Jeremy Travis, Director November 1997

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Visibility and Vigilance: Metro’s Situational

Approach to Preventing Subway Crime

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: How the

design, management, and maintenance characteristics of Metro,

Washington, D.C.’s subway system,

have contributed to the system’s

safety and appearance.

Key issues: Washington’s subway

system is recognized for its unusually

low crime rates. To determine

whether Metro’s environment is

responsible for its low crime rates,

Metro’s design characteristics were

reviewed and Metro’s management

and maintenance policies were

assessed to observe the extent to

which they embody situational crime

prevention measures that both theory

and practice suggest would be

successful.

Key findings: Some of the factors

found to contribute to Metro’s

success include:

• High, arched ceilings that not only

are architecturally sound and

aesthetically pleasing but also create

a feeling of openness that reduces

passenger fears and provides them

with an open view of the station.

Additionally, long and winding

corridors and corners were avoided

to reduce shadows and nooks that

criminals and panhandlers could

occupy.

• A system that allows passengers

to buy multiple-use farecards in any

dollar amount, cutting down the

time money is exposed to pickpockets and robbers. Farecards also must

be used on entry and exit from the

system, reducing the likelihood of

fare evasion.

continued...

by Nancy G. La Vigne

Washington, D.C.’s subway system

(Metro) has experienced lower than

expected crime rates since its inception

in 1976. The case study reported here

suggests that Metro’s relative safety,

compared with mass transit systems in

similar urban areas, may be attributable to a combination of design characteristics, management practices, and

maintenance policies that incorporate

principles of situational crime prevention and crime prevention through

environmental design (CPTED).

This Research in Brief identifies

factors in Metro’s environment that are

consistent with situational crime

prevention,1

 which aims to reduce

criminal opportunities by:

• Increasing the perceived effort of

offending.

• Increasing the perceived risk of

offending.

• Decreasing the perceived reward of

offending.

• Removing the “excuses” for offending—i.e., lax conditions or attitudes

that lead to criminality.

Results of analyses comparing Metro’s

crime statistics with those of subway

systems in Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago are also presented. They reveal

that crime rates in the Metro system are

generally lower and less variable than

in comparison systems. In addition,

Metro’s “in-ground” crime rate is

favorably contrasted to the aboveground rates at each of its stations and

the rates over time for the D.C. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

(SMSA).

Methodological concerns

Demonstrating that Metro’s environment explains its unusually low crime

rates, or even that Metro’s crime rates

are unusually low, is not an easy task.

Metro’s design is highly uniform from

station to station, a characteristic that

Metro’s architects deliberately planned

to ensure that riders could recognize

and use the system with ease. (See

“Planning Metro.”) The differences that

do exist among stations—such as

whether the station is elevated, the

length of the escalators, or whether the

station connects two or more lines—are

characteristics that are either unavoidable due to construction restrictions or

necessary to serve the needs of Metro’s

AN INTRAMURAL PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice
Issues and Findings

continued...

• Metro trains are equipped with

graffiti- and vandal-resistant

materials to discourage potential

offenders. When graffiti artists or

vandals do cause damage, maintenance workers clean and repair

damaged property promptly.

• No public restrooms, lockers, or

excess seats for potential offenders

to loiter. Fast food establishments

are prohibited because customers

generate litter and provide victims

for robbers and pickpockets.

• Enforcement of “quality of life”

violations, such as smoking or eating

on trains, and prompt reporting of

all vandalism and graffiti to maintenance personnel to ensure a safe

and clean environment.

• Continuously staffed entrance

kiosks while Metro is open. Station

attendants are aided by closed-circuit

televisions at all unmanned entrances, tunnels, and platforms, and

they carry two-way radios to report

crime and maintenance problems.

Metro’s crime rates have been stable

and are a fraction of those experienced by the subway systems in

Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago.

Applying Metro’s design, maintenance, and crime prevention

strategies may help new or existing

systems reduce crime in their subway

stations.

Target audience: Urban planners,

architects, criminologists, transit

police, and researchers.

ridership. Likewise, the maintenance of

Metro’s stations is stringent throughout:

Graffiti and litter are removed within

hours, lights are replaced promptly,

and structures damaged by vandalism

or wear and tear are removed or repaired immediately.

Metro’s uniformity in design and

maintenance, although exemplary,

nonetheless makes testing the impact

these variables might have on crime

within Metro difficult: The uniformity

of design and maintenance variables

from station to station would yield little

in the way of statistically significant

results. Given its design limitations,

this study required a series of tests that

build upon one another. (See exhibit 1.)

Situational crime prevention

at Metro

Metro’s environment has most of the

opportunity-reducing characteristics

found in a recent compilation of

situational crime prevention techniques

(see exhibit 2). These features and their

effectiveness are discussed below.

Increasing perceived effort. Metro

characteristics that might increase the

perceived effort of offending include

the following:

• Target hardening. Metro’s seats,

windows, and fixtures are constructed

with materials resistant to graffiti

writing and vandalism to increase the

effort associated with these offenses.

On Metro platforms, recessed walls and

bars installed in front of the walls

discourage graffiti.2

• Controlling access. Because Metro’s

design limits the number of stairways

leading from street level to underground

stations, gaining entry to the system to

commit offenses requires more effort

than would otherwise be the case. Metro

also closes during low-density (early

morning) hours. The risk of victimization

is highest during off-peak hours due to

the absence of capable guardians (third

parties) to intervene; therefore, closing

the Metro during these hours reduces

criminal opportunities.

• Deflecting offenders. Stations have

escalators on both ends of the platform

to encourage passengers to occupy the

entire platform rather than congregating in the middle. This design characteristic deflects pickpockets; the open

environment reduces jostling among

passengers. In addition, clear signage

directing riders to the nearest exits and

transfer points as well as maps situated

at exits, entrances, and transfer locations reduce confusion and uncertainty

among riders, making them less vulnerable to pickpocketing.

• Controlling facilitators of committing

crime. Metro’s planners deliberately

omitted public restrooms, luggage

lockers, and excess chairs and benches

so that potential offenders would not be

encouraged to linger in the system and

assess their targets. Planners prohibited

fast food facilities to minimize robbery

and pickpocket opportunities and to

decrease litter, thereby enhancing

maintenance of a clean environment.

Increasing perceived risks. Metro’s

entry and exit screening policies,

formal surveillance, employee surveillance, and natural surveillance all

contribute to Metro’s appearance of a

high-risk place to commit crime.

Metro’s automated fare collection

system is designed to reject counterfeit

slugs and bills and to preclude the use

of one farecard by several passengers in

succession, thus increasing the risks of

apprehension for fare evasion. Unlike

traditional token systems of older

subways, farecards are distance based

Research in Brief

2
1. Hyde, J.F., “CPTED Goes Underground,” a presentation made at the Crime Prevention

Through Environmental Design Conference, Washington, D.C., December 10, 1993.

2. Personal interview with Melvin Siegel, deputy director for architecture, Office of Engineering

and Architecture, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), May 21, 1995,

Washington, D.C.; personal interview with Richard J. Bochner, supervisor, Facilities and Planning

Section, Office of Planning, WMATA, May 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.; and telephone

interview with John F. Hyde, former deputy chief of the Metropolitan Transit Police, WMATA,

September 12, 1995.

3. Personal interview with Melvin Siegel, May 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.

4. See Weidner, R., “Target-Hardening at a New York City Subway Station: Decreased Fare

Evasion—At What Price?,” in R.V. Clarke (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 6., Monsey, New

York: Criminal Justice Press, 1996.

5. Personal interview with Melvin Siegel, May 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.

and must be used on both entry and

exit from the system, increasing the

risk of apprehension by 100 percent.

The farecard system also allows

passengers to purchase cards of any

dollar amount for multiple trips,

enabling them to reduce the frequency with which they exchange

cash for fares (thus exposing their

wallets to pickpockets).

Formal surveillance is achieved

through Metro’s transit police,

consisting of approximately 286

sworn officers and officials. They are

trained to be vigilant and to take

immediate action against “quality of

life” violations by making arrests

and issuing citations.3

 Metro prohibits riders from eating, drinking,

smoking, playing radios, transporting

animals, or moving from one rail car

to another. These rules are clearly

posted at the entrance to and exit

from the station platforms as well as

on the rail cars themselves, and they

are stringently enforced by Metro

police. According to Angus B.

MacLean, the first chief of the Metro

Transit Police, the transit police are

so vigilant, “Even today the word

around town is, ‘If you want to

commit crime, do it on the streets;

you’ll get caught doing it downstairs’.”4

 Transit police also have a

role in maintaining Metro’s pristine

environment. From the outset,

officers have been trained to report

any maintenance problems, such as

burned-out lights, to the maintenance department.5

Employee surveillance by station

attendants supplements formal

surveillance of the system and

contributes significantly to Metro’s

safe environment. Metro stations are

staffed during all hours of rail

operation. Attendants are positioned

 Planning Metro

Metro’s planners faced a multitude of concerns in designing the rapid transportation system, not the least of which was to ensure the safety and security of its passengers and the residents living in areas serviced by the system. Concern about passenger

security was underscored by the fact that, even in Metro’s early planning stages in the

1960s, Washington, D.C., had the tenth highest crime rate in the country.1

The major players involved in Metro’s planning included the engineering firm of

Deleuw, Cather & Co. and the architectural firm of Harry M. Weese & Associates,

both based in Chicago. In the early 1970s, they were joined by Angus B. MacLean,

hired as the first chief of the Metro Transit Police, and John F. Hyde, hired as deputy

chief. Both men contributed to the planning process during its early stages to ensure

that their security suggestions were integrated into the architects’ blueprints in a

cost-efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner.

Metro’s architects and planners set out to design a system that would deter criminals

and make riders feel comfortable and secure.2 “We were dealing with a clean slate,”

said Melvin Siegel, deputy director for architecture, Office of Engineering and Architecture, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. “We didn’t have many preconceived notions that tended to prevail. Other subway architects and designers tended to

borrow directly from railroad technology and design, which tends to lack creativity. We

had a creative committee [of fine arts] and a receptive board.”3

Metro’s architects also were fortunate that many of their efforts to create good

architectural form—one that was structurally sound as well as free of embellishments—also promoted a secure environment. Instead of the tension between

aesthetics and security that is often observed with target hardening and other

design measures,4 these two factors were considered to make a “good marriage.”5

For example, Metro’s high, arched ceilings resolve some structural requirements (the

600-foot platform requires high ceilings) while also providing passengers with a

feeling of openness, thus reducing levels of fear.

Today, Metro consists of a route of 92 miles and 75 stations, with 8 more stations

under construction; by early 2001, the total system will encompass 83 stations

covering 103.06 miles. To reduce operating costs, Metro runs from 5:30 a.m. to

midnight on weekdays and 8:00 a.m. to midnight on weekends and holidays, when

Metro services are less likely to be used. Fares on Metro are distance based, ranging

from $1.10 to $3.25, and dependent on the hours of travel, with rush-hour fares

slightly more expensive than off-peak fares.

3

Research in Brief
Research in Brief

4

The impetus for this Research in Brief stemmed from the need to explore and document the purported success of Metro as an application of

situational crime prevention measures incorporated into a mass transit system at its creation rather than retrofitted. Two questions formed

the basis of the research:

1. Is Metro safer than one would expect, given the incidence and prevalence of crime on other subway systems and crime occurring in the

communities Metro serves?

2. Is Metro’s unusually low crime rate explained by its environment—the way the system is designed, managed, and maintained?

The two questions were answered through a series of tests summarized below. 1

Test

A comparison of Metro's crime rates to

those of other subway systems2

An assessment of characteristics of Metro's

environment and the extent to which they

are consistent with situational crime

prevention techniques

A comparison of Metro's crime rates over

two time periods

A test of the correlation between Metro

crime rates in stations to the crime rates

above ground by census tract

A comparison of the variation in crime rates

on Metro to the variation in crime rates

above ground in the communities Metro

serves

Method Employed

Comparisons of extant data; F-tests

(using the Scheffe correction for multiple

comparisons) of an ANOVA (analysis of

variance) comparing mean rates per rider

on four systems for which crime data by

station were obtainable

Qualitative analysis and comparison

Calculation of Pearson correlation coefficients for Metro crime rates by station in

1993 to those in 1994

Calculation of Pearson correlation coefficients for crimes per 100,000 residents for

census tracts in which Metro stations are

located to crimes per 1 million riders for

Metro stations

F-tests to compare coefficients of relative

variation (SD/mean)3 for crimes per

100,000 residents for census tracts in

which Metro stations are located to crimes

per 1 million riders for Metro stations.

Result

Metro's crime rates, when calculated both

per rider and per passenger mile, are

lower than all other systems for which

data were obtainable

Metro's characteristics are consistent with

Clarke's 16 situational crime prevention

techniques

Correlations are positive and significant,

indicating that Metro's crime rates are

stable over time and allowing for the

possibility that this stability is due to

Metro's environment

Correlations are not significant, with the

exception of assaults that, when eliminating outliers, are positively correlated

(coefficient = .45, p<.000)

Variations are significantly smaller on

Metro for Part I crimes and robberies, but

the difference in variation for assaults is

not significant

Continued on next page

1

For a more detailed description of the methodology and analyses associated with this topic, see La Vigne, N.G., Crime Prevention Through the Design and

Management of Built Environment: The Case of the D.C. Metro, doctoral dissertation, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, School of Criminal Justice,

Newark, New Jersey, 1996; La Vigne, N.G., “Safe Transport: Security by Design on the D.C. Metro,” in R.V. Clarke (ed.), Preventing Mass Transit Crime, Crime

Prevention Studies, vol. 6, Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press, 1996; and La Vigne, N.G., “Security by Design on the Washington Metro,” in R.V. Clarke

(ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2d ed., New York, New York, Harrow and Heston, 1997.

2

It is important to note that these systems are far from identical in terms of important factors such as ridership, demographics, number of riders, number of

stations, or total route miles. However, care was taken to choose systems that are similar in size and service area, but varied in design characteristics. Metro,

MBTA, and CTA are similar in daily ridership but differ in route miles and number of stations. MARTA is much smaller than the other systems in terms of

riders, mileage, and stations, and it is the newest of the systems, beginning in 1979, just 3 years after Metro. Thus, MARTA was deemed an appropriate

comparison system because its planners, like Metro’s, were able to benefit from the successes and failures of other systems as well as from a greater

knowledge of crime prevention tactics. CTA operates 24 hours per day; Metro, MARTA, and MBTA open between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. and close between

midnight and 1:30 a.m. For comparison purposes, those crimes occurring on CTA between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. were subtracted before

calculating its crime rates and coefficients of variation.

3The coefficients of relative variation are calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean for each data set. Coefficients are compared to determine

whether the difference between the two are statistically significant through the use of an F-test, which is calculated by dividing the coefficients of variation

(large over small), and squaring: (CVlarge /CVsmall ) 2.

Exhibit 1. Summary Results of Eight Tests of Metro’s Success
5

Research in Brief

Test

A comparison of the variation in crime rates

on Metro underground to those on Metro

property aboveground (parking lots, bus

bays, etc.)

A comparison of variation in crime rates on

Metro to the variation in crime rates for

subway systems in Boston, Atlanta, and

Chicago

A comparison of trends over time for D.C.

SMSA crime rates and Metro crime rates

Method Employed

F-tests to compare coefficients of relative

variation SD/mean for crimes per 1,000

parked cars for Metro aboveground

premises to crimes per 1 million riders for

Metro stations underground

F-tests to compare coefficients of relative

variation for crimes per 1 million riders on

Metro to those of the comparison systems,

excluding parking lot crimes

Comparison of changes in Z-scores over

time4

Result

Variations do not differ significantly for Part

I crimes and robberies, but Metro assault

rates occurring underground exhibit more

variation than those for Metro aboveground property

Metro's variation is significantly smaller

than Boston's and Chicago's, but Atlanta's

is significantly smaller than the other three

systems (see endnote 13); all four subway

systems have significantly less variation by

station than does D.C. aboveground by

census tract

Variations in Z-scores indicate that changes

in crime rates over time for D.C. aboveground are not mirrored by Metro crimes

below

in kiosks at the entrances to the

platforms to provide assistance to

riders and keep an eye on potential

fare evaders.

All Metro stations have at least eight

strategically placed closed-circuit

television (CCTV) cameras so

attendants can monitor unstaffed

entrances, tunnels, and platforms.

CCTV screens are located in each

station attendant’s kiosk to increase

employee surveillance, thereby

increasing the risks of apprehension.

Another key component of Metro’s

surveillance is its communications

system. All Metro employees,

including maintenance personnel,

are equipped with two-way radios so

they can be located or alerted at any

time.6

 In addition, each rail car has

passenger-to-operator intercoms to

enable passengers to alert drivers to

dangerous situations or crimes in

progress. Blue light boxes containing

emergency phones and powertakedown buttons are located every

600 feet along the right of way.

Employee surveillance is aided by

Metro’s design, which was deliberately structured to ensure a high

level of natural surveillance. Metro’s

platforms are a uniform 600 feet

long, designed to accommodate a

train of eight 75-foot-long cars. The

platforms have a minimal number of

supporting columns, which can

provide cover for criminals. A high,

free-standing vaulted ceiling arches

above the tracks, giving the appearance of a wide-open design. These

unobstructed views also enable

riders to observe goings-on as they

wait for trains.

Metro’s natural surveillance characteristics include open pathways to

and from train railways that maximize natural surveillance, thereby

increasing the perceived risks of

committing crime. In addition, the

trains are characterized by a

“straight through” design, enabling police to walk freely

between cars, thus increasing

formal surveillance capabilities.

Metro’s planners deliberately

avoided long, winding corridors

and corners found in many older

systems. Such corners create

shadows that could hide criminals

and serve as nooks that panhandlers and homeless people like to

occupy.7

Proper lighting also enhances

natural surveillance. Lighting

within Metro is a minimum of one

footcandle,8

 and all new lighting is

a minimum of two footcandles.

Lighting is recessed so it does not

cast shadows. In addition, indented walls provide greater

reflection of light. As one of

Metro’s original designers explained, the recessed lighting

within the high, arched ceilings

was intended to “light the sky

[and] enhance the environment.”9

Continued from page 4

4

To standardize for differences in base rates between the two data sets, Z-scores are compared and analyzed to determine the extent to which crime rates

fluctuate in the same direction.
Research in Brief

6

Increasing Perceived Effort

1. Target hardening

Slug rejector device

Steering locks

Bandit screens

2. Access control

Parking lot barriers

Fenced yards

Entry phones

3. Deflecting offenders

Bus stop placement

Tavern location

Street closures

4. Controlling facilitators

Credit card photo

Caller-ID

Gun controls

Increasing Perceived Risks

5. Entry/exit screening

Automatic ticket gates

Baggage screening

Merchandise tags

6. Formal surveillance

Red light cameras

Burglar alarms

Security guards

7. Surveillance by employees

Pay phone location

Park attendants

CCTV systems

8. Natural surveillance

Defensible space

Street lighting

Cab driver ID

Reducing Anticipated Rewards

9. Target removal

Removable car radio

Women's refuges

Phonecard

10. Identifying property

Property marking

Vehicle licensing

Cattle branding

11. Reducing temptation

Gender-neutral phone lists

Off-street parking

V-chip

12. Denying benefits

Ink merchandise tags

PIN for car radios

Graffiti cleaning

Removing Excuses

13. Rule setting

Harassment codes

Customs declaration

Hotel registration

14. Stimulating conscience

"Shoplifting is stealing"

Roadside speedometers

"Bloody idiots drink and drive"

15. Controlling disinhibitors

Drinking age laws

Ignition interlock

16. Facilitating compliance

Improved library checkout

Public lavatories

Trash bins

Exhibit 2. Sixteen Techniques of Situational Prevention

Source: Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2d ed., New York, New York: Harrow and Heston, 1997.

Reducing anticipated rewards.

Reducing the rewards of crime can be

as simple as removing the crime target

or reducing benefits or temptations

associated with a particular crime. In

the case of Metro, the availability of

public telephones both within stations

and immediately outside enables

riders to make pickup arrangements

with a relative or friend before boarding the train, thus reducing waiting

time within the system and the associated risk of victimization.

Trains are strategically scheduled to

minimize the time riders are waiting

on platforms, particularly during offhours. Such scheduling increases the

chances of riders arriving at stations

just before trains depart. This reduces

opportunities for robberies by minimizing the time suitable targets (riders

waiting for trains) remain on the

relatively isolated platform.

Rewards of crime are also reduced

through Metro’s policy of keeping the

premises well maintained. Platforms,

cars, and corridors are free of litter;

graffiti is removed within 24 hours;

and vandalism damage is repaired

promptly. These actions diminish the

psychic thrill for litterers, graffiti

artists, and vandals because neither

they nor their friends are given the

chance to appreciate their work for

long.10

Removing the excuses. Removing

the excuses associated with committing a crime is a new situational

crime prevention tenet,11 based on

the assumption that individuals will

be less likely to commit a crime if

prohibitions are clear or if public

humiliation is the probable result of

a violation. Metro has established

highly specific and visible rules,

with signage indicating proscribed

activities and violations. These rules,

combined with the “zero tolerance”

enforcement approach adopted by

transit personnel, deter potential

CTA

2

0

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Metro MARTA MBTA

Exhibit 3. Comparison of Part I 

Crime* (per 1 Million Riders) on 

Four Subway Systems—1994

*Includes murder, rape, robbery, aggravated 

assault, burglary, larceny, and arson, but 

excludes auto theft due to the nature of 

subway crime.

Sources: Washington Area Metropolitan Transit 

Authority Transit Police, Metropolitan Atlanta 

Rapid Transit Authority Transit Police, 

Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority Transit 

Police, and Chicago Police Department.

Total Part I crimes 

per 1 million riders

1.51

7.65

5.88

12.31
7

Research in Brief

offenders by making them accountable for any violations. A related

means of removing excuses is

through “stimulating conscience,” or

evoking a sense of guilt or shame

associated with proscribed behavior.12 Metro uses its public address

system for this purpose; station

managers broadcast public reprimands of rule breakers.

Facilitating compliance with rules

and laws is another strategy that

promotes personal accountability.

For example, Metro makes it difficult

to justify littering by placing an

adequate number of trash receptacles and newspaper recycling bins

throughout each station. In addition

to facilitating compliance, an abundance of trash receptacles helps

transit employees to maintain a clean

environment, which may in turn

promote a sense of territoriality in

law-abiding passengers and enhance

their willingness to intervene should

the need arise.

Is Metro safer than one

would expect?

Analyses comparing Metro’s crime

rates to those of the Metropolitan

Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

(MARTA), the Metropolitan Boston

Transit Authority (MBTA), and the

Chicago Transit Authority (CTA)

indicate that Metro’s crime rates are

lower and that this difference is

statistically significant. Metro

experiences far fewer serious crimes

per rider than comparison systems.

Although data access difficulties

precluded a detailed comparison

between Metro and a larger range of

subway systems, the systems examined are similar to Metro in size and

service area (see exhibit 1, footnote

2). But Metro’s crime rates are a

small fraction of the other systems’

(see exhibit 3).13 These data support

the claim that Metro’s crime rates are

unusually low.

Is Metro’s safety explained

by its environment?

An assessment of Metro’s environment

suggests that it has the majority of

opportunity-reducing characteristics

recommended by both crime prevention theory and practice. The system is

clean and well lit, affords favorable

circumstances for natural and employee surveillance, and is characterized by strict enforcement of both rules

and laws.

In addition to its environmental

safeguards, Metro was found to have

stable crime rates over time, on a

station-by-station basis. This finding

suggests that Metro’s environment—

also stable over time—could be a

powerful explanation for the stability

in crime rates. Thus, environment

cannot be eliminated from the list of

potential causal factors that might

explain Metro’s low crime rates.14

Metro experiences less crime than

one would expect given the distribution of crime aboveground in the

communities Metro serves. With the

exception of assaults, Metro’s crime

rates by station do not covary with

crime rates for the census tracts

where Metro stations are located.

However, the relationship between

aboveground assaults by census tract

and belowground assaults in the

Exhibit 4. Comparison of Crime Rates for Metro Versus D.C. 

SMSA,1983–1994 

(Standardized total rates per Metro rider and per SMSA inhabitant 

represented as Z-scores*)

*Z-scores permit comparison of Metro and D.C. crime rates in a manner ensuring elimination of 

distortion that, given the nature of these data, would otherwise occur. Initially crime rate data for Metro 

were expressed as crimes per 100,000 riders; for D.C. SMSA, as crimes per 1 million inhabitants. 

Sources: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and FBI Uniform Crime Reports.

Metro Total

D.C. Total

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

83 84 85 86 87 88

Year

89 90 91 92 93 94

Z-score
Research in Brief

8

Metro system is positive and significant, suggesting that assaults may

not be as situationally influenced as

other crime types.15

That offenders are less willing to

perpetrate crimes on Metro property

than in the areas around Metro is also

supported by the fact that crime rates

from station to station vary less than

rates among census tracts.16 In

addition, a comparison of crime rates

from 1983 through 1994 for Metro

(underground) and Washington, D.C.

(above ground), indicates that the two

data sets do not covary, again supporting the notion that Metro’s crime rates

are independent of those occurring

above ground. (See exhibit 4.)

Addressing rival hypotheses

It is probable that rival explanations

exist that might account, at least in

part, for Metro’s unusually low crime

rates, and these warrant attention.

Some may argue, for example, that

Metro has such low crime rates

because riders do not represent a

cross-section of Washington, D.C.’s

population; rather, they are predominantly white, middle- to uppermiddle-class working people. However, exhibit 5 indicates that Metro

riders are less likely to be white, to

own their homes, and to be unemployed than the general population

in the D.C. SMSA.17 They are also

more likely to be single, as indicated

in exhibit 5.

These findings lend some validity to

the argument that Metro riders are

more advantaged than the overall

Washington, D.C., SMSA population.

However, the survey did not include

all riders living in areas that Metro

currently serves: It did not capture

riders using Metro’s Green Line

stations, which began operating in

mid-1991 and were expanded

through 1993. These Green Line

stations are found in areas with lower

income levels and higher unemployment rates than most other Metro

station locations. In addition, the

survey failed to capture two important Metro rider subpopulations:

tourists and persons under age 18,

such as high school and college

students who ride Metro to and from

school. Although tourists are more

likely to be victims than offenders,

students and youths in general are

more prone to offending than working people.

As an alternative to the ridership

argument, an examination could be

made of the changes in crime rates

as Metro expanded its service area.

Metro’s unusually low crime rates

could be explained by the system’s

serving a very small area, which is

predominantly middle to upper

middle class. This argument became

significantly less valid in 1991 when

the six stations on Metro’s new Green

Line began serving some high-crime,

inner-city points and southeast to

Anacostia. By the end of 1993, the

Green Line was further extended

northwest to Greenbelt, adding

another four stations. However, an

analysis of crime rates before and

after this additional construction

does not indicate a significant

increase in crime rates for total

crimes, Part 1 property crimes, or

Part 1 violent crimes.18

More specifically, auto theft,

pickpocketing, and assault declined

from 1989 to 1995, while robbery

increased slightly and grand larceny

increased more markedly.19 These

trends do not suggest a dramatic

change in crime following the

addition of the Green Line, which

can be interpreted as further support

for the hypothesis that Metro has

Exhibit 5. Metro Riders Demographic Index (ratio of % of 1991 

respondents who rode Metro in past week satisfying demographic

category, to % SMSA population respondents satisfying demographic

category, times 100)

Source: The Scarborough Report, 1992.

% White

91 85

59

145

% Own Home % Unemployed % Single

Index

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200
9

Research in Brief

Nancy G. La Vigne, Ph.D., is

director of the Crime Mapping

Research Center at the National Institute of Justice. Her

research areas include geographic analyses of crime,

situational crime prevention,

and community policing. This

study was conducted under

NIJ award number 96–0022

(intramural).

been relatively successful in insulating itself against crime occurring

above ground.

The ridership argument implies that

those who ride the subway regularly—rather than the occasional,

opportunistic rider or the potential

offender who loiters aboveground

without paying a fare and using the

system—are the same people who are

perpetrating crimes. Neither prior

research nor theory offers a basis to

support or refute this notion. The

service area argument suggests that

the type of people who offend are in a

racial minority, poor, uneducated, and

unemployed. The literature, however,

does not universally support such an

argument.20 The answer cannot be

gleaned from the data at hand, but

these questions merit further investigation in subsequent research on

subway crime.

Implications for theory and

practice

Rival hypotheses excepted, the tests

conducted for this research, when

considered in combination, generally

support the position that Metro is

unusually safe and that something

unique exists about Metro’s environment that explains its low crime rates.

Metro’s design characteristics and

maintenance and management

policies, which reflect situational

crime prevention principles, support

the hypothesis that what is special

about Metro’s environment is that it

reduces criminal opportunities.

Metro’s success suggests that the

environment can be manipulated to

reduce criminal opportunities.

Further, it implies that potential

offenders weigh the risks of apprehension against the effort and

expected payoff and consider the

presence of capable guardians when

weighing those risks.

Characteristics of Metro’s environment, from design elements to

enforcement strategies, can be

applied to new or existing systems in

an effort to reduce crime. Although

prior research indicates that the base

rates of subway crime are quite low

and that individuals have a greater

risk of victimization aboveground

than below,21 increasing security on

subway systems is an important

public policy objective. Fear of

victimization has been found to be

greater underground than above.22

Levels of passenger fear affect

ridership and, therefore, have

widespread implications for urban

policy, including issues of traffic

congestion and pollution created by

alternative modes of transportation,

such as taxicabs, buses, and private

automobiles. These indirect costs not

only affect the system itself but also

are ultimately translated into higher

sales taxes and cutbacks on governmental services.

Thus, the benefits of implementing

crime prevention tactics on subways

are far-reaching; reducing subway

crime saves money and increases

revenues at the same time because

riders will be more willing to use the

system. In an urban area, the wellbeing of its subway system, in terms

of low crime rates and ample ridership, can affect the well-being of the

entire metropolitan area.

The fact that this study’s hypotheses

were supported with the tests detailed above has important implications for crime prevention. The

majority of evaluations of crime

prevention efforts focus on interventions to address preexisting crime

problems, and these evaluations

tend to study the impact of an

intervention over a relatively short

time. Counter to this typical

approach to crime prevention

evaluation, this study enables

researchers not only to determine

the impact of a comprehensive

preventive effort created before a

crime problem occurred but also to

assess the impact of these measures over a significant period.

Metro appears as relatively crimefree today as the day it began

operating in 1976. This is particularly impressive considering that

Washington, D.C., still ranks high

in crime rates among cities its size.

Further efforts to evaluate a mix of

preventive measures should be

encouraged. In addition, studies of

subway offenders in terms of who

they are, where they live, where

they commit their crimes, and what

kinds of crime they commit are

needed if researchers and others

are to truly understand the nature

and distribution of subway crime

and how it can be prevented.
Research in Brief

10

Notes

1. Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Situational

Crime Prevention: Successful Case

Studies, New York, New York:

Harrow and Heston, 1992, 1997.

2. Deiter, R.H., The Story of Metro:

Transportation and Politics in the

Nation’s Capital, Glendale, California: Interurban Press, 1990; and

Mooney, B., “Metro: Building Rapid

Rail Transit in the National Capital

Region,” transcript, Washington,

D.C.: 1976.

3. Personal interview, June 14, 1994,

Washington, D.C., with B.E. Morrow,

then chief of the Metropolitan Transit

Police, Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority (WMATA).

4. Personal communication,

September 13, 1995, with Angus B.

MacLean, former police chief,

Metropolitan Transit Police,

WMATA.

5. Telephone interview, September

12, 1995, with John F. Hyde, former

deputy chief of the Metropolitan

Transit Police, WMATA.

6. Personal communication,

September 13, 1995, with Angus B.

MacLean, former police chief,

Transit Police, WMATA.

7. Deiter, R.H., The Story of Metro:

Transportation and Politics in the

Nation’s Capital; and Mooney, B.,

“Metro: Building Rapid Rail Transit

in the National Capital Region.”

8. A footcandle is a measure of

illumination that equals one lumen

of light per square foot. Fennelly,

L.J., Handbook of Loss Prevention

and Crime Prevention, 2d ed.,

Stoneham, Massachusetts:

Butterworth-Heinemann, 1989.

9. Personal interview with Richard J.

Bochner, supervisor, Facilities and

Planning Section, Office of Planning,

WMATA, May 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.; and personal interview

with Melvin Siegel, deputy director

for architecture, Office of Engineering and Architecture, WMATA, May

21, 1995, Washington, D.C.

10. Sloan-Howitt, M., and G.L.

Kelling, “Subway Graffiti in New

York City: ‘Getting Up’ vs. ‘Meaning

It and Cleaning It,’ ” in R.V. Clarke

(ed.), Situational Crime Prevention:

Successful Case Studies, New York,

New York: Harrow and Heston,

1992.

11. See Clarke, R.V., “Introduction,”

in R.V. Clarke (ed.), Situational

Crime Prevention: Successful Case

Studies, 2d ed., New York, New York:

Harrow and Heston, 1997.

12. Ibid.

13. MARTA’s coefficient of relative

variation is smaller than the three

comparison systems, including

Metro’s (although Metro’s is smaller

than CTA’s and MBTA’s). One might

speculate that MARTA’s low coefficient is explained by the same

design characteristics that Metro

possesses: the system is relatively

new, thus benefiting from more

current crime prevention measures,

and the stations exhibit little

variation in design. An alternative

possibility is that variations in

crime rates within subway systems

may be influenced by the land use

of the place in which stations are

located, which may be more uniform

in Atlanta than Washington, D.C.,

Chicago, or Boston. This latter

hypothesis merits further

investigation.

14. A further test of the implications

of this stability would be to compare

Metro’s year-to-year correlation

coefficient with that of other systems,

which would indicate whether such

stability is a characteristic unique to

Metro or common to subway systems

in general.

15. One explanation for the significant correlation between assaults on

Metro and those aboveground may be

due to the nature of the act itself.

The genesis for an assault may

commence underground but actually

take place aboveground, or vice

versa. Thus, it is possible that,

because assaults are less likely to

begin and end in the same location,

the difference between crime settings

is less distinct to such offenders,

and, therefore, the preventive

capabilities of Metro are less likely

to influence offending behavior.

16. Again, assaults are an exception

to this finding. The coefficient of

variation for assaults is smaller by

station than by census tract, but it is

not statistically significant, perhaps

because assaults are less placespecific than other crime types.

17. See also La Vigne, N.G., Crime

Prevention Through the Design and

Management of Built Environment:

The Case of the D.C. Metro, doctoral

dissertation, Rutgers, The State

University of New Jersey, School of

Criminal Justice, Newark, New

Jersey: 1996.

18. La Vigne, N.G., Crime Prevention

Through the Design and Management of Built Environment: The Case

of the D.C. Metro.

19. Ibid.
11

Research in Brief

Related Reading

Preventing Mass Transit Crime (Crime Prevention

Studies, vol. 6, Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice

Press, 1996), edited by Ronald V. Clarke, contains

several chapters on preventing crime in public transit

settings. Below are the chapter titles and authors.

Editorial Introduction: Crime and the Economics of

Mass Transit

Ronald V. Clarke

Redesigning Hell: Preventing Crime and Disorder at

the Port Authority Bus Terminal

Marcus Felson et al.

Eliminating Pay Phone Toll Fraud at the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan

Gisela Bichler and Ronald V. Clarke

Target Hardening at a New York City Subway Station:

Decreased Fare Evasion—at What Price?

Robert R. Weidner

Preventing Auto Theft in Suburban Vancouver Commuter Lots: Effects of a Bike Patrol

Paul Barclay, Jennifer Buckley, Paul J. Brantingham,

Patricia L. Brantingham, and Terry Whinn-Yates

Safe Transport: Security by Design on the Washington

Metro

Nancy G. La Vigne

Designing for Security in Météor: A Projected New

Metro Line in Paris

Marina L. Myhre and Fabien Rosso

Where Angel Fears to Tread: A Test in the New York

City Subway of the Robbery/Density Hypothesis

Ronald V. Clarke, Mathieu Belanger, and James A.

Eastman

The Environs of Rapid Transit Stations: A Focus for

Street Crime or Just Another Risky Place?

Richard Block and Sean Davis

The National Institute of Justice is a

component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, and the Office for Victims

of Crime.

Findings and conclusions of the research

reported here are those of the author and

do not necessarily reflect the official

position or policies of the U.S. Department

of Justice.

NCJ 166372

20. See Gabor, T., ‘Everybody Does

It!’: Crime By The Public, Toronto,

Canada: University of Toronto Press,

1994.

21. Del Castillo, V., Fear of Crime in

the New York City Subway, doctoral

dissertation, Fordham University,

Department of Sociology, New York,

New York, 1992; and Kenney, D.J.,

Crime, Fear, and the New York City

Subways: The Role of Citizen Action,

New York, New York: Praeger, 1987.

22. Wekerle, G.R., and C. Whitzman,

Safe Cities: Guidelines for Planning,

Design, and Management, New York,

New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold,

1995; Levy, N.J., Crime in New York

City’s Subways: A Study and Analysis

of Issues With Recommendations To

Author’s acknowledgments: This Research

in Brief would not have been possible

without the assistance of countless

individuals, the list of whom is too long to

include here but can be found in the

document cited in endnote 17. In particular, I would like to thank the Washington

Area Metropolitan Transit Authority,

especially Chief Barry McDevitt and the

staff of the Metro Transit Police, for their

patience in responding to my countless

requests for data and information.

Enhance Safety and the Public’s

Perception of Safety Within the

Subway System, New York, New

York: Senate Transportation Committee, 1994; Kenney, D.J., Crime, Fear,

and the New York City Subways: The

Role of Citizen Action; and Schnell,

J.B., A.J. Smith, K.R. Dimsdale, and

E.J. Thrasher, “Vandalism and

Passenger Security: A Study of

Crime and Vandalism on Urban Mass

Transit Systems in the United States

and Canada,” Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Transportation, 1973.
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