Motor Vehicles

USITC Publication 3545

September 2002

OFFICE OF INDUSTRIES

U.S. International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

This report was prepared principally by

Laura Polly

Transportation Branch

Electronics and Transportation Division

Vern Simpson

Robert A. Rogowsky

Address all communications to

Secretary to the Commission

United States International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436

Director of Operations

Director of Industries

COMMISSIONERS

Marcia E. Miller

Deanna Tanner Okun, Chairman

Jennifer A. Hillman, Vice Chairman

Lynn M. Bragg

Stephen Koplan
OMB No.: 3117--0188

09/02

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Industry and Trade Summary: Motor Vehicles

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ITS: Motor Vehicles
 1

 The information and analysis provided in this report are for the purposes of this report only. 

Nothing in this report should be construed to indicate how the Commission would find in an

investigation conducted under statutory authority covering the same or similar subject matter.

i

PREFACE

In 1991 the United States International Trade Commission initiated its current Industry and

Trade Summary series of informational reports on the thousands of products imported into

and exported from the United States. Each summary addresses a different

commodity/industry area and contains information on product uses, U.S. and foreign

producers, and customs treatment. Also included is an analysis of the basic factors affecting

trends in consumption, production, and trade of the commodity, as well as those bearing on

the competitiveness of U.S. industries in domestic and foreign markets.1

 This report on

motor vehicles covers the period 1997-2001.

iii

CONTENTS

Page

Abstract .................................................................... 1

Introduction .............................................................. 3

Passenger vehicles ............................................................... 4

Medium- and heavy-duty trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Buses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Bodies and chassis ............................................................... 4

Assembly process ............................................................... 5

U.S. industry profile .................................................... 5

Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Geographic distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Labor intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Manufacturing trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Lean manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Just-in-time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Six Sigma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Flexible manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Build-to-order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Modular assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Platform sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Design advances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Internet and manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Vertical integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Marketing methods and pricing practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Research and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Regulatory issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
iv

CONTENTS–Continued

Page

U.S. industry profile–Continued

Fuel economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Safety and emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Luxury tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Gas guzzler tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Extent of globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

U.S. market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 Consumer characteristics and factors affecting demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

The effects of September 11 on the U.S. automotive industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

U.S. trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

U.S. imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Principal suppliers and import levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

U.S. trade measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Tariff measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Nontariff measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

U.S. Government trade-related investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

 Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

U.S. exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Principal markets and export levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Foreign trade measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Tariff measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Nontariff measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
v

CONTENTS–Continued

Page

Foreign industry profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Appendixes

A. Tariff and Trade Agreement Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

Tables

1. U.S. motor vehicle industry employment and wages, 1997-2001 ........................ 7

2. U.S. car sales by sector, by percent, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

3. U.S. motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

4. U.S. commercial truck unit sales, by class of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5. U.S. car and light truck unit sales, by manufacturer, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

6. U.S. motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

7. U.S. passenger vehicle unit production, by car and light truck, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

8. U.S. motor vehicle merchandise trade balance based on imports for consumption and 

 domestic exports, in millions of dollars, by selected countries, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

9. U.S. motor vehicle imports for consumption, in millions of dollars, by selected countries, 

 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

10. U.S. motor vehicle domestic exports, in millions of dollars, by selected countries, 

 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

11. EU motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

12. EU motor vehicle exports, by type of vehicle, in million EUR, 1997-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

13. EU motor vehicle new registrations, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

14. EU motor vehicle imports, by type of vehicle, in million EUR, 1997-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

15. Japanese motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

16. Japanese motor vehicle unit exports, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

17. Japanese motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
vi

CONTENTS–Continued

Page

Tables–Continued

18. Japanese motor vehicle unit imports, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

19. Korean motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

20. Korean motor vehicle unit exports, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

21. Korean motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

22. Canadian motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

23. Canadian passenger vehicle unit imports from outside the NAFTA region, by source,

 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

24. Canadian motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

25. Mexican motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

26. Mexican motor vehicle unit exports, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

27. Mexican motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

28. Mexican passenger vehicle unit imports from outside the NAFTA region, by type of vehicle, 

 1997-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1

ABSTRACT

This report addresses trade and industry conditions for motor vehicles for the period

1997-2001. 

• U.S. motor vehicle production decreased from 12.1 million units in 1997 to

11.4 million units in 2001. Production by the Big Three (General Motors,

Ford, and the Chrysler division of DaimlerChrysler) registered an average

annual percentage decrease of 2.4 percent, while total U.S. production

registered an average annual percentage decrease of 1.3 percent. During the

period, the Big Three share of U.S. production decreased from 80 percent

in 1997 to 76 percent in 2001. Japanese and German transplants picked up

the slack, accounting for 22 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of U.S.

production in 2001, up from 20 percent and less than 1 percent in 1997.

C Because the U.S. market is the largest in the world, and is generally

considered to be among the markets most open to imports, import

consumption is high. During 1997-2001, sales of imports as a percentage of

total motor vehicle sales increased each year, from 13 percent of retail sales

in 1997 to 18 percent in 2001. Although subsidiaries of U.S. automakers,

primarily in Canada, are a major source of U.S. imports of passenger

vehicles, imports from Japan exert the greatest competitive pressure on U.S.

automakers. U.S. imports from Japan accounted for approximately 10

percent of U.S. passenger car sales in 2001, and 9 percent of U.S. light truck

sales. However, Japanese automakers rely heavily on their U.S. assembly

plants to serve the U.S. market. Japanese nameplate vehicles, regardless of

place of assembly, accounted for 27 percent of U.S. passenger vehicle sales

in 2001. Other leading sources of motor vehicle imports include Mexico,

Germany, and Korea.

C Sales of passenger vehicles to individual consumers and businesses account

for most sales and are roughly equal. Sales to Federal, State, and local

governments account for a very small percentage of total U.S. car sales.

Trends in motor vehicle sales in the United States are dominated by cyclical

macroeconomic trends in the U.S. economy. Typically, sales downturns of

several years follow several years of sales growth. Passenger vehicle sales

are highly representative of the health of the U.S. economy and are

considered to be an important leading economic indicator. New passenger

vehicle sales are influenced by personal income growth, unemployment

levels, consumer confidence, and the value of used cars. Factors considered

by purchasers of commercial vehicles include how the vehicle would meet

their transport needs, the price of the vehicle, and the lifecycle cost of the

vehicle. Commercial vehicles must meet a very high 
2

ABSTRACT–Continued

quality and reliability standard so that costly downtime is minimized and

maintenance costs are as low as possible.

C The U.S. automotive industry spends over $18 billion annually in research

and development of new advanced technologies aimed largely at four areas:

emissions, fuel efficiency, safety, and performance. The automotive

industry claims that it devotes more funds to research and development than

any other manufacturing industry. Although competition is fierce,

automakers recognize the benefits of working together on key areas of

precompetitive research. The Big Three have formally collaborated on a

number of shared technological and environmental concerns through the

United States Council for Automotive Research (USCAR), formed by the

three companies in 1992.
 1

 “Transplant” is a term that refers to U.S. assembly operations of foreign automakers.

 2

 The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, found at Internet address

http://www.autoalliance.org/facts.htm, retrieved Oct. 23, 2001.

 3

 As a region, the EU produces more vehicles per annum than the United States.

 4

 Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77, No. 5, Feb. 4, 2002, p. 8; and Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77,

No. 3, Jan. 21, 2002, p. 2.

3

INTRODUCTION

This summary covers developments in the motor vehicle industry, which includes passenger

vehicles, commercial trucks, buses, and bodies and chassis of these vehicles, during 1997-

2001. Information from earlier years, as well as forward-looking trends, are presented where

appropriate. Because passenger vehicles – cars and light trucks (pickup trucks, sport-utility

vehicles (SUVs), vans, and minivans) – account for over 97 percent of U.S. production and

motor vehicle sales, they will be given appropriate emphasis throughout. The report will

begin with a comprehensive profile of the U.S. industry, which consists of traditional U.S.

companies, Japanese and European ‘transplants,’1

 and U.S.-foreign joint-venture operations.

It will then present facts and trends related to the U.S. market and discuss U.S. trade and

related issues. The summary also provides a profile of leading foreign industries.

Automobile production is among the largest manufacturing industries in the United States,

and as such it is a critical economic driver, contributing substantially to employment and

productivity. Motor vehicle production reportedly accounts for over 5 percent of the U.S.

private-sector gross domestic product, and one out of every seven jobs in the United States

is in automotive manufacturing or a related industry. Automakers are important customers

of other businesses; for example, automakers are the largest consumer of steel in the United

States.2

The United States is the world’s largest single-country producer3

 and consumer of motor

vehicles. In 2001, passenger car and commercial vehicle production reached 11.4 million

units, and sales reached 17.5 million units.4

 Despite the fact that it is a mature market, the

United States remains the most important country in the world for investment by, and

competition among, global motor vehicle producers. Owing to these influences, the U.S.

motor vehicle industry has been characterized by constant organizational and technological

change, an increasing global presence, extensive international alliances, greater cooperation

among domestic rivals, and improved responsiveness to consumers. The industry has made

such changes in the presence of new regulatory demands, extreme cycles in the U.S. market,

and strong competition from foreign automakers.

The various segments of the motor vehicle industry have many common as well as

distinctive features related to the basic characteristics of the products, production methods,

and competitive and structural trends. The three major categories included in this report are

described below.
4

Passenger Vehicles

The passenger vehicle industry includes passenger automobiles and light trucks, which are

often considered as two related market segments. Passenger automobiles, or cars, include

sedans, station wagons, convertibles, and sports cars. Light trucks include pickup trucks,

SUVs, vans, and minivans, most of which have a gross vehicle weight (gvw) of no more than

10,000 pounds, although some industry data sources include trucks up to 14,000 pounds gvw

in the light truck category. Although cars and light trucks are distinctly different vehicles,

unlike the other motor vehicles included in this report, they are produced primarily for

individuals who purchase them for private transportation. Moreover, these vehicles generally

have common production processes, distribution systems, and producers.

Medium- and Heavy-Duty Trucks

Medium- and heavy-duty trucks account for nearly 3 percent of U.S. production and sales

of motor vehicles. These trucks are used primarily for carrying goods; classes 4-7, which are

medium-duty trucks, typically have a gvw of between 10,001 and 33,000 pounds, and class

8 heavy-duty trucks are those over 33,000 pounds gvw. This vehicle group includes tractor

units that pull semi-trailers, as well as integrated units. Medium- and heavy-duty trucks are

sold mainly for commercial use. Many of these trucks are produced by the same companies

that produce passenger vehicles.

Buses

Buses account for less than 1 percent of the motor vehicle industry. They are primarily

designed for the public transportation of 12 or more passengers, and can be divided into three

categories: motor coaches for intracity transportation, urban transit buses for intercity

transportation, and school buses and other specialty buses. In general, bus manufacturers do

not produce trucks and passenger vehicles; however, bus producers make extensive use of

chassis, engines, and transmissions produced by truck manufacturers. 

Bodies and Chassis

Bodies and chassis are major components of motor vehicles, forming a type of foundation

to which other parts are attached to form a vehicle. In fact, a vehicle chassis is sometimes

considered to be an unfinished vehicle. In most cases, motor vehicle manufacturers produce

the chassis and bodies of the vehicles, although, as noted, bus producers often purchase

chassis from a supplier, and then add various other components to form a completed vehicle.
 5

 Differing from some industries, the motor vehicle industry term “assembly plant” does not imply a

facility capable of only relatively simple production processes. Motor vehicle assembly plants may engage in

anything from relatively limited to very extensive production processes.

 6

 Some assembly plants produce certain vehicle parts such as the body stampings, while other plants only

assemble the vehicle; consequently, caution should be used when comparing plant productivity on a

vehicles-produced-per-employee basis. Body stamping, for example, is a major operation that, when

performed in the final assembly plant, requires the addition of a significant number of employees.

 7

 The products covered in this report are classified in the North American Industry Classification System

under headings 33611, Automobile and Light Duty Motor Vehicle Manufacturing; and 33612, Heavy Duty

Truck Manufacturing (except for 336212, Truck Trailer Manufacturing and 336214, Travel Trailer and

Camper Manufacturing). 

 8 Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77, No. 5, Feb. 4, 2002, p. 8.

5

Assembly Process

Motor vehicles are assembled in factories, generally referred to as assembly plants,5 where

thousands of parts and subassemblies come together on a production line. The motor vehicle

production process, while very complex, can be divided into four major steps. First, the

major components of the body and chassis are stamped from steel or formed with other

materials such as aluminum, fiberglass, or composite plastic.6

 The body and chassis parts are

then attached by welding, or sometimes with adhesives, to form the basic foundation of the

vehicle. The body is then painted. Finally, the body/chassis assembly is placed on an

assembly line where other components are attached to the vehicle. Certain portions of the

production process are highly automated, requiring little or no direct human labor input. The

primary material input for motor vehicle production is steel, although various types of metal,

plastics, rubber, glass, and textiles are also used extensively.

U.S. INDUSTRY PROFILE77

Producers

The U.S. motor vehicle manufacturing industry is highly concentrated. U.S. passenger

vehicle production accounts for more than 97 percent of total motor vehicle production, with

foreign-based automakers accounting for a growing share of U.S. production. In 2001,

traditional U.S. manufacturers known as the Big Three – General Motors (GM), Ford, and

Chrysler (as of 1998 a subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler of Germany) – accounted for

approximately 76 percent of U.S. passenger vehicle production. Japanese automakers Honda,

Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru-Isuzu, and Toyota accounted for 18 percent, and European

automakers BMW and Mercedes-Benz (division of DaimlerChrysler) accounted for nearly

2 percent. There are two U.S.-Japanese joint ventures – Autoalliance International (FordMazda) and New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) (GM Toyota) – which

accounted for nearly 4 percent.8

 Within the passenger vehicle segment, there has been a

steady increase in the production of light trucks to meet market demand. In 1997, light trucks

accounted for 50 percent of passenger vehicle production; by 2001 their share of passenger
 9 Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77, No. 5, Feb. 4, 2002, p. 8; and Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 73,

No. 6, Feb. 9, 1998, p. 6.

 10 Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 67, No. 3, Jan. 20, 1992, p. 1.

 11 Lindsay Chappell, “Alabama plant presents Hyundai with a challenge,” Automotive News, 

Apr. 8, 2002, p. 3.

 12 The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, found at Internet address

http://www.autoalliance.org/facts.htm, retrieved Oct. 23, 2001.

 13 Defined as SIC numbers 3711, motor vehicles and car bodies, and 3713, truck and bus bodies.

6

vehicle production reached 56 percent.9 This figure is up from just 33 percent as recently as

1990.10

Japanese automakers began producing in the United States in the 1980s largely as a means

to avoid the constraints of a voluntary restraint agreement on Japanese exports of passenger

vehicles to the United States. These assembly operations are known as ‘transplants.’

Localized production allows Japanese automakers to remain responsive to U.S. market

developments, alleviate potential trade friction, and dramatically reduce transportation costs.

German automakers BMW and Mercedes-Benz adopted this strategy in the 1990s, with

production beginning in their newly established plants in South Carolina in 1994 and

Alabama in 1997, respectively. The Korean industry will be the next to establish assembly

operations in the United States, with Hyundai announcing in April 2002 that it would begin

production in Alabama in 2005.11

The production of medium- and heavy-duty trucks and buses accounts for the remaining 3

percent of total U.S. motor vehicle production. U.S. producers of trucks include Ford,

Freightliner, GM, Isuzu, Mack, Navistar, Paccar (Kenworth and Peterbilt brands), Volvo,

and Western Star. Domestic bus manufacturers include Blue Bird, Chance Coach, El Dorado

National, Federal Coach, Gillig, Goshen Coach, Motor Coach Industries, Mid Bus, North

American Bus Industries, Navistar, Neoplan, New Flyer, Nova BUS, Setra, Thomas Built

Buses, and World Trans.

Employment

Based on average hourly pay, automotive employees earn more than employees in virtually

every other industry in the United States.12 Employment in the U.S. motor vehicle industry13

was fairly steady during 1997-2000, but dropped by 6 percent in 2001 (table 1). Production

workers as a percentage of total employment decreased each year, from 77 percent in 1997

to 70 percent in 2001. Total employment levels over the 10-year period 1992-2001

fluctuated upward by 8 percent; employment in 1992 totaled 348,800. 
 14 For SIC 3711 only.

 15 Bureau of Labor Statistics, found at Internet address http://data.bls.gov, retrieved Apr. 3, 2002.

 16 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2001 (Southfield, MI: Ward’s Communications, 2001), p. 293.

 17 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Contract ‘99: Membership or Money?” Sept. 8, 1999, found at Internet

address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Apr. 19, 2002.

 18 Reuters, “Automakers face possible battle with UAW,” Sept. 27, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Sept. 27, 2001.

7

Table 1

U.S. motor vehicle industry employment and wages, 1997-2001

Year

All employees

(thousands)

Production workers

(thousands)

Wages1

(dollars)

1997 388.6 300.6 21.63

1998 388.3 285.0 21.80

1999 400.6 287.8 21.73

2000 398.7 283.2 22.91

2001 376.1 261.6 24.03

 1 Average hourly earnings of production workers.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The average hourly earnings of production workers14 remained fairly steady during 1997-

2001, with an average annual percentage change of less than 3 percent. However, the average

hourly earnings of production workers in 2001 were 31 percent greater than those of workers

in 1992.15 Motor vehicle industry employees in the United States are the second-highest paid

in the world, with Germany ranking first and Japan, third.16

It is considered likely that the U.S. industry will undergo decreases in employment in the

coming years. According to some, U.S. manufacturers lag the Japanese transplants in

efficiency because they are overstaffed by tens of thousands of workers.17 One industry

analyst estimates that global overcapacity calls for the closure of 40 auto plants, up to 12 of

them in North America.18 Industry sources indicate that producers have become reluctant to

add workers even when sales are strong, preferring to utilize overtime or various types of

multiple-shift production. 

A large portion of the U.S. motor vehicle industry is unionized under the International

Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America

(UAW), making reductions in force difficult to implement. Despite the fact that the 1999

contract between the UAW and the Big Three specified a moratorium on plant closings until

2003, the UAW claimed to have lost more than 90,000 members in 2000. The elimination

of motor vehicle and component assembly jobs is reportedly responsible for a significant
 19 Just-auto.com editorial team, “UAW loses 90,000 members,” Apr. 26, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Apr. 26, 2001.

 20 Lindsay Chappell, “UAW takes new tack to unionize Nissan plant,” Automotive News, Aug. 28, 2000,

p. 6; and Reuters, “Nissan workers in Tennessee reject UAW,” Oct. 4, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Oct. 4, 2001.

 21 Foreign automakers have been attracted to the Southeastern United States for a number of reasons,

including public incentives offered by States; typically lower-cost, non-unionized labor; and comparatively

lower tax rates. Brian Corbett, “Southern Hospitality: The auto industry is migrating south,” Ward’s Auto

World, Aug. 2002, p. 45.

 22 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2001, pp. 236 and 242.

8

portion of this membership reduction.19 To date, the UAW has been largely unsuccessful in

organizing the Japanese- and European-based auto plants in the United States, with a number

of defeats during 1997-2001. In 1997, the UAW lost a second try at unionizing Nissan’s

plant in Smyrna, TN; in 1999 the teamsters failed to organize Honda workers at Marysville,

OH; in 2000 the UAW failed to organize Mercedes-Benz workers in Tuscaloosa, AL, and

Toyota workers in Georgetown, KY; and in 2001, a third attempt to organize Nissan Smyrna

ended in failure. The union has been successful in organizing AutoAlliance (Ford-Mazda

joint venture), Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, and NUMMI (GM-Toyota joint

venture).20

Geographic Distribution

U.S. motor vehicle and related production is concentrated in the Midwestern United States

and is centered in Michigan. This region of headquarters offices, R&D centers, vehicle and

parts production, and tool suppliers provides locational advantages for motor vehicle

producers. In recent years, however, the industry has expanded considerably in the

southeastern part of the country; this growth is led by foreign-based automakers.21 In 2000,

Michigan accounted for one-third of all car production in the United States, followed by

Ohio (18 percent), Illinois (13 percent), Kentucky (7 percent), and Tennessee (6 percent).

Michigan also was the leading State for U.S. light-, medium-, and heavy-duty truck

production, accounting for 18 percent of such production. Other leading truck-producing

States include Missouri (15 percent), Ohio (12 percent), Kentucky (12 percent), and Indiana

(7 percent).22

Labor Intensity

Skill requirements in the motor vehicle industry are diverse; some production jobs demand

relatively little skill and have a short training period, while others require extensive training

periods. The motor vehicle industry continues to use an extensive amount of labor, despite

efforts to increase automation of certain segments of the production process. Robots are used

widely for tasks such as welding, painting, and materials handling, and automation of

physically demanding or more dangerous tasks is also increasing. It is widely known within

the industry that the most efficient plants in the world rely not on extensive automation, but

on highly efficient organization of the production process. Thus, motor vehicle producers
 23 For example, Toyota eschews high-technology software options for managing its parts handling and

logistics in favor of its kanban system of laminated colored cards that are integral to its just-in-time system. 

Lindsay Chappell, “To heck with tech,” Automotive News, Automotive News Insight section, 

Aug. 6, 2001, p. 36i.

 24 A leading source on the application of lean manufacturing in the automotive industry is James P.

Womack, et. al., The Machine that Changed the World (New York: Rawson, 1990).

 25 However, the potential pitfalls of just-in-time parts delivery to auto plants were evident in the days after

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Air freight of parts was suspended for a

number of days, and a tightening of security at the Canadian border caused delays in road-transported goods

in excess of an entire day. Automakers cancelled shifts because of parts shortages, and an estimated 50,000

units of production were lost in the first week after the attack. Although an extreme case, the events of

September 11, 2001, show how disruptions in the transport sector can negatively affect just-in-time

operations.

9

integrate automation technology into the production process insofar as it improves the

overall efficiency of the system.23

Manufacturing Trends

Lean Manufacturing

Japanese automaker Toyota created the lean manufacturing system that not only permeates

the global auto industry, but has been adopted by countless manufacturing plants across

various industries around the world. A producer using lean manufacturing methods makes

continual efforts to improve the quality of the product and refine the production process to

improve efficiency. Lean production demands the elimination of waste by uncovering

inefficiencies and bottlenecks in the production system, requiring fewer resources than are

typically used in more traditional types of mass production, and demanding nearly perfect

quality of the components used in the vehicle. Workers have greater autonomy and

responsibility in order to ensure that defects are fixed on the assembly line rather than at the

end of the assembly process. Under a lean production system, assembly plants are often close

to suppliers to facilitate communication, timely parts shipments, and low inventories. The

system requires fewer managers and levels of management, fewer production workers, and

broader worker responsibilities, all of which combine to allow greater flexibility within all

levels of the company and create higher quality products.24

Just-in-Time

Integral to a lean manufacturing system is just-in-time parts delivery. Traditionally in the

just-in-time system, suppliers are responsible for delivering only the parts that are needed,

when they are needed, to the assembly line. This all but eliminates the need for automakers

to store large inventories of parts, allowing for significant cost savings.25 However, a rival

system, known as the ‘milk-run system,’ is gaining in popularity. Although both systems are

largely based on electronic communications, the milk-run system reverts the logistical
 26 Ayako Doi, “European ‘Milk Run’ System May Displace Kanban as New Standard for Lean

Manufacturing Logistics,” The Japan Automotive Digest, vol. VII, No. 30, Aug. 27, 2001, p. 1.

 27 Ayako Doi, “Logistics: Toyota Improves on Milk Run With ‘Cross-Dock’ Transshipment System,” The

Japan Automotive Digest, vol. VII, No. 39, Oct. 29, 2001, p. 10.

 28 Chappell, “To heck with tech.”

 29 Rhoda Miel, “Ford works on ‘direct automatic delivery’ in Spain, Automotive News, Jan. 14, 2002, p.

26J.

 30 Lindsay Chappell, “Nissan plant will be just-in-time showcase,” Automotive News, Automotive News

Insight section, Aug. 6, 2001, p. 12i.

 31 Ibid.

10

responsibility back to the automakers. Under the milk-run system, automakers continuously

run trucks to supplier factories, picking up and delivering needed parts to the assembly line.

Automakers report that they like the fact that they no longer pay suppliers for their

transportation costs. In addition, coupled with Internet purchasing, milk-run systems

reportedly cut on-floor inventories to levels below just-in-time systems. The milk-run system

was reportedly brought to Japan from Europe by Nissan in 2000, and it is slowly gaining

acceptance there.26

Automakers put their own stamp on their parts supply systems. For example, a further

expansion of the milk-run system is Toyota’s cross-dock transshipment system. Toyota,

reportedly using the milk-run system in its U.S. plants for several years, has its trucks pick

up parts from suppliers and bring them to one of four cross-dock centers. These centers

offload the parts on one side, sort them by the factory for which they are destined, and send

them out the other side to be loaded onto trucks heading for the assembly plants. There is no

storage at the cross-dock facilities, and Toyota claims that the combination milk-run/crossdock system is more cost effective than milk run alone,27 reducing overall mileage traveled,

cutting the number of trucks in use by 25 percent, and centralizing logistics.28

At Ford’s plant in Valencia, Spain, just-in-time has evolved into ‘direct automatic delivery,’

whereby finished modules manufactured by some 40 suppliers in a supplier park adjacent

to the assembly plant are moved directly to the vehicle assembly line via conveyors.

Computer sensors monitor parts traveling in metal carriers through the conveyor tunnels.

Ford claims that this system is most efficient, saving time and money, and reducing the risk

of parts damage.29

Nissan is reportedly considering conveyor transport of parts for its new light truck plant in

Canton, MS. Important suppliers will be located near the assembly plant, with some setting

up shop on site.30 Nissan reports that, for onsite suppliers, it would lease the real estate to the

supplier and the supplier would make the initial investment to construct its factory. If the

supplier loses its contract at a later point, the supplier would vacate, and Nissan or the

replacement supplier would pay the outgoing supplier the residual value of the factory.31

Suppliers would produce parts only as Nissan orders them for vehicles ordered by Nissan’s

retailing operation.
 32 Information on Six Sigma found at Internet address http://www.isixsigma.com, retrieved May 2, 2002.

 33 Eric Mayne, “Ford Reaps Benefits from Six-Sigma,” Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77, No. 9, Mar.

4, 2002, insert p. 1.

 34 The term ‘platform’ refers to the primary load-bearing structural assembly that determines the basic size

of a motor vehicle, supports the driveline, and links the suspension components of the motor vehicle.

 35 Nicole George, “Honda Puts Flexible Manufacturing To The Test, And Gets Good Results,” The Japan

Automotive Digest, vol. VII, No. 40, Nov. 5, 2001, p. 9.

11

Six Sigma

Six Sigma is another manufacturing technique that is employed in the auto industry, most

notably by Ford. Six Sigma is a disciplined, data-based approach and methodology for

eliminating defects (defined as anything outside of customer specifications) in any process.

The Greek letter s (sigma) refers to the standard deviation of a population; in Six Sigma, a

manufacturer aims for six standard deviations between the mean and the nearest specification

limit in any process. The statistical representation of Six Sigma describes quantitatively how

a process is performing. To achieve Six Sigma, a process must not produce more than 3.4

defects per million opportunities.32

Ford reported that its Six Sigma projects saved the company $325 million in 2001 through

the elimination of waste. The program examines customer complaints and identifies

variations in parts and/or processes that may be at the root of the problem. This information

is shared throughout the company so that similar issues in other vehicle programs may be

resolved early or avoided entirely.33

Flexible Manufacturing

Flexible manufacturing has become a goal for all automakers in recent years, with Honda the

undisputed leader in this area. In the fullest sense, flexible manufacturing would allow an

automaker to shift production of vehicles among any of its global auto plants, allowing for

a measure of control over unfavorable exchange rates, ability to meet unexpected demand

for new vehicles, and the smoothing of production levels within the automaker’s global

operations. Honda’s new Takai flexible production system was launched in 2000, and

identical systems have been installed in most of its major facilities around the world, a first

in the global auto industry. The principal features of the system include a simplified

conveyor process, state-of-the-art reprogrammable robots, and a reconfigured assembly line

that utilizes quality checks in each of five new zones. The system allows a single factory to

build all of Honda’s 40 models, accommodating 8 different vehicles at one time (up from 5)

from as many as 4 distinct platforms.34 Most flexible U.S. plants can handle vehicles from

no more than two distinct platforms. Honda’s flexible assembly lines increase production

potential by allowing the automaker to switch from producing one vehicle to another in just

3 minutes, down from 7 minutes. Honda reports that the system has cut manufacturing costs

by 10 percent, with another 10 percent expected to be cut by 2003. In addition, the company

claims that the new flexible system has cut new car investment and assembly line workload

by 50 percent,35 allowing Honda to introduce new models more quickly and at lower cost.

Similarly, Chrysler reportedly employs flexible manufacturing at three of its North American
 36 Alisa Priddle, “Toledo Gives Birth,” Ward’s Auto World, Jan. 2001, p. 47.

 37 “A Long March,” The Economist, July 20, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved July 25, 2001.

 38 Lindsay Chappell, “Makers face challenge of ‘5-day car’,” Automotive News, Jan. 22, 2001, 

p. 51.

 39 “A Long March.” 

 40 Ibid.

 41 Ibid. 

12

plants (though not to the extent of Honda); these plants are designed to assemble two

products and introduce a third with smooth changeover and no production stoppage.36

Build-to-Order

Another recent trend in the global auto industry is the move toward ‘build-to-order’ (BTO)

systems (also known as order-to-delivery, integrated customer ordering, and pull

manufacturing). BTO signifies a shift from a production-push model to a demand-pull type

of industry. Industry analysts agree that the traditional fixed volume way of manufacturing,

whereby automakers base their production levels and mix on highly complex forecasting and

scheduling techniques, is outdated and costly. Inaccurate forecasting associated with fixed

volume manufacturing often leaves dealers with large inventories of passenger vehicles,

forcing automakers to offer generous, and costly, incentives to sell these vehicles. A study

conducted in 2001 showed that the global auto industry loses approximately $80 billion

annually because of demand that was forecast but never materialized, and the subsequent

incentives required to sell these vehicles.37 GM alone believes it could save its supply chain

$12 billion annually by moving to a BTO system, and Ford has stated that BTO would allow

it to cut its parts and materials inventories by 50 percent.38 Nissan has estimated that if it

were able to convert entirely to a BTO culture, it could save up to $3,600 per vehicle.39

However, some argue that the concept of a single customer order moving through the

automotive supply chain in a coordinated, timely, and cost effective manner is unfeasible,

and that most customers really do not require the level of customization that BTO offers.

The International Car Distribution Programme (ICDP), based in the United Kingdom, is a

group of 40 automotive companies, including GM and Ford, that is examining the

distribution and sale of cars. Interestingly, the group has determined that, of the average 42

days it takes for a volume car to be delivered from the time it is ordered, 35 of those days,

or over 80 percent of that time, is taken up by paperwork and scheduling. It only takes 2 days

for the car to be built, and another 5 days for delivery.40 Although some point out that a BTO

system would be detrimental for automakers in times of market downturn, because auto

plants generally need to work at 80 percent capacity to remain profitable and wide

fluctuations in production levels lead to inefficiencies, ICDP believes that the rapidity with

which customers want their custom vehicles delivered varies greatly, and that demand can

be spread more evenly by offering certain incentives to buyers for particular delivery times.41
 42 A spaceframe typically includes full-length frame rails and a safety cage in a single, welded unit, to

which body panels are attached. The purpose of spaceframe construction is to eliminate material that is not

contributing to the overall strength of the structure. Spaceframes are exceptionally stiff, offer above-average

crash protection, and are substantially lower in weight.

 43 Colin Whitbread, “Paint shops delay progress of 3-day car,” Automotive News, Dec. 4, 2000, 

p. 28N.

 44 Just-auto.com editorial team, “Nissan plans built to order to cut waste, speed delivery,” 

Aug. 8, 2001, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Aug. 8, 2001.

 45 Chappell, “Makers face challenge of ‘5-day car.”

 46 Larry Edsall, “An Illinois metamorphosis: Mitsubishis built to order,” Automotive News, Apr. 9, 2001,

p. 8N.

 47 “GM Delays Saturn Build-to-Order,” Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 76, No. 44, Oct. 29, 2001, p. 1.

 48 Lindsay Chappell, “Nissan’s solution: Modules,” Automotive News, Mar. 5, 2001, p. 1.

13

The ICDP predicts that a 3-day car will be possible in the next decade, but identifies the

painting part of the production line as a leading obstacle. The advent of spaceframes42 and

solid-color plastic panels as a replacement for the traditional steel monocoque, or solid onepiece body and chassis, could save at least 12 hours of production lead time; however, they

require more components and higher levels of manual labor, and do not offer the same

potential economies of scale.43

Nissan is reportedly aiming for a 14-day car in Japan and Europe, with less ambitious targets

for the U.S. market. The company currently is running at 25-30 days in Japan and 40 days

in the United States.44 BMW is aiming for a 12-day turnaround on orders, and it projects it

will trim that figure to 10 days by 2003.45 Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America has

a form of BTO in place, where dealers are responsible for forecasting, up to 90 days out,

what vehicles they will need on their lots. Mitsubishi can deliver dealer orders on a 5-week

lead time.46 GM reportedly intends to expand its successful BTO program in Brazil and

establish BTO in its North American operations by the end of 2004. GM reports that its

current order-to-delivery time has been reduced from 70 days to 47 days. GM is expected

to launch BTO in North America with its Saturn division.47

Modular Assembly

Looking to Dell Computer as a prime example of a successful BTO company, it is apparent

that the key to BTO success in the auto industry is to have standard modules that can be

readily configured per customer order. Although the traditional model for auto

manufacturing is to have the vehicle move down an assembly line as components are

installed piece by piece, modular assembly shifts a large portion of the supply chain

management and component integration responsibility to Tier 1 suppliers, which deliver a

complete module – e.g., a cabin cockpit fitted with instrument clusters, airbags, audio

equipment, and wiring – to the automaker. Studies reportedly have shown that the

outsourcing of basic parts assembly to module producers could save automakers as much as

20 percent on production costs.48

The Big Three have reportedly experimented with modular assembly in plants in Mexico and

Brazil, but face strong opposition in the United States from the UAW, which views this new

mode of assembly as a threat to auto industry jobs. GM tried to bring a form of its Blue
 49 Dave Guilford, “Storm before the calm,” Automotive News, Jan. 21, 2002, p. 3; and Just-auto.com

editorial team, “GM’s new-ideas-in-action plant: Lansing Grand River,” Feb. 18, 2002, found at Internet

address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Feb. 26, 2002.

 50 Kim Willenson, “Nissan Canton Modular Mfg. Plan Will Put Three Suppliers in Main Compound, Five

Others Nearby,” The Japan Automotive Digest, vol. VII, No. 27, July 23, 2001, p. 1.

 51 “Nissan Embraces Modular Assembly,” Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 76, No. 47, Nov. 19,

2001, p. 3.

 52 James B. Treece and Robert Sherefkin, “Platform sharing key to profits,” Automotive News, 

Mar. 5, 2001, p. 53.

 53 Bradford Wernle, “Ford, Mazda, Volvo will share small platform,” Automotive News, 

Apr. 9, 2001, p. 39.

 54 Just-auto.com editorial team, “Interview with Rudolph A. Schlais, President, General Motors AsiaPacific,” Nov. 5, 2001, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved 

Apr. 17, 2002.

 55 Ayako Doi, “Honda Turns Its Back on Industry Gospel That Fewer Platforms Equals Higher Profits,”

The Japan Automotive Digest, vol. VII, No. 15, Apr. 30, 2001, p. 1.

14

Macaw system in Brazil to its Lansing Grand River plant as Project Yellowstone. Although

the plant does receive modules from suppliers, it did abandon the supplier-park-next-door

aspect, and GM officials have placed significantly more emphasis on the plant’s elimination

of waste and the degree to which workers are in control.49

Japanese and European transplants, which are typically not unionized, have begun

manufacturing with modules. For example, Nissan’s new light truck plant in Mississippi

plans to use modules extensively, with three main module suppliers onsite and four others

within 2 miles. Modules will be delivered to the line as they are needed for particular

vehicles.50 Nissan’s initial North American foray into a modified use of modules with the

2002 Altima at its Smyrna, TN, plant, reportedly provided a 5-percent cost savings and a 10-

percent reduction in assembly time.51

Platform Sharing

Platform sharing among models is another way in which manufacturers are trying to cut

costs and increase efficiency. Broadly defined, a platform is the vehicle’s primary loadbearing assembly, determining the size of the vehicle and integrating driveline and

suspension components. Platform sharing among partner automakers provides even greater

savings potential when there are complimentary areas of expertise. Chrysler and Japanese

partner Mitsubishi plan to share small- and mid-size platforms, reducing the two companies’

29 separate platforms to no more than 16.52 Ford is embarking on a similar strategy, to be

implemented by 2005, among certain Ford, Mazda, and Volvo models. Ultimately, 15

variations of 4 models, built in 5 or 6 countries, will come off a single platform.53 GM and

Japanese partners Subaru, Isuzu, and Suzuki intend to move from their current strategy of

product cross-sourcing to a sharing of joint platforms for the Asia-Pacific region; ultimately,

the companies may develop global platforms for their larger volume segments.54 Some

manufacturers, however, are not impressed with the trend toward consolidating platforms.

Honda’s president has stated that the use of common platforms would not allow the

automaker to respond effectively to the diverse requirements of its customers.55
 56 “GM Cuts Prototypes, Saves $100 Million,” Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 76, No. 27, July 2, 2001,

p. 3.

 57 However, some industry representatives have reported proportional distortions and difficulty with the

software accurately rendering certain shapes. J.P. Vettraino, “Virtual vehicle design: The search for a new

paradigm continues,” Automotive News, Automotive News Design section, 

June 4, 2001, p. 4D-J.

 58 Chris Wright, “Virtual testing to cut number of prototypes,” Automotive News, Jan. 14, 2002, 

p. 26S.

 59 “Toyota Digital Production Line Design System Cuts Time to Rollout by 75%,” The Japan Automotive

Digest, vol. VII, No. 44, Dec. 3, 2001, p. 7.

 60 Priddle, “Toledo Gives Birth,” p. 47.

 61 Ralph Kisiel, “Toyota adopts digital carmaking,” Automotive News, Apr. 8, 2002, p. 4.

15

Design Advances

The construction and testing of prototypes is a very expensive and time-consuming part of

the manufacturing process. Evolving computer-aided tools for ‘virtual design’ are enabling

automakers to reduce the number of prototypes required; for example, GM reports that it has

saved $100 million annually since 1998 and reduced its development cycle to 20-25 months

from 33 months by decreasing the number of prototypes it uses.56 Virtual design not only

allows for fewer prototypes, it also speeds product development, enables crash testing

without models, and facilitates parallel rather than sequential product development.57 One

industry observer predicts that, by 2005, virtual design capabilities will allow automakers

to cut the number of required prototypes by 50 percent.58

Digital tools are also being applied to the construction of new auto plants and the revamping

of older plants by creating and testing virtual assembly lines.59 For example,

DaimlerChrysler’s new Toledo North Assembly Plant was designed and built electronically

using 3D manufacturing simulation software. This technology allowed the company to build

the line, assemble virtual products, and refine the process before any actual construction took

place. The company estimates that it saved up to $4 million by avoiding costly changes that

would have had to have been made during the construction phase.60

Toyota is reportedly moving the most aggressively with digital manufacturing by employing

it in the design of its vehicles and manufacturing plants worldwide in a multi-pha plan.

Toyota forecasts that, once fully implemented, its far-reaching system will cut development

time by up to 50 percent.61
 62 “Chrysler Group to Redesign Production Planning Process to Better React to Market Changes,” The

Autoparts Report, vol. XV, No. 16, May 22, 2002, p. 1.

 63 “GM Cuts Prototypes, Saves $100 Million.”

 64 Automotive World, “Productivity on the up-and-up,” Oct. 23, 2000, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Oct. 30, 2000.

 65 Overall labor productivity combines stamping, engine, transmission, and assembly plant performance.

 66 Amy Wilson, “GM productivity roars past distracted Ford,” Automotive News, June 17, 2002, 

p. 42.

 67 Alisa Priddle, “Efficiency by the Numbers,” Ward’s Auto World, July 2001, p. 57.

 68 GM plants were the productivity leaders in the compact car, mid-sized car, luxury car, full-sized sportutility, full-sized pickup, minivan, and medium-duty truck categories. The other categories are subcompact

car, large car, sports car, small sport-utility, mid-sized sport-utility, small pickup, and large van.

16

The Internet and Manufacturing

Integrating operations via the Internet can be a cost-effective way to speed processes and

ensure not only that all parties are working with identical parameters, but that all parties are

apprised of changes and updates simultaneously. In 2002, Chrysler introduced its Internetbased Integrated Volume Planning program, which connects sales forecasting with supply

and manufacturing requirements. This new system is expected to reduce order-to-delivery

times, inventory, and tooling costs; and improve market responsiveness, sales forecast

accuracy, and manufacturing efficiency.62 GM is reportedly moving toward Internet-assisted

data transfer and design with its suppliers to facilitate the use of consistent information.63

Productivity

There are a number of ways to measure productivity in the auto industry, including the

number of cars produced annually per employee and number of hours to build a vehicle. In

general, Japanese plants are considered to be the most productive in the world, followed by

North American plants and then European plants. There are exceptions, however; for

example, Nissan’s plant in Sunderland, United Kingdom, is considered to be more

productive than any plant in the United States.64

According to the 2002 Harbour Report, which is an annual report on the productivity of

North American auto plants, in 2001 Nissan was the North American leader in overall labor

productivity65 for the eighth consecutive year at 29.00 hours to build a vehicle, up from

27.63 hours in 2001. Following Nissan were Honda at 31.18 (up from 29.11) and Toyota at

31.63 (up slightly from 31.06).66 Japanese automakers’ efficiency reportedly gives them at

least a $500 cost advantage per vehicle.67

GM leapfrogged Ford to take fourth place with 39.34, an improvement over its rate of 40.52

hours in 2001. This was the first time GM finished ahead of Ford in overall productivity

since the Harbour Report began tracking these statistics in 1989. In addition, when looking

at plant productivity by vehicle categories, GM plants were the leaders in 7 of 14

categories.68 GM also boasted 7 of the 10 most improved plants in 2001. GM has made great

strides in productivity during 1997-2001, owing to lean manufacturing, quality
 69 Wilson, “GM productivity roars past distracted Ford.”

 70 Ibid.

 71 Ibid.

 72 This category is ranked by total hours at a plant divided by the total output.

 73 Wilson, “GM productivity roars past distracted Ford.” 

 74 GM spun off Delphi Automotive Systems in May 1999, and Ford spun off Visteon in June 2000.

 75 During the 1990s, automakers increased the outsourcing of services such as staffing, product design,

document storage, quality analysis, and warranty management. One study reports that several years ago,

suppliers accounted for 40 percent of the value of a new passenger vehicle; today that percentage is 60-70

percent, and it is expected to rise to 80 percent during the next decade. In addition, in 2000 suppliers

accounted for 33 percent of product development responsibility; by 2010 this is expected to top 50 percent.

Wolfgang Ziebart, “Building systems doesn’t always build profits,” Automotive News, June 3, 2002, p. 10.

17

improvements, increased commonality among parts and among manufacturing systems, and

improved vehicle designs in terms of ease to build.69

Ford slipped from fourth place to fifth at 40.88 (up from 39.94), and DaimlerChrysler came

in last at 44.28, a slight improvement over its score of 44.81 in 2001.70 Ford’s productivity

reportedly has been negatively affected by quality problems over the past couple of years

that have necessitated assembly line changes to address these issues. Ford reportedly expects

to improve its rating for 2002. Although DaimlerChrysler has lagged in productivity, its

current manufacturing initiatives reportedly are expected to result in major productivity

improvements in the coming years.71

GM advanced on Nissan in the category of top individual vehicle assembly plant in 2001;72

its Oshawa, Ontario, plant pushed past Nissan’s Smyrna, TN, plant with 16.79 hours to build

a vehicle, compared to Smyrna’s 17.30. Two of Ford’s plants - Atlanta and Chicago - took

the third and fourth spots with 17.78 and 18.31 hours, respectively.73

Vertical Integration

The degree of vertical integration in the U.S. motor vehicle industry has been reduced in

recent years by the industry’s efforts to become more efficient. Traditionally, mass

production motor vehicle producers have used vertical integration to coordinate the

complicated nature of designing and building motor vehicles; today, major motor vehicle

producers worldwide, particularly those in the car and light truck segments, still produce

most of their own engines, transmissions, and body stampings. For other components, motor

vehicle producers rely on anywhere from several hundred to several thousand suppliers.

The automaker-supplier relationship changed significantly during the 1990s as a result of

efforts to reduce costs, improve shareholder value, and improve competitiveness. Some

automakers, most notably GM and Ford, have sold off certain partsmaking operations.74

General trends during the 1990s include decreased supplier bases; increased automaker

demands for lower prices from suppliers; increased outsourcing of tasks once performed by

automakers;75 and the delegation of supply chain management, including systems integration
 76 Auto Business, Ltd., “Concentration wave creates new mega-suppliers: Consolidation driven by

modularisation,” Feb. 26, 2001, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved June 20, 2002.

 77 Diana T. Kurylko and Robert Sherefkin, “DCX spells out vendor liability,” Automotive News, June 10,

2002, p. 1.

 78 Evan Schulz, Automobile Retail and Production in the Age of E-Commerce (Washington, DC: 

Economic Strategy Institute, 2001), p. 32.

 79 Institute of the Motor Industry, “E-marketplaces: After the spin, what next?” Mar. 11, 2002, found at

Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Mar. 13, 2002.

 80 Ralph Kisiel, “Outsider’s job: Ignite Covisint,” Automotive News, Apr. 23, 2001, p. 1; and Brian

Milligan, “What is Covisint?” Purchasing, Mar. 8, 2001, p. 35.

 81 “Japan’s Top Automakers Expected to Join Covisint,” Japan Auto Trends, Japan Automobile

Manufacturers Association, vol. 5, No. 1, Mar. 2001, p. 2.

 82 Reuters, “Peugeot joins online exchange Covisint,” May 22, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved May 22, 2001.

 83 Ralph Kisiel, “Covisint ‘scratching surface’ of supplier sector,” Automotive News, Jan. 21, 2002, p. 28.

 84 Ralph Kisiel, “Suppliers are warming up to online buying,” Automotive News, Mar. 26, 2001, 

p. 16.

18

responsibilities and the coordination of module assembly, to suppliers.76 Indicative of the

new responsibilities placed on suppliers, Chrysler is beginning to require that suppliers

assume a certain portion of the costs associated with recalls and warranty repairs.77

The creation of online marketplaces for the automotive industry also promises to change the

face of automaker-supplier relations. Components purchasing is generally estimated to be

approximately half the cost associated with vehicle manufacturing, and a recent study has

estimated that harnessing the Internet for business-to-business activity can save $1,063 per

vehicle through improved inventory control, streamlined purchasing, reduced warranty costs,

and improved productivity.78 Suppliers were initially concerned that automakers would use

these exchanges to further squeeze price concessions from them, and that confidential

information posted on the Web would be compromised; some of these concerns may still

linger.79 However, many believe that, when these exchanges hit their stride, tremendous

supply-chain management and product development benefits could be gained, resulting in

reduced inventories, better quality control, and improved response time.80

Several e-marketplaces emerged in the late 1990s; perhaps the most widely known exchange

is Covisint, which began operations in November 2000. Initially, Ford and GM in late 1999

announced plans to launch separate exchanges, but within months joined forces and invited

DaimlerChrysler to join. Nissan and Renault also signed on early in the exchange’s

development. By March 2001, Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Mazda, and 19 Japanese

partsmakers had announced their intention to join,81 and Peugeot joined in May 2001.82

Covisint is available to suppliers as purchasers as well as automakers as purchasers, and as

of January 2002, there were 5,000 automotive companies registered on Covisint, with 2,000

of those using the marketplace on a regular basis. Reportedly, 85 percent of the transactions

on Covisint are for parts, modules, and systems that are incorporated into vehicles, as

opposed to items like office supplies.83 In March 2001, auto parts supplier ArvinMeritor

claimed that a Covisint pilot auction reduced administrative purchase order costs from

$90.00 to $5.00, and saved considerable time expended on the transaction, from 182 minutes

to 22 minutes.84 In addition to e-marketplace services, Covisint offers supply-chain

management tools such as collaborative product development capabilities; however, as part
 85 Just-auto.com editorial team, “Covisint to cut workforce by a third,” June 28, 2002, found at Internet

address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved June 28, 2002.

 86 Mike Arnholt, “Tying It All Together,” Ward’s Auto World, June 2001, p. 32.

 87 Wim Oude Weernink, “SupplyOn launch imminent, says Bosch,” Automotive News, Dec. 4, 2000, p.

28V.

 88 “Purchasing chiefs develop distinct e-buying strategies,” Automotive News, Dec. 4, 2000, 

p. 28T.

 89 “Toyota Launches Parts Network,” Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 75, No. 9, Feb. 28, 2000, 

p. 5.

 90 For more information, see http://www.oeconnection.com. 

 91 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “The World Heavy Truck Industry: Structural Change Ahead,” Dec.

27, 1999, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Apr. 30, 2002.

19

of recent downsizing efforts, Covisint is reportedly deemphasizing its supply chain

management applications.85

While Covisint may have the most visibility, other e-marketplaces are also serving the auto

industry. Some automakers, such as Volkswagen and BMW, are developing their own

electronic purchasing relationships with their suppliers, and some suppliers, like Johnson

Controls, have launched their own e-marketplace initiatives. FreeMarkets Inc. predates

Covisint, and while it is not limited to the automotive industry, it boasts some high profile

members from the automotive community, such as Delphi, Visteon, and Dana. Like Covisint,

FreeMarkets is branching out into enabling Web-based product development capabilities.86

In late 2000, German auto parts producer Robert Bosch and three other German suppliers

formed the e-marketplace SupplyOn, which is open for business to all firms regardless of

nationality.87 In addition, Fiat owns 95 percent of Fast-Buyer, an online exchange based in

Italy.88 Toyota’s North American arm is the majority shareholder in the new iStarXchange,

which is open to all companies and is an exchange designed to serve the aftermarket for auto

parts;89 the Big Three launched a similar exchange for aftermarket parts called

OEConnection in 2001.90

Vertical integration of forward linkages in the motor vehicle industry (linkages to vehicle

purchasers) is limited. U.S. firms prefer to leave the process of selling vehicles to

independent retailers (see section on Marketing Methods and Pricing Practices). The most

notable integration of forward linkages is in terms of automakers’ ownership or equity

participation in daily rental car agencies which serve as an important source of high-volume,

although low profit, sales for automakers. Automakers also have financial subsidiaries which

serve as potential credit issuers to automobile purchasers. 

Producers of commercial vehicles (trucks and buses) are reportedly moving to strengthen

their downstream integration, with some of them expanding their financing operations,

offering leasing services, and/or generally moving towards becoming freight transportation

facilitators.91 Profit margins are very slim for truckmakers, and the shift toward truck and bus

manufacturers assuming the financial risk for their vehicles’ maintenance, currency

conversions, consumer credit, and residual value depreciation can be very profitable.

Industry observers note that, as most trucks are comparable in terms of quality and
 92 Tim Burt, “Contract hire gathers pace,” Sept. 21, 2000, Financial Times Electronic Publishing, found at

Internet address http://today.newscast.com, retrieved Sept. 22, 2000.

 93 Office of Automotive Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Motor Vehicles,” U.S. Industry and

Trade Outlook 2000, p. 36-4.

 94 Arlena Sawyers, “Biggest dealer groups gained share in 2001,” Automotive News, Apr. 15, 2002, p. 1.

 95 Justin Hyde for Reuters, “Ford exiting car dealer business,” June 27, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved June 27, 2001.

 96 Ibid.

 97 Ibid.

 98 Mary Connelly, “Dealers rip Ford certification,” Automotive News, May 29, 2000, p. 1.

 99 Mary Connelly, “Blue Oval Battle Looms for Ford, Dealers,” Automotive News article recapped in

American International Automobile Dealers Association newsletter, First UP, 

Mar. 19, 2001.

20

reliability, the level of leasing and service options offered by commercial vehicle

manufacturers will continue to gain in importance.92

Marketing Methods and Pricing Practices

The U.S. auto dealership industry consolidated significantly during 1997-2001. The

dealership community is increasingly dominated by large multifranchise operations that seek

high unit volume and are often willing, and able, to take a smaller profit per vehicle sold.

These dealerships are well financed, advertise extensively, and tend to cluster a variety of

brands on one property.93 In 1996, the leading 100 dealership groups accounted for 8.5

percent of light vehicle unit sales in the United States; by 2001, the top 100 accounted for

16.1 percent. Moreover, the top 10 dealership groups account for 50 percent of the new

vehicle sales of the top 100. The two leading dealership groups in 2001 were AutoNation

Inc., with 454,000 new retail sales, and UnitedAuto Group Inc., with 141,056.94

Although the retail segment of the motor vehicle industry has traditionally been largely

independent of U.S. producers, increasing competition within the industry has forced

changes in the distribution network. During the latter half of the 1990s, the Big Three

concentrated efforts on consolidating their dealerships and reducing distribution expenses,

which account for some 30 percent of the price of a new vehicle. However, GM was

dissuaded from a plan to purchase up to 10 percent of its dealers after independent dealers

strongly protested.95 Similarly, Ford, after purchasing 30 Ford dealers beginning in 1998,

decided to sell them under extreme pressure from independent dealers. Ford’s plan, dubbed

Auto Collection, called for the automaker to consolidate its dealer network and jointly own

dealerships with independent dealers.96 Not only is the notion of factory-owned dealerships

opposed by independent dealers, such dealerships are banned in some States.97 In 2000, Ford

instituted its Blue Oval Dealer Certification program (which entered into effect with the start

of the 2001 model year), again raising the ire of many in the dealership community.98

Certification is granted on an annual basis, and is based on a set of clear standards for

outstanding sales and customer service. Certified dealers receive a customer satisfaction

financial award on each eligible new vehicle, among other benefits. A cadre of State dealer

groups planned to take Ford to court for what they consider to be illegal price

discrimination.99 Chrysler also maintains a dealer certification program known as Five Star;

this program was introduced in 1997.
 100 Drew Winter, “Nissan Aiming for 14-day Car in Japan and Europe,” Ward’s Auto World, Aug. 2000,

p. 18.

 101 Maryann Keller, “Caught in the Web,” Automotive Industries, Mar. 2001, p. 37.

 102 Schulz, Automobile Retail and Production in the Age of E-Commerce, p. 23.

 103 Ralph Kisiel, “Panel: The bubble’s gone, but e-biz lives on,” Automotive News, Jan. 21, 2002, 

p. 25.

 104 “E-Dealers’ And Manufacturers Will Dominate Automotive Sales On The Internet AutoNation CEO

Says,” The Autoparts Report, vol. XIII, No. 24, June 20, 2000, p. 8.

 105 Tim Moran, “Whipped on the Web,” Automotive News, Automotive News Insight section, 

Jan. 29, 2001, p. 20i.

21

Motor vehicle producers typically devise production schedules on the basis of expected

demand for their products, and then ship the vehicles in response to orders from dealers.

Although a reported 90 percent of U.S. car purchasers buy vehicles off a dealer lot, in Japan

50-60 percent of the vehicles produced were ordered by customers, and another 30-40

percent have potential customers waiting. The European system falls in the middle, with 30

percent of vehicles produced being custom orders and the remaining 70 percent built based

on marketing forecasts for distribution to dealers.100 In most cases, producers hold only very

limited inventory of the finished product, although during severe sales declines, automakers

may build a large inventory, especially if they are reluctant to make substantial reductions

in production.

During the latter half of the 1990s, the Internet was expected to revolutionize the auto

manufacturing and distribution system by allowing consumers to custom-build their vehicles

online and eliminating costs associated with the dealership sales infrastructure. Within a

couple of years, however, it became apparent that this revolution would be more of an

evolution, and that in the short term, the Internet is more readily suited as a means for

automakers and dealers to cultivate customer relations, and for shoppers to gather

information about vehicle options, specifications, pricing, dealer incentives, trade-in values,

purchase financing, independent vehicle reviews, and cross-brand comparisons.101 One recent

study reports that, used effectively, the business-to-consumer Internet strategies may allow

for total savings for manufacturers and dealers of around $1,000 per vehicle on field support,

freight, sales commissions, inventory, and dealer overhead.102

Although consumers cannot currently purchase passenger vehicles directly from automakers,

the Internet offers consumers a way to interact with automakers in the buying process.

Programs such as GM BuyPower and FordDirect.com have the automakers and dealers

teamed to simplify the buying process by allowing customers to custom-build and price a

vehicle, search for a local dealer, search dealer inventories, and apply for financing – all

online. The sites boast 70,000 and 80,000 leads per month, respectively, which are then

passed on to dealers for follow-up.103

Third-party Internet buying services that refer customers to dealers did not live up to initial

expectations.104 Companies such as CarOrder.com, DreamLot.com, Autoweb.com,

CarsDirect.com, and Autobytel.com have been forced to change their business model, or

have gone out of business altogether.105 Some say this business model foundered because

firms were unable to earn a profit from every transaction, and could not prove that they
 106 Ibid.

 107 Keller, “Caught in the Web.”

 108 Ibid.

 109 See Mark Cooper, Director of Research, Consumer Federation of America, “A Roadblock on the

Information Superhighway: Anticompetitive Restrictions on Automotive Markets,” Feb. 2001.

 110 See Brian Shaffer, Ph.D., University of Maryland, for the National Automobile Dealers Association,

“An Assessment of Franchise Laws And Internet Auto Sales,” Aug. 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.nada.org/pdf/shaffer_report.pdf. 

 111 See http://www.saturnbp.com/company/our_story/saturn_experience/ for more information about

Saturn.

22

added sustainable value to the purchase process.106 When compared to products that are

successfully marketed via the Internet, such as airline tickets and books, the volume of

automotive sales is rather small at 33,000-34,000 per day; the fees earned from each referral

or transaction are not enough to cover costs and earn a profit.107 According to one expert,

“the Internet intermediary appears to be adding costs to a low-margin business, and that isn’t

a viable business proposition.”108 Although there are direct brokers and national dealership

websites that sell vehicles directly over the Internet, many argue that customers do not want

to give up the ‘test-drive, kick-the-tires’ experience of buying off a dealer lot. There is no

question, however, that the Internet has become a critical tool for passenger vehicle

purchasers as a means to arm themselves with information about vehicle options, pricing,

availability, and cross-brand comparisons before beginning the process of shopping at a

dealership.

Currently, there is a debate among industry observers as to the role that dealers will and

should play in the future, and the validity of franchise laws. Some argue that the current

passenger vehicle distribution system is anticompetitive, and that replacing the current

franchise system with an Internet-based system would save consumers a considerable

amount of money via the elimination of market power and gains in efficiency.109 Others

claim that the projected savings are overstated, and that franchise laws and the current

dealer-distribution system are valid and exist in the best interest of consumers as well as

small businesses.110

Pricing practices in the automotive retail sector have also come under increased scrutiny as

dealers and manufacturers make limited attempts to make purchasing a vehicle a less

unpleasant experience for consumers. Manufacturers set suggested retail prices for autos, but

in practice, these prices are generally considered to be, by both customers and dealers, a

starting point for negotiation. In most instances, customers pay less than the manufacturers’

suggested retail price (MSRP), and “haggling” between customer and the salesperson is

common practice, although most consumers consider the experience unpleasant. The final

sales price of the vehicle is largely related to the supply of the vehicle make or model relative

to demand. Popular makes or models are sold at prices closer to the MSRP; in some cases,

dealers charge more than the MSRP, especially when very popular models are introduced

and demand exceeds supply. GM’s Saturn division is an exception in the industry. Saturn

has a "No-Hassle, No-Haggle" sales policy, whereby dealers generally sell at posted

prices.111 This practice is considered to be a key aspect of Saturn’s high level of customer

satisfaction. Other dealerships have adopted this approach with varying degrees of success,

but price negotiation is still standard practice at most dealerships.
 112 The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, found at Internet address

http://www.autoalliance.org/facts.htm, retrieved Oct. 23, 2001.

 113 Statement of retired Ford USCAR member Bill Powers, found at

http://www.uscar.org/uscar/whois.htm, retrieved Apr. 24, 2002.

23

Manufacturers often offer various types of discounts and financial incentives that lower the

cost of the vehicles to the dealers. These price mechanisms are typically passed on to the

consumer to stimulate sales. There are various types of incentives offered to customers,

including simple discounts, rebates, and low-interest financing. There has been much

discussion within the U.S. auto industry regarding the prudence of incentives. The practice

is costly to manufacturers, which often end up in “incentive wars” that reduce profits. In the

passenger vehicle industry, the Big Three tend to rely heavily on incentives, whereas the

practice is less prevalent among Japanese- and European-owned producers. Incentives have

been generous and widely used in the post-September 11, 2001 environment, with low- and

no-interest financing and cash-back promotions offered by the Big Three as well as some

foreign-based automakers to bolster flagging sales during the months immediately following

the terrorist attacks on the United States.

Research and Development

The U.S. automotive industry spends over $18 billion annually in research and development

(R&D) of new advanced technologies aimed largely at four areas: emissions, fuel efficiency,

safety, and performance. The automotive industry reports that it devotes more funds to R&D

than any other manufacturing industry.112

Although companies have their own market objectives and competition is fierce, the

automakers recognize the benefits of working together on key areas of precompetitive

research. According to a former Ford official, “Consortia are an efficient way to conduct

research and evaluate alternatives, concentrating research and development on the most

promising technologies. By pooling resources, we are better able to tackle the technological

hurdles that will affect the entire industry. The societal benefit of such joint efforts is

improved products on the market sooner.”113 There are many private-sector partnerships

among automakers, and among automakers and suppliers, that foster cooperation in joint

basic research as well as joint development of new technologies.

Although the Big Three are competitors in the marketplace, they work together on shared

technological and environmental concerns under the umbrella of the United States Council

for Automotive Research (USCAR). USCAR was formed in 1992 by the three companies,

with the following objectives: 

• Monitoring current research projects and considering new opportunities.

• Coordinating the industry's interaction with government researchers.

• Sharing results of joint projects with member companies.

• Seeking and directing funding from public and private sources for joint 

 R&D.

• Providing facilities and administration for consortia.
 114 USCAR, “Who is USCAR?” found at Internet address http://www.uscar.org/uscar/whois.htm, retrieved

Apr. 24, 2002.

 115 USCAR, “Examples of PNGV Technical Accomplishments,” found at Internet address

http://www.uscar.org/pngv/accomp.htm, retrieved Apr. 24, 2002.

 116 “U.S. DOE starts Freedom CAR, retires PNGV,” Jan. 12, 2002, found at Internet address

http://www.dieselnet.com/news/0201doe.html, retrieved Apr. 24, 2002.

 117 Office of Advanced Automotive Technologies, U.S. Department of Energy, “FreedomCAR Fact

Sheet,” found at Internet address http://www.cartech.doe.gov/freedomcar/freedomcar-facts.html, retrieved

Apr. 24, 2002.

24

The Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) program was initiated in

September 1993 as a forum for collaborative basic research into technologies that would

result in a new class of vehicles that would get up to 80 miles per gallon without sacrificing

affordability, utility, safety and comfort.114 PNGV members included GM, Ford, Chrysler,

and 7 Federal agencies, as well as more than 400 organizations, including auto industry

suppliers, universities, the national laboratories, aerospace firms and small entrepreneurial

firms. PNGV accomplishments included significant work on hybrid-electric vehicles, fuel

cells, compression-ignition direct-injection engines, lithium ion batteries, polymer

composites and structural reaction injection molding, aluminum and continuous slab casting,

steel space-frame vehicle structure, vehicle simulation and virtual modeling, and advanced

computational methods.115

The PNGV program was to culminate in the production of prototype family autos in the year

2004, with the expectation that the technologies would be incorporated into even more

efficient production vehicles about 4 years later. However, a National Research Council Peer

Review issued in August 2001 concluded that the program was not likely to reach its goal

and recommended a restructuring of the PNGV program to reflect more accurately industry

developments and changing market conditions. Reportedly, emissions became a stumbling

block contributing to the failure of PNGV, as the program was aiming to achieve emissions

goals that were below standards set separately by the EPA, to be implemented in 2004. The

government reportedly spent $814 million on PNGV, while the industry spent over $980

million.116

In evaluating the former PNGV program, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and auto

industry partners agreed that public/private partnerships are the preferred approach to R&D.

However, it was agreed that cooperative efforts must be refocused on longer range goals,

with greater emphasis on energy and environmental concerns; fundamental R&D at the

component and subsystem level; coverage of all light vehicle platforms; technologies that

offer early opportunities to save petroleum; and technologies applicable to both fuel cell and

hybrid approaches (e.g., batteries, electronics, and motors).117

In January 2002, U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and executives of GM, Ford,

and DaimlerChrysler announced a new cooperative automotive research partnership between

the DOE and USCAR called FreedomCAR (Cooperative Automotive Research). The goal

of this new partnership is the development of a hydrogen fueled vehicle. According to

Secretary Abraham, FreedomCAR “is rooted in President Bush’s call, issued last May in (the

Administration’s) National Energy Plan, to reduce American reliance on foreign oil through

a balance of new domestic energy production and new technology to promote greater energy
 118 Remarks by Spencer Abraham on FreedomCAR, Detroit, MI, Jan. 9, 2002, found at Internet address

http://www.energy.gov/HQDocs/speeches/2002/janss/FreedomCar.html, retrieved 

June 20, 2002.

 119 “U.S. DOE starts Freedom CAR, retires PNGV.” Reportedly, DOE officials claim that work on PNGV

initiatives such as gasoline- or diesel-electric hybrid vehicles and light-weight materials will continue. Harry

Stoffer, “FreedomCAR: Real solution or tax waste?” Automotive News, June 10, 2002, 

p. 1.

 120 For more on these technologies, see Frost and Sullivan, “Intelligent technologies ahead,” Jan. 25, 2002,

found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Jan. 30, 2002; Richard Truett, “Supply and

demand,” Automotive News, Automotive News Insight section, Oct. 8, 2001, p. 2i; and Paul Hansen,

“Current Trends,” Automotive Industries, July 2001, p. 28.

 121 Sylvia Enders, “Challenges in the Global Truck Market - The Truck Industry on the Road to High

Technology,” ch. in Ralf Landmann, Heiko Wolters, Wolfgang Bernhart, and Holger Karsten, eds., The

Future of the Automotive Industry: Challenges and Concepts for the 21st Century (Warrendale, PA: Society

of Automotive Engineers, 2001), pp. 46-48.

25

efficiency.”118 FreedomCAR will focus on technologies to enable mass production of

affordable hydrogen-powered fuel cell vehicles and the hydrogen-supply infrastructure to

support them.119

R&D efforts in the automotive industry have focused on several other technologies over the

past 5 years, including diesel technology, integrated starter-generators, cylinder deactivation,

continuously variable transmissions, clutchless manual transmissions, active suspension,

ultrasonic park assist technology, and night vision technology. There have been many

electronic advances, such as drive-by-wire, steer-by-wire, brake-by-wire, electronic stability

control, adaptive cruise control, advanced airbag systems, tire pressure monitoring,

powertrain control systems, digital radio, hands-free phones, telematics, and rear-seat

entertainment systems. In addition, research is ongoing concerning the transition to 42-volt

alternators to handle the demands that future electrical systems in vehicles will require.120

The commercial vehicle industry reportedly is not as quick to adopt new technologies, as

commercial vehicle customers must be convinced that the new technology will lower the

operating costs of the vehicle in order to accept the higher purchase price and associated

maintenance costs. This constraint notwithstanding, there are numerous recent developments

in commercial vehicle technology in the areas of reduced fuel consumption through

electronic fuel injection systems and improved aerodynamics; improved efficiency, both in

terms of the durability of the truck and the facility of usage; and enhanced safety and comfort

for drivers.121
 122 49 U.S.C. 5323(j) sets out the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration’s

(FTA) requirements concerning domestic preference for federally-funded transit projects; specifically, all

rolling stock procured with FTA funds must have a domestic content of at least 60 percent and must undergo

final assembly in the United States.

 123 P.L. 94-163, Title III, Dec. 22, 1975, 89 Stat. 901.

 124 P.L. 92-513, Title V, 15 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.

 125 See 49 CFR 1.50. NHTSA is part of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and was founded in 1970

after the passage of the Highway Safety Act of 1970. 

 126 NHTSA maintains a broad definition of light trucks. To be held to the less rigorous fuel economy

standard for light trucks, a vehicle must have just one of the following characteristics: transports property on

an open bed; provides greater cargo-carrying than passenger-carrying volume; has seats that can be removed

to create a flat floor; transports more than 10 people; provides temporary living quarters; has four-wheel or

all-wheel drive; and has a gvw of 6,000 pounds and meets regulations for axle ground clearance. 49 CFR

523.5. Under this definition, minivans, SUVs, cross-over vehicles, pickup trucks, and some sedan-type

vehicles like Chrysler’s PT Cruiser are classified as light trucks. Because light trucks currently account for

half the passenger vehicle market and are largely used for personal transportation rather than for work/cargocarrying functions, NHTSA is currently considering a redefinition of light trucks, with the possibility of

creating several new vehicle categories. Harry Stoffer and Rick Kranz, “Feds rethink truck definition,”

Automotive News, May 13, 2002, p. 1.

 127 Fuel economy standards are set out in 49 CFR 531.5.

26

Regulatory Issues

In general, Government regulations regarding passenger vehicles cover fuel economy, safety,

and pollution control or emissions. There are also mandates regarding labeling and taxes. It

is challenging for automakers to meet the demands of all the mandates; for example, one way

to increase fuel economy is to lighten vehicle weight by using lighter materials. However,

this change may make the vehicle less safe in crash situations. In addition, consumer

demands in recent years have run counter to government regulations. Light trucks –

particularly SUVs – have gained tremendously in popularity in recent years; however, these

are typically the least fuel-efficient passenger vehicles available. Regulatory issues for

commercial vehicles tend to focus on emissions and safety issues, and there are also Buy

America provisions that apply to Federally funded transit projects.122

Fuel Economy

Following the 1973-74 oil embargo and energy supply crisis, the U.S. Congress enacted the

Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA)123 to reduce U.S. dependence on

foreign oil. Title III of EPCA added Title V to the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost

Savings Act.124 Title III required the Secretary of Transportation, who delegated the authority

to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA),125 to establish

mandatory average motor vehicle fuel economy standards for passenger automobiles and

light trucks.126 These standards are referred to as corporate average fuel economy standards

(CAFE).127 CAFE standards apply generally to any domestic or foreign vehicle manufacturer

that manufactures (whether or not in the customs territory of the United States) 10,000 or

more passenger cars in a model year. 

The EPCA required the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine the

methodology for calculating average fuel economy, and manufacturers failing to meet the
 128 This penalty is $5.00 multiplied by each tenth of a mpg that the applicable average fuel economy

standard exceeds the average fuel economy and multiplied by the number of automobiles covered by the

standard and manufactured by the manufacturer in a model year.

 129 Statement of L. Robert Shelton, Executive Director, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, July 17, 2001, found at

Internet address http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/nhtsa/announce/testimony/EnergyStatement.html, retrieved 

Apr. 10, 2002.

 130 67 FR 3470, Jan. 24, 2002.

 131 67 FR 26052, Apr. 4, 2002. See also USDOT press release, “NHTSA Publishes Final Model Year 2004

CAFE Standard for Light Trucks,” Apr. 1, 2002, found at Internet address

http://www.dot.gov/affaris/nhtsa2002.htm, retrieved Apr. 29, 2002.

 132 49 CFR 535.

 133 These include S. 804 (introduced May 1, 2001); H.R. 1815 (introduced May 10, 2001); H.R. 2614

(introduced July 24, 2001); S. 1923 (introduced Feb. 7, 2002); and S. 1926 (introduced Feb. 8, 2002).

 134 In addition, introduced on March 13, 2002, the Kerry-McCain amendment (S.A. 2999) to the U.S.

Department of Energy appropriations bill S. 517 proposed to raise CAFE by 50 percent within a decade.

(continued...)

27

standard are liable for civil penalty.128 The passenger car standard, which is 27.5 miles per

gallon (mpg), has not been increased since the 1986 model year. The CAFE standard is

lower for light trucks and was set on an annual basis; however, the light-truck CAFE

standard has been frozen at the model year 1996 level of 20.7 mpg (through model year

2003) by provisions in the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) annual appropriations

acts.129 The Appropriations Act for FY 2002 passed by the House and Senate allowed

NHTSA to begin rulemaking to set the light truck standard for model year 2004.130 Under

the CAFE law, a standard must be issued for a model year not later than 18 months before

the model year begins; therefore, NHTSA was to issue the model year 2004 standard by

April 1, 2002. NHTSA issued a continuation of the 20.7 mpg standard, saying that the 6-

month period it was afforded did not allow for a meaningful reevaluation of the current

standard.131

Each manufacturer can have three fleets for CAFE purposes: A domestic passenger car fleet,

an import passenger car fleet, and a light truck fleet (light truck fleets are not separated into

domestic or import fleets). An automobile is considered to be domestic if at least 75 percent

of the content is in U.S. materials or value added in the United States or Canada.

Manufacturers must meet the prescribed CAFE averages through the production of vehicles

or by accumulating credits in each class. Credits cannot be traded within fleets; they can be

only applied to the fleet for which they are earned. Thus, credits earned by a manufacturer's

import passenger car fleet cannot be applied against its domestic passenger car fleet or its

light truck fleet. Credits can be used to offset shortfalls in three previous or subsequent

model years.132

The CAFE debate resurfaced in 2001-2002 as the Administration began to examine whether

it should set new standards for the 2005-2010 model years. A number of bills were

introduced in the House and Senate proposing to raise average fuel economy standards to

various levels.133 The most extreme of these, H.R. 2614, would raise the combined passenger

car and light truck fuel economy standard to 40 mpg after model year 2011.134
 134(...continued)

148 Cong. Rec. S1859-01, *S1859. The amendment was withdrawn on April 18, 2002. 148 Cong. Rec.

S2893. 

 135 National Academies press release, “Federal Fuel Economy Standards Program Should Be Retooled,”

July 31, 2001, found at Internet address http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/, retrieved Apr. 10,

2002.

 136 An attribute-based system would set standards for vehicles grouped by attribute, e.g., weight, instead

of vehicle type, i.e., car or light truck.

 137 Credits are earned for vehicles that can burn ethanol as well as gasoline; however, gasoline is the

predominant fuel typically used in dual-fuel vehicles, and the credits can be used to compensate for less

efficient vehicles, providing for a potential negative effect on overall fuel economy.

 138 National Academies press release.

 139 U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “2002 Fuel Economy Guide”

found at Internet address http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/FEG2000.htm, retrieved Nov. 8, 2001.

 140 IRS pub. 535.

 141Internal Revenue press release, “IRS Moves to Clarify Taxpayer Deduction for Hybrid Vehicles,”

release No. IR-2002-64, May 21, 2002, found at Internet address http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-02-

64.pdf, retrieved July 1, 2002.

 142 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, “Light-Duty

Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends 1975 Through 2001,” found at Internet address

http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fetrends.htm, retrieved Nov. 8, 2001.

 143 Harry Stoffer, “Fuel economy remains a hard sell,” Automotive News, Oct. 15, 2001, p. 40.

28

A report issued in 2001 at the behest of Congress by the National Academy of Sciences

concluded that significant fuel economy gains can be made without sacrificing vehicle size

or horsepower using existing technology. “Some technologies already in existence today

could significantly reduce fuel consumption of new cars over the next 15 years, with

light-duty trucks having the greatest potential reductions. These technologies, which would

increase the purchase price of new cars and trucks, include engine advances that reduce

friction, such as variable valve timing, and more efficient powertrains, such as five-speed

automatic transmissions.”135 The report suggests that policy makers pursue the following

suggestions to correct the structural flaws in the CAFE system: (1) adopt tradable fuel

economy credits; (2) switch to attribute-based standards;136 (3) eliminate the two-fleet

(domestic and import) rule; (4) eliminate dual-fuel vehicle credits;137 and (5) pursue

government-industry R&D.138

For model year 2002, there are 10 passenger vehicles that get at least 45 mpg on the

highway; the leading 3 are gasoline-electric hybrids, and all 10 are produced by Honda,

Toyota, and Volkswagen.139 Federal tax credits of up to $2,000 are available on electric

vehicles, to be phased out by 2005.140 Tax deductions of up to $2,000 on gasoline-electric

hybrids were announced by the Internal Revenue Service in May 2002.141 In addition,

various States also offer tax breaks on clean fuel vehicles. However, despite fuel economy

regulations and consumer incentives, a recent report by the EPA found that all of the

passenger vehicles (cars and light trucks) sold in the United States in the 2001 model year

averaged just 20.4 mpg – the lowest average in over 20 years.142 According to a U.S.

industry representative, there are some 50 models available in the U.S. market that get at

least 30 mpg highway, but most are weak sellers; light trucks and vehicles with

comparatively greater weight and horsepower are currently quite popular.143
 144 Under the type approval system, motor vehicle manufacturers (including foreign motor vehicle

manufacturers and dealers of imported motor vehicles) typically have to file an application with the

appropriate government agency, and submit sample vehicles for testing. For more information about how the

type approval system works, see http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/public_comment/pubcom1/pubcom1_4.pdf

(Japan); http://www.vca.gov.uk/ (United Kingdom); or http://rvcs-prodweb.dot.gov.au/cert.html (Australia).

For imported vehicles, some governments, such as the Government of Japan, accept foreign technical

standards that are equivalent to their own, provided the manufacturer provides test data from approved

foreign testing institutes. In addition, some countries will dispatch officials to foreign motor vehicle

manufacturing plants for onsite testing of motor vehicles to be imported into that country. For more

information, see http://www.jama.or.jp/14_english/pdf/MIJ2001.pdf. 

 145 49 U.S.C. 30115; 49 CFR 567.

 146 Ibid.

 147 For information on NHTSA’s mission, see http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/nhtsa/whatis/overview/. 

 148 In recent years NHTSA has expanded its crash-test program to include not only front-impact testing

but side-impact testing as well. Congress also passed legislation in 2001 mandating the agency to begin

conducting rollover tests on SUVs and pickup trucks. 

 149 49 CFR 571.

 150 Eric Mayne, “Under Restraint,” Ward’s Auto World, Apr. 2002, p. 19.

 151 NHTSA serves as a clearinghouse for safety-related information to the public, and funds internal

studies on child safety seats, teen driver programs, new safety technologies, and a host of other programs that

monitor and seek to improve safety. NHTSA also commissions safety studies and/or gives grants to states,

cities, universities, and organizations such as the AAA Foundation of Traffic Safety and other nonacademic

research facilities to conduct their own safety research. NHTSA is also responsible for setting and

monitoring fuel economy standards (see section on Fuel Economy).

29

Safety and Emissions

Although most countries use a type approval system,144 the U.S. system that ensures that new

vehicles meet all safety and environmental regulations is known as self-certification.145 In

this system, all manufacturers marketing vehicles in the United States assume responsibility

and liability for engineering and testing a vehicle to ensure that it meets the U.S.

Government’s regulatory requirements. Every vehicle is certified by the manufacturer at the

point of manufacture as meeting all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.146

NHTSA is the key government agency in the establishment and enforcement of safety

standards for motor vehicles.147 NHTSA conducts independent crash testing of many new

vehicles and then scores them using a five-star rating system.148 NHTSA’s safety research

results form the foundation for the drafting and enforcement of safety-related regulations that

affect the design, manufacture, and use of restraint systems in motor vehicles. Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standard 208, Occupant Crash Protection,149 sets out standards for restraint

systems, which are constantly reviewed and revised as vehicles change and technology

develops. Suppliers of restraint systems generally consider 208 to be a baseline, aiming to

exceed the government standards. However, cost considerations often must be factored in

when deciding how far to go with safety equipment.150 NHTSA is also responsible for

investigating manufacturer defects.151
 152 P.L. 91-604, Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1676.

 153 P.L. 101-549, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2399.

 154 Office of Automotive Affairs, “Motor Vehicles,” p. 36-5.

 155 For more information, see the California Air Resources Board website, 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/2000review/zevben.pdf. 

 156 Office of Automotive Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Transatlantic Automotive Industry

Conference on International Regulatory Harmonization: Overall Conclusions,” Apr. 11, 1996, found at

http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/basic/chapeau.html, retrieved Sept. 5, 1997.

 157 The full text of the agreement can be found at http://www.unece.org/trans/conventn/globaut.pdf.

 158 UN/ECE press release, “Global Agreement on Vehicle Regulations Set To Enter Into Force,”

ECE/Trans/00/9, Geneva, Aug. 4, 2000, found at Internet address http://www.unece.org/press/00trans9e.htm.

30

In the realm of emissions standards, the Clean Air Act of 1970152 gave the EPA broad

authority to regulate motor vehicle emissions, and the standards have become progressively

more stringent since then. Vehicle emissions are being further reduced by provisions of the

1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).153 As part of the CAAA, 39 metropolitan areas

with excessive smog were identified and required to use cleaner-burning fuels beginning

with the 1998 model year.154 The State of California, through the California Air Resources

Board, has mandated emissions standards more stringent than those enforced by the EPA,

and several Northeastern States have followed California’s lead.155

Because designing and developing different versions of a particular model in order to satisfy

differing regulatory and certification requirements can add as much as 10 percent to the cost

of a vehicle,156 efforts to harmonize motor vehicle technical regulations on a global scale

gained momentum during the late 1990s. On March 12, 1998, following a year of intense

negotiations, the United States, the European Commission (EC), and Japan presented the text

of the draft Agreement Concerning the Establishing of Global Technical Regulations for

Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and Parts (the Global Agreement) to the United Nations

Economic Commission for Europe Working Party 29 (UN/ECE WP.29).157 The agreement

establishes a global process for developing new global technical regulations where there are

no existing standards, as well as harmonizing existing regulations, and aims to ensure high

levels of environmental protection, safety, energy efficiency, and anti-theft performance. In

order for the Global Agreement to enter into force, eight countries or regional economic

integration organizations had to become Contracting Parties (one of which had to be the

European Union (EU), Japan, or the United States). The United States was the first country

to sign the Global Agreement on June 25, 1998; the next six signatories were Canada, Japan,

France, the EU, Germany, and South Africa. During July 2000, the Russian Federation

became the eighth signatory, enabling the Global Agreement to enter into force on August

25, 2000.158

With the support of at least one-third of the members, a government can enter a standards

proposal in a compendium of candidate regulations. A consensus on the proposal would

make it binding. However, the agreement does not obligate Contracting Parties to adopt a

regulation into their own laws, and explicitly recognizes the right of national and subnational

authorities to adopt and maintain technical regulations that are more stringently protective

of health and environment than those established at the global level. If a contracting party

votes to establish a regulation, then it must initiate the domestic procedures to adopt the
 159 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Agency

Priorities and Public Participation in the Implementation of the 1998 Agreement on Global Technical

Regulations; and Statement of Policy, found at Internet address

http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/rulings/RIN2127-AH29/RIN2127-AH29.html,

retrieved Aug. 30, 2001.

 160 Toshio Aritake, “Japan: Automobile Lobby Groups Reach Agreement on Establishing Global

Standards,” International Trade Daily, Bureau of National Affairs, June 20, 2000.

 161 P.L. 102-388, Oct. 6, 1992, 106 Stat. 1520, sec. 355; 15 U.S.C.A. 1950.

 162 49 CFR 583.

 163 49 CFR 583.2.

 164 49 CFR 583.5.

 165 49 CFR 583.6.

31

regulation.159 In June 2000, an agreement was reached among members of the International

Organisation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers to start establishing from 2002 standardized

global technical standards in 16 areas related to safety, environment, and quality, based on

the UN/ECE initiative. Certain standards are set to be established by 2005, and others are

scheduled to come online by 2010.160

Labeling

Passenger cars and light trucks are subject to country-of-origin marking rules under the

American Automobile Labeling Act (AALA).161 In July 1994, NHTSA published a final rule

establishing new regulations to implement the AALA.162 However, implementation was

delayed until the 1997 model year. These regulations require passenger motor vehicles

manufacturers to label their vehicles with domestic and foreign content information. These

provisions enable consumers to take country-of-origin information into account in deciding

which vehicle to purchase.163 Each new passenger vehicle is required to be labeled with the

following five items of information: (1) the percentage of U.S./Canadian parts content; (2)

the names of any countries other than the United States or Canada that individually

contribute 15 percent or more of the equipment content, and the percentage content for each

country (only the two leading countries are required if more than two countries individually

contribute at least 15 percent); (3) the final assembly place by city, state (where appropriate),

and country; (4) the country of origin of the engine; and (5) the country of origin of the

transmission.164

In order to calculate the information required for the label, the vehicle manufacturer must

know certain information about the origin of each item of passenger vehicle equipment used

to assemble its vehicles. There are different procedures depending on whether equipment is

received from an allied supplier (a supplier wholly owned by the manufacturer) or an outside

supplier. As originally written, for equipment received from outside suppliers, the equipment

is considered U.S./Canadian if it contains at least 70 percent value added in the United

States/Canada. Thus, any equipment that is at least 70 percent U.S./Canadian is valued at 100

percent U.S./Canadian, and any equipment under 70 percent is valued at zero percent. For

equipment received from allied suppliers, the actual amount of U.S./Canadian content is

used.165
 166 P.L. 105-178, June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 107; 49 U.S.C.A. 32304; see also Office of Automotive Affairs,

U.S. Department of Commerce, “The American Automobile Labeling Act,” found at Internet address

http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/auto/aala.html.

 167 P.L. 101-508, Nov. 5, 1990, sec. 11216, 104 Stat. 1388; 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 4064.

 168 P.L. 103-66, Aug. 10, 1993, 107 Stat. 312; 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 4001.

 169 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 1.

 170 P.L. 95-618, Nov. 9, 1978, 92 Stat. 3174, sec. 201; 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 4064.

 171 P.L. 101-508, Nov. 5, 1990, sec. 11216, 104 Stat. 1388; 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 4064.

 172 U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “www.fueleconomy.gov,”

found at Internet address http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml#guzzler, retrieved Apr. 10, 2002.

32

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Reauthorization Act of 1998 amended

the method for determining content from outside suppliers by allowing such equipment with

U.S./Canadian content below 70 percent to be valued at the nearest 5 percent rather than

zero. Also, the AALA was amended to specify that assembly and labor costs incurred for the

final assembly of engines and transmissions are to be included in making these country of

origin determinations.166

Taxes

Luxury Tax

The luxury tax on automobiles was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

Act of 1990.167 When first enacted, the tax was on the first retail sale of vehicles over

$30,000 and was equal to 10 percent of the amount by which the vehicle’s retail price

exceeded $30,000. In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,168 the tax was

modified by indexing the $30,000 threshold for inflation occurring after 1990. The tax has

been progressively reduced throughout the second half of the 1990s; in August 1996 the rate

was reduced from 10 to 9 percent, and it will continue to decrease by 1 percent each year

until January 1, 2003, when the tax will expire. As of January 1, 2002, a tax of 3 percent is

levied on the amount of the vehicle selling price in excess of $40,000.169

Gas Guzzler Tax

The gas guzzler tax was part of the Energy Tax Act of 1978,170 and is an excise tax on the

sale of passenger cars within model types whose fuel economy fails to meet certain fuel

economy standards. The tax is imposed on manufacturers. Miles per gallon levels and tax

rates were established by year for 1980-85, and 1986 or later. For years 1986 and forward,

cars are subject to tax if fuel economy is below 22.5 mpg; the maximum tax is levied if fuel

economy is below 12.5 mpg. For years 1986 and forward, the lowest tax was $500, and the

maximum was $3,850. In 1990, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990171 doubled

the gas guzzler taxes in effect since 1986; the current taxes range from $1,000 to $7,700 per

car.172
 173 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 4064.

 174 “Model type” means a unique combination of car line, basic engine, and transmission class. “Car line”

is a name denoting a group of vehicles within a make or car division which has a degree of commonality in

construction (e.g., body, chassis). Car line does not consider any level of decor or opulence and is not

generally distinguished by characteristics as roof line, number of doors, seats, or windows, except for station

wagons or light-duty trucks, which are considered to be different car lines than passenger cars. See 40 CFR

Ch. 1, part 600.002-85.

 175 “Base level” means a unique combination of basic engine inertia weight class and transmission class. A

“base vehicle” is lowest priced version of each body style that makes up a car line. See 40 CFR Ch. 1, part

600.002-85.

 176 “Vehicle configuration” means a unique combination of basic engine, engine code, inertia weight class,

transmission configuration, and axle ratio within a base level. See 40 CFR Ch. 1, sec. 600.002-85.

 177 “Subconfiguration” means a unique combination, within a vehicle configuration of equivalent test

weight, of road-load horsepower and any other operational characteristics or parameters which the

administrator determines may significantly affect fuel economy within a vehicle configuration. See 40 CFR

Ch. 1, sec. 600.002-85.

 178 40 CFR Ch 1, sec. 600.

 179 Ibid.

33

The Energy Tax Act requires that the fuel economy of a model type for a model year be

determined by the EPA, through a methodology determined by the EPA.173 Final

determination of the gas guzzler tax amount is made by the Internal Revenue Service in

consultation with the EPA. The methodology is based on segmenting manufacturer designs

into categories – model type,174 base level,175 configuration level,176 and subconfiguration

level.177 According to the law, the EPA specifies the data selection and averaging methods

and imposes data requirements on manufacturers that assure that each base level is

represented by at least one test from the highest selling configuration. The manufacturer can

supplement this with additional data from other vehicles in the base level. Any fuel economy

data generated from emissions testing must be included at this time. Design changes that add

base levels or change certain parameters automatically require new gas guzzler

determinations. If the recalculated fuel economy value changes by 1 mpg or more, the gas

guzzler tax is redetermined.178

Gas guzzler liability calculations are performed before vehicles are available for sale, so that

the tax can be displayed on the fuel economy label at the beginning of the model year.179

This label notifies the consumer of the fuel economy value and the extra cost at the time of

the sale. Thus, the model type calculation must be performed using sales projections. The

tax is assessed on each automobile, based on the model type in which it falls.

Extent of Globalization

The motor vehicle industry is characterized by increasing competition, placing ever greater

demands on company resources. Firms are under intense pressure to increase quality,

efficiency, product diversity, performance, fuel efficiency, and safety. At the same time,

firms must carefully control costs. Besides reorganizing corporate structures to remain

responsive to competitive demands, firms are increasing their alliances with foreign firms

in an effort to pool resources and gain market access. Diverse forms of cooperation have

emerged, including joint ventures, equity arrangements, contractual production, major
 180 Ward’s Automotive International, Interrelationships Among the World’s Major Automakers 2001

(Southfield, MI: Ward’s Communications, 2001).

 181 Ibid.

 182 Just-auto.com editorial team, “Despite protesters, GM, Daewoo and creditors finally sign deal,” Apr.

30, 2002, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Apr. 30, 2002.

 183 Kim Willenson, “Suzuki Reported Planning To Take 15% of New Daewoo To Work on Subcompacts,”

The Japan Automotive Digest, vol. VIII, No. 23, June 24, 2002, p. 5.

 184 Ward’s Automotive International, Interrelationships Among the World’s Major Automakers 2001.

 185 Ibid.

34

component sourcing, marketing and distribution arrangements, technological agreements,

and manufacturing and assembly arrangements. 

The U.S. passenger vehicle industry has a presence in nearly every market in the world. The

industry sells its vehicles globally, and has extensive linkages with foreign automakers and

foreign parts suppliers. GM and Ford have extensive alliances with European, Japanese, and

Korean companies, in addition to having assembly plants and licensing arrangements in

other regions of the world, such as South America, Africa, and the Middle East. In Europe,

GM owns Saab of Sweden, purchasing the remaining 50 percent of the company in 2000.

GM has a 20-percent stake in Italy’s Fiat, with an option to purchase the remaining 80

percent after January 1, 2004. This arrangement includes joint purchasing and engine supply

strategies. GM also has a number of arrangements with Renault of France, including mutual

distribution activities in South America, parts supply, marketing agreements, and joint

development of light commercial vans. GM has transmission and engine supply

arrangements with BMW of Germany, and GM’s European Adam Opel subsidiary has a

joint-venture agreement with Russia’s AvtoVAZ for passenger car production in Russia.180

GM has an extensive presence in Asia; the company has a 20-percent stake in Fuji Heavy’s

Subaru, a 49-percent stake in Isuzu, and a 20-percent stake in Suzuki, all of Japan. These

alliances are far-reaching, providing for numerous development, manufacturing, and

marketing arrangements around the world.181 GM also owns 42.1 percent of a new jointventure company called GM-Daewoo Auto and Technology Co. The original agreement

specified that an unnamed GM partner(s) would purchase another 24.9 percent stake, with

Daewoo creditors holding 33 percent.182 Suzuki reportedly will take 15 percent, leaving a

9.9-percent share for another GM partner; some speculate that GM’s Chinese partner

Shanghai Automotive will also take a stake.183 GM has a 50-50 joint venture with China’s

First Auto Works called Jinbei-GM Automotive Co. to produce Chevrolet models, and a

joint venture with Shanghai Automotive to produce Buick models. GM also has an engine

supply arrangement with Honda, and a 5-year joint research agreement with Toyota

regarding advanced propulsion technologies.184

In Europe, Ford owns Jaguar, Aston Martin, and Land Rover of the United Kingdom, and

Volvo of Sweden. Ford and Fiat are joint partners in Iveco Ford Truck Ltd., which joined

the two companies’ British truckmaking operations, and Ford and Peugeot (France) are

collaborating on engines. Ford used to be a 50-percent partner with Volkswagen in the

AutoEuropa assembly plant, which is 100-percent owned by Volkswagen. The plant

continues to produce vehicles for Ford. Volkswagen also supplies engines to Volvo, and

Volvo has a mutual engine and parts supply arrangement with Renault.185
 186 Ibid.

 187 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “The World Heavy Truck Industry: Structural Change Ahead.” 

 188 Ibid.

 189 Enders, “Challenges in the Global Truck Market,” pp. 37-38.

 190 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “The World Heavy Truck Industry: Structural Change Ahead.” 

35

Like GM, Ford also has extensive ties in Asia. Ford owns 33.4 percent of Mazda of Japan.

The two companies have a far-reaching relationship, providing for numerous development,

manufacturing, and marketing arrangements around the world. Ford and Mazda have

collaborated extensively in the United States at their joint venture, AutoAlliance, as well as

in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The two automakers share platforms and parts, and are

to fully integrate their product releases and parts procurement by 2002. Ford also has two

separate 50-50 joint ventures in China with Chongqing Chang’an Automotive Co. and

Yuejin Motors to build passenger vehicles, as well as a 70-percent stake in Taiwan’s Lio Ho.

Ford’s Volvo has a 50-percent stake in the NedCar venture with Mitsubishi; Volvo will be

exiting the venture shortly. Volvo and Mitsubishi also collaborate on engines.186

Globalization and consolidation are also evident in the competitive commercial truck and bus

industry. This industry is characterized by high capital costs, relatively low production

volumes, and the need to reduce cost bases and achieve economies of scale.187 Access to

engine and major component supply and technology are also driving mergers, acquisitions,

and other relationships.188 European truckmakers are the most globalized, while Japanese

truckmakers are generally small and focused on the Asia market. Similarly, U.S. truckmakers

tend to focus on the relatively large North American market.189 Despite the fact that

government standards and market preferences vary around the world, transnational equity

partners are attempting to standardize production, to the extent possible, as common

platforms allow for larger volume components purchases.190

Recent tie-ups among bus and truckmakers include:

• Paccar’s (United States) purchase of DAF (Netherlands) in 1996 and

Leyland (United Kingdom) in 1998; the company has owned Foden (United

Kingdom) since 1980.

• Volvo’s (Sweden) acquisition of Mexicana de Autobuses in 1998.

• The purchase of U.S. school bus maker Blue Bird by British busmaker

Henlys in 1999.

• Volkswagen (Germany) becoming Scania’s (Sweden) main owner with a

34-percent voting share in early 2000 after Volvo lost a bid to up its stake

to full ownership (Volvo has 30.6-percent voting share).

• Volvo’s acquisition of Renault V.I. (France) through an equity swap in May

2000 that gave Renault 15 percent of Volvo, which it later upped to 20

percent. Renault also owns U.S.-based Mack Trucks, and has a 22.5-percent

stake in Nissan Diesel.

• Freightliner’s (DaimlerChrysler’s commercial truck unit) purchase of

Western Star (Canada) in 2000. In this deal, Freightliner also got Orion Bus

Industries, making DaimlerChrysler the only complete bus product line

manufacturer in North America, also owning Thomas Built Buses since

1998.
 191 Reuters, “U.S. auto market faces many plant closures,” Oct. 23, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Oct. 23, 2001.

36

• The extension of DaimlerChrysler’s tie-up with Hyundai (Korea) to

commercial vehicles in 2000.

• DaimlerChrysler’s acquisition of a 34-percent stake in Mitsubishi in 2000,

followed by its purchase of Volvo’s 3.3-percent stake in Mitsubishi Fuso

(the company’s commercial truck unit) in 2001.

• The creation by Ford and Navistar of a 50/50 joint venture in 2001 called

Blue Diamond Truck Co. that will manufacture medium-duty trucks in

Mexico.

U.S. MARKET

Consumer Characteristics and Factors Affecting Demand

Consumers of motor vehicles are individuals, businesses, and governments. Sales of

passenger vehicles to individual consumers and businesses account for most sales and are

roughly equal. Sales to federal, state, and local governments account for a very small

percentage of total U.S. car sales (table 2). Sales of commercial vehicles are primarily to

businesses (e.g., privately-owned trucking companies and bus transportation providers), and

governments (e.g., urban transit operators).

Table 2

U.S. car sales by sector, by percent, 1997-2001

Year Consumer Business Government

2001 55.3 42.7 2.0

2000 53.0 45.1 1.9

1999 50.2 47.8 2.0

1998 49.0 49.0 2.0

1997 47.3 51.0 1.7

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Trends in motor vehicle sales in the United States are dominated by cyclical macroeconomic

trends in the U.S. economy. Typically, sales downturns of several years follow several years

of sales growth. Passenger vehicle sales are highly representative of the health of the U.S.

economy and are considered to be an important leading economic indicator. According to

one auto industry expert, there are four key pillars upon which new passenger vehicle sales

rely: personal income growth, unemployment levels, consumer confidence, and the value

of used cars.191
 192 Office of Automotive Affairs, “Motor Vehicles,” p. 36-3.

 193 Enders, “Challenges in the Global Truck Market,” p. 42.

 194 Ibid.

 195 “Terror Attacks Stall Industry; Long-term Impact Unknown,” Ward’s Auto World, Oct. 2001, 

p. 25.

 196 Lindsay Chappell, “At half-staff: Grief and uncertainty seize industry, nation,” Automotive News,

Sept. 17, 2001, p. 1.

 197 According to JD Power. Just-auto.com editorial team, “Automakers, Feds gather for summit,” Sept. 21,

2001, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Sept. 21, 2001.

 198 Harry Stoffer, “Falling stock, empty showrooms tell of dark days,” Automotive News, 

Sept. 24, 2001, p. 4.

37

The length of time that automakers can expect their products to be competitive in the market

is decreasing due to competitive pressure from Asian automakers that significantly redesign

their models every 4 to 5 years, typically a faster cycle than U.S. automakers.192 Demand for

particular vehicles is influenced by factors such as safety, price, styling, performance,

quality, and image. Although these consumer attitudes are most pronounced in the passenger

vehicle market, the commercial vehicle market faces these consumer attitudes to varying

degrees as well.

Commercial vehicle sales are influenced by a number of factors, including growth or

contraction in the general economy, interest rates, fuel prices, the age of the fleet, availability

of used vehicles, and changes in regulations. Market factors such as the rise in online

shopping, which may increase the demand for medium-duty trucks, and tourism booms,

which might spur demand for motor coach-type buses, also influence sales. Purchases of

commercial vehicles are scrutinized as business investments, with a prospective buyer

considering how the vehicle would meet its transport needs, the price of the vehicle, and the

lifecycle cost of the vehicle.193 Commercial vehicles must meet a very high quality and

reliability standard so that costly downtime is minimized and maintenance costs are as low

as possible.194

The Effects of September 11 on the U.S. Automotive Industry

The combination of a slowdown in the world economy and the events of September 11 and

its aftermath have affected the U.S. and global automotive industries. In the months leading

up to September 11, the Big Three had experienced declines in sales and market share.

Immediate effects of September 11 included plant closings that resulted in an estimated

52,636 units of lost production in the first week after the attack; up to 36-hour delays in auto

parts deliveries at the Canadian border closest to Detroit due to heightened security

measures;195 a several-day delay in air-freight deliveries of auto parts;196 a sales downturn of

35 percent in the days after the attack;197 and over 20-percent declines in the share prices of

most automotive stocks.198 However, low and no interest financing offered by U.S. and some

foreign-based automakers boosted sales in the final quarter of 2001, with the result that

overall sales for the year 2001 exceeded the level of 1999 but were below the 2000 level.
 199 Donna Harris, “Surprisingly high sales? It’s normal,” Automotive News, June 3, 2002, p. 1.

 200 2001 Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures (Southfield, MI: Ward’s Communications, 2001), pp.

26-27.

 201 Lindsay Chappell, “Expect more Japanese trucks,” Automotive News, Apr. 1, 2002, p. 1.

38

Consumption

As noted, short- and medium-term consumption trends in the U.S. motor vehicle industry

tend to mirror the growth and decline of the U.S. economy. U.S. sales of motor vehicles

increased steadily from 15.5 million units in 1997 to 17.8 million in 2000, before declining

slightly in 2001 to 17.5 million (table 3). In the United States and other developed markets,

the level of motor vehicle ownership is high, leaving limited opportunity for substantial sales

growth. In addition, vehicle durability is increasing, requiring that vehicles be replaced less

often than in the past. These facts notwithstanding, the U.S. market for passenger vehicles

has been quite robust during the last several years. One factor supporting healthy sales is the

high incidence of expired leases; almost twice the number of vehicle leases expire annually

today as compared to the mid-1990s, requiring new leases or purchases. In addition, today,

passenger vehicle purchases require fewer weeks of the median family income owing to

discounts in new vehicle prices as well as soaring household incomes.199

Table 3

U.S. motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle,1

 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 8,272,074 8,141,721 8,698,284 8,846,625 8,422,625

Light trucks 6,849,647 7,401,286 8,195,254 8,503,130 8,699,744

Medium/heavy-duty trucks 376,139 424,280 521,534 461,918 350,009

 Total 15,497,860 15,967,287 17,415,072 17,811,673 17,472,378

 1 Comprehensive data on sales of buses are not available.

Source: Ward’s Communications.

Within the passenger vehicle sector, light trucks have become an increasingly important

product subsector in terms of sales. During 1997-2001, passenger car sales increased by an

annual average of less than 1 percent; sales of light trucks registered an average annual

increase of 6 percent. Although the most recent sales record for passenger car sales was set

in 1986, light trucks have set consecutive new sales records every year since 1992.200 The

Big Three benefitted from first-mover advantage in the light truck sector, but the increased

incursion of Japanese nameplates indicates that the Big Three’s market domination will be

challenged in the near future as Japanese automakers increase their truck-making capacity

in North America and introduce new models. In 1996, Japanese nameplates from all sources

accounted for 13 percent of the light truck market in the United States; by 2001, their share

was up to 20 percent.201
 202 2001 Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures, p. 15; and data supplied by Ward’s Communications,

Apr. 12, 2002.

 203 Data supplied by Ward’s Communications, Apr. 12, 2002.

 204 Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77, No. 1, Jan. 7, 2002, insert p. 1.

39

As noted earlier in this report, sales of commercial vehicles – i.e., medium- and heavy-duty

trucks and buses – account for a much smaller percentage of U.S. retail sales. Within the

commercial truck sector, medium-duty trucks and heavy-duty trucks have followed the same

trend, increasing to a peak in 1999 and declining thereafter (table 4). Sales of class 8, or

heavy-duty trucks, are more erratic, experiencing bigger shifts each year and culminating in

a 34-percent drop in 2001.

Table 4

U.S. commercial truck unit sales, by class of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Class 4 56,526 44,090 49,423 47,417 52,037

Class 5 9,262 25,173 30,353 29,125 24,362

Class 6 18,111 32,086 48,135 51,209 42,435

Class 7 113,689 117,128 130,983 122,614 91,650

 Total medium-duty 197,588 218,477 258,894 250,365 210,484

Class 8 (heavy-duty) 178,551 209,482 262,415 211,507 139,614

 Total medium- and heavy-duty 376,139 427,959 521,309 461,872 350,098

Source: Ward’s Communications, as printed in Automotive News, various issues.

The U.S. market is the largest in the world and is generally considered to be among the most

open markets to imports. As expected, import consumption is high. During 1997-2001, sales

of imports as a percentage of total motor vehicle unit sales increased each year, from 13

percent of retail sales in 1997 to 18 percent in 2001.202 Canada is the leading source of U.S.

motor vehicle imports; however, subsidiaries of U.S. automakers account for most of these

imports. Therefore, imports from Japan, the second-leading import source, exert the greatest

competitive pressure on U.S. automakers. U.S. imports from Japan accounted for

approximately 10 percent of U.S. passenger car sales in 2001, and 9 percent of U.S. light

truck sales.203 However, Japanese automakers rely heavily on their U.S. assembly plants to

serve the U.S. market, and Japanese nameplate vehicles, regardless of place of assembly,

accounted for 27 percent of U.S. passenger vehicle sales in 2001 (table 5).204
40

Production

The U.S. industry manufactures motor vehicles around the world and does not rely heavily

on domestic exports to serve overseas markets. Therefore, U.S. production depends primarily

on U.S., and to a lesser extent, Canadian demand for U.S.-built motor vehicles. U.S. motor

vehicle production decreased from 12.1 million units in 1997 to 11.4 million units in 2001

(table 6), while sales of motor vehicles increased during the period, indicating that imports

have gained market share. The relatively low level of U.S. motor vehicle exports provides

no substantial outlet for U.S. production during domestic market downturns.

Table 5

U.S. car and light truck unit sales, by manufacturer, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Big 3:

GM 

(Buick/Cadillac/Chevrolet/Hummer/

Oldsmobile/Pontiac/GMC/Saturn/Saab) 4,732,002 4,569,384 4,974,572 4,911,673 4,852,552

Ford

(Ford/Lincoln/Mercury/Jaguar/

Land Rover1

/Volvo2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,800,228 3,960,449 4,115,603 4,147,734 3,915,458

 DaimlerChrysler

(Chrysler/Plymouth/Jeep/Eagle/Dodge) 2,303,788 2,510,011 2,638,561 2,522,695 2,273,208

Total Big 3 .................. 10,836,018 11,039,844 11,728,736 11,582,102 11,041,218

Japanese brands:

Honda/Acura .................. 940,386 1,009,600 1,076,893 1,158,860 1,207,639

Isuzu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97,795 108,478 111,319 104,485 84,083

 Mazda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221,840 240,546 243,708 255,526 269,602

 Mitsubishi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190,978 192,785 263,418 316,496 323,686

 Nissan/Infiniti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728,377 621,601 677,890 752,786 703,659

 Subaru ....................... 133,783 147,833 156,806 172,218 185,944

 Suzuki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29,273 37,608 49,609 60,845 64,698

 Toyota/Lexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,230,112 1,361,025 1,475,441 1,619,206 1,741,254

 Total Japanese brands . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,572,544 3,719,476 4,055,084 4,440,422 4,580,565

Korean brands:

 Hyundai ...................... 113,186 90,217 164,190 244,391 346,235

 Kia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,325 82,893 134,594 160,606 223,721

 Daewoo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 2,242 30,787 68,360 48,296

Total Korean brands ............... 168,511 175,352 329,571 473,357 618,252

European brands:

BMW1 ........................ 122,500 152,981 184,350 189,423 213,127

 Land Rover1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,825 0 0 0 0

Mercedes ..................... 122,408 170,915 190,388 206,190 206,719

 Porsche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,976 17,243 20,884 22,410 23,041

 Volvo2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90,894 0 0 0 0

 VW/Audi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172,045 267,196 381,522 435,851 438,931

 Total European brands ............ 544,648 608,335 777,144 853,874 881,818

 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,121,721 15,543,007 16,890,535 17,349,755 17,121,853 1 Land Rover is counted as part of BMW Group for 1998-99, and as a stand-alone brand for 1997. 2 Volvo is not counted as part of Ford Group for 1997.

Note.--Data may not reconcile with table 3, as data from that source may have been revised.

Source: Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77, No. 1, Jan. 7, 2002, insert p. 1; Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 75, No.

2, Jan. 10, 2000, insert p. 1; and Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 74. No. 2, Jan. 11, 1998, insert p. 1.
41

Table 6

U.S. motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle,1

 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 5,933,921 5,554,373 5,637,949 5,542,217 4,879,119

Light trucks 5,858,937 6,073,948 6,955,161 6,840,099 6,292,779

Medium/heavy-duty trucks 337,716 374,342 428,140 391,398 252,791

 Total 12,130,574 12,002,663 13,021,250 12,773,714 11,424,689

 1 Comprehensive data on production of buses are not available.

Source: Ward’s Communications.

U.S. passenger vehicle production by GM, Ford, and Chrysler fluctuated during 1997-2001,

following the same pattern as total U.S. passenger vehicle production (table 7). Production

by the Big Three registered an average annual percentage decrease of 2.4 percent, and total

U.S. production registered an average annual percentage decrease of 1.3 percent. Production

by Japanese affiliates rose during the period, except for a slight decrease in 2001, with an

average annual percentage increase of 1.4 percent. Production by German affiliates rose

sharply during the period (with the exception of a slight dip in 1999), registering an average

annual percentage increase of 24.6 percent. German automakers BMW and Mercedes-Benz

began producing SUV models during the period with significant increases in production rates

thereafter; BMW began producing its X5 in 1999 and Mercedes-Benz began producing the

M Class in 1997.

Table 7

U.S. passenger vehicle unit production, by car and light truck, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Big 31

:

Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,037,082 3,736,573 3,915,432 3,776,728 3,155,904

Light truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,460,455 5,552,481 6,284,952 5,987,018 5,445,912

 Total Big 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,497,537 9,289,054 10,200,384 9,763,746 8,601,816

Japanese affiliates:

Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,833,896 1,762,998 1,674,123 1,726,824 1,689,046

Light truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378,277 451,941 589,290 727,483 678,935

 Total Japanese affiliates . . . . . . . . . . . 2,212,173 2,214,939 2,263,413 2,454,307 2,367,981

German affiliates:

Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62,943 54,802 48,394 38,665 34,169

Light truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,205 69,526 80,919 125,598 167,932

 Total German affiliates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83,148 124,328 129,313 164,263 202,101

Total:

Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,933,921 5,554,373 5,637,949 5,542,217 4,879,119

 Light truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,858,937 6,073,948 6,955,161 6,840,099 6,292,779

 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,792,858 11,628,321 12,593,110 12,382,316 11,171,898

 1

 General Motors, Ford, and the Chrysler Group of DaimlerChrysler.

Source: Ward’s Communications.
42

During the period, the share of U.S. production held by GM, Ford, and Chrysler fell. In

1997, the Big Three accounted for nearly 80 percent of total production, with Japanese

affiliates accounting for nearly 20 percent and German affiliates accounting for less than 1

percent. In 2001, those percentages were 76 percent, 22 percent, and 2 percent, respectively,

reflecting the increased capacity installed in the United States by Japanese and German

automakers. 

U.S. TRADE

Overview

The United States consistently runs a deficit in motor vehicle trade. The persistent trade

deficit can be attributed to several factors, including the decision of GM and Ford to produce

in foreign markets instead of relying on exports from the United States; the increasing

integration and rationalization of automotive production in the NAFTA region; and the

popularity of foreign models that are produced overseas, or the U.S. production of which is

supplemented by imports.

The U.S. deficit in motor vehicles trade increased by over 50 percent during 1997-2001

(table 8). The deficit with all leading trading partners of the United States increased during

the period, including Canada (31 percent), Japan (23 percent), Mexico (71 percent),

Germany (62 percent), and Korea (248 percent). 

Table 8

U.S. motor vehicle merchandise trade balance based on imports for consumption and 

domestic exports, in millions of dollars, by selected countries, 1997-2001

Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Japan -26,347 -27,745 -31,308 -33,735 -32,460

Canada -21,682 -24,301 -32,138 -31,171 -28,315

Mexico -10,340 -10,976 -13,537 -17,818 -17,717

Germany -8,669 -11,322 -14,019 -14,241 -14,080

Korea -1,822 -1,685 -2,870 -4,765 -6,335

United Kingdom -1,355 -1,398 -1,843 -2,481 -2,199

Sweden -1,808 -1,977 -2,064 -2,147 -2,167

Belgium -518 -910 -895 -892 -1,002

Austria 8 12 17 -26 -608

Brazil 239 86 20 -129 -601

All Other 3,683 2,910 1,022 677 865

 Total -68,612 -77,305 -97,614 -106,727 -104,619

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
43

U.S. Imports

Principal Suppliers and Import Levels

Canada has traditionally been the leading import supplier of motor vehicles to the United

States, owing to the high degree of integration between the U.S. and Canadian auto

industries (table 9). Japan, Mexico, and Germany were the second-, third-, and fourthleading sources of U.S. imports throughout the period, respectively. Although imports from

all leading sources increased during 1997-2001, owing to a strong motor vehicle market in

the United States as well as sustained popularity of import models, such imports tended to

slow or decrease slightly in 2000 and 2001. Imports from Korea, however, have increased

sharply, particularly since 1999, and increased at an average annual percentage of 35.3

percent during 1997-2001. 

Table 9

U.S. motor vehicle imports for consumption, in millions of dollars, by selected countries, 1997-2001

Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Canada 35,883 37,670 46,563 45,656 41,150

Japan 27,906 28,864 32,115 34,507 33,019

Mexico 12,270 13,225 15,813 21,025 21,327

Germany 9,761 12,484 15,094 15,373 15,852

Korea 1,900 1,691 2,886 4,792 6,369

United Kingdom 1,668 1,836 2,356 2,804 2,728

Sweden 1,859 2,011 2,106 2,189 2,191

Belgium 1,215 1,469 1,469 1,076 1,220

Austria 4 6 4 59 655

Brazil 11 3 3 167 625

All Other 508 567 1,255 1,904 2,107

 Total 92,984 99,826 119,663 129,553 127,244

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
 205 This was known as “the chicken war” with Europe. Proclamation No. 3564, 28 Fed. Reg. 13247, Dec.

6, 1963.

 206 2000 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment, European Commission, Brussels, July

2000, found at Internet address http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/usrbt2000.pdf, retrieved Feb. 12, 2002.

 207 “Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of

Action Pursuant to Section 301: Barriers to Access to the Auto Parts Replacement Market in Japan,”

Federal Register, May 18, 1995, pp. 26745-26746.

44

U.S. Trade Measures

Tariff Measures

U.S. normal trade relations (general) tariffs on most motor vehicles are quite low, at 2

percent ad valorem for buses, 2.5 percent on passenger vehicles and their bodies and chassis,

and 4 percent on road tractors for semi-trailers and on bus and truck bodies and chassis.

However, general and column 2 tariffs on trucks, including pickup trucks, are 25 percent.

This unusually high tariff has been in place for nearly four decades, having been imposed

in 1963 in retaliation against West German barriers to U.S. poultry exports.205

There are a variety of special tariff treatment programs in effect for motor vehicles (see

appendix A); most of them eliminate the duty on qualifying products, while some reduce the

column 1 general rate of duty. These programs include the Generalized System of

Preferences; Automotive Trade Products Act; North American Free Trade Agreement,

Goods of Canada and Goods of Mexico; African Growth and Opportunity Act; Caribbean

Basin Economic Recovery Act; United States-Israel Free Trade Area; Andean Trade

Preference Act; and the United States-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act.

Nontariff Measures

There are a number of current U.S. policies that foreign competitors view as barriers to

imports. For example, the European Union cites the luxury tax, gas guzzler tax, Corporate

Average Fuel Economy requirement, and the American Automobile Labeling Act as barriers

to imported passenger vehicles (see section on Regulatory Issues).206

U.S. Government Trade-Related Investigations

Japan

On May 16, 1995, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced

that, pursuant to sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States would

impose tariffs of 100 percent on U.S. imports of luxury cars from Japan.207 The

announcement came after USTR determined that Japan had specific barriers to access to the

aftermarket for auto parts in Japan. Extensive consultations between the United States and
 208 The Agreement includes 15 quantitative and qualitative criteria specific to motor vehicles, original

equipment parts, and aftermarket parts, as well as two general qualitative criteria, all of which are designed

to measure progress in reaching joint goals in these sectors.

 209 “U.S., Japan Informally Explore Future After Expiry of Auto Deal,” Apr. 28, 2000, found at Internet

address http://www.insidetrade.com, retrieved Apr. 28, 2000.

 210 Office of the United States Trade Representative press release, “U.S. and Japan Complete Annual

Review of Automotive Framework Agreement, U.S. Emphasizes Need for Improved Market Access and

Competition in Japan,” Nov. 29, 2000.

 211 Just-auto editorial team, “New round of U.S.-Japan auto talks agreed,” Sept. 3, 2001, found at Internet

address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Sept. 10, 2001.

 212 Chris Rugaber and Toshio Aritake, “U.S., Japan Agree To Form Auto Group To Replace Old

Economic Framework Pact,” International Trade Daily, Bureau of National Affairs, No. 202, Oct. 19, 2001.

 213 Office of the United States Trade Representative press release, “U.S. and Japan Launch New Forum To

Address Bilateral Automotive Issues,” Oct. 18, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/10/01-85.htm, retrieved June 27, 2002.

45

Japan eventually culminated in the signing of the U.S.-Japan Agreement on Autos and Auto

Parts (Agreement) on June 28, 1995, with an expiration date of December 31, 2000.

As part of the Agreement, the Government of Japan made commitments in three areas:

improving market access for foreign motor vehicles; eliminating regulations that limit U.S.

auto parts sales in Japan; and enhancing sales opportunities for U.S. original equipment parts

producers with Japanese automakers in the United States and Japan.208 Consultative meetings

were held periodically, and at the April 2000 meeting, the U.S. and Japanese Governments

discussed the future of the soon-to-expire Agreement; the Japanese Government highlighted

the globalization of the automotive industry and issues other than market access that will

determine the success of the automotive industry in Japan. U.S. auto parts interests supported

a follow-on agreement, while automakers expressed an interest in a government-togovernment consultative framework.209

The Governments of the United States and Japan met on November 28-29, 2000. Although

acknowledging some progress over the life of the Agreement, the United States expressed

concern that the overall market access objectives of the Agreement were not met, noting

decreases in U.S. exports of vehicles and parts to Japan. The United States stated that, the

weak Japanese economy notwithstanding, more could be done to improve access and

competition in the Japanese market.210 The Agreement expired without a continuance or

replacement at the end of 2000. 

It was reported in early September 2001 that high-level Japanese and U.S. trade officials had

agreed to start a new round of automotive trade talks, but these were stalled as a result of the

terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.211 On October 18, 2001, the

Governments of Japan and the United States announced that they would form a bilateral

Automotive Consultative Group that would meet annually. Reportedly, the Japanese would

like the Group to look at forward-looking global issues,212 while USTR stated that the group

will “assess trends in the industry” based on U.S. and Japanese trade and economic data, as

well as addressing “market access issues as well as needed regulatory reform in Japan.”213
 214 Office of the United States Trade Representative press release, “U.S. Gains Major Improvements in

Access to Korean Motor Vehicle Market,” Oct. 20, 1998, found at Internet address

http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/auto/koreapress1098.html, retrieved Apr. 30, 2002.

 215 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1998 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign

Trade Barriers, found at Internet address http://www.ustr.gov/pdf/1998_korea.pdf, retrieved June 4, 2002.

 216 Office of the United States Trade Representative press release, “U.S. Gains Major Improvements in

Access to Korean Motor Vehicle Market.”

 217 Statement of Stephen Collins, President, Automotive Trade Policy Council, U.S. International Trade

Commission public hearing in connection with inv. No. 332-425, U.S.-Korea FTA: The Economic Impact of

Establishing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and The Republic of Korea, USITC

publication 3425, Sept. 2001.

 218 Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 77, No. 2, Jan. 14, 2002, insert p. 6.

 219 Ward’s World Motor Vehicle Data 2001 (Southfield, MI: Ward’s Communications, 2001), 

p. 212.

46

Korea

In September 1995, the United States and Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) that aimed to address trade-distorting practices impeding access to the Korean motor

vehicle market. While the fourth-largest motor vehicle producer in the world and the fifthlargest market, imports account for less than 1 percent of the Korean motor vehicle market.

Dissatisfied with the progress made in implementing the 1995 MOU, the United States

engaged Korea in a series of negotiations during mid-1997, seeking more meaningful actions

on Korean tariffs, taxes, and standards.214 Because the United States did not view the

outcome of these negotiations as satisfactory, USTR initiated a section 301 investigation in

October 1997, and Korea’s market access barriers were cited as a priority foreign country

practice under Super 301 procedures.215 In October 1998, an agreement was reached that

ended the section 301 investigation against Korea, averting trade sanctions. The 1998

agreement was expected to “eliminate or streamline onerous standards and certification

requirements, substantially reduce the tariff and tax burden on foreign motor vehicles,

introduce a new, comprehensive secured financing mechanism to facilitate sales, and provide

effective redress to any anti-import activity.”216 However, the U.S. industry continues to cite

Korean practices as severely hampering the sale of imported motor vehicles.217

U.S. Exports

Principal Markets and Export Levels

The low level of U.S. exports relative to production is largely explained by an extensive U.S.

manufacturing and market presence in foreign countries. For example, in 2001 Ford

accounted for 11 percent (fourth place) and GM 10 percent (sixth place) of the West

European market,218 and Ford and GM were the region’s second- and fourth-largest

assemblers, respectively, in 2000.219 U.S. auto companies also have production facilities in

Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

There are several reasons this strong international presence has developed. Many foreign

markets have significant trade barriers, including high tariffs as well as nontariff barriers
 220 For more information on nontariff barriers, see Office of Automotive Affairs, U.S. Department of

Commerce, “World Motor Vehicle Import Requirements,” Aug. 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.ita,doc.gov/td/auto/impreq.html. 

 221 Rationalization refers to a strategy whereby vehicle models are produced in a single or reduced number

of locations, where models are most efficiently produced, for distribution throughout a wide region.

 222 For more information, see John Mutti, NAFTA: The Economic Consequences for Mexico and the

United States (Washington, DC: Economic Strategy Institute, 2001); and USITC, Production-Sharing: Use

of U.S. Components and Materials in Foreign Assembly Operations, 1995-1998, inv. No. 332-237, USITC

publication 3265, Dec. 1999.

47

such as domestic content requirements and investment requirements.220 Lower wage rates in

many countries are also an incentive for automakers to produce in foreign markets. Finally,

automakers are better able to respond to consumer preferences by establishing local

production, engineering, marketing, research, and management operations. As with imports,

Canada, Japan, Mexico, and Germany are the four leading trading partners in terms of U.S.

exports, although not in the same order (table 10). Owing to the integration of the North

American market, Canada and Mexico are the leading markets for U.S. vehicle exports. The

integration of the U.S. and Canadian automotive industries, spurred decades ago by the

Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, has resulted in significant production

rationalization,221 intra-industry trade, and trade in intermediate goods. Production-sharing

arrangements encouraged similar regional integration with Mexico. Prior to NAFTA, which

was implemented on January 1, 1994, Mexican import restrictions led U.S. automakers and

parts producers to maintain production in Mexico that was redundant with production

elsewhere in North America. However, the gradual removal of Mexican import barriers

under NAFTA has prompted the U.S. automotive industry to rationalize production by

exporting to Mexico those vehicles and parts that are more efficiently produced in the United

States or Canada.222

Table 10

U.S. motor vehicle domestic exports, in millions of dollars, by selected countries,

1997-2001

Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Canada 14,201 13,369 14,425 14,485 12,834

Mexico 1,929 2,248 2,277 3,207 3,610

Germany 1,092 1,163 1,075 1,133 1,772

Japan 1,558 1,118 807 772 559

United Kingdom 313 439 513 322 530

Belgium 697 560 574 184 217

Austria 12 18 22 34 47

Korea 78 7 16 27 35

Sweden 51 35 42 42 24

Brazil 250 89 23 38 24

All Other 4,191 3,477 2,277 2,582 2,972

 Total 24,372 22,522 22,049 22,827 22,625

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
 223 BMW also produces the Z3 roadster/coupe (to be replaced by the Z4 in autumn 2002) exclusively in

the United States.

 224 Japan does not maintain a tariff on imports of motor vehicles from any source, and the Canadian tariff

on nonNAFTA-qualifying vehicles is 6.1 percent.

 225 The Mexican tariff on nonNAFTA-qualifying vehicles is 20 percent; a tariff of 10 percent is levied on

certain trucks.

 226 Diesel and semi-diesel trucks 2.5 liters and below are assessed 11 percent, and those above 2.5 liters

are assessed 22 percent. The dividing size for gasoline-powered trucks is 2.8 liters.

 227 Office of Automotive Affairs, “World Motor Vehicle Import Requirements.”

48

U.S. exports to Japan have declined steadily throughout the period, and have been a source

of trade friction between the two countries (see section on U.S. Government trade-related

investigations). U.S. exports to Germany have increased during 1997-2001, largely owing

to shipments of Mercedes-Benz and BMW SUV models that are produced only in the United

States.223

Foreign Trade Measures

Tariff Measures

Foreign tariffs faced by U.S. exports vary by market. Developed markets tend to have low

or no tariffs on motor vehicle imports, while countries with fledgling motor vehicle

industries tend to maintain high tariffs as a form of protection. U.S. motor vehicle exports

to the leading three markets – Canada, Japan, and Mexico – are free of duty. U.S. exports

to Canada and Japan were free of duty throughout 1997-2001.224 Mexican tariffs on U.S.

passenger cars and commercial vehicles meeting the NAFTA rule of origin were phased

down during the period under the provisions of NAFTA, reaching 2.2 percent for passenger

cars and 4 percent for commercial vehicles in 2001; the tariff on most light trucks was zero

at the start of NAFTA, while the remaining tariff on certain light trucks meeting the rule of

origin was eliminated on January 1, 1998.225 Other important markets include Germany and

United Kingdom, which impose a common European external tariff of 10 percent ad valorem

on passenger cars, 12.5 percent on electric cars, and 11 and 22 percent on diesel- and gasengined trucks, depending on engine size.226 Korea maintains an 8-percent tariff on passenger

vehicles and a 10-percent tariff on commercial vehicles.227

Nontariff Measures

U.S. motor vehicle exports face a variety of nontariff measures in overseas markets. Taxes

based on engine size are imposed in numerous countries, including Korea. Although these

taxes are generally applied to both domestically produced and imported vehicles, they are

perceived as a barrier to U.S. exports which tend to be comparatively larger cars with bigger

engines. Taxes are also assessed, in some cases, based on local content.

Some countries require foreign automakers to obtain a license to import motor vehicles.

Obtaining such a license may be contingent on a number of requirements such as local

content requirements, foreign exchange balancing requirements (requirements concerning
 228 Ibid.

 229 Ibid.

 230 Ward’s Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 2001, p. 13.

 231 Automotive News, 2002 Market Data Book (Detroit, MI: Crain Communications, 2002), 

pp. 8-9.

 232 Unless otherwise noted, EU refers to the EU-15 countries, which are Austria, Belgium, Denmark,

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,

and the United Kingdom.

 233 Eurostat, Panorama of European Business, 1999 (Luxembourg: European Commission, 2000), p. 355.

49

the value of imports and exports), local ownership requirements in the case of domestic

manufacturing facilities producing foreign nameplate vehicles, and equity requirements in

joint venture operations.228

Some countries maintain bans on the import of motor vehicles from certain countries (e.g.,

until recently, Korea banned vehicles from Japan), maintain procurement policies that favor

local manufacturers, or maintain quotas on vehicle imports. In addition, certain foreign

countries do not have automobile purchase financing available and do not allow foreign

automakers to offer financing for the purchase of motor vehicles.229

FOREIGN INDUSTRY PROFILE

The global motor vehicle industry is relatively concentrated, with the leading 10 automakers

in the world accounting for 77 percent of total world output.230 The Japanese industry, which

was the world’s largest motor vehicle producer during the 1980s and early 1990s, is by far

the most important competitor of the United States. EU producers have a combined output

that exceeds that of Japan and the United States, but no single EU country rivals Japanese

or U.S. production.231 Korea has a substantial, export-oriented motor vehicle industry that

has experienced both growth and restructuring in recent years. Although Canada is a major

producer, it is generally not viewed as a competitor to the U.S. industry because the

Canadian industry is largely dominated by subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The small but

rapidly expanding industry in Mexico is also highly integrated with the U.S. industry,

although the strong presence of Volkswagen and Nissan, as well as the recent arrival of other

foreign companies, make it more of a potential competitor to the U.S. industry. 

European Union232

As a region, the EU is the leading motor vehicle producer in the world; production levels

approximate those of the NAFTA region (United States, Canada, and Mexico). In terms of

market size, the EU and the United States alternate as the global leader in annual motor

vehicle sales. The economic importance of the motor vehicle industry in the EU varies by

country; for Sweden, Germany, France, and Spain, motor vehicle production accounts for

approximately 10 percent of total manufacturing, while the average for the EU is around 8

percent.233 Within the EU, the largest producer is Germany (roughly 30 percent of EU

production), followed by France (19 percent), Spain (17 percent), United Kingdom (10
 234 GM brands include Opel, Vauxhall, and Saab; Ford brands include Ford, Volvo, Aston Martin, Jaguar,

and Land Rover; DaimlerChrysler brands include Mercedes-Benz, Chrysler, and Smart; Volkswagen brands

include Volkswagen, Audi, SEAT, Bentley, Lamborghini, and Rolls-Royce; Fiat brands include Fiat, Lancia,

Alfa Romeo, Ferrari, and Maserati; and PSA Peugeot Citroën brands include Peugeot and Citroën. 

 235 Steyr-Daimler-Puch is owned by Magna International of Canada.

 236 Eurostat, Panorama of European Business, p. 356.

50

percent), and Italy (10 percent). These five countries are also the largest motor vehicle

markets in the region.

There are over 20 passenger vehicle manufacturers in the EU. The largest automakers tend

to produce multiple brands, such as GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Volkswagen, Fiat, and PSA

Peugeot Citroën.234 There are also a number of stand-alone automakers, such as Porsche,

BMW, Bertone, Renault (recently partnered with Nissan), and MG Rover; several Japanese

automakers (Honda, Toyota, Nissan, and Mitsubishi); and a number of specialty carmakers

such as Caterham, Lotus, LTI Carbodies, MetroCab, Bugatti, and Morgan. In addition,

companies such as Pininfarina, Karmann, Steyr-Daimler-Puch,235 and Valmet design,

engineer, and/or manufacture passenger vehicles for other automakers. There are also

numerous truck and busmakers in the EU; many are divisions of the automakers listed above.

Leading producers include Henlys, Iveco (Fiat’s commercial vehicle unit), DaimlerChrysler,

MAN, Scania, Volkswagen, and Volvo. Similar to the United States, truck and bus

production is a very small percentage of overall motor vehicle production. 

Total EU motor vehicle production increased steadily throughout the period, with passenger

car production decreasing slightly in 2000 (table 11). Extra-EU exports account for around

20 percent of total production. The value of EU motor vehicle exports fluctuated during

1997-2000, with an average annual percentage increase of 6 percent (table 12). The EU runs

a trade surplus in motor vehicles, and as such, the industry is an important component in the

overall EU trade balance.236

Table 11

EU motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle,1

 1997-2000

1997 1998 1999 2000

Passenger cars 13,451,272 14,510,472 14,933,470 14,906,666

Light commercial vehicles 1,570,265 1,675,315 1,616,931 1,777,502

Trucks 334,562 379,094 394,211 417,235

Buses 36,672 35,397 33,788 35,314

 Total 15,392,771 16,600,278 16,978,400 17,136,717

 1 These product breakouts are the categories used by the European Automobile Manufacturers

Association. ‘Light commercial vehicles’ are analogous to the category ‘light trucks’ used when

presenting U.S. industry data; ‘trucks’ are analogous to the category ‘medium/heavy-duty trucks’ in U.S.

industry data tables. 

Source: National Associations/European Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet

address http://www.acea.be/acea/index.html, retrieved Apr. 25, 2002.
 237 Includes Audi, SEAT, Skoda, and Volkswagen brands.

 238 Includes Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover, and Volvo brands.

 239 Includes GM USA, Opel, Vauxhall, and Saab brands.

 240 National Associations/European Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address

http://www.acea.be/acea/index.html, retrieved May 3, 2002.

51

Table 12

EU motor vehicle exports, by type of vehicle, in million EUR, 1997-2000

1997 1998 1999 2000

Passenger cars 35,046 36,498 36,175 42,407

Light commercial vehicles 1,708 1,725 1,377 1,652

Trucks 4,167 4,257 3,520 4,309

Buses 590 719 484 577

 Total 41,510 43,199 41,555 48,946

Source: National Associations/European Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address

http://www.acea.be/acea/index.html, retrieved May 3, 2002.

New registrations of motor vehicles increased by 13 percent during 1997-2001, with a slight

decrease in 2000 (table 13). The EU reached a new record for motor vehicle sales in 1999,

and the slight decline in 2000 was largely attributable to rising fuel prices and higher interest

rates in the EU. The leading automakers in terms of West European passenger vehicle market

share in 2001 were Volkswagen237 (19 percent), PSA Peugeot Citroën (14 percent), Ford238

(11 percent), GM239(11 percent), and Renault (11 percent).240

Table 13

EU motor vehicle new registrations, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Passenger cars 13,005,029 13,940,823 14,632,826 14,319,107 14,418,837

Light commercial vehicles 1,444,738 1,620,811 1,804,794 1,853,891 1,787,240

Trucks and buses 273,355 320,057 360,157 391,964 381,066

 Total 14,723,122 15,881,691 16,797,777 16,564,962 16,587,143

Source: National Associations/European Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address

http://www.acea.be/acea/index.html, retrieved Apr. 25, 2002.

EU consumer preferences differ from those in the United States; for example, light

commercial vehicles, or light trucks, accounted for just 11 percent of total new EU passenger

vehicle registrations in 2001, as compared to over 50 percent in the United States. A number

of factors may act to limit market interest in light trucks (particularly larger models) in the

EU, including higher fuel prices; factors such as population density, constricted urban areas,

and narrower streets; and the popularity of station wagons in the EU. However, the compact

minivan, introduced in the EU market by Renault in 1996, has found a growing market
 241 Just-auto editorial team, “The reasons why full-size minivans don’t sell in Europe,” May 30, 2000,

found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved May 31, 2000.

 242 European Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.acea.be/,

retrieved May 8, 2002.

 243 Automotive World, “Reorganising vehicle assembly in Western Europe,” Oct. 31, 2000, found at

Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Jan. 29, 2001.

 244 “Europe: Build Will Outperform Market,” The Power Report, Jan. 2001, p. 15.

 245 Automotive World, “Reorganising vehicle assembly in Western Europe.”

52

niche.241 Fuel-efficient diesel vehicles have grown in popularity in the EU as a response to

high fuel prices and in tandem with improved diesel technology. In 1997, diesel-powered

vehicles accounted for 30 percent of passenger vehicle sales; by 2001, this percentage had

risen to 43.242 In addition, EU consumers, relative to their U.S. counterparts, reportedly are

less likely to try a new type of vehicle, less likely to change vehicle brands, and less

interested in the application of technological advances (e.g., telematics, satellite radio) in

their vehicles.243

The value of EU motor vehicle imports increased steadily during 1997-99, before declining

21 percent in 2000 (table 14). However, the value of imports registered an average annual

increase of 4 percent during the period. In general, imports from North America have

increased in recent years as German automaker investments in U.S. and Mexican production

facilities have resulted in reverse exports back to Europe. 

Table 14

EU motor vehicle imports, by type of vehicle, in million EUR, 1997-2000

1997 1998 1999 2000

Passenger cars 16,122 20,616 23,185 17,471

Light commercial vehicles 1,595 1,868 2,065 2,308

Trucks 457 477 456 471

Buses 102 147 266 313

 Total 18,275 23,109 25,972 20,563

Source: National Associations/European Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address

http://www.acea.be/acea/index.html, retrieved May 3, 2002.

There has been significant consolidation and restructuring of the industry located in Western

Europe, including the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler; the completion of GM’s 100-

percent acquisition of Saab and its equity stake in Fiat; Ford’s acquisition of Jaguar, Land

Rover, and Volvo’s passenger car division; BMW’s takeover (and subsequent sale) of Rover;

and Volkswagen’s acquisition of SEAT, Skoda, Bentley, and Lamborghini. Capacity

reductions have also been announced during the period, with both GM and Ford announcing

far-reaching restructuring strategies.244 Finally, there were also numerous development, coproduction, and supply arrangements that emerged during this period, among European

producers as well as between European producers and foreign partners. However, some

observers of the EU automotive industry assert that there is a need for more integration and

rationalization within the region.245
 246 Prices for passenger vehicles are reportedly highest in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria, and

lowest in Spain, Greece, and Finland. However, tax rates on vehicle purchases vary greatly, with some of the

low-priced countries charging the highest taxes. For example, an Opel model that retails for over 40 percent

more in Germany than Finland actually costs less in Germany because of the tax regime in Finland.

“European Union Finds That Car Prices Vary Up To 40% Across Europe,” The Autoparts Report, vol. XV,

No. 11, Mar. 6, 2002, p. 6.

 247 “European Union Finds that Car Prices Vary;” and Just-auto.com editorial team, “EC confirms block

exemption end proposals,” Feb. 6, 2002, found at Internet address 

http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Feb. 6, 2002.

 248 Just-auto.com editorial team, “Proposed EU car sales shake-up hampers supermarkets, internet

retailers,” Jan. 11, 2002, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Jan. 11, 2002.

 249 Just-auto.com editorial team, “New EC rules loosen, but not remove manufacturers’ hold over dealers,”

Feb. 7, 2002, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Feb. 7, 2002.

 250 Barbara McClellan, “Currency Conundrum: Europe’s weak euro hurts some, helps others,” Ward’s

Auto World, July 2000, p. 67.

 251 Ibid.

 252 Wim Oude Weernink, “Toyota acts to end European Losses,” Automotive News, Mar. 19, 2001, p. 24;

and “Nissan To Increase Euro-Based Procurement For UK Plants,” The Japan Automotive Digest, vol. VII,

No. 31, Sept. 3, 2001, p. 5.

 253 “Toyota Said It Will Source More Parts In The EU,” The Autoparts Report, vol. XV, No. 17, June 7,

2002, p. 6.

53

The vehicle distribution system in Western Europe is currently in flux. Motor vehicle

distribution has benefitted from a ‘block exemption’ from EU anti-trust rules, meaning that

automakers have been able to grant dealers exclusive territories and dictate pricing, resulting

in price variations throughout the region of up to 40 percent for identical vehicles.246 In

February 2002, the European Commission issued a set of draft rules that would remove the

block exemption. Such action would facilitate the purchase of cars from other countries

within the EU; broaden options for vehicle repairs; allow dealers to establish dealerships

anywhere in the EU and market more than one brand in their showrooms; force automakers

to offer dealers volume discounts comparable to those offered to fleet purchasers; and

promote Internet and supermarket retailing.247 Supporters of the removal of the block

exemption contend that the new system will promote competition and result in lower vehicle

prices for consumers.248 The current block exemption framework expires on September 30,

2002; while the new system will likely loosen the control automakers have over dealers,

some observers note that it is not likely that the market will be fully liberalized.249

Exchange rates and the introduction of euro in 1999 have affected EU industry developments

in recent years. After its introduction on the Continent in 1999, the value of the euro fell

relative to the dollar, yen, and sterling, while the sterling has been persistently strong. For

those companies purchasing most of their inputs and selling most of their products in euros,

the effect of the euro’s depreciation was minimized. However, those companies whose

products are manufactured with yen, sterling, or dollar inputs, but are sold in the euro zone,

found their profits squeezed.250 Some automakers reportedly tried to alleviate this risk by

locking in euro rates as part of their contracts;251 some also announced that, for their British

manufacturing sites, they would replace some British content with inputs from the

Continent,252 or require that British suppliers write their contracts in euros.253

A 2001 study by AT Kearney predicted that the “wait-and-see” attitude of the British

Government regarding the euro, along with overcapacity and a shift in demand toward

Eastern Europe, would prompt plant closures in the United Kingdom and a shift in high

volume car and parts manufacturing to the euro zone. Moreover, the study predicts that the
 254 For more information, see AT Kearney, “The Future of the U.K. Automotive Industry,” 2001, found at

Internet address http://www.atkearney.com.

 255 Kim Willenson, “Subsidy in Hand, Nissan Announces It Will Spend £235 Million to Keep Micra

Production in U.K.,” The Japan Automotive Digest, vol. VII, No. 3, Jan. 29, 2001, p. 1.

 256 “Honda Will Use New Swindon Plant To Export Back To Japan As Well As To U.S.,” The Japan

Automotive Digest, vol. VII, No. 33, Sept. 17, 2001, p. 5.

 257 “Ford U.K. operations remain firmly in the red,” Ward’s Automotive International, vol. 16, No. 19,

Oct. 2001, p. 9.

 258 Ford, GM announce U.K. investments,” Ward’s Automotive International, vol. 16, No. 4, Feb. 2001, 

p. 3.

 259 Ibid.

 260 Julian Rendell, “Made in Britain, maybe,” Autocar, Jan. 24, 2001, p. 18.

54

remaining operations in the United Kingdom would rely so heavily on euro-zone inputs that

they would, in effect, become “screwdriver” assembly operations with little local value

added. Finally, the study predicts that in the long term, the automakers that remain in the

United Kingdom may just be luxury automakers such as Jaguar, Land Rover, and BMW.254

However, despite these predictions, there have been many announcements of new investment

in the British industry, albeit most of them tempered with promises to decrease British

content. BMW announced it would invest $1.5 billion in Britain by the end of 2002 to

modernize the plant in Oxford for production of the new Mini, and add facilities for the new

generation of Rolls Royce beginning production in 2003 (however, BMW claimed that the

strength of the British pound was a factor in its decision to sell Rover). Similarly, Nissan

announced in early 2001 it would expand its Sunderland plant to accommodate production

of the new Micra subcompact beginning in December 2002 (influenced by a £40 million

government subsidy).255 Toyota announced plans to increase production at Burnaston,

moving production of 50,000 Corolla hatchbacks from Japan to Burnaston by 2002 and

boosting that plant to 100 percent capacity. Honda decided to proceed with its expansion of

Swindon, adding a new facility to build Civic hatchbacks and CR-Vs. However, Honda is

exporting some Swindon output to the United States and Japan for the first time, due to the

reduced profitability of sales to the Continent.256

Ford and GM both announced cutbacks in the United Kingdom in 2000 as part of their broad

restructuring plans for Europe; Ford announced that it would end production of the Fiesta

at Dagenham,257 and GM announced that it would end production of the Vectra at the

Vauxhall plant in Luton.258 However, Ford did invest in boosting engine building capacity

at Bridgend, and GM announced it would build the next-generation Vectra at the Vauxhall

plant in Ellesmere Port.259 Ford affiliate Jaguar also pledged investment at Halewood where

the X-type would replace the Escort.260
 261 International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Automobile Industry,” Industry

Sector Analysis, Nov. 2, 2001, found at Internet address http://www.stat-usa.gov, retrieved Apr. 30, 2002.

 262 JAN Corporation, Facts and Info 2001: A Guide to Japan’s Auto Industry (Tokyo: JAN Corporation,

2001), p. 148.

 263 Just-auto.com editorial team, “The Japanese vehicle industry in review,” Oct. 11, 2001, found at

Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Oct. 19, 2001.

 264 Total motor vehicle unit exports from Japan to the region reached 620,177 in 1996; in 1997 the decline

was relatively small, to 606,410. However, in 1998, Japanese exports fell 56 percent to 265,172 vehicles.

Japan exported 290,582 vehicles to the region in 1999 and 410,607 in 2000. World Automotive Market

Report (Chicago, IL: Auto and Truck International), various years.

55

Japan

The automotive industry in Japan is a key component in the national economy. Motor

vehicle and related industries account for over 13 percent of the country’s total

manufacturing output and 10 percent of the country’s jobs.261 There are 11 motor vehicle

manufacturers in Japan, 9 of which produce passenger vehicles: Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd.,

Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd., Honda Motor Co., Ltd., Isuzu Motors Ltd., Mazda Motor Corp.,

Mitsubishi Motors Corp., Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., Suzuki Motor Corp., and Toyota Motor

Corp. All of these have manufacturing operations in the United States with the exception of

Daihatsu and Suzuki; Suzuki does participate in the CAMI Automotive, Inc. joint venture

with GM, located in Canada.

Japan is the third-leading producer of cars and trucks behind the EU and the United States.

The Japanese automotive industry has traditionally been viewed as the leading competitor

for the U.S. auto industry in most regions of the world, including North America. In 2001,

Japanese automakers produced 8.1 million passenger cars (table 15), and exported 44 percent

of these vehicles (table 16). The United States is by far the leading market for Japanese

vehicle exports, receiving over 35 percent of such exports in 2000.262

Japanese motor vehicle production has fluctuated downward during 1997-2001, with 2000

the only year with a minor increase. During the last 5-10 years, the Japanese auto industry

has implemented major structural changes in reaction to a number of factors. The industry

has suffered the effects of overcapacity in recent years, resulting from a prolonged slump in

domestic demand.263 In addition, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997 dealt a serious

blow to Japanese automotive exports to that region.264 Japanese automakers have sold

unprofitable assets, reduced capacity through plant closures, and, with the exception of

Toyota and Honda, have offered equity stakes to foreign automakers in order to gain

financial and managerial assistance. Ford has a controlling interest in Mazda; GM has equity

stakes in Subaru and Suzuki, and a controlling interest in Isuzu; DaimlerChrysler has a
 265 Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, “Globalization of the Automotive Industry in Japan,”

The JAMA Forum, vol. 19, No. 1, 2001, p. 4.

 266 CSM Worldwide, “The restructuring of the Japanese and Korean auto industries,” Nov. 13, 2000,

found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved May 13, 2002.

 267 Ibid.

56

Table 15

Japanese motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle,1

 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 8,491,440 8,055,763 8,100,169 8,363,485 8,117,563

Trucks 2,421,413 1,937,076 1,746,912 1,726,818 1,601,536

Buses 62,234 56,953 48,395 54,544 58,092

 Total 10,975,087 10,049,792 9,895,476 10,144,847 9,777,191

 1 These product breakouts are the categories used by the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association. ‘Cars’ are

analogous to the category ‘passenger cars’ used when presenting U.S. industry data; ‘trucks’ would include light

trucks and medium/heavy-duty trucks. 

Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.japanauto.com., retrieved May 1, 2002.

Table 16

Japanese motor vehicle unit exports, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 3,578,658 3,684,150 3,757,460 3,795,854 3,568,797

Trucks 919,908 795,808 613,113 617,870 552,891

Buses 54,602 48,917 38,380 41,163 44,481

 Total 4,553,168 4,528,875 4,408,953 4,454,887 4,166,169

Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.japanauto.com, retrieved

May 1, 2002.

controlling interest in Mitsubishi; and Renault has a controlling interest in Nissan.265

Although in the past each Japanese automaker offered passenger cars in each vehicle

segment, regardless of the volume of sales it could garner, some automakers reportedly

suffered because they were unable to achieve economies of scale in every segment.266

Makers have taken steps to drop unprofitable segments, consolidate platforms internally,

consolidate platforms with their foreign equity partners, devise more efficient regional

sourcing strategies, and rationalize production, product portfolios, and supplier networks.267

Total motor vehicle sales in Japan have followed the same pattern as production, fluctuating

downward with a modest uptick in 2000 (table 17). However, while sales of passenger cars

bottomed out in 1998, increasing modestly in 1999-2001, truck sales continued to decline

throughout the period, with an average annual decrease of nearly 8 percent.
 268 JAN Corporation, Facts and Info 2001, p. 154.

 269 Includes Mercedes-Benz, Chrysler, and Smart brands.

 270 Includes Volkswagen and Audi brands.

 271 Includes BMW and Mini brands.

 272 Includes Ford, Volvo, Land Rover, Jaguar, and Aston Martin. Volvo accounted for more than one- half

of Ford’s total Japanese imports.

 273 Includes Chevrolet, Cadillac, Saturn, Opel, and Saab. Opel, GM’s European brand, accounted for 43

percent, and Chevrolet, 30 percent, of GM’s total Japanese imports.

 274 Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Japan Auto Trends, vol. 6, No. 1, Mar. 2002, 

p. 7b.

 275 Data provided by Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, May 21, 2002.

57

Table 17

Japanese motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 4,492,006 4,093,148 4,154,084 4,259,872 4,289,683

Trucks 2,217,257 1,772,136 1,692,654 1,686,599 1,600,858

Buses 15,763 14,141 14,478 16,571 15,932

 Total 6,725,026 5,879,425 5,861,216 5,963,042 5,606,473

Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.japanauto.com, retrieved

Apr. 25, 2002.

Imports account for a much smaller percentage of total sales in Japan as compared to the

United States; in 2001, imports accounted for 5 percent of motor vehicle sales in Japan (table

18). However, imports from Japanese factories overseas accounted for just 7 percent of total

Japanese imports in 2000,268 indicating that, while imports are a small portion of total sales,

they are mostly made up of non-Japanese brands. German imports are most popular in Japan,

with DaimlerChrysler269 (27 percent), Volkswagen270 (24 percent), and BMW271 (16 percent)

accounting for the highest passenger car import market shares in 2001. Ford272 ranked fourth,

accounting for 13 percent of the import market, followed by GM273 with 7 percent.274 By

region, in 2001, imports from the EU accounted for 70 percent of total motor vehicle

imports, followed by North America (18 percent), Eastern Europe (5 percent), and Africa (5

percent).275

Table 18

Japanese motor vehicle unit imports, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 371,113 268,795 259,736 285,582 287,116

Trucks 3,906 1,708 1,116 1,383 1,753

Buses 73 78 57 87 74

 Total 375,092 270,581 260,909 287,052 288,943

Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.japanauto.com, retrieved

Apr. 25, 2002.
 276 Automotive News Market Data Book 2001, p. 11.

 277 International Trade Administration, “Automobile Industry.” 

 278 Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Japan Auto Trends, vol. 6, No. 1, Mar. 2002, 

p. 7b.

 279 International Trade Administration, “Automobile Industry.”

 280 For more information on the motor vehicle registration and inspection system in Japan, see

http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/inspect/car13e.html. 

 281 International Trade Administration, “Automobile Industry.” 

 282 Ibid. 

58

Quality Study, which surveys the U.S. market, Japanese nameplate vehicles finished in the

top spot in 12 of 14 passenger car and light truck categories.276 The high standards for quality

that are embraced by Japanese automakers are also embraced by the Japanese consumer, who

demands a defect-free vehicle and a high level of after-sales service from dealers.277 Japanese

consumers also prefer smaller vehicles; vehicles with an engine displacement of 2,000 cc and

less accounted for nearly 83 percent of the market in 2001. At the same time, large cars with

an engine displacement of over 2,000 cc accounted for 84 percent of total passenger car

imports.278 The price and quality competition in Japan from domestic brands is reportedly

difficult to surmount.

In general, the typical Japanese consumer purchases new vehicles as opposed to used

vehicles, keeps the vehicle mileage relatively low, and trades vehicles in after 3 to 5 years.

Therefore, Japan has approximately 8 million like-new used vehicles to sell annually; most

of these are sold throughout Asia.279 This high turnover in new vehicle purchases may be at

least partly attributable to the shaken inspection system, whereby passenger vehicles are

subject to a schedule of thorough safety inspections, the first of which occurs 3 years after

the vehicle is purchased.280 The United States has asked Japan to eliminate the shaken

system, which it views as a nontariff barrier to market access and unnecessarily burdensome

for the Japanese consumer.281

Motor vehicles are sold in Japan through nationwide dealer networks, agencies, and local

representatives; imports can come directly from manufacturers to dealers with national sales

networks, or distributors can purchase imported vehicles from importers, and then resell

them through agencies and local representatives. Unlike in the United States, dealers of

domestic brands have strong financial ties to the automakers they represent; a reported 40

percent of domestic brand dealers have long term debts with the automakers whose cars they

sell. Such financial dependence is generally not the case with import dealers.282
 283 Jindo is a manufacturer of trucks only.

 284 Joe Kohn, “The Koreans move up,” Automotive News, Sept. 3, 2001, p. 1.

 285 R. Ben Weber, “A New Hyundai for America,” Korea Insight, Korea Economic Institute, vol. 4, No. 5,

May 2002, p. 3.

59

Korea

Korea is the fourth-leading automobile producer in the world, turning out 3.7 million motor

vehicles in 2001 (table 19). Truck and bus production accounts for a comparatively large

share of motor vehicle production in Korea, reaching 13 percent in 2001. There are seven

motor vehicle manufacturers in Korea: Hyundai, Daewoo, Kia, Ssangyong, Asia Motors,

Samsung, and Jindo.283 Korea is the third-largest automobile exporter in the world, exporting

56 percent of its domestic passenger car production and 41 percent of its total motor vehicle

production (table 20). Nearly one-third of those exports is destined for the United States.

Quality improvements and competitive pricing have helped Korean automakers penetrate

overseas markets, particularly the United States.284 Korean automakers are also focusing on

designing products to meet particular consumer needs and tastes; for example, Hyundai’s

most recent entry into the U.S. passenger vehicle market, its Santa Fe SUV, is the

automaker’s first vehicle designed in the United States at Hyundai’s Los Angeles design

center.285

Table 19

Korean motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle,1

 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Passenger cars 2,308,476 1,625,125 2,361,735 2,602,008 2,471,444

Multi-purpose vehicles 216,552 195,895 466,705 721,218 755,969

Trucks 248,200 161,594 242,234 256,370 238,876

Buses 242,871 159,687 228,282 246,288 225,027

 Total 3,016,099 2,142,301 3,298,956 3,825,884 3,691,316 1 These product breakouts are the categories used by the Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association. Multipurpose vehicles include SUVs, minivans, and station wagons; ‘trucks’ would include pickup trucks, medium-duty

trucks, and heavy-duty trucks.

Source: Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.kama.or.kr/, retrieved

Apr. 25, 2002.

Table 20

Korean motor vehicle unit exports, by type of vehicle,1

 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Passenger cars 1,155,893 1,228,144 1,390,072 1,544,473 1,397,015

Trucks 53,640 43,080 39,320 47,848 35,446

Buses 107,067 89,726 78,522 83,585 67,871

 Total 1,316,600 1,360,950 1,507,914 1,675,906 1,500,332 1 The Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association does not break out multi-purpose vehicles in its export statistics;

these vehicles are accounted for in the passenger car category.

Source: Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.kama.or.kr/, retrieved

Apr. 25, 2002.
 286 Ward’s World Motor Vehicle Data 2001, various pages.

 287 Just-auto.com editorial team, “Car Imports Jump 76% to 7,747 in 2001,” Jan. 4, 2002, found at Internet

address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Jan. 4, 2002.

 288 Knibb Gormezano & Partners, “Korea - Recovery and Restructuring,” July 27, 2000, found at Internet

address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Aug. 3, 2000.

 289 CSM Worldwide, “The restructuring of the Japanese and Korean auto industries.”

60

Following years of growth, Korean automobile production experienced a sharp decline in

1998 as domestic consumption declined by roughly 50 percent following the financial crisis

(table 21). However, production rose again in 1999 to pre-crisis levels, and export sales grew

throughout the period, except for a nearly 10-percent drop in 2001. The Korean market is not

nearly as saturated as other major producing nations, with 5.9 people per passenger car in

operation, contrasted with 2.4 in Japan, 1.9 in Germany, and 2.2 in the United States.286

Table 21

Korean motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Passenger cars 1,151,287 568,063 910,725 1,057,620 1,065,161

Multi-purpose vehicles 139,275 93,554 272,506 31,958 407,678

Trucks 208,884 128,284 198,286 204,194 211,151

Buses 133,615 75,185 153,889 158,821 164,498

 Total 1,633,061 865,086 1,535,406 1,452,593 1,848,488

Source: Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, found at Internet address http://www.kama.or.kr/, retrieved

Apr. 25, 2002.

Korea is the sixth-largest motor vehicle market in the world; however, as mentioned earlier,

imports account for less than 1 percent of motor vehicle sales in Korea. Motor vehicle

imports were prohibited in Korea until 1987, and imports from Japan were only permitted

beginning in 1999. According to the Korea Automobile Importers and Distributors

Association, Korea imported 7,747 cars in 2001, accounting for 0.7 percent of the market,

up from 4,414 cars, or 0.4 percent of the market, in 2000. Passenger car imports reportedly

peaked in 1996 at 10,315 before the Asian financial crisis.287 The U.S. industry has

repeatedly cited Korea as maintaining barriers to imported motor vehicles, and the U.S.

Government negotiated two MOUs with the Korean Government in 1995 and 1998 in an

effort to address some of these structural impediments (see section of U.S. government traderelated investigations).

Many Korean passenger vehicle producers were left in poor financial positions following the

Asian financial crisis, and the industry suffered from overcapacity.288 Significant

consolidation among domestic makers and investment from foreign manufacturers has begun

to reshape the industry.289 Hyundai acquired Kia and Asia Motors in 1999, and sold a 10-

percent equity stake to DaimlerChrysler in 2000. Daewoo took a 51.98-percent equity stake

in Ssangyong in 1998, and was in the market for a new owner itself for a number of years

before finally closing a deal with GM in 2002, in which GM took a 42-percent equity
 290 The agreement, signed by GM, Daewoo Motor Company, and the Korea Development Bank,

established a new company that will own and operate selected domestic and foreign assets of Daewoo Motor

Company. Just-auto.com editorial team, “Despite protesters, GM, Daewoo and creditors finally sign deal,”

Apr. 30, 2002, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Apr. 30, 2002.

 291 CSM Worldwide, “The restructuring of the Japanese and Korean auto industries.” 

 292 Ibid.

 293 According to Canadian Auto Workers union president Buzz Hargrove. “Ste. Therese Another Blow to

CAW,” Ward’s Automotive Reports, vol. 76, No. 37, Oct. 1, 2001, p. 1.

 294 Carlos Gomes, “Canadian Auto Report,” Scotia Economics, Nov. 30, 2001, found at Internet address

http://www.scotiabank.com, retrieved Mar. 28, 2002.

 295 In late 2001, DaimlerChrysler announced that it planned to close its Thomas Built bus factory in

Ontario and the Western Star truck plant in British Columbia.

61

stake.290 Mercedes also has a 3-percent stake in Ssangyong that predates Daewoo’s. Samsung

was acquired by Renault of France in 2000. 

As in Japan, Korean automakers have traditionally offered passenger cars in each vehicle

segment, regardless of sales volumes, which was unprofitable for some automakers that were

unable to achieve economies of scale in every segment.291 Some industry observers state that

to become more efficient and competitive in domestic and foreign markets, Korean makers

must consolidate platforms internally; consolidate platforms with their foreign equity

partners; devise more efficient regional sourcing strategies; and rationalize production,

product portfolios, and supplier networks.292

Canada

Canada is the fifth-largest motor vehicle producer and market in the world. The automotive

industry accounts for as many as one in five Canadian jobs,293 and 25 percent of Canada’s

total merchandise exports.294 As noted earlier, the Canadian auto industry is highly integrated

with that of the United States. GM, Ford, and Chrysler accounted for 75 percent of passenger

car and light truck production in Canada in 2001. Other automakers with a manufacturing

presence in Canada are Honda, Toyota, and Suzuki through a joint venture with GM called

CAMI. Volvo produced the 70 Series in Halifax, Nova Scotia until 1998. With the exception

of a GM plant in Ste-Thérèse, Québec, which is slated to close in September 2002, all

Canadian passenger vehicle production is in Ontario, within relatively close proximity to

Detroit. Commercial vehicle producers in Canada include Freightliner, Navistar, Paccar, and

Western Star;295 commercial vehicle production accounts for just 1 percent of total motor

vehicle production (table 22).

Total motor vehicle production fluctuated during 1997-2001, rising to a peak in 1999 and

declining thereafter. However, sales have grown throughout the period, indicating that

imports have increased their market share (table 23). In addition to increased imports from

outside the NAFTA region, imports from Mexico increased by an annual average of nearly

15 percent during 1997-2001. U.S. exports to Canada decreased during the period (see

section on U.S. exports).
 296 Alisa Priddle, “Canada’s on a Roll,” Ward’s Auto World, Dec. 2000, p. 68.

62

Table 22

Canadian motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 1,372,588 1,481,141 1,625,113 1,550,500 1,274,853

Light trucks 1,160,823 1,040,443 1,359,380 1,364,849 1,228,785

Medium/heavy-duty trucks 36,942 48,737 61,006 46,287 28,725

 Total 2,570,353 2,570,321 3,045,499 2,961,636 2,532,363

Source: Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001; Industry Canada, Quarterly

Automotive Circular, January to December 1999; and Industry Canada, Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to

December 1998.

Table 23

Canadian passenger vehicle unit imports from outside the NAFTA region, by source, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Europe 25,246 31,429 48,542 46,561 42,859

Japan 118,501 152,222 161,447 162,194 183,031

Korea 19,762 23,355 33,722 56,420 86,746

 Total 163,509 207,006 243,711 265,175 312,636

Source: Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001; and Industry Canada,

Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to December 1998.

The Canadian market for motor vehicles grew steadily during 1997-2001, at an average

annual rate of nearly 3 percent (table 24). The strength of the market during this period is

attributable to the strong Canadian economy, as well as the fact that the fleet of passenger

vehicles in Canada is aging, spurring new replacement vehicle purchases. A reported 40

percent of the Canadian passenger vehicle fleet in 2000 was at least 10 years old.296

Table 24

Canadian motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 736,477 741,129 806,808 843,425 856,372

Light trucks 649,787 642,780 687,832 694,001 694,676

Medium/heavy-duty trucks 32,589 36,605 39,294 46,116 33,866

Buses1 1,702 1,610 2,224 1,985 2,011

 Total 1,420,555 1,422,124 1,536,158 1,585,527 1,586,925

 1 Does not include urban/intercity buses.

Source: Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001; Industry Canada, Quarterly

Automotive Circular, January to December 1999; and Industry Canada, Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to

December 1998.
 297 Bob English, “Canada ends century with second-best sales,” Automotive News, Jan. 17, 2000, 

p. 52.

 298 Priddle, “Canada’s on a Roll,” p. 68.

 299 Ibid.

 300 Carlos Gomes, “Canadian Auto Report,” Scotia Economics, April 8, 2002, found at Internet address

http://www.scotiabank.com, retrieved May 7, 2002.

 301 The compact car segment is reportedly the sales leader in Canada, as opposed to the mid-sized car

segment in the United States. Dennis DesRosiers, “Canadian MSRPs,” Oct. 12, 2000, found at Internet

address http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Jan. 29, 2001.

 302 Ibid.

 303 Dennis DesRosiers, “Auto Pact II,” DesRosiers Automotive Reports, vol. 15, Issue 3, 

Feb. 28, 2001, found at Internet address http://www.desrosiers.ca, retrieved March 28, 2002.

63

Future strength of the Canadian passenger vehicle market is predicated on a number of

observations. First, Canada is reportedly the only major world economy whose citizens

purchased fewer new passenger vehicles during the 1990s than during the 1980s, rendering

the fleet of privately owned vehicles in need of replacement.297 Second, the Canadian market

tends to shadow trends in the U.S. market by 3 years, indicating that, as U.S. sales may have

entered a downturn beginning in 2001, Canadian sales will likely continue to grow for a few

more years.298 Third, Canadian used car exports to the United States soared during the latter

half of the1990s; U.S. retailers discovered Canadian auctions as a cheap source of used

vehicles for resale in the United States, reducing the availability of used cars to Canadian

consumers.299 Finally, the strong growth of vehicle leasing during the 1990s (by 1998, 40

percent of all new vehicle transactions in Canada were lease deals) means that many

consumers with expiring leases will be returning to the market for new vehicle purchases or

leases.300

The system of taxation in Canada greatly influences the passenger vehicle market. Canadians

are subject to a much higher income tax burden, which diminishes their purchasing power.

This leads many in lower income brackets to choose used vehicles instead of new vehicles,

and gives a larger share of new vehicle sales to compact cars.301 Moreover, while MSRPs are

in fact lower in Canada than in the United States, the actual purchase price is comparable,

owing to an extensive list of unique taxes such as air conditioning taxes, tire taxes, battery

taxes, as well as taxes similar to those found in the United States, like fuel economy taxes

and luxury vehicle taxes. Industry experts estimate that the tax burden on new vehicle

purchases in Canada is as much as 12 percent more than the tax burden in the United

States.302

The close integration of the U.S. and Canadian auto industry is largely attributable to the

1965 U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Trade Agreement (Auto Pact). Auto Pact

established a ‘conditional free-trade zone’ between the United States and Canada for motor

vehicles and original equipment parts, with specified local content and other requirements.

A key feature of the agreement allowed GM, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler to import into

Canada their affiliate automakers’ vehicles from third countries; i.e., GM could import Saab,

Isuzu, and Suzuki products, Ford could import Jaguar and Volvo products, and

DaimlerChrysler could import Mercedes-Benz products free of duty.303 However, Japanese

automakers Toyota, Honda, and Suzuki, which manufacture significant numbers of vehicles

in Canada, were excluded from Auto Pact. Safeguards were negotiated as part of the Auto

Pact; important among them were specified production-to-sales ratios for both cars and light

trucks, necessitating that automakers must have both car and light truck production in
 304 Ibid.

 305 Ibid.

 306 Ibid.

 307 See World Trade Organization, “Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,

Report of the Panel,” found at http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/6100d.pdf.

 308 Former Auto Pact members Ford and DaimlerChrysler reportedly have asked Canada to institute a

program allowing ‘substitution drawbacks,’ which would allow automakers to receive credits for vehicle

exports that could be applied to the 6.1 percent ad valorem duty they incur when importing vehicles from

outside NAFTA. These companies assert that such a program would not be easily challenged in the WTO.

 309 DesRosiers, “Auto Pact II.”

 310 Ibid.

 311 Ibid.

 312 Priddle, “Canada’s on a Roll,” p. 68.

64

Canada.304 In addition, a ratio of imports to domestically produced vehicles had to be

maintained. Canadian industry observers credit safeguards with the rapid growth of the

Canadian industry during the 1970s and 1980s.305

Auto Pact was made largely redundant by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1989

(which was in turn superseded by the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994)

because it lost the ability to enforce the safeguard penalties.306 However, the provision

allowing duty-free third-country imports by Auto Pact companies remained until the WTO

ruled in 1999, in response to a case brought by the EU and Japan in 1998, that Auto Pact

violated most-favored-nation and national treatment provisions of the 1994 General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and that the third-country import duty exemption scheme

constituted an export subsidy, which is also illegal under WTO rules.307 Canada appealed the

WTO decision, which was upheld in May 2000, and was given until February 19, 2001, to

comply with the WTO ruling. Subsequently, all non-NAFTA passenger vehicle imports have

been charged the Canadian tariff rate of 6.1 percent ad valorem.308 However, because nonNAFTA imports of Auto Pact members only accounted for 1.8 percent of the market in 2000,

the effect on these companies will likely be minimal.309 In 2000, nearly 85 percent of auto

imports entered Canada free of duty.310

The Canadian automotive industry has benefitted from billions of dollars in announced

investments by GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, and Toyota during 1997-2001. In addition,

significant investments have been made in establishing or expanding upon R&D facilities

in Canada, indicating that Canada is emerging as a global powerhouse in automotive

engineering.311 According to one industry expert, automotive R&D as a Canadian industry

was virtually nonexistent in 1990; by 2000 there were between 2,000 and 3,000 automotive

engineers working in Canada, and by 2005, this number could expand to as many as

10,000.312
 313 Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, Jan.-Dec. 2001, pp. 29-30.

 314 Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, Jan.-Dec. 2001, p. 29.

 315 Dina closed its doors in late 2001 in response to severe financial problems and the downturn in the

North American truck market. The company hopes to re-emerge when the market turns around. Reuters,

“Grupo Dina goes into hibernation,” Oct. 5, 2001, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com

retrieved Oct. 5, 2001.

 316 Just-auto.com editorial team, “Turbulence roils in the automotive industry in Latin America: Mexico,

Brazil, and Argentina, 1995-2005,” May 8, 2001, found at Internet address http://www.just-auto.com,

retrieved Apr. 26, 2002.

65

Mexico

Mexico is the sixth-largest motor vehicle producer in the world and the tenth-largest market.

As with Canada, the Mexican motor vehicle industry is highly integrated with that of the

United States, and is composed almost entirely of subsidiaries of foreign manufacturers that

determine the local product mix and local production levels as part of their global vehicle

manufacturing strategies. Volkswagen is the leading passenger car producer in Mexico,

accounting for 38 percent of Mexican car production in 2001; however, counting passenger

cars and light trucks together, the leading producer is GM (24 percent), followed closely by

DaimlerChrysler (23 percent). Volkswagen, Nissan, and Ford rank third, fourth, and fifth,

respectively.313 Other manufacturers of passenger cars and light trucks in Mexico include

BMW, Honda, and Renault.314 Medium- and heavy-duty truck vehicle assemblers in Mexico

include GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler (Freightliner and Mercedes-Benz brands), Paccar

(Kenworth brand), Navistar, Oshkosh, Scania, and Dina, a traditionally Mexican motor

vehicle company.315 Bus makers in Mexico include Dina, Mexicana de Autobuses (owned

by Volvo since 1998), and Scania. As in the United States, commercial vehicles account for

approximately 3 percent of total motor vehicle production in Mexico.

Although commercial vehicle production has fluctuated widely throughout the period,

passenger vehicle production grew strongly during 1997-2000, before dipping slightly in

2001 (table 25). Passenger vehicle production increased during 1997-2001 by an average

annual rate of 8 percent. Passenger cars accounted for 55 percent, and light trucks, 45

percent, of Mexican passenger vehicle production in 2001. The Mexican industry grew

significantly during the latter half of the 1990s partly as a result of the complete elimination

of U.S. tariffs on trucks originating in Mexico in 1998 and the strong growth in the U.S.

passenger vehicle market.316

Table 25

Mexican motor vehicle unit production, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 854,818 956,354 992,140 1,130,488 1,000,633

Light trucks 477,337 444,573 451,331 737,773 807,144

Medium/heavy-duty trucks 22,454 58,964 87,357 54,628 49,255

 Total 1,354,609 1,459,891 1,530,828 1,922,889 1,857,032

Source: Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001; Industry Canada, Quarterly

Automotive Circular, January to December 1999; and Industry Canada, Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to

December 1998.
 317 Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001, pp. 29-30; and

Industry Canada, Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to December 1998, pp. 22-23.

 318 Brian Corbett, Drew Winter, and Katherine Zachary, “Ay Caramba! Mexico is heading into the

automotive big leagues,” Ward’s Auto World, May 2000, p. 50.

 319 Ibid.

66

A very high percentage of Mexican passenger vehicle production is for export, mostly to the

United States. In 2001, 65 percent of passenger cars and 90 percent of light trucks were

exported (table 26). In 1997, these percentages were 70 and 81, respectively. By contrast,

only 35 percent of the medium- and heavy-duty trucks produced in 2001 were for export.317

Table 26

Mexican motor vehicle unit exports, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 593,086 600,696 675,953 787,478 651,060

Light trucks 386,705 352,491 356,814 630,946 729,907

Medium/heavy-duty trucks 64 30,888 44,170 16,247 17,457

 Total 979,855 984,075 1,076,937 1,434,671 1,398,424

Source: Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001; Industry Canada, Quarterly

Automotive Circular, January to December 1999; and Industry Canada, Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to

December 1998.

The Mexican automotive industry emerged from the country’s 1995 economic crisis in a

strong competitive position. Because of its strategic geographic location, level of

manufacturing competence, and existing automotive manufacturing infrastructure, Mexico

was chosen as the lead North American assembly site for numerous key new vehicle

programs, including DaimlerChrysler’s PT Cruiser, which was originally sole-sourced for

global distribution from Toluca; the new Volkswagen Beetle, which is sole-sourced from

Puebla; and the Ford Focus, for which Hermosillo was chosen as one of only two North

American production sites. In addition, GM launched the Pontiac Aztek, Buick Rendezvous,

and new Suburban/Yukon XL in Mexico; and Aguascalientes was chosen as the sole North

American source for Nissan’s redesigned 2001 Sentra.318 The Mexican industry has

demonstrated significant improvements in labor productivity, product quality, and

competitiveness in recent years. Vehicle quality is reportedly on par with vehicles built in

the United States or Canada, and some industry observers report that despite extensive

reliance on manual labor, many Mexican plants have better labor productivity than

comparable U.S. and Canadian plants.319

The Mexican motor vehicle market has grown steadily during 1997-2001, with total motor

vehicle sales growing by an average annual rate of 17 percent (table 27). Although light

trucks have accounted for ever larger portions of U.S. sales in recent years, passenger car

sales have increased significantly in Mexico, while the light truck market continues to be

influenced more by factors associated with commercial vehicle sales. Passenger car sales in

Mexico increased by an average annual rate of 22 percent during 1997-2001, while light

truck sales grew by a more modest 8 percent. 
 320 Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001, p. 13.

 321 Automotive World, “Mexico the land of the Aztecs offers a promising future for vehicle

manufacturers,” Oct. 9, 2001, found at http://www.just-auto.com, retrieved Oct. 10, 2001.

 322 Ibid.

67

Table 27

Mexican motor vehicle unit sales, by type of vehicle, 1997-2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 303,558 430,199 465,063 599,285 667,566

Light trucks 182,198 211,817 213,592 266,425 244,842

Medium/heavy-duty trucks 16,903 23,368 27,487 36,662 30,086

 Total 502,659 665,384 706,142 902,372 942,494

Source: Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001; Industry Canada, Quarterly

Automotive Circular, January to December 1999; Industry Canada, Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to

December 1998.

Imports from outside the NAFTA region accounted for 29 percent of total passenger car

sales in Mexico in 2001, up steeply from just 2 percent in 1997 (table 28). Imports of light

trucks accounted for 14 percent of total light truck sales in 2001. For passenger cars and light

trucks combined, the leading non-NAFTA import sources were South America

(40 percent of non-NAFTA imports); Europe (36 percent); Korea (10 percent); and Japan

(4 percent).320

Table 28

Mexican passenger vehicle unit imports from outside the NAFTA region, by type of vehicle, 1997-

2001

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Cars 6,732 27,560 55,490 139,487 188,602

Light trucks 7,499 10,341 15,885 27,382 34,540

 Total 14,231 37,901 71,375 166,869 223,142

Source: Industry Canada, Semi-Annual Automotive Circular, January to December 2001; and Industry Canada,

Quarterly Automotive Circular, January to December 1999.

The pace at which non-NAFTA import penetration of the Mexican market has grown can be

at least partly attributed to Mexico’s bilateral trade agreements with numerous

countries/regions,321 including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa Rica,

Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Israel, the EU, EFTA, and Singapore. In late

2001, Mexico and Panama resumed FTA talks; an agreement with Panama would provide

Mexico with free-trade status with all of Central America. These agreements have also

increased the attractiveness of Mexico as a production site;322 the country has received

billions of dollars of investment in recent years. 

APPENDIX A

TARIFF AND TRADE AGREEMENT

TERMS
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TARIFF AND TRADE AGREEMENT

TERMS

In the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS), chapters 1through 97 cover

all goods in trade and incorporate in the tariff nomenclature the internationally adopted

Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System through the 6-digit level of product

description. Subordinate 8-digit product subdivisions, either enacted by Congress or

proclaimed by the President, allow more narrowly applicable duty rates; 10-digit

administrative statistical reporting numbers provide data of national interest. Chapters 98 and

99 contain special U.S. classifications and temporary rate provisions, respectively. The HTS

replaced the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) effective January 1, 1989.

Duty rates in the general subcolumn of HTS column 1 are normal trade relations rates; many

general rates have been eliminated or are being reduced due to concessions resulting from

the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Column 1-general duty rates apply

to all countries except those listed in HTS general note 3(b) (Cuba, Laos, and North Korea)

plus Serbia and Montenegro, which are subject to the statutory rates set forth in column 2.

Specified goods from designated general-rate countries may be eligible for reduced rates of

duty or duty-free entry under preferential tariff programs, as set forth in the special

subcolumn of HTS rate of duty column 1 or in the general notes. If eligibility for special

tariff rates is not claimed or established, goods are dutiable at column 1-general rates. The

HTS does not list countries covered by a total or partial embargo.

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) affords nonreciprocal tariff preferences to

designated beneficiary developing countries. The U.S. GSP, enacted in title V of the Trade

Act of 1974 for 10 years and extended several times thereafter, applies to merchandise

imported on or after January 1, 1976, and before the close of December 31, 2006. Indicated

by the symbol "A", "A*", or "A+" in the special subcolumn, GSP provides duty-free entry

to eligible articles the product of and imported directly from designated beneficiary

developing countries (see HTS gen. note 4). Eligible products of listed sub-Saharan African

countries may qualify for duty-free entry under the African Growth and Opportunity Act

(AGOA) (see HTS gen. note 16) through September 30, 2008, as indicated by the symbol

“D” in the special subcolumn; see subchapter XIX of chapter 98.

The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) affords nonreciprocal tariff

preferences to designated Caribbean Basin developing countries. The CBERA, enacted in

title II of Public Law 98-67, implemented by Presidential Proclamation 5133 of November

30, 1983, and amended by the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, applies to goods entered, or

withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after January 1, 1984. Indicated by the

symbol "E" or "E*" in the special subcolumn, CBERA provides duty-free entry to eligible

articles, and reduced-duty treatment to certain other articles, which are the product of and

imported directly from designated countries (see HTS gen. note 7). Eligible products of

listed beneficiary countries may qualify for duty-free or reduced-duty entry under the

Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) (see HTS gen. note 17), through

September 30, 2008, as indicated by the symbol “R” in the special subcolumn; see

subchapter XX of chapter 98.
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Free rates of duty in the special subcolumn followed by the symbol "IL" are applicable to

products of Israel under the United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of

1985 (IFTA), as provided in general note 8 to the HTS; see also subchapter VIII of chapter

99. 

Preferential nonreciprocal duty-free treatment in the special subcolumn followed by the

symbol "J" or "J*" in parentheses is afforded to eligible articles from designated beneficiary

countries under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), enacted as title II of Public Law

102-182 (effective July 22, 1992; see HTS gen. note 11) and renewed through December 31,

2006, by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002.

Preferential free rates of duty in the special subcolumn followed by the symbol "CA" are

applicable to eligible goods of Canada, and rates followed by the symbol "MX" are

applicable to eligible goods of Mexico, under the North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA), as provided in general note 12 to the HTS and implemented effective January 1,

1994, by Presidential Proclamation 6641 of December 15, 1993. Goods must originate in

the NAFTA region under rules set forth in general note 12(t) and meet other requirements

of the note and applicable regulations.

Preferential rates of duty in the special subcolumn followed by the symbol “JO” are

applicable to eligible goods of Jordan under the United States-Jordan Free Trade Area

Implementation Act, (JFTA) effective as of Dec. 17, 2001; see HTS gen. note 18 and

subchapter IX of chapter 99.

Other special tariff treatment applies to particular products of insular possessions (gen. note

3(a)(iv)), products of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (gen. note 3(a)(v)), goods covered by

the Automotive Products Trade Act (APTA) (gen. note 5) and the Agreement on Trade in

Civil Aircraft (ATCA) (gen. note 6), articles imported from freely associated states (gen.

note 10), pharmaceutical products (gen. note 13), and intermediate chemicals for dyes (gen.

note 14).

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), pursuant to the

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, is based upon the earlier GATT 1947

(61 Stat. (pt. 5) A58; 8 UST (pt. 2) 1786) as the primary multilateral system of discipline and

principles governing international trade. The agreements mandate most-favored-nation

treatment, maintenance of scheduled concession rates of duty, and national treatment for

imported goods; GATT provides the legal framework for customs valuation standards,

"escape clause" (emergency) actions, antidumping and countervailing duties, dispute

settlement, and other measures. Results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral tariff

negotiations are set forth in separate schedules of concessions for each participating

contracting party, with the U.S. schedule designated as Schedule XX. Pursuant to the

Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) of the GATT 1994, member countries are

phasing out restrictions on imports under the prior "Arrangement Regarding International

Trade in Textiles" (known as the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA)). Under the MFA, a

departure from GATT 1947 provisions, importing and exporting countries negotiated

bilateral agreements limiting textile and apparel shipments, and importing countries could

take unilateral action to control shipments. Quantitative limits were established on textiles
A-4

and apparel of cotton, other vegetable fibers, wool, man-made fibers or silk blends in an

effort to prevent or limit market disruption in the importing countries. The ATC establishes

notification and safeguard procedures, along with other rules concerning the customs

treatment of textile and apparel shipments, and calls for the eventual complete integration

of this sector into the GATT 1994 and the phase-out of quotas over a ten-year period, or by

Jan. 1, 2005.