GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 9, 2007 

Congressional Requesters 

Subject: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the 

National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in Support of 

DNDO’s Testing and Development Program 

 

Preventing a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device (a “dirty bomb”) from 

being smuggled into the United States is a key national security priority. The 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through its Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office (DNDO), has lead responsibility for conducting the research, development, 

testing, and evaluation of radiation detection equipment that can be used to detect 

smuggled nuclear or radiological materials. National Security Presidential Directive43 /Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14 established DNDO in 2005 and made 

DNDO responsible for, among other things, choosing and purchasing the radiation 

detection equipment that will be used by DHS’s Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) at the nation’s seaports and other points of entry, as well as for coordinating 

with state and local governments on their radiation detection efforts and providing 

information and assistance to these governments when necessary.1

Much of DNDO’s work on radiation detection equipment to date has focused on the 

development and use of radiation detection portal monitors, which are larger-scale 

equipment that can screen vehicles, people, and cargo entering the United States. 

Beginning in 2005, DNDO has tested both the portal monitors that CBP uses today 

and advanced technology portal monitors. Current portal monitors, made of 

polyvinyl toluene (plastic) and known as “PVTs,” detect the presence of radiation but 

cannot distinguish between benign, naturally occurring radiological materials 

(NORM) such as ceramic tile, and dangerous materials such as highly enriched 

uranium (HEU). DNDO hopes that the next generation of portal monitors, known as 

“Advanced Spectroscopic Portals” (ASP), will be able to detect and more specifically 

identify radiological and nuclear materials within a shipping container. DNDO has 

stated that it will begin conducting tests of ASPs in February 2007 and begin fielding 

ASPs in spring 2007. 

 

1

 Although DNDO was originally created in April 2005 by National Security Presidential Directive-43/ 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14, the office was formally established in October 2006 by 

Section 501 of the SAFE Port Act. 
 DNDO has conducted tests on PVTs and ASPs at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). 

According to DNDO officials, the advantage of using the NTS for testing radiation 

detection equipment is that it provides the necessary facilities to test detection 

system capabilities with special nuclear materials, which consist of specified 

quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In addition, several of the 

Department of Energy’s (DOE) national laboratories have performed work related to 

the development, testing, or deployment of radiation detection portal monitors. In 

particular, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory (PNNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have extensive expertise 

in radiation detection technology and have tested numerous commercial models of 

PVTs on behalf of DHS and DOE. 

According to radiation detection experts, portal monitor tests are important because 

they help determine how well the monitors work in real-life situations and provide 

information for making the monitors better. In addition, DNDO and radiation 

detection experts agree that portal monitors should be tested both in a laboratorycontrolled setting, to learn about their performance capabilities, and under an 

assortment of real-life conditions, such as at seaports, to learn how well they perform 

under various environmental conditions in the field. In particular, testing should 

examine how well a portal monitor performs when screening various types of NORM, 

either in the local environment or in the cargo of a shipping container. In a February 

2006 report to the Committees on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate and House of 

Representatives, DNDO presented its Expenditure Plan for fiscal years 2006 through 

2010. This plan echoed the need for testing, stating that to fulfill its missions it 

would, among other things, 

• describe and analyze the performance of different types of radiation detection 

equipment, such as portal monitors, before deploying them; 

• develop and use sound, quantitative assessments of different types of radiation 

detection equipment that it deploys; 

• stress the use of both laboratory-controlled testing and operational field 

testing of portal monitors and other radiation detection equipment; and 

• develop a comprehensive database that describes currently deployed radiation 

detection equipment as well as equipment planned for deployment in the near 

future.2

DNDO’s Expenditure Plan also stated that the office would begin developing and 

purchasing ASPs in order to replace the PVT portal monitors currently used by CBP. 

DNDO contends that the intended ability of ASPs to detect and identify smuggled 

radiological or nuclear materials would represent an increase in capability over PVTs. 

 2

 See DNDO, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: FY 2006-–2010 Expenditure Plan (Washington,

D.C., February 2006), p. 27. The task of developing the performance database was part of DNDO’s

competitively-awarded Systems Engineering Support Program contract that DNDO awarded in August

2005. DNDO identified other tasks within this contract, including the development of requirements for

its Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) and modeling of different portal

monitor deployment scenarios. In September 2006, DNDO awarded a $1.3 billion contract for the

procurement of CAARS. 

2 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
To implement this plan, in May 2006, DNDO completed a cost-benefit analysis that 

supported its decision to begin deploying ASPs at domestic seaports with high

volumes of cargo and traffic. In July 2006, DHS announced that it had awarded 5-year 

contracts, totaling $1.2 billion, to three companies to produce ASPs. In October 2006, 

we reported that DNDO’s cost-benefit analysis suffered from several methodological 

flaws and did not provide a sound basis for DNDO’s decision to purchase ASPs.

3

 

Among other things, we reported that DNDO did not use actual test data on ASP 

performance but instead assumed that ASPs in the future will be able to meet 

DNDO’s long-range goal of being able to detect highly enriched uranium 95 percent of 

the time. In addition, although DNDO also tested PVTs at the same time it tested 

ASPs, it did not analyze the data gathered from these tests. 

Furthermore, according to DNDO’s Expenditure Plan, DNDO expects to rely heavily 

on the participation of state and local agencies to help protect the interior of the 

nation from a radiological or nuclear attack. In this regard, DNDO plans to support 

these agencies’ efforts to develop radiation detection and interdiction capabilities. 

For example, DNDO plans include working with state and local agencies to, among 

other things, deploy fixed and mobile radiation detection systems to help defend 

major, high-risk cities. As part of DNDO’s Securing the Cities Initiative, it plans to 

identify a limited number of high-risk regions, then provide these regions with

federally owned radiation detection equipment along with related training and other 

support packages. DNDO expects that state and local agencies will eventually 

purchase their own equipment and assume increasingly greater responsibilities in 

radiation detection efforts within their borders. 

Given DNDO’s goal of replacing PVT portal monitors with much more expensive 

ASPs, it is important for DNDO to fully understand the relative advantages and 

disadvantages of PVTs and ASPs before making the multibillion dollar investment 

that would be necessary to implement its current plan. Further, in light of the 

important role that DNDO foresees for state and local governments in radiation 

detection, it is also important that DNDO communicate this understanding to its state 

and local partners. Our October 2006 report concluded that DNDO’s assessment of 

ASPs did not fully support DNDO’s decision to purchase and deploy them. This 

report examines whether DNDO has fully collected and maintained all existing tests 

on PVTs in order to fully assess their advantages and limitations. To that end, we 

agreed with your offices to examine the extent to which DNDO has (1) compiled 

previous test results from the national laboratories on commercially available portal 

monitors, and (2) provided state and local authorities with information on the 

technical performance characteristics and operation of radiation detection 

equipment. 

To conduct our review, we gathered data on DNDO’s testing efforts, and visited

existing testing facilities. To assess the extent to which DNDO has collected previous 

test results from national laboratories on portal monitors, we began by obtaining a 

 3

 See GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of 

New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did 

Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits, GAO-07-133R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 

2006). 

3 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
list, originally provided to GAO by DHS and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), 

of 14 commercial, off-the-shelf, radiation portal monitors that were available for 

purchase as of January 2006. We then submitted this list to the national laboratories 

and asked each laboratory to identify, among other things, which of these portal 

monitors they had tested, when the testing occurred, and what agency sponsored the 

test.4

 During this process, the laboratories noted 15 additional commercially 

available models of PVT portal monitors that we later included on our list.5

 We also 

reviewed test reports for portal monitors produced by the National Institute of

Science and Technology (NIST). In addition, we had discussions with officials from 

DNDO; the Department of Defense; CBP; NIST; the National Nuclear Security 

Administration; and several DOE national laboratories, including BNL, LANL, ORNL, 

SNL, and PNNL. 6

 

To gain the perspectives of state governments that have participated in DNDO’s 

nuclear detection working groups, we obtained a list from DNDO of the states 

attending one of these working group meetings, then we contacted officials from 

each of the 17 states and the District of Columbia that attended one of DNDO’s 

working group meetings.7

 We also visited DHS’ NTS in Nevada, the Radiation 

Detector Test and Evaluation Center (RADTEC) testing facility at BNL, PNNL’s 

testing facilities in Washington State, SNL’s testing facilities in New Mexico, and 

DOD’s Technical Evaluation Assessment Monitor Site (TEAMS) in New Mexico. We 

conducted our review from November 2005 through January 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary 

DNDO has not yet collected a comprehensive inventory of testing information on 

commercially available PVT portal monitors. Such information—if collected and 

used—could improve DNDO’s understanding of how well portal monitors detect 

different radiological and nuclear materials under varying conditions. In turn, this 

understanding would assist DNDO’s future testing, development, deployment, and 

purchases of portal monitors. In response to our request for information, DNDO 

provided us with test reports from only 11 of at least 54 tests on commercially 

available portal monitors completed by DOE’s national laboratories since September 

 4

 Because several of the portal monitors were tested by more than one laboratory, the number of tests 

exceeds the number of portal monitors on our list. 

5

 One of the commercially available portal monitors on our list was an ASP, not a PVT. However, for 

ease of discussion, we use the term commercially available portal monitors to mean PVT portal

monitors. 

6 The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately organized agency within DOE that was 

created by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 with responsibility for the

nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferatrion, and naval reactors programs. Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999). 

7

 The stakeholders we contacted include representatives from the following state and local entities: 

California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, 

New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 

4 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
11, 2001.8

 However, when we later presented DNDO with our initial findings, DNDO’s 

Director of Assessments told us that she personally has access to the vast majority of 

test reports completed by the national laboratories. She added that DNDO is in the 

process of planning how to develop a database with this type of information so that 

the information will be more widely available to others in DNDO. Radiation 

detection experts with the national laboratories and industry told us that, in their 

view, DNDO should collect and maintain all the national laboratory test reports on 

commercially available portal monitors because these reports provide a 

comprehensive inventory of how well portal monitors detect a wide variety of 

radiological and nuclear materials and how environmental conditions and other 

factors may affect performance. 

DNDO is improving its efforts to provide technical and operational information about 

radiation portal monitors to state and local authorities. For example, DNDO recently 

helped to establish a Web site that, among other things, includes information for state 

and local officials on radiation detection equipment products and performance 

requirements. However, some state representatives with whom we spoke, 

particularly those from states with less experience conducting radiation detection 

programs, would like to see DNDO provide more prescriptive advice on what types of 

radiation detection equipment to deploy and how to use it. 

Background 

As of October 2006, which is the most recent date for which complete data are 

available, DNDO and CBP had installed 912 portal monitors at the nation’s points of 

entry. All of the portal monitors are PVTs. According to senior DNDO officials, DHS 

plans to deploy at ports of entry this year 60 of the 80 ASPs that it has purchased with 

fiscal year 2006 funds. DNDO plans to use the remaining 20 ASPs for further testing 

or refurbishment after it has completed its tests on ASPs this year. Ultimately, DHS 

plans to deploy about 3,000 portal monitors at the nation’s points of entry by 

September 2009. However, as we reported in March 2006, CBP’s deployment of 

portal monitors is behind schedule, and it appears unlikely that CBP will be able to 

reach its deployment goal on schedule.9

 

DHS Has Not Yet Collected Most of the Test Data Available from the 

National Laboratories on the Performance Capabilities of Radiation 

Detection Portal Monitors 

DNDO does not systematically collect the test results produced by the national 

laboratories on radiation detection portal monitors in support of DNDO’s testing and 

development program. In response to our request for data, DNDO could provide us 

 8

 Our estimate of 54 test reports is conservative. In cases in which a laboratory tested two models of 

PVTs that were manufactured by the same company and had virtually the same model number (e.g., 

4550-V and 4550-R), we counted this as one test rather than two tests. We did this because, according 

to a manufacturer with whom we spoke, similar model numbers for two PVTs indicate that the two 

PVTs are virtually the same. 9 See GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection 

Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22,

2006). 

5 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
with only 11 of at least 54 test reports completed by the national laboratories on PVT 

portal monitors since September 11, 2001. These 54 test reports contain information 

that, in our view, could help DNDO fully evaluate PVT’s capabilities and thus help 

guide its future testing, development, deployment, and acquisitions of portal 

monitors. DNDO could not provide us with the test reports other than those provided 

to them by BNL despite the fact that the majority of the tests were sponsored by 

offices within DHS.10 Our findings are consistent with those of the DOE Office of 

Inspector General, which reported in February 2006 that neither DHS nor DOE could 

provide it with a complete inventory of the national laboratories’ relevant research on 

nuclear and radiation detection.11 It is important to note that DNDO’s fiscal years 

2006—2010 Expenditure Plan states that DNDO will develop a “comprehensive

database” of current and future portal monitors.12

During the course of our review, DNDO officials told us that prior results on 

commercially available portal monitors do not remain relevant over time because the 

technology, in particular the software that converts the information detected by the 

portal monitor into meaningful data, changes often and significantly. However, 

officials with six private companies that manufacture commercially available portal 

monitors told us that, when they change the name or model number of their portal 

monitors, it typically does not mean that the software has significantly changed. For 

example, an official from one company told us that its model numbers represent 

different settings at which the portal monitor would sound an alarm when it detects 

the presence of radiation, as suggested by DNDO. However, the devices themselves 

were the same. The manufacturer had not changed either the portal monitor’s 

hardware or software. 

However, after a meeting on January 24, 2006, when we presented DNDO with our 

initial findings, DNDO’s Director of Assessments told us that she has access to the 

vast majority of the national laboratories’ test results on commercially available 

portal monitors. She added that DNDO was in the process of planning how to 

develop a database that would contain this type of information. DNDO told us it was 

planning to build this database because there is currently no central repository of test 

results that can be used by other analysts within DNDO on a need-to-know basis. 

According to senior DNDO officials, DNDO hired a new branch chief in November 

2006 who will be responsible for, among other things, leading DNDO’s establishment 

of a test data and report archive. 

Radiation detection experts with the national laboratories told us that, in their view, 

DNDO should collect and maintain data on previous testing performed on portal 

 10 DHS offices sponsoring the research were CBP, DNDO, and the Science & Technology Directorate. 

11See DOE Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Nuclear Detection Devices, DOE/IG-0720

(Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

12

 In response to our findings, a DNDO official told us that the “comprehensive database describing

currently deployed radiation detection systems and those planned for near-term domestic deployment”

mentioned in DNDO’s Expenditure Plan referred to operational data culled from the portal monitors 

that CBP has already deployed, not test data. However, DNDO’s Expenditure Plan never makes this 

distinction. 

6 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
monitors. In this way, DNDO could have a baseline inventory of how PVTs perform 

on a multitude of factors such as environmental conditions, the type of radiological 

or nuclear material to be detected, the best alarm setting for the PVT, the background 

level of radiation, and the quantity of benign radiological materials such as kitty litter 

or ceramic tiles that can be used to “mask” the presence of more dangerous 

radiological or nuclear materials in a container. 

In addition, by maintaining test results, DNDO would have a full record to determine 

how much and in what ways portal monitor technology has improved over time, 

which can be critical to selecting what type of portal monitor to further develop or 

purchase. Even if the results from a series of tests show that no portal monitor yet 

meets DNDO’s performance standards, maintaining previous test results can show 

what portal monitors are making the most progress towards those standards. 

Further, tests on portal monitors should differ depending on how the portal monitor 

will be used. For example, if CBP decided to deploy a particular portal monitor for 

use in primary cargo screenings, some of the relevant tests would be different than if 

CBP wanted to use the same portal monitors for secondary screenings (additional 

scans after the primary screening has sounded an alarm). Maintaining a full record of 

previous test results would help ensure that CBP and DNDO, before choosing or 

deploying a particular portal monitor, would have the correct type of tests 

corresponding to the specific way in which the portal monitor will be used. Finally, 

the DOE’s Inspector General noted in February 2006 that maintaining a central 

inventory of testing information would assist DHS and DOE in coordinating radiation 

detection research across national laboratories and, among other things, reducing the 

chances for unnecessarily duplicative efforts.13

 

DNDO Has Improved Its Efforts to Provide State Authorities with Basic

Performance Information and Other Forms of Assistance about Radiation 

Portal Monitors, but Some States Need Further Support 

DNDO has started a number of initiatives to provide state and local governments with 

technical and operational information, training, and financial assistance on radiation 

portal monitors. For example, DNDO, in cooperation with DHS’s Office of Grants 

and Training, recently unveiled the Responder Knowledge Base. This is a Web-based 

database that contains information on commercially available radiation detection 

equipment products, performance standards, and test results. According to DNDO 

officials, the main purpose of the Responder Knowledge Base is to provide state and 

local officials with information to help them evaluate radiation detection equipment 

and also help guide their purchases of this equipment. In addition, last year DNDO 

created a working group comprised of federal, state, and local radiation detection 

program officials. These officials meet periodically to exchange information and 

develop protocols on their radiation detection programs. According to DNDO and 

state officials, this group met in January, June, and October 2006. 

 13 See DOE Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Nuclear Detection Devices, DOE/IG-0720 

(Washington, D.C.: February 2006). In addition, it is important to note that, in some instances, DHS 

may want separate national laboratories to perform duplicative tests as a method to confirm the 

accuracy of test results. 

7 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
To further assist states and localities in their radiation detection efforts, DNDO has 

begun training state and local officials on how to operate radiation detection 

equipment. For example, state officials may attend 2-day training courses for law 

enforcement officials at DHS’s Counter Terrorism Operation Support facility at NTS. 

Moreover, DNDO has worked to get DHS to provide grants to state and local 

governments to, among other things, fund their radiation detection efforts. For 

instance, in September 2006 DHS issued grants totaling $3.2 million to states such as 

Kentucky and South Carolina to invest in fixed, mobile, and handheld radiation

detection equipment at interstate truck weigh stations. While DHS provides some 

information to states and localities on radiation detection equipment, officials from 

some states told us that DHS has not sought much input from them on what types of 

information they find most useful or valuable. 

We contacted all 18 state and local entities that participated in one of DNDO’s 

sponsored meetings. Of these 18 entities, 15 responded to our requests for 

information. Although our discussions with officials from all 15 entities indicated 

they supported DNDO’s initiatives and 4 of the 15 entities were interested in getting 

additional training from DNDO, officials from 8 states and the District of Columbia 

told us they would benefit from having more direct guidance to assist them in making 

purchasing decisions. According to officials from these 9 entities, they could use 

DNDO's input to help overcome their lack of experience and technical expertise. For 

example, one state official told us that her state has been purchasing older radiation 

detection equipment specifically because it had limited knowledge about new, 

commercially available equipment and it could not obtain recommendations from 

DNDO on which devices to use. 

In response, DNDO maintains that federal regulation prohibits it from recommending 

to state and local officials portal monitors that are made and sold by specific 

manufacturers.14 According to senior DNDO officials, DNDO's goal for the Responder 

Knowledge Base is to provide state and local officials with available performance 

information on radiation detection systems that they have tested without 

recommending specific products, which could be construed as an inappropriate 

endorsement. Despite this limitation, DNDO officials told us that they are readily 

available to answer specific technical and performance questions involving 

equipment tested by DNDO. 

Conclusions

DNDO told us that it is in the process of planning how to develop a comprehensive 

database on commercially available PVT portal monitors. We believe this is a step in 

the right direction. In our view, until DNDO compiles these data, it will be missing a 

significant tool that adds to the nation’s efforts to thwart nuclear smuggling. Until 

DNDO develops and completes this database--one that includes both test results and 

data derived from operations in the field--it is losing opportunities to better 

understand how these portal monitors perform. We agree with several radiation 

 14 See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702. 

8 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
detection experts who told us that these data will provide DNDO with guidance on 

how portal monitors vary in performance under different conditions and according to 

how they are used. This, in turn, will help DNDO develop better systems and make 

smarter procurement and deployment decisions. Furthermore, as pointed out by 

DOE’s Inspector General, these data would assist DHS’s and DOE’s efforts to reduce 

duplicative testing. Finally, if DNDO maintains more comprehensive data on PVTs, 

state and local governments could use this information to make more informed 

purchases of portal monitors. We believe that, if DNDO develops and maintains close 

working relationships with its state partners, it may be able to tailor these data to 

meet state needs and capabilities. 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

In order to ensure that the nation maintains a comprehensive source of information 

on the characteristics and performance of PVT portal monitors and to further the 

ability of state and local governments to make informed judgments about their 

radiation detection needs and future equipment purchases, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director, DNDO, take the 

following three actions: 

• collect and maintain reports concerning all of the testing performed by the 

U.S. national laboratories, 

• review the test reports in order to develop an information database on how 

PVTs perform in both laboratory and field tests on a variety of indicators such 

as their ability to detect specific radiological and nuclear materials or how 

they are affected by different levels of background environmental radiation, 

and 

• confer with state and local officials on what information they would find 

useful and how that information could be best presented to them. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

We provided DHS with a draft of this report for its review and comment. Its written 

comments are presented in enclosure 1. The department generally concurred with the 

recommendations presented. In addition, DHS offered some clarifications regarding 

its ability to obtain portal monitor testing results from other agencies, its archive of 

portal monitor test reports, and its efforts to help assist states and localities 

developing in their radiation detection capabilities. 

DHS concurred with our recommendation to collect and maintain reports from all 

portal monitor testing performed by the national laboratories, but noted that it has no 

direct authority to obtain test reports and data for programs that were not sponsored 

by DHS. However, as we explain in our report, over half of the national laboratory 

tests we identified were sponsored by parts of DHS, specifically CBP, DHS’s Science 

and Technology Directorate, or DNDO. We support DNDO’s future efforts to collect 

information from the national laboratories as part of its cooperative information 

sharing with the Department of Energy. 

DHS also stated that we misinterpreted the comments of DNDO officials concerning 

the 11 test reports—specifically, that the 11 test reports represented all the reports 

9 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
DNDO had in its collection. In response, we believe that there was no 

misinterpretation and that we described the situation accurately. During the course 

of our review, we asked DNDO to provide us with the results it had compiled from 

tests performed by the national laboratories on commercially available portal 

monitors. In response, DNDO provided us with the 11 test reports. We subsequently 

asked DNDO if it had additional test reports in its collection that it could provide to 

us. However, DNDO did not provide us any additional reports. 

DHS also concurred with our recommendation that it confer with state and local 

officials regarding their information needs, pointing out a number of ongoing efforts 

to disseminate information. These include: meeting with its stakeholder group 

comprised of representatives from 22 states, offering help at establishing standards, 

providing test reports, developing response protocols, providing detection training, 

and facilitating access to federal experts for alarm adjudication, analysis, and nuclear 

detection-related information and intelligence. DNDO also identified efforts at 

establishing a qualified equipment list, threat-based standards in response to the 

SAFE Port Act, and a fee-for-service test process to widen the available market for 

testing detection systems. 

--------------------------------------------------------- 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report 

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be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or 

by e-mail at aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this correspondence. 

Key contributors to this report include Julie Chamberlain, Leland Cogliani, Eugene 

Gray, Diane Raynes, Jim Shafer, Daren Sweeney, and Eugene Wisnoski. 

Gene Aloise 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

10 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
List of Requesters 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable Norm Coleman 

Ranking Member 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John D. Dingell 

Chairman 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable James R. Langevin 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John Linder 

House of Representatives 

11 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
Enclosure: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 

12 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
Enclosure: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security (cont.) 

(360641) 

13 GAO-07-347R Radiation Detection Equipment
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To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

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