focused solely on its 18,000 civil servants. Many of the contractors—and particularly the up to 26,000 on-site contractors—have competencies

that mirror those of NASA civil servants. A broader workforce planning process

would allow NASA to maximize organizational flexibility and fully leverage its

workforce to meet changing demands.

Third, NASA must integrate its acquisition and human capital planning

processes.

Contracts provide surge and long-term support capacity as well as the ability to

shift people and competencies as the mission dictates. NASA has made a good start

at establishing a new acquisition process that begins with a strategic discussion of

whether and how to contract for major programs and projects. But, this should be

further developed. NASA needs to factor in how cost, safety, facility availability, existing expertise, and scheduling will impact agency work. Such integration will help

NASA better understand the workforce implications of contracting decisions. To help

facilitate this process, the Panel designed tools to help managers focus on critical

common factors to consider in making civil service vs. contractor decisions.

27

Fourth, NASA should strengthen its human capital function and use a formal process to decide when to hire a permanent civil servant or a term employee.

As one of NASA’s most critical internal support capabilities, human capital needs

to be a full participant in all agency decisions with important workforce implications, including high-level planning for the total workforce. And, to be effective,

human capital professionals must have the ability to identify skill mismatches, promote the effective use of existing flexibilities, and collaborate with others to craft

other needed flexibilities.

In addition, NASA needs to be more strategic in how it makes civil service hiring

and conversion decisions. While the Agency uses many short-tenure employees, each

center currently has discretion to make its own decisions about which type of civil

servant to hire, and conversion to permanent employment is the predominant practice for most NASA term hires. The Panel developed a tool to assist NASA’s decision-making in these areas.

Fifth, the Panel has concerns about the long-term health of NASA’s research centers and believes that the Agency should use a more comprehensive framework to evaluate them.

The Panel found NASA’s approach to healthy centers to be people focused with

an emphasis on fully funding civil servants. To assist NASA in this area, the Panel

developed a detailed twelve-factor framework covering such areas as the center’s

mission, program performance, civil service and contractor workforce, and organizational structure. This framework should help NASA balance changing mission requirements and budget constraints. The Panel believes the ultimate test of the ten

healthy centers approach is whether it leads to a healthy NASA.

Sixth, NASA must make maximum use of existing human capital flexibilities while seeking new authorizations for other necessary reforms.

NASA has acknowledged that the significant programmatic changes over the past

few years have created a major imbalance between the work the Agency plans to

do and the existing workforce. In the Panel’s view, this imbalance is NASA’s most

serious workforce challenge. While the Agency’s mission and allocation of resources

have been changing substantially, the civil service workforce has not. The Panel

found that NASA could be more proactive in using currently available flexibilities

by establishing a more innovative recruitment program and encouraging the outplacement of blocks of employees with competencies no longer needed.

Also, the Panel believes that NASA should be provided a package of additional

flexibilities. Clearly, Administrator Griffin’s recent request for legislative authority

to pay an allowance to civil servants who voluntarily convert to a time-limited appointment recognizes the significant challenges facing NASA. Among other things,

the Panel believes that Congress should increase the monetary cap on buy-outs and

establish a new Reduction-in-Force (RIF) framework for NASA modeled on the National Institute of Science and Technology’s Alternative Personnel Management System. This new framework would allow the Agency to retain its highest-performing

employees in critical occupations by enhancing the weight given to performance,

narrowing the definition of ‘‘competitive area,’’ and preventing employees from

‘‘bumping’’ or ‘‘retreating’’ into positions for which they are poorly suited. The Panel

also believes that OPM should grant blanket authority to NASA to conduct buy-outs

over the next five years and to waive salary offsets when recruiting reemployed federal annuitants for critical areas.

More controversially, the Panel believes that Congress should provide NASA with

limited emergency authority to invoke a fully eligible individual’s retirement to meet

work restructuring needs if some or all of the following criteria are met:

• The employee’s skills are no longer required for mission accomplishment.

• The employee’s skills are outdated or unnecessary, and management determines that retraining would not be practical, or the employee is unwilling to

update skills.

• Funding for the employee’s existing work is not available.

• The employee’s skills are not easily transferred to other work.

Retiring employees should be compensated fairly by being given severance pay in

addition to earned annuities. While NASA would not likely use this emergency statutory authority on a broad basis, its availability would provide the means to secure

the expertise required for its highly complex mission, protecting the safety and integrity of the space program.

28

I want to emphasize that these statutory and regulatory recommendations cannot

be implemented by NASA alone. They require action by Congress and OPM in the

face of likely political resistance. However, by providing NASA with the tools to reshape its workforce, Congress could more easily hold NASA accountable for meeting

program milestones in a cost-effective, timely way.

Mr. Chairman, underlying the Panel’s recommendations is the belief that NASA’s

institutional health depends on a knowledge-based, data-driven approach to workforce utilization and management. For NASA to develop an optimally-sized, appropriately skilled workforce that is flexible and scalable, it will need to make human

capital decisions based on the rigorous collection and analysis of data widely shared

with stakeholders. From our work, we believe that NASA understands the nature

of this problem. It has taken some initial steps, but more significant changes are

needed. We believe NASA could adopt most of our recommendations without significant additional resources. And, the Panel’s recommended approach would not only

provide a stronger basis for internal agency decisions, but would also ensure that

you, as Members of Congress, have better information decisions about annual appropriations and the human capital flexibilities needed to accomplish NASA’s mission.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I would be pleased to

answer any questions you or the Subcommittee Members may have.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Stewart, and Dr. Black, the

floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID C. BLACK, PRESIDENT EMERITUS,

UNIVERSITIES SPACE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION; ADJUNCT

PROFESSOR, PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY DEPARTMENT, RICE

UNIVERSITY; CO-CHAIR, COMMITTEE ON ISSUES AFFECTING

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. SPACE SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

Dr. BLACK. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Hall, and Committee Members, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you

today. I appear in my capacity as Co-Chair of the National Research Council’s Committee on Issues Affecting the Future of the

U.S. Space Science and Engineering Workforce. My Co-Chair of the

NRC study, Professor Daniel Hastings, joins me today, and you can

tell which one of us drew the short straw.

Our committee found it useful to consider two distinct timeframes when evaluating the NASA workforce as it relates to

NASA’s implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration. Specifically, we looked at the next five years, and then, the timeframe

beyond 2012. I want to highlight three aspects of our committee’s

conclusions.

First, in the view of our committee, NASA does not currently

have the expertise needed in-house, particularly in the areas of systems engineering and project management, to implement the Vision, nor do we feel that any amount of training or retraining during this timeframe will address fully the shortage of expertise.

Second, we are confident that a well thought out and implemented training and hiring program will allow NASA to be well positioned in the post-2012 timeframe to implement the Vision.

Third, the Committee feels strongly that the issues NASA faces are

not unique to NASA. They are at the heart of any assessment of

the Nation’s aerospace technical workforce generally, and as such,

deserve consideration on a national scale.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to share a story with the Committee.

At the end of April, after our committee presented its report to

NASA, the Agency announced the winner of its Astronautic Glove

29

Challenge. The winner was Mr. Peter Homer. NASA used this new

and nontraditional approach to acquire a hardware design that will

eventually improve the ability of our astronauts to work in space,

but this is not simply a story about new equipment or an innovative approach to finding new ideas, one that our committee, in fact,

endorses. It turns out that Mr. Homer is unemployed, and actually

left the field of aerospace engineering many years ago to work as

a sales manager in the computer industry.

Indeed, this is a frequent aspect of the aerospace workforce, if I

could have the first figure, please. This is some data that we got

from NSF, and pertains to the year 2003. As you can see, of the

roughly 200,000 people, that blue circle, currently working in the

aerospace and space science arenas, only 40 percent of them have

degrees in those areas. Oh, you can’t see it. I can see it. I am sorry

you can’t see it.

Chairman UDALL. Dr. Black, why don’t you continue, and we

will——

Dr. BLACK. I will just continue.

Chairman UDALL. And this will be included in the record, and we

will do our best—here we go.

Dr. BLACK. Very good. Thank you. The blue area, as I say, has

roughly 200,000 people, and those are the ones currently working.

Only 40 percent of them actually have degrees in that area. Another point to make here is that the NASA civil service workforce

comprises only 10 percent of that area.

Moreover, fully 75 percent of the people with degrees in aerospace and space science are not currently working in this area, people like Mr. Homer. The point here is that one needs to take care

in interpreting the many numbers floating around, in terms of how

many skilled workers truly are available for these kinds of activities.

One of the main themes of our report is the need for hands-on

training for NASA’s workforce, particularly in the areas that are

key to achieving its programs on schedule and on budget. The Committee recognized that two skill areas are important not only to

NASA, but to the national security space programs. These are systems engineering and program project management. Those skills

cannot simply be produced in a classroom. They must be acquired

over time. Just as a baseball player cannot become proficient by

seeing the game explained on a blackboard, a systems engineer

cannot become proficient at his job without building and integrating a spacecraft.

But also, just as baseball players do not immediately head to the

major leagues without first graduating from Little Leagues,

through the farm systems, up to the majors, a systems engineer or

program manager must also start small and gain experience. Unfortunately, the opportunities for gaining this kind of experience

are missing. If you look at the following figure, that shows the kind

of opportunities for hands-on experience by graduate students in

earth and space sciences over the years, and as you can see, they

have been diminishing. That shows both sounding rockets, airborne

opportunities, balloons, and spacecraft, and in the aggregate, as

well as each of the individual elements of that graph, have all been

decreasing drastically over the years.

30

1 Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science and Engineering Workforce—Interim Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2006.

In closing, I would like to return to the third aspect of our conclusions. My experience as a former NASA employee and as the

president of a not-for-profit association of a hundred universities

working with NASA is that the Agency has a tendency, has tended

to deal with problems in relative isolation of other entities, a reflection of the can-do attitude of the Apollo era, as well as a bit of the

not invented here syndrome. The Committee feels that NASA

workforce issues are a microcosm of a broader set of national concerns, and that solutions are best sought in the context of what the

Committee refers to as the aerospace ecosystem, shown here.

NASA is a relatively small player in this ecosystem. As I said

earlier, the civil service makes up only 10 percent of the total workforce, and it therefore seems that it would do better to work with

other elements in defining and understanding the key issues, and

then arriving at a solution that is in everyone’s best interest. In

this way, NASA would be able to leverage its concerns off of those

of the larger inhabitants of the ecosystem.

That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for

your interest in this important topic, and would be happy to answer any questions you have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Black follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID C. BLACK

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, and Committee Members: I appreciate

the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is David Black. I am President

Emeritus of the Universities Space Research Association. I am also an Adjunct Professor in the Physics and Astronomy Department at Rice University. I appear today

largely in my capacity as Co-Chair of the National Research Council (NRC)’s Committee on Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science and Engineering

Workforce. The NRC is the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on matters of

science and technology. The views expressed in my testimony today are primarily

those expressed by the NRC Committee in its Final Report, as well as my own.1

I shall do my best to make clear which views are mine and which are those of the

Committee. The latter views are fully supported by my co-chair of the NRC study,

Dr. Daniel Hastings, Dean for Undergraduate Education and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems at MIT.

Allow me to address the specific questions that you posed prior to this hearing.

Your questions are indicated in bold type followed by my responses.

What was the scope of your recently released report on NASA’s Workforce,

and what are its major findings and recommendations?

The NRC Committee’s charge from NASA is to explore long-range science and

technology workforce needs to achieve the Nation’s long-term space exploration vision, identify obstacles to filling those needs, and explore solutions for consideration

by government, academia, and industry. The specific tasks that we have been requested to undertake are the following:

1. Assess current and projected demographics of the U.S. aerospace engineering

and space science workforce needed to accomplish the exploration vision;

2. Identify factors that impact the demographics of the affected workforces;

3. Assess NASA’s list of the workforce skills that will be needed to implement

the Vision for Space Exploration, both within the government and in industry;

4. Identify the skills needed to implement NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration

within the academic community;

5. Assess the current workforce against projected needs;

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6. Identify workforce gaps and analyze obstacles to responding to the workforce

needs, and in particular, analyze the proper role of academia and the obstacles to achieving this proper role; and

7. Develop recommendations for specific actions by the Federal Government, industry, and academia to address those needs, including considerations such

as organizational changes, recruiting and hiring practices, student programs,

and existing workforce training and improvement.

The NRC Committee has drawn upon input from a workshop and meetings, documents provided by NASA, and our own experiences to arrive at the following findings and associated recommendations:

Finding 1: NASA has undertaken a commendable top-down (i.e., headquarters-directed) analysis of current agency needs and the skill levels of its current workforce

that the committee believes is an excellent first step. But although NASA has considered workforce needs for the Agency as a whole, it has not yet projected its requirements for future hiring in terms of (1) the numbers and specific skill sets of

workers expected to be needed by each NASA center over time and (2) the timeframes for hiring based on anticipated retirements of the present workforce. The

committee believes that understanding future hiring requirements will depend on

an accurate, detailed assessment of the skills, Vision for Space Exploration-related

development capabilities, and expected attrition of the workforce for each center.

Recommendation 1: Collect detailed data on NASA workforce requirements.

The committee recommends that NASA collect detailed data on and develop accurate assessments of the capabilities possessed by the current workforce and required

for the future S&T workforce. The issue here is not simply ‘‘more data,’’ but data

that are more to the point in terms of understanding the workforce issue. Examples

of the type of data are cited below.

• Because each NASA center has unique mission requirements and the mobility

of personnel between centers is limited, NASA should complete a center-developed, bottom-up assessment of the current skills, experience levels, and

projected attrition of the workforce for each individual NASA center.

• NASA should use the data obtained from such assessments to develop a

model for projecting future NASA priorities for Vision for Space Exploration

skill development and hiring by competencies, experience levels, and centers,

as well as a model for the best mix of skill development conducted within

NASA versus within industry.

• NASA should translate identified workforce needs from competencies and experience levels into specific positions to be implemented at individual centers

at specific points in time.

• NASA should assess whether the skill levels of in-house scientists at each

field center are appropriate to fulfilling that center’s scientific leadership and

service responsibilities and should ensure that appropriate efforts are made

to maintain the scientific competency and currency of each center’s scientific

workforce.

• NASA should ensure that hiring constraints such as pay levels, personnel

ceilings, and ability to recruit suitable candidates guide make-or-buy decisions about how staffing needs will be met.

• NASA should ensure that appropriate workforce strategies?including providing training for staff (e.g., through the NASA Academy of Program/Project

and Engineering Leadership program), contracting out work to industry and

academia, facilitating exchange programs, and hiring temporary contract and

term employees are applied at each center.

The committee believes that it is premature to recommend a particular mix of

strategies for obtaining the desired worker skill mix until NASA fully defines its

staffing needs. NASA is moving to collect the data necessary to help them make

these capability assessments. Since NASA is in the Vision for Space Exploration for

the long-term, NASA will need to establish a systematic process for monitoring and

updating its workforce needs.

Finding 2: In the short-term, NASA has too few program and project managers and

systems engineers with the requisite experience in human space flight systems development to successfully oversee Vision for Space Exploration projects. Given the

lack of detailed data on NASA’s near-term workforce skills and needs as well as uncertainties over NASA’s budget, the committee did not attempt to assess the likely

success of NASA’s planned steps to address near-term workforce problems.

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Recommendation 2: Hire and retain younger workers within NASA.

The committee recommends that NASA implement a long-term strategy for hiring

a steady supply of younger workers and subsequently retaining those workers as

they rise to senior management positions so that a balanced distribution of age and

skill is maintained throughout the Agency’s entire workforce.

• NASA should take full advantage of the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004, which

was passed to facilitate the Agency’s recruitment of employees from industry.

NASA has already utilized the act to a considerable extent, and the committee encourages the Agency to continue to do so, as well as to inform Congress of any additional hiring flexibility that is required.

• NASA, working with Congress and the executive branch, should develop solutions to legal problems that limit the flow of senior and highly skilled employees from industry to NASA even when such employees are willing to accept

lower salaries. Issues regarding share holding, pensions, and perceived or actual conflicts of interest severely hamper personnel exchanges between industry and NASA. These problems stem from policy issues that cannot be resolved by NASA alone but instead require action by Congress and the executive branch working in concert with NASA.

Finding 3: NASA’s workforce requirements and challenges cannot be considered in

isolation from those of other government and industry organizations. NASA is part

of an aerospace workforce ecosystem in which the health and needs of one organization or sector can affect another. Thus, NASA’s workforce issues require the intervention and assistance of higher-level government organizations such as the Office

of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President.

Recommendation 3: Ensure a coordinated national strategy for aerospace workforce

development among relevant institutions.

The committee recommends that representatives from relevant government agencies, the aerospace industry, including the emerging private sector, and the academic community work together to develop a coordinated national strategy to ensure

an effective aerospace workforce ecosystem. When NASA is using only approximately 10 percent of the workers in the aerospace workforce, it must think about

its needs in the context of agencies and actors who have much larger needs.

Finding 4: There is a longstanding, widely recognized requirement for more highly

skilled program and project managers and systems engineers who have acquired

substantial experience in space systems development. Although the need exists

across all of NASA and the aerospace industry, it seems particularly acute for

human space flight systems because of the long periods between initiation of new

programs (i.e., the Space Shuttle program in the 1970s and the Constellation program 30 years later). NASA training programs are addressing some of the Agency’s requirements in this experience base, but the current requirement for a strong base

of highly skilled program and project management and systems engineering personnel, and limited opportunities for junior specialists to gain hands-on space

project experience, remain impediments to NASA’s ability to successfully carry out

Vision for Space Exploration programs and projects.

Recommendation 4: Provide hands-on training opportunities for NASA workers.

The committee recommends that NASA place a high priority on recruiting, training, and retaining skilled program and project managers and systems engineers and

that it provide the hands-on training and development opportunities for younger

and junior personnel required to establish and maintain the necessary capabilities

in these disciplines. Specific and immediate actions to be taken by NASA and other

parts of the Federal Government include the following:

• In establishing its strategy for meeting Vision for Space Exploration systems

engineering needs, NASA should determine the right balance between inhouse and out-of-house work and contractor roles and responsibilities, including the use of support service contractors.

• NASA should continue and also expand its current employee training programs such as those being conducted by the Academy of Program/Project and

Engineering Leadership (APPEL). To facilitate the development of key systems engineering and project management skills, NASA should increase the

number of opportunities for entry-level employees to be involved in hands-on

flight and end-to-end development programs. A variety of programs—including those involving balloons, sounding rockets, aircraft-based research, small

satellites, and so on—can be used to give these employees critical experience

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relatively early in their careers and allow them to contribute as systems engineers and program managers more quickly.

System Engineering is a discipline and skill that can be partially taught and also

has an important component of learning from experiences. It is much easier to learn

on small projects where mistakes can be made and recovery is possible than from

large projects where recovery might not be possible.

Finding 5: NASA relies on a highly trained technical workforce to achieve its goals

and has long accepted a responsibility for supporting the training of those who are

potential employees. In recent years, however, training for students has been less

well supported by NASA. A robust and stable commitment to creating opportunities

at the university level for experience in hands-on flight mission development, graduate research fellowships for science and engineering students, and research is essential for recruiting and developing the long-term supply of competent workers necessary to implement NASA’s future programs.

• Faculty research not only is fundamental to student training but also leads

to the development of new technology and tools for future applications in

space. Programs supporting critical scientific and technological expertise are

highly desirable.

• Hands-on experience for students is provided by sub-orbital programs, Explorer and other small spacecraft missions, and design competitions, all of

which rely on continuing NASA support.

• The Graduate Student Researchers Program supports the education and

training of prospective NASA employees and deserves augmented support.

• Undergraduate and graduate co-op student programs are particularly effective in giving students early hands-on experience and in exposing students

and NASA to each other to help enable sound career choices and hiring decisions.

Recommendation 5: Support university programs and provide hands-on opportunities

at the college level.

The committee recommends that NASA make workforce-related programs such as

the Graduate Student Researchers Program and co-op programs a high priority

within its education budget. NASA should also invest in the future workforce by

partnering with universities to provide hands-on experiences for students and opportunities for fundamental scientific and engineering research specific to NASA’s

needs. These experiences should include significant numbers of opportunities to participate in all aspects of sub-orbital and Explorer-class flight programs and in research fellowships and co-op student assignments.

Finding 6: Although NASA’s primary role is not education or outreach, improved

support of the higher education community and of young professionals is critical to

maintaining a sufficiently talented workforce. Involvement in providing development

and educational opportunities, especially hands-on flight and vehicle development

opportunities, will pay future dividends not only by encouraging larger numbers of

talented students to enter the field, but also by improving the abilities of incoming

employees. Indeed, a failure to invest in today’s students and young professionals

will ultimately lead to a crisis when that generation is expected to assume the mantle of leadership within the U.S. aerospace community.

Recommendation 6: Support involvement in suborbital programs and nontraditional

approaches to developing skills.

The committee recommends that NASA increase its investment in proven programs such as sounding rocket launches, aircraft-based research, and high-altitude

balloon campaigns, which provide ample opportunities for hands-on flight development experience at a relatively low cost of failure. Rather than viewing sounding

rockets, aircraft-based research, and balloon programs simply as low-cost, competed,

scientific missions, NASA should also recognize as an equal factor in the criteria for

their selection their ability to provide valuable hands-on experience for its younger

workers and should investigate the possibility of funding such programs through its

education budget. In addition, NASA should take advantage of nontraditional institutions and approaches both to inspire and to train potential future employees. Investment in programs such as Centennial Challenge prizes and other innovative

methods has the potential to pay benefits many times greater than their cost, by

simultaneously increasing NASA’s public visibility, training a new generation of

workers, and pushing the technology envelope.

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Strategic planning for workforce issues is difficult because budget and program

decisions often have major impacts on the workforce that make strategic planning

irrelevant. The committee heard from industry representatives who stated that

NASA’s ability to attract junior-level personnel and retain senior personnel would

be heavily influenced by perceptions about how compelling and stably funded the

Vision for Space Exploration is. The committee thus believes that NASA must adopt

policies that, while relatively inexpensive, can have a longer-term impact on its ability to obtain the highest-quality personnel. The development of the right people is

as important as the development of the right hardware. NASA policies must recognize and reflect this attention.

Which issues, according to the report, present the most serious challenges

to building and maintaining a healthy and strong NASA workforce?

The major challenges identified by the Committee are a) conducting programs on

time scales that are better matched to those of the emerging labor market and for

the near future, up to roughly five years from the present, and b) finding ways to

tap the broad and deep experience base in key job areas that currently exist outside

of the Agency. Allow me to expand on both of these points.

The Committee received input from university professors who observed that people in today’s young to middle-age labor market are more focused on short-term success and are more mobile than were their counterparts of the Apollo era. They are

attracted to careers where measurable progress of both a personal and professional

nature takes place over five to ten years, as contrasted with decades. The vast majority of current and recent large scale and therefore highly visible NASA programs,

be they robotic or human space flight, are of the latter variety. For example, it took

nearly three decades of planning, replanning and redesigning before the remarkably

successful Spitzer telescope was launched. It has been over 23 years since President

Reagan charged NASA with building and operating a space station, and the end of

that journey remains far in the future. These examples are typical of current NASA

programs. Perhaps just as telling is that this trend appears to be true also for the

Vision. The projected availability of the two key hardware components of the Vision

is slipping for a number of reasons.

The Committee’s discussions with members of the academic community revealed

that most are unwilling to urge their best students to pursue a career with NASA

or NASA-related programs. Moreover, given the propensity of younger members of

the aerospace workforce to seek shorter-term gratification, they are looking to other

professions such as bio-related fields, or economics, as their first choice rather than

the Nation’s space program. This represents rational choices given the potential returns and the perceptions of involvement in programs that might take a long time

to come to fruition.

The Committee found that pay scales for entry to mid-range professionals at

NASA are generally comparable, or even better, than in competing job sectors. This

is generally not the case for the more senior members of the aerospace workforce.

The drawn out nature of NASA’s current programs, coupled with the pay discrepancy, is a major cause for the drain of experienced workers from the Agency. Additional barriers in bringing experienced people back to NASA are found in conflict

of interest issues and the need for these individuals to divest themselves of the financial returns that took them to industry in the first place. This tends to make

these opportunities most attractive to people who are retiring from industry.

How well does NASA’s Workforce Strategy address the findings and recommendations contained in your report?

The Committee applauds NASA’s early efforts at developing a strategy for workforce development, but feels that it needs substantial work on several fronts. This

strategy is based fundamentally on the notion of maintaining ten healthy centers.

While such an approach is understandable from a purely political perspective, I am

concerned that it runs great risk that it becomes essentially a jobs program with

work being sent to centers that are not necessarily staffed to do the jobs. If there

were complete mobility in the civil service workforce, NASA might be able to make

this approach viable, but that mobility does not exist.

The NASA Workforce Strategy does recognize many of the key challenges that

NASA faces, but the Committee is concerned that the NASA strategy views its

workforce issues in isolation of what the Committee has dubbed the ‘‘aerospace

workforce ecosystem.’’ The workforce problems that NASA faces are a microcosm of

a broader national problem, one that faces academia, industry and other government entities, and it is the view of the Committee that all parties would be best

served by seeking a national solution to these problems. This approach would yield

a more stable long-term solution for NASA and the Nation’s aerospace workforce as

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a whole. This may take a cultural shift on the part of NASA and its centers. Data

provided to the Committee by NSF from 2003 reveals that fully 75 percent of the

workforce with a degree in aeronautics and space science-related fields does not currently work in those fields (Figure 1). The workforce is potentially available, but

needs revectoring.

Given that NASA is a multi-mission agency, how de we ensure that core

competencies are maintained in each of NASA’s core missions?

The fundamental issue facing NASA in its efforts to maintain core competency in

the short-term is its shortage of qualified experienced personnel in key areas such

as systems engineers and project managers. The Committee feels that training or

retraining of existing staff cannot meet this shortage in the near-term. There are

too few opportunities to gain the needed experience, particularly in the human space

flight regime to provide the number of needed experienced staff. Viewed from a

longer-term perspective, say the time frame from 2012 and beyond, a well conceived

and implemented set of training programs and opportunities could provide the necessary core of skilled workforce. This may mean looking to the full aerospace workforce ecosystem as a means to provide adequate hands-on training opportunities, not

just NASA missions.

NASA is a relatively small player in the aerospace workforce ecosystem from a

pure numbers perspective. For this reason, and others, the Committee encourages

NASA to look for opportunities to leverage its efforts with those of the DOD, industry, and the academic community to identify existing programs that could provide

opportunities, as well as work in a coordinated manner to develop new programs

to accomplish this vital training.

Which of the recommendations do you believe NASA could readily adopt

(i.e., that do not require significant resources or disruption in business

processes), and which do you think will be the most difficult to implement?

A strong finding from the Committee’s work is that meaningful opportunities for

hands-on training, an end-to-end involvement in doing space projects, has been a

declining element of NASA’s portfolio for several years (see Figure 2). The programs

that are most effective in providing the experience that is needed are the low cost

suborbital programs, such as sounding rockets and balloon programs. Relatively low

cost space missions such as the small end of the Explorer line are also of value here,

but they do not provide the opportunity to reach as many students as do the suborbital programs. Reaching students and workers when they are younger, and potentially more open to career paths is important.

Increasing efforts in the suborbital programs, particularly if paired with other entities with a vested interest in seeing skilled workers developed, would cost relatively little and could begin to show dividends on a time scale that is short compared to other similar training opportunities. The Committee feels that use of NASA

educational funding, along with joint funding from other entities, could be brought

to bear in this area. Emphasizing workforce development as a major factor in proposal competition for such programs, as distinct from a focus purely on the scientific

return is also encouraged by the Committee. This would bring an explicitly strategic

view to the funding of these opportunities.

Which issues related to NASA’s workforce are least well understood and

what recommendations does your report offer for addressing those uncertainties?

An oft-used exemplar for NASA’s workforce is a plot of the age distribution. Two

aspects of this distribution are usually mentioned; that the age of the peak has been

steadily increasing over the past several years, and that those members at the

upper end of the distribution will soon be retirement eligible. While it is the case

that there has been an aging of the workforce distribution, a comparison with the

other aerospace workforce sectors shows that NASA’s workforce is not significantly

different than the aerospace workforce generally (Figure 3).

The Committee would emphasize several points regarding this characterization of

the NASA workforce. It does not capture a key aspect of the workforce, viz., the experience associated with the bodies that are represented in the data, and as the

Committee has emphasized it is the lack of experienced personnel that lies at the

heart of NASA’s workforce issues. Moreover, the Committee was unable to find evidence that NASA, or anyone else for that matter, was able to say what the ‘‘right’’

distribution should be for an employer with NASA’s needs and challenges. A key

element here is how one can model this distribution so as to understand the

‘‘sources and sinks’’ that alter the distribution, understand the time scales over

which those sources and sinks operate and hence alter the distribution. The ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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mittee feels that any strategic plan that NASA develops for workforce development

must include an effort to model and ultimately understand the dynamics of its

workforce age distribution. The Committee was not able to conduct an extensive

search for people or organizations that do, or could do, this type of analysis, but it

seems clear that it lies outside of NASA, most probably in the academic community.

We would strongly encourage studies in this area. We would also encourage NASA

to periodically reevaluate its model and update its data both for the results and as

a way of keeping focus on these critical workforce concerns.

In closing my prepared remarks Mr. Chairman, I would reiterate that the NRC

Committee feels strongly that NASA needs to look outside of itself in assessing the

nature, scope, and possible solutions for its skill mix. NASA has historically been

a ‘‘can-do’’ agency, but also one afflicted to some extent with the ‘‘not invented here’’

syndrome. The issues NASA faces in terms of workforce are national in character;

they reverberate through other government agencies involved in space-related work,

as well as the private sector including universities. NASA should not, in our Committee’s view, try to structure a solution in isolation from consultation with the

broader set of communities noted above. I believe I can speak for many people in

saying that the Nation’s space programs would benefit if the issue of workforce is

addressed by involving the representatives of the workforce ecosystem in both the

assessment of the problem and the range of possible solutions.

Thank you again for the opportunity to share with your committee the perspectives on this important issue that the NRC Committee has developed over the past

year.

I would be happy to expand on my remarks or address additional questions should

you wish.

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BIOGRAPHY FOR DAVID C. BLACK

DAVID C. BLACK, is President Emeritus of the Universities Space Research Association (USRA), a consortium of 97 different colleges and universities having graduate programs in space science or engineering. He is also adjunct professor of space

physics and astronomy at Rice University. Between 1970 and 1975 Dr. Black served

in various capacities at NASA’s Ames Research Center, including chief of the Theoretical Studies Branch and deputy chief of the Space Science Division, and he was

the first chair of the Ames Basic Research Council. Dr. Black was selected as the

first chief scientist for the space station program at NASA Headquarters in 1985.

He returned to NASA Ames in 1987 as the chief scientist for space research. He

spent an academic year as a visiting professor at the University of London (1974– 1975). Dr. Black is an internationally recognized researcher in theoretical astrophysics and planetary science, specializing in studies of star and planetary system

formation. He has also done pioneering experimental research involving the isotopic

composition of noble gases in meteorites, was the first to discover and correctly identify evidence for non-solar material in solar system matter, and was the first to

show that the isotopic composition of solar flare noble gases differs from that of

solar wind noble gases. He is a leader in the current effort to search for and study

other planetary systems. He is past chair of the Solar System Exploration Subcommittee and the Origins Subcommittee of NASA’s Space Science Advisory Committee. Dr. Black also served as a member of the NRC Planetary and Lunar Exploration Task Group (1984–1988) and the Working Group on Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (1979–1983).

Dr. Black served as Co-Chair with Dr. Daniel Hastings of the National Research

Council (NRC)’s Committee on Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science

and Engineering Workforce. Dr. Hastings is a Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems and Dean for Undergraduate Education at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The other committee members were:

BURT S. BARNOW, Johns Hopkins University

JOHN W. DOUGLASS, Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc.

RAY M. HAYNES, Northrop Grumman Space Technology

MARGARET G. KIVELSON, University of California, Los Angeles

WILLIAM POMERANTZ, X PRIZE Foundation

JOSEPH H. ROTHENBERG, Universal Space Network

KATHRYN C. THORNTON, University of Virginia

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Dr. Black, and we worked through

the audiovisual glitch, and that is important data. We will put that

in the record.

Dr. Stone, five minutes is yours, and welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. LEE STONE, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, NASA COUNCIL OF IFPTE LOCALS, INTERNATIONAL

FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS

Dr. STONE. Thank you, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member

Hall for providing the International Federation of Professional and

Technical Engineers, NASA’s largest federal employee union, the

opportunity to present our perspective on the workforce challenges

facing NASA today.

IFPTE’s primary interest in testifying is to provide advocacy for

maintaining the technical excellence and independence of NASA’s

civil service workforce. However, our interests extend more broadly

to a deep commitment to NASA’s success, not only in the nearterm, but more important, in the long-term, consistent with the

true spirit of the Vision for Space Exploration.

NASA is not facing a workforce crisis. It is facing a fiscal crisis.

The President’s Vision outlines a bold and ambitious set of milestones, yet NASA is not being given a bold and ambitious budget

needed for success. As long as the Vision remains largely an unVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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funded mandate, all of NASA’s missions and its workforce will remain at risk, and that is the primary issue.

The last time a President asked NASA to send humans to the

Moon, NASA had nearly 36,000 civil servants onboard, and an annual budget of more than $30 billion, adjusted for inflation, and

they were not being asked to fix design problems with the Shuttle

or to build a Space Station at the same time. Yet today, NASA’s

civil service workforce has been halved, and its budget reduced by

more than 40 percent. Until the fundamental discrepancy between

mission and budget is corrected, NASA’s problems cannot be properly solved.

First slide, please, or the only slide, please. A workforce demographic problem is readily apparent in Figure 2–2 of the NRC report. The real problem is the five-fold reduction in the 30- to 34-

year-old range between 1993 and 2005, indicated by the vertical

blue arrows on the left, a fivefold reduction. Management, however,

remains obsessed with the faux problem of the right hand tail of

the distribution to the right of the vertical red line, which represents only about five percent of the workforce, and has been stable for more than a decade, yet there is where they keep pounding

to reduce it.

IFPTE applauds the National Research Council for its thoughtful

analysis and recommendations on NASA’s Workforce Plan. The report recognizes the immediate need to engage aggressively in the

education, the hands-on training, and recruitment of the next generation of NASA employees. IFPTE, however, is disappointed with

the National Academy of Public Administration’s report, as it fails

to question management’s assertions. It accepts as fact uncertain

and mistaken premises that NASA’s budget will not grow, that its

current employee skills are seriously mismatched with NASA’s new

mission, and thus, that NASA must reduce it science, aeronautics,

and technology development activities and workforce. We fundamentally disagree.

IFPTE, however, continues to support the ten healthy centers

philosophy initiated by Dr. Griffin, and we reject the criticism of

that plan in the NAPA report. We encourage Dr. Griffin to persevere in his efforts to decentralize the Constellation Program. Unfortunately, current policies continue to severely stress NASA’s research centers. The solutions should not be, and cannot be to convert them into mini-operational centers, or to subject them to some

BRAC-like process. Rather, the revitalization of cutting edge R&D

at the field centers is crucial for the safe and meaningful return

to the Moon, as well as for delivering on our promises in science

and aeronautics.

To reinvigorate NASA’s workforce in support of all of its missions, and to maintain America’s prestige and leadership in science

and aerospace R&D, IFPTE offers the following seven recommendations.

First, Congress should fund NASA at close to the authorized

level as possible, and prohibit transfer authority across major accounts. IFPTE proposes at least an additional $300 million for

science, $420 million for exploration systems, $200 million for aeronautics, $30 million for education, and $50 million for critical facilities over the President’s Fiscal Year 2008 proposal.

40

Second, Congress should preserve the technical excellence and

independence of NASA’s civil service workforce. NASA should fund

civil servant salaries directly to the centers, independent of programs, to allow for the effective use of matrix management, and to

end the scapegoating of civil service employees.

Third, NASA should provide stability for its current workforce, to

reassure its future workforce. The Administrator should publicly

reject any use of RIFs, so that the best and the brightest young engineers and science graduates can once again see NASA as a great

career move.

Fourth, IFPTE supports the NRC recommendations. NASA must

begin an aggressive campaign to recruit young employees while the

current staff is still on board to transfer its critical knowledge.

Fifth, IFPTE strongly opposes three of NAPA’s recommendations.

IFPTE opposes any authorization to use a BRAC-like process to

close centers, any streamlining of the RIF procedures, and any authority to unilaterally terminate retirement eligible employees.

Sixth, IFPTE supports enhancing voluntary buy-out authority.

We support the post-employment extension of medical coverage,

and an increase in the buy-out incentive up to an individual’s severance pay, capped at one year’s salary.

Seven, IFPTE strongly opposes any new authority to facilitate

the conversion of permanent positions to term positions, and therefore, we oppose the Administration’s proposed term conversion legislation.

In closing, IFPTE is very grateful for the bipartisan Congressional rescue that has thus far protected NASA’s workforce from a

misguided RIF. Let us now turn from the era of workforce damage

control to a more positive era of rebuilding NASA’s future workforce.

Once again, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Hall, IFPTE

thanks you for inviting us to bring these important issues to the

attention of the Subcommittee.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Stone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEE STONE

Thank you, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Calvert, for providing the

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, NASA’s largest

Union, this opportunity to present our perspective on the workforce challenges facing NASA today. It is a privilege and honor for me to speak for IFPTE and for the

thousands of NASA employees we represent.

IFPTE’s primary interest in testifying today is to provide advocacy for maintaining the technical excellence and independence of NASA’s civil service workforce that

has served the Agency so well for decades. However, our interest extends more

broadly to a deep commitment to NASA’s success not only in the near term but,

more importantly, in the long term, consistent with the true spirit of the Vision for

Space Exploration (VSE). NASA’s rank-and-file employees are not only the heart

and soul of the Agency, but also provide much of its brain power. They are hard

working and dedicated to mission success, but see this success as including all of

NASA’s critical missions. Indeed, many of our nation’s best and brightest came to

NASA primarily to be part of endeavors greater and nobler than more lucrative pursuits available to them in the private sector. They came to discover and to explore

so that America can lead mankind in aerospace science, engineering, and exploration. That dream is in jeopardy today, not because of a failure of technical competence or innovation, but because of a failure of political will.

NASA is not facing a workforce crisis; it is facing a fiscal crisis. The President’s

Vision outlines a bold and ambitious set of milestones for NASA, ultimately leading

to permanent human presence on the Moon and a safe manned mission to Mars.

Yet unfortunately, the White House has thus far been unwilling to propose a bold

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and ambitious NASA budget to match. The misguided policy decision to make the

VSE an unfunded mandate is the driving force behind all of NASA’s current woes.

IFPTE calls on Congress to redirect this policy and to fund NASA at the levels Authorized less than two years ago with overwhelming bipartisan support. This course

of action is essential for enabling NASA’s success, for maintaining America’s prestige and leadership in aerospace R&D, and ultimately for safeguarding our national

security.

• Unless NASA’s budget is increased significantly, commensurate with its full

set of responsibilities, mission failure is a real possibility. Something has to

give. Either the Constellation schedule will need to be significantly slipped,

or Shuttle and Space Station activities will need to be curtailed even further,

or, as the Administration would now have it, critical Aeronautics, Science and

Technology activities will be severely cut, leaving Orion and Ares vehicles

with ill-defined missions and NASA’s Science and Aeronautics responsibilities

unfulfilled. This is not a partisan concern; for example, Representative Calvert, the former Chairman (and now Ranking Member) of this subcommittee,

recently expressed concern about how cuts in NASA Aeronautics R&D impact

the Nation’s effort, coordinated by the newly established inter-agency Joint

Program Development Office (JPDO), to develop the next generation airspace

system:

‘‘. . .Congress anticipated that the Federal Aviation Administration, as the operator of our nation’s ATM system, and the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, as our nation’s leading aeronautics R&D organization, would

continue to work collaboratively as they have for more than forty years: NASA

researching and developing long-lead, high risk technologies; FAA adapting

their research products to incorporate them into the national airspace system. . .. The JPDO recognized NASA’s expertise early on by selecting them to

lead the ‘Agile Airspace’ integrated product team. . .. In the last eighteen

months, however, and subsequent to the creation of the JPDO, NASA’s aeronautics R&D program has undergone a major reorganization. . . I remain

concerned that so early in this grand endeavor now known as NextGen, one

of the two key partners is changing the rules of the game, and it’s happening

at a time when R&D roadmaps are being finalized, and spending for developing and integrating new technologies is about to ramp up. I would strongly

prefer that NASA’s Airspace Management program continue to advance promising technologies to a high level. . . It is my sincere hope that NASA’s actions

don’t hinder JPDO’s efforts to develop technologies upon which NextGen is reliant.’’

IFPTE shares this concern and urges Congress to properly fund NASA’s Aeronautics R&D mission, which will not only address this and other critical national needs, but will also greatly reduce the workforce instability at the

Agency.

• The Administration’s fiscal policy is driving the indefinite postponement of

the recruitment of NASA’s next generation of scientists and engineers thereby

seriously compromising the long-term health of the Agency. At an All-Hands

meeting at Ames Research Center on February 22nd 2007, Administrator

Griffin responded to a query about what NASA is doing to recruit young scientists and engineers by saying:

‘‘I cannot grow the Agency by bringing in even all-stars right now that I want

to bring in, unless and until folks like us who, as you said, are getting older,

until and unless these folks retire.’’

While we sympathize with the Administrator, given the untenable position he

is in of trying to meet NASA’s many awesome responsibilities without an

honest budget, we must stand in opposition to any further stalling. This defeatist statement, coming directly from the Administrator, reveals that the

current workforce plan is simply to punt, effectively sacrificing NASA’s future

to meet its immediate milestones, leaving his successor to deal with an even

more serious problem down the road.

IFPTE applauds the National Research Council (NRC) for its thoughtful report

and recommendations on NASA’s workforce planning. The report properly recognizes the symbiotic relationship between NASA’s in-house scientists and their academic colleagues, as well as the immediate need to engage aggressively in the education, hands-on training, and recruitment of the next generation of NASA employees. We fully endorse their key recommendations.

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• Although the NRC primary interest is in maintaining NASA’s support of academic research and IFPTE does not agree with all of the statements made

in the report, nonetheless, IFPTE believes that NASA’s entire multi-sector

workforce would be well served by following their recommendations.

• One concern however is the references made about government conflict-of-interest rules hindering the recruitment of senior program/project managers

from industry. IFPTE strongly believes that these ethics rules are absolutely

essential for protecting the government and the taxpayer from the corrupting

influence of private profit motives. The influence of the aerospace industry on

NASA policies is powerful enough already, any weakening of government ethics rules would be unwise.

IFPTE is disappointed with the National Association of Public Administration

(NAPA) report and strongly objects to the fact that it blindly accepts the Administration’s assertions about NASA’s fiscal and programmatic constraints and uses

them to bolster their argument that some dramatic workforce realignment with a

significant reduction of civil service component is somehow required for the success

of the VSE. This simply is not the case and indeed, we believe the converse is true.

We also strongly object to their recommendations that NASA management be given

new authority for streamlined Reductions-In-Force (RIFs) and for termination based

on retirement eligibility.

• For example, the NAPA report (p. 164) makes the astounding statement that:

‘‘Most employees who have been ‘‘uncovered’’ in the past are concentrated in

various legacy programs and related occupations, such as engineering and

science support (technicians); . . .program/project management; computer

science and information technology; space sciences; . . .various systems engineering competencies; electrical and electronics systems; . . .The April 2006

NASA Workforce Strategy recognized this reality.’’

The above statement that NASA does not now need and is not going to need

these ‘‘legacy’’ competencies to meet its future missions in Science, Aeronautics, and Human Space Flight is absurd. Yet, assertions like this are used

throughout the report to justify a persistent call to target CS employees for

layoffs. Indeed, the NRC report correctly points that NASA desperately needs

to recruit more talent in the areas of program/project management and in

systems engineering (and talented Aeronautics program/project managers and

systems engineers can clearly be quickly cross-trained to support space flight

programs). Furthermore, the NAPA report’s lack of objectivity is revealed as

it repeatedly uses the term ‘‘reality’’ to describe unchallenged assertions by

NASA management, while they refer to Union statements as ‘‘views.’’

• The fatal flaw in the NAPA report is that most of its recommendations are

based on mistaken or uncertain premises presented as facts. The budgetary

and the programmatic assertions made are not the clear cut ‘‘reality’’ that

NAPA would have one believe; for example, the drastic and unwise cuts to

Science, Aeronautics, and Technology Development in the President’s proposed FY 2008 budget will not become reality unless Congress agrees to

them. Over the last few years, a bipartisan coalition in Congress has repeatedly shown its willingness to restore NASA funding in these areas.

IFPTE continues to support the ‘‘ten healthy Centers’’ philosophy put forward by

Dr. Griffin; we reject criticism of his plan within the NAPA report. Unfortunately,

the implementation has been spotty. In particular, as noted in the NAPA report (p.

57), current policies have severely stressed NASA’s research centers. The solution

to this problem cannot be to convert them into mini-operational centers or to subject

them to a BRAC-like process. Rather, the Administration must recognize that revitalized R&D at NASA’s research centers is crucial for the success of the VSE and

NASA’s Science and Aeronautics missions. NASA’s research centers and their academic partners must be provided with the resources needed for them to continue

to make their contributions to NASA’s longer-term missions.

• Specifically, healthy Aeronautics and Exploration research budgets should be

fully sequestered from the manned space flight operational and exploration

development budgets and should be managed by the research centers. This

is necessary to prevent continued pilfering of longer-term research projects in

support of shorter-term Constellation milestones, and to make sure that the

technologies needed to support productive and safe long-duration lunar missions are available when the rockets are ready to get us there. In particular,

the Advanced Capabilities programs should be managed by research centers

with their R&D activities primarily at the research centers. This will protect

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these vital efforts from being usurped by Constellation and will foster innovation, unfettered by the constraints of current operational thinking. Constellation must be kept healthy by direct funding, not by co-opting R&D funds.

• As recommended in the NRC report (recommendation 6), small scale flight

projects (e.g., small sats, free flyers, balloon launches) should be revitalized

thereby enhancing synergistic links between academia, the smaller emerging

‘‘new’’ space industry, and the research centers. This not only has the potential to produce good space, Earth, life and microgravity science for less money,

but will also provide the key hands-on experience needed to develop strong

in-house program/project managers/scientists and to educate/recruit the next

generation of employees.

The key problem and the misguided nature of the current management approach

are readily apparent in Fig. 2–2 of the NRC report (see above).

• The real problem is the nearly five-fold reduction in the number in the 30–

34 year old range between 1993 and 2005 (see vertical blue arrow). The last

two Administrations share the blame for dereliction of their duty to renew

and replenish this critical national capability.

• NASA management (and the NAPA report) is obsessed with the faux problem

of the right-hand tail of the distribution (to the right of the vertical red line),

which represents only about five percent of the workforce and has demonstrated itself to be stable for more than the last decade. Furthermore, this

tail represents the older, experienced and dedicated, scientific and engineering workforce, whose retention is often critical for mission success because of

the priceless corporate memory they possess.

Matrix management and full-cost recovery of civil-service salaries:

NASA’s peculiar version of matrix management, in which programs wield all

budgetary power and line management is effectively impotent, is harming morale

and productivity at most centers among both the rank-and-file and line managers.

• When NASA claimed to convert over to ‘‘full-cost accounting’’ in FY04, it actually converted over to a full-cost recovery system. This system unwisely empowered distant program managers to siphon salary and facilities money

away from field centers. By giving so much power to senior program managers (for Constellation, program management is often indistinguishable or

closely aligned with line management at Johnson Space Center), a low priority has been placed on preserving long-term institutional assets and capabilities at the less-powerful centers. Labor costs at these centers can thus be

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low-balled by pitting competing centers against each other and they have

ended up being forced to provide technical support to programs at below actual cost simply because a half FTE for full time work is better than nothing.

This has created the artificially inflated ‘‘uncovered capacity’’ that is being exaggerated by anti-CS proponents to justify layoffs.

• The Administration has only recently begun to pay adequate attention to the

agency-wide consequences of full-cost recovery on core technical competencies

and facilities. There is little incentive within program management (which

controls nearly all of NASA funds and is under terrible pressure to meet current fiscal-year milestones) to be interested in any long-term agency-wide

workforce planning.

• Matrix management coupled with full-cost recovery is seriously undermining

line/center management authority and morale. For matrix management to

work properly, line and program management must have equal, complementary authorities. Line managers should control CS labor and travel costs (provided directly to each center); while program managers should control procurement and contractor labor costs. This more equitable balance would then

force greater cooperation between line and program management to the benefit of the Agency, its programs, and all of its employees.

Abuse of term hiring:

NASA management has been systematically abusing its authority to create term

civil-servant positions with strict quotas on hiring permanent positions, thus forcing

centers to make improper term hires to fill long-term technical needs more properly

served by a permanent hire.

• The percentage of NASA’s civil service workforce that is employed under a

term contract has increased more than 7-fold since the beginning of FY2003.

Of the current term positions, 80 percent are scientists or engineers and

many of them will leave the Agency in two to six years, despite NASA’s considerable investment in training them.

• The number of outside hires into permanent science and engineering positions

decreased more than 9-fold between FY 2000 and FY 2006.

• The ratio of permanent to non-permanent outside hires shifted from 1.3 in FY

2000 to 0.4 in FY 2006.

• As noted in the NAPA report (p. 160), ‘‘NASA has used term employment as

a vehicle to extend the typical one-year probationary period.’’ Even if this is

meant to be benevolent, this common rationale for using a term hire instead

of a permanent hire improperly circumvents the intent of Title 5 and the

Flexibility Act.

• IFPTE agrees with the NAPA recommendation that the decision to offer term

or permanent status should be based on a careful analysis of the job requirements and of the long-term need for the relevant skills. NASA must develop

transparent, consistent, and compelling criteria for denying full civil-service

rights to any new hire. However, IFPTE is troubled by the conclusion of

Chapter VI of the NAPA report that asserts that

‘‘Term employment may be preferable to permanent employment options given

the great deal of budget and programmatic uncertainty.’’

This statement openly advocates for the improper use of term positions to

compensate for political instability at the Agency. Every year, NASA’s budget

and programs are uncertain, so this cannot be used as a criterion for determining whether a position is best filled by a permanent or term hire. That

decision should be based on the position’s skill requirements and the long- vs.

short-term need for the specific competency being hired.

• The exploding use of term positions is threatening the quality and independence of our technical staff. The best and brightest new scientist and engineering graduates are being wooed by MIT, Johns Hopkins, Carnegie Mellon,

Stanford, Cal Tech, UC–Berkeley and many other high-caliber academic institutions. Premier academic institutions offer tenure. In the past, NASA has

been able to get its fair share of these candidates because it offered tenure,

better benefits, and a similarly excellent intellectual environment. The NRC

report (p. 41) notes that the reduction in federal pension benefits made under

the Reagan Administration is hindering NASA’s ability to recruit senior staff

away from more lucrative private-sector positions with better benefits than

the government. Any diminution of tenure rights will only make recruitment

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even more difficult as it will make cold cash the only usable currency to compete for top talent and the government is not in a good position to win based

on that criterion. More critically, tenure provides technical employees with

the security they need to speak truth to power.

• A more extensive analysis of the crucial value of civil-service tenure can be

found in IFPTE’s testimony to this Subcommittee on June 13th, 2006.

Balancing the public and private workforce components:

IFPTE reiterates its prior testimony stating that NASA benefits greatly from the

synergy generated by its combined federal and private-sector workforce. However,

we also believe that NASA has achieved the minimum healthy balance between its

current 18,020 civil servants on duty (16,299 full-time permanent) and its dedicated

contractor workforce of around 40,000. The latest CS number represents a nearly

a two-fold change from the 35,860 civil servants on board in FY1967, the last time

NASA was working to send Americans to the moon and back safely. Any further

decrease in the civil-service component would appear unwarranted and would put

mission success at increased risk.

IFPTE is concerned that neither the NRC nor the NAPA report emphasized the

many important reasons for maintaining a strong civil-service component to NASA’s workforce especially when facing budgetary and schedule pressures. A few of these

reasons are:

• Civil servants serve as smart buyers so the taxpayer buys good products at

a fair price.

• Civil servants are needed to provide proper technical monitoring and financial

oversight of NASA’s contractor and academic efforts.

• Civil servants are needed to balance out private-sector profit motives in order

to maintain safety. The Columbia Accident Investigations Board (p. 198) indeed pointed out that increases in the industry workforce together with reductions in the CS workforce contributed to the disaster and that, over time,

NASA management tends to forget this.

Prior to Challenger, Shuttle Program structure had hindered information

flows, leading the Rogers Commission to conclude that critical information

about technical problems was not conveyed effectively through the hierarchy.

The Space Shuttle Program had altered its structure by outsourcing to contractors, which added to communication problems. The Commission recommended many changes to remedy these problems, and NASA made many

of them. However, the Board found that those post-Challenger changes were

undone over time by management actions. NASA administrators, reacting to

government pressures, transferred more functions and responsibilities to the

private sector. The change was cost-efficient, but personnel cuts reduced oversight of contractors at the same time that the Agency’s dependence upon contractor engineering judgment increased.

The Agency also needs to engage more scientists, engineers, and technicians, and

fewer managers, deputy managers, associate managers, and assistant managers.

NASA’s dedicated technical workforce at all of its centers, both civil servant and

contractor, stands ready, willing, and able to support all of NASA’s missions and

there is more than enough technical work to go around. NASA headquarters needs

to reduce the load of self-generated program-reporting busy work that it dumps on

its front-line managers, which then reduces real productivity and drives the ‘‘need’’

for excess management.

Decentralizing the Constellation program:

Administrator Griffin deserves considerable praise for realizing that all of NASA

Centers should share in the work opportunities (and responsibilities) provided by

the Constellation program, according to their capabilities and facilities. This idea,

however, has been difficult to implement fully and is not a long-term solution.

• Constellation program management is too closely allied with Johnson Space

Center management and has therefore been very reluctant to comply fully

with the decentralization process. As stated in the minutes of the NASA Strategic Management Council’s February 21st 2007 meeting:

‘‘. . .flight centers seem reluctant to place development work at research centers. . .’’

Indeed, when Constellation work-packages have been transferred to other

centers, JSC has only minimally complied by transferring the CS Full Time

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Equivalent (FTE) portion of the funds, while retaining the procurement dollars and contractor work-year equivalent (WYE) funds, thereby making it impossible for other centers to match JSC’s apparent productivity. JSC continues to prefer hiring within their local JSC contractor teams and to resist

transferring the full budget associated with Constellation work-packages to

CS-contractor-academic teams at other centers.

• IFPTE concurs with the NRC report finding that rigorous requirement management is a critical factor in mission success (Box 4.1). It would therefore

appear troubling that Constellation and JSC management have chosen to use

employees of the Orion prime contractor to help define the development, validation, and verification of Orion’s requirements; this creates an obvious conflict of interest as these requirements impact the profitability of the prime

contract. To protect the taxpayer, civil-service ethics rules would disqualify

any civil-servant employee from working on a NASA project in which they

had a direct financial interest. Furthermore, this questionable out-sourcing is

particularly harmful when the expertise contracted out already exists inhouse at another NASA center.

• The Constellation work is largely short-term technical oversight tasks of

hardware-software development programs, with the lion’s share of the real

work ultimately performed by the Orion prime and sub-contractors. These

work assignments are generally not full-time and do not generally cover

NASA’s world-class scientists and technology developers, whose innovative research is critical for the long-term health of the Agency and the ultimate success of the VSE. The only sustainable long-term solution is to revitalize

NASA’s Aeronautics, Exploration Research and Technology, and Science programs.

The Administration’s proposed new flexibilities:

IFPTE supports NASA’s efforts to obtain enhanced voluntary buy-out authority.

However, we strongly opposed the effort to obtain legislation to enhance their authority to convert permanent positions to term positions as this would only exacerbate the current abuse of term hiring.

Recommendations:

In order for NASA to move forward towards reinvigorating its workforce to better

support all of its missions, IFPTE offers the following recommendations:

1. Congress should fund NASA as close to the authorized level as possible and prohibit executive transfer authority.

• In its endorsement of the VSE, Congress authorized $18.7 billion for

FY08, yet the President has proposed only $17.3 billion. This $1.4 billion

shortfall is at the core of all of NASA’s problems.

• None of the National Research Council recommendations on NASA workforce revitalization can come to fruition without adequate Appropriation.

• Congress’ direction will not have the intended impact unless all major

Appropriations accounts are unambiguously specified, with executive

transfer authority limited to moving funds within these major accounts

(e.g., Education funds should be specifically appropriated with transfer to

other activities prohibited).

• IFPTE proposes an additional $300 million for Science above that in the

President’s budget (including increased funding for the Research & Analysis activities called for by the NRC to support both in-house and academic research), an additional $120 million for Exploration Advanced Capabilities (to support the longer-term R&D needed to maintain healthy

and strong technology development both in-house and externally), an additional $30 million for Education (to encourage our youth to devote

themselves to a technical education leading to a career in aerospace), and

an additional $200 million for Aeronautics (to support NASA’s traditional

forte in Aeronautics R&D as well as its traditional relationship with the

aviation industry and its new commitments to the JPDO). In addition to

fully supporting NASA’s key missions, these specific Appropriations proposals also form the basis of an implementation plan for workforce renewal, consistent with the NRC report.

2. Congress should preserve and protect the technical integrity and

independence of NASA’s civil-service workforce.

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• All talk of downsizing should cease immediately and be replaced by talk

of sustained recruitment of NASA’s new generation of employees.

• Congress should prohibit the disruptive and misguided policy of full-cost

recovery of civil-service salaries, thereby re-empowering rank-and-file employees and their line management with the flexibility to assign and perform work as needed within a balanced partnership with program management.

• Congress should require NASA to fund CS salaries and travel directly to

the centers, independent of programs, to allow for more balanced and effective matrix management. This would put an end to the scapegoating

of the CS workforce for NASA’s overall budgetary shortfall.

• Congress should ask the Government Accountability Office to audit

NASA’s use of term positions.

• Although Congress has temporarily prohibited layoffs, as seen in the recent NAPA report, some within NASA management continue to promulgate anti-civil service rhetoric. Without adequate factual justification,

NAPA has endorsed a plan to consider downsizing NASA’s CS workforce

(i.e., they want to put RIFs back on the table with weaker safeguards,

with management’s latest target being 2,000 Shuttle employees primarily

at JSC and KSC as we near 2010). Clearly, most of these employees can

be retrained to work on Constellation or they will simply retire, yet

NASA is asking for legislation to go after them.

3. NASA management should provide visible and sustained stability for

its current workforce to support the inspiration then recruitment of

its future workforce.

• The best and brightest young engineering and science graduates need

once again to see aerospace as a stable career option in general and

NASA as a great career move in particular, comparable to accepting a job

at a premier academic or private-sector research institution (e.g., MIT or

Google or Lockheed Martin). They need to feel confident of stable job opportunities at NASA early in their education to inspire them to embark

on the demanding educational paths of science, engineering, and math.

• NASA should re-embrace its Aeronautics, Science, and Technology missions as these activities are a major component of the attraction to NASA

for the best and brightest young minds.

4. IFPTE supports the NRC recommendations, especially #2, #4, and #6.

• NASA must begin an aggressive campaign to recruit young employees

while the current senior staff is still on board to transfer its knowledge.

• NASA must aggressively establish hands-on training programs and research opportunities for both current employees and students (aka future

employees) to help forge a strong future workforce.

• NASA must maintain a portfolio of smaller flight programs to both provide valuable, yet less expensive, scientific return (especially given that

the Shuttle is no longer available to support Life or Microgravity Science)

and to train young project managers/scientists within more modest

projects.

5. IFPTE strongly opposes three NAPA recommendations.

• The NAPA report is deeply flawed as it accepts, unchallenged, erroneous

premises associated with the Administration’s policies. In particular, the

argument that NASA’s mission is changing dramatically thereby requiring a smaller CS workforce is fallacious. NASA’s mission has been and

will continue to be to perform aerospace-related scientific research & engineering development. The current transient emphasis on spacecraft design and development will pass and should not be the pretext for a massive downsizing of NASA’s civil service workforce. The crisis is artificial;

without adequate funds for Constellation, the Administrator has resorted

to cannibalizing the Science and Aeronautics budgets and their associated

employees. Rather than advocating for a fictitious realignment, the NAPA

report should have performed a more neutral and vigorous examination

of the budgetary and programmatic premises provided to them by the Administration.

• The recommendation that NASA should contemplate a BRAC-like process

to consider the closure of one or more of its research centers completely

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misses the mark. BRAC was a unique response to America winning the

cold war. The US therefore needed to dramatically transition its military

posture to be more appropriate for the completely different post-cold-war

world. NASA, on the other hand, is preparing to re-invigorate its human

space flight mission in response to the VSE. It is moving back to the future to re-invent Apollo, while also maintaining its traditional portfolio

of Aeronautics and Science. The VSE does not represent a dramatic

change in NASA’s mission but rather only a transient re-emphasis on

spacecraft design and development. Furthermore, NASA’s research centers function as a lifeline to academia and are absolutely essential if

NASA is going to solve the very real technology development obstacles on

the critical path to lunar outpost and Mars. NASA’s highly-respected research centers need to be rescued from the Administration’s current misguided policies, not sacrificed to meet short-term budgetary shortfalls.

• The recommendation that NASA management be allowed to streamline

its RIF procedures fails completely to acknowledge the fundamental principles behind the creation of the civil service. Hiring and firing employees

nearly at will, as is sometimes done in the private sector, may provide

management with the flexibility it craves, but it does not work well when

management is playing with the taxpayers’ money. The usual marketforce feedback is not present and thus very stringent regulations are absolutely necessary to prevent patronage, cronyism, and other forms of corruption. Furthermore, given that Chapter IV of the NAPA report laments

that NASA management currently is not properly following existing federal law related to contractor employees, it would seem imprudent to reward NASA management with greater authority to fire CS employees.

Again, NASA’s primary workforce challenge, as repeatedly highlighted in

the NRC report, is to recruit and build its future workforce. The obsession with layoffs is misplaced, is wasting taxpayer dollars, and harming

morale and productivity.

• The recommendation that NASA management be allowed to declare an

emergency and terminate its older annuity-eligible employees is not only

wrong-headed, it is overtly discriminatory. Retirement eligibility (which

correlates strongly with age) should never be used as a criterion for termination or any other adverse employment action. When all other criteria

are the same, using retirement eligibility to decide who stays and who

is fired is unconscionable. IFPTE is simply shocked that the NAPA would

openly advocate for age discrimination. NASA employees generally become annuity eligible at 50 years young; IFPTE believes that rather than

considering employees over 50 as liabilities, NASA management should

acknowledge that the maturity, wisdom, and hands-on experience that

our older scientists and engineers provide are critical for mission success.

6. IFPTE supports enhancing NASA’s voluntary buy-out authority.

• Congress should consider legislation to allow enhanced buy-out authority

for NASA. We therefore support the temporary continuation of medical

coverage in Section 102 of the Administration’s proposed flexibility legislation.

• Many non-critical employees would like to retire immediately, but need

to stay on a few additional years for financial reasons. A more reasonable

compensation package would greatly help NASA persuade these employees to retire without impacting morale and would ultimately save the taxpayer a lot of money.

• The NAPA recommendation that NASA management be allowed to increase its voluntary buy-out cap from $25,000 to $35,000 is simply inadequate to effectively enhance this incentive. The high-tech industry

standard is generally one year’s pay, which is much more than NASA’s current $25,000 or the proposed $35,000.

• IFPTE proposes a more realistic incentive, in line with those available to

many untenured private-sector employees, with the buy-out calculation

equal to the individual’s severance pay (regardless of annuity eligibility)

capped at one-year’s salary.

7. IFPTE strongly opposes any new authority to facilitate the conversion of permanent positions to term positions.

• NASA management is already abusing its current expanded term authority and should not be given additional authority to undermine civil-servVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ice independence. We therefore oppose Section 101 of the Administration’s proposed flexibility legislation.

In conclusion, IFPTE is encouraged by the recent effort to distribute Constellation

work more fairly and intelligently across the centers, and is very grateful for the

bipartisan Congressional rescue that protected NASA’s workforce from the Administration’s reckless RIF plan. We must now turn from the era of workforce damage

control to the more positive task of re-building NASA’s future multi-sector workforce. We hope that the Subcommittee will seriously consider our recommendations

above, as well as those of the NRC panel.

Once again, Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Calvert, IFPTE thanks you

very much for the opportunity to bring these important issues to the attention of

the Subcommittee.

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DISCUSSION

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Dr. Stone. At this point, let us

open up our first round of questions, and the chair will recognize

himself for five minutes.

I am going to direct my first round of questions to Dr. Black and

Mr. Stewart. Ms. Dawsey’s testimony notes that to a large degree,

these reports, and that is the National Academies’ and the NAPA

reports, confirm our assessments of the challenges facing us in the

workforce arena, and validate the actions that we have initiated to

address the most critical and encompassing issues.

Do you agree with NASA’s response to the findings and recommendations of these reports, and if not, which of your recommendations do you think need the most attention by NASA?

Dr. Stone, let us start with you, and then, we will move to Mr.

Stewart, and then, if Ms. Dawsey has—if there is time left, we will

give you a chance to share your point of view. So, Dr. Stone.

Dr. STONE. So, your question is what do I think of NASA’s response to these reports?

OPINIONS ON NASA’S RESPONSE TO NATIONAL ACADEMIES’

AND NAPA’S REPORTS

Chairman UDALL. Yes, yeah, and if you don’t agree with all of

them or most of them, or some of them, which of your recommendations do you think need most attention by NASA?

Dr. STONE. Okay. I would say that NASA has, indeed, basically,

except for the most extreme proposals at the end of the NAPA report, that I would like to address separately. The NAPA report basically is just a rubber stamping of the approach that NASA has

been taking, of trying to realign its workforce through a process

that largely involves the flexibility to enhance attrition, and to reduce the civil service complement, and I think there is a strange

mixture in the goals of NASA’s management, between trying to adjust to the real goal of the Vision, and trying to implement a civil

service reshaping that involves a reduction of several thousand employees.

And I think the latter is a political decision that isn’t linked to

any reality to the Vision, and so, there is some schizophrenia to

their response, in that some of it is addressing real issues, and

some of it is really just addressing that, what seems to be a predetermined goal to reduce the civil service complement.

As far as the NRC report, I don’t see much of a response at all

to what they have suggested, and indeed, they seem to be continuing to shrink their education budget, continuing to reduce efforts to bring in young people, and in my longer testimony, there

is a quote from the Administrator on this that I think is really telling. And there was a question asked at an all hands meeting at

Ames a few months ago by a very prominent scientist, and the scientist asked: ‘‘What is NASA doing to recruit young people?’’ which

is the largest effort in the NRC recommendations, and the Administrator’s response was: ‘‘I cannot grow the Agency by bringing in

even all stars right now, that I want to bring in, unless and until

folks like us, who as you said, are getting older, until and unless

these folks retire.’’ And indeed, I don’t think this is official policy,

54

but I think there is a quota of three to one, where centers are not

allowed, the research centers are not allowed to hire someone until

three people retire.

And so, I think that there is a fundamental resistance from management to actually seriously take on the question of solving that

fivefold reduction in the younger employees, and on one side, I find

that reprehensible, and on the other side, it is understandable. It

comes back to the point that I said at the beginning. There isn’t

enough money for Dr. Griffin to meet all the challenging needs of

Constellation, and also, rebuild the workforce. And he is choosing

to meet the short-term milestones of Constellation, and leave the

workforce rebuilding problem to his successor, and he is doing so,

I believe, not because he wants to, but because he is not being

given adequate budget to do it right.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Dr. Stone. I am going to try and

give Dr. Black a minute or so here to respond, and then, we will,

in the next round, I will give Mr. Stewart and Ms. Dawsey a

chance as well.

Dr. BLACK. Thank you, Chairman.

The problem of the workforce is a daunting one, and I think

NASA has made at least good initial strides in trying to deal with

this. As has been pointed out by Dr. Stone, our committee’s concerns as regards young people and fresh hires, I think that they

have not yet done all that well there.

One of the things to understand is this is a very, very difficult

problem. If you look at the kind of curve that Dr. Stone showed,

one of the things that I think NASA has not done is to characterize

its people both by the true level of their experience, their expertise,

they count belly buttons in bins by job categorization, but not

whether they really have the skills necessary.

And the other thing that is really crucial in the strategic sense

is to understand the dynamics of that curve. What are the sources

and sinks? How do you adjust? Over what time scales? Different

things have different timescales. Graduate students have certain

timescales, industry has timescales. So, I think they really need

somebody, and I don’t believe this expertise exists in the Agency.

We did a modest search. We were unable to find things, but I am

sure somebody in the university community knows how to do this,

to really understand what are the forces that shape and evolve that

curve that Dr. Stone showed. And I think essentially, you are going

to have to have that, if you are going to truly have a strategic plan

to deal with workforce issues.

Thank you, Dr. Black, and at this time, I will recognize the

Ranking Member, Mr. Hall, for five minutes.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Dawsey, it seems to

me that we all agree that NASA’s workforce is likely to face some

changes—we expect that—that is given—in order to meet new

goals that we have in exploration, science, and aeronautics, and

NASA sent us a Workforce Strategy over a year ago, and I presume

that you have been busy over the past year trying to implement

some of this strategy. I think that is a good presumption.

Would you please give me some specifics about what NASA is

doing to bring its workforce into appropriate alignment to meet our

55

exploration, science, and aero goals, and specifically, to answer the

in-house problems, as set out by Dr. Black?

HOW NASA IS ACHIEVING WORKFORCE GOALS

Ms. DAWSEY. Yes, sir. We have been working very hard over the

past year to implement the Workforce Strategy. The Workforce

Strategy is still current. What we have done is we have developed

a comprehensive implementation plan, and that implementation

plan, as I said, is worked around three goals, and one of them is

workforce planning.

Over the past year, we have set up a governance structure which

includes human capital as, I believe, Mr. Stewart recommended, in

all of the workforce planning decisions, aligned with other key officials in the Agency. We have also set up in that governance structure a standing workforce planning team, technical team, that includes human capital and workforce planning, workforce transition,

staff from around the Agency, and we have specific sub-teams that

will address specific issues, for example, for any skill mix issues,

or the Shuttle transition. We have a team set up to do the mapping

of Shuttle employees from Shuttle to Constellation.

In terms of alignment, we have redesigned our leadership development programs. Basically, what we are working on is while our

entry level pipeline is getting some criticism here this morning, we

do have that pipeline. We have students, co-op students at NASA.

We have about 400 of them at any given time. We also have over

400 graduate students working on NASA projects.

The other part of the alignment, though, is to make sure, as also

was suggested this morning, that we have program managers,

project managers, senior technical, and senior executive service

pipelines, and so, we are building career paths and training programs that start fairly early in our employees’ career, and give

them experience as needed, not only to build within their own career, but to understand NASA as a whole, both the program side

of the house and the institution side of the house.

And finally, we have taken our systems that have been operating

pretty much independently of one another, the systems that would

inform our leadership, and we are integrating them, so that they

have all the workforce data they need, all the demographic data

they need, to make decisions for the workforce.

Mr. HALL. I thank you for that. So, the NASA Workforce Strategy, the ten healthy centers, I think the Administrator pretty well

put that to bed.

Ms. DAWSEY. Yes.

Mr. HALL. That there was talk of closing them at one time, and

maybe some others on here think that might be the thing to do,

but I think he has taken a pretty firm position on that, and I think

a lot of us up here recognize how very capable he is.

The second one is to maximize the existing workforce, as you

have pointed out, and I think we have to do that, and third, then,

you said three goals, and is the third one to evolve to a more flexible civil service, by—in your workforce, you pointed out the temporary people that you were using, and how many different universities they were from. Does that kind of summarize what—the

three that you have said, or have I left out something?

56

Ms. DAWSEY. No, those are the three.

Mr. HALL. All right. I think my time is almost up, and I yield

back, and I do thank all four of you. Thank you, Dr. Black.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Judge Hall, and at this point, yield

five minutes, to recognize for five minutes the gentleman from

California, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and well, first of all,

let me ask Dr. Stone. You made suggestions about spending large

amounts of money. Could you suggest to us where that money will

be coming from?

SUGGESTED RESOURCES FOR FUNDING NASA

Dr. STONE. First of all, I don’t think they are large amounts of

money that we are talking about, asking for—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. Anytime you talk about over $100 million, it

is a lot of money.

Dr. STONE. Okay. But—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. Where is it supposed to come from? You want

to take it from the military? You want to take it from health research? To be taken seriously, when someone testifies here nowadays, you can’t just come up and say you want hundreds of millions of more dollars here, hundreds of millions of dollars more

there, and just expect we are going to come up with it like the

Tooth Fairy is going to deliver it. If you want to be taken seriously,

it is like any engineer, you have to know that you can’t build something out of nothing. So, where do you want to get that money?

Dr. STONE. With all due respect—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am asking a specific question. You can—— Dr. STONE. The numbers that we quoted there were right out of

the Authorization Bill. The Authorization Bill was passed almost

unanimously by both sides of Congress.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, fine.

Dr. STONE. And so I didn’t invent—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. Fine.

Dr. STONE. But secondly—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I will have to tell you that I disagree

with—quite often, when this Congress irresponsibly authorizes

money, and doesn’t say where it is coming from. You are an engineer, where do you want us to take it from?

Dr. STONE. Well, you mentioned the military. The military has well over $22 billion—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. STONE.—for its space research program. A lot of the Constellation efforts——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. STONE.—are efforts that could be leveraged by the military.

Indeed, when the Shuttle is gone, satellites are going to need to be

repaired in different ways, and I would think that a lot of the technology that would be developed under the Constellation program

would be dual use, and so, it would not be unfair to leverage some

of those funds.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. That is a good answer. That is

what I was looking for. So, you think that we can actually find

more funds by finding, by looking into what is now in the DOD

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budget, and either rechanneling them, or leveraging them, and

making sure that they pick up some of the costs for what you want

to do on the NASA side. Is that what you are talking about?

Dr. STONE. That was one suggestion. The bottom line question is,

though, if you ask NASA to do something, then you have to pay

for it, so if you are not going to give us the billion dollars, then you

have to decide what we are not going to do.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I agree with that as well, but let us just

note that when people are advocating that we are going to end up

spending so much more money, it has got to come from somewhere,

and almost, you know, in my 18 years here, at least the Democrats

now are suggesting that we have pay go, you have got to know

where the money is coming from in order to advocate something,

and I think to be taken seriously, and the suggestion you just gave,

I think, is a good suggestion.

Dr. STONE. Thank you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Let me note that when we are talking about the workforce and future workforce, which you also

stressed, we should be, I think NASA should be focusing more, although we just heard the testimony that there are 400, was it interns?

Ms. DAWSEY. There are 400 cooperative program interns at

NASA.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. It would seem to me that there should

be more than that. That is a very cost-effective program. We have

passed scholarship concepts here, which I have pushed for over the

years, to try to target those people who are getting their education,

and may not be able to afford it, unless we help them. The scholarships and the internships and apprentice programs, these are all

things that I think are very cost-effective that should address some

of the concerns of Dr. Stone and others that have testified today.

Let me note that for a long time, I have been on this committee

now for 19 years, and for at least 15 of those years, we were begging for a space strategy, and no President gave it to us except this

President, and I have my differences with this President on a number of issues, but I will suggest that he did give us a space strategy. He wants us to focus on the Moon, he puts that forward, back

to the Moon is the primary mission, and if we now know that that

is the space strategy, and we all were begging for one, shouldn’t

NASA be restructured so that it meets that strategy as its primary

goal?

And you are not going to do it by keeping NASA exactly the

same number of, you know, of employees, exactly the same number

of centers. There has to be a prioritization in order to meet a goal.

We finally have somebody set a goal, and I would suggest that we

are going to have, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we are

going to have to do some serious reform if we are to suggest to the

people that we are serious. Now, I just asked Dr. Stone to be serious about it, give us an example, we have got to prioritize as well,

and we have accepted the space strategy, let us get to work on it,

and I am very, very pleased that Mr. Feeney is going to be the

Ranking Member, and working with you, Chairman Udall, and you

can count on my active support to try to make sure we reach that

goal of back to the Moon, set that strategy, as the President has,

58

and do the things that are necessary to responsibly reach those

goals. Other goals have to be secondary, and it might mean closing

some of the centers and letting some of the people go, mainly because you can’t, as you say, you have got to spend money. The

money hasn’t been allocated, so let us spend the money that we

have got wisely, to achieve the specific goals that have been set by

the President. And I might say, approved by Congress.

With that said, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Congressman Rohrabacher, for

your spirited interchange with the Panel. I would acknowledge and

point out that all of us on the Committee know that we have to

find some additional resources, and we are working in a bipartisan

way to do so. At this point, I want to yield to—— Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, could—just one note.

Chairman UDALL. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is finding additional resources or making

the system more efficient.

Chairman UDALL. My opinion would be we need to both. Thank

you for that question, Congressman Rohrabacher. At this point, I

want to yield to Judge Hall, we want to start the clock for a special

announcement and acknowledgment. Judge Hall.

INTRODUCTION OF MR. FEENEY AS RANKING MEMBER

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman and Members on both sides of the docket, I am honored to say that when Ken Calvert was moved to Appropriations, it meant that we selected from among our group one

to be ranking with you, Mr. Chairman, here, and the selection has

been made. It is Mr. Feeney. He represents the Kennedy area, and

is a very great supporter and very knowledgeable about space and

aeronautics, and I think to demonstrate that I recognize him, that

I will abandon this area, and let him come on and take my place,

and I will go about looking for another job or something. Yield

back.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Congressman Hall, and as Congressman Feeney moves over here, I will filibuster for a minute or

so before I recognize Congressman Feeney. I would tell you that,

as Judge Hall mentioned, Congressman Calvert has taken an important position on the Appropriations Committee. He has, I am

sure, committed to all of us that we will take this particular committee’s interests to heart on the Appropriations Committee, but I

feel like we have actually generated a dual benefit, because as Congressman Calvert moves to the Appropriations Committee, we now

have a new Ranking Member, Mr. Feeney from Florida, who represents the Kennedy Space Center, and I know will be a strong advocate for all things NASA.

I had a chance to get to know Congressman Feeney a little bit

better when we traveled together last summer to see the new series of Shuttle launches. We, as we often do, as Members of Congress, jinxed the launch for that particular day, but those of you

remember the narrative, the Shuttle was launched on the 4th of

July, which was very appropriate, and I know Mr. Feeney was one

of the proud observers that day.

So, Congressman Feeney, I am looking forward to working with

you. Welcome, as the new Ranking Member of the Committee, and

59

the floor is yours to provide questions to the Panel, and to make

any comments you would like to make.

Mr. FEENEY. Well, thank you, chairman. I am really honored. I

am especially honored that my friend, Ralph Hall, would ask me

to take this position. In the interest of full disclosure, you know,

I am a real estate lawyer by background. I don’t know much about

science or space. I have got a lot of people in my district that do,

including my wife, who spent about two decades as an engineer for

a major contractor at Kennedy Space Center, and I like to point out

that my political adversaries regularly say I am no rocket scientist,

and that is true, but I am married to one, or she is pretty close,

anyway, and that is about the best I can do, but having said that,

I appreciate the chairman’s leadership, and I agree with him that

we are going to need both more resources and more efficient use

of our resources, and I think that is an attitude that the both of

us share, and I am very excited about pursuing ways to do that.

I am particularly interested in some of the criticism of the strategy that Ms. Dawsey has laid out today, and I think there is a lot

of good things in it, but some of the criticism focuses, and I think

Congressman Rohrabacher mentioned it, on a lack of an aggressive

enough plan for young people. And I should share with you that

along with Mark Kirk and Rick Larsen, I was the first American

allowed to see the Chinese civil space launch facility in Jiuquan,

and that was a year and a half ago, and one of the remarkable

things about what the Chinese are doing is that they are having

young people develop a next generation rocket. What they admitted

to us, and of course, all of their program is in their military budget,

and they intentionally obfuscate what they are doing, but they admitted that they have over 100 university centers working on

things involved in future space issues, whether it is creating robots

to explore the Moon. Whether it is different types of technology.

And one of my concerns is, and I think Dr. Black had a great analogy, no matter how talented you are, you can’t walk onto a baseball

field. I mean, try explaining the rules of baseball to a foreigner. It

is almost impossible, and it takes time to understand the rules, let

alone develop the specific skills. And I am concerned, Dr. Stone, I

think, pointed out with the retirement that we are facing, I am

very concerned that we do not have the long-term plan in place to

attract the young people that we are going to need to maintain

space predominance, and failure to maintain space predominance is

simply not an option. We don’t know what the Chinese long-term

intentions are, for example, but we cannot permit space predominance, anybody other that even potentially could be hostile to

peaceful interests, and I think it is very important.

Dr. Black, would you elaborate, because you talk about the fact

that we ought to visualize the workforce as more than just the

80,000 people that are working directly in aerospace and also

trained in aerospace, but we have got a much larger pool, DOD,

aerospace industries, can you give us some idea how we can better

use the available pool today, but also, develop a larger pool for tomorrow, of young people?

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SUGGESTIONS FOR UTILIZING THE CURRENT POOL OF WORKERS AND DEVELOPING A WORKFORCE FOR THE FUTURE

Dr. BLACK. Well, there actually is, as you are well aware, I am

sure, there is an Interagency Aerospace Workforce Revitalization

Taskforce Act, which you have been involved with, and that is, I

believe, a term thing that is involved, focuses strictly on government entities. One thing I would encourage you to do is try and

broaden that. The ecosystem that we talk about includes not only

the government, but also, the university community, as well, and

the private sector of the contractors, and it is in that context that

I think the solution must be sought, in terms of how to balance,

move, have flexibility for the overall aerospace workforce.

I would say that if you take your point on China, I think China

now is much like it was when I was a kid, at the beginning of the

Apollo, I am giving my age away here. It is——

Mr. FEENEY. You mean, much like we were.

Much like—right. And as, I think that it is one thing to maintain

existing space capabilities. It is another thing to have young people

actually develop new——

Dr. BLACK. Well, that is right. And I think the enthusiasm, what

the Chinese youth are probably seeing now is much what the youth

of America saw in the late ’50s and early ’60s.

Mr. FEENEY. I can tell you, their taikonauts are heroes over

there. We are——

Dr. BLACK. Oh, you bet. You bet. And so, and I think that is one

of the things we have lost, if you—as we listen to various witnesses

that came before us and our committee, one of the things that

emerged is that NASA is no longer the place, necessarily, where

the people in universities are recommending their best students go,

and in fact, many of the best students no longer do go there. And

one of the reasons for that is programs take so much longer. If you

look at what has happened with—I was the first chief scientist for

the Space Station Program. I came here in 1985 for that function,

and left in ’87. I don’t have to tell you where we are on that right

now.

So, that is the kind of thing that if you are today’s youth, and

by the way, today’s youth, I think, as a professor at Rice University, are—my experience and my colleagues’ experiences are that

they are much more oriented toward quick return. They are not as

career-oriented as many of us were, so I think the ability to attract

young people is a much more difficult challenge, and to keep them

in the workforce, than it was when we were growing up.

But I think it is important to do that, and Ms. Dawsey points out

the 400 kids working. The problem is, many of those are associated

with what is truly the sort of crown jewel of NASA, the science programs. They are very excited, and they come over, and that is

great, and I don’t think that should be discouraged, but the shortage that the Committee noticed was more in the systems engineering, project and program management, and there are very few programs that NASA has to bring youth in those areas. They are very

strong in the science areas, but not so strong in those areas, so I

think if they are going to truly address the shortages that they

have, they need to pay more attention to that aspect, as well.

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Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Congressman Feeney. Thank you,

Dr. Black. I wanted to acknowledge that a contributing and a very

engaged Member of the Committee has joined us, Mr. Melancon

from Louisiana. I know at this time, he doesn’t have any questions

and wants to learn from the panel, so at this time, I will recognize

the Member from Alabama, Mr. Bonner, and we all envy Alabama’s

delegation, and its commitment to aerospace and aeronautics, and

the tremendous set of facilities and operations they have down

there. So, Congressman Bonner.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to each of

the panel members.

I am going to give you an unscripted question, because a lot of

times, we get questions given to us that we think we need to put

on the record. As a nation, we have often looked to our President

or to the head of NASA, or other leaders in the field to set out a

vision, and I think it is safe to say that each of the four of you have

a passion for NASA, and have a passion for the mission of NASA.

But as President Kennedy in the 1960s, and as other Presidents in

more recent years have done, in describing their vision of where

they would like NASA to be in the 10, 15, 20 years in front of us,

where would you like to see NASA be? If you differ from what Congressman Rohrabacher indicated President Bush’s mission of taking us back to the Moon, and possibly on to Mars, where would you

like, and this is not a loaded question.

I would just like to know from your experience, where would you

like to see NASA go in the next 20, 30 years? And it is open to all

four of you.

FUTURE VISION FOR NASA

Mr. STEWART. Well, I think in fact, I think that the Vision that

President Bush set out is a pretty good one, and it is a very challenging one. I mean, we have been talking this morning as though

this is going to be a piece of cake. Well, I mean, given the realities

of the budget situation that the Congress faces, and given the realities of the existing NASA workforce, and given the fact that one

of the first things that Administrator Griffin mentioned when he

took responsibility for that position was that he wanted to bring

the core responsibilities back into NASA. He wanted NASA to have

the expertise and the experience to take charge of developing the

various elements that are going to be needed to achieve the Vision.

And that was exactly the right thing to say. I mean, that was

precisely on target, but it laid out a very daunting agenda, because

the fact is, and I think both our reports indicate that, the expertise

and the technical expertise that is needed to do that does not currently exist in NASA to the degree that it needs to if they are going

to accomplish it. So, that is why this workforce thing is so important.

And so, it is a challenging Vision that the President has set out,

and it is one that I think has it, I mean, you know, the Shuttle

has been, in many ways, a real triumph, in many ways, a great

tragedy, but because it never really went anywhere, you know, it

just went around in circles, so to speak, it didn’t have quite the

same excitement associated with the Apollo Program.

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Well, that is going to change now. And I think when we are actually another couple of years down the road, and the young people

of this country see, in fact, that we are going to go back to the

Moon, I think there is going to be a lot of them who are going to

get very excited about that, as they did before, and I certainly hope

that that is what happens. I think it will, and that is—if we could

achieve that, I would think we would be—and don’t forget, the Vision includes not stopping at the Moon. And so, if you really take

that seriously, you have really got yourself an agenda.

Ms. DAWSEY. Congressman, I agree with Mr. Stewart. I think

that the Vision set before us is an exciting Vision, and it is where

NASA should go.

I would like to say that our Administrator, Mike Griffin, is doing

his best to carry out that Vision. He has reorganized NASA back

to the, almost to look like the organization under, during the Apollo

era, and we are all tasked, Mike Griffin has spoken very directly,

as many of you may know, he is a very open, direct person, and

he has told us what he expects of us. And yes, it is a daunting challenge, but I really feel convinced that NASA is doing everything it

can, given what people are calling challenges in terms of budget

and FTEs, but what we have done in the past year is remarkable.

In terms of workforce planning, for example, I have talked about

a governance structure, but we took 75 separate systems just in

HR that didn’t talk to one another, and we pulled them together,

to give the leadership an idea of who is working on what, and when

and where. We have a competency management system that now

is loaded with personal competencies, as well as position competencies, and they are validated by supervisors or expert panels.

That system is married now with the Workforce Information Management System, to show, the CMS shows supply, the Workforce

Information Management System shows demand, and together,

they are showing us where our gaps and surpluses are, so that we

can start building recruitment programs around those.

The other thing that we are doing, in terms of setting, making

sure we are moving quickly enough and in the right direction, is

we have mapping plans of Shuttle to Constellation, so again, we

are watching that workforce, and where we don’t have, we have

ceiling restrictions, when I mentioned that we had 400 cooperative

education students in NASA, they are across all centers. They are

in science and engineering, and where most of the science funds

are going are to the graduate students, and yes, most of the money

for the graduate student program is science.

The other part of the problem is we do have a workforce that has

been at NASA a long time. People love NASA. It is an exciting

place to work. They come to work there, and it is their career. They

are not looking to move on. The newer generation might be, but our

experience so far is they want to be there. So, we are putting in

place really serious retraining programs. We are developing program project management training programs. We have engineering

programs going. We are sending people to colleges and universities,

as well as doing internal training. We have realized that we used

to be ten centers, and we realized that we need to be one NASA,

and Mike Griffin is really pushing that. So, when we look at the

exploration program, if work can be done at other centers, the work

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goes there. And NASA has educated, intelligent engineers and scientists in all ten of those centers, and so, we have been really, really successful.

Two years ago, we had over 2,000 unfunded FTEs, we have that

down to 200 now, because we have moved work judiciously, and we

have reassigned people. We have offered buy-outs and early outs to

allow us to recruit, and over 1,300 people have left, because we

have that flexibility. It is very difficult to explain how all of this

is coming together. We are working very hard on the institution

side of the house to support the program side of the house, and

there are a lot of exciting activities going on. And we also have

updated—— Chairman UDALL. Ms. Dawsey, if I might, the gentleman’s time

has expired, and I appreciate your passion for the subject, and if

the other witnesses would like to comment for the record on the

question that Mr. Bonner directed, we would be happy to accept

those comments.

I want to make a comment and make an acknowledgment before

we recognize Dr. Wu. Congressman Bonner talked about unscripted

remarks. He is now in a very exclusive group, because Congressman Rohrabacher never makes scripted remarks, to his great credit.

I did want to acknowledge we were talking about heroes in the

Chinese society, and we have just been joined by a true American

hero, and that is Buzz Aldrin is here, sitting on the front row, and

we want to acknowledge the great Buzz Aldrin. Thank you. Thank

you for your service and your example, and we are honored to have

you here, sir.

I would be honored to yield five minutes to Congressman Wu.

AGE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE NASA WORKFORCE

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for

making me a doctor. I have really disappointed my parents by not

going down, further down that road. But I am making up for it

today.

Ms. Dawsey, perhaps I will give you an opportunity to follow up

on the answer that you were making, and I am asking this question just based on anecdotal evidence, personal experience of visiting three or four NASA centers, and attending several lectures of

folks who were with the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo Programs,

and these were active participants. If you did the arithmetic, you

sort of thought oh my gosh, you know, these are folks who were

in their early to mid 30s when they were in charge of major parts

of the program.

That is one information set, if you will, and then, during my

walkthroughs, and this could be anecdotal and not accurate, it

could be because of the people I was with, and what I was looking

at, but it sure seemed to me like, and I hate to use the term old,

because these were folks about my age, maybe slightly older,

maybe slightly younger, but there were a whole bunch of folks who

were sort of longer in the tooth, like me, than coming to the younger age groups, there seem to be precipitous dive-downs statistically,

and then, as you get to the youngest of the professional groups, or

out in the assembly areas, there might be a little blip of younger

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people. But there seem to be a real collection of people at the older

end of the spectrum, and then, at least as a significant valley of

people in the in between range, and a shortage of younger people.

And I just, when I observe that, and this was, you know, over

a period of a few years, and I have not been back in the last 12

months or so, at least, I have a concern in the back of my head

about whether we have the right, whether we will have the right

personnel mix to accomplish the missions that have been set out

for us, and it is not that you don’t learn a lot, get better at things,

as one hopes, also, as one gets older, but I am just wondering about

the age distribution of the workforce that we have today, as compared to the early exploration phases that NASA engaged in,

whether that has something to do with NASA budgets, whether

that has something to do with the competitive arena that you all

are engaged in, with the private sector or others, and I would like

to just turn it over to you and the rest of the panel to address that

as best you can.

Ms. DAWSEY. I will try to keep my response shorter. One of the

reasons that what you observed is true is NASA has always worked

hard not to conduct reductions in force, and in the ’90s, when there

was major downsizing across government, NASA, attrited through

natural attrition, and did not conduct reductions in force when

most other government agencies did. So, that is why you see that

gap in the middle.

As I said, when we are able to hire, we are trying to hire to fill

that, to do the succession management kind of hiring, so that we

have people who are filling in the middle group, and bringing in

younger students. We recognize we do have an issue, and we are

working to address it.

One of the ways we are addressing it is we are having different— Constellation is relatively new, and we are just finishing the systems requirements, and the systems requirements reviews this

month, and we are going to do a program baseline synchronization

following that, and that will show, give us a better idea of what the

new requirements are for Constellation and where we need to direct our recruiting, and so, that is another effort to know what

kinds of skills and when we can start hiring to fill those skills,

those skill needs.

Mr. WU. Thank you. Would any of the other panelists like to

make a comment?

Mr. STEWART. You are right about the age distribution and so on.

It is very striking, and a good part of this is due to the fact that

in the ’90s, there was a job freeze in most areas of NASA, and it

was very difficult to deal with that, and there weren’t any fresh

outs coming in in several of those years. And I was on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in those years, and we wrote specific

reports on the safety implications of not having adequate workforce

dealing with the Space Shuttle, and it got to be 2000, 2001, those

restrictions were relaxed, and we could begin to hire young people

and so on.

But there are going on in NASA today, and we talk about it in

our report, various experiments, which are very encouraging—let

me see if I can get the right title on it—the Contracting Intern Program—which has been done in the Office of Procurement, to go out

65

and find young people, bring them in, circulate them around

through the centers, so they don’t get a headquarters mentality,

has been very successful.

There are a number of examples in other federal agencies, which

we talk about in our report, that I think NASA could usefully

adopt, and not at any great additional funding, none of these are

going to cost more money, but there are examples, and I think the

panel agrees, I don’t agree with much of what Dr. Stone said, let

me say, but I do agree that we have got to get more young people

in.

Chairman UDALL. Mr. Stewart, thank you. The gentleman’s time

has expired. We have just had a series of votes called, but I think

we will try and get another round from the Chairman and from the

Ranking Member, if you all would be willing to stay, and then, we

will have to adjourn the hearing.

WORKFORCE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Ms. Dawsey, you stated that NASA has a Workforce Implementation Plan to accompany the Workforce Strategy. Does that plan

have specific objective, steps to achieve those objectives, specific

milestones and resources requirements, and if not, why not, and

would you please either way, provide the Implementation Plan to

the Subcommittee?

Ms. DAWSEY. Yes, I think it is on, the Implementation Plan is on

its way to the Subcommittee, if you don’t already have it. It was

requested on Monday, so you may have it by now.

The Workforce Implementation Plan is very comprehensive. I

mentioned the three goals that we had, and each of those goals has

three objectives, but the total is 150 tasks to implement the strategy.

Chairman UDALL. Does it have timetables and milestones?

Ms. DAWSEY. Yes, it has timetables and milestones, and we have

an automatic tracking system, and the automatic tracking system

shows the milestones, the metrics, timetables, and the leads. And

it is agency-wide, we have—some of our centers are some of the

leads on the projects, on the tasks.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, and we look forward to reviewing

that plan when you send it over to us. Thank you.

Dr. Black, the National Academies report notes that it is critical

to maintain in-house scientific competence to provide leadership

and to maintain expertise in specialty areas that are not broadly

practiced in universities and industry. Would you elaborate on that

point?

IMPORTANCE OF IN-HOUSE SCIENTISTS AT NASA

Dr. BLACK. You know, the in-house scientists at NASA play a

very special role. They provide the linkage with the project and the

science objectives of the missions. They help translate the requirements. They are, in a sense, the guardians of the sciences, as the

trades need to be made, and as the mission goes forward.

And these are the kinds of activities that typically university

people do not have the time or the inclination to stay involved

with. So, it is very important that NASA maintain a core scientific

66

expertise with people who have the ability to work with the

projects, work with the engineers, to make sure that the projects

are being done in a way that really realizes the scientific objectives

that are set out. And so, these are the kinds of skills, if I understand your question, that we think that it is important to maintain

inside the Agency.

We did remark in our report that it would probably be worthwhile at least doing a head count, and see whether, in fact, all of

the scientists associated with NASA need to still be involved that

way, but that is a separate issue.

Chairman UDALL. In the couple of minutes I have remaining,

anybody else on the panel want to comment on that particular

question? Mr. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART. Well, somewhere before the hearing is over, I want

to just say clearly for the record, that I think Dr. Stone has seriously mischaracterized the NAPA report, and I take real exception

to some of the things that he said. I just want to get that on the

record. For example, nowhere in our report do we talk about BRAC

commission. It just isn’t there. I mean, we talk about the fact that

there ought to be a systematic methodology for looking at the centers, for matching the responsibilities of the centers to the workforce that they have, and providing the flexibility and tools that are

necessary to get the right people to the right place at the right

time.

The Senate Appropriations Committee, when they asked us to do

this report, I don’t think anticipated that we were going to come

back to them and say well, you know what, folks, what you need

to do is appropriate more money. I don’t think that was what they

had in mind when they gave us that assignment. We didn’t get into

the issue of what the NASA budget ought to be. That was not our

assignment. Our assignment was how do you make a flexible, scalable workforce a reality in NASA, given the tasks that they have

to accomplish, and the budget restraints that are part of their

world, and we have attempted to do that.

And if one reads the report carefully, you will see we are saying

you need data, you need data at the right places, you need data

that is integrated. You need mechanisms, and we have provided

several, that will help you make sense out of that data, and then,

you need the tools that you can then act on that data. That is essentially what the report is all about.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Stewart, and you can certainly

submit additional testimony on that line of thinking.

Mr. STEWART. I think we will.

Chairman UDALL. Dr. Stone, you want the last 38 seconds?

Dr. STONE. Just check the PDF file and do a search for BRAC.

You will find it.

Chairman UDALL. Let me turn, at this time, to the gentleman

from Florida for the final round of questioning. Mr. Feeney.

Mr. FEENEY. Well, thank you. Again, I want to thank Chairman

Udall, and we have to run off, and we have got a series of about

eight votes, so this will probably be the end, so that you guys can

go to lunch, and we can get about our business.

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RATIO OF PERMANENT AND NONPERMANENT CIVIL

SERVANTS

I focused earlier on the need to recruit youth, whether directly

in NASA, or DOD, or the aerospace community, that are excited

about this, and now, I want to address a question that Dr. Stone

has raised and Mr. Stewart has raised, and that is the question of

what the proper balance is, being the strategy that Ms. Dawsey described, talks about a more appropriate blend of permanent and

nonpermanent civil servants.

And I guess I would like very briefly, because we only have a few

minutes, I think I know Dr. Stone’s answer here, but I would like

to have the, maybe he can address this very quickly, but then the

others. What is the proper ratio? How do we determine that, and

for Ms. Dawsey, who I guess we will let finish up, how is NASA

going to make these judgments and decisions about who ought to

be permanent, as opposed—who ought to be nonpermanent civil

servants.

Dr. Stone, you want to start?

Dr. STONE. Just briefly. As I said in the beginning of my opening

statement, there were 36,000 NASA civil servant employees the

last time we went to the Moon, and we went there successfully.

And now, we have only 16,300 permanent, full-time civil servants

left.

And rather than give a long answer right now, I would just encourage the Subcommittee Members to take a look at the Columbia

Accident Investigation Board and their advice on this topic, because I think there is a detailed analysis done by an objective

panel about the role of over-outsourcing technical responsibilities to

the private sector, and undermining the internal technical abilities

of the agencies, and that contribution to the Columbia disaster,

and I think that analysis is thorough, and that would give you an

idea of what our concerns are. I can’t give you a magic number, but

I think when you look at the situation today, and you look at the

graph that I showed you up there, the biggest problem facing

NASA today is not to reduce its civil service workforce, and so, the

obsession with this is a little bit troubling, considering that is not

what the big problem is.

And secondly, in one of the responses made earlier by Mr. Stewart, he said that the problem of recruiting young people was only

in the ’90s, but if you take a look at the graph, half of that fivefold

reduction in the employees between 30 and 35 was between 1993

and 2000, and the other half of it was between 2000 and 2005. So,

all I am saying is we are not hiring young civil servants, and the

few young civil servants that we are hiring, we are hiring into term

positions, which are much less attractive than the positions that

were open to young people when I was looking at the Agency.

Mr. FEENEY. We are running out of time very quickly. Dr. Black

and Mr. Stewart.

Dr. BLACK. I just want to know if I get hazardous duty pay for

sitting between these two.

No, I don’t really have that much to add. I think it is, the only

thing I would say here is that, do not fall into the trap of just looking at a simple curve or two, and listening to numbers about how

68

many are in this bin or in that bin. This is a far more complex

issue than that, and to look at the dynamics of how you get people

in, as I said earlier, to look at the differing timescales for the

sources and sinks of these people, understanding the evolution of

this workforce is a very, very daunting problem, and I don’t think

we have our arms anywhere near yet around how to do that.

Mr. FEENEY. Mr. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART. You can’t give a precise ratio off the top of your

head. It is a position by position decision that the hiring authority

has to make, and it is the nature of the position, the nature of the

responsibilities that person would hold, along with a number of

other factors, and we have a very precise decision guide in our report that will help managers make that decision in a coherent, rational way.

In some cases, a term employee fits the position very well. In

other cases, the term employee would not be a good decision, but

you have to make that in a kind of rational way, and not just sort

of grab something out of the air, and what we have tried to do here

is to provide a mechanism for doing that in a rational and coherent

way, and if that is done, we think that the actual ratio will take

care of itself.

Mr. FEENEY. Ms. Dawsey, you have got about 10, 20 seconds.

Ms. DAWSEY. Okay, first of all, using term appointments is not

for the purpose of attriting civil servants. The purpose of the term

appointment is to look at work that is changing over the next 20

years, and making sure, as Mr. Stewart said, that the position dictates the type of appointment. Term appointments are for two

years initially, but can be extended up to six years, and with our

new term flexibility, we can convert without further competition to

permanent if we, in fact, still need the skills. Right now, we have

a skills mix issue that using term appointments will help us prevent in the future.

Chairman UDALL. Thank you. We are in a bit of a hurry, so you

will understand as we depart quickly, but I want to thank the

panel particularly, and for the very forthright and impassioned conversation we have had. And Dr. Black, you can apply for hazard

pay at the site office. But I think that as a service we all care deeply about NASA. We have a passion for its future, and we also have

great pride in what it has accomplished, and that is the point of

the hearing, and the point of your all’s appearance.

If there is no objection, the record will remain open for additional

statements from the Members, and for answers to any follow-up

questions the Subcommittee may ask of you all, the witnesses.

Without objection, so ordered.

The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Toni Dawsey, Assistant Administrator, Human Capital Management;

Chief Human Capital Officer, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA)

Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall

Q1. What are the critical milestones for NASA’s workforce planning over the next few

years, and do you anticipate any difficulties in reaching those milestones?

A1. The single most critical milestone for NASA’s workforce planning over the next

few years is the end of the Shuttle Program in 2010. As the new Constellation Program begins, NASA is shifting from a primary mode of operating and sustaining two

major legacy systems, to a period of concurrent development of several new systems,

and then to a period of transitioning from exploration back to operations. Operations

personnel will be critical elements of developmental design, testing, and verification

activities for Orion and Ares I initially. Once operational, the next developmental

iteration of Ares V, the Earth Departure Stage, and the Lunar Surface Access Module will begin, thereby concurrently driving the need for a substantial developmental workforce. Thus, the NASA paradigm must shift more than once over the

next few years. First, toward our new focus on development, and then to operations

cycles that allow the Vision laid out in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 to be

fully executed on the schedule and funding profile outlined by the President and

Congress. NASA’s overarching goal is to preserve its critical skill base, ensure the

viability of its core competencies, and execute the bold missions assigned to the

Agency—this will be challenging, dynamic, and evolutionary. The major milestones

for workforce planning related to transition are tied to the design milestones for the

Constellation program (including initial operational capability for the Orion/Crew

Exploration Vehicle currently planned for March 2015) as well as the retirement of

the Shuttle program in 2010. NASA will evaluate these milestones, and revise them

as appropriate, as part of the annual Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution process.

Workforce and critical skills must be retained for safe execution of the remaining

Shuttle missions, managed appropriately during the transition to ensure that the

new developmental program workforce requirements are met, and engaged during

the period following Shuttle retirement in 2010 prior to initial operational capability

of the Orion/Crew Exploration Vehicle. For those elements of our new spacecraft

systems that are based upon heritage Shuttle hardware or existing designs, the skill

set requirements will be directly transferable to the new programs. In other cases,

some of our workforce will have to shift roles, jobs, and possibly duty locations as

the needs of the new programs require. The inherently more efficient design of the

new systems will result in a need for fewer direct operations, support, and processing skills. Thus, some of the operations-focused workforce will be leveraged and

shifted to more development-focused activities such as planning, design, testing and

verification, and integration in order to build a workforce capacity that enables future developmental cycles spanning the transition from initial Ares I/Crew Launch

Vehicle and Orion capability, to development and fielding of Ares V, Earth Departure Stage, Lunar Surface Access Module, Lunar Outpost, and then to systems that

will take America to Mars.

NASA plans to maintain this vital workforce and experience through final fly out

of the Shuttle through: applying some of the new processes required for the new

Ares and Orion vehicles to Space Shuttle processing in order to give workers the

skills and hands-on experience they need to qualify for future work; non-monetary

award based strategies; financial incentives when necessary; conversion to temporary and term appointments; and solid leadership. In addition, NASA is developing integrated workforce requirements across the Shuttle, International Space

Station and Constellation programs. This will help with scenario planning, identification of gaps and overlaps in skills availability, and further refinement of the

workforce profile. All of these steps will ensure we maintain the proper workforce

for continued safe operations.

Q2. Your testimony notes that ‘‘with an enhanced workforce planning capability,

NASA will be able to determine the demand for, and supply of workforce skills

based on current and projected work requirements.’’ What is the timetable for

having the enhanced workforce planning capability, and how are decisions on

workforce being made in the meantime?

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A2. NASA’s workforce planning capability is being enhanced in two key areas: (1)

the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) process; and, (2) the improvement of the quality of planning data used to determine gaps between workforce supply and demand.

As explained more fully in the response to Question for the Record number nine

below, workforce planning at NASA is programmatically driven through the PPBE

process. Formulation of the FY 2009 budget is the first time that NASA is fully integrating workforce planning into the PPBE process. FY 2009 budget formulation is

currently in process, and the impact of enhanced workforce planning integration is

already being seen as workforce analysis drives Agency mission and work distribution planning. In addition to the normal PPBE data collection, the Agency is using

the NASA Workforce Integrated Management System to improve its ability to track

and manage the Available for New Work pool (uncovered capacity; i.e., civil service

employees at NASA that are not currently assigned or supporting Agency programs)

through new data collection formats.

NASA plans to complete several efforts to improve the quality of workforce planning data for use outside of the budget process by the end of the calendar year. One

important initiative is the development of a Strategic Workforce Management Model

which will be an Agency-wide ‘‘FTE demand’’ (i.e., the anticipated long-term need

for workforce FTE, to accomplish funded programs and projects) model to be used

in workforce planning activities. In addition, NASA is holding Agency-wide capability assessment forums to further refine the Agency’s workforce planning picture.

Finally, the Agency is now evaluating several modeling, simulation and analytical

tools in an effort to better capture system dynamics and requirements-driven workforce and skill-mix forecasting.

Q3. The National Academies report recommends that NASA increase opportunities

for younger workers to obtain hands-on flight development experience through

NASA’s sub-orbital programs. The report also suggests that NASA fund these

hands-on training opportunities through the Education Office. Does NASA have

any plans for adopting this recommendation and has it been discussed with

NASA’s Education Office?

A3. Experience has shown that exciting and compelling NASA missions truly can

inspire the next generation of explorers, innovators, and leaders. NASA’s unique

program content, people, and facilities can be leveraged to spark interest, capture

imaginations, and guide students toward careers in STEM fields while increasing

their scientific and technologic literacy to the benefit of the Nation.

A top priority for the new management of NASA’s Science Mission Directorate

(SMD) is to provide greater hands-on development and flight opportunities as a way

to prepare undergraduate and graduate students in science and engineering to lead

larger missions in the future. Through NASA’s suborbital sounding rocket, balloon,

and aircraft research programs, as well as flight projects, SMD is currently conducting a comprehensive study of student hands-on opportunities to better prepare

new scientists and engineers in the scientific exploration of space through a Student

Collaboration Definition Team. This team was established to: 1) explore best practices in project-based learning exemplifying the nature of NASA’s scientific exploration in space; 2) explore additional learning opportunities of a similar character

that is not part of a flight missions; and, 3) provide opportunities for input from

the community engaged with SMD. This team held its first meeting in early May

2007. A white paper is under development and a community workshop will be held

at the end of 2007 or early 2008. The sub-orbital research programs continue their

involvement of students in relevant authentic research opportunities. In addition,

four new sounding rocket payloads were recently selected for flight, with research

launches planned between 2008 and 2010.

NASA’s Office of Education in collaboration with the Agency’s four Mission Directorates provides additional opportunities for students to engage in NASA mission

related experiences. For example, within SMD, a broad spectrum of education activities are sponsored ranging from kindergarten to postgraduate levels. All of NASA’s

science missions and programs are required to have an education and public outreach component. Through a competitive, peer-review selection process, NASA provides funding dedicated to education and public outreach to researchers. NASA also

sponsors graduate and post-doctoral fellowship opportunities. In addition, the Agency is looking for new ways to provide increased opportunities for students to gain

greater experience developing and launching their own science instruments, either

in conjunction with science missions or through its sub-orbital rocket and balloon

programs.

Examples of successful collaborations include:

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• Launched in January 2006 as part of the New Horizons Mission, the Student

Dust Counter is the first student-built instrument selected by NASA to fly on

a planetary mission. Built by students at the University of Colorado at Boulder, the counter will monitor the density of dust grains in space. This data

is of particular interest to researchers. Given the nine-year travel time, discoveries from this mission will engage today’s elementary school student until

college when this spacecraft encounters Pluto.

• Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere (AIM) began its two-year mission on April

25, 2007, after a flawless ride to Earth orbit aboard an Orbital Sciences Pegasus XL rocket. AIM is the first mission dedicated to exploring mysterious ice

clouds that dot the edge of space in Earth’s Polar Regions. With AIM, Hampton University in Virginia has become the first Historically Black College and

University to lead a NASA satellite mission. Undergraduate and graduate

students from various STEM disciplines will have an opportunity to join faculty researchers in the analysis of collected data.

• On February 17, 2007, NASA launched five Time History of Events and

Macroscale Interactions during Substorms (THEMIS) micro-satellites to study

the Earth’s magnetosphere. THEMIS will help scientists understand how and

why space storms create havoc on satellites, power grids, and communication

systems. Students will work with scientists to unravel a variety of scientific

mysteries.

• Between the International Space Station, the Space Shuttle, sounding rockets

and high altitude balloons, NASA’s Education Flight Projects provide handson experiences to inspire and motivate students to pursue studies and careers

in STEM through participation in NASA research applications. NASA is using

its unique assets like the C–9 better known as ‘‘The Vomit Comet’’ to allow

students to study microgravity. The Agency is launching student experiments

more than 25 miles above the Earth on sounding rockets. And NASA astronauts make phone calls from 240 miles above Earth’s atmosphere to students

to involve them in current research aboard the International Space Station.

All these opportunities take advantage of NASA’s flight hardware projects

provide real, hands-on experiences to inspire the minds, imaginations, and career ambitions of America’s young people.

• NASA’s support of higher education students is embodied by the National

Space Grant College and Fellowship Program, which continues to provide fellowships and scholarships to students across the country. Recent statistics

show that, of the pool of students who completed their degrees, 31 percent

were employed in STEM careers and 48 percent continued their education to

the Master’s, Ph.D., or postdoctoral levels. Many consortia have implemented

hands-on, university student-led projects in aeronautics, rocketry, scientific

ballooning, rocketry, and nano- and micro-satellite development. These types

of projects provide the professional training that enable students to be fully

prepared to enter the STEM workforce.

• NASA, in collaborations with the International Space Education Board

(ISEB), is increasing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics literacy and enhancing future workforce needs with the development of Global

Education Ground Station Network. The network will serve the interest of all

universities wishing to launch small satellites, by providing near continuous

ground station coverage for all educational satellites. NASA is funding California Polytechnic University (Cal Poly) to collaboratively develop software in

support of the Global Educational Ground Station Network. The software will

schedule passes autonomously, monitor for errors, perform error correction,

prioritize utilization, etc. The network is to be developed by students for students.

• The Office of Education is sponsoring one Science, Engineering, Mathematics

and Aerospace Academy (SEMAA) team to participate in ARLISS (A Rocket

Launch for International Student Satellites). ARLISS is designed to provide

an educational experience to students in the design, flight, and data analysis

of a space experiment (an experiment housed in a coke can). This program

is to prepare students for an exciting, technical challenge that may lead to

launching space experiments into low-Earth orbits and beyond. University

aeronautics/astronautics students, high school students, robotic clubs, and

hobbyists get together each year to fly their satellite projects in rockets supplied by Aero-pac. Stanford University and others around the world sponsor

this project.

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Q4. According to the list of NASA workforce competencies provided in the National

Academies report, there are 106 NASA workers with competency in astronomy

and astrophysics, eight with competency in hydrological science, 36 in air traffic

systems, and so on. How is NASA making decisions about how many individuals are needed to maintain core competencies in science and aeronautics areas?

A4. The NASA centers use the Agency’s Workforce Integrated Management System

(WIMS) to plan the individuals and competencies required for future work elements.

WIMS aggregates the numerical data expressing workforce requirements for each

center. Center management reviews this planning data and makes adjustments as

necessary, including adjustments to the size of specific workforce components. Each

center is the focus for specific key capabilities required for the overall NASA mission, including space flight, aeronautics and science capabilities. Through the annual budget process, centers work with Headquarters in making decisions that affect the workforce strength available in the future to provide key capabilities.

Q5a. With respect to the ‘‘Ten Healthy Centers’’ component of NASA’s Workforce

strategy, Dr. Black questions whether the Centers will have the appropriate

staff to handle work that is sent to the Centers. Mr. Stewart raises concerns

about how NASA plans to measure the health of its Centers. What are NASA’s current plans for implementing the ‘‘Ten Healthy Centers’’ approach?

A5a. NASA has implemented and intends to maintain the ‘‘Ten Healthy Centers’’ approach.

Q5b. What criteria is NASA using to evaluate the health of its Centers?

A5b. An essential attribute of a healthy center is a skilled and flexible blended

workforce with sufficient depth and breadth to meet the Agency’s challenges. Recognizing that NASA must be able to assess the capability (or ‘‘health’’) of its workforce

to meet mission goals, the Agency recently developed six measures of workforce capability that are being used to monitor multiple dimensions of workforce health at

the centers and identify areas of misalignment. These measures are: scalability,

skill availability and access, performance and proficiency, sufficiency, sustainability,

and utilization. They are defined below.

• Scalability: Extent to which a center is able to adjust the number of FTE

(civil service employees) and WYE (contractor employees) of different types

quickly enough to meet changes in workforce demand within an anticipated

range of future work.

• Skill Availability and Access: Extent to which a center has access to needed

competencies at an acceptable quality level for range of anticipated work.

• Performance and Proficiency: Extent to which civil service and contractor performance is (or is anticipated to be) reliable for range of work—particularly

with work that is new, high risk or inflexible in terms of schedule or cost.

• Sufficiency: Degree to which a center has sufficient capacity, appropriate skill

mix, and competence within the civil service workforce to fulfill management

and oversight responsibilities.

• Sustainability: Extent to which a center has sufficient ‘‘bench strength’’ over

time to sustain appropriate level of internal capacity in key business, technical, and managerial positions to grow in-house skills and replace workforce

as they move up or out.

• Utilization: Degree to which civil service workforce is used efficiently to perform the work of the center, in terms of ‘‘coverage’’ of workforce by budgeted

FTE dollars as well as efficient and effective use of staff to funded work.

Associated with each measure are qualitative and/or quantitative indicators (including demographic patterns, refresh rates, attrition patterns, career development

paths) that each center uses to assess its workforce relative to that measure. The

measures can be used individually to describe specific areas of misalignment, but

are intended to operate as a set to demonstrate the overall ‘‘health’’ (or capability)

of a center’s workforce and indicate potential tradeoffs that may be necessary to

meet particular workforce objectives.

It is important for the Agency to identify potential misalignments sufficiently

early that there is adequate lead time to develop and implement effective strategies

to correct the misalignments. For that reason, we have integrated this assessment

process with the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.

The objective is to have centers provide information to the Agency regarding the capability of their workforce over the budget planning horizon using a consistent and

systematic approach.

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Q6. How are decisions currently being made on whether NASA projects should be

conducted by in-house civil servants or by contractors?

A6. NASA has a policy directive in place to address distinguishing between contractor and civil service functions. NASA also has identified specific activities that

it has determined to be vital to keep in house. These include: strategic guidance,

oversight, fundamental decision-making, sustaining program momentum, retention

of institutional memory, decisions about cost trade-offs, and architectural understanding. Decisions regarding whether projects should be conducted by in-house civil

servants or by contractors are made within the framework of the NASA Strategic

Acquisition Approach. During acquisition strategy planning, leadership considers

issues such as alignment with the Agency Strategic Plan and the NASA Ten

Healthy Centers policy. Prior to acquisition or to partnership commitments, Acquisition Strategy Meetings are held to validate make-buy rationales and to make final

make-buy decisions.

Q6a. How does NASA determine whether it has the right level of in-house expertise

to make ‘‘smart-buyer’’ decisions?

A6a. Assuring ‘‘smart-buyer’’ capability is inherent in Agency and center leadership’s responsibility to manage NASA’s multi-sector workforce. It is inextricably

linked with responsible institutional and technical management practiced at NASA.

Several major Agency-level processes come together to ensure that NASA has the

right level of in-house expertise to make ‘‘smart-buyer’’ decisions. Within the acquisition process, NASA leadership at both the Agency and center level work together

in the Strategic Acquisition Approach to make sure that all pertinent considerations

(such as key activities and Agency strategy and policy described above) are taken

into account in determining which work to contract out and which to perform inhouse. Within the budget process, the Agency makes decisions about the assignment

of work to centers such that risk to the long term viability of centers and their

‘‘smartbuyer’’ capability is minimized and center health assured. Within the human

capital process, recruitment, staffing and development actions are undertaken continually to improve NASA’s ‘‘smart-buyer’’ capability.

Q6b. Does NASA plan to use the tools for decisions about the mix of contractors and

civil servants in NASA projects provided in the NAPA report?

A6b. It is important to note that NAPA’s eight major categories of critical importance in deciding whether to hire a civil servant or use a contractor are not conceptually new to NASA. Considerations of Function, Resources, Workload, Labor Market, Accountability, Risk, Quality/Service Level, and Employment/Flexibility are already part of NASA’s decision-making. What is new about NAPA’s NASA Civil Servant-Contractor Decision-Making Guide is its quantitative approach to using the scoring and rating of multiple criteria within each category to drive Agency make-buy

decisions. NASA is currently in the process of coordinating analysis and evaluation

of NAPA’s Guide to determine how it may be incorporated into Agency practice.

Q7. Your testimony refers to the creation of a Workforce Planning Governance Structure. How often does this group meet and could you please provide some examples of the types of decisions that they are making?

A7. The Workforce Planning Governance Structure, established to strengthen

NASA’s human capital strategic planning capability, has representation from the

Agency’s human resources community, mission directorates, other mission support

offices, and the NASA centers. The governance process will be used to align the

Agency’s resources in a manner that ensures the effective utilization of the workforce and the skills needed to accomplish the Agency’s mission. The focus will be

on increasing the level of integration and collaboration across workforce planning

functions, improving the quality of information used to make decisions, and balancing short- and long-term planning needs.

There are three main components of the Governance Structure: the Agency Governance Group, a Workforce Planning Technical Team, and other issue-specific ad

hoc technical teams that are formed as needed.

The Agency Governance Group is responsible for surfacing high-risk issues and

recommendations to senior management, evaluating the results of planning activities, monitoring the progress of the operational groups, and developing workforce

planning capabilities.

The Workforce Planning Technical Team is a standing, on-going group that implements workforce planning guidance and policies; helps develop and implement center workforce planning capabilities; and assists in collecting data in support of workVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:30 Dec 21, 2007 Jkt 035235 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA07\051707\35235 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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force activities undertaken by the team. It is the hub of workforce planning information collection, distribution, analysis, and reporting across NASA.

The ad hoc technical teams are formed to deal with specific issues. Their purpose

is limited to the issue they are tasked with solving, with a defined scope and

timeline.

The Workforce Planning Technical Team is the element that meets regularly to

address important workforce issues facing the Agency and to develop strategies to

address the issues. It is not the group that makes the key decisions for the Agency;

instead, it functions as a working, representative team that studies significant

workforce issues and provides information, data, and recommendations to Agency

senior management to consider. This team held its first meeting in mid-February

and meets (via telecon) every two weeks. This group has focused on a number of

significant workforce planning initiatives over the past four months, including:

• establishing a greatly improved process for identifying the Available for New

Work (uncovered capacity) segment of the workforce to facilitate finding solutions to mitigate the problem; and,

• ensuring that centers understand the new ‘‘Measures of Workforce Capability’’ adopted by the Agency to assess workforce health at the centers so

that the information centers provide will generate valuable insights into the

workforce challenges they face, enabling Agency leadership to identify the actions needed to strengthen and sustain workforce health.

Q8a. At the June 13, 2006, Subcommittee hearing, you testified that NASA had reduced its uncovered capacity through retraining, job fairs, and buy-outs,

among other measures. What is the current status of NASA’s uncovered capacity and how does NASA track who is uncovered and by how much?

A8a. As stated in the NASA response to Questions for the Record number two

above and number nine below the Agency plans individuals to programs and

projects at one tenth of an FTE level by program and project at the work breakdown

(WBS) level by name in the current year and next two years in the Agency Workforce Integrated Management System (WIMS). WIMS identifies which of the workforce is not fully assigned to a WBS and by how much.

NASA’s level of Available for New Work has been reduced to less than 100 FTE

in FY 2008, an amount that is historically manageable as it is owed primarily to

normal starting and stopping of tasks or projects. The success in reducing the level

of uncovered capacity is due primarily to assigning Constellation Program work to

every NASA center so that all centers are vested in the space exploration mission.

While NASA still has skill mix imbalances at the centers the Agency continues to

address those through early out/buy-out measures.

Q8b. At last year’s hearing, you noted that NASA had established retraining programs lasting several months at research Centers to allow staff to develop the

skills needed to handle new work sent to the Centers. What is the result of those

training programs and how are you assessing the effectiveness of those programs?

A8b. Many NASA centers have initiatives in place to ensure they have employees

in place with the skills necessary to take on Constellation work. The retraining efforts predominantly focus on program and project management and systems engineering. Many of these initiatives are in their infancy, with identified employees

still working on competency and skills development. NASA’s Academy for Program

Project and Engineering Leadership, which provides the bulk of this type of training

within the Agency, conducted over 1,600 instances of related training in FY 2006.

Training instances in FY 2007 will exceed last year’s number.

NASA’s Langley Research Center (LaRC) in Virginia has begun a program of retraining that includes technicians. LaRC has also offered open enrollment courses

on program management. In addition, LaRC has begun a series on program management and exploration which consists of courses, mentoring, projects, and details

to other centers. To date, the participants have completed all the course work and

are scheduling other aspects of the curriculum. NASA’s Glenn Research Center in

Ohio has recently begun its second class of systems engineering. They are conducting a mid-point evaluation of the first class and will make needed adjustments.

Program effectiveness will eventually be assessed by engineering and project management feedback.

In addition, other centers have transition teams in place to manage retraining efforts. NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Texas has established an Engineering Academy designed to provide a comprehensive training program for the next generation

of engineers. This effort will prove especially useful to those engineers currently

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supporting the Space Shuttle Program, as they gain knowledge & training in design

and development competencies. NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida centralized all day-to-day engineering functions into a new Engineering Directorate in October 2006. The realignment effort will enable them to more efficiently and effectively utilize current engineering skills and resources as well as position themselves

to be prepared for meeting Constellation workforce and skills requirements. NASA’s

Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama has created a Shuttle Transition Team

that is heavily engaged with human resources staff to define skill gaps, recruitment

and retraining strategies.

Not all of the research centers have been conducting retraining. NASA’s Dryden

Flight Research Center in California, for example, was able to hire within the past

year. Individuals were selected with the needed skill set to support the Center’s

Constellation work.

The centers are working to ensure that they have the necessary competencies and

skill sets to support the Vision for Exploration. They have positioned themselves

well as the workforce plan more sharply focuses on the competencies needed for the

Agency’s future.

Q9a. Your testimony states that NASA has ‘‘integrated and synchronized workforce

planning with the development of program and project budgets.’’ Could you

please describe in concrete terms how workforce planning is integrated with

programs and with project budgets?

A9a. NASA utilizes the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE)

process as an Agency-wide methodology for aligning resources in a comprehensive,

top-down approach that supports the Agency’s vision and mission. It focuses on

translating Agency strategy, priorities and planned outcomes into actionable programs. Workforce planning at NASA is programmatically driven through this budget process. The preparation of the FY 2009 budget is the first year that we have

fully integrated workforce planning into the PPBE process through all phases.

Several of the annual PPBE process milestones incorporate workforce planning:

(1) Both the Strategic Program Guidance and the Program and Resource Guidance

incorporate workforce planning policy guidance; (2) Interim snapshots of workforce

distribution data inform all of the milestones within the programming phase of

PPBE; (3) The Institutional Infrastructure Analysis includes the evaluation of qualitative Workforce Measures of Capability (e.g., sustainability, scalability, etc.) and

quantitative workforce planning data focused on areas of concern collected from the

NASA centers; (4) Workforce data and analysis informs make-buy decisions made

under NASA’s new Strategic Acquisition Approach, as well as final Programming

decisions; and, (5) Outputs of the PPBE Programming phase include a comprehensive plan for work and workforce distribution for the current and next five fiscal

years.

Data collection, tracking and reporting for PPBE workforce planning is managed

through the NASA Workforce Integrated Management System (WIMS). Within

WIMS, the supply of current and planned civil servants is aligned with planned program-based work demand and funding sources. WIMS outputs include a workforce

plan that ties each employee (to the 1/10 of an FTE level) to a specific project work

breakdown structure (WBS) element for the current and next two years. For the following three years, FTE-competencies are planned by WBS. Because of these plans,

each NASA center understands how many FTEs and what type of FTE is funded

for the various projects assigned to it, and it can plan its human capital programs

accordingly.

Q9b. Prior to this integration, how were workforce decisions made with respect to

program developments and project budgets?

A9b. Prior to the implementation of the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) process, there was a greater separation between budget planning and

workforce planning. The processes were more sequential, with workforce planning

being secondary. Budget decisions were made first, and these drove workforce planning. In recent years, key aspects of budget planning and workforce planning take

place concurrently. NASA’s implementation of full cost accounting has shed light on

the workforce impacts of what previously might have been understood as primarily

budget decisions. Currently, analysis of the workforce frequently influences and

even drives budget and mission planning decisions; for example, in determining at

what NASA center work packages will be directed.

Q10a. Your testimony notes that ‘‘Competencies are the common thread that tie the

elements of workforce management together. CMS is a relatively new system

that we are continually working to improve. By integrating CMS with other

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workforce planning tools, we are able to not only identify, the critical current

and future competency gaps and surpluses, but we can weave that competency

information throughout the workforce management process.’’ Could you please

describe the history of the CMS development along with milestones for improvements that are being made or are planned to be made.

A10a. The Competency Management System (CMS) is managed and operated by

the Office of Human Capital Management at NASA Headquarters, working with

mission directorates, mission support offices and the NASA centers. The primary objectives of CMS are to maintain a listing of workforce competencies across the Agency, align the expertise of the workforce to the mission via the budget planning process, and enable the Agency to build the level of expertise in targeted knowledge

areas. The CMS was deployed in multiple phases as it grew in scope and operations. The

goal was to try and minimize the impact and work at the centers, so early deployment was limited to a small audience at each of the centers. This also allowed greater flexibility with the design by allowing the team to incorporate lessons learned

from one phase into the next.

Since the start of the program, the Agency has undergone several major strategic

and operational changes. Therefore, the CMS must, and does continue, to adjust and

adapt to the changing business environment in order to maintain its relevancy and

usefulness to the Agency’s mission.

The history of CMS development along with milestones for improvements:

Development/Center Implementation Pilot Phase (2000–2001)

• Developed the competency model (concepts, data structure and business process)

• Developed a Competency Dictionary at one center (content from subject matter experts)

• Collected competency data from all 1,800 employees at the center over a three

month period

• Supervisors and peer reviewers conducted validation of employee competencies over a five month period

Agency Implementation Pilot Phase (2001–2003)

• Developed the Competency Dictionary for the entire Agency (consensus by

subject matter experts from the centers)

• Generated an initial Position Level Competency Inventory (based on NASA

Classification Codes)

• Centers refined the position inventory

• Performed FY 2005 interim budget assessment of workforce FTE needs in

terms of competencies

• Performed first GAP analysis and identification of critical competencies

Agency Implementation Deployment Phase (2004–2006)

• Performed FY 2006 budget assessment of workforce FTE needs

• Conducted revision 5 of the Competency Dictionary (increased review audience to include functional offices at the corporate level)

• Requested competency data from all employees in the Agency

• Supervisors performed validation of employee competencies

• Planned deployment of additional functionality (2007–2008)

• Integrated with the employee development process and the Agency’s new

Learning Management System

• Modified the Agency workforce gap analysis process to adapt to changes of

the Agency budget planning process

Operational & Maintenance Phase (2008–)

• Perform annual review and revision of the workforce competency dictionary

• Perform annual Agency workforce gap analysis in conjunction with the Agency budget submittal

• Supervisors and human resource specialists maintain accurate and updated

competency requirements for job positions

• Employees and supervisors develop and implement individual learning plans

to build and maintain employee’s expertise

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Q10b. What are the other workforce planning tools being integrated with CMS and

what is the plan for that integration process?

A10b. Competency Management System (CMS) data, plus a comprehensive set of

other workforce data currently available, are already providing good definition of the

current workforce. The Workforce Information Management System, in conjunction

CMS, provides the Agency with good information about current workforce gaps and

surpluses. Additionally, the Agency has a business intelligence tool populated with

current and historical workforce data. This business intelligence tool enables multidimensional analysis of workforce trends and forecasts future retirements in specific

organizational, occupational and skills areas. Forecasting of retirements enables the

Agency to do one aspect of advanced planning for the workforce, determining if

there are workforce components which are at increased risk due to future losses.

Q10c. When will NASA be in a position to identify current and future competency

gaps and surpluses using workforce-planning tools such as CMS?

A10c. Currently, NASA is planning to utilize CMS in the fall of 2007 to perform

workforce competency gap analysis based on the proposed FY 2009 budget. This information will show trends in planned competency needs over the next five years

and the forecasted ability of the workforce to meet those needs. From this analysis,

areas of potential competency shortages and surpluses should be identified.

The second aspect of workforce planning requires effective processes for getting

good definition of future work requirements. This is directly related to program

planning and budget formulation, and, for the first time, NASA is integrating workforce planning with the budget process for the FY 2009 budget. NASA anticipates

successful identification of potential workforce gaps and surpluses. The Agency also

anticipates it will have learned important lessons to apply to the FY 2010 budget

and workforce planning processes.

Q11a. Your testimony states that ‘‘The capabilities of HCIE (Human Capital Information Environment) are enormous, limited only by our ingenuity in identifying the boundless ways in which information can be woven together to drive

decisions and enable success.’’ Could you please describe the requirements for

the development of the HCIE?

A11a. Developing the Human Capital Information Environment (HCIE) is the first

step in creating a fully integrated, strategically focused, business management environment for online, near-real-time access to comprehensive information needed for

rapid and accurate decision-making. The basic requirement for HCIE development

is inter-operability and close integration with NASA’s financial management system

through a shared database to provide dependable human capital information, integrated with information from other business areas, such as finance, for all organizational elements. This common, robust data source will eliminate the need for stand

alone, non-integrated systems, which often offer redundant capabilities. The authoritative data repository, HCIE, will furnish a wealth of information in support of the

demands of this mission-driven, project-oriented Agency. HCIE supports the President’s Management Agenda (PMA), implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration, and our NASA Workforce Transformation; and aligns with our Information

Resource Management Strategy and the HR Lines, Business, and EGov requirements. Finally, HCIE has been developed using a service-oriented architecture

which provides point integration and inter-operability with our non-human capital

applications such as identify management, safety, security, legal, facilities, and financial management.

Q11b. What is the relationship of the CMS and other workforce planning tools to the

HCIE?

A11b. The HCIE is the vehicle to enable integration of all human capital tools, including CMS and the other workforce planning tools. NASA has already integrated

information from CMS, WIMS (workforce planning tool), the Agency’s Labor Distribution System and the Agency’s budget system with the HCIE data warehouse.

By integrating authoritative data from each of NASA’s workforce planning and financial systems within a single data warehouse, the Agency enables the generation

of complex queries, analysis and reporting of information most useful to project

managers, program managers and workforce planners.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by John G. Stewart, National Academy of Public Administration Fellow;

Member, Panel on NASA Multi-sector Workforce

Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall

Q1. Both the NAPA and the National Academies reports call for more detailed information on the workforce at NASA’s Centers. Could you please discuss in specific

terms what information the Agency needs in order to support long-term workforce planning?

A1. The Panel believes that NASA’s workforce planning processes and data collection should address the total workforce, including the work for which it will hire

staff as well as for the work it will buy. While the Panel acknowledges the key differences in NASA’s relationship with its contractors and noted that NASA is not responsible for managing contractor personnel on a daily basis, the Agency should

nonetheless do a competency analysis for this group that comprises two-thirds of the

Agency’s multi-sector workforce. The contractor competency assessment should be

done on an aggregate basis, focusing on cost effectiveness, timeliness of deliverables,

and return on investment. In addition to detailed information about needed competencies across programs, NASA needs information on its required skills, certifications, and programmatic/project assignments.

For the contracting organizations, NASA needs such information as:

• Appropriate roles of contractors—for example, the Agency should specifically

identify work that is not inherently governmental, is located off-site, is not

a NASA core competency, is not needed long-term, requires a unique expertise, or results in a distinct product appropriately delivered by a contractor.

• Contract duration and flexibilities for surge capacity.

• Penalties associated with early termination.

• Cost-effectiveness.

• Return-on-investment.

In terms of its current workforce, NASA will need to identify competing demands

across programs and projects. It will need to fully understand the current

workforce’s availability and competencies and project future workforce requirements

across the organization in the short-term, intermediate-term, and longer-term time

horizons.

While gathering information on the current civil service workforce, NASA should

consider the extent to which current recruiting sources and programs, as well as

current training and development programs, are meeting its needs. In addition to

the standard information typically collected in workforce planning processes, NASA

particularly needs information that allows it to track skill mismatches by individual

employees and field centers. It particularly needs information such as:

• Existing competencies, especially for key occupations

• Potential desirability of retraining or redirecting competencies and the cost of

retraining, if needed and feasible

• Occupational mix

This information should be collected by center and aggregated for the Agency as

a whole.

In order to project future work requirements, NASA needs to collect data in such

areas as:

• Specific program demand changes over the short-term, intermediate-term,

and longer-term

• Competencies needed during these time frames based on business projections

• Nature of the work to be done, including volume, location, duration, and appropriate component of the multi-sector workforce (tenured or limited duration civil servant, contractor, grantee, university, military, etc.)

As part of this analysis, NASA should consider several key questions:

• How will the structure of the work and its organization, as well as the underlying job functions, need to change to meet these demands?

• How will technology continue to impact the way work is accomplished?

• How can the Agency respond to unexpected requirements or contingencies?

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NASA also needs to determine the core workforce required to maintain competencies that may be required over the longer-term, but for which the Agency has

a declining current need. By quantifying core workforce requirements, the Agency

could ensure a critical mass is available in the future in case of a resurging need.

To this end, the Panel urged NASA to use a methodology, such as RAND’s, to quantify the ‘‘core’’ workforce required to maintain its critical aeronautics and scientific

competencies. Consistent with the Panel’s emphasis on the total NASA workforce,

the analysis should include both civil service and contractor components. The Panel

further recommended that this same methodology be applied to the Shuttle transition process to assist with long-term scheduling projections, quantification of core

competencies and proficiencies, and analysis of overlapping mission needs.

Q2. The NAPA and National Academies reports emphasize that NASA should make

full use of the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. Did your committee conclude that

NASA was under-utilizing the Flexibility Act, and if so, why?

A2. The Panel believes that NASA could make greater use of certain key provisions

of the Flexibility Act. One provision that NASA has made extensive use of is the

term appointment authority. In this area, however, the dominant practice or intention at most centers has been to convert successfully performing terms, without regard to whether the work they are performing is permanent. The major exception

has been Kennedy Space Center, which has no plans to routinely convert terms

given the planned retirement of the Space Shuttle.

In addition to the term appointment authority, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004

provides the Agency with additional authorities in the following areas:

• Pay a ‘‘re-designation’’ bonus to a current federal employee, who accepts a position with NASA designated as a critical need.

• Pay a retention bonus of up to 50 percent of basic pay if the position meets

a critical need.

• Pay a salary of up to the Vice President’s for a position when the Administrator finds it necessary to recruit or retain an exceptionally highly qualified

individual for a critical position (limit to 10 employees).

• Direct hiring authority for GS–7 through GS–12 scientific and professional

positions with qualifying GPA (Distinguished Scholar program).

• Ability to extend Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments beyond the

initial two-year period for up to four additional years.

• Travel and transportation expenses for certain new appointees.

• Annual leave enhancements for certain non-federal experiences.

• Limited term appointment to ‘‘career reserved’’ SES positions to fill a temporary need.

• Qualifications pay to encourage employees to accept a new set of duties or

new position.

• Increased maximum rate of pay for NASA–excepted (NEX) employees.

The Panel recommended that NASA use formal decision metrics to ensure that

decisions about hiring or converting terms are grounded in work-based criteria. This

will ensure that NASA acts strategically, not tactically, in filling its term and permanent positions. Regarding conversions, the Panel believes that they should occur

not simply because of a satisfactory performance by an individual, but based on an

evaluation of the nature of the work—for example, a core competency inadequately

represented in the current workforce or a required proficiency level best achieved

through a permanent civil service hire.

NASA has made virtually no use of the Distinguished Scholar program, relying

heavily on its long-established co-op program. The Panel believes that NASA would

be more effective over the long-term by expanding its recruitment strategy to hire

Distinguished Scholars as a way to recruit the next generation of agency scientists,

engineers, and administrators. Despite some differences on how best to respond to

NASA’s workforce challenges, our Panel, the National Academy of Sciences Committee, and the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers all

agree that rebuilding NASA’s early and mid-career workforce is critical.

Likewise, the Panel noted that NASA has made limited use of its IPA authority

for external placements, with no more than seven each in FY 2004 and FY 2005.

For an agency with changing program needs and priorities and identified underutilized competencies, the IPA program offers an excellent opportunity to leverage

scarce salary dollars and FTE through negotiated cost-sharing arrangements with

universities, non-profits, State/local governments, and others that might need NASA

expertise. Such a mechanism would allow NASA employees with unfunded work, for

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example, to contribute meaningfully to another institution and further enhance

their skill base.

Q3. The NAPA report mentions strategic partnerships with other federal agencies

that demand technical skills as a potential opportunity for managing NASA employees whose skills do not align with current NASA projects. Could you please

elaborate on this aspect of the NAPA report?

A3. Given NASA’s workforce misalignments, the Panel believes that the Agency

could make greater efforts to partner with other federal agencies. Near the beginning of this study, the Academy offered to broker a partnership between NASA and

the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to help alleviate NASA’s uncovered

capacity problem. Officials at the highest level of PTO were interested in a block

of NASA’s scientific and technical personnel becoming patent examiners, on a temporary or preferably permanent basis, to reduce patent processing backlogs. It was

also interested in accessing NASA expertise to train its patent examiners in stateof-the art aeronautics, nanotechnology, and other scientific disciplines for which the

Agency typically receives patent applications. PTO was open to reimbursing NASA,

relocating NASA employees, and considering the use of NASA employees at their

home centers. In response to this offer, NASA offered no official or strategic agency

encouragement for employees to participate, but chose to refer the offer only to

Ames Research Center, which posted the information as an opportunity for individual center employees to voluntarily explore on their own.

Despite its stated commitment to a ‘‘flexible, scalable workforce,’’ NASA has not

vigorously pursued other out-placement options in the belief that future work assignments will require the skills of current NASA employees, and it would therefore

be imprudent to put significant effort into out-placement. In interviews, some NASA

officials expressed reluctance to directly communicate with employees, both individually and collectively, about the need to manage their careers and take advantage

of all available opportunities—both inside and outside of NASA. Some NASA officials even said they were concerned that being too forthright with individual employees about their options would be construed as harassment.

In addition to PTO, the Panel identified other possible federal agencies that could

make use of NASA’s excess competencies:

• The Environmental Protection Agency, with whom NASA shares an interest

in climate change and wind tunnels

• The National Institutes of Health, with whom NASA shares an interest in

space implications for medical technology improvements and the lessons to be

learned about microgravity’s impact on health

• The Department of Energy, with whom NASA shares an interest in basic research as well in various elaborate batteries used in space missions

• The Department of Defense, which has similar need for project and program

managers within varied engineering disciplines

This is a challenge across the Federal Government. Some agencies have excess

competencies in areas that are critical needs for other federal agencies. It may be

useful for the Federal Government to have an informed broker, such as OPM or

OMB, to identify opportunities for competency sharing and trading among federal

agencies. The broker would be responsible for making matches between federal

agencies with skill deficiencies, whether temporary or long-term, with agencies with

excess capacity, undergoing low attrition, or mission changes. In today’s environment, with such rapidly changing technology, the government’s role as financial and

human capital steward is likely to require additional adaptive mechanisms to facilitate the government’s effective use and development of its human capital resources.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by David C. Black, President Emeritus, Universities Space Research Association; Adjunct Professor, Physics and Astronomy Department, Rice University;

Co-Chair, Committee on Issues Affecting the Future of the U.S. Space Science

and Engineering Workforce, National Research Council, The National Academies

Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall

Q1. During your oral testimony, you showed a figure that indicates that the number

of opportunities for students to gain hands-on training has been declining.

Could you please elaborate on this point and describe which opportunities have

been declining and why?

A1. The figure shown during my testimony is included below for your reference.

There are two major messages in this figure. One is that the vast majority of opportunities for students to gain space experience via involvement in payloads is found

in the suborbital programs—typically sounding rockets, balloons, and aircraft-based

research (primarily high-altitude aircraft such as NASA’s WB–57 and ER–2 airplanes). While the Explorer and other deep space missions do have student involvement, it is typically at the instrument level rather than the full spacecraft level.

Moreover, owing to the cost of Explorer missions, relative to that of suborbital missions, and the associated longer timescale for project development, the deep space

missions do not lend themselves as readily to substantial student involvement.

The second message is that all opportunities for student involvement have been

in steady decline over the past few decades. This is most notable in the sub-orbital

program that includes sounding rockets, balloons, and aircraft (where the involvement is primarily at the instrument level). The reasons for this decline are varied.

One of the contributors to the decline is the heavy emphasis on science return as

the justification for these missions. This emphasis, while valid, places the lower cost

sub-orbital missions at a disadvantage when compared with an Explorer mission,

for example. In general, NASA’s science leadership argues that the ‘‘quality’’ of

science, measured in terms of papers published or influence on other researchers,

is less for a sub-orbital mission. Also, the quantity of science is less, as judged by

the amount of data returned. This emphasis on science for the lower cost, more student-oriented missions ignores one of the key aspects of these missions, workforce

development. These missions give a cradle-to-grave training experience in project

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management and systems engineering, both key skills that are currently in short

supply at NASA. Our committee would like to see proposals for suborbital programs

be judged much higher (some committee members believe at least 50 percent) on

the merits of the workforce development aspect of the proposal, with the rest of the

weighting in the review process being the science that would be accomplished by

the proposed mission.

Another factor in reduction of these opportunities is a combination of funding reductions as NASA managers look everywhere for funds to cover the increasing costs

of their higher profile missions, as well as a past lack of support for sub-orbital missions by senior management at NASA. One further point to note here is that launch

opportunities in this country have diminished over time making it harder to find

suitable, that is low cost and relatively frequent, rides into low-Earth orbit for student satellites.

Q2. Your testimony referred to the value of sub-orbital programs in providing systems engineering and project management skills. Could you please explain in detail how the sub-orbital programs help develop these skills?

A2. Sub-orbital programs typically can be conducted from beginning to end in a

year or two, while more complex Earth orbital projects may take at least two to four

years. Both of these timescales are consistent with meaningful involvement of students. The shorter timescale is well matched to design and build classes for undergraduates, or even high school students, while the longer timescale matches well

with graduate student experiences. In addition to the time match to student activity, there is an opportunity in these projects for students to see and experience all

facets of a major project. They see what happens if inadequate attention is paid to

interface issues, for example. They learn to manage a project on a schedule and a

budget. Also, they can learn from a failure as much as a success. NASA’s main missions now cost so much and have so much visibility that many more procedures and

additional backup systems are added to reduce risk. This drives cost up and keeps

students out of meaningful career development experiences.

Q3. How much do sub-orbital programs typically cost and what is the end-to-end duration of such programs? What, if any recommendations did your committee

make on how these programs should be funded?

A3. Since our report was issued there has been some change in NASA’s sub-orbital

programs, particularly the sounding rocket program. The sounding rocket program

appeared to be in continuing and serious decline even as late as the issuance of our

report. However, a new NASA Associate Administrator for Science has indicated his

intention to revive the sounding rocket program by increasing its funding and returning to a launch rate of 24 flights a year by FY10. However, I would note that

his goal for this is to solidify the sub-orbital program’s role in developing science

and also producing experienced principal investigators for science missions. Our

committee emphasized that sub-orbital programs are a value to the entire agency—

not simply science—because they can provide experience in program/project management and systems engineering that can eventually be used in other programs,

including human space flight.

According to a presentation made by NASA’s sounding rocket program office to

the Space Studies Board in June 2007, after our report was completed, NASA’s

sounding rocket program has seen a dramatic drop in flights over the past decade.

The program currently supports about 10 principal investigators per year and an

annual flight rate of 10 to 20 flights per year. In contrast to promised increased

funding following the announcement of the Vision for Space Exploration in January

2004, NASA made severe cuts to the sounding rocket program budget: $4.2M in

FY05, $10.9M in FY06, $9.4M in FY07, and $11.7M in FY08—a $36M cut over a

four-year period. Our committee found that implementing the Vision will require

precisely the kinds of skills that the sounding rocket programs provide.

Each launch costs between $2.5M–$3M including operating costs, and a typical

project lasts from one to three years (the actual flight times, however, are measured

in minutes). NASA’s sounding rocket program has a success rate of about 98 percent. These factors make sounding rocket programs ideal for educational uses and

allows for students to see a project through from the beginning to the end. The committee recommended NASA increase its investment in sounding rockets to provide

ample-opportunities from hands-on flight development experience at a relatively low

cost of failure.

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Q4. Both the NAPA and the National Academies reports call for more detailed information on the workforce at NASA’s Centers. Could you please discuss in specific

terms what information the Agency needs in order to support long-term workforce planning?

A4. NASA is slowly coming to grips with understanding its workforce issues. In my

view and that of the NRC committee, NASA does not yet understand how to model

its workforce and its evolution. They need far better insight into the skills that reside at the Agency, a better understanding of the flow of programs and how that

affects the civil service workforce, and they need to look outside of NASA to understand better the sources and movements of experienced as well as entry-level professional talent that is available. This is a skill that does not reside at NASA. They

will need to look to outside expertise to help them in both identifying the type of

information that is needed to do good workforce modeling, and in constructing the

models to use the data. NASA, in my opinion, has lost track to some extent that

it is an enabler of the Nation’s civil space program. It has evolved to a point where

it sees itself as an independent entity and makes policy and other decisions, particularly workforce matters, based on survival of the Agency and its centers rather than

doing the job for the country.

Q5. The NAPA and National Academies reports emphasize that NASA should make

full use of the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004.

Q5a. Did your committee conclude that NASA was underutilizing the Flexibility Act,

and if so, why?

A5a. The committee heard anecdotal information from a number of speakers that

although the NASA Flexibility Act had helped the Agency, it was still relatively recent and therefore the Agency had not yet been able to adopt it to the fullest extent

(for instance, not all of the relevant offices were aware of the Act’s provisions). The

committee did not conclude that there was resistance to the Act at NASA, but did

hear some comments from NASA officials that indicated that even if the Agency was

able to make full use of it, some fine-tuning may still be necessary. This is probably

a subject that is best left to discussions directly between Congress and NASA.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Lee Stone, Legislative Representative, NASA Council of IFPTE Locals,

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers

Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall

Centralized HQ Versus Decentralized Center-based Decision-making

Q1. NASA’s workforce strategy involves a transition from a more decentralized Center-led decision-making process to an agency-wide, integrated approach. What

are the Centers’ and the IFPTE’s perspectives on how smoothly this transition

is occurring?

A1. The value of centralized versus de-centralized governance depends on the mission. NASA is designing and preparing to build one Orion crew exploration vehicle

and two Aries launch vehicles using essentially existing technologies. It is absolutely

critical for everyone to be on the same page; the value of a single centralized focal

point for Constellation program planning and decision making is self-evident. However, for NASA’s multifaceted Science, Aeronautics, and Technology Development

missions, the value of centralized governance at Headquarters (HQ) is far from obvious. Rigid centralization schemes are known to stymie innovation and creativity,

which are generally the fruits of smaller, more agile, and independent teams that

can tolerate failure within a less rigid schedule and budget structure. Indeed, the

Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) plan is anything but innovative,

born of the necessity of meeting an urgent schedule to replace the Shuttle with a

budget half that the last time NASA was asked to design a manned lunar spacecraft. So up front, it should be noted that NASA’s new management governance

model embraced to support the Constellation program may not be appropriate for

NASA’s other equally important endeavors.

The wisdom of NASA’s management plan aside, its centralized, matrix management model has been unevenly applied. At its essence, matrix management is designed to split management into two equal branches: 1) centralized programmatic

management authority is retained at HQ, and 2) de-centralized line management

authority is delegated to the Centers. There are however two problems with NASA’s current implementation of matrix management. First, HQ has delegated line management responsibilities, yet has not provided the necessary resources and authority

to the Centers to perform this task. NASA’s current governance model has therefore

seriously weakened line management, which is not the co-equal partner it needs to

be for mission success. This has resulted in program management controlling all of

the financial resources and micromanaging program implementation, and has prevented line management from being able to function properly to the detriment of

the Agency, its Centers, and its missions. Second, as a result of this first point, in

order to salvage power for its line management, center management at Johnson

Space Center (and to some extent at the other manned space flight Centers) has

simply hijacked key program management authority and uses that power to protect

its Center from the adverse consequences of NASA’s implementation of lopsided matrix management and full-cost recovery of salary and facilities costs. While JSC’s success at collapsing matrix management by combining key line and program management nodes is an understandable, and indeed predictable, reaction to NASA’s flawed matrix management implementation, the sustained centralization of program

and fiscal authority for manned space programs at JSC continues to be an obstacle

to any bone fide matrix management system centralized at HQ and is a major obstacle to the 10 healthy centers plan.

The governance model and Exploration:

NASA’s manned spacecraft development and manned space flight implementation

are endeavors so massive and ambitious that they benefit from a more centralized

authoritarian leadership strategy. The transition to centralized authority at HQ continues to be slow and remains incomplete. Indeed, the initial artificial uncovered capacity crisis of the last few years was generated by the programmatic transfer of

a large chunk of NASA’s personnel funds to Constellation by the Administration,

followed by the refusal by Constellation program management (largely overlapping

with JSC line management) to share these resources appropriately across all NASA

Centers. The Administration’s initial plan was to retain funding and personnel at

JSC and eliminate across the rest of the Agency, nearly 3,000 highly skilled and

experienced federal employees, predominately at the Research Centers, who were

improperly deemed unworthy of Constellation dollars because of a fictitious ‘‘skillsmix’’ problem. If the House and Senate Science committees had not intervened with

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a Reduction-In-Force (RIF) moratorium (subsequently extended by the CommerceJustice-Science Appropriators), that plan would have been fully implemented last

year. Indeed, the phase-one harassment and buy-out portion of the plan was implemented resulting in the loss of more than a thousand largely technical employees

and a significant decrease in morale across the Research Centers, but phase-two of

the employee elimination plan was luckily averted by direct Congressional intervention. IFPTE and NASA’s civil service workforce remain extremely grateful for the

strong bipartisan leadership shown by Chairman Gordon and former Chairman

Boehlert in their timely opposition to the Administration’s ill-devised plan.

In the summer of 2006, IFPTE testified that NASA’s uncovered capacity crisis

was a fiction created by a deeply flawed accounting process and a program management unwilling to accept that the technical staff at Research Centers should play

a major role in Constellation. Squeezed by the RIF moratorium, last fall, Administrator Griffin finally simply directed JSC to transfer meaningful work packages to

the Research Centers and the ‘‘crisis’’ dissipated. Indeed, Centers that last year reported hundreds of employees with skills/competencies deemed surplus have now received funding to assign Constellation work to nearly all of them. The magical disappearance of the uncovered capacity confirms that the initial crisis was a fiction

created by management failures, and not by any skills problem with the technical

staff across the Agency. We now have empirical proof that employees at Ames,

Glenn, JPL, Langley, and Goddard can work well together with employees at JSC,

Marshall, and KSC to the benefit of the Exploration mission, the Agency, and the

Nation. NASA’s employees, distributed across all Centers, stand ready to make Constellation a success and look forward to that opportunity and challenge.

So why isn’t this the happy ending of this scary fairy tale? There are two lingering clouds that loom ominously. First, sustained underfunding of the Agency is

still squeezing NASA’s scientists and researchers who do not fully benefit from Constellation work packages that only cover Constellation development activities. This

problem requires the re-balancing and/or additional appropriation of funds to

Science, Aeronautics, and Technology research activities that have taken a disproportionate and unwise share of the fiscal hit imposed by NASA’s inadequate

budget. Congress should act to force a modest yet essential rebalancing, which

would only involve about five percent of NASA’s budget. Second, the distribution of

work packages from JSC are still being made begrudgingly so that inadequate numbers of civil servant Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) are being transferred to cover the

required work and few procurement funds are being transferred to cover associated

local expenses. Furthermore, JSC management continues to co-opt Advanced Capabilities funds that should be used to cover scientists and researchers engaged in

longer term, non-Constellation, Research and Development (R&D) activities. Advanced Capabilities funding is being diverted to meet unfunded Constellation requirements and to cover disproportionately JSC personnel and contract support

staff. Congress should act to prevent the diversion of the few remaining R&D funds

within the Exploration Systems Mission to non-R&D activities and away from the

Research Centers.

The governance model and Science & Aeronautics:

NASA’s broad research missions in Science and Aeronautics are less well served

by a centralized, distant, and bureaucratic leadership at HQ, detached from the

nitty gritty R&D process and overly influenced by transient political interests. Succinctly stated, NASA’s long-term R&D should be managed by those most qualified

to manage NASA’s R&D activities, NASA’s Research Centers, with greater independence from the vicissitudes of the personalities and political winds at HQ. Indeed, the director of National Institutes of Health understands that he is merely the

custodian of a distributed brain trust that needs nurturing, oversight, and advocacy,

not intrusive technical direction. The Institutes are largely autonomous, the Lab

Chiefs are largely autonomous, and even the individual PIs are largely autonomous.

That more decentralized structure not only gets the job done, it fosters creativity

and innovation. The Associate Administrators for the Science and Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates should follow that example and embrace more muted

and humble roles. In the ideal matrix governance model, program management sets

budgets, goals, and milestones, while line management assigns the technical work

to the appropriate personnel, decides on the needed procurement and procurement

mechanisms, implements the program plan, and is accountable for meeting the milestones. Unfortunately, program management has abused its near absolute fiscal authority to co-opt line management’s authority to assign work, to direct local procurements, to manage day-to-day activities at the performing centers, and thus to undermine collective bargaining rights (because all Union contracts are with center line

management, which is becoming somewhat irrelevant). Any transition to a bone fide

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matrix management model will require equalizing the balance of authority between

program and line management.

Specific recommendations:

IFPTE asks that Congress:

• Increase NASA’s Science, Aeronautics, and Advanced Capabilities budgets

and protect them from being reprogrammed overtly or covertly to Constellation.

• Direct NASA to provide civil-servant salaries and non-programmatic travel

along with CM&O directly to the centers, independent of programs, to allow

for effective matrix management and to maintain Center capabilities.

• Line management would then be empowered (i.e., funded) to perform its

critical immediate roles of assigning and supervising work as well as its

longer term role of keeping local intellectual capabilities and facilities

healthy. Re-empowering center management to perform the latter role is

essential because the currently unchecked Program management funding

structure benefits from exploiting current resources for near-term milestone at the expense of long-term milestones and institutional infrastructure. Program management should, however, continue to control procurement funding levels and programmatic travel funds to perform its critical

role of setting budgets, goals, and milestones. With this more equitable

division of resources and authorities, the short-term programmatic and

longer term institutional interests can be properly balanced through cooperation between the two branches of management. Program management would have to negotiate with Center management for civil service

labor, yet Center management would still need to align its workforce to

meet program needs in order to acquire procurement and most travel

funds.

• Direct NASA to move program management of the research activities of the

Advanced Capabilities programs to the Research Centers to prevent their subjugation by Constellation or JSC management, and to allow them to maintain

crucial independent research and technology development capabilities across

NASA’s research Centers.

• Inter-center competition and cooperation across multiple research programs assigned evenly across co-equal research centers will prevent parochial interests from dominating programmatic interests.

Abuse of Term Hiring Authority

Q2. Your testimony notes that NASA’s increasing use of ‘‘term’’ hires [hiring for work

that is expected to last between 1–6 years] rather than tenured civil service hires

is, in part jeopardizing NASA’s ability to attract the best and brightest science

and engineering staff.

Q2a. Why do you believe that the use of term hires jeopardizes NASA’s ability to attract the best and brightest?

A2a. When young scientists receive their Ph.D. from a world-class institution

(thereby completing 20+ years of formal education), most begin to plot a future for

themselves whereby they can expect a stable and productive research career in their

field of choice. In some instances, a one-to-three-year postdoctoral fellowship is

sought in order to obtain additional training to broaden their skills and experience

under the mentorship of a well-respected researcher at another elite institution.

However, within a year or two of receiving their Ph.D., the best and brightest young

scientists begin to seek a tenure track (hard money) research professorships at a

prestigious university and eschew non-tenure track (soft money) adjunct professorships that are contingent on external funding sources. Young biotech scientists and

aerospace engineers have highly lucrative private-sector opportunities in addition to

this traditional academic option. In the past, NASA has competed successfully for

its fair share of these individuals by offering a package of advantages that academia

cannot match: accelerated tenure, no teaching requirements, and access to numerous sources of competed and even directed Research and Analysis funding for mission-related research projects that nonetheless are largely self-generated. NASA has

been successful in the past in recruiting even the most competitive candidates by

offering better job security, more comprehensive benefits, cutting-edge research opportunities, and a very high quality of life. In particular, one of the most rewarding

aspects of a career at NASA has been the ability to remain engaged with an exciting

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long-term project throughout its lifetime so that one is still around to see one’s technical contribution finally comes to fruition, as opposed to being terminated after a

few years of performing piece work.

In the early 1980’s, the Federal Government lost some of its recruiting leverage

in the arena of benefits when they converted to a less competitive 401k-style dominated and less desirable retirement system (i.e., private sector and academia now

often offer better benefits). Over the last few years, NASA’s recruiting problems

have been exacerbated by three critical factors: the policy of improperly using term

offers to circumvent the federal employee tenure process and to assert greater daily

control over its technical staff, the dramatic reduction of NASA research opportunities available to in-house scientists and engineers to perform self-generated missionrelated R&D, and the full-cost recovery of employee salaries. The latter has created

a hostile and demeaning time-clock punching environment that 1) prevents our best

scientists and engineers from devoting an appropriate portion of their time to difficult longer-term technical problems (and thus improving/sustaining their technical

skills) and 2) forces them into a full-time preoccupation with short-term milestones

within an autocratic program management system. NASA’s best and brightest scientists and engineers have no problem saluting the flag and working diligently towards NASA’s mission goals, but they do not thrive when bossed around on a daily

basis by non-technical administrative task masters obsessed with weekly performance metrics, and when deprived of nearly all independent research funding opportunities.

As a result of these factors, the current senior technical workforce can no longer

aggressively recruit the graduating students of their academic colleagues because

they cannot say, in good conscience, that coming to NASA is the best career move

for that young student compared to tenure track options at prestigious academic institutions or lucrative stock options at cutting-edge private high-tech ventures. Word

of mouth recruiting by NASA’s technical staff (not by HR) is how NASA has traditionally gained access to the best and brightest technical employees before they are

even on the market, so that NASA could bring them on board as pre- and post-doctoral fellows to focus on NASA relevant training and then hire many of them as permanent civil servants. That proven recruiting process is now breaking down to

NASA’s peril; as NASA’s pre- and post-doctoral fellowships and permanent S&E positions dry up, so does its future.

In brief, the best and brightest will not consider term positions at a fiscally unstable and programmatically chaotic NASA a promising career move when they can

take prestigious positions at UC–Berkeley, MIT, Google, or other elite academic or

private-sector institutions that will offer them greater intellectual latitude and genuine respect often with more lucrative compensation packages. The bottom line is

that the key to successful recruiting of NASA’s future workforce is to be able to

promise candidates exciting and stable careers within an intellectually open and respectful work environment that values and features independent research opportunities. Note also that with term positions, recruitment becomes a recurring task as

the Agency must bid again and again for skills as terms expire, or risk losing increasingly experienced talent in which it has already invested considerable resources.

Over the last four years, NASA’s management has been so overly disrespectful to

its technical staff (term hiring being only one facet of this disrespect) that serious

harm has already taken place. This disrespect has been part of a well-orchestrated

and ill-conceived campaign to accelerate the attrition of NASA’s senior technical

staff, a strategy that remains ongoing, albeit tempered in recent months. The other

side of respect is loyalty. NASA employees have traditionally shown tremendous loyalty that drives them to work nights and weekends, and to forfeit annual leave

without financial compensation. But loyalty is a two-way street and permanent status is at the core of the Agency’s loyalty to its staff. NASA employees were rudely

awakened in February 2004 to discover that Administrator O’Keefe had commissioned a secret plan for the mass lay off of nearly 3,000 employees to cover the unfunded mandate of the Vision for Space Exploration. That betrayal and the attendant scapegoating of NASA’s technical staff will not soon be forgotten. Although the

situation has improved recently, unless the Administration fully and openly re-embraces a policy of respect for and loyalty to NASA’s civil service workforce, NASA

will no longer enjoy the recruiting power it has relied on for decades and unwisely

takes for granted.

Q2b. To what extent are term hires being used for the science and engineering staff

at present?

A2b. In addition to affecting recruitment, the use of term positions also has adverse

ramifications for mission success because a transient Science and Engineering

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(S&E) workforce threatens safety (as esoteric yet crucial knowledge/experience

leaves the Agency when experienced staff leave at the end of their term) and squanders precious training resources (as trained personnel leave the Agency setting up

a requirement to train new arrivals). Even more importantly, one of the primary

reasons for according civil servants tenure is so that they can speak truth to power;

tenured employees can speak up and say something is unsafe without the fear of

losing their jobs, but term employees know full well that the future renewal or conversion of their position will be jeopardized if they challenge their management

chain. The CAIB report warned us clearly that NASA’s schedule and budget driven

management culture was a primary cause of the Columbia disaster; that management culture is dangerously reinforced by the use of term hires who are dis-empowered, relative to permanent hires, to speak up when schedule or budget is undermining safety and/or mission success.

In fiscal year 1994 (FY 1994), NASA made 181 outside hires for Full-Time Permanent (FTP) Science & Engineering (S&E) staff and only four-term S&E hires. The

S&E term percentage (2.2 percent) was less than that found across all employees:

NASA hired a total of 337 FTP employees that year and only 19 term hires (5.6

percent).

Over the last three years, NASA’s hiring actions have shown a dramatically different trend. FTP S&E hires numbered only 64, 53, and 36 in FY 2005, in FY 2006,

and so far in FY 2007, respectively, while term S&E hires numbered 174, 227, and

161. So we have gone from a tiny fraction of S&E employees being hired as term

employees in the early 90’s to more than three quarters now.

Even more troubling is that the above term hiring trend appears to be more highly focused on S&E staff. In the same three periods, FTP Professional Administrative

hires numbered 77, 100, and 63, respectively, while term PA hires numbered 154,

215, and 121 yielding a ratio closer to about two-thirds term hiring.

In sum, over the last three years, NASA has been hiring about three-quarters of

its new S&E full-time outside hires under term contracts (as opposed to less than

three percent in 1994) and has been hiring more than twice as many managers as

scientists and engineers (as opposed to less than half as many in 1994).

NASA management has created the alarming trends above by imposing strict

quotas on the hiring of new permanent employees, thus forcing Centers to make improper term hires to fill long-term technical needs more properly served by a permanent hire. In other words, one of the premises of the question ‘‘that term hiring is

for work expected to last between 1–6 years’’ is simply false within NASA’s current

implementation. Term hiring is performed because it is generally the only hiring

permitted by HQ, not because of the specifics of the position. Furthermore, centerbased quotas of permanent hires are linked to the number of permanent employees

who leave each center. By arbitrarily linking the departure of ∼3 permanent employees to each permanent new hire each Center can have, HQ is also increasing its

pressure on center management to harass older employees to retire.

The data above are as of 6/23/07 and were acquired from http://

hqpowerplay.hq.nasa.gov/workforce/moredata.html

Specific Recommendations:

IFPTE asks Congress to:

• Commission the GAO to audit NASA’s use of term positions over the last

three years and determine to what extent that authority has been abused.

• It appears that NASA is not the only federal agency that has been using

non-permanent S&E hiring strategies that weaken the independence of

government technical experts, so perhaps this investigation should be extended to all government agencies across the executive branch that perform scientific or engineering R&D.

• Direct NASA to convert all current terms positions to permanent status unless they can explicitly demonstrate that, for each term position, the Agency’s

need for the position’s skill/competency has an unambiguous programmatically defined endpoint by the end of the term.

• Merely stating that future funding is unsure is not an adequate rationale

as all future federal funding is by definition uncertain.

• Require NASA to return to a hiring policy whereby all new hires default to

permanent unless an explicit, written justification is provided explaining why

NASA’s programmatic need for that skill/competency clearly ends within a

specified term of less than six years.

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• This exercise should be performed as proper Human Resource protocol in

the first place so this proposal should not be considered burdensome.

• Cap NASA’s use of term hires at 10 percent of outside hires annually.

In closing, IFPTE is very encouraged by recent changes in NASA’s workforce posture that appear to indicate a renewed respect for in-house talent and skills. Nonetheless, there are a number of remaining obstacles in the road ahead; those discussed above are only a few of them. The bottom line is that the National Research

Council (NRC) report indicates that NASA will face a workforce crisis in the notto-distant future unless it immediately starts to educate, recruit, and train the next

generation of technical employees, who should apprentice under the current NASA

senior technical staff before they retire (indeed, this was the rationale for the rarely

used retention bonuses in the Flexibility Act). The Administration is not heeding

that advice because, as the Administrator has publicly stated, NASA has not been

given adequate funds to do so. Over the last decade and a half, NASA has steadily

lost 80 percent of its 35-year-old workforce and nothing is being done to stop that

alarming trend. IFPTE adds its voice to the urgent call by the NRC and others for

NASA to renew its intellectual infrastructure before the chain of knowledge and experience is broken. Congress should act to remedy this increasingly serious situation

by appropriating and sequestering adequate funds for this endeavor and by directing the Administrator to begin an aggressive workforce renewal.

Once again, IFPTE thanks Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Feeney for

their keen interest in and dedication to NASA’s success, and for the opportunity to

bring the concerns of the NASA federal employees we represent to the attention of

your subcommittee.

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Appendix 2:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN STEWART,

ACADEMY FELLOW AND MEMBER OF THE

NASA MULTI-SECTOR WORKFORCE PANEL

Mr. Chairman, I appreciated the opportunity to testify before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics on May 17, 2007 on behalf of the National

Academy of Public Administration’s NASA Multi-sector Workforce Panel. The Panel’s goal is the same as the Subcommittee’s: to ensure the health and vitality of

NASA’s greatest asset, its civil service and contractor workforce. At the outset, it

is important to understand that the Panel’s recommendation for additional human

capital flexibilities was designed to provide NASA with authority to restructure its

workforce to meet new competency requirements while maintaining essential employees regardless of age. The Panel’s recommendation does not authorize NASA to

arbitrarily reduce staff or to discriminate based on age. Unlike the mandatory retirement of civil servants required by federal law until 1979, the proposal would protect NASA’s ability to maintain essential employees of all ages.

I am taking this opportunity to submit additional information for the record in

four major areas:

• Scope of the Academy’s project

• NASA’s budgetary context

• NASA’s need for proactive workforce management

• Proposals to overcome NASA’s existing civil service constraints

Scope of the Project

This nearly year-long study was not conducted in a vacuum. The Panel and study

team reached out to a wide range of stakeholders, traveled to eight of NASA’s field

centers, and conducted more than one hundred interviews, including meetings with

labor representatives and contractor organizations. I was pleased to serve along-side

five other Panel members who believe strongly in NASA. I am a longstanding

former member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and for two years served as

staff director of the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space

(1977–1979). Three of the other Panel members were long-time NASA executives at

headquarters and at Goddard Space Flight Center. All of us care about NASA and

want to be responsible stewards of its future.

As explained in my testimony, the Panel was asked to answer some very specific

questions about NASA’s current workforce and field structure. Neither the Senate

Appropriation Subcommittee nor NASA asked the Panel to evaluate the sufficiency

of NASA’s current or projected level of funding. Similarly, we were not asked to conduct a detailed assessment of the planned timeline for phasing-out the Space Shuttle, completing the International Space Station, developing the next-generation

launch vehicles, or establishing a permanent lunar outpost. The Administrator did

not expect the Panel to make recommendations for dramatic changes to existing program plans, timetables, or budgets. The Panel believed its responsibility was to determine what kind of workforce would be required by NASA and to provide guidance

on the work-based criteria and policies needed for the Agency to achieve this desired

state. Recognizing that aeronautics and scientific competencies will be critical components of NASA’s future workforce, for example, the Panel did recommend that

NASA quantify the core workforce required to maintain and nurture these competencies over the long-term. The Panel cautioned, however, that NASA needs to

avoid looking at disciplines and programs in isolation. Instead, it should evaluate

competency needs and excesses across all programs and avoid a stove-piped approach to competency management.

Budgetary Context

In order to resolve NASA’s workforce challenges, others have strongly advocated

for increased funding, a dramatic reduction in contractor support, and a return to

the civil service levels of the 1960s as the panacea for NASA’s workforce challenges.

The Panel believes this approach is inconsistent with the notion of managerial and

taxpayer accountability. It also ignores the fact that, with a proposed 3.1 percent

increase in the President’s FY 08 request, NASA’s budget is already slated for a

larger increase than the one percent average rate of growth for other domestic discretionary agencies. Although Congress certainly may appropriate additional funds

for NASA, I personally believe this is unlikely given the ‘‘pay-go’’ system, which

would require any increases to NASA to be paid for with cuts to other important

federal programs.

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Unless Congress does decide to make significant, long-term increases to NASA’s

appropriation, NASA will have to deal with its 21st century challenges by developing a more balanced, optimally-sized, and skilled workforce tailored to current

and projected mission needs. NASA could facilitate this transition by adopting a

more proactive workforce strategy based on the use of innovative strategic planning

mechanisms, objective data reliance, focused organizational health assessments, and

work-based human capital reforms. This would enhance NASA’s health and ensure

its ability to safely meet its program milestones in a cost effective manner.

Given the long-term fiscal challenges facing this country, I believe it would have

been irresponsible, unrealistic, and inaccurate for the Panel to tell the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee that NASA’s workforce problems could or should simply

be solved with more money. Within the confines of the projected budget, the Panel

provided an objective assessment of the alignment of the current NASA workforce

with the new programs, the Agency’s management strategies, and the tools required

by NASA.

The Panel believes that NASA management must be accountable for implementing the Vision, approved by the President and Congress, and setting priorities

consistent with that Vision and within the budget appropriated.

Proactive Workforce Management

The Panel applauds the work of NASA’s civil servants and contractors, acknowledging them as the Agency’s greatest asset. In examining the civil service portion

of NASA’s workforce, however, the Panel believed that NASA should be more

proactive in making use of all available flexibilities—both those available to all federal agencies and those specifically authorized in the NASA Flexibilities Act of

2004—to develop the workforce of the future. Specifically, we recommended that

NASA expand its existing recruiting practices by establishing a nationally recognized, prestigious program to:

• Attract exemplary applicants with technical and administrative strengths.

• Focus on long-term core competency needs of the Agency.

• Replenish the workforce after decades of hiring freezes.

We believed that the existing Distinguished Scholar Authority, authorized by the

NASA Flexibilities Act, could be used as the lynchpin for establishing such a program and help NASA to recruit its next generation of leaders.

In addition, we urged NASA to be much more proactive in establishing strategic

partnerships with Federal, State, and local governments, as well as universities and

non-profits. In many cases, NASA has an excess of certain competencies that may

be useful to other organizations. By formally establishing a program to temporarily

or permanently out-place blocks of employees with competencies no longer needed

by the Agency, NASA would be able to widely share its talent with the Nation. We

recommended that NASA:

• Use inter-agency details for assignments with other federal partners.

• Partner with non-federal entities through the IPA program.

We also encouraged NASA to explore the possibility of strategically out-placing

some existing research programs that NASA will not need in the future, but are important to the Nation as a whole. To this end, we recommended that NASA headquarters identify potential opportunities across the Agency and provide initial seedmoney to the university, non-profit, or foundation assuming responsibility for the

function. Affected field centers would then be expected to identify potential candidate institutions within their area and negotiate with them.

Overcoming Constraints

At the same time, we were struck by the significance of existing civil service constraints. Even if NASA took all available discretionary actions, we believed it would

not have sufficient flexibility to develop the required workforce. Accordingly, we recommended a package of additional statutory flexibilities. Several of these seem relatively uncontroversial:

• Congress should increase the monetary cap on buy-outs to $35,000 and adjust

for inflation in following years.

• OPM should grant NASA blanket authority to conduct buy-outs over the next

five years.

• Congress should authorize NASA to temporarily pay the government’s share

of health care premiums for non-retiring employees who agree to resign and

are not otherwise eligible to carry their benefits with them.

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• OPM should grant NASA blanket authority to waive salary offsets when recruiting reemployed federal annuitants for critical areas.

The Panel had two other recommendations that were more controversial and

would require greater change within the existing civil service system. First, we believe that NASA deserves the same Reduction-in-Force (RIF) framework as the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST). The existing RIF system is

widely acknowledged to be counterproductive and expensive, as well as harmful to

federal employees and organizational health. Accordingly, we urged Congress to exempt NASA from the Title 5 RIF rules by establishing a new RIF framework modeled on NIST’s Alternative Personnel Management System. This system would:

• Define competitive areas in a more targeted manner, such as career path.

• Limit both ‘‘bumping’’ and ‘‘retreating’’ to within the same occupational series

or specialty.

• Give enhanced weight to performance.

Second, the Panel believes that Congress should provide NASA with limited emergency authority to invoke a fully eligible individual’s retirement if he or she can no

longer reasonably be utilized by the Agency. Some or all of the following criteria

would have to be met:

• The employee’s skills are no longer required for mission accomplishment.

• The employee’s skills are outdated or unnecessary, and management determines that retraining would not be practical, or the employee is unwilling to

update skills.

• Funding for the employee’s existing work is not available.

• The employee’s skills are not easily transferred to other work.

We believe retiring employees should be compensated fairly by being given severance pay in addition to earned annuities. This emergency statutory authority would

provide NASA with one means to secure the expertise required for its highly complex mission, while protecting the safety and integrity of the space program.

In conclusion, the Panel took very seriously its charge to think creatively about

ways in which NASA might most effectively plan for its workforce of the future. The

Panel did not make these recommendations without considerable study and forethought. Each recommendation is consistent with the goal articulated in NASA’s

Workforce Strategy: to develop a flexible, scalable workforce. While providing certain additional flexibilities to NASA to help it address critical competency shortfalls

and excesses, the Panel’s proposed package of flexibilities would preserve the best

of the civil service system for the 21st century.

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