IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-40799

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

MANUEL JESUS BUENFIL-CATALAN, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 1:15-CR-868-1 

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

 Defendant-Appellant Manuel Jesus Buenfil-Catalan pleaded guilty to 

illegal reentry and was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment and three 

years of supervised release. He contends that the district court plainly erred 

in applying the crime-of-violence enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) 

(2015) based on his prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fif h Circuit

FILED

April 3, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-40799

2 

We have held that Tennessee aggravated assault under subsection (a) of 

the statute is categorically a crime of violence. United States v. MungiaPortillo, 484 F.3d 813, 815-17 (5th Cir. 2007) (examining TENN. CODE ANN. 

§ 39-13-102(a) (1991)). We have also held that the Tennessee aggravated 

assault statute is “identical in all material respects” to the Texas aggravated 

assault statute. United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 

2007) (examining TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 22.02 (2000)). We recently 

reaffirmed our holding that Texas aggravated assault is categorically a crime 

of violence. United States v. Villasenor-Ortiz, No. 16-10366, 2017 WL 113917, 

at *3 & n.9 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2017) (unpublished) (examining TEX. PENAL CODE 

ANN. § 22.02(a) (2003)); Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d at 200-01. 

 Buenfil-Catalan nonetheless insists that the Tennessee aggravated 

assault statute is indivisible in its entirety and that an aggravated assault 

under subsection (b) is not generic aggravated assault. Whether Tennessee 

treats an aggravated assault under subsection (b) as an offense with different 

elements than an aggravated assault under subsection (a) is subject to 

reasonable dispute. See, e.g., State v. Roberson, 988 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1998). Buenfil-Catalan therefore fails to show that subsection (b) is 

clearly or obviously not divisible from subsection (a). See Puckett v. United 

States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). The district court did not plainly err in 

treating the Tennessee aggravated assault statute as divisible and examining 

the state court documents to determine which subsection Buenfil-Catalan was 

convicted of violating. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). 

These documents reflect that Buenfil-Catalan was convicted of violating 

subsection (a), namely, § 39-13-102(a)(1). The district court did not plainly err 

in determining that his Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault is a crime 

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No. 16-40799

3 

of violence. See Villasenor-Ortiz, 2017 WL 113917, at *3; Guillen-Alvarez, 489 

F.3d at 200-01; Mungia-Portillo, 484 F.3d at 815-17.

 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 16-40799 Document: 00513936820 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/03/2017