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38–706 2007

GAO BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF THE 

INVESTIGATION INTO THE FL–13 CONGRESSIONAL 

DISTRICT ELECTION 

MEETING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 

ADMINISTRATION 

TASK FORCE FOR THE CONTESTED ELECTION IN 

THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MEETING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 2, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/administration/index.html 


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COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ZOE LOFGREN, California, 

Vice-Chairwoman 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

SUSAN DAVIS, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan, 

Ranking Minority Member 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

KEVIN MCCARTHY, California 

S. ELIZABETH BIRNBAUM, Staff Director 

WILLIAM PLASTER, Minority Staff Director 

TASK FORCE FOR THE CONTESTED ELECTION IN THE 13TH CONGRESSIONAL

DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas, Chairman 

ZOE LOFGREN, California KEVIN MCCARTHY, California 


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GAO BRIEFING ON THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE FL–13 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT CONTESTED ELECTION 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2007 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

TASK FORCE ON FLORIDA–13, 

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 4:05 p.m., in Room 1310, 

Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Charles A. Gonzalez [chairman of the task force] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Gonzalez, Lofgren, McCarthy, Ehlers, 

and Lungren. 

Staff Present: Thomas Hicks, Senior Election Counsel; Janelle 

Hu, Election Counsel; Jennifer Daehn, Election Counsel; Matt 

Pinkus, Professional Staff Member/Parliamentarian; Kristin 

McCowan, Chief Legislative Clerk; Daniel Favarulo, Staff Assistant; Matthew DeFreitas, Staff Assistant; Kyle Anderson, Press Director; Gineen Beach, Minority Counsel; and Bryan Dorsey, Minority Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I am going to call the meeting of the Task Force 

on Florida–13—this is a public meeting, of course, and it is going 

to be called to order. 

The record will reflect that I am Charles Gonzalez, and I am the 

chairman of the task force. And I am joined today by another member of the task force, Kevin McCarthy, a Congressman from California. And we have also Dan Lungren, who is not officially a member of the task force but has attended different meetings and hearings that we have had, and briefings. Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, 

the third member of the task force, is delayed presently but will 

be joining us. 

Recognizing that we are probably going to have votes in about 30 

minutes, we are going to try to get as much done as possible today. 

The witnesses that we have here—and I believe we may be hearing 

from all three if necessary, but I will start with the easier names. 

And that is going to be Jan Montgomery and Gloria Jarmon, and 

then we have Dr. Naba Barkakati, which is pretty good after all 

this time. Because I believe it is going to be Dr. Barkakati that is 

going to actually be making the report. 

By way of background, we had a briefing last week. A draft report was being prepared. It had to be vetted, basically, if you want 

to call it that, or presented to ES&S, the manufacturer of the voting machines in question, as well as Florida election officials, for 


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their input, their comments and so on. My understanding is that 

has been completed, and today GAO will be making a report to us 

that should answer the question about whether there is a need for 

further testing. 

And with that, I will turn it over to the GAO representatives. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. If we could hold on—— 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Sorry. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. And I am sorry. 

I apologize to Congressman McCarthy. If any Member wishes to 

make an opening statement, we can do so at the present time. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. I thank Chairman Gonzalez. 

Today’s public hearing will analyze the GAO’s report that summarizes the investigation of the Florida-13 congressional election 

that took place almost a year ago between Congressman Buchanan 

and Ms. Jennings. 

I thank our witnesses for returning to publicly report their findings thus far and for their continued cooperation to keep the task 

force informed and to brief members last week. 

I am pleased that all parties are working well together. In what 

could be a contentious struggle to get information from the courts, 

the state, the vendors and experts, the GAO has received cooperation from all parties as it has gone over studies that have already 

been done and as it has formulated plans of further studies, 

checked protocols and rechecked protocols. 

The results of this investigation thus far seems to clearly point 

that there is no smoking gun, no evidence that the voting system 

would have caused the undervote, a conclusion similar to what 

Sarasota County, the State of Florida and the independent teams 

of experts have already derived. 

Right now, based upon GAO’s findings, we seem to be nearing 

the conclusion of this contested election so that GAO can corroborate its findings with reasonable certainty on what it has found 

thus far, and that there is no evidence that voting systems caused 

undervotes and that the undervotes could instead have occurred 

because voters intentionally undervoted or did not properly cast 

their ballots, perhaps due to the ballot design. 

The GAO is recommending that it conduct a few additional tests. 

I credit the GAO with its professional undertaking of this very difficult responsibility in response to the task force’s request. I agree 

with the GAO recommendations to move forward with those additional tests so it can make its eventual recommendation with the 

reasonable certainty and finally put to rest for the people of the 

13th District of Florida the challenge against Congressman Vern 

Buchanan. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Mr. McCarthy follows:] 


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Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Congressman McCarthy. 

And at this time, we will turn it over to the witnesses. 

STATEMENT OF MR. NABAJYOTI BARKAKATI, SENIOR-LEVEL 

TECHNOLOGIST, APPLIED RESEARCH AND METHODS, U.S. 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the task force, I am here today to 

present our findings regarding the Florida–13 review. 

Thanks in large part to the task force’s continued support, we 

have had good cooperation from all parties involved, and we have 

been able to access all the information we needed to study whether 

the voting systems contributed to the undervote in the Florida–13 

race in Sarasota County’s 2006 general election. 

In that election, Sarasota County used ES&S voting systems, 

specifically the Unity Election Management System and 1,499 

iVotronic direct recording electronic, DRE, touchscreen machines, 

during the early voting and Election Day voting days. 

Our independent analysis of the 2006 general election data from 

the county, Sarasota County, confirmed the unusually large number of undervotes there in the Florida-13 race, and we found that 

the undervotes were generally distributed across all precincts and 

all machines. 

We found that the prior reviews and testing provided reasonable 

assurance that the Unity Election Management System did not 

contribute to the undervote, and the votes captured by the 

iVotronic DREs within the precincts matched the voter count from 

the precinct registers within an acceptable range of errors. 

However, these tests do not provide enough information to determine whether the iVotronics contributed to the undervote or not. 

The firmware comparison and parallel tests, which were done as 

part of Florida State’s audit of the Sarasota County elections, provided useful information, but the results could not be applied to all 

iVotronics because the number machines that were tested was 

small. Additionally, the machines were not tested for all the different ways that the voter could have cast votes using the machines—a feature of an iVotronic machine. We also did not find 

prior testing of what happens when a touchscreen is deliberately 

miscalibrated. 

To address these issues, we are proposing three tests: a firmware 

verification test; a ballot test; and a calibration test, which should 

be conducted to try to obtain further assurance that the iVotronic 

DREs used in the Sarasota County elections did not cause the 

undervote. 

The proposed firmware verification test is similar to the one that 

was conducted by Florida State on six machines, but, in this case, 

we are conducting on a larger population. It is going to test a representative sample of iVotronic DREs and compare its installed 

firmware with the certified version. 

The ballot test is going to exercise the different ways of casting 

ballots, selecting candidates and casting a vote on 10 iVotronic 

DREs. 

The calibration test would deliberately miscalibrate an iVotronic 

DRE and then test it to verify whether it works properly. 


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We estimate that all three tests would take 2 weeks using a staff 

of about six to eight people, once we have made all the arrangements necessary for the tests. 

Should the task force ask GAO to conduct these tests, several 

matters need to be addressed before the testing could begin. We 

would need to obtain access to the machines that are currently sequestered under a court order. We have to arrange for a test site, 

obtain some tools that are needed for firmware verification tests, 

develop the test protocols and test procedures, and arrange for a 

video recording of the test. 

Sarasota County election officials have told us that, working 

around their current election schedule, they can help GAO access 

the machines and provide a test site between November 26 and December 7, 2007. 

Before I conclude, I should mention that we recognize that 

human interaction with the ballot layout could have been a potential cause of the undervote. And although we have not explored this 

issue in our review, we note that there is an ongoing academic 

study that is exploring this issue using machines from ES&S, the 

same manufacturer. We believe that such experiments could be 

useful and could provide insight into the ballot layout issue. 

We also noted that there are several suggestions which have 

been offered as possible ways to establish that the voters are intentionally undervoting and the machines are not causing the 

undervote. 

First, a voter-verified paper trail could provide an independent 

confirmation that the touchscreen machines did not malfunction in 

recording and counting the votes. 

Second, providing explicit feedback of the undervote and requiring positive verification before casting the ballot with an undervote 

might just prevent many voters from unintentionally undervoting. 

And third and finally, offering a ‘‘none of the above’’ option in a 

race could provide the voters with an option that enables them to 

indicate that they are intentionally undervoting. 

However, we emphasize that any decision about these or other 

suggestions about ballot layout or things related to the voting system functions should be informed by human-factors studies that assess their effectiveness in accurately recording the voters’ intentions and making the voting systems easier to use and preventing 

unintentional undervotes. 

In conclusion, the prior tests and reviews of the Sarasota County 

2006 election have provided valuable information about their voting systems. Our review has found that, in many cases, we could 

rely on those results—on that information to eliminate areas of 

concern. This has allowed us to identify the areas where increased 

assurances are needed to answer the questions being raised. Accordingly, the primary focus of the tests we are proposing is to obtain reasonable assurance that the results of prior reviews, as well 

as our proposed tests, could be applied to all the iVotronic DREs 

that were used in the 2006 election. 

However, even after completing all the proposed tests, we would 

not be able to provide absolute assurance that the iVotronics did 

not play any role in the large undervote because we are unable to 

recreate the exact conditions of the election in 2006. 


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By successfully conducting the tests, however, we are going to be 

able to reduce the possibility that the machines were the reason of 

the undervote and shift attention to the other possibilities that the 

voters either intentionally undervoted or did not properly cast their 

ballot on the iVotronic, potentially because of issues related to the 

interaction between the voter and the ballot. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes the summary of my written statement. I would be happy to respond to questions at this time from 

you and other Members of the task force. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Barkakati follows:] 


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Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

I have been informed that Congresswoman Lofgren may not be 

able to make it back before the recorded votes. It would be my intention, then, that we would be recessing once we are called for 

votes if we still have business going on and then reconvening. I 

apologize. But Zoe’s—obviously, there are other pieces of legislation. She is meeting with leadership, and she is actually with the 

Speaker, as we speak. 

But a couple things, Doctor, let me ask you on some of the things 

that are kind of, you know, reasonably understandable by the lay 

person. 

You are going to be conducting tests on a greater number of machines than were used in the previous testing. Is that correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. I didn’t mention specifically, but the number always depends on the level of confidence they want and the 

error you are going to tolerate. 

And if you want to conclude at a 99 percent confidence level that, 

at the most, 4 percent of the machines may have different software, 

then you have to test 115, according to our statisticians, you have 

to test 115 machines, which would be selected out of the ones that 

are sequestered as well as the ones that have been used since the 

2006 election. And that is what we are proposing, 115 machines to 

test. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. As opposed to how many that were tested previously? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. There were six machines that were tested in 

Florida State’s audit. And that was the point that statisticians 

made, that it was an insufficient number to conclude that the results could apply to all the machines. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. The other thing you pointed out was also the different options or variations that could actually occur in voting in 

the Florida–13. I believe that there are over 100 variations; is that 

correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. The reason for looking through all the variations is that we are trying to use the machine’s features in determining how many ways you could go back and change your vote 

and, you know, maybe confirm what you have done and then vote. 

Because of the ways you can do so, by paging back, because there 

are multiple pages of ballots, and you can go from the review 

screen where you see the summary and can touch and go back— 

because of those combinations, it comes out to be 112 for a simple, 

like, 2-person race, where you are having to consider many different ways of going back and forth. And that is the reason we 

have 112 ways we determined that we should be testing. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. And you are going to use how many variations? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. We are going to use all those 112 ways of selecting a candidate and casting a ballot. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. And how many were used in the testing? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. In the previous tests, we had 10 ways of combinations that were used in the Florida State audit. And then the 

normal testing of candidates verifies three ways, which is like each 

candidate and an undervote. So those three ways were covered. So 

13 ways were covered by previous tests. 


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But I should emphasize that we are not putting as much—that 

is not the biggest item. More important to ask was the confirmation of the firmware, that every machine is running the same software. That was the important part. And then this is another additional assurance to confirm the proper working of the machine. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Okay. 

And I wish to acknowledge that we have been joined by Congressman Ehlers, who is the ranking member of the full committee. 

Welcome, Congressman. 

The other thing that was of concern and I think we have touched 

on in the past—of course, time is always of the essence when we 

have these contests. I think we all agree on that. But we wanted 

to do this in a very orderly manner. It is somewhat disturbing that 

we would not be able to actually conclude some of this testing until 

late November, early December. 

My understanding is the reason that we would do that is that 

is the only time that the Florida officials would be available to assist you. To try to do it any other way actually may even prolong 

it. In other words, if we assume responsibility for the premises, the 

security of the premises, the sequestered machines, rather than the 

present situation where everybody in Florida is duly acknowledged 

and authorized to maintain that kind of control, to do it any other 

way would probably even extend it beyond November 26 through 

the first week of December. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. That is true. We had considered based on the 

task force’s need for doing it faster, and we also concluded that it 

would be hard to get it done any other way because of all the reasons that you cited. And what they had told us is that if we cannot 

do it within that 2-week time period, then it could be as late as 

in February because of other primaries coming up for the presidential election. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Okay. So we are faced with the situation that November 26 may be the earliest. And that is a window of opportunity. And I will tell you now that we need to take advantage of 

that opportunity and in no way wait until 2008. 

At this time, I will recognize my colleague, Congressman McCarthy. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just ask that 

we could keep this ratio in the full committee as well. [Laughter.] 

Let me just touch on a few—and I appreciate the help. Now, you 

have looked at the reports that Sarasota, the reports that Florida 

has done, and the reports of the experts. Have you found anything 

in those reports in your testing that doesn’t conclude what they 

have said? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. No, we didn’t find anything—we didn’t find anything that concluded anything different from what they have already concluded. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Okay. And if I understand correctly, you have 

some assurance already, and to take it to 99 percent assurance 

would take 115 machines? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. And of those machines that you tested, were all 

those machines used in the election? 


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Mr. BARKAKATI. Oh, no, I am sorry. We have not tested any machines yet. What we are proposing is that we would test 115 machines. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. I thought you said six machines were tested. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Oh, I am sorry. Yeah, you are right. Those six 

machines were tested by Florida State during their audit. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. And those were used in the election? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. They were. Those six machines were—I think 

they were used in the election maybe—— 

Mr. MCCARTHY. And in the precinct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I don’t know precisely. At least some of them 

were used. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. It is my understanding those six were used in 

this congressional election in those precincts. And you found nothing wrong with these? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. No. Those tests didn’t find anything wrong. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. All right. So if the 115 machines give you 99 

percent assurance, where are you currently in your assurance of 

nothing going wrong? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. The statisticians, I mean, we didn’t ask them to 

calculate it with the six machines tested. That is going to be pretty 

low, though, you know, in terms of statistical terms, it will be very 

low assurance that all the population of machines are running the 

same software. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. So you just want to have that reasonable assurance? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Right. I mean, we wanted—— 

Mr. MCCARTHY. You wanted to be at absolute? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. We could probably get back to you with the 

number. But that would be, honestly speaking, quite low, I mean, 

in the tens or less probably. But for 99 percent assurance that all 

the machines are running—see, we are kind of running into the situation that we don’t know if all the machines are the same or not, 

even though there is no reason to say they are not the same. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Of this that you have already tested, has there 

been any smoking gun or any signs that would drive you to look 

at something else? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. No. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Okay. So you have some assurance already. The 

ballot design, does that move up on the list of maybe the outcome 

of what has caused this? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Actually, we were trying to say it in this manner. If we did the tests of the 115 machines and there was nothing 

found in the ones we are proposing, then definitely the remaining 

next cause, only remaining cause would be—after all, voters can intentionally do it. That is a different issue. Then unintentionally 

missing it because of ballot layout is the prominent reason, probably, remaining at that point. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I keep seeing, with the testing that we 

have done, the county did the testing, the State did the testing, 

brought in the independents, and now you have done so much that 

you come back all with the same answer, the assurance. And then 

we are going to go one more. 


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Just for the voters of the 13th, so far everything that was said 

on Election Day has come true. Would this be the end of this? 

Would we be able to tell the voters then—I guess right now we can 

tell them we have reasonable assurance that, yes, the outcome is 

true—that we would be able to say, yes, the outcome is totally true. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I think, actually, after we finish the tests we 

proposed, then we can say that we have a reasonable assurance 

that the machines did not probably cause the undervote. At that 

point, we can make the statement, because then we have tested it. 

Right now, our problem is that we—basically, the sticking point is 

that we don’t know if all the machines are truly—— 

Mr. MCCARTHY. We want to get to the highest percentage so we 

can say we are at 99 percent. We can never get to 100. But we just 

want to reaffirm what we already found out from our testing. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. To be able to apply the results we know so 

far, which have been showing that the machine hasn’t caused anything. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. So we just want to jump through the next hoop 

to reassure what we already know. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. The problem we are running into—the statisticians tell us that, with the six machines tested, I could not say that 

we have reasonable assurance yet. We are getting that after we 

have finished the 115 machines. Then we can say that all the tests 

that were done so far tell us now that we are very much certain 

that they are—— 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that I would support to do this further testing. But I would like to come to a conclusion. And I know we have an assurance so far. And I will go to the 

99 percent, but I don’t want to carry it on 2 years until the next 

election. 

I yield back. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. McCarthy. I know 

there is only a certain degree of, again, certainty that we can arrive 

at. But I understand what you are saying. 

At this time, does anyone else wish to be recognized? 

Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You may have already answered this, but let me just get this correct. If you do the test that you are asking the task force to permit 

you to do, you can then come back with your results and say that 

you have reached a reasonable assurance that either the machines 

did malfunction or did not malfunction? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. We will be able to say it at that point. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. If you say that, is there a possibility you 

would ask for further tests? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. No. I mean, we have—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. We can never say that we considered all possible 

tests by the machine. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I understand that. But I just want to make sure 

that, from your standpoint, you are telling us if the task force 

okays the testing, when you finish that, you will be able to give us 

what you call a, quote/unquote, ‘‘reasonable assurance’’ level conclusions? 


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Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Now, here is the question I got. On page 

15 of the draft that we had received, you explain the justification 

for one of the three additional tests you are proposing, which expanded the number of ways a voter could select the candidate in 

the congressional race from the 13 tests to the 112. 

Now, see if I have got this right. To get to the 112 ways a voter 

could choose a candidate, it appears the voters would have to cast 

and change their votes in this race four times. Now, just to an average person or even someone who has been involved in politics a 

long time, both as a candidate and as a voter, changing your vote 

in a single race four times would seem highly unusual, to say the 

least. But your report says that the 112 permutations would compile the expected forms of voter behavior. 

What I am trying to understand is, how is that within the universe of the expected forms of voter behavior? I would call that 

aberrate behavior, unusual behavior, something that, if I saw it, 

would either send up a red flag or I would say, ‘‘That is so unusual, 

I wouldn’t expect to see it again.’’ 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Actually, I should say that those 112 include all 

the combinations. Of course, one person doing—I mean, there are 

some that are like—we have eliminated some that wouldn’t make 

any sense. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I am trying to understand. Am I reading it correctly? Is that what the report said? You would have to change 

your vote in this race four times to come to that—— 

Mr. BARKAKATI. The combinations include everything from single, one selection to changing once to other combinations of changing, going forward, coming back and changing. So it is a combination of all of them coming out to be 112. 

To get to the 112, you do include some what might seem like odd 

behavior. But the counts come up because it includes everything 

from simple to complicated ones. 

And the assumption is, if you did not know anything about the 

machine, then you are trying to make it do all the stuff that it can 

do, to confirm that it works under all those circumstances. And 

that was the reason for picking that. 

I mean, in some ways, because you have to realize that 112 ballots can be cast within about 1 day basically, so we thought that 

is a good test to exercise the machine. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Sure. You are making sure you take the whole 

universe in of possible voter behavior, it would seem to me, rather 

than just expected forms. 

Let me ask you this, and I didn’t quite understand what you 

were saying about, you call it, ballot layout. I have heard the expression, ‘‘ballot design.’’ Nothing you are doing goes to the question of ballot design or ballot layout, is that correct, in your tests? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I should qualify it in this way. The machine that 

we are testing is loaded with the ballot that was used in the 2006 

election. So in that sense, it has the layout that is there. We are 

testing that. 

But the human interaction, the voters’ reaction to the ballot, is 

not something we have tested or have proposed right now. And 


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which is why we kind of ended up saying that, if we do this, the 

machine could be eliminated as the reason, but—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Machines would be eliminated. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yeah, but the voters—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. I just wanted to make sure that is what you 

were talking about. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. You are welcome. 

Mr. Ehlers, do you have any questions? 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few. 

As a scientist, I am a little worried about the terms used here: 

partial assurance, absolute assurance, increased assurance and so 

forth. 

When you have concluded the next set of tests, will you be able 

to express that in terms of a percentage likelihood, rather than the 

nondescriptive terms or nonquantitative terms you used? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yeah, I think we will be able to do the statistical 

sample of the machine in the primary comparison. That part we 

can definitely do in a quantifiable way. 

And as far as our statisticians, the next part depends on the 

logic, which says that machines that run the same software would 

behave the same way. If you accept that logic, then we can extend 

it to that level, that, yes, that will be quantifiable. 

And if it is not quantifiable, what we are saying is that our reasonable assurance is that machines do not cause—you know, it is 

not 100 percent, but with some very high degree of certainty, the 

machine did not cause the problem. That would be our—— 

Mr. EHLERS. Well, you talk about your assurance now. What 

would you guess is your percentage assurance now that—— 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I should really not probably guess because—I 

should have asked our statisticians to calculate that. They would 

be able to tell with the sample of six what the percentage would 

be. Unfortunately I shouldn’t say. I mean, I know it is low because 

they said, ‘‘Oh, that is not good enough.’’ But I wouldn’t quantify 

it. At this point, I don’t know statistically. 

Mr. EHLERS. What concerns me a little is we keep going by 

iteration, and we may end up with a 99 percent assurance. Are you 

going to come back and say, ‘‘Well, we should do a few more tests 

and maybe we can get it at 99.5’’? Where are you going to draw 

the line? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Actually, we did pick the 99 percent confidence 

level based on the sample size we could test in a reasonable 

amount of time. And even though we are cautious in how we 

present our results and everything in a very careful way, we do expect that that will give us what we might call reasonable assurance. 

And like I said, at that point, we can say that no more than 4 

percent of the machines could have had any problem, you know, essentially. That only gives you an error level of 4 percent, unfortunately. That is how it goes. 

Mr. EHLERS. Okay. But our decision here is basically whether 

Mr. Buchanan remains seated as the Congressman or he does not. 

And you have to have—the evidence for saying that he is not has 

to be very, very strong. In other words, you may be talking about 


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a 99 percent assurance that the machines worked right, but if you 

are trying to show the other—or anyone is trying to show that he 

should not be seated, that Ms. Jennings had won, there has to be 

a very high probability in her favor. 

What I am getting at is it appears, what you have so far, there 

is no probability that, given the evidence you have—or very low 

probability that she was the actual winner. And it is a much higher 

probability that he is the winner. Is that correct? 

Mr. BARKAKATI. I think after we finish our proposed testing, that 

will be certainly the indication, that the machines were—I mean, 

if your decision is based on the machines’ performance, whether it 

is working or not working, it is most likely that everything succeeds, then we conclude the machines were not the problem. And 

then it will be up to the task force to decide how to use that knowledge, I think. 

Mr. EHLERS. Okay. Then we get into issues of ballot design, 

human behavior and so forth. 

Mr. BARKAKATI. Yes. 

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you, Mr. Ehlers. 

We have to make it real clear, the GAO are really evidence-gatherers for us, and then we will make those determinations. 

But I do want to point out that, when we tasked GAO as to exactly what they were going to be doing, we were very clear that, 

in the final analysis, this first part of the work that you were 

doing, the last subpart was: Considering the tests that were conducted on the voting systems from Sarasota County after the general election, are additional tests needed to determine whether voting systems contributed to the undervote? That is what brings us 

here today. 

And it seems pretty clear, on page 11, it says, ‘‘Prior tests and 

reviews provide some assurance, but do not provide reasonable assurance, that the iVotronic DREs did not contribute to the 

undervote. Prior tests and reviews of Sarasota County voting systems provide useful information but have some shortcomings.’’ 

So that is why it is necessary. You will be in a much better position to give us more probative and valuable information on which 

we may predicate a decision on the reliability of the results that 

were reported to us on the election in Florida-13. 

And we have just been joined by Congresswoman Lofgren. 

And thank you very much. I know you rushed over here. 

And by the way, I have been told that she was on ‘‘The View’’ 

this morning. 

Ms. LOFGREN. No, not me. It was—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I thought it was you. 

Ms. LOFGREN. The Speaker was on there. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Oh, the Speaker. I thought it was you. We were 

saying Lofgren. 

Oh, well, given my choice, it would have been Representative 

Lofgren. 

This is being recorded, and I am sure the Speaker is watching. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. LOFGREN. That would not be my choice. 


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Mr. GONZALEZ. All right. Representative Lofgren, at this point, 

if you wish to ask any questions—I know you were not here, but 

you attended last week’s briefing, and I think you were provided 

a draft of the report. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Right. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. If you have any questions—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. No, I think this is proceeding properly. And at the 

appropriate time, I will have a motion to offer when others are 

through with their questions. If that is now, I will do it now. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. All right. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Everyone is ready. 

‘‘I move that the task force approve the proposed GAO testing 

plan and associated protocols as follows: A, firmware testing to 

verify that the firmware in the iVotronic DREs used in Sarasota 

County matches the certified version; B, ballot testing of iVotronic 

DREs to confirm correct operation; C, miscalibration of an 

iVotronic DRE to understand the effect on the undervote. 

I move further that the Chairman request that all individuals, 

offices and entities whose cooperation is necessary fully, promptly 

and voluntarily assist the GAO to enable it to conduct the testing 

described above.’’ 

That would be the motion. 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. GONZALEZ. All right. 

All in favor of the motion, vote, ‘‘Aye.’’ 

It is unanimous, and the record will reflect such. 

Also, I want to make sure that the record will include, being part 

of the record, and that is the report as submitted by GAO today. 

And we look forward to continuing working with you. Advise us 

immediately if you need some additional assistance in gaining access, any problems you have with logistics. 

Anything further? 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to congratulate you 

on this committee, because everything that we have done has been 

unanimous in our approach. And I think this is probably going to 

show, in the long run, how contested elections should be done in 

the future. So, thank you. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, I want to thank my colleagues for that. 

And we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the task force was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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