[Cite as Brown v. Brown, 2019-Ohio-3619.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

CLERMONT COUNTY 

LEAH KATE BROWN, 

 Appellee, 

 - vs - 

CLINTON BROWN, 

 Appellant. 

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CASE NO. CA2019-01-007 

O P I N I O N 

9/9/2019 

APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION 

Case No. 2015DRC00545 

Alexander, Wagner & Kinman, Christopher M. Alexander, 423 Reading Road, Mason, Ohio 

45040, for appellee 

Allen Law Firm, LLC, Mitchell W. Allen, 8469 Mason-Montgomery Road, Suite 2, Mason, 

Ohio 45040, for appellant 

 S. POWELL, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Clinton Brown ("Father"), appeals the decision of the Clermont 

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, finding appellee, Leah Kate 

Brown ("Mother"), "in contempt as a second offender" after she was found in civil contempt 
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for violating the parties' shared parenting agreement. Father also appeals the domestic 

relations court's decision ordering Mother to pay him $500 in attorney fees stemming from 

that civil contempt finding. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Mother and Father were divorced in the summer of 2015. Following their 

divorce, Mother and Father were parties to a shared parenting agreement regarding their 

two children, twins born on September 23, 2009. Approximately two years after their 

divorce, on November 6, 2017, December 11, 2017, and December 21, 2017, Father filed 

three separate motions for contempt against Mother. The three motions alleged that 

Mother had committed nine violations of the parties' shared parenting agreement; the 

November 6, 2017 motion alleging five violations, the December 11, 2017 motion alleging 

one violation, and the December 21, 2017 motion alleging three violations. Although 

brought in three separate motions, Father numbered the alleged violations consecutively 

one through nine. The nine violations alleged by Father in those three motions were as 

follows. 

November 6, 2017 Motion for Contempt 

(1) Violation of Article I, Section K, due to Mother discussing the 

case with the children; 

(2) Violation of Article I, Section I, due to Mother's failure to give 

Father his right of first refusal for parenting time on July 24, 

2017; 

(3) Violation of Article V, Section B, for Mother enrolling their 

daughter in an activity that impacted Father's parenting time; 

(4) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on October 21, 2017 rather 

than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time; and 

(5) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on October 28, 2017 rather 

than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time. 
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December 11, 2017 Motion for Contempt 

(6) Violation of Article 1, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on November 18, 2017 rather 

than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time. 

December 21, 2017 Motion for Contempt 

(7) Violation of Article I, Section I, due to Mother's failure to give 

Father his right of first refusal for parenting time on December 

8, 2017; 

(8) Violation of Article I, Section K, due to Mother again 

discussing the case with the children; and 

(9) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on December 16, 2017 rather 

than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time. 

{¶ 3} On January 23, 2018, a single hearing on Father's three motions for contempt 

was held before a domestic relations court magistrate. Shortly thereafter, on March 8, 2018, 

the magistrate issued a decision finding Mother in contempt for committing seven of the 

nine violations Father alleged in his three motions; violations (1) thru (5) set forth in Father's 

November 6, 2017 motion, violation (6) set forth in Father's December 11, 2017 motion, 

and violation (9) set forth in Father's December 21, 2017 motion. Due to these seven 

violations, the magistrate issued a purge order that required Mother, as a "first offender," to 

pay a $100 fine and provide Father with makeup parenting time. The magistrate also 

ordered Mother to reimburse Father $495 in court costs ($165 for each of the three motions 

for contempt he filed) and to pay Father $500 in attorney fees. The magistrate reached this 

decision by rejecting Father's claim that he was actually entitled to $1,500 in attorney fees, 

i.e., $500 for each of the three motions for contempt he filed and from which Mother was 

sanctioned. 

{¶ 4} In so holding, the magistrate noted that Father's attorney "did not testify with 

respect to his attorney fees." This, as the magistrate found, was a necessary prerequisite 
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for a party seeking attorney fees in excess of the presumptively "reasonable" $500 fee set 

forth in the domestic relations court's local rules; specifically, Loc.R. DR 45(B). Pursuant to 

that rule, "[u]nless otherwise determined by the Court and absent formal evidence, $500 is 

a reasonable attorney fee." What constitutes "formal evidence" is set forth in the domestic 

relations court's Loc.R. DR 45(C), which provides that "[i]f a party is seeking an award for 

attorney fees in excess of $500," the attorney must present the following evidence: 

(1) An itemized statement describing the services rendered, the 

time for such services, the requested hourly rate, and necessary 

expenses and cost for litigation; 

(2) Testimony as to whether the case was complicated by any 

factor which necessitated extra time being spent on the case; 

(3) Testimony regarding the attorney's years in practice and 

experience in domestic relations cases; and 

(4) Evidence of the defending party's ability to pay, and of the 

moving party's need for an award of attorney fees. 

{¶ 5} On March 8, 2018, Father filed objections to the magistrate's decision. As 

part of his objections, Father argued the magistrate erred by finding Mother was just a "first 

offender" despite the magistrate determining Mother had committed seven violations of the 

parties' shared parenting agreement. Father also argued the magistrate erred by ordering 

Mother to pay him only $500 in attorney fees. 

{¶ 6} On August 21, 2018, the domestic relations court issued a decision overruling 

Father's objections. In so holding, the domestic relations court found an award of $500 in 

attorney fees was a "reasonable fee in this case." This was because, according to the 

domestic relations court, "[i]t is for one proceeding not for each individual motion or violation 

addressed in that proceeding." The domestic relations court also found that an award of 

$500 in attorney fees was proper since Father had "failed to present any formal evidence 

that he incurred reasonable attorney fees in excess of $500." 
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{¶ 7} On August 31, 2018, Father appealed the domestic relations court's decision. 

Similar to the two objections outlined above, Father challenged the domestic relations 

court's decision finding Mother was just a "first offender" despite the magistrate determining 

Mother had committed seven violations of the parties' shared parenting agreement. Father 

also challenged the domestic relations court's decision ordering Mother to pay him only 

$500 in attorney fees. Finding no merit to any of his arguments raised therein, this court 

affirmed the domestic relations court's decision in Brown v. Brown, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 

CA2018-08-064, 2019-Ohio-2164 ("Brown I"). 

{¶ 8} Specifically, as this court stated when overruling Father's argument 

challenging the domestic relations court's "first offender" finding: 

Father argues that because Mother was found guilty of over 

three violations of the shared parenting agreement she should 

have been found to be a third-time offender. This court does 

not find that the domestic relations court abused its discretion in 

finding Mother to be a first-time offender because there was no 

evidence presented indicating that Mother had been found guilty 

of any contempt offenses prior to the hearing. 

Id. at ¶ 68. 

{¶ 9} Thereafter, when overruling Father's argument challenging the domestic 

relations court's award of attorney fees, this court stated: 

Father further argues that the court should have awarded him 

$500 in attorney fees for each contempt motion filed. However, 

Father failed to present any evidence concerning his attorney 

fees and thus cannot demonstrate that the domestic relations 

court abused its discretion in awarding him the presumptive 

"reasonable" attorney fee. 

Id. at ¶ 69. 

{¶ 10} While Father's appeal in Brown I was pending, Father filed an additional nine 

motions for contempt against Mother; three on April 4, 2018, one on May 1, 2018, four on 

May 23, 2018, and one additional motion on June 8, 2018. Each of Father's nine motions 
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alleged a single violation of the parties' shared parenting agreement. The nine violations 

alleged by Father in those nine motions were as follows. 

April 4, 2018 Motions for Contempt 

(1) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on February 3 and 4, 2018 

rather than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time; 

(2) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on February 24 and 25, 2018 

rather than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time; and 

(3) Violation of Article 1, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on March 17 and 18, 2018 

rather than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time. 

May 1, 2018 Motion for Contempt 

(1) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on April 7 and 8, 2018 rather 

than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time. 

May 23, 2018 Motions for Contempt 

(1) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on May 3, 2018 rather than 

allowing Father to exercise his parenting time; 

(2) Violation of Article I, Section C, for Mother taking their 

daughter to a cheerleading event on May 5 and 6, 2018 rather 

than allowing Father to exercise his parenting time; 

(3) Violation of Article V, Section B, for Mother enrolling their son 

in an activity that impacted Father's parenting time; and 

(4) Violation of Article V, Section B, for Mother enrolling their son 

in another activity that impacted Father's parenting time. 

June 8, 2018 Motion for Contempt 

(1) Violation of Article I, Section A, and Article X, for Mother 

interfering with Father's access to their children's school, and 

thus Father's parenting time, as well as Mother interfering with 

Father's access to their children's records. 

{¶ 11} On August 24, 2018, the magistrate held a single hearing on Father's motions. 
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Father did not object to the magistrate holding a single hearing to address each of his nine 

motions. Rather, as part of the magistrate's scheduling order, the magistrate specifically 

stated that "[c]ounsel further agreed that it would be easier to try all the Motions at one 

time." Both Mother and Father appeared at this hearing represented by counsel. Although 

a transcript of this hearing was not made a part of the record, the record nevertheless 

reveals that both Mother and Father also testified at this hearing. 

{¶ 12} On October 16, 2018, the magistrate issued a decision sanctioning Mother on 

four of the nine alleged violations set forth in Father's nine motions for contempt; violations 

(2) and (3) alleged in Father's four motions filed on April 4, 2018, as well as the single 

violations alleged in Father's motions filed on May 1, 2018 and June 8, 2018. Due to these 

four violations, the magistrate found Mother "in contempt as a second offender" and 

sentenced Mother to a 60-day jail term. Mother, however, was notified that she could purge 

the contempt by providing Father with makeup parenting time and by writing an apology 

letter to their daughter's soccer facility. The magistrate also ordered Mother to reimburse 

Father $660 in court costs "representing court costs for the four Motions for which the Court 

is making a finding of contempt ($165 each)," as well as pay Father $500 in attorney fees. 

The magistrate reached this decision by again rejecting Father's claim that he was actually 

entitled to $2,000 in attorney fees, i.e., $500 for each of the four motions for contempt he 

filed and from which Mother was sanctioned. 

{¶ 13} On October 29, 2018, Father filed objections to the magistrate's decision. 

Father's objections contained the same basic arguments Father advanced in Brown I. 

Specifically, Father argued that the magistrate erred by (1) finding Mother was just a 

"second offender" despite the magistrate sanctioning Mother on four violations of the 

parties' shared parenting agreement and by (2) ordering Mother to pay him only $500 in 

attorney fees. 
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{¶ 14} On December 12, 2018, the domestic relations court issued a decision 

overruling Father's objections. In so holding, the domestic relations court determined the 

magistrate did not err by finding Mother was just a "second offender." This was because, 

according to the domestic relations court, "[b]y combining the findings of contempt in one 

finding of contempt as a second offender serves both the purpose of the proceedings and 

the purpose of sanctions." The domestic relations court also determined the magistrate did 

not err by ordering Mother to pay Father only $500 in attorney fees. In reaching this 

decision, the domestic relations court stated: 

[Father's] attorney failed to present any formal evidence as to 

this motion for attorney fees. This court determined that $500 

is a reasonable attorney fee in this case. The award of attorney 

fees is not a sanction but a reimbursement for actual time 

expended as determined reasonable by the court absent formal 

evidence. 

Appeal 

{¶ 15} Father now appeals the domestic relations court's decision, raising a single 

assignment of error for review. In his assignment of error, Father argues the domestic 

relations court erred by finding Mother was just a "second offender" despite the domestic 

relations court sanctioning Mother for committing four violations of the parties' shared 

parenting agreement. Father also argues the domestic relations court erred by ordering 

Mother to pay him only $500 in attorney fees. We find no merit to either of Father's claims. 

Domestic Relations Court's "Second Offender" Finding 

{¶ 16} Just as it had done in Brown I, the domestic relations court found Mother in 

civil contempt for her failure to comply with the parties' shared parenting agreement. A 

finding of civil contempt is proper where the sanctions imposed by the domestic relations 

court are primarily for reasons benefiting the complainant and are remedial and coercive in 

nature. Ganaway v. Ganaway, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-05-039, 2017-Ohio-1009, ¶ 
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24. A domestic relations court's finding of civil contempt will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion. Dimitriou v. Dimitriou, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-11-

119, 2012-Ohio-4773, ¶ 13. This includes the imposition of penalties. Mackowiak v. 

Mackowiak, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2010-04-009, 2011-Ohio-3013, ¶ 45, discretionary 

appeal not allowed, 130 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2011-Ohio-5883, citing Fidler v. Fidler, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 08AP-284, 2008-Ohio-4688, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 17} R.C. 2705.03 "governs contempt hearings and provides that the accused 

must be given the opportunity to be heard." Pulled From The Pits Rescue & Sanctuary v. 

Dabernig, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 15AP0061, 2016-Ohio-7255, ¶ 9. To that end, pursuant to 

R.C. 2705.05(A), in all contempt proceedings, "the court shall conduct a hearing." At that 

contempt hearing, R.C. 2705.05(A) mandates the court to "investigate the charge and hear 

any answer or testimony that the accused makes or offers and shall determine whether the 

accused is guilty of the contempt charge." Thereafter, if the accused is found in contempt, 

"the court may impose" any of the penalties set forth in R.C. 2705.05(A)(1) thru (3). Those 

penalties are: 

(1) For a first offense, a fine of not more than two hundred fifty 

dollars, a definite term of imprisonment of not more than thirty 

days in jail, or both; 

(2) For a second offense, a fine of not more than five hundred 

dollars, a definite term of imprisonment of not more than sixty 

days in jail, or both; 

(3) For a third or subsequent offense, a fine of not more than 

one thousand dollars, a definite term of imprisonment of not 

more than ninety days in jail, or both. 

{¶ 18} Although there can be no dispute that Mother had been found in contempt 

previously, see Brown I, the domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion by finding 

Mother was just a "second offender" rather than a third offender, fourth offender, and fifth 

offender as Father suggests. This is true despite the fact that the domestic relations court 
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sanctioned Mother for committing four separate violations of the parties' shared parenting 

agreement. 

{¶ 19} By arguing Mother should have been considered a higher tiered offender for 

each violation, Father is misapplying the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Pugh v. Pugh, 

15 Ohio St.3d 136 (1984), the Tenth District Court of Appeals' holding in Bowers v. Bowers, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 90AP-130, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5223 (Nov. 29, 1990), and this 

court's holding in Mackowiak, 2011-Ohio-3013. Specifically, as this court held in Mackowiak 

when discussing Pugh, "when two or more violations are brought in a single contempt action 

and during one hearing, the person found guilty of contempt cannot be punished for each 

violation." Mackowiak at ¶ 57, citing Pugh at 142-143; and Bowers. 

{¶ 20} Father argues that because he filed nine separate motions for contempt each 

alleging a single violation of the parties' shared parenting agreement that his nine motions 

were not "brought in a single contempt action during one hearing." This, according to 

Father, required the domestic relations court to designate Mother a higher tiered offender 

for each of Mother's four violations. However, contrary to Father's claim, incentivizing a 

complainant to file separate motions for contempt for each alleged violation of the parties' 

shared parenting agreement was not the Ohio Supreme Court's intent behind its holding in 

Pugh, the Tenth District's holding in Bowers, or this court's holding in Mackowiak. This 

court should not, and will not, permit Father to misapply the principles outlined in Pugh, 

Bowers, and Mackowiak in order to reach his desired result; namely, punishing Mother to 

the harshest extent possible. 

{¶ 21} This is the same basic holding advanced by this court in Brown I. Again, as 

part of Father's prior appeal, Father argued that "because Mother was found guilty of over 

three violations of the shared parenting agreement she should have been found to be a 

third-time offender." Id., 2019-Ohio-2164 at ¶ 68. This court disagreed and found the 
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domestic relations court did not err "in finding Mother to be a first-time offender because 

there was no evidence presented indicating that Mother had been found guilty of any 

contempt offenses prior to the hearing." Id. But, had this court held the opposite, that 

holding would have required this court to find Mother was, at the very least, a "third 

offender." This is because, as noted above, the domestic relations court found Mother had 

violated a portion of each of Father's three motions for contempt. 

{¶ 22} Because Mother was found to have violated a portion of each of Father's three 

motions, our holding in Brown I would not have been dependent on the fact Mother had not 

been found in contempt previously. Mother would have instead been found to be a "first 

offender" for violating at least one of the alleged violations set forth in Father's November 

6, 2017 motion, a "second offender" for committing the alleged violation set forth in Father's 

December 11, 2017 motion, and a "third offender" for committing one of the alleged 

violations set forth in Father's December 21, 2017 motion. This court rejected that argument 

in Brown I and similarly rejects that argument here. 

{¶ 23} In reaching this decision, we find it necessary to discuss the underlying facts 

set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in Pugh and the Tenth District in Bowers, the two 

decisions this court relied on in Mackowiak to hold that "when two or more violations are 

brought in a single contempt action and during one hearing, the person found guilty of 

contempt cannot be punished for each violation." Mackowiak, 2011-Ohio-3013 at ¶ 57, 

citing Pugh, 15 Ohio St.3d at 142-143; and Bowers, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5223. 

{¶ 24} In Pugh, appellee filed two motions for contempt against the appellant; one 

on March 15, 1983 and the other on April 15, 1983. In her first motion, appellee alleged 

that appellant had violated the terms of their separation agreement by failing to timely pay 

a lump sum property settlement. Id. at 137. Similarly, in her second motion, appellee 

alleged that appellant had violated the terms of their separation agreement since "the title 
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to the Jaguar had not been transferred, that the snowmobile had not been transferred, and 

that the appellant was behind in his periodic payments and child support." Id. 

{¶ 25} On May 5, 1983, the domestic relations court held a single hearing on 

appellee's two motions for contempt. During this hearing, evidence was presented 

indicating appellant had committed both violations alleged in each of appellee's two 

motions. Upon finding appellant in contempt on each of the two violations set forth in 

appellee's two motions for contempt, the domestic relations court ordered appellant to serve 

two consecutive ten-day jail terms; one ten-day jail term for failing to timely pay the lump 

sum property settlement and another ten-day jail term for "for not transferring the title to the 

Jaguar, for willfully failing to pay his child support obligation, and for willfully failing to make 

his periodic payments." Id. at 138. 

{¶ 26} Appellant appealed the domestic relations court's decision. As part of his 

appeal, appellant argued that it was improper for the domestic relations court to order him 

to serve two consecutive ten-day jail terms "for violating two different terms of the separation 

agreement" when "both violations were brought out in one action for contempt." (Emphasis 

added.) Id. at 142. Relying on R.C. 2705.05, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed and found 

that even though appellee had filed two motions for contempt, "appellant may only be 

imprisoned for a maximum of ten days if he is found guilty of contempt. He cannot be 

imprisoned for each violation which composes the contempt charge." Id. at 143.1 

{¶ 27} Similar to the facts in Pugh, in Bowers, appellee also filed two motions for 

contempt against the appellant; one on October 10, 1989 and one on November 2, 1989. 

Bowers, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5223 at *2. The first motion alleged that appellant had 

 

1. We note that although appellant could not be imprisoned for each violation in Pugh, the Ohio Supreme 

Court nevertheless found its holding "[did] not limit the number of contempt actions which may be brought." 

Id., 15 Ohio St.3d at 143. That is to say "[i]f appellant refuses to obey the orders of the court after serving his 

sentence, additional contempt proceedings can be initiated which list the appellant's violations." Id.
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violated the parties' divorce decree by "refusing to comply with the visitation order and for 

refusing to allow telephone contact with his daughter." Id. On the other hand, the second 

motion alleged that appellant had violated the parties' divorce decree by failing "to divide 

the funds on deposit at BancOhio National Bank pursuant to the terms of the decree of 

divorce." Id. 

{¶ 28} On December 18, 1989, the domestic relations court held a single hearing on 

appellee's two motions for contempt. Id. Following this hearing, the domestic relations 

court found appellant in contempt for denying appellee visitation time with their daughter. 

Id. The domestic relations court also found appellant in contempt for "her willful failure and 

refusal to divide the proceeds of the BancOhio account[.]" Id. Upon finding appellant in 

contempt on each of the two violations set forth in appellee's two motions for contempt, the 

domestic relations court ordered appellant to pay a $1,000 fine; one $500 fine for denying 

appellee visitation time with their daughter and another $500 fine for failing to divide the 

proceeds of the BancOhio account. Id. 

{¶ 29} Appellant appealed the domestic relations court's decision. As part of her 

appeal, appellant argued the domestic relations court "erred in imposing more than one fine 

on her, and in imposing an excessive fine on her." Id. at *8. Just like in Pugh, the Tenth 

District agreed and held that even though appellee had filed two separate motions for 

contempt that "the two violations were brought in a single action and during one hearing." 

(Emphasis added.) Id. Therefore, because the two motions for contempt were brought in 

a "single action and during one hearing," the Tenth District found that once the appellant 

was found in contempt that she could not be fined for "each violation which composes the 

contempt charges." Id. Accordingly, citing to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Pugh, 

the Tenth District held "the trial court erred in imposing a fine on appellant on each of the 

contempt charges and in fining appellant more than the maximum amount permitted by 
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statute." Id., 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5223 at *8. 

{¶ 30} As noted above, Father argues that because he filed nine separate motions 

for contempt each alleging a single violation of the parties' shared parenting agreement that 

the nine motions were not "brought in a single contempt action and during one hearing." 

However, based on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Pugh and the Tenth District's 

holding in Bowers, Father's understanding of what it means be "brought in a single contempt 

action" is misplaced. Rather, in accordance with Pugh and Bowers, an action in contempt 

may be classified as a single contempt action even when the alleged violations are brought 

in two or more motions for contempt. This is true so long as each of those motions are 

addressed during one contempt hearing.2 Therefore, contrary to Father's claim, the 

holdings set forth in Pugh, Bowers, and Mackowiak applies only when allegations of 

contempt are brought in a single contempt action and during one hearing not when the 

allegations of contempt are brought in separate contempt motions and during one hearing. 

{¶ 31} In reaching this decision, we note Father's references to the fact that he has 

"no control" over the domestic relations court's docket and scheduling office. Therefore, 

according to Father, he should not be penalized for the magistrate "set[ting] all the matters 

for [a single hearing] on the same day, presumably as a matter of judicial economy." 

However, as noted above, Father did not object to the magistrate holding a single hearing 

to address his nine motions for contempt. Rather, as part of the magistrate's scheduling 

order, the magistrate specifically stated that "[c]ounsel further agreed that it would be easier 

to try all the Motions at one time." Because Father agreed that all nine of his motions should 

be heard at a single hearing, Father invited any error that may have occurred and cannot 

 

2. The facts in Pugh and Bowers are analogous to the facts and circumstances here, i.e., a domestic relations 

court holding one hearing to address the appellees' two motions for contempt filed against the appellants. 

The fact that Pugh and Bowers dealt with only two motions for contempt while this case deals with nine 

separate motions is a difference without a distinction. 
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now claim any resulting prejudice therefrom. See State ex rel. Bitter v. Missig, 72 Ohio 

St.3d 249, 254 (1995) (a party is not "permitted to take advantage of an error which he 

himself invited or induced the trial court to make"). 

{¶ 32} We also note Father's references to the generally well-established principle 

that contempt proceedings must necessarily involve some form of punishment. See In re 

J.M., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2008-01-004, 2008-Ohio-6763, ¶ 47 ("punishment is 

inherent in contempt"). However, although serving as a form of punishment, "[t]he penalties 

imposed for civil contempt are designed to coerce compliance with a court order for the 

benefit of the complainant." Castanias v. Castanias, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-04-

036, 2009-Ohio-6171, ¶ 11. In other words, as the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Pugh, 

sanctions imposed for civil contempt are used "'to enforce compliance with an order of the 

court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of noncompliance.'" Id., 

15 Ohio St.3d at 140, quoting McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 

S.Ct. 497 (1949). A complainant filing successive motions for contempt each alleging a 

single violation of a shared parenting agreement in hopes that the contemnor would be 

punished more severely for each violation does not serve this purpose. 

{¶ 33} For example, applying Father's argument set forth above, a complainant 

would be rewarded for filing 14 separate motions for contempt after the contemnor 

prohibited the complainant from exercising his or her parenting time over a consecutive twoweek period. This is because, according to Father's argument, the domestic relations court 

would be required to find the contemnor in contempt as a "14th offender," thereby subjecting 

the contemnor to the maximum penalties set forth in R.C. 2705.05(A)(3) for each of the 14 

violations: a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, a definite term of imprisonment of 

not more than 90 days in jail, or both. Or, in this example, a $14,000 fine and a definite 

term of imprisonment of 1,260 days in jail. 
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{¶ 34} This, also according to Father's argument, would require the domestic 

relations court to order the contemnor to reimburse the complainant $2,310 in court costs 

and pay the complainant $7,000 in attorney fees, i.e., $165 in court costs and $500 in 

attorney fees for each of the 14 contempt motions upon which the complainant filed and for 

which the contemnor was sanctioned. This would hold true even though it was likely only 

the date had changed on 13 of those motions. While Father may disagree, we find such a 

holding improper in that it would both (1) unduly penalize the contemnor to an extent not 

contemplated by the General Assembly through the passage of R.C. 2705.05(A)(1) thru (3), 

and (2) result a windfall to the complainant and the complainant's attorney through an award 

of attorney fees above and beyond anything that could be considered reasonable. Again, 

just as the domestic relations court found, "[t]he award of attorney fees is not a sanction but 

a reimbursement for actual time expended as determined reasonable by the court absent 

formal evidence." (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 35} The domestic relations court also found that "[b]y combining the findings of 

contempt in one finding of contempt as a second offender serves both the purpose of the 

proceedings and the purpose of sanctions." We agree. This is because, as noted above, 

incentivizing a complainant to file separate motions for contempt for each alleged violation 

was not the Ohio Supreme Court's intention by its holding in Pugh, the Tenth District's 

holding in Bowers, or this court's holding in Mackowiak. Once more, rather than punishing 

the contemnor to the harshest extent possible, the purpose of civil contempt is to "coerce 

compliance with a court order for the benefit of the complainant." Castanias, 2009-Ohio6171 at ¶ 11. This can be achieved without placing an unnecessary burden on the domestic 

relations court to process nearly identical, repetitive, and duplicitous motions for contempt 

in hopes that the contemnor would be punished more severely as a higher tiered offender 

for each alleged violation. 
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{¶ 36} This court's holding is further supported by the discretionary nature of R.C. 

2705.05(A). As noted above, that statute specifically provides that if the accused is found 

guilty of contempt, "the court may impose" any of the penalties set forth in R.C. 

2705.05(A)(1) thru (3). (Emphasis added.) Therefore, contrary to Father's claim, even if 

the domestic relations court had designated Mother a higher tiered offender, the domestic 

relations court was under no obligation to sanction Mother to any harsher punishment than 

it did. This is because the statute at issue, R.C. 2705.05(A), contains the discretionary term 

may rather than mandatory term shall. See State v. Recinos, 5th Dist. Richland No. 14CA9, 

2014-Ohio-3021, ¶ 34 ("[t]he word 'shall' is usually interpreted to make the provision in 

which it is contained mandatory" whereas "the use of the word 'may' is generally construed 

to make the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary"), citing

Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy District, 27 Ohio St. 2d 102, 107 (1971). 

{¶ 37} The penalties that should be imposed upon the contemnor is left to the sound 

discretion of the domestic relations court, not the complainant. Mackowiak, 2011-Ohio3013 at ¶ 45. The penalties imposed on Mother by the domestic relations court in this case 

– sentencing Mother to a 60-day jail term that could be purged by Mother providing Father 

with makeup parenting time and by writing an apology letter to their daughter's soccer 

facility – was not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kolenic v. Kolenic, 11th Dist. Geauga 

No. 2017-G-0117, 2018-Ohio-1106, ¶ 34 (domestic relations court did not abuse its 

discretion by imposing a sanction that was statutorily permissible). The penalties instead 

served as both a punishment for Mother's past indiscretions and a tool to coerce Mother to 

comply with the parties' shared parenting agreement going forward. Therefore, because 

we find no abuse of discretion in the domestic relations court's decision, Father's argument 

challenging the domestic relation court's decision finding Mother was just a "second 

offender" lacks merit. 
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Domestic Relations Court's Order of Attorney Fees 

{¶ 38} Father also argues the domestic relations court erred by ordering Mother to 

pay him only $500 in attorney fees. Father instead argues the domestic relations court 

should have ordered Mother to pay him $2,000, i.e., $500 for each of the four motions for 

contempt upon which he filed and for which Mother was sanctioned. However, just as the 

domestic relations court found, Father failed to present any evidence concerning his 

attorney fees at the contempt hearing. This was the same problem Father faced in Brown

I. Id., 2019-Ohio-2164 at ¶ 69. Therefore, because Father failed to present any evidence 

concerning his attorney fees, Father cannot demonstrate that the domestic relations court 

abused its discretion by awarding him the presumptively "reasonable" $500 fee set forth in 

the domestic relations court's Loc.R. DR 45(B).3 Accordingly, because we find no error in 

the domestic relations court's decision, Father's argument challenging the domestic 

relations court's decision ordering Mother to pay him only $500 in attorney fees also lacks 

merit. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 39} The domestic relations court did not err by finding Mother was a "second 

offender" despite the domestic relations court finding Mother committed four violations of 

the parties' shared parenting agreement. Such a holding was proper in light of the Ohio 

Supreme Court's decision in Pugh, the Tenth District's decision in Bowers, and this court's 

holding in Mackowiak. The domestic relations court also did not err by ordering Mother to 

pay Father only $500 in attorney fees. This was because, as noted above, Father failed to 

present any evidence concerning his attorney fees as required by the domestic relations 

 

3. Although not argued by Father as part of his appellate brief, we note that this holding fully complies with 

the requirements set forth in R.C. 3109.051(K), a statute that requires the domestic relations court to order 

the contemnor to pay the complainant's "reasonable attorney fees" that "arose in relation to" the contemnor 

failing to comply with the complainant's parenting time rights. 
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court's local rules when seeking fees in excess of the presumptively "reasonable" $500 fee. 

Therefore, finding no merit to any of the arguments raised herein, Father's single 

assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled. 

{¶ 40} Judgment affirmed. 

 PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.