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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

October 28, 2006 

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

 UNITED STATES SENATE 

 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

 COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities 

(SIGIR-06-032) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. This review was requested by the 

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. In his request, the 

Chairman stated that a critical element of the reconstruction effort in Iraq is the development 

of logistics support capabilities for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior. In order for the ISF to independently conduct combat and other 

operations, the Ministries of Defense and Interior along with the Ministry of Finance need to 

develop the organizations, infrastructure, policies and systems to manage and sustain 

logistics capabilities over the long-term. 

We considered comments from the Defense Reconstruction Support Office, the MultiNational Force-Iraq, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and the MultiNational Corps-Iraq on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. Their 

comments are addressed in the report, where applicable, and copies of the response letters 

from the Multi-National Force-Iraq and Defense Reconstruction Support Office are included 

in the Management Comments section of this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, 

please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott (joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil / 703-604-0982, or in 

Baghdad at 703-343-7926); or Mr. Steven H. Sternlieb (steven.sternlieb@sigir.mil / 703-428-

0240). See Appendix F for the report distribution. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

 Inspector General 

cc: See Distribution 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SIGIR-06-032 October 28, 2006 

Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities 

Executive Summary 

Introduction. The Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq lays out the 

goals and general framework to achieve security and stability in Iraq to include building 

the capacity of the Iraqi government to defeat terrorists and neutralize insurgents and 

illegal armed groups. On October 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) reported 

to the Congress that the development and fielding of the Iraqi logistics’ capabilities1 is a 

critical component for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in conducting security operations 

independently.2 Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) is using funds from both the Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund to build the 

logistics capabilities of the Iraqi Army under the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi local 

and national police forces under the Ministry of Interior. Our report is limited to the use 

of IRRF to achieve these goals, while the DoD Office of Inspector General and the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office have been charged with reporting on Iraq Security 

Forces Fund expenditures. As of August 1, 2006, the United States had spent $666 

million from the IRRF on the development and fielding of these capabilities. 

Objectives. The purpose of this review was to identify whether efforts to build logistics 

capabilities within the ISF are being properly managed and are achieving their intended 

outcomes. Specifically, the objectives of the audit were to determine: 

 

• DoD’s plans and timelines for implementing a functioning logistics operation 

within the ISF 

• plans and timelines for transitioning a sustainable and maintainable logistics 

operation to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior for sustaining 

and maintaining the force structure 

• barriers and resource limitations to the success of long-term sustainment 

capabilities within the ISF 

To respond to the audit objectives, we structured the report in two sections to discuss the 

findings. The first section focuses on the development of the Iraqi Army logistics 

capabilities within the Ministry of Defense. The Iraqi Army and its support forces 

comprise about 98% of the total force that the MNF-I is training for the Ministry of 

Defense. Because the Iraqi Navy and Air Force will not be fully formed until at least the 

summer of 2007, we focused on MNF-I’s efforts in the Ministry of Defense to implement 

logistics capabilities to support the Iraqi Army. The assessment centered on the 

 

1

 ISF logistics capabilities include the ability to maintain equipment, provide the supply support to the 

security forces, transport personnel and equipment, and maintain the health of Iraqi soldiers and police. 2

 DoD submitted its October 13, 2005, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq report to the Congress 

pursuant to Section 1024 of Public Law 109-13 (for reporting through the end of fiscal year 2006). 

i
development of the Iraqi Army’s tactical and operational maintenance, transportation, 

supply, and health logistics support. The second section focuses on the development of 

the logistics capabilities of the Ministry of Interior and its local and national police 

forces. 

Results. MNF-I has made some progress in its efforts to build effective logistics 

capabilities within the Iraqi Army and to transition these capabilities to the control of the 

Ministry of Defense. However, significant challenges remain that put at risk MNF-I’s 

goal to transition a sustainable and maintainable logistics operation to the Ministry of 

Defense by January 1, 2008. Further, we found that the planning for the logistics 

capabilities for the Ministry of Interior is incomplete. Consequently, we also believe that 

MNF-I will face significant challenges in implementing and transitioning logistics 

capabilities to the Ministry of Interior and its local and national police forces.

Ministry of Defense. MNF-I has much to do to meet its goal of implementing logistics 

capabilities within the Iraqi Army, to transition these to Ministry of Defense control 

periodically over the next 14 months, and to transfer all capabilities by January 1, 2008. 

Although MNF-I does not know how many logistics personnel it has trained, MNF-I has 

made some progress in its efforts to build logistics capabilities within the Iraqi Army and 

to transition these capabilities to the control of the Ministry of Defense. Nevertheless, 

significant challenges remain that put MNF-I’s goal at risk: 

• Adequate personnel to train Iraqi Army logistics units – MNF-I has 

acknowledged that it has an insufficient number of logistics personnel in Iraq to 

train Iraqi Army logistics units simultaneously and that it has not developed a 

plan to address this shortfall. MNF-I told us that it is considering using a trainthe-trainer model, in which Iraqi logistics soldiers who have already been trained 

would be paired with other Iraqi soldiers. This would maximize the number of 

trained personnel. MNF-I has yet to commit to this course of action. 

• Ensuring that there are enough trained soldiers to implement its plans—the 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) could not tell us 

how many personnel have been trained to support these logistics functions. 

Further, not all trained soldiers are assigned to and remain with logistics units, 

particularly for operational-level logistics units that require personnel with 

advanced specialty training, such as doctors, nurses, medics, and mechanics. 

• Ensuring that the Ministry of Defense provides enough funds to sustain the 

logistics capabilities that MNF-I is planning to transfer to Iraqi Army control in 

2007—MNSTC-I estimates that it will cost the Ministry of Defense about $3.5 

billion to sustain its operations in 2007. Because the Ministry of Defense’s 

budget has not been submitted to or approved by the Iraqi Parliament, it is not 

possible to assess whether the Ministry of Defense is prepared to provide 

sufficient funds to support logistics capabilities in 2007. 

Ministry of Interior. MNF-I does not expect to complete its plans to develop the 

logistics capabilities within the Ministry of Interior until the end of November 2006. 

Once finalized, we believe that MNF-I will face significant challenges that will put its 

plans at risk: 

ii
• Implementing its plan and achieving logistics capabilities within the Ministry of 

Interior—because the Ministry does not control the Iraqi Police Service.3 

• Training enough logistics personnel to implement its plans—because MNF-I 

plans are not yet final, there can be no assurance that MNSTC-I is planning to 

train enough police forces logistics personnel by the end of 2006. 

• Ensuring that the Ministry of Interior provides enough funds to sustain the 

logistics capabilities of the Iraqi police forces in 2007—MNSTC-I estimates it 

will cost the Ministry of Interior about $2.4 billion to sustain its operations in 

2007. Because the Ministry of Interior’s budget has also not been submitted to or 

approved by the Iraqi Parliament, it is not possible to assess whether the Ministry 

of Interior is prepared to provide sufficient funds to support logistics capabilities 

in 2007. 

Given the challenges that MNF-I faced within the Ministry of Interior, we believe that 

there is a significant risk that even if the initial goal to develop a sustainable logistics 

capability plan is achieved by the end of November 2006, the Ministry of Interior will not 

be capable of assuming and sustaining logistics support for the Iraqi local and national 

police forces in the near term. 

Related Observation. During the audit we examined data that the Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) used to track its expenditures for supplies and other services that it 

provided to the ISF from January through June 2006. We found that the MNC-I did not 

account for a relatively small amount of the funds (about $900,000) that were spent in 

this period. We also found that neither 22% of the funds spent to support the Iraqi Armed 

Forces nor 84% of the funds spent to support the Iraqi local and national police forces 

were assigned to an appropriate supply category, although MNC-I was required to assign 

both. 

Management Actions. During this audit, we notified MNF-I of several discrepancies in 

the data MNC-I used to track its expenditures for supplies and other services that it 

provided to the ISF from January through June 2006. Although MNF-I has already made 

adjustments to the reporting process to improve the accuracy and consistency of MNC-I’s 

reporting, MNC-I officials said they would also take action to adjust the data to 

accurately reflect the historical costs of its logistics support to the ISF. Corrective action 

to improve data accuracy had not been completed as of the preparation of this report. 

Recommendations. We recommend that the Commanding General, MNF-I, direct his 

staff and MNF-I subordinate commands to take these actions: 

1. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, identify Iraqi Army logistics 

personnel requirements and formulate a plan for training these personnel. 

2. In cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, identify Iraqi local and national 

police forces logistics personnel requirements and formulate a plan for training 

these personnel. 

3. On receipt of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior budgets for 

2007, identify the extent to which they adequately support the logistics 

capabilities that MNF-I plans to transfer to it. 

 

3

 The Iraqi Police Service is the name for the local police force. 

iii
Developing and fielding Iraqi logistics capabilities is a critical component of the U.S. 

government effort to help the ISF of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior 

become capable of independently conducting security operations. Therefore, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take these actions: 

4. Provide Congress an assessment in the quarterly report, Measuring Security and 

Stability in Iraq,4 to include: 

a. details of MNF-I’s plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to 

train ISF logistics personnel, for both the Ministry of Defense and the 

Ministry of Interior 

b. the adequacy of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior 

budgets to support their respective logistics capability 

Management Comments and Audit Response. We received written comments from 

MNF-I and, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, from the Defense Reconstruction 

Support Office (DRSO). MNF-I concurred with our recommendations. DRSO said that 

it would include our recommended information in its quarterly report, Measuring 

Security and Stability in Iraq—to the extent the information reflects the statutory scope 

of the report. However, DRSO also stated that our recommended assessment is outside 

the scope of the current legislation. DRSO asserted that information contained in the 

quarterly report is directed by law and that DRSO follows the statutory language in 

determining content. The comments from MNF-I and DRSO are included in the 

Management Comments section of this report. 

We disagree with the DRSO response. We believe that the assessments recommended to 

be part of the DoD quarterly report are well within the scope of current legislation. 

Specifically, Section 9010 (c) of the National Defense Appropriations Act for 2007, 

Public Law 109-289, directs that the report address, at a minimum, the operational 

readiness status of the Iraqi military forces, key criteria for assessing the capabilities and 

readiness of the Iraqi police and other Ministry of Interior forces, and goals for achieving 

certain readiness and capability levels. As discussed, the Commanding General, MNF-I, 

stated on August 30, 2006, that logistics capabilities were one of the key enablers to help 

get the ISF to the point where they can provide security independent of U.S. and coalition 

forces. As a result, we believe that including in the quarterly report an assessment of 

MNF-I’s logistics support plans and the Iraqi government’s willingness to provide 

funding to maintain logistics capabilities is both appropriate and necessary. 

MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I also provided technical comments and additional 

documentation in response to a draft of this report. We considered this information in 

finalizing our report, making revisions as appropriate. 

 

4

 DoD submits this quarterly report to the Congress under Section 9010 of Public Law 109-148 (a 

continuation of the reporting through the end of fiscal year 2006, as also required under Section 1024 of 

Public Law 109-13), and Public Law 109-289 (for reporting through the end of fiscal year 2007). 

iv
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 

Background 1 

Objectives 3 

Findings 

Development of Iraqi Army Logistics Capabilities 4 

Development of Ministry of Interior and Local and National Police Forces 

 Logistics Capabilities 13 

Related Observations 17 

Conclusion and Recommendations 18

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 21 

B. IRRF Expenditures for ISF Logistics Capabilities 24 

C. Descriptions of Iraqi Army Logistics Units 25 

D. Iraqi Army Logistics Personnel Authorizations 27 

E. Acronyms 28 

F. Report Distribution 29 

G. Audit Team Members 31 

Management Comments 

Multi-National Force-Iraq 32 

Defense Reconstruction Support Office 34 
Introduction 

Background 

The Administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq lays out the goals and general 

framework to achieve security and stability in Iraq to include building the capacity of the 

Iraqi government to defeat terrorists and neutralize insurgents and illegal armed groups. 

On October 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) reported to the Congress that the 

development and fielding of the Iraqi logistics’ capabilities is a critical component for the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in conducting security operations independently.5 The 

Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) stated on August 30, 

2006, that logistics capabilities were one of the key enablers to help get the ISF to the 

point (in the next 12-17 months) where they can provide security in Iraq independent of 

U.S. and coalition forces. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the development of the ISF’s logistics 

capabilities on February 1, 2005. In response, MNF-I and its subordinate commands 

initiated the development of separate of logistics support concepts for the Iraqi 

government’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. The intent of each “Concept” 

is to broadly outline and describe the desired long-term logistics capabilities for the 

Ministry of Defense’s Iraqi Armed Forces, which encompasses the Iraqi Army, Air 

Force, and Navy; and the Ministry of Interior’s local and national police forces, 

consisting of the Iraqi Police Service (i.e. the local police), National Police, and Support 

Forces.6

 These Concepts govern operational orders and other plans to develop and 

implement logistics capabilities within the ISF including the ability to maintain 

equipment, supply security forces, transport personnel and equipment, and maintain the 

health of Iraqi soldiers and police. 

MNF-I is using funds from both the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the 

Iraq Security Forces Fund to build these logistics capabilities.7 As of August 1, 2006, the 

United States had spent about $666 million from the IRRF to build the logistics 

capabilities of the Iraqi Army under the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi local and 

national police forces under the Ministry of Interior. This includes expenditures of about 

$596 million for the Ministry of Defense and $70 million for the Ministry of Interior, and 

represents 13.3% of the $5.0 billion of the IRRF allocated to reconstructing Iraq’s 

Security and Law Enforcement infrastructure. These expenditures are discussed in more 

detail in Appendix B. The DoD Office of the Inspector General and the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office are charged with reporting on Iraq Security Forces 

Fund expenditures. Therefore, the Iraq Security Forces Fund expenditures are not 

discussed in this report. 

 

Department of Defense Program Responsibilities. The U.S.-led MNF-I, headquartered 

in Baghdad, Iraq, leads coalition efforts to train, equip, and organize ISF. These efforts 

are executed by two subordinate commands for MNF-I. The Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) conducts the initial organization, training, and 

 

5

 DoD submitted its October 13, 2005 Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq report to the Congress 

pursuant to Section 1024 of Public Law 109-13 (for reporting through the end of fiscal year 2006). 

6

 MNF-I does not currently count approximately 145,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel, who are 

under the control of the Ministry of Interior, as part of the ISF. 

7

 For the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund, see Public Law 108-11 and Public Law 108-106. For the 

Iraq Security Forces Fund, see Public Law 109-13. 

1
equipping of ISF, as well as develops the capabilities of the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior to execute contracts and prepare their budget submissions to the Ministry of 

Finance. The Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) provides on-the-job training of the ISF 

through mentoring and partnership arrangements. Both MNF-I commands conduct 

assessments of these forces, including ISF logistics commands and units, to determine the 

degree to which they can perform combat operations and other missions independent of 

MNF-I forces. 

 

Department of State Program Responsibilities. The Department of State’s Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office assists the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq in setting 

reconstruction policy and coordinating with the Commanding General, MNF-I. Although 

the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office initially was the lead U.S. agency providing 

expertise and operational assistance to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, these 

responsibilities were transferred to MNSTC-I on October 1, 2005, to ensure that the 

development of pivotal ministerial functions is synchronized with the development of 

ISF. Nevertheless, the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office is still responsible for 

managing the IRRF and assisting the Ministry of Finance with building the annual Iraqi 

government budget submission to the Iraqi Parliament. 8

 The submission for 2007 will 

include the proposed budget for the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior and was due 

to be presented to the Iraqi Parliament by October 10, 2006, for the upcoming calendar 

year, but this did not occur. 

Design of the Concept of Logistics Support for the Ministry of Defense. The Concept 

of Logistics Support for the Ministry of Defense (the “Concept”) was approved by the 

Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s planning and operations committee and the Multi-National 

Force-Iraq on March 1, 2006. The Concept describes the roles of Ministry of Defense 

components to execute logistics functions at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

These responsibilities are divided in the following manner: 

• At the strategic level, the Ministry of Defense Director General of Acquisition, 

Logistics and Infrastructure manages and controls Iraqi Armed Forces acquisition 

of goods and services, logistics and infrastructure operations, and the national 

supply and maintenance systems. 

• At the operational level, the Support Command is responsible for planning, 

coordinating, directing, and monitoring the activities of Taji National Depot and 

the Regional and Garrison support units in support of Iraqi Armed Forces tactical 

units. 

• At the tactical level, the Iraqi Army divisions and Navy and Air Force squadrons 

have their own logistics units that are integrated within the divisions and 

squadrons to provide support during combat operations and other missions. 

Design of the Concept of Logistics Support for the Ministry of Interior. 

Development of the Ministry of Interior Logistic Handbook, which describes the concept 

of logistics support for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, was completed by MNSTC-I and 

approved by MNF-I at the end of September 2006. This Concept enumerates national, 

provincial, and district-level responsibilities and processes for the Ministry of Interior and 

its local and national police forces. Although MNSTC-I has discussed the Concept with 

 

8

 The Iraqi government’s fiscal year is the same as the normal calendar year and thus begins on January 1, 

2007. The Ministries of Defense and Interior were to provide their annual budget submissions to the 

Ministry of Finance on July 15, 2006, but these were not submitted until the beginning of October 2006. 

2
the Ministry of Interior, Ministry officials had not formally agreed to implement the 

Concept as of the preparation of our report. Further, MNF-I has not yet finalized its 

logistics support plans for the Ministry of Interior. As MNF-I’s plans were not yet 

finalized, our review was limited to observations of MNF-I’s ongoing efforts for planning 

and transitioning logistics capabilities to the Ministry of Interior. We also identified 

potential challenges that MNF-I will likely face in implementing the Concept, if and 

when it is agreed to by the Iraqi government. 

Objectives 

The purpose of this review was to identify whether efforts to build logistics capabilities 

within the ISF are being properly managed and are achieving their intended outcomes. 

Specifically, the objectives of the audit were to determine: 

 

• DoD’s plans and timelines for implementing a functioning logistics operation 

within the ISF 

• plans and timelines for transitioning a sustainable and maintainable logistics 

operation to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior for sustaining 

and maintaining the force structure 

• barriers and resource limitations to the success of long-term sustainment 

capabilities within the ISF 

To respond to the audit objectives, we structured the report in two sections to discuss our 

findings. The first section focuses on the development of the Iraqi Army’s logistics 

capability within the Ministry of Defense. The Iraqi Army and its support forces 

comprise about 98% of the total force that MNF-I is training for the Ministry of Defense. 

Because the Iraqi Navy and Air Force will not be fully formed until at least the summer 

of 2007, we focused our report on MNF-I’s efforts to implement logistics capabilities to 

support the Iraqi Army. The assessment centered on the development of the Iraqi Army’s 

tactical and operational maintenance, transportation, supply, and health logistics support. 

The second section focuses on the development of the logistics capabilities of the 

Ministry of Interior and its local and national police forces. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, 

see Appendix A. For a description of IRRF expenditures, see Appendix B. For 

descriptions of the Iraqi Army logistics units, see Appendix C. For a listing of Iraqi 

Army logistics personnel authorizations, see Appendix D. For definitions of the 

acronyms used in this report, see Appendix E. For a list of the report’s distribution, see 

Appendix F. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix G. 

3
Development of Iraqi Army Logistics Capabilities 

MNF-I plans to implement a functioning logistics operation within the Iraqi Army and 

transition these operations to the Ministry of Defense by January 1, 2008. By that time, 

MNF-I expects the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense to be able to self-sustain its 

forces and maintain the logistics capabilities that MNF-I transferred to them. MNF-I is 

building what it terms “good enough” tactical and operational logistics capabilities within 

the Iraqi Army. By “good enough” MNF-I means that the Iraqi Army’s 10 divisions can 

only conduct counter-insurgency combat operations and other types of missions in their 

geographic areas of responsibility within Iraq. The logistics capabilities being developed 

include maintenance, transportation, supply, and health logistics capabilities, which are 

intended to be executed by several different types of logistics units as specified in the 

Concept of Logistics Support for the Ministry of Defense (herein referred to as the 

“Concept”). While MNF-I has processes in place to transition this capability, including 

equipment and facilities, to the Ministry of Defense, it faces the challenges of having 

enough logistics trainers, having enough trained Iraqi personnel to support the logistics 

Concept, and ensuring that the Ministry of Defense sufficiently budgets for enough funds 

to sustain this capability over time. 

Building Capabilities 

There are seven types of logistics units envisioned in the Concept for the Iraqi Ministry 

of Defense’s logistics capability, as shown in Table 1. The table lists the types of 

logistics units, the number required by the Concept, and the dates on which these units 

are expected to transition to the control of the Ministry of Defense. 

Table 1: Iraqi Army Logistics Units Transition Timelines 

Type of Unit Required 

by the Concepta

Number of Units 

Required by the 

Concept 

Projected Transition 

Date for 

all Units 

Headquarters and Services Company 158b December 2007 

Motorized Transportation Regiment 9 May 2007 

Mechanized Logistics Battalion 4 June 2007 

Regional Support Unit 5 June 2007 

Garrison Support Unit 77 December 2007 

Taji National Depot 1 December 2007 

Support Command 1 December 2007 

Notes: a

 See Appendix C for descriptions of the units. 

b This total includes Headquarters and Services Companies that are part of the Iraqi Army battalion, 

brigade, and divisional headquarters for the 10 divisions; and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command. It does 

not include Headquarters and Services Companies resident in the Motorized Transportation Regiments 

and Mechanized Logistics Battalions.

Source: MNF-I as of September 30, 2006. 

4
Implementing “Good Enough” Logistics Capabilities within the Iraqi Army. MNF-I 

plans to build logistics capabilities within the Iraqi Army that are “good enough” to 

enable independent counter-insurgency operations. As discussed earlier, by “good 

enough” MNF-I means that the Iraqi Army’s 10 divisions can only conduct counterinsurgency combat operations and other types of missions in their geographic areas of 

responsibility within Iraq. For example, the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divisions will only be 

able to sustain combat operations and other missions for five days without being resupplied by its Regional Support Unit. Because MNF-I pursued a “good enough” 

solution to building the Iraqi Army’s logistics capabilities, some of these divisions’ 

tactical supply capability resides at its Regional Support Unit rather than within these 

divisions. 

MNF-I has been developing the Concept since early 2005 in accordance with the 

directive from the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to MNF-I 

officials, the Concept was based on the United Kingdom’s model of logistics support. 

Supply consumption rates and personnel manning data were determined using standard 

U.S. Army logistics rules and analytical software. Once the analysis was completed, 

MNF-I went through an iterative process using professional military judgment to make 

adjustments to the analysis. On March 1, 2006, the current version of the Concept was 

approved by the Ministry of Defense’s planning and operations committee and MNF-I. 

The Concept states that maintenance, supply, transportation, and health support are the 

key logistics functions required to sustain Iraqi Army combat and other types of 

operations. These four support functions will be implemented by logistics units that are 

being formed across two tactical and two operational “lines of support” pursuant to the 

Concept. These functions are defined in the following way: 

• Maintenance support: the service, repair and overhaul of vehicles, weapons, 

aircraft, watercraft, and other equipment 

• Supply support: the procurement, receiving, storing, issue and accounting of all 

types, or classes, of supplies such as food, fuel, ammunition, and spare parts for 

vehicles 

• Transportation support: the movement of personnel, cargo and liquids, and 

equipment 

• Health support: the integrated medical system to promote, improve, conserve, or 

restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Iraqi Army 

At the tactical level, units will be integrated with Iraqi Army infantry or mechanized 

divisions.9

 For example, a Headquarters and Services Company will provide 

maintenance, transportation, and supply support to either type of division. Other 

logistical units are specialized to support either an infantry or mechanized division. For 

example, a Motorized Transportation Regiment will provide both maintenance and 

transportation support to an infantry division whereas Mechanized Logistics Battalions 

provide this support to the one mechanized division in the Iraqi Army. 

At the operational level the Concept has stand-alone units that provide logistics support 

to the Iraqi Army divisions. These include the Regional Support Units and their 

subordinate Garrison Support Units, which provide maintenance, supply, and health 

support to the divisions. Each Regional Support Unit supports two Iraqi Army divisions 

located in their respective regions by providing support directly to the division or to the 

Garrison Support Units that operate and maintain the Iraqi Army’s bases and support the 

 

9

 The mechanized division combines tank and infantry battalions in each of its three brigades. 

5
divisions while they are in garrison on a base. Depending on its size and purpose, some 

Garrison Support Units also provide maintenance and/or health support to Iraqi Army 

divisions. Also at the operational level, Taji National Depot provides maintenance and 

supply logistics support to all Iraqi Army divisions. The Support Command, once 

formed, will oversee all of these operational level logistics units. 

As part of the “good enough” solution, there are no specific logistics units for some lines 

of support. For example, at the tactical level, health support is provided through a 

soldier’s combat lifesaver skills that are taught in basic training or by medics that are part 

of the Headquarters and Services Companies integrated with each division. Trauma 

surgery for combat-related injuries and other advanced health care will be provided by 

civilian hospitals run by the Ministry of Health. Other lines of support are currently 

performed by contractors rather than Iraqi Army personnel. For example, the Iraqi Army 

uses trucking contractors to provide transportation support. These contractors transport 

equipment and supplies from vendors and from sea and air ports to the Taji National 

Depot and the Regional Support Units; and from vendors directly to Regional Support 

Units. 

MNF-I officials we interviewed said that while the Ministry of Defense realizes that the 

current logistics capabilities of the Iraqi Army requires supplemental support from 

contractors, its goal is to have all support performed by Iraqi Army personnel and, in the 

future, they may build an additional Motorized Transportation Regiment to meet the 

additional transportation requirements. The Iraqi Army is also relying on contractor 

support for some operational level maintenance capabilities and base life support. 

Whether these contracts become a permanent part of the Iraqi Army’s logistics operations 

has not been determined. Table 2 depicts the tactical and operational units by lines of 

support for the nine infantry and one mechanized Iraqi Army divisions. 

Table 2: Logistics Units Arrayed by Level and Support Function 

Line of 

Supporta

Maintenance 

Support 

Transportation 

Support 

Supply 

Support 

Health 

Support 

First tactical 

level 

Headquarters and 

Services Company 

Headquarters and 

Services Company 

Headquarters and 

Services Company 

No Specific Unit 

Second tactical 

level 

Motorized 

Transportation 

Regiment or 

Mechanized 

Logistics Battalion 

Motorized 

Transportation 

Regiment or 

Mechanized 

Logistics Battalion 

Regional Support 

Unit or Mechanized 

Logistics Battalionb

Headquarters and 

Services Company 

First operational 

level 

Regional or Garrison 

Support Unit 

None 

(provided by 

contractors) 

Regional or Garrison 

Support Unit 

 Regional or 

Garrison Support 

Unit 

Second 

operational level 

Taji National Depot None 

(provided by 

contractors) 

Taji National Depotc None 

(to be provided by 

the Ministry of 

Health) 

Notes: a

 For clarity and consistency, we referred to the four lines of support by their tactical or operational levels in 

this report. 

b

 Second line supply support for the infantry divisions is provided by the supply company resident at the 

Regional Support Unit. 

c

 The Iraqi Army’s current ammunition supply point is part of the second operational level supply support. 

This will eventually be closed and instead each of the five Regional Support Units will have their own 

ammunition supply point. 

Source: SIGIR Analysis as of August 2006. See Appendix C for a description of the tactical and operational 

levels and units. 

6
Transitioning Capabilities to the Ministry of Defense. MNF-I has three types of 

processes for transitioning logistics support units, equipment, and facilities to Iraqi 

control. First, MNF-I uses a structured process known as the “Transition Readiness 

Assessment” that it developed to determine when logistics units are ready to begin their 

transition to Iraqi Army control. As discussed in previous DoD and U.S. Government 

Accountability Office reports, this assessment process has been and is similar to the 

process DoD uses for rating the “readiness” of U.S. units to perform their missions.10

Second, for equipment transfers, MNF-I uses a paper process to transfer equipment, 

including weapons, to the Iraqi Army. Third, MNF-I, through MNSTC-I, has a welldefined process to transfer real property to the Iraqi Army and the Ministry of Defense. 

Transition Process for Logistics Units

The process by which MNF-I transitions logistics units to Iraqi control is usually set up in 

several phases over a period of time. Initial organizing, training, and equipping of Iraqi 

Army units is conducted by MNSTC-I. On-the-job training to get Iraqi units to a point 

where they can operate independently and be transitioned to Iraqi Army control is 

conducted by MNC-I. MNF-I assesses the progress of Iraqi logistics units by conducting 

a Transition Readiness Assessment of each individual unit, and these assessments are 

reported to the Commanding General, MNF-I, each month. The assessments are 

classified, and therefore, the ratings of specific logistics units are not discussed in this 

report. 

These assessments rate the readiness of an Iraqi Army unit by four levels of capability. 

These ratings start from when the unit is formed (level 4); to when it can fight side by 

side with MNF-I forces (level 3); to when it is deemed capable of controlling its own area 

of responsibility with coalition support (level 2); to when it is able to independently 

conduct operations (level 1). When a unit is rated level 2, MNF-I will begin the process 

to transition the unit to Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense control. An Iraqi Army unit 

will be rated level 2 when it has at least 85% of its equipment on hand and authorized 

personnel assigned. At this point, MNF-I begins the process of transitioning a level 2 

unit to Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense control. MNF-I’s priority has been on 

training Iraqi Army divisions to conduct counter-insurgency operations. 

In keeping with these priorities, MNF-I has focused on transitioning the tactical logistics 

units that integrated with the divisions. MNF-I has been most successful applying this 

process of building, training, and transitioning logistics units of the Motorized 

Transportation Regiments to Iraqi control within roughly 195 days. This is comprised of 

the following steps: 

• MNSTC-I conducts initial training and equipping of a Motorized Transportation 

Regiment in about 60 days. 

• MNC-I then conducts on-the-job training over a period of 90 days by partnering 

with the Motorized Transportation Regiment and integrating it into the MNC-I’s 

overall logistics system. In this way, the regiment learns by providing support to 

their parent Iraqi Army infantry division through current operations. 

• Once the Motorized Transportation Regiment and its parent division are 

determined to be capable of controlling its own area of responsibility with 

coalition support, MNC-I begins a 45-day validation process to ensure a smooth 

transition of the regiment to Iraqi control. 

 

10 See Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq (DoD, May 26, 2006) and Rebuilding Iraq: More 

Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges (GAO06-953T, July 11, 2006). 

7
MNF-I has already transitioned three of nine Motorized Transportation Regiments to 

Iraqi control with two more scheduled to transition to Iraqi control by the end of October 

2006. The remaining four Motorized Transportation Regiments are scheduled to 

transition to Iraqi control by May 2007. MNC-I will follow-up 60 days after each of the 

Motorized Transportation Regiments has been transitioned to the Iraqi Army to assess its 

performance. 

Transition Process for Equipment

MNF-I uses a paper process to transfer equipment to Iraqi Army logistics units. This 

process includes the receipt of an itemized list of equipment by serial number, vehicle 

identification number, or other unique identifying number. Equipment being transitioned 

to the Iraqi Army is counted out by MNF-I officials in front of an Iraqi Army officer or 

official. The Iraqi and MNF-I official then both sign the receiving document. This 

document is then scanned and sent to MNSTC-I and the paper copy is kept by the Iraqi 

Army unit. If the equipment is issued to a soldier, the process will be repeated and the 

solider is fully responsible for the cost of the equipment if it is lost or stolen. We found 

that MNF-I is on schedule to deliver 85% of all 17 key items, which includes assault 

rifles, uniforms, body armor, armored vehicles, and trucks; to each of the 10 Iraqi Army 

divisions by the end of 2006.11 

Nevertheless, MNF-I believes that the Iraqi Army has adequate procedures to maintain 

accountability, but these procedures have not been sufficiently enforced to date. 

Therefore, MNF-I and the Ministry of Defense are taking steps to improve the Iraqi 

Army’s enforcement of the procedures for the accountability of equipment. For example, 

on September 6, 2006, the Ministry of Defense published a manual describing how 

accountability of equipment should be maintained and audited. Also, MNF-I published 

an order requiring all MNC-I units to conduct a full inventory of the Iraqi Army’s 

equipment this fall to include serial numbers for weapons. This effort will correspond 

with a Ministry of Defense directive for all Iraqi Army battalions to have an official 

property book established by November 1, 2006. Although there is some degree of risk 

associated with a paper system and the Concept intends for information technology at the 

operational level to eventually automate logistics processes to improve accountability for 

equipment ordered and issued, five Iraqi Army units that we queried had accountability 

of weapons down to the individual to whom the weapon was issued. 

Transition Process for Real Property

As we previously reported,12 MNSTC-I has a well established process for transferring 

real property to the Ministry of Defense by using standard DoD facilities management 

procedures. MNSTC-I’s Real Property Transfer Report documents the facilities, 

infrastructure systems, site security and transition life support responsibility, such as base 

operations and maintenance and long-range capital investment requirements. This 

document serves as the basic information that feeds into the planning, programming, and 

budgeting processes required to effectively manage real property assets, and will provide 

Iraqi infrastructure engineers information to manage the transferred assets. MNSTC-I 

has responsibility for $324.7 million in IRRF construction projects related to the 

development of logistics capabilities in the Ministry of Defense to include the Iraqi 

Army. 

 

11 In a related report, we observed management control weaknesses in MNSTC-I’s processes for accounting 

for three types of weapons that were purchased with the IRRF for the ISF. Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons 

Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-

033, October 28, 2006). 

12 See Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government (SIGIR-06-006, April 29, 2006). 

8
For whole base transfers, MNSTC-I’s process entails a 120-day notification timeline. 

The process involves the Ministry of Defense in all phases of the transfer process from 

notification of transfer; to conducting a joint inventory and inspection of the property; to 

the official transfer ceremony and the handover of responsibility for life support and 

security. As of August 30, 2006, 32 of 82 forward operating bases and six other 

installations have been transferred to the Ministry of Defense. 

To manage the bases that were transferred and will be transferred to Iraqi Army control, 

in July 2006, the Ministry of Defense took over 62 base life support contracts from 

MNSTC-I to supplement the capabilities of Garrison Support Unit personnel. These 

contracts provide Iraqi Army soldiers with a variety of support, including food, water, 

morale items, and waste services while they are in garrison. According to MNSTC-I 

officials, this improvement in the ability to contract for these services marks an important 

increase in the strategic capability of the Ministry of Defense to execute contracts for 

services. Although there have been some reports of difficulties and contractors walking 

off the job in Al-Anbar province, according to one MNSTC-I general officer we met with 

MNSTC-I officials believe the transition of the services from MNSTC-I to the Ministry 

of Defense was successful and the responsibility for other types of services may be 

transferred in this manner. 

Potential Barriers and Resource Limitations. MNF-I will face three key challenges to 

the successful transition of logistics operations to the Ministry of Defense. MNF-I will 

need to determine: 

• how to increase its logistics training personnel 

• how many trained Iraqi Army logistics personnel are required and then properly 

assigned to conduct logistics operations 

• the cost of logistics operations and whether the Ministry of Defense is adequately 

budgeting to sustain logistics operations in 2007 and beyond 

If not overcome, these challenges could limit the long-term success of the Iraqi Army’s 

logistics operations. 

Training

In building logistics units, MNF-I would like to train all of the Iraqi Army logistics units 

in the same manner it has trained the Motorized Transportation Regiments. MNF-I does 

not, however, have enough qualified logistics training personnel resident in MNSTC-I or 

MNC-I to conduct training of other types of logistics units simultaneously. Therefore, 

MNF-I has discussed using the Motorized Transportation Regiments as a test bed to 

develop a “train-the-trainer” system, whereby maintenance and transportation personnel 

in the Motorized Transportation Regiment would train their counterparts in the 

Headquarters and Services Companies. However, MNF-I had not committed to this 

approach as of the preparation of this report. Additionally, MNF-I is looking to leverage 

lessons learned from transitioning the Motorized Transportation Regiments to improve 

the training of other logistics units. 

Personnel 

To plan for and successfully transition logistics operations to the Ministry of Defense, 

MNF-I faces challenges regarding the fielding and training of logistics personnel. MNF-I 

could not identify how many logistics personnel the Concept requires in order to be 

properly implemented. In the absence of MNF-I data, we calculated that between 37,800 

to 44,500 personnel will be required for the total number of logistics units required by the 

9
Concept to support the Iraqi Army.13 These numbers reflect between 85% and 100% of 

Iraqi Army personnel needed to fill the logistics units staffing as required by the Concept. 

After providing technical comments to our draft report that questioned our calculation, 

and upon further discussion, MNSTC-I officials we shared this information with agreed 

with our analysis. MNF-I is drafting an order to identify the number of additional Iraqi 

Army logistics personnel required to implement the Concept, but these numbers were not 

available as of the preparation of this report. 

MNF-I does not know how many logistics personnel it has trained because they do not 

have historical records due to a loss of computerized data. However, after reviewing a 

draft of this report, MNSTC-I officials provided information documenting that as of 

September 30, 2006, a total of 42,900 “support forces” have been trained since 2004. 

This total includes not only logistics personnel but also military police and 

communications and administrative personnel.14 Although MNSTC-I officials said the 

majority of the support personnel trained since 2004 were logistics personnel, MNSTC-I 

only had records available for about 6,900 Iraqi Army logistics personnel that were 

trained between January and September 2006. Further, according to MNSTC-I officials, 

their records for logistics personnel trained prior to 2006 were lost as a result of a 

network crash, thus not available for our review or their records. 

 

However, not all personnel receiving logistics training are currently assigned to logistics 

units. In some instances Iraqi Army division commanders divert trained logistics 

personnel to combat units; in other instances some decide to leave the army because Iraqi 

soldiers do not have a legal obligation to complete their service. MNF-I officials said the 

command is taking a proactive approach to address these issues directly with the Ministry 

of Defense. 

We believe that MNF-I still faces major challenges for ensuring that the personnel 

requirements for certain logistics specialties and operational-level units are met. For 

example, we found that the Iraqi Army is particularly short of trained medical personnel 

for health support. As of August 23, 2006, the Iraqi Army had 24% of its required 

doctors, 22% of its required nurses, 42% of its required medics, and 22% of its required 

pharmacists currently assigned to Iraqi Army units. Complicating this shortage, division 

commanders often assign Iraqi Army medics that are trained at the Iraqi Army Support 

and Services Institute to non-medic positions in rifle companies or to fill the needs of 

other units instead of assigning these medics to the medical platoons of the Headquarters 

and Services Companies. As one of the measures planned, MNF-I is to work with the 

Ministry of Defense to better identify medics and have the Ministry publish guidance 

requiring division commanders to assign these personnel to the Headquarters and 

Services Companies. Furthermore, Iraq is chronically short of doctors, nurses, and 

dentists across the country. We were told by MNSTC-I officials that the shortage of 

health support personnel exists because of the exodus from Iraq to avoid the violence in 

the country. In addition, the Iraqi Army has to compete with the Ministry of Health for 

 

13 See Appendix D for a discussion of how this estimate was calculated. Our estimate does not include the 

5,000 to 5,900 logistics personnel required to be assigned to the Iraqi Army divisions in the logistics 

section of division, brigade, or battalion command staffs or combat companies. 

 

14 MNSTC-I reported there were 9,600 support soldiers in the August 29, 2006, DoD Report to the 

Congress titled, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. According to MNSTC-I officials, these soldiers 

were reported under the general Support Forces category and had been trained to fill requirements in 

operational-level Iraqi Army units. Other support forces trained to meet tactical-level requirements were 

included in the category for the total number of Iraqi Army personnel trained by MNSTC-I. 

 

10
the medical personnel that remain in Iraq, further complicating the Iraqi Army’s 

recruitment and retention of qualified medical personnel, according to MNSTC-I 

officials. MNF-I has not yet completed a plan to address the shortage of health support 

personnel. 

We also found the logistics units comprising the Concept’s operational lines of support 

are severely undermanned. As of September 25, 2006, the five Regional Support Units 

were the best staffed operational level units with 49% (3,454) of their total minimum 

authorized personnel assigned. Of the 77 Garrison Support Units that are authorized by 

the Concept to support the Iraqi Army, only 5 are currently forming and MNF-I has not 

determined how it will organize the rest. Given this shortage of personnel, it is unclear 

how the Regional Support Units will be able to transition to Iraqi Army control by June 

2007 and how all 77 Garrison Support Units will transition by January 1, 2008. 

The lack of trained personnel assigned to these units has consequences. Since the Iraqi 

Army did not have the intrinsic capability to perform the maintenance that Regional and 

Garrison support units would provide, the U.S. Army awarded a National Maintenance 

Contract on May 19, 2005, to a U.S. contractor to provide vehicle maintenance for the 

Iraqi Army for an initial cost of $11.5 million to be funded with the IRRF. Over time, 

this contract expanded to include maintenance on vehicles, communications equipment, 

and night vision equipment. The contract is to expire on March 31, 2007, and has grown 

to a total cost of $247 million. The additional $235.5 million above the initial cost is to 

be paid from the Iraq Security Forces Fund. 

Under the terms of the contract, the contractor trained local Iraqis to be mechanics and to 

perform other supply functions. The intent was for these mechanics to become Iraqi 

Army civilian or uniformed mechanics when the Regional Support Units transitioned off 

the contract by January 2007 and the Garrison Support Units transitioned off the 

contracts by the end of March 2007. Although one Regional Support Unit transitioned its 

maintenance capability from the contractors to Iraqi Army control, MNSTC-I officials 

believe the contract will need to be extended through the end of 2007 to continue to build 

up the capability of the other Regional and Garrison support units.15 Moreover, three of 

the five Garrison Support Units being formed are not currently authorized to have 

mechanics, making it unlikely that these units could absorb contractor personnel into 

their staffs when the National Maintenance Contract expires. As a result, it is unclear 

when the Iraqi Army will have a fully functioning Iraqi-controlled maintenance 

capability. 

MNF-I’s plan to transition the Taji National Depot by January 1, 2008, may also be at 

risk. Although the equipment to operate and maintain the depot should be on site by the 

end of 2006, the depot only had 27% (274) of its minimum authorized personnel on 

September 25, 2006, but none were logistics support personnel. The 27% were soldiers 

with the depot’s security detachment. As the depot will require highly skilled logistics 

personnel to perform heavy grade maintenance such as vehicle overhauls or manage 

national stocks of supplies, it may take several years before the depot has enough 

mechanics and supply personnel to be fully operational and transitioned to Iraqi Army 

control, according to some MNF-I officials we interviewed. The U.S. Army Materiel 

Command currently has a team working with the Iraqi Army to improve the situation at 

 

15 DoD reported in its August 29, 2006, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq report that two Regional 

Support Units transitioned to Iraqi Army control. We determined that only the maintenance facility of one 

of the Regional Support Units transitioned off the National Maintenance Contract to the control of the Iraqi 

Army. 

11
the depot and develop a depot-level concept of operations and policy and procedures 

documents. 

Finally, the Support Command is responsible for commanding all operational level 

logistics units including the Taji National Depot, the five Regional Support Units, and the 

77 planned Garrison Support Units. MNF-I and the Ministry of Defense have developed 

doctrine for the Support Command. However, the command only exists on paper and no 

personnel have been assigned to it. As with the depot, this command requires highly 

trained logistics personnel to plan, coordinate, direct, and monitor operational level 

logistics support to sustain combat operations, and other types of missions, and forecast 

short- and long-term support requirements. Moreover, the Support Command is essential 

to carrying out and implementing the logistics policies that are being developed by the 

Ministry of Defense with MNF-I’s assistance. To address this shortfall of logistics 

command and control capability, MNF-I has worked with the Ministry of Defense to 

develop a nucleus of the Support Command within the Joint Headquarters to have 

oversight of current support operations. The effect of this, however, has been a blurring 

of the roles and responsibilities of the Joint Headquarters, which oversees all Iraqi Armed 

Forces operations for the Ministry of Defense, and what are intended to be the 

responsibilities of the Support Command, according to MNF-I officials. 

Funding

MNSTC-I has estimated the Ministry of Defense costs to sustain its overall operations at 

$3.5 billion in 2007. However, the Ministry of Defense had not finalized its budget 

submission with the Ministry of Finance for 2007 when this report was prepared. MNF-I 

officials told us that MNF-I has informed the Ministry of Defense that they will not 

provide any supplies or funds to sustain Iraqi Army operations in 2007 (except in an 

emergency). Therefore, it will be entirely up the Iraqi government to provide enough 

funding in the Ministry of Defense’s budget to sustain and maintain the logistics 

capabilities. However, since the budget for the Ministry of Defense has not been 

approved by the Iraqi Parliament, it is not possible to assess whether the Ministry of 

Defense is prepared to provide sufficient funds to support the logistics capabilities that 

MNF-I is planning on transitioning to it in 2007. 

12
Development of Ministry of Interior and Local 

and National Police Forces Logistics Capabilities 

DoD notified the Congress in its August 29, 2006, Measuring Security and Stability in 

Iraq report that the logistics systems for the Ministry of Interior were ineffective. In 

particular, DoD reported that the Ministry’s capabilities were inadequate to support the 

local and national police forces being trained by MNSTC-I. Further, there is a continued 

lack of clarity within the Ministry about the responsibilities of the central Ministry and 

provincial governments for sustaining local and national police forces. According to one 

MNSTC-I general officer, establishing effective logistics support processes will take time 

and effort. 

MNF-I officials stated that the command is in the final stages of completing its plans to 

build logistics capabilities within the Ministry of Interior and its local and national police 

forces—the Iraqi Police Service; the National Police; and the Support Forces, such as the 

Department of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate. Development of 

the Ministry of Interior Logistic Handbook, which describes the concept of logistics 

support (the Concept) for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, was completed by MNSTC-I and 

approved by MNF-I at the end of September 2006. 16 This Concept details national, 

provincial, and district-level responsibilities and processes for the Ministry of Interior and 

its local and national civilian police force logisticians. Although MNSTC-I has discussed 

the Concept with the Ministry of Interior, it has not yet been approved by Ministry 

officials. 

A conference for developing the Ministry of Interior’s logistics capabilities, anticipated to 

be held in October 2006, is to focus on the synchronization of MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and 

MNC-I efforts to build the Ministry of Interior logistics capabilities. The conference had 

not taken place by the time this report was prepared. Both the Concept and the 

conference are required to enable MNF-I to finalize its plans for building Ministry of 

Interior logistics capabilities by the end of November 2006. As MNF-I’s plans were not 

yet finalized, our review was limited to observations of MNF-I’s ongoing efforts for 

planning and transitioning logistics capabilities to the Ministry of Interior. We also 

identified potential challenges that MNF-I will likely face in implementing the Concept, 

if and when it is agreed to by the Iraqi government. 

Organization of the Ministry of Interior. The Deputy Minister for Administration is 

responsible for all logistics functions in the Ministry of Interior including approving all 

logistics decisions and expenditures ranging from fuel to vehicle maintenance to general 

office supplies. These responsibilities are delegated to the Director General of Logistics. 

This structure supports the logistics requirements of the national police forces reporting 

directly to the Ministry of Interior. The management and reporting structure of the 

various police forces reporting directly to the Ministry of Interior and logistically 

supported by the Director General of Logistics is comprised of: 

• National Police forces 

• Border Enforcement forces 

• Ports of Entry forces 

 

16 Despite its formal title of “Ministry of Interior Logistic Handbook”, MNSTC-I officials generically refer 

to this document as the concept of logistics support (i.e. the Concept). For clarity and consistency, we used 

the generic term in this report. 

13
Further, under the proposed Concept, the Iraqi Police Service which reports directly to 

the Provincial Governors could be supported by the Director General of Logistics on a 

cost-reimbursement basis. 

Logistics Planning for the Ministry of Interior. The “Concept” of logistics support for 

the Ministry of Interior was only recently completed in part because MNF-I had given top 

priority to building the logistics capabilities within the Ministry of Defense for the Iraqi 

Army based on security considerations. To focus attention and effort on the Ministry of 

Interior’s local and national police forces, MNF-I designated 2006 as the “Year of the 

Police.” Although MNSTC-I has been working on developing the logistics capabilities 

of the local and national police forces since 2004, and the management capabilities of the 

Ministry of Interior since at least June 2005, MNSTC-I only had three staff officers 

assigned to developing the Concept until July 2006. Since July, MNSTC-I increased its 

staffing to about ten officers and MNF-I attached a liaison officer to support MNSTC-I 

efforts to formulate the “Concept.” According to MNSTC-I officials, these additional 

resources made it possible for MNSTC-I to significantly increase the breadth and scope 

of the “Concept” during the months of July and August 2006. MNF-I approved the 

Concept at the end of September 2006. Although the “Concept” has been discussed with 

Ministry officials, and MNSTC-I is proceeding with its training of tactical forces in 

accordance with the Concept, there has been no formal agreement yet with Ministry 

officials to implement it. 

 

Unlike the Iraqi Army, where logistics units are being added to the force structure, the 

local and national police forces have generally been in place since the previous regime 

was in power according to MNSTC-I officials. To augment these structures, MNSTC-I 

has worked with the Ministry of Interior forces to train existing personnel as logisticians 

to manage and account for equipment and supplies. However, according to MNSTC-I 

officials, the local and national polices forces’ tactical capabilities to maintain their 

equipment was a continuing challenge that is being addressed. Further, the Ministry 

lacks the capabilities to transport supplies and equipment to Border Enforcement 

personnel stationed at forts along Iraq’s almost 2,400-mile border. Further, since the 

Concept has not been agreed upon, it is difficult to assess whether or not the existing 

cadre of personnel will be sufficient or adequately trained. 

Transitioning Security Operations, Equipment, and Facilities to the Ministry of 

Interior. To support the logistics capabilities being planned, MNF-I has processes for 

transitioning the security of provinces, equipment, and facilities to Ministry of Interior 

control. 

Security

As the local and national police forces are under either Ministry of Interior or provincial 

government control, MNF-I uses its transition readiness assessment process to measure 

the progress of each unit to operate independently. In commenting on the draft of this 

report, MNSTC-I officials elaborated on MNF-I’s ability to objectively judge the 

logistics capabilities of the local and national police. This ability varied depending on 

whether the unit was: 

• under the control of the Ministry of Interior 

• under the control of a Province 

• centrally organized or regionally dispersed 

14
For example, MNF-I has good visibility of progress for National Police forces, which 

directly report to the Ministry; somewhat less visibility of progress for Border 

Enforcement and Ports of Entry forces, which also directly report to the Ministry even 

though dispersed across Iraq; and even less visibility of progress for the Iraqi Police 

Service, whose forces are dispersed throughout Iraq and controlled by the provincial 

governors. We have no reason to believe that this visibility is any different for the 

Ministry. We were also told that when MNF-I determines that the Ministry of Interior 

forces in a province are capable enough to secure it, along with Iraqi Army forces, MNFI will turn over security of a province to the control of the Iraqi government, as recently 

occurred in the Dahuk and Muthanna provinces.17

Equipment

MNF-I uses a paper-based procedure for transferring equipment to the Ministry of 

Interior and its local and national forces. When MNSTC-I issues equipment to police 

forces, it requires the receiving police official to sign for the equipment as well as a 

MNF-I official that is assigned to train the police unit. According to MNSTC-I officials, 

this paper process works well when MNSTC-I first provides equipment to the Ministry 

logisticians, who subsequently transfer the equipment to the respective local and national 

police logisticians. However, until the practice was discontinued in April 2006, MNSTCI often bypassed the Ministry of Interior logisticians and issued equipment directly to 

local and national police forces. Because of this practice, the Ministry of Interior’s 

accountability of equipment provided by MNSTC-I directly to the police units, rather 

than through the logistician, prior to 2006 remains poor. 

MNF-I is proactively assisting the Ministry of Interior to improve its equipment 

accountability, including drafting an order to assist the Ministry in having copies of 

equipment transfer receipts provided to the police unit, regional police headquarters, 

Ministry of Interior headquarters, and MNSTC-I. Although these records will still be 

kept in paper form, MNF-I officials believe that this would be a step forward in 

improving the accountability of equipment transferred to the local and national police 

forces. 

In commenting on the draft of this report, MNSTC-I officials noted that in September 

2006, the Ministry of Interior completed a full inventory of its headquarters equipment 

and that of the National Police, thereby establishing updated property books of the 

equipment it has on-hand. Additionally, the Ministry is taking steps to computerize its 

records. It has not yet been determined whether the Ministry can account for all 

equipment provided to it by MNSTC-I since 2004.18 

Facilities

We also previously reported that MNSTC-I attempted to develop a working relationship 

with the Ministry of Interior in order to properly transfer capital assets and real property, 

but it has not been as successful in these efforts as it was with the Ministry of Defense.19

This was due to the uncertain and changing political climate at the Ministry of Interior, 

 

17 The turnover of control of the security of a province depends on many factors including the capability of 

the provincial government to govern the province. 

18 In a related report, we observed management control weaknesses in MNSTC-I’s processes for accounting 

for three types of weapons that were purchased with the IRRF for the ISF. Whether these weaknesses will 

impede the Ministry of Interior’s ability to account for its equipment has yet to be determined. See Iraqi 

Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund, (SIGIR-06-033, October 28, 2006). 

19See Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer of the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraq Government (SIGIR-06-006, April 29, 2006). 

15
which has created a turbulent and unpredictable organizational process, and not to a lack 

of effort by MNSTC-I. For example, MNSTC-I developed a timeline in November 2005 

for the Ministry of Interior to organize both national and provincial infrastructure 

planning for the transfer of construction projects, but the Ministry of Interior has not 

recognized assets transferred at the local level for the past two years according to 

MNSTC-I program managers. 

Potential Barriers and Resource Limitations. We believe that MNF-I will face three 

potential challenges that, if not adequately addressed, could limit the implementation of 

the Concept for the Ministry of Interior. 

First, the Ministry of Interior does not control the Iraqi Police Service, which represents 

72% (135,000) of the Ministry of Interior forces (188,300) to be trained by MNSTC-I by 

the end of 2006. The Iraqi Police Service precincts, like any local police force in the 

United States, fall under the control of their local municipality and the provincial 

government in which the municipality is located pursuant to the Iraqi constitution. As we 

understand the proposed concept of logistics support to the Iraqi Police Service, the local 

police force will have its own budget and have authority from the Provincial government 

to procure its own logistics support. However, the Ministry of Interior will also make 

available select high-dollar equipment that can be supplied through a national contract on 

a reimbursable basis. For example, the provincial police chiefs have a choice to either 

procure high-dollar equipment such as vehicles and weapons through the Ministry or 

procuring them directly from a vendor. However, the provincial police chiefs are not 

required to procure equipment through the Ministry or follow its equipment 

accountability procedures. 

A second potential challenge is the issue of whether Iraqi local and national police forces 

will have adequate logistics personnel to implement the Concept when it is finalized. 

Currently the Concept does not require Iraqi local and national police forces to add a 

significant amount of logistics personnel because the Ministry of Interior already has 

much of its logistics personnel in place, according to MNSTC-I officials. MNSTC-I 

states it will complete its training of Ministry of Interior forces by the end of December 

2006. However, given that the logistics concept has not been approved and that the 

Ministry of Interior does not have an agreed to plan for supporting the local police in the 

Provinces, we question whether the number of existing logistics personnel is adequate to 

support and sustain Ministry of Interior logistics capabilities and operations. Depending 

on MNF-I’s final plans to implement the Concept, MNSTC-I may need to provide 

training on logistics skills and possibly train additional personnel in order to implement a 

functioning logistics operation within the Ministry of Interior to include potential support 

for the Iraqi Police Service in the Provinces. 

The last, and perhaps most significant challenge, will be whether the Ministry of Interior 

adequately budgets to sustain the logistics capabilities and processes that that MNF-I is 

designing for it. As with the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior had not 

finalized its budget submission with the Ministry of Finance for 2007 at the time we were 

completing this report. MNSTC-I estimated that the Ministry of Interior would need $2.4 

billion to sustain its operations in 2007. DoD reported in its August 29, 2006, Measuring 

Security and Stability in Iraq report that MNF-I requested $151 million for assistance to 

sustain the Ministry of Interior and its police forces in 2007. As a result, the Ministry of 

Interior would have to budget more than $2.2 billion in calendar year 2007 in order to 

sustain its operations, including the current level of logistics support. As was the case for 

the Ministry of Defense, because the Ministry of Interior budget has not yet been 

approved by the Iraqi Parliament, it is not possible to assess whether the Ministry is 

prepared to provide sufficient funds to support logistics capabilities in 2007. 

16
Related Observations

During the audit we examined MNC-I’s monthly reports used to track expenditures for 

supplies and other services that MNC-I’s subordinate units provided to ISF from January 

through June 2006. Although MNC-I cost reports indicated that it spent about $40.3 

million, our calculations showed that MNC-I actually spent about $41.2 million. Of the 

$41.2 million total we calculated, roughly $40.7 million was spent in support of the Iraqi 

Armed Forces and about $440,000 was spent in support of the Iraqi local and national 

police forces.20 The difference of about $900,000, or 2% of the $41.2 million total we 

calculated, was primarily due to mathematical errors in the spreadsheets MNC-I’s used to 

track these costs. 

We also found other recordkeeping errors. Specifically, we found that neither 22% of the 

funds spent for supplies and services provided to support the Iraqi Armed Forces nor 84% 

of the funds spent to support the Iraqi local and national police forces were properly 

assigned to an appropriate supply category, although MNC-I was required to assign both. 

For example, several lines of expenditures were notes for “bulk funds” but the purpose of 

the funds was not recorded. Because these expenditures were not properly categorized, 

we designated them as “other” expenditures. 

Management Actions 

During this audit, we notified MNF-I officials of the discrepancies in MNC-I’s data. 

Subsequently, MNF-I made adjustments to the reporting process to improve the accuracy 

and consistency of how costs to support the ISF are reported. Additionally, MNC-I 

officials said they would take action to adjust the data to accurately reflect the historical 

costs of its logistics support to the ISF. Corrective action to improve data accuracy had 

not been completed as of the preparation of this report. 

 

20 These numbers do not add up to $41.2 million due to rounding. 

17
Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

Ministry of Defense. Although MNF-I does not know, and therefore cannot report, how 

many logistics personnel it has trained, MNF-I has made some progress in its efforts to 

build logistics capabilities within the Iraqi Army and to transition these capabilities to the 

control of the Ministry of Defense. However, significant challenges remain that put at 

risk MNF-I’s goal to transition a sustainable and maintainable logistics operation to the 

Ministry of Defense by January 1, 2008: 

• Adequate personnel to train Iraqi Army logistics units – MNF-I has 

acknowledged that it has an insufficient number of logistics personnel in Iraq to 

train Iraqi Army logistics units simultaneously and that it has not developed a 

plan to address this shortfall. However, MNF-I told us that MNF-I is considering 

using a train-the-trainer model in which Iraqi logistics soldiers who have already 

been trained would be paired with other Iraqi soldiers. This would maximize the 

number of trained personnel. MNF-I has yet to commit to this course of action. 

• Ensuring there are enough trained soldiers to implement its plans—MNSTC-I 

could not tell us how many personnel have been trained to support these logistics 

functions. Further, not all trained soldiers are assigned to and remain with 

logistics units, particularly for operational-level logistics units that require 

personnel with advanced specialty training such as doctors, nurses, medics, and 

mechanics. 

• Ensuring that the Ministry of Defense provides enough funds to sustain the 

logistics capabilities that MNF-I is planning to transfer to Iraqi Army control in 

2007—MNSTC-I estimates that it will cost the Ministry of Defense about $3.5 

billion to sustain its operations in 2007. Because the Ministry of Defense’s 

budget has not been submitted to or approved by the Iraqi Parliament, it is not 

possible to assess whether the Ministry of Defense is prepared to provide 

sufficient funds to support logistics capabilities in 2007. 

Ministry of Interior. MNF-I does not expect to complete its plans to develop the 

logistics capabilities within the Ministry of Interior until the end of November 2006. 

Once finalized, we believe that MNF-I will face significant challenges that will put its 

plans at risk: 

• Implementing its plan and achieving logistics capabilities within the Ministry of 

Interior—because the Ministry does not control the Iraqi Police Service. 

• Training enough logistics personnel to implement its plans—because MNF-I 

plans are not yet final, there can be no assurance that MNSTC-I is planning to 

train enough police forces logistics personnel by the end of 2006. 

• Ensuring that the Ministry of Interior provides enough funds to sustain the 

logistics capabilities of the Iraqi police forces in 2007—MNSTC-I estimates it 

will cost the Ministry of Interior about $2.4 billion to sustain its operations in 

2007. Because the Ministry of Interior’s budget has also not been submitted to or 

approved by the Iraqi Parliament, it is not possible to assess whether the Ministry 

of Interior is prepared to provide sufficient funds to support logistics capabilities 

in 2007. 

18
Because of the challenges that MNF-I faced within the Ministry of Interior, we believe 

that there is a significant risk that even if the initial goal to develop a sustainable logistics 

capability plan is achieved by the end of November 2006, the Ministry of Interior will not 

be capable of assuming and sustaining logistics support for the Iraqi local and national 

police forces in the near term. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Commanding General, MNF-I direct his staff and MNF-I 

subordinate commands to take these actions: 

1. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, identify Iraqi Army logistics 

personnel requirements and formulate a plan for training these personnel. 

2. In cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, identify Iraqi local and national 

police forces logistics personnel requirements and formulate a plan for training 

these personnel. 

3. On receipt of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior budgets for 

2007, identify the extent to which they adequately support the logistics 

capabilities that MNF-I plans to transfer to it. 

Developing and fielding Iraqi logistics’ capabilities is a critical component of the U.S. 

government effort to help the ISF of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior 

become capable of independently conducting security operations. Therefore, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense take these actions: 

4. Provide Congress an assessment in the quarterly report, Measuring Security and 

Stability in Iraq,21 to include: a. details of MNF-I’s plan(s) and progress in executing the plan(s) to train 

ISF logistics personnel, for both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 

Interior 

b. the adequacy of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior budgets 

to support their respective logistics capability 

Management Comments and Audit Response

We received written comments from MNF-I and, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, 

from the Defense Reconstruction Support Office (DRSO). MNF-I concurred with our 

recommendations. DRSO said that it would include our recommended information in its 

quarterly report, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq—to the extent the information 

reflects upon the statutory scope of the report. However, DRSO also stated that our 

recommended assessment is outside the scope of the current legislation. DRSO asserted 

that information contained in the quarterly report is directed by law and that DRSO 

follows the statutory language in determining content. The comments from MNF-I and 

DRSO are included in the Management Comments section of this report. 

 

21 DoD submits this report to the Congress pursuant to Section 9010 of Public Law 109-148 (a continuation 

of the reporting through the end of fiscal year 2006, as also required under Section 1024 of Public Law 

109-13), and Public Law 109-289 (for reporting through the end of fiscal year 2007). 

19
We disagree with the DRSO response. We believe that the assessments recommended to 

be part of the DoD quarterly report are well within the scope of current legislation. 

Specifically, Section 9010 (c) of the National Defense Appropriations Act for 2007, 

Public Law 109-289, directs that the report address, at a minimum, the operational 

readiness status of the Iraqi military forces, key criteria for assessing the capabilities and 

readiness of the Iraqi police and other Ministry of Interior forces, and goals for achieving 

certain readiness and capability levels. As discussed, the Commanding General, MNF-I, 

stated on August 30, 2006, that logistics capabilities were one of the key enablers to help 

get ISF to the point where they can provide security independent of U.S. and coalition 

forces. As a result, we believe that including in the quarterly report an assessment of 

MNF-I’s logistics support plans and the Iraqi government’s willingness to provide 

funding to maintain logistics capabilities is both appropriate and necessary. 

MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I also provided technical comments and additional 

documentation in response to a draft of this report. We considered this information in 

finalizing our report, making revisions as appropriate. 

20
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

This review was requested by the Chairman of the United States Senate Armed Services 

Committee. In his request, the Chairman stated that a critical element of the 

reconstruction effort in Iraq is the development of logistics support capabilities for the 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Ministries of Defense and Interior. In order for the 

ISF to independently conduct combat and other operations, the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior along with the Ministry of Finance need to develop the organizations, 

infrastructure, policies and systems to manage and sustain logistics capabilities over the 

long-term. Therefore, this audit was initiated on June 26, 2006, (Project No. 6020) to 

determine whether U.S. efforts to build the logistics capabilities within the ISF, using the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), were achieving their intended outcomes. 

Specifically, the objectives of the audit were to determine: 

 

• Department of Defense’s (DoD) plans and timelines for implementing a 

functioning logistics operation within the ISF 

• plans and timelines for transitioning a sustainable and maintainable logistics 

operation to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, for sustaining 

and maintaining the force structure 

• barriers and resource limitations to the success of long-term sustainment 

capabilities within the ISF 

To respond to the audit objectives, we structured the report in two sections to discuss our 

findings. The first section discusses our findings on the development of Iraqi Army 

logistics capabilities within the Ministry of Defense. The Iraqi Army and its support 

forces comprise about 98% of the total force that the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 

is training for the Ministry of Defense. Because the Iraqi Navy and Air Force will not be 

fully formed until at least the summer of 2007, we focused our report on MNF-I’s efforts 

in the Ministry of Defense to implement logistics capabilities to support the Iraqi Army. 

Our assessment centered on the development of the Iraqi Army’s tactical and operational 

maintenance, supply, transportation, and health logistics support capabilities. The second 

section discusses our observations on the development of the logistics capabilities of the 

Ministry of Interior and its local and national police forces. 

To determine how MNF-I is developing, implementing, and transitioning logistics 

capabilities to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, we interviewed 

MNF-I officials responsible for these activities, including officials from its subordinate 

commands the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the 

Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). From these officials we collected and reviewed the 

March 1, 2006, logistics support Concept for the Ministry of Defense and the July 

through September 2006 drafts of the Concept for the Ministry of Interior, and supporting 

documentation. We also collected and reviewed other MNF-I guidance, fragmentary 

orders, budget information and other documentation to substantiate the statements of 

MNF-I officials. We also reviewed DoD quarterly reports submitted to the Congress 

pursuant to Section 1024 of Public Law 109-13 and Section 9010 of Public Law 109-148. 

To determine the amount of IRRF spent on developing Iraqi Army and Iraqi local and 

national police forces logistics capabilities, we collected and examined MNSTC-I’s data 

for IRRF expenditures. This data was in the form of spreadsheets derived from the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System. This information was cross21
checked with quarterly reports submitted to the Congress to meet the IRRF reporting 

requirements of Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106, and documents in the Joint 

Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts database for consistency. We 

consulted with MNSTC-I officials to ensure we had accurately captured the appropriate 

logistical costs. 

To determine Iraqi Army logistics personnel levels required by the Concept of Logistics 

Support for the Ministry of Defense, we obtained personnel authorization data by the 

types and the number of logistics units authorized from MNSTC-I, multiplied these 

numbers, and summed the totals. We provided our results to both MNF-I and MNSTC-I 

officials and verified with MNSTC-I that we (1) had the most current data, and (2) only 

used the additional logistics support personnel requirements added by the Concept to 

provide logistics support the Iraqi Army. We also obtained the equipment costs per unit 

from MNSTC-I and applied the same process to derive the total costs of equipment. 

These costs, however, included average costs for the Headquarters and Services 

Companies, and the different size Garrison Support Units as there are various 

configurations of each type of unit. 

To determine the cost of supplies MNC-I provided to the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police 

forces, we obtained spreadsheets containing monthly data from January to June 2006 

from MNC-I. We then analyzed this data to determine whether all the costs had been 

identified appropriately and accurately accounted for. Where there were discrepancies 

between the totals that were reported by MNC-I and what the data showed, we noted 

these discrepancies and provided the information back to MNC-I for verification. 

This audit was conducted from June 2006 through October 2006, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We reviewed IRRF expenditures that were compiled 

in MNSTC-I spreadsheets. This information was derived from data contained in the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System; however we did not audit this 

financial management system. For more information on the reliability of data drawn 

from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, see the following 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports. 

• Information Security: Corps of Engineers Making Improvements But Weaknesses 

Continue (GAO-02-589, June 10, 2002) 

• Financial Management: Significant Weaknesses in Corps of Engineers’ Computer 

Controls (GAO-01-89, October 11, 2000) 

Prior Coverage. We issued these reports related to the logistics capabilities of the 

Ministries of Defense and Interior: 

• Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense 

Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033, October 28, 

2006). This report discusses the ISF’s limited capability to maintain weapons 

bought using IRRF money due to the lack of spare parts, technical repair manuals, 

and arms maintenance personnel. During this review we also observed 

questionable practices in maintaining the accuracy of weapons inventories 

reflected in MNSTC-I property records for 3 of the 12 weapons types purchased 

with IRRF funds for the ISF. 

22
• Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer 

of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraq Government (SIGIR06-006, April 29, 2006). This report found MNSTC-I had a process in place for 

transferring real property, such as forward operating bases, to the Ministry of 

Defense but did not have similar process in place to transfer real property to the 

Ministry of Interior. This was due to the Ministry of Interior’s reluctance to work 

with MNSTC-I to establish a transfer process. 

The Departments of Defense and State Offices of the Inspector General issued, 

Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, jointly on July 15, 2005. This report 

recommended MNF-I, in coordination with MNSTC-I and the MNC-I and in consultation 

with the Ministry of Interior, establish internal controls to track the transfer and 

accountability of equipment to the Iraqi Police Service. 

In addition, GAO has discussed the development of logistics capabilities of ISF and 

Transition Readiness Assessments in these reports: 

 

• Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation (GAO-06-1094T, 

September 11, 2006) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy is Needed to Help 

Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges (GAO-06-953T, July 11, 2006) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing 

Challenges (GAO-06-697T, April 25, 2006) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges (GAO06-428T, February 8, 2006) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and 

Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable 

Progress (GAO-06-179T, October 18, 2005) 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring 

Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police (GAO-05-431T, March 14, 

2005) 

Both GAO and the DoD Office of the Inspector General have on-going audits of ISF 

logistics capabilities. We coordinated our efforts with these organizations. 

23
Appendix B. IRRF Expenditures for ISF 

Logistics Capabilities 

The table below summarizes the results of our review of IRRF used to develop the 

logistics capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces. Of the total $666.2 million expended as of 

August 1, 2006, we found about $596 million was spent to develop the logistics 

capabilities of the Iraqi Armed Forces and about $70.2 million was spent to develop the 

capability of the Iraqi local and national police forces. These expenditures were 

classified into three categories: 

• Non-Construction: for services such as the training of logistics personnel 

• Construction: to build logistics-related facilities such as a supply warehouse or 

maintenance facility 

• Quick Response Fund: to address emergency or immediate needs with provisions 

such as generators, uniforms, and food for the ISF logistics personnel 

The $666.2 million spent on developing logistics capabilities represents about 13.3% of 

the $5 billion of the IRRF allocated (as of July 2006) to reconstructing Iraq’s Security 

and Law Enforcement infrastructure. 

Table: IRRF Expenditures for ISF Logistics Capabilities 

Ministry Type of Expenditure Expenditures 

Non-Construction $248,709,556 

Construction $324,740,778 

Ministry of Defense 

Quick Response Fund $22,516,542 

Total Ministry of Defense $595,966,876 

Non-Construction $42,098,790 

Construction $21,940,408 

Ministry of Interior 

Quick Response Fund $6,169,345 

Total Ministry of Interior $70,208,543 

Total $666,175,419 

Source: SIGIR analysis of MNSTC-I data for IRRF expenditures for ISF logistics as of August 1, 2006. 

24
Appendix C. Descriptions of Iraqi Army Logistics 

Units 

The following briefly summarizes the responsibilities and capabilities of the logistic units 

as discussed in the Concept of Logistics Support for the Ministry of Defense. These units 

provide tactical and operational support to Iraqi Army divisions. Each type of support 

can be further divided into two levels such as the 1st and 2nd tactical levels. For example, 

• 1st level tactical support is primarily provided by the Headquarters and Services 

Companies, which are integrated with the divisions’ subordinate combat units 

(e.g. a brigade or battalion) and the divisional headquarters. 

• 2nd level tactical units, such as the Motorized Transportation Regiments and 

Mechanized Logistics Battalions, integrated with the divisional headquarters or 

the divisions’ brigades and have more capability than what is resident in the 

Headquarters and Services Companies. 

Similarly, the operational is divided into the 1st and 2nd operational levels. All 

operational units are intended to report to the Support Command when it is functional. 

• The 1st operational level is comprised of the Regional and Garrison support units, 

which provide support to a specific division but are external to those divisions. 

• Taji National Depot is at the 2nd operational level unit and provides support to all 

Iraqi Army divisions. 

Headquarters and Services Company 

The primary role of the Headquarters and Services Company is to provide 1st tactical 

level maintenance, supply, and transportations support, and 2nd tactical level health 

support to the unit it supports. The Headquarters and Services Company is part of the 

headquarters element of an Iraqi Army battalion, brigade, or division and includes 

medics, mechanics, food service personnel, supply specialists, and transportation 

personnel. 

Motorized Transportation Regiment 

The primary role of the Motorized Transportation Regiment is to provide 2nd tactical 

level transportation support, to include vehicle recovery, through the delivery of people, 

supplies, and equipment to and from its division. Its secondary duty includes providing 

2nd tactical level maintenance support to its division. The regiment includes four 

transportation companies comprised of heavy, medium and light military and civilian 

trucks and vans, and recovery vehicles, such as tow trucks, to facilitate transportation 

requirements. 

 

Mechanized Logistics Battalion 

The primary role of the Mechanized Logistics Battalions is to provide 2nd tactical level 

maintenance, supply and transport companies support to the mechanized division. This 

includes medics, mechanics, food service personnel, supply specialists, and transportation 

personnel. 

25
Regional Support Unit 

The primary role of the Regional Support Unit is to provide 1st operational level 

maintenance, supply, and health support to two Iraqi Army divisions located in its region 

either directly or indirectly via the Garrison Support Units that it commands. Each unit 

will eventually have an ammunition supply point on base. 

Garrison Support Unit 

The Garrison Support Unit manages a forward operating base, providing life support to 

the soldiers garrisoned at the base. Depending on the size and purpose some Garrison 

Support Units also provide some 1st operational level maintenance and/or health support. 

Taji National Depot 

The Taji National Depot comprises military, defense civilian and contractor staff for 

providing 2nd operational level maintenance and supply to the Iraqi Armed Forces. This 

includes managing national stocks of supplies and performing heavy grade maintenance 

on vehicles and other equipment. 

Support Command 

The Support Command will oversee the Taji National Depot, Regional and Garrison 

support units. The Support Command is responsible for planning, directing, providing 

and monitoring of daily logistics support to forward operating bases and Iraqi Army 

divisions. It also is responsible for providing input to the Ministry of Defense for longterm logistics planning. 

26
Appendix D. Iraqi Army Logistics Personnel 

Authorizations 

The table below lists the total number of Iraqi Army logistics personnel that are 

authorized for each type of logistics unit required to be added to the Iraqi Army by the 

Concept of Logistic Support for the Ministry of Defense. MNF-I’s goal is to train and 

equip at least 85% of a logistics units’ authorized personnel. As this is the minimum 

amount of personnel that must be assigned to a unit before it can be transitioned to Iraqi 

Army control, we have displayed the number of soldiers needed to meet 85% and 100% 

of total personnel requirements for comparison. 

 

These totals were derived from data contained within the units’ Table of Organization 

and Equipment, which lists the number of soldiers and equipment each unit is authorized 

to have. The Tables of Organization and Equipment were provided by MNSTC-I and are 

current as of October 6, 2006. To determine our estimate of the total number of 

personnel required for each unit we multiplied the number of personnel authorized to be 

in each unit by the number of units required by the Concept to provide logistics support 

to the Iraqi Army. Our estimate does not include the 5,000 to 5,900 logistics personnel 

required to be assigned to the Iraqi Army divisions in the logistics section of division, 

brigade, or battalion command staffs or combat companies. 

 

Table: Iraqi Army Logistics Personnel Required by the Concept of Logistics 

Support 

Type of Unit Required 

by the Concept 

Number of 

Units 

Required by 

the Concept 

85% of 

Total 

Personnel 

Requirement 

100% of Total 

Personnel 

Requirement

Headquarters and Services Companies 158 17,536 20,630 

Motorized Transportation Regiments 9 6,296 7,407 

Mechanized Logistics Battalions 4 1,242 1,461 

Regional Support Units 5 6,922 8,144 

Garrison Support Units 77 4,984 5,677 

Taji National Depot 1 1,012 1,190 

Support Command 1 Not yet 

determined 

Not yet 

determined 

Total 255 37,833 44,509 

Source: SIGIR Analysis of MNSTC-I personnel authorizations figures as of October 6, 2006. 

27
Appendix E. Acronyms

DoD Department of Defense 

DRSO Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 

ISF Iraqi Security Forces 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

28
Appendix F. Report Distribution 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office 

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Inspector General, Department of State 

Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense* 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

 Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget) 

Inspector General, Department of Defense 

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency 

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) 

Director, Project and Contracting Office 

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

 Commanding General, Gulf Region Division 

Auditor General of the Army 

U.S. Central Command

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq* 

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central 

Other Federal Government Organizations 

Director, Office of Management and Budget 

Comptroller General of the United States 

Inspector General, Department of the Treasury 

Inspector General, Department of Commerce 

Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services 

Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development 

President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation 

President, U.S. Institute for Peace 

*Recipient of the draft audit report. 

29
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

U.S. Senate 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and 

International Security 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

U.S. House of Representatives 

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs 

Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 

Relations 

House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia 

30
Appendix G. Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. 

McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to the report 

include: 

Michael Bianco 

Walt Keays 

Nelson Reyes 

Steven Sternlieb 

Jason Venner 

31
Management Comments 

Multi-National Force-Iraq 

32
33
Management Comments 

Defense Reconstruction Support Office 

34