SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1699-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RYAN M. MCMENAMIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted April 27, 2021 – Decided May 28, 2021

Before Judges Fisher and Gilson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 18-10-

1339.

Mario J. Persiano, attorney for appellant. 

Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Ryan M. McMenamin pled guilty to fourth-degree driving 

while his license was suspended for a third conviction of driving while 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). He appeals, arguing that his violation came 

to light when his motor vehicle was stopped at an unconstitutional checkpoint. 

We reject that argument and affirm the denial of his motion to suppress and his 

conviction.

I.

On May 6, 2018, defendant was driving a motor vehicle in Burlington 

Township. He was stopped by Officer James Conway and given four 

summonses for motor vehicle violations: tinted windows, N.J.S.A. 39:3-75; 

driving without a license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10; driving with a suspended license, 

N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; and driving without insurance, N.J.S.A. 39:6B-2. A check of 

defendant's record revealed that he had been driving after his license was 

suspended for a third conviction of driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 

39:4-50. Consequently, in October 2018, defendant was indicted for fourthdegree driving with a suspended license, while the license had been suspended 

for a second or subsequent conviction of DWI. 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop,

arguing that his motor vehicle had been stopped at an unconstitutional 

checkpoint. While that motion was pending, defendant pled guilty to the 

indicted crime, preserving his right to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial if 
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his motion to suppress was denied. The plea form also stated that defendant 

preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 

On August 15, 2019, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at 

which one witness testified: Officer Conway. Conway explained that on May 

6, 2018, he was working a patrol shift from 1 p.m. to 1 a.m. Shortly after starting 

his shift, Conway joined several other police officers who were conducting a 

"traffic detail" near Sunset Road. Conway recalled that when he arrived there 

were three other officers already at the detail, including a sergeant. The officers 

all parked their police vehicles in a bank parking lot just off Sunset Road.

Describing the traffic detail, Conway testified that some officers would 

stand by the roadway to look for violations, such as drivers not wearing 

seatbelts, tinted windows, cracked windshields, and expired inspection stickers. 

If a violation was observed and the vehicle was turning onto an access road to a 

nearby shopping plaza, an officer would signal the driver to pull into the bank 

parking lot. An officer would then speak with the driver and issue a ticket if a 

violation was confirmed. Conway also testified that if no violation was observed 

or the vehicle was not turning onto the access road, the car would not be stopped. 

Regarding the stop of defendant's car, Conway explained that he was 

standing by the side of the road and had positioned himself in a place where he 
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could see vehicles approaching his location, but the drivers would not be able to 

see him "until it's too late." He saw defendant's car turn onto the access road 

and he observed that the car had tinted windows. Accordingly, Conway directed 

defendant to stop his vehicle in the bank parking lot. Conway then approached 

the vehicle and asked defendant for "his credentials." Defendant did not have a 

license or an insurance card. Accordingly, Conway issued four motor vehicle 

summonses to defendant for driving without a license, driving with a suspended 

license, driving with no insurance, and driving in a vehicle with illegally tinted 

windows.

During cross-examination, Conway testified he had previously 

participated in two DWI checkpoints. He explained that DWI checkpoints were 

very detailed operations where cars were stopped according to established 

procedures to check for intoxicated drivers. Conway explained that the traffic 

detail on May 6, 2018 was not a checkpoint. 

At the end of the evidentiary hearing, counsel for defendant argued that 

defendant had been stopped at an unconstitutional checkpoint and therefore all 

evidence of him driving without a license should be suppressed. In making that 

argument, defense counsel relied on our decision in State v. Kirk, 202 N.J.

Super. 28, 56-58 (App. Div. 1985), where we detailed the procedures necessary 
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for a checkpoint to comply with the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 

7 of the New Jersey Constitution.

The trial court rejected defendant's arguments. The court found Conway 

to be credible. Based on Conway's testimony, the trial court found that 

defendant's motor vehicle was only stopped after Conway observed the tinted 

windows. Accordingly, the trial court reasoned that the traffic detail on May 6, 

2018 was not an unconstitutional checkpoint. Instead, the court found that 

Conway had lawfully observed the tinted window violation from the roadway 

and then stopped the vehicle based on a reasonable articulable suspicion of a 

motor vehicle violation. In making that finding, the trial court relied on our 

decision in State v. Foley, 218 N.J. Super. 210, 213-14 (App. Div. 1987), where 

we held that a police officer can set up roadside observation points and stop 

vehicles when a violation is observed without violating the Federal or our State 

Constitutions.

II.

On appeal, defendant argues:

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL FINDINGS 

ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 

DEFENDANT'S STOP ARE SUBJECT TO PLENARY 

REVIEW[.]
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POINT II: THE POLICE DETAIL WAS 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ART I, PAR. 7 OF 

THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.

SUBPOINT A: THE STANDARDS OUTLINED IN 

STATE V. KIRK ARE APPLICABLE, IN PART, TO 

ASSESS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 

BURLINGTON TOWNSHIP POLICE DETAIL.

SUBPOINT B: THE LACK OF CONTROLS OVER 

POLICE CONDUCT AND DISCRETION MADE IT 

POSSIBLE FOR MOTORISTS TO BE SEIZED 

WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE 

SUSPICION[.]

POINT III: THE COURT'S HOLDING IN STATE V. 

FOLEY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT'S 

STOP[.]

Our review is limited when a motion to suppress is denied following an 

evidentiary hearing. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). We defer to the 

factual and credibility findings made by the trial court "so long as those findings 

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Handy, 

206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). The 

legal conclusions of a trial court are reviewed de novo. State v. Hubbard, 222 

N.J. 249, 263 (2015) (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)).

The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 

U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. A motor vehicle can be 

lawfully stopped without a warrant if a police officer has "a reasonable and 
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articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing 

a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense." State v. 

Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016) (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 

(1999)). "An investigative detention that is premised on less than reasonable 

and articulable suspicion is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence discovered 

during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the exclusionary 

rule." Elders, 192 N.J. at 247 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 132-33 

(2002)).

Police can set up a checkpoint on a roadway to stop and detain motorists 

without individualized suspicion, but such checkpoints must be executed in 

strict adherence to well-established procedural safeguards. Kirk, 202 N.J. 

Super. at 40-41. "In order to pass muster under our [S]tate [C]onstitution, a 

roadblock or checkpoint must be established for a specific need and to achieve 

a particular purpose at a specific place." State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 652 (2002) 

(citing Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. at 37).

By contrast to a checkpoint, "[a] simple observation into the interior of an 

automobile by a police officer located outside the automobile is not a 'search' 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Foley, 218 N.J. Super. at 215 

(citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983)). Accordingly, a police 
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officer can view motorists and motor vehicles from a roadside observation point 

and, if violations are seen, stop the motor vehicle. Id. at 216.

The central issue on this appeal is whether defendant's motor vehicle was 

stopped at a checkpoint that lacked adequate procedures or whether it was 

stopped after Conway observed that the motor vehicle had tinted windows. The 

trial court's finding that the stop was not part of a checkpoint is supported by 

substantial credible evidence and well-established law. Moreover, the trial 

court's finding that Conway had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop 

defendant's car based on observations he made from the roadway is also 

supported by substantial credible evidence and well-established law. 

In short, Conway did not randomly stop defendant's car without a 

reasonable articulable suspicion. Instead, Conway positioned himself alongside 

a road so that he could make observations of vehicles as they approached him. 

The trial court found Conway's testimony to be credible and that Conway saw 

the tinted window violation before directing defendant to stop his vehicle. 

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the procedures in this case were

like the procedures that we approved in Foley, 218 N.J. Super. at 215. Thus, 

there was not a checkpoint requiring specialized procedures as discussed in Kirk, 

202 N.J. Super. at 40-41. Accordingly, we reject defendant's arguments. 
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Affirmed.