alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Jane Uhl v. City of New York et al.

Motion to dispense with printing denied, without prejudice, however, to a renewal thereof upon papers demonstrating the jurisdiction of this court. Concur — Rabin, J. P., Valente, McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
(Nos. 87-CC-3271, 87-CC-3272 cons.

#### Kenneth Miller and Henry Hite, Claimants, *v.*The State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Opinion filed October 7, 1992.*

Copeland, Finn & Fieri, for Claimants.

Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (John R. Buckley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

*163OPINION

Burke, J.

Claimants brought this action against the State of Illinois as a result of an incident which occurred on Interstate 57. On June 8, 1986, Kenneth Miller was operating a motor vehicle south on Interstate 57 at approximately 3:00 p.m. He was near Peotone when the car hit a rise in the highway. Mr. Miller stated that he did not see the two-foot high, “A” shaped rise at any time prior to the impact. When the car hit the rise, he grabbed tightly onto the steering wheel and pulled over to the side. The car flew slightly into the air on the left side and sustained damage to the undercarriage. Prior to striking the rise, Mr. Miller observed two or three cars that pulled over about 50 to 100 yards past the rise on the highway. Henry Hite, Mr. Millers father-in-law and owner of the car, was a passenger at the time of the incident. As a result of the impact with the rise, both Claimants were treated in the emergency room of a hospital in the Kankakee area and released.

The issues are whether the State is responsible for this particular incident allegedly caused by the buckling of the rise in the pavement on Interstate 57, and whether the State had actual or constructive notice prior to the occurrence of the incident.

No evidence was presented to show that the State or its employees knew or should have known about this particular rise on the day in question. Claimants cited a case which deals with similar facts, but is distinguishable *164because evidence of 70 similar prior incidents involving buckles was presented which gave *the State notice of a*particular problem in the area. *(St. Cyr v. State*(1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 36.) In the case at bar, it is clear that the buckle existed for a short period of time. The other two or three cars in the vicinity may have been damaged by the buckle immediately before Claimants’ car struck it, but there was no evidence to suggest that the State should have known about this buckle or failed to do anything about it once it occurred.

State employees stated that there is no way to predict when a buckle is going to occur and that there is no set pattern to buckling. The State does not deny that these buckles can be a dangerous condition; however, the fact that these buckles occur is not evidence of negligence. Where *there is no*indication of prior notice, either actual or constructive, on the part of the State to these conditions, the State will not be held responsible.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim is denied.
#### STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*JUAN MCRAE

(AC 25121)

McLachlan, Harper and Freedman, Js.

Argued March 30

officially released May 3, 2005

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### § 27.3 Definitions.

The definitions contained in the Act (at 12 U.S.C. 3702) shall apply to this subpart, in addition to and as further clarified by the following definitions. As used in this subpart:

*General Counsel* means the General Counsel of the Department of Housing and Urban Development;

*Multifamily mortgage* does not include a mortgage covering a property on which there is located a one- to four-family residence, except when the one- to four-family residence is subject to a mortgage pursuant to section 202 of the Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. 1701q), or section 811 (42 U.S.C. 8013) of the National Affordable Housing Act. The definition of multifamily mortgage also includes a mortgage taken by the Secretary in connection with the previous sale of the project by the Secretary (purchase money mortgage).
#### Ernest Critoph, Doing Business as Critoph Brothers, Respondent, v. Leonard E. Lerczak, Doing Business as Chippewa Construction Co., et al., Appellants.

Order insofar as appealed from unanimously affirmed, with $25 costs and disbursements. Stay vacated. (Appeal from part of order of Erie Special Term permitting amendment of plaintiff’s complaint.) Present— Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, Halpem and Henry, JJ.
#### § 3286.15 Consultation with the Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee (MHCC).

The Secretary will seek input from the MHCC when revising the installation program regulations in this part 3286. Before publication of a proposed rule to revise these regulations, the Secretary will provide the MHCC with a 120-day opportunity to comment on such revision. The MHCC may send to the Secretary any of the MHCC's own recommendations to adopt new installation program regulations or to modify or repeal any of the regulations in this part. Along with each recommendation, the MHCC must set forth pertinent data and arguments in support of the action sought. The Secretary will either: Accept or modify the recommendation and publish it for public comment in accordance with section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553), along with an explanation of the reasons for any such modification; or reject the recommendation entirely, and provide to the MHCC a written explanation of the reasons for the rejection. This section does not supersede section 605 of the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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G:\JLALL\CASES\CIVIL\09-0702\90daydismissal.wpd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Jelani Johnson, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

City of Concord, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 09-0702 JL

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties hereto, by their counsel, having advised the court that they have agreed

to a settlement of this cause, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this cause of action be

dismissed with prejudice; provided, however that if any party hereto shall certify to this

court, within ninety days, with proof of service thereof, that the agreed consideration for

said settlement has not been delivered over, the foregoing order shall stand vacated and

this cause shall forthwith be restored to the calendar to be set for trial.

DATED: January 28, 2010

__________________________________

 James Larson

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-00702-JL Document 27 Filed 01/28/10 Page 1 of 1
#### § 3286.813 Inclusion in state plan.

If a state installation program is included in a state plan approved in accordance with § 3282.302 of this chapter, the state installation program is subject to all of the requirements for such a state plan, including annual review by HUD.
FILED

January 23, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

DECEMBER SESSION, 1997

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9701-CC-00037

)

Appellee, ) NO. 5970 BELOW

)

)

) HARDEMAN COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JON KERRY BLACKWOOD

GEORGE E. WOODS, ) JUDGE

)

Appellant. )

ORDER

Appellant was convicted upon pleas of guilty to driving on a revoked

license and speeding. He was tried by a jury and acquitted of charges that he

possessed over .5 grams of cocaine. For the driving on a revoked license

conviction, Appellant was sentenced to three months incarceration in the county

jail with 75% service required; he was also fined $50. Appellant was also fined

$25 for speeding. On appeal Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying

him probation or allowing him to serve his sentence on house arrest. After a

review of the record we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court

should be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The record reflects that Appellant has an extensive record of citations for

motor vehicle offenses including violations of the registration law, driving without

a license, improper vehicle license, and speeding. In addition in June, 1988,

Appellant was convicted of felonious possession of marijuana and served 45

days with the balance of a three year sentence suspended. While on probation
-2-

for the marijuana conviction Appellant was found guilty of cocaine possession.

In January, 1992, Appellant was again convicted of cocaine possesion and

placed on probation.

It is obvious that Appellant has generally disregarded this state’s drug and

motor vehicle laws. Prior probationary periods have not deterred Appellant’s

continued criminal activity. Under these circumstances we find no error in the

denial of a suspended sentence or other alternative sentence.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20,

Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

____________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE

___________________________________

J. CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE
(March 15, 1978)

#### Maurice Willer, Appellant, v Arthur Cooperman, as Chairman of the Workmen’s Compensation Board of the State of New York, Respondent.

In an action, *inter alia,*to review respondent’s determination suspending petitioner’s authorization to participate as a physician in the workmen’s compensation program, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated February 16, 1978, which, *inter alia,*denied his motion to preliminarily enjoin the suspension. Order reversed, without costs or disbursements, and motion for a preliminary injunction granted on condition that plaintiff not seek or request an adjournment of the hearing now scheduled to be held before the Kings County Medical Society on April 6,1978, the preliminary injunction to be effective until the determination by the medical society at the conclusion of the hearing. Plaintiff was afforded neither a hearing nor notice of the charges against him prior to his suspension. There is no indication in the record that the public health, safety or welfare required the emergency action of a suspension prior to a hearing (cf. *Gerard v Barry,*59 AD2d 901). Mollen, P. J., Hopkins, Martuscello and Damiani, JJ., concur.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

 

242 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________________

No. 97-60552

(Summary Calendar)

__________________________

DANIEL S. CORNACCHIONE, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FORREST COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(96-CV-159)

__________________________________________________

July 21, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this Americans with Disabilities Act2 (“ADA”) case,

Plaintiff-Appellant Daniel S. Cornacchione, Sr. appeals the

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DefendantAppellant Forrest County General Hospital (“Forrest General”).

Cornacchione argues that the district court erred in concluding

that (1) Cornacchione was not “disabled” for purposes of the ADA;

(2) Forrest General reasonably accommodated him; and (3) Forrest

General did not discriminate against him because of a disability.
2

After a de novo review of the record, the briefs submitted by

the parties, and the applicable law, we reach the same conclusions

as did the district court for the same reasons articulated by that

court in its Memorandum Opinion and Order. Accordingly, as there

is no genuine issue of material fact, the district court’s decision

granting summary judgment in favor of Forrest General is, in all

respects,

AFFIRMED.
§ 35.155 Minimum requirements. ( a ) Nothing in subparts B, C, D, F through M, and R of this part is intended to preclude a designated party or owner from conducting additional evaluation or hazard reduction measures beyond the minimum requirements established for each program in this regulation. For example, if the applicable subpart requires visual assessment, the designated party may choose to perform a risk assessment in accordance with § 35.1320. Similarly, if the applicable subpart requires interim controls, a designated party or owner may choose to implement abatement in accordance with § 35.1325.
( b ) To the extent that assistance from any of the programs covered by subparts B, C, D, and F through M of this part is used in conjunction with other HUD program assistance, the most protective requirements prevail.
[64 FR 50202, Sept. 15, 1999, as amended at 82 FR 4167, Jan. 13, 2017]
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Solo Cup Company (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 28, 2008 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert D. Koney, Jr., as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ Robert D. Koney, Jr.

Robert D. Koney, Jr.

Chief Financial Officer

March 16, 2009
<PAGE>
 
 
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11

            STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
 
 
                                        Three Months Ended   Nine Months Ended
                                        September 29, 1996  September 29, 1996
                                        ------------------  ------------------
<S>                                     <C>                 <C>
PRO FORMA:
 
Primary
 
Average shares outstanding                    1,770,000           1,770,000

Adjustment to reflect shares issued to
   reflect S corporation distributions            8,806              (1,185)
                                             ----------          ----------
 
Total                                         1,778,806           1,768,815
                                             ==========          ==========
 
Pro forma net income                         $  205,498          $  496,319
                                             ==========          ==========
 
Per Common Share amount                      $     0.12          $     0.28
                                             ==========          ==========
 
</TABLE>
Fully diluted earnings per Common Share and primary earnings per Common Share
are the same for the three and nine months ended September 29, 1996.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 40589 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff–Appellee,

versus JOEL MELO-CEDANO, Also Known as Joel Melo-Serrano, Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 1:15 -CR- 741 -1

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
Joel Melo-Cedano appeals his conviction of illegal reentry in violatio n of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). He challenges the constitutionality of § 1326, claim

ing that “[o]rganic principles of American law (the law of nations) prohibits [ sic ] Congressional criminalization of America’s borders.” He maintains that

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 16, 2016 Lyl e W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-40589 Document: 00513800728 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/16/2016No. 16

- 40589

2 “[c]riminalizing borders is anathema to the law of nations (an organic part of America’s common law).” He posits that § 1326 is un con stitutional as applied to him because he was under the impression that he could apply for adjustment of status only from within the United States. The gover nment has moved for summary affirmance in lieu of filing an appellate brief or, alternatively, for an extension of time to fi le its brief. Melo- Cedano has moved to file an untimely response to the motion for summary affirmance.
Because Melo -Cedano did not present the foregoing issues to the district court , our review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Howard , 766 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied , 135 S. Ct. 1015 (2015). To estab

lish plain error, Melo-Cedano must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes such a showing, this court has the discre

tion to correct the error, but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id

. Melo-Cedano has not shown any clear or obvious error with respect to the constitutionality of § 1326. S ee United States v. Comstock , 560 U.S. 126, 135

- 36 (2010); Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135. In addition, “the crime of illegal re

entry is not a specific intent crime, and a mistake of law is thus not a defense.” United States v. Flores -Martinez , 677 F.3d 699, 712 (5th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, Melo

- Cedano’s as

- applied challenge to the constitutionality of § 1326 is insufficient to show error, plain or otherwise. See id. ; Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135. The motion for summary affirmance is DENIED. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis , 406 F.2d 1158 , 116 2 (5th Cir. 1969). The government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file its brief is DENIED as un necessary
. Melo- Cedano’s motion to file an untimely response is GRANTED. The judgment is AFFIRMED. Case: 16-40589 Document: 00513800728 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/16/2016
a

84°00"

oa

NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE
HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEY INDEX

31°

30°

26°

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

30
7 1 AYCROSS
PRTMAN | MERGE nN
TALLANAE “Tass ‘
chara mee

DEPTH
GRADIENTS
Meters
°

Feet ‘
°

max depth

max depth

COMTOURS IN METERS

VALDOSTA

—borovr

82°00"
### §485h–7. Amendment of repayment contract for payment of annual installments in two parts

In any repayment contract which provides for payment of construction charges by single annual installments, the Secretary may by agreement with the contracting organization amend such contract to provide for the payment of such annual installments in two parts on such dates in the calendar year as may best enable the contracting organization to meet its payments.

(Pub. L. 87–613, §3, Aug. 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 408.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was not enacted as part of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 which comprises this subchapter.
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Stipulation re Dismissal 1

LAURENCE F. PADWAY, #89314

Law Offices of Laurence F. Padway

1516 Oak Street, Suite 109

Alameda, California 94501

Telephone: (510)814-0680

Facsimile : (510)814-0650

Attorneys for plaintiff

ALFREDO LEON OREA

SEAN P. NALTY (SBN #121253)

SHIVANI NANDA (SBN# 235891)

WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, 

 EDELMAN& DICKER LLP

525 Market Street, 17th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105

Telephone: (415) 433-0990

Facsimile: (415) 434-1370

Attorneys for Defendant FS SAN FRANCISCO 

EMPLOYMENT, INC.’s LONG TERM

DISABILITY PLAN and Real Party in Interest LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFREDO LEON OREA, No. C09-02538 WHA

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED]

Plaintiff, ORDER RE DISMISSAL 

vs. 

FS SAN FRANCISCO 

EMPLOYMENT, INC.’s LONG TERM

DISABILITY PLAN,

Defendant.

______________________________/

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

NORTH AMERICA,

Real Party In Interest

______________________________/

Whereas, settlement in the above matter has been reached. The parties, by and through their

respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree that the above named action be dismissed,

with prejudice and in its entirety as to each party and Real Party in Interest, with each party to be

Case 3:09-cv-02538-WHA Document 47 Filed 04/28/10 Page 1 of 2
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Stipulation re Dismissal 2

responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs.

Date: April 28, 2010 WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER LLP

By: /s/ 

SEAN P. NALTY 

SIVANI NANDA

Attorneys for Defendant FS SAN FRANCISCO 

EMPLOYMENT, INC.’s LONG TERM

DISABILITY PLAN and Real Party in Interest LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

Date: April 27, 2010 LAW OFFICES OF LAURENCE F. PADWAY

By: /s/ 

LAURENCE F. PADWAY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Alfredo Leon Orea

PURSUANT TO STIPULATION, IT IS ORDERED that this matter is dismissed with

prejudice as to all parties, all real parties in interest, and all claims for relief, each party to be

responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs.

Date: By: 

Honorable William H. Alsup

United States District Court Judge

April 28, 2010.

U

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge William Alsup

Case 3:09-cv-02538-WHA Document 47 Filed 04/28/10 Page 2 of 2