S. HRG. 110–153

SECURING AMERICA’S INTEREST IN

IRAQ: THE REMAINING OPTIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 10, 11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, AND FEBRUARY 1, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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SECURING AMERICA’S INTEREST IN IRAQ: THE REMAINING OPTIONS

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38–033 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–153

SECURING AMERICA’S INTEREST IN

IRAQ: THE REMAINING OPTIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 10, 11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, AND FEBRUARY 1, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

(III)

CONTENTS

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

WHERE WE ARE: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 2

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

Marr, Dr. Phebe, historian, author of ‘‘The Modern History of Iraq,’’ Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

O’Hanlon, Dr. Michael, senior fellow and Sydney Stein, Jr., chair, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC ....................................................................... 17

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21

Pillar, Dr. Paul, visiting professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown

University, Washington, DC ............................................................................... 31

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34

Said, Yahia, director, Iraq Revenue Watch, London School of Economics,

London, England .................................................................................................. 23

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared statement . 92

Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, prepared statement ..................... 91

Thursday, January 11, 2007 (a.m.)

THE ADMINISTRATION’S PLAN FOR IRAQ

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 95

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, statement .......................... 128

Poll published in the Military Times .............................................................. 159

Article from the Daily Telegraph .................................................................... 160

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, statement .................. 147

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, statement ........... 150

Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, statement ........................ 121

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, statement ............................... 126

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, statement ............. 110

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, statement .................. 123

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, statement .............................. 114

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, statement ............................ 146

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, statement ................... 118

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 97

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement ................... 143

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska, statement ............................. 141

Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida, statement ..................................... 135

Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, statement ............................... 139

Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 99

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 102

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden .................................... 161

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar .................................... 170

Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, statement ............. 131

Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from Louisiana, statement .............................. 148

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, statement .......................... 136

Page

IV

Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, statement ..................................... 153

Thursday, January 11, 2007 (p.m.)

ALTERNATIVE PLANS: TROOP SURGE, PARTITION, WITHDRAWAL, OR

STRENGTHEN THE CENTER

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 175

Carpenter, Dr. Ted Galen, vice president of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Washington, DC ................................................................... 218

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 221

Galbraith, Hon. Peter W., senior diplomatic fellow, Center for Arms Control

and Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC ............................................................ 177

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 180

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 184

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 187

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 176

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Serwer, Daniel, vice president, Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute

of Peace, Washington, DC ................................................................................... 252

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 255

Haass, Hon. Richard, president, Council on Foreign Relations, New York,

NY ......................................................................................................................... 264

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 268

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 256

Nasr, Dr. Vali R., professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate

School, Monterey, Ca ........................................................................................... 272

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 276

Ross, Hon. Dennis, counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC ................................... 258

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 261

Thursday, January 18, 2007

MILITARY AND SECURITY STRATEGY

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 327

Hoar, GEN Joseph P., USMC (Ret.), former commander in chief, U.S. Central

Command, Del Mar, CA ...................................................................................... 342

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 343

Keane, GEN Jack, USA (Ret.), former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 336

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 328

McCaffrey, GEN Barry, USA (Ret.), president, BR McCaffrey Associates LLC

and adjunct professor of International Affairs, U.S. Military Academy,

Arlington, VA ........................................................................................................ 331

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 334

Odom, LTG William E., USA (Ret.), senior fellow, Hudson Institute; former

Director of the National Security Agency, Washington, DC ............................ 344

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 348

Page

V

Tuesday, January 23, 2007 (a.m.)

ALTERNATIVE PLANS CONTINUED—FEDERALISM, SIDE WITH THE

MAJORITY, STRATEGIC REDEPLOYMENT, OR NEGOTIATE?

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 401

Gelb, Hon. Leslie H., president emeritus and board senior fellow, Council

on Foreign Relations, New York, NY ................................................................. 404

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 406

Korb, Hon. Lawrence J., senior fellow, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 418

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 421

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 402

Luttwak, Dr. Edward N., senior fellow, Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Washington, DC ..................................................................................... 410

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 413

Malley, Robert, director, Middle East and North Africa Program, International Crisis Group, Washington, DC ............................................................. 427

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 431

Tuesday, January 23, 2007 (p.m.)

ALTERNATIVE PLANS (CONTINUED)

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 475

Gingrich, Hon. Newt, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives;

senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC ....................... 483

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 487

Murtha, Hon. John P., U.S. Congressman from Pennsylvania, chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 476

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 480

Thursday, January 25, 2007 (a.m.)

RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 525

Jones, BG Michael D., USA, J–5 Deputy Director for Political-Military

Affairs—Middle East, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC .......................... 537

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 528

Satterfield, Hon. David, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC ..................................... 530

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 534

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

‘‘Families of the Fallen for Change’’ letter submitted by Senator Biden ............ 574

Responses of Ambassador Satterfield to Questions submitted by Senator

Webb ...................................................................................................................... 576

‘‘Contributions From Other Donors’’ submitted by the State Department ......... 579

Thursday, January 25, 2007 (p.m.)

POLITICAL STRATEGY

al-Rahim, Rend, executive director, the Iraq Foundation, Washington, DC ...... 589

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 594

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 587

Dodge, Dr. Toby, consulting senior fellow for the Middle East, International

Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United Kingdom ................................ 612

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 615

Kubba, Dr. Laith, senior director for the Middle East and North Africa,

National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC .................................... 606

Page

VI

Kubba, Dr. Laith, senior director for the Middle East and North Africa,

National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC—Continued

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 609

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 588

Talabani, Qubad, Representative of the United States, Kurdistan Regional

Government, Washington, DC ............................................................................ 597

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 602

Tuesday, January 30, 2007

ALTERNATIVE PLANS: THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP

Baker, Hon. James A., III, cochair, Iraq Study Group; partner, Baker-Botts

LLP, Houston, TX ................................................................................................ 647

Prepared joint statement of James Baker and Lee Hamilton ...................... 652

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 645

Hamilton, Hon. Lee H., cochair, Iraq Study Group; director, Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC ......................................... 650

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, prepared statement ......... 695

Wednesday, January 31, 2007

IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, SESSION 1

Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., former Secretary of State; principal, The

Albright Group LLC, Washington, DC ............................................................... 730

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 733

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 697

Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., former Secretary of State; chairman, Kissinger

McLarty Associates, New York, NY ................................................................... 701

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 704

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 699

Thursday, February 1, 2007

IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, SESSION 2

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 755

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 756

Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew, former National Security Advisor; counselor and

trustee, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ..... 777

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 780

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 757

Scowcroft, LTG Brent, USAF (Ret.), former National Security Advisor; president, The Scowcroft Group, Washington, DC .................................................... 759

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 761

Appendix

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Barzani, Nechirvan, Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq,

Erbil, Kurdistan-Iraq, letter from ....................................................................... 797

Morrow, Dr. Jonathan, senior legal adviser to the Ministry of Natural Resources, Kurdistan Regional Government; former senior adviser to the U.S.

Institute of Peace, prepared statement .............................................................. 798

Shafiq, Tariq, director, Petrolog & Associates, London, UK; chair, Fertile

Crescent Oil Company, Baghdad, Iraq, ‘‘Perspective of Iraq Draft Petroleum

Law’’ ...................................................................................................................... 802

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WHERE WE ARE: THE CURRENT SITUATION

IN IRAQ

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer,

Bill Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson, and Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Chairman LUGAR. Let me call the hearing to order. If we may

have order in the committee room.

To the committee and to all who are assembled, let me indicate

that technically the Senate has not yet acted upon the new chairmanships, ranking members, and membership of committees. The

Senate will do so fairly promptly this week, but our business goes

on in the committee. And it’s my privilege today, as the outgoing

chairman of the committee, to introduce my friend and great Senator, Joe Biden, who will be our chairman and will preside over today’s hearing. We will assume he is chairman, and he will act as

chairman today and tomorrow and—through a very vigorous series

of hearings on Iraq and the Middle East that we have planned.

Let me just say that one of the strengths of our committee has

been the commitment of Senator Biden and Democratic and Republican committee members to bipartisanship, but likewise to very,

very substantial questioning of American foreign policy, regardless

of which party—which President we have served under. I’m certain

that that will continue. It’s an important aspect that the face of

America be as united as possible, and we have attempted to further

that idea, I think, with some degree of success. For example, the

India Nuclear Agreement that was just concluded celebrated a significant strategic development for our country with an overwhelming vote in this committee and support of Members of the

House of Representatives who shared this bipartisan ethic.

So, with that introduction, let me just indicate I’m delighted to

welcome our new members to the committee. I’m certain the chairman will want to do that, too. But it’s especially good to welcome

him to the chairmanship, and I turn over the gavel, which I do not

see at the present, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

2

But, nevertheless, in due course that will be forthcoming, too.

[Laughter.]

Chairman BIDEN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Chairman BIDEN. Folks, let me echo the comments made by the

Senator. Technically, we vote in the U.S. Congress on the organization. I am insisting on an open vote, not a secret ballot, if you get

the meaning of that. There may very well be a secret ballot. We

may keep him as chairman. I may vote for him. [Laughter.]

One of the things that Senator Lugar emphasized is that all of

us on this committee, under his leadership and the brief stint before that under mine and now again under mine, is that we understand that no foreign policy in America can be sustained without

the informed consent of the American people. And one of the overwhelming responsibilities of this committee, which has legislative

responsibility, but quite frankly, its role, historically, has been

more in playing the role of providing a platform upon which to inform the American people of the options—many times, difficult options—that must be chosen by a President of the United States in

order to conduct the foreign policy of this country.

And this morning we begin the work of the new Congress with

many new Members, including many new members on this committee. We welcome, today, new members—Senator Cardin, Senator Casey, Senator Corker, and Senator Webb, and we’re delighted

they have joined the committee. We also welcome veteran members

of the U.S. Senate who are new to the Foreign Relations Committee—Senator DeMint, Senator Johnny Isakson from Georgia,

Senator Bob Menendez from New Jersey, and Senator Vitter, who

I don’t see here yet, but I’m sure will be coming.

You join a committee that’s tried to remain a place for sanity and

civility in what has been a very partisan and sometimes polarized

Senate over the last decade. We’ve not always succeeded, but, quite

frankly, when we have, it’s largely been due to the efforts of Chairman Lugar. I don’t want to make this sound like a mutual admiration society, but, to state the fact, there is no one—no one in the

U.S. Senate who knows more about foreign policy, and no one who

has contributed more to American security than Chairman Lugar.

Today, we’re brought together by a question that dominates our

national debate, and it really boils down to a simple proposition.

What options remain to meet our twin goals of bringing American

forces home and leaving behind a stable Iraq? Over the next 4

weeks, this committee will seek answers to that question. First, we

will hear from the Bush administration, then we’ll hear from experts—left, right, and center—in our government and out of government, from across the United States and beyond our borders.

Then we’ll hear from men and women with very different ideas, but

who are united in their devotion to this country and their desire

to see us through this very difficult time.

The Bush administration, as well as important private groups

and experts, have developed varying plans on how to proceed in

Iraq. Tonight, I will sit, as will all of you, and listen to our President, and he will have my prayers and hopes that his plan will be

3

one that will ease our burden and not deepen it. But it’s a unique

responsibility of the U.S. Congress, and especially and historically

the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. Senate, to evaluate

these plans, in public, to help our citizens understand the very difficult choices this country faces.

That’s the best way to secure, in my view, as I said earlier, the

informed consent of the American people. For without their informed consent, whatever policy we arrive at cannot long be sustained.

I have my own strongly held views, as the witnesses know and

my colleagues know, about what to do and how we should proceed

in Iraq. There will be plenty of time for me to talk about them in

the days ahead. But, for now, I want to set out what Senator Lugar

and I jointly hope to accomplish as we put together this agenda for

the next several weeks, and how we hope to accomplish it.

First, let me make it clear what these hearings are not intended

to be about. They are not about an effort to revisit the past, point

fingers, or place blame on how we got to where we are. The American people spoke very loudly this past November. They know that

we’re in a significant mess in Iraq. But instead of arguing how we

got into that mess, they want us to be proactive and be part of the

solution. They expect us to help America get out of the mess we’re

in, not talk about how we got there.

We will start by receiving the most up-to-date unvarnished analysis of the situation and trends in Iraq and in the region. As a matter of fact, we began that inquiry yesterday. As all my colleagues

know, and many people in the audience know, we have a ‘‘Secret

Room’’ in the Senate. It’s called ‘‘S–407,’’ where we’re able to have

unvarnished discussions with the most sensitive information, requiring the highest clearance. And yesterday, all of my colleagues

and I sat there for a considerable amount of time receiving a classified briefing from all the major intelligence agencies of the U.S.

Government.

We continue that inquiry, the inquiry of determining what the

facts are on the ground today, with the experts who will assist us

in assessing the political, security, economic, and diplomatic realities that are on the ground today in Iraq and in the region.

We’ll begin with Dr. Phebe Marr, who has given us her valuable

time and scholarship and insight for many years in this committee

and is one of the most welcome witnesses that we have had in both

administrations, all administrations. She is a preeminent historian

of Iraq, and she will provide a historical overview. It is our view

that by illuminating the past, we’re going to be better able to understand the present, and hopefully better prepared to deal with

the present situation.

Michael O’Hanlon, of the Brookings Institution, has also graced

us with his presence in the past, and he will focus on—I’d put it

this way—focus on the numbers. How do we measure the current

situation in Iraq? The trends, in terms of security, the economy,

and public opinion.

And Mr. Said, the director of the Iraq Revenue Watch, will speak

to us on the political dynamics inside Iraq. Who are the main players? What are their interests? And what possible scenarios could

bring them together?

4

And then Paul Pillar, the former national intelligence officer for

Near East and South Asia, will address the dynamics in the region.

He has, again, graced us with his presence in the past, and has

been very valuable. The issue that we will ask him to discuss is:

What do Iraq’s neighbors want? And how can they affect the outcome on the ground in Iraq, if they can affect the outcome?

The goal today, as it was yesterday, is not to discuss policy options, although there are no limits on what any of the witnesses

can discuss, but it’s to get at the facts, as best we know them. We

want this committee and the public to have a strong foundation

upon which to evaluate the principal policy options that are being

discussed in this country today. Starting tomorrow and over the following 3 weeks, we will turn to those options and ask: Where do

we go from here? Secretary of State Rice has graciously indicated

she is not only ready, but anxious, to appear before our committee,

which she will do tomorrow, after President Bush announces the

administration’s plans, tonight.

The authors of every other major plan for Iraq will present their

recommendations, including those who advocate escalation, those

who advocate withdrawal, partition, federalization, siding with one

side or the other, strengthening the center, and so on. The major

authors of the plans—the authors of those major plans will come

and testify over the next 3 weeks.

As we hear from them, we’ll also hear from leading military, diplomatic, economic, and political experts, and we will ask this country’s senior statesmen and stateswomen, former National Security

Advisors, former Secretaries of State, to help us put everything

we’ve heard in context as we conclude what will probably be the

first round of hearings on Iraq.

The ultimate question for this committee is the question that’ll

be on the minds of every American as we listen to the President

of the United States tonight. Will your plan, Mr. President, or

other plans, put us on a better path in Iraq, or will it dig us into

a deeper hole with more pain, and not much to show for it? We

pray it will be the former. But together we have a responsibility

and, I believe, an opportunity to help put this country on a better

path.

So, let’s begin. Let me turn this over now to Senator Lugar for

any comments that he wishes to make.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

thank you for holding this important hearing and for assembling

such an excellent panel.

I would offer a special greeting, as you have, to Dr. Phebe Marr,

who has been a tremendous resource for the committee, and for me

personally. She testified at four different Iraq hearings during my

recent chairmanship, and also appeared at a hearing held under

Senator Biden in August 2002. Dr. Marr’s calm and authoritative

analysis on Iraq is grounded in a prodigious understanding of that

country and a nonpartisan outlook that is badly needed in this

debate.

Dr. Michael O’Hanlon has also provided excellent testimony before our committee in recent years. In 2005 and 2006, I wrote a series of 15 ‘‘Dear Colleague’’ letters to—on Iraq to all Senators.

These letters introduced reports and documents that I found to be

5

particularly illuminating. The Brookings Institution Iraq Index, a

report overseen by Dr. O’Hanlon, accompanied the first letter that

I sent, and it provides a remarkably detailed view of the economic

and security situation in Iraq. The Iraq Index is updated regularly,

and I continue to recommend it to any Member of Congress or citizen who wants a thoughtful grounding in the facts.

I also welcome Mr. Said and Dr. Pillar, who are testifying before

this committee for the first time. We are grateful to have them as

a new resource at this critical moment.

Tonight, President Bush will give a speech outlining his intended

course in Iraq. In recent days, I have had opportunities to talk to

the President about Iraq. Among other points, I underscored the

need for a thorough effort to involve Congress in the decisionmaking process.

United States policy in Iraq would benefit greatly from meaningful executive branch consultations with legislators, and from careful study by Members of Congress, that’s directed at dispassionately evaluating the President’s plan and other options. Members

of this committee and the entire Congress must be prepared to

make reasoned judgments about what the President is proposing.

Initially, the President and his team need to explain what objectives we are trying to achieve: If forces are expanded, where and

how they will be used; why such a strategy will succeed; and how

Iraqi forces will be involved; how long additional troops may be

needed; what contingencies are in place if the situation does not

improve; and how this strategy fits into our discussion throughout

the region.

The American media is understandably focused on the possibility

of a troop surge in Iraq. But whatever may be the final conclusion

on this point, relative success or failure is likely to hinge on many

other factors and decisions. The complexity of the Iraq situation

demands more of us than partisan sound bites or preconceived

judgments.

With this in mind, this hearing, setting the terms of reference for

what is happening in Iraq, is especially timely. I look forward to

the insights of our distinguished panel and to working with Chairman Biden and all members of this committee as we continue our

inquiry in the coming weeks.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you, Senator.

Let me explain to the new Members of the Senate that the way

we proceed will be to hear from all the witnesses—and I’ll announce that order in a moment—and then open it to questions,

based on our seniority here.

This is a very important topic, to say the least. And we could

probably, with some useful benefit to informing ourselves, spend 2

days with this panel alone. But my staff tells me, in consultation

with the Republican staff, that, as a practical matter, we’re going

to limit each of us, including myself, to 8-minute rounds of questions. I realize that is, in some sense, is not sufficient to really explore in the kind of depth you may want to. My experience is, the

witnesses are available to you, personally, after the hearing, and

on the telephone and in their offices, and occasionally, if you ask

6

them, they will make themselves available in your offices if it

works with their schedule.

So, I apologize in advance that there’s not going to be the kind

of exposition that—if we were doing this as a seminar at a university, we’d be able to spend a whole lot more time. But the dictates

of time make it difficult. So, we’re going to limit it to 8-minute

rounds, if I may.

But, first, let me begin. And the order in which I will ask the

witnesses to deliver their statements will be Dr. Marr, Mr.

O’Hanlon, Mr. Said, and Dr. Pillar.

Welcome, again, Phebe, and we’re delighted to have you here.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, HISTORIAN, AUTHOR OF

‘‘THE MODERN HISTORY OF IRAQ,’’ WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. MARR. Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, I want to say how delighted I am to be back again. And I can’t commend you and the

committee enough for what I think has been a remarkable job in

the continuing debate on Iraq and in informing the American public on it. It has seemed to me to be quite a wonderful effort, I hope

will continue with good effect.

I have been asked to address the historical context of this issue.

And let me say that 2007 marks the 50th year that I’ve been involved in Iraq. I’ve done other things besides Iraq, but it was 1957

when I first went to Iraq. And so, I have the benefit of some historical hindsight in having actually been on the ground through all of

the regimes, including the monarchy.

Iraq has had a very rich and varied history, but one of the things

that has struck me as I have followed it as a scholar and personally is the discontinuity of Iraqi history. And, indeed, we’re in the

middle of another such period.

Actually, I’d like to address three questions this morning. The

first is: Where is Iraq today? What are the chief political and social

elements we face in Iraq? Second: How can we account for this situation? To what extent is it historical? And, last: Is this current

situation likely to be lasting? Is it transient? Is it remediable?

Iraq, since 2003, has undergone not one, but several, revolutionary and radical changes of a proportion not seen since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the state in the

1920s. And I think the degree and nature of these changes need

to be recognized.

First has been a radical change in leadership. It’s not simply that

Iraqi leadership and its dictatorship have been decapitated, now

physically, as well as literally, but that an entirely new leadership

group has come to power. The ethnic and sectarian composition of

that leadership has changed. Shia and Kurds have replaced Arab

Sunnis as the dominant group. And its ideological orientation has

also changed, from one that was secular, nationalist, and devoted

to a unitary Iraqi State to one with differing visions of where Iraq

should go. Overall the leadership has a view that is far more dominated by religion than it has been at any time in Iraq’s history.

Since the nature and character of this leadership is critical to our

endeavor, I’d like to just take a few minutes to indicate a few characteristics of these leaders worth noting. They result from a study

7

that I’ve been engaged in at the United States Institute of Peace

for the last couple of years. I’ve attached a couple of charts to my

written testimony, and I think there’s a special report coming out

on the Internet very shortly. But there are three characteristics I’d

like to call to your attention. One is inexperience and discontinuity

in leadership over the past 4 years. Some 75 percent of the current

leaders hold national positions for the first time. This makes for a

very steep learning curve in governance. Second is the divide between the leaders with roots in the exile community, together with

Kurds who have been living in the north, separate from the rest

of Iraq, and those leaders who remained living inside Iraq under

Saddam’s rule. These groups have different narratives of the past

and visions for the future. And third, and most important, the key

leaders today have been shaped by decades of opposition to the

former regime. Many spent years in underground movements or

imprisoned by Saddam, and lost family members to the Baath. Few

insiders, including professionals who simply worked under the

Baath regime, have made it into the leadership. The suspicion, distrust, and hostility between these two groups is the core dynamic

driving much of the politics in Iraq today, making reconciliation

difficult.

A second fundamental change has been the destruction of governmental institutions, the bureaucracy and the army, about which

much has been said. The institutions underpinned not just the

Baath regime, but Iraq’s Government since its founding in the

1920s. Both of these institutions were established under the British, under the mandate, but had their origins in the Ottoman period. Despite ups and downs and periods of instability in modern

Iraq, these two institutions remained the backbone of the state

until 2003. The collapse of much of Iraq’s bureaucratic and military

structure have left a void that, in my view, will take years, if not

decades, to fill and has left an enormous political, social, and institutional vacuum. This vacuum is now filled, in part, by militias and

a new mix of parties and factions.

A third radical change is underway as a result of these events:

The collapse of the state as the Iraqis have known it since its creation under international mandate in 1920. Iraq is now a failing,

if not yet a failed state, with a new central government that has

difficulty cohering and whose reach does not extend much beyond

the perimeters of the Green Zone. The establishment of a government that delivers services to the population—chief among them,

security—is recognized as the chief task before Iraqis and its foreign supporters. However this issue of governance is resolved, the

form of the Iraqi State is likely to change fundamentally. How governance will be reconstituted, power distributed in the future, is a

big question. But Iraq is not likely to be a unified state dominated

by a strong central government in Baghdad, at least for some time.

A fourth revolutionary change has been the seemingly radical

shift in identity on the part of the population, which, in extreme

form, has led to this vicious sectarian war in Baghdad and its environs, and to serious demographic shifts, and an effort, not yet successful, to make this communal identity territorial.

Many have seen these identities—Kurdish, Shia, Sunni, Turkmen, et cetera—as longstanding, even primordial, a bedrock of

8

Iraqi society. But I think this is a misreading of Iraq’s much more

complex and interesting history. The intensity of these sectarian

and ethnic divisions are more the result of a collapsing order, a

vicious incitement of civil war by al-Qaeda, and political manipulation by politicians desirous of getting power. They were also exacerbated by an overweening central government and increasing persecution of the opposition by Saddam’s dictatorship. However, the

events of the past year have solidified emerging communal identities to an extent not known before in Iraq. And only time will tell

whether they can be mitigated. This is likely to take enormous effort by Iraqis and by us.

And, last, another profound change is becoming apparent: The

collapse of one of the Arab world’s major cities—Baghdad. Baghdad

has played a major role in Iraqi history, not just since the 1920s,

but since its founding in the eighth century. Iraq, with its two rivers and complex irrigation system, as well as geographic openness

to invasion from foreign territory, has seldom flourished unless it

has had a relatively strong central government to harness its water

resources and protect its population.

When Baghdad has declined or been destroyed, as it twice was

by the Mongols, Iraq has fallen into long periods of decay. But one

must remember that, ultimately, that city and Mesopotamia, now

Iraq, have always revived.

Greater Baghdad now contains a quarter to a third of Iraq’s population and its highest concentration of skills and infrastructure.

Baghdad, as a city, is not lost, but its revival and the return of its

middle class are essential to overcoming ethnic and sectarian divisions and the restoration of a functioning government.

One last thought on the current situation, and this may overlap

a little with my colleague. Major ethnic and sectarian blocs are already fragmenting into smaller units based on personal interests,

desire for power, differing visions and constituencies. It’s these

smaller units, and the leadership of the larger, better organized

and financed parties, also intermixed with militias, that will be

making the decisions on Iraq’s direction. It seems to me that one

way out of the conundrum of communal-identity politics is to encourage political alliances between these various groups on issues

and interests, such as oil legislation, commercial legislation, regulation of water resources, economic development, and other issues.

This is a slow, laborious process, but it’s probably the only way in

which some of the distrust and hostility between the leaders and

groups can be broken down and a new political dynamic shaped.

Let me finish up by asking: Given this situation, what prognosis

may be made? I feel Iraq faces three potential futures in the near

and midterm, and it’s still too early to tell which will dominate.

Given the grievous mistakes made on all sides, this process is going

to be very costly and time consuming, and no one should expect a

clear outcome in the next 2 years, probably even in the next decade. But helping to shape the long-term future of Iraq in one direction or the other will have a profound effect on the region and, I

believe, on our own security.

The first outcome is that Iraq will break up, as I’m calling it, into

its three main ethnic and sectarian components—Kurdish, Arab

Sunni, and Arab Shia—hastened by ethnic and sectarian conflicts

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spiraling out of control. Unless this division is shepherded and fostered by outside forces, however, I think this outcome is unlikely,

on its own. This division is not historical, but has come to the fore

in a moment of history characterized by political vacuum and

chaos, as I’ve indicated. Such a division will pose real difficulties

in Iraq and is radical in its implications for a region in which peace

depends on tolerance and coexistence, not just within Islam, but

among ethnic and national groups. While this breakup may happen, in my view it should not be encouraged or brokered by the

United States, especially if we want to disengage our forces from

the country. It will create more, not less, instability in the future.

The second outcome is that Iraq may break down, a process that

is well underway. Rather than cohesive ethnic and sectarian entities, the Iraqi polity will disintegrate into smaller units. These will

comprise political parties and movements, militias, local tribal

leaders, already mentioned. In reality, this is the Iraq that is

emerging, with different local forces competing in an effort to establish control in various areas of the country. This scenario, a fullblown failed state, would cause serious problems for the region and

the United States. Indeed, I feel that the failed-state syndrome

may be spreading throughout the region, as events in Lebanon and

Palestine indicate. We may be seeing the breakdown of the state

system established in the region by the British and French after

World War I.

A third outcome would be to slow and gradually arrest the decline, and for Iraq to gradually reconstitute a government that recognizes the new identities that have emerged, but learns to accommodate them in some new framework that allows for economic and

social development. It’ll be easy to rebuild this framework, I believe, if Iraqis do not divide indefatigably on ethnic and sectarian

lines, but, rather, work within various groups and parties that are

gradually participating in the political system to achieve mutual interest. Even if such a government does not control much territory

out of Baghdad or the Green Zone, it’s better to keep it intact as

a symbol and a framework, toward which future generations can

work, than to destroy it and try once again to establish another

new and entirely radical framework.

Iraq is very far from achieving a new government that works,

and the collapse we are witnessing is likely to get worse before it

gets better. Only when the participants in Iraq recognize, in this

struggle for power, that they are losing more than they can gain

by continuing it, will it come to an end. That may be a long time.

In the meantime, the best we can probably do is to help staunch

the violence, contain the struggle within Iraq’s borders, and keep

alive the possibility that after extremism has run its course, the potential for a different Iraq is still there.

Others in the region should be encouraged to do the same, a task

which should be built on the fact that no state in the region, or its

leadership, wants to see the collapse of the current state system,

no matter how much in need of reform their domestic governments

may be.

Thank you for your time.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, HISTORIAN, AUTHOR OF ‘‘THE MODERN

HISTORY OF IRAQ,’’ WASHINGTON, DC

I will be focusing almost entirely on Iraq’s domestic politics, my area of expertise,

and hopefully bringing a little historical perspective to bear, since I have been working on Iraq for some 50 years now. I would like to address three questions today.

First, where is Iraq today? What are the chief political and social characteristics we

face? Second, how can we account for this situation? And lastly, is the current situation likely to be lasting? Or is it transient? Is it remediable?

First, what can be said about the situation in Iraq today? Iraq since 2003 has undergone not one but several revolutionary changes, of a proportion not seen since

the collapse of Ottoman Empire and the formation of the new Iraqi state in the

1920s. The first has been a revolutionary change in leadership. It is not simply that

a regime and its dictatorial head have been—not only figuratively but now literally—decapitated, but an entirely new leadership group has come to power. This

leadership, brought to power essentially by elections in 2005, has now entirely reversed several of the characteristics of the old Baath regime, and even the transitional regimes that replaced it in 2003 and 2004. It has changed the ethnic and sectarian composition of the leadership. (It is now dominated by Shia and Kurds rather

than Arab Sunnis.) It has changed the ideological orientation from one which was

secular and nationalist, devoted to a unitary Iraqi state, to one with different visions but far more dominated by religion. At the same time, it has brought more

women into power and in general is better educated. The new leaders come, more

often, from urban origin, whereas Saddam’s clique were more rural and small town

born. But the change has also now brought new men and women into power. They

have three distinct characteristics worth noting.

First is their inexperience and the discontinuity in their leadership. Some 76 percent in this Cabinet and Presidency hold such jobs for the first time. This has meant

a lack of experience, a steep learning curve, and an inability to establish links with

one another and with constituencies. Most have had little chance to gain experience

because of the continual change of Cabinets.

Second, the change has also brought a divide between a group of leaders with

roots in exile who have lived outside of Iraq and Kurds who have been living in the

north separate from the rest of Iraq on the one hand, and those who remained inside living under Saddam on the other. The latter include key elements now in opposition, such as the Baath, as well as the younger generation and the dispossessed

who follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Some 28 percent are outsiders, now mainly from Middle Eastern rather than Western countries; some 15 percent are Kurds; only 26 percent are insiders.

Third, and most important, is the fact that the key leaders in power today have

all been shaped by years, even decades, of opposition to the former regime. The

heads of the Kurdish parties and the Shia religio-political parties, such as SCIRI

and Dawa, spent years in underground movements; were imprisoned by Saddam;

lost family members to the Baath; and even fought the long Iran-Iraq war against

the regime from the Iranian side. Some 43 percent of the current leaders were active in opposition politics. Since 2003, few ‘‘insiders’’—especially those in any way

affiliated with the Baath regime, such as professionals who worked in education or

health, Sunni or Shia—have made it into the leadership. While many of this group

are encompassed by the insurgency, or support it passively, others in this group

would like to join the political process but are excluded. The suspicion, distrust, and

hostility between these two groups is the core dynamic driving much of the politics

in Iraq today, which makes a reconciliation process so difficult to achieve.

In conjunction with this leadership change has gone another fundamental upheaval: The erosion and destruction of the governmental institutions—the bureaucracy and the army—which underpinned not just the Baath regime but Iraq’s Government since its founding in the 1920s. Both of these institutions were established

by the British under the mandate, although both had their origins in the Ottoman

period. Despite ups and downs and periods of instability, these two institutions remained the backbone of the state until 2003. Much has been made of the destruction

(or collapse) of these institutions elsewhere, and I will not dwell on it here, but the

profound impact this has had on the current situation in Iraq must be appreciated.

The disbanding of all of Iraq’s military and security forces, the removal of the Baath

Party apparatus that ran the bureaucracy and the education establishment (deBaathification), and, as a result, the collapse of much of Iraq’s bureaucratic structure, have left a void that will takes years—if not decades to fill. While much of

this structure—especially at the top—needed to be removed, and a good bit of the

rest had been hollowed out and corrupted under Saddam’s rule, the sudden and precipitous collapse of this governmental underpinning and the removal of much of the

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educated class that ran it have created an enormous political, social, and institutional vacuum. This vacuum is now filled in part by militias and a mix of new and

often inexperienced political parties and factions.

As result of these events, a second radical change is underway in Iraq: The collapse of the state as Iraqis have known it since its formal creation under international mandate in 1920. Iraq is now a failing—if not yet a failed—state with a

new central government that has difficulty cohering and whose reach does not extend much beyond the perimeters of the Green Zone in Baghdad and which does

not, clearly, command a monopoly over the official use of force. Indeed, outside of

the three Kurdish-run provinces, there is little provincial or local government yet

either. The establishment of government that delivers services to the population,

chief among them security, is now recognized as the chief task before Iraqis and its

foreign supporters.

However, before that is accomplished, the form of the Iraqi state is likely to

change fundamentally. For 35 years under the Baath, Iraq was a unitary state

which was part of the Arab world. Now it is one in which ethnic and sectarian identities predominate and new and different subnational groups, including militias, are

emerging. The constitution, drafted and passed in a referendum last year, provides

for a radical devolution of authority to federal regions, an issue on which many

Iraqis are divided and which may or may not come to complete fruition. How governance will be reconstituted and power distributed in the new entity that emerges

from the current confusion is a large question, but Iraq is not likely to be a unified

state dominated by a strong central government in Baghdad, at least for some time.

In fact, a high degree of decentralization—or even an absence of formal government

in many areas—may characterize Iraq for some time. The increasing fractures in

the body politic have, of course, raised the question of whether the Iraqi state can—

or even should—continue to exist, or whether it will be divided into ethnic and sectarian or perhaps subnational components. Should that happen, the results would

be revolutionary indeed, not only for Iraq but for the entire surrounding region, with

implications likely to reverberate for decades.

There have been other changes in Iraq that are almost as revolutionary as these

changes in leadership and the transformation of the state. One has been the seeming change in identity on the part of the population, which, in its recent extreme

form has led to a vicious sectarian war in Baghdad and its environs. This changing

identity has now led to more serious demographic shifts and an effort—not yet successful—to make this communal identity ‘‘territorial’’ by carving out more purely

ethnic or sectarian areas. While the development of a semi-independent Kurdish entity in the north has been taking shape for over a decade under the aegis of the

Kurdish nationalist parties, carving out distinct Shia and Sunni areas—even emphasizing Shia and Sunni identity as the fundamental basis of political loyalty—is

new.

Many have seen these identities (Kurdish, Shia, Sunni, Turkman, Christian, etc.)

as longstanding, even primordial, a bedrock of Iraqi society that has long been submerged, manipulated, or repressed by foreign (British) or dictatorial (the Baath and

Saddam Hussein) rule, and have now come to the fore as a natural expression by

the population of their political aspirations. I recognize how compelling and attractive that view is for people looking for an understandable explanation of what is

happening today, but I personally think it is a misreading of Iraq’s much more complex and interesting history. One should be wary of reading back into the past what

is happening today and of assuming it is the necessary foundation of the future.

These intense sectarian divisions in Baghdad, where mixed marriages were common, is new and is partly the result of collapsing order, a vicious incitement of civil

war by al-Qaeda, political manipulation by politicians desirous of getting a Shia majority, and is now driven by just plain fear and intimidation.

This is not to say that these ethnic and sectarian differences and identities are

themselves new; they go back centuries, but their strength and their exclusivity

have varied greatly over time. Ethnic and sectarian identity in Iraq has always had

to compete with far stronger tribal, clan, and family ties. As Iraq modernized and

joined the international community in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, a middle class

espoused political ideologies imported from outside (Nationalism—Iraqi, Arab and

Kurdish—as well as Socialism and Communism) and for years—right through the

1970s when Saddam stamped them out they were the chief motivating factors of the

emerging middle class. In recent decades, Islamic visions competed with them, often

cutting across ethnic and sectarian lines.

An overweening central government and increasing persecution of the opposition

and repression by Saddam’s growing dictatorship in Baghdad are better explanations for these emerging identities. If Iraq and the Baghdad government had been

more attractive, open, and promising, it is questionable whether these more excluVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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sive and separatist identities would have taken root. Kurdish nationalism has always been espoused by the two Kurdish parties and their leaders (the KDP and the

PUK), but they did not dominate the north—tribal leaders on the payroll of

Saddam’s government did—until Saddam’s war with Iran and his subsequent attack

on Kuwait so weakened his government that he could no longer control the north.

Much the same could be said for the Shia-Sunni divide, which he clearly exacerbated by relying on his tribal Sunni relatives from Tikrit and then killing and repressing Shia when they rose up in 1991.

Even so, these sectarian identities have never been exclusive nor, until recently,

expressed territorially. It was the power vacuum, and the innovation of elections on

a body politic still unaccustomed to a peaceful competition for power, that provided

the opportunity for leaders to mobilize a constituency along these lines. Despite this,

the Shia bloc is politically divided. Sunnis, who have identified more with the state

they have dominated in the past, are only now coming to grips with the idea of a

‘‘Sunni’’ rather than an Iraqi or Arab identity, largely out of fear they will be

marginalized or exterminated. The events of the last year have solidified emerging

communal identities to an extent not known before in Iraq; only time will tell

whether they can be mitigated and overcome in the future. And this is likely to take

enormous effort by Iraqis as well as by us.

Last, a fourth profound change is becoming apparent: The collapse of one of the

Arab world’s major cities, Baghdad. Baghdad has played a major role in Iraqi and

Islamic history not just since 1920s, but since its founding in 762. It can be said

that Iraq, with its two rivers and its complex irrigation system, as well as its geographic openness to invasion from foreign territory, has never flourished unless it

had a relatively strong central government to harness its water resources and protect its population. Baghdad is the city that has provided that function. Its high

point came in the 10th century when it was a center of learning and trade and integrated population and ideas from all over the known world. When Baghdad has declined or been destroyed (as it was, twice, by the Mongols in 1258 and 1402), Iraqi

cohesion has ceased to exist and it has fallen into long periods of decay. But one

must remember that, ultimately, the city—and Mesopotamia—always revived.

Today, the capital is in a serious state of erosion—from insurgency, sectarian warfare, and population displacement and emigration. Indeed, much of this decline predates our invasion. Since floods were controlled in the mid-1950s, Baghdad has been

inundated with migrants from rural areas in the north and south, who created satellite cities—urban villages—which changed the ethnic composition of the city and

diluted its urban core. The growth of Baghdad, especially in the 1970s and 1980s,

drained other areas of population. Greater Baghdad contains between a quarter and

a third of Iraq’s population and its highest concentration of skills and infrastructure. However, even under Saddam, Baghdad began to lose its skilled middle class,

which is now beginning to hemorrhage.

This strand of Iraq’s population, its educated middle class, must be revived if the

country is to get back on its feet. It is this class which has, for the most part, submerged its ethnic, sectarian, and tribal identity in broader visions and aspirations—

political, social, and cultural—and has greater contact with and affinity for the outside world. Intermarriage among sects and even ethnic groups was increasingly

common in this middle class, which staffed the bureaucracy, the educational establishments, and the top echelons of the military. Unfortunately, under the long decades of Baath rule, this class was ‘‘Baathized’’ to a degree, in order to survive, and

has now found itself disadvantaged, and under current sectarian warfare, persecuted. And it is this class in Baghdad that is now fleeing in droves, not just for

other places in Iraq, but outside to Jordan, Syria, the gulf, and Europe. While educated middle classes exist in other Iraqi cities—Mosul, Basra, Kirkuk, Irbil—they

are much smaller, less cosmopolitan, and, now, far less mixed. They will not be able

to function as the kind of mixing bowl necessary to create interactions between and

among different groups, so essential in the modern world.

Baghdad as a city is by no means lost, but its revival (in more modest dimensions)

and the return of its ‘‘mixed’’ middle class are essential to overcoming ethnic and

sectarian divisions and to the revival of a functioning, nonsectarian government, all

of which is critical to any decent future outcome in Iraq. However decentralized Iraq

may become in its future iteration, none of its parts will be able to achieve their

aspirations without Baghdad. And the weaker the central government is, the weaker the economic and social revival will be.

One last thought on the current situation. Before we give up and hasten to assume that ethnic and sectarian identity will be the basis of new state arrangements

(either inside a weak Iraqi state or in independent entities), there is one other political dynamic emerging that bears notice. The major ethnic and sectarian blocs (the

Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shia) are already fragmenting into smaller units based

13

on personal interests, a desire for power, and differing visions and constituencies.

None of the larger ethnic and sectarian units on which a new regionalized state is

proposed are homogeneous. These smaller units have been galvanized by the three

elections of 2005, and have formed political parties and blocs. These blocs are themselves composed of smaller parties and groups often now supported by militias.

While the militias have gotten most of the attention, the parties have not. It is the

leadership of the larger, better organized and financed parties that now control the

situation in Baghdad. More attention needs to be paid to them and to their leadership, since they will be making the decisions on Iraq’s direction.

The most important of these parties are clear. In the north, the Kurds are divided

between two principal political parties: The KDP and the PUK. Both parties are of

longstanding, each with its own separate military forces and political party hierarchies. Both are led by men with monumental ambitions and egos. These leaders and

parties, now cooperating in a common constitutional venture, the Kurdish Regional

Government (KRG), have fought for decades in the past and are still not wholly integrated into a Kurdish government. They could split in the future. Kurdish society

also has an emerging Islamic movement (the Kurdish Islamic Union is a good example); separate tribal groups with some stature; and ethnic and sectarian minorities

(Turkmen, Christians) with distinct identities and outside supporters.

In the face of a disintegrating Iraqi state and the chaos and danger in Iraq, the

Kurds have pulled together since 2003 in confronting the Arab part of Iraq and are

increasingly separating themselves from Baghdad. However, the KRG in the north

is not self-sustaining economically, politically, or militarily, nor can it be for many

decades, and even as it moves in that direction, it faces the long-term affliction of

isolation, provincialism, and hostility from its neighbors that could thwart its domestic development. Failure in this experiment or a complete collapse of Baghdad

could again fracture the north and give rise to warlordism and tribal politics, as it

did in the mid-1990s. Kurds need to be given encouragement not only to nurture

their successful experiment in the north, but also to spread it to the south and to

cooperate in reviving Iraq rather than moving in a direction of separatism.

In the Shia bloc, the UIA, there is even less unanimity. Several political parties

or movements dominate this sector and only pull together under the increasingly

weaker leadership of Aytollah Sistani, who wants to keep a ‘‘Shia majority’’ in Iraq.

Whether he can continue to do so under the pressure of events is a large question.

The major Shia parties are clearly SCIRI, under the cleric and politician Abdual

Aziz al-Hakim, and the Sadrist movement under Muqtada al-Sadr, also a minor

cleric. The Dawa Party of Prime Minister Maliki is a weak third.

SCIRI, formed in 1982 in Iran from Iraqis exiled there, was originally an umbrella

group but has now become a party devoted to Hakim and the furtherance of Shia

interests. It has been heavily financed and organized by Iran, and its militia, originally the Badr Brigade (now the Badr organization), was originally trained and

officered by Iran. It has allegedly disarmed. It attracts educated middle-class Shia,

who probably see it as the best avenue to power in a new Shia-dominated Iraq, but

its leadership is distinctly clerical and has ties to Iran. SCIRI’s leanings toward clerical rule are drawbacks in Iraq, especially for Arab Sunnis and Kurds.

Dawa has legitimacy as the founder of the Shia Islamic movement in Iraq in the

late 1950s, but it was virtually emasculated by Saddam in the late 1970s and 1980s.

Most of its leaders fled to Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Europe where they remained

in exile for decades. Their organization is weak and they have no militia to speak

of.

The Sadrist movement is not an organized party. Its closest model would be

Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its leader, Muqtada, is erratic, militant, and sometimes

dangerous. He has few religious or educational credentials, but he draws on his father’s name and legacy. (His father, the chief Ayatollah in Iraq, was killed by Saddam in 1999). More important, he has attracted a wide following among poor, the

downtrodden and youth, who have not benefited from the changes in 2003. He has

emphasized opposition to the occupation, Iraqi unity, and the fact that he and his

followers are ‘‘insiders,’’ not exiles. His militia, now seen by many in the United

States as a major threat to the new government, is fractured and localized, often

under the command of street toughs, and it is not clear the extent to which he can

himself command all of them. A smaller Shia group, al-Fadhila, also an offshoot of

the conservative Shia movement founded by Muqtada’s father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, bears watching; it has influence in Basra.

These various Shia groups and their leaders are in competition for power and

have been for decades (especially the Sadrists and Hakims), and it is not clear that

unity can be kept between them. They also draw on different constituencies and

have somewhat different visions for the future of Iraq. SCIRI, for example, espouses

14

a Shia region in the south; Sadr is more in favor of a unified Iraq. Dawa sits somewhere in the middle.

The Sunni component of the spectrum is the most fragmented. The Sunni contingent which has been taken into the Cabinet and controls 16 percent of seats in Parliament (Iraqi Accordance Front or Tawafuq) is itself composed of several parties

without much cohesion. Most important is the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), a party

going back to the 1960s and roughly modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. While

it represents Sunnis, it is more nationalist than Sunni, and does have a history and

some organization. The second component, known as Ahl al-Iraq (People of Iraq),

is a mixture of secularists, tribal, and religious dignitaries, such as Adnan Dulaimi.

As its name suggests, it has a nationalist focus. The third component, the National

Dialogue Council, is relatively insignificant. Even if these groups come hand together on issues, it is not clear how much of the Sunni constituency they represent.

The Iraqi Dialogue Front, under Salah Mutlaq, a former Baathist, who probably

represents some of the ex-Baath constituency, got 4 percent of the votes and sits

in Parliament but not the Cabinet. Whether these two groups can be said to represent ‘‘Sunnis’’—and how many—is at issue, since much of the Sunni insurgency

is still out of power and presumed to consist in large part of former Baathists, religious jihadis, and now indigenous Iraqi al-Qaeda elements. Bringing some of these

non-Qaida elements into the process is essential, but expecting the Sunni community to stick together as Sunnis or to think and feel as Sunnis is premature. Many

Sunnis, long associated with the state and its formation, think along nationalist

lines, and have ambitions beyond a mere Sunni region.

And one should not forget, entirely, the remnants of the main secular bloc to run

in the December 2005 election: The Iraqiya list, headed by Ayyad Allawi. This group

constitutes the bulk of the educated Iraqis who think in national, rather than communal or ethnic terms. Although they only got 9 percent of the vote and have little

chance of forming a government, they have positions in the Cabinet and could help

in contributing to a more balanced, nonsectarian government in the future.

One way out of the conundrum of communal identity politics is to encourage new

political alliances between individuals and groups on issues and interests, rather

than alliances based on identity. This will be very difficult, especially for the Shia,

who see their identity as a ticket to majority rule, but it can be done, and, to a certain extent, already is being done. On issues such as oil legislation, regulation of

water resources, economic development, and some other issues—even that of federalism and keeping Iraq together—voting blocs can be created across ethnic and

sectarian lines, in ways that benefit all communities. This is a slow, laborious process, but it is probably the only way in which some of the distrust and hostility between these leaders can be broken down and new political dynamics shaped.

To the extent that educated professionals can be brought into government to help

shape these deals and bridge the gap, that will help. Ultimately, state organizations

and institutions can be rebuilt under new management. While no new grand vision

is likely to emerge any time soon from this process, pragmatism may take root, and

with it the bones of a government which delivers services. If this happens, larger

groups of Iraqis will give their new government some loyalty. It is the state—and

effective governance—which needs, gradually, to be put back into the equation, to

enable ethnic and sectarian loyalties to be damped down and to curb the insurgency.

In this process, no two factors are more important than reviving economic development (not just oil revenues) and bringing back an educated middle class which has

some degree of contact with and understanding of the outside world beyond the exclusive domain of tribe, family, sect and ethnic group.

Given this situation, what prognosis may be made? Is the current situation likely

to last? Or is it a transient stage? What is a likely long-term outcome and what

would be ‘‘best’’ for Iraqis, the region, and the United States?

Iraq faces three potential futures in the near and midterm, and it is still too early

to tell which will dominate. All that one can say, thanks to grievous mistakes made

on all sides, is that the process is going to be very costly and time-consuming; no

one should expect any clear outcome in the next 2 years and probably not even in

the next decade. But helping to shape that long-term future in one direction or the

other will have a profound effect on the region and, I believe, our own security.

The first outcome is that Iraq will ‘‘break up’’ into three main ethnic and sectarian

components—Kurdish, Arab Sunni, and Arab Shia—hastened by the ethnic and sectarian conflicts spiraling out of control, and already indicated in the constitution.

Many see this as inevitable and (in the West) as a possible way to ‘‘fix’’ the Iraqi

situation and hence to reduce our deep military involvement. Iraq may end up with

such a division, but, unless it is shepherded and fostered by outside forces, it is unlikely, for several reasons. This division is not historical, but has come to the fore

in a moment of history characterized by a political vacuum, chaos, and shrewd politVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
15

ical leaders who have mobilized constituents on this basis—especially the two Kurdish parties and SCIRI. But such a clear-cut division has real difficulties in Iraq. One

is that it does not correspond to reality. Even in the Kurdish area—where there is

more substance to the claim, this identity is fostered by two leaders and two parties

who have near total control over their opponents and region. But these parties have

no clear borders recognized by neighbors, or by Arabs to the south, and they will

be challenged by all. And they do not have the economic wherewithal for maintenance of a sustainable state, either in terms of economic investment (some 70 percent of their income still comes from the central government in Baghdad), ability

to defend their borders, or recognition. Independence, as many of their leaders recognize, may come with a big economic price tag that their constituents may not ultimately be willing to pay.

Elsewhere in Iraq, there is insufficient sectarian homogeneity to form the basis

of a state or even a region. Shia parties themselves disagree profoundly on whether

a federal state in the south—under Shia religious control—should be established.

SCIRI is forwarding this project because it wants to control this territory, eclipse

Sadrists, and impose its vision on the Shia population. It is opposed by Sadrists and

other more secular Shia, and they will contest the issue, if not in Parliament, on

the street. Creation of such a Shia entity will pose questions of its boundaries—and

we already see sectarian strife in Baghdad as a component of the struggle over who

will control portions of the city. This is also a new political principle and dynamic

likely to spread to neighboring states like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which have

a mix of Shia and Sunni populations, with immensely destabilizing prospects. And

it is an exclusivist principle. What kind of state will it be? The leadership of SCIRI,

with its strong clerical leadership, its earlier reliance on its own militia, and its emphasis on a ‘‘Shia’’ majority, does not give confidence that it will be any more democratic than its parent model in Iran. Moreover, getting a stable, recognized, ‘‘Shia’’

government in this region will be a long and contentious proposition providing little

stability in the south. If the Kurds are unable to defend their borders themselves,

how will the Shia be able to do so?

But it is in Arab Sunni areas—with Anbar at its heart—that this project fails

abysmally. First, Arab Sunni Iraqis, whether the more rural variety inhabiting

towns and cities along the Euphrates and Tigris, or their more sophisticated cousins—urban cousins—in Baghdad and Mosul, have been nurtured for decades on

Arabism and on loyalty to an Iraqi state, which they helped create since 1920. True,

some are more religiously oriented than secular, but this does not detract from their

sense of nationalism. Getting Iraqi Sunnis to identify as Sunnis is going to be a long

and very difficult task, let alone getting them to concentrate on governing a truncated ‘‘Sunni’’ federal area. And they are surrounded by neighboring Arab countries

with leaders and populations who agree with them. And, as in the case with the

Shia, where will the borders of this entity be? How much of Baghdad will it include?

Will it divide the city of Mosul with Kurds along the Tigris River? And what about

Diyala province with its Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish and Turkman populations? How

is that to be divided up? While sectarian cleansing in these areas is underway to

an alarming degree, it is by no means complete and in no way desirable. The results

are not going to be a homogenous Sunni area but a patchwork quilt. Moreover, unless the sting of the Sunni insurgency is drawn, any map of Iraq shows that the

Arab Sunnis population control strategic portions of Iraqi territory—which they can

use, as they have been doing—to prevent both Kurdish and Shia progress. Included

in this territory are water resources—both the Tigris and Euprhates; access to

neighboring Arab countries, and communications right across the center of the country, as well as Iraq’s ability to export oil through pipelines.

In the end, the creation of new entities—even regions—based on Shia and Sunni

identity is radical in its implications for a region in which peace depends on tolerance and coexistence between Islam’s two major sects. I will not mention here the

obvious implications for the geostrategic position of Iran and its role in the region

or the equally obvious reactions from other Sunni-dominated states. While this

breakup may happen, it should not be encouraged or brokered by the United States,

especially if we want, ultimately, to disengage our forces from the country. I believe

it will create more, not less, instability in the future.

A second outcome is that Iraq may ‘‘break down,’’ a process that is also well

underway. Rather than cohesive ethnic and sectarian entities, Iraqi society will disintegrate into smaller units. These will comprise the political parties and movements we already see, with their various leaders and organizations; different militias; local tribal leaders and warlords, criminal organizations that can control access

to resources; and, in urban areas, a combination of local groups and educated leaders who command the necessary skills to run things. Some of these groups and organizations may overlap—especially parties and their militias—and they will function

16

through some fig leaf of government. But the territory over which they rule will

vary and possibly shift as will their command over Iraq’s resources. This breakdown

is almost wholly a function of a collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The

process of building an alternative regional government in the wake of this collapse

is furthest advanced in the three Kurdish provinces in the north, but it is not complete there by any means.

In reality, this is the Iraq that is emerging, with differing local forces competing

and engaging with one another in an effort to reestablish control and primacy in

various areas of the country. In some cases these struggles are violent. But none

of these local warlords, militias, parties, or provincial governments—even if they can

keep a modicum of order in their territory—can achieve the kind of economic development, security, contacts with the outside world, and promise of a modern life and

a future to which most Iraqis aspire. In the meantime, organized criminal elements—and a myriad of freebooters—are increasingly stealing Iraq’s patrimony,

while its oil wells and other resources go further into decline. And in some areas,

such as Baghdad, the absence of government has led to a Hobbesian nightmare of

insecurity, violence, and the most vicious personal attacks on human beings seen

anywhere in the modern world. Iraq could descend further into breakdown, as local

warlords, militias, criminal elements, and others assert control. This scenario—a

full blown ‘‘failed state’’—is already causing problems for the region and for the

United States. Indeed, the failed state syndrome may be spreading, as events in

Lebanon this summer and now in Palestine indicate. Needless to say, it is precisely

the failed state syndrome that produces the best opportunity for al-Qaeda and other

jihadists opposed to United States and Western interests to nest in the region.

A third outcome is to slow and gradually arrest the decline, and for Iraq to gradually reconstitute an Iraqi Government that recognizes the new divisions which have

emerged, but learns to accommodate them and overcome them in some new framework that allows for economic and social development. No society can exist without

governance, and that is the root of Iraq’s problems today. It will be easier to rebuild

this framework, I believe, if Iraqis do not divide, indefatigably, on ethnic and sectarian lines, but rather work with the various groups and parties that are gradually

participating in the new political system to achieve mutual interests. This does not

preclude the emergence of new parties, but none are on the horizon now. Such accommodations will exclude extremes, such as al-Qaeda, and possibly some—though

not all—Sadrist elements, and it must include many of the Sunnis—ex-Baathists

and others—who are not yet in the government. This aim can be advanced by pushing leaders in Baghdad to cut deals and make agreements on issues on which they

have mutual interests—across the ethnic and sectarian divide. It is also essential

to expand areas of economic development; government services (especially security)

and to bring back the middle class and put them in positions of administrative and

military authority. Regardless of who is running politics, an infusion of educated,

experienced technocrats will help moderate the process and push it toward the middle. Over time, new links and understandings may become institutionalized and a

government in Baghdad gradually take shape. Even if this government does not control much territory outside of Baghdad or the Green Zone, it is better to keep it intact as a symbol and a framework toward which a future generation can work, than

to destroy it and try, once again, to establish a new and entirely radical framework.

Iraq is very far from achieving a new government that works, and the collapse

we are witnessing is more likely to get worse before it gets better. Only when the

participants in this struggle for power recognize that they are losing more than they

can gain by continuing, will it come to an end. That may be a very long time. In

the meantime, the best we can probably do is to staunch the violence; contain the

struggle; and keep alive the possibility that after extremism has run its course, the

potential for a different Iraq is still there. Others in the region should be encouraged to do the same, a task which should be made easier by the fact that no state

in the region—or its leadership—wants to see the collapse of the current state system, no matter how much in need of reform is its domestic government may be.

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FROM THE DECEMBER 15, 2005, IRAQI LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

Party Total seats Percentage

Shia Parties:

United Iraqi Alliance ............................................................................................................... 128 46.55

Progressives ............................................................................................................................ 2 0.73

Total ................................................................................................................................... 130 47.27

17

SEAT DISTRIBUTION FROM THE DECEMBER 15, 2005, IRAQI LEGISLATIVE ELECTION—Continued

Party Total seats Percentage

Sunni Parties:

Accord Front ............................................................................................................................ 44 16.00

Iraqi Dialogue Front ................................................................................................................ 11 4.00

Liberation and Reconciliation Bloc ........................................................................................ 3 1.09

Total ................................................................................................................................... 58 21.09

Kurdish Parties:

Kurdistan Alliance .................................................................................................................. 53 19.27

Islamic Union of Kurdistan .................................................................................................... 5 1.82

Total ................................................................................................................................... 58 21.09

Secular Nationalist Parties:

National Iraqi List .................................................................................................................. 25 9.09

Iraqi Nation List (Mithal al-Alusi) .......................................................................................... 1 0.36

Total ................................................................................................................................... 26 9.45

Minority Parties:

The Two Rivers List (Assyrian) ............................................................................................... 1 0.36

The Yazidi Movement .............................................................................................................. 1 0.36

Iraqi Turkman Front ................................................................................................................ 1 0.36

Total ................................................................................................................................... 3 1.09

MINISTRIES AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS BY PARTY, PERMANENT GOVERNMENT, 2006

Party

No. of

ministries

+leadership

positions

Percentage

UIA ................................................................................................................................................... 21 45.65

SCIRI ....................................................................................................................................... 5 10.87

Dawa ....................................................................................................................................... 1 2.17

Dawa Tandhim ........................................................................................................................ 3 6.52

Sadrists ................................................................................................................................... 4 8.70

Islamic Action ......................................................................................................................... 1 2.17

Hezbollah ................................................................................................................................ 1 2.17

Independent ............................................................................................................................ 6 13.04

Kurdistan Alliance ........................................................................................................................... 8 17.39

PUK ......................................................................................................................................... 4 8.70

KDP ......................................................................................................................................... 4 8.70

Tawafuq ........................................................................................................................................... 9 19.57

Iraqiya .............................................................................................................................................. 6 13.04

Independent ..................................................................................................................................... 2 4.35

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The charts presented by Dr. Marr were not reproducible. They

will be maintained for viewing in the committee’s premanent record.]

Chairman BIDEN. Doctor, thank you. Thank you very much.

Michael.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL O’HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW

AND SYDNEY STEIN, JR., CHAIR, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. O’HANLON. Thank you, Senator. It’s a great honor to appear

before this committee today.

18

Chairman BIDEN. By the way—excuse me for interrupting—I

note that, in the interest of time, you’ve been unable to go through

the entire statements each of you had——

Dr. MARR. Oh, yes.

Chairman BIDEN [continuing]. Your entire statements will be

placed in the record for everyone to have available.

Dr. O’HANLON. Thank you for the honor to testify today.

I think the numbers in Iraq essentially add up to what we all,

I think, are realizing in our gut more and more, which is, the state

of Iraq today is poor. As a person trying to maintain an objective

database on this for 31⁄2 years now, I tried hard not to use that

kind of a sweeping conclusion for the first couple of years. There

was always reason to think that the glass might be half full, or at

least the data themselves might suggest that you could find information that would allow you to reach that conclusion. And we

thought, as providing a database, it was important for us not to

prejudge where things were headed. But I think it’s increasingly

clear that in Iraq the situation is poor, that we are losing. One can

debate whether we’ve lost. I would agree with Secretary Powell’s

characterization, that we are losing, but there is still hope for salvaging something. And the degree of setback or degree of an unfortunate outcome matters a great deal, even if we are not going to

wind up where we hope to be, on the scale that we had hoped. But

the data, I think, are very clear, and let me go through just a couple of points to try to summarize why I say that.

On the testimony I’ve prepared today, we have 18 security indicators, 6 economic indicators, and another half dozen or so political

and public opinion indicators. The latter category has some hope,

has some positive element, but the first two are almost uniformly

bad. Of the 18 security indicators that we’re presenting for you

today, 17 of them are either bad or, at best, stagnant, in terms of

the trend lines. Only one can be said to be positive, and that’s the

one that I think, unfortunately, is less important and less—itself,

less promising than we once hoped—which is the progress in training Iraqi security forces, because even though we are making technical progress, getting them equipment, getting them training. We

all know that their sectarian trends and tendencies are growing,

and one can’t even speak, necessarily, of a clearly improving Iraqi

security force, at this time. We’ve tried to guestimate about how

many of the Iraqi security forces may be not only technically proficient, but politically dependable in some way. Very hard to come

up with that kind of a number. I’ve talked to people in the military

and the administration on this. I know you all have, too. But I

think that, at best, there are several thousand Iraqi forces that can

be reliably said to be politically dependable, even if there may be

100,000 or more that pass at least a modest standard of technical

capability. So, the security environment is quite poor.

On the economic front, of the six categories that we summarize

in our testimony today, only one of them shows any real positive

motion, and that’s the GDP. But that, of course, is essentially a

top-down effect from high oil prices and from foreign aid, and it

doesn’t necessarily reach all the middle-class Iraqis that we need

to reach.

19

So, this is why I conclude that things aren’t good, and, in fact,

are quite poor, on balance.

Let me identify, very quickly, six categories, and give you just a

little bit of information on each of the six, and try to do so quickly,

because I realize it’s easy to swamp people with data. And, by the

way, I should say, by way of background, not all this data is of

equally good quality. Again, those of you—and most of you who

have been to Iraq know how hard it is to get information from the

ground, and we also know that the numbers—you know, the benchmarks may be off, and the trends may be somewhat off. But I still

think the overall gist of this is pretty clear.

I should also say, our information is largely U.S. Government information, but we also try to depend a great deal on journalists

working in the field, on nongovernmental organizations in the field,

and, to some extent, our own research. But we are not in Iraq, with

a lot of interns, gathering data; we are primarily trying to compile

and assess trends.

First point of the six categories—and this is obvious, but I’d better make it clear and get it on the table anyway—the violence levels in Iraq have been escalating dramatically. We’ve seen this

again in the recent data. There is considerable disagreement about

how many people in Iraq are dying per month, but it’s probably in

the range of 4–5,000 civilians a month, which is at least double

what it was just a couple of years ago. And, frankly, in this broad

semantic debate about whether Iraq is in civil war or not, by that

standard Iraq is very, very clearly in civil war. The sheer level of

violence makes this one of the two or three most violent places in

earth. And, frankly, we’re getting to the point where it even begins

to rival some of the more violent periods during Saddam’s rule,

which is a terrible thing to have to say. It’s not as bad, of course,

as the worst period of the Iran-Iraq war or of Saddam’s genocides

against his own people, but it is essentially rivaling—essentially—

what I might say is the average level of Saddam’s level of violence

over his 25 years in power, about 4–5,000 civilians being killed per

month.

One backup piece of information on this, or corroborating statistic, the number of attacks per day that we’re seeing from militias

or sectarian groups or insurgents is now almost 200, which is an

escalation of at least a factor of five from a couple of years ago. So,

the first point, again, is fairly obvious, but, I think, worth emphasizing.

Second point—and Dr. Marr made this point, and we all are

aware of it—is the growing sectarian nature of the violence. And

here, I’m just going to highlight one or two statistics, which come

largely from Pentagon data bases. In the early 2 years of Iraq’s

war—or of our experience in Iraq since 2003—there were very few

sectarian attacks, maybe zero or one per day, according to the Pentagon’s best effort to tabulate. More of the attacks were a Sunnibased insurgency against anyone associated with the government,

whether it was our forces, Iraqi Shia, Iraqi Sunni, Iraq Kurd. The

violence was very much of an insurgent and terrorist nature. And

zero or one attacks per day were assessed as sectarian. Now it’s 30

sectarian attacks a day. Three zero. So, this is a dramatic escalation in the amount of sectarian violence.

20

We have a terrorist threat, an insurgency threat, and a civil war

from sectarian violence, all at the same time. And I don’t want to

make too much of the semantic issue here. If you want to call it

‘‘sectarian strife’’ or ‘‘large-scale sectarian strife’’ rather than ‘‘civil

war,’’ I suppose we can still have that debate, but the sheer

amount of violence and the growing political impetus to the violence from the different sectarian leaders makes Iraq unambiguously qualified, in my mind, as a place where we have a civil war

today. So, I wanted to underscore the sectarian nature of the violence.

Third point, related to the first two, is that, if you want to put

it in a nutshell, Iraq is becoming Bosnia. Ethnic cleansing and displacement are becoming paramount. And here, I think the statistics have been underappreciated in much of the public debate, so

far. So, let me try to be very clear on one big, important data point;

100,000 Iraqis per month are being driven from their homes right

now. Roughly half are winding up abroad, roughly half are moving

to different parts of Iraq. This is Bosnia-scale ethnic cleansing. I

agree with Dr. Marr that it would be preferable—and Iraqis certainly would prefer—to retain some level of multiethnic society,

and that separation of the country into autonomous zones raises a

lot of tough questions. However, let’s be clear about what the data

show. It’s happening already. And right now, it’s the militias and

the death squads that are driving the ethnic cleansing, and the

movement toward a breakup of Iraq. And the question, pretty soon,

is going to be whether we try to manage that process or let the militias alone drive it, because it’s happening; 100,000 people a month

are being driven from their homes. Iraq looks like Bosnia, more

and more. That’s my third point.

Fourth point, disturbing—again, not surprising, but disturbing—

middle- and upperclass flight. We have huge problems of Iraqi professional classes, the people we need to get involved in rebuilding

this country, no longer able to do so. To some extent, it’s a legacy

of the issue about de-Baathification and the degree to which Ambassador Bremer expanded the de-Baathification approach beyond

what was initially planned, but also, now, Iraqis are being driven

from their homes because of the amount of kidnaping of upperclass

individuals, much of it financially driven. And just one very disturbing statistic: Physicians in Iraq. We now estimate that a third

of them have left the country or have been killed or kidnaped in

the time since liberation of Iraq from Saddam, 4 years ago. So, onethird of all physicians are out of Iraq and no longer practicing. And

that’s probably, if anything, an underestimate. So, middle-class and

upperclass flight, or the death of many middle-class and upperclass

individuals, has become a real challenge for putting this country

back together in any meaningful way.

Fifth point. And this makes me, I should admit in advance, sympathetic to President Bush’s planned—from what I understand—

planned focus on job creation in his speech tonight. I think it’s

overdue. But unemployment is a big problem in Iraq. And I think

the Commander Emergency Response Program, which we used, on

a pilot scale, on a smaller scale, in the early years, was a very good

idea. If you want to call it ‘‘make work,’’ that’s fine. If you want

to call it ‘‘FDR-style job creation,’’ that’s fine. I think that’s what

21

Iraq needs today, because the unemployment rate is stubbornly

high. And even if job creation is not, per se, a good economic development strategy, it may be a good security strategy, because it

takes angry young men off the streets. So, the unemployment rate,

as best we can tell, is still stuck in the 30-plus-percent range. Now,

by developing-country standards, that’s not necessarily without

precedent, but in Iraq it fuels the civil war and the sectarian strife

and the insurgency, and that’s the reason why it’s of great concern,

in addition to the obvious reasons.

Last point, I’ll finish on Iraqi pessimism. For the first 2 years of

this effort, Iraqi optimism was one of the few things we could really

latch onto and say that the political process plus the gratitude of

the Iraqis that Saddam was gone—maybe not gratitude toward us,

per se, because they quickly became angry with us, but gratitude

in a broader sense—plus their hope about the future, provided a

real sense that this country could come together, because the optimism rates about the country’s prognosis, among Iraqis themselves, were in the 70-percent range for the first couple of years.

Those numbers have plummeted. They’re still higher than I would

have predicted, to be honest with you. They still look like they are

40–45 percent optimism, but they are way, way down from what

they used to be. And if you look at a couple of other indicators of

Iraqi public opinion, especially from a June 2006 poll done by our

International Republican Institute, only 25—excuse me, I’ll put it

another way—75 percent of all Iraqis consider the security environment to be poor—75 percent; and 60 percent consider the economic

environment to be poor. So——

Chairman BIDEN. Can I ask a point of clarification?

Dr. O’HANLON. Yes; please.

Chairman BIDEN. Is that polling data, or that data about pessimism, does that include the roughly 1 million people who have

been displaced or are out of country, or does it include——

Dr. O’HANLON. It’s a very good point, Senator. It does not, as far

as I understand. And, therefore, if you did address these individuals who have suffered most directly, the numbers might well be

lower. But, in any event, I think the overall gist, the trendlines, are

bad. And when you ask Iraqis about the security environment or

the economic environment, they’re even more pessimistic than they

are in general terms.

That’s my overall message, and I look forward to the conversation later.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. O’Hanlon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O’HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW AND SYDNEY STEIN,

JR., CHAIR, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

The year 2006 was, tragically and inescapably, a bad one in Iraq. Our ongoing

work at Brookings makes this conclusion abundantly clear in quantitative terms. Violence got worse for Iraqi civilians and barely declined at all for American and Iraqi

troops. And the economy was fairly stagnant as well.

Despite the drama of Saddam’s execution in the year’s final days, 2006 will probably be remembered most for two developments inside Iraq. The first is the failure

of the 2005 election process to produce any sense of progress. In fact, 2006 was the

year that politicians in Iraq did much more to advance the interests of their own

sects and religions than to build a new cohesive country. (In a September poll,

Prime Minister al-Maliki was viewed unfavorably by 85 percent of all Sunni Arabs,

22

for example.) The second is the related commencement of Iraq’s civil war dating

back to the February 22 bombing of the hallowed Shia mosque in Samarra. While

some still question whether Iraq is in civil war, there is no longer much serious debate about the situation. The sheer level of violence, and the increasing

politicization of the violence to include many more Shia attacks on Sunnis as well

as the reverse, qualify the mayhem in Iraq as civil war by most definitions of the

term. And the country has become one of the three or four most violent places on

Earth.

It is still possible to find signs of hope in our Brookings statistics on Iraq: The

numbers of Iraqi security forces who are trained and technically proficient, the

gradually improving GDP, recent reductions in Iraqi state subsidies for consumer

goods (which distort the economy and divert government resources), the number of

children being immunized. But those same children cannot feel safe en route to

school in much of today’s Iraq; that GDP growth is a top-down phenomenon having

little if any discernible effect on the unemployment rate or well-being of Iraqis in

places such as Al Anbar province and Sadr City, Baghdad; reductions in subsidies

are not enough to spur much private sector investment in such a violent country;

and those increasingly proficient security forces remain politically unreliable in most

cases, just as inclined to stoke sectarian strife as to contain it.

The performance of Iraq’s utilities remains stagnant—not bad by the standards

of developing countries, but hardly better than under Saddam. Oil production and

electricity availability remain generally flat nationwide. Fuels for household cooking

and heating and transportation fall even further short of estimated need than they

did a year or two ago, as does electricity production in Baghdad.

Despite some unconvincing rhetoric from President Bush in the prelude to the November elections that ‘‘absolutely, we’re winning,’’ most Americans now agree on the

diagnosis of the situation in Iraq. Former Secretary Baker and former Congressman

Hamilton recently warned of a ‘‘further slide toward chaos.’’ Secretary of Defense,

Robert Gates, stated in his confirmation hearings that we aren’t winning, even if

he declined to go as far as Colin Powell and assert that we are actually losing.

Former Secretary Rumsfeld himself, in his leaked November memo, recognized that

Iraq was going badly and put out a laundry list of potential options in Iraq that

we may have to consider to salvage the situation, including a Dayton-like process

modeled on Bosnia’s experience to negotiate an end to the civil war.

Iraqis tend to share a similar diagnosis. According to a June 2006 poll, 59 percent

call the economy poor and 75 percent describe the security environment as poor. The

security situation in particular has only deteriorated since then.

Against this backdrop, dramatic measures are clearly needed. At a minimum, we

will likely require some combination of the options now being proposed by the Iraq

Study Group, the Pentagon, and others. President Bush is likely to recommend several of these in his eagerly awaited January speech—a massive program to create

jobs, a surge of 25,000 more American troops to Iraq to try to improve security in

Baghdad, an ultimatum to Iraqi political leaders that if they fail to achieve consensus on key issues like sharing oil, American support for the operation could very

soon decline.

Our Brookings data suggest rationales for each of these possible policy steps, even

if there are also counterarguments. Coalition forces have never reached the numbers

needed to provide security for the population in Iraq, and indigenous forces remain

suspect—in their technical proficiency, and even more so in their political dependability. These two realities make at least a tactical case for a surge, if it is really

feasible on the part of our already overworked soldiers and marines. Despite the

success of military commanders in putting Iraqis to work with their commander

emergency response program funds, the administration never chose to emphasize

job creation in its economic reconstruction plans meaning that the unemployment

rate has remained stubbornly high. And for all our happiness about Iraq’s democracy, it is clear that extremely few Iraqi leaders enjoy any real support outside of

their own sectarian group. Trying to force them to work across sectarian lines must

be a focus of our policy efforts, if there is to be any hope of ultimate stability in

Iraq.

Social scientists and military experts do not know how to assess, rigorously, the

probabilities that such steps will succeed at this late hour in Iraq. Overall, however,

it seems fair to say that most have become quite pessimistic. If the above types of

ideas fail, therefore, ‘‘Plan B’’ options may well be needed within a year, ranging

from a federalism plan for Iraq that Rumsfeld and Senator Biden have been discussing to plans that would go even further and help Iraqis relocate to parts of their

country where they could feel safer (as Bosnia expert, Edward Joseph, and I have

recently advocated in The American Interest). Such an idea is widely unpopular—

with Iraqis themselves, with President Bush, with most Americans who value the

23

notion of interethnic tolerance. But with 100,000 Iraqis per month being displaced

from their homes, making for a total of some 2 million since Saddam was overthrown, ethnic cleansing is already happening. Unless current trends are reversed,

the question may soon become not whether we can stop this Bosnia-like violence—

but whether we try to manage it or let the death squads continue to dictate its scale

and its character.

Although it has been said before about previous new years, it seems very likely

that 2007 will be make or break time in Iraq.

Category 11/03 11/04 11/05 11/06

Security

U.S./other foreign troops in Iraq (thousands) ........................... 123/24 138/24 160/23 140/17

U.S. troops killed ....................................................................... 82 137 96 68

Percent killed by IEDs ................................................................ 24 13 48 54

U.S. troops wounded .................................................................. 337 1,397 466 508

Iraqi Army/police fatalities ........................................................ 50 160 176 123

Iraqi civilian fatalities ............................................................... 1,250 2,900 1,800 4,000

Multiple fatality bombings (for month in question) ................. 6 11 41 65

Estimated strength of insurgency ............................................. 5,000 20,000 20,000 25,000

Estimated strength of Shia militias .......................................... 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000

Daily average of interethnic attacks ......................................... 0 1 1 30

Estimated number of foreign fighters ....................................... 250 750 1,250 1,350

Number of daily attacks by insurgents/militias ....................... 32 77 90 185

Attacks on oil/gas assets .......................................................... 9 30 0 11

Iraqis internally displaced 100,000 since 04/03 (total) ........... 100,000 175,000 200,000 650,000

Iraqi refugees since 04/03 (total) ............................................. 100,000 350,000 900,000 1,500,000

Iraqi physicians murdered or kidnapped/fled Iraq ................... 100/1,000 250/2,000 1,000/5,000 2,250/12,000

Iraqi Security Forces technically proficient ............................... 0 10,000 35,000 115,000

Iraqi Security Forces politically dependable .............................. 0 0 5,000 10,000

Economics

Oil production (millions of barrels/day; prewar: 2.5) ............... 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1

Percent of household fuel needs available ............................... 76 77 88 54

Electricity production (in megawatts, prewar: 4,000) .............. 3,600 3,200 3,700 3,700

Ave. hours/day of power, Baghdad (prewar: 20) ...................... 12 12 9 7

Unemployment rate (percent) .................................................... 50 35 33 33

Per capita GDP (real dollars; prewar: $900) ............................ 550 1,000 1,100 1,150

Politics, Public Opinion, Democracy, Law

No. of Trained Judges ................................................................ 0 250 350 750

Telephone subscribers (prewar: 800,000) ................................. 600,000 2,135,000 5,500,000 8,100,000

Independent media companies (prewar: 0) .............................. 100 150 225 400

Iraqi optimism (percent who think things going in right direction) .................................................................................. 65 54 49 45

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. Said.

STATEMENT OF YAHIA SAID, DIRECTOR, IRAQ REVENUE

WATCH, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, LONDON,

ENGLAND

Mr. SAID. Mr. Chairman, Senators, I’m honored to be here, and

I’m pleased by your interest in the situation in Iraq, and efforts to

find a solution that will be helpful to the Iraqi and American people.

Chairman BIDEN. As Strom Thurmond used to say, ‘‘Will you pull

the machine closer so everyone can hear you?’’ Thank you very

much.

Mr. SAID. Some of the statements I’m going to make are going

to echo what was said before, and, in a way, will confirm, through

24

anecdotal evidence, what has been suggested through the numbers

and statistics.

The conflict in Iraq is not only pervasive, as the numbers suggest, but it’s very complex. And it’s very important not to try to

simplify it. The situation in Iraq has suffered, and policymaking in

Iraq has suffered, because the conflict was reduced to some of its

elements rather than looked at in its complexity. This is not only

a conflict between democracy and its enemies, it’s not only a conflict between insurgency and counterinsurgency, it’s not only a conflict between Sunni and Shia. This is a multifaceted, overlapping

series of conflicts which is a function of the various groups and interests and agendas. And what I will try to do in my statement is

try to address some of the elements of the conflict, to just illustrate

the complexity of it, and hopefully that will help inform policymaking. I will also try to address the question: Why are these conflicts taking such a violent form? And finally, I will try to address

issues of national dialog and efforts at finding a peaceful resolution

to these conflicts.

As the numbers suggested by Mr. O’Hanlon, the insurgency continues—and by ‘‘insurgency’’ I mean attacks against coalition

forces—continues to be a significant part of the conflict. The majority of attacks continue to target coalition forces and coalition personnel, and the high numbers of casualties are evidence to that.

But the insurgency is also a domestic political game. Many groups

from the various communities, from various political directions, engage in the insurgency to acquire political legitimacy and to acquire, through that, a right to govern. Indeed, when the Iraqi Government proposed or suggested the option of an amnesty lately,

insurgents bristled and said, ‘‘They shouldn’t be pardoned for fighting the occupation, they should be rewarded by being given positions in power.’’ The insurgency is also about many other factors,

including money. And it’s becoming harder and harder to distinguish whether a commercial interest is a goal in itself or is a

means to a goal.

The sectarian violence, as, again, the numbers have suggested, is

on the rise, and is tearing at the fabric of society, but it’s not producing the kind of consolidation, the kind of alignment along sectarian and ethnic lines that some of the architects of the violence

have hoped for. Indeed, as Ms. Marr has suggested, there is fragmentation. There is fragmentation within communities, there is

fragmentation within political blocs and individual political parties.

There is also increasing and growing specter of warlordism as

rogue military commanders take control of fragments of militias

and even state security structures. And the evidence for the fragmentation is everywhere. On my recent trip to Baghdad, a driver

from a Sunni neighborhood complained to me that the Sunni insurgents, the Sunni fighters, kill more of their own kin than they do

of Shia militias. The fighting between the Sadrists and militias affiliated with the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the

SCIRI, and security forces controlled by them, have swept throughout the south of the country, and, over the last year, the Sadrists

have gained control, at least temporarily, of various cities in the

south. Even in Kurdistan the tensions are not far below the surface.

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One of the largest movements—the largest political movement in

Iraq today are the Sadrists, and I think it’s worthwhile to focus a

little bit on that component of the situation in Iraq, because it’s

also illustrative of the dynamics. While other political parties control state and security structures, particularly the SCIRI, the

Sadrists control the streets. But this is a very controversial and

contradictory movement. The Sadrists nurture a nationalist image.

They don’t engage in sectarian rhetoric. They have clashed frequently with coalition forces. At the same time, they have participated in the political process, they have 30 MPs, 6 ministers currently in boycott.

Many ex-Baathists—Shia ex-Baathists—joined the Sadrist movement, yet the Sadrist movement has been the most vocal in calling

for revenge and for punishing regime officials. The Sadrists style

themselves after Hezbollah in Lebanon, and seek to protect their

communities and constituents and provide services. At the same

time, their militias are undisciplined and engage in criminal violence and looting, themselves, and, of course, man some of the

feared death squads.

This is a movement of the poor. This is an antiestablishment

movement. Their grassroots support comes from the very poor Arab

Shia in the countryside and the slums of Baghdad. And, as such,

their natural enemies are not necessarily the Sunnis, but are the

establishment, regardless of their sectarian or ethnic affiliation.

As—and we see that through their clashes with the Shia establishment, with the merchant and religious Shia establishment represented by SCIRI.

So, you have one movement that is fighting three conflicts. It’s

fighting an insurgency, it’s fighting an antiestablishment revolt,

and it’s fighting a sectarian civil war.

So, why does the conflict in Iraq take such violent forms? It does,

because there is a political vacuum, as Ms. Marr—Professor

Marr—has suggested. And this political vacuum is signaling to the

various groups and communities the necessity to protect their interests and achieve their goals through violent means, because

there is no framework for a peaceful resolution of conflicts, for a

peaceful reconciliation of the diverging interests.

This violence, of course, is also feeding into the collapse of the

state, and you have a vicious circle of political vacuum, violence,

and state collapse.

Now, the political process that took place over the last 3 years

was supposed to address that. It was supposed to create that vehicle for a peaceful resolution of conflict, for ways for Iraqis to come

together and reconcile their differences. But, unfortunately, and despite a tremendous effort by Iraqis, Americans, and others, this has

not been the case. Indeed, the political process is defunct, and, as

Ms. Marr suggested, the state also has not emerged. We don’t have,

in Iraq, a legitimate public authority that could protect people and

provide them with services.

Why did this process fail? And this is not about pointing fingers

at the past, but it’s very important to understand some of the reasons for the failings. It’s tempting to point the finger at external

factors. Indeed, the Iraqis love to point the finger at external factors. And if you ask them, ‘‘It’s the Americans’ fault, it’s the

26

Israelis, it’s the Iranians, it’s Saddam,’’ and everybody possible. But

there are, of course, internal reasons. And one of them is the fact

that many Iraqis, a majority of Iraqis, are sitting on the fence, or,

as my colleague has just suggested, are pessimistic. Iraqis have little faith in the process—in the political process and its results, and

in the elites that emerge from it. They don’t have confidence in this

regime—in the current regime and its sustainability.

What you have is a pervasive atmosphere—it’s two sentiments

that—dominating the situation in Iraq—which is fear and apathy.

And you see that everywhere. And it’s these sentiments that provide the perfect cover for corruption, for terrorism, for violence, and

for sectarian hate. Even government officials are inflicted by this

sentiment, and this explains how they use their positions to undermine, to dismantle the machinery of government that has been entrusted to them. And, indeed, you can hear echoes of that pessimism or apathy in the Prime Minister’s recent interview with the

Wall Street Journal.

Within this atmosphere, we’re seeing, now, a hardening of positions on all sides. There is this mood, if you like, of going for a last

push. And it’s not only evident through the terrorist and the sectarian violence, but also in the government’s own position. Clearly,

the model of a full-spectrum national unity government, which we

still have in Iraq now, has not worked. It has even furthered the

dismantling of the machinery of the state, because it was reduced

to farming out ministries to individual parties and groups. Now the

strongest parties in the government, particularly the SCIRI and

the Kurds, are trying to build a narrower government, and hope

that it would be more efficient and work more as a team. But there

are risks to this approach. These parties don’t have strong grassroots support, and will rely more both on coercion, but also on continued U.S. support and bolstering. The execution of Saddam Hussein, and the manner in which it was carried out, and the rhetoric

and the timing and everything, is indication of this hardening.

That event was clearly designed to intimidate political opponents

of the government, and particularly the Sunni community.

The new security plan and the push for an all-out assault, in

combination with the surge option, is also an indication of that.

There is very little evidence to show, today, that the Iraqi Government will be able to mobilize the resources necessary to make this

security plan more successful than those who preceded it. And a

temporary surge will also probably not lead to sustainable outcomes. At the same time, if the plan—if the security plan is carried

out in a one-sided way, and the Prime Minister has indicated that

he views Sunni violence, terrorist violence, as the primary problem,

and that the Shia militias are a secondary reaction to that—so, if

this plan is carried out in a one-sided way with disregard to human

rights, it can exacerbate the situation and make finding a political

peaceful solution even harder. And, at the end of the day, the only

solution to the situation in Iraq has to come through dialog, has

to come through engagement and ownership of a broad cross-section of Iraqis, to overcome that feeling of apathy and disconnection.

The dialog has to be genuine—as in, the parties have to produce

real concessions—all the parties. It has to be broad. It has to involve not only the sectarian protagonists, but also those who still

27

believe in the viability of the Iraqi states and in the necessity, as

Professor Marr has indicated, of having a central state in that particular region.

Unfortunately, the government’s action, the hardening of the government’s position over the last 6 months—the Iraqi Government

has closed down to opposition newspapers, TV stations, has issued

arrest warrants for leading opposition figures—do not create a conducive environment for an open and genuine dialog. So, there is

need for international intervention on that front, and I’ll address

that later.

Dialog, of course, doesn’t mean that one needs to throw out the

results of the political process of the last 3 years. I think the Constitution—the Iraqi Constitution, with all its shortcomings, serves

as a good starting point for dialog, but the Constitution needs to

be transformed, through genuine dialog, from a dysfunctional to a

rational federal structure.

Oil, and—negotiations on an oil deal, which have apparently concluded recently, also provide a model for the—for that rational federalism. The main principles that the negotiators have agreed on

is to maximize the benefit of Iraq’s oil wealth to all Iraqis, to use

oil as a way to unite the nation, and to build a framework based

on transparency, which is very important in a situation of lack—

of poor trust, and on efficiency and equity.

Major issues have been resolved, like having a central account to

accumulate all oil revenues, and manage the oil revenues on—at

the federal level. Apparently, even the issue—the current issue of

contracting, and who has the right to contract, has been resolved,

as well as the structure for a national oil company.

But there remains issues open, and it’s very important not to let

the details derail the negotiations. And it’s also very important to

have a professional and open dialog on those issues, as in involving

the proper professionals in the negotiations, and not reduce them

to a political kitchen cabinet. One needs financial people, one needs

economists and petroleum experts, involved in the debate.

And one of the critical issues is how the revenue-sharing framework is going to work. Will it be through the writing of checks,

which is unsustainable in the long term? There is no reason for

Basrah to transfer money to the central government so that it can

write checks to the other regions. Unless the revenue-sharing is

carried out through the budget, through an integral budgetary

process, the arrangement will be unsustainable. So, it’s very important to make sure that the integrity of budgetary process is preserved.

In conclusion, I think policies for Iraq should be informed by the

complexity of the conflict. A surge, or the security plan envisioned

now for Iraq, reduces the conflict to one between a democracy and

its enemies; between democracy and terror. But if it is carried out

with disregard to human rights, if it is carried out with disregard

to the rule of law and in a one-sided way, it may exacerbate the

situation and may also increase sectarian tensions and undermine

the very democracy it purports to defend.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces also reduces the conflict to an

issue of a fight between an occupying army and a nationalist resistance. But, at the same time, a withdrawal may spell the end to the

28

Green-Zone-based Iraqi State, and that could unleash further spirals of violence.

Segregation, or the various proposals on the table that are aimed

at addressing Iraq through an ethnic prism, reduces the conflict to

one between Sunnis and Shia. But, in that atmosphere of fragmentations, as Professor Marr has suggested, that means that we

will just replace one civil war with three civil wars, one failed state

with three failed states. And, as I hope the next speaker will address Iraqi partition or segregation will lead to unimaginable consequences at the regional level.

So, the only solution for Iraq will have to be long term and comprehensive, as Professor Marr has suggested, and will have to be

based on an open and inclusive dialog, but it’s something the

Iraqis, on their own, cannot do, and they will need an international

intervention to identify the protagonists, to bring them to the negotiations table, and to help prod them to reach compromise. What

Iraq needs today is an internationally sponsored and mediated

peace process.

And I will finish at that. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Said follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF YAHIA KHAIRI SAID, DIRECTOR, REVENUE WATCH

INSTITUTE, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, LONDON, ENGLAND

The conflict in Iraq today is as complex as it is pervasive. This is a reflection of

the various groups and interests at play as well as the legacies of the past. The conflict can not be reduced to simple dichotomies of democracy against its enemies,

resistance against the occupation or Shia vs. Sunni. Likewise there is no single universal solution to the conflict. Neither the current proposal for a ‘‘surge’’ nor the

proposal to withdraw coalition forces are likely to bring peace. What is needed is

a comprehensive and long-term approach based on an open and inclusive dialog at

national and international levels, in which the fair distribution of Iraqi oil revenues

is used as an incentive for uniting Iraqis.

THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The Insurgency: The targeting of Multinational Forces continues to account for a

significant portion of the violence as evidenced by the consistently high numbers of

coalition casualties. The insurgency is also an arena of domestic political conflict.

Groups from different ethnic and political backgrounds use the ‘‘resistance’’ to legitimate their claim to power. Sunni insurgents bristled at the government’s offer of

an amnesty last year, insisting that they should be rewarded, not pardoned for

fighting the occupation. Al-Qaeda uses videos of attacks on U.S. troops to recruit

and fundraise for its own global war. Some insurgent attacks are simply a cover for

economic crimes. As with many such conflicts, it is often hard to discern whether

the violence is purely a means to commercial gain or an end in itself.

Spiralling sectarian violence is polarising communities and tearing society apart.

However, it is not producing the consolidation and political mobilization along ethnic and sectarian lines as intended by its architects. Quite the opposite, the pervasive violence and uncertainty is leading to fragmentation within communities, political blocks, and individual parties. Warlordism is emerging as rogue commanders

assume control of fragments of militias and individual units of the state security

forces.

A resident of a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad recently complained to me that

Sunni fighters kill more of their own kin than they do Shia militias. Tribal rivalries

broke into open conflict in the Anbar province this summer pitching Sunni tribes

against each other and against the foreign al-Qaeda fighters. The head of the prominent Tamim tribe recently expressed a widely held sentiment among fellow Sunnis

when he lambasted the ‘‘Iraqi un-Islamic Party’’ which purports to represent them

in government. Likewise among the Shiites, there are frequent and violent confrontations between the SCIRI-controlled militias and police forces on one side, and

militias associated with the Sadrist movement, on the other. These confrontations

allowed the Sadrists at various times to briefly seize control of most major cities

in central and southern Iraq. The competition to control Basra’s oil smuggling busiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
29

ness among various militias and political parties often takes the form of street warfare. Less overtly, tensions bubble just under the surface between the two main

Kurdish parties and between them on one side and Kurdish Islamists on the other.

Outburst of separatism by Kurdish leaders—like the recent spat over the national

flag—should be viewed in the context of competition for power in Kurdistan itself.

The Sadrist Movement is emblematic of the complexities and contradictions of

Iraq’s political and security landscape. While SCIRI and other political groups control government positions and resources, the Sadrists control the street. They nurture a nationalist image clashing occasionally with Multinational Forces and deriding the new elite who came with the invasion. This did not stop them from actively

participating in the political process. The Sadrists have 30 members of Parliament

and 6 ministers. Many Shia ex-Baathists joined the Sadrists after the collapse of

the regime yet the movement is most vocal in seeking revenge against regime officials. Among Shia groups the Sadrists are the least likely to employ sectarian rhetoric yet their warlords are implicated in the worst instances of sectarian violence.

The Sadrists try to emulate Hezbollah in Lebanon by seeking to protect and provide

social services to their constituents and by meting out vigilante justice against

criminals and those engaged in what they deem to be ‘‘un-Islamic’’ conduct. But its

militias are undisciplined and often engage in looting and criminal activities themselves. The Sadr leadership freely admits to having only indirect control over their

fighters. The Sadrists style themselves as the representatives of the poor and downtrodden. Indeed their main strength is the support of millions of poor Arab Shia in

the rural south and the slums of Baghdad who are in a rebellious mood aimed at

the establishment regardless of its sectarian color. As such SCIRI and other Shia

groups representing the merchant and religious elite with strong ties to Iran are

the Sadrists’ natural enemy. In short, the Sadrists are simultaneously fighting a nationalist insurgency, a revolt against the establishment and a sectarian conflict.

STATE WEAKNESS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The pervasiveness of the violence in Iraq today, the persistent power vacuum and

progressive hollowing out of the state are components of a vicious circle. State weakness sends signals to the various groups that they can, and, in fact, need to defend

their interests and achieve their goals through violent means. The political process

over the past 3 years was supposed to fill the vacuum by establishing a framework

where Iraqis can reconcile competing interests through peaceful means. The goal

was to establish a legitimate public authority which would protect Iraqis and provide them with essential services. Despite enormous efforts, expenditures and sacrifice by Iraqis, Americans, and others, this goal has yet to be achieved.

It is tempting under such circumstances to blame everything on enemies and external influences such as al-Qaeda and Iraq’s neighbors. Iraqis habitually blame

their woes on the Americans, Iran, Arab States, Israel, Saddam, and so on. There

is no question that external factors, sometimes by intent and sometimes by mistake,

have played a role in shaping the current predicament. But the roots for such consistent failure need to be explored and addressed inside society itself.

Despite overcoming great risks to vote in two elections and a referendum, Iraqis

have little faith in the political process and the leadership it has produced. Indeed

political participation for most Iraqis has been limited to these three votes. There

are few in Iraq today who believe in the viability and sustainability of the new regime. A substantial majority sits on the proverbial fence. This is not only a result

of the authoritarian legacy or the fact that change came from the outside. It is also

the result of disappointed hopes and broken promises over the past 4 years.

Fear and apathy are the most pervasive sentiments in Iraq today. They provide

the perfect cover for corruption, crime, and terror and sap the energy from the enormous task of reconstruction. These sentiments extend to many officials and politicians who do not shy from dismantling the machinery of government and the state

they have been entrusted with in pursuit of short-term narrow gains. One could

even hear echoes of this apathy in the recent interview by Prime Minister Maliki

with the Wall Street Journal.

Faced with this predicament, there is a hardening of positions on all sides and

a determination to go for ‘‘one last push.’’ This is not only expressed through the

debilitating terrorist and militia violence but also in the posture of the Iraqi Government.

The model of a full spectrum ‘‘National Unity’’ government is clearly not working

and has indeed exacerbated the decline of the state. The farming out of ministries

to individual parties and groups produced a weak and divided government unable

to function as a team.

30

The strongest parties in government, particularly the SCIRI and the Kurds, seem

resolved to build a narrower coalition government which may exclude the Sadrists

and some Sunni parties. This has already taken place on the ground with Sunni

parties only nominally participating in government and the Sadrists boycotting it.

Without the Sadrists, however, this coalition has little grassroots support. It will

have to rely more on cordon and will be more susceptible to external influences. It

will be even more dependent on continuous U.S. support.

The handling of the Saddam execution is illustrative of the hardening of the government’s stance. The rush to execute the former dictator, the rhetoric preceding it

and the manner in which it was carried out were clearly designed to intimidate the

Sunnis.

The government has also hardened its rhetoric and actions against political

opponents, closing down two opposition TV stations and issuing an arrest warrant

for the most prominent opposition figure—the head of the Association of Muslim

Scholars.

SECURITY PLANS

The security plan announced a couple of days ago is the culmination of this

approach. While officially targeted at all militias and armed groups, the Prime Minister has clearly indicated that he views Sunni violence as the main source of tensions and Shia militias as a reaction to Sunni violence.

It is not clear yet whether the government will limit the targets of the security

plan to Sunni groups or whether it will also take on the Sadrists. Either way it is

unlikely that it will be able to muster the resources necessary to achieve better results than previous efforts, including the two recent Baghdad security plans. Even

a temporary U.S. surge in support of the plan is no guarantee for achieving sustainable outcomes. A military offensive—especially if it fails to protect civilians on all

sides—is liable to inflame the sectarian conflict and make a peaceful settlement

even less likely. The U.S. forces can find themselves embroiled, as a party, in the

sectarian conflict.

There is no doubt that there is an urgent need to confront the terrorists, criminals, and those spreading sectarian hatred and to protect civilians from them. This

can only be achieved on the basis of legitimacy and respect for human rights and

the rule of law. It is, therefore, particularly disconcerting when the Iraqi Government insists on taking over control of the security portfolio in order to fight the enemies ‘‘our way,’’ dispensing with what they view as exaggerated and misplaced U.S.

concern for human rights.

The new security plan and the associated surge option emphasises the aspect of

struggle between a nascent democracy and its opponents. Yet if it is carried out

without regard to human rights and in a way that exacerbates sectarian tensions,

it is only likely to make matters worse and destroy the very democracy it seeks to

protect.

If the conflict in Iraq was primarily about occupation and resistance then a speedy

withdrawal of coalition forces would offer the best solution. In today’s context a

withdrawal will cause a spike in other forms of violence and precipitate the collapse

of the last remnants of the Iraqi state unleashing an open-ended conflict with unpredictable consequences.

A solution based on ethnic segregation emphasises another aspect of the conflict.

But in the context of fragmentation and warlordism, it is unlikely to bring any relief. On the contrary it will exacerbate ethnic cleansing and undermine regional stability.

NATIONAL DIALOG

Ultimately the violence in Iraq can only end through a political process which

unites Iraqis rather than dividing them. For this to happen it is necessary to engage

all constituencies in the shaping of the new Iraq and provide them with a sense of

ownership in the outcome. This requires open and inclusive dialog and readiness for

compromise on all sides. It will require broadening the political process to include

those Iraqis who still believe in nation-building and coexistence rather than limiting

it to the combatants and extremists on all sides. Current national dialog and reconciliation efforts have fallen short of these ideals.

Dialog will clearly require regional and international mediation. International assistance is needed to help identify the protagonists, bring them to the negotiations,

and encourage them to compromise. In short Iraq is in need of an internationally

mediated peace process.

The International Compact with Iraq offers a platform for such dialog as well as

a framework for mobilizing international assistance once a settlement is reached.

31

Other initiatives by the United Nations and the League of Arab States are essential

for success in this context.

The final settlement can not dispense with the achievements of the last 3 years.

Those, including the constitution, will have to serve as the starting point of any discussion over Iraq’s future. The constitution will need to be reviewed and implemented in a way that provides a basis for rational federalism. The winners of the

political process will have to be prepared to make real concessions and genuinely

share power and resources if compromise is to be achieved.

Over the past months, Iraqi officials have been negotiating a framework for the

management and sharing of Iraq’s oil wealth which can provide a model for the

shape of federalism in the new Iraq. Negotiators were in agreement that such

framework should maximise the benefit from the wealth to all Iraqis and promote

national cohesion. It should be based on the principles of efficiency, transparency,

and equity. Transparency is particularly important as it helps build trust among the

various parties and prevent abuse.

The negotiators succeeded in overcoming a number of obstacles agreeing in particular on the federal management and sharing of all oil revenues, a structure for

a National Oil Company and a framework for coordinating negotiations and contracting with International Operating Companies. Some details will still need to be

worked out, chief among them is the exact mechanism for revenue-sharing. If the

new framework is to contribute to national cohesion, transparency and accountability the budgetary process must be the main vehicle for revenue-sharing.

A draft framework along these lines has been developed over the past months and

will shortly be presented to Parliament. It is critical for the success of this effort

that deliberations on the subject are carried out in an open, inclusive, and professional manner.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Doctor.

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL PILLAR, VISITING PROFESSOR,

SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,

WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. PILLAR. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank

you very much for the privilege of participating in this most important set of hearings. And I commend the committee, as Phebe Marr

did in her opening comment, for its approach to educating the

American public on this topic.

You’ve asked me to address the relationship between the conflict

in Iraq and other trends and developments in the Middle East.

And, in that connection, I would focus on five major dimensions on

which the war has had impact elsewhere in the region or on the

perceptions and concerns of other Middle Eastern actors. Those five

are: Sectarian divisions, extremism and terrorism, political change

and democratization, ethnic separatism, and the alignments and

the relative influence of other states in the region.

With the violence in Iraq having increasingly assumed the character of a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, as described by my

fellow panelist, it has intensified sectarian sentiment, suspicions,

and resentments all along the Sunni-Shia divide, only a portion of

which runs through Iraq. Just as important, this divide coincides

with longstanding and deeply resented patterns of economic privilege and political power.

The evident conviction of many Iraqi Shiites, who, as we know,

constitute a majority in their country, that their time for political

dominance has come, cannot help but put revisionist thoughts in

the minds of their coreligionists elsewhere in the region. The conflict in Iraq has made this sectarian divide more salient, not only

for ordinary Shia and Sunni populations, but also for regimes. It’s

a concern for Saudi leaders, for example, because of Saudi symVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
32

pathy for their Sunni brethren in Iraq, and because of any possibility of restiveness among the Saudi Shia minority. Looking out

from Riyadh, Saudis today see themselves as encircled by a Shia

arc that now includes control of both of the other major Persian

Gulf countries—Iran and Iraq. King Abdullah of Jordan has spoken

in similar terms about such a Shia arc.

For the United States, one consequence—not the only one—but

one consequence of this regionwide intensification of sectarian sentiment is that it is difficult for the United States to do just about

anything in Iraq without it being perceived, fairly or unfairly, as

favoring one community over the other and thereby antagonizing

either Sunnis or Shiites, or perhaps both, elsewhere in the region.

A second dimension on which the war in Iraq is having repercussions throughout the Middle East, and, in this case, even beyond,

concerns extremist sentiment and the threat of jihadist terrorism.

Iraq is now the biggest and most prominent jihad, and may ultimately have effects at least as significant as those of earlier ones,

partly because it is seen as a struggle against the United States,

in the eyes of the jihadists, the sole remaining superpower and the

leader of the West. I concur, and I think just about any other serious student of international terrorism would concur, in the judgments recently declassified from the national intelligence estimate

on terrorism which stated that—in the words of the estimators—

that, ‘‘The war in Iraq has become a cause celebre for jihadists. It

is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives. It

is one of the major factors fueling the spread of the global jihadist

movement, and is being exploited by al-Qaeda to attract new recruits and donors.’’

Some of the possible effects within the surrounding region may

already be seen in, for example, the suicide bombings in Amman,

in November 2005, which were carried out by Iraqis from the alQaeda-in-Iraq group.

A third important regional dimension is the possibility of favorable political change, especially democratization, within Middle

Eastern countries. One hopeful development in the Middle East

over the last few years has been an increase in open discussion of

such political change. And I believe the current administration,

with its rhetorical emphasis on democratization, deserves at least

a share of the credit for that.

In looking not just for talk, but for meaningful reform, however,

it is harder to be encouraged. What passes for political reform in

the Middle East has generally been, in countries such as Egypt,

slow, fragmentary, very cautious, subject to backsliding, and more

a matter of form than of substance.

It is difficult to point convincingly to effects, one way or the

other, that the war in Iraq has had on political reform in other

Middle Eastern states, but, in my judgment, the all-too-glaring

troubles in Iraq have tended, on balance, to discourage political reform in other Middle Eastern countries, for two reasons. First, the

demonstration of what can go terribly wrong in a violent and destructive way has been a disincentive to experiment with political

change. Middle Eastern leaders, like political leaders anywhere,

tend to stick with what has worked with them so far when confronted with such frightening and uncertain consequences of

33

change. And, second, the identification of the United States with

both the cause of democratization and the war in Iraq has, unfortunately, led the former subject to be tarnished with some of the ill

will and controversy associated with the latter, however illogical

that connection may be.

The fourth major issue, and an important one for three of the

states that border Iraq, is ethic separatism. And here, of course,

we’re talking about the status of the Kurds, the prototypical stateless ethnic group. Kurdish separatism is a concern for both Syria

and Iran, for example, which have significant Kurdish minorities.

The strongest worries, however, are in Turkey, where Kurds constitute about 20 percent of the population and where the organization that has usually been known as the Kurdistan Workers Party,

or PKK, waged an insurgent and terrorist campaign that left an estimated 35,000 people dead. Ankara has been very sensitive about

any suggestion of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan because of worries about rekindling separatist sentiment among Turkish Kurds.

Turkey also is unhappy about what it regards as insufficient action

by Iraq or the United States against PKK fighters who have taken

refuge in northern Iraq.

The final set of issues I would highlight concerns effects on the

geopolitics of the Middle East; that is, on the relative power and

the foreign policies of neighboring states. Among the neighbors the

largest winner has been Iran. The war has crippled what had been

the largest regional counterweight to Iranian influence, not to mention doing away with a dictator who started a war in the 1980s

that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iranians.

Iranians today view the war in Iraq with mixed motives. The current leadership in Tehran probably is pleased to see the United

States continue to be bogged down and bleeding in Iraq for the

time being, but it also has no reason to want escalating and

unending disorder on its western border. Tehran has been reaching

out and providing assistance to a wide variety of Iraqi groups.

Although some of this assistance may help to make trouble for

United States forces, it is best understood as an effort by Tehran

to cast out as many lines of influence as it possibly can do, that

whenever the dust in Iraq finally settles, it will have a good chance

of having the friendship of, or at least access to, whoever is in

power in Iraq.

Syria is another neighbor that faces a significantly changed geopolitical environment as a result of events in Iraq. The bitter and

longstanding rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi wings of the

Baathist movement had been a major determinant of Syrian foreign policy for many years. It was the principal factor that led Damascus to break ranks with its Arab brethren and ally with Iran

during the Iran-Iraq war. The demise of the Iraqi Baathist regime

has changed all this, as punctuated by the restoration of diplomatic

relations just 2 months ago, in November, between Syria and Iraq.

Sectarian considerations also must enter into thinking in Damascus, where the regime is dominated by the minority Alawite sect,

but rules a Sunni majority. Meanwhile, Syria’s main foreign-policy

aim continues to be return of the Golan Heights, which Syrian

leaders realize could come about only through cooperation with the

United States.

34

I’ve highlighted what I regard as the main issues that involve

the regional impact of this war. They are not the only issues, of

course. A major concern of Jordan, for example, is the influx onto

its territory of an estimated 700,000 Iraq refugees. Syria also faces

a major Iraqi refugee problem, as do Lebanon and Egypt, and, to

lesser degrees, other neighboring states.

Oil is another interest for several Middle Eastern states, given

the obvious effects that different possible levels of Iraqi production

and export could have on the oil market, and, thus, on the finances

of these countries.

A concluding point, Mr. Chairman, concerns the United States

directly. Given how much the war in Iraq has become a preoccupation for the United States, it necessarily colors virtually all of our

other dealings with countries in the region. It has been one of the

chief reasons for the decline in the standing of the United States

among publics in the region, as recorded by opinion polls by such

organizations as the Pew group taken over the last several years.

It has been a reason for concern and doubt among Middle Eastern

governments regarding the attention and commitment that Washington can give to other endeavors. And Middle Eastern governments know that it has, in effect, relegated to a lower priority almost every other U.S. interest in the Middle East.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pillar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL PILLAR, VISITING PROFESSOR, SECURITY STUDIES

PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the privilege of participating in this very important series of hearings related to the conflict in Iraq.

I have been asked to address the relationship between that conflict and other trends

and developments in the Middle East.

Events in other countries in the region will depend primarily on issues and conditions in those countries; in my judgment, the hoped-for beneficial demonstration effects that success in Iraq would have had on the politics of the broader Middle East

have always been overly optimistic. Nonetheless, the development of a multifaceted

and worsening armed conflict in Iraq does have significant implications for the rest

of the region and by implication for U.S. interests in the region. Unfortunately, conflict and instability tend to have greater repercussions in a neighborhood than do

success and stability.

In the case of Iraq and the Middle East, regional consequences involve concerns

by neighbors about what may yet lie ahead as well as adjustments that regional actors already have made. The consequences involve regimes in the region as well as

nonstate actors such as terrorist groups. And they involve direct consequences of the

violence in Iraq as well as more indirect reverberations from the conflict there.

I want to emphasize how much uncertainty is involved in trying to analyze the

regional impact of the current war in Iraq, much less of various future scenarios

or policy options. It is simply impossible to predict the full range of important regional effects, partly because of the uncertainty that clouds Iraq’s own future but

also because of the complexity of factors affecting events elsewhere in the Middle

East. Any prognostications that speak with certainty about particular future effects

ought to be met with skepticism.

With that understanding, I would identify five major dimensions on which—although specific future consequences may be uncertain—the war in Iraq already has

had discernible impact elsewhere in the Middle East and is likely to have more, and

which, therefore, are worthy of attention as debates over policy proceed. Those five

are: Sectarian divisions, extremism and terrorism, political change and democratization, ethnic separatism, and the alignments and relative influence of states in the

region.

35

SECTARIAN CONFLICT

Sectarian divides within the Muslim world deserve to be discussed first, because

the violence in Iraq has increasingly assumed the character of a civil war between

Sunni and Shia. As such, it has intensified sectarian sentiment, suspicions, and

resentments all along the Sunni-Shia faultline, only a portion of which runs through

Iraq. It would be almost impossible to overstate how strongly this divide, which the

Iraq war has made more salient, stokes feelings and fears among many people of

the Middle East. Rooted in centuries-old disputes over succession to the Prophet, the

conflict manifests itself today in, for example, the perspective of some Sunnis (particularly the more doctrinaire Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia) that Shia are not even

true Muslims. Just as important, the sectarian divide coincides with resented patterns of economic privilege and political power.

The special significance of Iraq is that, although Shiites are a minority of Muslims

worldwide, they are a majority in Iraq (as well as, of course, next door in Iran). The

evident conviction of many Iraqi Shiites that their time for political dominance has

come cannot help but put revisionist thoughts in the minds of their coreligionists

elsewhere in the region. These include the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia, who are

concentrated in the oil-rich eastern province and see themselves treated as secondclass citizens. They include the Shiites who constitute a majority in Bahrain but are

still under the rule of a Sunni government. And they include Shiites in Lebanon,

who probably are the fastest-growing community in that religiously divided country

and who believe that current power-sharing arrangements give them an unfairly

small portion of power—a sentiment exploited by Lebanese Hezbollah.

The conflict in Iraq has made this sectarian divide more salient not only for Shia

populations but also for regimes. The sectarian coloration of that conflict is an acute

concern for Saudi leaders, for example, because of their own sympathy for Sunni

Arabs in Iraq, the emotions of other Saudis over the plight of their Sunni brethren

in Iraq, and any possibility of restiveness among Saudi Shiites. Looking out from

Riyadh, Saudis now see themselves as encircled by a Shia arc that includes control

of both of the other large Persian Gulf States—Iran and Iraq—Shia activism in Lebanon, and significant Shia populations in the Arab Gulf States as well as to their

south in Yemen. King Abdullah of Jordan also has spoken publicly about such a

Shia arc.

For the United States, this intensification of sectarian conflict carries several hazards, only one of which is the specter of direct intervention by other regional actors

in the Iraqi civil war. There also are issues of stability in the other countries that

must manage their own part of the Sunni-Shia divide. And not least, there is the

difficulty of the United States doing almost anything in Iraq without it being perceived, fairly or unfairly, as favoring one community over the other and thereby antagonizing either Sunnis or Shiites, or perhaps both, elsewhere in the region.

EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

A second dimension on which the war in Iraq is having repercussions throughout

the Middle East—and in this case even beyond—concerns extremist sentiment and

the threat of international terrorism, particularly from Islamist terrorists often

styled as ‘‘jihadists.’’ Other wars in other Muslim lands have served as jihads in recent years, including in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan. The

Afghan jihad against the Soviets served as an inspiration to radical Islamists, a

training ground for terrorists, and a networking opportunity for jihadists of diverse

nationalities. We have seen the effects in much of the international terrorism of the

past decade and a half. Iraq is now the biggest and most prominent jihad. It may

ultimately have effects at least as significant as those of earlier jihads, because it

is taking place in a large and important country that is part of the core of the Arab

and Muslim worlds, and because it is partly a struggle against the United States,

the sole remaining superpower and the leader of the West.

The effects of the war in Iraq on international terrorism were aptly summarized

in the National Intelligence Estimate on international terrorism that was partially

declassified last fall. In the words of the estimators, the war in Iraq has become

a ‘‘cause celebre’’ for jihadists, is ‘‘shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and

operatives,’’ is one of the major factors fueling the spread of the global jihadist

movement, and is being exploited by al-Qaeda ‘‘to attract new recruits and donors.’’

I concur with those judgments, as I believe would almost any other serious student

of international terrorism.

The full effects on terrorism of the war in Iraq, as of the earlier anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, will not be seen and felt for a good number of years. But some

of the possible effects within the surrounding region may already be seen in, for

example, the suicide bombings in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, which were

36

perpetrated by Iraqis who belonged to the ‘‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’’ organization. Another

possible effect is the recent use in Afghanistan of suicide bombings, a tactic not previously part of the repertoire of insurgents there but perhaps partly exported from,

or inspired by, Iraq where the tactic has been used extensively.

I believe that the most important variable in Iraq in the months or years ahead

as far as the effects on international terrorism are concerned is the sheer continuation of the war, as well as the continued U.S. participation in it. ‘‘Jihad’’ means,

literally, ‘‘struggle.’’ What is important to the jihadist, more so than any particular

outcome, is participation in a struggle. As long as the jihadists’ struggle in Iraq is

not completely extinguished, it will continue to inspire the Islamist rank-and-file

and to be exploited by the likes of al-Qaeda.

POLITICAL CHANGE AND DEMOCRATIZATION

A third important regional dimension is the possibility of political change within

Middle Eastern countries, especially change in the favorable direction of more democracy and more civil and political liberties in what is still, by most measures, the

most undemocratic and illiberal region of the world. One hopeful development in the

Middle East over the last few years has been an increase in open discussion of

issues of political change. There has been, at least, more talk about the subject; it

has been more of a live topic in more Middle Eastern countries than a few years

earlier. I believe the current U.S. administration, with its rhetorical emphasis on

democratization, deserves a share of the credit for this.

In looking not just for talk but for meaningful action, however, it is harder to be

encouraged. What passes for political reform in the Middle East has generally been

slow, fragmentary, very cautious, subject to backsliding, and more a matter of form

than of substance.

It is difficult to point convincingly to effects, in one direction or another, that the

war in Iraq has had on political reform in other Middle Eastern states. Inspired

statesmanship should have good reason to move ahead with reform regardless of

what is happening in Iraq. But most Middle Eastern statesmanship is not inspired.

And in my judgment, the all-too-glaring troubles in Iraq have tended, on balance,

to discourage political reform in other Middle Eastern countries, for two reasons.

First, the demonstration of what can go wrong—in a very violent and destructive

way—has been a disincentive to experiment with political change. Middle Eastern

leaders, like leaders anywhere, tend to stick with what they’ve got and with what

has worked for them so far, when confronted with such frightening and uncertain

consequences of political change. If today’s Iraq is the face of a new Middle East,

then most Middle Eastern leaders, not to mention most publics, do not want to be

part of it.

Second, the identification of the United States with both the cause of democratization and the war in Iraq has led the former to be tarnished with some of the ill

will and controversy associated with the latter. This connection is, of course, illogical. But it should not be surprising, given that some in the Middle East had already

tended to view liberal democracy with suspicion as an alien import from the West.

The issue of political change and democratization is important for many Middle

Eastern countries, but I would mention two as being of particular significance. One

is Egypt, the most populous Arab country and a keystone of U.S. policy in the region. The Mubarak government has evidently seen the need at least to appear to

be open to reform, as manifested in the holding in 2005 of an ostensibly competitive

Presidential election, in place of the prior procedure of a one-candidate referendum.

But such procedural change has not reflected any significant loosening of Mubarak’s

hold on power. A continuing emergency law helps to maintain that hold, opposition

Presidential candidates have not been treated fairly, and the most popular and effective opposition party remains outlawed.

The other key country is Saudi Arabia, in which neither the form nor the reality

is remotely democratic, and in which power is still in the hands of a privileged royal

family in alliance with a religious establishment. King Abdullah appears to recognize the need for reform if Saudi Arabia is not to fall victim to more sudden and

destructive kinds of change. He faces stubborn opposition, however, not least from

within the royal family. Anything in the regional environment that makes political

reform appear riskier will make his task harder.

ETHNIC SEPARATISM

The fourth major issue, and an important one for three of the states that border

Iraq, is ethnic separatism. This really means the issue of the Kurds, who ever since

the peace of Versailles have been the prototypical stateless ethnic group. Kurdish

separatism is a concern for Syria, in which Kurds, who are concentrated in the

37

northeast part of the country, constitute a bit less than 10 percent of the Syrian

population. It also is a concern in multiethnic Iran, where Kurds in the northwest

represent about 7 percent of Iran’s population. Kurdish dissatisfaction led to deadly

riots in Syria in 2004 and in Iran in 2005. The strongest worries, however, are in

Turkey, where Kurds constitute about 20 percent of the population and where the

organization usually known as the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, waged an insurgent and terrorist campaign that has left an estimated 35,000 people dead. Ankara has been very sensitive about any suggestion of independence for Iraqi

Kurdistan, because of worries about rekindling separatist sentiment among the

Kurds of southeastern Turkey. The Government of Turkey also has a strong interest

in the status of PKK fighters who have taken refuge in northern Iraq, and it has

been unhappy about what it considers to be insufficient U.S. or Iraqi efforts against

those fighters.

The views of regional governments toward the Kurds, as events in Iraq play out

over the coming months, will depend at least as much on the legal and political

forms applied to Iraqi Kurdistan as on the practical facts on the ground. After all,

since 1991 the Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed—and neighboring governments have lived

with—what has largely been de facto independence, despite Kurdish participation

in politics in Baghdad. The situation may be similar to that of Taiwan in the Far

East, in which de facto independence is tolerated but any move to make it de jure

would be destabilizing.

ALIGNMENTS AND POWER OF NEIGHBORING STATES

The final set of issues I would highlight concerns the effects the situation in Iraq

is having on the geopolitics of the Middle East—that is, the effects on the relative

power, and the foreign policies, of neighboring states. The geopolitical impact stems

from at least three aspects of that situation: The change in the ideological map of

the region resulting from removal of the Iraqi Baathist regime; the competition of

neighboring states for influence within Iraq; and the debilitating effects of the war

itself, which has greatly weakened what had been one of the stronger states in the

area.

Among the neighbors, the largest winner has been Iran. The war has not only toppled the dictator who initiated an earlier war that killed hundreds of thousands of

Iranians; it also has crippled what had been the largest regional counterweight to

Iranian influence. Meanwhile, the all-consuming preoccupation that the Iraq war

has become for the United States, along with the growing unpopularity of the war

among Americans, probably has made Iranian leaders less fearful than they otherwise might have been about forceful U.S. action, including military action, against

Iran. This confidence is tempered, however, by the fact that the occupation of Iraq

has completed a U.S. military encirclement of Iran, a posture that nonetheless suits

the internal political purposes of Iranian hard-liners as they play off an image of

confrontation with Washington.

Iranians today view the war in Iraq with a mixture of motives. The current leadership in Tehran probably is pleased to see the United States continue to be bogged

down and bleeding in Iraq for the time being. But it also has no reason to want

escalating and unending disorder on its western border. Tehran seems determined

to exercise as much influence as it can inside Iraq as whatever process of political

reconstruction there unfolds. It has been reaching out, and providing assistance to,

a wide variety of Iraqi groups, not just its traditional allies such as the Supreme

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Although some of this assistance may

help to make trouble for U.S. forces, it is best understood as an effort by Tehran

to throw out as many lines of influence as it can so that whenever the dust in Iraq

finally settles, it will have a good chance of having the friendship of, or at least access to, whoever is in power. Iranian leaders probably realize that creation in Iraq

of a duplicate of their own system of clerical rule is not feasible, but they at least

want to avoid a regime in Baghdad that is hostile to Iran.

Iranian leaders almost certainly hoped, prior to March 2003, that they would be

able—as was the case in Afghanistan—to work cooperatively with the United States

on the political reconstruction of Iraq. That, of course, did not happen. But the

shared U.S. and Iranian interest in avoiding escalating and unending disorder in

Iraq probably would make Tehran, despite all the ill will that has transpired over

other issues, receptive to engagement with Washington. The Iranians would want

such engagement, however, not to be limited to any one issue—be it Iraq, or the

nuclear program, or anything else—but instead to address all matters in dispute.

Syria is another neighbor that faces a significantly changed geopolitical environment as a result of events in Iraq. The bitter and longstanding rivalry between the

Syrian and Iraqi wings of the Baathist movement had been a major determinant

38

of Syrian foreign policy. It was the principal factor that led Damascus to break

ranks with its Arab brethren and to ally with Iran, and later to participate in Operation Desert Storm, which reversed Saddam Hussein’s aggression in Kuwait. With

the demise of the Iraqi Baathist regime, the foreign policy equation for Syria has

changed. Syria restored relations with Iraq in November 2006. Although the economic ties between Syria and Iran are substantial, Syria’s main reason for its otherwise counterintuitive alliance with Tehran is over. The sectarian dimension also

must influence thinking in Damascus, because the regime is dominated by the minority Alawite sect but rules a Sunni majority. The implication of all these factors

is that there is significant potential for coaxing Syria away from the alignment with

Iran and its client Hezbollah, and toward more cooperation with the United States,

with the hope for Syria of realizing what is still its main foreign policy goal: The

return of the Golan Heights.

Other regional states, including the gulf Arabs, are conscious of the strength that

Iraq once had and that, if it were again to become stable and united, could be the

basis for Iraq once again throwing its weight around. They also are conscious of the

fact that the issues involved in previous conflicts involving Iraq were not all the creation of Saddam Hussein. The longstanding enmity between Persian and Arab that

underlay the Iran-Iraq war certainly was not. And Kuwaitis viewing the turmoil to

their north know that the notion of Kuwait as rightfully the 19th province of Iraq

also predated Saddam, and has been part of the undercurrent of relations with Iraq

ever since Kuwait became independent.

I have highlighted several of the main issues that involve the regional impact of

the Iraq war. They are not the only issues. A major concern, for example, of another

of Iraq’s immediate neighbors—Jordan—is the influx of approximately 700,000 Iraqi

refugees. Syria and other neighbors also are facing a significant Iraqi refugee problem. Oil is another issue of high interest to several Middle Eastern states, given the

effects that different levels of Iraqi production and export could have on oil prices

and consequently on the finances and economies of those states.

A concluding point concerns the United States directly. Given how much the war

in Iraq has become a preoccupation for the United States, it necessarily colors virtually all of our other dealings with the Middle East and with countries in the region. It has been one of the chief reasons for the slide in the standing of the United

States among publics in the region, as recorded by opinion polls taken over the last

several years. It has been a reason for concern and doubt among governments regarding the attention and commitment that Washington can give to other endeavors. And Middle Eastern governments know that it has, in effect, relegated to a

lower priority almost every other U.S. interest in the region.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much. Your collective testimony has generated a number of questions, and let me begin.

Dr. Marr and Mr. Said, I’ve actually—as many have—read the

Iraqi Constitution, and I have it in front of me, and it is a—if I

were to make a comparison, I’d compare it to our Articles of Confederation rather than the American Constitution. And it lays out

in detail how regions can become regions; and, if they become regions, what authority they have, the 18 governates can. Tell me,

if you will, Dr. Marr, in light of your point, on page two or three,

in which you say, ‘‘Iraq is not likely to be a unified state dominated

by a strong central government in Baghdad for at least some time’’

and ‘‘the high degree of decentralization called for in the Constitution.’’ How do we square that?

Dr. MARR. I’ve read the Constitution, too, but, I must say, not in

the last month, so you may have to spark——

Chairman BIDEN. Well, then——

Dr. MARR. No; I know the whole issue of regionalism—the question of whether Iraq, or rather federalism, is going to be defined

by large regions is a very controversial one. Now, we have a clearly

formulated region in the KRG, the Kurdish Regional Government,

which, as you know, would like, in my view, to expand and take

in other Kurdish-majority areas, including Kirkuk, which I don’t

believe will be done entirely tranquilly. I think that’s a flashpoint

39

that could cause a lot of difficulty. And I also believe that, within

that region, while the Kurds are cooperating—and I give them high

marks on a lot of things—looking beneath the surface, some of

these differences, some of this fragmentation exists there, as well.

However, the Kurds have a solid region. Now, what is at stake here

is whether there’s enough homogeneity among these two other sectarian groups—‘‘The Shia’’ and ‘‘The Sunnis’’—to form a region

similar to that in Kurdistan. And one particular party, SCIRI, Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq—I won’t say that

again—would like to form a nine-province Shia region in the south,

which, of course, they expect to control.

If we look at that map up there, it looks as though there’s a Shia

majority down there, but, in fact, there’s much more fragmentation.

I don’t believe that that could be accomplished without quite a bit

of controversy with others, for example, the Sadrists, just to mention one. And, indeed, that piece of legislation, as you know, the

legislation to enable the Parliament to form that region, was postponed for 18 months, precisely because people see it as controversial.

When we come to the so-called Sunni region, that’s even more

difficult, because the Sunnis, in my view—you can’t speak of them

as ‘‘The Sunnis’’ because they’re very diverse. As a whole, Sunnis

have played the major role in the formation of the state, and have

dominated the state—not exclusively, but it’s been something they

feel they’ve done. Getting Sunnis to identify as Sunnis rather than

Iraqis, nationalists, or even Arab nationalists, is extremely difficult.

Last, but not least, there are large mixed areas, which are undergoing a lot of sectarian differentiation. They are a patchwork quilt.

If we look at greater Baghdad, if we had a map here of where these

areas are, Kirkuk, many other areas such as Diala, they are a

nightmare. They include Kurds, Turkmen, Shia, Sunnis—actually

creating borders, dividing them up, would be very difficult. And, in

the end, I think we would have a system, if we follow through with

this, which is, in some ways, repugnant to many people, that the

dominant identity has to be what you were born with, in——

Chairman BIDEN. If I can——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. One way or another.

Chairman BIDEN [continuing]. Interrupt. The dominant identity,

as I read the Constitution, doesn’t require it to be based upon a region, based upon ethnicity. In my seven visits to Iraq, I meet with

people, and they say they want to have their local policeman running their local areas. They’ve gotten along very well. And they

don’t want a national police force dominated by a bunch of thugs

patrolling their streets.

Question. Do any of you picture, in your lifetime, the likelihood

that a national police force will be patrolling the streets of

Fallujah? It’s a serious question. Does anybody see that in their

lifetime?

[No response.]

Chairman BIDEN. I don’t think so. I don’t see it, either. So, it’s

about time, I think, we, maybe, stop pushing a rope here.

One of the questions I have, as well, is: What is the role of

Sistani? What influence does he possess now? Anyone. Yes.

40

Mr. SAID. Well, I’ll address the issue of Sistani, but I also would

like to come back on the issue of the Constitution.

Sistani has great moral authority in Iraq, and it extends beyond

the Shia community. However, that authority has been eroding

over the past 3 years.

Chairman BIDEN. Why?

Mr. SAID. In part, because Sistani himself has been manipulated,

if you like, by some of the Shia political parties.

Senator BOXER. I’m sorry, say that louder.

Mr. SAID. He has been—the image—the institution of Mr. Sistani

has been manipulated by some of—by the—some of the Shia parties who have been trying to glean legitimacy from him. The institution of the Shia Marjiya has been used for political means to

advance narrow party political objectives. And this has reflected

negatively on—has tarnished, has limited—has reduced the omnipotence of Sistani. At the end of the day, it’s very important to remember that Sistani is an apolitical—is a nonpolitical religious

leader who does not like to meddle in politics. And he has largely

withdrawn from interference since the last elections.

Chairman BIDEN. Let me follow up with a question, since my

time is up.

Mr. O’Hanlon, you indicated that—which comports what we’ve

been told—that there are roughly about 5,000 politically reliable,

as well as well-trained, Iraqi forces. I listened this morning to Mr.

Bartlett, speaking for the President—and I’m assuming he’s going

to say what Mr. Bartlett said today—that, in a surge that will be

in conjunction with Iraqi forces, who will be moved into neighborhoods, who will be the ones, ‘‘going door to door,’’ do you believe

there are a sufficient number of reliable Iraqi forces to work with

whatever surge plan the President moves forward, if the President’s plan envisions a significant Iraqi military initiative along

with this surge?

Dr. O’HANLON. Right now, Senator, I’d say no. I think the only

hope for changing that is if there can be some kind of a broad political dynamic that’s created in the next couple of months, that’s

been different from what we’ve seen in the past—some resolution

on sharing oil, on rehabilitating former Baathists who don’t have

blood on their hands, letting them regain their jobs, all the things

that probably should have been done 2 or 3 years ago. There’s some

hope of creating—and it’s, of course, a political question. It’s less

about training and less about the mathematics of the schedule, and

more about this national need for consensus.

Chairman BIDEN. Do you all agree that oil has the potential to

be the glue that holds the country together, rather than splits it

apart?

Mr. SAID. Definitely. And as the resolution on the oil negotiation

shows, one could come up with solutions that go beyond the

Constitution——

Chairman BIDEN. Well——

Mr. SAID [continuing]. Beyond the——

Chairman BIDEN [continuing]. There’s been no resolution on the

distribution of the revenue. There has been a resolution—tentative,

as I understand it—on who has authority to determine whether or

not investments will be made, in what wells and where. But if

41

you’re sitting out there in the Sunni province, where you’ve got a

lot of nice sand and shale, and not much else, you’re going to want

to know, ‘‘How much is coming my way?’’ in terms of revenue-sharing, and, ‘‘What guarantees are there to be?’’ In my understanding,

that’s the point that has not been resolved. Is that correct?

Dr. MARR. I’m not entirely sure of that. But I think negotiations

are going on now, and, to my surprise, I’ve been impressed by the

fact that there have been some compromises on this—by the Kurds,

for example, who are the most eager to get going on this. Maybe

not enough compromises yet, but there have actually been some.

So, I think it could move ahead in that direction, but it could also

be a point of contention, depending on how it’s done.

Chairman BIDEN. That’s encouraging. My time is up. I thank

you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the four statements. And I suspect that—I appreciate them even more having read, in the Wall Street Journal yesterday, a story called ‘‘Nightmare Scenario,’’ which relates to the

U.S. withdrawal from the region. Now, although a lot of our debate,

politically, has been over whether troops should come in or whether

they should come out, and the timeframe for the coming out, and

so forth, the Wall Street Journal had this paragraph that said,

‘‘The United States is pushing a wide-ranging strategy to persuade

Sunni allies that are serious about countering the rise of Iran in

exchange for Arab help in Iraq and Palestinian territories. Key to

the effort is to continue to promise to keep United States forces in

Iraq for as long as necessary. But the United States is also beefing

up the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, plans to deepen security cooperation with the gulf allies. The Pentagon has proposed sending

a second carrier battle group to the gulf region. There are also advanced plans in the way to knit together the air defense systems

of the six smaller states, including Qatar, Oman, and the United

Arab Emirates, and to build a United States-administered missile

defense system. Similarly, the Air Force is laying plans to lay up

exercises with Arab allies in the region. One proposal calls for the

United States to hold combined air exercise with Oman and the

UAE.’’

Now, that’s a very sizable agenda going on, quite apart from the

debate that we’re having as to whether as many as 20,000 troops,

in some form or other, get to Baghdad. I want to raise a question

of the panel, of any of you. You’ve illustrated the interests of each

of the regional governments, and discussed in your testimony, how

critical U.S. presence is for them. Absent that, they have testified,

either publicly or covertly, that they will take action—the Jordanians, even—to carve out, maybe, a space to take care of these

700,000 refugees that you have mentioned; or the Saudis, quite

overtly, that they may come to the assistance of Sunnis in Iraq

under certain conditions. Likewise, the Syrians, conflicted, in a

way, because of the nature of their government, but their Sunni

majority has a deep interest in Iraq outcomes. Furthermore, the

Turks, as you have mentioned, quite apart from Iran—characterized as the big winner—each with important interests in Iraq.

42

What if Secretary Rice, as she heads out to the area Friday to

begin a very important and timely tour, were to suggest all of us

need to come together—by ‘‘all of us,’’ I mean the United States

and Iraq, the Turks, the Iranians and the Syrians and the Jordanians, and even the Egyptians and the Saudis—around the same

table to meet rather continuously? This is not the old debate,

‘‘Should we have negotiations with Syria? Should we ever talk to

Iran?’’ Rather, the subject of conversation question is, each of these

countries has an interest in Iraq, presently, and an interest in us—

that is, the United States presence in the region. What about this

carrier group? What about the six countries with conducting air exercises over here? What do they think about the United States having more troops in the general area? Where? What should they be

doing? Now, we may not want to share all of our plans, although

this is pretty explicit in the Wall Street Journal, in terms of a permanent presence. But absence means chaos for a good number of

people. And you have to consider those who will take advantage of

the situation in ways that, strategically, may be injurious to the

United States and certainly a good number of other people, including the specter raised in the article of all-out warfare, which would

likely constrict the supply of oil to everybody in the world, the price

goes sky high, recessions occur—the subject, really not discussed

today, but an implication of this predicament.

Now, is it practical, if the Secretary were to say, ‘‘I’d like to have

a meeting. We can have it wherever you want to have it, but we’d

like to see everybody around the table’’—what would be the response, at this point, of the neighbors? Would they come together?

Would they want to see each other? Would they want to participate

with us? Do you have any feel about some type of strategy, of

grand diplomacy in which we, sort of, lay all the cards on the table

and try to think through what is happening in this troubled period,

which you all have said is going to take time to evolve—not 6

months or a year or so forth, but an evolutionary struggle for a

state to evolve in Iraq, in which that kind of time can only be guaranteed if all the rest of the players are not restive and aggressive?

Anyone have thoughts about this idea? Yes.

Mr. SAID. I think you raise a very important point. And there’s

a situation of putting the cart before the horse in the debate about

Iraq—surge, withdrawal, troop movement. I think the decision on

troops should come on the back of such settlement that you have

outlined—a comprehensive regional agreement. Iraq’s neighbors

will have various attitudes toward that, because some of them, as

has been suggested, are flourishing—and generally like the current

state of affairs, although they fear deterioration. Others have been

crying for attention. Saudi Arabia, in particular, had been demanding attention to the situation of Iraq, from the United States, as

well as Turkey. So, there will be various responses.

One problem with having a comprehensive regional conference to

address all the issues in the region, that this is a—quite a big load

for one conference, but there is no doubt that, as suggested, also,

by the Baker-Hamilton Report, that there is need for a regional approach. Iraq cannot be solved on its own, Palestine cannot be

solved on its own. But the decision on troops and troop movements

43

should come on the back of such—the blueprint of such agreement,

rather than come ahead of it.

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, I’d like to add one word on this, and it’s

sort of a hawkish case for regional engagement, if you will, which

is that, I—Paul Pillar mentioned, earlier, that Iran’s interest here

may be trying to maximize its influence. I think there’s also a

chance that Iran is trying to deal the United States a major strategic defeat and try to drive us, not only out of Iraq, but out of the

region, and that Iraq—that Iran has gotten more ambitious as this

war has gone worse.

I would see one purpose of a regional conference as disabusing

Iran of the notion that it can drive us out of the region, and sitting

down and making it clear to Iran that they should have an interest

in some level of stability in Iraq, because, even if Iraq totally fails,

which it might, we are going to stay committed, to the extent our

regional partners wish, to the Persian Gulf, and that Iran has no

chance of driving us out of the region. I think that message is

worth sending. I’d be very curious—I know people in this room

have been articulate about the need for different options in Iraq,

but I haven’t heard anybody say we should get out of the Persian

Gulf. And I think Iran needs to be disabused of the notion that

they could drive us out.

Senator LUGAR. And particularly because we have negotiations

with Iran about nuclear weapons. That goes on somewhere very

close to this. And perhaps a feeling, by Iran, that, in fact, if we are

in a withdrawal status would have, I think, a deep effect upon that

set of negotiations.

Dr. PILLAR. Senator Lugar, if I could just add to what Mike said.

If you look at the perspectives of, say, the Saudis—and the issue

has been raised about Saudi concern, about the ties with the

United States, and so on—it really isn’t American troops fighting

in Iraq that are most important to the Saudis, as far as their own

security is concerned; it has to do with those other aspects of the

U.S. presence, the overall U.S. security guarantee, and so on.

And my other final comment would be, how the regional actors

would respond to that kind of initiative depends on other things,

as well, such as what the United States is doing vis-a-vis the ArabIsraeli conflict. And that’s the reason the Iraq Study Group highlighted that issue, as well.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

There’s so much to try to tackle, and it’s hard to do, obviously,

in a short period of time. We appreciate your testimony this morning.

Let me try to cut to the, sort of—there’s a short-term and a longterm set of interests here. The long-term interests are enormous.

And you’ve just touched on them. I mean, obviously, none of us on

either side of the aisle—I don’t think anybody in Congress—wants

to give short shrift to the large strategic interests we have in the

region. And anybody who’s been talking, like myself, about the

need to push the process—and I recommended an international

44

peace conference in—3 years ago. Nothing’s happened. We’ve been

sitting around not engaging in this kind of political resolution,

while we’ve continued down the military side. But none of us have

suggested that there isn’t a huge interest in the stability of the region, in the—in our neighbors, in a whole set of strategic issues.

But when you measure those interests against what Iraq is doing

to our interests, you come out on a real low side of that ledger. Iran

is more powerful. Hezbollah is more powerful. Hamas is more powerful. ‘‘The Shia Revival,’’ as Vali Nasr refers to it, is more real.

I mean, things that weren’t staring us in the face are now staring

us in every quarter. We’re worse off.

So, our current policy is, in fact, not protecting our interests, not

doing for the forces that we want to support in those countries,

what’s in their interest. And, in the end, we’re setting ourselves

backward.

Against that, you have to, sort of, ask yourself, OK, so where do

you go here, to put those interests back on the table and resolve

this? No. 1 issue in front of us is this question of more troops. Now,

that speaks, I think, to both short and long term. Let me just come

to it very quickly.

General Abizaid said—and now he’s leaving, we understand

there’s a transition, but I don’t think you could quickly dismiss his

experience, his being in the field, General Casey being in the field,

and what they’ve observed and learned in that period of time—and

he said, point blank on November 15 of last year, ‘‘I’ve met with

every divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander,

General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, ‘In your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now,

does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?’

And they all said no.’’

Now, Mr. Said, you just said, yourself, that adding more troops

may, in fact, make it more difficult to get a resolution. So, my question to each of you, in sum, is: If there isn’t sufficient evidence of

this kind of summitry and diplomacy, if there isn’t a sufficient political process in place—and I want your judgment as to whether

or not there is—will more troops have any chance of, in fact, getting what we want, or is it going to make matters worse? And, if

it does, where are we, after putting them in, in 6 months, if it

hasn’t worked?

Mr. O’Hanlon.

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator Kerry, very tough question. I like your

idea of a ledger. On the positive side of the troop-surge proposal,

I would say, we all know, tactically, there have never been enough

troops in Iraq to clear and hold. So, that’s the tactical argument

for this case. It would have been a much more compelling argument 3 and 4 years ago than it is today, but I think it remains,

at some level, in the plus column. On the negative column, of

course, we know that there is no political resolution of these very

sectarian divides——

Senator KERRY. Well, hold on a minute. I mean, 30,000 troops or

20,000 troops, is there anybody who imagines, measured against

the task, that that’s enough to do the job?

Dr. O’HANLON. You have to hope that you can get momentum in

Baghdad, or in parts of Baghdad, and then that will begin to have

45

a spillover effect. So, narrowly speaking, I would say no; there’s no

hope you can do it nationwide with 20,000 troops.

Senator KERRY. Go ahead and finish up.

Dr. O’HANLON. Well, I think—I think, you know, that’s the main

tactical argument in favor. Most of the other arguments say, either

there’s a danger to this, to our Army and Marines, to the Iraqi

sense of dependency on us, or it’s not going to be enough.

Getting to Senator Biden’s question earlier, ‘‘Are there enough

Iraqi security forces to team with us to be dependable?’’ Absolutely

not, unless there’s a much stronger political consensus in Iraq.

So, I would not oppose the surge, but I would only support it if

it’s in the context of a much broader——

Senator KERRY. Political settlement. And you don’t see the political settlement effort or capacity there now.

Dr. O’HANLON. Not now.

Dr. MARR. I would ask——

Senator KERRY. Dr. Marr.

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Very carefully, what these troops are

going to do. I have some questions as they get involved in this complex sectarian situation and other issues. Are they going to attack

simply Muqtada, or are they also going to attack insurgents? What

are the Iraqis going to do? What are others going to do? What are

these troops going to do, and what is the strategy that is going to

be employed?

One other issue, about sending them or not sending them in, is

the question of how we get Iraqis—I don’t want to say to just step

up to the plate; that’s a very simplistic idea—but, indeed, Iraqis

themselves are the only ones who can ultimately sort out and move

ahead on this sectarian strife issue. And whether sending the

troops in and doing the job for them is going to provide an atmosphere which enables them to do it, or whether it’s going to delay

the hard choice they face. This is another issue——

Senator KERRY. Do you see the political process in place to resolve the fundamental differences between an Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

and a Muqtada al-Sadr, between the very—the interests of the militias, the warlordism that Mr. Said just referred to, the Sunni reluctance to participate, the Sunni desire to reemerge as the people

who run the country, the interests of certain individuals with respect to Iran, the Persian-Arab divide? I mean, all of these things

are, it seems to me, so huge, so historically and culturally deep in

this issue, that, as it further disintegrates into this morass of individual interests, you can’t—our troops can’t pull that back together,

can they, Mr. Said?

Mr. SAID. No. Troops, alone, can never resolve this. I mean—

well, there’s one caveat to that, of course. If you send 500,000

troops to Iraq, you may be able to steamroll the situation without

there being a political consensus, but there is no—neither the resources nor the will to do that. So, given the lack of the possibility

to mobilize the necessary troops, the troops need to come on the

back of political consensus, on the back of a political settlement

that is internationally mediated, that is supported by Iraq’s neighbors, as well as the various communities in Iraq.

Senator KERRY. I mean, I want to get your answer, too, Mr. Pillar, but, as you do, because time runs so fast, could you just touch

46

on the question of to what degree the presence of the American

troops delays the willingness of people to resolve those issues, and

acts as a cover for people’s other interests to be able to play out

to see who’s on top and who’s on the bottom?

Dr. PILLAR. I think there’s a strong sense, both among Iraqis and

with the regional players, the subject of Senator Lugar’s question,

that, as long as the United States is doing the heavy lifting, however much of an interest they have in eventually resolving the situation, they are not the ones in the front having to do it. There is

an issue of having to concentrate the minds.

Senator KERRY. Do you want to comment, Mr. Pillar? You said

something about the Green Zone state that struck me. The Green

Zone state might fall. Isn’t the fact that it is only a Green Zone

state, kind of fundamental to this question of legitimacy and of resolving these larger political differences?

Dr. PILLAR. I think some—I think that was your——

Senator KERRY. And would you, as you touch on that, tell me: If

the troops start going after the militia—and I’m reading that

they’re talking about an evenhandedness in the application of

this—what is the Muqtada al-Sadr response to that? And where do

the Badr Brigade and the Jaish al-Mahdi come out in that conflict?

Mr. SAID. It’s speculative, at this point, to judge what the troops

are going to do. The Iraqi Government security plan, although, declares that all the militias will be attacked, but also, in the same

breath, states that they view Sunni violence as the primary objective. So, on the back of this security plan, the surge of U.S. troops

can be seen as taking sides in the ongoing sectarian conflict. The

United States may declare that it will go differently, but, at this

point, the agreement, since the meeting in Amman between the

Prime Minister and the President, seems to have been to go for one

last push in support of the elites that have emerged out of the current political process and against their enemies. And this could

contribute—if mishandled, and especially if no protection is offered

to all communities, to all Iraqi communities, this could embroil the

United States in a new role in Iraq, as being a party in the conflict.

Senator KERRY. My time is up, but——

Mr. SAID. Thank you.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. But none of you answered the question—maybe you will as you go along here—of: What happens if

this fails?

Mr. SAID. It will make—it will make the negotiations even harder. I mean, we have a window of opportunity today, and maybe

passing, for a negotiated settlement, including the region. Further

blood, more blood—and, if it’s seen as one-sided—will make negotiations even harder, down the road.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you each for your presentations and your continued efforts

to educate and inform not just the Congress, but the American people. And that, as we all appreciate, is of great essence, on probably

the most significant issue this Nation has faced since Vietnam. Not

just as you all have said, and each in your own way, noted, that

it is not just an Iraqi issue, it is far broader, and the consequences

47

are far more significant. It’s a regional issue, and some of us have

been saying that for some time.

As I have listened to your presentations and my colleagues’ questions, no matter the question, no matter the answer, no matter the

issue, the dynamic, it all comes back to one fundamental thing, and

that’s the absolute requirement for political settlement, not just in

Iraq, but in the Middle East. And each of you has been very articulate in framing those issues in some specificity.

I noted, Mr. Said, in your testimony and comments, if I can

quote—I think you said something to the effect that no framework

for a peaceful resolution exists now in Iraq. You then further, toward the end of your statement, said, ‘‘What Iraq needs now is an

international sponsored peace process, a framework.’’ You engaged

Senator Lugar on this issue, to some extent. With that in mind,

and each of you have noted Professor Marr’s point about: Only the

Iraqis, essentially, can settle their differences. Dr. Brookings—I

mean, Dr. O’Hanlon——

[Laughter.]

Chairman BIDEN. You don’t mind Dr. Brookings, do you?

Dr. O’HANLON. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Senator HAGEL. I think your mother was from that side of the

family. [Laughter.]

Dr. O’Hanlon noted that this was going to require a broad political dynamic. So, if I have listened as attentively as I think I have

to each of you, you all come to the same conclusion. So, here’s the

question. We will, tonight, learn, from the President of the United

States, what he is going to propose to the Congress and the American people, and to our allies—most specifically, to the Iraqi Government—on where we go from here. I think it’s pretty clear what

that proposal is going to consist of. And you mentioned BakerHamilton. I don’t think that there is any great—I’ll listen to the

President tonight, carefully, obviously, to find out, but I don’t think

there is any great attention in what the President is going to say

tonight that comes from, or a result of, the 79 recommendations

that came out of the Baker-Hamilton Commission—one, specifically, which has been noted here, engagement with Iran and Syria,

and the wider diplomatic regional focus.

If you all had the opportunity—and I know you all talk to the

White House and decisionmakers—but to focus on two or three

most specific issues, in the President’s presentation tonight, as to

what he will be proposing, what would you say are the most important two or three? Or what would you like to see are the most important two or three? Or, if you were the President, what do you

think is the essence of where we go from here, and why? And I

know we are limited in our time, but I have 4 minutes; that gives

each of you 1 minute. And we would start with Dr. Marr.

Thank you.

Chairman BIDEN. You can go over, on your answers.

Dr. MARR. I would focus on regional cooperation. That is to say,

getting the regional community in, either by a big conference,

which I tend to think isn’t going to work very well, or by a contact

group, something that allows us to deal with them individually—

would be very important, and getting them on board on stablizing

Iraq. And, second, on the kinds of pressures, incentives, other

48

things we’re going to have to undertake, as the group that’s providing most of the force in Iraq, to nudge Iraqis—that means the

political parties in power now—to cooperate, to get on with reconciliation, to deal with the de-Baathification issue, and other

things. Ultimately that’s going to determine what kind of response

we get in Iraq.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. O’Hanlon.

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, I would focus, as Phebe has just said, on

the need for political reconciliation. I think it’s the overwhelming

prerequisite to any kind of success, or even averting complete failure in Iraq, at this point. It’s hard for the President to really create

the right mentality in Iraqi minds, because, of course, he is so committed to this operation. But it strikes me that the Iraqis need to

feel like 2007 is a make-or-break year. Hopefully, they can read our

politics well enough to know that this country may support the

President tonight if he asks for more effort in various ways, but I

think it’s probably his last chance to really get that kind of support

from the country, and he may not even get it this time. And so,

I hope that there’s a sense of acute focus among Iraqis on the need

to resolve issues like sharing oil equally, reining in militias, rehabilitating former Baathists who don’t have blood on their hands

directly, and dealing with issues like Kirkuk. If that doesn’t work,

the President can’t talk about it very easily tonight, but I think the

backup plan is to think about this more like Bosnia and move

toward a facilitated resolution of the civil war, where we move toward autonomous regions and help people relocate so they’re in

neighborhoods where they feel safer. I think that’s the obvious

backup plan, and pretty much the only choice we’re going to have

within 9 to 12 months, unless things turn around quickly.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Said.

Mr. SAID. For a political settlement in Iraq, Iraqis need to come

together to decide on the shape of the state they want to live in.

That’s the essence of a political process that is—that doesn’t exist

now. We have the formal mechanisms—we have elections, we have

a constitution, we have a government—but they are not working.

And the evidence to that is the violence and the apathy that I have

spoken about. So, there needs to be an external intervention, because Iraqi forces, Iraqi political entities and groups, are clearly

unable to reach that consensus on their own. There is a need for

international intervention in that regard. And it’s better that it’s

multilateral rather than the United States doing it alone, as it has

been trying over the last 3 years. There is a need to bring in more

players, who can cajole the various actors, who can bring them to

the table, and who can provide the essential support needed to implement whatever the Iraqis agree on—needed to support whatever

the Iraqis can agree on.

And only on the back of that, one can then decide which forces

stay, which forces leave. Maybe other actors will be able to bring

their own forces to the table after having been engaged properly.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Dr. PILLAR. It is unfortunate that—but true, as you said, Senator—that what we hear tonight probably is not going to be drawn

much from the Baker-Hamilton Report, so I would just use the last

49

few seconds to say I endorse strongly both the approach in the report that the regional engagement, including engagement with the

likes of Syria and Iran, has to be part of a package, and, second,

to support the whole concept of an approach toward the troop presence in Iraq that let’s Iraqis, as well as the American people, look

forward to a future in which, as the report put it, by the first quarter of 2008, essentially the combat role by United States troops will

be over.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, to each of you. Mr. Chairman, thank

you.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much. We usually move—at

least I have been moving based on seniority, but Senator—my good

friend, Senator Dodd, is here, but he suggested that I move to Senator Feingold.

Senator DODD. Before you jump too quickly at that, Mr. Chairman, as a strong supporter of the seniority system—I’ve, over the

years, acquired the ability to appreciate it—let me briefly, briefly

say—let me congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on taking the gavel

here—to thank Dick Lugar for tremendous leadership on this committee. And it’s a continuation—a continuum here. I’m not surprised at all that Joe Biden is convening a hearing like this, with

a distinguished group of panelists, to talk about the critical foreign

policy issue of the day. It’s exactly what Dick Lugar has been doing

before. It’s great to see this kind of leadership move back and forth

here, with people who are highly competent, know what they’re

talking about, and providing great leadership in the country on this

issue. So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very, very much.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, as an increasingly strong supporter of

the seniority system——

[Laughter.]

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Let me thank Senator Dodd for

his tremendous courtesy in this regard.

Senator KERRY. Ask Senator Webb how he feels about this.

[Laughter.]

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you all for coming to testify in front

of this committee. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for arranging this and the rest of the hearings we’ll be having over the

next few weeks. I know you and your staff have worked hard to lay

out a range of good hearings and witnesses so this committee can

grapple with one of the most significant challenges, really, in our

Nation’s history.

Unfortunately, these hearings are taking place in the context of

increasing violence in Iraq, a lack of political agreement among

Iraqi political factions, an overstrained United States military, and

an overwhelming and accurate sense among the American people

that the President’s policies in Iraq are wrong. This really is, of

course, a tragic situation. And I appreciate your candor and insights today on what I hope will be the first of many open, honest,

and candid hearings we’ll have.

My colleagues have already addressed a number of important

issues. I don’t want to take a lot of time here today, but I do want

to talk about a critical aspect of the administration’s Iraq policy:

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What the role of the United States military in Iraq is, given what

you’ve been talking about, political deadlock and increasing sectarian violence; what impact the current United States military

presence in Iraq is having on the political, economic, and security

conditions in Iraq; and, most importantly, what impact our continuing presence in Iraq is having on our efforts to defeat terrorist

networks not just in Iraq, not just in the region, but around the

world. I think sometimes we forget this isn’t a regional issue, it is

an international issue. And I think one of the greatest failings of

our view of this is that we look at this either in—through the prism

of Iraq or even through the prism of the Middle East. That is insufficient, in light of what happened to us on 9/11, in light of the challenges to the security of the American people.

So, let me start with Dr. Pillar. Let me focus on a statement you

made in your testimony. To paraphrase, you said you concurred

with the statements in the declassified national intelligence estimate published by DNI on September 26, 2006, that suggested that

Iraq could become a ‘‘cause celebre’’ for jihadists, and that it is

‘‘shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives,’’ and

is being exploited by al-Qaeda to ‘‘attract new recruits and donors.’’

First, in speaking generally about your analysis, would the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq at some point help counter

the ability of al-Qaeda and other jihadists around the world to recruit new members?

Dr. PILLAR. Yes, sir; I believe it would, which is not to say that

it would undo much of the damage that’s already been done.

What’s taking place in Iraq right now is that the current prominent

jihad mirrors what took place in Afghanistan in the earlier jihad

against the Soviets in the 1980s, where a number of effects occurred. One, it became a huge inspiration and propaganda point,

a kind of rallying point. Two, it was a training ground, in a very

specific way. Lots of people learned how to handle firearms and explosives to put to other use. And third, it was the ultimate extremist networking opportunity, in which you had people of different

nationalities—Pakistanis, Arabs, what have you—who came together. And we’re still seeing the effects of that today. I think most

of the long-term effects of the jihad in Iraq paralleling that most

of those we have yet to see. What’s already occurred cannot be undone. But the short answer to your question is yes; we can avoid

compounding the damage by reducing, or bringing to a close, our

presence there.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that direct answer. So, more

specifically, then, is it safe to say that al-Qaeda will continue to exploit the presence of a significant level of United States military

personnel in Iraq?

Dr. PILLAR. There’s no question in my mind that it will. It’s been

one of the biggest propaganda points that al-Qaeda has been

offered.

Senator FEINGOLD. In your prepared statement, you said that,

‘‘The most important variable in Iraq in the months or years ahead

is the sheer continuation of the war, as well as the continued

United States participation in it.’’ So, for example, if the United

States began redeploying from Iraq, what would be the long-term

impact on al-Qaeda, globally, in your view?

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Dr. PILLAR. Senator Feingold, I think you have to bear in mind

that ‘‘jihad’’ means, literally, ‘‘struggle.’’ What’s most important for

the people we’re talking about is not a particular outcome, or what

we, back in this country, might consider, in our lexicon, victory or

defeat and what have you. It’s participation in a struggle, and especially participation in a struggle against a superpower. And with

the Soviets no longer around, that’s us. So, just about any outcome

that is within the realm of imagination of anyone in this room,

which would involve at least some violence still in Iraq, is going to

serve that purpose of a struggle. So, that’s the most important

thing, not a particular outcome or this side winning or that side

losing.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor.

Dr. O’Hanlon, thanks for your testimony. First, let me applaud

the work that you and your colleagues at Brookings are doing on

Iraq. Your data and analysis are helpful and insightful. Let me ask

you some questions about some of the—what lies beneath the data.

Your data obviously highlights troubling trends. It shows that,

regardless of the size of United States troop presence in Iraq—and

your data shows that it has gone from 123,000 in 2003 to 140,000

in 2006—Iraqi civilian fatalities, estimated strength of the insurgency, strength of the Shia militias, and daily average interethnic

attacks and the estimated number of foreign fighters have all risen

over the past 3 years, without fail. Given that we can’t, from this

data, draw a connection between U.S. troop levels and the improvement of any of these important indicators, can we draw a conclusion with your data that sending in more U.S. troops will actually

have an impact on any of these key indicators?

Dr. O’HANLON. No; not from the data, Senator. I think there’s a

possibility of constructing a theory that the added troops could

help, especially in the context of a broader political and economic

initiative. But there’s no data that would prove that it would work.

And, in fact, I think that, to the contrary, I would be, while not

against the surge proposal, if done in a broader context, I’d be

skeptical, at this point, that it can make a big difference.

Senator FEINGOLD. As you mentioned, the other big troubling

statistic is shown in the number of Iraqis who are displaced. This

is turning into an incredible humanitarian tragedy. According to

your data, in your view: Would an increase in United States military personnel in Iraq address any of the driving factors of their

displacement—presumably things like bombings, growing militias,

interethnic attacks? As we discussed, it appears as if the numbers

don’t support the hypothesis that more troops will help settle

things down.

Dr. O’HANLON. Well, again, you can tell a story, you can construct a theory of how more neighborhood-by-neighborhood security

might help reduce the ethnic displacement. But, again, we have no

evidence from the information, that we’ve accumulated over 4

years’ time, to prove that. Even in an earlier period, when there

was less violence and less for the United States and its partners

to deal with day to day in Iraq, we were not able to get things on

a positive trajectory. So, I think, if anything, the data would make

one skeptical. Can’t prove it, one way or another, but should make

one skeptical about the prospects.

52

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, studying your data, what dynamics or

variables, in your view, have had the most significant impact on reducing violence in Iraq? The top-line numbers you’ve given us

show, again, pretty consistent increase in the violence across the

board, but do you see any connections or positive stories in that

data that should contribute to formulating policy proposals?

Dr. O’HANLON. I see virtually no positive news on the hard numbers of security or economics. The only good news really is in the

politics and the public opinion, although there’s less than there

used to be. Two or three years ago, it was possible to tell a better

story, because 2 or 3 years ago, the Shia really seemed to believe

in the future of Iraq, and that’s when you had the Grand Ayatollah

al-Sistani more vocal, trying to rein in some of the militias. The

overall Shia response to the insurgency seemed to be one of patience, of believing time was on their side anyway. They stayed optimistic in the polls. They still seemed to believe in the idea of an

integrated Iraq. The Sunni Arabs were very skeptical all along, and

very quickly soured on our presence, as you know, but the Shia

stayed positive for a long time. Unfortunately, that’s gone, to a

large extent, and I don’t know how to recreate it.

So, I’m certainly much more pessimistic about the idea of building an integrated Iraq, at this point, than I have been in the previous 4 years.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thanks, all of you.

And, again, thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you, Senator.

I would note the presence of Chairman Lantos’s wife, Annette

Lantos, in the audience. Welcome. I’m glad you’ve come over to the

other side. Thank you.

Senator Coleman is next, but he is absent.

So, Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, it’s an honor to be on this committee.

Chairman BIDEN. We welcome you. We’re delighted to have you

with us.

Senator CORKER. Thank you. And I’m glad to see that, after

Ranking Member Lugar had 35 hearings, you’re doing the same.

This is a tremendous service to us in the Senate, to our country,

and I appreciate what you’re doing very much, and echo what Senator Dodd said, a minute ago.

I’m a new member. I’ll ask one question and then move on to

other members. But I know that we all want to see a stable Iraq,

and we all want to see our men and women in uniform home as

soon as possible. And I keep hearing that possibly the addition of

troops would be better served after political settlements could

occur. And I guess the question is: Is there any real thought that

political settlements can occur with so much chaos, with so much

lack of security for citizens there in Iraq today?

Dr. MARR. I’ll start by taking a crack at that. I’m not optimistic

either, but I’m a realist. And so, my expectations, from the start,

were perhaps not of the highest.

I think the idea that we’re operating in a timeframe where, in

the next year or two, according to our exigencies here, the situation

is going to play out in Iraq is wrong. Their timeframe—as you can

53

see if you talk to any of these leaders coming over here—is a much

longer one. And I, frankly, think this chaos, perhaps not with the

same level of killing—but this kind of instability is going to go on

for a very long time, until the population and the political leadership that either benefits or loses from it comes to the conclusion

that they’re losing more than they’re gaining. And the settlement

is not going to result from some grand conference, some grand reconciliation. I’d like to suggest, again, it’s going to be much more

mundane and prosaic. And we see it going on at a local level. It

will come from different groups making different deals with different people across these divides until something more cohesive

emerges. That’s going to take quite some time. And whether our

patience with this process is going to last or not is an open question.

Dr. O’HANLON. A somewhat different take, Senator, although I

greatly respect Dr. Marr’s point and I think there’s a lot to it. I

would also say, when 100,000 people a month are being driven

from their homes, the idea that the conflict can stay at this level

indefinitely, and essentially retain a character like we’re seeing

today, is not what I would agree with or prognosticate. I would say

that we have a couple of years to save anything like a multiethnic

integrated Iraq. Frankly, I don’t think it’s that important to save

it. I think stability is much more important than salvaging the

kind of Iraq that’s been there in the past, from America’s strategicinterest perspective. And I think we’re going to have to see

progress on that in the course of 2007, in part because of American

politics, but in part because another year’s worth of this level of

ethnic cleansing and Iraq starts to look more and more like three

separated regions, where you essentially had a civil war divide the

country. I see Dr. Marr is disagreeing with me, but that’s what the

numbers say to me.

And so, I think that we are going to have to view 2007 as our

last best chance to have anything like current strategy succeed,

and, if it doesn’t, with or without a surge, I think within a year

we’re going to have to start having a conversation about whether

Iraq has to be divided up into a—what you could call a federal

structure or a soft partition—you know, different phrases can be

used—but basically where oil revenue is shared, but, otherwise,

most of the governance, most of the security is done in three separate provinces, there is some kind of a loose federal structure, a

small federal army. And, otherwise, you help people relocate, if

they need to, to places where they will feel safer, and help them

with relocation assistance, in terms of housing and jobs.

Dr. PILLAR. Well, it is valid to say that—to point out that the security affects the politics, just as the politics affects the security.

I strongly agree with Phebe Marr’s observations about the timeframe involved and about how Iraqis are going to keep doing what

they’re doing until they believe they don’t have a chance to get the

upper hand. If you’re looking for an analogy in the Middle East,

that I think is frightening in a way, but perhaps most apt, it was

the Lebanese civil war, which raged on for something like 14 years,

from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, until all the Lebanese parties—and that, too, was one characterized by a very complex sectarian mosaic—until they basically exhausted themselves, literally

54

and figuratively, and finally, with the help of the Saudis and the

Syrians, reached a peace agreement, even though that left a number of people dissatisfied. We’re seeing the effects of it today. But

that’s the kind of timeframe I think we’re dealing with, with regard

to resolving, if it’s ever going to be even halfway resolved, the political conflict in Iraq.

Senator CORKER. Well, are you recommending, then, that things

stay as is until they get so bad that people start making those

kinds of deals? Is that what you’re recommending?

Dr. PILLAR. It wasn’t a recommendation, Senator Corker, it was

an analytic observation about the situation we face.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.

I would note that we did not have 135,000 forces in Lebanon during that period. And I know you’re making an accurate—I think,

accurate observation, but—at any rate.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. I want to thank Senator Dodd for understanding

my conflict here with the Environment Committee. I really do appreciate it. And I want to thank——

Chairman BIDEN. You’re a chairwoman of that committee——

Senator BOXER. Yes.

Chairman BIDEN [continuing]. And he has interests before that

committee, and, don’t worry, he’s not going to fool around with you.

[Laughter.]

Senator BOXER. I shall never forget the problems of Connecticut.

[Laughter.]

Acid rain and everything else.

Senators Biden and Lugar, thank you for continuing to work so

closely together. And this panel, I think, has been fascinating. And

I find that, you know, as I’ve listened, a couple of things are leaping out at me that I think make sense in a very difficult chaotic

situation. And the things I think make sense happen to be the

things that my chairman has been talking about, and I’m going to

pursue what Mr. O’Hanlon has talked about—which is to try and

wake up, smell the roses, and figure out what is actually happening on the ground. People are moving toward their ethnic identities. That’s not America. This is what we don’t want to see happen. But either we’re going to accept that or our kids are getting

killed—and more and more and more. And if you listen to Dr.

Marr—and she’s so learned—she says, ‘‘Only when the participants

in the struggle for power recognize they’re losing more than they

can gain will this violence come to an end. This may be a very long

time. And, in the meantime, the best we can do is staunch the violence, contain the struggle.’’ Listen. How many more dead will that

be? And I’m not asking you that, because you’re not a military expert. But I will ask the Secretary of State that.

And I have to say, Dr. Marr, with all due respect, when you talk

about—you see, kind of, an ending, and you say—and you could be

right—‘‘This will end when’’—and I’m quoting you—‘‘different people make different deals across a period of time.’’ How is that better than the idea of accepting the fact that that dealmaking ought

to happen from all the parties accepting the reality of this, and

then doing what Mr. Said says, which is come to a political agreement, and then figure out how to enforce that agreement with

55

international forces, not just on the backs of the American people.

I just—and I say ‘‘the American people,’’ because their kids are

bearing the brunt of this.

I think it’s very interesting—I read, Mr. Said, your amazing article, December 9, 2002. Is it—am I right that your family fled Iraq

because of Saddam Hussein? OK. And this is what you wrote in

2002, ‘‘There are many reasons why Iraqis who have long sought

to topple Saddam Hussein are opposed to the impending war.’’ This

is before the war started. ‘‘This, after all, is not the first time the

United States has pursued regime change in Iraq. All previous attempts ended with disastrous consequences for the Iraqi people.’’

But I would add a sentence: And this time, although it isn’t

ended, a lot of families here are coping with disastrous consequences, not only the dead, but the wounded and the post-traumatic stress and the brain injuries and so on.

Now, Mr. Said, every poll shows us that 60 percent of the Iraqis

today think it’s OK to shoot an American. Could you explain to us

why that is the case? Could you—why do you think that’s so?

Mr. SAID. I mean, it’s understandable. The effect of United States

troops in Iraq today—not the whole consequences of the invasion,

which obviously are—have been catastrophic for thousands of

Iraqis and Americans—is ambiguous, it’s a mixed bag. On one

hand, the foreign troops are an irritant, they are creating a reaction in the form of an insurgency, which continues to be the bulk

of the violence taking place in Iraq today. And the number—60 percent—confirms that, that for most Iraqis they view the American

presence as an occupation, and they continue to consider fighting

the occupation a legitimate pursuit.

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, let me——

Mr. SAID. However, if I may——

Senator BOXER. Yes. Go ahead.

Mr. SAID [continuing]. The presence of United States troops

today is critical for the survival of the Iraqi State and actually for

the physical survival of many Iraqis. The United States troops in

Iraq today have a humanitarian mission, as well as a——

Senator BOXER. I get it. Why do 70 percent of the Iraqi people

say we should get out, 60 percent say it’s OK to shoot? So, this may

be the case, but clearly that message hasn’t gotten through.

Now, Dr. Marr, have you ever read the book, ‘‘The Reckoning,’’

by Sandra Mackey?

Dr. MARR. Yes. I know her. Yes.

Senator BOXER. Both of you make me very proud, by the way,

just as an aside. But I read that book before I voted on whether

or not I wanted to give this President authority to go to war. She

predicted everything that has happened. And one of the things she

said—and I want—and you may not agree with her—is that after

World War I, Iraq was put together, was it not, as a country?

Dr. MARR. No; I think there were some elements of being together before that. There was Mesopotamia——

Senator BOXER. I understand.

Dr. MARR. You know, there’s a sense of living within that territory that is more than just throwing a country——

Senator BOXER. But is it not——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Together.

56

Senator BOXER [continuing]. So that there was no ‘‘Iraq,’’ per se,

until after World War I?

Dr. MARR. Yes. That’s——

Senator BOXER. And is it not true——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. True of many countries——

Senator BOXER. Well, I’m——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. In the area.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. I’m not talking about other countries.

Dr. MARR. Yes.

Senator BOXER. I’m talking about Iraq. And isn’t it true—isn’t it

true that when the British drew these lines, they put many different ethnic groups inside Iraq who they knew had many years,

perhaps thousands of years, of enmity?

Dr. MARR. I don’t even know what you’re talking about. They

put——

Senator BOXER. I’m talking about——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Ethnic groups inside of——

Senator BOXER. I’m saying——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Iraq?

Senator BOXER. I’m saying: When they drew the lines, according

to Sandra Mackey, they were very clear that they drew them knowing that it would be a contentious country because of all the ethnic

rivalries. Would you agree with her on that point?

Dr. MARR. No.

Senator BOXER. You don’t agree——

Dr. MARR. It’s a——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. With her.

Dr. MARR. It’s a long issue. I don’t deny ethnic and sectarian rivalries, but I do want to succinctly address your issue. There are

many other ties—tribal, family—which frequently override ethnic

and sectarian identity, and a nonsectarian educated middle class,

which was very strong in periods in Iraq—forties, fifties, sixties,

seventies. Education doesn’t obliterate, sectarianism, but really reduces it. It’s much more complex. And I didn’t want to leave the

impression that I feel that United States troops have to stick

around for years and years while Iraqis solve their problem. I

would favor, if the Iraqis can’t get their act together in a reasonable time, a policy of containment, that is containing the problems

from spilling across the borders of Iraq.

So, don’t, please, identify my position with one of sticking around

there——

Senator BOXER. Good, I’m glad you——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Forever——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Clarified. I’m really glad.

Dr. MARR [continuing]. While that happens.

But I want to come back to one point. I don’t agree with the reality—I don’t think Sandra goes as far as this—that Iraq is inevitably based on ethnic identity and sectarian identity which has

come to the fore very virulently only recently. You may think

you’re going to get stability by recognizing these divisions, and

drawing lines, but who is going to protect the seams?

Senator BOXER. Well, let me——

Dr. MARR. Which forces——

57

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Let me—let me address——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. You know——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. That——

Dr. MARR. So——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Because I think my chairman has

spelled that out beautifully, because we’re talking about still one

Iraq with semiautonomous regions, where you can bring in, you

know, the world community to help enforce a political settlement.

But that’s OK. I don’t need to—you know we disagree on the point.

And I’ll close, because I know my time is up. But it seems to me

that Sandra Mackey was right on every single point that she made,

that what would happen when a war came is that these ethnic differences would come to the surface, where they were tampened

down before.

Because I think we’re missing the point. We haven’t really laid

out how we’re going to get keeping this country as a whole and not

going with the idea expressed by Dr. O’Hanlon. We haven’t really

resolved that question. If you think they’re going to go in and go

after al-Sadr, al-Maliki’s government will fall, because he’s dependent on Sadr. So then, is it all going to be against the Sunnis? And

then, as Mr. Hakim says, ‘‘Are we in the middle, taking sides in

a civil war?’’ It’s complex.

I thank you all for your time. And I thank you——

Chairman BIDEN. Well, I thank you, Senator. I’m sure the panel

would be prepared to answer some questions. We will not take up

the rest of their academic and——

Senator BOXER. No, no, that’s not what I meant.

Chairman BIDEN. But I’m—no, but, I mean, I hope the panel

would consider—and if you could submit through the chair any additional questions you have. But I’d try to narrow them, rather

than have each of us committing 10 or 12 questions to them. I

know we could do that.

Senator BOXER. That’s my only one. Thank you.

Chairman BIDEN. Yes. No; I would—the panel has no problem responding to that, I’m sure.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was in Iraq about a month ago. And just a quick observation.

OK? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To me, it seemed like there are two battles going on in Iraq. One

is a war in the Anbar province that our Marines are fighting, and

they know who the enemy is. The enemy is the foreign fighters and

the al-Qaeda insurgents. And the Marines are doing their job, and

they’re making progress every day, in the sense of eliminating terrorists. You can measure this progress. The other battle is in Baghdad, and consists of sectarian violence. I see our troops caught in

the crosshairs of this sectarian violence in Baghdad. If you see it,

it’s almost unbelievable, the extent of it, the depravity of it. And

it seems to me that as our Marines make progress in clearing areas

of terrorists, they need Sunnis to participate in the police departments in Anbar to hold the territory they’ve cleared. The local

Sunnis know who the foreign fighters are. And Sunnis are needed

in the army. So it seems to me that the Iraqis have got to achieve

reconciliation in order to end the violence in the long term. We

58

can’t resolve anything in Iraq in the long term, militarily, without

reconciliation among Iraqi factions. And during my trip to Iraq it

didn’t appear to me that the Iraqi leadership were doing all they

could to achieve real reconciliation. I met with Dr. Rubaie, the National Security Advisor for the Prime Minister, and said that he

didn’t think that sectarian violence was a major issue in Iraq. I

was incredulous when I heard that. Yet we continue to face the

problem with Sunnis and the insurgency and I think we saw some

of that in the paper today. When I was in Iraq I didn’t get a sense

that Iraqis are done killing each other through sectarian violence.

And so, my first question is: Does anybody here have a sense of

whether reconciliation can occur in Iraq today? And, if not, is there

a timeline for reconciliation?

Mr. SAID. Mr. Coleman, I tried, in my testimony, to illustrate a

complex conflict—and you alluded to that—that there is an insurgency, for example, taking place in Anbar, and the sort of the civil

strife taking place in Baghdad. Of course, it’s less neat than that,

actually. There are insurgencies and civil wars happening throughout Iraq. There are only a few pockets of stability in Iraq, including

Kurdistan. But, almost in every province there is a conflict, whether it’s a criminal—criminal gangs or whether it’s a sort of a social

revolt against the establishment or whether it’s civil war. In Anbar

this summer, there were clashes between Sunni tribes. Ostensibly,

in the media, it was about Sunni tribes fighting al-Qaeda, but, in

reality, these were old tribal rivalries spilling into open conflict and

being dressed as Anbar tribes fighting al-Qaeda. Inside the Sunni

political representations, there are deep fissures between the

Islamists, on one side, and the Baathists—and unreformed

Baathists, on the other. So, there are no neat groups that one can

resort to or revert to in a partition formula whereby one can say:

What do the Sunnis say? There is a vast difference between the positions of various Sunni groups. And the differences between the

Shia groups are expressed in real fighting and dead bodies in the

south, throughout Basrah. Every city in the south has fallen out

of government control at one point or the other over the last 6

months.

So, the Iraqis are not done killing each other, but on the various

bases, under various motivations—there is—we don’t have the luxury to wait out for compromises to emerge from this chaos. The situation—the pervasive fear and violence is creating a humanitarian

disaster in Iraq, as Mr. O’Hanlon has described, that needs to be

addressed. So, there is an urgency for a political process, if you

like, regardless of the willingness of the parties to engage. The

problem is, the parties need to be brought to the table. And what

needs to be—to happen is, one needs to bring more parties that are

willing to engage. If the combatants, if the radicals or the extremists are not willing to talk, then the table needs to be widened, because there are many Iraqis, as well, who want to see peace in

their country, and want to rebuild their nation. And this is a role

for the international community. There is a need for an international-sponsored peace process that will bring Iraqis to the table,

including those who are willing to find compromises and willing to

stay together.

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Senator COLEMAN. But, Dr. Marr, I mean, if I could turn to you

on this, if the parties aren’t at that point where they have that fundamental commitment to say, ‘‘We recognize what the problem is,

and we are committed to do those things to resolve it’’—that’s my

concern as—and I’ll listen to the President, but I’m not—I didn’t

see, in my time there, in my conversations, that you’ve got a commitment on the part of the Iraqis to do what has to be done that

would then justify a greater commitment of American lives and resources. That’s my problem. If——

Dr. MARR. I agree that that is a problem. And it’s not perhaps

either/or. I’m just expressing what I think is a realistic analysis of

what’s likely to happen. That doesn’t mean that I like it or there

aren’t some other things we can do.

The key issue is: How do you get Iraqis, particularly those that

are going to be in the political process, to reconcile? And you have

pointed out a very good way to do that. You’ve got to put pressure,

you have to have incentives, you certainly have to widen the political spectrum. Because one of the things that’s operative here is

that political parties and groups who have power now want to keep

it, and their power is fragile. And widening the spectrum and including others may not be exactly what they want. We don’t want

to get caught in that. We, alone, are not the only ones who need

to do this. The regional neighbors have their own clients, and they

need to be able to exercise pressure but there are numerous ways

in which we could push, nudge, and otherwise try to get this reconciliation.

Now, whether that’s going to be successful is a big issue. And

certainly whether we keep troops there and keep on with this effort, if Iraqis don’t rise to the occasion, I have to say, it is, in fact,

one of your jobs——

Senator COLEMAN. And——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. To decide that.

Senator COLEMAN. But you have also highlighted the consequences if we do that, that there are devastating consequences,

in terms of ethnic cleansing, in terms of—Dr. Pillar, in terms of

what’s going to happen in the rest of the region.

And I’m not sure what my time is, Mr. Chairman. If I can

just——

Chairman BIDEN. No; you have another little bit.

Senator COLEMAN. Dr. Pillar, the—we’re not in this alone. I

mean, Iran has—Iran is pressuring us in—with Hezbollah in Lebanon; they’re pressuring us with Hamas in Gaza; they’re pressuring us with supporting al-Sadr in Iraq. Is there any appetite on

the part of folks in the region to play a constructive role in trying

to resolve this situation?

Dr. PILLAR. Yes, Senator; I think there is. And you can look at

past experience. In the case of the Syrians, for example, just to

mention them in passing, they were part of Operation Desert

Storm, back in 1991. In the wake of 9/11 I believe administration

officials would tell you that Syrian counterterrorist cooperation

against the jihadists, about whom they share with us a concern,

has taken place. The State Department has spoken about that publicly. And in the case of Iran, we had the experience of very profitable cooperation in Afghanistan in the wake of Operation Enduring

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Freedom. And people like Ambassador Khalilzad and Ambassador

Dobbins could talk to you about that.

There’s little doubt in my mind that, in Tehran, there was at

least a hope, if not an expectation, that something similar would

happen with the political reconstruction of Iraq. Obviously, it did

not work out that way. But the short answer to your question is

yes; as demonstrated in the past, even the likes of the Iranians and

the Syrians have shown their willingness to cooperate.

Senator COLEMAN. Does any other—is that a unanimous opinion?

Mr. SAID. I think there is opening for engagement, almost with

all parties, without exception. And the question is: What’s the

framework? It has to be a multilateral framework. It has to be seen

as a fair framework that will offer everyone something. Everyone

needs something out of the process. It cannot be just at the expense—you know, it cannot happen at the expense of some parties

and to the benefit of others.

Dr. PILLAR. And it has to be, as Senator Lugar put it earlier in

the proceedings, all the cards on the table. You know, from the Iranians’ point of view, they wouldn’t want a negotiation just about

Iraq, just as they’re not comfortable with a negotiation just about

the nuclear issue. They want to talk about all issues in dispute

with the United States.

Senator COLEMAN. But you do recognize that they are fueling—

they are fueling the instability, they’re doing those things that are

worsening the problem rather than doing anything to——

Dr. PILLAR. As I suggest in my testimony, they are dealing with

a wide variety of groups in Iraq. It may be hard—and you’d have

to rely on your classified intelligence for the latest story on this—

to connect this bit of Iranian assistance with that attack. Nonetheless, some of that assistance, no doubt, has facilitated attacks

against coalition forces. But, as I suggested before, the main way

to look at that is as a full-court press by Iran to get as much influence in Iraq as they possibly can, with all parties.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.

Did you want to say something, Mike?

Dr. O’HANLON. I just wanted to make one other point. And I

hesitate to add a nuance to anything Paul Pillar has said on this

region; he knows it so well. But I am getting worried, from what

we can see from the available evidence, that Iran has one other

aim, which is to deal the United States a major strategic defeat in

the region, which it now thinks is attainable in a way it did not

3 and 4 years ago, which may somewhat change the calculus. And

it doesn’t make me oppose the idea of negotiation, but it makes me

very wary of expecting any progress or even assuming that Iran

wants a stable Iraq as an outcome in this.

Senator COLEMAN. And I share those concerns, Dr. O’Hanlon.

Mr. SAID. If I may just add, Iran is not a coherent actor, by the

way. Iran—there are various influences and interests in Iran, and

that also gives an opening for dialog.

Dr. PILLAR. Yes; we have to see beyond the outrageous rhetoric

of Ahmadinejad. I agree completely.

Chairman BIDEN. Let me—by the way, the chairman and I have

discussed holding, hopefully, some thoughtful hearings on Iran and

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actually what the state of play in Iran is, unrelated to us, just

what’s going on in Iran at the moment.

But let me, before I yield to my friend from Connecticut, indicate

that there is going to be—you’ve been sitting a long time, and there

is going to be a vote at noon, in which time we will break. Assuming the vote goes off at noon—after Senator Dodd, we will break

for that vote, which will be 15 minutes, give you a little breather.

And then I will confer with the Senator, and I’ll ask the staff to

confer with you. My intention was to continue to go through, to finish, but it’s a much bigger committee. We have a total of 1, 2, 3,

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11—almost 12 more members to go. I’d like you

all to consider, based on your schedules, whether or not you would

want to break briefly for a lunch break from 12 noon to 1 o’clock,

to give you an opportunity to have some lunch.

Senator SUNUNU. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Yes.

Senator SUNUNU. If we break when the vote occurs, it does appear we might have time for one more round on each side. Being

the next in line, I have a particular interest in that type of

arrangement——

[Laughter.]

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. If it were possible.

Chairman BIDEN. Well, based on your comments yesterday, I’m

not going to let that happen. [Laughter.]

Chairman BIDEN. That’s a joke. That’s a joke. We will accommodate you, Senator, notwithstanding your comments. [Laughter.]

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I’m going to ask one question, and then I see colleagues

here, and try and provide some time for others before we break for

the vote. Let me also join the chairman in welcoming our new

members to the committee.

Jim, I’ve sat in that chair you’re in, a long time ago, but it does

move, and then it stalls, it seems, for a while. [Laughter.]

But I was looking at Barack Obama and remembering last year

when he was sitting—and wondering if we’d even notice him at the

end of the table, and moving up very quickly. So, welcome, all of

you, to a very exciting committee with some tremendous leadership

we’ve had, as I mentioned, with Dick Lugar and with Joe Biden

now, and others. So, it’s a good committee to be on, and your participation is really welcome.

I’d like to just pick up on—picking up off Senator Coleman’s

question. We’re going to have the Secretary of State here tomorrow,

as you know, coming before us. And I have been impressed with

your comments and your ideas in this thing, and particularly, Dr.

Marr, this issue of reconciliation, how it’s going to come about. I

suspect you’re probably more—far more right about that. Despite

our desires for something else to happen in a sort of a conversion

on the road to Damascus here to occur with major political leaders.

But two points here; I’d like you to just quickly comment, if you

can. One is: What can we be doing to help facilitate this? A question we get all the time, that if you’re—if you believe this is a

surge, it’s not the right idea, that increasing military forces doesn’t

make a lot of sense, that clearly political resolution here is what

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everyone seems to suggest is ultimately going to produce the kind

of results we’d like to see, the question then follows on: What

should we be doing? What should the United States, our allies,

moderate Arab leaders in the region, be doing, specifically?

I just came back from 6 days in the region, as well. I was there

with my colleague from Massachusetts. We were in Lebanon and

spent about 31⁄2 hours with President Assad in Damascus, which

I’ve shared, with the Secretary and others, the conversations and

what was offered there. One of the things that I share with you

here is, when I asked, specifically, ‘‘What sort—what do you want

to see, in Iraq, occur?’’—the answer, I don’t mind sharing with you

here in this room, was, ‘‘I’d like to see a pluralistic, stable Arab

government. I’m not interested in seeing a fundamentalist ShiaIranian state on my border.’’ Now, he said that in English in a private meeting. It wasn’t announced in—in Arabic in a public document. So, I’m conscious of the fact that these are statements being

made, as Tom Friedman likes to point out, in private, where you

may get less than what the actual policies are. But, nonetheless,

I found it interesting that he pursued, or at least willing to say

those things.

What should we be doing? How should the United States—how

should the Secretary of State be conducting our foreign policy in

the region? And what, specifically, do you think we ought to be

doing to encourage this kind of political resolution that we’re all

talking about?

Dr. MARR. That is absolutely critical and difficult, and I have

only a few thoughts; I hope my colleagues have some others.

First of all, the absence of security and the dreadful humanitarian situation that Mike O’Hanlon is talking about needs to be

addressed. Insecure people are not willing to make compromises.

But with the political parties, you’ve got to have a collection of incentives and disincentives to get them to come to some terms on

these very issues we’ve identified. There’s a considerable amount of

agreement on this.

You’ve got to say no to some people who may not like it, and

you’ve got to have a little, perhaps, stick there, in terms of how

long and how much support and troops the United States is going

to be willing to provide.

And, second of all, I like the idea that I just heard—and I agree

with it—of widening the pool. I’m not so sure some of the parties

who now have power, and who feel very fragile, who feel worried

that the Baath might come back or Sunnis might come back or

whatever, are going to be willing to make the compromises. There

used to be a large middle class with a lot of technocrats. There are

not a lot now. Many of them have fled. They need to come back.

Two things, I think, are very important. One is to get this Cabinet to act as a Cabinet, not just a collection of fiefdoms of individual people, and getting the educated middle-class professionals

back who have some of the spirit of, you know, nonsectarian identity.

So, widening the political pool, getting other people in, would be

helpful. But I think, of course, the neighbors need to be brought in.

We’ve talked about that. There’s no easy answer. That’s the only

thing I want to say here. This is going to be long, laborious, the

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kind of thing diplomats, politicians do all the time. But I think our

expectation, that somehow this is going to happen rapidly, needs

to be a little more realistic.

Senator DODD. Anyone else want to comment?

Dr. PILLAR. If I understand your very broad question, Senator

Dodd, about approaching the region, I would just incorporate, by

reference, the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, and two

themes, in particular. One is what we were discussing a moment

ago, which is to talk with everyone. And that doesn’t necessarily

mean one big multilateral conference. I think Phebe made the very

appropriate point earlier that other kinds of engagement are called

for. And, No. 2, be prepared to talk about everything that is on the

agenda of the regional governments, and not just ours. And, again,

the Arab-Israeli conflict comes right to the fore.

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, I wanted to make a plug for what I

know many of you do, especially in the bipartisan coalitions or

groups that go to Iraq and talk to Iraqis, because I think Iraqis

need to know American political support is very fragile, and it’s not

going to last much longer.

Senator DODD. We’ve made that point.

Dr. O’HANLON. And I’m sure you continue to, but I think they

need to keep hearing it, because I think it’s very hard for President

Bush to send that message in a convincing way, given how much

his Presidency depends on this. From what I understand of the

way he’s going to talk—tonight, from what little I’ve heard from

people in the administration, he is, of course, not going to be able

to create this sense. He’s going to try to put pressure on the Iraqis,

but he’s not going to be able to say, and not going to want to say,

that if they don’t get their act together, we’re leaving. You know,

that’s just not something that he is in a position to want to say.

But I think you all, collectively, and we, in the think-tank world,

to a lesser degree—we’re less visible and less important in their

eyes—we have to send that message, that, you know, for the reasons across the spectrum, from military capability of our Army and

Marine Corps, to the patience of our people, to the upcoming Presidential race, and everything else, our patience for sticking with

anything like this strategy is very limited, and it’s probably measured in terms of 9 to 18 months, not years.

Mr. SAID. I just wanted to second what Professor Marr has said,

in terms of broadening the political process—if you like, facilitating

national dialog, internationalizing the Iraq—the Iraq issue, and

bringing in more actors to the table.

About the broadening of the political process, this is not about

reversing the outcomes of the political process——

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. SAID [continuing]. Of the last 3 years, it’s about enhancing

it. It’s a process that has some elements that are good, but it’s

clearly not working, and it needs to be enhanced. There needs to

be concessions. The winners of the political process need to make

concessions and bring in more people to the table. And I’m not talking, here, about more combatants and more extremists, but about

bringing people with a vested interest in a democratic Iraq.

There are also things that the United States will need to do on

the humanitarian level. There is a humanitarian situation evolving

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in Iraq today, and the United States needs to keep engaging on

that issue, and maybe also bring in more international support.

And, finally, again, it’s—again, efforts that are already underway

in Iraq, on state-building, on maintaining the machinery of government, that will be necessary, no matter what the outcome of the

current violence is.

Senator DODD. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. I thank you very much.

Let me suggest that it’s possible that maybe all the Senators who

were here will not be coming back, so it may be more in your interest for us to keep going. But I will do—you need a break. We’ll go

to Senator Sununu, and, after his questioning, I’d ask permission,

since Senator Webb has to preside at 1 o’clock, if the vote hasn’t

been called by then, whether or not my friend from Pennsylvania

would be willing to let Senator Webb go next. And then we can

make a—then we’ll give you a break, regardless, and then decide

whether to come back in 5 minutes or give everybody a chance to

eat lunch. My guess is, we’ll continue to go through, in light of the

rollcall I just got from the committee staff as to who is likely to

come back. So, it may be easier to do it that way.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, I presume, by the way, opening

statements are going to—you’ve made an accommodation for that

to be included.

Chairman BIDEN. Yes; anyone who has an opening statement, it

will be placed in the record.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Chairman BIDEN. Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We often say how much we appreciate your time and testimony,

to all of our witnesses, but I think it’s fair to say, today in particular, this has been a great panel. They’re very constructive, very

specific, very direct, and I think that’s extremely helpful to us,

given the importance of these issues.

There does seem to be a lot of consensus about the importance

of the climate: Economic issues, political issues, social issues that

need to be dealt with in order for stability—long-term stability to

be realized. There’s been specific discussion, as there was in the

Iraq Study Group report, of things like the oil law, provincial elections, the training process, and the broader reconciliation process.

Those were all recommendations here. But I think, Mr. O’Hanlon,

you, in particular, emphasize that those would need to be addressed, or at least referenced, with regard to any change in the

military footprint, military operations, and military objectives. And

I think this, as well, is something that was contemplated in the

Study Group Report, specifically with regard to an increase in

troops. On page 73, it says, ‘‘We could support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad

or speed up the training-and-equipping mission if the United

States commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective. We reject the immediate withdrawal of troops because we

believe so much is at stake.’’ So, clearly, this is something that’s

contemplated by Baker-Hamilton, but in the context of achieving

some of these other specific objectives.

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So, I’d like all the panelists to comment, but we’ll begin with Mr.

O’Hanlon, whether or not you feel that some increase in forces, if

used to—hypothetically, for example, stabilize Baghdad—would

make, or could make, a difference in improving the window for

training forces or for the formal reconciliation process, which began

in December, but seems to have slowed a little bit. I mean, we can

talk about those two specific examples or any others you want to

discuss.

Dr. O’HANLON. I’ll give you a somewhat tortured answer, Senator. I would support a surge, in the context of a much broader approach, but I’m not sure I could be very confident it’s going to

work. So, since I have the opportunity—and you’ve given it to me—

to speak today, I think that we all have to be thinking about

backup plans very hard, because, with or without a surge, I think

we’re likely to see something like the current strategy not succeed.

But I would still think our chances would improve in the short

term, at the tactical level, at least, with a surge. So, it’s a tough

situation.

Senator SUNUNU. If those troops are given a specific objective, or

an objective to support one of these other political or economic

issues, which would it be? Which do you think their temporary role

or security role could be most effective in enhancing?

Dr. O’HANLON. I think that they have to create some level of stability in Iraq, in the neighborhoods, reduce the violence. If you

don’t do that, nothing else can work.

Senator SUNUNU. But, in terms of reconciliation, training, oil

law, provincial elections, we—for example, in the electoral process,

last time a surge was implemented, or two of the three times that

we saw a surge in troops, it was focused on the elections, with relative success, and most people agree that those were relatively

peaceful.

Dr. O’HANLON. I think a limited focused approach like that probably won’t work. We’re going to—we sort of need a miracle, politically. We need for Prime Minister al-Maliki, who now has an 85-

percent unfavorability rating among Sunni Arabs, to be seen as a

different kind of leader than he’s been seen as so far. Or maybe we

need a new Iraqi Prime Minister, like Allawi, who at least had a

little stronger—you know, linkages across other ethnic groups. But

I think we are beyond the point where you could say one specific

political improvement will be enough. I think we’re going to have

to see a whole new ball game in very short order.

Dr. MARR. Well, it seems to me that if there’s any mission for

this additional surge, it’s going to be to stop the ethnic cleansing,

sectarian cleansing, or whatever we want to call it, in Baghdad. It

certainly can’t address all the problems of the country. But it’s the

demographic shift, that Michael has mentioned, that is so devastating and we want to stop and slow this. That’s what we mean

when we say ‘‘providing some security in Baghdad.’’ But I think

we’ve all pointed out how that’s fraught with dangers, because it’s

so inextricably mixed with different ethnic and sectarian groups

and political parties and others. I agree, here, that perhaps it’s

worth giving it a shot, but our chances of actually turning the

whole situation around on the ground is very slim. We might be

able, with our forces, to hold some neighborhoods or do something

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militarily, but, as everybody has pointed out here, the real issue is:

What are you going to do with the time you buy and the increase

in tranquility, presumably, that you get? How are you going to get

Iraqis to begin to address their political problems? That’s the real

issue.

Senator SUNUNU. And that’s the point I make. And where I’d like

a little bit of additional comment is: If that time is created, where

might it be best used? And do you even think it might be used effectively?

Mr. Said.

Mr. SAID. I think this is an issue of putting the horse before the

cart. I think the troops are a tool to achieving a certain objective.

We need to agree on the objectives before we can discuss the tools.

And the discussion seems to be having—that there is this option

of a surge on the table, and let’s find a role for it. And I think

that’s the wrong way of asking the question, or for putting the

question, I think.

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I—although it would—I think I’ve actually asked the question in just the way you want. The objectives

are a reconciliation process—equity in distribution of oil revenues,

so that the Sunnis feel enfranchised economically, provincial elections, so that the feel enfranchised politically, so that they have

some better voice in governance. Those are the objectives that will

lead to long-term success. And my question is: Do you see an opportunity for additional military troops to help achieve a window

where those objectives might be accomplished?

Mr. SAID. I think if there is agreement—if there is a political

process that leads to agreement on these issues, if we—if we have

a blueprint for addressing these issues, on the back of that they

may be needed—more troops may be needed or less troops may be

needed. It all depends on the shape of the agreement. That agreement may bring other troops from other countries to help with the

situation, and it doesn’t have to become a burden of the United

States alone. So, there are all kinds of outcomes from the political

process that could lead to increased or reduced troops.

There’s one issue that the others suggested, and I have emphasized, as well, which is the humanitarian role. There is one role

that the United States can play today, which is protecting civilians.

But that’s—this has to be done in an evenhanded way that is not

seen as participating in the conflict on one side or the other. But

protecting civilians is definitely an important role.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Mr. Pillar.

Dr. PILLAR. It presumably is the capability of troops, whether it’s

part of the surge or any others, to provide security, not to run elections, not to pump oil, not to do those other things. But I think the

answer to your question, Senator, if I understand it, is that you

cannot focus on any one thing. You noted the elections before. Well,

we’ve been through this multistage political reconstruction process

in which there was always something else to look forward to. You

know, the constituent assembly elections or the transfer of sovereignty or the election of the regular legislature. We’re through all

that. And so, there isn’t any one thing. It is the oil. It is the political reconciliation. It’s the neighborhood-by-neighborhood security.

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It’s everything. So, I’m afraid I would resist giving you a specific

answer, because the valid answer is: All of the above.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.

Folks, what we’re going to do is give you a little bit of a break

here. I instructed—I suggested that my colleagues go and vote.

We’ll adjourn. If Senator Lugar makes it back before I do, he will

reconvene the committee for Senator Webb to be able to ask his

questions. This is an opportunity to get up and stretch your legs.

And I think what we’ll try to do is go straight through rather than

have you have to come back this afternoon.

So, we’ll adjourn until the vote is over.

Thank you.

Recess, I should say.

[Recess.]

Chairman BIDEN. The hearing will come to order, please.

There’s an awful lot of things that are going on today, including

a meeting with Mr. Hadley. I see that in order, next, ordinarily,

what would be the case—and I’d just raise this as a question—my

friend from Florida would be next, but Senator Casey, a new member, is to be down at the White House at a quarter of 12. I wonder

whether or not the Senator would yield to Senator Casey?

Senator BILL NELSON. Of course I do.

Chairman BIDEN. And then go back to—I believe the Senator

from Alaska, who’s next on this side, but I’m not sure.

Senator Casey, why don’t you proceed?

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman—and I appreciate

your indulgence—Senator Lugar. And thank you, Senator Nelson,

for this opportunity to jump the line a little bit. I will try not to

get used to it.

I have two questions, one that pertains to our troops, and the

other with regard to diplomacy.

I come from Pennsylvania, where Senator Specter and I represent a State that has lost, right now, the third-highest amount

of troops—just last week went above 140. I’m thinking of those

troops today, and their families, as all of us are, who gave, as Abraham Lincoln told us a long time ago, the last full measure of devotion to their country.

One of the questions I have for Dr. O’Hanlon and others—when

it comes to data points with regard to where we are in Iraq, one

that I’m not sure you’ve been able to track, or whether you or the

other panelists have information about, is the condition of our

troops, in terms of the things we used to read a lot more about

than we do now—body armor, the protective gear, weapons, all of

the indicators that we can point to that tell us whether or not we’re

doing everything we can to support the troops who are in battle

right now. Do you have any information about that or any kind of

status? Because, as you know better than I, many months ago we

read about all the horrors, where families were buying equipment

and body armor and things like that. So, that’s the first question

I had, with regard to that data point, so to speak.

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator Casey, my impression is that most of

these numbers are much better now, but I’m going to focus on one

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thing, which I wonder if we should have had a broader national debate about, which is the type of vehicle we put our troops in. As

you know, there are some vehicles that are built around the world

that are designed to withstand the blast of mines, or, as we call

them in Iraq, improvised explosive devices, which are now responsible for about half of all of our fatalities, as our data show. And,

of course, other types of threats exist, and snipers are a worse concern than before in Iraq, but it’s really the IED problem that’s No.

1. And I, frankly, am wondering—it’s getting pretty late in the

game to have this conversation, but I am wondering if we should

have had, and maybe still should have, a big debate about whether

to refit a lot of our vehicles with things that look more like some

of the specialized mine-clearance vehicles, that are more expensive,

have—often have V-shaped hulls, different kinds of suspension, are

higher up off the ground. Now, a bigger IED can always penetrate

that, so there’s always a countermeasure the enemy can envision.

But, frankly, that’s the one thing I’m still wondering, if, in broad

terms, we really never focused on enough in this country. It would

be very hard to build 10,000 of them fast, but if you took a World

War II-type approach, and you said, ‘‘This is a national emergency,

we’re going to have to ask every car manufacturer in the United

States to do this for 6 months,’’ you could do it. And we simply

haven’t considered that. I’m not sure history will judge us very

well. And I say this as being critical of myself, too. I’m a defense

specialist at Brookings, and I wonder if I shouldn’t have been

thinking about this more 3 and 4 years ago. It may be kind of late

in the game now, but I—maybe not.

Senator CASEY. But, in particular, you’re talking about up-armoring vehicles, or retrofitting or redesigning?

Dr. O’HANLON. New vehicles. Vehicles that are designed to have

V-shaped hulls, higher suspensions to be able to operate more effectively on three wheels, even if one’s blown out. Basically, building much of our patrolling fleet around the same vehicle concept

that some specialized mine-clearance vehicles currently employ in

the U.S. military, but that most of our fleet of Hummers and Bradleys and so forth does not.

Senator CASEY. And in the interest of time—and I know Senator

Webb has presiding duties, and I want to be cognizant of that—the

last question is very broad, and it’s been asked, probably, in different ways throughout the morning, but it’s one that I think a lot

of Americans are wondering about. We hear a lot of things that

talk about a political solution and steps to get us in that direction,

apart from the military strategy and tactics on the ground, much

of which we’ll be talking about tonight when the President presents

his plan. But just in terms of diplomacy, if you could focus on that

with your collective experience, I think it’s good to work with lists,

if we can, if that’s at all possible. I know it’s very difficult in this

context. But if you had the opportunity to construct a diplomatic

strategy for the next 6 months, say, what would be the three or

four or five things you would do, in terms of very specific steps that

this Government should take diplomatically—within the region especially, or beyond the region? Any one of you can weigh in on that,

in terms of a specific list of steps.

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Mr. SAID. Well, I think there is a need to engage with Iraq’s

neighbors, but also with the broader international community, the

permanent five from the Security Council. Professor Marr suggested a contact group concept. That may be a good first step. I

still believe that we need to work toward a process—a peace process that will involve some form of a conference. But, preparations

for that, engaging with each of Iraq’s neighbors, trying to address

their concerns and their interests in Iraq, and trying to see how

they can contribute to influencing the situation inside Iraq by

working with their constituencies in Iraq, by working with the

groups, by providing assurances for certain groups in Iraq about

their interests, and encouraging them to achieve compromises.

So, there is scope for active diplomacy in Iraq. And some of that

has taken place in the international compact with Iraq, which the

administration and the United Nations have been engaged in over

the last 6 months. And I had an opportunity to work on that. That

involved intensive diplomacy with the Gulf States and with the

international community, 22 countries or more, to bring them in

Iraq. And there is great interest to get engaged. There is great interest in the international community to get engaged in Iraq in a

meaningful way so that there is no hierarchy at levels and sort of

a—category A countries and category B. But really get engaged—

China, Russia, the gulf. And there—and this should be pursued.

Dr. MARR. I had a couple of thoughts at a practical level, on our

Embassy. We need skillful, behind-the-scenes, but muscular, diplomacy. I like much of what Ambassador Khalilzad did. And we’re

getting another very good Ambassador. But two things are needed

for our Embassy there: More Arabic speakers, of every kind—it’s

difficult enough, in the security situation, to get out, but the more

we can interact with Iraqis at every level, the better off we’ll be;

and more sustained deployments, not of troops, but of AID people,

whoever. The turnover in personnel, because it’s a hardship post,

is abysmal, in terms of intelligence, building linkages, networks,

and so on. That’s what everyone complains about. You just get into

the job, you learn who’s who, you establish the contacts, and you’re

out, and somebody else comes in. So, those are two practical things

that I think would help our Embassy in Baghdad.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator CASEY. I’m out of time.

Chairman BIDEN. Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We hear a lot about suggestions that we, here in the United

States, might do or propose, and the President is going to present

his new proposal this evening. We’ll listen very attentively to that.

But I think we all recognize that we can only do so much from the

outside, from the United States perspective, or even from the international-community perspective. And I appreciate the focus that

you all have made in saying we need to broaden the dialog, bring

in more. But we recognize that the Iraqis have to step up and do

their part. They’ve got to be the participant.

And, Mr. O’Hanlon, I listened very attentively this morning as

you kind of went down through your various measures, and I have

to admit that they were really very discouraging as you listen to

some of the terminology that you used, and that others of you used,

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as well. You know, you used the term ‘‘pessimism’’ over and over.

We heard of the ‘‘hardening of the people,’’ the word ‘‘fear’’ and the

‘‘apathy,’’ just the general environment being ‘‘poor,’’ all very negative and really very discouraging words. We all know that you can’t

really engage, you can’t get your—the men behind you to engage

in the fight that you must take on if you don’t believe. And the

question that I would pose to you, Mr. O’Hanlon, and to any of the

others is: Is there any good-news indicators that we’re seeing from

the Iraqis that give us hope to believe that if we should move forward with, as the President may propose, this surge, that the Iraqi

people feel a degree of optimism, at this point, that they can be

that full participant that we need and expect them to be? Are there

any good signs that you can report?

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, I think you could find some, and we

used to try very hard to try to give them equal billing, because I

used to think that, whether they were 50 percent of the reality of

Iraq or not, they needed to be highlighted. But they seem to be

dwindling in number. But I can still tick off a few for you.

Some of them are on our last category, of politics and public opinion. Certainly, Iraqis have a lot more in the way of communications, whether it’s newspapers, TV, telephones, Internet access.

And they use these things, and they relish them. There’s also, from

what I understand—I haven’t spent as much time in Iraq as some

people on this committee, but there is more bustle in some of the

streets, or at least there has been. And we can read about a traffic

jam, and that’s the negative way to look at it; the upside is that

a lot of people have cars, and there is a sense of people still wanting to be out and about, despite the risks. So, there is a certain energy in Iraq that I think may be dwindling, but it’s still there.

There are some indicators about public utility performance. It’s

confusing to try to track GAO and USAID and figure out exactly

where Iraqi utilities stand today. Electricity is not very good. Oil

production is not very good. Water and sewage performance, hard

to read. I can’t quite get confidence in the data I’m seeing. Things

are probably about at Saddam Hussein levels, though. In other

words, we’ve basically treaded water for 4 years on that front. But

there are some new facilities coming online. Child vaccinations

seem to be up, from what I can tell. The number of trained judges

in the Iraqi political system, of course, much higher than it used

to be.

So, yes, if you want to find things, you can find a number of indicators that——

Senator MURKOWSKI. We can find——

Dr. O’HANLON [continuing]. Are possible.

Senator MURKOWSKI [continuing]. Those, but do the Iraqi people

believe that more good is being delivered?

Dr. O’HANLON. Not now.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Now, Mr. Said, you’re kind of shaking your

head no. Can you comment on that?

Mr. SAID. Unfortunately, in terms of life of Iraqis on the street,

it’s getting progressively worse. And even if you can find numbers—for example, the numbers on the electricity don’t look so bad,

but the reality of it is worse than the numbers. Water—the Ministry of Water Resources have done a wonderful job. It’s one of the

71

most efficient ministries in Iraq. But, without electricity, you can’t

deliver water. So, even where things are getting better, the overall

situation is making it worse.

However, if you are looking for a silver lining in the situation,

one of the elements is the recent agreement on an oil management

framework. Because that agreement shows that there has been

movement since the time when the Iraqis negotiated a constitution

as a zero-sum game, whereby weakening the federal government—

the strength of the region is only achieved through weakening the

central government. I think the deal on oil shows that the Iraqis

have moved on, have realized, if you like, that, actually, it doesn’t

have to be a zero-sum game, that strong federalism is based on a

strong center and strong regions.

So, there are elements of awakening, if you like, at least among

some Iraqi—Iraq’s leaders and politicians, but, in terms of reality

on the ground, it’s devastating.

Senator MURKOWSKI. On the oil issue, have you looked at the

Alaska Permanent Fund model as a model to be utilized there,

where you would have a sharing of the revenues among the people?

And, in your opinion, do you think that that would help with some

of the sectarian strife that we’re facing now?

Mr. SAID. I think there have been proposals for a direct distribution of oil revenues to the Iraqi citizens. Some people in the Iraqi

Government strongly support that. However, there has been great

opposition to it from the international financial institutions.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Great opposition, you say?

Mr. SAID. Opposition to the direct distribution of revenues. They

fear that it may be inefficient use of resources, that Iraq needs to

invest all its oil revenues, and so on. I, personally, disagree with

that. I think direct distribution is a good tool to unify Iraqis. I

think there is a lot speaking in favor of direct distribution of revenues to the citizens, at least a portion—a small portion. Unfortunately, it is now—it’s not happening, simply because of strong opposition by the IMF, in particular.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. O’Hanlon.

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, I think it’s a good idea, also. And I

would envision, potentially, divvying up Iraq’s oil into three or four

buckets, one of which would be the Alaska model, direct distribution, one of which would be direct payments to the provinces, based

on population, a third bucket would be for federal projects or for

national-level institutions. But I think, in responding to the international financial institutions, the natural thing to do is to keep reducing Iraqi subsidies, which we all know are still too high. The

Bush administration has had some success in convincing them to

reduce those for various consumer goods. Try to keep reducing

those, and then use the Alaska model, direct distribution system,

as compensation. So, that’s a way to avoid, you know, siphoning off

money from investment, and I think it would also improve the consumer market for many of these goods, which is being distorted by

subsidies right now.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much.

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At the risk of generating a revolt here, the most junior member

of the committee is to preside at 1 o’clock. I’ll leave it up to his

more senior colleagues to wonder whether you let him go for 8 minutes, which means it’s going to put you all behind. I will have

pushed you back a good 20 minutes.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I don’t mind. Be happy to defer. At

1 o’clock, I turn into a pumpkin, as well, in handling a meeting.

So, if we can go—let the Senator from Virginia go ahead, and just

let me get in a couple of questions before 1 o’clock.

Chairman BIDEN. We will try to do that. We’ve got 15 minutes.

If you do less than 8, you’ll make more friends, Jim. [Laughter.]

Senator WEBB. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I realize

that I’ve now incurred a sequence of obligations all the way down

this bench here. And the unfortunate part of that is, as the junior

member, there’s not many ways I can repay that——

[Laughter.]

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Other than agreeing to preside on

the Senate floor for some of these people, which I won’t do. [Laughter.]

Senator WEBB. But I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I thought there were some really fascinating information for

me to be able to put into the thought process here. I think, as most

of you know, I was an early-warning voice against going into Iraq

in this way. I thought that strategically it was going to harm the

country. And I was very interested to see that there seems to be

pretty strong agreement here that the—for the long-term benefit of

Iraq and the region, the solution here really should be moving from

the outside in, rather than from the inside out. And what I mean

by that is, we do need a regional diplomatic umbrella before we

can, in my view, guarantee the long-term security and stability of

Iraq.

And I know that, Dr. Marr, in your testimony, you mentioned the

notion that there’s going to be a high degree of decentralization for

quite a period of time. And Dr. Pillar mentioned, several places, the

specter of direct intervention. And, you know, Dr. Said, you mentioned the Lebanon model, which—I was a journalist in Lebanon

in 1983, when the Marines were there. You—there were a number

of parallels, other than simply the idea that people are going to

fight it out over a period of years. Just the notion they had a very

weak central government that was unable to get on its feet. You

had all these different militia elements in constant turmoil. There

was a great deal of middle-class flight, and, you know, people with

high degrees of skills leaving the country. And we’re seeing, in

many ways, some of those parallels.

And it occurs to me that, with respect to the players in this region, that it would be much better to have a United States-led

sponsorship, in a way, that would bring these players to the table

in a constructive way, rather than having them come in more as

a consequence of disarray as things move forward. I would like

your thoughts on that.

Dr. MARR. Let me just say that among people I talk to that know

the region, this opinion is almost unanimous—there is widespread

believe that we need to engage the neighbors, and, to an extent,

the international community, in a variety of ways. And I would just

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like to go back to the Iraq Study Group, because it was interesting

that we had a very wide variety of opinions—on the right, left, middle—and there really was very widespread agreement that this

must be a component, particularly if Iraq is not going to be successfully stabilized soon. I keep coming back to at least minimizing the

damage to the neighbors and getting the neighbors to help to put

either pressure or provide incentives to their clients inside. We

need to do that.

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, I think it’s probably a good idea, although I’m skeptical of Iran’s willingness to participate in a constructive way. But I think, even under those circumstances, it’s

still worth doing. As I’ve tried to argue, it’s because, in part, you

can tell the Iranians, ‘‘Listen, there’s not going to be any great outcome for you here, in terms of driving us out of the region.’’ If

you’re in a conference where Saudis and Turks are sitting down

with the United States, we’ll have our allies there, too, and it’ll be

easier, I think, to convince the Iranians, something which they

need to recognize, which I’m not sure they have, so far, which—

they cannot drive us out of the region the way Britain left in the

early 1970s, for example. Regardless of the outcome, and regardless

of who’s elected President in the United States in 2 years, we are

almost certainly going to stay committed to our traditional allies.

And I hope that awareness could sober Iran a bit about what it’s

trying to do inside Iraq. So, even if you take a very, sort of, dire

interpretation of Iran’s motives, I think it’s still worth talking.

Dr. PILLAR. Senator, I agree with your observation entirely. And

just to comment on Mike’s comment, Iran’s motives are shaped, in

large part, by the United States posture toward Iran. And insofar

as regime change is the main element of—or is perceived to be the

main element of—that posture then the other side doesn’t have

much incentive to cooperate. So, that’s a set of incentives that is

very much in our power to manipulate.

Mr. SAID. I think, without taking the Lebanon analogy too far,

because, of course, there are also differences there, I think what is

also instructive from Lebanon is the Taif accords, the peace deal

that brought peace to Lebanon. It was sponsored by Saudi Arabia,

and it involved an element of implementation by Saudi Arabia, as

well. And I think there are—there are instructive elements there

that could be extended to Iraq, whereby a regional process

where——

Senator WEBB. Yes.

Mr. SAID [continuing]. Can not only bring the solution and the

settlement, but also the resources to implement it.

Senator WEBB. I have 21⁄2 minutes left. I have one other question, and it—it’s, sort of, inspired by the chairman’s question earlier about: Do you ever—do you think you would ever see national

police operating on the streets of Fallujah? Do any of you believe

there will ever be true stability in Iraq if there are American combat troops on the streets of Iraq’s cities? Or while there are?

Mr. SAID. No.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.

Senator Isakson.

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Senator ISAKSON. In deference to my—the Senator from Florida

who has to leave at 1 o’clock also, I’m certainly willing to let him

ask a couple of questions before 1 o’clock.

Chairman BIDEN. I told you this is the most collegial committee

in the Senate here. Thank you very much. It’s kind of you.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you.

Senator ISAKSON. As long as he doesn’t run over. [Laughter.]

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, rather than make a speech, I’m just

going to ask questions. How’s that?

Senator ISAKSON. Good.

Senator BILL NELSON. When does the pain of sectarian strife become sufficient that it finally causes the Sunnis and the Shiites to

start getting serious about reconciliation?

Mr. SAID. The pain is already quite serious. The question is—and

if it was just Sunnis and Shiites fighting, there may—we may have

reached that threshold. But what’s happening in Iraq, as has been

suggested by others as well, is fragmentation. This is becoming,

gradually, a war of everyone against everyone. There are criminals

on the streets. There are myriad Shia militias fighting among each

other as much as they are fighting against the Sunnis. There are

death squads of undescribable origin and of undescribable violence.

This has become such a pervasive exercise in violence that there

is no pain threshold that can stop it. This—there are no coherent

sides directing the violence anymore. They are fragmented. There

are warlords acting at the behest of the highest bidders. There are

commercial interests and foreign interventions. Iraq has passed the

point, if you like, where it can pull itself by its bootstraps. There

is a need for an external intervention to bring peace to Iraq.

Senator BILL NELSON. All right, now, that answer is particularly

appropriate to Baghdad, would you not say? Let’s go outside, to the

west of Baghdad, to Al Anbar. I thought that the Marine commanders made a compelling case to me there, that additional

troops would help them, as they are beginning to get the Sunni

leaders to help them with al-Qaeda, which is the problem in western Iraq, in Al Anbar. Give me—differentiate between Al Anbar

and Baghdad.

Mr. SAID. There are clearly differences, but they could go, also,

the other way around. One of the major sources of the—the major

source of violence in Anbar is the fight between the Iraqis and

Americans. So——

Senator BILL NELSON. Pull that mike——

Mr. SAID [continuing]. One can easily——

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. To you closer.

Mr. SAID. Huh?

Senator BILL NELSON. Pull the mike closer.

Mr. SAID. I’m sorry. I’m saying, the main component of violence

in Anbar is the fight—is the violence between the Iraqis and Americans. So, one can just as well say that a solution in Anbar can

come through withdrawing U.S. forces rather than increasing

them. But, regardless of that, even in Anbar there is intra-Iraqi violence. It’s not Shia versus Sunni, it’s Sunni versus Sunni. And, indeed, the tribal feuds in Anbar province—old tribal feuds on—over

commercial interests and smuggling routes, have spilled out into

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this new coalition of Anbar tribes purporting to fight al-Qaeda. In

reality, there is an—inside that determination, there are old tribal

rivalries that are being used. And, in a way, the United States is

being used by one tribe to bolster its bid against the other. So, it’s

never a simple—a black-and-white situation. But——

Senator BILL NELSON. Right. All right, you——

Mr. SAID [continuing]. You are right that, in mixed areas,

that’s—the situation is different.

Senator BILL NELSON. With the example you just gave in Al

Anbar, could the Saudis, with their tribal influence, help in settling

down the tribal strife, and, therefore, help with the stabilization of

that western part of Iraq?

Mr. SAID. Tremendously. I think the one party if—everyone

speaks about bringing Iran to the table, and Syria—I think one

party that could contribute a lot more significantly than those two

to a political settlement in Iraq is Saudi Arabia. And it’s not being

engaged properly.

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Let’s——

Dr. MARR. If I could——

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes, Dr. Marr.

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Just remind people how complex it is,

there are tribes and tribes. And I’ve talked to people in Saudi Arabia who don’t have any love for the Dulaymis, who are in Anbar.

But I do agree the Saudis have a very vested interest in the stability of the Sunni region, so that this instability doesn’t spill

across the border. And something beside building a fence should be

done.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I haven’t given you

my report, but that’s one of the reasons I went and spent 12 days

in the region. And I spoke, specifically at the request of General

Hayden, to the Saudis—the King, all of the security apparatus in

Saudi Arabia, and so forth. So, I would ask: How do you encourage

Saudi Arabia properly to get involved?

Mr. SAID. I’m sorry. One reason why the Saudis are not being engaged sufficiently in Iraq is that—is the resistance on behalf of

Iraqi—some of the Iraqi leaders, winners of the political process, to

engage them. Because clearly a Saudi engagement will bolster the

position of some of the opposition groups, vis-a-vis some of those

who are in power; and, therefore, Saudi engagements needs to be

a part of a regional approach, and it needs to be part of an internationally mediated settlement for Iraq that goes beyond, if you

like, the pain threshold of the Iraqi Government. I mean, we cannot—this will not happen if everything happens exactly as to the

wishes of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government needs to be

pressured into accepting Saudi engagement, as well as some of the

other groups need to be pressured into accepting Iranian engagement.

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Final question, Senator Isakson.

As I said, I’m not making a speech, I’m asking questions.

A final question. Bashar Assad says that he has an alliance with

Iran, vis-a-vis Iraq. You all have already testified on his reasons

not to do that. How do we—how do we crack that door? How do

we start to bring him to us instead of to Iran?

76

Dr. PILLAR. I think two main things. One, bear in mind that his

principal objective is still to get what his father couldn’t get, which

was return of the Golan, as, obviously, part of a larger peace process with Israel. And the last time the Syrian track was active, they

came this close to an agreement. And the second thing is, there are

economic ties that have developed over the years between Iran and

Syria, and there’s going to have to be some kind of consideration

for how economic ties with the United States could take part of the

place of that, if they lost any of it.

So, economic issues and Arab-Israeli peace-process issues.

Mr. SAID. If I might add, again, I mean, the—there has been a

very strong and constructive, in the region, Syrian-Saudi alliance

that has broken down over the last 10 years. And that’s something

that could also be—especially in terms of economic aid—if Saudi

Arabia could replace Syria’s dependence on Iran, one could see a

different behavior.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, a procedural question, if I

may?

Chairman BIDEN. Sure.

Senator MENENDEZ. I won’t be, unfortunately, able to stay after

Senator Isakson. I have an interview I’ve got to do. What is the

procedure here on questions for the committee?

Chairman BIDEN. Yes; we’ll submit——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Some course of events——

Chairman BIDEN [continuing]. Them through the Chair to the

witnesses.

And I apologize to my colleague from New Jersey for the way

this has been disjointed a bit here.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

All of you have said, in one way or another, that reconciliation

is absolutely essential to long-range stability of Iraq. I have read

that part of the administration’s case may be—for a surge of troops

in Baghdad—may be that you can’t have reconciliation until you

first have stability within Baghdad, relative peace. The question is:

If the multifaceted violence—more than just the sectarian violence,

but what you, Mr. Said, have referred to—if, in fact, a surge does

produce a more peaceful Iraq, without having played a favorite

within the many facets, and was evenhandedly done, can that contribute to bringing about the reconciliation we’re talking about? Or

is the fact that we’re going to have soldiers there, present—as the

answer to Mr. Webb’s question—make it impossible?

Mr. SAID. I think any additional U.S. soldier brings with him

the—or with her—the complexity of the issue. Again, it’s one more

occupation soldier, in the eyes of many Iraqis, as well as a protector for some communities, in the case of the sectarian violence.

So, the—you’re asking if the presence of the troops will produce

stability, and I think what we’ve heard from me and from the others is that there is skepticism that the proposed surge will produce

the stability and the protection that the people will get. But to answer your question directly, yes; if they succeed, if the additional

troops do succeed in protecting more Iraqis and reducing the

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threshold of fear, the level of fear that they experience today, then,

of course, that will be—that will contribute to political settlement.

Dr. MARR. I would just——

Senator ISAKSON. Yes.

Dr. MARR. I would just like to add, here, that I see the situation

in the Iraqi Government, within the Green Zone, as one centered

on political parties and factions and groups, with their militias,

particularly an alliance between the two Kurdish parties and

SCIRI. Of course, Muqtada al-Sadr is playing a role. These are political parties with leaders who have been shaped by certain perceptions. They’re new, they’re not entirely stable. And this is the

dynamic you have to look at. They’re being asked to make compromises with ex-Baathists, people—insurgents and people who

have perhaps wreaked a great deal of terror in Baghdad, and who

have a history of wanting to get back in. So, I—put it in a political

context here, because, in fact, it’s not just a question of stabilizing

Baghdad. They might use us for that purpose, because, indeed,

that’s what they’d like. Better we do it than that they do it. Even

if we stabilize Baghdad, if that should occur, we’re going to have

to find ways to get these particular parties, groups, leaders, operating within this dynamic, to make the compromises necessary,

and to expand the political group. That’s the task that’s at hand,

and we can think of a variety of ways in which you can do that.

Hopefully, it will work, but it really requires a strategy, nudging,

and instruments, positive and negative, to get that to occur.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Dr. Marr.

Dr. O’Hanlon, I want to ask you a question, and you can add on

what you were going to say. Sixteen years ago, my son wrote a

master’s graduate thesis at the University of Georgia—which as a

father I read—which just occurred to me in your testimony, it was

about the effects of the Dutch disease on the Middle East. And the

Dutch disease, as I remember it from that master’s thesis, is when

you have a nation with a singular source of wealth, which is a raw

material—in this case, oil—that never develops its infrastructure

or its economy or its people, then it—they are rife for problems.

Then it went into investigating each one of these.

The President’s recommendation, we are told, is going to have a

$1 billion economic—for lack of a better word, a WPA program for,

I presume, mostly in Baghdad. Does that help, given this Dutch

disease, which Iraq obviously suffers from—does that—assuming,

again, the stability, which is step one—does that help to bring—

to contribute to reconciliation, if, in fact, they begin being employed

in the—there begins some semblance of a diversified economy?

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, I’m a supporter of a job-creation program, not necessarily because I expect it to contribute to a stronger

Iraqi economy, in the long term, but because I think it’s a good security strategy, in the short to middle term—takes some of the unemployed angry young men off the street, or at least gives us some

hope that some fraction of them will be less likely to oppose what

we’re doing and oppose the Iraqi Government. So, on those more

specific security grounds, I would support it.

On your earlier question, if I might add on——

Senator ISAKSON. Please.

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Dr. O’HANLON [continuing]. I think it’s fine to imagine, you

know, a surge beginning before a reconciliation, as long as there’s

a sense of urgency about the latter. Because I think—my own

sense, this is just guesstimating, of course—but the best you could

hope for out of a surge is to get violence back to where it was,

maybe, in 2004, or, if you’re really lucky, the more difficult parts

of 2003. A surge is not going to end Iraq’s problems, it’s not going

to stabilize Baghdad. That would be too ambitious of a goal, and

it’s just not realistic. So, the most we can hope is that it arrests

the deterioration, maybe stops some of the worst ethnic cleansing,

and gets things back to where they were a couple of years ago.

That’s obviously not good enough. That’s not a stable endpoint. So,

the only way that could be useful is if there very quickly follows

on—hopefully at the same time, but certainly very quickly thereafter—a broader political and economic strategy, as well.

Senator ISAKSON. Yes.

Mr. SAID. I think it’s a very important question you raise about

Dutch disease. And, indeed, none of the economic policies promoted

by the United States in Iraq under the direct administration, nor

now under the Iraqi Government, are mindful of that. Indeed,

Iraq’s dependence, singular dependence, on oil has increased over

the past 4 years. Last year’s budget, 94 percent of government revenues came from oil. That’s unprecedented. There is no country in

the world that has such degree of dependence on oil. But, unfortunately, at this point, it seems that Dutch disease—worrying about

Dutch disease is a luxury that the Iraqi Government cannot afford.

And, as Mr. O’Hanlon suggested, an immediate job-creation program, although it is clear that it will not offer any long-term economic benefits, will at least reduce the violence, which is the main

concern.

Senator ISAKSON. Dr. Pillar, I—first of all, thank you for your

service to the country. You’re a retired veteran, served in Vietnam—I was reading your resume—and, I think, wrote a book that’s

title was, in part, ‘‘Negotiating Peace and Terrorism in U.S. Foreign Policy.’’ And when you made your statement, it was enlightening to me, when you said—talked about ‘‘jihad depended on

struggle,’’ and talked about ‘‘the terrorist networking, given the

struggle in Iraq,’’ assuming, for a second—knowing what happened

on 9/11, and knowing what al-Qaeda’s stated purposes are, and assuming stability came to Iraq and we were gone, what would alQaeda do to—would it create more struggles to keep feeding itself?

Dr. PILLAR. It would create more struggles. It would lose a big

propaganda point and recruitment tool and networking opportunity

and training ground, which, again, are the things that parallel

what we saw in Afghanistan. It would not be critical, one way or

another, in the survival of al-Qaeda. And most of what al-Qaeda

will continue to try to do would not depend even on a safe haven,

as was once the case in Afghanistan. One can talk about Iraq, but

more important will be things terrorists do in places like Hamburg

and Kuala Lumpur and flight-training schools in the United

States, which is one of the lessons of 9/11: You don’t need a territory. They can do their dirty business other ways.

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Senator ISAKSON. And I guess my answer to that would be, they

thrive off the continued conflict in Iraq, they have no interest in

reconciliation, or peace, for that matter.

Dr. PILLAR. Absolutely. They thrive off of continued conflict in

Iraq, yes.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAID. If I may add, here, also, al-Qaeda is not necessarily interested in gaining power in Iraq.

Senator ISAKSON. I know.

Mr. SAID. Al-Qaeda is more interested in keeping it as it is, and

keeping the United States in Iraq, where there could be major confrontation.

Dr. PILLAR. Exactly. I agree, completely.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Senator Cardin, you take what time you need.

[Laughter.]

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very

much. And I can’t tell you how much—how important I think these

hearings are, and the witnesses that we have here, building upon

the opinion that the United States needs to lead with diplomacy

and bringing in the international community if we’re going to be

able to complete a mission in our interest in Iraq.

I want to follow up specifically on one part that is likely to be

in the President’s policy, and that is the public works initiative,

significant United States-initiated economic-development public

works in Iraq. And I want to know what your views are as to the

capacity of Iraq to be able to deal with that type of initiative. All

of you are saying that the United States is viewed as an occupation

force, the President’s message tonight is certainly going to get

mixed reviews among the parties in Iraq. It’s—it makes more visible, United States presence in Iraq. There are concerns about security issues among any public works projects. And I just would like

to know—we’ve had problems in Congress making sure the money

is used appropriately that we appropriate. And we know that it has

not been the case. So, I guess I have a concern that, yes, we want

to be responsible in building Iraq, the economics and providing opportunity for the people of Iraq, but—well, what are your views as

to how well that will be used in Iraq, or what suggestions you

might have as to what we should be doing to make sure that

money is properly used in Iraq, understanding that the package

that the President’s likely to be submitting to us is coupled with

an escalation of United States presence in Iraq that certainly will

cause some additional problems for us in that region?

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, that’s a great question. I certainly think

you’re right to raise all these concerns, but I still strongly support

the job-creation program, because, again, unemployment has been

such a nagging issue in Iraq, and it creates more angry unemployed young men who join the Mahdi Militia, for example, or who

join the Sunni-based insurgency. So, I think it makes sense. But

to focus in on one of your operational questions: How do we provide

oversight? What are the most important things for us to watch? In

the spirit of what I was saying before, and that my colleague, Mr.

Said, was saying also, I think it’s, in a way, almost less important

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what the Iraqis do on their jobs, and more important that we make

sure the right people get the money. In other words, you don’t want

to have this become a slush fund that some jihadist gets in charge

of or some militia member gets in charge of, and then turns it into

a patronage system to reward militia members. You have to make

sure that you are being very careful about the disbursement of the

funds. I don’t, frankly, care if they whitewash the same fence 10

times in a row, as long as it’s 10 people who are relatively goodnatured and well-intentioned and are not using that money to funnel to a lot of al-Qaeda or insurgent or militia operatives.

So, figuring out the mechanism to pay people, I think, is the single most important thing, and my guess is the right answer is to

build on the military commander’s emergency response program,

because our troops in the field are the ones who are out there in

the large numbers who are going to have the ability to do more vetting and more careful distribution. They have to be involved, at

some level. You can’t just rely on these Provincial Support Teams,

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, that have a couple of dozen people in each province, because they’re going to have to give the

money in bucketloads to Iraqis who, in some cases, may or may not

be fully dependable. That would be my only advice.

Dr. MARR. I’d just like to make three points on this. I would hope

that this money is going to be rapidly funneled to Iraqis. The whole

idea that Americans are going to be there doing the public works

is just, it seems to me, a nonstarter.

Iraqis traditionally are schizophrenic on foreign powers and occupation, and we perhaps put a tad too much concern on antiforeign,

antioccupation sentiment. Of course that’s going to be there, but

Iraqis do need the outside help. And yet, even when they get it,

they’re going to rebel against it.

I think there is an issue here, not so much on the public works

and the emergency funds, because the money needs to be spread

for employment, I agree. But in terms of really developing the economy, getting the electricity going, and so forth, Iraq used to have

a very good technocratic class, engineers and others, but, as everybody has pointed out, they’re really losing it, not just at the top

level, the engineer, but the technocrats who actually do the work.

I recall a conversation in Basrah, last time I was there, about some

technician who was dealing with something as simple as filters of

some kind on oil installations; and just getting people to understand that they had to change that filter—it had to be absolutely

clean every day—he said, was very really a problem. So, this is

something we do need to be concerned about, whether the money

is going to be used properly.

And we haven’t talked too much about it, but corruption is a

huge problem. Mike probably knows the figures on how much of

the Iraqi oil revenue, the economy, and so on, is siphoned off to individuals, and doesn’t feed into the formal economy or the government. So, some kind of balance has to be found, in terms of oversight of the funds, that they’re going not just to insurgents, that

goes without saying, but corrupt politicians and others—there will

always be a certain amount of corruption—versus getting that

money and the jobs into the bloodstream. I think there’s always a

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balance to be achieved here. But that corruption issue is a real

problem.

Senator CARDIN. I agree with you. And there’s certainly a desire

to get Iraqis employed. And I can appreciate your pointing that out.

But I think, at the end of the day, we want the water supply to

be available to the Iraqis. We wanted this to be constructive and

helping the economy of the country to lead toward stability of the

country. And without the experts that they need, because they

have left, without having the trained workforce, there’s going to be

a lot of foreign interest in helping in Iraq, and, unfortunately, some

of that’s not going to be well received, it seems to me.

Mr. SAID. I think there are two problems with the job-creation

program that is being proposed. First of all, the Iraqi Government,

last year—this past year—have failed to spend a lot of the money

that it has allocated through the budget for investment. There is

a serious shortage of capacity to spend, in the Iraqi Government,

to—especially for investment projects. So, to add additional resources, if the Iraqi Government hasn’t been able to spend, is a bit

problematic.

So far, such initiatives have been guided by short-term interests,

particularly addressing the security situation, and has not fed into

a long-term or medium-term strategy. Now, there is—the Iraqi

Government has developed several strategies—a national development strategy on, currently, the compact—but there has been—

there seems to be continued—continuing disconnect between the

interventions, the aid money that is being given, and the Iraqi medium-term strategy. So, it’s very important for this particular package to flow through an Iraqi-owned and -designed planning strategy that looks in the—to the medium term and is not ad hoc and

short term.

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me thank, again, the witnesses, and

thank your patience, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Well, thank you for your patience.

Senator Lugar, do you have anything you want to——

Senator LUGAR. Just one followup on Senator Cardin’s question.

We’ve been discussing—and he illuminated this, as you have—that

it would be desirable for this to flow through somebody in Iraq. But

you’ve all testified the bureaucracy is decimated, the professionals

that were left have gone somewhere, and there is a protection problem even for those Iraqis who might be doing these works, quite

apart from Americans or somebody. Physically, how can the billion

dollars be spent? You’ve said that the Iraqis couldn’t allocate

maybe a quarter of their own budget this year, quite apart from

$1 billion that comes in from us. I’m just trying to trace, physically,

what happens, in terms of expectations and results.

Mr. SAID. This is quite a challenge. I mean, you are pointing out

a serious challenge that the administration will face in spending

these resources. I think the trick is—here is to help spend at least

some of these resources to build Iraqi capacity to spend, Iraqi capacity to manage and execute projects, which has been decimated

over the last 3 or 4 years.

Senator LUGAR. Build the capacity to get those resources to

people.

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Mr. SAID. Another element of it is to use the emergency response

fund framework that the commanders use, the military commanders on the ground, with small sums of money, to produce the

kind of relief. But this is not a framework within which you spend

billions of dollars; these are much more small-scale—however,

quite effective in generating short-term employment.

Dr. MARR. Just one point. I’d like to bring up my favorite subject,

and that’s exchanges—education, students, training people, getting

Iraqis out; it doesn’t even have to be to the United States—and

working on the visa problem here, to get them in. I’m hearing all

kinds of complaints, still, about Iraqis not being able to come over,

study, and so on. But one way to help build the capacity is to get

Iraqis out, get them in training, and that helps some of the security problems, as well.

Senator LUGAR. You mean develop a major scholarship program

for 10,000 Iraqis, something of this sort, with a significant publicrelations aspect, and maybe some leadership.

Dr. MARR. Not enough is being—not enough is being done there,

I think.

Chairman BIDEN. Senator Menendez——

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN [continuing]. Welcome back.

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m glad to have been recognized. I didn’t

think it was going to be that short, but I appreciate it. And I appreciate the panelists for their testimony and their staying power for

all this time. And I wanted to get back, and having sat here all

morning I hope that the questions that I want to pose to you are

not repetitive. I stayed here through the morning, so, maybe on

some of the questions and answers, you may have answered some

of this. So, I hope it’s not repetitive, in case I didn’t catch it.

As I both read your testimonies and listened to your testimony

here today, and your answers to questions I have a real concern.

I didn’t vote for the war in the first place, so I come from a certain

point of view. But, of course, I want us to succeed. And it seems

to me that everything I heard you collectively say is that this is

about, at the end of the day, a political solution, and that we cannot necessarily accomplish a military solution.

I hear and read, for example, Dr. Marr, in your testimony, toward the end, you say, ‘‘Only when the participants in the struggle

for power recognize that they are losing more than they can gain

by continuing will it come to an end. And that may be’’—your sentence goes on, ‘‘that may be a very long time.’’ When I listen to Mr.

Said say that, in fact, ‘‘a good part of the violence is one about

power and money’’ and when I hear Dr. Pillar say, which I agree

with totally, that ‘‘Iran is the big winner, at the end of the day’’—

all of those comments, and others, in my mind, speak volumes as

to why an escalation is not the solution to our problem. As a matter of fact, from what I’ve seen of those who are military experts,

including several of our generals, say is that to have a real ability

to have some military effort—as I think Mr. Said mentioned—is

about half a million troops, over three times the number of troops

that exist in the United States now. And there is no way, both military, I think, from the U.S. perspective, in terms of the ability to

do that, as well as the support, for that possibly to happen.

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So, having said all of that, the question is: How is it—and you’ve

all talked, at different points, about the political process, the regional players but what would you be saying tomorrow if the Secretary of State comes before the committee? What would you be

saying to her if you were advising her, and to the President, about

what the steps are that we need to take to get that political process, both internally by Iraqis and as General Pace said, ‘‘to love

their children more than they hate their neighbors’’? That can’t be

accomplished through military might, to love their children more

than they hate their neighbors. The question is: How do we have

a surge, an escalation, in a political process that gives us the ultimate success that we want? What would be the steps that you

would be suggesting in order to accomplish that?

Dr. MARR. Well, I’d kind of like to go back to the Iraq Study report again, because I think they really did address this, aside from

the surge. And, incidently, I’m not so pessimistic that I think there

are going to be no agreements between Iraqis for a very long time.

We’ve pointed out to one area where this long process seems to be

beginning, and that’s the oil legislation. There have been some

compromises, mainly from the Kurds, who recognize that they want

to get on with this. I think you have to take a strong stand behind

the scenes and indicate that there’s both a carrot and a stick, as

the Iraqi Study Group report said. We’re willing to continue aid

and help—not necessarily money, but training, assistance, support,

and so on—if certain milestone steps are taken—something on the

de-Baathification, compromise on the oil law, and——

Senator MENENDEZ. But this is now—you’re saying the United

States saying to——

Dr. MARR. United States talking turkey——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Proactively.

Dr. MARR. Yes; to these——

Senator MENENDEZ. And as part of that——

Dr. MARR. But also negative. If——

Senator MENENDEZ. Uh-huh.

Dr. MARR [continuing]. These things are——

Senator MENENDEZ. That’s what I want to——

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Not accomplished—and our patience isn’t

exhaustive, as Michael has said—then we’re going to withdraw this

support, including military support.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’m glad you said that, because my followup to the question, and I’d like to hear from others, is: Isn’t it

true that benchmarks without timetables or at least consequences,

are only aspirations, as part of that process? What would your suggestions be?

Mr. SAID. I think benchmarks are useful, even without consequences, because they set goals, they set parameters

according——

Senator MENENDEZ. But we’ve had those benchmarks, and many

of them have not been met, and——

Mr. SAID. Definitely.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And now we have them as another excuse for an escalation of troops.

Mr. SAID. Definitely. I mean, there is definitely a need to—for

the U.S. Government to take a more assertive role, vis-a-vis its

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own allies in Iraq. There is a need to take a more serious look

at——

Senator MENENDEZ. How do we get other regional players to be

involved in a proactive way?

Mr. SAID. Beyond that, I thought—I think it’s very important to

say that this is not something the United States alone can make.

I think internationalizing Iraq is a very critical element. To give

you just one example, the League of Arab States and the United

Nations have been trying, over the last 3 years, to build, if you like,

the Iraqi delegation to a peace conference, trying to canvas Iraqi

political class and political elites to identify people who could sit together and negotiate a peace settlement. This is a role that the

United States cannot play. This is a role that could—that only

trusted international multilateral actors can do. And I think the

United States should encourage such efforts, be it through the

United Nations, through the international compact, or through the

Arab League, to broaden the negotiating table and bring additional

Iraqis to the table, and regional players, to start working on a settlement and on a political framework.

Senator MENENDEZ. Dr. Pillar, you may have responded to this

previously, but in the twin exercise that the Iranians and the Syrians have right now, where, in one part they are enjoying us being

bogged down, shedding our blood and national treasure, and on the

other part, they have an interest in the stability of Iraq, where is

the tipping point? Where do we get them to move in the direction

that is more positive than the negativity they are playing right

now?

Dr. PILLAR. Well, Senator, we did address, somewhat earlier in

the proceedings, some of the ways of manipulating the incentives.

On the Syrian side, it has to do with their objectives regarding the

peace process, getting the Golan back. With regard to the Iranian

side, Tehran is interested in a whole host of things—not just the

nuclear issue that gets all the attention, but a whole host of things

that involve the United States, having to do with everything from

frozen assets to developing a normal relationship, and a vague

thing that the Iranians would refer to as ‘‘respect,’’ which is kind

of hard to operationalize, but it is important to them.

I think Phebe, I’d go back to the Iraq Study Group as a reference

point to this, because I think their treatment of the external dimension is excellent. And I would summarize our earlier discussions in this room and what the ISG says by saying the diplomatic

approach needs to be inclusive with regard to with whom we are

speaking, it needs to be flexible with regard to the forums and formats—it’s not just one big conference, it’s bilateral contacts, it’s

track-two-type stuff, it’s the indirect incentives that could affect the

thinking in places like Tehran, and it has to be sensitive to what’s

on the agenda of those countries. I just mentioned some things of

interest to Iran, for example. We can’t just limit it to, ‘‘We want

to talk about stopping your troublemaking in Iraq.’’ You know, if

that’s our agenda, it’s going to go nowhere. It has to be broader.

Mr. SAID. If I may add another element here, which is violence

inside Iran and Syria, Iraq has been—there has been an element

of contagion taking place through Iraq, and there has been a spike

in sectarian violence and ethnic violence in Iran, both with the

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Arab minority and the Kurdish minority. And there have been

issues with the Kurdish minority in Syria. And this could become

more serious as Iraq implodes. So, there is a threshold of pain, if

you like, there, as well, that will encourage them to engage more.

Dr. PILLAR. With the Kurds, there were fatal riots in Syria, I believe in 2004, and similar ones in Iran in 2005, so they’ve actually

had bloodshed inside their territories over these issues.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BIDEN. Folks, the end is in sight. You’ve been a wonderful panel.

Let me address, from a slightly different perspective, several

points you’ve raised.

I believe—it doesn’t make me correct, it just made me a pariah

for a while—I believe I was the first one to suggest, in an op-ed

piece over a year ago—that there be an international conference,

and a contact group to follow up on that conference. It was pointed

out, as one of the criticisms, which is legitimate, in one sense, that

if you expand the participation, not only externally, but internally,

within Iraq, which you’re suggesting, you are, by definition, undercutting the government. There is a ‘‘freely elected government in

Iraq.’’ There is a Constitution that the Iraqi people have overwhelming voted for. ‘‘I was there when the vote took place,’’ the argument goes. Therefore, for the United States to do anything that

goes beyond the governmental entities that exist now within Iraq,

and to do anything without their permission relative to external

forces, is to, in effect, negate the commitment we made to their

Constitution and to the unity government. How do you respond to

that?

Dr. Pillar.

Dr. PILLAR. Well, I guess it all has to be portrayed as help. And

when you talk about the regional actors—for example, Mr. Said

made the point about the Arab League’s efforts to try to help the

Iraqis do all the functions that a sovereign state would do—and so,

if help can be phrased in those terms, it doesn’t necessarily have

to be represented as inconsistent with Iraqi sovereignty.

Chairman BIDEN. But if, in fact, the existing Maliki government

says, ‘‘We don’t want X, Y, or Z participating in this conference, internally—they are not elected, they’re not part of the government,

they do not hold a ministry,’’ et cetera—then what do we say?

Mr. SAID. I mean, a peace process—I’m sorry, a peace process, by

definition, detracts from sovereignty. There is——

Chairman BIDEN. Detracts from sovereignty?

Mr. SAID. Detracts from sovereignty. There is no peace process

anywhere in the world that recognizes 100 percent of the sovereignty of one of the parties involved. If there is a need for a peace

process, this means there is a problem; and, therefore, we have

to—it’s a last—it’s a last—it’s a last resort.

Governance, sovereignty, the right, is not a carte blanche, it’s not

an open check. If the government is not delivering, in terms of providing for peace, in terms of providing a peaceful conflict resolution

mechanism, then it loses the right to some of its sovereignty.

Chairman BIDEN. Well, that is a new international concept. I

happen to agree with it, but that is a new concept, in terms of what

we’d constitute as the sacredness of sovereignty. I happen to agree

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with you, but I just want to make sure we understand. We mix

terms a lot. We—not you—we interchange terms a great deal. As

you all pointed out, it’s very complex in Iraq. There’s an insurgency

and there’s sectarian violence and there’s insurgency and violence

within the insurgency and so on. I would describe the situation in

Iraq as almost a disintegration rather than a civil war, quite

frankly.

But, having said that, I think, in order to help us in this process,

think through this process—and one of the things the chairman

and I have, I think, been pretty much in lockstep on is trying to

figure out these practical big-ticket items.

For example, employment. I have made many trips to Iraq, in

relative terms. Two trips ago, I met with General Chiarelli, the No.

2 guy, who is now leaving.

He said, ‘‘Senator, if I—you ever hear me criticize the—raise the

word ‘bureaucrat’ again, smack me.’’ He said, ‘‘There is no bureaucracy to deal with here in Iraq. We desperately need one.’’

And he gave me the following example. He said, ‘‘You know, the

date palm, the national fruit, national tree, it’s a symbol of Iraq’’—

he went back through the history of it.

He said—and I’m embarrassed that I don’t remember the

varmint that can decimate it, but it’s something the equivalent of

the boll weevil to cotton—‘‘you have to spray these every 5 years.’’

And, he said, ‘‘If you don’t, within that timeframe, you run the

risk of this disease consuming this national treasure, and also a

previous source of income.’’

And he said, ‘‘So, I went to the Embassy and said, ‘You ought to

get them—we ought to spray these things.’ ’’

And he said—and I’m paraphrasing—he said, ‘‘They said, ‘No,

that’s up to the Iraqis.’ ’’ And he said, ‘‘But I told them there’s no

Department of Agriculture that works.’’

And he said, ‘‘Well, they said, ‘It’s got to be them.’ ’’ And he said,

‘‘So, I did what Saddam did. I used my helicopters and went and

sprayed them.’’

Which leads me to the second point he raised to me. He said,

‘‘You know, we have what I call the most expensive water fountain

in all the Middle East, that we built in Baghdad.’’ He said, ‘‘It’s

great to put some high water—potable water to everybody in Baghdad.’’ He said, ‘‘We built it,’’ except we didn’t run the pipes from

‘‘the fountain’’ to the homes. That was up to the Iraqis. Yet there

was no mechanism by which the Iraqis knew how to, or were able

to, organize, at least at that point, actually putting the PVC pipe

in the ground from his term of art, his facetious term, ‘‘the water

fountain’’ to the homes.

So, I guess what I’m getting at is this. And this is a question to

you, Dr. Marr. From a historical perspective, how big a contributor

to the economy of Iraq was agriculture in the 1950s, let’s say, or

the 1940s or the 1960s? I mean, was it a major component? You

hear the phrase ‘‘Iraq used to be the breadbasket of the Middle

East.’’ Can you tell me, from a historical perspective what—

whether or not Iraq was a major exporter of agricultural products

in the past?

Dr. MARR. I have covered that in my previous book, and there’s

a very interesting history on that. And let me just recoup it.

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When the British were there, under the mandate, up until the

1950s, they put a lot of emphasis on agriculture. But you have to

remember, as you know, there are two kinds. There’s irrigation system in the south, which is hugely expensive. You have to

desalinate, you have to put a lot of effort, on dams and so forth,

and you have to have a population that likes agriculture and wants

to work in it. And, in fact, that has gradually fallen into decay.

Growing grains, rice, and other things grown in the south, Iraqis

were able to feed themselves, were even able to do some exporting,

into the 1950s. The rain-fed agriculture in the north is much easier. The Kurdish area and some of the areas around Mosul, you

don’t need that irrigation. But, frankly, because of political mismanagement and all sorts of other things, agriculture has fallen

into incredible disarray in Iraq. This migration of the population

from the south to Baghdad and so on has depopulated the area,

and it really has fallen into decline. And not only does Iraq not export, not just under our occupation or even under Saddam, but everything went into industry, and you can just chart the figures

where oil and urban service industries, working for the government, for education, took over and left agriculture behind.

One word of caution. I’m not sure Iraq can be a breadbasket. I

think there’s been too much emphasis on how much agriculture

could do. It could certainly be revived. It would help to feed the

population. But modern agriculture is not grains and so on; it’s

vegetables and other things you grow for commercial agriculture.

They could do a great deal more with that. But a breadbasket for

the Middle East, I think, is too ambitious.

But agriculture, as a percentage of population employed or any

other figure, has declined radically.

Chairman BIDEN. Well, one of the reasons I raised the question

is, my last trip, over the Fourth of July, it was suggested to me

there was a direct correlation—and, Michael—or Dr. O’Hanlon,

maybe you could speak to this—there was a direct correlation between the formation of the unity government and the exponential

rise in those participating in militias, the exact opposite that was

predicted. What was predicted was, there would be a unity government; what that would do is focus on a unified Iraq; they would

have a united Iraqi Army that was multiethnic; that the police

force would be able to begin to be purged of the death squads and

so on. And the irony was, at least in just pure data, that the number of people being prepared to get a paycheck and get a weapon

to ‘‘fight with a militia’’ went up almost exponentially. And so, two

of the generals with whom I sat said, ‘‘You want me to deal with

the militia. Don’t give me jurisdiction to disarm them. Get the Department of Agriculture working, and give them employment. You

want me to deal with reduction of the militia. Give me the opportunity to provide for employment.’’ Because these are people between the ages of 18 and 30, they’ve got nothing to do. The unemployment rates you gave us were very high. Are they correct? Is

there a correlation—are people joining the militias, in part, because

there’s nothing else to do, a la riots in the 1960s in the United

States of America, in center cities where large numbers of teams

sat on corners and had nothing to do, and, therefore, engaged? You

were mayor of Indianapolis, going through that very difficult period

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of time. Talk to me about that a minute. I mean, what’s the correlation between the intensity of support for being part of a militia

and the sectarian violence and being unemployed?

Dr. O’HANLON. I don’t think I can create a direct link that I can

prove with the data. But I can agree with your point, in a broader

sense. But it’s impression. And the impression is that when you

give a country lack of hope for multiple years—you know, you have

angry young men joining the working-age population, with nothing

else to do—we just have to ask: What’s going to be their psychology? So, it’s the commonsensical answer you gave that I would

fall back on, myself. I can’t prove it from the data. And in the small

samples that we have of pilot projects being attempted, I don’t

think we have a way to prove that job-creation programs reduce

the support for the insurgency or the militias. But, as you say, Senator, it’s the combination of high unemployment, the experiment in

democracy not really producing reconciliation, 3 years of accumulated violence. All this has added up to a climate of hopelessness,

and we have to attack it in multiple ways, even if we’re not sure

of what’s going to work.

Chairman BIDEN. OK. Last point I’ll make, and then—unless the

chairman has additional questions, close this out.

I was impressed with, not the dissimilarity, but the similarity of

your testimony today on a number of very important points. One

is that there’s no straight line here to look at, in terms of the disintegration of the situation in Iraq. It’s not totally a consequence,

or even primarily a consequence, of religion, although religion is

playing a larger role. There’s an interlocking and complicated connection between tribal loyalties, religious loyalties, political parties,

the disintegration of the middle class, or at least the exodus. One

thing that I don’t want to misrepresent, so I’m going to ask you

specifically—my impression is that there was total agreement on

the need for a political settlement being the ultimate criteria for

stability in Iraq. The real question that’s evolved is one that we’ve

been discussing for a while, and the Baker Commission discussed,

and I have discussed in the proposal I’ve made, and others—I’m

not unique in this regard—and that is whether continuing and/or

increasing our presence physically with military in Iraq promotes

movement toward reconciliation, whatever ‘‘reconciliation’’ means,

or the looming middle term—not threat, but reality that, over the

next 12 to 18 months, if there’s not a correlation between political

reconciliation—if that does not occur, you will see a correlation

with the reduction of American forces, to the point that we essentially have removed all our combat forces from that country. And

that seems to be the tension. I may not be explaining this succinctly. But, given the broad choice that it seems to me the President of the United States has—and it’s a pretty basic choice, it

seems to me—does he increase, surge, escalate, or even just maintain without any threat, if you will, of significant reduction within

a particular timeframe? Is that more likely to get action along the

lines we need it, which is reconciliation of some sort? Or is it better

as the Baker Commission suggested, by implication anyway, to tell

the Maliki government, and others now, ‘‘Hey, Jack, it’s not gonna

last very much longer’’?

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I was asked, when the President made his secret trip to Iraq—

I was on one of those programs, and they showed a picture of the

President whispering in Maliki’s ear. And they said, ‘‘What do you

think of that?’’ I said, ‘‘It depends on what he’s whispering.’’ I

wasn’t being facetious. If he’s whispering, ‘‘I’m with you to the end,

don’t worry, we’re staying,’’ then we’re in real trouble, was my response. If he’s whispering, ‘‘Hey, Jack, listen up here. You’ve got

a limited amount of time. You’ve got to make some courageous and

difficult choices. You’ve got to put yourself on the line. If you do,

we’ll help. If you don’t, you can’t count on it.’’ In very colloquial

terms, that’s about what the choices are, in terms of our policy.

You can demur, you cannot answer, but if you’re willing, which

side of that ledger do you—are more inclined to come down on? I

know nothing is straight-line here, nothing is black and white.

What should be the thrust of our policy over the next year as it

relates to the issue of encouraging consensus, or a move toward

consensus or reconciliation? By suggesting we’re going to be leaving

or by suggesting that we’re going to provide the physical stability,

the security, first, before we ask you to make these very difficult

decisions?

Dr. O’HANLON. Senator, it’s a great way of framing the dilemma.

I think the way I would put it is, I would not be comfortable with

President Bush being the only person speaking for the United

States on this issue, because we know anything he says is going

to be interpreted not as a surge, but as a new level of effort. His

whole legacy is linked, as we all know, to Iraq coming out at least

OK. So, I personally, not just become—not just because I’m a Democrat—I’m happy to see the Congress in Democratic hands—and,

even where Republicans are having the opportunity, they are asking tough questions and sending the message—the current policy

is not going to be sustainable. It’s not sustainable militarily. The

Army and Marine Corps are already doing too much, even at

140,000. To go to 160 is really going to something that has to be

viewed as a temporary measure, even if President Bush asked for

50,000 more troops in the budget this year.

In terms of our politics, we all know, a number of you running

for President, and just running for campaigns in 2008, are sending

a message, ‘‘This can’t continue.’’ And the Iraqis have to know that,

with 100,000 people being displaced from their homes every month,

it can’t continue in their country either.

So, only if both messages are sent simultaneously can it work.

A surge, by itself, with the implication that it could continue indefinitely, I think, would be a terrible message to send. But if it’s juxtaposed with this sense of urgency, and ‘‘2007 is the last real

chance,’’ then I think there may be a case for it.

Dr. MARR. That is a wonderful question, and I think it is the nub

of the matter. I’ve asked myself the same thing, thinking of it from

the Iraqi side, What motivates——

Chairman BIDEN. Right.

Dr. MARR [continuing]. Iraqis? And I wish I had a really definitive opinion on it, but I think I lean somewhat more to the Iraq

Study Group sense of it, although I’m not hard over.

A couple of points. I think threat is necessary, but not sufficient,

to get the Iraqis to move. And I think we have to ask ourselves,

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also, what motivates people. It’s not only threat. If you’re always

threatening, without some incentive, you’re not going to get anywhere. But there is a sense of not only so much hopelessness, but

passivity, or, ‘‘What can we do about it?’’ in the Iraqi tradition that

I’m not sure, even if we used a threat, it’s going to be successful.

Chairman BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. SAID. I think that a threat to withdraw will have two impacts of opposite direction. On one hand, it may incentivize people

to talk and to seek a settlement. On the other hand, it may emphasize—encourage them to go for a last push. Indeed, what seems to

be the dynamic, so far, has been that the threat and the—because

people in Iraq realize that the Americans are not staying—has

been to go for a last push.

Likewise, the surge option, particularly if taken out of context,

out of political context, is more likely to produce negative results

than positive.

A third—and it’s just a general comment—I don’t think there is

an option of a gradual U.S. withdrawal. I think what you will realize—and this has happened on—in regional bases, in provincial

bases—that attempts to withdraw, especially British attempts to

withdraw, gradually have not materialized. And, indeed, once you

start to withdraw, you’ll have to be ready to withdraw almost immediately. And so, that is also important to keep in mind.

Dr. PILLAR. I will not demur at all in answering your very clear

question, Senator. I would definitely lean in the direction of letting

the Iraqis know we’re not going to be there forever, consistent with

the Iraq Study Group report.

I disagree a little bit with the comment Mr. Said just made. You

know, people talk about an immediate withdrawal versus gradual.

I think, just as a matter of military logistics and force protection

and all that, even if you wanted to get out fast, fast could translate

into a matter of months and wouldn’t really be that much different

from the timeframe that the ISG was talking about.

But my basis for answering you that way is, basically, we have

tried other things, even ones that look like surges in the Baghdad

area. They haven’t worked. This other thing might not work, either, but at least it hasn’t been tried. And it’s also the option that

we know will reduce U.S. costs and casualties.

Chairman BIDEN. Well, I appreciate it very much. We’re going to

hear from the Secretary tomorrow. She’s graciously agreed to be

here. And I hope, when she does, we will have explained that in

a sense, ‘‘surge’’ is a bit of a misnomer. Most Americans, I think,

when you talk about a ‘‘surge,’’ are thinking of 20 or 25 or 30 or

15,000 folks getting on a boat, being shipped to the gulf, coming

up through Basrah, and occupying Baghdad. The truth of the matter is, this is going to be a process, if it occurs. And we’re talking

about telling the Marines they’ve got to go from 6 months to a year

in place. We’re going to tell the Army guys and women there,

they’re going to go from 12 months to 14 months, we’re going to

take a brigade out of Kuwait or out of Qatar and move them in,

and so on. So, this is a process—which I think complicates the matter even more, in a sense. But that’s for another day.

So, I—again, the purpose of this is to educate us—and you’ve

helped do that today. And hopefully, the American people and the

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press have gained as much from listening to all of you as we have.

I truly appreciate your patience. You’ve been sitting here since

9:30. It’s now a quarter of 2. It’s the drawback from expanding the

committee to 21 people. I guess that’s the number we have. But

there are so many people in the Senate so critically interested in

this that I overcame my instinct of making it smaller. I was chairman or ranking member of Judiciary for 17 years, and my entire

effort was to reduce the size of the committee to make it more manageable. But I’m delighted with the new members. You can tell the

degree of the concern and participation. And I think you’ve all

noted—you’ve testified before—I doubt whether you’ve ever testified before where you were any more convinced that as many people were listening to everything word you had to say. And so, I

hope that’s some psychic remuneration for you, for all the work

you’ve done on our behalf. We promise we’ll try to cut the questions

down. We’ll kind of see if we have multiple questions. I don’t want

you in a position where you’re spending the next whatever having

to answer the written questions.

Again, the chairman and I both thank you for your tremendous

input here and your patience.

And the committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

The series of hearings that we begin today provide a critical opportunity to forge

a new strategic direction for Iraq and the entire region—one that is long overdue

and one I hope all Americans will eventually be able to rally behind. I would like

to express my appreciation to our panel’s witnesses for their appearance today. I

look forward to hearing their assessments, especially as they relate to the regional

implications of the situation in Iraq today.

We went to war in Iraq recklessly; we must move forward responsibly. The war’s

costs to our Nation have been staggering. These costs encompass what we hold to

be most precious—the blood of our citizens. They also extend to the many thousands

more Iraqi people killed and wounded as their country slides into the chaos of sectarian violence and civil war. We have incurred extraordinary financial costs—expenses totaling more than $380 billion and now estimated at $8 billion a month.

The war also has diverted our Nation’s focus fighting international terrorism and

deflected our attention to the many additional threats to our national security

abroad and national greatness at home—costs difficult to measure, perhaps, but

very real all the same.

The Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people must understand that the United

States does not intend to maintain its current presence in their country for the long

term. They must make the difficult but essential decisions to end today’s sectarian

violence and to provide for their own security. The American people are not alone

in seeking that day; indeed, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens also does

not want our forces present in their country for any longer than is absolutely necessary.

The key question of the moment is how long the United States should be expected

to keep our forces in Iraq as its government seeks to assume these burdens? How

and when do we begin to drawdown our combat presence and conclude our mission

in a way that does not leave even greater chaos behind? What is the administration’s strategic vision and, as it relates to our presence in Iraq, its eventual end

point?

The answers to these questions are not to be found in Iraq alone. Achieving our

goals in this war requires a coherent strategy encompassing the entire region. The

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, published by the National Security Council

in November 2005, principally emphasized how the United States would help the

Iraqi people defeat terrorists and build an inclusive democratic state. This strategy

identified an initiative to increase international support for Iraq. It did not, howVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ever, affirm the need for an overarching diplomatic solution that is now, more than

ever, an imperative if we are to end the war.

I have said for many months that the United States does not require a military

solution to end the war in Iraq. We must seek a diplomatic solution immediately—

one that engages all nations in the region with historic and cultural ties to Iraq.

Because they are part of today’s problem, Syria and Iran also must be party to tomorrow’s solution. This overarching diplomatic solution, one supportive of a coherent strategy, will lead to four outcomes. First, it will enable us to withdraw our combat troops from Iraq over time. Second, it will lead to progressively greater regional

stability. Third, it will allow us to fight international terrorism more effectively.

Lastly, it will enable us to address our broad strategic interests around the world

with renewed vigor.

During an earlier era in our Nation’s history, we were faced with an unpopular

war that had gone on too long. The then-recently retired General Dwight David Eisenhower spoke out against the conduct of the Korean war in the summer of 1952.

‘‘Where do we go from here,’’ he asked; ‘‘when comes the end?’’

Today, the members of this committee—indeed all Americans—await answers to

these same questions: Where do we go from here? When comes the end?

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR

FROM MARYLAND

As a new member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I wish to thank

Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Senator Lugar for taking the initiative to

hold today’s hearing regarding the war in Iraq. This hearing is timely and responds

to the interest of the public to learn more up-to-date information about the President’s plans and options.

I know the citizens of Maryland are very keen to understand where we are in Iraq

and the implications for our sons and daughters fighting in Baghdad and other

parts of that country. Maryland is home to the U.S. Naval Academy and other key

military installations. For many reasons, the Iraq war and the return of our troops

are of critical concern to the citizens of my State. Sixty-two Marylanders have lost

their lives in Iraq and many more have suffered life-changing injuries.

In fact, this is one of the reasons I sought a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee. Marylanders want to be informed about what is happening in Iraq and other

U.S. engagements around the world and I wanted to be in a position to respond to

this interest. To be sure, the Iraq Study Group Report was an excellent means to

begin this process. The findings and recommendations from the report constitute the

most in-depth study to date of the management of the Iraq war. Specifically, I agree

with the report’s recommendation to begin a phased troop withdrawal of combat brigades.

Today we begin a series of hearings on Iraq designed to give Members of Congress

and the American public a situational overview of the war and viable options to

change our current course to promote greater security and to bring our military

forces home. At the outset, I am very concerned about media reports regarding the

Bush administration’s intent to increase the number of U.S. troops.

In 2002, as a Member of the House of Representatives, I voted against the war

in Iraq and have been critical of the President’s conduct of the war and reconstruction efforts. I have encouraged the President to change course in Iraq and begin a

phased troop withdrawal. Now, every indication suggests the President plans to do

the opposite and increase American forces.

The escalation in combat forces causes me great concern for several reasons. First,

it is unclear whether we can count on the Iraqi military/security forces to contribute

and participate in the new security arrangement at a level that will allow U.S.

forces to pull back from Baghdad and to begin troop withdrawal. This was the major

problem in 2006 with ‘‘Operation Together Forward’’ Iraq failed to provide the

agreed-upon troop numbers.

Second, there is strong opinion that the increase in U.S. forces by itself will do

little to quelling the violence in Iraq and protect its civilians. The Iraqis should not

be allowed to hide behind robust American troop levels. Rather, the Iraqis should

assume responsibility to hold areas with American tactical, logistical, and technical

support. It is imperative now for the Iraqi Government to assert control over its

armed forces and security apparatus and finally institute appropriate command and

control structures to credibly fix many of their identified shortcomings.

Third, with increased security must come greater protection for civilians and enhanced economic/infrastructure reconstruction efforts. While I recognize reconstruction is a long-term process, the quicker the United States and our coalition partners

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begin this effort, the sooner we can stifle the insurgents’ ability to recruit more Iraqi

citizens into the deadly cycle of violence. Security and reconstruction go hand in

hand and we owe it to the people of Iraq and our troops to implement a multifaceted

approach to rebuild Iraq.

Fourth, it appears the President’s new Iraq plan may well raise as many problems

as it attempts to resolve. Troop escalation is a risky gambit that could increase sectarian violence and contribute further to Iraq’s slide to a larger civil war. I hope

this is not the case and I encourage the President to work with this Congress to

create a lasting solution to the situation in Iraq.

Finally, in that regard, it is critical that an aggressive initiative be undertaken

on the political and diplomatic front among the countries in the region. The goal

of such an initiative must be to bring about a cease-fire in the civil war and an Iraqi

Government that has the support of all the ethnic communities in Iraq. Military efforts alone cannot bring peace and stability to Iraq. The United States must undertake a broader international effort for a political solution to the civil war in Iraq.

During the coming weeks, the role of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to

inform will be just as important as the role of the committee itself. This committee

must exercise the appropriate oversight and investigation that the American people

are demanding, and that our troops deserve.

(95)

THE ADMINISTRATION’S PLAN FOR IRAQ

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007 [A.M.]

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich, Murkowski, DeMint, Isakson,

and Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will come to order.

Welcome to the Foreign Relations Committee, Madam Secretary.

It’s an honor to have you here.

Nearly 4 years ago, Congress and the American people gave the

President of the United States the authority to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and, if necessary, to depose a dictator. We

know now that the weapons of mass destruction were not there,

and that the dictator is no longer there, as well. The Iraqis have

held elections, and they’ve formed a government. But the country

and our troops, in my view, are now embroiled in the midst of a

vicious civil war.

As of last night, according to the Pentagon, 3,009 Americans

have lost their lives, over 22,000 have been wounded, and we have

spent and committed hundreds of billions of dollars. And there

seems to be no end in sight.

For many months now, the American people have understood

that our present policy is a failure, and they wanted to know, and

continue to want to know, where we go from here.

Last night, like millions of my fellow Americans, I listened intently to the President of the United States lay out his new strategy for Iraq. We all hoped and prayed the President would present

us with a plan that would make things better. Instead, I fear that

what the President has proposed is more likely to make things

worse.

We hoped and prayed we would hear of a plan that would have

two features: Begin to bring American forces home and a reasonable prospect of leaving behind a stable Iraq. Instead, we heard a

plan to escalate the war, not only in Iraq, but possibly into Iran

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and Syria, as well. I believe the President’s strategy is not a solution, Secretary Rice. I believe it’s a tragic mistake.

In Iraq, the core of the President’s plan is to send another 20,000

Americans to Baghdad, a city of more than 6 million people, where

they will go, with their fellow Iraqi soldiers, door to door in the

middle of a civil war.

If memory serves me, we’ve tried that kind of escalation twice before in Baghdad. And it’s failed twice in Baghdad. And I fear it will

fail a third time. And the result will be the loss of more American

lives and our military stretched to the breaking point, with little

prospect of success, and a further loss of influence in the region.

Secretary Rice, this November the American people voted for a

dramatic change in Iraq. The President said, forthrightly, he heard

them. But it seems clear to me from listening to him last night, he

did not listen. And, for the life of me, I don’t understand how he

could reject the overwhelming opposition to his plan from a broad

bipartisan cross-section of the country’s leaders—military, civilian,

and civic. As I understand it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed this

plan. Our commander in the region, General Abizaid, opposed the

plan. Our commanders in Iraq, starting with General Casey, opposed this plan. The Baker-Hamilton Commission opposed this

plan. And so did our greatest soldier statesman, Colin Powell.

They all gave advice to the President that could be boiled down

to two things. First, our military cannot stop the Shia, the Kurds,

and the Sunnis from killing each other. The Iraqi people have to

make very, very, very difficult political compromises in order for

the killing to stop. And all of the people who gave advice to the

President that I’ve mentioned suggested that the best way to force

the leaders and the people to make these hard compromises was

to start, this year, to drawdown our forces, not escalate them. The

second consensus point from the advice the President got was that

the way to secure this political solution to secure Iraq—was to secure support for whatever political solution the Iraqis arrived at

from Turkey, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and all the neighbors. And

there’s a second reason for seeking that kind of support and consultation. It was that, if, in fact, the civil war cannot be stopped,

at least with a regional consensus, the hope would be, it would be

contained within Iraq.

So, Secretary Rice, to be very blunt, I can’t, in good conscience,

support the President’s approach. But because there’s so much at

stake, I’m also not prepared to give up on finding a bipartisan way

forward that meets the twin goals most Americans share and, I believe—I don’t speak for anyone in this committee, but I believe

most of my colleagues in the Senate share, and that is: How do we

bring American forces home in an orderly way over the next year

and leave behind a stable Iraq? In all my years in the Senate, Secretary Rice, I don’t think we’ve faced a more pivotal moment than

the one we face today. Failure in Iraq will not be confined to Iraq.

It will do terrible damage to our ability to protect our interests all

over the world, and, I fear, for a long time to come. That’s why we

have to work together for a solution.

I’m aware that the surge is not 22,000 people—or 20,000 people

getting into the boat, landing at one moment. The reason why I

think there’s still time for us to work out a bipartisan solution is

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that this is a process. We need a solution that will gain the support

of our fellow citizens.

I say to my colleagues, maybe because I got here in the midst

of the Vietnam war, toward the end, I think we all learned a lesson, whether we went or didn’t go, whether we were for it or

against it, is no foreign policy can be sustained in this country

without the informed consent of the American people. They’ve got

to sign on. They’ve got to sign on. I just hope it’s not too late.

Mr. Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in

welcoming Secretary Rice to the Foreign Relations Committee once

again. I appreciate her willingness to discuss policy on Iraq with

the committee in advance of a very important trip to the Middle

East which I understand commences tomorrow. All of us listened

intently to President Bush’s speech last night. Yesterday I said

that, initially, the President and his team should explain what objectives we’re trying to achieve if forces are expanded, where and

how will they be used, why is it the strategy will succeed, how

Iraqi forces will be involved, how long additional troops may be

needed, what contingencies are in place if the situation does not

improve, and how this strategy fits into our discussion throughout

the region. The President made an important start on this process

with his speech. The elements of his plan require careful study by

Members of Congress. I appreciate the efforts the President has

made, thus far, to reach out to Congress and to the American

people.

I was encouraged by the President’s emphasis on a regional element in his Iraq strategy. Whenever we begin to see Iraq as a set

piece—an isolated problem that can be solved outside the context

of our broader interests—we should reexamine our frame of reference. Our efforts to stabilize Iraq and sustain a pluralist government there have an important humanitarian purpose. But remaking Iraq, in and of itself, does not constitute a strategic objective.

Stability in Iraq is important because it has a direct bearing on

vital U.S. strategic objectives. To determine our future course in

Iraq, we must be very clear about what those objectives are. In my

judgment there are four primary ones.

First, we have an interest in preventing Iraq, or any piece of its

territory, from being used as a safe haven or training ground for

terrorists. As part of this, we have an interest in preventing any

potential terrorist in Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Second, we have an interest in preventing a civil war or conditions of permanent disorder in Iraq that upset wider regional stability. The consequences of turmoil that draws in outside powers or

spills over into neighboring states could be grave. Such turmoil

could generate a regional war, topple friendly governments, expand

destabilizing refugee flows, close the Persian Gulf to shipping traffic, or destroy key oil production and transportation facilities. Any

of these outcomes could restrict or diminish the flow of oil from the

region, with disastrous results for the world economy.

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Third, we have an interest in preventing the loss of U.S. credibility and standing in the region and throughout the world. Some

loss of confidence in the United States has already occurred, but

our subsequent actions in Iraq may determine how we are viewed

for generations.

Fourth, we have an interest in preventing Iranian domination of

the region. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni government opened

up opportunities for Iran to seek much more influence in Iraq. An

Iran that is bolstered by an alliance with a Shiite government in

Iraq or a separate Shiite state in southern Iraq would pose serious

challenges for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab governments. Iran is pressing a broad agenda in the Middle East with uncertain consequences for weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of Israel, and other U.S. interests. Any course we adopt in Iraq

would consider how it would impact the regional influence of Iran.

Now, these are not our only interests in Iraq, but they’re fundamental reasons for our military presence during the last several

years.

I would observe that all four of these objectives are deeply affected not just by whether the insurgency and sectarian violence

can be abated in Iraq cities and neighborhoods, but by the action

of Iraq’s neighbors.

For this reason, I have advocated broader diplomacy in the region that is directed at both improving stability in Iraq and expanding our options in the region. Inevitably, when one suggests

such a diplomatic course, this is interpreted as advocating negotiations with Syria and Iran—nations that have overtly and covertly

worked against our interests and violated international norms. But

the purpose of the talks is not to change our posture toward these

countries. A necessary regional dialog should not be sacrificed because of fear of what might happen if we include unfriendly regimes. Moreover, we already have numerous contacts with the Iranians and Syrians through intermediaries and other means. The

regional dialog I am suggesting does not have to occur in a formal

conference setting, but it needs to occur, and it needs to be sustained.

Both our friends and our enemies in the region must know that

we will defend out interests and our allies. They must know that

we are willing to exercise the substantial leverage we possess in

the region in the form of military presence, financial assistance,

diplomatic context, and other resources. Although it is unlikely

that a political settlement in Iraq can be imposed from the outside,

it is equally unlikely that one will succeed in the absence of external pressures and incentives. We should be active in bringing those

forces to bear on Iraqi factions. We should work to prevent miscalculations related to the turmoil in Iraq.

Now, finally, much attention has been focused on the President’s

call for increasing troop levels in Iraq. This is an important consideration, but it is not the only element of his plan that requires examination. The larger issue is how we will manage our strategic interests in the Middle East, in light of our situation in Iraq. Can

we use the stability that we offer the region, and our role as a

counterweight to Iran, to gain more help in Iraq and in the region?

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I look forward to continuing our examination of Iraq in the committee’s hearings, and especially your testimony this morning.

Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Madam Secretary, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF

STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you, members of the committee.

I look forward to our discussion. And in order to facilitate that,

Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement that I would like to have

entered into the record, and I will——

Senator BIDEN. Without objection, your entire statement will be

placed in the record.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

As I come before you today, America is facing a crucial moment—

indeed, as the chairman has put it, a pivotal moment—concerning

our policies in Iraq and concerning our broader policies in the Middle East. I think that we all know that the stakes in Iraq are enormous and that the consequences of failure would also be enormous,

not just for America and for Iraq, but for the entire region of the

Middle East, and, indeed, for the world. And so, we agree that the

stakes in Iraq are enormous. And as the President said last night,

Americans broadly agree, and we in the administration count ourselves among them, that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable. On

these two points, we are unified: The enormousness of the stakes,

and the unacceptability of the current situation.

The President has, therefore, forged a new strategy that speaks

both to our stakes in Iraq and the need to change the way that we

are doing things. The Iraqis have devised a strategy that they believe will work for their most urgent problem; that is, to return security to Baghdad. We are going to support that strategy through

the augmentation of American military forces. I think Secretary

Gates will say more about that in his committee. But I want also

to emphasize that we see this not just as a military effort, but also

as one that must have very strong political and economic elements.

In order to better deliver on the governance and economic side,

the United States is further decentralizing and diversifying our civilian presence. And I will talk a little bit more about that, and in

greater detail. We are further integrating our civil and military operations. And, as Senator Lugar has noted, it’s extremely important

to see Iraq in a regional context, and I would like to talk a little

bit about the regional strategy that we want to pursue that supports reformers and responsible leaders in Iraq and across the

broader Middle East.

Let me be very clear. We all understand that the responsibility

for what kind of Iraq this will be rests with the Iraqis. They are

the only ones who can decide whether or not Iraq is, in fact, going

to be an Iraq for all Iraqis, one that is unified, or whether they are

going to allow sectarian passions to unravel that chance for a unified Iraq. We know, historically, that Iraq rests on the region’s religious and ethnic fault lines. And, in many ways, due to events in

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Baghdad over the last year, Baghdad has become the center of that

struggle.

The Samarra mosque bombing provoked sectarianism, and it set

it aflame at a pace that threatens to overwhelm the fragile and yet

promising process of reconciliation, a process that has produced

successful elections and a new constitution, and substantial agreement, as we sit here today, on a law to share Iraq’s oil wealth

fairly, as well as a commitment to a more reasonable approach to

de-Baathification and to hold provincial elections. Iraqis must take

on the essential challenge, therefore, that threatens this process of

national reconciliation, and that is the protection of their population from criminals and violent extremists who kill in the name

of sectarian grievance.

The President, last night, made clear that the augmentation of

our forces is to support the Iraqis in that goal of returning control

and civility to their capital. He also noted that there are also very

important strategic, economic, and political elements that must be

followed up if ‘‘clear, hold, and build’’ is to actually work this way.

And so, I want to assure you that we, in the State Department, recognize the importance of surging our civilian elements and our civilian efforts, as well as the surge that would be there on the

military side. This is a comprehensive policy.

Iraq has a federal government. We need to get our civilian employees out of our Embassy, out of the Green Zone, into the field,

across Iraq. We have had, over the last year and a half, the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are operating

outside of Baghdad. The importance of those teams should be understood in the following way: It is extremely important to have an

effective and functioning government in Baghdad, and we have

worked with them on ministries, on budget processes, on the technical assistance that they need, to have a functioning government.

But it is equally important to have local and provincial governments that can deliver for their people. And, indeed, this gives us

multiple points for success, not just the Government in Baghdad,

but the people with whom we are working in the provinces.

I might just note that we believe that this is having an effect in

places like Mosul and Tal Afar, but it’s also having a very good effect even in some of the most difficult places. And one of the other

elements of the President’s policy last night was to announce that

4,000 American forces would be augmented in Anbar, the epicenter

of al-Qaeda activity. That is, in part, because we believe that the

efforts that we’ve been making with local leaders, particularly the

sheikhs in Anbar, are beginning to pay fruit. For instance, they

have recruited, from their own ranks, 1,100 young men to send to

Jordan for training, and these ‘‘Sons of Anbar,’’ as they call them,

will come back to enter the fight against al-Qaeda.

And so, I want to emphasize, we’re focused on the need to return

control to Baghdad, but we’re also very focused on the need to build

capacity in the local and provincial governments, and to be able to

deliver economic and reconstruction assistance there.

Finally, let me just say one word about our regional diplomatic

strategy. Obviously, Iraq is central now to America’s role in the

Middle East—central to our credibility, central to the prospects for

stability, and central to the role that our allies and friends and

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Iraq’s neighbors will play in the Middle East. But we have to base

our regional strategy on the substantially changed realities of the

Middle East.

This is a different Middle East. This Middle East is a Middle

East in which there really is a new alignment of forces. On one

side are reformers and responsible leaders who seek to advance

their interests peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the

other side are extremists, of every sect and ethnicity, who use violence to spread chaos, to undermine democratic governments, and

to impose agendas of hatred and intolerance. On one side of that

divide, the gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the other

countries of the gulf—Egypt, Jordan, the young democracies of Lebanon, of the Palestinian territory, led by Mahmoud Abbas, and in

Iraq. But on the other side of that divide are Iran, Syria,

Hezbollah, and Hamas. And I think we have to understand that

that is a fundamental divide. Iran and Syria have made their

choice, and their choice is to destabilize, not to stabilize.

And so, with all respect to those who talk about engagement with

Syria and Iran, I think we need to recognize that if Iran and Syria

wish to play a stabilizing role for their own interests, then they

will do so. If, on the other hand, they intend to offer a stabilizing

role because they believe that, in our current situation in Iraq, we

are willing to pay a price, that’s not diplomacy, that’s extortion.

And I would just ask you what that price might be.

I have a hard time believing that Iran will, on one side, talk to

us about stabilizing Iraq and say, ‘‘Oh, by the way, we won’t talk

about what you’re doing in the Security Council to stop our nuclear

program.’’ That’s not part of the price. Or that Syria will talk about

stabilizing Iraq while they continue to destabilize it, and say, ‘‘Oh,

we aren’t actually interested in talking about the fact that we have

not reconciled to the loss of our position in Lebanon or to the existence of a tribunal to try those who are responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri.’’ These two will most certainly come into

contact with each other, the destabilizing activities in Iraq and the

desires of these states to have us pay a price that we cannot pay.

We do have a regional approach. It is to work with those governments that share our view of where the Middle East should be

going. It is also to work with those governments in a way that can

bring support to the new Iraqi democracy. It is to support the very

normal democracy that Iraq itself may engage in with all of its

neighbors. And it is to have an international compact, which is a

bargain between the international community and Iraq, for support

in response to Iraqi reforms, economic and, indeed, some that are

political. In that Iraqi compact, both Syria and Iran have been

present, and will continue to be.

Let me just conclude by saying that we all understand, in the administration, that there are no magic formulas for Iraq, as the

Baker-Hamilton Commission said. And I’d like you to understand

that we really did consider the options before us. The President

called on advisors from outside. He called on the advice of the

Baker-Hamilton Study Group. And, of course, he discussed the policies with his advisors, like me, who have been there from the beginning, and, therefore, bear responsibility for both the successes

and failures of this policy; and new advisors, like Secretary of DeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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fense Gates, who came with a fresh eye. After all of that, he came

to the conclusion—and I fully agree—that the most urgent task before us now is to help the Iraqi Government. And I want to emphasize ‘‘help’’ the Iraqi Government—to establish confidence among

the Iraqi population that it will, and can, protect all of its citizens,

whether they are Sunni, Shia, Kurds, or others, and that they will,

in an evenhanded fashion, punish those violent people who are killing innocent Iraqis, whatever their sect, ethnicity, or political

affiliation.

We believe that the Iraqi Government, which has not always performed, has every reason to understand the consequences, now, of

nonperformance. They, after all, came to us and said that this

problem had to be solved. They came to us and said that, yes, they

would make the necessary decisions to prevent political interference in the military operations that need to be taken to deal

with the Baghdad problem. They came to us and said that, ‘‘This

government will not be able to survive if it cannot reestablish civil

order.’’ And they gave to the President, and not just Prime Minister

Maliki, but many leaders, an assurance that this time they’re going

to make the difficult choices in order to get it done.

The situation in Iraq is unacceptable, but Iraq is also, at this

point in time, of very high stakes to this Nation. This is a time for

a national desire and a national imperative not to fail in Iraq.

We’ve faced crucible tests as a country before, and we’ve come

through them when we have come through them together. I want

to pledge to you, as the President last—did last night, that we

want to work with all Americans, here, particularly, in the Congress, the representatives of the American people, as we move forward on a strategy that will allow us to succeed in Iraq. This is

the strategy that the President believes is the best strategy that we

can pursue. And I ask your careful consideration of it, your ideas

for how to improve it. And, of course, understanding that not everyone will agree, I do believe that we’re united in our desire to see

America succeed.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as I come before you today, America

faces a crucial moment. We all know that the stakes in Iraq are enormous. And we

all share the belief that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable. On this we are united.

The new way forward that President Bush outlined last night requires us to do

things differently. Most importantly, the Iraqis have devised their own strategy, and

our efforts will support theirs. To do so, we will further decentralize and diversify

our civilian presence in Iraq to better assist the Iraqi people. We will further integrate our civilian and military operations. And we will fashion a regional strategy

that supports reformers and responsible leaders in Iraq and across the Broader Middle East.

Among Americans and Iraqis, there is no confusion over one basic fact: It is Iraqis

who are responsible for what kind of country Iraq will be. It is they who must decide

whether Iraq will be characterized by national unity or sectarian conflict. The President has conveyed to the Iraqi leadership that we will support their good decisions,

but that America’s patience is limited.

Iraqis are now engaged in a task without precedent in their history. Iraq rests

on the main religious and ethnic faultlines in the Middle East, and for centuries,

Iraqis have settled their differences through oppression and violence. Now they are

attempting to do so peacefully and politically. This is not easy, and as one could

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expect, many Iraqis have deep grievances, which some violent men interpret as a

license to kill innocent people.

Baghdad has become the center of this conflict. We know that al-Qaeda deliberately sought to provoke sectarian violence in Iraq by targeting Shia civilians. With

last February’s bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the success of their plan

accelerated. Sectarian passions, incited to violence, now threaten to overwhelm

Iraq’s fragile, yet promising, process of reconciliation—a process that has produced

successful elections and a new constitution, substantial agreement on a law to share

Iraq’s oil fairly, and commitment to a more reasonable approach to ‘‘debaathification.’’

To succeed with national reconciliation, the Iraqi Government must improve security for its people, particularly in Baghdad. Iraqis themselves must take up this essential challenge. They must protect their population from criminals and violent

extremists who kill innocent Iraqis in the name of sectarian grievance. The Iraqi

Government must reestablish civil order in Baghdad to regain the trust of its people

and control of its capital. President Bush has decided to augment our forces to help

the Iraqis achieve this mission. Secretary Gates will have more to say on this.

Success in Iraq, however, relies on more than military efforts alone; it also requires robust political and economic progress. Our military operations must be fully

integrated with our civilian and diplomatic efforts, across the entire U.S. Government, to advance the strategy that I laid out before you last year: ‘‘Clear, hold, and

build.’’ All of us in the State Department fully understand our role in this mission,

and we are prepared to play it. We are ready to strengthen, indeed to ‘‘surge,’’ our

civilian efforts.

Our political and economic strategy mirrors our military plan: Iraqis are in the

lead; we are supporting them. Improvement in the security situation, especially in

Baghdad, will open a window of opportunity for the Iraqi Government to accelerate

the process of national reconciliation. We can and will measure whether this work

is being done. We recognize that the trend of political progress in Iraq is just as

important as the end result. On the hydrocarbon law, for example, Iraqis are transcending sectarian differences and achieving a national purpose. This is a positive

trend, and the process is moving in the right direction.

Iraqis must also take steps that accelerate economic development and growth. The

Government of Iraq has taken many important steps already on key economic

issues, including policies to open Iraq’s economy more fully and responsibly to foreign investment. The Iraqi Government must now move urgently, especially in the

most troubled areas, to deliver essential services to its people—programs that improve lives in meaningful ways, that restore confidence in national and local governance, and provide a stake in the country’s future for all Iraqis who wish to see an

expansion of hope rather than a continuation of violence. The Iraqi Government is

committing $10 billion of its own resources to help create jobs, to break the logjams

to growth in their economy, and to further national reconciliation.

To better disperse these new resources throughout the country, Iraqis are building

new governmental structures. One innovation they have proposed is the creation of

a new National Reconstruction Development Council, which would enable the Prime

Minister to deliver resources faster and more effectively for major infrastructure

projects. This Council will also help take the place of our own Relief and Reconstruction Fund. Another Iraqi innovation is the development of Project Management

Units, to help Iraqis use their own resources more effectively to implement programs.

For these efforts to succeed, our support will be crucial. Since 2004, we have used

money from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and other programs to build

infrastructure and help the central government move toward self-reliance. As we

enter 2007, despite many problems, we have substantially and successfully completed this phase. As Iraqis take charge, we will narrow our focus in how we help

their central government. Using FY 2006 Supplemental funding, we have worked

with the Iraqis to improve their capacity to govern. Now, our advisory efforts will

concentrate on the most vital ministries. We will advise and invest our resources

where we judge that our efforts will be most effective.

To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure that it is

closely integrated with our security strategy, I have appointed Tim Carney to the

new position of coordinator for Iraq Transitional Assistance. He will be based in

Baghdad and will work with Iraqi counterparts to facilitate a maximum degree of

coordination in our economic and development efforts.

As Iraqis intensify efforts to improve lives, the main focus of our support will continue to shift toward helping the Iraqi Government expand its reach, its relevance,

and its resources beyond the Green Zone. We will help local leaders improve their

capacity to govern and deliver public services. Our economic efforts will be more tarVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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geted on specific local needs with proven records of success, like microcredit programs. And we will engage with leading private sector enterprises and other local

businesses, including the more promising state-owned firms, to break the obstacles

to growth.

Our decentralization of effort in Iraq will require a more decentralized presence.

We must continue to get civilians and diplomats out of our Embassy, out of the capital and into the field, all across the country. The mechanism to do this is the Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT. We currently have 10 PRTs deployed across

Iraq: 7 American and 3 coalition. Building on this existing presence, we plan to expand from 10 to at least 18 teams. For example, we will have six PRTs in Baghdad,

not just one. We will go from one team in Anbar province to three—in Fallujah,

Ramadi, and Al Qaim. These PRTs will closely share responsibilities and reflect an

unprecedented unity of civilian and military effort.

Expanding our PRT presence will also enable us to diversify our assistance across

all of Iraq. Iraq has a federal government. Much of the street-level authority, and

much of the opportunity for positive change in Iraq, lies outside the Green Zone—

in local and provincial governments with party leaders and tribal chiefs. By actively

supporting these provincial groups and structures, we diversify our chances of success in Iraq. Our PRTs have had success working at the local level in towns like

Mosul, Tikrit, and Tal Afar. Now we will invest in other parts of Iraq, like Anbar

province, where local leaders are showing their desire and building their capacity

to confront violent extremists and build new sources of hope for their people.

All total, we seek to deploy hundreds of additional civilians across Iraq to help

Iraqis build their nation. And we will ask Congress to provide funding to support

and secure our expanded civilian presence. We want to give our civilians, deployed

in PRTs, the flexibility to devote extra resources where they can do the most good

at the local level. Our expanded PRT presence will be a powerful tool to empower

Iraq’s reformers and responsible leaders in their struggle against violent extremism.

We, therefore, plan to request, as part of our FY 2007 Supplemental, significant new

operating funds for our PRTs as well as hundreds of million of dollars to fund their

programs. When we add in relevant USAID projects, we hope to approximately double our resource commitment to help local Iraqi communities through PRTs.

These commitments will not be indefinite. As I said earlier, one of our main objectives in this phase is to help the Iraqis use their own money to rebuild their country. The Iraqis have budgeted billions of dollars for this mission in 2007, and as

their efforts become more effective, we have kept our FY 2008 requests limited. We

want Iraqis to rely more and more on their own resources, their own people, and

their own efforts. Therefore, by 2008 and 2009, the burden of local assistance should

be assumed more effectively by the Iraqi Government. In the meantime, though, our

efforts will be vital.

The final piece of our effort is the development of a regional diplomatic strategy,

which was a key recommendation of the Iraq Study Group. Iraq is central to the

future of the Middle East. The security of this region is an enduring vital interest

for the United States. America’s presence in this part of the world contributes significantly to its stability and success. So, as we recommit ourselves in Iraq, we are

also enhancing our efforts to support reformers and responsible leaders in the region—and to deter and counter aggression to our friends and allies.

Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed realities of the Middle East. Historic change is now unfolding in the region, and it is unleashing a great

deal of tension, anxiety, and violence. But it is also revealing a new strategic alignment in the Middle East. This is the same alignment we see in Iraq. On one side

are the many reformers and responsible leaders, who seek to advance their interests

peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other side are extremists, of every

sect and ethnicity, who use violence to spread chaos, to undermine democratic governments, and to impose agendas of hate and intolerance.

This is why the proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those who share

our goals. In this group, I would count, of course, our democratic allies: Turkey and

Israel. I would also count the governments of the Gulf States plus Egypt and Jordan, or the ‘‘GCC+2.’’ We have established unprecedented consultation with this

group of countries. In fact, I will be returning to the region, and to this process,

later this week. I would also count among our key partners the democratic reformers and leaders in places like Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and, of course,

Iraq. Our most important goal now is to use our diplomacy to empower democratic

and other responsible leaders across the region. We must help them show their fellow citizens that it is they, not violent extremists, who can best protect their lives,

promote their interests, and advance a future of hope.

On Iraq, in particular, our regional diplomacy has several components. One concerns Iraq’s neighbor to the north: Turkey. President Bush and I have engaged reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tired GEN Joe Ralston to work with Iraq and Turkey on concerns about terrorism

from the Kurdish Worker’s Party. Those efforts have helped to ease tensions, but

we will do more to protect our ally, Turkey, from terrorist attacks.

Over the last 6 months, we have also supported significant progress in crafting

an international compact between the Iraqi Government and the international community. Working with more than 40 countries, Iraq has developed a set of written

commitments to action on political, security, and economic targets. The creation of

the compact has been guided by a diplomatic process that has already met at the

level of Foreign Ministers. This group involves all of Iraq’s neighbors—including

Iran—and other states that have invested significantly in Iraq’s future. Iraq has led

the compact process. The United Nations has served as cochair. And the World

Bank has assisted. This diplomatic process also provides a structure that can easily

accommodate flexible, informal meetings of smaller groups of countries about other

topics of common concern.

While many of us are working to strengthen peace in the region, two governments

have unfortunately chosen to align themselves with the forces of violent extremism—both in Iraq and across the Middle East. One is Syria. Despite many appeals, including from Syria’s fellow Arab States, the leaders in Damascus continue

to destabilize Iraq and their neighbors and support terrorism. The problem here is

not a lack of talk with Syria but a lack of action by Syria.

Iran is the other. If the government in Tehran wants to help stabilize the region,

as it now claims, it should end its support for violent extremists who destroy the

aspirations of innocent Lebanese, Palestinians, and Iraqis. And it should end its

pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. I repeat my offer today: If Iran suspends

its enrichment of uranium—which is, after all, an international demand, not just

an American one—then the United States is prepared to reverse 27 years of policy,

and I will meet with my Iranian counterpart—anytime, anywhere—to discuss every

facet of our countries’ relationship. Until then, we will continue to work with the

Iraqis and use all of our power to limit and counter the activities of Iranian agents

who are attacking our people and innocent civilians in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I know there are no guarantees or

magic formulas on the question of Iraq. I know that most Americans are skeptical

and concerned about the prospects of success. I know and share the concern for

those who remain in harm’s way that all Americans feel, as well as the heartbreak

they feel for the families who have lost loved ones.

I also know that, over the past several weeks, President Bush and our entire national security team have carefully considered a full range of new ideas. The President has heard from those of his advisors, like me, who have been around from the

very beginning, and who bear responsibility for our policy thus far—its successes

and its setbacks. He has also heard from new advisors who bring a fresh perspective. In addition, the President has weighed the thoughtful advice given to him by

Members of Congress, by our friends and allies abroad, and by outside experts like

the gracious public servants who made up the Iraq Study Group.

The conclusion the President reached, with which I fully agree, is that the most

urgent task now is to help the Iraqi Government establish confidence that it can,

and will, protect all of its citizens, regardless of their sectarian identity, from violent

extremists who threaten Iraq’s young democracy—and that it will reinforce security

with political reconciliation and economic support. Implementing this strategy will

take time to succeed, and I fully expect that mistakes will be made along the way.

I also know that violent extremists will retain their capacity and their appetite to

murder innocent people. But reestablishing civil order—the willingness and the capacity of the Iraqi Government to meet its responsibilities to its people—is essential.

The situation in Iraq is unacceptable, and the stakes are extraordinary—for the

United States, for the region, and for the entire international community. It was,

after all, the trouble and turmoil of the Middle East that produced the violent extremist ideology of al-Qaeda, which led 19 young men to crash airplanes into our

cities 5 years ago on September 11. It is clear that, now and for many years to come,

the crucible of the Middle East will remain the center of gravity for American and

international interests.

There have been other critical times for America, when we have united as one

nation to meet great challenges. Now must be such a time, for it is a national desire

and a national imperative not to fail in Iraq. This, we believe, is the best strategy

to ensure success. And I ask that you give it a chance to work.

Senator BIDEN. Madam Secretary, thank you very much. And I

assure you, no one on this committee has any doubt about your intense concern and the intensity with which you have deliberated on

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this and your frank acknowledgment of the mistakes that have

been made. And I don’t have any doubt about us wondering whether or not you care a great deal about this.

I have been told by the staff that the Secretary—she has a big

day today. She has to be here, as well as in the House, and she

understandably will have to leave here by 1 o’clock, at the latest.

According to the staff calculation—and I’m going to hold everybody

to this, including myself—that if we give everyone 7 minutes, everyone will have an opportunity to ask her, not all the questions

you have, but the most important questions you think need be

asked. We will be holding these hearings for another 21⁄2 weeks.

There’ll be plenty of opportunities. And, again, the Secretary will

be back over the ensuing months. And so, I hope that that meets

with everyone’s approval. Matter of fact, seven may be stretching

it, but that’s where we’re going to start, if we can.

Let me begin, Secretary Rice. Last night, the President said, and

I quote, ‘‘Succeeding in Iraq requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of extremists’ challenges,

and that begins with addressing Iran and Syria.’’ He went on to

say, ‘‘We will interrupt the flow of support for Iran and Syria, and

we will seek out and destroy networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.’’ Does that mean the

President has plans to cross the Syrian and/or Iranian borders to

pursue those persons or individuals or governments providing that

help?

Secretary RICE. Mr. Chairman, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

was just asked this question, and I think he perhaps said it best.

He talked about what we’re really trying to do here, which is to

protect our forces, and that we are doing that by seeking out these

networks that we know are operating in Iraq. We are doing it

through intelligence. We are then able, as we did on the 21st of December, to go after these groups, where we find them. In that case,

we then ask the Iraqi Government to declare them persona non

grata and expel them from the country, because they were holding

diplomatic passports. But what is really being contemplated here,

in terms of these networks, is that we believe we can do what we

need to do inside Iraq. Obviously, the President isn’t going to rule

anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take down

these networks in Iraq.

The broader point is that we do have, and we have always had,

as a country, very strong interests and allies in the gulf region, and

we do need to work with our allies to make certain that they have

the defense capacity that they need against growing Iranian military buildup, that they feel that we are going to be a presence in

the Persian Gulf region, as we have been, and that we establish

confidence with the states with which we have long alliances, that

we will help to defend their interests. And that’s what the President had in mind.

Senator BIDEN. Secretary Rice, do you believe the President has

the constitutional authority to pursue, across the border into Iraq

or Syria, the networks in those countries?

Secretary RICE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think I would not like to

speculate on the President’s constitutional authority or to say anything that certainly would abridge his constitutional authority,

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which is broad, as Commander in Chief. I do think that everyone

will understand that the American people and, I assume, the Congress, expects the President to do what is necessary to protect our

forces.

Senator BIDEN. Madam Secretary, I just want to make it clear,

speaking for myself, that if the President concluded he had to invade Iran or Syria in pursuit of these networks, I believe the

present authorization—which granted the President the right to

use force in Iraq—does not cover that, and he does need congressional authority to do that. I just want to set that marker.

Let me move on. How long do you estimate American forces will

be going door to door with their Iraqi counterparts in Baghdad before they can—I believe the phrase is ‘‘secure’’—or ‘‘clear, hold, and

build’’? What is the estimate of how long will it take to clear? And

how long are we prepared to hold with American forces in Baghdad

that are being surged?

Secretary RICE. Well, I can’t give you an exact timetable on how

long operations might take. Let me just note that the Iraqis are in

the lead on these Baghdad operations. And I think that one reason

that it’s extremely important that they are bringing some of their

best forces from around Iraq to participate in this—or to lead this

effort is that a good deal of the establishing of confidence in these

neighborhoods has to be done by Iraqis. We will be in support of

them, but I think that it’s extremely important to have an image

in mind that it is Iraqis who are expected to take census. After all,

they’re the ones with the linguistics skills to do so. It is Iraqis that

are expected to be in these neighborhoods. The problem with previous Baghdad security plans is that there weren’t enough forces

to hold. I think that it is important that it will be a combination

of Iraqi forces: Army and police—national police and local police.

But we want to be certain, this time, that the holding phase lasts

long enough for the Iraqis to be able to deal with the perpetrators

of the violence. And so, I don’t want to try to put a timeframe on

it, but Secretary Gates said, earlier today, that he expects this to,

of course, be a temporary measure while Iraqi forces are brought

up to——

Senator BIDEN. Well, Secretary Rice, I think you’re right. It’s important to have a visual image of what this means: 6.2 million people, a civil war or a sectarian war taking place. And here’s what

the President said last night, referring to our surge troops, ‘‘The

vast majority of them, five brigades, will be deployed to Baghdad.

These troops will work alongside Iraqi units, and will be embedded

in their formations.’’ No American should misunderstand what that

means. It means young marines are going to be standing next to

an Iraqi soldier as they break down a door. So, I’d want to know

and you’ve answered it—my question related to how long we think

these marines and these five brigades are going to be kicking in

doors, standing on street corners, patrolling neighborhoods, going

to second-story walkups, et cetera. And that was the reason for my

question. But, you’re right, it’s important we have the correct

image of what this is. And that’s what it is.

Secretary RICE. It is important that we have the correct image

that Iraqis want to have this be their responsibility.

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Senator BIDEN. Are you confident—you, personally, Madam Secretary—this will be my concluding comment—question—are you

confident that Maliki has the capacity to send you a sufficient

number of troops that will stay in the lead, that will allow American Marines to feel that their physical security is not being jeopardized merely by being ‘‘with this brigade of Iraqis’’? Are you

confident they will send a sufficient number, and their best?

Secretary RICE. Most importantly, General Casey and our Ambassador believe strongly that the Maliki government intends to

live up to its obligations.

Senator BIDEN. But I’m asking you, Secretary Rice.

Secretary RICE. I have met Prime Minister Maliki. I was with

him in Amman. I saw his resolve. I think he knows that his government is, in a sense, on borrowed time, not just in terms of the

American people, but in terms of the Iraqi people.

Senator BIDEN. Are you confident?

Secretary RICE. I’m confident.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Secretary—or, excuse

me—Major Secretary——

[Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. Senator Lugar—Chairman Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rice, in the New York Times today, columnist David

Brooks wrote a column called ‘‘The Fog Over Iraq.’’ I simply wanted

your comment, because you have indicated you have visited with

Prime Minister Maliki. David Brooks references the meeting of our

President with Prime Minister Maliki on November 30 in which,

reportedly, Maliki presented a plan in which our troops, the American troops, would go to the periphery of Baghdad, and would fight

off insurgents, Sunni insurgents or whoever, trying to penetrate

Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Army and police, including Shiites

and Kurds, principally, would take over the responsibility of attempting to clear the city.

Essentially, Brooks says President Bush rejected that plan, or

our Government did, and the President has decided that we would

do the opposite. American troops would be embedded in the nine

police districts in Baghdad, and would, in fact, be more heavily involved, with a new mandate to secure those areas, whether door to

door or in some other fashion. One thought is, no, not door to door,

that the Shiites go door to door, and that we are back in the background, advising and supporting, and so forth. But the article goes

on to give the impression that Maliki and the Kurds and the Shiites had at least an idea of creating their own kind of stability.

Now, from our standpoint, we may have decided that such a

move rejected the Sunnis as a partner in the process; and, thus,

led to greater destabilization of the country as a whole on—but let

me just ask for your comment as to whether this is a sequence of

events that transpired into the plan that the President gave last

night. And what are the strengths and dangers of that?

Secretary RICE. Yes, Senator Lugar, the core of the Maliki plan

has really been preserved here. This really is based on his plan. It

is absolutely the case that the Iraqis have wanted to have responsibility for their own problem, to have their troops under their command, and to move out. When Prime Minister Maliki presented the

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plan, he wanted our people to look at it with his military people

to see how quickly this could be accelerated so that he could go and

take care of the sectarian problem in Baghdad.

The fact is that it could not be accelerated quickly enough with

only Iraqi forces in order to meet the timeline that he really felt

he had, in terms of dealing with the Baghdad problem. And so, out

of this planning process came, from our generals, the view that we

needed to augment their forces, as embeds, as, by the way, the

Baker-Hamilton Commission recommends, as people who can help

them with, in a sense, on-the-job training, who can help them to,

kind of, solidify their ability to go after this. But the Iraqis continue to press that they really need to be the ones interfacing with

their population in a major way, they need to be the ones to deliver

the stability that is needed.

I think you will see that in a relatively brief period of time as

their forces develop, they will take on more and more. And as the

President said last night, the thought is, they would have all of

their forces by November. But there was a gap in time between the

time that they need to get Baghdad under control and having the

capability to do it, even bringing, as they are, their best and most

reliable army forces from around the country.

So, that’s the difference. But I don’t believe it was ever really the

Prime Minister’s intention that it would be Shia and Kurds only.

I think he understands that one of the problems that they have is

that the Sunni population feels that the Iraqi Government is not

evenhanded in dealing with death squads.

Senator LUGAR. What can you tell us about favorable reception

of some of the sheikhs in Anbar province of our new policies?

Would you describe that situation?

Secretary RICE. Yes. Well, the last time that there was a kind

of formal report about Anbar, I remember some of the reporting as

being the tremendous difficulties in Anbar. And it is a difficult

place, because it is the epicenter of al-Qaeda. Now what you will

hear from our commanders in the area—and also I have heard directly from my Provincial Reconstruction Team leader, a very seasoned diplomat—is that the sheikhs have essentially gotten tired

of al-Qaeda, and want them out. They do not believe that we can

do that alone. They have begun to recruit their own young men to

be trained to be a force against the foreign invaders. They have,

for instance, sent 1,100 young men to Jordan to train for something

that they call the ‘‘Sons of Anbar’’ to come back. They will recruit

more and send them. This is also a part of a success, we believe,

of a policy with regional neighbors who have been involved in the

Sunni outreach piece. It is into that—Anbar—that we believe it’s

important to surge both civilian and military assets. And so, when

the President talks about 4,000 additional forces sent to Anbar,

this is not because of a sectarian problem, this is because we think

we may be able to support this local effort against al-Qaeda, and,

second, to surge resources into Anbar.

To be very frank, the chairman asked me if I was confident about

the Iraqi Government. I’m confident that they want to do this. I’m

also one who knows that there have been times when they haven’t

performed, in the past. And one of the things that they’ve got to

perform better on is getting economic resources into some of the

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Sunni areas, particularly into Anbar. And so, we are also going to

increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Anbar

to help with that process.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Dodd.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR

FROM CONNECTICUT

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Madam Secretary. And let me thank you, as

well. We’ve had some conversations over the last couple of weeks,

prior to the trip Senator Kerry and I took to the region, and then

on the return, as well, and I thank you for that. And I thank you

for being here this morning.

And again, I thank the chairman for holding these set—these series of hearings that we’re going to have on the subject matter.

They’d offer, I hope, an opportunity for us not only to listen to you,

as we did the President last evening, but also an opportunity for

you to hear from us, as well. I think it’s important that there be

a conversation here as we try to sort out this policy and begin to

make sense of it. It’s not about Democrats and Republicans, it’s

about getting this right. And I couldn’t agree more with Senator

Biden, I don’t know of another foreign policy crisis that’s been as

compelling as this one. Over the past 32 years, as a Member of the

House and as a Member of this body and a member of this committee for a quarter of a century, I’ve never been to the region

where I’ve felt it was more in crisis than it is today, and at greater

risk.

So, I’d like to share just some opening thoughts and comments,

if I can with you, and then—and get to a quick question.

On the eve of the Second World War, the 20th century’s most

daunting and difficult struggle, Winston Churchill explained, in the

following words, a compelling thought, I think. He said, ‘‘There’s no

worse mistake in public leadership than to hold out false hopes to

be swept away. People face peril or misfortune with fortitude and

buoyancy, but they bitterly resent being deceived or finding that

those responsible for their affairs are, themselves, dwelling in a

fool’s paradise.’’

Madam Secretary, I’m sorry to say, today—and I think many

hold this view—that a fool’s paradise describes nothing as aptly as

our Iraq policy today. I think most Americans know it, painfully.

The Iraqi people, of course, know this, in compelling numbers.

If the President did grasp, I think, the sad extent of that failure,

I sincerely doubt he would have ordered yet more troops into Iraq.

The President’s plan simply strikes me as a continuation of Operation Together Forward, which has been described already,

which—far from improving Iraq’s security climate, produced the

unintended consequences of heightened sectarian violence.

I fail to see—and I think many others share this view—how the

outcome will be different this time. And that is a true disservice,

I think, to the American troops, who have shown nothing but professionalism and courage and should not be asked to risk their

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lives for an unsound strategy and an unsound and an unsure purpose.

The Baker-Hamilton Report should have disabused us, in my

view, of the notion that, caught in the midst of sectarian, ethnic,

and religious political hatreds, we can simply bludgeon our way to

victory. As many of us have been saying for some time now, only

political and diplomatic possibilities hold out any real hope of reversing the spiral into chaos.

The time for blunt force, I think, is long past, and many hold

that view. Instead, we ought to withdraw, I think, our combat

troops from these large urban areas of sectarian conflict, where

they simply are cannon fodder. There are 23 militias operating in

Baghdad, alone. It’s hard to identify exactly who is the enemy here.

We have Shias and Sunnis, you have Baathists, you have insurgents, some al-Qaeda elements here. Asking our military people to

sort out who the enemy is in all of this is extremely difficult, to

put it mildly. Instead, we ought to be focusing our attention on

training reliable Iraqi security forces, providing some security in

the border areas. And, as several of our junior officers that I talked

with in Baghdad suggested, providing the kind of security around

some of these critical infrastructure areas, and provide the kind of

water, sewage, and electrical grids that are so critical to people

having some sense of opportunity or hope for the future.

If the only solution in Iraq is a political one, then diplomacy happens to be the weapon that we have left, and must use. The President’s solution to—for all of this—or to all was, of course, to ignore

the most important recommendations the Iraq Study Group—

namely, robust diplomacy—and, instead, settle on an escalation of

our current combat strategy. This is a tactic in search of a strategy,

in my view, and will not bring us a more stable Iraq. The American people have spent $14 billion training and equipping 300,000 Iraqi police and security forces. Yet, as I said a moment ago, 23 separate sectarian militias operate with impunity

throughout Baghdad, alone. Sectarian killings continue largely

unabated, averaging scores of deaths every day, and thousands a

month. This is not random violence, it is a targeted civil war complete with ethnic cleansing. Those of us who have been to Iraq recently have seen it with our own eyes, heard it with our own ears.

Beyond that, the President’s own intelligence experts have told us

that the Islamic world is growing more radical and that the terrorist threat is greater today than it was on 9/11, not despite, but

because of, the continuing war in Iraq. They conclude it’s become

both a physical and ideological training ground for the next generation of extremists. The wider region has been further plunged into

violence, as we know. Hezbollah has crippled the Lebanese Government; civil war in the Palestinian territories now seems more likely

than ever; Syria and Iran are more powerful and emboldened than

they have been in recent memory; we’re further away from stabilizing Afghanistan as drug-traffickers and tribal warfare now

threaten to destroy its nascent democracy, and the Taliban is growing stronger by the hour.

And perhaps most troubling of all is our standing in the world.

According to the Pew Center for Global Opinion, most people in

Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan,

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Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, India, and China think that the war in

Iraq is a greater danger to world peace than either Iran or North

Korea, stunning as those numbers are. The President says that

we’re in a war of ideas. But how can we possibly win that kind of

a war between democracy and extremism when so much of the

world considers us to be the threat? It’s deeply troubling to me, as

I hope it is to you, as well. How weakened is our standing in the

world and our support from foreign peoples? How many tools have

we thrown away? And how safe are we now?

Senator Lugar raised an important question in his opening comments that I’d like you to address, if you can, and that is—none

of us are suggesting, at this table, that we engage Iran or Syria as

if they were an ally or a friend or talking about conferences where

we give them a status they don’t deserve. But it’s awfully difficult

to understand, Madam Secretary, why we would not try to engage

very directly with people who can play a critical role in providing

some stability. We heard, in Syria, the President say that he’s interested in a secular Arab State operating on his border, does not

want a Shia-dominated fundamentalist state on his border. That

was just a comment to us in the room with Embassy personnel

present. It seems to me it’s worthy of examining and exploring

those areas where we can have a common ground here, rather than

just neglecting or ignoring that kind of an offer, if we’re going to

bring stability to the region.

I wish you would, once again, address the issue raised by Senator Lugar in the context in which he raised it, not diplomacy as

a favor or a gift or some acknowledgment that we agree with these

people, but, rather, the necessity for the United States to lead in

a region where we have not been able to do so.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

Let me address the question, first, of Iran and Syria. And they

are different. And I think we need to separate the two.

First of all, on Syria, we did engage, for quite a long time. Colin

Powell engaged. Rich Armitage engaged. Bill Burns engaged. And,

in fact, we got nowhere. And, indeed, I would argue that the situation, from our point of view, is worse today, in terms of the terms

on which we would be engaging, than it was at that time.

The terms on which we would be engaging now, and on which

we’re being asked to engage, is that we go to the Syrians and we

say, ‘‘Help us to stabilize Iraq,’’ or, ‘‘Let’s join in our common interest to stabilize Iraq.’’ That’s what we would say to them. The problem, of course, is that if they have an interest in stabilizing Iraq,

I assume that they will do it on the basis of their national interest,

and that they will do it because it is in their national interest. To

do anything more with them is to suggest that there’s a tradeoff

that’s possible, ‘‘You help us stabilize in Iraq, and perhaps we will

overlook some of your activities in Lebanon. You help us stabilize

in Iraq, perhaps we can do something to shave some of the teeth

from the tribunal.’’

I think it’s extremely important to note that we have talked to

the Syrians. We’ve generally gotten nowhere. And now we would

be going in a way that I fear looks like a supplicant.

Senator DODD. Could I just ask you, Madam Secretary——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

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Senator DODD [continuing]. Is that speculation on your part, or

has——

Secretary RICE. No.

Senator DODD [continuing]. That been the reaction you’ve heard?

It seems to me——

Secretary RICE. I would also just note that an awful lot of people

have engaged the Syrians recently, to no good effect. The Italians,

the Germans, the British all engaged them to no good effect.

Senator DODD. Well, but——

Secretary RICE. Senator Dodd, if I really thought that the Syrians didn’t know how to help stabilize Iraq, and we needed to tell

them, then perhaps that would be worth doing. They know how to

stabilize Iraq. They just need to stop allowing terrorists to cross

their borders.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RICE. Shall I go to Iran? Because I do think they’re different.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Secretary RICE. When it comes to Iran, first of all, there’s a 27-

year history of not engaging Iran, so this would be a major shift

in policy. Of course, we did talk to them about Afghanistan, when

that made sense. But what we’re looking at, again, is an Iran that

is engaging activities to try to kill our troops. They know how to

stop that. They know how to stop it tomorrow. They know how to

stop destabilizing the young Iranian—Iraqi Government. And I assume that if they believe it’s in their interest, they would do so.

But I just don’t believe, for a moment, that the conversation with

the Iranians is going to go in the following way, ‘‘Help us stabilize

Iraq,’’ and they don’t want to talk about a price on their nuclear

program.

We are, I think, dealing with Iran in the proper fashion, which

is to insist, with the rest of the international community, that any

negotiations with Iran are going to be on the basis of suspension

of their nuclear program. We are reaching out to the Iranian people. We just had a group of Iranian medical doctors here, in an exchange. We will have some American sports teams go there. There

are banks. We are making it difficult for Iran to continue its policies of terrorism and WMD pursuit, because we are sanctioning

and designating their banks that are engaged in those activities,

and it is having an effect on whether people are willing to invest

in Iran, whether they are willing to take the reputational risk of

handling Iranian assets. That’s why banks are leaving Iran. That’s

why they’re having trouble finding a way to support their investment in their oil and gas industry.

We do have a pretty comprehensive way of dealing with Iran. I

have made the offer. If they are prepared to suspend their enrichment capability, I’m there with their people at any time that they’d

like and any place that they’d like. But I think that’s the proper

context.

And, finally, we do have the opportunity, within the international compact, to have Iran and Syria play a positive role in

Iraq, if they wish to do it. They are—they’ve been at those meetings of the international compact, and they should play a positive

role. And so, I don’t think there’s an absence of diplomacy, an abVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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sence of a policy toward Iran and Syria; it’s just that direct negotiations on this matter put us in the role of supplicant, and I think

that’s a problem.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Hagel.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR

FROM NEBRASKA

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Dr. Rice.

We always appreciate you coming before this committee. And before I get to my questions, I want to——

[Pause.]

Senator HAGEL. I was concerned. I—that doesn’t count on my

time. He’s not from Nebraska, Mr. Chairman. I——

[Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. Would you reset—would you reset the clock?

Senator HAGEL. He took the train over from Delaware, that fellow did. [Laughter.]

Like I was saying, Dr. Rice—it was a little heavy, anyway; we

needed a break——

[Laughter.]

Senator HAGEL. We are very appreciative of your trip to the Middle East tomorrow, because not only does it fit into what we are

discussing today—and I have believed for some time that it is the

centerpiece of the difficulties in the Middle East, as was noted here

by our cochairman—this issue is going to be with us for some time,

as it has been. And you have noted that. The President has noted

that. I would hope that—and I have reviewed your travel schedule—that we will find, as a result of those meetings, that we will

have locked in place some very significant followup. And I have

been one, as you know—and I’ve discussed this with you—that I

think the President and you should think very seriously about

some kind of a day-to-day high-level envoy. You do not have the

time and the energy and the resources and the manpower—I don’t

need to tell you—to continue to work this, nor does the President.

But if, in fact, we’re going to make progress and move this to some

higher plane, where we are developing some confidence and trust

that we have lost, in my opinion—and I think others share that,

especially recent conversations and poll numbers—this issue must

be addressed, and that means followup. So, thank you for your

leadership.

I want to comment briefly on the President’s speech last night,

as he presented to America and the world his new strategy for

Iraq, and then I want to ask you a couple of questions.

I’m going to note one of the points that the President made last

night at the conclusion of his speech, when he said, ‘‘We mourn the

loss of every fallen American, and we owe it to them to build a future worthy of their sacrifice.’’ And I don’t think there is a question

that we all in this country agree with that. But I would even begin

with this evaluation, that we owe the military and their families

a policy—a policy worthy of their sacrifices. And I don’t believe, Dr.

Rice, we have that policy today. I think what the President said

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last night—and I listened carefully, and read through it again this

morning—is all about a broadened American involvement—escalation—in Iraq and the Middle East. I do not agree with that escalation. And I would further note, that when you say, as you have

here this morning, that we need to address and help the Iraqis,

and pay attention to the fact that Iraqis are being killed. Madam

Secretary, Iraqis are killing Iraqis. We are in a civil war. This is

sectarian violence out of control, Iraqi on Iraqi. Worse, it is intersectarian violence, Shia killing Shia. To ask our young men and

women to sacrifice their lives to be put in the middle of a civil war

is wrong. It’s, first of all, in my opinion, morally wrong; it’s

tactically, strategically, militarily wrong.

We will not win a war of attrition in the Middle East. And I further note that you talk about skepticism and pessimism of the

American people, and some in Congress. That is not some kind of

a subjective analysis, that is because, Madam Secretary, we’ve been

there almost 4 years. And there’s a reason for that skepticism and

pessimism. And that is based on the facts on the ground, the reality of the dynamics.

And so, I have been one, as you know, who believed that the appropriate focus is not to escalate, but to try to find a broader incorporation of a framework. And it will have to be certainly regional,

as many of us have been saying for a long time. That should not

be new to anyone. But it has to be more than regional, it is going

to have to be internationally sponsored. And that’s going to include

Iran and Syria.

When you were engaging Chairman Biden on this issue, on the

specific question, ‘‘Will our troops go into Iran or Syria in pursuit,

based on what the President said last night?’’ you cannot sit here

today—not because you’re dishonest or you don’t understand—but

no one in our Government can sit here today and tell Americans

that we won’t engage the Iranians and the Syrians across the border. Some of us remember 1970, Madam Secretary, and that was

Cambodia. And when our Government lied to the American people

and said, ‘‘We didn’t cross the border going into Cambodia’’—in

fact, we did. I happen to know something about that, as do some

on this committee.

So, Madam Secretary, when you set in motion the kind of policy

that the President is talking about here, it’s very, very dangerous.

Matter of fact, I have to say, Madam Secretary, that I think this

speech, given last night by this President, represents the most dangerous foreign-policy blunder in this country since Vietnam, if it’s

carried out. I will resist it.

Now, let me ask a question about the Maliki government. Is all

of the Maliki government in support of America’s significant escalation of troops and all the other things the President talked about?

And where are our allies? Are they escalating, as well? It’s my understanding that most of our allies have been withdrawing their

troops. My understanding is that Great Britain intends to have

most of their troops, if not all, out by the end of this year. Are the

British escalating their troops? Are the Poles, the Italians, the

South Koreans, the Australians? Are we finding ourselves isolated—going to find ourselves isolated? If you would answer those

two questions, thank you.

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Secretary RICE. Yes; certainly, Senator.

The first thing, I don’t think we anticipate an augmentation of

other coalition forces. But the number of Iraqi forces that should

be growing over the next several months, so that, in fact, by November, these are the places that Iraq itself can take care of—we

do expect Iraqi forces to fill the void.

Now, second, let me just go to the question of escalation.

Senator HAGEL. Let me ask you to——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Answer the second question—actually, my first question——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. A little more specifically. The coalition government of Prime Minister Maliki——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. The Sunnis——

Secretary RICE. Right.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Sadr——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. His 30 members, which leads us

right into, as we put our Marines and Army in Baghdad, another

22,000, or whether that’s going to be 15,000, we’re going to then

put them in a position to be killing, I assume, militia—because the

militia’s the problem there. And, so, that’s the position we’re going

to put our troops in, and they’ll be killing our troops. Now, are the

Sunni-Shia coalition members, and the Kurds, of Maliki’s government, are they all supporting our new position?

Secretary RICE. Of course Muqtada al-Sadr does not support coalition forces at all.

Senator HAGEL. He has 30 representatives on that——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Government. So my—again, is this

a—is this a unified support of—go ahead.

Secretary RICE. Sorry. His 30 people are not even enough. If you

count the two Kurdish parties, the IIP and the other Shia parties,

they are, in fact, a majority. And, indeed, the President has talked

to the leaders of those blocs, prior to this, to say that they need

to support Prime Minister Maliki’s plan. And the augmentation of

our forces, of course, is in support of that plan.

So, I think you will find support among the people who are supporting Prime Minister Maliki in his desire to end the sectarian violence, and that is more than Prime Minister Maliki himself.

Senator HAGEL. Well, that’s not my question.

Secretary RICE. Well, you asked me to also——

Senator HAGEL. My question was the escalation of American

troops in Iraq.

Secretary RICE. But I think you asked who was supporting it,

and I said the Kurdish parties, Prime Minister Maliki and his Shia

allies, and the IIP support a plan to do this, and they know that

the augmentation of American forces is part of that plan.

Now, as to the question of escalation, I don’t see it, and the

President doesn’t see it, as an escalation.

Senator HAGEL. Putting 22,000 new troops—more troops in is not

an escalation?

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Secretary RICE. Well, I think, Senator, escalation is not just a

matter of how many numbers you put in. Escalation is also a question of, ‘‘Are you changing the strategic goal of what you’re trying

to do?’’

Senator HAGEL. Would you call it a decrease and billions of——

Secretary RICE. I would——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Dollars more than you——

Secretary RICE. I would——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Need for it?

Secretary RICE. I would call it, Senator, an augmentation that allows the Iraqis to deal with this very serious problem that they

have in Baghdad. This is not a change in what we are trying to

achieve. The Iraqi Government needs to establish population security. What this augmentation does is to help them carry out their

plan to get population security.

I just want to note, though, of course, that many of the American

casualties actually are taken in places like Anbar, they’re also

taken, really, because convoys are moving back and forth in the

city. They are deliberately done by people who are trying to get us

out of the country. They’re not because we are caught in the middle

of crossfire between Sunnis and Shia. I think it is important, again,

to use the chairman’s word, to have an image of what’s really going

on in Baghdad. It is absolutely the case that Iraqi——

Senator HAGEL. Madam Secretary, your intelligence and mine is

a lot different. And I know my time is up here. But to sit there and

say that, Madam Secretary; that’s just not true.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, if you will——

Senator HAGEL. That is not true.

Secretary RICE. Senator, if you’ll allow me to finish, there is a

point I’d like to make about the Iraqis killing Iraqis and what that

really is.

Senator HAGEL. Well, what that really is, it’s pretty obvious what

it really is.

Secretary RICE. There are death squads, Senator, that are going

into neighborhoods, and they are killing Iraqis. And, indeed, the

death squads are Iraqis. So, in that sense, it’s Iraqis killing Iraqis.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Secretary RICE. But I think it is wrong to give an image that

somehow all Sunnis and Shia have broken into violence against one

another. What the Maliki government is trying to do is to reestablish civil order so that the violent groups, including militias, including death squads, are dealt with by Iraqi forces, with the aid of

American forces. That’s different than saying that all of Iraq has

fallen into civil war. And I just think it’s the wrong image. Not all

of Baghdad has fallen into civil war. There are deliberate efforts by

organized groups to go after Sunnis, if they are Shia, and Shia, if

they are Sunnis. What the President said to Prime Minister Maliki

is, ‘‘You have got to be evenhanded in how you go after these killers, whether they are Sunni or whether they are Shia.’’ And that

is the obligation that he undertook, and it is the assurance that he

gave.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

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Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, these are really important exchanges, but if we’re going to get to the junior members being able

to ask their questions, I’m going to have to start to cut them off.

And I’m reluctant to do it, because this is something the American

people should hear and understand. And so, I’m sorry, but I’m

going to try to—try to get us back into the—into this 7 minutes.

OK?

Senator Kerry.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KERRY. You had to put the hammer down now, huh?

[Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. Yes; I’m going to put the hammer down now.

Yes; right.

Senator KERRY. Madam Secretary, welcome. And we appreciate

your being here. I’m going to try and summarize a couple of comments—of thoughts, quickly, and then, obviously, try to get some

questions. The time is so tight.

With all due respect, I think you were splitting hairs a little bit

in your answer to Senator Hagel. It is true that Iraq, as a whole,

is not engaged in—broadly, as you’re saying, but the trendline is

increasingly moving in that direction. And in places like Basrah,

the British are struggling. There’s increasing violence in communities where there wasn’t. And the level of violence, according to

most people’s standards, the testimony we had yesterday in this

committee, is larger than classified civil wars in many other places,

historically. And the violence of Sunni on Shia is clearly sectarian,

and it is civil war between them. Low grade, still; but, nevertheless, civil war.

The Middle East that Senator Dodd and I saw when we were

there a few weeks ago, certainly the Middle East I saw, is very different from the one that I think you’ve described here today. Last

night’s speech by the President was very important. It was important for what it said and set out as a policy, but it was also important, I think, for what it didn’t say and didn’t do.

Many of us—as you know, in our own personal conversation,

we’ve been looking for a bipartisan way to approach this. I think

the President lost an enormous opportunity last night for that bipartisanship. None of us want failure. There is a road to success,

in the judgment of some people, conceivably. Much more out of

reach than it ever was at any point in time, because of the failure

to make the right choices and to find that consensus to date.

But last night the President chose, fundamentally, to ignore the

foundation built by the Iraq Study Group, the foundation built, bipartisan basis here, and knowingly and willfully has divided the

country yet again, and the Congress, over this issue. We didn’t find

that bipartisanship. And what was particularly lacking, in my

judgment—and I don’t understand it—was the political-diplomatic

approach and solution here. Every general, you yourself, the President, has said, there’s no military solution. But last night the

President didn’t offer the diplomatic and political solution. And

why there isn’t a resolution on the oil revenue, why there isn’t a

resolution on the federalism, why there isn’t a path to that through

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the summitry and the diplomacy necessary, is really beyond a lot

of people’s understanding, at this point.

The Middle East that we saw is a Middle East—and if you measure a policy by what it’s accomplishing—I mean, I hate to say it,

but this policy is unbelievably off the mark. A failure. Hamas is

stronger than at any time previously. Hezbollah is stronger than

at any time previously. Iran is stronger than at any time previously. Iraq is more of a mess than at any time previously. That

is the measure of a failure.

And so, the question is—and here, we have, in the New York

Times today, a story, saying that—promising troops where they

aren’t really needed, a story about how the government itself is

saying, ‘‘We don’t want them,’’ and how they would like to run the

war the way they want to, which I thought was the purpose of this

exercise, but we’re not going to let them.

Now, I want to get to some questions, and it’s hard to do it in

this timeframe. But the President said, last night, that America’s

commitment is not open-ended, and, if they don’t follow through,

they will lose the support of the American people and the Iraqi people. I don’t want to debate with you whether or not you—they’ve

already lost the support of the American people. I think it’s pretty

evident to most people that that’s where we are. But what does it

mean to say it’s not open-ended? What is the accountability measure here? Are you saying, if it’s not open-ended, that you’re prepared to terminate it? Do you agree that it’s not open-ended, first

of all?

Secretary RICE. Of course it is not open-ended.

Senator KERRY. All right. If it’s not open-ended, does that mean

you’re prepared, if they fail, to pull out, to terminate? What is

the—what is the accountability mechanism?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think it’s best to leave the President’s

words as the President’s words.

I do think that the accountability rests in two places. First of all,

I think the Iraqis now know that if they don’t succeed in returning

security to their population, then their population is not going to

support them.

Senator KERRY. And what are we going to do? That’s the big

issue to the United States Congress.

Secretary RICE. It’s a democratic process. And, second, we will

have an opportunity, as this policy unfolds—it’s not going to happen overnight, to see whether or not, in fact, the Iraqis are living

up to the assurances that they gave us.

Senator KERRY. And what if they don’t?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I don’t think you go to plan B. You work

with plan A.

Senator KERRY. But that’s not a plan B. That’s a very critical

issue here.

Secretary RICE. You work with plan A, and you give it the possibility of success, the best possibility of success. And I want to emphasize, it’s not just about Baghdad. There are other elements to

this policy. And I really think it’s important not to underestimate

the importance of relying, of course, on the Maliki government, in

terms of Baghdad, but also relying on the local councils and the

local leaders of Baghdad, through the expansion of PRTs there, reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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lying on the local leaders in places like Anbar to do the kinds of

things that they’ve started to do.

Senator KERRY. But, Madam Secretary, with all due respect—I

mean, all of that is good. I think those PRT teams are terrific, and

I think the effort of those folks out there is courageous, unbelievable. But they can’t do this if Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and SCIRI have

a grand design for a nine-province state that is Shia in the south,

to the exclusion of adequate support to the Sunni in Baghdad and

a central government. You know that. They can’t do it if Muqtada

al-Sadr has ambitions with respect to the country, and the Sunni

aren’t brought to the table with a sufficient stake that they feel

they’re sharing. That’s the fundamental struggle here.

Secretary RICE. I agree, Senator.

Senator KERRY. The President didn’t address it.

Secretary RICE. No; the President did address it. He talked about

the need for the national oil law.

Senator KERRY. The need for it, but not how it’s going to happen

and why do we have to wait 3 years to have that?

Secretary RICE. It’s actually a very difficult thing, Senator, in a

place where they’ve never solved their problems by politics, to ask

them to take one of the most fundamental issues facing the country, which is, how are they going to divide the one strong resource

they have—which is oil—and what’s remarkable is that the oil law

that they are now close to finalizing is not a sectarian oil law. In

fact, even though the Kurds might have been expected as some

have said they would—to insist that they will simply control all the

resources themselves, that’s not what the oil law does.

Senator KERRY. I understand what the framework for it is. But

the question is: Why is there not the political resolution on the

table that assures Americans that the fundamental struggle between Sunni and Shia—and the struggle within Shia—I mean, the

President talked last night about this war as if it’s sort of a single

war—the Green Zone government struggling for democracy versus

everybody else. Really, there are four or five—there are several

wars.

Senator BIDEN. Senator, your——

Senator KERRY. There’s a war of——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Time is——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Sunni on Shia. There’s a war of

Sunni and Shia on American occupiers. There’s a war of Syria,

Iran, engaging with——

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think everybody understands that, but

you asked me about the political reconciliation.

Senator KERRY. Well——

Senator BIDEN. Senator, I’m sorry, your time is up. We’re just

not going to be able——

Secretary RICE. All right.

Senator BIDEN. If——

Senator KERRY. Well, could you just speak to the——

Secretary RICE. Shall I answer?

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Political piece, please?

Secretary RICE. Yes. The political piece, it is composed of the following elements: The national oil law, which is a remarkable law,

in that it does not take a sectarian cast; a new de-Baathification

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policy, which already has allowed a number of officers to return to

the armed forces, and pensions to be paid, and there will be further

effort on that; a commitment to provincial elections, which the

Sunnis feel will be important for righting the disproportionally low

share of their representation in provincial councils, because they

boycotted the elections, early on. These are the elements of a national reconciliation plan. And I don’t think, Senator, it can be imposed from the outside. I do think the Iraqis themselves, with our

help and with the help of others—and, by the way, with an international compact, where the international community has, indeed,

said, ‘‘Those are the obligations that you must undertake for support’’—that that is how they will get to that national reconciliation

plan. But they’re not going to get there if they’re unable to provide

population security in Baghdad, because that is stoking the atmosphere of sectarianism.

Senator BIDEN. I realize that generates a lot of questions, but I’m

going to yield now to Senator Coleman.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MINNESOTA

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rice, first I would say that I do appreciate the President’s candor last night in admitting mistakes. I think it was important. I share his perspective on the two fronts we face in Iraq.

We’re fighting a war against al-Qaeda and foreign fighters in Al

Anbar province. We’re winning that war. I was there just 3 weeks

ago. But the problem is that we can’t be successful there in the

long term, unless we have Sunnis in the police force and Sunnis

in the army. And that gets back to the sectarian violence that we’re

seeing in Baghdad.

The chairman asked the question about capacity. To me, the

issue is not the capacity of the Iraqis to do what has to be done

to deal with this sectarian violence, but their resolve. I met with

Dr. Rubaie, who is the Prime Minister’s national security advisor,

and I can tell you, 3 weeks ago he didn’t think the answer to the

violence in Baghdad was more American troops there. The sense I

got from Dr. Rubaie was, ‘‘We [Iraqis] can take care of this—it is

our problem.’’ You’ve indicated that, ‘‘This time, they’re going to

make the difficult choices.’’ And I’m not seeing that type of resolve

in the Iraqis. It is difficult to ask them to enact an oil law. It’s a

lot more difficult to ask our sons and daughters and fathers and

brothers and sisters to be on the front line in Baghdad, in the

crosshairs of sectarian violence when we have this question about

the resolve of the Iraqis to do what they need to do to end sectarian

hatred.

And so, my question to you is: Wouldn’t it be wiser to hold the

Iraqis to certain benchmarks, to tell them, ‘‘You have X number of

months to pass an oil law that distributes oil throughout the region, to put money into places like Anbar province, that are Sunnidominated and have been cut off in the past, and to show a real

commitment to a reconciliation’’? I just don’t know if the Iraqis are

done killing each other. I don’t know if the bloodletting is past the

mark where all the groups are tired of it and willing to pursue reconciliation. Why wouldn’t it be wiser for us today, ‘‘We’ll give you

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6 months to do this, and if you achieve it, there are a range of

things that the U.S. can do in response’’? Why put more American

lives on the line now, in the hope that this time the Iraqis will

make the difficult choices?

Secretary RICE. Senator, you’ve come to the real crux of the matter. Is it a matter of capacity or is it a matter of resolve? If you

think it’s just a matter of resolve, then I think that’s precisely the

strategy that you would pursue. You would say to them, ‘‘Show us,

first, that you’re resolved, and then we’ll help you.’’ But if you

think it’s both a matter of resolve and capability, which our people

do, despite the somewhat bravado of Mr. Rubaie and some others—

I think the Iraqi Defense Minister didn’t think that he has the

forces to do what he needs to do. And so, if you think it’s a matter

of both resolve and capability, then you want to provide the capability up front so they don’t fail. And that’s really what the President is saying. Then you have to have the resolve. I am absolutely

of the mind, and absolutely committed, that they have to have the

resolve. And, frankly, they haven’t always shown it. But they are

moving on a number of fronts that show that resolve—the oil law,

some of the moves on de-Baathification.

But I think, again, it’s important to have a view of what Baghdad really looks like. First of all, they are going to be on the front

lines, because they understand that sectarian violence has to be

ended by them, not by us. We can support them; we can’t take it

on. But all of us remember times in our history when it was not

good to be in a neighborhood when the police came in. I came from

a part of our country where that was the case. Seeing the police

come into Birmingham, AL, when I was a kid, was not a comforting

sight. That’s essentially the case in some of the neighborhoods of

Baghdad. And so, what that government has to do is to reestablish

in that population the confidence that they are going to establish

civil order, that they’re not going to let death squads take out

neighborhoods, kill the men, send the women into exile. That’s

what we’re trying to help them to do. But they’ve got to be on the

front lines of this, because ultimately only they can solve the sectarian problem.

Senator COLEMAN. I think we agree on the outcome. We agree on

what the Iraqi Government has to do. We face the saying, ‘‘Fooled

once, shame on you; fooled twice, shame on me.’’ What I have yet

to see—even as recently as 3 weeks ago—is that level of commitment and resolve, so that the Shias are willing to say, ‘‘We’re going

to take care of the Muqtada al-Sadrs. We’re going to do those

things that have to be done to quell the sectarian violence.’’ And

to put the lives of more Americans in the center of that sectarian

violence in Baghdad, without first having the Iraqis deliver on substantial benchmarks on reconciliation, something we can point to,

other than just trusting—I’m not prepared, at this time, to support

that. The cost is too great. But it would appear to me that if we

could get some measure of assurance that the commitment is there

on the part of the Iraqis to deliver, that would be acceptable. What

we have now from the Iraqis are promises that they have failed to

fulfill previously, and I think the cost is too high to make further

troop commitments based on the calculation we are faced with.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

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Senator, may I just say, I understand. We’re clear-eyed, too,

about the fact that the Iraqi Government has to perform, and we’re

clear-eyed about the fact that they’ve not, in the past. But I think

it’s awfully important to recognize that the violence—the sectarian

violence, which was really accelerated by Samarra—is threatening

to outrun their chance to do exactly the things that you want them

to do, because the atmosphere of sectarianism is breaking down the

very fabric of a society that, frankly, has a lot of ties between their

peoples. Their tribes are mixed Sunni and Shia. There are intermarried Sunni and Shia. There are a lot of fibers of the society that

are actually not sectarian. But if what is going on in Baghdad continues apace, without the government capable of getting control of

it and reestablishing civil order, then you are going to have the

kind of breakdown in the fabric of society to support the very processes of national reconciliation that you’re talking about. That’s

why this is urgent, and that’s why we don’t have time to sequence

it, to let them prove themselves first and then we will add forces

to help them do what they need to do. As I said, if it’s a matter

of just resolve, then the sequencing works. But it’s also capability.

And that’s the assessment of our military people and of our political people.

We have the ability, of course, to see how they’re doing, in terms

of living up to their obligations, because not all American forces are

going to go in up front. Not all will be ready to go in on day one.

And you can be sure that we’re going to be watching very carefully,

and we’re going to be pressing them very hard, that their obligations are obligations that, if they don’t meet, this plan cannot succeed. We’re also going to be diversifying our efforts, making sure

that we’re not just dependent on the Maliki government for some

successes in the country, but rather on local leaders, of the kind

that we’re working with in Anbar. But I just think it’s extremely

important to recognize that the threat right now is that that fabric

of a society that is nonsectarian is being stretched to the limit by

what’s going on in Baghdad. And they don’t have a lot of time to

get on top of it, and we don’t have time to sequence our help to

help them get on top of it.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator Feingold.

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR

FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Madam Secretary, for appearing before the committee today. Unfortunately, Madam Secretary, this hearing is taking place in the context of what has become a true nightmare for

the United States, and quite possibly the greatest foreign policy

mistake in the history of our Nation. We just heard Senator Hagel,

I think, use similar language, and I thank him sincerely for his

candor before this committee.

We currently have 140,000 of our bravest men and women in

uniform in Iraq, stuck in what has become a civil war. Over 3,000

Americans have died. And yet, we continue to see increases in

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interethnic attacks and bombings, in the strength of Shia militias

and the strength of the insurgency and displaced persons and so

on. Almost 4 years after this war began, Iraqis are no closer to a

political agreement or to resolving the underlying political, ethnic,

religious, and economic problems that are ripping the country

apart. But the President wants to send more United States troops

to Iraq. His strategy runs counter to the needs of our strained military, counter to the testimony of our military’s most senior officers,

counter to the need to address the troubling developments in places

like Afghanistan and Somalia, and counter to the fact that, after

4 years of failed strategies for victory, the American people have

sent a resounding message, and that message is, it is time to redeploy our brave troops out of Iraq now.

The American people soundly rejected the President’s Iraq policy

in November. They sent a clear message that maintaining our

troops in Iraq is not in the interest of our national security. They

understand that our Iraq-centric policies are hurting our ability to

defeat the enemy that attacked us on 9/11.

We can’t afford to continue this course. I have consistently called

for the redeployment of our military from Iraq. I was the first Senator, in August 2005, to call for a timetable to withdraw the troops

over a period of time of 15 months, at that time. But that advice

has not been heeded. And now Congress must use its main power,

the power of the purse, to put an end to our involvement in this

disastrous war. And I’m not talking here only about the surge or

escalation. It is time to use the power of the purse to bring our

troops out of Iraq. Over the next several weeks, I—and I hope,

many of my colleagues—will work together to take a hard look at

exactly how we should do that. But it is time to use that power.

Our troops in Iraq have performed heroically, but we cannot continue to send our Nation’s best into a war that was started—and

is still maintained—on false pretenses. An indefinite presence of

United States military personnel in Iraq will not fix that country’s

political problems. And sending more troops to Iraq will not provide

the stability that can only come from a political agreement.

From the beginning, this war has been a mistake, and the policies that have carried it out have been a failure. We need a new

national security strategy that starts with a redeployment from

Iraq so we can repair and strengthen our military and focus on the

global threats to our national security.

With that, Madam Secretary, my first question is this. Is the

United States more secure now as a result of our military incursion

into Iraq than we were before we entered Iraq?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think that we are more secure. We are

more secure, but we’re not secure.

Senator FEINGOLD. Are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda?

Secretary RICE. We have done a lot to break up al-Qaeda, the

forces that came against us on September 11.

Senator FEINGOLD. But are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda,

than we were before we went into Iraq?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I do think that we are more secure, visa-vis al-Qaeda, for a lot of reasons, not just our policies in the Middle East; the policies we’ve undertaken through homeland security

improvements.

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Senator FEINGOLD. I asked you whether, as a result of our Iraqi

intervention, are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda?

Secretary RICE. Senator, the notion about Iraq has always been

that to deal with the short-term problem of al-Qaeda, as it exists

now, is not going to create long-term security. You can only do that

by changing the nature of the Middle East that produced al-Qaeda.

I don’t want us to confuse what we are doing in Iraq with the

short-term problem.

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. Well, let me ask about——

Secretary RICE. The longer term security.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Other things.

Secretary RICE. The longer term issue is how the Middle East

itself evolves.

Senator FEINGOLD. Right.

Secretary RICE. And that’s why Iraq is so important, and that’s

why it’s important that we succeed in Iraq.

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand the argument. I completely reject it, but I understand it.

What about Afghanistan? Are we better off in Afghanistan than

we were before the invasion of Iraq?

Secretary RICE. I think there’s no doubt that we are better off

in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has made a lot of progress since

2001—when we invaded.

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s not what I asked. I asked if we’re better off since the intervention in Iraq.

Secretary RICE. Senator, not everything is related to what we

have done in Iraq.

Senator FEINGOLD. It’s a simple——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. We’ve done——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Question. Did it——

Secretary RICE. What we’ve done——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Help or did it hurt our situation

in Afghanistan?

Secretary RICE. I think that we have been managing what is

going on in Afghanistan as we’ve been managing what’s been going

on in Iraq. I don’t actually see the connection that you are trying

to draw.

Senator FEINGOLD. They’re not——

Secretary RICE. I don’t understand.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, are we better off, vis-a-vis Iran and

North Korea, than we were prior to the intervention in Iraq? Is our

security situation, vis-a-vis Iran and North Korea, better than it

was before the intervention in Iraq?

Secretary RICE. Well, I don’t really think, Senator, that the

North Korean nuclear test has anything to do with Iraq.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think the diversion of attention from

the most important problems in the world has everything to do

with this terrible mistake.

What—let’s try something that I think is more direct—what

about our military, the strain on our military? Is our military better off than it was before Iraq intervention?

Secretary RICE. Senator, we’re at war. And when we’re at war,

there’s going to be strain on the military. I think that’s what General Pace would tell you. But, again, I just can’t agree with you

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that there’s been a diversion of our attention from all other policy

problems. If you look at the progress that we’ve actually made on

North Korea, with North Korea under a chapter 7 resolution and

with six-party talks about to begin again, if you look at the

progress that we’re making on stopping an Iranian nuclear weapon,

that, by the way, has been entrain for quite some time, if you look

at the progress that we’ve made—and I have to say, you know, this

Middle East that somehow was so stable before we invaded Iraq is

a Middle East that I didn’t recognize in 2000 or 2001 either. That

was a Middle East where Saddam Hussein was still in power, still

with the potential to invade his neighbors, as he had done before,

where Syria was deep into Lebanon, where the Palestinian territories were governed by a man who was stealing the Palestinians

blind, but couldn’t take a peace deal—I don’t see——

Senator FEINGOLD. My time——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. That Middle East as having

been——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. My——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Very stable. So——

Senator FEINGOLD. My time is up, but I see this problem of our

security as an international problem. And I believe the diversion of

attention in Iraq has been absolutely catastrophic with regard to

our national security.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, I appreciate your views on that,

but I’m the one who, every day, goes to the office and works not

just on Iraq, but on North Korea, on Iran, on the problems in Somalia, in Sudan. And I think if you look around, you’ll see that the

United States has a very active policy everywhere in the world.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator Corker. And, again, welcome to the committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM

TENNESSEE

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the tremendous testimony that you’ve allowed us to have over the last 3

days.

And, Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.

I’ve heard a lot—it seems that people agree—that in Iraq we

need a political solution, that that is what needs to occur. And it

seems to me that what the administration has tried to put forth

is a way for a political process to occur and a political solution to

happen, and that is by causing Iraqis to actually feel secure, to feel

like they can, in fact, go about a political process in a way that allows people to debate and come to a solution.

One of the things I’ve realized with the testimony over the last

3 days is, there is another school of thought, and that is, that by

some—and I don’t mean by anybody on this panel, specifically—but

that, by some who wish to withdraw, they believe that the only

way there’s going to be a political process, a healthy political process, is for there to be an all-out civil war first, that what we’ve had

is a measured civil war, and that, by withdrawing, there actually

would be an all-out civil war, and that things have got to get much

worse before they get any better.

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I’d like for you to address those two schools of thought, if you

would.

Secretary RICE. Well, thank you, Senator.

First of all, I think you’ve put it very well, because the risk of

American withdrawal, or, as it’s sometimes called, redeployment—

and I think we have to recognize, redeployment’s really withdrawal—then we are dealing with a circumstance in which the

Iraqis are so-called ‘‘left to their own devices’’ to deal with a problem that threatens to overwhelm their political process. And that

is the sectarian violence in Baghdad.

Again, as I was saying to Senator Coleman, it really does depend

on whether you think this is a matter of Iraqi resolve or a matter

of capability, or a matter of both. And the President and his team

thinks it’s a matter of both. And so, no amount of resolve, if they

don’t have the capability, is going to help them to deal with the

sectarian violence in Baghdad. That’s why we want to augment

their capability, so that they can show that resolve.

When analysts look at what you would be talking about if you

just said to them, ‘‘All right, you just go at one another, and we’ll

go to the borders and defend the borders, and we’ll fight al-Qaeda,

and we’ll do a few other things, but it’s really up to you to resolve

this,’’ I think it has the wrong idea of what’s really going on in

Baghdad. It’s not as if, street-to-street, every Sunni and every Shia

is determined to kill each other. That’s really not the case. You do

have, stoked by al-Qaeda, after the Samarra bombing, people—extremist Sunni and Shia death squads, Sunni and Shia—who are,

in the name of sectarianism, going in to neighborhoods, killing the

men—that’s where those bodies are coming from—expelling the

women—that’s why there are internally displaced people—but it is

an organized effort to perpetrate violence by Shia death squads and

Sunni death squads. That means that if the Iraqi Government is

actually able to deal with the organized effort, then they will be

able to stem the tide of sectarian violence. But if they’re not able

to do that, and to reestablish civil order, then the fabric of the society, which has not always been just sectarian—there is a lot of

intermarriage, a lot of—a lot of community between the groups—

that fabric’s going to break apart.

And so, that’s why the President has outlined what he has. He

did look, Senator, at other options. He did look at the question of

whether or not the Iraqis could be told, ‘‘Go do this on your own.’’

And the assessment of the people on the ground, both our political

people and our military people, is that they didn’t yet have the

forces to do it. I think General Casey said, at one point, it would

be the summer before they were really able to take control of operations in Iraq. Well, by the summer, if something hasn’t improved

in Baghdad, then they’re going to be in very difficult straits.

So, as you think about this policy, and whether you decide to accept it or reject it, I think you have to think about the consequences of not going down this route. And the consequences of

that is that you leave the Iraqi Government without the capability

to deal with their sectarian problem.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, out of respect for my more senior junior members on this committee, I’m going to pass any——

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Senator BIDEN. I’m sure it’s appreciated. Thank you very much,

Senator.

Chairman Boxer.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM

CALIFORNIA

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, for me today marks the bipartisan end of a

rubberstamp Senate, and I am proud to be here in behalf of the

people of California.

Madam Secretary, on November 7, the American people voted for

a change in Congress, citing Iraq as the No. 1 issue affecting their

vote. And a week later, General Abizaid told the Senate Armed

Services Committee that he checked with every single divisional

commander on the ground in Iraq, and, to a person, no one believed

that more American troops would improve the situation, because

the Iraqis already rely on us too much. And then, on December 7,

the Iraq Study Group, noting that 61 percent of the Iraqis, who you

say support us so much, approve of attacks on United States

troops—they approve of shooting and killing United States troops—

the Iraqi Study Group, in light of that, recommended that United

States combat troops should be redeployed out of Iraq by early

2008. They also called for an immediate meeting—international

meeting in the region to find a political solution to Iraq. And one

line that stands out in that Iraq Study Report is, ‘‘Absent a political solution, all the troops in the world will not provide security.’’

And on January 8, the Military Times—and I’d ask unanimous

consent to place this into the record, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,

may I place this in the record? The Military Times?

Senator BIDEN. Without objection, it’ll be placed in the record.

Senator BOXER. The Military Times published a poll, which

found that only 35 percent of military members approved of the

way President Bush is handling this war, and only 38 percent

thought there should be more troops.

So, from where I sit, Madam Secretary, you are not listening to

the American people, you are not listening to the military, you are

not listening to the bipartisan voices from the Senate, you are not

listening to the Iraq Study Group. Only you know who you are listening to. And you wonder why there is a dark cloud of skepticism

and pessimism over this Nation.

I think people are right to be skeptical, after listening to some

of the things that have been said by your administration. For example, October 19, 2005, you came before this committee to discuss, in your words, ‘‘how we assure victory in Iraq.’’ And you said

the following in answer to Senator Feingold, ‘‘I have no doubt that,

as the Iraqi security forces get better—and they are getting better

and are holding territory, and they are doing the things with minimal help—we are going to be able to bring down the level of our

forces. I have no doubt’’—I want to reiterate—‘‘I have no doubt that

that’s going to happen in a reasonable timeframe.’’ You had no

doubt. Not a doubt. And last night the President’s announcement

of an escalation is a total rebuke of your confident pronouncement.

Now, the issue is: Who pays the price? Who pays the price? I’m

not going to pay a personal price. My kids are too old, and my

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grandchild is too young. You’re not going to pay a particular price,

as I understand it, with immediate family. So, who pays the price?

The American military and their families. And I just want to bring

us back to that fact.

NPR has done a series of interviews with families who have lost

kids. And the announcer said to one family in the Midwest, ‘‘What’s

changed in your lives since your son’s death?’’ The answer comes

back, ‘‘Everything. You can’t begin to imagine how even the little

things change—how you go through the day, how you celebrate

Christmas’’—Mr. Chairman, could I please—‘‘You can’t begin to

imagine how you celebrate any holiday or birthday. There’s an absence. It’s not like the person has never been there. They’ve—always were there, and now they’re not, and you’re looking at an

empty hole. He has a purple heart. The flag that was on his coffin.

And one of the two urns that we got back—he came back in three

parts, two urns and one coffin. He’s buried in three places, if you

count our house. He’s buried in New Jersey. He’s buried in Cleveland.’’ That’s who’s going to pay the price.

And then you have the most moving thing I’ve ever heard on a

radio station, which is a visit to a burn unit and a talk with the

nurse. Devon suffered burns over 93 percent of his body, three amputations—both legs, one arm—his back was broken, internal organs exposed. As the hospital staff entered the room, they would

see photographs on the wall, pictures of a healthy private standing

proud in his dark green Army dress uniform. ‘‘It’s very important,’’

says the major, ‘‘that nurses see the patient as a person, because

the majority of our patients have facial burns and they’re unrecognizable, and they’re extremely disfigured.’’

So, who pays the price? Not me. Not you. These are the people

who pay the price.

So, I want to ask you, since this administration has been so clear

about how this has been a coalition, and a coalition—you’ve already

said that we don’t have anybody else escalating their presence at

this time. Is that correct?

Secretary RICE. That is correct.

Senator BOXER. That is correct. Have you seen the recent news

that the British are going to be bringing home thousands of troops

in the near future?

Secretary RICE. I have seen the stories about what the British

are going to do. I’ll wait for a confirmation from the British Government about what they’re going to do.

Senator BOXER. OK. I would ask unanimous consent to place into

the record the article from today that announces that that’s what

they’re going to do, is bring home thousands of troops.

And I want to point out to the American people, we are all alone.

We are all alone. There’s no other country standing with us in this

escalation. And if you look at this coalition, the closest to us—we’ve

got about 130–140,000 troops. I don’t know the exact number. The

Brits had 7,200. They’re going to be announcing they’re bringing

home, as I understand it, more than 3,000 of those. The next-biggest coalition member is South Korea with 2,300; Poland, with 900;

and, after that, Australia, with 800. No one is joining us in this

surge.

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Do you have an estimate of the number of casualties we expect

from this surge?

Secretary RICE. No, Senator. I don’t think there’s any way to give

you such an estimate.

Senator BOXER. Has the President—because he said, ‘‘expect

more sacrifice’’—he must know.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I don’t think that any of us have a number that—of expected casualties. I think that people understand

that there is going to be violence for some time in Iraq, and that

there will be more casualties.

And let me just say, you know, I fully understand the sacrifice

that the American people are making, and especially the sacrifice

that our soldiers are making, men and women in uniform. I visit

them. I know what they’re going through. I talk to their families.

I see it.

I could never—and I can never—do anything to replace any of

those lost men and women in uniform, or the diplomats, some of

whom have been lost——

Senator BOXER. Madam Secretary, please, I know you feel terrible about it. That’s not the point. I was making the case as to

who pays the price for your decisions. And the fact that this administration would move forward with this escalation with no clue as

to the further price that we’re going to pay militarily—we certainly

know the numbers, billions of dollars, that we can’t spend here in

this country—I find really appalling that there’s not even enough

time taken to figure out what the casualties would be.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator——

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think it would be highly unlikely for

the military to tell the President, ‘‘We expect X number of casualties because of this augmentation of the forces.’’ And, again, let me

just say, the President sees this as an effort to help the Iraqis with

an urgent task so that the sectarian violence in Baghdad does not

outrun the political process and make it impossible to have the

kind of national reconciliation that we all want to see there.

But I just want to say one thing, Senator, about the placard that

you held up. I have to admit, my eyesight’s not what it used to be,

so I couldn’t actually see the date underneath, but I think it may

have been 2005.

Senator BOXER. October—it was the end of 2005, October—midOctober——

Secretary RICE. I think——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. 2005. And you had——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. The President——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Absolutely no doubt——

Secretary RICE. Yes. And I think the President spoke——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. About how great it was going.

Secretary RICE. I don’t think I ever said it was going great,

Senator.

Senator BOXER. You thought that our troops would be coming

home.

Secretary RICE. Senator, let’s not overstate the case.

Senator BOXER. Well, let’s just put——

Secretary RICE. I don’t think I said it was going great.

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Senator BOXER [continuing]. Let’s just put it up again.

Secretary RICE. The point that I wanted to make, Senator, is

that that is October 2005. The President has talked repeatedly now

about the changed circumstances that we faced after the Samarra

bombing of February 2006, because that bombing did, in fact,

change the character of the conflict in Iraq. Before that, we were

fighting al-Qaeda. Before that, we were fighting some insurgents,

some Saddamists. But it was the purpose of Zarqawi to try and

stoke sectarian violence. He wrote this letter to Zawahiri, told him

he was going to do that. Zawahiri himself was even concerned that

this might be a bad policy. But it turns out to have been a very

smart one, because, in fact, through the bombing of the Golden

Mosque, he accelerated this sectarian violence to the point that it

now has presented us with a new set of circumstances.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Sununu.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, in the President’s remarks last night, there

were some things that I was pleased to hear, such as his emphasis

that the burden has shifted now to the Iraqi Government, both for

these political issues that we’ve heard talked about today, but also

for security, even setting a timetable for Iraqis taking full responsibility for security in the outlying provinces by November. There

were some areas where I have a little bit more concern, such as

whether or not the use of the troops he discussed will really be appropriate in dealing with sectarian violence in Baghdad, and some

areas where I was a little bit more disappointed, such as the failure to talk about or establish a more formal process for engaging

all of Iraq’s neighbors, including those that are already very supportive and have been helpful, such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia or

Jordan, in a more formal process to provide whatever support is

necessary for Iraq.

But I want to begin with the area of political reform and change

for the Iraqi Government, because—even here, I think you’ve

sensed a level of frustration, because, while we understand that a

change in the oil law, local elections, a reconciliation process, are

essential to long-term success, and no matter how we succeed militarily, those gains won’t be sustained unless these political reforms

are undertaken, we still haven’t been provided with a lot of clarity

there, and timeframe. And while I think an arbitrary date for removing all troops from Iraq doesn’t make sense militarily or diplomatically, setting a very clear timetable for these reforms does

make some sense, because it sends the right message to everyone

involved.

And I would further suggest, to you and the entire administration, if we don’t see more specifics, and even, where appropriate,

a timeframe that’s established in concert with the Iraqi Government, then Congress is probably going to step into the void and

start setting a timeframe for the Iraqi commitments that have been

made. I certainly wouldn’t prefer that. I would prefer the former

to the latter.

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So, I offer that as a very strong suggestion, that we work to provide much more clarity and specifics, in terms of timing. And I

have two questions about those issues.

First, a very specific question with regard to the oil law. You referred to the oil law as a ‘‘remarkable law.’’ Well, it’s the most remarkable law that no one has ever really seen. Over the last week,

I’ve had conversations with White House—senior White House staff

about this issue. We had a top-secret briefing where this was

raised in a very specific way. We heard from scholars yesterday.

And what we can gain is that there has been some agreement on

investment issues, and even ownership, but not on distribution.

And, from where I sit, it’s distribution that really matters. Money

is power. Money is power in Washington. Money is power anywhere

around the world. And unless we have a methodology for distribution, we’re not going to be successful.

So, can you give more specifics about these different government

objectives, not just oil law, political elections, reconciliation process,

de-Baathification law? And what about the oil law, specifically?

When are we going to see the area of distribution resolved?

Secretary RICE. Well, on the first, Senator, I take your point

about needing to understand the timeframe in which the Iraqis are

trying to do the benchmarks that are put before you. It’s a political

process for them, just like we have political processes in the United

States. And I think there have been times when we’ve missed deadlines on trying to get this legislative piece done or that legislative

piece done. But they do have a timeframe for moving things forward into their Parliament and getting the laws passed and so

forth. They’ve tried to make sure that the laws that they’re putting

forward have enough political support so they don’t have a problem

in the Parliament. So, they’re going about it, I think, in the right

way. But certainly I think we can be more explicit about how they

see the timeframes ahead, and in the days to come, I’ll try to do

that.

As to the oil law, actually the sticking point has been less about

distribution. They understand that there needs to be some distribution on the basis of a formula that has to do with where the resource came from, the need to distribute it in a way that is equitable, and, indeed, to deal with the fact that some parts of the

country are particularly underdeveloped. And so, distribution has

actually been less of a problem than the question of who gets to

sign contracts. That’s, frankly, been the one that they’ve been hung

up on.

And so, I think you’ll find that it’s a law that, in terms of distribution, in terms of some basic notion of a trust for the Iraqi people, is actually quite forward-leaning.

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I understand the point you make, that investment may have been the sticking point, but I think it’s also important that we fully recognize that, while that may have been the

sticking point in negotiation, that is not the issue that has the potential to fuel the sectarian violence. And it’s when the Sunnis do

not feel that there’s an equitable distribution scheme, when they’re

not enfranchised economically, that they’re more likely to turn to

sectarian organizations or sectarian groups, because they think

that violence is the only way to ensure that kind of resolution.

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So, I understand investment may have been the negotiating

sticking point, but I think equitable distribution is more important

to long-term enfranchisement economically, and, therefore, to dealing with some of the sectarian problems.

The second question I want to ask is about the PRTs. There were

some comments made, very positive, about the work of PRTs, or

their reconstruction teams, or their potential. But it’s my understanding that many of them are confined to relatively small compounds, that there are security issues. So, two issues. One, where

will the funding and support come from? Two, how are we going

to address the security issues that confine them, when we’re deploying troops elsewhere? And, third, what about recruitment? It is

my understanding that recruitment has been a problem, that

Baker-Hamilton Commission outlined, unfortunately, the tragic

fact that we have so few Arab speakers in our—both our State and

intelligence personnel in Iraq. How are we going to address these

two issues? Better recruitment, Arab speakers and security on the

reconstruction teams.

Secretary RICE. Yes. Senator, just so I’m not misunderstood on

the oil law, it does address the question of distribution. And I think

it addresses it in a way that we find hopeful.

Senator SUNUNU. We had senior intelligence officials, 1 day

ago—2 days ago—that were able to tell us nothing about the proposed distribution methodology. On Friday Senior National Security Council staff was able to tell me and others in the room nothing about distribution methodology.

Secretary RICE. Senator——

Senator SUNUNU. So, either the right information isn’t being put

into the hands of the President’s National Security Advisor and his

senior intelligence official for the Middle East or there’s a refusal

to share information.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, let me just say that I will tell you

what we know of the draft law. I will send you a note about that.

[The information submitted by the State Department follows:]

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, February 14, 2007.

Hon. JOHN E. SUNUNU,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR SUNUNU: I am writing to follow up on the question you raised during my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 11 regarding the need for Iraq to establish a mechanism to share its oil wealth among

all its provinces.

l agree with you on the importance of this issue. We have clearly communicated

to the Iraqi government our view that it is critical for Iraq to pass a hydrocarbon

law that reinforces national institutions and creates a fair and transparent mechanism to distribute revenues between the central government and the provinces in

a way that is broadly acceptable to all Iraqis.

In August 2006, discussions between the central government and the Kurdistan

Regional Government (KRG) began. Despite marked differences of approach in the

beginning of this process, the parties have made significant progress and have

agreed that Iraq will draft a hydrocarbon law that sets out the guiding principles

and framework for the oil and gas sector.

In the course of their discussions, the KRG and the central government have also

agreed that the central government should collect and distribute revenue to the

provinces according to each province’s population once a census is completed. The

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Iraqis have now started drafting a specific revenue sharing law that will more specifically codify the collection methods and distribution levels.

We will continue to keep your staff updated as the Iraqis finalize these important

pieces of legislation. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have further questions.

Sincerely,

CONDOLEEZZA RICE.

Secretary RICE. In terms of the PRTs, now, 98 percent of our positions are filled. And, as a matter of fact, we’ve already filled 68

percent of the positions that would come into rotation in the summer of 2007. There was a time when we had some difficulty in recruiting. We had to make some changes in the way we recruited.

I wanted to be sure that we had senior people leading these PRT

teams, not people who were too junior. And, in fact, I think you will

find that we are doing very well, in terms of getting the right people to the PRTs. And so, it was—there was a time. We changed

some of the incentives. We changed the way we recruit for them.

And we’re doing very well in filling the PRTs.

The absence of Arabic speakers, I’m afraid, is the result of the

national underinvestment in Arabic language skills over a very

long period of time, and we’re doing what we can to improve that.

You know, at one time—I think we didn’t have problems, frankly,

finding Russian speakers, because the United States invested in

people like me to teach them Russian. We really haven’t done that,

as a nation, which is why we have a critical-languages initiative,

which is why we’re recruiting people with mid-level experience who

might have those language skills. And we’re going to have to do

better at getting Arabic speakers not just into the PRTs and into

Baghdad, but into the rest of the Middle East, as well.

Finally, one of the things that we’re doing is, we’re increasing the

training of the people who go into Arabic, so that they have longer

in the training, so that they are more capable in the language before they go out. So, we’re trying to address that problem.

Finally, as to security for the PRTs, yes, security is something

that I’m very concerned about and take very seriously. We are now

being provided security through the brigade teams with which we

are, in effect, embedded, and we think that works best. Our people

do move around. We just recently had, for the President, a briefing

by four of our PRT teams. And, yes, they have, sometimes, some

difficulty. But they get out, and they go meet local leaders. One

was telling me—I’ll not name the province, for security reasons—

but that he’s out at least three, four times a week with the local

leaders. And so, people are getting out. They are experiencing some

of the same dangers that affect our military forces, and I think it’s

important to recognize that our civilians are on the front lines, too.

But since we went to this structure of the PRTs, they are getting

out.

Senator BIDEN. Madam Secretary, let me suggest that—we want

to get you out by 1 o’clock, so—I appreciate your exposition, but,

to the extent that we all can’t be shorter, we’re going to be trespassing on your time.

Senator from Florida.

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STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM

FLORIDA

Senator BILL NELSON. Madam Secretary, I have supported you

and the administration on the war, but I cannot continue to support the administration’s position. I have not been told the truth.

I have not been told the truth, over and over again, by administration witnesses. And the American people have not been told the

truth. And I don’t come to this conclusion very lightly.

Does General Abizaid support an increase in troops?

Secretary RICE. He does.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, that’s at variance, of course, as

you’ve heard.

Secretary RICE. I think, Senator, first of all, if you look at his testimony, and you look at the next lines in his testimony, he talks

about the conditions under which troops might be useful. And, in

fact, everybody had hoped that this would be done with Iraqi

forces. It wasn’t that we didn’t need more forces; it was hoped that

we would do it with Iraqi forces. And what the Baghdad security

plan of the summer showed was that that wasn’t possible.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well——

Secretary RICE. General Abizaid and General Casey have been

involved in the development of this plan. And it—in fact, General

Casey presented this option to the President.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I’m looking forward to talking to

General Abizaid. He is one of the few that have come before a number of the committees, that I have the privilege of sitting on, who

I feel like has been a straight-shooter. And it’s my hope that Chairman Carl Levin will call him here, and I will ask him directly. But,

of course, I was one of the ones that asked him that question, very

specifically, when he was last here in front of the Congress, and he

is someone that I think has credibility. But, sad to say, he’s one

of the few who I’ve felt like that I was getting a straight story

from.

Let me pick up on something Mr. Coleman said. Three weeks

ago, we were in Iraq and our mouths about dropped open when the

National Security Advisory, Dr. Rubaie, said—and I think this is

almost his direct quote—‘‘This is not a sectarian war.’’ And he went

on to talk about how the conflict is extremist al-Qaeda and how the

Baathists who want to come back into power. And, of course, that’s

part of the situation. But the two of us, certainly this Senator, got

the impression that they are not coming to grips with what they

must face. And that is that you’ve got Sunnis on Shiites, and Shiites on Shiites, and Sunnis on Sunnis. And until you get that problem being solved, our efforts are just simply not going to work.

Now, I’ll tell you one place where I agree with the President,

when he said last night that he was going to send additional troops

into Anbar province. I was convinced by the Marine commanders

there, as I think Mr. Coleman was, as well, that there, where you

have just a Sunni population and that the enemy is al-Qaeda, that

working with those Sunni tribal leaders with additional American

troops could bring some progress. But that is not so, in Baghdad.

And I’m sad that we’ve come to this point.

Let me just conclude by asking you something I would like for

you to amplify upon, although I think it’s been said by a number

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of people here. Obviously we need an intense diplomatic effort in

the region. One of the points of my trip was, at the request of General Hayden, to go and talk with the Saudi king, urging the Saudis

to use their tribal contacts in Iraq to try to get people to come together. Could you outline for the committee what intense diplomatic effort will be taken, and will it be taken simultaneously with

the President’s plan for additional troops?

Secretary RICE. Senator, it is being taken. I will go out, tomorrow

night. The group that we are engaging, in addition to all the many

bilateral engagements that we have with the Saudis, with the Kuwaitis, with others who can help, the Jordanians, who can help, is

through a group called the ‘‘GCC-plus-two.’’ That is really the appropriate group. We work also with Turkey very closely on Iraq.

We have a problem on the northern border with the PKK that General Ralston is trying to resolve. But I think you would find that,

first of all, there already has been diplomatic effort. We will, of

course, try to intensify that effort to support what the Maliki government is now trying to do to get its sectarian problem under control.

Frankly, the countries of the region are also watching to see

whether this will be an evenhanded government in dealing with

both Sunnis and Shia. And so, the Maliki government faces, I

think, some skepticism, not just from Americans and from Iraqis,

but also from the region. And we’ve made that point to them, that

they really must deal with the sectarian problem in an evenhanded

fashion, or they’re not going to get support from the region.

That said, to the degree that we hear from the Saudis and others

that their biggest strategic concern is Iran, then they have a very

strong incentive to help stabilize Iraq, so that Iraq is, indeed, a

barrier to Iranian influence in the region, not a bridge.

Senator BILL NELSON. What do you——

Senator BIDEN. I hate to do this, but if the next question is going

to result in a long answer, we’re—you’re going to be running out

of time, Senator. So——

Secretary RICE. Thirty seconds.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. If you want——

Senator BILL NELSON. Well——

Senator BIDEN. If it’s a quick question, please——

Senator BILL NELSON. It’s very quick.

We need more than engagement. We need to get these countries

to act. So, how do you get them to act?

Secretary RICE. There’s an international compact that they’ve all

negotiated. We need to finalize it.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator Voinovich.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR

FROM OHIO

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I’m sorry that I wasn’t here for your testimony

or for the other questions that have been asked of you, so please

forgive me if I am redundant. But I met this morning with representatives from 10 nations who are concerned about our Visa

Waiver Program. I believe that the current program—and I’m glad

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the President understands this—needs to be changed, because

these nations whose representatives I met with are our allies and

helping us in Afghanistan and in Iraq. I think you know that the

most important weapon, in terms of winning the war on terror, is

our public diplomacy, which needs to be improved substantially.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can proceed with the Visa Waiver

legislation early in this session of Congress, so we can help some

of our allies, who are really upset with us that their citizens cannot

enter into the United States because of this unrealistic and restrictive program we currently have.

You should know that I am skeptical that a surge of troops will

bring an end to the escalation of violence and the insurgency in

Iraq. Many of the generals that have served there have said they

do not believe additional troops will be helpful—in Baghdad, particularly. And, Madam Secretary, my faith in Prime Minister

Maliki’s ability to make the hard choices necessary to bring about

political solutions has to be restored. There needs to be a political

solution between the Sunnis and the Shiites. I have asked this

question now for 2 years: How can there be a unity government—

one that is not dominated by the Shiites that will ultimately get

rid of the Sunnis that are in Iraq—when Muqtada al-Sadr is there?

From everything I understand, he very well tells Prime Minister

Maliki what to do. We have seen evidence that Sadr simply makes

a telephone call and Maliki pulls the plug on whatever he was previously doing in order to meet Sadr’s wishes.

I think that we underestimate the hatred between Sunnis and

Shiites. We’re saying that somehow they are all going to get together and everything is going to be happy. The Sunnis and the

Baathists oppressed the Shiites for many, many years. Now the

Shiites are in the majority. Is there going to be a unity government, or another theocracy, like there is in Iran? I think that is

what Sadr wants.

So, how can you explain to us that the political divisions in Iraq

are going to be resolved? Probably this article was discussed already this morning, ‘‘The Fog’’ by David Brooks in the New York

Times. Brooks says that the plan we are proposing does not reflect

what Maliki says he wants done. But I would insist that Maliki

stand up and make it clear to the whole world that he does want

this done, that he supports the plan, and that the United States

is not superimposing its wishes onto him. If he does not make that

clear, then everyone is going to think, ‘‘Here we go again, the

United States is in there on its own.’’

Another important question that has been raised here is: How

much help are we getting from our Sunni friends in the Middle

East? What have they done to help us? In addition, countries that

had been our friends are withdrawing support. Why are our friends

leaving? Have they lost confidence that this dream we had of a democracy in Iraq, which many of us bought into, will no longer happen, and that Iraq is going to break down into a civil war? Another

major concern I believe we all have is that we don’t want any more

of our young men and women killed in a civil war between two

groups that ultimately are never going to come together.

I send letters out to the families of soldiers, and I tell them how

brave their sons were, and that the work that they are doing there

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in Iraq and the casualties we have sustained are as important as

that of the Second World War. But I have to rewrite the letter

today. We’re talking now about stability as our goal. And we’re

talking about young men and women’s lives at risk for that. This

is a very, very important decision, and I think you are going to

have to do a much better job, and so is the President, explaining

this to us. You have seen the testimony here among my colleagues.

I would like to add that I have supported the President’s effort in

Iraq, and I bought into the dream of democracy taking root there,

and now I don’t think it is going to happen.

Secretary RICE. Well, thank you, Senator.

I think that we don’t have an option to fail in Iraq. Consequences

are too great. And I do think that it is not—I just don’t think that

it is true that Iraqi Sunnis and Shia hate each other to the point

that they can’t live together. I don’t believe that. I do think that

there are long pent-up tensions and emotions and grievances in

that society that come from years of tyranny, and that it’s going

to take some time for them to get over it. And I do think they’ve

had a very bad set of circumstances by——

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, but, Madam Secretary, what evidentiary fact do we have that Maliki is going to make the tough

political decisions that he has to make, and lose his support from

Sadr and the others?

Secretary RICE. Senator, we have from him these assurances.

He’s going to have to act on them. We’re going to know very soon

whether or not there’s political interference when his forces—and

they’re his forces—want to go into a neighborhood. We’re going to

know very soon whether or not he is carrying through with his

view—with what he told us, which is that, ‘‘If you are Sunni or

Shia, and you’re outside the law, and you’re killing innocent Iraqis,

then you have to pay a price for that. You have to be punished.’’

We’re going to know. And American forces, as they flow in over

time, will only go to support a policy in which Iraqis are carrying

out those obligations.

But I just want to emphasize again—I’ve heard everybody say,

‘‘We cannot fail. We cannot fail. We cannot fail.’’ If they are unable

to get a hold of the sectarian violence, to show that they can control Baghdad, to establish confidence that they’re going to be evenhanded, then it’s going to be very difficult for them to——

Senator VOINOVICH. How can it happen with Sadr?

Secretary RICE. The Iraqis are going to have to deal with Sadr.

And, to the degree that Sadr is outside of the political process and

his death squads are engaged in violence, then they’re going to

have to deal with those death squads. And the Prime Minister has

said, ‘‘Nobody and nothing is off limits.’’ We will know, Senator,

whether or not they’re following through. But we’d really better

give them a chance to get a hold of this sectarian violence in their

capital, where it’s not Iraqis running down the streets killing other

Iraqis, Sunni and Shia; it is organized death squads going into

neighborhoods and killing Sunnis and Shia. That is what is going

on there, and they need to reestablish civil order, and we need to

be able to help them do that. That’s the purpose of the augmentation of our forces.

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Senator BIDEN. Madam Secretary, I’m sure you understand—

you’ve been around—how profound this—these inquiries are.

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Obama.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM

ILLINOIS

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I’ll pursue a line of questioning that we talked

about yesterday in a one-on-one meeting. I expressed these same

views to the President. You know, I think when you hear the voices

of Senator Hagel, Senator Voinovich, others on this panel, I think

you get a sense of how weighty and painful this process has become.

This administration took a gamble. It staked American prestige

and our national security on the premise that it could go in, overthrow Saddam Hussein, and rebuild a functioning democracy. And,

so far, each time that we’ve made an assessment of how that gamble has paid off, it appears that it has failed. And, essentially, the

administration repeatedly has said, ‘‘We’re doubling down. We’re

going to keep on going. You know, maybe we lost that bet, but

we’re going to put a little more money in, and—because now we’ve

got a lot in the pot, and we can’t afford to lose what we’ve put in

the pot.’’ And the fundamental question that the American people

and, I think, every Senator on this panel, Republican and Democrat, are having to face now is: At what point do we say, ‘‘Enough’’?

And so, this, then, raises the line of questioning that I presented

to you yesterday.

It seems as if a solution to the problem is always 6 months away.

I’ll give you an example. Ambassador Khalilzad. He was up here

before this committee in July of last year. He said, ‘‘I believe, Senator, that this government has about 6 months or so to bring this

sectarian violence under control. And, if it doesn’t, then I think we

would have a serious situation.’’ I pressed him on the issue. I said,

‘‘If this government has not significantly reduced sectarian violence

in about 6 months, then we’ve got real problems. I mean, if I’m

hearing this correctly, the Iraqi people—at that point, the confidence in the central government will have eroded to the point

where it’s not clear what we do. And I guess the question becomes:

What do we do then? Because you may be back here in 6 months,

and I’m going to feel bad when I read back this transcript and say,

‘‘Six months is up, and the sectarian violence continues.’’ He said,

‘‘Well, what I’d like to say, Senator, is that we have to work with

the Iraqi Government in the course of the next 6 months to bring

the sectarian violence under control.’’ So on, so forth.

Six months have passed. The sectarian violence has worsened. It

is now the President’s position and the administration position

that, despite these failures, we now have to put more young American troops at risk.

And so, I—to me, this is the key question. You continually say

that we’ve got assurances from the Maliki government that it is

going to be different this time. What I want to know is: No. 1, what

are the specific benchmarks and assurances have been received?

Where are these written? How can we examine them? No. 2, why

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would we not want to explicitly condition, in whatever supplemental appropriations legislation that these benchmarks be met, so

that the American people and legislators who are voting on them

have some understanding of what it is that we expect and it’s not

a backroom, secret conversation between the President and Maliki?

No. 3, what are the consequences if these benchmarks are not met?

What leverage do we have that would provide us some assurance

that 6 months from now you will not be sitting before us again,

saying, ‘‘Well, it didn’t work. Sadr’s militia has not been disarmed.

We have not seen sufficient cooperation with respect to distribution

of oil resources. We are still seeing political interference. We have

lost an additional 100 or 200 or 300 or 400 American lives. We

have spent an additional $100 billion. But we still can’t afford to

lose; and so, we’re going to have to proceed in the same fashion,

and maybe we’ll have to send more troops in.’’ What leverage do

we have 6 months from now?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, the leverage is that we’re not

going to stay married to a plan that’s not working in Baghdad if

the Iraqis are not living up to their part of the obligation, because

it won’t work. Unless they’re prepared to make the tough political

decisions—and, frankly, we know why the sectarian violence didn’t

come down that all had hoped would. It didn’t come down, because

there weren’t enough forces, when these areas were cleared, to actually hold them, because there were not enough reliable Iraqi

forces. And we know that there was too much political interference

in what was going on. That’s been changed in this plan, both by

the augmentation of the forces with our own forces and by bringing

forces in from other parts of Iraq. So, we’re not going to stay married to a plan that isn’t working because the Iraqis aren’t living up

to their end of the bargain.

Senator OBAMA. Madam Secretary, because I think the chairman, appropriately, is trying to keep our time restricted, I want to

just follow up on this and be very clear. Are you telling me that

if, in 6 months or whatever timeframe you are suggesting, the

Maliki government has not met these benchmarks—which, by the

way, are not sufficiently explicit to the public and Members of Congress, for a lot of us to make decisions, but let’s assume that these

benchmarks are clarified over the next several weeks as this is

being debated—that, at that point, you are going to suggest to the

Maliki government that we are going to start phasing down our

troop levels in Iraq?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I want to be not explicit about what we

might do, because I don’t want to speculate. But I will tell you this.

The benchmark that I’m looking at—the oil law is important, the

political process is extraordinarily important, but the most important thing that the Iraqi Government has to do right now is to reestablish the confidence of its population that it’s going to be evenhanded in defending it. That’s what we need to see over the next

2 or 3 months. And I think that over the next several months,

they’re going to have to show that——

Senator OBAMA. Or else what?

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Or this plan——

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Or this plan is not——

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Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Or this plan is not going to work.

Senator OBAMA. The question is not whether the plan is going to

work or not. The question is: What are the consequences to the

Iraqi Government? Are there any circumstances, that the President

or you are willing to share with the public and/or the Congress, in

which we would say to the Iraqis, ‘‘We are no longer maintaining

combat troops—American combat troops in Iraq’’? Are there any

circumstances that you can articulate in which we would say to the

Maliki government that, ‘‘Enough is enough, and we are no longer

committing our troops’’?

Secretary RICE. I’m not going to speculate, but I do tell you that

the President made very clear that of course there are circumstances. That’s what it means when he says, ‘‘Our patience is

not limited.’’

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much——

Secretary RICE. But I do think we need to recognize that the consequences for the Iraqis are also quite dire, and they are in a process in which their people are going to hold them accountable, as

well.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. The

Maliki government will probably be gone by then, but—Senator

Murkowski.

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM

ALASKA

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Secretary Rice, for your time this morning and

for all that you do. I wish you well in your trip, at the end of this

week.

You’ve clearly heard the skepticism that has been expressed this

morning, from so many of my colleagues, and for good reason.

Skepticism about a lot of things. The assurances that we may or

may not get from Mr. Maliki, an individual that we all concede has

not been able to deliver, or to follow through with assurances that

have been given in the past. There’s a great leap of faith that I

think is being made here that he is going to be able to do that

which he promises, in terms of delivering the number of Iraqi

troops, mobilizing, and really taking on those issues that, to this

point in time, he has been hesitant to do so. Skepticism with the

fact that we are going in alone.

And I will echo the concerns that Senator Boxer raised. On the

broadcast that I was watching last night of the President, there

was a little ticker underneath him as he spoke. And one of those

tickers was the announcement that Britain was withdrawing 3,000

of their troops from Iraq. And it was—the visual on that was pretty

compelling, because it took me back to last year, the year before,

the year before that, when we were sitting in this Foreign Relations room asking what the number of coalition forces were, where

they were coming from, and the administration was citing, and

proudly so, to the number of countries that were engaged with us

on this. But your comment to us this morning is that you don’t anticipate an augmentation of the coalition forces.

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You also said—and I think this is where—one area of the frustration of the American people, that Iraq came to us with this plan.

Maliki came to us, to the United States, with this plan. And I think

there are many in this country who are saying, ‘‘Well, why did they

just come to us? Why is it just the United States that is shouldering this? Why is Great Britain pulling back? Why are we the

only ones that are moving forward with this new plan?’’

So, I have great concern as to where we are now, in terms of the

world scene, and the fact that it really is the United States in the

Iraq situation, very much alone, a situation that I had hoped we

would not be in.

I want to focus my question this morning on the mission itself.

When the idea of a surge in forces was first presented, I was one

of those that said, ‘‘I have skepticism about it, but if there is a

clear definition for the mission, I think it’s something that we

should look at, look at very carefully.’’ I would agree with Senator

Hagel that, given the American lives that have been lost in Iraq,

we want to make sure that we have a policy that is worthy of their

sacrifices. And those are his words, and I think they’re very well

spoken. But I’m not convinced, as I look to the plan that the President presented yesterday, that what we are seeing is that much

different than what we have been doing in the past. You look to

the Victory in Iraq plan that came out in November 2005, and I

flipped through that to compare that with the highlights of the Iraq

Strategy Review from January 2007. And basically, the components

that we’re talking about for the security perspective remain the

same: To clear, to hold, and to build. And we, in Alaska, have paid

very close attention to what happens when we try to increase our

forces in Baghdad. We saw that with the extension of the 172d

Stryker Brigade in August for an additional 4 months. The strategy

at that point in time was to plus-up the forces in Baghdad so that

we could deal with the security issue. What we saw then didn’t

give me much assurance that plussing-up, or a temporary surge, is

going to deliver us anything more than we have now.

So, my question to you, Madam Secretary, is: How is it any different if we recognize that part of the problem, as the President

has described, was the restrictions that we had in place before? Is

this ramping up of this 17,500 in Baghdad—what assurances can

you give us that this is going to yield us a better result, a different

result than what we have seen in the past?

Secretary RICE. Well, of course, Senator, there aren’t any guarantees, but I can tell you why the President, his advisors, his military

advisors, believe that this is going to work. The plan requires a

very different structure for Baghdad, a military commander for

Baghdad, an Iraqi military commander for Baghdad, two deputy

commanders for Baghdad, the division of the city into nine military

governances that have forces deployed to those sections, Iraqi

Army, Iraqi national police, Iraqi local police, and an American battalion to help them. And so, the structure is completely different.

But I wouldn’t just run over the point that you made. The rules

of engagement really were the problem. Inadequate force and rules

of engagement were the problem. Those have been fixed in this

new plan.

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Now, the Maliki government—I understand the skepticism that

people have that they will follow through. But, you know, they are

only 9 months in office. That’s not really very long. And they are

dealing with an extremely difficult set of circumstances in which

sectarianism broke out in February 2006 in a very big way, and it’s

threatening to overrun the process that they’re engaged in. And so,

I think the fact that they didn’t act properly in the past does not

mean that they won’t act properly in the future. And I think it is

something that we have to give them a chance to do.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And I think the concern that you’ve heard

today is: How long do we give them that chance? And those benchmarks are extremely important.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Secretary RICE. We’re going to know very early, Senator, because

they have to act very quickly. Their forces will start to come in

February 1.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Senator Menendez.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR

FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, thank you for your service to the country.

I didn’t vote for the war in Iraq, in the first place. I believe it

is one of the best decisions I ever made. And I simply don’t believe

that the President’s escalation of the war will work. It seems to me

that it’s time for a political surge, not a military escalation. And

I also believe it’s long past time that we transition both our efforts

in Iraq and our mission in Iraq, particularly with our troops, and

then ultimately the transition of our troops out of Iraq in order to

have the Iraqis to understand what you’ve talked about here. But

they haven’t given us any benchmarks that one can measure by.

We have to have them understand that they have to make the hard

choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a government of

national unity.

When I heard General Pace, last year, say to us that, ‘‘We have

to get the Iraqis to love their children more than they hate their

neighbors,’’ that’s a powerful truism. But that does not get achieved

by military might.

And so, it seems to me, to paraphrase Shakespeare, an escalation

by any other name is an escalation. I know out of the White House,

it came as ‘‘surge,’’ but ‘‘surge’’ would mean temporary, and that’s

clearly not the case here. And a failed strategy, however repackaged, is still a failed strategy. We tried this plan before, and it

didn’t work, when we sent 12,000 troops to Baghdad last summer.

And we heard a panel of witnesses yesterday, and there have

been other military experts, who have said that, at this point, reliable Iraqi troops aren’t there simply to show up. So, you suggested

the President has listened to a wide range of people—the Iraqi

Study Group, the Members of Congress, different military options,

the American people—but if he listened, I don’t think he’s heard.

I don’t think he’s heard that wide range of views.

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So, I want to ask you, though, even in the midst of my own

views, trying to understand what is really new about this effort:

Did the President obtain a commitment from Prime Minister

Maliki specifically to use Iraqi troops against Muqtada al-Sadr’s

troops?

Secretary RICE. He obtained an assurance from Prime Minster

Maliki that he will go after whoever is killing innocent Iraqis. And

I think they fully understand that the Jaish al-Mahdi are part of

the problem.

Senator MENENDEZ. Did he speak specifically about—and obtain

specific commitments about—going against al-Sadr?

Secretary RICE. He said that whoever they have to go after, and

the military thinks they have to go after, they’ll go after them.

Senator MENENDEZ. The reason I asked this specific question, is

because it’s al-Sadr who’s keeping his government afloat right now.

Secretary RICE. Well, actually, al-Sadr and his people pulled out

of the government, and the government hasn’t collapsed. They

pulled out, as you remember, because of the Amman meeting with

President Bush. And I think that demonstrates that, in fact, they

can continue to function even if the Sadr forces are not a part of

the government.

Senator MENENDEZ. When the President spoke to these other different groups—there’s a broad misgiving among Shiite leaders in

the government about the Shiites having a deep-seated fear that

the power they want to have at the polls is going to be whittled

away by Americans in pursuit of Sunnis—did he get their commitment to support Prime Minister Maliki?

Secretary RICE. I’m sorry. ‘‘Their,’’ being the other Shia?

Senator MENENDEZ. The other Shia leaders, the other party leaders.

Secretary RICE. Yes. For instance, the SCIRI supports Prime

Minister Maliki in this effort.

Senator MENENDEZ. In the effort to support him in his position

as Prime Minister?

Secretary RICE. They support him as Prime Minister. They

brought him into power.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I find it really hard—unless we have

a specific—I know the general view, that, ‘‘We will go against anyone,’’ but is not, in fact, part of the negotiations that the President

had with Prime Minister Maliki to give him more operational control? And, in that operational control, couldn’t he circumvent going

against al-Sadr?

Secretary RICE. If he circumvents going against the people who

are doing the killing, then he’s going to fail, and this plan is going

to fail. And he understands that.

Senator MENENDEZ. And let’s talk about that, then. Let’s assume

that, for argument’s sake—let’s not think about the best; the best

would be great—let’s assume he fails. One of the problems is these

benchmarks without timelines or consequences. Even the Iraq

Study Group said that, as part of their recommendation—they specifically said, ‘‘If the Iraqi Government does not make substantial

progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, economic support for the Iraqi GovernVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
145

ment.’’ But when I heard your response to Senator Coleman, you

said the Iraqis didn’t have—you said—you go with plan A, and if

plan A doesn’t work, then you deal with it subsequently. I think

that’s been part of our problem here. We have a plan, but even

plan A does not have contingencies. It doesn’t have benchmarks.

How can you ask the American people, and the Members of Congress who represent the American people, to continue to give you

a blank check without benchmarks that are definable, without

benchmarks that have timelines of some consequence, without consequences to the failure to meet those deadlines? Because we’ve

seen these benchmarks be repackaged from the past. They were

benchmarks before. They were not met. There are no consequences.

And we continue to create a dependency—by the Iraqis on our

forces.

Secretary RICE. But, Senator, first of all, I think you do one

strategy at a time. But you can tell—and you can adjust a strategy

as you go along. This is not going to unfold all at once. We’re going

to know whether or not, in fact, the Iraqis are living up to their

obligations. And we’re going to know, early on. And there are

opportunities for adjustment then.

The benchmarks are actually very clear, and the Iraqis themselves have set forward some timetables for those benchmarks,

because they’ve got to get legislation through. They have an international compact that they’re trying to respond to.

But I just want to speak to the word—to the point of consequences. There are consequences, in that they will lose the support of the American people, and they’ll lose the support of the

Iraqi people.

Senator MENENDEZ. But they’re there already, Madam Secretary,

in terms of the support of the American people. The question is:

What will our Government do, specifically, if benchmarks are not

met? What will we do? And that’s where there is no answer. And,

therefore, very difficult to be supportive of any such——

Secretary RICE. Senator——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Policy.

Secretary RICE. I just think that it’s bad policy, frankly, to speculate on what you’ll do if a plan fails that you’re trying to make

work.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, you——

Secretary RICE. I just don’t think it’s the way to go about it.

Senator MENENDEZ. The President did it in Leave No Child

Behind.

Secretary RICE. But——

Senator MENENDEZ. There are real consequences if you, in fact,

don’t meet certain standards. You lose a lot of money. You get——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Categorized as a failed school

district. It seems to be a standard that can work here domestically.

We’re unwilling to give the government—standards that ultimately

they would have to meet in order for us to be able to achieve success or, therefore, determine what are the consequences to failure.

Secretary RICE. Senator, as complicated as education policy is, I

think Iraq—the circumstances of the Iraqis are very complicated.

We’re not giving—first of all, we don’t expect that anyone here is

146

giving us a blank check. I understand the skepticism. And I know

that if this doesn’t show some success, there isn’t going to be support for this policy. I understand that.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you——

Secretary RICE. And we said this to the Iraqis, in no uncertain

terms. They have to start to deliver. They have to start to deliver

now. And if they don’t, then I think they know that we’re not going

to be able to continue to support them at the levels that we do.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator Isakson.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM

GEORGIA

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In respect for Senators Cardin and Casey, Webb and Vitter, I’ll

be very quick.

In reference to the previous exchange, I would simply say this.

It’s been my observation in war and in diplomacy, there are times

you can answer questions and times you can’t. I have great respect

for that, and I understand the answers the Secretary has given,

and I respect her being here today.

With regard to that, I hope this hearing is the most watched television event in downtown Baghdad right now, which I’m sure it is.

And if it is, and Maliki is watching television, I think he realizes

that this—in Kenny Rogers old song, ‘‘You’ve gotta know when to

hold ’em and know when to fold ’em,’’ it’s time for them to deliver

on the hand that they’ve dealt, and there’s no folding that will take

place. You can’t go on, ad infinitum.

And I would say, in response to the exchange—I heard, from the

President last night, in the right words, ‘‘This one is for all the

marbles,’’ vis-a-vis the Iraqi commitment, and it being totally

across the board, and there be no cover for Muqtada al-Sadr any

more than a Sunni or anybody else that might be around. That’s

just a—you don’t have to answer that. That’s just my observation.

My second thing, to live up to my promise to my colleagues, is

to say this. Ranking Member Lugar made a very insightful statement with regard to diplomacy. I—it has not gone unnoticed to me

that John Negroponte has joined your staff as the No. 2 person, I

believe, at State. It also has not gone unnoticed that, when you answered the questions regarding Syria and regarding Iran, they

were definitive into what you expected, they were not prospective

in what might happen. And I think there’s a burden on Iran and

Syria to show that there are reasons to come to the table that are

in the best interest of the region. The United States is not a nonnegotiable nation. We may, as history has proven, been the best

negotiating nation that there ever was, but there’s a time to

negotiate, and it’s after you know what the cards of the other side

are going to be, or at least the first card. And I think, the way you

stated it was appropriate. And I encourage us to pursue negotiations, but not by giving away, at the outset, what we may have to

have in the end.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator. Your generosity

is much appreciated.

Senator Cardin.

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STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR

FROM MARYLAND

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Madam Secretary, thank you.

I certainly want our foreign policy to succeed, including in Iraq.

Several weeks ago, when the President said that he would reevaluate our programs in Iraq and come out with a new policy at the

beginning of the year, I was encouraged by that, because I thought:

At last, Congress and the President and the American people

would be together on a policy in Iraq. I must tell you, I’m extremely disappointed. The Iraq Study Group, the military experts,

have all said that it’s time to start drawing down our troops. And

yet, the plan will increase the number of troops. I don’t understand

that.

They talk about engaging the international community. And I’ve

listened to your testimony, and I’ve listened to the President last

night, and it seems like we are making a limited effort, not an allout effort, and we certainly are not holding the Iraqis accountable

to stand up to defend their own country.

So, I have one question I want to ask about the troop numbers;

how the 20,000-plus troops numbers were determined. I must tell

you that if we were looking at how many troops are necessary to

quell a civil war that is occurring in Iraq, I think one would pick

a much larger number. If we’re looking at carrying out our current

mission, military experts believe that we should be drawing down,

so that we at least give the Iraqis a message that they have to take

care of their own country, and we start making it clear this not a

United States occupation.

So, I am somewhat suspect that this number was determined, because it’s what you have available, that it’s not—you don’t have

many more that you could bring in at this time without creating

a significant problem to our military. So, please tell me how this

particular number was arrived at.

Secretary RICE. Senator, Chairman Pace answered this question,

earlier today, and the requirement was established in the field

when the mission was established. And the mission was, first of all,

to support the successes that are beginning to emerge in Anbar—

that’s where the 4,000 came from; and, second, to provide assistance to the Iraqis as they bring in their best forces to be able to

deal with the death squads and the organized violence that is going

on against Iraqi populations.

Yes; if you were trying to quell a civil war, you would need much

larger forces. But if what you’re trying to do is to provide population security in relatively defined areas by augmenting Iraqi

forces, then that’s a much smaller number. And the Joint Chiefs

of Staff then resource the plan that is given to them by the military. That’s how the number was determined.

Senator CARDIN. All I can tell you is that the information that

we’ve received from people that have been in command indicate

that they’re—that’s—it doesn’t add up that way.

But, I tell you, I think it’s going to be very transparent to the

international community that these numbers are more symbolic, as

far as the numbers of it—it’s not symbolic to those who are going

over, not symbolic to those who are putting their lives on the line—

148

but it won’t make a significant difference as far as the amount of

violence in the country itself, but will be very much an indication

that the United States is increasing its commitment in Iraq.

One more question, very quickly. The President talked last night

about talking to our allies around the world. Can you just list countries that are in support of what we’re doing and whether any

countries are going to come to our help, as far as providing additional military personnel in Iraq?

Secretary RICE. I think that we don’t expect additional military

personnel. In fact, our surge of personnel is to support the Iraqis

in this very specific mission and to leave behind an Iraqi force that

can do this on its own. And so, in fact, I think it’s a temporary matter from our point of view, to bridge for the absence of Iraqi forces

that are capable of doing this.

We do have allies on the ground with us. We’re not alone, Senator Cardin. We do have, still, Australian forces there, Japanese

forces, Korean forces, lots of forces from——

Senator CARDIN. And they all concur with this new plan? I

mean——

Secretary RICE. We have had—Prime Minister Howard was out

this morning saying that this is the right thing to do. We know

that Prime Minister Blair agrees. I talked yesterday with leaders—

with Foreign Ministers from the region. They understand the need

to deal with this.

Senator CARDIN. We all understand the need to deal with it,

but——

Secretary RICE. No; they understand what it is we’re doing. Their

concern is the concern that I’m hearing here: Will the Maliki government do this in an evenhanded fashion that goes both after

Shia and Sunni death squads? And that is their concern, not the

number of American forces that may be needed.

Senator CARDIN. I’m glad to see this committee is not alone.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll yield back.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator Vitter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM

LOUISIANA

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam

Secretary. Good luck on your upcoming trip.

My main reaction to this initiative and the President’s speech is

really to think of a number of significant questions, so I want to

just go directly to those.

I have not heard General Pace’s testimony, so forgive me. I think

the President precisely, last night, said ‘‘over 20,000 troops.’’ What

is that exact number, or what is the upper limit on that?

Secretary RICE. I think it’s around 21,500, at most. But I’d like

General Pace to speak to that, because they have a way that they

intend to flow the troops in that probably affects that number.

Senator VITTER. OK. I know they have a very specific plan for

those troops, but, broadbrush and to a layman, that is—what?—

roughly 15 percent of what we have there now. So, it is a marginal

increase, as compared to a 50-percent increase. And so, that does

lead to a concern of mine that we may commit the same mistake

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I think we clearly have in the past, which is too little, maybe too

late. In light of the past, why shouldn’t we take that number and

say we’re going to increase it 50 percent, we’re going to increase

it 100 percent?

Secretary RICE. I think if that had been the assessment of the

commanders as to what needed to be done, that would have been

the recommendation. But this is a very specific purpose. Let’s leave

aside Anbar, which is really to deal with the positive developments

there, in terms of what the sheikhs are doing. But in Baghdad, it

is not to make Americans the center of police security or of providing population security for Iraqis in Baghdad, it is to augment

Iraqi forces in the lead in doing that, because we recognize that

sending Americans in to separate people and neighborhoods, or to

go door to door and try to do a census, makes no sense. And so,

while there were obviously very detailed calculations done on what

that needed to be in the nine districts that are being developed, a

battalion per district, and how then to embed people with the Iraqi

forces so that they are trained up quickly.

Senator VITTER. Well, I’m——

Secretary RICE. I think that’s where the number comes from.

Senator VITTER. I certainly understand all of that. But my point

about past history is, I assume it was the commanders’ recommendation about numbers in the past that seemed to be—in

many cases, have been too low. So: Does the number take account

of any drawdown of British or other troops?

Secretary RICE. Because it is a very specific mission in Baghdad

to support the Iraqis at this time, it’s unaffected by any drawdown

that might take place—for instance, in the south of the country.

Senator VITTER. But surely, while the British mission in the

south of the country is not what we’re talking about, particularly

in Baghdad, I assume we consider it significant, so that just forgetting about it has some loss or impact.

Secretary RICE. Well, first of all, the British will continue to be

there for some time. But Basrah is being turned over to Iraqi control. And that, by the way, is happening throughout the country—

the continuing problems are Anbar, Diala, and Baghdad. In most

of the country, responsibility is being turned over to Iraqis; and, as

that happens, then people can withdraw their forces.

Senator VITTER. OK. And a final question about troops. As I

heard the President, he talked about mostly Baghdad, also some in

Anbar, no increased deployment having to do with the borders. And

it seems to me, personnel and material coming over the borders is

maybe not the dominant problem, but a real problem. And is part

of the new plan going to address that in any significant way?

Secretary RICE. Well, what the President has done, on recommendation of his commanders, is to increase our naval and air

presence through the carrier presence, and also to give an expanded mission, in terms of breaking up these networks. But we

think it’s principally an intelligence function, Senator. Those borders are so long and so porous that I don’t think you want to try

to depend on boots on the ground to actually deal with the borders.

Senator VITTER. OK. I want to turn to Sadr—obviously a big

topic of discussion, for obvious reasons. As I understand the status

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of the government, he hasn’t quite completely left the government.

They’re boycotting it. It’s something in between; correct?

Secretary RICE. Well, he pulled his people out of the government,

but they’ve never really said they wanted to leave the government.

The fact of the matter is, the government is functioning without

them.

Senator VITTER. But no one different has, for instance, assumed

leadership of those ministries, correct?

Secretary RICE. In fact, there are temporary ministers in a couple of those ministries.

Senator VITTER. OK. What different scenarios do you see playing

out if, in fact, Prime Minister Maliki is serious and acts on his

commitment? Sadr isn’t going to like that, clearly doesn’t agree, is

going to react somehow. So, how would you game out or play out

that situation? Because I assume we have to be prepared for that.

Secretary RICE. Well, the first thing is that these death squads,

wherever they’re coming from—and some of them are being driven

by Jaish al Mahdi—have to be dealt with. And Sadr apparently has

said that if his people are doing this killing, then they ought to be

dealt with. We will see whether he holds to that commitment.

But, ultimately yes, he has, I suppose, the power to threaten the

government. But the government can’t be intimidated by that. And

with enough forces that are reliable and capable, I think they believe they can meet any contingency.

But, again, it goes back to the question of whether or not you believe that this is just a problem of will, or is it a problem of both

will and capability? The President, on reflection on his commanders’ recommendation, believes that it’s both will and capability, will and capability to be able to deal with whatever contingency they face, including contingencies they may face in Sadr City

or from the Sadr forces.

Senator VITTER. So, in terms of that playing out, I assume you’re

fairly confident that the government can continue to survive without him and with an even more complete and full opposition by his

forces than exist now.

Secretary RICE. Well, there’s also the possibility that he will decide that he wants to continue to be a part of the political process.

Senator VITTER. Right.

Secretary RICE. That’s a possibility.

Senator VITTER. Right. I’m not discarding that. I’m just asking

your analysis of the other possibility.

Secretary RICE. Well, I think it’s become such a critical situation

for them that they recognize they’ve got to take on anybody who

stands in their way of bringing population security.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Casey.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR

FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for

convening this very important hearing.

Madam Secretary, we appreciate your presence here and your

testimony and your public service.

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I represent the State of Pennsylvania, along with Senator Specter. We’ve now lost, as of last week, more than 140 in Iraq. And

in a State like ours, apart from the deaths in big cities like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, most of the deaths, most of the loss of life,

are soldiers and marines from very small towns. And, as you can

imagine—and I know you appreciate this—when there is a death

like that in a small town, it is like an earthquake, it’s cataclysmic

to the community and obviously to the family. And I think that one

of my basic obligations as a U.S. Senator, when it comes to Iraq,

one of the obligations I have, when it comes to the question of what

we’re going to do, going forward in Iraq, is to support policies that,

in fact, will be cognizant of those numbers, the loss of life, and to

do everything I can to make sure that we reduce, as much as we

can, as humanly possible, the likelihood that another one of our

sons or daughters are sacrificed for a policy that is flawed.

Based upon your testimony today and based upon what I heard

the President say, National Security Advisor—all of the public

record that Americans have been reviewing the last couple of days,

I have to say I’m not convinced that the escalation of troops that

the President formally announced last night has support in a strategy that will work. And I don’t think I can meet my obligation and

support that kind of an increase in troop levels.

But, I have to say, despite what I might think, I think it’s very

important—and some of this will be redundant, I realize, but I

think it’s very important that you tell us, once again, in your own

words, but also on behalf of the President and the administration,

What is the nexus—and I have not heard this articulated well, so

far—what is the nexus between the good news that the Iraqi have

developed this plan themselves, that has its genesis or origin in

their work and their leadership—but what’s the nexus between

that Iraqi strategy and the need for approximately 20,000 new

troops?

Secretary RICE. Yes. When the Iraqis came to Jordan and they

said they really have to get a hold of this Baghdad problem, and

recognizing that the Baghdad security plan that had been carried

out in the summer did not succeed, they wanted to do it themselves. To be very frank, they wanted to do it themselves. They

believe that sectarian violence is their problem, not ours. And I

applaud that. I think that’s the right responsibility.

It is true that people like Rubaie, who sometimes are very enthusiastic, say, ‘‘We can do this on our own.’’ But, in fact, when the

experts, including their own defense people, looked at the capabilities that they had and when those capabilities would actually mature, which would be in the summer sometime, there is a gap between the capabilities that will mature by the summer, when we

begin to really transfer operational control to them over most of

their forces, and what needs to be done in Baghdad now. And so,

the President asked his commanders to work with the Iraqis to see

what it would take to be able to undertake a population protection—get-control-of-the-capital plan now rather than waiting until

the summer, when the Iraqis could do that themselves. And the

plan that came back was for an augmentation of American forces

so that a battalion could be with each of these nine Iraqi groups

152

that are going to be in each of these nine military districts. That’s

where it came from.

And so, the link, Senator, is—again, if you believe—and I understand that people don’t believe that the Iraqis have the will, that

there’s great skepticism as to whether they have the will—if you

believe that it’s a matter of will, then we should do exactly what

people are saying, we should draw back and say, ‘‘Go at it. Go at

it, and you’d better succeed in getting rid of this sectarian violence,

or you’re not going to be able to continue to govern.’’ But you believe that it’s both will and capability, then telling them to do

something that you don’t think they’re capable of doing is not good

policy. And so, the President’s policy is premised on the urgency of

getting Baghdad under control and what Iraqi capabilities there

are and what augmentation we need to do. So, that’s how you

would think about the relationship between the two.

Senator CASEY. Well, I appreciate your answer, but I do hope

that you and other members of the administration continually, in

the next couple of days especially, make the case very specifically

why you and the President and others think this is necessary, because I don’t think the American people are hearing that. They’re

hearing a lot of the same rhetoric we’ve heard for a lot of years,

in my judgment. The best efforts to make sure that every sound

bite is phrased in a way that sounds like, ‘‘If we don’t do this, it’s

going to adversely impact the war on terror,’’ which I think the

case hasn’t been made, with regard to this particular policy.

So, I’ll move on. One more question. With regard to diplomacy,

we hear it all the time—and this is your business—we hear it all

the time. We hear about the necessity of a political strategy and

a diplomatic strategy. Can you very quickly—and I’d ask you to

submit—amplify this for the record for this hearing, if you could

provide that. But, just very quickly, can you summarize for us specific steps you have taken, personally, as Secretary of State, when

it comes to dealing with the real crisis that we now have in Iraq,

at least in the last 2 years, just a list, if you can.

Secretary RICE. On the diplomatic front?

Senator CASEY. Absolutely.

Secretary RICE. Yes. Well, I have been constantly—whether it’s

through bilateral discussions or in the multilateral form that we’ve

created, the GCC-plus-two—pressing these states to help the Iraqis

send missions to Iraq. And we’ve succeeded in getting some of them

there; getting the Arab League to go there in support because one

of the problems is, they see, ‘‘Well, perhaps Iran is too influential,

but these Iraqis, the Shia there are Arabs.’’ So bringing them into

the Arab fold is extremely important.

I have worked very hard to get European Union to go in, in a

major way. And, in fact, their commissioner, Benita FerreroWaldner, has gone several times, at our urging. But the most important thing that we’ve done is, we’ve negotiated, over the last

year, almost year now, an international compact for Iraq which has

very specific things that the Iraqis are to do, including things like

an oil law, anticorruption measures, and so forth, and a series of

steps that the international community would take in response.

This is something that we used very effectively with Afghanistan,

and we think we can use it effectively with Iraq, as well. The debt

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relief. We’ve negotiated, for the Iraqis, 80 percent debt relief from

most of the Paris Club debtors, and 100 percent from ourselves and

several others. We’re trying to get the Gulf States to do the same.

So, it’s been a very active agenda.

I do think that they’ve been much more active with Iraq in the

last 6 or 7 months, really engaging—really, the last year—really

engaging and trying to get Sunnis involved in the process. I suspect

that some of the Sunni states have been supportive of what is

going on in Anbar, and have had a role in helping that come about.

So, that’s how we see the diplomacy. And it’s not a question of

whether—to my mind, who you talk to; it’s a question of what

they’re prepared to do. And the states that have the same vision

of the Middle East, and want an Iraq that is unified, stable, without undue Iranian influence, which is one of the uniting factors for

all of these states, I think, is the place to be.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Webb, your patience is commendable, and your experience is extensive.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, U.S. SENATOR FROM

VIRGINIA

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also realize I am the

last obstacle between you and lunch, and——

Senator BIDEN. No, no, no, no.

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Secretary Rice and the door. [Laughter.]

So, I’ll be as brief as I can.

Secretary Rice, I want to thank you for being here. And I want

you to know my door is always open if you ever want to come by

and discuss any issue or call me or whatever. I’m looking forward

very much to working with you.

I’d like to associate myself with many of the views here, that

you’ve heard, about what I believe is a necessity for us to widen

the diplomatic approach, in terms of reaching a solution. I want to

make a—just a quick comment that won’t require an answer from

you, and then I do have a question about something that concerns

me a great deal.

With respect to the situation in Iran, and with Iran and the region, there are many, including myself, who warned that invading

and occupying Iraq would, in fact, empower Iran. And that has become a reality. We also—there was a great deal of notice and comment recently about the fact that Iran has more power in Iraq than

it has had in a very long—perhaps going back a couple of hundred

years, and that is a reality. And our options are in—to ignore, to

do things informally, as you’ve been discussing, or to more actively

engage.

And when I’m looking at this, one of the things that sticks in my

mind is a situation that we had with China in 1971. This was a

rogue nation. It had nuclear weapons. It had an American war on

its border. The parallels are not exact, but we went forward,

without giving up any of our own ideals or our national objectives,

and we did a very aggressive engagement process that, over a period of time, has arguably brought China into the international

community.

154

And I just hope you will pass on to their President, (a) my best

regards, and (b) that if he were to move in that direction, he certainly would have the strong support of me, and perhaps other

people.

The question that I have for you goes back to the Presidential

finding on the resolution that authorized force in 2002. And there

is a sentence in here which basically says that, ‘‘This resolution

does not constitute any change in the position of the executive

branch with regard to its authority to use force to deter, prevent,

or respond to aggression or other threats to United States interests

outside of Iraq.’’ This phrase went to situations outside of Iraq. And

this is a question that can be answered either, you know, very

briefly or through written testimony, but my question is: Is this

the—is it the position of this administration that it possesses the

authority to take unilateral action against Iran, in the absence of

a direct threat, without congressional approval?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I’m really loathe to get into questions

of the President’s authorities without a rather more clear understanding of what we are actually talking about. So, let me answer

you, in fact, in writing. I think that would be the best thing to do.

Senator WEBB. I would appreciate that.

Secretary RICE. But let me just say how we view the situation

currently. We continue to believe that our struggle with Iran is a

long one. It’s a strategic one. It has elements of the fight in the war

on terror. It has elements of trying to stabilize a Middle East in

which Iran is a tremendously destabilizing force. It has, of course,

an Iraq dimension. And it also has an important nuclear dimension. And I think we believe we have the right policy for dealing

with those matters, through diplomacy.

Now, what the President was very much referring to is, of

course, every American President—and that goes back a very, very

long way—has made very clear that we will defend our interests

and those of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. And so, there is

nothing new in that statement that the President has made.

The one important new fact here is that, for force-protection purposes, we have to worry about what Iran is doing. We all know

their activities for these enhanced IEDs and so forth. And we are

going to go after the networks that do that.

I believe that—when you talk to the military advisors, they believe that is something that can be done in Iraq, that it is something that is done by good intelligence and by quickness of action.

And, in fact, we’ve had a couple of those occasions recently, where

we’ve gone after these networks.

Senator WEBB. Right. Well, I think that—I think we both probably know what the elephant in the bedroom is here. And I’ve got

a long history of experience in dealing with defense issues. And

there is one pretty profound change since I was in the Pentagon,

in the Reagan administration, and that is the notion that the executive branch has the power to conduct a preemptive war, as opposed to a preemptive attack. And the situations that you’re talking about really go to a preemptive attack against a specific threat,

where people on the other side are being threatened. And the concern that I and a number of people have is that this would be interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
155

preted as something broader. So, I’d appreciate it if you could give

us something in writing on that.

Secretary RICE. I will, certainly.

[The information submitted by the State Department follows:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, January 31, 2007.

Hon. JIM WEBB,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR WEBB: In the President’s January 10 speech to the American people on the Administration’s New Way Forward in Iraq, he made clear that Iran was

providing material support for attacks on American forces. He emphasized the importance of disrupting these attacks and interrupting the flow of support from Iran

and Syria. The President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our

forces in Iraq. During the January 11 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing

on Iraq, you and Senator Biden asked a number of questions concerning the scope

of the President’s authority to carry out these critical missions.

The Administration believes that there is clear authority for U.S. operations within the territory of Iraq to prevent further Iranian- or Syrian-supported attacks

against U.S. forces operating as part of the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF–I) or

against civilian targets. Such attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and the safety of our personnel; they also continue to threaten the region’s security and stability. U.S. military operations in Iraq are conducted under

the President’s constitutional authority and the Authorization for Use of Military

Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107–243), which authorized the use of

armed force to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security

Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq’s security

and stability, which encompasses MNF–I conducting military operations against any

forces that carry out attacks against MNF–I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.

You also ask what authority might be relevant in connection with a hypothetical

military operation in Iran. As this Administration has said, we are not planning to

invade Iran. For over two years, we have actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to

address Iran’s nuclear program, and we remain committed to resolving our concerns

with Iran diplomatically. Of course, the Constitution charges the President to protect the United States and the American people. As Commander in Chief, he must

be able to defend the United States, for example, if U.S. forces come under attack.

Whether and how to do so in any specific situation would depend on the facts and

circumstances at that time. Administration officials communicate regularly with the

leadership and other Members of Congress with regard to the deployment of U.S.

forces and the measures that may be necessary to protect the security interests of

the United States and will continue to do so.

We hope this information will be helpful to you and thank you for your interest

in this important issue.

Sincerely,

JEFFREY T. BERGNER,

Assistant Secretary,

Legislative Affairs.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much.

Secretary RICE. If I may, just one other point on Senator Webb’s

earlier point. Senator, we’ve gone a long way, actually, to offer the

opportunity for the Iranians to talk to us. We did it in the context

of the nuclear program, because we believe that’s a real near-term

threat and if we don’t get a handle on the nuclear program, we’ve

got a real problem. I want to repeat again—now, if they will stop

enriching so that they’re not improving their nuclear capability

while they’re talking, they’ll find somebody who’s willing to talk to

them under any circumstances. But I think short of that, we send

a wrong message about our resolve. And, frankly, it has a cost with

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nations in the region that are looking very closely at how we are

conducting ourselves, vis-a-vis the Iranians.

Senator WEBB. Right. Well, I think that it’s important, as the

Baker Commission was saying, and a lot of people have been saying, and I’ve been saying, that when you have a situation with a

nation that constitutes this kind of threat, it’s very important to

confront, as well as to engage. And I personally think it would be

a bold act for George W. Bush to get on an airplane and go to

Tehran in the same manner that President Nixon did, take a gamble and not give up one thing that we believe in in terms of its

moving toward weapons of mass destruction, our belief that Israel

needs to be recognized and its interests need to be protected, but

to maybe start changing the formula here.

Thank you.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. I thank my colleagues for their patience; and,

particularly, I thank the Secretary of State.

Madam Secretary, I’d conclude by just making a few very brief

comments.

One is, one of the things that you’ve learned here today from

hearing our colleagues is that there is an overwhelming concern

that the reason why we insisted that we not accept the Maliki

plan, as he laid it out, is that what he would do is go in and take

out the Sunnis and we’d exacerbate the civil war. That may or may

not be true, but that’s been one of the potential explanations as to

why we insisted we go into Baghdad when he said they don’t need

us in Baghdad. I’m not saying that’s right or wrong. Just be aware

that that’s something that’s going to have to be dealt with, in terms

of, I suspect, people’s judgments about how they feel about the administration’s position.

Second, I also want to make it clear, as chairman of the committee, that I feel very strongly that the authorization of the use

of force, and the provision that the Senator read from it, explicitly

denies you the authority to go into Iran. Let me say that again. Explicitly denies you the authority to go into Iran. We will fight that

out if the President moves, but I just want the record to show—

and I would like to have a legal response from the State Department, if they think they have authority to pursue networks or anything else across the border into Iran and Iraq. That will generate

a constitutional confrontation here in the Senate, I predict to you.

At least I will attempt to make it a confrontation.

Third point I would make, Madam Secretary, is that I’ve sat

through a lot of hearings, and you have, too, and, God love you,

you’ve had to do it in a very different position than I have, and I

commend you for your patience, but I want to say, again—and I

hope you’ll convey it to the President, because I’m sure he has not

had time to watch our hearing—I think what occurred here today

was fairly profound, in the sense that you heard 21 members, with

one or two notable exceptions, expressing outright hostility, disagreement, and/or overwhelming concern with the President’s proposal. And I think that he will proceed at significant political risk

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if there is not a much more intensive and detailed attempt to bring

the U.S. Senate and the Congress into his proposals.

As you point out, this surge is a process. This is not going to happen in a day or a week or a month. And we will have time and

opportunity to revisit this next month, and in the next 2 months.

Because the President is going to, as I understand it, Madam Secretary—and my colleague from Virginia knows more about this

than any of us on the committee, having served in the Pentagon—

as I understand it, the decision will come across the desk of the

President of the United States, or at least through the Secretary

of Defense, next week, in 3 weeks or 5 weeks, as to whether he extends 1,500, 2,000, 900, 600, 1,400 marines, sailors, and soldiers.

And so, this is a decision that will necessarily have to be revisited

privately by the President once a week, once a month, from this

point on.

And I see my——

Senator WEBB. Mr. Chairman, if I may, we saw a notice from the

Marine Corps this morning about a number of units already having

been extended.

Senator BIDEN. Right. But my point is, a month from now, in

order to keep the troop level up to accommodating this 21,500 additional forces, that decision will have to be made again.

Senator WEBB. Right. Yes, sir. This was a part of that——

Senator BIDEN. Extending. So——

Senator WEBB [continuing]. His proposal—or the policy that he

mentioned last night.

Senator BIDEN. So, the point I’m making is that I don’t want

anybody to think—and I hope the administration does not think—

that the President’s made a decision, we’re going to go forward

with 21,500 people, it’s a done deal, that it is finished. He will have

an opportunity to revisit it. We will revisit it. And you heard from

my colleagues, they are, I don’t think it’s unfair to say, ranging

from skepticism to intense skepticism to outright opposition to the

President’s proposal.

And I’ll end where I began, Madam Secretary. And I realize this

is not all on your plate. If we can’t figure out how to bring along

the American people on this deal, we are—we are in real trouble.

We would be making a tragic mistake that I think will mortgage

the ability of this President and that of the next President to do

what they are going to have to do. And that is, there will be a requirement to deploy force to other parts of the world. We will undermine that in a way that I think will be incredibly damaging to

our national interest. So, that’s just one man’s opinion.

I appreciate, Madam Secretary, your perseverance, your willingness to be here, and the fact that we have cut your lunch hour by

20 minutes. And that’s not a minor point. You’re going to have to

go and sit down in front of the House, as well. But I thank you for

your courtesy.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. I hope that we make it clear to the men and

women that are serving our country today in Iraq that this difference of opinion in regard to the President’s sending in more

troops——

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Senator BIDEN. It has nothing to do with them.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Is that we’re supportive of what

they’re doing, and we’re going to provide them the resources so

they can do their job, and are protected, to the very best of our

ability. Because I wouldn’t want anything said in here today to interpret that we’re just——

Senator BIDEN. I think that’s a valid point to raise again, and we

should raise it again and again. In my seven trips to Iraq—and collectively on this committee there’s probably been 50 trips to Iraq—

I don’t know a single person, having voted for or voted against the

deployment, having agreed or disagreed with the President, who

hasn’t been absolutely amazed by the dedication, the service, and

the overwhelming commitment of those forces on the ground. And

if you want to see how that works, travel to Iraq with a guy that

is a noncommissioned officer, and watch how he relates with these

folks on the streets of Baghdad and Fallujah and Basrah. It is real.

They have our overwhelming support. They have our admiration.

And it should not be read that our disagreement, to the extent we

disagree with the President, is any reflection on their abilities.

I would close by saying that I also want to thank the Capitol Police for having done, very skillfully and without much fanfare, a

very good job in keeping order here today. I want to acknowledge

that and thank them.

I want to thank all of you who came to listen, for the orderly way

in which you did. I know there are incredibly strong feelings about

this issue, and as American citizens, you’ve conducted yourself in

a way that I think makes our democracy one that’s the envy of the

world.

Again, I thank you, Madam Secretary.

The committee is—oh, I’m supposed to—also, we’re supposed to

begin this afternoon’s hearing at 2 o’clock, but I’ve been informed

by the U.S. Senate that we are going to have two votes at 2 o’clock,

that they are—to use Senate jargon, they’ve been agreed to by

unanimous consent, which means they will take place. So, rather

than convene at 2 o’clock, we will convene at 2:30. And the list of

witnesses we have today are very prominent people who have different views on—and specific plans on—how to proceed in Iraq.

They include the Honorable Peter Galbraith, Dr. Frederick Kagan

of the American Enterprise Institute, and Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter

of the CATO Institute.

So, I thank you, Madam Secretary.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED

FOR THE RECORD

POLL PUBLISHED IN THE MILITARY TIMES SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOXER

(1) Are you on active duty?

Yes—100%

No—0%

(Note: Only active-duty responses were counted in remaining results.)

(2) Service Branch?

Army—46%

Navy—21%

Air Force—23%

Marine Corps—9%

Coast Guard—1%

No response—0%

(3) How many times have you deployed to Iraq?

Once—32%

Twice—12%

Three times—3%

More than three times—3%

Never/no response—50%

(4) How many times have you deployed to Afghanistan?

Once—12%

Twice—1%

Three times—0%

More than three times—0%

Never/no response—85%

(5) In total, I have deployed in support of the war in Afghanistan and/or Iraq for:

Less than 2 months—3%

3–6 months—17%

7–12 months—25%

13–18 months—11%

19 or more months—9%

Haven’t deployed/no response—34%

(6) Should the U.S. have gone to war in Iraq?

Yes—41%

No—37%

No opinion/no answer—9%

Decline to answer/no answer—11%

(7) Regardless of whether you think the U.S. should have gone to war, how likely

is the U.S. to succeed?

Very likely to succeed—13%

Somewhat likely to succeed—37%

Not very likely to succeed—31%

Not at all likely to succeed—10%

No opinion/no answer—8%

(8) How soon do you think the Iraqi military will be ready to replace large numbers

of American troops?

Less than a year—2%

1-2 years—20%

3-5 years—36%

5-10 years—22%

More than 10 years—12%

No opinion/no answer—7%

(9) How long do you think the U.S. will need to stay in Iraq to reach its goals?

Less than a year—2%

1–2 years—8%

3–5 years—26%

5–10 years—31%

More than years—23%

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No opinion/no answer—8%

(10) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation with Iraq?

Approve—35%

Disapprove—42%

No opinion—10%

Decline to answer—12%

(11) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job

as president?

Approve—52%

Disapprove—31%

No opinion—6%

Decline to answer—10%

(12) Do you consider the war in Iraq to be part of the war on terrorism that began

Sept. 11, 2001, or do you consider it to be an entirely separate military action?

Part of the war on terrorism—47%

Separate military action—47%

No opinion—5%

(13) We currently have 145,000 troops in Iraq and Kuwait. How many troops do you

think we should have there?

Zero—13%

0–50,000—7%

50,000–144,000—6%

145,000—13%

146,000–200,000—22%

200,000+ —16%

No opinion/Don’t know—23%

(14) We currently have 18,000 troops in Afghanistan. How many troops do you think

we should have there?

Zero—8%

0–10,000—7%

10,000–17,000—4%

18,000—15%

19,000–50,000—27%

50,000+ —12%

No opinion/Don’t know—26%

ARTICLE FROM THE DAILY TELEGRAPH SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOXER

[From The Daily Telegraph, Jan. 11, 2007]

3,000 BRITISH TROOPS TO BE PULLED OUT OF IRAQ BY MAY

(By Thomas Harding in Basra and Toby Harnden in Washington]

Thousands of British troops will return home from Iraq by the end of May, The

Daily Telegraph can reveal today.

Tony Blair will announce within the next fortnight that almost 3,000 troops are

to be cut from the current total of 7,200, allowing the military to recover from 4

years of battle that have left it severely overstretched.

In what will be the first substantial cut of British troops serving in southern Iraq,

their number will drop to 4,500 on May 31. The announcement will be made by the

Prime Minister before he steps down from office as an intended signal of the

achievements the British have made in Iraq—albeit at the cost of 128 dead.

The plans for the British withdrawal were revealed as President George W. Bush

announced that he was sending an additional 21,500 troops into Iraq.

The primary objective of the five brigades and two U.S. Marine battalions is to

curtail sectarian violence in Baghdad and target Sunni insurgent strongholds in

western Anbar province.

His high-stakes, prime-time television address to Americans last night signalled

a stark divergence of policy on Iraq with that of his British allies.

In an uncharacteristic admission of errors, Mr. Bush made acknowledged ‘‘mistakes’’ in previous ‘‘failed’’ plans to pacify Baghdad.

The troop ‘‘surge’’—bitterly opposed by Democrats and many Republicans—would

bring forward the end of the war, he said. ‘‘If we increase our support at this crucial

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moment, and help the Iraqis break the cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our

troops begin coming home.’’

He gave warning to Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Premier, that America’s patience

was running out: ‘‘If the Iraqi Government does not follow through on its promises,

it will lose the support of the American people and it will lose the support of the

Iraqi people.’’

Mr. Bush’s strategy was to be accompanied by a massive influx of American cash

for reconstruction and a commitment from the Iraq Government to send three brigades into Baghdad.

A senior British officer serving in Iraq said yesterday: ‘‘The U.S. situation appears

to be getting worse because they are sending more troops while the British are getting out of Basra. But the situation is different, with the Americans facing a gargantuan problem of sectarian violence.’’

The precise timetable for the U.K. withdrawal has been disclosed to The Daily

Telegraph. Unless there are ‘‘major hiccups’’ in the next few months, 1 Mechanised

Brigade will enter Iraq with a much reduced force when it replaces 19 Light Brigade

in June for its 6-month tour.

Military planners are drawing up force levels for when Basra comes under ‘‘provincial Iraqi control’’ at the end of spring, when all security will be handed over to

the Iraqi police and army.

The British Army will then position its troops at a major base that is being expanded at Basra Air Station, 5 miles west of the city, where they will be on standby.

A small force of 200 men will be left in central Basra.

By the end of February the volatile Maysan province, patrolled by the 600-strong

battle group of the Queen’s Royal Lancers, will be handed over to the local authorities.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF STATE CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN

Question. Does the executive branch believe the objectives set forth in section 3(a)

of Pubic Law 107–243 have been achieved and why?

• If the answer to this question is yes, please elaborate on the authority under

U.S. law for the continued use of force by U.S. forces in Iraq.

• If the answer to this question is no—

• What is the ‘‘continuing threat posed by Iraq’’?

• Which United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq are United

States Armed Forces enforcing?

Answer. Section 3(a) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq

Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107–243) authorizes the use of armed force to defend the

national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq

and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding

Iraq.

To date, the United States, working closely with its coalition partners, has

achieved certain successes in working toward the objectives in section 3(a) of the

AUMF. For example, coalition military operations resulted in the fall of the former

Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein. In addition, coalition military operations allowed weapons inspections that had been blocked for years by the Iraqi Government

to take place. The military has been critical in contributing to the ongoing democratic transformation of Iraq, including by supporting two national elections and a

referendum that approved Iraq’s new constitution and furthering the development

of Iraq’s new security forces. The use of military force also has disrupted the activities of terrorists plotting acts of violence against Iraqi, American, and other interests.

While certain progress has been made, U.S. military operations continue to be

necessary and appropriate to defend the national security of the United States and

to eliminate the continuing threat presented by the current circumstances in Iraq.

In his January 10 speech on the administration’s New Way Forward in Iraq, the

President underscored that, for the safety of the American people, the United States

must succeed in Iraq. He made it clear that failure in Iraq would lead to radical

Islamic extremists growing in strength and resolve and gaining recruits. He noted

that, as a result, they would be in a better position to topple moderate governments,

create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. He also

noted that failure would provide our enemies a safe haven from which to plan and

launch attacks on the American people.

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As we have consistently made clear in the administration’s regular report to the

Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the United States also continues to use military force to enforce relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. As the AUMF recognizes, the President clearly indicated

prior to taking military action that the United States was committed to work with

the United Nations Security Council to meet the common challenge posed by Iraq.

This commitment has not wavered, and the United States continues to play a leading role in Multinational Force in Iraq, which the Security Council authorized in

Resolution 1546, inter alia, to take all necessary measures to contribute to the

maintenance of Iraq’s security and stability. Moreover, the Security Council has

twice unanimously extended this authorization for the Multinational Force, most recently in Resolution 1723. This authorization encompasses MNF–I conducting military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against MNF–I or Iraqi

civilian and military targets. As the Department has noted in previous reports to

Congress, these contributions in implementation of the Security Council resolutions

also assist the Iraqi people in the development of their political and security institutions in accordance with the transitional frameworks established in a series of Security Council resolutions, both of which are critical to the longer term security of the

Iraqis.

In light of the foregoing, the administration believes that there continues to be

clear authority for U.S. military operations within the territory of Iraq based upon

the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and the

President’s constitutional authority.

Question. In his January 10 speech, President Bush said, ‘‘Succeeding in Iraq also

requires defending its territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of

extremist challenges. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and

out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We

will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We’ll interrupt the flow of support from Iran

and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.’’

• Does the administration have plans to cross the Syrian and/or Iranian border

to pursue those persons or individuals or governments providing that help? • In your opinion, does the administration have the constitutional authority to

pursue networks across Iraq’s borders into Iran or Syria?

Answer. In the President’s January 10 speech to the American people on the administration’s New Way Forward in Iraq, he made clear that Iran was providing

material support for attacks on American forces. He emphasized the importance of

disrupting these attacks and interrupting the flow of support from Iran and Syria.

The President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks that

are providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our forces in Iraq.

The administration believes that there is clear authority for U.S. operations within the tenitory of Iraq to prevent Syrian- or further Iranian-supported attacks

against U.S. forces operating as part of the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF–I) or

against civilian targets. Such attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and the safety of our personnel; they also continue to threaten the region’s security and stability. U.S. military operations in Iraq are conducted under

the President’s constitutional authority and the Authorization for Use of Military

Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107–243), which authorized the use of

armed force to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security

Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq’s security

and stability, which encompasses MNF–I conducting military operations against any

forces that carry out attacks against MNF–I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.

This question also asks what authority might be relevant in connection with a hypothetical military operation into Iran or Syria. We are not planning to invade Iran

or Syria. As this administration has said, we have actively pursued a diplomatic

strategy to address Iran’s nuclear program, and we remain committed to resolving

our concerns with Iran diplomatically. We are also committed to using diplomacy

to address Syria’s facilitation of foreign fighters into Iraq, its harboring of former

Iraqi regime elements; and its interference in Lebanon. Of course, the Constitution

charges the President to protect the United States and the American people. As

Commander in Chief, he must be able to defend the United States if the U.S. forces

come under attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific situation would depend on the facts and circumstances at that time. Administration officials communicate regularly with the leadership and other Members of Congress with regard to

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the deployment of U.S. forces and the measures that may be necessary to protect

the security interests of the United States and will continue to do so.

Question. In March 2006, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad announced that he had

been authorized to hold face-to-face talks with the Iranians in Baghdad. More recently the Bush administration has said that it will engage with Iran only if it suspends its uranium enrichment.

• Does the March 2006 offer still stand? If not, when was it rescinded and under

what circumstances? What led to the change in the March 2006 policy?

• How would you characterize Iran’s and Syria’s involvement in the U.N.-sponsored ‘‘international compact’’?

• Given the administration’s stance on engagement with Iran and Syria, is it supportive of Iran’s and Syria’s continuing involvement with the ‘‘international

compact’’?

Answer. Secretary Rice previously authorized Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to

speak directly to the Iranians in an ‘‘ambassador-to-ambassador’’ channel on issues

relating specifically to Iraq. For various operational reasons at the time, we have

not used this channel. Our current offer on the table with the Iranians as announced by Secretary Rice last May is to review with Iran in the Five-Plus-One context the whole range of bilateral and multilateral issues, with the only condition

being Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment efforts just condemned by the U.N.

Security Council. On occasion we also use our Swiss channel to communicate specific, topical information to the Iranian Government.

As members of the United Nations, Iran and Syria have both been briefed on the

International Compact with Iraq during a meeting at the United Nations in September 2006, and we would expect that the United Nations would invite them to

attend future meetings. Neither Iran nor Syria has participated in any Preparatory

Group meetings.

We encourage all of Iraq’s neighbors to be responsible stakeholders in supporting

and assisting the Iraqi Government. To that end, we continue to pressure Iran and

Syria to suspend their destabilizing activities. Like Iraq’s other neighbors, Iran and

Syria must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and act in a

manner that supports a stable and democratic future for the Iraqi people.

Launching the International Compact with Iraq has been a joint undertaking of

the Government of Iraq and the United Nations. The United Nations has hosted two

events in New York to engage the international community with the compact; one

on September 18, 2006, and the other on November 13, 2006. The United Nations

invited all U.N. member countries and the international organizations and financial

institutions that are concerned about Iraq and the compact to these events. Thirtyeight countries and organizations attended the first event, and 78 attended the second. Iran and Syria were represented at both events.

Beyond attending these two events, neither Iran nor Syria has played an active

role in developing the compact.

Question. Do Iran and Syria assess it in their long-term interest for there to be

continuing instability and violence in Iraq?

Answer. Clearly, it should be in the long-term interest of Iran and Syria—and of

the rest of the international community—to have an Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself. We can only infer what Iran and Syria assess is their

long-term interest in Iraq by their behavior to date, which has not been constructive. Iran has demonstrated by its support for violence and militias that it does not

support a free and democratic Iraq. Iran’s continued support for networks that are

using explosive devices to attack coalition and Iraqi personnel is a demonstration

that they must regard instability and violence as in Iran’s interest.

Syria, on the one hand, has a record of supporting Sunni insurgents and has

made insufficient progress in clamping down on foreign jihadists crossing its borders

into Iraq—a major source of continuing violence and instability. On the other hand,

the Syrians have recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iraqis

to deal with terrorism, border, and security problems. Syria must make good on its

commitments to Iraq. We hope that both Iran and Syria will end their destabilizing

behavior and become a positive influence on Iraq.

Question. How would Iran and Syria react to the credible threat of a United

States redeployment from Iraq? Would this prompt them to further destabilize Iraq?

Would this pressure them to seek means to stabilize the situation for fear of a spillover of violence?

Answer. In the absence of United States and coalition forces in Iraq, we have no

reason to believe that Iran or Syria would suspend their destabilizing actions. Quite

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to the contrary, it appears likely that Iran and Syria would fill the vacuum left by

a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and increase their unhelpful, destabilizing interference

in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Senior Iranian and Syrian Government officials have made clear in recent statements that they actively seek U.S. withdrawal from not only Iraq, but also the entire region. We believe that redeploying forces from Iraq prematurely would thus

send the wrong message not only to Tehran, but also to key gulf allies who feel increasingly concerned by the Iranian regime’s aggressive regional policy.

Question. What steps is the United States Government making to weaken the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq? What is the likelihood of a Turkish military intervention against the PKK in northern Iraq?

Answer. The PKK is a Foreign Terrorist Organization as defined by U.S. law. We

have worked closely with our allies to convince them to take a tough stance against

the organization and dry up its sources of support.

To intensify our work with both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments, on August

28 the Secretary appointed a Special Envoy for Countering the PKK, (Ret.) GEN

Joseph Ralston, to focus on this problem. General Ralston is working closely with

his Turkish counterpart, General Baser, and Iraqi interlocutor, Minister al-Waeli.

Since his appointment as Envoy, General Ralston has traveled repeatedly to the region and attempted to engage productively with both the Turks and the Iraqis.

General Ralston has engaged the Turkish and Iraqi Governments as well as officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government. His conversations have focused on

building confidence between Turkey and Iraq and obtaining cooperation to fight

against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party, which is using northern Iraq as a

base of support for attacks against Turkey. Since General Ralston launched his efforts, our Embassy in Baghdad has worked closely with the Iraqis and Turks. As

a result of these efforts, the Government of Iraq has shut down several PKK front

offices in Iraq and begun closing down Makhmour refugee camp. We also continue

to work with our European allies to curb terrorist financing of PKK activities.

Turkey remains a close ally of the United States and works with us on many

issues. Turkey is supportive of the President’s goal of a united, stable, and prosperous Iraq. We do not expect Turkey to take any action that would undermine this

goal. In fact, Turkey is working with us and the Government of Iraq, permiting the

transit of military sustainment cargo, promote trade, and encouraging national reconciliation.

Question. Three estimates have been produced on the number of Iraqi civilians

killed in violence in 2006. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

estimated 34,452; a compilation of data from Iraqi Health, Interior, and Defense

Ministries puts the number at 12,357; another estimate by the Iraqi Health Ministry put the number at 22,950.

• Which of these is the most accurate figure in your estimation and why?

• What is the State Department’s estimate for the number of Iraqi civilians killed

in 2006?

• Does the administration have a quantitative definition for what would constitute a civil war in Iraq?

• Does the administration consider Iraq to be in the state of civil war?

• How many Iraqis have been displaced from their homes since the February

2006 bombing at the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra?

• How many have been displaced in Baghdad?

Answer. While we are aware of the different estimates of several organizations

and are quite mindful that thousands have died needlessly at the hands of extremists, the United States maintains no independently developed assessment of Iraqi

fatalities.

The current sectarian violence in Iraq is now the main threat to a stable, peaceful

future. There are several varying academic definitions for what constitutes a civil

war. However, such definitions and labels are not nearly as important as what we

and the Iraqis are doing together to stop the violence. As President Bush and Prime

Minister Maliki have agreed in their strategy, Iraqi and American forces will pursue

all those perpetrating violence in Iraq, regardless of sect or party affiliation.

Following the February 2006 Samarra bombings, estimates of new internally displaced Iraqis range from 360,000 (International Organization for Migration–IOM) to

500,000 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees–UNHCR). This adds to

a long-term caseload of internally displaced persons that both UNHCR and IOM estimate at 1.2 million. In Baghdad alone, IOM has estimated nearly 20,000 Iraqis

are displaced.

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Question. In your testimony, you said that Iraq’s security capabilities will mature

during the summer of 2007. How do you define mature? What do you expect the

capacity of the Iraqi security forces will be by the summer of 2007 in terms of their

ability to take over security responsibility from coalition forces?

Answer. The President noted in his January 10 address to the Nation that the

Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces

by November of this year.

As to timing, a Joint MNF–I and Iraqi committee every month assesses which

provinces and cities are eligible for this transition of security responsibility to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). To date, three provinces have transitioned to PIC:

Muthanna in July, Dhi Qar in September, and Najaf in December.

Capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are one of four factors considered,

and there is not one-to-one correspondence between ISF capability and GOI assumption of security. The other three factors are a threat assessment, the capability of

Iraqi governance (especially at the provincial level), and the ability of MNF–I forces

to support.

With regard to control of Iraq’s military, currently 5 of 10 Iraq divisions are now

under the operational control of Iraqi Ground Forces Command, and more divisions

are expected to transition to Iraqi command as forces develop. We expect all 10 Iraqi

Army divisions to be under the control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command by May

2007.

Transfer to PIC and transfer of army divisional command to Iraq does not happen

unless Iraqi forces and command relationships have matured sufficiently to be in

a leading—as opposed to a supporting—role.

Question. According to the Government Accountability Office, the number of violent attacks per month in Iraq has increased from a few hundred in May 2003 to

almost 6,000 in October 2003 [sic]. During this same period the number of trained

Iraqi Security Forces has steadily increased to 323,000, according the State Department’s reporting.

• Given the sharp increase in the reported capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces,

how do you explain the continued deterioration in the security conditions in

Iraq?

Answer. The deterioration in the security conditions in Iraq are the direct result

of the acceleration of sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. Provoking sectarian

violence has been a long-held goal of al-Qaeda in Iraq. With last February’s bombing

of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the success of their plan accelerated. Sectarian

passions, incited to violence, now threaten to overwhelm Iraq’s fragile, yet promising, process of reconciliation; a process that has produced successful elections and

a new constitution, substantial agreement on a law to share Iraq’s oil fairly, and

commitment to an approach to ‘‘de-Baathification’’ that supports broad national reconciliation goals.

For specific information about the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, I would

refer you to the Department of Defense.

Question. In your testimony you stated that the administration is ‘‘further integrating [its] civil and military operations.’’ Could you explain what this means?

Answer. There must be the fullest possible civilian-military unity of effort if we

are to succeed in Iraq. Reconstruction and economic development cannot occur in

the absence of security. Once security is achieved, there must be an immediate, targeted civilian effort to capitalize on that gain to benefit the Iraqi people.

To that end, we will immediately begin deploying greater civilian resources alongside our military in Baghdad and Anbar province. The centerpiece of this effort will

be the expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We will double the number of PRTs from 10 to 20, through a three-phase rollout program, but the extent

of our deployment of civilian resources will depend on FY07 budget supplemental

funding. We plan to collocate nine new PRTs with Brigade Combat Teams in Baghdad and Anbar. We also plan to add a new PRT in North Babil and augment existing PRTs with specialized civilian technical personnel, based on local needs. PRTs

will leverage both civilian and military resources against a common strategic plan

to sustain stability, promote economic growth, support Iraqi leaders who reject violence and foster Iraqi self-sufficiency.

Question. You testified, ‘‘Out of this planning process came, from our generals, the

view that we needed to augment [the Iraqi] forces, as embeds, as, by the way, the

Baker-Hamilton Commission recommends, as people who can help them with, in a

sense, on-the-job training, who can help them to, kind of, solidify their ability to go

after this.’’

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• Will United States forces be under Iraqi command or operational control? • How will the command arrangements work for embedded American soldiers?

Answer. All coalition forces and embedded transition teams with Iraqi Security

Forces remain under the operational command and control of Multi-National

Forces–Iraq (MNF–I) commanders. For further details regarding the military command and control structure, the State Department defers to the Department of Defense.

Question. You said in your testimony that ‘‘the rules of engagement really were

the problem’’ in Operation Together Forward during the summer and fall of 2006.

Could you elaborate? What were the problems with the previous rules of engagement and how have they been corrected?

Answer. In 2006, the Iraqi Government placed political limitations on coalition

and Iraqi security operations that undermined the evenhanded pursuit of those engaged in violence. Some, but not all extremists, were approved as acceptable targets

of security operations. The President’s ‘‘New Way Forward’’ is a joint United StatesIraq strategy for bringing stability to Iraq, with a particular focus on Baghdad and

Anbar province. Prime Minister Maliki has now pledged that no neighborhood will

be beyond the reach of the Iraqi state, that the central government will pursue all

perpetrators of violence regardless of sect or party, and that there will not be political interference in security decisions. President Bush and Secretary Rice have both

made very clear that the Iraqi Government must fulfill this pledge for the ‘‘New

Way Forward’’ to be successful.

Question. In increasing the number of forces in Baghdad, how will the administration ensure perceptions of evenhandedness in cracking down on Sunni insurgent

and terrorist groups and Shiite militias? How will American forces avoid becoming

embroiled in Baghdad’s sectarian violence?

Answer. It is critically important that Iraqis and Iraq’s neighbors perceive that

both Iraqi and American security forces are acting in an evenhanded manner

against all those who perpetrate violence regardless of sect or party affiliation. Both

President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki are committed to pursuing ‘‘The New

Way Forward’’ in such an even-handed manner. Prime Minister Maliki has made

it clear, publicly, to the Iraqi people that security operations in Baghdad will make

no distinction between Shia, Sunni, or other types of illegal militia or illegal activity. He further stated that the Baghdad security plan will not permit a safe haven

for any outlaws regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation, nor will there

be political influence in security decisions. President Bush has made similar commitments to the American people.

American and Iraqi security forces will operate jointly to ensure that they are

pursuing a unified, evenhanded approach to securing neighborhoods and targeting

those engaged in violence. At the highest levels, American and Iraqi commanders

will work together to plan operations. On the ground, there will be American advisors embedded in all Iraqi units. The establishment of joint security stations in each

of the nine Baghdad districts to be manned with Iraqi police, Iraqi Army, and coalition forces should also minimize the likelihood any unit will act in a sectarian manner.

Question. You testified that during Operations Together Forward I and II ‘‘there

were not enough reliable Iraqi forces.’’

• How has this problem been remedied?

• How many politically reliable Iraqi Army and police do you assess there to be?

• How many Iraqi security forces do you expect will be in Baghdad as part of the

new plan? Which units will participate? What is the readiness levels and sectarian composition of the units?

Answer. The President laid out a revised military approach when he addressed

the Nation on January 10 and announced a new strategy, ‘‘The New Way Forward,’’

in Iraq. As part of this joint United States-Iraqi plan, Prime Minister Maliki has

committed to deploy three additional Iraqi Army Brigades to Baghdad. The Prime

Minister has restructured the command arrangements in Baghdad, with one overall

military commander, two subordinates, and an Iraqi Army Brigade assigned to each

of the nine districts in the city. Joint security stations manned with Iraqi police,

Iraqi Army, and coalition forces should minimize the likelihood any unit will act in

a sectarian manner.

Details of Iraqi unit participation, sectarian composition, and overall planned

force strength in Baghdad have not been released by the Government of Iraq. I

would refer you to the Department of Defense for readiness levels of Iraqi units,

which are assessed by Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF–I).

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Question. In June, Prime Minister Maliki offered a 24-point National Reconciliation Program.

• To date, how successful has this program been?

• What have been the areas of notable progress and what are the continuing challenges?

• In the light of Prime Minister Maliki’s new strategy, does this 24-point remain

operative?

Answer. Since PM Maliki launched his National Reconciliation plan on June 25,

the Iraqi Government, through the Ministry of National Reconciliation, sponsored

three out of four in a series of reconciliation conferences across Iraq—for tribal leaders, civil society organizations, and political parties. The fourth conference for

religious leaders is tentatively scheduled for this month. In addition, the Prime Minister has participated in a conference hosted by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Mecca, in which religious leaders—both Sunni and Shia—have

condemned sectarian violence in Iraq and called for an end to bloodshed.

The conferences have helped to encourage progress on some of the toughest, unresolved political issues. For example, at the political parties’ conference in December,

PM Maliki helped to further de-Baathifciation reform by reaching out to former

Baathists and inviting them to rejoin the military.

The Government of Iraq is currently drafting a law to submit to the Council of

Representatives that would reform the de-Baathificiation process by giving thousands of former Baathists the option of returning to their former government jobs

or drawing a pension for their past government employment. The Constitutional Review Committee, which met for the first time on November 15, is considering

amendments to the constitution, a process critical to keeping Iraq’s Sunni Arabs engaged in the reconciliation process. The Iraqis are also close to completing a National Hydrocarbon Law, which we expect they will submit to the Council of Ministers shortly. A fair and equitable Hydrocarbon Law that gives all Iraqis a share

of their country’s abundant wealth will help support national reconciliation.

In his new security plan, the Prime Minister stated publicly that he will pursue

all those engaged in violence, regardless of their sect or party affiliation. This evenhanded approach to combating violence is consistent with the Prime Minister’s

stated national reconciliation goals. If the Iraqi Government successfully fulfills its

pledge to pursue all those who perpetrate violence, it will create the conditions necessary to make additional political progress on critical reconciliation issues. It will

also improve the Iraqi Government’s credibility among its neighbors in the gulf

whose support it will need to create a stable, prosperous future.

Question. In your [Secretary Rice’s] testimony you said that ‘‘the core of the

Maliki plan has really been preserved’’ in the plan of the administration. What are

the differences in the two plans? What changes were made to the Maliki plan? What

specific commitments has Prime Minister Maliki made to assure the success of the

new Baghdad Security Plan? What specific commitments has he given to you [S],

President Bush, or other senior members of the administration that he will crack

down on the Jaysh al-Mandi? What public statements has he made indicating his

willingness to crack down on the Jaysh al-Mandi by name?

Answer. The current Baghdad Security Plan is the result of a collaborative effort.

In reviewing PM Maliki’s plan, MNF–I assessed that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

were not yet capable of doing all the tasks, and as a result the current plan has

a larger supporting role for MNF–I than first envisioned.

The Prime Minister assured President Bush that there would be even-handedness

in pursuing all involved in violence. Maliki has said that his government will make

no exception for any group or individual regardless of sect or party affiliation. We

expect him to apply this principle universally, including to the Jaysh al-Mandi

(JAM).

The Prime Minister assured the President that there would be no political interference with military command decisions.

He also pledged to provide three additional brigades to implement the new Baghdad Security Plan.

Prime Minister Maliki stated publicly on January 26 that: ‘‘The Baghdad security

plan is now ready, and we will depend on our armed forces to implement it with

multinational forces behind them . . . ISF will carry out the plan to restore security

for Baghdad, will punish outlaws or those who work according to political or sectarian bias . . . The ISF will be above politics. Political parties and political organizations are barred from political activities among the armed forces . . . Iraq will

not allow militias, regardless of sect, to replace the function of the state or interfere

with security.’’

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Question. In your testimony you spoke of ‘‘surging’’ the civilian efforts of the Department of State. How many American diplomats does the State Department have

in Iraq? By what amount will these numbers increase? Where will they serve? How

many will be placed in Provincial Reconstruction Teams? How much experience does

the average PRT team leader have?

Answer. Based on the latest staffing figures, there are 334 State Department employees on the ground at Embassy Baghdad, and an additional 46 State Department

employees in Regional Embassy Offices and Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(PRTs). Other federal agencies, such as DOD and the Department of Justice also

have employees working at the Embassy and other sites, who serve under Chief of

Mission authority.

We do not anticipate any major staff increases in Embassy Baghdad at this time,

but we are establishing new PRTs in Anbar, Baghdad, and North Babil. We also

plan to augment several existing PRTs in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Salah ad-Din,

Ninawa, Kirkuk, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Basrah.

We are currently reviewing the requirements, both here in Washington and with

Embassy Baghdad. In total, we expect to add more than 300 civilian employees in

these PRT locations. Some will be State Department Employees, including 10 Senior

Foreign Service Officers and specialized direct hires, who will establish the new Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Other team members will come from USAID, DOD,

Federal Agencies, and contractors.

PRT leaders are highly competent Senior Foreign Service Officers with extensive

overseas experience and proven records of leadership. They can call on the special

expertise of their team members, who include experienced city managers, engineers,

and others.

Question. In his January 10 speech, President Bush stated his intention to seek $1.2 billion in additional economic and reconstruction funds. According to a January

2007 Government Accountability Office report, ‘‘as of August 2006, the government

of Iraq had spent . . . 8 percent of its annual capital goods budget and 14 percent

of its annual capital projects budget. Iraq’s fiscal year begins on January 1 of each

year.’’ The report found that in the Ministry of Oil of a $3.533 billion capital budget

only $4 million had been expended. Given these funding shortfalls on the Iraqi side,

what is the rationale for additional United States reconstruction assistance for Iraq?

Answer. In his January 10 speech, the President stressed the importance of our

improving the ability of the Iraqi Government to meet the basic needs of its people,

although he did not mention a specific assistance figure for any future budget requests.

The Iraqi Government must do its part to invest in its own economic development

and to follow through on our joint strategy. The Government of Iraq is committed

to spending $10 billion this year to help create jobs and further national reconciliation. However, Iraq faces major challenges in designing and executing its capital

budget. Simply put, Iraq has available assets, the product of last year’s underspent

budget and profits from higher than anticipated oil prices, but they do not have the

mechanisms to spend them—especially with the speed necessary for post-kinetic stabilization in Baghdad and Anbar. Iraq must develop the means to put its money to

use, both for short-term ‘‘build’’ efforts and longer term capital investment.

There are several obstacles to better budget execution, including technical problems, such as the lack of the ability to obligate money for multiyear projects, and

a lack of training and equipment to process the transactions. The Iraqis are taking

steps to address this problem, such as draft 2007 budget provisions that permit the

Ministry of Finance to reallocate funding from any ministry that is unable to spend

it promptly. If the USG does not continue to provide assistance to the Iraqi Government, the Iraqis will not be able to develop the mechanisms they need to spend effectively their own budget. While we cannot spend their money for them, we must

help them get on the path to self-sufficiency.

To help the Iraqi Government improve budget execution and take on more responsibility for Iraq’s own economic future, Secretary Rice has appointed Ambassador

Tim Carney as her new Coordinator for Economic Transition. Ambassador Carney

is now in Baghdad helping the Government of Iraq meet its financial responsibilities, specifically on budget execution, job creation, and capital investment projects.

Continued United States assistance is vital to help Iraq address these problems

and allow it to meet the myriad needs of its people. Beginning in FY 2006, we have

shifted the emphasis of our assistance away from large reconstruction projects toward programs designed to increase Iraqi capacity to govern at the national and

local level. Continued U.S. assistance is vital to establish firmly the roots of democratic and representative governance, to support moderate political forces, to continue economic reforms, and to establish competent and representative government.

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It is a critical component of the President’s ‘‘New Way Forward’’ strategy to bring

stability to Baghdad and the rest of Iraq.

Question. How deep is the Iraqi support for both the administration’s new plan

and Prime Minister Maliki’s security plan?

• Which factions have been publicly supportive and which have opposed? • How much support do the plans enjoy beyond the office of the Prime Minister? • How much support is there for the plans from the GCC+2?

Answer. PM Maliki, in his role as Iraq’s commander in chief, agreed to the troop

increase as part of the Iraqi security plan and on the basis of advice from his military and defense advisors, including Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir al-Mufraji.

Other members of the Iraqi body politic were consulted about the decision, and some

leaders, such as Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, supported the plan, while others

were more cautious.

The Prime Minister presented the new Iraqi security plan to the Iraqi Council of

Representatives (CoR), which approved it on January 26 following a vigorous debate. The plan’s strongest support came from Shia and Kurdish blocs. Some Sunnis

in the CoR criticized the plan’s details, claiming it specifically targets Sunnis and

Sunni neighborhoods. Prime Minister Maliki, who attended the CoR session to

present his argument for the plan, responded to such criticisms by explaining that

the new security plan targets ‘‘all who stand in the way of the law,’’ despite sect,

religion, or nationality. The plan’s ultimate passage, though, demonstrates support

within the Iraqi Government and the Council of Representatives.

During their last meeting, the GCC+2 participants agreed that it was in the interest of all countries for there to be a stable, prosperous, and unified Iraq, based on

respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity, unity, and sovereignty. They expressed their

readiness to support Iraq’s efforts in this regard. While supportive of the security

plan laid out by President Bush on January 10, the GCC+2 have expressed skepticism about the intentions of the Iraqi Government, and want the Iraqi Government to demonstrate through its actions on the ground that it is a truly national,

rather than a sectarian, government.

Question. You testified that there is a ‘‘new alignment’’ of forces in the Middle

East pitting ‘‘reformers and responsible leaders’’ against extremists, of every sect

and ethnicity, who use violence to spread chaos, to undermine democratic governments, and to impose agendas of hatred and intolerance.

• On which side of the divide to place Muqtada al-Sadr? Jaysh al-Mandi? The

Badr Organization? • How would you characterize Prime Minister Maliki’s relationship with Muqtada

al-Sadr? • What is the relationship between the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and the Badr

Organization and the Jaysh al-Mandi?

Answer. Any individuals or groups regardless of party or sectarian affiliation, who

reject violence and pursue their agendas through peaceful democratic means can be

part of the new alignment. Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr have joined the political

process and are part of United Iraqi Coalition (UIC) of which the Prime Minister

and his party, Dawa Islamiya, are also a part. The Sadrists have about 30 seats

in the Iraqi Parliament and have 6 ministers as part of the Iraqi Government.

Muqtada al-Sadr’s supporters have chosen to be part of the political process and it

is up to him to remain a part of the political process. Sadr appeared to reaffirm his

commitment to the political process when he ordered his members of the Council

of Representatives (CoR) to return after boycotting the sessions in late November.

We assess that Prime Minister Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr have good relations.

PM Maliki believes the right course is to engage Sadr politically and to try to engage him constructively in the political process and to dissuade him from supporting

violence. PM Maliki believes he needs the support of a unified UIC in the Council

of Representatives (CoR), and works closely with all the major factions in the UIC,

including the Sadrists, in order to keep their support. Sadr himself has not aspired

to political office. Instead, he has asked his followers to support other leaders for

office, such as PM Maliki.

The Iraqi Government needs to have a monopoly on the legal use of armed force.

This means that the Jaysh al-Mandi or any militia cannot continue to take orders

from anyone other than the Iraqi Government. Rogue elements must be reined in.

This needs to be done by the Iraqis, and quickly.

In 2003, the Badr Organization announced it had officially disbanded its militias.

However, reports suggest that elements within the Badr Organization are still active, and we have raised our concerns with the senior leaders of the Organization

and with SCIRI.

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The Iraqi Ministry of Interior has hired former members of the Badr Organization

and members or former members of JAM as part of the police force. Some elements

from both Badr and JAM have infiltrated the security ministries, in particular the

Ministry of Interior. We are working closely with the Iraqi Government, particularly

the Minister of Interior, to reform the Ministry of Interior and police, and to find

ways to improve the screening process of those who seek to join the police and security forces in Iraq.

RESPONSES BY SECRETARY OF STATE CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. With only the kind of recruiting effort that comes from phone calls from

you, yourself, has State been able to meet its staffing goals in Iraq.

Other agencies have also had significant challenges in meeting staffing targets—

both budgetary (no international emergency line items in their budgets) as well as

legal (the President cannot order civilians to war, they must volunteer, adding to

the time it takes to deploy).

Is the President seeking changes to these authorities? What is your vision for fulfilling the civilian mandate?

Will you or other Cabinet Secretaries begin directed assignments?

Answer. Fully staffing our most critical posts, including Baghdad and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, is one of our highest priorities. We have

made changes to our Foreign Service bidding and assignments process and offered

a generous incentive package to encourage bidders to volunteer for service in Iraq.

Even without personal phone calls, State Department employees have willingly responded to the call for service and have volunteered to serve at even the most difficult and dangerous posts abroad.

In the current assignments cycle, we have already filled 89 percent (156 positions

out of 176) of Foreign Service positions in Iraq for summer 2007. For Embassy

Baghdad, we have committed candidates for 117 out of 128 jobs. For the Iraq PRTs,

we have 39 committed candidates for 48 jobs. Personnel in Baghdad are also being

provided the opportunity to serve at PRTs and will be able to extend their assignments if they wish to do so. The Bureau of Human Resources, the Bureau of Near

Eastern Affairs, and senior leaders in the Department are reaching out to potential

candidates to fill the remaining positions. We are also looking at qualified Civil

Service employees or Eligible Family Members to fill some positions in Iraq on limited noncareer appointments. I am confident that these positions will be filled.

At this time, the Department is not seeking any additional authorities related to

assignments. The administration has sought various legislative changes to improve

the incentives for overseas service. A number of these incentives were included in

the FY 2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 109–234). During

this Congress, the Department will continue to pursue Foreign Service Modernization to make services abroad more attractive and to reduce the 18.6-percent pay gap

for overseas service. Other proposals may also be forthcoming, as we reevaluate the

existing incentives for hardship service and determine if other legislative changes

are needed to support and compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult

posts overseas.

The Department’s FY 2007 supplemental request for operations includes funds to

enable State to reimburse other civilian agencies for personnel they make available

for service in Iraq. We believe that this will overcome a significant obstacle to recruiting qualified personnel from other agencies.

To date, we have not had to utilize directed assignments to meet our staffing

needs in Iraq. We are prepared to direct the assignment of Foreign Service members

should that become necessary. Our goal, however, is continuing to fill the positions

in Iraq and in all of our missions around the world with qualified, willing employees

who can carry out our crucial U.S. foreign policy objectives overseas. Questions

about other Cabinet Secretaries’ decisions to direct assignments of their employees

may be best addressed by those agencies directly.

Question. What are the political trends outside Baghdad? Have the PRTs been effective in empowering moderate parties? Is that a part of the mandate?

Answer. Political trends outside of Baghdad vary from province to province. Parts

of Iraq, such as the Kurdistan region, are enjoying relative security and prosperity.

Ninawa, Tamim (Kirkuk), and Salah al-Din have occasional acts of terrorism, but

political life continues despite this. In Anbar and Diyala, acts of violence are disrupting political life. In south-central Iraq, sectarian violence is negligible, but there

have been sporadic episodes of Shia-on-Shia violence between Badr Organization

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and Jaysh al-Mandi elements, or involving fringe groups, such as the Soldiers of

Heaven just outside of Najaf. In Basrah, militias and political disputes play a negative role on the political development of that province.

The President has decided to expand the size and reach of the PRTs due to their

success in building Iraqi capacity and self-sufficiency to date. Since 2005, PRTs have

invested effectively in moderate Iraqi leaders on the local level by:

• Reaching out to local and provincial leaders (including grassroots groups) who

want to make a difference in making Iraq’s democracy work; • Conducting extensive training in governance and municipal planning for provincial, district, and subdistrict offices; • Working with Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees to improve

the provincial governments’ ability to identify and prioritize systematically the

reconstruction and development needs of their provinces and to improve the delivery of essential services; • Facilitating better working relationships between provincial leaders and their

counterparts in the central government, improving their ability to secure funds

from the centre to pay for provincial projects.

A core objective of the President’s new strategy is to empower moderates—those

Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their interests peacefully, politically, and

under the rule of law. The expanded PRT program will be central to that effort.

PRTs will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, such

as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner. The expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders

through targeted assistance, such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner.

Question. Can you describe recent efforts we have heard about in Al Anbar province to reach out to disenfranchised Sunni Shaikhs? Are these having any measurable effects politically or against al-Qaeda—Iraq? How can we keep from being used

as one of our witnesses yesterday suggested may be happening?

Answer. In early 2006, several tribes, including those who have links to insurgent

groups, began efforts to root out foreign militants in their region. Some of these

tribal leaders have met with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in a show of support

for his government and in an effort to become involved in the political process. Many

of these tribal shaikhs have concluded that they can no longer watch the destruction

of their areas. They see no positive future with al-Qaeda.

Although parts of Anbar remain dangerous, in particular in the areas immediately

surrounding Ramadi, we have started to notice some improvement, such as additional shops opening and an increase in the number of the police force in Anbar

province in general. USG-sponsored reconstruction programs have already begun in

parts of Anbar. Anbar province enjoys perhaps the highest level of electricity anywhere in Iraq. We hope that more tribal leaders will be motivated to join the process

after witnessing the tangible improvements brought about by reconstruction programs.

Question. In your strategic review, has anyone modeled the negative economic impacts a precipitous withdrawal and collapsed state would mean to the region and

the world?

Answer. We are unaware of any formal models, econometric or other, of the negative economic impacts that a precipitous U.S./coalition withdrawal from Iraq and the

(probable) ensuing collapse of the Iraqi state would mean to the region and the

world. The impacts modeled would depend on the model’s assumptions. However, if

a U.S./coalition withdrawal was followed by the collapse of the Iraqi state, then that

would almost certainly cause a serious decline in Iraqi oil output for some period

of time.

International oil markets would be most affected by a collapse scenario. The loss

of Iraq’s oil from world markets could have a serious impact on the world oil market, both from the immediate shortage and from the higher ‘‘risk premium’’ that the

market would demand. However, this could be mitigated by the current excess capacity in world oil production (e.g., Saudi Arabia’s excess production capacity of

about 2 million barrels per day is greater than Iraq’s production for world markets

of 1.5 million barrels per day). In addition, in any serious disruption of oil supplies,

one option is that the members of the International Energy Agency could consider

a drawdown of oil stocks.

Collapse of the Iraqi Government would also almost certainly result in a major

outflow of refugees. The economic consequences for neighboring countries (Iran, JorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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dan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey) would be severe, as they struggled

to provide food, shelter, and security. In addition, Iraq’s neighbors export and transship significant amounts of goods of all types to Iraq and would be affected by an

Iraqi collapse.

Question. One of our witnesses yesterday brought up the Iraq compact. Can you

share specifics on that with us for the record?

Answer. The International Compact with Iraq (ICI) is a framework for the international community to support the Government of Iraq in exchange for Iraq making

a series of commitments to essential economic initiatives and reforms—including

and extending beyond Iraq’s commitments under its IMF Stand-By Arrangements

(SBA). The ICI also defines the political and security context required for the economic reforms to succeed. Iraq developed the ICI with the support of the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and its major international donor partners. International

contributions for the ICI will come in a variety of forms, including technical support,

debt forgiveness, loans, private investment, and grants. The ultimate goal of the ICI

is to set Iraq on a path to financial and economic self-sufficiency.

The ICI demonstrates the increasing capabilities and determination of the Iraqi

Government to determine its future. The goals, commitments, and benchmarks in

the ICI were primarily developed by the Iraqis themselves, and the ICI document

has been approved by Iraq’s Council of Ministers. Iraq is already moving forward

to implement aspects of the ICI, for example, its progress to develop a new hydrocarbons law.

The next step is for Iraq and the United Nations to convene a meeting to close

the text of the ICI documents. At that time, the ICI document and annexes will be

publicly released in final form for review by the international community in anticipation of a high-level international conference for formal adoption of the ICI in the

near future.

More information about the work to develop the ICI can be found at

www.IraqCompact.org (a Web site maintained by the United Nations).

Question. Please provide for the committee the latest draft of the hydrocarbons

law and relevant details of negotiations.

Answer. The Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government have

made significant progress in narrowing their disagreements. We expect them to submit a completed draft law to the Council of Ministers (their Cabinet) shortly and

to the Council of Representatives (their Parliament) sometime in March. However,

differences remain over where to draw the lines of authority for approving exploration and production contracts. The Iraqi negotiators are hard at work resolving

these differences.

Due to the ongoing nature of the negotiations, the U.S. Government does not have

an up-to-date draft of the law. Based on our conversations with Iraqi officials, we

understand the current version contains the following elements:

(1) A framework for developing Iraq’s oil and gas sector, based upon free market principles and encouragement of private sector investment;

(2) A set of governing principles and broad organization of the sector;

(3) Key principles for revenue sharing, including, that after funding of its national responsibilities, the central government will collect and distribute revenue to local authorities according to a formula that will include population as

a basis.

The law also stipulates that separate, complementary laws will follow the main

hydrocarbon law and will contain the following elements:

(1) Specific implementation details on revenue sharing;

(2) Definition of the roles of the Iraqi National Oil Company and the Ministry

of Oil;

(3) There could also be subsequent legislation on petroleum taxation.

Question. Each nation in the region has its own interests in mind when it comes

to a particular outcome in Iraq. Other than Iran and Syria, what indications do we

have from regional leaders that they are willing to put Iraq’s interests first? Are

they taking any constructive steps worth mentioning?

Answer. Iraq does not exist in isolation from the region. Overcoming governance

and security challenges will require the help and support of its neighbors. On governance issues, the international community can have a large impact through its

participation in the International Compact with Iraq (ICI). Under the ICI, Iraq has

committed to a series of primarily economic reforms that will allow it to become selfsufficient over the next 5 years. In exchange, its international partners will support

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pact provides a framework for Iraq’s economic transformation and integration into

the regional and global economy. We expect the compact to be completed and signed

in the coming months.

On security, Iraq’s neighbors can be helpful by supporting the Iraqi Government

and stopping the flow of terrorists elements across their borders. While we are

working with our partners in the region to strengthen peace, two governments—

Syria and Iran—have chosen to align themselves with the forces of violent extremism in Iraq and elsewhere. The problem is not a lack of dialog, but a lack of positive action by those states.

As you know, I recently returned from travel to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait

to urge support for the Government of Iraq and the new strategy. My interlocutors

expressed their strong concern over the growth of negative Iranian involvement in

Iraq and al-Qaeda terror. At the same time, they made clear their concern that the

current Iraqi Government was acting in a manner that reflected a sectarian rather

than national agenda.

We understand these concerns and we believe the Iraqi Government understands

them as well. Prime Minister Maliki and his government have pledged not to tolerate any act of violence from any community or group. That means that all those

engaged in killing and intimidation, whether Shia or Sunni, need to be confronted.

Only through new facts on the ground—tangible evidence of action against all

those who pursue violence can the Government of Iraq establish the credibility at

home and abroad that it needs to chart a successful future.

Question. An important element in planning successfully is sequencing. Can we

bring the proper resources to focus at the right time? Can the Iraqis and we maintain the ‘‘hold’’ long enough to build? What should that building entail? As you understand it, would this be done by uniformed forces, civilians, or Iraqis?

Answer. As you know, the President has decided to augment our own troop levels

in Baghdad and Anbar by 21,500. The mission of this enhanced force is to support

Iraqi troops and commanders, who are now in the lead, to help clear and secure

neighborhoods, protect the local population, provide essential services, and create

conditions necessary to spur local economic development.

The Department of State is contributing robustly to this effort by expanding our

present close coordination with our military counterparts in and outside of Baghdad,

and with the Iraqi Government to capitalize on security improvements by creating

jobs and promoting economic revitalization. There must be the fullest possible civilian-military unity of effort if we are to be successful.

To that end, we will immediately deploy greater resources alongside our military

in Baghdad and Anbar. The centerpiece of this effort will be our expansion of our

Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We will double our PRTs from 10 to 20, adding

more than 300 new personnel. We will expand our PRTs in three phases with the

first phase occurring over the next 3 months to complement our enhanced military

efforts. In that time, we plan to colocate nine new PRTs—six in Baghdad and three

in Anbar—with Brigade Combat Teams engaged in security operations.

The Department will recruit and deploy senior-level Team Leaders for these nine

new PRTs who will work jointly with brigade commanders to develop plans for the

‘‘build’’ phase of clear, hold, and build. Well-qualified officers have already stepped

forward for these assignments.

PRTs will target both civilian and military resources, including foreign assistance

and the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, as part of a strategic plan to

sustain stability, promote economic growth, and foster Iraqi self-sufficiency where

we have made security gains.

In the next two phases of our PRT expansion, we will add a new PRT in North

Babil and augment our existing PRTs with specialized technical personnel, such as

irrigation specialists, veterinarians, and agribusiness development experts, based on

local provincial needs.

PRTs will support local moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, such

as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective and sustainable way. We intend to complete

all three phases of our PRT expansion by the end of the calendar year. Completion,

however, will be dependent both on funding levels and circumstances on the ground.

(175)

ALTERNATIVE PLANS: TROOP SURGE, PARTITION, WITHDRAWAL, OR STRENGTHEN THE

CENTER

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007 [P.M.]

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Menendez, Bill Nelson, Casey, Webb,

Lugar, Corker, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I apologize to

our distinguished witnesses. As they know, the hearing was supposed to start at 2 o’clock. They—please sit, gentlemen—they adjusted their schedules to accommodate us, and, unfortunately, neither Senator Lugar nor I have control over the Senate floor. Nor

do I want it. But I truly appreciate their indulgence.

This afternoon, we begin our examination of the various plans for

securing our interests in Iraq. We obviously heard from ‘‘the plan’’

this morning, the plan put forward by the President of the United

States. And I appreciate the Secretary coming to attempt to make

a case for that plan. But, as I said at the outset of these hearings,

in announcing these hearings, the process here was to get a lay of

the land, to get a historical perspective, an intelligence perspective,

which we did, the previous 2 days. And then we began, with the

Secretary, to hear the credible alternatives that have been offered—left, right, and center—Republican, Democrat, Independent,

think tank, and individual Members of the Congress—for example,

Jack Murtha, at some point, will come and testify, and as will, I

suspect, former Speaker Gingrich. So, the whole idea here is for the

public to understand what the various alternatives offered by serious people are, that are out there, so they understand there is not

only a single alternative—‘‘Either you do this, or we,’’ quote,

‘‘leave,’’ although that may be a plan, as well.

So, today we’ll hear three starkly different, but well-informed,

proposals from thoughtful and very articulate witnesses. While

each of them has very different ideas on how to proceed from this

point out, they’re united in their devotion to this country and their

desire to see us through this difficult time.

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We’re going to begin today with Ambassador Peter Galbraith,

senior diplomatic fellow with the Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation. He’s also, from our perspective and the perspectives

of the people sitting behind me—his greatest credential is, he was

a staff member on this committee in decades gone by, and we’re delighted to have him back. Ambassador Galbraith argues that we

should accept a partition of Iraq—that has already taken place,

withdraw from Arab Iraq, and redeploy a small force in Kurdistan

that can strike at al-Qaeda if necessary.

Next, we will hear from Dr. Frederick Kagan, resident scholar at

the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Kagan has authored a recent study that, ‘‘calls for a sustained surge of American combat

forces into Iraq in order to restore and maintain stability and security in Baghdad, reduce sectarian violence, protect the Iraqi population, and help establish a normal life for the Iraqi people.’’ I

found it very interesting. I read your entire report, and I’m anxious

to hear you expound on it.

We’ll then hear from Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, the vice president

of defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute. Dr.

Carpenter argues, and I quote, ‘‘The President should begin the

process of removing American troops immediately, and that process

needs to be completed in no less than 6 months.’’

To state again for the record what is obvious: These are all very

well-informed, very bright, and very patriotic Americans with

three, essentially, totally different views as to how to proceed from

this point. And I am confident that their testimony will help enlighten and inform the committee.

I would now yield to my colleague, Chairman Lugar, if he wishes

to make any opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The President has offered a plan that he believes will advance

United States interests in Iraq and the Middle East. In recent conversations with the President, I have tried to underscore the need

for a thorough effort to involve Congress in the decisionmaking

process. As we conduct dialog with the executive branch, Members

of Congress have a responsibility to make informed and reasoned

judgments about what the President is proposing. Congress must

carefully study how the President’s plan will affect the welfare of

American service men and women, the prospects for success in

Iraq, and the future of our broader strategic interests.

This morning, our committee had an opportunity to engage Secretary Rice in a frank discussion about the President’s plan and the

situation in Iraq. This afternoon, we will continue our inquiry, with

the help of an impressive panel of witnesses, who represent competing points of view.

In my comments at the hearing this morning, I outlined what I

believe are United States primary strategic objectives in Iraq, and

they are: Preventing the use of Iraq as a safe haven or training

ground for terrorism; preventing civil war and upheaval in Iraq

from creating instability that leads to regional war, the overthrow

of friendly governments, the destruction of oil facilities or other caVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00186 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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lamities; and preventing a loss of U.S. credibility in the region and

the world; and preventing Iran, finally, from dominating the region.

I suggest that, given these objectives, the outcome in Iraq is intimately connected with what happens beyond Iraq’s borders. On

this basis, I believe that any plan for Iraq must include a vigorous

and creative regional diplomatic component that makes use of our

strengths, including our stabilizing military presence in the region.

The options that will be presented by our witnesses center on

fundamental questions of whether the United States should continue its military presence in Iraq. As you make your arguments,

I’ll be interested in how you prescribe the broader strategic context

of the Middle East that is vital national security. My own view is

that we must have a military presence in Iraq indefinitely and that

we ought to inform all the border countries of that proposition, in

addition to Iraqis. The positioning of those forces is at issue, and

hopefully you will have some comments about that.

I’ll look forward to your insights and our experts as they come

along the trail throughout the hearings that Senator Biden has

planned.

And I thank the chairman, again, for holding this hearing this

afternoon.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Galbraith.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. GALBRAITH, SENIOR DIPLOMATIC FELLOW, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members

of the Committee on Foreign Relations, thank you for the invitation

to testify before this committee on alternative strategies toward

Iraq. It’s a special privilege for me to be here, since the committee

was my professional home for 14 years, and it is here where I had

a great deal of my education on Iraq, as some of the more senior

members of the committee may recall.

I have submitted a detailed statement, together with a one-page

summary of my plan, and I hope that they will be included in the

record of these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they will be.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. And before I begin, I was asked by the

committee staff to clarify my relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government. I’ve sent an e-mail explaining this. As described in my book, I’ve been friends with the Kurdish leaders, and,

for that matter, many other Iraqi leaders, for a very long period of

time, but I do not have a paid relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Iraq has broken up, and it is in the midst of a civil war. Reality,

and not wishes, must dictate our strategy. President Bush’s new

strategy relies on two elements that simply do not exist: First, an

inclusive national unity government in Iraq; and, second, Iraqi security services—that is, the army and the police—that are loyal to

Iraq and not to their sect or ethnic group. The Maliki government

is a sectarian Shiite government that is regarded as alien, and inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00187 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
178

deed even non-Iraqi, by the Sunni Arabs, and as irrelevant by the

Kurds. The government’s conduct—the protection of Shiite militias,

its selective provision of government services, the manner in which

it carried out Saddam’s execution—provides no evidence that it can

transform itself into something different from what it is.

But even if Iraq had a genuine government of national unity, it

would be largely irrelevant. There is no part of the country where

the government actually exercises significant authority.

In the southern half of Iraq and eastern Baghdad, Shiite religious parties have created local theocracies that use militias to enforce a version of Islamic law modeled on Iran, but far stricter. The

much-vaunted human rights provisions of the Iraqi Constitution do

not apply.

Kurdistan, in the north, is a de facto independent state with its

own army and its own flag. The Iraqi Army is barred from the region. Flying the Iraqi flag is prohibited, and central-government

ministries are not present. Further, the Kurdish people voted, 98.5

percent for independence, in a nonbinding referendum held in January 2005.

The Sunni center is a battleground between insurgents that command widespread local support and U.S. forces. And Baghdad is

the front line of the Sunni-Shiite civil war. The Mahdi Army, the

radical Shiite militia, controls the capital’s Shiite neighbors in the

east, while al-Qaeda, its offshoots, and Baathists control Sunni districts in the west. In Baghdad and in other formerly mixed areas,

extremists are engaging in brutal sectarian cleansing, with a death

toll that may well be in excess of 200 a day.

Iraq’s army and police reflect Iraq’s divisions. They are either

Sunni or Shiite. The Shiite police include the death squads that

target Sunnis. In Sunni areas, the police are either insurgent sympathizers or insurgents. Iraq’s Army, while somewhat better, is

divided into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish battalions. They are ultimately loyal not to the nominal chain of command, but to their political party leaders or, in the case of the Kurds, to the Kurdistan

Regional Government. Iraq’s security forces are not neutral guarantors of public security, but combatants in a civil war. United

States training has not, and will not, make these forces into Iraqis;

it will only create more lethal combatants in a civil war.

The goal of a self-sustaining, unified, and democratic Iraq would

require a vast expansion of the United States military mission in

Iraq, to include disarming Shiite militias, dismantling the

theocracies, and policing Iraq’s mixed areas in order to end the civil

war. The Iraqi Government has no intention of taking on the Shiite

militias, and Iraq’s security forces cannot police Iraq’s mixed areas,

since there are no such forces that are trusted by both Sunnis and

Shiites.

The President’s plan, in short, does nothing to stop Iraq’s civil

war or to build a unified Iraq. The alternative is to accept the reality that Iraq has broken up, and to work with its components. We

should get out of the business of nation-building in Iraq and respect the democratic decision of the Iraqis to have a country of very

strong regions and a powerless center. Iraq’s Constitution, adopted

by 80 percent of Iraq’s people, is a roadmap to partition. It recognizes Kurdistan as a self-governing region and permits other parts

179

of the country to form regions. Iraq’s Council of Representatives

has already passed a law paving the way to the formation of a Shiite super-region in the south in the next 15 months.

Under Iraq’s Constitution, regions can have their own armies,

called regional guards, and exercise substantial control over their

natural resources, including oil. Except for the short list of exclusive federal powers listed in article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution,

regional law is superior to federal law in Iraq. By design, Iraq’s

Constitution makes it difficult for the central government to function, and its few powers do not even include taxation.

The regionalization of Iraq is a fact. It also provides the best

hope for security, and, therefore, opens the way to a United States

withdrawal. Without any significant coalition presence, Kurdistan

has already made itself into the one secure and reasonably democratic part of Iraq. The south is also reasonably secure, and will become more so as it forms its regional institutions. No purpose is

served by a coalition presence in the south, and it should be withdrawn immediately.

Regionalization makes for a more effective strategy in combating

the Sunni insurgency. Right now, U.S. forces battle Sunni insurgents on behalf of a Shiite-led government and a Shiite-dominated

military. Sunnis see these forces as alien and dangerous. Too many

Sunnis see the choice today as one between their own extremists

and a pro-Iranian Shiite government that sponsors anti-Sunni

death squads. The Sunni extremists are not trying to kill you,

whereas the other guys are. By forming their own region, Sunni

Arabs can provide for their own security, and there could be economic and other incentives to combat extremists. In my view, the

United States should state that it will withdraw from the Sunni

Arab region when a Sunni regional guard is established.

So far, the Sunni Arabs have been the strongest opponents of

federalism in Iraq. But with Kurdistan already in existence and a

Shiite region likely on its way, the Sunnis are faced with a choice

between governing themselves or being governed by a Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad.

The United States has one achievable overriding interest in Iraq

today, which is to keep al-Qaeda and its ilk from having a base

from which they can attack the United States. If Sunni Arabs cannot provide for their own security, then the United States must be

prepared to reengage in the Sunni areas. This is best accomplished

by placing a small over-the-horizon force in Kurdistan. Kurdistan

has the Western-oriented aspiring democracy that the United

States once hoped for all of Iraq, and the Kurds are among the

most pro-American people in the world. They would welcome a

United States base, not least because it would provide them a

measure of security against Arab Iraqis, who may seek revenge

against the Kurds for having collaborated with the United States

in Iraq. From Kurdistan, the United States military could readily

move back into any Sunni Arab area where al-Qaeda or its allies

established a base. The Kurdistan peshmerga would willingly assist their American allies with intelligence and other support.

By deploying to what is still, nominally, Iraqi territory, the

United States would avoid the political complications in the United

States and in Iraq involved in reentering Iraq following a total

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withdrawal. Partition, as noted by the Baker-Hamilton Commission

and by many experts, is not an easy solution, but many of the

worst consequences of partition, including sectarian killing and an

Iranian-dominated Shiite south, have already happened. And the

United States has no plan to reverse any of this.

Mr. Chairman, I’m often asked: What is the difference between

the plan that you and Les Gelb have put forward and the plan that

I have outlined? We agree that the future of Iraq is up to the

Iraqis. You and Les Gelb are more optimistic that Iraq may hold

together and, if you’re right, I think that would be terrific. I’m pessimistic that the country can hold together over the long term. But,

nonetheless, the fundamental premise of both plans is that the

United States should not be engaged in nation-building in Iraq;

this should be left to the Iraqis.

Partition is an Iraqi solution. It does not require the United

States to do anything, although we can, and should, take steps,

diplomatically and through our financial assistance, that can

smooth the process, and also to try to deal with the regional consequences.

The alternative to partition is a continued U.S.-led effort at nation-building that has not worked for the last 4 years, and, in my

view, has no prospect for success. That, Mr. Chairman, is a formula

for war without an end.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Galbraith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PETER W. GALBRAITH, SENIOR DIPLOMATIC

FELLOW, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations,

thank you for the invitation to testify before this committee on alternative strategies

toward Iraq. It is a special privilege to be here since the committee staff was my

professional home for 14 years and it is here where I began my education on Iraq.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR U.S. STRATEGY

It is clear that our present strategy for Iraq has failed miserably both in concept

and execution. Any new strategy should, I believe, be based on the following premises:

First, the United States needs to extricate itself from Iraq as soon as feasible so

that we can address other more urgent threats to our national security, including

from nuclear North Korea and nuclear ambitious Iran.

Second, any new strategy should focus on the objectives that are achievable in

Iraq consistent with the military and other resources we are prepared to commit.

Third, the starting point for any new strategy for Iraq should be the country as

it is, not as we wish it were.

IRAQ: BROKEN APART AND IN CIVIL WAR

The reality of Iraq is stark. The country has broken up and is in the midst of

a civil war.

In the southern half of Iraq, Shiite religious parties and clerics have created

theocracies policed by militias that number well over 100,000. In Basra, three religious parties control—and sometimes fight over—the 100,000 barrels of oil diverted

each day from legal exports into smuggling. To the extent that the central government has authority in the south, it is because the same Shiite parties that dominate

the center also control the south.

Kurdistan in the north is de facto an independent state with its own army and

its own flag. The Iraqi Army is barred from the region, flying the Iraqi flag prohibited, and central government ministries are not present. The Kurdish people voted

98.5 percent for independence in an informal referendum in January 2005.

The Sunni center is a battleground between insurgents that command widespread

local support and U.S. forces. The Iraqi Army, which we proclaim to be a national

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institution, is seen by the Sunni Arabs as a largely Shiite force loyal to a Shiiteled government that they see as an ally of national enemy, Iran.

Baghdad is the front line of Iraq’s Sunni-Shiite civil war. The Mahdi army, the

radical Shiite militia, controls the capital’s Shiite neighborhoods in the east while

al-Qaeda offshoots and Baathists control the Sunni districts in the west. In Baghdad, and in other formerly mixed areas, extremists are engaging in brutal sectarian

cleansing with a death toll probably in excess of 200 a day.

TWIN PILLARS OF CURRENT STRATEGY

The Bush administration’s strategy for Iraq rests on two pillars: First, an inclusive and effective national unity government that represents Iraq’s Shiites, Sunnis,

and Kurds; and, second, the development of effective Iraqi Army and police that can

take over security responsibilities from U.S. forces.

Iraq does not have a government of national unity. Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki pursues a sectarian Shiite agenda, as seen most dramatically in the manner

in which he carried out Saddam Hussein’s execution. The Maliki government is

keen to fight the Sunni insurgents—or to be more precise, to have the U.S. military

fight Sunni insurgents—but has resisted all steps to disband Shiite militias. But,

even if Iraq had a genuine national unity government, it would be largely irrelevant. There is no part of the country where the government actually exercises significant authority.

Iraq’s Army and police are either Shiite or Sunni. In Baghdad, the Shiite death

squads that target Sunnis are the police. In Sunni areas, the police are often insurgent sympathizers or insurgents. Iraq’s Army, while somewhat better, is divided

into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish battalions. These are ultimately loyal not to the

nominal chain of command, but to their sects, or, in the case of the Kurds, to the

Kurdistan Regional Government. In a country in the midst of a civil war, it is unrealistic to believe that Iraq’s security forces can somehow be different from the country itself.

Iraq’s security forces are not neutral guarantors of public security but combatants

in a civil war. U.S. training has not made, and will not make, these forces into

Iraqis. It will only create more lethal combatants in a civil war.

WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A DEMOCRATIC AND UNIFIED IRAQ

To achieve the Bush administration’s stated goal of a self-sustaining unified and

democratic Iraq, the United States would have to undertake two major military missions that it is not now undertaking.

First, it would have to disarm, forcefully, Iraq’s Shiite militias and dismantle the

Shiite theocracies that these militias keep in power. This would bring the United

States into direct conflict with Iraq’s Shiite power structure. The Shiites are three

times as numerous as the Sunni Arabs, possess more powerful armed forces, and

have in neighboring Iran a powerful ally.

Second, the United States would have to end Iraq’s civil war. This means deploying U.S. troops to serve as the police in Baghdad and other mixed areas for an indefinite period of time. These are not tasks that can be handled by Iraqi security

forces since there are no such forces that are trusted by both Sunnis and Shiites.

The Bush administration has no intention of undertaking either of these missions

which would require many more troops, mean significantly greater casualties (especially if we tried to use our troops as police), and probably not succeed.

IRAQ’S CONSTITUTION: A ROADMAP TO PARTITION

The alternative is to accept the reality—an Iraq that has broken up—and work

with its components. We should get out of the business of nation-building in Iraq

and respect the democratic decision of the Iraqis to have a country of strong regions

and a powerless center.

Iraq’s Constitution, adopted by 80 percent of Iraq’s people, is a roadmap to partition. It recognizes Kurdistan as a self-governing region and permits other parts of

the country to form regions. Iraq’s Council of Representatives has already passed

a law paving the way to the formation of a Shiite ‘‘super region’’ in 15 months.

Under the constitution, Iraq’s regions can have their own armies (called Regional

Guards) and exercise substantial control over their natural resources including oil.

Except for the short list of exclusive federal powers listed in article 110 of the Iraqi

Constitution, regional law is superior to federal law. By design, Iraq’s Constitution

makes it difficult for the central government to function and its few powers do not

even include taxation.

182

WITHDRAW WHERE WE HAVE NO ACHIEVABLE MISSION

By accepting the reality of Iraq, we can see a path to withdrawal. The Shiite

south is stable, albeit theocratic and pro-Iranian. If we are not going to disband the

militias and local theocracies—which we allowed to become established during the

CPA’s formal occupation of Iraq—there is no purpose served by a continued coalition

presence in the Shiite southern half of Iraq. We should withdraw immediately.

In the Sunni center, our current strategy involves handing off combat duties to

the Iraqi Army. Mostly, it is Shiite battalions that fight in the Sunni Arab areas,

as the Sunni units are not reliable. What the Bush administration portrays as Iraqi,

the local population sees as a hostile force loyal to a Shiite-dominated government

in Baghdad installed by the Americans invader and closely aligned with the traditional enemy, Iran. The more we ‘‘Iraqize’’ the fight in the Sunni heartland, the

more we strengthen the insurgency.

If the Sunni Arabs were to form their own region, they could take control of their

own security. Right now, the choice for ordinary Sunnis is between what they see

as a radical Shiite government that sponsors anti-Sunni death squads and their own

extremists. Within the establishment of a Sunni region, the choice becomes one between nationalist and traditional leadership on the one hand and the Islamic extremists on the other. Outsiders can influence this choice by providing economic incentives for a more moderate Sunni Arab government. The United States should

state that it will withdraw from the Sunni Arab region when its Regional Guard

is established.

So far, the Sunni Arabs have been the strongest opponents of federalism in Iraq.

But, with Kurdistan already in existence and a Shiite region likely on its way, the

Sunnis are faced with a choice between governing themselves or being governed by

a Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad.

BAGHDAD

Because it is Iraq’s most mixed city, Baghdad is the front line of Iraq’s SunniShiite civil war. It is tragedy for its people—most of whom do not share the sectarian hatred that is fueling a killing spree that is taking several thousand lives

a month. Iraqi forces cannot end the civil war because many of them are partisans

of one side, and the proposed surge of U.S. troops will not end it. There is no good

solution to Baghdad. Ideally, the United States could help broker a political deal for

power-sharing among Sunnis and Shiites (with space for the much smaller Christian, Mandean/Sabean, Turkmen, and Kurdish communities). But, the reality is that

Baghdad is already divided. A formal division into Shiite and Sunni sectors may be

the only way to halt the effort by Shiite militias to enlarge the Shiite parts of the

city.

Unless the United States is prepared to assume long-term police duties in Baghdad, we should withdraw our troops from the city. If we withdraw, there will be sectarian cleansing of mixed neighborhoods and sectarian killing. And, this will be the

case if we stay with our current forces or even after the modest surge now being

discussed.

KURDISTAN

Kurdistan is Iraq’s most stable region. It is the one part of the country that is

the pro-Western, secular, and aspiring democracy that the Bush administration had

hoped for all of Iraq. The United States should work to strengthen democratic institutions in Kurdistan as well as the military capabilities of the Kurdistan military

(the peshmerga) which is Iraq’s only reliable indigenous military force.

Iraq’s Constitution provides for a referendum to be held by the end of this year

to determine the status of Kirkuk and other areas disputed between Kurds and

Arabs. Holding this referendum has the potential to increase, significantly, violence

in areas that are ethnically mixed. On the other hand, Kirkuk has been a source

of conflict in Iraq for seven decades. Failing to resolve the matter at a time when

there is a constitutionally agreed process to do so is also likely to produce conflict

and is destabilizing over the long term.

Because of our special relationship with the Kurds, the United States has clout

that it does not enjoy elsewhere in the country. The United States should engage

in a major diplomatic effort to resolve the boundaries of Kurdistan through negotiation wherever possible. The Kurds, who hold the upper hand in much of this

disputed territory, should be cautioned about the dangers of overreaching. With regard to Kirkuk, the U.S. diplomacy should focus on entrenching power-sharing

among the governorate’s four communities—Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Chaldean/

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Assyrians—so that all have a stake in Kirkuk regardless of the outcome of the referendum.

PREVENTING AL-QAEDA FROM HAVING A BASE

The United States has one overriding interest in Iraq today—to keep al-Qaeda

and like-minded Salafi terrorist groups from having a base from which they can plot

attacks on the United States. If Sunni Arabs cannot provide for their own security,

the United States must be prepared to reengage.

This is best accomplished by placing a small over-the-horizon force in Kurdistan.

The Kurds are among the most pro-American people in the world and would welcome a U.S. military presence, not the least because it would help protect them from

Arab Iraqis who resent their close cooperation with the United States during the

2003 war and thereafter. From Kurdistan, the U.S. military could readily move back

into any Sunni Arab area where al-Qaeda or its allies established a base. The Kurdish peshmerga would willingly assist their American allies with intelligence and

operationally. By deploying to what is still nominally Iraqi territory, the United

States would avoid the political complications—in the United States and in Iraq—

involved in reentering Iraq following a total withdrawal.

WILL IRAQ STAY TOGETHER?

Can Iraq survive as a loose federation? Over the short term, Iraq’s Kurdish and

Shiite leaders are committed to the constitutional arrangements while the Sunni

Arabs say that they want a more centralized state. Both Sunni Arabs and Shiites

identify as Iraqis, although they have radically different visions as to what Iraq

should be. The creation of Sunni and Shiite federal units, therefore, is not likely to

lead to a full separation. Rather, by giving each community their own entity, federalism can help avoid the alternative where Sunnis and Shiites fight a prolonged

civil war for control of all Arab Iraq.

The Kurds do not identify as Iraqis. They associate Iraq with decades of repression and with Saddam Hussein’s genocide. Almost unanimously, Iraqi Kurds want

their own independent state. Keeping people in a state they hate is a formula for

never ending conflict of the sort that has characterized the entire history of modern

Iraq. The United States may—and for the time being probably should—delay

Kurdistan’s full independence, but we cannot prevent it. Our real interest is in preventing the violent break up of Iraq, and not in holding together a country that

brought nonstop misery to the majority of its people for its entire history.

PARTITION AND WITHDRAW: A STRATEGY TO GET THE U.S. OUT OF IRAQ

Summary: Accept the partition of Iraq that has already taken place, withdraw

from Arab Iraq, and redeploy a small force to Kurdistan that can strike at al-Qaeda

if necessary.

Key Facts: Iraq has broken up and is in the midst of a civil war. Kurdistan in

the north is a de facto independent state with its own army. The Shiite south is

governed separately from Baghdad. The Iraqi Parliament has approved a law paving the way for the formation of a Shiite ‘‘super region’’ in 15 months. The Sunni

center is a battleground and Baghdad is the front line of the Sunni-Shiite civil war.

Iraq’s Constitution ratifies the country’s partition, recognizing Kurdistan as a selfgoverning region and permitting other parts of the country to form regions. Under

the Constitution, Iraq’s regions can have their own armies (called Regional Guards)

and exercise substantial control over their natural resources including oil. Except

for the short list of exclusive federal powers listed in Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution, regional law is superior to federal law. By design, Iraq’s Constitution

makes it difficult for the central government to function and its few powers do not

even include taxation. To achieve a unified and democratic Iraq, the United States

would have to use its military to end the civil war, build a strong central government over the objections of the Kurds and many Shiites, and be prepared to remain

in Iraq indefinitely. Even so, the prospects for success would be minimal.

Policy Recommendations:

1. Accept the reality of partition and work with the regions that emerge to develop

stable regional governments with competent security forces.

2. Use deplomacy to smooth the path to partition by helping resolve territorial disputes between regions, and notably between Kurdistan and Arab Iraq over Kirkuk.

3. Facilitate a solution to Baghdad either by devising a plan for power sharing

between Sunnis and Shiites in the city or by dividing it along current sectarian

boundaries.

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4. Mitigate the humanitarian consequences of Iraq’s civil war with assistance to

displaced populations.

5. Withdraw coalition forces immediately from Iraq’s Shiite south where they are

not needed for stability.

6. Withdraw rapidly from most of Baghdad recognizing that the U.S. military is

not prepared to become the police of the city.

7. State that the U.S. will withdraw from the Iraq’s Sunni areas at such time as

the Sunnis are prepared to assume security for their own region.

8. Retain an ‘‘over-the-horizon’’ U.S. military force in pro-American Kurdistan that

could intervene against al-Qaeda and other global terrorist organizations if necessary.

9. Delay Iraq’s formal breakup as long as possible while preparing neighbors to

accept peacefully the new reality.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kagan.

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR,

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of this——

The CHAIRMAN. Again, welcome.

Dr. KAGAN [continuing]. Committee, I’m very grateful for the opportunity to speak before you today on this issue that is of such

great importance to our Nation.

Iraq is clearly in a very dire situation right now, and no objective

observer could deny that. And we face, at this moment, I believe,

a series of very difficult choices among options, none of which are

pleasant, none of which can promise success, all of which carry increased risk, of one form or another.

I’d like to stress that I do believe that there is an option that can

succeed in at least offering us a chance to move forward toward a

road that would actually be acceptable to us over the long term.

And I do believe that that option is embodied in the plan that I

have presented at AEI, some time ago, in the report called ‘‘Choosing Victory.’’

But I’d like, first, to highlight the fact that I believe that we have

come to a point of bifurcation in the history of the world. And I

don’t think that’s too strong a statement. I think that it is impossible to overstate how much rides on the outcome of the war in Iraq

today.

A number of experts from various parties and persuasions have

looked at the possibility and likelihood of containing a civil war in

Iraq that is now underway, and preventing it from spreading

throughout the region, without actually tamping it down and bringing it under control in Iraq. And the conclusions are very, very

poor; very, very pessimistic.

Judging from past civil wars, ethnosectarian conflicts around the

world, it is very clear that a civil war, allowed to proceed unchecked in Iraq as the result of a precipitate American withdrawal,

is highly likely to spread violence throughout the entire region, destabilize Iraq’s neighbors, and may quite possibly lead to regional

conflict. This is not something that the United States could view

with any degree of equanimity. This is not Southeast Asia, this is

not a part of the world that we can walk away from, this is a region that will always be at the center of America’s vital interests

in the world, and not an area where we can simply watch idly as

conflict expands and brings in ever more warriors.

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Unfortunately, I think this nightmare scenario is not improbable

if we do not bring the violence in Iraq under control and work hard

to reestablish an Iraqi State that can govern its territory and maintain its own security and defend itself against foes, internal and external. And I do believe that it is possible to do that.

We have not succeeded in Iraq, so far, because we have not applied sound strategy to this conflict. I think that’s very clear. I’ve

been making that case consistently, honestly, even since before the

war began. Sound strategy requires—sound strategy in counterinsurgency requires, first and foremost, providing security to the

population. When people have to wake up in the morning and wonder and worry if they and their families will live to see the evening,

they will not participate in the political process in a normal way,

they will not participate in economic processes in a normal way,

they will not interact with one another, even with family and

friends and neighbors, in a normal way. That is a fact of human

nature, and it has been seen in many, many conflicts.

It is no surprise to me, therefore, that the Iraqis, thus far, have

not been behaving in the manner that we would like them to behave in. That is to say, a manner that is characterized by compromise and civility and inclusiveness. When the violence has

reached the point that we have allowed it to reach through not

working hard enough to bring it under control, it is natural for

Iraqi sects and groups to turn to them—to turn to their own powers and their own capabilities to defend each other, and it is, unfortunately, also natural for them to begin to attack each other.

Iraq does not, in fact, have a long history of vast sectarian conflict ripping it apart from age to age. The level of violence that

we’re seeing now is unusual in Iraqi history, as it is unusual in the

history of most states. I do believe that we can work to bring it

under control, and I do believe that bringing security to the Iraqi

people, in the first instance, will enable them to begin to make the

difficult choices and compromises that will be so essential to allow

them to move forward to create the sort of stable state that we desire, and that they desire.

I do not believe that solutions such as partition will be effective

or will be, rather, tolerable. Unfortunately, it is not the case that

Iraq is now divided neatly into three zones which can simply each

be given its own government. Although there has been sectarian

cleansing going on in Baghdad and in other cities in Iraq, Baghdad

remains a mixed city. Many of its neighborhoods remain mixed between sects. And actually dividing the country into three zones will

require, de facto, an enormous amount more sectarian cleansing.

Another word for this process, I believe, will be ‘‘genocide,’’ as I believe that the increasing escalation of violence that is the normal

part of any widespread sectarian cleansing generally leads to such

efforts.

I do not believe that the United States can stand by, purely from

an ethical perspective, and watch that occur. And I would remind

the committee that it was the position of especially the Democratic

Party and the Clinton administration in the 1990s that it was intolerable for the United States to stand idly by and watch as ethnic

cleansing and genocide went on in the Balkans. I really can’t imagine how we could believe that it could be tolerable now to permit,

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and, indeed, even encourage, that to occur, when we are so clearly

partially responsible for the circumstances in which this violence

has developed.

But I want to emphasize, we are not in Iraq, in my view, for the

benefit of the Iraqis; we are in Iraq, in my view, in pursuit of

American national interests. And the national interest, at this

point, is the prevention of the development of regional civil war

and regional violence on a scale that would be intolerable to us.

And I believe that, purely in the service of our own interests, if

nothing else, it is vital that we work to bring the violence under

control.

Now, we have put forward a plan, which we have presented in

great detail, called ‘‘Choosing Victory,’’ in which we recommend the

introduction of additional U.S. forces into Baghdad and into Al

Anbar province. We believe that this plan is workable. We brought

together a group of military planners with significant experience—

recent experience—in Iraq. We were advised, by General Jack

Keane, the former Chief—Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and lieutenant general, retired, David Barno, and a number of other officers who gave us their wisdom. And we looked very carefully at

what we believed the military requirements would be of bringing

security to the vital Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods in

Baghdad as the beginning of an operation to pacify the entire city,

which would then enable us to move beyond Baghdad into troubled

areas in Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and elsewhere. We also believe that

it was necessary to increase our forces in Al Anbar province, which

is another base of the Sunni insurgency, in order to prevent insurgents from moving easily back and forth between that province and

Baghdad.

We emphasize that we do not believe that this security operation,

by itself, will lead to success in Iraq. It is, rather, the essential precondition for moving forward with the host of reconciliation initiatives, political developments, and economic development that will

be vital, in the end, to resolving this conflict.

There has been much complaint about the fact that the Iraqi

Armed Forces are not ethnically mixed, not sectarianly mixed. Of

course they’re not. You do not—you cannot recruit Sunni Arabs

into a force when the insurgents are terrorizing their families and

killing their family members when they join the army. As we have

seen in Tal Afar and Ramadi and in other places, when you can

bring security to an area, you can then begin to recruit Sunni

Arabs and other ethnicities and sects into the armed forces and

produce a more balanced force. Security is the precondition.

I will freely say, because I have said it consistently all along,

that the Bush administration has made an error in not prioritizing

the establishment of security in Iraq. I do not believe—and it was

our considered opinion when we studied this problem very carefully—we do not believe that the situation is so far gone that no

solution is feasible.

People have challenged the numbers of troops that would be required to do this. I would say they should explain—the burden is

on them to explain what forces they think would be necessary, and

on what basis they make the calculation. We have been completely

open and transparent on the basis for our force calculations, which

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are in line with traditional counterinsurgency practice and also

with the experience of operations in Iraq previously. We believe

that these forces will be adequate to provide security in the areas

of Baghdad that we think is most important.

We recommended a significant reconstruction effort to accompany this program. We are going to be continuing, in subsequent

phases of this project, to examine changes that we think need to

be made in the training of the Iraqi Army, the training of the Iraqi

police, reconstruction efforts, and the development of Iraqi governmental structures, and so forth. We clearly do believe our study is

something that will take some time, and the reconstruction of Iraq

is something that will take some time, but we are absolutely convinced that simply allowing Iraq to collapse now by withdrawing

our forces, or by trying to carve off some piece of Iraq and protect

only that, is not in the interest of the United States of America and

will, in fact, put us in tremendous jeopardy over the long run, and

possibly even in the short run. And we, therefore, believe that it

is vital and urgent that we work now to bring the situation under

control.

I thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN

ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

CHOOSING VICTORY: A PLAN FOR SUCCESS IN IRAQ—PHASE I REPORT

(A REPORT OF THE IRAQ PLANNING GROUP AT THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Victory is still an option in Iraq. America, a country of 300 million people with a GDP of $12 trillion and more than 1 million soldiers and marines, has the resources to stabilize Iraq, a state the size of California with a population of 25 million and a GDP under $100 billion. America must use its resources skillfully and

decisively to help build a successful democratically elected, sovereign government in

Iraq.

Victory in Iraq is vital to America’s security. Defeat will likely lead to regional

conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and increased global terrorism.

Iraq has reached a critical point. The strategy of relying on a political process to

eliminate the insurgency has failed. Rising sectarian violence threatens to break

America’s will to fight. This violence will destroy the Iraqi Government, armed

forces, and people if it is not rapidly controlled.

Victory in Iraq is still possible at an acceptable level of effort. We must adopt a

new approach to the war and implement it quickly and decisively.

We must act now to restore security and stability to Baghdad. We and the enemy

have identified it as the decisive point.

There is a way to do this.

• We must balance our focus on training Iraqi soldiers with a determined effort

to secure the Iraqi population and contain the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq,

and now it must become the first priority.

• We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations that begin in the spring of 2007 is

necessary, possible, and will be sufficient to improve security and set conditions

for economic development, political development, reconciliation, and the development of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to provide permanent security.

• American forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear high-violence Sunni and

mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.

• After those neighborhoods are cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again

partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security, reconstitute police forces, and integrate police and Iraqi Army efforts to maintain the population’s security.

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• As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal life,

bolster employment, and, working through Iraqi officials, strengthen Iraqi local

government. • Securing the population strengthens the ability of Iraq’s central government to

exercise its sovereign powers.

This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:

• The ground forces must accept longer tours for several years. National Guard

units will have to accept increased deployments during this period. • Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring equipment from nondeploying Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must be mobilized to provide replacement equipment

sets urgently.

• The President must request a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq.

Responsibility and accountability for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies. The President must insist upon the completion of reconstruction projects. The President should also request a dramatic increase in Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds.

• The President must request a substantial increase in ground forces endstrength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by

ensuring that relief is on the way. The President must issue a personal call for

young Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of this generation.

• The President and his representatives in Iraq must forge unity of effort with

the Iraqi Government.

Other courses of action have been proposed. All will fail.

• Withdraw immediately. This approach will lead to immediate defeat. The Iraqi

Security Forces are entirely dependent upon American support to survive and

function. If U.S. forces withdraw now, the Iraqi forces will collapse. Iraq will

descend into total civil war that will rapidly spread throughout the Middle East.

• Engage Iraq’s neighbors. This approach will fail. The basic causes of violence

and sources of manpower and resources for the warring sides come from within

Iraq. Iraq’s neighbors are encouraging the violence, but they cannot stop it.

• Increase embedded trainers dramatically. This approach cannot succeed rapidly

enough to prevent defeat. Removing U.S. forces from patrolling neighborhoods

to embed them as trainers will lead to an immediate rise in violence. This rise

in violence will destroy America’s remaining will to fight and escalate the cycle

of sectarian violence in Iraq beyond anything an Iraqi Army could bring under

control.

Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow in far more desperate circumstances.

Committing to victory now will demonstrate America’s strength to our friends and

enemies around the world.

INTRODUCTION

American forces in Iraq today are engaged in the pivotal struggle of our age. If

the United States allows Iraq to slide into full-scale civil war, characterized by the

collapse of the central government and the widespread mobilization of the population in internal conflict, the consequences will be epochal. Internal strife in Iraq

has already generated a large displaced population within the country and significant refugee flows into neighboring lands. Those neighbors, both Sunni and Shia,

have already made clear their determination to enter Iraq and its struggles if America withdraws and the conflict escalates into greater sectarian violence or civil war.

Iraq’s diverse neighbors, however, have opposing interests in how the conflict is settled. Consequently, failure in Iraq now will likely lead to regional war, destabilizing

important states in the Middle East and creating a fertile ground for terrorism.

Success in Iraq, on the other hand, would transform the international situation.

Success will give the United States critical leverage against Iran, which is now positioning itself to become the regional hegemon after our anticipated defeat. It will

strengthen America’s position around the world, where our inability to contain conflict in Iraq is badly tarnishing our stature. And success will convert a violent, chaotic region in the heart of the Middle East and on the front line of the Sunni-Shiite

divide into a secure state able to support peace within its borders and throughout

the region. There can be no question that victory in Iraq is worth considerable

American effort or that defeat would be catastrophic.

Some now argue that victory is beyond our grasp. America cannot (or should not)

involve itself in civil, sectarian conflicts, they say, and the troops required to control

such conflicts are larger than the U.S. military could possibly deploy. Neither of

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these arguments is valid. The United States has faced ethnosectarian conflict on at

least five occasions in the past 15 years. In Somalia, Afghanistan, and Rwanda, successive American administrations allowed the conflicts to continue without making

any serious attempts to control or contain them. The results have been disastrous.

Inaction in Afghanistan in the 1990s led to the rise of the Taliban and its support

for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda—and therefore indirectly to the 9/11 attacks. Inaction, indeed humiliation, in Somalia led to a larger civil war in which radical

Islamists took control of most of the country by the end of 2006. In late December,

the conflict took a new turn as Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia in support of the

internationally recognized transitional government. A civil war has become a regional war, as civil wars often do. In Rwanda, civil war and genocide also spread,

involving Congo and, indeed, much of sub-Saharan Africa in widespread conflict and

death. One clear lesson of post-cold-war conflicts is that ignoring civil wars is dangerous and can generate grave, unintended consequences for America’s future security.

The United States has recently intervened, along with its allies, to control ethnically and religiously motivated civil wars on two occasions, however, in 1995 in

Bosnia and in 1999 in Kosovo. Both efforts were successful in ending the violence

and creating the preconditions for peace and political and economic development.

The parallels are, of course, imperfect; much of the ethnic cleansing had already

been accomplished in both areas before the United States intervened with armed

force. In the Balkans, however, the levels of violence and death as a proportion of

the population were much higher than they have been in Iraq. Additionally, the

armed forces of the states neighboring Bosnia and Kosovo were much more directly

involved in the struggle than those of Iraq’s neighbors. Above all, the introduction

of U.S. and European forces in strength in Bosnia and Kosovo has ended the killing

and prevented that conflict from spreading throughout the region, as it threatened

to do in the 1990s. It is possible to contain ethnosectarian civil wars, but only by

ending them.

The United States has the military power necessary to control the violence in

Iraq. The main purpose of the report that follows is to consider in detail what

amount of armed force would be needed to bring the sectarian violence in Baghdad

down to levels that would permit economic and political development and real national reconciliation. Before turning to that consideration, however, we should reflect on the fact that the United States between 2001 and 2006 has committed only

a small proportion of its total national strength to this struggle. There are more

than 1 million soldiers in the Active and Reserve ground forces, and only 140,000

of them are in Iraq at the moment. Many others are engaged in vital tasks in the

United States and elsewhere from which they could not easily be moved, and soldiers and marines are not interchangeable beans. If this war were the vital national

priority that it should be, however, the United States could commit many more soldiers to the fight. This report will address in greater detail some of the ways of

making more forces available for this struggle.

The United States could also devote a significantly higher proportion of its national wealth to this problem in two ways. First, the President has finally called for

a significant increase in the size of the ground forces—the warriors who are actually

shouldering much of the burden in this conflict. The United States can and should

sustain larger ground forces than it now has, both to support operations in Iraq and

to be prepared for likely contingencies elsewhere. Five years into the global war on

terror, the Bush administration has recognized this urgent need and begun to address it.

Second, the United States can and must devote significantly more resources to

helping reconstruction and economic development in Iraq. The American GDP is

over $13 trillion; Iraq’s is about $100 billion. America’s ability to improve the daily

lives of Iraqis is very great, even at levels of expenditure that would barely affect

the U.S. economy. Effective reconstruction and economic development are essential

components of any counterinsurgency campaign and are urgently needed in Iraq.

This report will consider how to improve some aspects of these necessary programs,

which will be considered in more detail in subsequent phases of this project.

But reconstruction, economic development, national reconciliation, political development, and many other essential elements of the solution to Iraq’s problems are

all unattainable in the current security environment. Violence in Iraq has risen

every year since 2003. Last year was the bloodiest on record, despite significant

military operations aimed at reducing the violence in Baghdad. The bombing of the

Golden Mosque of Samarra in February 2006 accelerated the sectarian conflict dramatically, and the fighting has moved beyond insurgents and organized militias to

neighborhood watch groups engaging in their own local violence. This development

is ominous because it signals that significant portions of the Iraqi population have

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begun to mobilize for full-scale civil war. In this violent context, when so many Iraqi

individuals and families must worry about their physical survival on a daily basis,

American proposals that rely on diplomatic, political, and economic efforts to resolve

the crisis are doomed to failure. Such efforts will not succeed until Iraq’s population

is secure from rampant violence. Establishing security in Baghdad, and then in the

violent regions that surround it, must become the top priority of the American military presence in Iraq today. Securing Baghdad to bring the violence in Iraq’s capital

under control must be the centerpiece of a military operation that should be

launched as rapidly as possible. Effective reconstruction and the building of Iraqi

governing institutions will accompany and follow this military operation. Without

such an operation, America’s defeat in Iraq appears imminent, regardless of any

other efforts the United States might undertake. The remainder of this report will

consider the shape and requirements of such an operation, the likely enemy responses, and the ways of overcoming them.

SECURING THE POPULATION

The recently released military doctrinal manual on counterinsurgency operations

declares, ‘‘The cornerstone of any [counterinsurgency] effort is establishing security

for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can

be implemented and disorder spreads.’’ This statement encapsulates the wisdom of

generations of counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners. The importance of establishing security is manifold. First, people who are constantly in fear for their

lives and for their loved ones do not participate in political, economic, or social processes in a normal way. The fear of violence and death distorts everything they do,

think, and feel, and it often changes how they interact even with neighbors and

friends. When violence reaches a level at which most people feel themselves to be

in danger, as it has in many areas of Baghdad and Anbar, then political processes

largely cease to function.

It is not usually possible to use those collapsing processes to redress or control

the violence, moreover. In Iraq, as in many other insurgencies, rebel groups take

up arms in part to gain leverage that the political process would not otherwise give

them. The Sunni Arab rejectionists in Iraq have preferred violence to democracy

from the outset because they know that they will not control a truly democratic

Iraq. They have, therefore, hoped to use violence and its threat to force the Shiite

majority to give them a much greater say in governing Iraq than their proportion

in the population would attain. As long as they believe that violence is providing

them with political leverage, they will continue to prefer violence to dialogue. Encouraging the Shiite government to negotiate with them without first containing the

violence only reinforces the Sunni Arab rejectionists’ belief in the efficacy of violence

to advance their cause.

Ongoing violence within a state, finally saps the legitimacy of that state’s government in the eyes of its citizens. As the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency manual

explains, the first indicator of a government’s legitimacy is ‘‘the ability to provide

security for the population (including protection from internal and external

threats).’’ Providing security for its people is the core mission of any state. Continual

violence and death eliminate the people’s support for the government, leading to an

increase in violence as individuals and groups undertake to protect and avenge

themselves independently of state structures, legal institutions, or government sanction. Allowing disorder to persist over the long term is extremely hazardous to the

health of any government. And America’s objective in Iraq is creating a secure and

sovereign national government elected by the Iraqi people.

The U.S. Government has not given priority to providing security to the Iraqi population from the outset of the war, however. The inadequacy of coalition forces at

the end of major combat operations to maintain order is well-known and well-documented now. It is less well-known that American forces continued to underemphasize the importance of establishing and maintaining security even after the military

command and the administration recognized that insurgency and low-grade civil

war were erupting in Iraq. America’s commanders in Iraq, notably Generals John

Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command since mid-2003, and George Casey,

commander of Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF–I) since mid-2004, have instead

emphasized the need for Iraqis to solve their own security problems. The leading

U.S. commanders have, therefore, prioritized using U.S. troops to establish and

train Iraqi Security Forces. Indeed, American military commanders have never pursued the defeat of the enemy even after it became obvious that Iraqi forces lacked

the ability to do so. As a result, the United States has ceded the initiative to the

enemies of the United States and the Iraqi Government and permitted the steady

deterioration of the security situation.

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The basis of the Abizaid-Casey strategy is twofold: American forces in Iraq are

an irritant and generate insurgents who want to drive us out of their country, and

the Iraqis must be able to create and maintain their own stability lest they become

permanently dependent on our military presence. Both of these arguments contain

elements of truth, but realities in Iraq are much more complex.

The coalition presence in Iraq is an irritant in many areas, and it has generated

a number of insurgents particularly among former Baathists, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and Sunni Arab rejectionists. But this argument is less helpful in evaluating

courses of action than is commonly supposed. U.S. forces in Iraq currently maintain

a very light footprint—140,000 troops in a country of 25 million people. Most Iraqis

surveyed report that they rarely if ever see American forces. There is no reason to

imagine, moreover, that it matters to the insurgency whether there are 100,000,

140,000, or 200,000 Americans in Iraq.

Insurgent rhetoric does not count our soldiers; rather, it denounces the presence

of any American troops on Iraqi soil. Osama bin Laden launched the 9/11 attacks

in part because of a far lighter American presence in Saudi Arabia—a presence

similar to what almost every plan for withdrawal from Iraq proposes to maintain

in the country or the region for years to come. Increases on the scale proposed in

this report are extraordinarily unlikely to lead to any significant increase in the ‘‘irritation’’ caused by our presence, particularly in the most vivid manifestation of that

‘‘irritation,’’ which is the propaganda of our enemies. We should remember that our

enemies in Iraq try to shift blame for their own mass murder attacks against innocent civilians to the coalition forces that are assisting the Iraqi Government. The

problem in Iraq is not so much that coalition forces are perceived as occupiers, but

rather that coalition forces are occupiers who have not made good on their primary

responsibility—securing the population.

The argument that Iraqis must be able to maintain their own security is also

valid but incomplete. American forces can clearly leave Iraq, successfully, only when

there is an Iraqi Government in place that controls its own forces and maintains

the safety of its people. Training Iraqi Security Forces, both the Iraqi Army and police forces of various types, is clearly an essential precondition for the ultimate withdrawal of U.S. troops. It is not true, however, that the United States should allow

the violence in Iraq to continue until the Iraqi Security Forces can bring it under

control on their own or even with our support.

In the first place, there is a world of difference between training security forces

that can maintain a peace that has already been established and training those

capable of conducting the complex and large-scale counterinsurgency operations that

the situation now demands. The coalition and the Iraqi Government have been

placing nascent Iraqi units and their soldiers in extremely difficult and dangerous

situations that require sophisticated command structures, excellent equipment, organization, superior leadership, and exceptional individual discipline. By focusing on

preparing the Iraqis to do everything, the U.S. military command has set the bar

too high. There are tasks in Iraq, such as clearing enemies out of high-violence

neighborhoods and securing their populations, that only American forces will be able

to do for some time. These tasks will not have to be repeated if they are done properly the first time. As new, properly trained Iraqi units become available, they will

be more capable of holding areas that have already been cleared and secured than

of clearing and securing those areas themselves.

In the second place, the emphasis on training Iraqi forces to establish security,

themselves, ignores the transition from insurgency to nascent civil war now going

on in Iraq. Preparing a largely Shiite Iraqi Army to suppress a Sunni Arab insurgency always posed a number of daunting challenges—many Shia do not want to

march into Sunni lands to fight; the presence of Shia military units inflames Sunni

Arab sentiment as much or more than the presence of American forces; and Shia

military units are much more open both to corruption and to committing atrocities

that stoke the insurgency than are coalition forces.

But the United States cannot rely on a primarily Shiite army to bring order to

a land torn by sectarian strife because that policy is unlikely to end violence in a

way that permits national reconciliation. Shiite military units cannot be seen as

honest brokers in mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods. As the violence continues to

rise, moreover, the members of the army—all of whom belong to one sect or another—come under increasing pressure to desert, commit atrocities, or otherwise undermine efforts at national reconciliation. Something similar happened to the large

and professional Yugoslav Army in the early 1990s. Rather than keeping the fragmenting state together, the army itself fragmented, sending weapons and experienced soldiers to the various warring sides and fueling the civil war. If no external

force works to reduce the violence while the Iraqi Army is training, it is virtually

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certain that the army will sooner or later break under the sectarian strain—and

with it will go Iraq’s only hope for peace in this generation.

Indeed, improved security is a precondition for rebalancing the demographic composition of security forces, which is, in turn, a prerequisite for preventing their involvement in sectarian or civil war and establishing their legitimacy with the Iraqi

population. The lack of Sunni representation in security forces stems mainly from

the enemy’s ability to hold hostage the families of potential recruits. Recent efforts

to reconstitute the police and recruit soldiers in predominantly Sunni areas such as

Tall Afar and Ramadi demonstrate that improved security leads to more representative and legitimate security forces.

The right strategy is to strike a balance among three concerns rather than between two: The United States should be sensitive to the danger of flooding Iraq with

too many coalition soldiers and of making the Iraqis too dependent on the coalition

to do everything, but America must balance those fears against the imminent danger of allowing the security situation to collapse completely.

The strategy proposed in this plan attempts to redress the imbalance in the

United States approach so far. This plan proposes a moderate increase in American

troop levels, but one far below anything likely to provoke a massive reaction by the

Iraqi people. The plan proposes to continue training Iraqi troops, placing them either in the lead or in partnership with American units wherever possible. The plan

encourages such partnership efforts as a path to transferring control of Iraq’s security to well-prepared Iraqi forces directed by its autonomous government, albeit on

a more realistic timeline than the ones currently under discussion. Above all, the

plan proposes to redress MNF–I’s continual failure to prioritize securing the Iraqi

people.

MNF–I’s strategy so far has focused on increasing Iraqi capabilities, but the violence continues to rise faster than those capabilities. Nascent Iraqi forces are not

prepared to operate effectively in areas where the enemy has succeeded in intimidating and coercing the population or has established a strong defensive capability.

Coalition forces are needed to set conditions for the development of ISF as well as

the introduction of ISF into contentious areas. The correct approach, embodied in

the plan proposed below, works both to increase Iraqi capabilities and to decrease

the violence to a level the Iraqis themselves can control. This strategy is the only

one that can succeed in creating a secure, autonomous, and democratic Iraq free of

sectarian violence, insurgency, and civil war.

THE CHALLENGE

The challenge facing the United States in Iraq comes primarily from a series of

enemies who are actively trying to stoke violence and create chaos to destroy the

current political and social order. Some people examining Iraq have become so frustrated and confused by the complexity of this challenge that they prefer to throw

up their hands rather than attempt to cope with it. The challenge is, nevertheless,

comprehensible. To understand it, one must first consider the geography and demography of the capital region and then describe the enemy in some detail.

Geography and Demography

Baghdad is the center of gravity of the conflict in Iraq at this moment. Insurgents

on all sides have declared that they intend to win or die there. It is the capital and

center of Iraqi Government. It is the base of American power and influence in the

country. It is the largest and most populous city in Iraq. It is home to one of Iraq’s

largest Shiite communities, but also to many mixed Sunni and Shiite communities.

Widely publicized American efforts to gain control of the violence in Baghdad in Operation Together Forward (conducted in two phases in 2006) connected American

success in Iraq overall to success in Baghdad. For good or ill, the pivotal struggle

for Iraq is occurring in its capital.

Baghdad is a city of some 6 million people that straddles the Tigris River. Northeast of the Army Canal that divides the eastern side of the city lies Sadr City, a

Shiite slum of more than 2 million people. Ministries and government buildings line

the Tigris on either side. On the western bank lies the Green Zone, an area secured

by American military forces that houses U.S. military and political headquarters,

critical Iraqi governmental institutions, and bases for some American soldiers. On

the western edge of the city is Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), home of Camp

Victory, one of the largest U.S. bases in the country. The road from BIAP to the

Green Zone is known as ‘‘Route Irish,’’ which has gained notoriety for being one of

the most dangerous stretches of road in Iraq.

Baghdad is a mixed city on many levels. Most of Baghdad’s Shiite population live

in and around Sadr City and its two satellite neighborhoods of Shaab and Ur; many

of the Sunnis live on the western side of the city. But many neighborhoods and disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00202 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tricts are themselves mixed, especially those between BIAP and the Green Zone and

immediately around the Green Zone on both sides of the river. Rising sectarian violence is changing this demographic pattern, however, and the mixed neighborhoods

are increasingly being ‘‘cleansed’’ and becoming more homogeneous.

Neither the challenges in Iraq nor the solutions even to Baghdad’s problems are

contained entirely in Baghdad, however. Anbar province, the large, mostly desert

area to the west of Baghdad, contains the core of the Sunni Arab rejectionist insurgency. U.S. and Iraqi forces fight insurgents for control of Anbar’s largest cities,

Ramadi and Fallujah, while Marines work to root out al-Qaeda and other insurgent

and terrorist groups throughout the vast province. Insurgents move from Anbar into

Baghdad and back again, linking these two problematic areas inextricably. Even the

insurgents who regularly operate in Baghdad have bases outside of the city, especially in the villages near Taji to the north and Iskandariyah to the south. These

two settlement belts provide a great deal of support to the enemy operating in the

capital. Diyala province, which lies to the north and east of Baghdad, is another important insurgent base. The Diyala River flows through its province’s capital city

of Baquba and, finally, into the Tigris River just south of Baghdad. Sunni

rejectionists and al-Qaeda operatives follow the Diyala River toward Baghdad and

then, leaving its course, launch strikes into the heart of Sadr City. Baghdad is,

therefore, a nexus of violence drawn from a number of regions outside the city.

Baghdad also contains its own internal violent dynamic into which these outside

forces flow.

The Enemy

There is violence in Iraq today because it suits certain groups and individuals to

disrupt the development of normal political and economic life in that country

through intimidation, terrorism, and killing. Violence on this scale is not historically

normal to Iraq (or virtually any other country, for that matter), and it is not a force

of nature. Too often violent events in Iraq are reported in the passive voice, as

though no agent in particular caused them. This sense of directionless, almost purposeless violence is one of the major factors hindering the intelligent consideration

of America’s options in this conflict. Before entering into the consideration of one

such option, therefore, we must first consider the enemies of peace and order in

Iraq. These can be broken into six main groups: Three Sunni Arab and three Shiite.

Sunni Arab Insurgent Groups. Sunni Arab violence in Iraq has gone through three

main phases. Even before coalition forces invaded in March 2003, Saddam Hussein

had prepared to sustain a guerrilla war if he was attacked. He formed the Fedayeen

Saddam, fighters trained and motivated to conduct irregular warfare, and sprinkled

them throughout Iraq (most likely to suppress the Shiite insurgency he expected to

follow an American withdrawal, as had happened after the 1991 invasion). When

major combat operations ended without securing much of the country, these fighters

joined thousands of soldiers and officers of the defeated conventional army in an inchoate resistance. This resistance was networked but not centrally directed, although Saddam and his sons, Uday and Qusay, tried to organize it when they were

in hiding. When coalition forces killed Uday and Qusay in Mosul in July 2003 and

captured Saddam in December 2003 near Tikrit, the Baathist resistance was weakened but not destroyed. It continues to play an important part in generating

anticoalition violence, especially in Anbar and Baghdad.

At the turn of 2004, however, a new force was emerging within the Sunni Arab

resistance—terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in Iraq (run by Abu Musab alZarqawi until his death in June 2006 and now by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, also known

as Abu Hamza al-Muhajer) and Ansar al-Sunna. Al-Qaeda in Iraq focused its efforts

on more spectacularly violent and symbolic attacks, rather than conducting the

smaller attacks upon coalition troops using the improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

favored by the Baathists. Al-Qaeda in Iraq also favored attacking Iraqi civilians and

government leaders. Zarqawi struck Iraqis who were cooperating with the government, but also attacked the Shiite community aggressively with the avowed aim of

provoking a Sunni-Shia civil war. His efforts culminated with the destruction of the

Golden Mosque of Samarra in February 2006, which incited a dramatic increase in

the level of Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq, an increase that has continued even after

his death.

The increase in sectarian violence has spawned yet another type of Sunni Arab

group—vigilantes who organize as neighborhood defense militias in Baghdad ostensibly to protect their areas from Shiite attacks. These groups have formed primarily

because American forces have chosen not to provide security to the population and

Iraqis have been unable to do so; while Shiite militias (which this report will consider presently) have ruthlessly targeted Sunni Arab civilians. These groups tend

to be self-organizing and to have more limited goals, although some become tied to

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al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, Baathists, or other larger organizations. The rise

of these vigilante groups is in some respects the most disturbing phenomenon in

Iraq. It indicates a dramatic increase in popular participation in the struggle and

is a step on the road to the mobilization of the Iraqi population for full-scale civil

war. This vigilante violence is also more inchoate and less subject to either negotiation or political control. It is an extremely dangerous development that must be

checked as rapidly as possible.

The goals of these various groups are divergent but in some respects complementary. The Baathists initially sought the restoration of Saddam Hussein or one of

their leaders to power. The trial and execution of Saddam have largely eliminated

that goal, but the Baathist movement has resurrected itself as an Iraqi nationalist

front aimed at ridding Iraq of foreign ‘‘occupying’’ forces and restoring the rule of

the Sunni Arabs in some form. Baathists are also posing as defenders of local populations against Shiite depredations. The absence of security in Sunni neighborhoods

makes this enemy’s claim credible to local populations and enables Baathists to recruit more insurgents to their cause.

The ideology of al-Qaeda in Iraq and affiliated groups complements that of the

Baathists in some respects, but not in others. These various groups agree that they

want coalition forces out of Iraq and the Sunni Arabs in control of the country. But

whereas the Baathists pursue a more secularist and nationalist agenda, the aim of

al-Qaeda in Iraq is to establish Taliban-style sharia government in Iraq. They hope

then to use Iraq as a base from which to expand their theocracy to other Muslim

states. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been working tirelessly since early 2004 to incite sectarian violence in the belief that it would energize the Sunni community in Iraq and

provide the terrorists with the recruits they need to triumph there and elsewhere

in the Muslim world. To this end, they have focused on mass attacks against civilians and major landmarks such as the Golden Mosque, while the Baathists have

focused much more heavily on coalition and Iraqi military targets. The lines between these two groups are blurring, however, as the first generation of fighters is

being killed off and replaced by Sunni nationalists with stronger Islamist leanings.

It is becoming in some ways more difficult rather than less to contemplate splitting

these two groups apart.

The aims of Sunni vigilante groups are more disparate and less clear. Most were

formed to protect local Sunni populations from Shiite attacks, and that security

function remains the core of their identity. Some have taken advantage of opportunities to drive Shiites out of their neighborhoods or nearby areas, contributing to

the sectarian cleansing in Baghdad. Some are drawn to the Baathist or terrorist

ideologies. These groups conduct small-scale attacks and are not centralized or highly coordinated.

The Sunni Arab insurgent groups cooperate relatively well despite disagreements

about their ultimate aims. This cooperation results mainly from their shared sense

that the Sunni community is under attack and fighting for its survival. The secular

Baathists, Islamist terrorists, and vigilante groups could not form a coherent political program and would not try to do so. Baathists and Islamists cooperate in attacking coalition targets, but even within the Islamist community there is growing

disagreement about the desirability or morality of attacking Iraqi civilians—alQaeda in Iraq continues to pursue this approach, but Ansar al-Sunna rejects it. Vigilante groups attack Shiite civilians in the name of self-defense because of the lack

of security in and around their communities. As long as the Sunni Arabs feel besieged and beleaguered, attempts to splinter these groups politically are unlikely to

be successful despite the differences in their aims and targeting preferences. All of

them draw great strength and their main recruiting tools from the violence in Iraq

and the growing sectarian struggle. They are not likely to abandon their own use

of force as long as that violence remains at a high enough level to justify their actions as attempts to defend the Sunni Arab community from attack while they further their own ideological objectives.

Shiite Insurgent Groups. The Shiite political community in Iraq is broken into a

number of significant groups and parties, but Shiite insurgents generally fall into

one of three groups. The Jaysh al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army) is nominally under the control of renegade cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. This group took to the streets in large numbers in 2004, especially in its strongholds of Najaf and Karbala, from which it was

cleared by a large scale yet careful coalition military operation. The Badr Corps is

the military arm of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), of

which Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is the leader. This group was formed and supported by

Iran in the 1980s and continues to maintain close ties to Tehran, although the degree of Iran’s control of SCIRI and the Badr Corps is unclear. The third group of

Shiite fighters is the vigilantes who have sprung up in Sadr City and Shiite and

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mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad, much as the Sunni vigilante groups have grown

in this period of chaos.

The Badr Corps and the Jaysh al-Mahdi share some goals and concerns, but not

others. They both seek to establish Shiite sharia law in Iraq and to ensure Shiite

domination of the country. They are both concerned about Sunni rejectionism and

the Sunni insurgency, which has provided the principal justification for their efforts

to recruit and maintain their militias. Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s relentless attacks on Shiite

civilians have powerfully supported their justification and aided their recruiting.

Hakim and Sadr also agree in principle that the coalition forces should withdraw

rapidly, but they do not agree on the importance of this objective or the need to take

action to secure it. Sadr has long identified the U.S. presence as an intolerable violation of Iraq’s sovereignty, and his forces have often attacked coalition forces in an

effort to force them to withdraw. Hakim and SCIRI have taken a much more moderate approach. They understand that the aims of coalition policy in Iraq would

leave the Shiites in control of the country, and they are more tolerant of the presence of coalition forces that keep the Sunni insurgency under control. They have

been far less aggressive about attacking coalition forces. Both groups have, however,

consistently supported the killing and torture of Sunni Arabs to cleanse areas and

neighborhoods and create solid blocks of Shiite habitation.

The Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps will be the main military rivals for power

in a post-U.S. Iraq. Both observed the destruction of Sadr’s militia in 2004 and are

reluctant to repeat that experience because of the need to maintain their military

force for use against one another in the expected battle for dominance after the

United States leaves. This rivalry, which is manifested on the political as well as

the military plane, hinders the cooperation of these two groups, which are also increasingly separate geographically: The Jaysh al-Mahdi is based in Sadr City,

whereas the main strength of the Badr Corps is in the southern part of Iraq.

The political aims, rivalries, and maneuverings of the Jaysh al-Mahdi and the

Badr Corps are far removed from the aims of most of the Shiite vigilante groups

operating in Baghdad. Like their Sunni counterparts, these groups are mainly concerned with defending their neighborhoods against Sunni (especially al-Qaeda in

Iraq) attacks. They also opportunistically engage in sectarian cleansing and ‘‘reprisal’’ attacks (often the same thing). The strength and organization of the Jaysh

al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps makes it easier for Shiite vigilante groups to cohere.

Yet, as with all vigilante groups, negotiation and political accommodation with local

fighters is unlikely to be productive by itself because they are responding to localized violence.

Crime. It is important to understand that a significant part of the violence in Iraq

is not orchestrated by any political group at all, but is simply the crime and gang

violence that flourishes in the absence of order and government control. This problem is not restricted to Baghdad or Anbar, moreover. The British raid against the

aptly named ‘‘serious crimes unit’’ in Basra in December 2006 underlines the

breadth of the difficulty. Many individuals and groups throughout Iraq have taken

advantage of the government’s weakness to organize kidnapping rings, smuggling

rings, and other criminal enterprises. With much of the Iraqi police force either engaged in sectarian violence or criminality, or else devoted to the counterinsurgency

effort, rule of law in Iraq is extremely weak. Both insurgents and criminals have

deeply infiltrated the police and partially infiltrated the army, underscoring in a different way the impossibility of handing responsibility for security and maintaining

the rule of law to either organization very rapidly.

Criminal activity is not merely a problem for civil society in Iraq, however. It also

supports the insurgency. A significant portion of the insurgency’s financial resources

comes from criminal activities of one sort or another—including a variety of scams

that divert revenue from the oil industry into insurgent coffers. Insurgents and

criminals can also hide behind one another, confusing efforts to identify the agent

behind particular murders and other sorts of attacks. Criminality is an important

issue for coalition forces in Iraq that must be addressed in order to improve the

overall security and political situations.

THE PLAN

No military operation by itself can resolve Iraq’s problems. Success in Iraq can

only emerge when political, economic, diplomatic, and reconciliation initiatives resolve underlying tensions and grievances and give the Iraqi people reason to accept

the legitimacy of their government. The security situation in Iraq and particularly

Baghdad is so grave, however, that political, economic, diplomatic, and reconciliation

initiatives will fail unless a well-conceived and properly supported military operation secures the population first and quickly. The purpose of this operation is to

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reduce sectarian violence to levels low enough to permit political and economic development, reconciliation, and the recruitment and training of an Iraqi Army and

police force with an appropriate regional and sectarian balance. This report focuses

on military operations in and around Baghdad because the security situation there

is deteriorating quickly and requires the urgent attention of the United States

Armed Forces. Subsequent working groups and reports will consider initiatives vital

to allowing the Iraqis to take control of their country, armed forces, and security;

political developments; and regional issues. The emphasis on military operations in

this first phase of this project does not indicate any denigration of the importance

of the nonmilitary elements of a solution to the crisis in Iraq.

Why Baghdad?

From the standpoint of security and violence, Iraq consists of three zones. The

Kurdish provinces to the north are extremely secure—violence is rare and economic

development (fueled by the period of de facto autonomy in the 1990s) is well underway. Most of the Shiite provinces to the south of Baghdad are very secure, although

Basra still faces a worrisome amount of violence and criminality. The vast majority

of attacks occur in the four provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Salaheddin, and Diyala,

with Ninawa a more distant fifth. Polling data partially reflect this distribution of

attacks: Iraqis in the Shiite south and Kurdish north overwhelmingly feel safe in

their neighborhoods, while those in the five violent provinces feel extremely unsafe.

Of these provinces, Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala are currently of greatest concern.

Salaheddin, which contains Saddam Hussein’s hometown near Tikrit as well as

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Samarra, has been the scene of a large number of attacks, but it contains relatively

few large concentrated settlements and is relatively farther from Baghdad. Ninawa

is worrisome because it contains Mosul, one of Iraq’s largest mixed cities, but the

clear-and-hold operation that began in Tall Afar in September 2005 has reduced the

violence in this province greatly. Anbar has been a hotbed of the insurgency almost

from its outset, and two of its major cities, Fallujah and Ramadi, have been centers

of the fight against Sunni Arab rejectionists since early 2004. Anbar serves as a

base of Sunni fighters who move into and attack targets in Baghdad. Diyala has

also become a critical battleground, especially the city of Baquba, where Zarqawi

was found and killed in June 2006. It is a mixed province in which considerable sectarian cleansing and displacement have occurred; and it is close enough to Baghdad

that fighters on both sides commute between the two cities. Diyala province is also

becoming a significant al-Qaeda base from which the enemy launches attacks

against Shiites in Sadr City, Baghdad.

Before the effects of the Samarra mosque bombing had become clear, it might

have been reasonable to consider operations along the Euphrates, Tigris, and Diyala

River valleys (that is, in Anbar, Ninawa, Salaheddin, and Diyala provinces), postponing the more difficult task of clearing and holding Baghdad. The rise of sectarian

violence within the capital and the repeated declarations of all sides that Baghdad

is the key to victory or defeat have removed this alternative option. The violence

in the central areas of Iraq is now so high that few reporters venture far from the

Green Zone. Consequently, events within a relatively small area of the capital now

disproportionately shape the world’s perceptions of the situation in the country. It

is necessary to focus on securing these areas in order to retain the American people’s support for the war and increase international support. More importantly, it

is necessary to prevent the sectarian cleansing in the heart of Baghdad from spreading further through the rest of Iraq. The populations of other mixed cities, such as

Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tall Afar, are watching how the coalition forces and Iraqi Government respond to sectarian violence in Baghdad. If Baghdad is truly cleansed and

divided, then similar sectarian violence will follow in these other mixed cities. The

result will be a bloody civil war that permanently destroys any concept of Iraq as

a mixed state. For good or for ill, the decisive struggle in this war will be played

out in Iraq’s capital.

Any plan for bringing security to Iraq must therefore address Baghdad first of all,

but it cannot entirely neglect Anbar and Diyala provinces, which are tied so tightly

to the challenges of Baghdad. This report, therefore, identifies Baghdad as the main

effort to which all necessary resources should be devoted, and it identifies operations in Anbar and possibly Diyala as supporting efforts—secondary operations

that help to accomplish the main effort but receive just enough force to succeed

without compromising the main effort.

Forces Required

Having identified Baghdad as the main effort, we can then consider the problem

of securing that city in more detail. There is considerable theory and historical evidence about the numbers of troops required to provide security to a given population

in a counterinsurgency. The military’s counterinsurgency manual concludes that a

ratio of one soldier for every 40 or 50 inhabitants provides a good rule of thumb

for such calculations. COL H.R. McMaster and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

used a ratio of about 1 soldier per every 40 inhabitants to secure Tall Afar in 2005.

American soldiers and marines in Ramadi have made considerable progress in securing that city, although much lower force ratios have slowed and limited that

progress. MG Peter Chiarelli put down the Sadrist uprising in Sadr City in mid2004, on the other hand, with one division (under 20,000 soldiers) in a population

of over 2 million.

The population of Baghdad is around 6 million, which would require, in theory,

around 150,000 counterinsurgents to maintain security. It is neither necessary nor

wise to try to clear and hold the entire city all at once, however. The Jaysh al-Mahdi

based in Sadr City has demonstrated its reluctance to engage in a full-scale conflict

with American forces, ever since coalition forces defeated Moqtada al-Sadr and his

army in Najaf in the summer of 2004. Rather, the Jaysh al-Mahdi now needs to preserve its fighters in order to maintain its strength against the Badr Corps in the

struggle for control of post-coalition Iraq. Attempting to clear Sadr City at this moment would almost certainly force the Jaysh al-Mahdi, into precisely such a confrontation with American troops, however. It would also do enormous damage to

Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki’s political base and would probably lead to

the collapse of the Iraqi Government. Clearing Sadr City is both unwise and unnecessary at this time.

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Many attacks against Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad emanate from Sadr City.

There are two ways to resolve that problem. The first is to attack Sadr City by targeting known militia bases and concentrations with discrete strikes. This option initially requires the fewest number of forces. But such operations would almost certainly provoke a massive political and military conflagration. They ultimately will

demand high force concentrations and generate instability in the current Iraqi Government, as described above. This option is, therefore, extremely risky. It would be

better, instead, to secure the Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods by deploying American and Iraqi forces into them and protecting their inhabitants from all

violent attacks coming from any area. This second approach also accords with sound

counterinsurgency practice, which favors defensive strategies aimed at protecting

the population over offensive strategies aimed at killing insurgents.

The first phase of this plan, therefore, excludes military operations within Sadr

City and focuses on securing the Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods around

the Green Zone and between that area and Baghdad International Airport/Camp

Victory. This approach establishes security among a population of perhaps 2 million

people, which would require, according to historical norms, between 40,000 and

50,000 counterinsurgent troops. Generating proper force ratios to secure the population in these neighborhoods is much more feasible than generating the force ratios

to confront the Jaysh al-Mahdi in Sadr City or to secure the entire population of

Baghdad at once. Yet securing the population in these neighborhoods is likely to reduce levels of violence elsewhere in Baghdad.

The working group also calculated the forces required for this operation in another way. The area we have identified as being the ‘‘critical terrain’’ in Baghdad

(because of its mixed ethnicity and its geographic centrality) consists of about 23

districts. Clearing and holding a city district in Baghdad requires an American force

of about one battalion (approximately 600 soldiers organized into four companies of

about 150 soldiers each). We have considerable evidence about what force levels are

necessary for such operations because of recent and current operations in Baghdad.

There is now about one battalion deployed in the district of Dora (the area south

of the Karadah Peninsula just south of the Green Zone). Dora is a very dangerous

neighborhood that is difficult to control, and the troops there are barely managing.

Dora would benefit from reinforcements or from having the adjoining areas brought

more securely under control. Many other neighborhoods that would be cleared under

this proposal would require fewer troops because they are less violent and large;

some might require more. On balance, current operations suggest that one battalion

per district would provide a sufficient overall force level to bring the violence in

these 23 districts under control.

There are three battalions in an Army Brigade Combat Team or BCT, which, together with all of its supportinng elements, numbers around 5,000 soldiers. Twentythree districts would require eight BCTs (which would leave one battalion to spare

as a Reserve), or around 40,000 soldiers. Since operations would be going on around

the Green Zone and Camp Victory, it would be necessary to maintain additional

forces to guard and garrison those areas, amounting to perhaps another BCT, for

a total of nine (around 45,000 troops total).

Whether we calculate the forces necessary based on historical ratios or on units

engaged in current operations, the results are very similar: We can reasonably expect that between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers could establish and maintain security

in the 23 critical Sunni and mixed districts in the center of Baghdad in the first

phase of an operation aimed at ending violence in the city, securing its population,

and securing Iraq.

Current and Proposed Deployments

The United States currently has approximately 140,000 troops in Iraq, including

about 70,000 in 13 Army Brigade Combat Teams and two Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs—the Marines slightly smaller equivalent of brigades). Of the remaining 70,000 soldiers, many are engaged in the enormous task of providing supplies to coalition soldiers and to the 134,000 soldiers in the Iraqi Army, who are

almost entirely dependent on American logistics to survive and operate. A large

number of American troops are engaged in securing the long lines of communication

from Kuwait to Baghdad (600 miles) and from there to U.S. forward operating bases

(FOBs) around the country. Around 6,000 soldiers are now involved in training Iraqi

Army and police units as well. The BCTs and RCTs are the forces that would be

used in clearing and holding Baghdad, so the rest of this report will focus on them,

recognizing that the number of these units significantly underrepresents the total

size of the American combat presence in Iraq.

Seven BCTs, the largest concentration of the BCTs and RCTs now in Iraq, operate

in and around Baghdad. Five BCTs operate within the city itself (although they

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mostly live on FOBs in the city’s suburbs and drive to their areas of operations to

conduct patrols). One BCT operates in the insurgent belts to the north around Taji

and the remaining BCT operates in the belts to the south around Iskandariyah (the

so-called Triangle of Death). Two Marine RCTs and one Army BCT operate in

Anbar. Their bases are located in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Al Asad. The remaining

five Army BCTs operate mostly to the north of Baghdad in Ninawa, Salaheddin, and

Diyala provinces in cities like Mosul, Tikrit, Samarra, and Baquba.

An Army National Guard Brigade is stationed in a static defensive position in Kuwait guarding the enormous supply and training areas there. Recent news reports

suggest that a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division has been ordered to Kuwait

as well, although the purpose of that deployment is not clear at the time that this

report is being written. The BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division might be deployed

to Iraq to engage in combat missions there in the near future; the National Guard

brigade could not leave Kuwait without endangering the security of U.S. supply

lines and bases.

The current deployment of U.S. forces in and around Baghdad, therefore, provides

approximately four BCTs (12 battalions or about 20,000 troops in all) for conducting

combat operations in the city. The equivalent of one BCT is required for base security. Such a force level is evidently inadequate for clearing and holding any sizable

portion of Baghdad. The Army and Marine presence in Anbar is inadequate to maintain even the most basic security in that province. The situation in Diyala is almost

as dire. Pulling troops from either province to reinforce operations in Baghdad

would almost surely lead to the further collapse of those regions. Salaheddin is similarly problematic, while security in Ninawa is extremely precarious. Any attempt to

concentrate forces in Baghdad by moving them from elsewhere in Iraq would precipitate greater violence in the outlying areas. Such violence would eventually move

down the river valleys to Baghdad and undermine attempts to succeed in the capital, as occurred in 2004. This plan will, therefore, require a deployment of at least

four Army Brigade Combat Teams (approximately 20,000 soldiers) into Baghdad

from outside Iraq.

Because of the close relationship between the insurgency in Anbar and the violence in Baghdad, it would be desirable to address both areas at once. In reality,

the United States simply cannot make available enough forces to bring Anbar under

control at the same time as it tries to secure the critical neighborhoods of Baghdad.

A deployment of additional troops into Baghdad will, nevertheless, both generate

and suffer from spillover effects in Anbar. This very real risk calls for a preplanned

response. This report, therefore, proposes to add two additional Marine RCTs to the

two RCTs and one Army BCT that are already in Anbar. This force (five brigadeequivalents, or about 18,000 soldiers and marines) is too small to secure the major

cities in Anbar, let alone the entire province. Five brigade-equivalents would, however, suffice to cover the roads from Anbar to Baghdad, intercept insurgents, and

prevent the establishment of new rebel strongholds in the province. Such operations

would properly support the main effort in Baghdad by controlling spillover effects.

The commander on the ground in Iraq could use the two additional RCTs designated for Anbar elsewhere, of course. It might prove more important to interdict

movement between Diyala and Baghdad than to reinforce American troops now in

Anbar. In the worst case, the commander could move these regiments into the capital if unexpectedly high violence erupted in Baghdad itself during the clear-andhold operation there. By deploying these two additional RCTs into Iraq, the commander on the ground will gain the flexibility to respond to unforeseen difficulties

or opportunities in and around Baghdad without having to accept any additional

risk in outlying areas.

The Army Brigade in Anbar, finally, was initially deployed to Iraq in January

2006. By the time the recommended operations would begin, it will have been in

Iraq for nearly 15 months. This plan, therefore, proposes to send a fresh Army BCT

into Anbar to replace that unit, which has already had its tour extended. It would

require a total deployment of five Army BCTs and two Marine RCTs in addition to

the forces already in Iraq. In an emergency, of course, the commander in Iraq could

keep the existing brigade in Anbar and use the brigade designated to replace it as

a further Reserve for deployment in Baghdad or elsewhere. The plan, therefore,

commits four additional BCTs into Baghdad, designates two RCTs for Anbar but

makes them available elsewhere if necessary, and designates one BCT that could

be used as a Reserve in an emergency.

Clearing and Holding

What actually happens on the ground determines whether this or any plan succeeds or fails. American forces have gained considerable expertise in clearing and

holding operations in Iraq from their failures, such as the first Battle of Fallujah

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in April 2004, and from their successes, such as operations in Tall Afar in September 2005. (The report discusses the general character and specific phases of

clear-and-hold operations in several sections below.) Recent operations in Baghdad

emphasize the skill with which U.S. troops can clear enemies from urban areas. In

2006, American forces in Baghdad conducted Operation Together Forward (OTF) in

two phases: The first from June 14 to July 24, 2006; the second from August 1

through October 24, 2006. In both operations, the clear phase went well. Violence

dropped in cleared neighborhoods and some economic activity resumed.

But the U.S. command committed inadequate combat power to hold operations,

relying instead on Iraqi police and soldiers to maintain the security that joint U.S.

and Iraqi patrols had established. The United States added two brigades (fewer

than 10,000 troops) to support the first phase of OTF and one brigade (plus additional detachments coming to around 7,000 soldiers) to support the second. Because

there were too few American troops, and because American commanders wished to

rely heavily on Iraqi forces, U.S. troops did not remain in cleared neighborhoods either to defend them or to support and improve the Iraqi forces trying to maintain

order there. The different Sunni and Shiite enemy groups made a point of surging

into the cleared but undefended neighborhoods to demonstrate the futility of the operations, and they also attacked neighborhoods that were not being cleared by

American and Iraqi troops. Violence overall in Baghdad soared.

The plan proposed in this report would use established practices for clearing

neighborhoods, but would provide adequate American forces to hold them, in partnership with Iraqi forces. American units remain in neighborhoods to secure the

population and to support and strengthen Iraqi forces until they are able to hold

the area without coalition support. These undertakings are firmly in accord with

recommended counterinsurgency doctrine.

Clearing operations generally proceed as follows. American troops partner with

Iraqi troops before the operation. They plan the operation and train for it together.

Since American and Iraqi units are already operating throughout Baghdad’s neighborhoods, they gather intelligence in the targeted area prior to the operation. They

determine the enemy’s strength and disposition, how the enemy is organized and

conducts operations, and so on. When the operation begins, joint U.S.-Iraqi teams

isolate the district through checkpoints and other outposts, patrols, surveillance,

and obstacles. American and Iraqi infantry then sweep through the district. They

cordon off each house or apartment block and then knock on the door, asking to examine the inside. If they are granted permission, they enter politely and then examine every part of the structure for weapons caches and evidence of enemy activity.

The Iraqi forces with them provide a vital cultural interface with the inhabitants

both by communicating with them and by sensing irregularities. On the rare occasions when the occupants attempt to refuse permission to examine the house, Iraqi

and U.S. soldiers enter by force and continue their search.

When every structure in the district (including every mosque) has been searched

and all weapons caches and suspicious individuals have been removed, neither the

American nor the Iraqi soldiers leave the neighborhood. Instead, they establish permanent positions in disused factories, houses, apartments, government buildings,

and, if necessary, schools (although coalition forces prefer to avoid occupying schools

because it sends a bad signal to the neighborhood). American and Iraqi teams man

each position jointly. They allow traffic into the neighborhood to resume, although

they continue to man joint outposts at critical intersections. They conduct regular

joint foot and vehicle patrols throughout the neighborhood, maintaining contact with

the local population and establishing trust. Over time, U.S. forces will assist Iraqis

in developing comprehensive, sustainable human intelligence networks in the area.

The tactics described above are illustrative, not prescriptive. They are based on

practices that American units have used in Iraq in the past. Commanders will apply

techniques appropriate to the areas in which they are operating. Every such combined operation requires that American forces, Iraqi Army units, and Iraqi police

formations all work toward a common goal and within a single command structure.

Unity of effort is essential for success in this kind of endeavor.

According to military officers who have experience with clearing operations in

Iraq, after 2 weeks of improved security and continued force presence, the local people typically begin providing the coalition forces in their neighborhoods with valuable tactical intelligence. As the enemy attempts to reinfiltrate the neighborhood,

locals report some of them. Savvy Iraqi or even American soldiers note new faces

and begin to ask questions. When bombs or IEDs go off, locals reveal the perpetrators. Before long, they begin to warn coalition troops when LEDs have been placed.

At that point, violence begins to drop significantly and economic and political

progress can begin.

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There is nothing novel about this approach to counterinsurgency. It has been

practiced in some form in almost every successful counterinsurgent operation. It was

successful on a local level in Vietnam in the form of the Combined Action Platoon

(CAP) program, which many observers felt should have been extended to more of

that country. It has worked in Tall Afar and, insofar as it was applied, even in

Baghdad. It is working now in Ramadi and in south Baghdad. If properly resourced,

it can bring large sections of the capital under control.

Curiously, though proven effective, this approach runs counter to the current

MNF–I concept of disengaging from populated areas and rapidly handing over security responsibility to Iraqi forces of dubious capability.

It is vital to sustain the hold part of the operation for months after the initial

clearing operation. Previous failed clear-and-hold operations in Iraq suggest that the

enemy can reinfiltrate a cleared area in about 90 days. Within 6 months, the enemy

can be operating openly once more. In a dense urban environment like Baghdad,

the enemy can reconstitute even faster. In addition, the enemy in Iraq has historically pursued a pattern of going to ground when coalition forces are present and

waiting for them to leave. By withdrawing American troops from the hold phase of

an operation too quickly, the United States plays into this enemy strategy. Any

sound clear-and-hold approach, therefore, will require the presence of significant

American forces in neighborhoods, supporting and strengthening Iraqi troops and

police, for at least 9–12 months after the start of operations.

Training

This long-hold period allows time for Iraqi troops and police to gain the capability

and confidence they need reliably to assume responsibility for maintaining secured

areas. Phase II of this project will address the challenges of training Iraqi military

and police forces in greater detail, but some observations are appropriate here.

Discussions of military policy in Iraq frequently present efforts to train Iraqi

forces as antithetical to efforts to use American forces to help bring security to the

Iraqi people. The Iraq Study Group report and several other proposals emphasizing

training Iraqis have suggested increasing the number of U.S. soldiers embedded

within Iraqi units and decreasing the number of Americans actually conducting operations. These proposals claim that increasing the number of embedded trainers

will accelerate the training of Iraqi units. Such ideas ignore a critical fact joint, sustained clear-and-hold operations that involve both Americans and Iraqis working in

partnership are one of the most effective ways to train Iraqi units rapidly and to

a high standard.

To begin with, the United States has a small pool of soldiers whose job is to train

indigenous troops—the Special Forces (which was created in the 1960s to perform

this mission). Those soldiers spend their careers learning how to train others, and

they are superb at it. In the past year, however, Special Forces have come to concentrate more heavily on what is called ‘‘direct action’’—tracking terrorists, kicking

in doors, and seizing enemies. The large size of the Iraqi Army, furthermore, requires more trainers than the Special Forces can provide. For both reasons, the

training mission in Iraq has been given to soldiers drawn from the conventional

forces, both Active Duty and National Guard. These soldiers receive some training

in how to train Iraqis and then embed with Iraqi units to accomplish their task.

America’s flexible and creative soldiers respond well to this challenge, but the skills

of the conventional forces soldiers detailed to this task are generally lower than

those of the Special Forces troops specifically trained for it. Although the U.S. Army

is now training more conventional soldiers for these responsibilities, it cannot do so

fast enough to embed enough trained, conventional soldiers with Iraqi units rapidly.

The more the United States tries to accelerate training Iraqi units by embedding

soldiers, the lower the average quality of that training will be.

This kind of training also takes a much larger toll on the American ground forces

than most people imagine. The number of embedded trainers is small compared to

the total number of U.S. forces in Iraq, but the effect on the Army is disproportionately high. Training teams have a high proportion of officers and noncommissioned

officers and a relatively small complement of enlisted soldiers. Each training team,

therefore, effectively removes the leadership cadre of an American battalion. The

enlisted personnel of the battalion will often have remained behind, and so the battalion is not counted as being ‘‘deployed,’’ but neither can it be used for combat without the replacement of its leadership team. This process is having an important negative effect on the deployability of units in the Army that would appear on paper

to be usable.

Iraqi units operating together with American units learn a great deal very

quickly. They interact with U.S. command teams as they plan operations, and then

they execute those operations alongside the best and most professional soldiers in

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the world. There is no substitute for this kind of training. It is one thing for an advisor to describe what to do; it is another to watch a superb soldier and unit do it

expertly. If the only training of Iraqi troops is being conducted by embedded American trainers, Iraqis will never see what excellence looks like. When they fight

alongside excellent soldiers, they see it vividly and understand better what to aim

for. Combined clear-and-hold operations are an essential means for bringing the

Iraqi Army up to the necessary levels of capability as quickly as possible.

THE ENEMY’S RESPONSES

The enemy will respond to American and Iraqi efforts to establish security in

Baghdad. No one can predict their response with certainty, but after nearly 4 years

in this struggle planners can observe the patterns in their behavior that suggest

their likely reactions. Different groups will, of course, respond differently to ongoing

operations. Above all, the action of clearing and holding a large part of central

Baghdad will change the relationship between groups and even the political dynamics within Iraq. This report will not consider these second-order effects in detail, but

subsequent phases of the project will do so. For now this report remains focused on

the most essential task facing the U.S. and Iraqi governments today: Defeating

enemy attempts to disrupt our efforts to establish security.

General Enemy Responses

The clear-and-hold operation occurs in four main phases: (1) The deployment of

U.S. and Iraqi forces to their designated areas, (2) the establishment of those forces

in their areas and efforts to acquire necessary intelligence and physical bases from

which to conduct operations, (3) the clearing of the neighborhoods, and (4) holding

cleared areas. This report first considers the possible reactions of all enemy groups

taken together in each phase and then the possible reactions of each individual

group separately. The report will consider what each enemy is most likely to do, and

what actions each enemy could undertake that would most endanger the mission

and American interests.

Phase I: Deployment and Marshalling of Resources. This phase extends from the

announcement of the President’s intention to conduct clear-and-hold operations until

all units involved in that operation are physically on the ground in and around

Baghdad and Anbar. In general terms, this is a dangerous time. The President will

have announced his intentions, but American reinforcements will not yet have arrived in theater. Enemy groups might take advantage of this interval to increase

sectarian cleansing and to establish themselves in strong positions in targeted

neighborhoods in the hopes of making the clearing operations too painful for U.S.

forces to conduct. This is the most dangerous course of action they could take, but

it is not the most likely if the President acts quickly and decisively and forces arrive

in theater before spring. Many enemies in Iraq are fair-weather foes: Violence generally drops after Ramadan and remains relatively lower through the winter. It is

most likely that the enemy will conduct an expanded propaganda campaign aimed

at intimidating civilians and raising enemy morale during the first phase of American operations.

The best coalition responses include developing an effective and clear information

campaign that underlines the scale, duration, and determination of the coming effort; stepping up the ‘‘presence patrols’’ of units already in Baghdad; emphasizing

that the aim of coming operations is to protect civilians of all sects and ethnicities;

and countering enemy disinformation. To prevent sabotage in future phases, coalition forces must secure the resources needed for reconstruction and reconstitution

of police in the targeted areas.

Phase II: Preparation. In this phase, coalition units begin to arrive in their designated areas. They start developing intelligence, establishing relationships with the

population and ISF, and assessing the overall situation. Extremists are likely to respond by increasing the number of suicide bombings and targeted murders of civilians. Local vigilante groups are more likely to go to ground and avoid direct confrontations with coalition forces. Rather, these groups will rely on indirect attacks

on coalition forces, including IEDs and mortar fire. They may also attack civilians.

Some enemy groups may attempt to move from threatened districts to areas they

perceive as safer and wait out the operation. U.S. forces must anticipate such movements, and units must be prepared to conduct raids and other short operations to

deny the enemy safe haven in other areas. Most enemies will continue their efforts

to infiltrate the Iraqi Army and police units in their areas.

During this phase, the most damaging actions the enemy could take would be to

surge the level of their violence dramatically in an effort to discredit the security

effort and the Iraqi Government, to complete sectarian cleansing campaigns, and to

intimidate the population. This course of action is less likely because most insurgent

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groups have only a limited capability to surge on short notice, because most will

avoid using up all available fighters and suicide bombers at the outset of a campaign, and because U.S. and Iraqi forces are already present and patrolling in Baghdad. The appropriate coalition response is again to increase presence and patrols

throughout the capital, especially in the areas beyond those designated for clearing

operations, in order to deny the enemy safe havens. The coalition will also have to

conduct an intelligent information campaign that makes clear that the violence is

the result of an increase in insurgent attacks aimed at harming the Iraqi people,

but that future operations will end the violence permanently. The coalition must

also be prepared for humanitarian efforts to handle increased refugee flows within

Baghdad and beyond.

Phase III: Clearing. The insurgents in Iraq have fallen into a pattern in response

to clear-and-hold operations. At the beginning of such operations, they normally

surge their attacks and target both coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. They bring

in specialized capabilities, such as snipers and IED cells, to inflict casualties on

American and Iraqi forces in order to test their resolve. When it becomes clear that

the coalition intends to pursue the operation, most enemy groups then go to ground.

They use contacts in the Iraqi Government to attempt to discredit the operation,

constrain it, or cancel it altogether. They expect that any clearing operation will be

short-lived, and that U.S. forces will leave vulnerable Iraqi Army and police forces

unsupported when the operations end. They, therefore, conserve their fighters and

weapons while the Americans are present. They anticipate unleashing them on the

civilian population if political efforts to forestall the operation fail or Iraqi forces and

Americans leave. This surge—go to ground—surge pattern is the likeliest enemy response to the clearing operations proposed in this report.

It requires careful consideration and response. First and foremost, the American

Government and the American people, as well as the Iraqi Government and the

Iraqi people, must understand the importance of seeing the clear-and-hold operation

through to its conclusion. If the operation begins in March and violence begins to

wane in May, the governments and publics cannot, thereby, conclude that the operation has succeeded beyond expectations and start to wind down. The United States

must continue to maintain its forces to support Iraqi troops in their hold operations

for months after violence in cleared neighborhoods has begun to fall, because the

odds are that the enemy is trying to husband its resources for a future attack when

U.S. forces leave.

In addition, the American and Iraqi Governments and people must recognize that

a surge in enemy violence later in 2007 is very likely even if this operation is successful. The insurgents regularly increase the level of their violence in Ramadan

each year. If this operation begins in March and violence wanes through the summer, it is very likely that the violence will escalate again in the fall. This pattern

is normal and to be expected. To the extent that a reduction in violence is the measure of success of this operation, we must be prepared to compare Ramadan 2007

with Ramadan 2006 rather than with June or July 2007.

It should be possible, moreover, to mitigate the magnitude of the late-2007 enemy

surge. American forces working with Iraqis in permanent positions in cleared neighborhoods will acquire a great deal of intelligence about the enemy. They will be able

to identify and stop many attempts to infiltrate cleared neighborhoods again. As

they gain the trust of the population, they will receive more information about enemies who escaped when the area was cleared. They will locate more weapons

caches and limit the flow of new weapons into the neighborhood. Long-term presence will help reduce the enemy’s ability to launch new attacks later in the year.

During the third phase, the most dangerous course of action the enemy might

take is an Iraqi equivalent of the Tet offensive, in which all or most enemy groups

converge on coalition forces in large-scale and spectacular attacks. Enemy groups

conduct mass-casualty attacks on mixed neighborhoods that coalition forces are attempting to clear, suborn Iraqi security forces, and launch high-profile attacks in

other Iraqi cities. Some enemy groups might assassinate prominent civil or religious

leaders or destroy important religious landmarks.

This course of action is less likely because it requires the insurgents to expend

most of their fighters and weapons rapidly at the beginning of the operation, something they have generally avoided in the past. It can be countered by ensuring that

clearing operations proceed rapidly and simultaneously in multiple neighborhoods.

The coalition must also devote particular attention to protecting likely high-profile

targets in Baghdad and around the country. The United States must maintain a sizable Reserve to offset the danger that the enemy might attempt to generate high

levels of violence in neighborhoods or cities that are not being cleared. American

commanders must have uncommitted troops that can be sent to troubled areas rapidly and on short notice without detracting from the main effort to clear the desVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00213 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ignated communities. If U.S. commanders attempt to conduct this operation with

precisely the number of soldiers they think they might need to clear neighborhoods,

but do not retain a substantial Reserve, they entice the enemy to choose this most

dangerous option and severely constrain their own ability to respond to this contingency. A significant Reserve (at least one brigade combat team) is an essential component of this or any sound plan.

Phase IV: Hold and Build. By this phase of the operation, U.S. and Iraqi forces

will have examined every structure in a neighborhood, removed all weapons caches

that they have identified, and detained many suspicious individuals, some of whom

will turn out to be members of enemy groups. The hold-and-build phase of this operation is one of the most dangerous for the population of the cleared neighborhood.

The detainment of suspicious individuals involves removing many of the young,

tough, armed men who were defending the neighborhood from outside attack (whatever violence of their own they might have been committing). Unless the coalition

maintains a robust armed presence in the cleared area, the remaining inhabitants—

disproportionately including the elderly, women, and children—will be highly vulnerable to enemy strikes.

Past clearing operations followed by premature American withdrawals have conditioned enemies to wait for this phase to strike. Consequently, this plan argues that

enemy groups are likely to revert to their past pattern of surging violently, going

to ground, and subsequently surging very violently. Once the insurgents find that

American forces are remaining in force in cleared neighborhoods, they will probably

adopt a different approach. Surging fighters and weapons into protected neighborhoods exposes the insurgents to losses without giving them any benefits. They are

more likely, therefore, to increase the number of high casualty attacks, especially

vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs or car bombs) and suicide bombers. It is extremely difficult to stop all such attacks, and some will inevitably reach their targets. If they

are relatively low in number and isolated rather than massed, then they will not

likely be sufficient to derail reconstruction and political development. Active patrolling, intelligence-gathering, and control of critical access points can help reduce the

number and effectiveness of such attacks.

The enemy is likely, then, to attempt to move into uncleared neighborhoods and

destabilize them by striking less-well-defended targets. The enemy may also attempt

to increase the level of violence in cities beyond Baghdad, attempt to conduct highprofile assassinations, or try to destroy prominent religious landmarks. In the worst

case, they may try to surge back into cleared neighborhoods to demonstrate the futility of the clearing effort.

The most effective responses to such insurgent efforts, once again, rely on having

a readily available Reserve Force. Reserves must be able to reinforce cleared neighborhoods threatened by large surges of violence, to control increasing violence in

uncleared neighborhoods, and to address attacks in cities outside of Baghdad. The

plan in this proposal designates one BCT as a Reserve for Baghdad and two RCTs

in Iraq as potential Reserves in case of emergency. The plan calls for deploying

those RCTs into Anbar province in the expectation that threatened Sunni insurgents will return to their base. It might prove necessary, however, to deploy one or

both of those RCTs into Diyala, another al-Qaeda base that emerges, or even into

Baghdad or its nearer suburbs.

These decisions can only be made by the commander on the ground in light of

changing circumstances, but his Reserve Forces can only achieve the effects he desires if they are already near Baghdad. Kuwait is 600 miles from the Iraqi capital—

Reserve Forces held there might take too long to arrive in response to a crisis.

Forces stationed in the United States, even if alerted for possible deployment, would

almost certainly take too long to respond. Reacting effectively to likely enemy challenges requires positioning significant Reserve Forces already near the scene of the

fighting.

Specific Enemy Responses

Although the discussion above captures the likely aggregate of enemy responses,

it is important to consider how each individual enemy group is likely to respond as

well, since the particularities of those responses can have a profound impact on the

developing political situation in Iraq. The major insurgent groupings are the Jaysh

al-Mahdi, the Badr Corps, al-Qaeda in Iraq and associated Islamist groups, the

Baathists and military nationalists, and vigilante groups on both sides. As we have

seen, the Shiite militias share many common aims but are also rivals for power.

They may cooperate in some scenarios, but there is reason to believe that they can

be kept apart in others. The Sunni groups have cooperated more closely because of

their sense of being beleaguered, but their divergent aims and methods will likely

lead to different responses to the proposed clearing and holding operations. Despite

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the conflicting sectarian makeup and aims of the vigilante groups, on the other

hand, their motivations and methods make it likely that their responses to clearand-hold operations will be similar to one another.

Jaysh al-Mahdi. Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi, presents one of

the greatest dangers to this operation. It is based in Sadr City, which it largely controls through a Hezbollah model of providing services, including security, that the

local government is unable to offer. It is impossible to estimate with accuracy how

many fighters the Jaysh al-Mahdi could muster in total, let alone how many are

still under Sadr’s control. There are certainly thousands of armed militiamen, however—more than enough to force a bloody showdown with coalition forces if provoked or driven to full-scale conflict.

Moqtada al-Sadr himself has also become a force in the political process, moreover. His 30-seat bloc of parliamentarians is an important element of Maliki’s government (although his recent ‘‘walkout’’ from Parliament underlined the feasibility

of forming a coalition government without him if necessary—which was one of the

reasons why his followers returned to their seats relatively quickly). A full-scale confrontation with the Jaysh al-Mahdi would not only be bloody, but it would also be

a political crisis of the first order in Iraq. It is thus highly desirable to avoid such

a confrontation if it is at all possible.

The Jaysh al-Mahdi has been conducting numerous murderous raids from Sadr

City into Sunni and mixed neighborhoods and has caused many of the American

casualties in Baghdad. Clearing operations in Sunni and mixed districts will lead

to conflict with isolated groups of Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters. Efforts to contain the

flow of such fighters from Sadr City into Baghdad will require coalition forces to

patrol the borders of Sadr City (which they are already doing) and possibly to restrict access to Sadr City periodically. These actions will place coalition forces in

close proximity to the heart of the Jaysh al-Mahdi’s power. The desire to appear

evenhanded by attacking Shiite militias even as operations bring Sunni-sponsored

violence under control also creates pressure to launch isolated raids into Sadr City

itself.

If coalition operations are skillfully conceived and executed, they will not provoke

a full-scale confrontation with Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi. It is not in Sadr’s interest to engage in a full-scale confrontadon. His experiences in 2004 in Najaf and

Karbala made clear that whatever political damage he might be able to cause

through such violence, American forces will decimate his fighters. He cannot afford

to lose his warriors. He is not popular within the Iraqi political system and draws

much of his political strength from his militia. He also requires a strong military

arm to confront the Badr Corps and SCIRI in the fight for control of a post-coalition

Iraq. Whatever harm Sadrists might do to coalition hopes for success in Iraq by confronting coalition forces directly, this path would almost certainly be political suicide

for Sadr. He is unlikely to choose direct confrontation with the coalition unless it

is forced upon him.

Invading or sealing off Sadr City would force Sadr to resist coalition forces vigorously, regardless of the cost. Even launching isolated raids in and around Sadr City

is dangerous. Such raids might lead to escalation on both sides and an unintended,

major confrontation that both sides wish to avoid. For that reason, this plan focuses

on responding to Jaysh al-Mahdi attacks by protecting the neighborhoods they are

targeting, rather than by striking at the sources of their power.

Such defensive operations will, nevertheless, lead to the killing and capturing of

Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters, but they are not likely to provoke Sadr or his unruly lieutenants into full-scale conflict. For months, coalition forces have been engaged with

Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters in discrete operations. On each occasion when coalition

forces have captured or killed members of death squads, Sadr and the Jaysh alMahdi leadership have abandoned their compromised militiamen, declaring them

‘‘rogue elements’’ or criminals masquerading as warriors. This past restraint on

their part is evidence of their desire to avoid a full-fledged conflict. As long as coalition forces demonstrate similar restraint with regard to Sadr City, it is likely that

the Jaysh al-Mahdi will remain relatively quiescent.

If large-scale conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi nevertheless erupts, the plan proposed in this report would require substantial modification. It would be necessary

to abandon much of the effort to clear and hold Sunni and mixed neighborhoods in

central Baghdad in order to focus instead on clearing Sadr City. Clearing operations

in Sadr City would be bloody—the Jaysh al-Mahdi has had a long time to fortify

the area—but the result is not in doubt. Coalition forces would destroy the Jaysh

al-Mahdi and clear the Shiite neighborhoods. Depending on the political and security situation, it would then be necessary to turn back to the problem of suppressing

the Sunni Arab insurgency and securing the neighborhoods in the center of Baghdad.

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Large-scale conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi would probably lead to the withdrawal of Sadr from the political process and might lead to the fall of the Maliki

government. Such an occurrence would be unfortunate but not necessarily devastating. Even if the Maliki government fell, executive power would remain in the

Iraqi Presidential Council, which could form an emergency government. Iraq would

remain a sovereign state. Conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi is clearly undesirable

and dangerous, and every effort should be made to avoid it. It would not, however,

necessarily lead to immediate coalition defeat.

The Badr Corps. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Badr Corps is an important player in

Iraqi politics, but it has relatively little presence in Baghdad, where Sadr and the

Jaysh al-Mahdi are the dominant militia group. Hakim has already manifested his

concern that Sadr is gaining the upper hand in the Shiite community, particularly

in central Iraq. He could do little to influence the fighting in Baghdad directly except by increasing the flow of Shiite fighters from the south into the capital.

If coalition operations are clearly aimed at establishing security in central Baghdad and not attacking the Shiite communities in and around Sadr City, it is unlikely that the Badr Corps will play a very large role. If the United States attacked

Sadr City, however, Hakim might make common cause with Sadr and attempt to

inflame the south and all of Shiite Iraq against the coalition. In this worst case,

coalition defeat is very likely—the Iraqi Government could not survive such a challenge, and coalition forces could not likely handle the military threat throughout

Iraq. This is yet another reason to avoid any direct attack on Sadr City or actions

that are likely to lead to a full-scale confrontation with Sadr.

It is even less in Hakim’s interest to provoke a full-scale confrontation with the

coalition than it is in Sadr’s. Sadr has gained political influence by taking a strong

anti-American position. Hakim has been much more moderate, apparently concentrating on the likelihood that the U.S. presence will lead in the end to a Shiite state

that he hopes to rule. No part of the plan proposed in this report directly threatens

the outcome he desires. On the contrary, clearing and holding the Sunni and mixed

neighborhoods in Baghdad and suppressing the Sunni Arab insurgency in Anbar forwards Hakim’s goals. It is very likely that Hakim will publicly protest against Shiite

casualties and denounce the operation, but it is extremely unlikely that he will support Sadr or throw large numbers of his own fighters into the fray—as long as the

core of the Shiite community is not threatened.

Iran. It is more difficult to estimate likely Iranian actions to the various possibilities outlined above, but the range of Tehran’s possible responses is rather narrowly

constrained. Iran is certainly unlikely to watch the destruction of the Badr Corps

or even the Jaysh al-Mahdi with equanimity, and would probably increase dramatically the level of its support for those groups, even including direct support through

Iranian advisors. This is yet another reason why courting a full-scale confrontation

with the Shiite militias in the first stage of the operation would be unwise. Iran

is likely to increase its support of the militias and other fighting groups in Iraq in

response to any American operation. The impact of such an increase will be muted

as long as the United States sends and maintains an adequate troop presence to

secure and hold designated neighborhoods. Iran is highly unlikely to court a direct

military confrontation with the United States during such an operation—by sending

disguised fighters against our supply lines in the south, for instance, or taking any

other military action that could be traced directly back to Tehran.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Other Islamist Groups. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is one of the most

dangerous enemies facing coalition forces, not because of its power but because of

its goals. Unique among the major insurgent groups, al-Qaeda in Iraq aims directly

at regional objectives and sees operations in Iraq as merely a steppingstone to

achieving larger goals. This group is also motivated by an apocalyptic vision of the

grand struggle between righteous Islam and ‘‘heresy’’ within the Muslim community

(including Shiism), and between Islam and the infidel West. Zarqawi, the group’s

leader until his death in June 2006, adopted a Leninist strategy, according to which

‘‘the worse it is, the better it is’’ for the insurgent groups. Zarqawi used a series

of spectacular attacks on Shiite (and even Sunni) civilians deliberately to ignite sectarian conflict. This approach drew criticism even from other parts of the global alQaeda movement—Aymara al-Zawahiri, the group’s ideological leader, criticized

Zarqawi for his attacks on Shiites. Other Islamist groups in Iraq, including Ansar

al-Sunna, also question the religious justification for attacking fellow Muslims in

such an instrumental way.

But Zargawi’s strategy was effective. The Shiite community in Iraq endured

nearly 2 years of attacks without responding on a large scale, but the bombing of

the Golden Mosque in February 2006 proved too much for that community to withstand. The cycling sectarian violence in Iraq owes a great deal to Zargawi’s deterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00216 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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mined efforts to provoke full-scale civil war and chaotic violence, from which he

thought his group would benefit.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq can be expected to continue to pursue this approach during the

proposed clear-and-hold operation. In general terms, the group will probably continue to target Shiite civilians, both ordinary people and key figures in the government and within the Shiite religious community. It is likely to work to generate

more spectacular attacks like the Golden Mosque bombing or mass-casualty attacks

in Shiite communities. If such attacks succeed in significant numbers, they will undermine confidence in the clearing operation, spur the Shiite militias to even greater

sectarian violence, and may ultimately break the Iraqi Government.

It is not clear how, specifically, al-Qaeda in Iraq and associated groups will respond to the proposed clearing operation. Faced with a substantial attempt to end

the violence in Baghdad, they might embrace an apocalyptic fight with coalition

forces in the heart of the capital, surging all of their resources against coalition and

especially Iraqi civilian targets. This approach would generate a lot of violence in

the initial phase of the clearing operation, but would not necessarily be the most

dangerous response they might make. By striking the coalition when coalition forces

were most prepared, the Islamists will lose many fighters and use up their limited

supply of suicide bombers and car bombs. If the U.S. and Iraqi forces pursue the

operation to its conclusion, they will significantly reduce this particular enemy’s

ability to undertake subsequent surges of violence, and the prospects for the success

of the operation will increase.

It is more likely that al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Islamist groups will act as they

have in the past: They will increase violence at the start of the operation and then

go to ground either in Baghdad neighborhoods not designated for clearing or in the

surrounding cities and towns. There, they will hope to reconstitute and prepare for

a major surge of violence after the clearing operations have ended. They will also

prepare spectacular mass-casualty attacks against targets in Baghdad and elsewhere.

The coalition must maintain great pressure on the Islamists in Baghdad and beyond. Clearing and holding neighborhoods over the long term will help mitigate the

risks of attacks in those neighborhoods, but the presence of large Reserves is once

again essential to preventing the Islamists from establishing safe bases elsewhere

from which to prepare devastating attacks. The regions around Taji, to the north

of Baghdad, and Iskandariyah, to the south, merit particular attention. There are

already two American BCTs operating there, one in each region, and they should

not be moved. They may need to be reinforced. Additionally, because al-Qaeda has

bases in Diyala province, coalition forces may have to seal off the roads from Diyala

into Baghdad or to divert Reserves into Diyala itself. The main al-Qaeda bases, of

course, are in Anbar, which is why the proposed plan devotes two additional RCTs

to that province.

Baathists and Military Nationalists. These groups have sustained a de facto working alliance with the Islamists because of the perceived danger to the Sunni Arab

community in Iraq, but they disagree both on objectives and on methods (although

the turnover in leadership is leading to greater convergence, as noted above). The

Baathists and military nationalists include the most experienced insurgent fighters,

many drawn from the ranks of Saddam’s army. They have focused their attacks

heavily on coalition forces, including Iraqi Security Forces, which they regard as legitimate targets, but have eschewed attacks on Iraqi civilians. They are not in favor

of accelerating the civil war simply for the purpose of generating chaos from which

they hope to benefit—on the contrary, they aim to bring the civil war under control

after they win the struggle, as they expect to do.

The aims of these groups are also confined more narrowly to Iraq. They are unlikely to be as willing as the Islamists to condemn Iraq to an annihilating sectarian

conflict in the hopes of achieving some greater regional benefit. They are much more

likely, therefore, to become open to negotiation and political persuasion if they come

to believe that their military struggle is hopeless.

The Baathists pose a significant danger in the first three phases of the proposed

operation. They are likely to launch a significant propaganda effort during the deployment of coalition forces. They will attempt to portray the planned operation as

an assault on the Sunni community. They may seek, thereby, to bring regional and

international pressure to bear on the United States to abandon the plan entirely.

As the operation begins, the Baathists are likely to launch increased attacks against

coalition forces. Because the Baathists are the most militarily skilled among enemy

groups, they may pose the most serious challenge to forces clearing those neighborhoods where they have been able to establish strongpoints and defensive positions.

The worst case scenarios involve increased cooperation between the Baathists and

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the Islamists, including Baathist support for mass-casualty or spectacular attacks

on Shiite targets.

The coalition must counter Baathist propaganda efforts with skillful information

operations that emphasize that the coalition’s goal is to protect the population, both

Sunni and Shia, from criminals and terrorists. Initiating reconstruction activities in

the immediate wake of the clearing operation (a policy considered in more detail

below) will also help offset the impression that this mission is aimed at harming

the Sunnis. Most of Iraq’s Sunni neighbors, and many Sunni states beyond Iraq’s

borders, have become extremely concerned about the danger of a spreading civil

war. Many are quietly suggesting that an American withdrawal would be disastrous

and are advocating for a surge aimed at bringing the violence under control. They

might posture in various ways publicly, but they are extremely unlikely to bring any

effective pressure to bear to stop an operation that suits their interests, regardless

of Baathist propaganda.

Greater Baathist cooperation with the Islamists cannot be discounted, but it is not

yet certain. The continual al-Qaeda in Iraq attacks against Shiite civilians have

alienated many insurgents on both sides, and this trend is likely to continue. The

Baathist desire to rule a unified Iraq clashes with the Islamist willingness to destroy Iraq in the name of larger regional gains, a fact that will make increased cooperation between the groups difficult. But as time elapses, and a younger generation of Iraqi nationalists takes leadership positions in what was originally the

Baathist resistance movement, they may work more closely than their predecessors

with the Islamists.

Perhaps the most dangerous option the Baathists could choose would be to try to

force Sunni politicians to leave the government, possibly by moving their base of operations out of Baghdad and into Anbar and Diyala. The coalition must work to

foreclose this option by retaining control in Anbar and by maintaining a sufficient

Reserve to respond to shifts in Baathist attack patterns and movements.

Vigilante Groups, Sunni and Shia. The main justification for vigilante groups on

both sides is the need to protect their neighborhoods from sectarian attacks. Many

of these groups are also involved in criminal activity, and some are taking advantage of the situation to engage in sectarian cleansing of their own. It is highly unlikely, nevertheless, that members of these groups would actively resist a large-scale

clearing operation. The most radical might join hardcore insurgent groups. Some

might attempt to accelerate sectarian cleansing before coalition forces arrived in

force. Most, however, are likely to blend back into the population during the clearing

operation and wait to see what happens.

As long as peace is maintained in the cleared neighborhoods during the hold

phase, the members of these vigilante groups are unlikely to cause much trouble.

They retain a latent potential for violence if the coalition allows a security vacuum

to develop. Some of them will be dissatisfied by the transition from being the big

men around town, protecting their people, to being unemployed youths. Employment

programs and other reconstruction efforts may help, but the coalition and the Iraqis

must also consider ways of addressing individuals’ and groups’ loss of honor and

prestige during this transition. Reintegrating members of the vigilante groups into

their neighborhoods is not a simple process. Rather, it requires careful thought, appropriate planning, and adequate preparation.

Timeline

The operations proposed in this plan would take most of 2007 to complete. As we

shall see, most of the necessary reinforcements would not arrive in their designated

areas until March; active clearing operations would probably not begin until early

April. Past examples suggest that preparation and clearing operations will take

about 90 days, and so should be completed by midsummer. It will then be necessary

to support Iraqi forces in hold-and-build operations through the end of 2007 in order

to continue to degrade insurgent networks, prevent infiltration of cleared areas

again, and mitigate likely enemy efforts to launch an autumn surge against coalition, civilian, symbolic, and high-profile targets. By early 2008, it should become

possible to begin moving some American forces out of the cleared areas of Baghdad,

although it is unlikely that large numbers of U.S. troops could begin to return home

until much later in 2008, for reasons described below.

2007 will be a violent year in Iraq. If this proposal is not adopted, then insurgent

and sectarian violence will continue to increase unabated, as it has every year since

the invasion. If this plan is adopted, then the pattern of the violence will probably

change. There will be a significant increase in violence as clearing operations commence, probably followed by a reduction in violence in the summer, followed by a

substantial surge of violence in the fall. If the United States continues on its present

course, American and Iraqi casualties will be spread more evenly over the year, but

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all will be wasted because success is extraordinarily unlikely. If this plan is adopted,

there will probably be higher casualties in the spring and fall, but far fewer by the

end of the year. The coalition, moreover, will have made significant progress toward

establishing security in Iraq’s capital and paving the way for a sustainable transition to Iraqi control and responsibility.

WHAT IF? WHAT NEXT?

Sound military planning requires considering ‘‘branches and sequels’’: How to

handle contingencies that are likely to arise during the course of operations, and

how to prepare for subsequent operations when the current one has been completed.

The consideration of enemy courses of action above included a number of likely

branches to handle possible contingencies. The most probable branches include:

1. Deploying Reserve Forces into neighborhoods not being cleared as enemy

groups attempt to attack more vulnerable targets;

2. Restricting movement between Baghdad and either Anbar or Diyala or

both, in order to prevent insurgents from shifting their bases;

3. Deploying Reserves in areas of Baghdad being cleared to overcome unexpected resistance;

4. Deploying significant Reserve Forces either to Anbar, Diyala, or elsewhere

in response to enemy efforts to launch attacks outside of the capital;

5. Reinforcing security for high-profile targets (both people and structures) in

Baghdad, the north, and the Shia areas to the south.

Less probable branches include:

1. Sealing Sadr City off either from the rest of Baghdad or from Diyala;

2. Attacking into Sadr City in the event of an unplanned major confrontation

with Shiite militias (although this plan stresses the desirability of avoiding such

a confrontation as much as possible);

3. Conducting operations against the Badr Corps in southern Iraq in the

event of a major confrontation with SCIRI. (Again, this can result only from

great misfortune or ineptitude on the part of the coalition, since its aim should

be to avoid such a confrontation.)

Executing the more probable branches requires having a significant Reserve ready

and stationed within Iraq. Forces in Kuwait, let alone the United States, are too

far away to respond rapidly to most of the likely contingencies. If commanders deploy only the force necessary to conduct the clearing operation, optimistically assuming that the enemy will not react or adapt to the clear-and-hold operation, they

would be pursuing an irresponsible and dangerous policy.

The operation to clear and hold the center of Baghdad is only the beginning of

a larger effort to pacify Iraq. It is difficult to predict with any precision what operations would be necessary upon the conclusion of this one, particularly since clearing and holding the center of Baghdad would transform not only the security but

also the political situation in the country. Some sequels are very likely to be necessary, however:

1. Bringing Sadr City under control (see below);

2. Redeploying forces from Baghdad to clear and hold Anbar, beginning with

Ramadi and Fallujah and then expanding up the Euphrates and out to the Syrian border;

3. Moving forces from Baghdad up the Diyala to Baquba and clearing that

area;

4. Reinforcing security in the north, particularly in Ninawa, including Mosul.

It is possible that the successful clearing of central Baghdad will leave Moqtada

al-Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi still defiantly in control of Sadr City. If that is the

case, then U.S. and Iraqi forces will have to clear that Shiite stronghold by force

and disarm the militia. It is also possible, however, that the clear-and-hold operation in central Baghdad will weaken Sadr’s power base in Sadr City and support

a predominantly political solution to that problem. The sectarian violence now raging in Baghdad is one of the most powerful recruiting tools for the Jaysh al-Mahdi,

and one of its most potent overt justifications. If that violence is dramatically reduced, it is likely that some Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters will begin to fall away from

the group, reducing Sadr’s leverage within the Shiite community and within Iraq

as a whole. Such a weakening might well induce him and many of his followers to

enter the political fold wholeheartedly rather than halfheartedly, as they have so

far done. The United States must be clear, though, that the elimination of the Jaysh

al-Mahdi as an effective fighting force in Baghdad, either through negotiation or by

force, is the essential next step after the clearing of the central areas of the city.

The sequence of these operations matters a great deal. The persistence of the

Sunni insurgency justifies the strength of the Shiite militias and continues Maliki’s

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dependence upon them. If the United States insists on attacking Sadr and his supporters first, Maliki and the Iraqi Government will have no leverage with him or

justification for permitting that attack, which will look like American support to the

Sunni insurgency. If, instead, the coalition begins by clearing and holding Sunni and

mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad, as well as conducting more aggressive operations in Anbar, the United States and the Iraqi Government will show

that they are determined to suppress the Sunni insurgency and to protect both

Sunnis and Shiites. That demonstration will make subsequent operations against

Shiite militias much more politically palatable in Iraq. Eliminating the raging Sunni

insurgency will also eliminate the ostensible justification for those militias, liberating Maliki to support their disarmament. The challenges in Iraq are complex, but

not an insoluble puzzle if they are approached in the right order.

RECONSTRUCTION

Military operations alone cannot solve Iraq’s problems. Any complete solution

must address a host of political, economic, diplomatic, and social challenges as well

as the security situation. This proposal emphasizes the military portion of the solution because it is urgent to bring the violence under control before it tears Iraq

apart completely. Subsequent phases and working groups will examine the other aspects of the problem in much greater detail. Reconstruction deserves consideration

even at this early phase, even though it will be addressed again in more detail.

Soldiers, whether American or Iraqi, moving through a neighborhood to clear it

inevitably do damage. Violence flares up, and innocent people are invariably killed.

Past experience shows that many neighborhoods are willing to accept this price in

the hope of having security and peace thereafter, but it is important to provide them

with a more immediate and tangible compensation for the violence as well. In addition, it is clear that high levels of unemployment in Iraq create a pool of potential

recruits for militias and violent organizations. The lack of essential services in many

neighborhoods also provides an opportunity for more organized enemy groups such

as militias to usurp the government’s traditional roles (the Hezbollah model).

For all of these reasons, therefore, every clear-and-hold operation must be accompanied by an immediate reconstruction program. As military commanders move into

neighborhoods to establish security, they should also reach out to local leaders to

find out what essential services must be restored quickly to permit a basic level of

normal life to resume. The military now encapsulates the most common list of essential services in the abbreviation SWET: Sewage, water, electricity, and trash removal. Most neighborhoods will require SWET packages to begin operating, ideally

within hours of the end of combat operations.

Managing this reconstruction effort is an enormous challenge, and this phase of

the report can only suggest some of the complexities without offering detailed solutions. It is vital that the Iraqi people associate the Iraqi Government with the reconstruction effort as much as possible. Defeating the enemy’s Hezbollah model requires getting Iraqis accustomed to looking to their local and central government

to provide essential services. Even when the money and capability to provide those

services are coming from the coalition, therefore, it is vital that the local inhabitants

attribute the provision of the services themselves to legitimate local leaders.

It is not possible, however, to conduct such efforts through the Iraqi central government. The responsible ministries are often highly corrupt and unable to perform

their basic functions properly. Some of the most important ‘‘service’’ ministries are

controlled by Sadr and his lieutenants—political figures whom the coalition emphatically does not wish to legitimate or support. Few ministries actually have connections to local government, moreover. Providing the ministries with funds to conduct local reconstruction will most likely result in strengthening the insurgency.

The American Government is not well organized to oversee extensive reconstruction projects on a local level, however. Reconstruction efforts to date have been disorganized. They have generated enormous friction between responsible agencies,

and they have had inadequate results for the Iraqi people. Resolving these difficulties will require a significant effort to reorganize the way the American Government

does business in such conflicts (an effort that we must undertake urgently, since

Iraq is not the first and will not be the last place the United States will have to

engage in reconstruction of one sort or another). In the short term, however, the

only organization capable of planning and executing reconstruction projects in combat zones is the U.S. military. The essential SWET programs, therefore, must be

the responsibility of local commanders. Those commanders will need representatives

from USAID, the State Department, the Department of Agriculture, and other government agencies to advise them about developing and executing their programs,

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but the responsibility and the authority to dispense the necessary funds must lie

with the commanders.

The absence of security has hampered reconstruction projects throughout Iraq so

far. Reports indicate that as much as 30 percent of the resources designated for reconstruction projects has been diverted to providing security for those projects. Insecurity raises the cost in other ways as well, since local and international contractors

and employees demand higher wages and prices for operating in dangerous areas.

Establishing real security in central Baghdad and then maintaining it with a large

American troop presence will greatly mitigate these problems, allowing a much

higher proportion of reconstruction funds to go to actually improving the lives of

Iraqis and encouraging them to reject violence.

It is not enough simply to restore essential services in cleared neighborhoods,

however. The American relationship with Iraq has been deteriorating steadily over

the past several months as U.S. leaders have begun to chastise Maliki and other

Iraqis for failing to contain the violence and the militias on their own. The hectoring

and insulting tone that has entered this discourse is manifested in the notion of

‘‘incentivizing’’ the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own security. Upon examination, however, it becomes clear that all the incentives commonly suggested are

negative: If the Iraqis do not disarm the militias, then the United States will leave

and abandon them to genocide and civil war. This is not the way to encourage a

desired behavior or to maintain good relations with an ally.

The United States must develop a set of positive incentives to encourage and reward Iraqis at all levels for taking the desired steps toward pacifying their country.

One such way would be to create a second tier of reconstruction projects beyond

SWET packages. As commanders discuss with local leaders what essential services

to restore at the end of combat operations, they should also discuss what reconstruction projects could dramatically increase quality of life in the neighborhood thereafter. They should indicate that funds for those projects will be released when the

neighborhood fully complies with a set of requirements to support coalition efforts

to maintain peace: Disarming remaining militias, turning over criminals, reporting

insurgent efforts to infiltrate the neighborhood again, warning coalition forces about

IEDs and imminent attacks, and so on. Any neighborhood meeting these requirements would receive the Tier II reconstruction package.

This approach would redress another problem with a reconstruction program

aimed only at restoring services in cleared areas: It allows reconstruction to proceed

in neighborhoods that were stable to begin with. Giving SWET packages exclusively

to cleared areas, in effect, rewards bad neighborhoods and punishes good ones. A

Tier II package could go to any neighborhood in which basic security prevails and

the inhabitants of which comply with the requirements of the program. Since the

initial focus of operations in Baghdad would be on Sunni and mixed neighborhoods,

a Tier II program would also help to ensure that Baghdad’s Shiites received tangible

benefits from the operation as well.

In addition to these programmed reconstruction activities, Congress should also

fund the Commander’s Emergency Response Program at a high level. This program

has proven invaluable since the start of the insurgency because it allows local commanders to allocate resources on the spot to critical reconstruction efforts as the

need for them arises. It gives commanders necessary flexibility and allows them to

target funds to projects that directly support ongoing operations or forestall impending crises.

MAKING THE FORCES AVAILABLE

This plan requires the deployment to Iraq of an additional five Army BCTs and

two Marine RCTs. Any lesser force will entail a much greater risk of failure. The

strain on the Army and Marines of maintaining even the current level of forces in

Iraq is well-known, and this proposal does not underestimate the challenge of generating additional forces for the 18–24 months required by this plan. It is, however,

possible to do so within the constraints of the All-Volunteer Force.

There are currently 13 Army BCTs and 2 Marine RCTs in Iraq. The Army and

Marines have already developed their plans for rotating fresh units into the country

over the course of 2007, and they are as follows:

• One BCT and two RCTs are scheduled to deploy to Iraq in the first quarter.

• Four BCTs will deploy in the second quarter.

• Six BCTs will deploy in the third quarter.

• One BCT and two RCTs will deploy in the fourth quarter.

Since the aim of this force generation model has been to maintain a steady state

of 15 brigades and regiments in Iraq, the Pentagon has planned to remove the same

number of units from Iraq as are sent in. In place of this approach, this plan proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00221 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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poses to extend the tours of most Army BCTs now in Iraq from 12 months to 15

months, and of the Marine RCTs from 7 months to 12 months. This plan also proposes to accelerate the deployment of the four BCTs scheduled to enter Iraq in the

second quarter so that they arrive instead in March. These changes in the deployment schedule would produce a surge of two Marine RCTs and five Army BCTs in

the first quarter and sustain it throughout 2007, using only Active-Duty Forces already scheduled to deploy to Iraq in that year.

Sustaining such a large presence through 2008, which is probably necessary, requires mobilizing about six National Guard brigades that are not currently scheduled to deploy. The President has the legal authority to make such a callup, but

Pentagon policy has, hitherto, been to avoid using so many National Guard brigades

in Iraq in 2008. The proposed deployment plan would require a change in Pentagon

policy, but not additional congressional authorization. Even though these brigades

would not deploy until well into 2008 (and into a much more benign security environment than the active units now in Iraq face), the military must begin to alert

and prepare them right now. Adopting the plan proposed in this report requires

changing Pentagon policy immediately to grant the chief of staff of the Army full

access to the National Guard and Reserve.

Extending the tours of units and mobilizing the National Guard and Reserve will

place a greater strain on soldiers and their families. If there were any option that

did not threaten to place an unbearable burden on the military, other than the defeat of the United States, this plan would propose it. Maintaining anything like the

current course will continue to strain the military badly and will also lead to failure.

Withdrawing forces now will accelerate defeat, violence, and failure. It is worth considering in some detail what that failure would look like.

It is possible to surmise what will occur in Iraq when the U.S. Armed Forces withdraw in the current environment on the basis of what has happened in the past

when U.S. forces have withdrawn prematurely from areas in Iraq. Enemy groups

round up Iraqis who collaborate with Americans and their own government, then

publicly torture and kill these people, often along with their entire families. Death

squads commit horrific atrocities against one another but most often against innocent civilians, leaving their mangled corpses on streets and in yards. To many

Americans watching from afar, these are just dead bodies and evidence of failure.

But to the soldiers preparing to withdraw, they are people the United States has

betrayed and abandoned to horrible deaths.

As soldiers establish themselves in neighborhoods, they work hard to gain the

trust of the locals. That trust is essential in persuading local leaders and citizens

to provide critical information soldiers need to identify and capture enemies, avoid

ambushes and IEDs, and perform almost any military mission. American soldiers

and marines are well aware of the reciprocal obligation they undertake to protect

those Iraqis who trust them enough to provide intelligence. One of the greatest frustrations American soldiers are experiencing today is the inability to fulfill that implicit promise.

American withdrawal from Iraq will be a searing and scarring experience. U.S.

soldiers will be forced to confront the results of America’s defeat on the most personal level. Terrorists will videotape death squads operating with American troops

stacking arms in the background. Al Jazeera and other Muslim media outlets will

play the tapes endlessly, accompanied by claims that the Americans were committing or abetting the atrocities. The process of such a defeat will demoralize the

Army and Marines far more dramatically and permanently than asking brigades to

serve a few additional months in the course of a successful operation that brings

the United States closer to victory. The strain on the Army and Marines is very real

and a serious concern, but it is not correctable with any simple solution—not even

immediate withdrawal.

The President has already embraced an essential element of the longer term solution for the strain, however: Increasing the end-strength of the ground forces. It has

been clear for some time that the Active-Duty Army and Marines were too small

for the challenges they face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. The President’s call for enlarging them comes not a moment too soon.

For some time now, skeptics of such enlargement have argued that it would not

be possible to recruit more soldiers in time of war into the volunteer force, but recruiting does not appear to be the factor limiting the expansion of the ground forces.

Instead, the ability of the training base to accept new recruits and give them basic

soldier skills before sending them to their units regulates the pace of expanding the

Army and the Marines. Part of the problem is that the training base is not expansible and has not been prepared for a serious effort to build the sort of ground forces

the nation needs in this time of crisis. That inadequacy must also change. In addition to making a national call for young people to serve in the military, the PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00222 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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dent must also make a priority of expanding the ground forces training base as

quickly as possible to permit a more rapid expansion of the Army and Marines. Current estimates suggest that the Army could grow by only about 7,000 soldiers per

year for the next few years. That figure is wholly inadequate. Many estimates of

the appropriate size of the active Army suggest that the United States needs at

least 50,000 more soldiers—or even more. The United States cannot wait 5 years

to achieve this necessary increase in end-strength. The Secretary of Defense must

make it a priority to create the capability to expand the Army much more rapidly,

and the United States should maintain that capability indefinitely to avoid finding

the country again unable to add forces rapidly in wartime in the future.

The most serious challenge in accelerating the deployment of brigades scheduled

to enter Iraq this year, however, has nothing to do with the number of people in

the Armed Forces. The Army and Marines have worn out their equipment. Tanks,

Bradleys, and Humvees are not designed to drive thousands of miles a year, but

they have been doing so for years in extremely harsh conditions. News reports indicate that many units in the Army are at low levels of readiness because they do

not have enough functioning equipment to take to the field. Units regularly swap

equipment with one another as they prepare to deploy. Sometimes soldiers getting

ready to move to Iraq do not receive the equipment they need until a few weeks

before they start their deployment.

Congress has recognized this problem and has appropriated funds to ‘‘reset’’ the

Army and Marines—primarily by buying or repairing the necessary equipment. But

even recent increases in these appropriations have not brought America’s military

industry to anything like full mobilization. Army depots are operating far below

their maximum capability despite this equipment crisis. This situation is unacceptable. The Department of Defense must request and Congress should authorize an

additional significant increase in funds for reequipping the military, and all available military industrial resources should be brought to bear on this challenge as

rapidly as possible.

Many of the proposals in this section can be summed up briefly: The Nation must

be put on a war footing. That does not mean a return to the draft. It is possible

and necessary to maintain a volunteer military while fighting this war and beyond.

It does, however, mean abandoning peacetime bureaucratic routines within the Pentagon and throughout the defense establishment. It means that the President must

issue a call to arms. It means that Congress must provide the necessary financial

support. It means that everyone involved in the defense of the Nation must make

supporting the troops fighting this war the number one priority. It is disgraceful

that the Nation has not been placed on a war footing even this far into such an

important conflict, but it is essential to transform this state of affairs if the United

States is to conduct the operations necessary to avoid imminent defeat and pursue

victory.

OTHER PROPOSALS AND THEIR CHALLENGES

There are a number of other proposals for resolving the crisis in Iraq, most of

which fall into one or more of the following categories:

• Train Iraqi forces and transition more rapidly to full Iraqi control (the current

U.S. military strategy).

• Increase the training of Iraqi forces and engage Iraq’s neighbors to reduce the

violence (the core of the Iraq Study Group report).

• Partition Iraq (Senator Joseph Biden’s [D-Del.] proposal).

• Withdraw U.S. forces immediately (House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.] and

Senator Carl Levin’s [D-Mich.] suggestion).

None of these proposals offers any prospect for success in Iraq; all, in fact, make

defeat and regional war far more likely.

Train and Transition

This is the current U.S. military strategy as outlined repeatedly by MNF–I commander, GEN George Casey. This approach is at odds with the ‘‘clear-hold-build’’

strategy outlined by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President George W.

Bush more than a year ago. The American Military command has never tried to implement clear-hold-build because it has never given U.S. forces in Iraq the mission

of providing security to the Iraqi people. MNF–I has instead focused on training

Iraqi forces and has used its mobile units reactively to regain control of insurgent

strongholds. The exceptions to this principle proved the rule: Operations Together

Forward I and II used American forces to clear neighborhoods, but sought to rely

exclusively on Iraqis to hold them afterward—the main reason for the failure of

those operations.

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The creation of a trained Iraqi Army of more than 130,000 soldiers in just a few

years starting from scratch has been an amazing accomplishment. The determination of Iraqi soldiers, who put their lives on the line just to enlist in an environment

in which terrorists regularly target recruiting stations, is astonishing. But as the

capabilities of the Iraqi Army have steadily increased, the sectarian violence has increased even faster. Unless the United States takes action to bring the violence

down to a level at which the growing Iraqi Security Forces can control it, then the

violence will ultimately destroy those security forces as well. Although MNF–I has

repeatedly published maps of Iraq with expanding areas of green, denoting regions

that have been ‘‘transitioned’’ to Iraqi control, these graphics and metrics do not correctly indicate whether the United States is succeeding or failing in Iraq. Despite

these transitions, the United States is on a glide-path to defeat and not victory. The

current strategy has clearly failed and must be replaced quickly.

Train and Negotiate

The Iraq Study Group (ISG) proposed to increase the number of embedded trainers, eliminate almost all other U.S. combat forces in Iraq, and negotiate with Iran

and Syria to control the violence. This report has already considered why simply

embedding more soldiers with Iraqi units is not likely to increase the capability of

the Iraqi Army rapidly and may even slow down its improvement by removing opportunities for the Iraqis to conduct operations together with America’s outstanding

soldiers and marines. The ISG report also ignores the significant delay before new

Iraqi forces can take the field, even with accelerated training. What will happen to

the insurgency and violence in that time? Clearly it will continue to grow. Very

likely it will rapidly grow beyond the point at which any plausible increase in Iraqi

forces’ capabilities could control it.

The ISG counters by proposing that the United States and the Iraqi Government

open negotiations with Iran and Syria in an effort to persuade them to contain the

growing sectarian violence. It is beyond the scope of this report to consider whether

the Iranians or Syrians are likely to be helpful in such negotiations, but there is

no reason to imagine that they could control the violence in Iraq even if they wished

to.

Iran provides Shiite groups of all varieties with weapons, expertise, advice, and

money. Syria tacitly permits the movement of insurgents across its borders. This assistance to the rebels increases the overall level of violence in Iraq, as well as the

lethality of certain insurgent attacks. But could the Iranians and the Syrians turn

the violence off?

To begin with, there is ample evidence that the various insurgencies in Iraq have

developed their own multifarious sources of funding, mostly resulting from criminal

activities and corruption that they siphon off for their own purposes. They also have

an ample stock of high explosives: Saddam Hussein packed his country with ammunition warehouses for more than a decade. As one observer put it: ‘‘There’s enough

high explosives in Iraq now to maintain the current level of violence for a thousand

years.’’ If the Iranians cut off their supplies, the insurgents would still be able to

fund their enterprises. They would still have the wherewithal to make IEDs and car

bombs, and they would still recruit suicide bombers. Outside sources of assistance

help them, but the withdrawal of those resources would not stop them.

Could the Iranians order SCIRI or the Jaysh al-Mahdi to stop their attacks? It

is extremely unlikely. To begin with, although SCIRI and Jaysh al-Mahdi are Shiites, they are Arabs, not Persians. It will always be difficult for Iraqi Shiites to obey

explicit instructions from Iranians for cultural reasons. But, above all, the escalating violence in Iraq results less from Iranian encouragement than from the internal dynamics of Iraq itself.

The Shiite community in Iraq remained remarkably quiescent under increasing

Sunni attacks through 2004 and 2005, despite rapidly growing tensions between

Iran and the United States. The explosion in sectarian violence followed the bombing of the Samarra mosque. The recruiting and propaganda of Shiite groups relies

heavily on portraying them as defenders of the Shiite people against Sunni assaults.

It is difficult to imagine how they would explain abandoning their fight in the face

of continuing Sunni attacks simply because the Iranians tell them to do so. The vigilante groups that are in some respects the most worrisome manifestation of the nascent civil war will not listen to the Iranians at all. These are mostly local, self-organized groups aimed at preventing and avenging attacks on their communities. The

only way to bring such groups under control is to establish security, thereby removing their only real reason for being.

And who could bring the Sunni Arab insurgents under control? Syria, still less

Iran, does not control al-Qaeda in Iraq or Ansar al-Sunna. Such groups take orders

from no state and cannot be made to stop their activities by a diktat from Damascus

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or Tehran. The Baathists are no more likely to stop their fighting simply because

the Syrians intervene with them. To begin with, the Baathists are Iraqi nationalists,

unlikely to take orders from foreign regimes. Neither are they organized into a neat

hierarchical system that would facilitate Syrian discussions with them. When the

United States destroyed the Iraqi Baathist state in 2003, it also destroyed the political and some of the social hierarchy in the Sunni Arab community. The lack of a

clear hierarchy that controls its followers has severely hindered the U.S. ability to

negotiate with the insurgents during its attempts to do so and will limit the Syrians

no less.

The problem with relying on Iraq’s neighbors to control the violence is less that

they will not do so than that they cannot. This approach is a blind alley that will

lead nowhere because it misrepresents the fundamental nature of the problem in

Iraq.

Partition Iraq

This approach takes as its basis the assumption that Iraq naturally falls into

three parts. Supporters of it usually point to one of two mutually contradictory facts:

Iraq has three main social groups (Sunni Arabs, Shiites, and Kurds), and the Iraqi

state was formed in 1921 from three Ottoman vilayets or administrative districts.

Iraq, advocates of this view say, is an artificial creation that would be more stable

if we allowed it to fall back into its natural, trinary form.

To begin with, the fact that the Ottoman Empire chose to rule what is now Iraq

via three administrative districts does not make the present Iraqi state an artificial

creation. On the contrary, from prehistoric times the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers

and the land between them have formed a single community, often composed of

multiple ethnicities and religions but functioning as an economic and often political

unit.

Ottoman administrative practice should not convince modern observers that Iraq

is by nature a tripartite state. The Ottomans did not align territory according to

modern concepts of national self-determination. They divided and conquered, as did

most other empires. The notion of some preindependence Iraqi system in which each

social group controlled its own area in peace is a myth. Any such tripartite structure

would itself be an artificial innovation with no historical basis.

The Ottoman vilayets (of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra) were not themselves homogeneous ethnic or sectarian groupings. Mosul, Baghdad, Baquba, and Kirkuk, four

of Iraq’s principal cities, have long been mixed at both the metropolitan and the

neighborhood level.

Even now, a high proportion of Iraqis live in mixed communities. Partitioning the

country could only result from the migration of millions of people. Many would resist. Bloodbaths would ensue. When this process occurred in the Balkans in the

1990s the international community called it ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and ‘‘genocide.’’ It is

difficult to imagine how the United States and the international community could

now accept and even propose a solution that they rightly condemned not a decade

ago.

These principled considerations parallel practical concerns. Who would get Baghdad? The capital is now mixed between Sunni and Shia. Depriving one group of that

city and giving it to another would create an obvious sense of victory and defeat

between the groups—not something that bodes well for subsequent stability. If the

international community sought to divide Baghdad, where would it draw the line?

The Tigris seems an obvious choice, but it has already become impossible. There are

many Sunnis living east of the river and many Shiites living to the west. Jaysh alMahdi fighters are working hard to seize more territory on the West Bank and drive

the Sunnis farther out. If the United States allows this process to continue, as advocates of partition suggest, America will de facto be giving Baghdad to the Shiites

at the cost of the dislocation of 2 or 3 million Sunnis. Again, this is a process that

can only come at the price of hideous suffering and death. Last, there is the problem

of oil. The Kurds have oil fields. The Shiites have oil fields. The Sunni Arabs do

not. Fear of the loss of oil revenue is one factor driving the Sunni insurgency now.

Partitioning Iraq would make that fear a permanent reality. Why would the Sunnis

stop fighting? They would not. Partition is not only a historical abomination and an

invitation for sectarian cleansing and genocide on a vast scale—it is also a recipe

for perpetual conflict in Mesopotamia.

Iraq does not break down cleanly into Kurdish, Shia, or Sunni Arab areas either

demographically or historically. Rather, within these broad categories there are serious fissures and rivalries which have been exploited by overlords (Ottoman, British,

and Iraqi) to maintain central control. These rivalries will not disappear by a simple

ethnic or sectarian realignment or oil-sharing scheme. Shia factions will war with

each other, and Shia violence could spill into other Arab Shia tribes in the region.

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Sunni tribal forces, urban Baathists, Islamic radicals, and other interested states

will not allow a peaceful Sunni heartland to be established, even if they could somehow be reconciled to a strip of the upper Euphrates and the Anbar desert. The integration of Kurds into this realignment, and the minority populations that live in

Kurdish areas, is far more complicated than most observers recognize, starting with

the fact that there are two rival Kurdish parties now, reflecting important linguistic

and tribal distinctions. Considering the presence of large numbers of Turkmen,

Yazidi, and other minority groups in the lands that a partition would give to

Kurdistan presents another set of problems that partitioning will only exacerbate.

Withdrawal

Advocates of immediate withdrawal fall into a number of camps. Some propose

pulling American forces out of Iraq because they opposed the war to begin with.

Others argue that we have already lost and that further efforts to turn the tide are

useless. Still others claim that American interests would be better served by

withdrawing to other parts of region—or withdrawing from the region altogether.

Slightly more sophisticated advocates of this plan argue that the American presence

in Iraq is an irritant and permits a sort of laziness on the part of the Iraqi Government. Consequently, they say, a U.S. withdrawal would both reduce the violence

and force the Iraqis to contribute more effectively. Many of these arguments are irrelevant or invalid. All face a challenge that advocates have an obligation to answer:

What will happen in Iraq and in the region following a withdrawal of U.S. forces,

and why will that be better for America than attempting to win?

The War Was Wrong From the Beginning. This argument for withdrawal is without any logical foundation. Whatever the wisdom or folly of the initial decision to

invade Iraq in 2003, the problems the United States faces there now are real and

imminent. The lives of millions of people literally hang in the balance in a country

poised on the brink of full-scale civil war. The issues at stake are far too important

to allow resentment at an earlier decision to prevent a rational assessment of the

best course of action today. America has a responsibility to pursue its own interests

in Iraq, and those interests require establishing security and a legitimate government. And America has an obligation to the Iraqi people that it would be immoral

and reprehensible to ignore.

The War Is Already Lost. The war is not lost. The legitimate, elected Iraqi Government remains stable and commands the support of the majority of the Iraqi people.

The Armed Forces of Iraq are at their posts, training and fighting every day. The

levels of violence in Iraq per capita are far lower than those of Bosnia and Kosovo

in the 1990s, and the United States was able to contain those conflicts. By any

measure, victory in Iraq is still possible if the United States has the will and the

skill to seek it.

Those who disagree with this assessment still have an obligation, moreover, to

propose a positive strategy for moving forward. Accepting defeat might solve an immediate problem, but international politics will not stop when we have done so.

What will happen in Iraq? What will happen in the region? What will the United

States have to do? Will that situation actually be better or worse than attempting

to fight through a difficult time now? Advocating immediate withdrawal without answering these questions persuasively and in detail is irresponsible.

Many who prefer immediate withdrawal implicitly or explicitly believe that the

United States can find a ‘‘soft landing’’ that will contain the violence and prevent

it from spreading throughout the region. After all, no sensible and responsible person could advocate an approach that would ignite the entire Middle East in fullscale sectarian war. A forthcoming study from the Saban Center for Middle East

Policy at the Brookings Institute, whose interim findings have been publicly presented, casts serious doubt on the likelihood of any ‘‘soft landing,’’ however. The

study’s codirector, Kenneth Pollack, argues that the history of civil wars strongly

suggests that the Iraq conflict will spill over onto Iraq’s neighbors on a large scale.

It is highly likely not only to involve them in Iraq’s struggles, but to ignite secondary civil wars within those states that may spread even further. He argues that

there is no natural checking mechanism that would build up any sort of resistance

to this conflict spreading. On the contrary, refugee flows from Iraq are already

changing the demographics of the region and will continue to do so. Refugees will

appeal to similar ethnic and sectarian groups in their new host countries to involve

themselves in the larger struggle. War will spread, involving American interests and

allies. It is nearly certain that the United States will find itself reengaging in the

Middle East on far worse terms than it now faces. Withdrawal promises at best a

partial relief from the immediate pain at the expense of far worse suffering for years

to come.

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The United States Could Accomplish Its Regional Goals Better by Leaving. Various

attempts at sophisticated argumentation claim that America could best regain its

lost leverage in the Middle East by pulling back from Iraq and focusing on other

issues. Again, advocates of this approach rarely consider the likely consequences of

withdrawal and how the prospects of regional war will probably destroy any leverage the United States might hypothetically gain. They ignore completely, moreover,

the fact that America’s defeat in Iraq will destroy its credibility in the region and

around the world for years to come.

When the United States first invaded Iraq in 2003, the Iranian regime was clearly

frightened. It responded to that fear by lying low and reducing the level of tension

with the West. By mid-2004, Tehran had decided that the United States was bogged

down in a war it was losing. The Iranians seized that opportunity to move forward

aggressively with their nuclear program despite international opposition, to court

conflict with the United States, and to increase support for Shiite militias in Iraq.

What will happen if the United States withdraws from Iraq and abandons that

country to chaos? The likeliest outcome is that Iran will seek and possibly achieve

hegemony in the region. Iran is by far the largest and strongest state in the Middle

East, even without nuclear weapons. The creation of a power vacuum on its western

frontier would make it stronger still. With neither a strong Iraqi nor an American

presence, Tehran’s writ would run throughout the gulf region virtually unopposed.

It is very difficult to see how such an outcome restores any degree of leverage in

the Middle East to a defeated United States.

The American Presence in Iraq Is the Problem. This argument is simply untrue.

There are two simple tests to apply: How has the pattern of violence in Iraq correlated with the size of American forces, and whom are the insurgents attacking?

If the irritating presence of American soldiers were the primary cause of violence

in Iraq, then more American troops should lead to more violence and fewer troops

would produce less violence. In fact, the opposite has been the case. When the

United States has increased force levels in Iraq in the past in order to provide security for elections and the constitutional referendum, violence dropped significantly.

When U.S. forces cleared Tall Afar, Mosul, and Sadr City in 2004, violence dropped.

As MNF–I has attempted to reduce the American presence in Iraq prematurely, violence has increased. Correlating American presence with violence does not suggest

that American forces are the problem, but rather that they are part of the solution.

The idea that American troops are the irritant in Iraq does not explain the fact

that attacks by Iraqis on other Iraqis are steadily increasing. If the American troop

presence is causing the bloodshed, why are Iraqis killing each other, rather than

coalition forces, in growing numbers? This explanation also suffers from the fact

that repeated anecdotes reveal that many Iraqis prefer to see American troops rather than Iraqi police. Sunnis in Baghdad warn each other that they should trust

Iraqi Government forces only when they are accompanied by American soldiers. It

is difficult to see in such examples proof of the theorem that the U.S. presence is

the source of the problem, still less that removing U.S. forces would lead to peace.

CONCLUSION

America faces a serious challenge in Iraq today, and there are no simple or easy

solutions. The proposal described in this report is only the essential first step on

a long road. Successful counterinsurgency strategy requires a skillful blend of military, political, economic, diplomatic, and social initiatives. Although attempts to

suppress rebellions through brute force have succeeded in the past on occasion, the

methods required to implement them are repugnant to Americans and have rightly

been rejected. The emphasis on military power in this proposal does not come from

any belief that such power can bring success on its own. On the contrary, the successive phases of this project will examine various aspects of training the Iraqi

Security Forces, transitioning to Iraqi governmental control, and other political, economic, and diplomatic developments that are essential components of any successful

strategy.

But there is no prospect for any positive developments in Iraq today until the security situation is brought under control. Political processes cannot resolve, absorb,

or control communal and terrorist violence at the current levels. Economic development cannot even begin in earnest amidst such bloodshed. Diplomatic approaches

cannot resolve a conflict that is driven by internal factors. The top priority of American strategy in Iraq today must be to secure the population and bring the violence

under control. Making political progress of any sort a precondition for the start of

such an operation will virtually ensure failure and defeat.

There is risk in any military operation, and America and the Iraqi Government

and people face a number of clever and determined enemies. The United States has

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consistently underestimated the skill and capability of these enemies and relied on

overly optimistic assumptions about what would happen in Iraq. It is time to accept

reality. The fight in Iraq is difficult. The enemy will work hard to defeat the coalition and the Iraqi Government. Things will not go according to plan. The coalition

and the Iraqi Government may fail. But failure is neither inevitable nor tolerable,

and so the United States must redouble its efforts to succeed. America must adopt

a new strategy based more firmly on successful counterinsurgency practices, and the

Nation must provide its commanders with the troops they need to execute that

strategy in the face of a thinking enemy. The enemy has been at war with us for

nearly 4 years. The United States has emphasized restraint and caution. It is time

for America to go to war and win. And America can.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kagan.

Dr. Carpenter.

STATEMENT OF DR. TED GALEN CARPENTER, VICE PRESIDENT OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, CATO

INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. CARPENTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank

the committee for the invitation to offer my views this afternoon.

I have provided a longer written statement, and I would request

that that be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of all of you, if you have a written

statement that exceeded or was different than what your verbal

testimony is, that’ll be included in the record.

Dr. CARPENTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Optimism about the United States mission in Iraq has faded dramatically in the past few months. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group

accurately concluded that the situation was, ‘‘grave and deteriorating.’’ The Pentagon’s report to Congress in November 2006

paints a similarly dismal picture, with attacks on United States

troops, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians all at record levels.

Yet, proponents of the war refuse to admit what is increasingly obvious: That Washington’s Iraq occupation and democratization mission is failing and there is little realistic prospect that its fortunes

will improve. Something much more dramatic than a modest course

correction is needed.

It is essential to ask the administration and its supporters at

what point they will admit that the costs of this venture have become unbearable. How much longer are they willing to have our

troops stay in Iraq? Two years? Five years? Ten years? How many

more tax dollars are they willing to pour into Iraq? Another $300

billion? $600 billion? One trillion? And, most crucial of all, how

many more American lives are they willing to sacrifice? Two thousand? Five thousand? Ten thousand? It is time for the supporters

of the war to be specific.

Proponents of the mission avoid addressing such unpleasant

questions. Instead, they act as though victory in Iraq can be

achieved merely through the exercise of willpower, that we can

simply choose victory.

Whether or not one describes it as a civil war, the security situation in Iraq is extraordinarily violent and chaotic. Moreover, the

nature of the violence has shifted, with the principal component

now sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiites. The Iraq Study

Group noted that 4 of Iraq’s 18 provinces are, ‘‘highly insecure.’’

And those provinces account for 40 percent of the country’s population.

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A November 2006 U.N. report highlights the extent of the growing bloodshed. The carnage is now running at at least 120 victims

each day. We must remember, this is occurring in a country of

barely 26 million people. A comparable pace in the United States

would be a horrifying 1,400 deaths per day, or nearly 500,000 a

year. If political violence were consuming that many American

lives, there would be little debate about whether the United States

was in a civil war.

In addition to the growing violence, there is mounting evidence

that the majority of Iraqis no longer want United States troops in

their country. The bottom line is that the United States is mired

in a country that is already in the early stages of an exceedingly

complex multisided civil war, and this is not just a war between

Sunnis and Shia, this is a war with multiple factions, including internal conflicts among the various sects. It is also a situation where

all significant factions, save one—the Kurds—want American

troops to leave. That is an untenable situation.

Increasing the number of United States troops in Iraq by 21,000

or so is a futile attempt to salvage a mission that has gone terribly

wrong. It would merely increase the number of casualties, both

American and Iraqi, over the short term, while having little longterm impact on the security environment. Moreover, the magnitude

of the proposed buildup falls far short of the numbers needed to

give the occupation forces a realistic prospect of suppressing the violence. Experts on counterinsurgency, for many, many years, have

consistently concluded that at least 10 soldiers per 1,000 population are required to have a sufficient impact. And, indeed, many

experts have argued that, in cases where armed resistance is intense and pervasive, which certainly seems to apply to Iraq, deployments of 20 soldiers per 1,000 may be needed. Given Iraq’s population of 26 million, such a mission would require the deployment

of at least 260,000 ground forces, and probably as many as 520,000.

We simply don’t have the troops for that kind of mission.

A limited surge of additional troops is the latest illusory panacea

offered by the people who brought us the Iraq quagmire in the first

place. It is an idea that should be rejected, and, instead, the United

States needs to withdraw from Iraq.

Proponents of staying in Iraq offer several reasons why a prompt

withdrawal would be bad for the United States. They argue that

al-Qaeda’s 1,300 fighters will somehow take over Iraq, that a

United States withdrawal will embolden Islamic radicals worldwide, that a withdrawal will lead to a regional Sunni-Shiite proxy

war, and that leaving Iraq without achieving our goals would betray a moral obligation to the Iraqi people. I deal with all of those

allegations, at some length, in my written statement. Suffice it to

say here that those arguments vary in terms of plausibility. Some,

especially the notion that al-Qaeda will be able to take over Iraq,

are farfetched; others, especially the concern about a regional proxy

war, have some validity. All of them, though, are ultimately deficient as a reason for keeping United States troops in Iraq.

A decision to withdraw and leave Iraq to its own fate is certainly

not without adverse consequences. America’s terrorist adversaries

will portray the pullout as a defeat for U.S. policy. But staying on

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indefinitely in a dire and deteriorating security environment is

even worse for our country.

The costs, both tangible and intangible, of a prompt exit must be

measured against the costs of staying in Iraq. Moreover, even if the

United States absorbs the costs of a prolonged mission, there is no

realistic prospect that anything resembling victory resides at the

end of that effort. Indeed, most of the indicators suggest that we

would be merely delaying the inevitable.

The intangible costs are already considerable. America’s reputation in the Muslim world is at its lowest level in history, largely

because of the Iraq mission. America’s reputation elsewhere in the

world, including among longstanding allies and friends, has, likewise, taken a major hit. The All-Volunteer Force has been strained

to the breaking point, and the social wounds that the Vietnam war

inflicted on our society, which took so long to heal, have been

ripped open. Our country is, once again, bitterly divided over a

murky war. The longer we stay in Iraq, the worse all of those problems will become.

The tangible costs are even more depressing. The financial tab for the Iraq mission is already some $350 billion, and the meter is

running at approximately $8 billion a month, and that is before the

President’s new escalation. Furthermore, even those appalling figures do not take into account substantial indirect costs, such as the

expense of long-term care for wounded Iraq war veterans.

The United States needs to adopt a decisive withdrawal strategy,

measured in months, not years. A longer schedule would simply

prolong the agony. Emotionally, deciding to leave under current

conditions will not be easy, for it requires an implicit admission

that Washington has failed in its ambitious goal to create a stable,

united, democratic secular Iraq that would be a model for peace

throughout the Middle East. But that goal was unrealistic, from

the outset. It is difficult for any nation, and especially the American superpower, to admit failure. However, it is better to admit

failure while the adverse consequences are manageable. Failure in

Iraq would be a setback for the United States, particularly in terms

of global clout and credibility, but one of the advantages to being

a superpower is that the country can absorb a setback without experiencing catastrophic damages to its core interests or capabilities.

Failure in Iraq does not even come close to threatening those core

interests and capabilities. Most important, a withdrawal now will

be less painful than withdrawing years from now, when the cost in

blood, treasure, and credibility will be even greater.

The withdrawal needs to be comprehensive, not partial. The only

troops remaining in Iraq should be a modest number of special

forces personnel who would work with political factions to eradicate

the al-Qaeda interlopers in their country. It must be clear to Iraqis

and to populations throughout the Muslim world that Washington

has no intention of trying to maintain a military presence in Iraq.

That has already become a lightning rod for the Muslim world.

Above all, United States policymakers need to absorb the larger

lesson of the Iraq debacle. Launching an elective war in pursuit of

a nation-building fantasy was an act of folly. It is a folly that policymakers should vow never to repeat.

Thank you.

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[The prepared statement of Dr. Carpenter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. TED GALEN CARPENTER, VICE PRESIDENT OF DEFENSE

AND FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, CATO INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Optimism about the U.S. mission in Iraq has faded dramatically in the past few

months. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group conceded that the situation in Iraq was

‘‘grave and deteriorating.’’ The Pentagon’s report to Congress in November 2006

paints a similarly dismal picture, with attacks on U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces,

and Iraqi civilians at record levels.

Yet proponents of the war refuse to admit what is becoming increasingly obvious:

Washington’s Iraq occupation and democratization mission is failing, and there is

little realistic prospect that its fortunes will improve. Something much more dramatic than a modest course correction is needed.

It is essential to ask the administration and its hawkish backers at what point

they will admit that the costs of this venture have become unbearable. How much

longer are they willing to have our troops stay in Iraq? Five years? Ten years?

Twenty years? How many more tax dollars are they willing to pour into Iraq? Another $300 billion? $600 billion? $1 trillion? And most crucial of all, how many more

American lives are they willing to sacrifice? Two thousand? Five thousand? Ten

thousand?

Proponents of the mission avoid addressing such unpleasant questions. Instead,

they act as though victory in Iraq can be achieved merely through the exercise of

will power.

THE DIRE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ

Whether or not one describes it as a civil war, the security situation in Iraq is

extraordinarily violent and chaotic. Moreover, the nature of the violence in that

country has shifted since the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in

Samarra, one of Shia Islam’s holiest sites. The Sunni-led insurgency against United

States and British occupation forces and the security forces of the U.S.-sponsored

Iraqi Government is still a significant factor, but it is no longer the dominant one.

The turmoil now centers around sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shiites.

Baghdad is the epicenter of that strife, but it has erupted in other parts of the country as well. The Iraq Study Group noted that four of Iraq’s 18 provinces are ‘‘highly

insecure.’’ Those provinces account for about 40 percent of the country’s population.

A November 2006 U.N. report highlights the extent of the growing bloodshed. The

carnage is now running at approximately 120 victims each day. This is occurring

in a country of barely 26 million people. A comparable pace in the United States

would be a horrifying 1,400 deaths per day—or nearly 500,000 per year. If violence

between feuding political or ethno-religious factions was consuming that many

American lives, there would be little debate about whether the United States was

experiencing a civil war.

In addition to the casualties in Iraq, there are other human costs. The United Nations estimates that some 1.6 million people have been displaced inside Iraq (i.e.,

they are ‘‘internal refugees’’) as a result of the fighting. Another 1.8 million have

fled the country entirely, mostly to Jordan and Syria. Moreover, the pace of the exodus is accelerating. Refugees are now leaving Iraq at the rate of nearly 3,000 a day.

The bulk of those refugees are middle and upper class families. Indeed, there are

affluent neighborhoods in Baghdad and other cities that now resemble ghost towns.

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE VIOLENCE

The mounting chaos in Iraq is not simply a case of Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, although that is the dominant theme. The Iraq Study Group notes the complexity of Iraq’s security turmoil. ‘‘In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs,

and Turkmen. In Basra and the south, the violence is largely an intra-Shia struggle.’’ Implicitly rejecting the arguments of those who contend that the violence is

primarily a Sunni-Shia conflict confined to Baghdad, the members of the commission point out that ‘‘most of Iraq’s cities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by

persistent violence. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki warns that conflicts in the various regions could be ‘‘Shiite versus Shiite and Sunni versus Sunni.’’

There is also mounting evidence that the majority of Iraqis no longer want U.S.

troops in their country. The bottom line is that the United States is mired in a country that is already in the early stages of an exceedingly complex, multisided civil

war, and where all significant factions save one (the Kurds) want American troops

to leave. That is an untenable situation.

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ILLUSORY SOLUTION—SEND MORE TROOPS

Increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq by 20,000 or so is a futile attempt

to salvage a mission that has gone terribly wrong. In all likelihood, it would merely

increase the number of casualties—both American and Iraqi—over the short term

while having little long-term impact on the security environment. Moreover, the

magnitude of the proposed buildup falls far short of the numbers needed to give the

occupation forces a realistic prospect of suppressing the violence. Experts on

counterinsurgency strategies have consistently concluded that at least 10 soldiers

per 1,000 population are required to have a sufficient impact. Indeed, some experts

have argued that in cases where armed resistance is intense and pervasive (which

certainly seems to apply to Iraq), deployments of 20 soldiers per thousand may be

needed.

Given Iraq’s population (26 million) such a mission would require the deployment

of at least 260,000 ground forces (an increase of 115,000 from current levels) and

probably as many as 520,000. Even the lower requirement will strain the U.S. Army

and Marine Corps to the breaking point. Yet a lesser deployment would have no realistic chance to get the job done. A limited ‘‘surge’’ of additional troops is the latest

illusory panacea offered by the people who brought us the Iraq quagmire in the first

place. It is an idea that should be rejected.

CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING

Proponents of staying in Iraq offer several reasons why a prompt withdrawal

would be bad for the United States. Those arguments vary in terms of plausibility.

All of them, though, are ultimately deficient as a reason for keeping U.S. troops in

Iraq.

Allegation: Al-Qaeda would take over Iraq

Administration officials and other supporters of the war have warned repeatedly

that a ‘‘premature’’ withdrawal of U.S. forces would enable al-Qaeda to turn Iraq

into a sanctuary to plot and launch attacks against the United States and other

Western countries. But al-Qaeda taking over Iraq is an extremely improbable scenario. The Iraq Study Group put the figure of foreign fighters at only 1,300; a relatively small component of the Sunni insurgency against U.S. forces. It strains credulity to imagine 1,300 fighters (and foreigners at that) taking over and controlling

a country of 26 million people.

The challenge for al-Qaeda would be even more daunting than those raw numbers

suggest. The organization does have some support among the Sunni Arabs in Iraq,

but opinion even among that segment of the population is divided. A September

2006 poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found that 94 percent of Sunnis had a somewhat, or highly, unfavorable attitude toward al-Qaeda. As the violence of al-Qaeda attacks has mounted,

and the victims are increasingly Iraqis—not Americans—many Sunnis have turned

against the terrorists. There have even been a growing number of reports during

the past year of armed conflicts between Iraqi Sunnis and foreign fighters.

The PIPA poll also showed that 98 percent of Shiite respondents and 100 percent

of Kurdish respondents had somewhat, or very, unfavorable views of al-Qaeda. The

notion that a Shiite-Kurdish-dominated government would tolerate Iraq becoming a

safe haven for al-Qaeda is improbable on its face. And even if U.S. troops left Iraq,

the successor government would continue to be dominated by the Kurds and Shiites,

since they make up more than 80 percent of Iraq’s population and, in marked contrast to the situation under Saddam Hussein, they now control the military and police. That doesn’t suggest a reliable safe haven for al-Qaeda.

Allegation: The terrorists would be emboldened worldwide

In urging the United States to persevere in Iraq, President Bush has warned that

an early military withdrawal would encourage al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Weak U.S. responses to challenges over the previous quarter century, especially in Lebanon and Somalia, had emboldened such people, Bush argues. Hawkish

pundits have made similar allegations.

It is a curious line of argument with ominous implications, for it assumes that

the United States should have stayed in both countries, despite the military

debacles there. The mistake, according to that logic, was not the original decision

to intervene but the decision to limit American losses and terminate the missions.

That is a classic case of learning the wrong lessons from history.

Yes, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups apparently concluded that the Lebanon

and Somalia episodes showed that U.S. leaders and the American people have no

stomach for enduring murky missions that entail significant casualties. They are

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likely to draw a similar lesson if the United States withdraws from Iraq without

an irrefutable triumph. That is why it is so imperative to be cautious about a decision to intervene in the first place. Military missions should not be undertaken unless there are indisputably vital American security interests at stake.

A decision to withdraw and leave Iraq to its own fate is not without adverse consequences. America’s terrorist adversaries will portray a pullout as a defeat for U.S.

policy. But the cost of staying on indefinitely in a dire security environment is even

worse for our country. President Bush and his advisors need to consider the possibility that the United States might stay in Iraq for many years to come and still

not achieve its policy goals. And the costs, both in blood and treasure, continue to

mount.

Allegation: The conflict will spill over Iraq’s borders and create regional chaos

That concern does have some validity. The ingredients are in place for a regional

Sunni-Shia ‘‘proxy war.’’ Predominantly Shiite Iran has already taken a great interest in political and military developments in its western neighbor. Indeed, Washington has repeatedly accused Tehran of interfering in Iraq. There is little doubt

that Iran wants to see a Shiite-controlled government in Baghdad and would react

badly if it appeared that Iraq’s Sunni minority might be poised to regain power and

once again subjugate the Shiite majority. The current Iraqi Government is quite

friendly to Iran, and Tehran can be expected to take steps to protect the new-found

influence it enjoys in Baghdad.

But Iraq’s other neighbors are apprehensive about the specter of a Shiite-controlled Iraq. Saudi Arabia, in particular, regards the prospect of such a state on its

northern border as anathema, worrying about the impact on its own Shia minority—which is concentrated in the principal oil-producing region. There are indications that wealthy Saudis are already providing funds to Sunni forces in Iraq.

A regional Sunni-Shiite proxy war in Iraq would turn the Bush administration’s

policy there into even more of a debacle than it has already become. Even worse,

Iraq’s neighbors could be drawn in as direct participants in the fighting. Washington

should take steps to head off those dangers.

Probably the best approach would be for the United States to convene a regional

conference that included (at a minimum) Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and

Turkey. The purpose of such a conference should be to make all parties confront the

danger of the Iraqi turmoil mushrooming into a regional armed struggle that ultimately would not be in the best interests of any country involved. Ideally, that realization might lead to a commitment by the neighboring states to refrain from—or

at least bound the extent of—meddling in the escalating violence in Iraq

Ultimately, though, maintaining a U.S. military occupation of Iraq to forestall a

possible regional proxy war is simply too high a price to pay, both in money spent

and American lives sacrificed.

Allegation: Leaving Iraq would betray a moral obligation to the Iraqi people

In addition to their other objections, opponents of withdrawal protest that we will

leave Iraq in chaos, and that would be an immoral action on the part of the United

States. Even some critics of the war have been susceptible to that argument, invoking the so-called Pottery Barn principle: ‘‘You broke it, you bought it.’’

There are two major problems with that argument. First, unless some restrictions

are put in place, the obligation is seemingly open-ended. There is little question that

chaos might increase in Iraq after U.S. forces leave, but advocates of staying the

course do not explain how the United States can prevent the contending factions

in Iraq from fighting the civil war they already seem to have started. At least, no

one has explained how the United States can restore the peace there at anything

resembling a reasonable cost in American blood and treasure.

Leaving aside the very real possibility that the job of building a stable democracy

might never be done, the moral obligation thesis begs a fundamental question: What

about the moral obligation of the U.S. Government to its own soldiers and to the

American people? There is clearly an obligation not to waste either American lives

or American tax dollars. We are doing both in Iraq. Staying the course is not a

moral strategy; it is the epitome of an immoral one.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF STAYING IN IRAQ

Leaving Iraq is clearly not cost-free, but the costs (both tangible and intangible)

of a prompt exit must be measured against the costs of staying the course. Moreover, even if the United States absorbs the costs of a prolonged mission, there is

no certainty that anything resembling victory resides at the end of that effort. Indeed, most of the indicators suggest that we would be merely delaying defeat.

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Damage to America’s standing in the world

Even the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq conceded that

the U.S. occupation of Iraq had served as a focal point and inspiration for Muslim

extremists. Equally worrisome, it had also served as a training arena for such militants to hone their military and terrorist skills. An al-Qaeda letter intercepted by

the U.S. military indicates that the organization itself regards a continued U.S.

military presence and, consequently, a long war in Iraq as a boon to its cause.

A December 2006 Zogby poll of populations in five Arab nations reveals just how

much anti-U.S. sentiment has increased throughout that region. Opinions of the

United States, which were already rather negative, have grown significantly worse

in the past year.

Outside the Arab world, there also has been a hardening of attitudes toward the

United States. Even among longstanding friends and allies (in such places as Europe and East Asia), the United States is viewed in a significantly more negative

light. The longer we stay in Iraq, the worse those problems will become.

Straining the All-Volunteer military

Even some hawks are concerned about the negative impact of the Iraq mission

on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). They should be concerned. In December 2006,

GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army’s Chief of Staff, bluntly told a House committee that the Active-Duty Army ‘‘will break’’ unless there was a permanent increase in force structure. And that is before any contemplated additional deployments to Iraq.

The military leaders are not exaggerating. Already the Army has struggled to

meet its recruiting goals, even though it has diluted the standards for new recruits,

including by issuing waivers in cases where there is evidence of criminal behavior

or mental illness. Indeed, the Iraq occupation has been sustained to this point only

through extraordinary exertions, including an unprecedented number of ‘‘stop loss’’

orders, preventing military personnel from returning to civilian life when their

terms of enlistment are up, and recalling members of the Reserves—including some

people in their forties and fifties. The AVF is straining to the breaking point already, and the longer we stay in Iraq, the worse those strains will become.

Costs in blood and treasure

The tab for the Iraq mission is already more than $350 billion, and the meter is now running at approximately $8 billion a month. Furthermore, even those appalling figures do not take into account indirect costs, such as long-term care for

wounded Iraq war veterans.

Except when the survival of the Nation is at stake, all military missions must be

judged according to a cost-benefit calculation. Iraq has never come close to being a

war for America’s survival. Even the connection of the Iraq mission to the larger

war against radical Islamic terrorism was always tenuous, at best. For all of his odious qualities, Saddam Hussein was a secular tyrant, not an Islamic radical. Indeed,

the radical Islamists expressed nearly as much hatred for Saddam as they did for

the United States. Iraq was an elective war—a war of choice, and a bad choice at

that.

DECIDING TO LEAVE

The United States needs to adopt a withdrawal strategy measured in months, not

years. Indeed, the President should begin the process of removing American troops

immediately, and that process needs to be complete in no more than 6 months. A

longer schedule would simply prolong the agony. It would also afford various Iraq

factions (especially the Kurds and some of the Shia political players) the opportunity

to try to entice or manipulate the United States into delaying the withdrawal of its

forces still further.

Emotionally, deciding to leave under current conditions will not be easy, for it requires an implicit admission that Washington has failed in its ambitious goal to create a stable, united, democratic, secular Iraq that would be a model for peace

throughout the Middle East. But that goal was unrealistic from the outset. It is difficult for any nation, and especially the American superpower, to admit failure.

However, it is better to admit failure when the adverse consequences are relatively

modest. A defeat in Iraq would assuredly be a setback for the United States, particularly in terms of global clout and credibility. But one of the advantages to being

a superpower is that the country can absorb a setback without experiencing catastrophic damage to its core interests or capabilities. Defeat in Iraq does not even

come close to threatening those interests or capabilities. Most important, a withdrawal now will be less painful than withdrawing years from now when the cost

in blood, treasure, and credibility will prove far greater.

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The withdrawal needs to be comprehensive, not partial. The only troops remaining in Iraq should be a modest number of Special Forces personnel who would work

with political factions in Iraq inclined to eradicate the al-Qaeda interlopers in their

country. It must be clear to Iraqis and populations throughout the Muslim world

that Washington has no intention of trying to maintain a military presence in Iraq.

Above all, U.S. policymakers need to absorb the larger lesson of the Iraq debacle.

Launching an elective war in pursuit of a nation-building chimera was an act of

folly. It is a folly they should vow never to repeat in any other country.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Carpenter.

I’d like to—because my colleagues have been so patient today,

why don’t I yield my time and I’ll ask questions last on our side.

And I’ll yield first to Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

the courtesy.

I want to thank all of the panelists for their testimony.

I’d like to start with you, Dr. Kagan. Did you have an opportunity to advise the White House about your plan?

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, I have not spoken with the President, but

I have spoken with individuals in the White House.

Senator MENENDEZ. Are they senior officials of the White House?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Is the plan that you heard the President describe last night, would you say it is largely your plan?

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, it’s very difficult for me to tell. The President gave a very general speech—the elements of the plan relating

to the change of mission, the new strategy to try to secure Iraq, the

commitment of five additional combat brigades to Baghdad, certainly those are things that we recommended. I have not yet seen,

in any detail, the actual military proposal that the President intends to pursue, and so, I can’t really say to what extent this is

my plan.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you agree with the essence of his plan

last night?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I certainly believe that the change in strategy

is essential, that the—we must commit to trying to establish security in Baghdad first. And I do believe that we need additional

forces in order to do that.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, what is the timeframe for that? How

long do we stay there, under—even under your plan—let’s assume,

for argument sakes, this is your plan—how long do we stay?

Dr. KAGAN. Our estimates were that we would be able to establish security in Baghdad, at least in the neighborhoods that we

were proposing to operate in, by the end of 2007. We believe that

we would need to sustain this higher force level into 2008 in order

to support operations in Al Anbar, Diyala, and elsewhere. And we

believe that somewhere in the 18- to 24-month period, we would be

able to begin turning over responsibilities to Iraqi forces and withdrawing.

Senator MENENDEZ. OK. Now, we lead—under your plan, we lead

this fight, do we not?

Dr. KAGAN. Under my plan, we would be working together with

the Iraqis to clear and hold neighborhoods.

Senator MENENDEZ. But we’ve heard a lot of testimony, including

before this committee the other day—yesterday I think—and we’ve

heard from others, that the Iraqis don’t have, at this point, the

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ability to show up for the purposes that have been outlined in the

securing of Baghdad. Isn’t that true? Isn’t that pretty much recognized?

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, when we developed our plan, we took into

account the possibility that the Iraqis would not come in the numbers that might be desirable. And so, we attempted to define a

force level for American troops that would be adequate, even if the

Iraqis disappointed us.

Senator MENENDEZ. You know, it just seems to me that we need

to be honest with the American people in this plan. This plan, as

I see it, including that which is described by the President, wants

to be sugarcoated under the guise that Iraqis are going to lead, and

we are somehow going to follow and give them assistance. And I

clearly have the picture that these American troops who will lead,

will be at the forefront, will be the targets, and we will have some

Iraqis assisting along the way. And that is a fundamentally different mission than both the President tried to suggest and I heard

Secretary Rice try to suggest, this morning, in her opening statement. And I think it’s not quite—well, it’s not quite honest about

what is taking place.

Now, before I came to this afternoon’s hearing, I got a notice that

the New Jersey National Guard troops currently stationed in Iraq

are going to have their tours extended by 120 days as a result of

the President’s policy to add to the war effort. And I think there

is some release out saying that extension of troop tours by both the

Guard and Reserve is now going to be part of the policy of the

United States for up to an additional year. Isn’t that going to have

real consequences on a military that is already far stretched and

cannot meet these challenges—on morale, on performance in the

field, and ultimately on the very recruitment that we need to build

up the Armed Forces strength of the United States?

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, I and the Active Duty and retired officers

who developed this plan are all very concerned about the strains

on the Army and the Marine Corps and the National Guard and

Reserves, but we think that, set against that, we must also be extremely concerned about the prospect that the damage that’ll be

done to the volunteer force by defeat in Iraq, which we believe will

be drawn out, at painful and extremely emotionally searing event,

and we think that it will actually do much greater damage to the

force than the relatively short——

Senator MENENDEZ. Is there an answer to how many lives and

how much money?

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, it was not——

Senator MENENDEZ. Where is it that you define, Dr. Kagan, and

those who advocate along your lines—where is it that you define

that if you do not have success, as you have pointed out a way that

you believe we can achieve success, where is the tipping point? Because to listen to those advocates who say that we cannot fail in

Iraq and believe that failure, in terms of the military options, is the

driving force in—i.e., to create security—we have had escalations

and they have not succeeded. Because, in my mind, we haven’t had

the political surge to do it. Now, you reject that.

The point being, at what point, when you do not succeed again,

if you do not succeed again—at what point will you come and tell

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us, ‘‘Well, if we had another 20, 30, 40,000 troops, we could ultimately succeed here’’? It just seems to me that we’ve been through

this in our history before. Where is the tipping point in which you

are willing to admit that a different course, than even the one you

suggest, is appropriate?

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, I have high confidence that the plan that we

proposed will bring down the level of violence in Baghdad, and I

believe that that will be a positive good, even if we ultimately have

to withdraw from the country because of other unfortunate developments in the political realm. I believe that we need to take this opportunity to try to restore order and try to get ourselves on a track

that will avoid some of the terrible consequences of defeat. If that

doesn’t work, then obviously we will have to reconsider.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Dr. Carpenter, very quickly—I have about a minute left—in your

testimony—in your written testimony, you talk about bringing others in a regional conference, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria,

Jordan, and Turkey. You heard that maybe—I don’t know if you

heard—the Secretary of State’s answers to two of those partners

along the way of not having them engage. Could you give your own

reflections on that, and how does bringing Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the table at the same time, in a regional context, gives us

an opportunity to offset some of her concerns, and—how do you

view that?

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, I think it is absolutely essential to involve all of Iraq’s neighbors in an attempt to try to at least quarantine the violence in that country and prevent it from becoming

a regional proxy war, or, even worse, a regional war. That simply

cannot be accomplished without involving Iran and Syria. As distasteful as we rightfully regard those governments, they are important actors in the region. And one of the basic lessons I think we

need to learn for American foreign policy generally is that it is not

very effective to refuse to talk to one’s adversaries, that the most

difficult task of diplomacy is getting results from regimes that you,

quite frankly, wish didn’t exist. It’s easy to talk to one’s friends; it

is very, very difficult, but ever so necessary, to talk to one’s adversaries. And we are not going to get any kind of solution, even the

limited solution of quarantining the violence in Iraq, unless we

draw in Iran and Syria, as well as Iraq’s other neighbors, into this

process.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’m

going to follow your good example and yield to Senator Corker.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can interrupt for just one moment, I would

say to my colleagues, if, in fact, you have additional questions, in

light of the relatively small number here, my intention would be

to allow you to go back for a second round, if the panel would be

willing to stick around.

Thank you.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate it.

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I enjoyed your remarks. And, again, I want to thank our chairman for the distinguished panelists that we continue to have in

these meetings.

I think that we talk a great deal about ending the war in Iraq

and withdrawing our troops, but I think we all know that the war

in Iraq is going to continue for years, in one way or another, if we

leave. And so, I’d like for each of you to respond, if you will, to us,

if we, in fact, do withdraw, if, in fact, President Bush’s plan is not

followed—I’d like for you all to paint the picture—I know there’s

going to be tremendous civil strife, tens and thousands of lives will

be lost in the following period—describe to us, if you will, if withdrawal does occur in a timely fashion—6 months, 9 months—how

you view Iraq to be when that occurs.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Let me take a crack at that, Senator.

Certainly, if we withdraw, there is going to be continued sectarian killing between Sunnis and Shiites. Iran will exercise enormous influence in Iraq. For decades Iran sponsored the Shiite religious parties that, as a result of the U.S. invasion, now control

Iraq’s government. The central government will not exercise any

more authority than it does now, which is to say it will have basically no authority. Kurdistan will continue to be, de facto, independent.

And if we stay in Iraq, all of this will also be the case. There is

a civil war in Iraq which we are not containing that civil war.

There is terrible sectarian killing, and we’re not able to stop it. An

increase in the number of troops is not going to help control the

killing. Our troops are not trained to be police. They don’t speak

the language. They don’t have the local knowledge. And if they are

relying on so-called Iraqi troops, you have to ask the question: Who

are those Iraqi troops? They are going to be either Sunni or Shiite

or Kurdish peshmerga. If a Sunni or Shiite stops at a roadblock

manned by troops or police of the opposite sect, his life is in danger. Unless a Baghdad resident knows the local troops or police are

from his own sect, he’s not going to feel safe.

So, the short answer is that Iraq after withdrawal and Iraq today

are not going to look very much different. There is just the one

achievable goal, which is one that Senator Lugar mentioned. We

can, I think, disrupt al-Qaeda.

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, if I may, I must respectfully disagree. Iraq,

after withdrawal, will look very different. It is not the case that we

are doing nothing at all to contain the civil war, and we should not

delude ourselves into imagining that if we left, it would simply continue in this similar fashion.

It is certainly true that when Iraqis come to Iraqi checkpoints

manned only by Iraqis, at this point, they’re frequently nervous if

those Iraqis are from another sect, unless there are American soldiers present with them. And right now, we have been very effective in a number of places in maintaining order, keeping a lid on

things, working together with Iraqi troops that are there; who do

perform infinitely better when we are there and are much more restrained in their behavior and much more tolerated and trusted by

the Iraqi population. And you can even see this on Sunni blogs in

Iraq, where Sunnis warn each other, ‘‘If the Iraqi police come by

themselves, we should be very worried about that. If they come

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with American troops, it’s OK.’’ Now, that’s obviously not a good

sign for being able to do any sort of rapid transition to the Iraqi

police, but that’s hardly news. It does mean, first of all, that the

Iraqis are less hostile to our presence than many people make out,

and it also means that we are playing an important role.

If we were to withdraw precipitantly, the violence would increase

dramatically—I think, by orders of magnitude. I think you would

end up seeing millions of people displaced. We’re already seeing

this process underway, and it’s extremely unfortunate. I believe

that Iraq’s neighbors would begin to get involved. They would have

to, in terms of self-defense. There are already 900,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan, for instance. I believe that they would attempt to

resolve this problem by moving their own forces forward into Iraq

in order to stem the refugee tides and contain the violence before

it reaches their borders. I think they would be drawn rapidly into

the conflict. I think some of them would seek to be drawn into the

conflict by supporting one side or the other. I think, before very

long, you would find that the regional—that Iraq’s neighbors would

see themselves as stakeholders in various parts of the outcome of

this conflict, and would begin mobilizing increased degrees of military power to back their stakes.

In short, I believe it’s very likely that we would find ourselves

in the midst of a regional conflict in a region from which we cannot

leave, in an area which we simply cannot abandon, and with the

stakes much higher, and the conditions for us much worse, even

apart from the humanitarian catastrophe that would be involved.

Senator CORKER. And that sounds a lot like escalation to me,

but—go ahead.

Dr. CARPENTER. Senator, first of all, I would agree with almost

everything that Ambassador Galbraith said. I think it’s important

to emphasize that the civil war is already underway in Iraq. We

have a situation—I’ve already cited the number of people dying on

a daily basis: 1.6 million people have been displaced internally,

largely moving from areas where they are an ethnic minority to

one where they are in the majority, so ethnic cleansing and the sectarian divide is growing almost by the day; 1.8 million people have

already left the country entirely, and those are primarily the middle-class Iraqis, the very people that we want as the building

blocks for a strong civil society—they’re leaving. This is with the

American troop presence there.

We face the prospect now of trying to play referee in an ongoing

multisided civil war. I can’t think of anything that would be a more

futile and frustrating task than trying to play that role.

And, for Dr. Kagan, I think it’s important to stress that this kind

of commitment would be open-ended. We would be refereeing this

conflict, year after year after year. There would be no discernible

end in sight.

As Ambassador Galbraith has already delineated, Iraq has already fragmented. We’re seeing this process proceed. But it is very,

very unlikely that it’s going to be reversed.

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you for your comments. And I

really do ask these questions without bias. And I know my time is

up, but let me—so, what you’re saying is, you would sense no intensified killing, no escalation whatsoever, whether we are there or

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not there. You think it will remain exactly as is today. That’s what

Dr. Galbraith said.

Dr. CARPENTER. I think we’re going to see an intensification

where—whenever we leave, whether that is 6 months from now or

6 years from now. What we need to focus on—and I agree with him

fully—is making sure that al-Qaeda cannot use any portion of Iraq

for a safe haven. I think that danger is exaggerated, but it’s not

insignificant. We do have to deal with that problem. And we need

to focus on a limited attainable objective—namely, quarantining

that violence in Iraq so that it does not become a regional war. And

I believe there is a reasonable prospect of convincing even Iran and

Syria that a proxy war can easily spiral out of control and it would

not be in their best interest to tolerate that kind of development,

that it is better to quarantine this conflict and allow the dynamics

in Iraq to play themselves out. Perhaps, at some point, the various

factions in Iraq will agree on compromise, either a reasonably

peaceful formal partition or a very loose federation with adequate

political compromise, but they have to determine that. We cannot

determine that outcome for them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I say to my friend from Florida, I have taken his advice and—

if it’s all right with him, right?

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. I was fully prepared to give back the favor that

Senator Nelson gave me yesterday, but—thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I appreciate this opportunity. Not

that I don’t want to see my colleagues, but this is a nice way to

do a hearing. [Laughter.]

You get to this end quicker this way. No; I’m grateful for this opportunity, and I’m grateful for the three of you spending the time

and providing the scholarship that you provide for this important

discussion today.

My friends in the media should cover this, as they did this morning’s hearing, but that’s not the way things are done here.

But let me get right to a couple of basic questions. And I think

I’ll direct some of these at each member of the panel, but, in particular, I guess, the first one, I’d direct in—with specificity, to Dr.

Galbraith—Ambassador Galbraith.

You mentioned the presence of, and the activity of, what you

called ‘‘local theocracies.’’ That’s the first time I had heard that

kind of pinpoint analysis of what’s happening, really, in neighborhoods, so to speak, on that. You talked about local theocracies

operating, and action taking place at the local level, which is in

contravention of, or in conflict with, the Constitution. Could you

amplify that?

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Senator, we talk about Iraq as if there

were a functioning Iraqi Government, and that the violence is

somehow directed against that government. But the reality is very

different. Various Shiite political parties control different parts of

the south. In Baghdad, the Mahdi Army controls the Shiite neighborhoods. These political parties and militias enforce their own law.

If you’re accused of a crime or some offense against the religious

law, you don’t necessarily go to the state-run courts but, quite

often, end up before an ad hoc court that will hand out a summary

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punishment. Although the sale of alcohol, for example, is not illegal

in Iraq, Christians who sell alcohol have been summarily executed

based upon unofficial religious law.

Nonetheless, the Shiite south is relatively a stable situation. To

get rid of religious party rule would entail a major military operation involving several hundred thousand troops.

The one place in the south that is not stable is Basrah where

three different Shiite parties are vying for the control of the city,

and, more importantly, are vying for the control of the smuggling

of oil. I have been told by Iraq’s Oil Ministry that 100,000 barrels

less a day enters the pipeline near Basrah than actually gets on

the ships in the Persian Gulf. And this oil is funding these three

parties and their militias.

Senator CASEY. And the next question I have pertains just to diplomacy, generally. I’ll direct it to the Ambassador, but certainly,

Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Kagan, can also weigh in on this, and you

should, if—I think we’ve got enough time. The question of diplomacy. Ambassador, if you had a—I want to say ‘‘if you had a magic

wand’’—but if you had the opportunity to construct a diplomatic

strategy, starting today and going forward, forget about the past—

there’s a lot we could talk about, what I would judge failures, but

let’s just start from today, going forward—what’s the best strategy,

in your mind, in terms of dealing with the cards we’ve been dealt,

in terms of an overall fully engaged diplomatic strategy?

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Well, first, I think we need to be clear

about our objectives. And even if we wished Iraq were to hold together, we need to be realistic about what is achievable. I believe

our top priority should be to avoid—or minimize—the violence that

accompanies Iraq’s breakup. This violence could escalate sharply if

the regional states were to intervene. There is a danger Turkey

might intervene in Kirkuk, where a referendum is supposed to be

held at the end of this year. Iran might increase its already large

role in Iraq. The Saudis have threatened to intervene on behalf of

the Sunnis, although I think that’s largely an empty threat. Our

diplomacy should be aimed at helping Iraq’s neighbors face up to

the new realities in Iraq, try to make whatever is going to develop

as palatable to them as possible.

I don’t subscribe to the notion, in the Baker-Hamilton Report,

that talking to Iran or Syria would improve the situation in Iraq,

because Iran, in fact, supports the same Shiite-led government that

we do. The people in power in Iraq are Iran’s best friends. Iran has

no desire to undermine the Iraqi Government, even if it opposes

our presence. And Syria is not a large player; and so, there isn’t

much to be accomplished there.

I do believe, however, that we should talk to Iran and Syria on

other issues. As President Kennedy said in his inaugural address,

‘‘we should never negotiate out of fear, but we should never fear

to negotiate.’’ I think this advice is highly relevant to Iran and

Syria. I might add that I also like this line because it was my father who wrote it for President Kennedy.

The CHAIRMAN. I should be attributing that to your father, then,

rather than President Kennedy. That’s a great line, and it’s a good

point.

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Senator CASEY. I wanted to ask one more question, but, Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Kagan, if you wanted to weigh in?

Dr. KAGAN. Sure. I think we have to be realistic about what diplomacy can achieve and what diplomacy cannot achieve. I’m not

going to say, a priori, that we should or should not negotiate with

any state in the region. What I am going to say is that the problems in Iraq that we’re facing right now are internal Iraqi problems, primarily. The money for the insurgency is coming primarily

from corruption and crime and other things that are internal to

Iraq. There are weapons that are coming into Iraq, but, as a friend

of mine in the United States military said once, there’s enough

high explosive in Iraq to keep this conflict going at this level for

1,000 years. There is no real prospect for cutting off supply to this

insurgency or to this violence, and thereby turning it off. And

therefore, with all of the goodwill in the world, I do not believe that

the Iranians or the Syrians are capable of helping us materially in

Iraq, even were we to talk to them.

Neither do I believe that it would be effective to try to negotiate

with the states or the region in order to get them to hold the ring

while their coreligionists slug it out in a vicious sectarian genocidal

civil war. I think, you know, it is very odd to me that people are

ready to say that the Iraqis are irrational and will not act in their

own interests, and that they’re simply hopeless, and yet say that,

nevertheless, the Iranians will be perfectly rational, despite evidence to the contrary, and other states in the region will behave

with perfect rationality, even as the stakes go up and the atrocities

mount. I find that, frankly, unlikely.

Senator CASEY. I know we’re out of time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You had one other question?

Senator CASEY. One quick one. I don’t know if it’s a yes or no.

But in terms of the mechanics of constructing a diplomatic strategy, going forward, what does that mean, specifically, in any of

your opinions? Does it mean Secretary Rice, who’s leaving, I guess,

tomorrow, and will be there for an extended period of time—does

that mean she’s—in your judgment, stays? Does it mean an envoy?

What does it mean? Does it mean the President has to have more

personal involvement? What are the building blocks of that kind of

a—we can all talk about diplomacy, but what does that mean, practically, in terms of time and personnel and attention, if you get my

drift?

Dr. CARPENTER. There are a number of possible options. I would

suggest putting a special envoy in charge. I think that’s probably

the more direct approach. We also have to be realistic. As much as

it might be constructive over the long term to engage with Iran and

other countries on a variety of issues, the more issues we add to

the agenda, the greater the likelihood of a breakdown. And I speak,

specifically, if we start bringing in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute

into the mix. That almost guarantees failure. I would have a very

narrow, very focused agenda, and that is, let’s prevent the tragedy

in Iraq—and it certainly is that—from becoming a full-blown regional tragedy. That goal, I believe, is attainable. There’s no guarantee that we’re going to succeed, but we ought to make the effort,

and I think there is at least a reasonable prospect we can succeed

with that narrow, but extremely important, goal.

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Senator CASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to ask, of the panel, reaction to these observations. It would appear that—this may be over

generalized, so correct me if I’m wrong—but prior to now our

United States forces were, if not on the periphery of Baghdad, were

clearly not embedded, as the term is now being used, in the nine

police districts of Baghdad. So, if our forces acted within the city,

they were on patrol or had been called upon, coming in from the

outside, took action, perhaps alongside the police or the army, and

withdrew again to the outskirts of the city. And this, at least, is

the mode of operations that is being pointed out as permitting a

great deal more Iraqi casualties, irrespective of whether those

killings are civil war or sectarian violence. But the killings escalated because of certain events. So, it would appear that the plan

now being presented by the President is to have Americans embedded; although it is yet been revealed, specifically, what the role of

the Americans will be. Some have said, no, it will not be a doorto-door visit alongside an Iraqi police officer; rather, we’ll be back

at the headquarters, we’ll be monitoring the conduct of the Iraqis

to make sure that it is neutral with regard to whomever they

might encounter on patrol. And, in this way, essentially, there’ll be,

potentially, better goodwill built among the populace so that the

government may have some chance of operating and coming to decisions.

Now, I would suggest that this may be the most important goal.

But, on the other hand, weigh this against the fact that some who

are arguing this already in the Senate or Congress or the public

would say, ‘‘This is the last chance, this is an opportunity to stop

the unacceptable violence in the Baghdad area. If it doesn’t work,

we’re out of there.’’ And they mean out of Iraq, not out of Baghdad.

Now, this concerns me a great deal, because I see that domestic political dynamics might very well lead that way. The President

asked for support of his policy, and should it—for some reason, not

work very soon, or maybe not work very well at all, and people say,

‘‘That’s enough.’’

Now, leaving aside the strategies you all have presented today,

in which perhaps you, Dr. Carpenter, have come closest to

advocating a total withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. Although I suspect you would have disagreement, as to what American forces do. Some of us have argued that the important objective, really, is to have Americans in Iraq somewhere, and for quite

a while, largely to reduce the potential for sectarian violence across

the region, and, likewise, to prevent a series of tragedies that could

result. It is also important for Secretary Rice on her tour now, or

subsequent ones, to convey explicitly that we are going to be there;

and, therefore, they can count on that. It’s not a negotiation, but

it’s information. Likewise, maybe if she is successful, she gets a

roundtable of all the groups that are involved, the nations, so they

all inform each other of what their intent may be. Everybody, sort

of, hears it, so that the chances for some regional stability are enhanced in that process.

Now, Ambassador Galbraith has suggested that Americans

might, in fact, reside in Kurdistan as—or the Kurd part of the

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country, as at least one place that they are welcomed and relatively

safe as may be in the area, but this could be any number of places,

and I don’t want to game that out.

I’m just asking, I suppose, for some advice as to whether, in this

current political situation, not only in Iraq, but in the Middle East

and here, is it not a more prudent step to think in terms of how

we maintain a presence, and that we argue about that, as opposed

to numbers, surges, precisely what the Americans will do, door to

door or in the headquarters?

Does anyone have a general comment on this?

Ambassador.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Senator Lugar, the point you make is

very similar to the one that I’ve made in my testimony. That is,

the United States does have some remaining achievable objectives.

The most important is one that you mentioned: Namely, disrupting

al-Qaeda. That is one reason not to withdraw completely. There is

some advantage to having United States forces in Iraq as a deterrent. Being in Kurdistan would help stabilize the situation as between Kurdistan and Turkey. I think the independence of

Kurdistan is inevitable. It may not be desirable, but it is inevitable.

But it’s not immediate. And, in that sense, a United States presence can help bring stability to that region, and provide reassurance to Turkey, as well as deter any kind of action that might be

taken by the surrounding states.

The reason I argue for a United States military presence in

Kurdistan is that that’s where our forces would be welcome. If they

are anyplace else in the country, they will have to devote large resources to force protection.

I want to come back to a fundamental problem, which I think everybody who has a plan for Iraq must address—what happens after

you’ve done all these things, be it the President’s plan or my proposal for a redeployment to Kurdistan? The situation in Iraq is not

going to change in any fundamental way. The government of Prime

Minister Nouri al-Maliki reflects the will of the 60 percent of the

Iraqi population—the Shiites—who voted for it. The Shiite electorate wishes to define Iraq as a Shiite state. And even Sunnis who

despised Saddam Hussein are not going to accept that definition of

the state. On the other hand, the Shiites are not going to give up

on it. So, you are never going to get to an inclusive state. I don’t

discuss the Kurds, because, for all practical purposes, they’re out

of Iraq already.

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, if I could respond, as well. I—first of all,

Ambassador Galbraith has made this point repeatedly, but I do

find it a little bit odd—I understand the Kurdish perspective, but

I find it a little bit odd to say that the Kurds are out of there

already, when the President of Iraq is a Kurd, and when there is

a substantial bloc of Kurdish representatives in Parliament—in the

Iraqi Parliament who have been extremely active. The Kurds may

think that they’re out, in some respects, but they’re clearly continuing to play. And I think the reason for that is that they understand that, at the end of the day, it is not in the interests of

Kurdistan for Kurdistan to break off from Iraq and have vast sectarian civil war going on immediately to their south, which will inevitably push refugees in their direction and involve them in vioVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00244 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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lence along their borders. That’s not in their interest. And I credit

the Kurds with more self-interest—more understanding of their

self-interest than that, than to think that they imagine that that’s

going to be a happy scenario for them.

I’m very concerned about the practicalities—the military practicalities, of a plan for maintaining United States forces in

Kurdistan, with the expectation that they will be doing things in

Iraq. Where will they draw their supplies from? They certainly

can’t maintain a supply line the length of Iraq into Kurdistan without having a very substantial presence that would run against the

concept. They will have to draw their supplies from Turkey. Well,

the Turks might well allow that to happen, for a variety of reasons,

but I’m curious about what demands the Turks would end up making on the Kurds in return for support of our presence there. After

all, the people who most adamantly oppose the idea of an independent Kurdistan are the Turks. And the problems of the PKK

and the fear of terrorism based in Kurdistan, I fear, could lead to

a very, very nasty situation very rapidly.

In addition to that, Kurdistan is far away from any of the regions

where we would have to be most concerned about al-Qaeda infiltration. And I think we have to ask ourselves: What do we think the

military operations look like? Are we going to fly our soldiers in

helicopters across uncontrolled hostile terrain spotted with surfaceto-air missiles and a variety of other dangers, to land in unknown

places, conduct operations and leave? Those are very daunting military operations. It’s much harder—if your concern is dealing with

al-Qaeda, it’s much harder and more dangerous to our soldiers to

undertake those kinds of operations than it is to attempt to bring

the security situation under control more generally and have a firm

base in Iraq from which you can deal with these things on a local

basis.

I’m also very concerned about the prospect of having American

soldiers flown in, on call, from local Iraqis to deal with what problems that they report. We’ve seen that, all too often, when our soldiers are flying in from afar, coming in from afar, and do not know

the local situation, they can easily be drawn into actions that are

counterproductive. When they’re present, and when they can understand the neighborhood—and to talk about local knowledge at

this point and say that our soldiers don’t have it, when many of

them are going back on their third tours into Iraq, I must say, I

think we have a pretty fair amount of understanding of Iraq in the

army, at this point—our soldiers on the ground are able to recognize situations that they should not involve themselves in, but only

if they’re there.

Dr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond briefly. In one

sense, the President’s new proposal is regressive, in that it further

Americanizes the war, which I think is exactly the opposite direction that we ought to be going.

There is also an inherent contradiction in his speech last night.

On the one hand, he contends that it would be absolutely disastrous for the United States to leave Iraq with something less than

a victory; on the other hand, he sets up these milestones for the

Iraqi Government with, certainly, the implied threat that if the

Iraqi Government does not meet those milestones, our commitment

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is not unlimited and it’s not open-ended, that we might then withdraw, presumably with something less than a victory. I would

maintain he can’t have it both ways. If it is true that any withdrawal from Iraq with less than a victory would truly be disastrous

for the United States, then we are stuck in Iraq indefinitely; we

have to stay there even if the Iraqi Government were the biggest

collection of villains or buffoons on the planet, because our own

vital interests would dictate that we stay.

I would argue that, in fact, it would be far less than a disaster

for the United States to leave Iraq, and that, ultimately, we have

a choice of leaving now, having spent $350 billion and 3,000 American lives, or the committee can have a similar hearing 2 years

from now, when the costs may very well be $600 billion and 5,500

or 6,000 American lives. That’s the choice we really face.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I’d say to my colleagues, I’ve just been informed

there is a—is it a vote or a live quorum? There’s a live quorum that

just began. I would suggest—it’s up to the Senator from Florida—

he can begin his questions, if he’d like to do that, or we can recess

and go, and then I’ll ask my questions last. Are you ready to go?

Well, what I’m going to do is turn the gavel over to the Senator

from Florida, and we’ll go vote, and hopefully by the time he finishes his questions, if we’re not back, if you could recess for 3 or

4 minutes, and we’ll take the intervening time, because I have

some questions, and anyone else who has any more can come back.

But I’d like to spend 10 minutes with you. So—if I may.

So, I—I’m going to go vote. I guess others are, as well. But the

chair is yours, sir. And we’ll be back shortly.

Senator BILL NELSON. So, I get to completely run the——

The CHAIRMAN. You get to completely run the committee. You

can get unanimous consent for anything you want if you’re the only

one here. [Laughter.]

And so—I’ve always enjoyed it when I was in that position.

Senator BILL NELSON. Can I——

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, you have a lot more power

than any chairman has.

Senator BILL NELSON. You mean I can get unanimous consent on

changing the rules about seniority? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, you could probably do that, until I come

back and seek a vote on it. [Laughter.]

But—no, but it’s all yours, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON [presiding]. Well, what do you all think the

President meant when he said America’s commitment is not openended?

Dr. CARPENTER. I have to admit I’m a bit cynical about it. I think

it is an empty threat, it is a bluff, it is an attempt to get the Maliki

government to do what Ambassador Galbraith has demonstrated

pretty clearly it is not either willing or capable of doing. And this

threat is not going to be taken seriously by the Maliki government.

They feel that we are in Iraq for the long term and that they will

not respond to this setting of milestones without penalties. And,

frankly, if you don’t have very specific penalties, milestones become

largely meaningless.

237

Ambassador GALBRAITH. We’re not far from the day when the

Maliki government might be just as happy to see us go. The civil

war can end either in power-sharing—regionalization is a type of

power-sharing—or it can end in victory for one side. Scholars who

have look at civil wars fought since World War II note that, maybe,

15 percent have ended with power-sharing while the other 85 percent have ended with one side winning. And who’s going to win the

civil war in Iraq? The Shiites are three times as numerous, and

they have, in neighboring Iran, a very powerful ally. The Shiites

have much larger armed forces than the Sunni Arabs, and they

control the mechanisms of the state. The Sunni Arab countries that

might ally with the Iraqi Sunnis are relatively weak states. The

Saudis have money, but limited ability to project power. Jordan is

far from the populated parts of Iraq. The Syrian position is ambivalent. Syria is an ally of Iran, and it’s ruled by the Alawites, who

are a Shiite sect, even though Syria is a Sunni majority state. So,

the alternative to power-sharing and regionalization is a Shiite victory in the civil war which, in turn, might well lead to the genocide

that Dr. Kagan has warned about. But, from the point of view of

the Maliki government, a U.S. withdrawal may not be the end of

the world.

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, I think that—I disagree with the notion

that the Iraqis think that we’re staying there forever. I think, on

the contrary, that the Iraqi Shia, for the most part, decided some

time ago that we were going to be out quickly. And I believe that

the Iraqi Sunni Arabs have also decided that we are on the way

out. And I believe that the various intelligence estimates that we

heard at the end of last year suggest that a number of these groups

are already ready to do their victory dances, because they think

that they have defeated us and that we will be, shortly, leaving.

And I think that we have seen the beginning of a dominance dance

in Iraq already, as rival Shia groups begin to position themselves

for a contest that they expect to occur within their own community

over which Shia group will run a Shia-dominated Iraq.

I don’t think that the problem is convincing the Iraqis that we

are going to leave at some point. I think that the Iraqis expect us

to leave shortly. And I don’t think that the Maliki government has

been failing to do what it is that we want them to do because they

think that we’re going to be there forever and that that’s a good

thing. I think that they have not been doing what we wanted them

to do, in the first instance, in many cases, because they were incapable of it, because we were expecting of them things that were

unreasonable, and the standards that we have set for what we

want the Iraqi security forces to be able to do by themselves, I’ve

thought, have been unreasonable for a long time, which is why I

think that it’s very important that the President come forward with

a plan that recognizes the limitations of those forces and the importance of having American forces in the lead. I recognize that’s

not what he said, but that is what we recommended, and I believe

that that would be the appropriate way to approach this problem.

There’s been a lot of talk about incentivizing the Iraqi Government. And I have to confess that I have a problem with a lot of

that conversation, because what we’re really proposing to

incentivize them with is the threat of unleashing complete genocide

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on the Iraqi people by pulling out and allowing the civil war to escalate unchecked and making no effort to restrain it. I find that to

be a somewhat ambivalent ethical position to take, to say that, ‘‘If

you don’t do what we say, we’re going to allow you to plunge into

this horrible abyss.’’ It also is a strange position to take toward a

government that we wish to regard as an allied government, that

our notion of incentivizing them is hurling repeated threats of such

catastrophe at them.

I think it’s worth discussing what we could do to incentive the

Maliki government, either positively or negatively, but I don’t think

that it’s appropriate for us to throw threats at them that we will

simply withdraw, in spite of our concern for them, in spite of our

ethical position, and in spite of our own interests, simply as a way

of attempting to compel them to do the things that we think they

need to do.

Senator BILL NELSON. What are your expectations of the Maliki

government? And when?

Dr. KAGAN. I expect that the Maliki government will, in the first

instance, tolerate the operation that we are proposing, and they

have already shown that they will tolerate it. I expect them to send

Iraqi forces to assist in it, and they have already begun to do that,

as General Pace testified, earlier in the day. I expect that to continue, although I, frankly, expect to be disappointed by the number

of troops that actually show up, as we regularly have been. But I

expect them to show up in greater numbers than they have before.

I expect them to cooperate with us actively as we work to establish

security for their people in the capital. And I expect, as that security proceeds, that they will begin to make important strides in the

direction of the reconciliation initiatives that are going to be so important to the long-term settlement of this conflict.

I do expect them to undertake those things. I expect that the

process will be arduous, there will be setbacks, and there will be

disappointments.

Senator BILL NELSON. So, you think it will meet the President’s

test.

Dr. KAGAN. I believe that we will be able to attain a stable and

secure state in Iraq.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I hope you’re right, but I don’t believe it. And that’s my impression.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Mr. Chairman.

Senator BILL NELSON. And my impression is that increased

troops in Anbar province will help, but not in Baghdad.

Mr. Galbraith.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Here’s what I expect from the Maliki

government. I expect it to say what it wants us to hear, and I don’t

expect it to do very many of those things at all. Perhaps the best

example of this is the Prime Minister’s repeated statements that

militias are incompatible with the functioning of a democratic Iraq,

and then he does precisely nothing about the militias. And that is

not because he’s weak, that’s not because he’s dependent on the

Sadrists for support, but it is because he is part of the system of

sectarian Shiite rule that includes the Shiite militias.

The character of the Maliki government was perhaps best demonstrated by the manner in which it executed Saddam Hussein. In

239

his rush to execute Saddam for a 1982 crime against supporters of

his Dawa Party, Maliki cut short Saddam’s ongoing trial for the

Kurdish genocide, a case that involved a thousand times as many

dead as did the Dujail case. He acted over the protests of the Kurds

and, in the rush to execution, did not follow Iraq’s constitutional

procedures that require all three Presidents to ratify a death sentence. He allowed the Mahdi Army militiamen to participate in the

execution. That wasn’t incompetence, that was the way his government is.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Carpenter. Just a minute, and then

I’m going to have to run to make this vote.

Dr. CARPENTER. I would take a position roughly midpoint between what Ambassador Galbraith has said and what Dr. Kagan

has said. I think the Maliki government will participate, with some

vigor, in operations to crack down on the Sunni insurgents and

Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, and it will do little or nothing

when it comes to operations to crack down on the Shiite militias.

This is a sectarian government, as much as the Bush administration really doesn’t want to admit that reality, and it is a participant in the ongoing civil war. It is not a neutral arbiter. We have

to understand that point.

What I worry about is the American troops increasingly being

embedded with Iraqi security forces. I think that was one of the

worst proposals of the Iraq Study Group; and, unfortunately, it’s

one of the main things the Bush administration has adopted. One

of the reasons we have been able to keep——

Senator BILL NELSON. Why? Why, on the embedding?

Dr. CARPENTER. Why they adopted it? Or why is it——

Senator BILL NELSON. Why do you disagree with the embedding?

Dr. CARPENTER I think one of the reasons that we’ve been able

to keep casuality rates relatively low is the American——

Senator BILL NELSON. OK. So, you think it would increase American casualties.

Dr. CARPENTER. It makes them more and more vulnerable.

They’re going to be dependent on their security on their Iraqi counterparts.

Senator BILL NELSON. OK.

The committee will stand in recess, subject to the call of the

Chair. Thank you all very much.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. We’ll come back to order.

I thank you for your patience. I know the Ambassador, after 14

years up here, knows what it’s like here. The reason why Senator

Lugar and I hung around over there, we were told there was going

to be an immediate vote, and they’re still—it probably won’t occur

til tomorrow morning. But, I apologize.

Gentlemen, I—the reason I asked you to stay is, I’ve been impressed with what you’ve written in the past and how cogent your

arguments are for your various positions. And, as I said earlier, my

intention, along with Chairman Lugar, is to try to, as thoroughly

and as clearly as possible, lay out for our colleagues what options

people—bright people think exist out there, because I don’t think

any one of us would suggest there’s any, ‘‘good answer’’ left. I know

what each of you are proposing is not what you would do if you

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could wave a wand and come to a—what you would think would

be the best outcome for Iraq and for the United States.

But let me start off with a broad question and ask each of you

to respond—in any order. And that is—tell me, if you will—and

this may be a way to meet my objective of trying to focus, for my

colleagues and for me, the alternatives—how does what you are

proposing differ—and why—from what the President has proposed?

In other words, maybe starting with you, Dr. Kagan, I read your

report, ‘‘Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq.’’ I may be

mistaken, but it seems as though what the President proposed has

the elements of what you have proposed, but not, if I may, the

weight of how you proposed it. And you very clearly lay out that

the first stage in the process is the Sunni neighborhoods, if I’m not

mistaken—is it 19 or—you list a specific number.

Dr. KAGAN. Twenty-three, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty-three. Then Sadr City, then Anbar province—which makes sense to me. I mean, if you’re going to adopt

the proposal, or if you think the best outcome, and the way to

achieve it, is to surge force, you have been, in my view, the most

thoroughly honest, in the sense of laying out, from beginning to

end, what you think has to happen for there to be success.

And so, why don’t we start—as succinctly as you can, but take

what time you need. Tell me how—and I’m not looking for you to

criticize the President. I’m just—I’m just trying to have everybody

understand where the gaps are, so that when they take a look, they

know what they’re talking about, what’s being said. Tell me how

what you have proposed, in broad strokes or as specific as you can

get, is different than—not just what we heard last night, but the

actual plan, which obviously the President didn’t have a chance to

go into every jot and tittle of his plan—how it differs, as best you

know it.

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for your kind

remarks about our report and also for the opportunity to speak

with you about this.

I will answer your question directly, but I would like to offer a

couple of caveats. First of all, I don’t feel like I know what the

President’s plan is, in any great detail. We can look at some——

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough.

Dr. KAGAN [continuing]. Of the things that he said.

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not sure, either.

Dr. KAGAN. And I’d also like to make the point that we are going

to have, apparently, a change of command in Iraq shortly, from

General Casey to General Petraeus, I hope—a man for whom I

have a tremendous amount of respect.

The CHAIRMAN. I share your view about Petraeus.

Dr. KAGAN. And when General Petraeus takes command, he will

have to look at the situation afresh and develop a plan that he’s

going to be comfortable executing. He’s certainly not simply going

to take the plan that has been developed, you know, before he got

there, and execute it. So, I would expect to see some changes, even

in the plan that has been outlined so far, when the actual commander gets there. That would be normal.

Having said that, I think that the plan that the President outlined, insofar as he did, is similar to ours in its large aspects, apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00250 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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parently differs from ours in some more tactical details, which I

think are extremely important.

He did say that he would change the strategy and that he would

change the mission of United States forces in Iraq from having the

primary goal of training and transitioning to having the primary

goal of establishing security. And I think that’s a terrifically important change in strategy. It is the one that we recommended.

And I’d like to make a point that people are focusing on the number of additional troops that will be sent in as being the delta between what we’ve been doing and what we will be doing. And that’s

actually not right. We have, already, something like 20 or 25,000

American soldiers in and around Baghdad. They have not had it

as their primary mission to establish and maintain security in

Baghdad for most of the time. That will now become their mission.

So, we’re actually talking about an increase of, you know, more like

40 or 50,000 American soldiers dedicated to this mission over what

we’ve had previously. And so, the change is actually rather more

significant than people have been focusing on. And that is in accord

with what we recommended.

He did say that he would send five additional combat brigades

to Baghdad as rapidly as they can get there. And that is also what

we recommended. And that is the size of the force that we recommended.

There’s been some confusion because of the way the administration has presented numbers to match the brigades, and I believe

that that has to do with—there are different ways of counting how

many troops there are in a brigade. So, we gave a total force increment for Iraq of 35,000. The President is talking about 20-some

thousand. I think that’s a difference in counting, more than anything else, because we recommended five additional Army brigades

and two additional Marine regimental combat teams. The President said that it would be five American brigades and one regimental combat team. So, the forces that he’s proposing are very

parallel in size to the forces that we proposed. And we think it’s

very important to have all of those forces. And, if it were me, I

would continue to fight for the additional regimental combat team,

as well, because I think it’s important to have reserves available

for this operation.

Now, the President did say that the Iraqis would be in the lead.

He did talk about our forces supporting them. And he did talk

about increasing the number of our forces embedded in Iraqi units

conducting these operations. Those statements are not in accord

with what we had recommended. We believe that, in the first instance, this has to be an American-led operation, simply because

there are not enough Iraqi forces, and they are not trained adequately to be in the lead. And so, that is an area of divergence.

The CHAIRMAN. If I could interrupt for a moment, we heard testimony yesterday from a counterpart of yours, different organization,

but—Mr. O’Hanlon, and asked him how many, ‘‘politically reliable,’’

not just trained, but politically reliable combat forces he thought

were available from the Iraqi side right now, and he gave a number

of 5,000. What is your sense of the number of available trained

Iraqi forces that could be, ‘‘counted upon’’ to fill the mission you

have envisioned for them?

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Dr. KAGAN. I’m sorry to say that it’s not really possible to answer

that question with any degree of precision, because I’m not sure

that that knowledge actually exists.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, quite frankly, I would have been disappointed if you had—had you given me a number, because I share

your view. I don’t know——

Dr. KAGAN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. How anybody knows that number.

Dr. KAGAN. And that’s why we—that’s why we—when we sat

down to look at this operation, we attempted to design an operation

that could succeed even with a very low level of Iraqi participation.

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Dr. KAGAN. We think that the Iraqi participation is important,

not so much because it will provide bodies, but because we need

the—we need to have an Iraqi face on the operation, as much as

possible, and the Iraqis to interact with their own populations, as

much as possible, with our forces present. But we are not relying

on large numbers of Iraqi forces coming, and we certainly do not

want them to be operating on their own——

The CHAIRMAN. Quite frankly, that was my reading of your report. The second thing is—it leads me to this point, I hope I don’t

come across as being cynical here, but I believe the reason why the

President and his team rejected Maliki’s plan, which was, ‘‘You

Americans stay outside the city, we’ll go in, you essentially reinforce us’’—is that they feared one of two things, probably both:

That they would not be competent to do the job, and they would

essentially be Shia—I don’t want to be too—Shia forces cleansing

Sunni areas, and that what we would be doing is indirectly giving

a green light to what would be further sectarian violence rather

than limiting or eliminating sectarian violence.

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, of course, I don’t know—I don’t know

the details of the plan that Maliki presented or why the

administration——

The CHAIRMAN. All I know is——

Dr. KAGAN [continuing]. Reacted as it did.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. What was characterized by——

Dr. KAGAN. I understand.

If I had been presented with such a plan by the government, I

would have opposed it, on more or less precisely those grounds.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. OK.

And you mentioned Tal Afar as an example in your report, and

I think you did in your statement. And in 2005, we had roughly

5,000 American forces, with some Iraqi forces—but 5,000 American

forces, if memory serves me—in a city, in a population of about

200,000. We’re talking about—and I understand your point, I think

it’s a fair point—there are roughly 25,000 American forces in and

around Baghdad with a mission other than the one that’s now

being assigned them. So, it’s arguably—it’s intellectually credible to

say that, since the mission is being changed, the multiplier effect

here is—add those 25,000, that have been there, to the 15 or 16

or 17, whatever the number comes to—to President’s total of

21,500, and—at least that’s what the Secretary said today, four

going to Anbar. So, let’s say you’re adding, on top of that—you’re

talking roughly—you could argue, 40,000 folks with a new mission.

243

Because I was wondering how you get to the counterinsurgency

ratio that most of the military people with whom I have spoken,

as far back as 3 years ago with General Donovan, who was very

frustrated that he wasn’t getting the support—the number of

troops he needed, and his talking about Anbar province—I remember him saying—and I’m paraphrasing—that every officer learns in

war college that the ratio needs to be, and then he named it and

said—not 100 to 1, not 150 to 1, and so on.

So, if you were to use your numbers in the multiplier, my word—

since it’s a different mission, arguing you actually have more people moving here is in the 25,000 range already, then I assume

that’s how you make your argument that the counterinsurgency

ratio required is closer to what is taught at the academies and the

war college and—than it otherwise would be. Is that——

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think if you look at the population of the area that we were proposing to clear and hold, in the

first instance, it’s something under 2 million——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. KAGAN [continuing]. Which would call for a force ratio of between 40 or 50,000 in——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. KAGAN [continuing]. Order to meet that. And that is the force

ratio that we—that our plan would bring into that area, because

we would make full use of the forces that are already there——

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Dr. KAGAN [continuing]. And this increment.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not belabor this, but this is helpful to me—

one further apparent difference is—the President said, last night,

and I asked the Secretary today, and others did, as well, that they

are not limiting this effort to the 23 neighborhoods. Now, I don’t

know whether they answered the question for political reasons or

if substantively it’s correct. I’m not sure which. When it was asked,

‘‘Do they have the green light to go into Sadr City? Do they have

the green light to deal with the militia?’’—the answer was, ‘‘Yes;

that would be the case.’’ But is your understanding that the first

phase, or the phase the President is talking about, or Petraeus may

be talking about, is more in line with your plan—to only focus on

the 23 neighborhoods, 2 million people, as opposed to the totality

of Baghdad and 6-plus-million people?

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, we’ve been explicit, on a number of

occasions, that our plan does see, in the initial phase, focusing on

the 23 Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods and not going

into Sadr City, in the first instance. Now, that was predicated on

a number of assumptions about the difficulty that would be entailed in going into Sadr City—in part, assuming that the Maliki

government would not be forthcoming with support for doing that.

If, in fact, the Maliki government is going to be forthcoming with

that support, then that would change the equation, but we have

not had the opportunity to go back and reevaluate, you know, what

our force ratio assumptions would be in that circumstance.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’d respectfully suggest, if that is the case,

the force ratios are a little out of whack, and you’re going to be

dealing with the different situation.

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The last question on this point, and again, I have so many questions. My temptation would be to keep you here all night, all of

you. Where Petraeus has been successful—and he has been—in the

past, north of Baghdad, in dealing with an insurgency, it’s been an

insurgency, as opposed to sectarian strife and a civil war. Say it

another way. A mixed neighborhood in Baghdad is different than

going into Tal Afar, where the insurgents are the former Baathists,

Saddamists, et cetera, and/or al-Qaeda, and their target being us

and/or government troops. When you go into a neighborhood—and

I want the public to understand we’re not talking about a neighborhood of 500 people, we’re talking about neighborhoods that are tens

of thousands of people—when you go in a neighborhood where the

problem is within the neighborhood, if it’s a mixed neighborhood,

people are, figuratively speaking, crossing the street, killing each

other, and/or if it’s not an integrated neighborhood, primarily a

Shia neighborhood, you have death squads wearing uniforms and/

or the Mahdi Militia coming in and taking them out. That’s a little

different circumstance than dealing with an insurgency, isn’t it?

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I have to, respectfully, disagree with

your premise. Tal Afar actually is a mixed city. It is mixed Sunni/

Shia. It’s also mixed between Arab and Turkoman and Kurd. And

all of those factions were, in fact, shooting at one another, and H.R.

McMaster, the commander of the unit that cleared Tal Afar in

2005, has described, in great detail, there would be circumstances

where Sunni snipers would climb turrets, fire into Shia neighborhoods to commit casualties, and then those same Sunni snipers

would actually climb down, cross over into the Shia neighborhoods

and fire back into the Sunni neighborhoods to commit atrocities in

precisely the same sort of effort, to incite sectarian civil war within

Tal Afar. And so, it actually was very similar to what’s going on

in Baghdad, and, in many respects——

The CHAIRMAN. Had the mosque—had the Samarra mosque been

taken out, at that point?

Dr. KAGAN. No, Mr. Chairman; it hadn’t. And, even so, there was

this very high level of intersectarian violence. And, in addition to

that, the Sunni insurgents had established real strongholds in Tal

Afar. They had video booths where they would tape their messages

and beheadings. I mean, they had a real professional apparatus,

and were ready to receive us.

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Dr. KAGAN. Because we’ve been operating continually in a lot of

the Baghdad neighborhoods that we’re talking about going into, in

most of those areas they don’t have anything like the same degree

of preparation. But, no; I think we actually already have seen success in dealing with this sort of sectarian conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Last question for you, if I may. We heard,

this morning, about the successes that are taking place in Anbar

province, according to the Secretary. And she cited that certain of

the tribal chiefs, very upset with the al-Qaeda, have sent their sons

to Jordan to be trained to come back, ostensibly, and be a resistance to al-Qaeda intervention, and, I suspect, to not be as cooperative with the insurgency, the former Saddamists and Baathists.

Can you tell me if you know anything about that?

245

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, only what I’ve seen in newspapers

and what I’ve heard about. I mean, it does appear that some of the

sheikhs in Anbar have become frustrated with the ongoing civil

war. And I think it’s very important to understand that the Sunni

Arab insurgency is not monolithic, either.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Dr. KAGAN. And there is divergence of views even within the

Islamist wing. Al-Qaeda in Iraq says that it’s OK to kill Iraqi civilians. Ansar al-Sunna has taken the position, often, that it isn’t.

There are disputes among these groups about tactics, techniques,

goals, and so forth. And I think what we’re seeing in Anbar province is the beginning of a splintering of this movement. Now, I

think if we continue the process of establishing security to make

it possible for these guys to participate more directly, and if the

Maliki government will reach out in a situation of improving security, to offer the necessary reconciliation to bring them into the

fold, I think it’s possible that we can see significant political

progress.

The CHAIRMAN. Question for the three of you. And you need not

answer it, if you choose not to. If you had to take a bet, how many

of you would bet that Maliki is the Prime Minister in November

of this year?

Dr. CARPENTER. The answer to that question, Mr. Chairman, depends very much on whether we are serious about pressing the

Maliki government to take on the Shiite militias and to neutralize

Muqtada Sadr. If we are serious about that, I think that places

Maliki in an almost impossible position and that that will severely

undercut his political base. It would make it very likely that he

would not be Prime Minister by November. If this is merely a rhetorical flourish on the part of the Bush administration, and this is

substantively an effort to go after the Sunni neighborhoods in

Baghdad, and to suppress the Sunni insurgency, and the talk of

going after the Shia militia is just political cover, then I think

Maliki may be a skillful enough politician to survive and be Prime

Minister at the end of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. I think Dr. Carpenter’s analysis is as

good as any. The problem is that the Maliki government rests on

a narrow margin within the I’tilaf, within the Shiite Alliance. In

the electoral battle between Abel Abdul Mahdi and Jaafari, Jaafari

prevailed by one vote. And other elements, notably the Kurds, but

perhaps some of the Sunnis, might well prefer Mahdi to Maliki. Indeed, the Bush administration may tire of Maliki, because he’s not

much more effective than Jaafari. Although he doesn’t have some

of Jaafari’s annoying personal traits, he hasn’t been much more effective as a leader.

No matter who is the Government of Iraq we’re going to get tired

of them, because they’re not going to be effective, because they

don’t have the agenda that we want them to have, and they don’t

exercise the power that we wish they would.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, let’s just ask: In your partition

scenario, what happens to Iraqis’ oil wealth?

Ambassador GALBRAITH. The Iraqis are on the verge of concluding a deal that will, at least for some period of time, share the

246

oil revenues on the basis of population. The distribution of oil revenues has never been a central issue. The central issue has been

who controls the oilfields. And that has been central for the Kurds,

and some of the Shiites, because they do not want to go back to

the situation where Baghdad cuts the check and Baghdad has all

the power.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Like any federal system, frankly, they

understand that it works only when there are local sources of revenue. But, in terms of how that revenue is distributed, there is a

broad consensus to share it. Now, if Iraq does not hold together as

a state, then you——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, under your scenario, it’s not a state, correct?

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Well, it—my view is that, over the long

term, it will not survive as a single state.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Which, incidently, doesn’t mean that I

think it’s going to split into three states. If you asked them, both

Sunnis and Shiites would say, ‘‘Yes; we’re Iraqis.’’ The trouble is,

they have such radically vision of what that means that I believe

it is better to do what the Shiites want to do and what the Sunnis

still resist, which is to have their own regions. But that’s really a

decision for the Sunnis to make. The Kurds, it’s entirely different.

They——

The CHAIRMAN. No, I——

Ambassador GALBRAITH [continuing]. They don’t want to be part

of Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I got that, about the Kurds. My concern is

that I don’t see, absent essentially letting a civil war rage from

Anbar province down through Basrah, and let the outcome dictate

who runs the show in those two areas—short of that, I don’t know

what’s left for the Sunnis. I mean, if they end up with three different states, in effect, the inclination to share oil ain’t gonna be

around, and there’s nothing there, there in Anbar province.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. First, if the Kurds actually leave, they

will take with them a percentage of Iraq’s oil reserves that is approximately the same as their share of Iraq’s population. So,

that’s——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador GALBRAITH [continuing]. That’s not a big issue. So,

the issue is in Arab Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Will the Shiites be prepared to give to

the Sunni region a percentage that is equal to the Sunni percentage of the population? I don’t know the answer to that. Right now,

the Shiites have agreed to such a formula. That they’ll continue to

be generous toward the Sunnis in conditions of an ongong civil war,

or if the civil war intensifies, is not likely. And, in fact, it——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador GALBRAITH [continuing]. Could have a very bad ending. And that is why, with regard to Arab Iraq, I believe that the

plan that I’ve put forward and that you have put forward is the

only way to go. It is a plan that protects the Sunnis by allowing

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them to have their own region, to provide for their own security,

and, if it’s implemented soon, would come at time when there is

still enough political will there to guarantee them a share of revenue. This revenue-sharing should be done through legislation—as

has already been agreed—and not by trying to change the Iraqi

Constitution, which is as difficult to change as our own. But if the

Sunnis don’t move to establish their own region, if the civil war

spins on for another year or two, I think it’s unlikely——

The CHAIRMAN. Just—let me just—one of things I want to get

straight here, make sure I understand it. The legislation that’s already agreed to is agreed to, in principle, by a committee, a group

of people meeting. There has not been any legislation introduced,

there has not been any legislation passed, am I correct in that? The

Iraqi Parliament has not passed any legislation saying that—I remember, I was in—over the Fourth of July, I met with Mr. Maliki

in his office, and I asked him about two issues. One was federation

or regionalism, as their Constitution calls for, and the second was

about allocation of oil revenues. He said, ‘‘Aw, the Constitution has

already taken care of that.’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, with all due respect,

Mr. Prime Minister, you and I may be the only two who have read

the Constitution. It doesn’t say that. It says ‘equitable share,’ or

some such language, but there’s no guarantee what that means.’’

Said, ‘‘There’s no need for that.’’

So, I just want to be clear that whether or not there is—if you

know if there is, or is about to be introduced—legislation that the

tribal chiefs in—the tribal leaders in Anbar province can say, ‘‘I

know I’m now going to get’’——

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Well, the——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ‘‘20 percent of the revenue, or whatever.’’

Ambassador GALBRAITH [continuing]. The legislation that is

pending is an oil law, and it’s a very complicated law that entails

many compromises. It’s one thing to say, as does the Constitution,

that the regions have control over new oil, but to implement that,

in terms of——

The CHAIRMAN. It’s very hard.

Ambassador GALBRAITH [continuing]. Pipelines and everything

else is difficult. But the oil law will do this and it is mostly agreed.

Some issues remain between Kurdistan and Arab Iraq, but there’s

a good chance that they’ll be resolved.

The CHAIRMAN. Well——

Ambassador GALBRAITH. It also includes the provisions for revenue-sharing, which, however, will be done in a separate law. The

problem is this. The Sunnis do not consider 20 percent to be their

share of the population, and they don’t consider it, therefore, to be

their fair share of the oil wealth. And, furthermore, until 2003,

they got 70 to 80 percent of the oil wealth.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I know that. That was——

Ambassador GALBRAITH. So, 20 percent is—even if we think it’s

fair, they don’t think it’s fair.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know, it’s amazing how people’s attitudes change when faced with the realistic alternatives they may

face. In my meeting with major oil executives—not just Americanbased companies, but foreign companies—I don’t understand why,

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3 years ago, the President didn’t bring some of these guys in, and

bring in the major informed elements of the three communities,

and say, ‘‘Look, you know, you’re not—listen to these guys, they’re

not going to invest the $40 billion you need to develop your fields

unless you have a national oil policy, unless you have some reason

to make them believe you’re going to be able to do this without any

real prospect of them being blown up.’’ But that goes another way.

Let me ask another question, and I won’t keep you much longer.

Up until recently—and I’m not sure what I think right now, but

up until recently, I have come away from my visits to Iraq with the

following sense of things: That, from 2004—really, early 2005, up

until mid-2006, the Kurds, although overwhelmingly wanting independence, reached the tentative conclusion that—if they seek independence, or if the nation falls apart, and they are able to declare

themselves independent because there is an all-out civil war—that

they are not about to give up on Kirkuk, and the Turks aren’t

about to let them have their way in Kirkuk; and that, although, on

the one hand, they would look like they’re in pretty good shape,

they would be inviting both the Iranians and the Turks to come

after them. And so, it’s better for them to be in a position where

this gets played out over a longer haul, as long as they’re able to

maintain the autonomy they now have; and that the Sunnis, at

least the tribal leadership, has reached the conclusion they’re not

going to be in control like they were—I mean, 70 percent of the oil,

90 percent of the power, et cetera—in their lifetimes, and it’s better

to work out some accommodation where at least they’re secure, as

long as they actually have a source of revenue. And the Shia, although they now have met their expectation and desire to be the

dominant political force, absent some kind of ultimate arrangement, they are not going to be in a position to be able to prevent,

‘‘their mosques’’ from being blown up over the next decade, and

more. And so, there was the possibility of a political accommodation.

But I’m not sure that prevails anymore, because, talking to these

folks, I think the Shia think they can take out the Sunnis, the

Sunnis think they can take out the Shia, and the Kurds think they

could probably negotiate, literally negotiate, their independent status without having a full-blown conflict with the Turks and the Iranians.

Give me your sense of what the mindset, in your view, is. And

I realize that there’s Shia on Shia, as well as Shia on Sunni, and

so on. I realize there will be competition within a Shia region, if

it were to be voted. I think that’s one of the reasons why Sadr

sided with the Sunnis in voting against the legislation to allow for

the regional system to come into play 18 months from now. But,

what do you think—how do you think they view their equities, each

of the parties, the major parties, in an all-out conflict?

Dr. KAGAN. I think we need to address that question in two

ways, because I think, right—there is how they feel about that

now, and there’s the question of how they would feel about that if

we actually could get the security situation under control, because

I think it’s not possible to overestimate the impact that the current

violence has on everyone’s attitudes, and also that everyone’s beliefs about our intentions have on their attitudes. I think that curVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00258 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.001 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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rent Shia attitudes are heavily fueled by the fact that the Sunni

insurgency is not under control and they are under continual attack, and by the belief that we are not going to bring the Sunni

insurgency under control, and that we are, in fact, going to leave,

shortly, which I do believe is their actual mindset, or had been, to

this point.

Now, if we make it clear that we actually are going to bring the

Sunni insurgency under control and we are going to provide them

with a basic level of security, and, therefore, we’re going to eliminate the need for them to go out and do that on their own, which

does pose significant challenges and costs to them—and I think we

should keep that in mind—I think that much as Maliki might lean

in that direction if no other solution is presented to him, he does

have to recognize that even a Shia victory, in that context, will be

unutterably bloody for him and will impose all sorts of costs on his

government and on different factions within the Shia groups, will

compromise their ability to form a subsequent stable government,

and so forth, and will lead to perennial instability.

So, I think the issue is: How will they feel about that, when we

have offered them an alternative, when we have made it clear that

we are going to bring the Sunni insurgency under control, and that

they don’t have to do that? I believe that that will change their attitudes pretty fundamentally. Now, I believe, in addition to that,

that there is evidence, especially, as you’ve brought up, in Anbar

from among the tribal sheikhs and elsewhere, and even from things

that I hear from the—my former students, who are now in Baghdad and who tell me about popular attitudes that they’re encountering as they patrol the streets—and some of them actually are

living in the neighborhoods now—among the Sunni. And there is

some evidence, I think, that this—there is beginning to be a weariness of this conflict and a willingness to end it in a more reasonable way if they could be assured that they were not going to be

under continual attack by Shia militias.

And so, I think the issue is, we have to be able to imagine what

Iraq looks like when we have brought the violence in the mixed

areas of Baghdad actually under control. I believe we can. We can

have an argument about whether we can or not. But if we do, then

that will change the political equation very fundamentally, in my

view.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s the basic premise of your position.

Dr. KAGAN. Yes; exactly.

Dr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. CARPENTER. I think that’s the crux of the disagreement. I do

not believe there is a realistic prospect that we can achieve a secure environment, that we can suppress the Sunni insurgency, at

least that we can do so at anything resembling a reasonable cost,

in terms of blood and treasure, to our own country. Yes; if we occupied Iraq with a very large army, 4 or 500,000 troops, and were

willing to stay for many, many years, we would have a chance of

stabilizing the security environment. But we don’t have that option.

I don’t think there would be 1 American in 20 who would favor

paying the price that would be required to achieve that result. Absent that result, what we’re seeing in Iraq is this ongoing civil war,

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where the Shia have concluded this is their moment, this is when

they can reverse decades, generations, of subjugation by the

Sunnis. They are not going to pass up that opportunity, and they

are not likely to be gentle when they do achieve full power.

The Sunnis increasingly are in defensive mode. Rather than having as the primary objective—driving American forces out of Iraq—

it is the terrible fear that, if they don’t forestall the establishment

of a Shia-dominated government on a permanent basis, that they

are faced with, at best, massive discrimination, third-class citizenship in their own country, and, at worse, ongoing ethnic cleansing

and terrible consequences in that regard.

The Kurds are off with their own agenda. What we’re going to

see is Kurdistan become the Taiwan of that part of the world. It

will be an independent country in everything except extensive

international diplomatic recognition, but it will be an independent

country. The danger for the Kurds is what you have identified—

that they could overreach. If they insist on gaining the oil riches

in and around Kirkuk, they create the risk of outside intervention,

certainly by Turkey, perhaps by Iran. Where we can play a constructive role there is to convince Turkey, especially, that this

would be an unwise move, that it is, in fact, in Turkey’s best interest to have a stable, democratic Kurdistan as a buffer between Turkey and what is likely to be ‘‘Chaos-stan’’ in the rest of Iraq. That

is, again, an achievable objective, I think, if we work hard at it.

And Kurdistan may be able to have a reasonably stable and peaceful existence. The rest of Iraq is going to be a cauldron of chaos

unless we are willing to pay a huge price, over a very long term,

in both blood and treasure.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. First, I think I agree with what Dr.

Carpenter has just said, so I won’t repeat it. But I agree with your

point that the space for political compromise has diminished and

perhaps disappeared. But the fundamental problem is that Maliki

represents a Shiite constituency that wants to define Iraq as a Shiite state. And, for the Sunnis, there is no way—even for those who

despise the insurgency—that they can accept that definition of

Iraq. It does not include them. They see Iraq’s Shiite rulers as

alien. On the gallows, Saddam Hussein spoke for many Sunnis

when he warned against ‘‘the Persians’’ by which he clearly meant

Iraq’s Shiite leaders. With differences that are so deep, these other

fixes, such as sharing oil revenue, are not going to satisfy the

Sunnis.

With regard to the Kurds, my view is simple, and certainly influenced by my experience in the Balkans, which is where you have

people who unanimously don’t want to be part of a state, you can

only keep them in that state by brute force. Now, the fortunate

thing that distinguishes Iraq from Yugoslavia in 1991, is the

Kurds—unlike the Slovenes and Croatians—are bent on a headstrong rush to immediate independence. So, I think there’s a period

of time to work out many of the problems could result from full

independence. I think what Dr. Carpenter said is right; Kurdistan

is already Taiwan. Just as, if Taiwan would declare itself independent if the opportunity arose, so will Kurdistan. The Kurds believe this time will come and they won’t do anything precipitate.

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My final point relates to the major outstanding issue for

Kurdistan, namely boundaries of Kurdistan? Disputes between

Kurds and Arabs over these boundaries could, by the end of this

year, be a whole new source of violence in Iraq. Now, this is an

issue on which the United States can do something diplomatically,

and yet has been totally absent. Why can we do something diplomatically? Because we actually have influence with the Kurds.

We can help Kurds and Arabs draw lines that both see as fair. But,

I also think we can use our influence with the Kurds to caution

them against overreaching on the territorial issue, because, at the

moment, they have the upper hand.

That, then, leaves the issue of Kirkuk. There is, in Iraq’s Constitution, a formula for solving Kirkuk through a referendum.

Kirkuk has been a source of conflict in Iraq for the entire history

of Iraq. I don’t see any merit in postponing or getting rid of this

provision. The issue needs to be settled. But what can be done in

advance of the referendum is to entrench power-sharing in Kirkuk

among its four communities—the Kurds, the Turkomen, the Arabs,

and the Christians—so that after the referendum, none of these

communities feel that they’re losers. But, again, the time to do that

is now. Once you have the referendum and it’s part of Kurdistan,

which is what I expect, or it’s not, then the possibilities for compromise are much worse. After the referendum is too late.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, there is a lot more I’d like to ask

you. I wish I could say there will be no need to call you back, but

my guess is that we’ll need your advice and input several months

from now, as well. And, again, I genuinely appreciate the amount

of time, effort, expertise, and commitment you’ve all applied in arriving at your various positions.

I thought this morning’s hearing was—the term is overused, to

say it was historic, but I thought it was extremely significant, in

that it would be impossible for anyone to have listened to it this

morning and not come to the conclusion that there is very little

support for the approach the President is pursuing. And I hope

he’ll be willing to adjust, as he moves forward. My prayer would

be his proposal is right, it works, everything works out. That would

be my prayer, but that is, I think, just that; a prayer.

Let me also note that I was informed by my staff that our bad

fortune is Dr. Galbraith’s good fortune, and that is that Nancy

Stetson, who has been a senior member of this committee for a couple of decades, is—is that—am I correct?—is joining—oh, I thought

you were joining it. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I thought—actually, our bad fortune is your missed opportunity. [Laughter.]

I thought, Nance, the note I got, to show you how smart I am,

I thought it said you were joining Ambassador Galbraith. They got

a—you had a better offer, OK. I—well, I’m getting out of this negotiation, I tell you right now. [Laughter.]

Anyway, Nancy, we’re going to miss you. You’ve been an incredible, incredible resource for the committee, and for me, personally,

and so, you’ll be joining the ranks of the famous no-longer-employed Foreign Relations Committee staffers, and I hope your success is as stellar as the Ambassador’s has been.

Ambassador GALBRAITH. And, if I may add, we’ll be seeing her

in New England, where we also expect to be seeing you.

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The CHAIRMAN. Well, you will be seeing me in New England. I

don’t know—guessing the outcome of that is probably easier than

guessing the outcome of Iraq.

But, anyway, at any rate, I thank you all very, very much. I

thank the audience for your interest here. There’s a lot at stake.

And, as I said, this has been very helpful.

We will adjourn.

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, VICE PRESIDENT, PEACE AND STABILITY

OPERATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC *

TROOPS ALONE ARE NOT THE ANSWER—CIVILIAN EFFORTS IN IRAQ NEED

STRENGTHENING

As vice president for peace and stability operations at the U.S. Institute of Peace,

I have, for 3 years, supervised a congressionally funded peacebuilding effort in Iraq,

after a decade spent on Balkans peacebuilding efforts both at the State Department

and USIP. I also acted as executive director of the Iraq Study Group last year. But

I offer you today only my personal views—I do not speak for USIP or for the Study

Group.

Vital American interests should determine our future course of action in Iraq. I

would list them in the following order:

1. Stabilize a united Iraq and the region. We have to tamp down the civil conflict and prevent it from spreading to, or involving, Iraq’s neighbors.

2. Prevent terrorist threats to America and its allies. We must ensure that

Iraq does not become a platform for operations abroad by al-Qaeda or other terrorists.

3. Restore flexibility in the use of U.S. forces. Our military is overcommitted

today; we need to rebuild its capacity to react to events elsewhere in the world.

4. Return America to a preeminent global position. We need to regain moral,

military, and diplomatic standing in a world that views us as compromised,

weakened, and ineffective.

Let me also mention interests we should renounce: We need no guaranteed access

to oil or permanent bases, and we must not take sides in a civil war or a broader

Sunni-Shia conflict.

No simple solution

There is no simple course of action that will satisfy our vital interests. Precipitous

withdrawal of American forces from Iraq might help us regain flexibility, but would

not prevent parts of Iraq from being used as a terrorist platform. Nor would withdrawal stabilize the country or the region. Breaking Iraq up into sectarian zones

would likewise allow parts of Iraq to be used by terrorists and would destabilize the

region.

I am not a military expert, but to me additional U.S. forces make sense only in

support of a broader civilian peacebuilding effort aimed at political reconciliation

and economic stabilization, and only if there is a target date for turnover of combat

responsibilities to Iraqi forces. The political situation in Iraq and in the United

States will not permit American forces to continue combat for several years. Nor

will the global situation, which requires U.S. forces to be available for contingencies

elsewhere. In any event, Sunni and Shia both need the wakeup call that a target

date will provide.

Increasing troop levels will not suffice—we need a broader approach

So much attention has been paid to troop levels that other requirements to stabilize Iraq are not being discussed. The grave and deteriorating situation in Iraq

is not due to military failure. Our troops have fought well and hard. It is due to

indigenous political forces largely beyond our control, as well as planning, diplomatic and economic failures, all of which are civilian responsibilities. If we only beef

up U.S. troop presence, without intensifying civilian efforts, the situation will continue to deteriorate.

Additional civilian resources are required. Only a small fraction of the funds Congress has appropriated for Iraq has gone to civilian efforts—less than 10 percent.

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Future funding should include $5 billion for civilian peacebuilding. Five times the

current level—below $1 billion per year—this is still a small percentage of the total.

What can be done with new civilian resources? The primary goal should be national reconciliation through strengthening rule of law and the moderate center.

Holding Iraq together will require increasing governing capacity at the central, regional, and provincial levels including the judicial as well as the executive and legislative branches—and building up civil society. We should support the many courageous Iraqis who are willing to reach across sectarian lines to build a democratic

Iraq.

The U.S. Institute of Peace has been engaged since early 2004 in this work, devoting a modest but productive $5 million per year provided by Congress to prevent

sectarian violence, build up the rule of law, and educate and train a new generation

of leaders. For example, we support a network of 25 Iraqis who undertake intersectarian dialog efforts in their own communities, demonstrably reducing violence.

Does it make sense that USIP’s appropriation for Iraq has been cut 40 percent?

Similar cuts are affecting the work of other organizations doing vital reconciliation

work in Iraq.

What about the economic front? I do not believe jobs will prevent terrorism. I also

doubt the ability of the U.S. Government to create jobs in the private sector at

home, much less abroad. The best we can do for the Iraqis is to help with their oil

sector, which they should run as a commercial enterprise in the interests of the

whole country. We should also provide microcredits to small enterprises and funds

to our military commanders, embassy and provincial reconstruction teams, for

small-scale improvements to stabilize local situations. But I would not suggest a

massive national jobs program, which would likely be exploited by insurgents and

militias for their own purposes.

Neither politics nor the economy in Iraq will go far on American money alone. The

Iraqis need to take on far more responsibility. Prime Minister Maliki’s ‘‘milestones’’

have now been published: We have target dates for passage of the oil law, rolling

back de-Baathification, and a clampdown on militias. He is already at risk of missing several of them. We need to convey a much more serious message about the

need to meet milestones, and our willingness to assist, while remaining flexible

about timing and realistic about the capacity of any leadership in Iraq today to meet

expectations.

Diplomacy is an essential ingredient

Neither military nor civilian efforts will be successful inside Iraq without a diplomatic component. We need help from our friends and allies as well as self-interested

cooperation from Iraq’s neighbors, two of which are our adversaries.

Our diplomatic strategy should be multilateral: We need a ‘‘contact group’’ that

includes all of Iraq’s immediate neighbors. It is within this multilateral forum that

we should talk with Syria and Iran, as we are doing with North Korea in the sixparty talks.

The purpose of talking with Damascus and Tehran is to discover if there are areas

of mutual interest, in particular in stabilizing Iraq as U.S. troops begin to withdraw.

Both Syria and Iran stand to lose a great deal if Iraq comes apart. Neither is likely

to be able to seal itself off from refugees and internal unrest (at the least among

the Kurds and possibly among other groups, including the Sunni majority in Syria).

Neither Iran nor Syria is in good shape to meet these challenges. While their concept of what contributes to stability may not coincide with ours, there is a real possibility of finding some areas of mutual interest, as we did with Iran on Afghanistan.

The only reason for not talking with Damascus and Tehran is hope that the regimes will soon change for the better. I am not in principle opposed to regime

change—I played a role in conceptualizing the effort that brought down Slobodan

Milosevic peacefully. But I see no evidence that regime change is imminent.

Conclusions

Let me summarize in conclusion the course of action I would propose for the

United States in Iraq today, and that I hope might find support on both sides of

the aisle in Congress:

1. Washington should commit itself to an intensified diplomatic, political, economic, and if necessary, military effort over the course of this year to stabilize

Iraq and to lay the basis for beginning to drawdown U.S. combat troops by a

date certain.

2. Civilian resources for Iraq should be increased sharply to $5 billion per

year, with a multiyear commitment to strengthening Iraqi institutions at all

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levels and supporting those in civil society prepared to contribute to peacebuilding.

3. The political effort should focus on reconciliation—helping the Iraqis to

meet clearly defined milestones and building up governing capacity at all levels.

4. The essential diplomatic component should be multilateral and include direct talks with Damascus and Tehran. A Presidential envoy—someone whom

the President trusts to pursue U.S. interests with vigor—should be appointed

for this purpose.

I hasten to add that if my suggestions were fully adopted, the likelihood of even

relative success would increase only marginally. We are in deep; getting out is not

going to be easy, painless, or quick. Nor can we get out completely: We will have

to remain engaged in Iraq for years to come, and in the region for the foreseeable

future. How we handle Iraq will have repercussions for many years to come. We

need to use the next year for a last, best effort to achieve relative success. After

that I see no alternative to phasing out the U.S. combat role and allowing the Iraqis

to cope for themselves, with—conditions permitting—training and other military assistance and a robust, continuing civilian assistance effort.

* (Note.—This testimony presents the personal views of the author, not those of the

United States Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues.)

(255)

REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Bill Nelson,

Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman,

Corker, Sununu, Murkowski, Isakson, and Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order, please.

Today, we continue our comprehensive examination of the remaining options in Iraq. And our witnesses today have multiple

talents, but they’re going to focus, I hope, on helping us evaluate

the role of regional diplomacy and what role it can play, if any, in

stabilizing Iraq or in containing the fallout within Iraq if stability

within Iraq proves elusive.

It is one thing to call for regional diplomacy, as many have. It’s

another thing to actually do it. And it seems to me we have to start

with answers to some very critical questions, or at least a shot at

them.

One is: How do Iraqis’ neighbors see their interests? And do

these interests overlap or conflict with ours? Is it possible to devise

a framework that would encourage Iraq’s neighbors to work cooperatively to stabilize Iraq? Can Iraq’s neighbors influence groups

within Iraq with whom they have close ties? And what role, if any,

should the United States play in forging this regional cooperation?

Is there a price for such cooperation? And, if so, what is it? And

is the alternative to cooperation a regional proxy war?

As we explore the answers to these questions, I’d like to make

one thing clear at the outset so I don’t fly under any false colors

here. I have trouble accepting—as a matter of fact, I don’t accept—

the notion that there is a direct linkage between the situation in

Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict, peace

between the Arabs and the Israelis or Palestinians, is obviously

worth pursuing, worth pursuing vigorously, and worth pursuing

vigorously on its own merits. But, even if a peace treaty were

signed tomorrow, I do not believe it would end the civil war in Iraq.

And maybe our colleagues can speak to that connection, if there is

any.

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To help guide our discussion today, we’re joined by a very strong

panel of witnesses, and that is not hyperbole. They have tremendous experience in the region. It’s doubtful we could get three people with stronger views and more serious high-level experience in

the region.

Ambassador Richard Haass is the president of the Council on

Foreign Relations, and, from 2001 to 2003, he was the director of

the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. He’s also a very

good friend of this committee, and I consider him a friend, if that

doesn’t hurt his reputation. But every member on this committee,

I suspect, feels the same way. He’s also the author of a first-rate

article entitled, ‘‘The New Middle East,’’ in the recent issue of

Foreign Affairs magazine. I recommend it to everyone.

Ambassador Dennis Ross’ name is synonymous with the ArabIsraeli peace process. For more than 12 years, spanning two administrations, one Republican, one Democrat, he led our Nation’s

efforts to secure a lasting peace in the Middle East. He’s currently

a counselor and the Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Washington

Institute for Near East Policy.

And Dr. Vali Nasr is a professor of national security affairs at

the Naval Postgraduate School. His recent book, which I read with

great interest, ‘‘The Shia Revival,’’ has made, I think, a significant

contribution to our understanding of the forces that have been unleashed by the war in Iraq.

We are incredibly fortunate to have these three men with us

today, and I look forward to hearing their testimony.

I’ll now yield to Chairman Lugar.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, which I believe is one of the most important ones in our series.

National debate on Iraq is focused intensely on what the role of

United States forces should be at this stage of the war. The stakes

surrounding this decision are particularly high, as American service men and women have made enormous sacrifices in Iraq during

the last 4 years. Should we attempt to expand neighborhood-level

security in Baghdad or elsewhere? Can such a strategy help establish order and create space for the government and the security

forces to solidify themselves? Should we increase troop levels to

achieve such a mission?

We have heard testimony from experts with a wide range of opinions on these questions. Some back the President’s plan to commit

more troops, others suggest this is a waste of time and resources,

or that the President’s remedy will fall far short of what is needed.

But, even as we debate specific issues of military policy and troop

deployment, we must see the broader picture. And whenever we

begin to think of Iraq as a set piece, an isolated problem that can

be solved outside the context of our broader Middle East interest,

we should reexamine our frame of reference.

The underlying issue for American foreign policy is how we defend our interests in the Middle East, given the new realities that

our 4 years in Iraq have imposed. This hearing will focus on this

broader question. Both our friends and our enemies must know we

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are willing to exercise the substantial leverage we possess in the

region in the form of military presence, financial assistance, diplomatic context, and other resources. Although a political settlement

in Iraq cannot be imposed from the outside, it is equally unlikely

that one will succeed in the absence of external pressure and incentives.

Some strategists within our Government saw the intervention in

Iraq as a geostrategic chess move designed to remake the Middle

East. But even if the President’s current plan substantially improves conditions in Iraq, the outcome in that country is going to

be imperfect. Iraq will not soon become the type of pluralist unified

democratic bulwark in the center of the Middle East for which

some in the Bush administration had hoped.

Developing a broader Middle East strategy is all the more urgent, given that our intervention in Iraq has fundamentally

changed the power balance in the region. In particular, the fall of

Saddam Hussein’s Sunni government opened up opportunities for

Iran to seek much greater influence in Iraq. An Iran that is bolstered by an alliance with a Shiite government in Iraq, or a separate Shiite state in southern Iraq, would pose serious challenges for

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab governments. Iran is

pressing a broad agenda in the Middle East, with uncertain consequences, for weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of

Israel, and other United States interests. Any course we adopt in

Iraq should consider how it will impact the regional influence of

Iran.

Despite our current focus on Iraq, the President and the Congress must be preparing the American people and our allies for

what comes next. We should recognize that conditions of national

fatigue can impose severe limits on our decisionmaking. If the

President’s Iraq plan is not successful, calls for a rapid withdrawal

from Iraq will intensify. If a withdrawal eventually does occur, it

may happen in an atmosphere in which American fatigue with Iraq

deployment limits our ability to address issues of vital national urgency elsewhere in the Middle East. We need frank policy discussions in this country about our vital interests in the region.

The difficulties we have had in Iraq make a strong presence in

the Middle East more imperative, and not less. Our Nation must

understand that, if and when we withdraw, or redeployment from

Iraq occurs, it will not mean that our interests in the Middle East

have diminished. In fact, it may mean we will need to bolster our

military, diplomatic, and economic presence elsewhere in the Middle East.

Regardless of decisions on troop levels in Iraq, we must go to

work now on a broader Middle East strategy that reveals critical

relationships in the region, includes an attempt to reinvigorate the

Arab-Israeli peace process. We should also be planning how we can

continue to project military power in the Middle East, how we bolster allies in the region, how we protect oil flows, how we prevent

and react to terrorist threats. This will require sustained engagement by our Government. Secretary Rice has begun that process

with her current trip to the region, and I’m hopeful she will get the

support and priority that she needs to accelerate our diplomacy in

the Middle East.

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I am also hopeful our Government will be aggressive and creative

in pursuing a regional dialog. Inevitably, when anyone suggests

such a diplomatic course, it is interpreted as advocating talks with

Syria and Iran, nations that have overtly and covertly worked

against our interests and violated international norms. As I stated

at the hearing with Secretary Rice, the purpose of talks is not to

change our posture toward those countries, nor should we compromise vital interests or strike ethereal bargains that cannot be

verified. But if we lack the flexibility to communicate with unfriendly regimes, we increase the chances of miscalculation, undercut our ability to take advantage of any favorable situations, and

potentially limit the regional leverage with which we can confront

Iran and Syria.

We should be mindful that Iranian ambitions, coupled with disorder in Iraq, have caused consternation in many parts of the Arab

world. Under certain scenarios, Arab governments may become

more receptive to coordination with the United States on a variety

of fronts. In addition, though Iran—or, rather, though Iran and

Syria cooperate closely, their interests diverge, in many cases. And

the regional dialog I am suggesting does not have to occur in a formal conference setting, but it needs to occur, and it needs to be

sustained.

I welcome, along with the chairman, a very distinguished panel,

and we look forward to your insights.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

With the chairman’s permission, I think we’ll limit our rounds to

8 minutes, and try to get through. And I will suggest to our witnesses that, since it’s only 8 minutes, when the clock begins, I may

direct questions to you individually. Each of you are fully capable

of answering every one of the questions I have, but, in order to try

to get more questions in, quite frankly, I’m going to just put one

of you in the barrel each time, if that’s OK with you.

I asked the staff what the protocol here is, that both Richard and

Dennis have had significant positions in the administration. I don’t

know who goes first, so I decided to go with age. So, we’re going

to start with you, Dennis, first, and——

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And then we’ll go to Richard, and

then we’ll go to Dr. Nasr.

And welcome, again. We’re delighted to have you here.

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, COUNSELOR AND ZIEGLER DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador ROSS. Thank you. I’m always happy to be the oldest

one to present first. [Laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it’s—I think it’s an important

time to be here. And I think this is an—a particularly important

part of the way of looking at this issue.

I’m looking at this from the standpoint of what will be the regional dimension and its impact on Iraq; less, really, the impact of

Iraq on the region, although I’ll touch on that somewhat.

I have submitted a longer statement for the record, but I’m going

to highlight my comments in a number of areas.

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The CHAIRMAN. And the entire statement will be placed in the

record.

Ambassador ROSS. Thank you.

First, I start with a premise that the solution to Iraq is going to

be found within Iraq, not outside of Iraq. If we got every one of

Iraq’s neighbors to do exactly what we wanted them to do, what

we would be able to do, I suspect, is to contain the conflict within

Iraq, and to defuse it, which is very important, but we would not

be able to settle it. The salvation for Iraq is going to be found inside Iraq, not outside of it, No. 1.

No. 2, I think the assessment of Iraq’s reality in the Iraq Study

Group was first rate and, I think, reveals lots of insights. I think

its discussion of the region, I find much less compelling. The argument that every issue in the region is inextricably linked, I think,

belies the reality in the region, tends to put too much of an emphasis on the outside, and especially on the Arab-Israeli conflict, which

is not to say, as you were saying before, Mr. Chairman, that this

is an issue that doesn’t affect the whole region. Of course it affects

the region. It affects the climate in the region, it affects the perception of what we’re doing, it affects the perception of who’s up, who’s

down in the region, radical Islamicists exploit the Israeli-Palestinian issue to recruit new followers, to manipulate anger against

us. But if you solve the Palestinian problem tomorrow, you are not

going to change what’s happening in Iraq, you are not going to affect the Sunni insurgency in Anbar province, you are not going to

affect the Shia militias who are fighting a sectarian war, maybe,

in their eyes, for defensive reasons. If you solve this problem,

maybe you affect our standing, but you don’t affect that reality.

There’s another, I would say, mythology that’s going around that

says, you know, we would get Sunni governments in the region to

do much more in Iraq if only we could take the Palestinian problem

off their back. And, here again, I would say this is a mythology.

The Saudis have a stake in what’s going on in Iraq, and the proof

of that is, they’re contemplating a $12 billion security barrier along

their border. The Jordanians have a stake of what’s going on in

Iraq. They have absorbed 750,000 Iraqi refugees. They can illafford to absorb any more. They clearly have a stake in what happens in Iraq. The reason they are not as active—all the Sunni

governments are not as active in Iraq as we would like, from a political standpoint, from an economic standpoint—is because they

are concerned about promoting Shia dominance in Iraq, not because they’re held back, in some fashion, by the Palestinians. They

may well intervene in Iraq if the situation in Iraq becomes much

worse. We face an irony. The worse the situation gets in Iraq, the

more they’re likely to intervene, not necessarily the way we would

like.

If you look at the Syrians and the Iranians, here again I would

say, they also have leverage, although I would not put the Syrians

and the Iranians in the same category. The Iranian points of leverage are much greater than the Syrian points of leverage. It’s pretty

well known they played a major role, at least in the past, in organizing, training, financing, and arming the Shia militias. I would

say their leverage, in some respects, is going up, not down, because, as power within Iraq becomes more diffuse, as there’s fragVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00269 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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mentation within the militias, as we see power devolve more and

more to the local levels, the Iranian points of access increase.

That said, if tomorrow the Iranians decided that they were going

to cut off the militias, the militias, at this point, have their own

means of financing and have enough weapons to continue to fight,

and they probably would. So, Iran has influence, but they don’t

have control.

Are either the Iranians or the Syrians prepared to change their

behavior today? I would say no. I don’t think they’re particularly

unhappy with what’s going on there. Could they be induced into

changing their behavior in Iraq? I doubt it. Are we in a situation

where they would be more inclined to pull our chestnuts out of the

fire? I don’t think so, unless the cost to them, in their eyes, was

to go up dramatically, or, alternatively, if they began to believe

that, in a sense, their own chestnuts within Iraq were somehow at

stake.

And, here again, we begin to see another one of the ironies. The

worse the situation gets in Iraq, the more the incentive for intervention from the outside goes up. It can be negative intervention,

it can be positive intervention. The reality is, all of Iraq’s neighbors

are afraid of a convulsion within Iraq. All of them understand that

if you suddenly had a convulsion, you could have millions of refugees, you could have instability within Iraq that would bleed across

the borders, you could have every one of their neighbors become

competitors, in terms of creating and turning Iraq into a platform

for potential threats to them.

So, they have a stake in preventing the worst in Iraq. The problem is, today they have a situation that is basically tolerable, either

the Iranians actually find it good, because it keeps us tied down,

or, at this stage, they don’t believe that it imposes enough of a risk

to them for them to change their behavior.

The paradox, interestingly enough, is, if you take a look at all of

the neighbors, if they suddenly thought the situation became much

more dangerous to them, they might have an incentive in coming

together in some fashion to try to at least contain that reality. One

thing I can tell you from all my experience in the Middle East,

nothing good in the Middle East ever happens on its own. Plenty

of bad things happen on their own, but nothing good ever happens

on its own. So, if you wanted to orchestrate this, you probably

would need—and I know you’ve called for this, at one point—you

probably would need some kind of regional conference, which,

again, would have to be orchestrated. It couldn’t just be established

as a big photo op. You’d have to prepare the ground before you

went there, you’d have to work on it when you got there.

But, even here, I would caution and note that this is not likely,

right now, to work the way we might want, because, again, the realities on the ground have to change to the point that what’s going

on there isn’t tolerable for everybody. And I’m afraid, today, that

it is.

In a sense, I think, also, there’s a parallel here with what’s happening on the inside. No one on the inside within Iraq, none of

the—not the Iraqi leadership, not the current Iraqi Government,

not the different sectarian leaders, find the situation sufficiently intolerable—as bad as we might think it is, none of them find it suffiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00270 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ciently intolerable to change their behavior. Prime Minister Maliki

has now made a series of commitments to President Bush, ranging

from increasing the number of Iraqi forces, to protecting Sunni and

Shia neighborhoods equally, to finally working out a sharing of oil

revenues, producing a fair process for the amendments to the Constitution, a new law on de-Baathification, providing reconstruction

moneys, including to Anbar province. I could go on and on and on.

All of these commitments are very important. Had any of them

taken place before, we wouldn’t need a surge right now. The reality

is, here, I don’t have high expectations it’s going to work, because,

once again, unless, in fact, Prime Minister Maliki is convinced that

he’s on the brink of great danger if he doesn’t act, I don’t think

we’re going to see either Prime Minister Maliki or other leaders

take what are, for them, excruciating decisions and change their

behavior, unless they feel they have to.

In the case of the Sunnis, they haven’t made the emotional adjustment to being, in a sense, subordinate to the Shia. In the case

of the Shia, the Shia operate on the premise that they’re a majority, but they could lose their power at any moment. Because they

fear that, they continue to act the way they do.

And, in a sense, this brings me to a broader conclusion, and that

broader conclusion is, we face an unfortunate paradox. The unfortunate paradox is, so long as we keep the lid on within Iraq, everybody on the outside of Iraq and everybody on the inside of Iraq has

no reason to change their behavior. The paradox for us is that we

have very good reasons to keep the lid on, because we don’t have

an interest in seeing a major convulsion within Iraq, we don’t have

an interest in seeing a free-for-all there, we don’t have an interest

in seeing the instability there radiate outward. But, unfortunately,

unless we can somehow convince everybody that the lid is going to

come off, I don’t believe that any of them are going to change their

behaviors, whether we’re talking about any of the neighbors or

we’re talking about those on the inside.

And I’ll stop there.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ross follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, COUNSELOR AND ZIEGLER DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC

I have been asked to discuss Iraq in a regional context. I interpret the request

to be less about how Iraq fits in the region and more about how the region may

affect Iraq and its future.

I take this view largely because most Americans—and I presume this committee—

are principally concerned with how we are going to manage the best possible outcome in Iraq. The starting point for achieving the best possible outcome, or more

accurately the least bad one, is understanding that the future of Iraq is going to

be determined by Iraqis. While Iraq’s neighbors certainly have influence on different

sectarian groups within Iraq, their influence is limited.

The Iraq Study Group’s assessment of the internal reality of Iraq was extraordinary in its candor and its insights. Its emphasis on the role of the outside world

was far less so. Saying that all issues in the Middle East are inextricably linked

belies reality and placed a misleading focus on the role of Syria and Iran and the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It is certainly fair to say that the different conflicts in the area affect the broader

climate, the expectations of different regional leaders and publics, the likelihood of

who is on the defensive and who is on the offensive, and whether or not it pays

to be an American friend or foe. From that perspective, it is certainly true that settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would take away a basic source of grievance

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that Islamists exploit to recruit new followers and to manipulate anger against the

United States.

Beyond that, the Israeli-Palestinian has precious little relevance to Iraq. If there

were no Palestinian conflict, we would still face a Sunni insurgency in Anbar province. We would still face Shia militias determined to protect against Sunni insurgent attacks and to wreak vengeance either in response to, or unfortunately, in anticipation of such assaults.

While I support intensive efforts to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I do it

for reasons completely unrelated to Iraq. I do it because it is right to try to reduce

the violence and settle the conflict on its own merits. It is right to remove a source

of radicalism in the region. It is right not simply to deny Islamists a grievance, but

also the ability to transform what has been a national conflict into a religious conflict—almost assuredly what could happen if Palestinians come to believe that there

is no possibility of settling the conflict and Hamas comes to dominate the Palestinian future. It is right also to correct the impression that much of the Muslim—

and certainly nearly all the Arab—world have presently of the United States: That

given the Bush administration’s disengagement from the peace process for the last

6 years, the United States is simply indifferent on an issue that matters deeply to

them.

But there should be no illusions. Our efforts to settle the conflict are not going

to materially change the challenges we face in Iraq. Moreover, the notion that if we

do more to settle the Palestinian conflict, the Saudis and Jordanians will become

more helpful on Iraq is also illusory. Both have a stake in what happens in Iraq.

Neither can be indifferent. The Saudis are contemplating a $12 billion security barrier along their border with Iraq, fearing the spillover of terror or refugees or instability otherwise. Similarly, Jordan has already absorbed 750,000 Iraq refugees. It

cannot absorb more—and yet an all-out convulsion within Iraq would certainly confront Jordan with the prospect of having to absorb thousands more.

Neither the Saudis nor Jordanians want to see Iraq fall apart; nor do they want

to see a Shia-dominated state with very close ties to Iran. Today, they seem to be

more concerned about the latter than the former. They see Sunnis under constant

assault from Shia militias; they see Sunnis being driven from their homes in mixed

neighborhoods; they see Iran with increasing presence and influence. It is not the

Palestinian issue that has led the Saudis, Jordanians, and other leading Sunni

countries and leaders to hesitate in providing the kind of support they could to the

Iraqi Government. What holds them back is their dislike for what they see emerging

in the new Iraq.

One development that might trigger far greater involvement by the Sunni regimes

is a negative one. The more they see the Sunni tribes threatened by the Shia, the

more likely the Saudis and Jordanians are to intervene. Until that point we can

push and cajole, but I suspect, with marginal affect.

We are led back again to Iraq and its internal dynamics. The Palestinian-conflict

cannot affect these dynamics; but could Iran and Syria? Again, the answer is probably more as spoilers rather than as fixers, though Iran is undoubtedly more of a

problem in this connection than Syria. Bear in mind that Iran has unmistakable

links to the Mahdi Army and to the Badr organization, and has helped to arm, organize, and finance both. While today neither of these militias is any longer primarily

dependent on Iran for money and weaponry, given their access to governmental and

nongovernmental coffers, Iran can certainly wield influence with these militias and

with different Shia political figures. Moreover, as power and the militias have become more diffused, localized, and less hierarchical, Iran’s capacity to be a spoiler

has probably increased, particularly as militias and criminal gangs merge at local

levels and as Iran can provide them material support.

What this suggests is that all the neighbors—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey, Syria, and Iran—can probably add to Iraq’s problems. They are far less capable

of being the key to Iraq’s salvation; only the Iraqis can provide that. Only Iraqis

can decide whether they will forge a national compact. To date, they have done little

to indicate that national reconciliation is a serious priority. And, unfortunately, the

Maliki government chose to handle the execution of Saddam Hussein, not as a moment for reconciliation but, instead, for conveying to the Sunnis that the Shia now

ruled, that the Sunnis were powerless in the new Iraq, and that the Shia would act

without regard for Sunni sensibilities. While the execution could have been seized

by the Maliki government as an opportunity to send a message to the Sunnis that

now was a time to end a chapter of Iraqi history in which all sides had been brutalized and chart a new future together, it preferred to signal its dominance and its

need for vengeance.

This is the context in Iraq in which the President has made his decision to increase our forces in Baghdad and Anbar province. Maliki’s commitment to act on

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a new security plan and to treat Shia and Sunnis similarly, no longer favoring Shia

militias, is unlikely to be believed within Iraq. Previously, he has said he would not

tolerate lawlessness or the militias and not only never acted against them, but has

consistently turned a blind eye to the infiltration of the militias in the Interior Ministry and the police forces. In the eyes of the Sunnis, he has tacitly supported Shia

death squads and the depopulation of Sunnis in the mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad.

Words won’t convince Sunnis that Maliki is serious about a new strategy to provide protection to all Iraqis regardless of sect. There will need to be demonstrations

of his national, not sectarian, commitment. It won’t take long to know whether his

commitments are real or merely rhetorical. Will Iraqi forces join ours in the

numbers the security plan calls for? Will they protect Shia and Sunni populations

equally? Will legislation finally be adopted on sharing oil revenues with a mechanism for implementing these shared provisions according to population? Will there

be a fair process finally for dealing with the amendments to the constitution? Will

the Iraqi reconstruction moneys materialize and be available also in Anbar province? Will former Baath officials below the highest levels be rehabilitated and integrated back into ministries?

Without even confronting the Mahdi Army, which I doubt is realistic for the time

being, all the actions implied in the answers to these questions would signal a profound change—and President Bush, in effect, has offered all of these as measures

of why the surge will work now as opposed to all previous efforts. To be sure, Iraq’s

neighbors could make these behaviors more likely if they were prepared to make

a collective effort to use their respective leverage. In theory, Iran could press both

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr—given their weight within the Parliament and their leadership of competing Shia militias—to support Prime Minister

Maliki in taking such steps. The Saudis and Jordanians could use their connections

with the leading Sunni tribes to get them to show they will meet the Prime Minister

part way and to reciprocate when the Maliki government takes steps toward them.

The Syrians could make it easier for Sunni tribal leaders to reach out by working

to prevent jihadists from crossing into Iraq and threatening them.

But turning theory into reality seems highly improbable at this time. Unless the

Iranians and Saudis are prepared to forge a deal on Iraq, I suspect that Iraq’s

neighbors will not contribute to defusing tensions among the different sectarian

groups. Indeed, the only circumstance in which I see Iran and Saudi Arabia behaving differently is if they both became fearful that a precipitous U.S. withdrawal

might trigger a real convulsion in Iraq. Potentially millions of refugees on the move,

instability bleeding across Iraq’s borders, and competition to bolster their friends in

Iraq that intensifies and proves very expensive to both the Saudis and Iranians

could conceivably create enough of a convergence of interest in Iraq to lead the two

to explore a possible deal.

There is irony here—only if the reality in Iraq threatens to be far more costly to

both the Saudis and Iranians are they likely to contemplate some limited understanding on Iraq. I don’t have high expectations. Iran may think they are more insulated from spillover of instability in Iraq and in any case they would rather back

60 percent of the population than the 20 percent the Saudis would be supporting.

Nonetheless, the Saudi capacity to underwrite the Sunnis could give the Iranians

pause.

I would support a regional conference with the neighbors, including Iran and

Syria, not because I expect much to come of it, but because all sides might come

to see some value in tempering their spoiling instincts. The U.S. role at such a conference might be to see whether there is a potential for some understandings on

Iraq, and to cultivate them even between the Saudis and Iranians if we deem them

to be of any value.

While worth considering, I don’t believe that any such deals are on the horizon.

In fact, I suspect that at this point they are about as likely as seeing Iraqis begin

to act on national reconciliation. In either case, it will take discomfort to get Iraq’s

neighbors or Iraq’s Government and sectarian leaders to transform their behaviors.

The situation may be objectively terrible in Iraq, but it has not been sufficiently bad

to catalyze a change in behavior of Iraq’s leaders and Iraq’s neighbors. By keeping

the lid on with our forces, and preventing a real collapse, we make it safe enough

for everyone—next to and within Iraq to avoid taking what they regard as excruciating decisions.

It is not an accident that Iraq’s leaders have avoided the hard choices required

to create a national compact. Sunnis continue to resist at least emotionally that they

must be subservient to the Shia. The Shia are a majority who act as if they believe

they will lose their dominant position in governing Iraq unless they hold the line

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every day against the Sunnis. Insurgent attacks justify the maintenance of militias,

which in the eyes of Shia, protect them when no one else will.

In my experience, leaders don’t cross thresholds in historic conflicts because they

are induced into doing so. They may approach the thresholds given certain promises

about the future, but they don’t cross them unless they see the costs—as they measure them—if they fail to act.

President Bush has now established the key measures that will show whether the

Iraqi Government and its Shia leaders are prepared to change their behavior in a

way that also produces Sunni responses. If there is no consequence for the Iraqi

Government for failing to meet their commitments, I believe that neither the different Iraqi leaders nor their counterparts in the neighboring states will perceive

that the United States will decide to give up our readiness to keep the lid on in

Iraq—regardless of the cost to us.

The great paradox of Iraq today is that our fear of an Iraqi collapse keeps us

there and reduces the need for either Iraqis or their neighbors to change course.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks.

Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY

Ambassador HAASS. Thank you, sir. Thank you, again, for having

me back and for testifying on the situation on Iraq.

To the extent one is judged by those one testifies with, I’m flattered by being with Dennis Ross and Vali Nasr.

What I’d like to do is just make some remarks and put the full

statement in the record——

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement will be placed in the record.

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. And just to make clear that my

views also are my own and I’m not speaking on behalf of the

Council.

I won’t take your time, Senator Biden, rehearsing how we got to

where we are in Iraq, other than to say the United States continues to pay an enormous price for the decision to attack Iraq and

for subsequent decisions made in the aftermath of its liberation.

The decision to attack, in 2003, was a classic war of choice, and it’s

been followed by any number of bad choices since. And the result

is an early end to the era of American primacy in the Middle East

and the emergence of a region more likely to do damage to itself,

the United States, and the world. And this is the context in which

we have to look at Iraq, which has now become a hybrid. It’s become part civil war, part failed state, and part regional conflict. All

of this has real consequences for the United States.

Let me take a step back. Foreign policy must always be about

achieving the best possible outcome. Iraq is not going to be a model

society or a functioning democracy anytime soon. We should expunge such words as ‘‘success’’ and ‘‘victory’’ from our vocabulary.

Ambitious goals are simply beyond reach, given the nature of Iraqi

society and the number of people there prepared to kill one another. It would be wise to emphasize not what the United States

can accomplish in Iraq, but what it can avoid.

In this context, I believe there are two reasons to support a

surge, in principle. One is the possibility that it may work, that it

may provide the time and space for Iraqi authorities to introduce

power and revenue-sharing and improve the quality of Iraq’s military and police. And the second argument, in principle, in favor of

surge, is that if it fails—if it fails to turn things around and Iraq

descends further into chaos, it will help make clear that the onus

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for Iraqi’s failure falls on the Iraqis themselves. And such a perception would be less costly, all things being equal, for our reputation

than a judgment that Iraq was lost because of a lack of American

staying power.

There are, however, several downsides to the decision to surge

forces. And, to begin with, a surge is not a strategy, it’s simply a

tactic. And the premise behind it seems to be that all the Iraqi

Government requires is a few months to get its house in order. But

if the Iraqis were prepared to do what was needed, a surge would

not be necessary. And if they’re not willing to do what is called for,

a surge will not be enough.

This, to me, suggests what may be the fundamental flaw implicit

in the new policy. The United States goal is to work with Iraqis

to establish a functioning democracy in which the interests and

rights of minorities are protected. But the goal of the Iraqi Government is different. It appears to be to establish a country in which

the rights and interests of the Shia majority are protected above

all else.

A second drawback of the surge is that it will entail real costs—

economic, military, and human. A surge is not an abstraction. It

will change the lives of tens of thousands of individuals and families in this country.

And, third, a drawback I would mention is that if a surge in U.S.

forces cannot alter the fundamental dynamics of Iraq, as Senator

Lugar mentioned, calls will mount here at home for U.S. military

withdrawal, based on the judgment the United States has done all

it can and that doing more would be futile. So, ironically, doing

more in the short run will make it more difficult to sustain a

United States presence in Iraq in the long run.

All those drawbacks notwithstanding, let me also add that opposition to a surge does not constitute a strategy. A rapid withdrawal

of U.S. forces would certainly intensify the civil conflict, produce

humanitarian disaster, provide a sanctuary and a school for terrorists, and draw in many of Iraq’s neighbors, turning the country,

and possibly the region, into a battleground. In addition, a rapid

withdrawal of U.S. forces would also increase the cost to U.S. foreign policy worldwide, as it would raise questions everywhere

about U.S. predictability and reliability.

I do think there is an alternative to both a surge and to nearterm withdrawal. It would entail reductions in U.S. force levels. It

would call for less participation in Iraq’s civil fighting. It would require more emphasis on training and advising of Iraq military and

police. It would continue work with local leaders to forge compromise. And it would involve invigorated diplomacy at the regional level. I would call it some version of ‘‘Iraqification,’’ with a

diplomatic dimension.

Let me make clear, in advocating this, though, that such an approach would not solve the Iraq problem. It’s premised, rather, on

the notion that Iraq, at best, will remain divided and messy for

years, and the most the United States can achieve is to keep open

the possibility of normalcy until such a time most Shias and

Sunnis in Iraq are willing to embrace such a notion and take steps

to bring it about.

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In that context, let me make clear that it’s not at all apparent

to me that widening the war to Syria or Iran would accomplish

more than it would cost. Any attack on either Syria or Iran would

run the risk of leading either, or both, countries to intensify their

unhelpful actions in Iraq, including the risk to United States personnel. And there’s no reason to assume that their responses would

necessarily be limited to Iraq.

More important, it’s not clear to me why the administration continues to resist the suggestion, put forward by the Iraq Study

Group and others, that it support the creation of a regional forum.

What makes the most sense is a standing mechanism akin to the

so-called ‘‘Six Plus Two’’ forum used to help manage events in Afghanistan. In such a forum, the United States and others could

challenge Syria to do more to make it difficult for terrorists to cross

into Iraq. And we obviously could challenge Iran, as well.

Why should we involve Iran and Syria? Let me suggest three

reasons. Neither Iran nor Syria has an interest in an Iraq that fails

or falls apart. The cohesion of both is potentially vulnerable to

Kurdish nationalism. The economies of both would be burdened by

refugees. But also, neither would benefit from conflicts with neighbors that could easily evolve out of an intensified civil war in Iraq.

With Syria, in particular, there is an opportunity. Syria might be

open to persuasion and compromise if the scope of talks were expanded. One could imagine Israel returning the Golan Heights to

Syria in return for a peace treaty, diplomatic relations, and a major

reduction in Syria’s support for both Hamas and Hezbollah. The

United States, in that context, would reduce Syrian sanctions. And,

as part of that, Syria, then, in turn, would have to do a better job

of policing its border with Iraq. And I would simply suggest that

the United States should give Israel its blessing to explore this possibility.

Iran is more difficult, though, again, I can imagine a broad package that would place an extremely low ceiling on uranium enrichment activity that Iran could take in exchange for accepting the

most stringent of inspections. Iran would gain access to, but not

physical control of, nuclear fuel for purposes of electricity generation. Sanctions could be reduced, depending upon Iranian willingness to curtail its support for terror and its opposition to Israel. If

we take such an approach with Iran, which I think we should, we

should make our position public.

The Iranian public needs to know how it would benefit from normal ties. And the Iranian public needs to know how they pay a

price for the foreign policy of their government. The Achilles heel

of the Government in Iran is their mismanagement of the Iranian

economy, and, on a regular basis, we, as outsiders, should make

clear to the Iranian people the price they pay, the better standard

of living they could enjoy. That, I believe, is the best way to put

pressure on the clerics running the country.

Implicit in all this is two things. One is, the United States should

let go of its regime-change ambitions, in the short run, toward Iran

and Syria. Regime change is not going to come about in either

country soon enough to affect U.S. interests. I could be wrong in

this, but no one can count that I am wrong. We cannot conduct forVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00276 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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eign policy on the hope that regime change will come soon enough

to solve our problems for us.

The United States should also jettison preconditions to sitting

down and talking with either country. The fact that both are acting

in ways we find objectionable is not a reason not to negotiate, it’s

a reason to negotiate. What matters is not where you begin a negotiation, it’s where you come out.

And I say all this, acknowledging that there’s no guarantee that

diplomacy would work. That said, it’s not clear to me how the

United States is worse off for having tried. The failure of diplomatic initiative, one that’s perceived as fair and reasonable, would

actually make it less difficult for the United States to rally domestic and international support for harsher policies toward either

Syria or Iran.

Let me just quickly talk about the Palestinian issue. I would simply say that history suggests that negotiations tend to succeed only

when leaders on all sides are both willing and able to compromise,

and it’s not clear that such leadership now exists. And, in this context, what I would argue for is that the United States should articulate publicly its views of final status. We’ve done this, in part,

vis-a-vis, Israel. The United States should also do this, vis-a-vis the

Palestinians. For example, we should say that any peace would be

based on the 1967 lines, that the Palestinians would receive territorial and other forms of compensation whenever there were deviations, and that they would also receive economic compensation.

Let me just make clear that I’m not suggesting that negotiations

be started now. The situation is not ripe for that. But the United

States can begin to alter the debate within Palestinian society.

Hamas needs to be pressed to explain why it’s resisting negotiating

with Israel and why it persists in violence, when an attractive diplomatic settlement is available. The goal should be either to

strengthen Abu Mazen or to create conditions in which Hamas

evolves away from violence.

Let me echo the words of Dennis Ross and others, that progress

in the Palestinian issue will not affect the situation in Iraq. Iraqis,

we all know, are killing themselves for any number of reasons, but

promoting a Palestinian state is simply not one of them.

Beyond the Middle East, there’s an entire foreign policy agenda

that could benefit from greater attention, from North Korea to climate change to trade negotiations, to Darfur, to Afghanistan—

where the situation is deteriorating—to homeland security to energy policy. I would simply say that Iraq gets in the way of much

of this.

The military commitment we are making in Iraq leaves the

United States with little leverage and little capacity to use elsewhere. Iraq is also absorbing economic resources. It contributes to

anti-Americanism and makes it more difficult for the United States

to drum up support. It requires a great deal of time and political

capital that could be better spent on other policies. An emphasis

on Iraq also carries with it a long-term risk. If things continue to

go badly, it will be more likely that we will suffer an ‘‘Iraq syndrome’’ that will constrain our ability to be active everywhere.

In short—and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman—I would suggest the time has come for the post-Iraq era of American foreign

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policy. This remains an era of extraordinary opportunity for the

United States. We’re free to devote the bulk of our resources to

dealing with the global challenges of our era. What’s more, we have

the potential to enlist the support of the other major powers in

tackling these challenges. But, so long as Iraq drains American resources, distracts its attention, and distances others from us, we

will not be able to translate this opportunity into reality. Worse

yet, this opportunity will soon fade. As others have pointed out, it

will be Iraqis who will largely determine their own fate, but only

by reducing our own investment in Iraq and by refocusing our energies elsewhere will we place ourselves in a position to improve

our own fate.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Haass follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the situation in Iraq and, in particular, on regional and global aspects of current U.S. policy in Iraq. I will not rehearse here today how we got to where we are—other than to say that the United

States and the American people are paying a substantial price for the decision to

attack Iraq and for subsequent decisions made in the aftermath of Iraq’s liberation.

The decision to attack Iraq in 2003—a classic war of choice—was followed by numerous bad choices.

The result is an early end to the era of American primacy in the Middle East and

the emergence of a region far more likely to do damage to itself, the United States,

and the world. To be sure, we now have an Iraq that is no longer ruled by a dictator

and one in which the population has had an opportunity to vote on several occasions

for either candidates or a constitution. But the more significant result is an Iraq

that is violent, divided, and dangerous. The debate over whether what is taking

place there constitutes a civil war is not productive. The reality is that Iraq is an

unattractive hybrid: Part civil war, part failed state, and part regional conflict.

The Iraqi Government is weak internally and challenged from without by terrorists, Sunni insurgents, and Shia militias. Shia domination of the south is near complete and growing in the center given ethnic cleansing and emigration. The Kurds

are living a separate life in the country’s north. The Sunni minority sees itself as

discriminated against; one consequence is that the bulk of the instability centers on

the capital area and the west.

The recent execution of Saddam Hussein is at once a reflection of the reality that

has come to be Iraq and a development that exacerbated sectarianism. It reveals

a lack of discipline and professionalism on the part of Iraqi authorities. What we

saw represented more the politics of retribution than the rule of law.

All of this has important consequences for the United States. Foreign policy must

always be about achieving the best possible outcome. At times this can translate

into lofty goals. This is not one of those times. It would be wiser to emphasize not

what the United States can accomplish in Iraq but what it might avoid. Iraq is not

going to be a model society or functioning democracy any time soon. We should expunge such words as ‘‘success’’ and ‘‘victory’’ from our vocabulary. Ambitious goals

are beyond reach given the nature of Iraqi society and the number of people there

prepared to kill rather than compromise to bring about their vision of the country’s

future. We can let historians argue over whether ambitious goals were ever achievable; they are not achievable now.

ASSESSING THE SURGE

This is the context in which President Bush chose to articulate a new policy, one

with an increase or surge in U.S. forces at its core. There are two reasons to support

a surge in U.S. forces. One argument in its favor is the possibility it may work, that

it might provide time and space for Iraqi authorities to introduce needed power and

revenue sharing and to increase the quantity and, more important, improve the

quality of Iraq’s military and police forces. To do this, a surge would have to be implemented in a manner that was nonsectarian and open-ended.

The second argument in favor of a surge is that if it fails to turn things around

and if Iraq descends further into violence and chaos, it will help to make clear that

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the onus for Iraq’s failure falls not on the United States (and not on any lack of

U.S. commitment) but on the Iraqis themselves. At least in principle, such a perception would be less costly for the reputation of the United States than the judgment

that Iraq was lost because of a lack of American staying power or reliability.

There are, however, several downsides to the decision to increase the number of

U.S. forces in Iraq, including the basic problem that it may not achieve a meaningful improvement in stability and security for Iraqis. A surge is not a strategy; it is

a tactic, a component of a larger policy. The premise behind the new policy seems

to be that all the Iraqi Government requires is a few months to get its house in

order, to introduce much-needed political and economic reforms that will assuage

most Sunnis and military and police reforms that will make the country safer. But

if the Iraqis were prepared to do what was needed, a surge would not be necessary.

And if they are not willing and able to do what is called for, a surge will not be

enough.

More broadly, the United States requires an Iraqi Government that is willing and

able to take advantage of the opportunity a surge is designed to provide—and by

‘‘take advantage’’ I do not mean exploit it so as to strengthen Shia control. This

may, in fact, be the fundamental flaw of the surge decision and U.S. policy. The U.S.

goal is to work with Iraqis to establish a functioning democracy in which the interests and rights of minorities are protected. The goal of the Iraqi Government appears to be to establish a country in which the rights and interests of the Shia majority are protected above all else.

A second drawback of a surge is that it will entail real economic, military, and

above all, human costs. It is important to keep in mind that a surge is not an abstraction. It will change the lives of tens of thousands of families and individuals

in this country—and bring to a premature end the lives of an unknown number of

American men and women.

A third drawback to a surge in U.S. forces is that if (as seems likely) it cannot

alter the fundamental dynamics of Iraq, calls will mount here at home for a U.S.

military withdrawal based on the judgment that the United States had done all it

could and that doing more would be futile and costly. Ironically, doing more in the

short run will make it more difficult to sustain a U.S. presence for the long run.

There are, thus, good reasons to question the new U.S. approach to Iraq. But we

should be no less clear about the drawbacks to the principal alternative. Opposition

to a surge does not constitute a desirable strategy. A rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces

would almost certainly intensify the civil conflict, produce a humanitarian disaster,

provide a sanctuary and a school for terrorists, and draw in many of Iraq’s neighbors, turning Iraq and, potentially, much of the Middle East into a battleground.

A rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces would also increase the costs to U.S. foreign

policy more generally, as it would raise questions in the minds of friends and foes

alike about U.S. predictability and reliability. Even some of the most vocal critics

around the world of U.S. policy would be critical of a sudden end to U.S. involvement. And for good reason, as terrorists would be emboldened, countries such as

Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela would be more prone to act assertively, and

friends would be more likely to decrease their dependence upon the United States,

something that could lead them either to reach new accommodations with others or

to build up their own military might, including possibly reconsidering the utility of

developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

There is, however, an alternative to both a surge as defined by the administration

and near-term withdrawal. It would entail gradual reductions in U.S. force levels,

less participation in Iraq’s civil fighting, more emphasis on training and advising

of military and police units, continuing work with local political leaders to forge

compromise, and diplomacy designed to influence the behavior of Iraq’s neighbors.

Call it ‘‘Iragification’’ with a diplomatic dimension.

Such an approach would not attempt to ‘‘solve’’ the Iraq problem. To the contrary,

it is premised on the view that there is no major breakthrough to be produced by

a surge or any other change in U.S. policy. It is similarly premised on the notion

that Iraq will remain a messy and divided country for years, and the best and most

the United States can hope to achieve is to keep open the possibility of something

approaching normalcy until such a time most Shias and Sunnis are willing to embrace such a notion and take steps that would bring it about. In short, this third

approach would buy time and give the Iraqis a chance to improve their lot—and in

the process reduce the direct and indirect costs to the United States and to U.S.

foreign policy.

In considering the alternatives it pays to keep in mind that outsiders have three

options when it comes to civil wars. One is to smother them. Alas, this has proven

not to be achievable in Iraq. A second is to help or simply allow the stronger party—

in this case Iraq’s Shia majority—to prevail. This would be a terrible conclusion to

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the U.S. intervention. It would strengthen Iranian influence, cause a humanitarian

tragedy, and likely lead to a regional conflict given concerns throughout the Arab

world for their Sunni brothers and opposition to Iranian hegemony. A third option

would be to accept that civil fighting will continue until it burns itself out, either

from exhaustion or from a realization by most Iraqis and their external benefactors

that no victory is possible and that peace and stability are preferable to continued

conflict. Such an outcome will likely take many years to evolve. The best thing that

can be said about it is that it is preferable to the scenario of a one-sided victory.

THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. POLICY

As the above makes clear, Iraq cannot be viewed in isolation. The President was

right to recognize the regional component of Iraqi security. He was also right to

claim that both Iran and Syria have acted in ways that have contributed to the

challenges confronted by Iraq’s Government and its people.

But it is not at all apparent that widening the war to either or both countries

would accomplish more than it would cost. Any attack on Iran or Syria runs the

risk of leading either or both countries to intensify their actions in Iraq, including

increasing the risk to U.S. personnel. And there is no reason they would be limited

to reacting within Iraq. Iran in particular has the ability to act throughout the region and beyond given its ties to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

More important, it is not clear why the administration continues to resist the suggestion put forward by the Iraq Study Group and others that it support the creation

of a regional forum that would have as its mission to stabilize the situation in Iraq.

What makes the most sense is a standing mechanism akin to the so-called ‘‘Six Plus

Two’’ forum used to help manage events in Afghanistan. An Iraq forum—consisting

of Iraq, its six immediate neighbors (Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and

Turkey), and selected outsiders (possibly the five permanent members of the U.N.

Security Council)—would provide a forum in which outside involvement in Iraq

could be addressed. In particular, the United States and others could challenge

Syria to do more to make it difficult for terrorists to enter into Iraq and Iran to

curtail its support for terrorism.

Why should the United States involve Iran and Syria, two countries that have

more often then not exacerbated matters in Iraq? To begin with, neither has an interest in an Iraq that fails. The cohesion of both is vulnerable to Kurdish nationalism; the economies of both would be burdened by floods of refugees. Neither would

benefit from conflicts with neighbors that could all too easily evolve out of an intensified civil war in Iraq that left the Sunnis vulnerable.

Syria might be even more open to persuasion and compromise if the scope of talks

were expanded to address concerns beyond Iraq. One can imagine a negotiation in

which Israel would return the Golan Heights to Syria in return for a peace treaty,

diplomatic relations, and a major reduction in Syrian support of both Hezbollah and

Hamas. The United States would reduce or end economic and political sanctions in

a context that included Syrian-Israeli normalization and enhanced Syrian efforts to

police its border. The United States and Israel would also benefit from the cooling

in Syrian-Iranian ties that would result. The United States should give Israel its

blessing to explore this possibility with Damascus.

Iran is a more difficult challenge, although here, too, one can imagine a broader

package that would place an extremely low ceiling on any uranium enrichment

activity Iran could undertake in exchange for the most stringent inspections. In

exchange for such restraint, Iran would gain access to (but not physical control of)

nuclear fuel for purposes of electricity generation. Other economic and diplomatic

sanctions could be reduced depending on whether Iran was willing to curtail its support for terror and its opposition to Israel. Making such offers public—making it

clear to the Iranian public how they would benefit from normal ties and how much

they pay for Iran’s radical foreign policy—would place pressure on the government

and increase the odds it will compromise.

Implicit in all this is that the United States is willing to let go of its ‘‘regime

change’’ ambitions toward Iran and Syria. This makes sense, because regime change

is not going to come about soon enough to affect U.S. interests in Iraq or beyond.

The United States should also jettison preconditions to sitting down and talking

with either Syria or Iran. The fact that they are acting in ways the United States

finds objectionable is reason to negotiate. What matters is not where you begin a

negotiation but where you come out.

There is, of course, no guarantee that these or similar diplomatic initiatives would

bear fruit. Obviously, it would have been wiser to have approached both countries

several years ago when the price of oil was lower and when the U.S. position in Iraq

was stronger. Still, it is not clear how the United States would find itself worse off

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for having tried now. To the contrary, the failure of a diplomatic initiative widely

perceived as fair and reasonable would make it less difficult for the United States

to build domestic and international support for other, harsher policies toward Syria

and Iran.

The other regional matter that is garnering a great deal of attention of late is

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Obviously, progress here would be welcome and applauded. No one—Palestinians, Israelis, or Americans—benefits from the current

impasse. History, though, strongly suggests that negotiations tend to succeed only

when certain critical elements are in place. In addition to a process and a formula

that parties must be prepared to accept, there needs to be leaders on all sides who

are both willing and able to compromise. It is not clear that such leadership currently exists on either side of this divide. The Olmert government is weak as a result of the widely judged failure of last year’s Lebanon incursion. The leadership of

the Palestinian Authority appears willing to compromise but it is not clear it is

strong enough to do so given the political and armed opposition of Hamas. Hamas,

by contrast, might well be able to make peace if it so chose; the problem is that

there is no evidence it is so disposed.

In this circumstance, the most valuable thing the United States could do is to

begin to articulate publicly its views of final status. This could be done either as

part of phase 3 of the roadmap or apart from it. The United States has already done

some of this, making clear in a letter to then-Prime Minister Sharon that the territorial dimension of any peace agreement would have to reflect Israeli security concerns and demographic realities, and that any Palestinian ‘‘right of return’’ would

be limited to Palestine. It would be proper to state publicly as well that any peace

would be based on the 1967 lines, that Palestinians would receive territorial compensation whenever there were deviations, and that they would receive economic

compensation (and assistance more generally) to help deal with the refugee problem

and more broadly the challenge of establishing a viable state. The United States

could indicate its own readiness to be generous and gain pledges from Japan, the

European Union, and Arab governments to more than match American largesse.

In suggesting this I want to be clear about two things. First, I am not recommending that negotiations be started now. Again, the situation is not ripe for that.

But by articulating such commitments, the United States can alter the debate within the Palestinian society. Hamas needs to be pressed to explain why it resists negotiating with Israel and persists in violence when an attractive diplomatic settlement

is available. The goal should be to strengthen the hand of Abu Mazen—or to create

conditions in which Hamas evolves and moves away from violence. If and when such

changes occur, prospects will improve for diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians.

Second, progress in the Palestinian issue will not affect the situation on the

ground in Iraq. Iraqis are killing one another for many reasons, but promoting a

Palestinian state is not one of them. Still, investing more in this issue makes sense

on its merits and as one way of giving America’s Sunni friends a positive development to point to, something that will bolster their domestic standing and make it

less difficult for them to be seen to be cooperating with the United States.

It is also important to look beyond the immediate region of the Middle East. The

United States could enter into bilateral talks with North Korea and present it with

a comprehensive proposal that would attempt to induce it (as well as pressure it)

to give up its nuclear program. The United States could introduce ideas about how

to slow climate change. Trade negotiations are stalled and could be jump-started.

There is a genocide in Darfur that needs to be stopped. Afghanistan is deteriorating;

economic, military, and diplomatic resources are needed urgently if that country is

not going to resemble Iraq in several years time. Much more can and should be done

to enhance the security of the American homeland. And there is the crying need for

an energy policy that will reduce American use of oil and gas and reduce our dependence on imports (U.S. vulnerability to both price hikes and supply interruptions) and slow the flow of dollars to governments that in many cases are carrying

out policies inimical to U.S. interests.

Iraq gets in the way of much of this. It is simply absorbing too many, resources.

The military commitment there leaves the United States with little leverage to

apply elsewhere and little capacity to use if situations warrant. Iraq is also absorbing economic resources, resources that could and should be used for everything from

military modernization to other pressing domestic and international needs. Iraq contributes to anti-Americanism and makes it more difficult for the United States to

drum up support for its policies. It also requires a great deal of time and political

capital, time and effort that could better be spent on building support at home and

abroad for other policies. And an emphasis on Iraq also carries with it a longer term

risk: If things continue to go badly, it becomes more likely that we will suffer a colVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00281 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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lective allergy (an ‘‘Iraq syndrome’’) that will constrain the ability of this country

to be as active in the world as it needs to be.

In short, the time has come for the post-Iraq era of American foreign policy to

get under way. Such a transition is long overdue. I have written at length on the

proposition that this moment of history is one of unprecedented opportunity. Not

having to worry about the prospect of major power conflict, the United States is free

to devote the bulk of its resources to dealing with the local, regional, and global

challenges of our era. What is more, it has the potential to enlist the active support

of the other major powers—China, Europe, India, Japan, Russia, and others—in

tackling these challenges. But so long as Iraq drains American resources, distracts

its attention, and distances others from us, we will not be able to translate this opportunity into reality. Worse yet, the opportunity will fade. We should keep in mind

that it will be Iraqis who will largely determine their own fate. Only by reducing

the American stake in Iraq and by refocusing our energies elsewhere will we place

ourselves in a position to improve our own.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Professor.

STATEMENT OF DR. VALI R. NASR, PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL

SECURITY AFFAIRS, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CA

Dr. NASR. Good morning. Let me begin by thanking Mr. Chairman and the committee for inviting me to testify here.

I’ve submitted my full statement for the record, so I will——

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

Dr. NASR [continuing]. Raise some of the issues here—in particular, focus on the implications of the sectarian violence in Iraq,

for that country and for the region.

There’s no doubt that the year 2006 has marked the emergence

of sectarianism as a major divide in Middle East politics. It’s now

the single-most important factor in deciding Iraq’s future, but it’s

no longer just limited to Iraq. In Lebanon, last summer, we saw

that war between Israel and Hezbollah very quickly opened a sectarian rift in that country between the Shias and the other communities, which has only been deepening as Hezbollah has been trying

to overthrow the government in Beirut. The competition over Lebanon and in Iraq has intensified tensions between Saudi Arabia

and Iran, which has, in recent months, taken increasingly sectarian

tone.

In the coming years, one, we can expect that sectarianism is

going to play a much more important role in deciding regional alliances and how our allies and adversaries are likely to array themselves in various arenas of conflict in the region. At a popular level,

we should also expect that sectarianism is going to be a

radicalizing force in the Middle East. At a time where we’re still

involved in the global war on terror. Shias and Sunnis, on both

sides, as they gravitate toward militias, are likely to resort to more

and more radical ideas to demonize one another and also to compete in the anti-American/anti-Israeli arena for the support of the

Arab street.

I think there is, at this moment in time, also a very serious

threat that sectarianism may become endemic, much more embedded to the conflicts in the region, and, more importantly, that it

will also entangle the United States Middle East policy in this

problem. The potential is increasing, partly because in Iraq the

United States is now poised to become far more directly immersed

in that country’s sectarian conflict, and also because it is contemVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00282 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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plating a much more confrontational approach with Iran at a

time—in alliance with Sunni Arab regimes who are defining the rivalry with Iran, at this point in time, in, very clearly, Shia, Sunni,

and sectarian terms. Embarking and embracing the posture of the

Arab governments at this point in time as a mantra for American

policy in the region will only confirm and perpetuate what I see to

be the most violent and divisive trend that has emerged in that region, and it potentially will be a source of problem for the United

States.

And, in Iraq, two things in 2006 happened. One is that we saw

sectarianism grow. The second trend was that we had a distancing

of relations between Americans and the Shias, who initially welcomed and supported the American involvement in Iraq. This had,

in the first place, to do with the bombing in Samarra, but it also

had to do with an American decision in 2006 to shift its focus from

fighting the insurgency to policing the sectarian politics in Iraq.

For better or for worse, the Shia saw these shifts as a threat to

their sense of security, and also, the bombing put to question

whether reconciliation with Sunnis is at all possible. And in this

environment, their politics turned to radicalism, following militias

and people like Muqtada al-Sadr. I think, given the mood and—on

the Shia street, it is clear that the United States is not going to

get cooperation from the Maliki government unless it first make

progress on the insurgency issue, and others address security concerns on the other side. And in this context, a surge that could potentially take on Shia militias directly can actually open a completely new front; namely, a direct confrontation between the

United States and the Shias, and potentially a Shia insurgency in

Iraq, something that we have, so far, not seen in that country.

Now, Iran is also connected to this discussion—2006 also saw the

dramatic turn for the worst in Iran’s relations with its neighbors

and the United States. The hard-line President adopted a much

more unbending position on the nuclear issue and escalated tensions with the United States and Israel deliberately. This confident

and provocative attitude is reflective of a change in the environment of the region. Iran feels a lot more bullish and confident after

the fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and the disruption of

the Arab—of the Iraqi Army, which means that there is no military

bulwark in the region in Iran’s immediate neighborhood to contain

Iranian military power. Iran today very clearly has hegemonic ambitions and would like its influence to—all the way from Central

Asia to Persian Gulf to Lebanon to be recognized, essentially to

view these areas as its ‘‘near abroad,’’ to use a term from the Russian vocabulary.

Now, Iranian hegemony is a concern to countries around Iran,

and to Saudi Arabia, in particular. And intensification of rivalry

between the two of them will threaten regional stability. And, more

so, I think, it will also fuel radical pro-al-Qaeda jihadi activism.

When the last time—mainly because Sunni governments view

and use extremism and sectarianism in order to confront Hezbollah

and Iran’s popularity on their own streets, these two countries had

the rivalry similar to, today, in the 1980s and 1990s. The consequence of that was al-Qaeda, Taliban, and 9/11. So, that threat

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once again is looming as we’re seeing the specter of sectarianism

rise.

And I think, for the United States, containment of that rivalry

rather than taking part in it should, of a singular more important

objective, in bringing stability to the region and confronting the

issue of terrorism and extremism.

Now, the question before Washington for a long time has been

how to deal with an ascendant bullish aggressive Iran, to engage

it in order to influence its behavior or to confront it. There’s no

doubt, in the past 3 years Iranian involvement in Iraq has been an

irritant, in many regards, to the United States. Many in this country have suggested that securing Iranian cooperation would be important to stabilizing Iraq, and success in that arena may translate

into success in other arenas, such as the nuclear issue.

Iraq presented a particularly opportune opening, mainly because,

even as we speak, U.S. interests and Iranian interests still, on

many issues in Iraq, seem to be converging. Iranian influence and

assets in Iraq are very important to the stability of that country

because of the depth and breadth of cultural, political, social, and

economic relations between Iran and the majority of Iraq’s population to the south, which are the Shia. So, whether or not it is possible to leverage that influence to U.S.’s—to serving the U.S.’s interest is something that should be explored.

Second, as Ambassador Haass mentioned, Iran does not want

Iraq to fail or to break up, mainly because it doesn’t want a Kurdish state in their north. Iran does not want a costly civil war next

door to it. And Iran also wants the Shia government in Baghdad

to succeed, and the Shias to consolidate the powers that they have

gained since 2003. In fact, for that reason it has supported the political process in Iraq—elections, governments, et cetera—since

then, although it must be said that the environment of distrust and

tensions with the United States has led Iranians to follow a policy

of controlled chaos in Iraq; namely, keep it on a sufficient boiler so

that the United States will be preoccupied and the American people will lose appetite for any kind of military engagement in Iran.

Now, despite the potential for having an opening over Iraq, it

hasn’t materialized. And, in fact, it seems that the policy is likely

to be that rolling back Iranian influence in Iraq and the rest of the

region is seen as a solution to the myriad Middle East problems

we’re facing from Lebanon to the Palestinian issue, all the way to

Afghanistan. Now, the—a policy that’s focused on Iran rather than

Iraq, and is built on the Arab Iranian Sunni-Shia divide in the region, will only escalate conflict in Iraq by making Iraq into a battleground between Iran and the United States, and, ultimately,

Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is not something for the future. In

fact, an attempt to exclude Iran from Iraq will likely provoke this

rather than the departure of the United States from Iraq. And it

also will not remain in Iraq, it will spread to the rest of the Middle

East. It will entrench sectarianism and deepen American involvement in the Middle East.

Now, this is somewhat reminiscent to a policy that was followed

in the 1980s and 1990s to contain the Iranian revolution, at which

time the United States supported an Arab-Sunni alliance to contain

Iran in the region. However, there are some important differences

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to be noticed. One is that Iran was far weaker than it is today, particularly on the nuclear issue. Second, containment of Iran in the

1980s and 1990s rested on Iraq’s military capability. And third,

success of this strategy of containment of Iran during those decades

owed a good deal to the presence and importance of Taliban, jihadi

activists, and all of those who were ultimately responsible for 9/11.

Today, there is no Iraqi military bulwark. The task of militarily

confronting and containing Iran will fall on the United States

shoulders in a long-term situation. Moreover, we saw the cost, in

2001, of a policy of the region, trying to mobilize radical Sunni ideology in order to confront Shia influence. If we are to revert to that

containment strategy one more time, given the array of forces in

the region, given the weakness—military weakness of countries

around Iran—we ought to contemplate that we’re going to be in the

Persian Gulf, as well as the rest of the Middle East, for a very long

time, and this is a long-term commitment that would require us to

deploy in various arenas of conflict.

Now, it also would place the United States squarely in the middle of regional conflicts, and at a time when we’re going to be seeing ideological extremism and terrorism to be escalating. The consequences on open conflict and attack, as was also mentioned by

Ambassador Haass, are, I think, very great. First of all, today I

think the Iranian regime, despite all of its negative behavior, sees

stability in the Persian Gulf to be in its interests. It abandoned the

goal of exporting revolution about a decade ago, and has, so far,

sought to increase its influence within the existing regional power

structure. It improved its relations with its neighbors. It normalized relations with Saudi Arabia. It supported stabilization of

Afghanistan in 2001, and that of Iraq, at least in the initial phase,

by supporting elections and the government.

Now, an open conflict with Iran will reverse this. It will entrench

and strengthen the Iranian regime. It will rally the Iranian population to the flag. It will weaken the drive in Iran for democracy,

and will divert attention of the Iranian people from economic and

social problems. It will also radicalize the Iranian regime and make

it far more dangerous to its neighbors. It will, without a doubt, become far more dependent—determined to acquire weapons of mass

destruction and to destabilize the Middle East and try to spread

the United States and its Arab allies in as many arenas of conflict

as it can—it is possible.

Now, confronting Iran directly, particularly if it ends up in a

military situation, I think, will also worsen the situation in Iraq,

and it also will spread to other arenas of conflict—in Afghanistan,

in particular, the Persian Gulf, Palestinian territories, and Lebanon. It will also inflame, I think, anti-Americanism across the

Muslim world.

There are serious disagreements between the United States and

Iran, most notably over the nuclear issue, and it is very important

for the United States to address that. However, for so long as Iran

sees benefit in stability in the Persian Gulf and accepts the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, engagement could provide a path

to influencing its behavior for the better. Although, as was mentioned, engagement is not likely to quickly or cheaply yield results,

it has the benefit of continuing to deepen Iranian involvement in

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its own region rather than give it an incentive to stabilize that

region.

I think, at this point in time, no two countries matter more to

the future of the Middle East than the United States and Iran. In

many ways, the future of that region will be decided in the crucible

of competition, cooperation, engagement, or confrontation between

these two countries. And I think a policy that will bring stability

to that relationship will both—will most effectively serve our purposes in conflict in Iraq, in stabilizing the Persian Gulf, as well as

preventing a further escalation of tensions in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. And I think, talking about

linkages, it is not so much that—as was mentioned, that the Palestinian issue is a solution to Iraq and to the problem with Iran, it’s

the other way around, that Iran and Iraq, and stability there, is

more important, in terms of also having achievements in the Palestinian arena.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nasr follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. VALI NASR, PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY AF- FAIRS, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, AND ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS, MONTEREY, CA

Since 2003 Shia-Sunni conflict has emerged as a major divide in Middle East politics, and radically changed the regional context for U.S. policy. Sectarian violence

is no longer just limited to Iraq, but has expanded in scope to influence regional

development from the Persian Gulf to Lebanon, adding new complexity to the conflicts in the region and presenting a serious foreign policy challenge to the United

States. Taking stock of the risks and visible dangers that this change presents is

a significant challenge facing U.S. policy in the Middle East.

In Iraq sectarian violence has derailed the effort to build a viable state, and is

today the single most important threat to the future of that country. In Lebanon

following the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah a sectarian rift opened between Shias on the one hand, and Sunnis and Christians on the other. That rift

is deepening as Hezbollah pushes to unseat the Sunni-led government in Beirut.

Lebanon and Iraq have in turn escalated tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The competition between the two regional rivals has in recent months taken an increasingly sectarian tone. The sectarian competition even extends to extremist

jihadi organizations associated with al-Qaeda. These groups have supported alQaeda elements in Iraq, and have intensified their anti-Shia rhetoric and attacks

in the Middle East and South Asia.

All this suggests that Iraq has introduced sectarianism to conflicts and rivalries

in the Middle East. The Shia-Sunni rivalry in religious, as well as secular arenas,

will likely be an important factor in the near future. This trend was clearly evident

during the war in Lebanon last summer when Hezbollah’s growing influence elicited

a sectarian reaction from Arab capitals as well as a number of extremist jihadi Web

sites. The condemnation of Hezbollah as a Shia organization indicated that although

the conflict itself was not new, the response to it was not decided by the Arab-Israeli

issue alone but sectarian posturing.

For the United States the rising sectarian tensions present a number of challenges:

1. Sectarian violence will determine the fate of Iraq and what that will mean for

U.S. standing and interests in the Middle East.

2. Sectarianism will play an important role in deciding regional alliances in the

Middle East and how various states and substate actors will act. Sectarianism will

compete with, as well as interact with, other concerns such as the Arab-Israeli

issue: Political and economic reform, and support for U.S. policies, most notably the

global war on terror. This will complicate the management of U.S. interests.

3. Sectarian conflict will color relations of Middle East states, but conflicts where

they occur are likely to be waged by nonstate actors—militias and political organizations. This will contribute to regional instability and increases the likelihood of violence.

4. Sectarian conflict is a radicalizing force. Shia and Sunni militias will inevitably

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lence against Shias was perpetuated by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab alZarqawi and his al-Qaeda forces. In the Arab world and Pakistan violent antiShiism is the domain of radical pro-al-Qaeda clerics, Web sites, and armed groups.

Sectarianism—especially among Sunnis—is a driver for radical jihadi ideology.

Among the Shias in Iraq sectarian violence has had a similar effect. It has shifted

power within that community to the radical forces of Muqtada al-Sadr and his

Mahdi Army. The specter of U.S. confrontation with Shia militias and Iran will

likely accelerate this trend.

5. The sectarian dimension of regional politics is of direct relevance to the growing

tensions in United States-Iran relations. Conflict between the United States—in alliance with Sunni Arab regimes who view the Iranian challenge in sectarian

terms—and Iran will exacerbate sectarian tensions, and further embed them in regional conflicts.

ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

Shias and Sunnis represent the oldest and most important sectarian divide in

Islam, the origins of which go back to the seventh century to a disagreement about

who the Prophet Muhammad’s legitimate successors were. Over time, the two sects

developed their own distinct conception of Islamic teachings and practice which has

given each sect its identity and outlook on society and politics. Shias are a minority

of 10–15 percent of the Muslim world, but constitute a sizable portion of those in

the arc from Lebanon to Pakistan—some 150 million people in all. They account for

about 90 percent of Iranians, 70 percent of Bahrainis, 65 percent of Iraqis, 40 percent of Lebanese, and a sizable portion of the people living in the Persian Gulf region. Despite their demographic weight outside Iran the Shias had never enjoyed

power.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ

No where was the plight of the Shia more evident than in Iraq. Under Saddam

Iraq was a sectarian state that had routinely brutalized Shias. After the first Iraq

war in 1991 the Kurdish areas of Iraq were removed from Saddam’s control. In the

Arab south that he ruled, the Shia portion of the population is even larger, approximating 80 percent. After that war the Shias in the south rose in a rebellion which

was brutally suppressed with as many as 300,000 Shias dying and many more escaping to Iran. Between 1991 and 2003 Saddam’s rule was sustained by suppression

of Shias. The sectarianism that we see in Iraq has its roots in the sectarianism that

was practiced by Saddam’s regime.

The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was of symbolic importance to

the Middle East. The war ended minority Sunni rule in Iraq and empowered Shias,

and this has in turn led to a Shia revival across the Middle East that as a cultural

and political force will shape regional politics. Iraq has encouraged the region’s

Shias to demand greater rights and representation, but also to identify themselves

as members of a regionwide community that extends beyond state borders. The Shia

revival has also raised Iran’s status as the region’s largest Shia actor. It was for

this reason that Shias initially welcomed America’s role in Iraq—the most important Shia spiritual leader, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani encouraged the Shia

to embrace the political process introduced to Iraq by the United States by voting

and joining the newly established security forces.

However, the shift in the sectarian balance of power met with Sunni resistance,

first in Iraq but increasingly in Arab capitals. The fall from power of Sunnis in Iraq

has ended their hegemonic domination of regional politics and diminished the power

of Sunni regimes and ruling communities. This has led to a Sunni backlash that

is reflected in the ferocity of insurgent attacks in Iraq since 2003, criticism of U.S.

policy in Iraq in friendly Arab capitals and unwillingness to help the new Shia-led

Iraqi Government, and growing anti-Shia and anti-Iranian tenor of radical jihadi

propaganda.

The insurgency that the United States confronted during the first two years of

the occupation was largely Sunni in character. It drew on the Sunni belief in manifest destiny to rule, anger at loss of power in Baghdad, and the resources of Sunni

tribes, foreign fighters, radical ideologies, and Baath Party and former Sunni officer

corps to wage a campaign of violence against the U.S. occupation and also to prevent the Shia consolidation of power in the belief that a hasty U.S. departure will

lead to a collapse of the current government and restoration of Sunni rule.

For the first 2 years of the occupation the Shia showed great restraint in the face

of insurgent attacks on Shia targets, heeding the call of Ayatollah Sistani not to

‘‘fall into the trap of a sectarian war,’’ but also trusting that the United States

would defeat the insurgency. All that changed in 2006 as Shias abandoned restraint

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favoring retaliation. Radical voices of the like of Muqtada al-Sadr drowned Sistani’s

call for restraint and moderation. Two developments were instrumental in changing

Shia attitude:

1. The bombing of the Shia holy shrine in Samarrah in February 2006. The

Samarrah bombing was a psychological turning point for Iraqi Shias. It gravely

threatened the Shia’s sense of security and put to question the feasibility of reconciliation with Sunnis. It also raised doubts in Shia minds about the United States

ability and willingness to defeat the insurgency—whose violent capabilities and ferocious anti-Shiism was undeniable. Many also questioned the wisdom of exercising

restraint, arguing that it had only emboldened the insurgency. The doubt provided

an opening for Shia militias to step into the breach to provide security to Shia communities, but also to establish a ‘‘balance of terror’’ by attacking Sunni civilians.

Iraq never recovered from the impact of Samarrah and fell victim to the vicious

cycle of sectarian violence. The political process failed to focus the country back on

reconciliation.

2. The Shia anger and reaction to the Samarrah bombing was aggravated by a

shift in U.S. strategy in Iraq that would alienate the Shia and deepen their distrust

of the United States. This would in turn reduce American influence over Shia politics—now at its lowest point—and raise the stock of anti-American forces of

Muqtada al-Sadr, and his Mahdi Army, which would escalate attacks on Sunnis as

it spread its control over Baghdad and the Shia south.

The United States had hoped that the December 2005 elections would turn Iraq

around. The United States had persuaded Sunnis to participate in the elections and

join a national unity government, hoping to, thereby, end or at least damp down

the insurgency, but that did not come to pass. Hoping to win the support of Sunni

politicians Washington began to distance itself from the Shia. It pressured the Shia

on the issue of their militias, as well as the unpopular notion of amnesty for former

Baathists. Shias resisted. Especially after Samarrah they saw the insurgency rather

than their own militias as the problem—Shia militias, they pointed out, were often

the only forces effectively defending Shia neighborhoods against car bombs. Shias

also saw the overt U.S. push for a national-unity government as coddling the Sunnis

and, worse yet, rewarding the insurgency. With the insurgency in full swing, Shias

worried that American resolve was weakening. This convinced them more than before that they needed their armed militias—reflected in their cool reception to the

surge of 20,000 troops announced by the administration.

2006 proved to be a turning point in U.S.-Shia relations. U.S. strategy during that

year became one of shifting the focus of its military operations from fighting the insurgency to contain Shia militias in the sectarian fight in Baghdad. The Shia saw

this as a tilt away from them toward the Sunnis—addressing their security demands rather than those of Shias. That this happened at a time of great anxiety

in the Shia community following the Samarrah bombing did not help the U.S. position. In particular, that a year on the U.S. strategy of working more closely with

Sunnis had not weakened the insurgency—which still by some estimates accounts

for 80 percent of U.S. casualties in Iraq—nor had it reduced the rate of attacks on

Shia targets. What it achieved was to create doubts as to whether the United States

was a reliable ally. Those doubts benefited Muqtada al-Sadr and weakened moderate Shia voices.

It is now clear that Shias are not willing to give up on their militias—which they

believe is the only credible bulwark against sectarian attacks by the insurgency

without security guarantees from the United States. That means that the United

States will get cooperation from Shias on the issue of militias only after it has

shown gains in containing the insurgency. Shias will resist disarming so long as the

insurgency is a threat.

The radicalization of Shia politics is likely to worsen if the U.S. military directly

targets Shias forces in Baghdad. That could provoke a Shia insurgency in Baghdad

and the Iraqi south—among the largest population group in Iraq—which would

present the United States with a vastly broader security challenge, one that can

overwhelm U.S. forces. The United States today is hard-pressed to defeat the insurgency that it is facing, but runs the danger of provoking a potentially larger one.

BROADER REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The radicalization of Shia politics in Iraq has coincided with developments elsewhere in the region to make 2006 the fateful year during which the sectarianism

that began in Iraq turned into a regional dynamic. That the United States was slow

to understand the convergence of sectarianism and regional politics accounts for its

limited ability to coherently manage the cascading conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, and

over Iran’s nuclear program.

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In summer 2006 the war with Israel emboldened Hezbollah just as it divided Lebanon along sectarian lines. The Lebanon war marked the regionalization of sectarian tensions that were manifest in Iraq. The reaction of Arab governments and

a number of pro-al-Qaeda jihadi leaders and Web sites to Hezbollah’s campaign was

unexpectedly sectarian, departing from the customary unity against Israel. Since

the war Lebanese politics has taken an increasingly sectarian tone as Hezbollah’s

drive to topple the Lebanese Government has viewed as a Shia power play by Lebanon’s other communities; and since the regional reaction to developments in Lebanon has pitted Iran against the traditional Sunni power brokers in the region:

Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

What is evident in the aftermath of the Lebanon war is that the sectarian rivalries that first surfaced in Iraq now compete with the Arab-Israeli conflict to determine regional alliances and political attitudes of ordinary people. Hezbollah and

Iran would prefer to focus the region on the Arab-Israeli issue and to gain support

as champions of the Palestinian cause. However, they have faced resistance in pursuing this agenda from regimes and radical Sunni groups who see Iran and the sectarian issue as more important. In this environment the intensification of sectarian

conflict in Iraq and its growing regional dimension has led Hezbollah and Iran to

intensify their campaign against Israel in the hope of diverting attention from the

divisive role that Iraq is playing in the region.

2006 also witnessed a dramatic turn in U.S.-Iran relations. In 2005 Iran elected

a hard-line President, who invigorated Iran’s determination to pursue its nuclear

program just as he escalated tensions with the United States and Israel. This confident and provocative attitude is reflective of change in the strategic environment

in the region, and Iran’s belief that it enjoys a stronger position than it did in 2003.

Iran benefited from regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fall of the Taliban

and the Saddam regime provided Iran with greater space to assert its influence in

the region, and the destruction of the Iraqi Army removed a significant bulwark

against Iranian ambition and influence in the Persian Gulf. The occupation of Iraq

has depleted American power and prestige making it harder to contain Iran, which

has seized the opportunity to spread its wings. Rising Iranian clout has fed, and

been fed, by the Shia revival that swept across the Middle East in the wake of the

Iraq war. Iran today has hegemonic ambitions in the Persian Gulf and sees itself

as a great power, and it views nuclear capability as the means to attain that goal.

What Iran seeks is for the United States to accept Central Asia, Afghanistan, and

the Persian Gulf as Iran’s ‘‘near abroad’’—a zone of influence in which Iran’s interests would determine ebbs and flows of politics—and to recognize Iranian presence

in Syria and Lebanon.

The specter of Iranian hegemony has been a source of concern for Iran’s neighbors. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has viewed Iran’s gains in Iraq and its growing

influence in Lebanon and over the Palestinian issue with alarm. Intensification of

the rivalry between the two threatens regional stability, and more importantly can

fuel pro-al-Qaeda jihadi activism. The rivalry between the two in Afghanistan and

South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s served as the context for radicalization that ultimately led to 9/11.

There is no doubt that managing Iran poses an important challenge to U.S. foreign policy, one that extends beyond the nuclear issue and the threat to Israel. The

question before Washington has been whether to engage Iran to influence the course

of its development or to contain it. In the past 3 years, Iranian involvement in Iraq

has been an irritant to Washington. Many, including the Iraq Study Group, have

suggested that securing Iranian cooperation is important to stabilizing Iraq—and

success in that arena may translate into success in dealing with the nuclear issue.

Iraq presented an opening in part because U.S. and Iranian interests in Iraq, even

today, appear to converge on key issues: Iran does not want Iraq to fail or break

up (fearing an independent Kurdish state), and a civil war in Iraq is worrisome to

Tehran. Iran wants the Shia government in Baghdad to succeed, and for Shias to

consolidate the gains that they have made since 2003. In fact, since 2003 Iran has

supported the political process—elections, constitution, and governments—that the

United States introduced to Iraq. The possibility of engagement, despite the potential for positive benefits for Iraq, has so far remained remote, and now seems to be

disappearing altogether.

It now appears that U.S. policy is gravitating toward confrontation with Iran, not

only in Iraq but across the region. Washington appears to see rolling back Iranian

influence as the key to resolving various regional problems. A policy that is focused

on Iran rather than Iraq will escalate conflict in Iraq and across the Middle East,

thereby deepening American involvement in the region with the potential for adversely impacting U.S. interests.

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This policy is reminiscent of the containment strategy of the 1980s and early

1990s when the United States rallied Iran’s neighbors to contain the spread of the

Iranian revolution. However at that time, Iran was weaker, and containment of Iran

was anchored in Iraq’s military capability, and Taliban and radical Sunni ideology’s

ability to counter Shia Iran’s influence. But today the Iraqi military bulwark is no

longer there. The task of militarily confronting and containing Iran will fall on U.S.

shoulders. Moreover, in 2001 it became evident that the cost of Sunni containment

of Shia Iran was the rise of radical Sunni jihadi ideology, al-Qaeda, and 9/11.

Reverting to the old containment strategy today, given the current capability of

Iran’s neighbors in the Middle East and the balance of power in the region, would

mean a long-time American commitment to staying in the Persian Gulf and deploying to other arenas of conflict in an environment of growing radicalism. It would

place the United States at the heart of the region’s conflicts and vulnerable to ideological extremism and terrorism, all of which will likely only escalate as a consequence.

The consequences of conflict with Iran will be grave for the region and U.S. interests. Conflict will radicalize the Iranian regime, and, more important, the Iranian

public. Conflict will adversely impact political developments in Iran, entrenching

and strengthening the Iranian regime, which will rally the population to the flag.

Anti-Americanism and ideological radicalism has not been a staple of popular politics in Iran for some time now. It has been the quest for democracy that has dominated Iranian imagination—sharply contrasting with the popular mood in the rest

of the Middle East. That trend will likely be reversed in the advent of conflict.

The Iranian regime today sees regional stability in its interest. Iran abandoned

the goal of exporting its revolution to its Persian Gulf neighbors at the end of 1980s,

and has since acted as a status-quo power. It seeks influence within the existing

regional power structure. It improved its relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors

throughout the 1990s, and in particular normalized relations with Saudi Arabia.

Iran supported stabilization of Afghanistan in 2001 and that of Iraq during the

early phase of the occupation. Conflict will change the direction that Iranian foreign

policy has been following. The process of greater engagement of Iran with the region, and its inclusion in its political and economic structures that has characterized

the past decade will be reversed. Iran will likely become more dangerous to its

neighbors, a trend which the United States will be hard-pressed to control or reverse without escalating conflict even further and committing itself to greater presence in the region.

Confrontation with Iran will likely worsen the situation in Iraq, but its impact

will not remain limited to Iraq. It will unfold in different arenas across a large expanse of territory from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf, the Palestinian territories

and Lebanon, as well as in various forms outside of the Middle East. It will inflame

anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. The costs of such a conflict will far exceed

what the United States confronts in the region today, in particular if the conflict

leads to a war with Iran—a country that is vastly larger and more populous than

Iraq. Conflict will also make Iran more determined to acquire WMD and to destabilize the Middle East. That will expand the scope and intensity of conflicts that

impact U.S. interests, as well as reverse gains made so far in the war on terror.

There are serious areas of disagreement between the United States and Iran over

the nuclear issue, and Iran’s role in Lebanon, the Palestinian conflict, and Iraq. U.S.

concerns with Iranian ambition and policies must be addressed. However, for so

long as Iran sees benefit in stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, engagement could provide a path to influencing its behavior to serve U.S. interests

and those of its neighbors. Although engagement is not likely to quickly or cheaply

yield what the United States wants from Iran, it still has the benefit of deepening

Iranian involvement in, and commitment to, the regional order that the United

States is seeking to bolster.

CONTENDING WITH THE CHALLENGE

U.S. interests would be best served by a policy approach that is premised on the

following:

1. In Iraq, it is imperative to work for a political settlement that would limit the

scope of sectarian violence. The chaos in Iraq is a consequence of the absence of a

credible political process and roadmap to sectarian peace and state-building. The violence cannot be brought under control through military means. Only a political

plan of action, which can credibly move the fighting parties toward compromise will

remove the incentive for violence and change the dynamic on the ground.

The national unity plan that was conceived at the end of 2005 was put before

Iraqis at a different time when violence had not deepened animosities on both sides

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and when the United States had much more leverage with Shia leaders as well as

their followers. The time for that plan has passed, and pressuring the Iraqi Government by placing benchmarks before it will not change that fact. If national unity

is still attainable it will have to come through a new plan.

There exists a danger that in the coming months the ‘‘surge strategy’’ will extend

the scope of the conflict by provoking a Shia insurgency. Shia militias have so far

not been fighting U.S. troops; but direct confrontation can transform their sectarian

war into a Shia insurgency—something Iraq has so far not faced. The majority of

Iraq’s population, especially in the critical Arab regions, is Shia. An anti-American

Shia insurgency, at a time when the Sunni insurgency continues, will significantly

increase the burden on the U.S. military in Iraq. It will also further radicalize Shias

in the region. Radicalization of Shias—will mark a significant expansion in the

scope and intensity of threat to U.S. security and interests, and will adversely impact the global effort to contain radicalism and terrorism. Shia militias are a problem for Iraq, but an escalation of the conflict by turning them into an anti-American

force will benefit neither Iraq not the United States.

2. Anchoring United States Middle East policy in containing Iran will expand the

scope of the conflict in the region rather than reduce it. It will also increase the

scope of the terrorist threat to the United States rather than reduce it. Such a policy

will also require a long-term U.S. presence in the Middle East. The United States

should rather seek to deescalate tensions in the region by promoting political solutions to crises in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Iraq, and the nuclear standoff

with Iran. The United States should not tie all these conflicts to the challenge of

Iranian hegemony, and not view a broader conflict with Iran as a solution to challenges facing the Palestinian issue, Lebanon and Iraq. No two countries matter

more to the future of the Middle East than the United States and Iran. The importance of stability in U.S.-Iranian relations for the future of the Middle East cannot

be overemphasized. Engagement rather than conflict presents the most realistic

chance for achieving that goal.

3. The United States must take steps to discourage regional actors from using sectarianism as a foreign policy tool. Investment in sectarian voices and especially radical Sunni organizations of the al-Qaeda type most closely tied to sectarian ideology

and violence will not only intensify the conflict but promote extremism to the detriment of the broader U.S. interests in the region. As great a challenge as Shia ascendancy and Iranian aggressiveness is to the United States and its allies strengthening the ideological and organizational bases of Sunni extremism will only further

threaten U.S. interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I’m going to yield for a moment to Chairman Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, let me indicate that a number of

Republican Senators, including some members of this committee,

have been invited by Steve Hadley, our National Security Director,

to meet with him immediately in the Roosevelt Room at the White

House. I’m among those that have been invited, and feel that I

need to accept that invitation. And so, I apologize for the absence

of some members from the committee, at this point, but we——

Senator KERRY. We should bring Hadley up here to listen to

these guys.

Senator LUGAR. Well, we have had some remarkable testimony,

and I appreciate your yielding to me.

The CHAIRMAN. If you would like to—I’d yield to you, if you want

to ask a couple of questions——

Senator LUGAR. No; I think I——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Before you leave.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. I will depart, at this point——

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. To make this engagement. Thank

you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator. I fully understand it,

and I think it’s important you all do go down and see Mr. Hadley.

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And let me begin by thanking you all for your testimony. And I’d

like to focus, at the outset here, on when the Secretary of State

was before us—and I’ll address this to all three of you; if you can

give me a short answer, I’d appreciate it—she indicated that direct

negotiations with Syria and Iran would be—her words were, ‘‘puts

us in a role of supplicant’’; it would be, ‘‘extortion,’’ not diplomacy.

You’ve spoken to this. Can you tell me why there are those—and

because these are very bright, respected people—why they would

view it as extortion and/or us being a supplicant? You’ve all indicated we should engage, in some form or another. So, I mean,

what’s the motivation—I’m not being a wiseguy—I mean, what’s

happening on the other side of the divide here that views this as

extortion—a pretty strong word—and as us being a supplicant?

That seems to me to set the bar pretty high to get to the point

where you now say, ‘‘Well, yeah, we can now move to discussion.’’

Is it a negotiating gambit or—what do you think?

Richard. Mr. Secretary.

Ambassador HAASS. I don’t think it’s a negotiating gambit. I

think it comes from an assessment of the relative standing or position of us vis-a-vis them, or, to use an old Soviet concept, Senator,

I think the concern in the administration—it’s odd for me to talk

for them now, I’m not sure I could talk for them when I worked

for them, but let me try—I think the concern in the administration

is that the so-called ‘‘correlation of forces’’ has moved against the

United States. Because of the situation in Iraq, because of the price

of energy, because of what happened this summer in Lebanon,

there’s a concern that a negotiation involving Iran and Syria would

give us precious few cards to play, and, again, finds them in the

driver’s seat. Needless to say, I disagree with that. It ignores some

tremendous strengths that we have. It also ignores the possibility

that if we don’t like what we can negotiate, we can just walk. And,

as I said before, I always think negotiations have two real purposes. One is to potentially reach an agreement. The other is to

clarify. If they don’t succeed, and if it turns out that Iran and Syria

are being outrageous in their demands, then that can be quite useful to the Secretary of State and others as they go about trying to

build regional and global support for some sort of a sanction.

So, I don’t understand, I don’t agree with the reluctance to negotiate, but I do believe it largely stems from an assessment that our

relative position has worsened.

Let me say one other thing very quickly. There’s an irony here,

because when our relative position was quite strong several years

ago, we also refused to negotiate.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

Ambassador HAASS. And the——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I was about to point that out, but I——

Ambassador HAASS. There was a reluctance to negotiate, then,

because people felt it was not necessary and regime change was

going to come.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, look, the reason I ask it is—the purpose of

these hearings is to try to enlighten us, as well as the American

public. I start with the premise that there are some very bright

people in this administration, so it’s not just pique that it’s suggesting, and I think it’s an important explanation.

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Dennis, you wanted to comment on that?

Ambassador ROSS. I do, because I’ve had some exchanges, because I wrote an article in which I made a case for why we should

be talking to the Syrians, although I do believe dealing with the

Syrians and dealing with the Iranians requires what I call a stickand-carrot approach, not necessarily a carrot-and-stick approach.

They have to know what they lose to concentrate the mind, but

then they have to know, if they’re prepared to change their behavior, what they get for it. So, it has to be both dimensions.

What I’ve heard from the administration is, I think, three points.

First is that, basically, the Syrians have made their choice; they

feel that they have made their strategic choice with the Iranians,

and there is—you’re not going to be able to affect them, No. 1. No.

2 is their fear that the only thing the Syrians want is Lebanon, so

you’ll go in there, and immediately what you’re doing is you’re talking about Lebanon, and we don’t want to be—we don’t want to look

like we’re talking about Lebanon. And, No. 3—and they’re certainly

hearing it from the Saudis, especially in the aftermath of Bashar

Asad’s speech in which he referred to ‘‘half-men,’’ and the Saudis

interpreted that as being, shall we say, more than a slur against

them. They’ve heard, from the Saudis, that the worst thing in the

world that we could be doing right now is sending the signal that

we’re prepared to go talk to them at a time when they think they’re

riding high.

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Ambassador ROSS. Those are the—I think, the factors that influence them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me go to—only a few minutes left here—Dennis. You indicated—and I happen to agree with you—that the only thing that’s

going to change the behavior of the Iraqis internally and work

out—or attempt to work out some of the real risks each of the parties would have to take to deal with this sectarian violence—would

be a real change. And I was asked, some time ago, when the President was whispering literally in the ear of Maliki, you know, ‘‘Do

you think it’s a good thing?’’ And I said, ‘‘It depends on what he’s

whispering in his ear.’’ If he’s saying, ‘‘Hey, Jack, if you don’t

straighten things out, we’re leaving,’’ that might get his attention.

If it’s, ‘‘We’re with you, don’t worry. We’ll send in reinforcements,’’

then we’re probably in trouble.

I think everybody agrees, here, there needs to be a change, that

there has to be, that old expression, there’s nothing like a hanging

to focus one’s attention. This conundrum here, we, basically, it

seems to me, have to send a message that we ain’t hanging around

for a long time. I assume that’s why Richard and you and others,

and the Iraq Study Group, and I all said we have to start to drawdown to send that message.

Does the mere fact that we have sent in a surge, even though,

quite frankly, he could have moved these troops around without

going through all this—does that have—does that delay the inevitable, forcing the Iraqis to have to look at what they have to do

in order to be able to deal with this issue?

Ambassador ROSS. It does, unless somehow you would condition

the surge. In other words, we’ve got the first tranche of it beginVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00293 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ning. If it became very clear that, ‘‘Nothing else happens unless we

now see you begin to fulfill all the commitments you’ve now said

you’re prepared to make, whether it’s the sharing of oil revenues

or it’s the de-Baathification’’——

The CHAIRMAN. I asked that question. They made it clear that,

no, there was no absolute conditioning. Now, I understand if an administration wouldn’t say that publicly, but I don’t understand an

administration not saying that privately.

Let me conclude. I don’t want to run over my time; it may be,

with the reduced number, we may be able to have a second

round—but, Professor, as I said, I read your book with great interest. I thought your testimony was enlightening. I find one irony

here, though. At the very moment the administration is getting involved in a ‘‘surge,’’ the argument I’m hearing from my contacts

within Iraq that my staff and I keep after our seven trips over

there—is that it’s viewed as—by the Sunnis, at the moment—as a

pro-Shia effort, that we are going after the Sunnis and leaving the

Shia alone, and we are taking sides. The irony is, outside of Iraq

the argument is we’re siding with the Sunni states against the

Shia. How does that play in the neighborhood?

Dr. NASR. Well, even within Iraq, many Shias have the same

complaint; namely, that the troops should not have come to Baghdad at all, they should have been—the surge should have been at

Al Anbar. And, in fact, I think Prime Minister Maliki tried to have

his own security plan ahead of the announcement of the new strategy in order to avoid having—sending the troops in. That’s exactly

that—the dilemma, Senator. We’re in an environment in the region, where, increasingly, there is a divide, in terms of opinion on

a host of issues, and we’re seeing that public opinion is following,

in many of these issues, along sectarian lines. Part of the problem

with the surge is that there is a military solution here, with no political plan to back it up. It would have been possible to——

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

Dr. NASR [continuing]. Assuage the fears of both sides if there

was a new political plan that would have shown a roadmap to

peace with, I think, a step-by-step about how the United States can

actually get the two sides to make the compromises, rather than

just putting benchmarks at it. So, as a result, I think nobody believes that there is a political solution here. They see the—they see

that this is essentially an effort to decommission their military assets at a time in which—where there’s political uncertainty for

them, and they’re sort of circling the wagons.

The CHAIRMAN. A cynical view expressed by some editorial

boards, and, I must admit, by me and others, is, it could also be

just to hand this off, just keep this going. But I’m not sure.

My time is up. I’ll come back, Professor; I want to ask you about

specific Shia leaders and the degree to which they support, or don’t

support, this new effort.

But, with that, let me yield to Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, to each of you,

thank you for your continued contributions to helping, not just the

Congress, but the American people, understand the depth of this

issue.

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Mr. Ross, you ended your testimony almost like a book, chapter

one. And it just kind of fell off the table with a not particularly optimistic view of not only Iraq, but the Middle East. So, my question

to each of you is: Where do we go from here? We have heard, this

morning, an inventory of consequences of bad decisions made over

the last 4 years. And I thought the three of you presented not only

the past issues, but the current dilemmas and challenges rather

clearly. But I’m interested now in asking the three of you: In your

opinions, where do we go from here, addressing such issues as the

resources that we now have in Iraq, the investment that we have

made in Iraq? Where best can we maximize those resources to have

some influence over the outcome in Iraq and the scope of the Middle East? Recognizing, as the three of you have said, that we don’t

have many good options, if we have any options at all. We are dealing with many uncontrollables, many dynamics that are well beyond what we can influence.

So, Mr. Ross, begin with you. Thank you.

Ambassador ROSS. Well, I guess with regard to Iraq, I would

offer two suggestions. The first is, in a sense, what I was implying

with the chairman before, at least the first part of the surge is already done, because forces are en route or already there. I would

condition any further implementation of the surge on whether or

not the Iraqi Government is living up to the promises they’ve

made. There’s a whole—in a sense, the President’s now laid out a

series of measures by which you can evaluate whether they’re

doing what they said they were going to do or not. If they’re not

prepared to do what they say, you know, we could be providing a

lot—much larger numbers of forces and it wouldn’t make a difference. I completely identify with what Vali was saying about the

issue of, if you don’t have a political plan, it doesn’t matter what

you’re doing in the security area. So, that’s point one. I would condition further implementation of the surge on whether or not, in

fact, the—Prime Minister Maliki is living up to what he said he

would do.

No. 2, if, in fact, he’s unlikely to do—which is fulfill those promises, which is my fear, not my—certainly not what I want to see,

but what I’m afraid of—then I think we should also take—we

should take—we should be aware of what’s happening on the

ground in Iraq that is already beginning to move toward a kind of

fragmentation, or at least changing the realities on the ground.

About 100,000 Iraqis a month are being displaced, which means

that the whole nature of the mixed areas, that previously was the

reality on the ground, is being changed. So, maybe we’re moving

toward what could be a Bosnian kind of outcome, in which case,

forces should be there to facilitate that, you should develop it in

stages. You might find it easier to internationalize the presence in

a circumstance where you were dealing with a Bosnia kind of outcome. That strikes me as being a better way to try to manage what

will happen in Iraq.

Look, I think having Iraq devolve into some kind of convulsive

state is hardly in our interest. I don’t know how much capability

we’re going to have to prevent that over the long haul. I don’t think

you justify staying in Iraq just because the situation gets worse.

That becomes a trap forever. So, one alternative way of managing

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a transition, it seems to me, is, recognize what’s already taking

place on the ground, try to make it safer by approaching it more

in terms of a Bosnia approach, try to internationalize the presence

in light of that, because the objective is suddenly changing.

Third, you know, obviously, I’ve identified a major part of my

life’s work as being involved with trying to resolve or deal with the

Israeli-Palestinian issue. I would do it, as I said, not because it’s

going to have the slightest impact on Iraq. It’s not going to have

the slightest impact on Iraq. But one of the mistakes the administration made is, it sent a message of indifference on this issue.

Here was an issue that, from the standpoint of the Arab and the

Muslim world, they considered to be a core grievance. The last

thing in the world we ought to be doing is sending a message that

what they consider to be very important, we consider to be unimportant.

So, I would make an effort, like what Richard said earlier; I don’t

think this is a time you’re going to be able to resolve the issue. We

have a divided Palestinian leadership. We have an Israeli Government that does not have a great deal of public support. To think

that those leaderships, at this point, are going to take on the core

issues of the conflict that go to the heart of self-definition and identity, issues like Jerusalem and refugees and borders, I think, is just

unrealistic. But, you know, that doesn’t mean you sit on the sidelines. The consequence of sitting on the sidelines for the last 6

years is that the situation has gotten dramatically worse.

I think there’s a great deal that can be done right now, even in

the context of what’s happening among Palestinians. There’s a competition right now for what is going to be the future identity of the

Palestinians, and it’s between Fatah independence and Hamas.

And, at this juncture, I think, I’ve seen—having just come back

from the area, I can tell you I’ve seen, for the first time, a lot of

the Palestinians in Fatah and around—and, I would say, the independents are determined now to compete, because they realize

what Hamas has in mind is an Islamic State. Now, I think the

more they compete, the more you may also end up splitting Hamas.

So, I think the more that we could orchestrate—and the very active effort to try to affect that competition, which involves Arab

States, which involves the Israelis, which involves the Europeans

and ourselves, that’s one thing that’s very important. Clearly, the

Israelis also have a stake in what that competition is, so you have

to try to promote much greater coordination between, I think, the

Israelis and Abu Mazen, and the people around Abu Mazen. I think

that gives you a chance to begin to affect this. It doesn’t mean, by

the way that you don’t at least talk about a political horizon, because, again, if you want those in the Palestinian world who believe in coexistence to succeed, they also have to be able to point

to the fact that there is a possibility and a sense of hope that’s out

there. So, I’d work at two different levels. But don’t focus on a political horizon to the exclusion of what’s happening day to day on

the ground, especially from an American standpoint. After 6 years

of having disengaged, we will not have credibility on a political horizon if the day-to-day realities aren’t changing, because we don’t

have a whole lot of credibility right now.

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I’ll just close. In terms of Iran, I, too, believe that it’s important

to engage Iran, but it’s important to think about how best to do it.

When I said, before, that the combination of sticks and carrots is

an important combination, I put it in that order deliberately. We

have a very interesting debate going on in Iran right now. If you

take a look at what’s happening, in terms of what’s happening on

the state radio, if you look at, in the past week, within the media

within Iran, criticisms of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in terms of what

he’s saying publicly and how it’s isolating Iran and putting them

at risk, it suggests to me that there is a potential to change the

balance of forces within Iran. It’s very important that, in fact,

Ahmadinejad not look like his way of confrontation works. It’s very

important that, in a sense, there’s an unmistakable cost to pursuing the pathway that he’s on. But it’s also very clear that they

have to see that they can gain something if they change their behavior.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Dr. Haass.

Ambassador HAASS. Three things. On the diplomatic side, I

would support a regional forum modeled on the Afghan experience;

American support, rather than resistance, to an Israeli-Syrian dialog; and, third, I would favor unconditional bilateral talks with

Iran.

But, beyond the diplomatic, let’s talk about Iraq for a second,

Senator.

There are three potential goals for U.S. policy now. One is to try

to stop the civil war, or reduce the civil war. That’s been the dominant one. The second is to try to prevent a regional war. The third

is to protect the United States reputation for reliability around the

world, despite Iraq.

I believe that stopping, or significantly affecting, the civil war is

probably beyond our capacity. With this surge, we’re going to face

a terrible dilemma. Either we essentially have an anti-Sunni bias

which runs the risk of strengthening the Iranian and Shia hold on

things, and turning things into a regional war, because, ultimately,

regional states will not stand by while their Sunni kith and kin get

hammered; or we end up going after, much more, the Shia militias,

which is taking on a much larger mission, and we would not have

the Iraqi Government as a partner anymore—and, again, it would

put United States forces in the middle of something much larger.

Again, my principal problem with the surge is that it reinforces

the interaction between American forces and the Iraqi civil war.

I’m not sure that’s a smart place for us to be. To the contrary, I

am increasingly persuaded it is where we don’t want to be. So, we

need to think about how we have a presence in Iraq and avoid

some of the risks of what a withdrawal would bring about. But we

need to design a presence for Iraq that plays for the long haul, that

does not get us in the middle of a civil war. This means less troops;

it means pulling back from Baghdad, thinking more about the borders, thinking more about training, essentially playing for time.

Civil wars take time. Either one side wins or they burn out. At the

moment, the only side that could conceivably win is the Shia.

That’s not an outcome we would want. And so, this may simply

take time. I don’t like sitting here saying this. The idea that the

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best we can help manage is an Iraq in which civil conflict goes on

for several years or longer is not a very attractive thing to say before this or any other committee. That said, it is my analysis that

that’s probably, now, the best outcome—or the least bad outcome,

let’s be honest about it—the least bad outcome that we can realistically hope for. So, what I’m trying to do is design a United States

presence that reduces the direct and indirect cost to the United

States of a civil war in Iraq, which, again, means trying to limit

the scale of the civil war, but, again, more than anything else, preventing the civil war from going truly regional, and trying to avoid

a situation where Iraq undermines United States foreign policy

worldwide.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Professor.

Dr. NASR. Yes, thank you, Senator.

First of all, I don’t think we should expect much in terms of cooperation from the current Iraqi Government, from the Maliki government, for the reason that I think that pressure below from his

community on him is not in the direction of—to making the necessary compromises on oil revenue, on power-sharing, on an amnesty law, and the like. I mean, he’s caught between pressure from

Washington, pressure from below, and in a very fractious alliance

that he has to maintain just to survive in office, so I think he’s trying—he will do just sufficient amount to keep Washington backed

off, but we shouldn’t really expect much movement at all.

And, second, he is being pushed to work off of a plan that was

conceived a year ago, at December 2005, for national unity and reconciliation, in a very different environment in Iraq. And the environment’s changed, the plan hasn’t changed, and this current government probably will not be able to operate on the back of that.

And, as Ambassador Ross mentioned, there’s no other plan on the

table that he would move forward. So, we essentially should come

to terms with the fact that, no, we shouldn’t invest our hopes in

a political solution by this government in Baghdad, if it survives.

And if it doesn’t survive and collapses, it actually will compound

the problem.

Second, I would say that a war that has changed the region—

and we all attest to that; everybody in the region would say that

this war has changed everything—their perception of one another,

the calculus—how could that war be resolved without that region

having the buy-in? I mean, we almost want to recreate Iraq and

put the Humpty Dumpty back, without having anybody’s buy-in. I

think we—our focus has not been on a final solution that the region, all of Iraq’s neighbors, will be willing to accept. We constantly

say, ‘‘Well, stability’s in their interest.’’ Yes; it is. But they’re—that,

they all agree on. Nobody wants chaos in Iraq. What they don’t

agree on is: What is the final shape of Iraq? And we have had no

conversation, and they have had no conversation—other than Iranians and the Turks, I don’t know of any other real, you know, adversaries that actually are talking about: What is the final shape?

And I think when—back to Senator Biden’s question, when we say:

Are we going to be supplicants with the Iranians and Syrians, and

is this extortion?—that’s really at the level of when we want speVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00298 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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cifics from them. So, what do we barter, for specifics, like stopping

arming of the Mahdi Army?

But I think the larger issue of, would Iran or Syria or Saudi Arabia be able to arrive at an agreement, in terms of power-sharing—

how much would the Sunnis get, how much the Shiites would get,

how much the Kurds would get—I think—I don’t think that would

put us in a supplicant position, or the Iranians and the Syrians

will be in a position not extort anything for that. And the region

is familiar with that kind of a thing. They did it in Lebanon over

the tariff agreement. They continuously have these kinds of discussions about other conflicts.

So, I think, for us, we should, sort of, accept that we’re not going

to—we’re not going to get a political solution for Iraq out of the current plan on the table. There is no incentive on the ground for this

Iraqi Government to support us, given the pressure it’s feeling from

below. And I should say the same for the Sunnis. You could say

the insurgency has been winning, it’s been bending the U.S. will,

it’s been changing our strategy. Why would they change course, at

this point in time?

And I think, at the regional level, I do agree with both my copanelists, that it’s extremely important, but I think our focus should

not be on bartering over specific issues, it should be on getting a

regional buy-in for a final shape of Iraq.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Senator DODD [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Biden had to step out for a few minutes, and so, I have

become the acting chairman of this committee, and I yield myself

an hour and a half. [Laughter.]

Rare moments you get, here, to be—take a few minutes.

Well, thank you all very, very much for your testimony.

I want to commend Dick Lugar, as well. I know he made his

opening statement this morning, but he had some comments in

there that are really worth repeating again, and he emphasized the

points that were made by our panelists here: ‘‘The purpose of talks

is not to change our posture toward these countries,’’ talking about

Iran and Syria, principally, ‘‘nor would we compromise vital interests or strike the ethereal bargains that cannot be verified, but if

we lack the flexibility to communicate with unfriendly regimes, we

increase the chances of miscalculation, undercut our ability to take

advantage of any favorable situations, and potentially limit the regional leverage with which we can control Iran and Syria.’’ And I—

there are other statements in there, but—I think that was a very

thoughtful comment by Senator Lugar, and—and it makes the

point that all of you have made this morning, as well, and I just

want to thank you for it.

There are several comments in here, and I thought the comment,

Richard, that you made in here, in just—‘‘What matters is not

where you begin a negotiation, but where it ends in that process.’’

Just for the sake of conversation, Senator Kerry and I were in

the region, back in the middle part of December, and spent—here

he is now—we spent some time with President Assad, along with

the United States Embassy personnel in the room, so this has been

reported back to the State Department, as well as our own conversations, and asking President Assad what he wanted to come

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out of Iraq. And my colleague from Massachusetts can share some

thoughts on this, as well. And, as I heard him talking about, he—

now, again, it was said in English—as Tom Friedman likes to point

out, if they don’t say it in public and in Arabic, it may mean less,

but, nonetheless, I’ll tell you what he said in English. He wanted

a pluralist Arab State on his border. He had no interest seeing a

Shia, Iranian-dominated fundamentalist state. And that didn’t

come as any shock to me. That would seem to be sort of a rational

conclusion by President Assad. But it seems to me it’s worthy,

then, of exploring that question.

I don’t know how widely it’s been reported, but, for the first time

in a quarter of a century, Baghdad and Damascus are—exchanged

Ambassadors. President Talibani, I think, was in Damascus the

other day. Prime Minister Maliki spent a good part of his exile in

Damascus, as President Talibani spent a good part of his time in

the Kurdish areas or in Iran. I mean, there’s a lot of history here

that goes back over a long time. The world didn’t begin on the day

that we went into Iraq, and unraveling this situation requires a

good understanding of the history of the background.

I would hope, by the way—and I just raise this here, because

we’ve talked about it—that we would have a debate like this, ourselves, rather quickly, as we discuss this new proposal on the

surge. And I agree with you, Richard, it’s a tactic, not a strategy

here, but it’s an important issue, and the rationale for it is completely different than the rationale we were offered back several

years ago, when the original authorizing resolution came up here,

and it dealt with the issue of weapons of mass destruction, it dealt

with Saddam Hussein and terrorism. There’s a whole new set of

circumstances that we ought to be considering as we go forward

with this. And so, whether or not you agree or disagree with it, the

fact of the matter is, the Senate of the United States ought to take

some time out to do exactly what this committee is doing here, to

talk about these very issues that I think are critically important

to us. And my hope is we’ll get beyond, sort of, the nonbinding resolution, which is a way to express something up here, but, rather,

have a good debate, require a new authorization and a discussion

of exactly what the implications are.

Let me ask a couple of quick questions, if I can. I, again, thank

you for your testimony. It’s very, very good. And you may have implied this, as I went through the comments. And I’ll begin with

you, Dr. Nasr. Tell me about—the quick question—we have no

problem—I have no problem seeing President Assad—I think we

should have been talking—I’d have a real problem in sitting down

with Ahmadinejad, frankly. The idea that I’d sit down with someone who has said the things he has—my father was a prosecutor

at Nuremberg, and—and wrote my mother, every day, these letters, talking about what went on—400 letters during that year and

a half in 1945 through the end of 1946. The idea that you’d have

a head of state denying the existence of the Holocaust was stunning to me. And the idea I’d be sitting in a room with this individual is abhorrent to me. Who should we be dealing with in Iran?

There are many different levels, it seems to me, in Iran, that we

could be talking or at least opening some doors with. Where would

you suggest we begin a process? If you’re not going to necessarily

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want to sit down with the President of the country, but you wanted

to access some other centers of influence, of power centers, where

would you suggest we begin that conversation?

Dr. NASR. Well, a lot of the conversation in the West that actually has been with the head of Iran’s National Security Council, Ali

Larijani, who’s also been the main negotiator with Javier Solana

over the nuclear issue. He was the one, actually, Iran appointed

when there was a potential for a conversation over Iraq, to travel

to Iraq, to meet with Ambassador Khalilzad, at that point.

Ultimately, our interest in Iran is to influence the top decisionmaking in the country. Ahmadinejad is only one component of that.

Senator DODD. Right.

Dr. NASR. But the real levers of power in Iran are held by the

Supreme Leader, as well as major power centers within the military and the political establishment.

Senator DODD. So, your point is, there are other places we

could—opening up those doors, without necessarily focusing exactly

on the—Ahmadinejad.

Dr. NASR. I think, actually, focusing Ahmadinejad has been a

mistake by American media and the American administration. It’s

actually empowered him. About a decade ago, when Iran had a reformist President, the attitude in Washington was, ‘‘There is no

point talking to the Iranian President, because he’s not—doesn’t

really hold any power.’’ And ever since Ahmadinejad’s become

President, we have seen him as everything in Iran. And that’s a

mistake, as well. In fact, the elections in Iran, the dissent in Iran,

which Ambassador Ross was pointing to, suggests that this is not

our typical dictatorship, where, like in Syria, there’s one man ruling. He is vulnerable. He has staked his ground. And the more we

focus on him, actually, the more important we make him and his

position within Iran itself. We ought to—we ought to have an approach that we have a policy toward Iran, not toward the Iranian

President.

Senator DODD. Good point.

Dennis or Richard, do you want to comment on that?

Ambassador ROSS. Yes, I would—I would echo a lot of that. I

would simply add that the easiest way for us to begin an engagement would be through a regional conference on Iraq——

Senator DODD. Yes.

Ambassador ROSS [continuing]. Where you’d have a built-in multilateral forum, where you wouldn’t be dealing with Ahmadinejad,

and where you have an area where there could be a convergence

of interest, if they have enough fear about what may be happening

in Iraq. I don’t think they have it right now, but I think, in fact,

it could, in fact, be something that begins to emerge. That would

be how I would suggest it.

I would add one qualifier in what Vali said. I don’t think you can

let what Ahmadinejad says go without response. I don’t think, you

know, these kinds of statements can somehow be dismissed because of, ‘‘Well, the Iranian President isn’t important.’’ The Iranian—because there is a kind of interesting elite, and there is a

difference of opinion in that elite, it’s important that they understand the consequences of that kind of behavior.

Senator DODD. Yes.

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Ambassador ROSS. And you’re seeing it, as I said—as Vali knows,

if you look, in the last week, at the commentary in different Iranian newspapers, he’s being attacked precisely because of what he

says. So, I would say it’s important that we find ways to do that,

as well.

Senator DODD. Yes. And the economic issues—I think, Richard,

you point out—are very important, as well, to highlight the failure

there. But——

Ambassador HAASS. Too often, diplomats think of diplomacy as

something which is done in secret and in private. I actually think,

with the Iranians, we would be far wiser to put it out there—again,

to put pressure on the government. And also, given that there are

competing centers of political authority——

Senator DODD. Yes.

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. We ought to contribute to that

competition.

I’d just say one other thing, Senator. There’s a time urgency

here—partially related to Iraq, even more related to Iran’s nuclear

program. Our options will get narrowed, given that Iran is gradually accumulating the capacity to enrich. And time, in that sense,

does not work in our favor. So, sooner rather than later, we need

to decide what it is we are prepared to do, in terms of a diplomatic

outcome, because otherwise the alternatives tend to be either living

with an Iran that accumulates a nuclear capability or having to use

military force. I would suggest that neither is a terribly attractive

option. So, again, to me, it highlights the need for us to get squared

away on a diplomatic approach.

Senator DODD. I couldn’t agree with you more—in fact, I intended to open my remarks by saying: In the 25 years I’ve been a

member of this committee and a Member of this body, having traveled to the region on a number of occasions, not anywhere near the

numbers that our panelists have, but I have never seen it as bad,

nor have I ever seen it with as many opportunities. I think some—

one of you made that point in your prepared remarks. But what I

sensed, more than anything else, was the absence of our engagement. I must have heard that a thousand times; the sort of benign

participation in what’s going on. And that concerns me. And I’m

glad the Secretary is there now, but I’d often hoped that we might

have done something a little bit more, given the complexity of the

issues and the importance of the moment, to have someone on the

ground on more of a permanent basis there that would be able to

really help us manage these events and be around to take advantage of these opportunities as they come up.

Let me ask one or two quick questions, because I want my colleagues to get to—I was very impressed with—Fareed Zakaria

wrote a piece the other day in the Times about the surge issue, and

he said one of the—if I paraphrase him correctly, he said, ‘‘It’s not

so much that you may be opposed to the surge, what we ought to

be worried about is, it may succeed.’’ And I think one or both of

you made this point, and that is that if it succeeds, in the sense

it contributes to a further alienation of the very people we’re trying

to get together, the designation of 17,000 troops in the streets of

a city of 6 million people, with 23 militias and a variety of other

factions operating there, well, we’re invariably going to be having

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to take on—in fact, we’ve been urging taking on the Mahdi Militia,

and Sadr—his point being, that this—if it succeeds, it actually

moves us further away from exactly the point I think most are arguing here, and that is a political solution. I wonder if you wanted

to comment on his conclusions in that.

Ambassador HAASS. Well, it’s one of several dilemmas we face.

And let me suggest some others, though, in addition to what

Fareed is writing about. And, by the way, a lot of them come down

to the fact that at the end of the day, we and the Iraqi Government

don’t share the same end state. And I would simply suggest that’s

one of the reasons we don’t have as much leverage as we thought.

The idea of withholding a surge may not necessarily be something

they would be that upset over. If you think that the goal of the government is to consolidate Shia primacy, then a surge doesn’t necessarily help their short-term objectives. So, I’m not sure we have

that much influence, in terms of regulating our presence there, because, again, they’ve got a set of objectives that is fundamentally

different than ours in terms of the end state they envision for their

own country.

Senator DODD. Yes.

Ambassador ROSS. I would just say, I—on the issue of withholding the surge, it’s—that has to be part of a larger strategy. You

don’t just withhold the surge; you withhold the surge, and then I

basically think you send the message, ‘‘OK, we’re going to change

course now, fundamentally.’’

Senator DODD. Yes.

Ambassador ROSS. And I have favored the idea of not simply imposing a deadline and pulling out, but saying to them, ‘‘All right,

we’re now going to—we’re going to negotiate a withdrawal with

you.’’ You concentrate their mind. You know the reality’s going to

change.

I don’t think that, you know, the—it’s true, I think, what Richard

said, they have a different end state in mind. I don’t see any indication of this government, regardless of its commitment, is serious

about national reconciliation. I think the message they sent with

the execution of Saddam Hussein was just the opposite. Here was

an opportunity for them to say to the Sunnis, in particular, ‘‘You

know, we’re going to put that chapter in our history behind us. We

were all brutalized by him. We all suffered from him. Now we’re

going to write a common history—we’re going to write a common

future together.’’ They didn’t do that. They sent the message,

‘‘We’re in control.’’ And so, I think, you know, if they feel that

somehow being in control is put at risk, that might change their

behavior.

Senator DODD. Yes. Well——

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I know that having you in control

means you’re 4 minutes over. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. No; I apologize. I was actually going to take an

hour. [Laughter.]

But I think the point is really worthwhile, but my sense of it is—

to just end up on this point, is that—quite the opposite. I think the

surge really does exacerbate and delay the decisionmaking process,

for various reasons. My view is, I think, you know, the Shias have

a reason why they want us there without a clear mission, in that

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we can consolidate power for them. The Sunnis think we might be

able to protect them or get them back in the door. And as long as

we’re failing to start to talk about an endgame and how this works,

then I think the political realities haven’t set in. And the sooner

they set in, the more likely, I think, you’re going to get the kind

of—at least the progress that we’re talking about here. And I think

you’ve both—all three of you have articulated that well, that—don’t

expect a conversion here to happen overnight; but to move it on a

road, it seems to me that we’ve got to—we’ve got to change the paradigm here, the dynamic, pretty considerably, and we’re not doing

that at all, it seems to me; we’re just perpetuating a strategy here

that is not producing, in any likelihood, the results that we’d all

like to see.

But, great testimony, and I wish there were more time, myself,

to talk with you here.

But I thank you immensely for your contributions, not just today,

but over the years. You’ve all been tremendously helpful to us, and

I thank you.

I thought, Richard, your piece in Time magazine was excellent,

by the way.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the conversion take place on the Road to

Damascus? That’s the question here. But—

Senator, welcome, again, and——

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The floor is yours.

Senator CORKER [continuing]. Thank you, sir.

I do wonder, in light of the testimony today and just the tremendous focus that you’ve caused this committee to have on Iraq, rightfully, does it make any sense for us to consider asking General

Petraeus—I know he has a war to fight, I know that taking him

away from that could be frowned upon, but he does have to be—

he does have to come before the Senate, at some point, anyway,

and I’m wondering if it makes any sense, especially with Dr. Nasr’s

presentation regarding the Shia situation in Iraq and its relationship to Iran, to possibly have testimony? I just ask that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are—that’s a very good question, Senator. I haven’t been the mayor of a big city. You’re—you had the

great good fortune to be able to set policy. There’s jurisdictional

webs up here. I have talked to Senator Levin, the chairman of the

Armed Services Committee. I think it would be good to have some

cross-pollenization here, to have General Petraeus, and, for that

matter, to have the Secretary of Defense here, as well, and to have

State Department officials testify there. That’s not been worked out

yet, but I think your suggestion is a very good one. And I have

found, in my many meetings and exchanges with General Petraeus,

he’s a forthcoming guy, he’s a straightforward guy, and he really

is one of the best we have, in my view, and it would benefit us all

if he were able to be here. I will follow up on that.

I’d ask to put a little bit more time back on the clock for the Senator, since that was a question directed to the Chair.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you for

these excellent hearings. And I want to thank this outstanding

panel. I think you all have all done an excellent job.

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And, you know, because I’ve asked my questions in these panels

in a sort of civil way, I think some people think I have a leaning

as to which direction I think we ought to go. I really don’t. Fortunately, I was—unfortunately or fortunately—I was a mayor of a

city when these decisions were being made. I have no personal feelings, and truly think that the type of testimony that you’ve given,

and others have given, allow us, in public, to discuss our policies

and really calls the American public, themselves, to think about

what ought to be done. And so, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you

for that. And, Richard, I thank you for taking the time, while I was

a lowly candidate, to meet with me. I did read your book, and I appreciate that.

And I just—I want to ask three questions, one to each of you.

There’s no question that the civil war that is taking place in Iraq

today is one that we, in essence, by virtue of our involvement, created. And I know there’s been a lot—a school of thought that says

that we should—that maybe what we’re doing is allowing a muted

civil war to take place, not an all-out civil war. I don’t think that

there’s been enough discussion publicly about what allowing an

unmuted civil war might mean. And the Americans are used to

going out and solving problems; that’s what the American way of

life and psyche is. And I just wonder if you could address—and I

know you all are here to talk about relations surrounding Iraq—

if you could address, you know, how you think it might be, if you

will—you’re someone that’s been highly in foreign policy for Americans, based on what you presented a minute ago—to watch, sort of,

passively, if you will, an all-out civil war take place, as opposed to

us going in and trying to be involved proactively, as now has been

put forth by the administration.

Dr. Nasr, I appreciated very much—I really was interested in

what you were saying as it relates to us getting involved in Baghdad, in essence, and getting involved in—more fully in this sectarian violence, and how that might, in essence, tie us more closely

to confrontation with Iran. And you mentioned something about

seeing a change in behavior by Maliki and the Iraqi Government.

And I really am having a hard time—and in no way criticize that

comment—but I don’t—I’m having a hard time understanding how

we caused that change of behavior to truly take place.

And then, Mr. Ross, just the whole issue of causing them to live

up to their promises. There’s a timeframe—I, too, question their

ability to live up to the promises. I think that’s the weakest part

of what has been discussed over this last 10 days. I’d love to hear,

you know, more discussion about that.

Ambassador HAASS. Well, thank you, Senator. I like your phrase,

‘‘muted civil war.’’ And what you say about the penchant for solving

foreign policy may be American, but it also may be beyond reach

in this situation. And management is not a very sexy idea, but

sometimes it’s the best you can do. And I actually suggest, in this

case, we’ll be fortunate if we can manage, at all, the course of

events. But my own analysis is that we will consider ourselves fortunate, moving forward, if we can help limit the civil war to what

you call a muted situation. If it becomes all-out, you would have

not simply a humanitarian tragedy on a scale greater than we are

seeing, but the odds grow exponentially for it becoming a signifiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00305 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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cant regional war. Sunni governments around the region, and

Sunni nongovernmental organizations and individuals around the

region, are going to sit back and see a degree of Shia domination

in Iraq that many of the Shia in Iraq seem to want. So, unless we

can keep the civil war, in some ways muted, we could see competition between Iraq’s neighbors in Iraq, but also growing conflict between and among Iraq’s neighbors beyond Iraq. I can imagine a

scenario where there would be Sunni-Shia outbreaks of violence in

many other countries, in which there would be terrorist attacks,

perhaps fomented or supported, one way or another, by various

governments. You know people always like to say that things have

to get worse before they get better. One of the two pieces of wisdom

I have in the Middle East is that things often get worse before they

get even worse. And that possibility, I would suggest, can’t be dismissed.

So, we need to, in some ways, recalibrate our policy toward

muting, to use your word again, the violence, which, again, to me,

raises questions about the logic of a surge and putting us in the

middle of things. It does put an emphasis on regional diplomacy,

meant to adjust inflows of arms and money and volunteers. It puts

an emphasis on dealing with Syria to try to close down the SyrianIraqi border more than it has been. And it means, again, playing

for time, because only when Iraqis come to the conclusion that this

game is not worth the candle, only when Iraqis basically get exhausted or decide that they’d actually rather have a degree of normalcy, will this begin to fade significantly.

The United States needs to avoid extreme foreign policies until

that happens. And, to me, the two extremes are either trying to totally smother the civil war, working with the government to try to

eliminate it, which is not realistic, or pulling the plug, which would

exacerbate things in Iraq and raise all sorts of questions about the

United States worldwide.

So, I’m trying to see if there’s a needle to thread here, where we

can find some middle course. I’m not comfortable with it. It’s not

pretty. But my hunch is, we need to find the strategy, one at lower

costs and a lower level of involvement, that we can sustain for

years, until this begins to play itself out. And, coming back to what

you said, that’s not a solution, but that’s probably the best available option.

Dr. NASR. Thank you, Senator.

The issue of the behavior of the Maliki government, or its perception of the U.S. position, you’re correct, I mean, it’s—in many ways,

is counterintuitive for many Americans. I think the issue to—is

key—as Ambassador Haass said, is the demand or desire for Shia

domination, which is really the prevalent, I think, political attitude

in the Shia community. I think many of them—we, maybe, were

slow to take stock of this after the February bombing of Samarra—

concluded there’s not going to be reconciliation in this country, and

they began to sort of think of a different endgame, which was to

maximize control of territory, particularly Baghdad, and assert

Shia domination.

And I think part of our dilemma is where we don’t see the same

endgame as the Iraqi Government, is that we’re still operating on

the assumption that, (a) reconciliation is possible, (b) that the

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Shias want it, and (c) that this government somehow can even rise

above its own community and constituency to follow a policy course

that may not be—may not be popular.

Nothing I have seen from the Maliki government in the past several months suggests that it can act independent of its core constituency, or that it’s willing to do so. I think it’s more driven by

survival within that coalition, and it’s more driven by the public

opinion, which, unfortunately, is not, right now, in a conciliatory

mood. And I think if we listen to, say, the statements of Maliki’s

partners in his own coalition, in his government, in the Parliament,

not to say the mood in the street, it’s far more sectarian and hardline than what we hear from him. And I think that his value right

now is for the UIA government to manage Washington’s expectation without giving the house away. But I don’t see the kind of

shift in attitude that is necessary for this government to wholeheartedly back a unity plan. And I don’t think it’s a function of,

necessarily, his personal caliber or opinion. It’s a matter of the political mood in a country that has become deeply divided because

of the—because of the violence, and also, I think, indicative, at

some of the diplomatic discussion we had, that we cannot do it

alone. We take two steps in the direction of the Sunnis, as Senator

Biden mentioned, about the issue of the surge, the Shias get angry;

we move two steps in the direction of the Shias, the Sunnis accuse

us of bias. And we’re, sort of, caught in a situation that—you know

our endgames are not those of these communities, and they will

likely pursue their own agendas, despite what we will be saying.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank the panelists for their exceptional and insightful

testimony. I really appreciate it.

I want to start with Ambassador Ross. And I think it’s worthy

of quoting from some of your written testimony, because it’s the

preface to the question I want to ask you.

You say, ‘‘The only circumstance in which I see Iran and Saudi

Arabia behaving differently is if they both become fearful that a

precipitous U.S. withdrawal might trigger a real convulsion in Iraq,

and then the consequences of that would create, possibly, a convergence of interests in Iraq to lead the two to explore a possible

deal.’’ And then you go on to say, ‘‘There is an irony here. Only if

the reality in Iraq threatens to be far more costly to both the

Saudis and Iranians are they likely to contemplate some limited

understanding in Iraq.’’ And then you say, ‘‘By keeping the lid on

with our forces and preventing a real collapse, we make it safe

enough for everyone next to and within Iraq to avoid taking what

they regard as excruciating decisions.’’ And finally, ‘‘In my experience’’—this is, again, your testimony—‘‘leaders don’t cross threshold in historic conflicts because they are induced into doing so.

They may approach the thresholds, given certain promises about

the future, but they don’t cross them unless they see the costs, as

they measure them, if they fail to act.’’ And that’s where I want

to start.

You know, when we had Secretary Rice here, I asked her questions about benchmarks, consequences, and deadlines. It seems to

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me—and, of course, she rejected all of those propositions—it seems

to me that, if we are going to hope for the Iraqis to love their children more than they hate their neighbors, that this actually is not

about military action, but a whole host of other issues—reconciliation, diplomatic, power-sharing, and revenue-sharing issues.

So, isn’t the question really—if we’re going to change the direction

here, isn’t it about having benchmarks with consequences and

deadlines? I’ve heard, I think, all of you say the Maliki government

has shown nothing that leads us to believe they’re truly going to

change the course. So, aren’t those some of the things that we

should be doing? And what accelerant can we add to the equation

to get others, outside of Iraq, to come to that conclusion that you

said will be necessary for them to find some convergence of

interest?

Ambassador ROSS. Look, I think the key—and it—we’ve—you

hear, in the skepticism on all of us—is: How do you create a sense

of consequence for nonperformance? Up until now, there’s been no

consequence for nonperformance. In fact, your question was about

the promises and my skepticism about the promises. People tend

to forget that Prime Minister Maliki, when he came in—what was

his first big initiative, immediately? It was security for Baghdad.

That was his first big initiative. Now, we’re on, I think, by my

count, his third national reconciliation plan. Each time we see

these commitments are adopted, and there’s never a consequence

for not fulfilling the behavior or changing the course.

So, everyone has become conditioned to a certain reality that we

will keep the lid on. And, as bad as the situation is, it’s not intolerable for them, on the inside, because the choice—and this is why

I used the word very consciously, ‘‘excruciating decisions,’’ and I do

have some experience negotiating with people who have to make

what are excruciating decisions, as they measure them, because

they have to take on history and mythology. In Maliki’s case, what

makes it so difficult for him is partly the reasons that Vali was

talking about: The structure of the situation, who his allies are, his

own instinct. But I would even say it goes beyond that. The Shia,

today, in Iraq are a majority, but they act as if they’re a minority.

They act as if they’re completely vulnerable, because they have a

history that tells them they are vulnerable. They’ve been oppressed. So, they’re not going to change their mindset unless, in

fact, they see there’s a consequence out there that threatens what

they want.

Our current position today, in a sense, allows everybody to live

with a situation that isn’t good, but it’s certainly better than having to take these excruciating decisions. So, if there isn’t—in my

mind, if there isn’t consequence, if we aren’t, at this point, going

to say, ‘‘All right, believe it or not, we’re not going to be here to

allow you to pursue what you want,’’—that’s why I say, I don’t

want to leave in a—leave them in a lurch where you impose a

deadline, because then everybody simply invests in their own militia, anticipating what’s coming, which is the kind of scenario that

Richard was talking about. And everybody on the outside, then,

sort of positions themselves, as well.

The trick for us is to convince them the lid is going to come off,

and be very clear when it’s going to happen, but in a way where

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they have the potential to affect it, they have the capacity to affect

it, so then they have to make a choice. Up until now, we have freed

them of having to make a choice. Until they have to make a choice,

they won’t.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, that means benchmarks with consequences.

Ambassador ROSS. Absolutely.

Senator MENENDEZ. How do you get the world to look at—you

suggested, in the Bosnian-type situation—how do you get the rest

of the world to buy into that?

Ambassador ROSS. I think, actually, if we—and this gets, I think,

again, to something all three of us have been—at least been implying, if not stating explicitly. We have to be much clearer on what

it is we’re trying to achieve. As long as we say we’re going to succeed, but we don’t define, really, what ‘‘success’’ is in anything but

in a level of abstraction, no one is going to sign on. We have to look

at what are the choices. Richard suggested maybe the best choice,

to borrow the Senator’s term, is a kind of muted civil war, where

you contain it. I outlined the—a kind of, Bosnia situation, because

it’s not as bad as that, and it is—it could be a situation where you

have a transition to that. I think if we were to spell it out and say,

‘‘This is what we’re going for,’’ and have quiet conversations in advance, which is the essence of diplomacy—the essence of diplomacy

is, you don’t spring big initiatives out in public unless you’ve done

your work in advance with everybody to condition them to what

you’re trying to do. You have enough private conversations to talk

about how you refine the concepts that you’re laying out. I would

at least try this, at this point. It may be too late. But the fact that

you’ve got, as I said, 100,000 Iraqis a month being displaced says

that you’re already having population transfers take place—unfortunately, in the worst circumstances.

So, maybe you try to make a virtue of necessity. I think all of

us are in a position where—and I use this language also in my

written testimony; Richard used it, as well—I don’t think we can

look for a good outcome in Iraq; we’re looking for the least bad outcome.

Senator MENENDEZ. Ambassador Haass, let me ask you—I see a

sense you want to comment on that, as well, but let me ask you

one thing. One—you said, in a recent article, ‘‘One thing is certain:

The American era in the Middle East is over.’’ And then you went

on to talk about, ‘‘The Iraq war, more than anything else, has

caused this fall.’’ Could you expound upon that for us on what that

means?

Ambassador HAASS. The reason I’m not comfortable with the

Bosnian solution is that while it may reflect the changing demographic realities—ethnic cleansing, call it what you will, is going

on, on a daily, hourly basis now—I don’t believe that creates the

basis for an enduring political and economic framework. The Sunni

minority is not going to be content. It’s not simply a physical question, it’s a question over control—sharing of resources, sharing of

political power, and so forth. And so, unless there’s a major political conversion by the majority, there can’t simply be a narrow

territorial or demographic solution, which is where the Bosnian

parallel, I believe, doesn’t work.

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The reason I’ve suggested that, ‘‘The United States era in the

region is over, more than anything else, because of Iraq,’’ is a reflection on how history has evolved in this part of the world. The

modern history in the Middle East goes back about 200 years,

since, essentially, Napoleon entered Egypt at the end of the 18th

century. Since, there have been a number of eras, beginning with

the Ottomans, a Colonial era or European era, the cold war, and

then an American era. And the height of the American era was the

end of the cold war and the previous Iraq war, where you had this

degree of American dominance that was quite extraordinary, including an ability to put together coalitions, deal with Iraqi aggression, promote a peace process in ways that were historically unprecedented, and so forth.

What concerns me now is we have put a disproportionate share

of our resources, broadly defined, in Iraq, which leaves us with less

resources to do other things. We’ve lost the principal counter to

Iran, which was Iraq. So, we’ve lost the local geopolitical balance.

Iran, meanwhile, is feeling that it’s ‘‘riding high,’’ thanks to relatively high energy costs, their strategic accomplishment, this summer with Hezbollah, the loss of the Taliban, and what’s happened

in Iraq. So, they’re feeling strategically advantaged. And you add

all this up, and it seems to me that we’re entering an era where

the United States has less resources that are discretionary and

available to make things happen, that Iran has dramatically improved its position, and that many of the things that the United

States would want to bring about in the Middle East we’re simply

unable to. And what this means to me is, it’s not simply an era

where America’s influence has gone down, but rather than we need

to think of the Middle East as a qualitatively different foreign policy challenge.

Indeed, if I were going to paint with broad strokes, the U.S. Government faces two great strategic challenges as it looks forward.

One is dealing with Asia—its economic success; the translation of

economic success into political and military power; all these great

powers, regional and global, in the absence of regional mechanisms

for managing them; old-fashioned disputes in many cases going

back to World War II. So, we’ve got this challenge of dealing with

Asian dynamism. The Middle East could not be a more different

challenge. It’s the challenge of negative energy, it’s the challenge

of proliferation, it’s the challenge of terrorism, it’s the challenge of

failing states, it’s the challenge of Iranian imperialism, it’s the

challenge of leftover, unresolved issues like the Israeli-Palestinian

crisis. Virtually no government has come up with a concept of legitimacy. It hasn’t figured out its relationship with its own people.

There’s no regional mechanisms worthy of the name. All this takes

place where we have to deal not simply with the terrorism of the

region, but also with the region’s energy. So, when you think about

American foreign policy, you’ve got these two tremendous strategic

challenges. The one in the Middle East is a negative challenge. Our

capacity to cope with it is dramatically down. We don’t have the

partners on the outside. The Europeans, the Chinese, the Russians

don’t see it the same way. We certainly don’t have the partners on

the inside. And there’s simply more sources of instability than I’ve

ever seen emerge at once.

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So, all this adds up to be an extraordinarily difficult and dangerous and worrisome era for the United States. It is no surprise

that we’re having this kind of a conversation today. And my prediction and fear is that we’ll continue to have conversations like

this for many years to come. We’re in for an extraordinarily difficult period. I don’t know whether it’s 3 years, 5 years, 10 years,

or longer, but I honestly believe, Senator, that the potential for

American foreign policy to be weakened and distorted by the Middle East has never been greater.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for

these hearings.

Mr. Ross, you were cut off before you could answer Senator Corker’s question, and you had that look of anticipation in your eyes.

Would you like to say what you were going to say?

Ambassador ROSS. No, I actually did answer it with Senator

Menendez, because I—the real issue was: Why do I have skepticism about why Maliki will now live up to the commitments that

he’s made? And it’s because none of them are new. We’ve heard all

of them before, whether it’s security for Baghdad or it’s national

reconciliation or it’s de-Baathification law or it’s the amnesty issue.

Every single one of these, we’ve heard, in one form or the other,

before, and the only thing that would make it different now would

be if, in fact—and this gets back to what Senator Biden was saying—if the President has whispered in his ear and said, ‘‘You

know, I’m not going to say this publicly, but I’m telling you, you’ve

got 6 months. And, at the end of those 6 months, let me tell you

what’s going to happen. We will no longer be in a position to basically keep the lid on and protect what you want’’—if he’s doing that

in private, then maybe—maybe there’ll be a ‘‘Conversion on the

Road to Damascus.’’

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you.

I am new to this committee, and appreciate very much these

hearings, because I’m learning a lot, at a rapid rate. But I’ve got

a lot to learn.

I didn’t get to hear your testimony, but I read all of the statements last night, and your editorial in the Washington Post, which

seemed to be something that you all found some agreement in. If

I remember correctly, basically, all three of you, in one way or another, were saying that we need to get all the people in the region

together, because we have an interesting situation. All of them

don’t like us being there, because of what they perceive our vision

of victory is, but none of them want us to leave, because they

won’t—don’t want the regional civil war. Is that a fair statement,

without speaking for all of you?

Ambassador ROSS. It is for me, yes.

Senator ISAKSON. OK. My question is this, on the diplomacy side

and on the regional forum, I think, that you referred to. If it is—

if the worst outcome, for both those who like us and those who

don’t, is an all-out regional civil war, and if that is the most likely

outcome—and I think Mr. Haass said the least bad outcome is to

avoid having a regional civil war, is that correct?

Ambassador HAASS. Avoid having a regional conflict.

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Senator ISAKSON. And none of them want that—if some forum

was created where all the players, who are contiguous to Iraq and

in the region, were invited to a forum, is it almost not somewhat

incumbent upon them to both come and try to participate in some

meaningful way? Yes. And you can all three respond to that.

Ambassador ROSS. Yes; I think it could be put together, but,

again, having some experience doing diplomacy, I don’t think you

launch this kind of initiative unless you do your homework first,

and that means you go around and you—you have to develop an

agenda in advance. You don’t go there not knowing how this thing

is going to evolve once you get there. So, you develop an agenda

in advance, with some specific, I think, criteria and items on that

agenda. I think you have to also create the impression that,

again—it’s not enough for us to say, ‘‘Our patience has limits.’’

We’re going to have to—we are going to have to make it clear that

there comes a point at which this stops, because the only way

you’re going to concentrate everybody’s mind and realize that what

we’re talking about is no longer a set of abstractions is for them

to realize how soon the danger that they’re afraid of could begin

to emerge.

The problem we have right now is that—and I said it in the written testimony—we’ve created a circumstance—not by design, but

by consequence—where no one is sufficiently uncomfortable with

the current situation. And until they become sufficiently uncomfortable with the current situation, they won’t change their behavior.

And if you want a regional forum to work, you’re also going to have

to not just prepare it, you’re going to have to create a context

where they understand there’s a danger out there that they understand, in their own terms; we don’t have to explain it to them.

Ambassador HAASS. Could I just disagree slightly? Not on the regional forum; obviously, I’d like to see that. As I hear Dennis talk,

there’s a certain train of events that could be set in motion if the

Iraqi Government doesn’t meet these benchmarks or conditions.

The United States would then do dramatically less. I’m not sure

that would necessarily disappoint the Iraqi Government that much,

given their agenda of possibly consolidating Shia primacy. But,

also, I worry about the chain of events it could set in motion. Dennis has what you might call—the word ‘‘optimism’’ is rarely used

in Iraq—a potentially optimistic prediction that if we give Iraqis a

glimpse into this dark future, they will then begin to act more responsibly. I wish that were so. I’m not so optimistic. It’s quite possible that if we give them a glimpse into a dark future, they will

take it. And by that, I mean we will move toward a regional conflict, where Sunni governments and other groups around the region

will go and help the Sunni minority in Iraq, and essentially we will

regionalize what’s now a largely if not entirely an internal conflict.

So, if you’re asking me, ‘‘Are you prepared to run that risk?’’—I

would say ‘‘probably not.’’ And that’s why, again, coming back to

what Senator Corker was saying, a more realistic and in some

ways a safer goal for U.S. foreign policy is to try to prevent the

worst from happening rather than adopting a more ambitious diplomacy, which while it could succeed, has a high downside. The

potential exists of leading to a chain of events that could regionalize this far more. So, I, for one, would be quite wary of going

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down that path, unless I had understandings, understandings that

are probably not obtainable, that the other actors would act in a

far more responsible way than, shall we say, history suggests they

are prepared to act.

Senator ISAKSON. I think—well, maybe I missed this—I think

what—I wasn’t thinking about whether Maliki actually would go

along, but whether all the others—regional players——

Ambassador ROSS. Yes.

Senator ISAKSON [continuing]. Have they—they probably would

go along.

Ambassador ROSS. Yes. Look, I don’t have high expectations. My

point is, I can see the path we’re on, and I can see where that’s

headed. So, I would try to create different categories of outcomes.

One outcome is one that has the potential of changing behavior on

the inside of Iraq. The other outcome is changing the behavior outside Iraq. You change the behavior on the outside of Iraq, you

produce your containment model, Richard. You change the behavior

inside Iraq, and you actually have a chance to change the realities

there. I’m not hopeful, but I’m—I want to exhaust every possibility

before we go to the least bad of all the outcomes.

Senator ISAKSON. You believe containment is more likely than internal stability?

Ambassador ROSS. That’s my fear, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you all agree on that?

Dr. NASR. Yes.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, to the panelists. I’m sorry that I arrived late, although I’ve been following some of the conversation over C–SPAN.

Obviously, we’re at a critical juncture in Iraq; nobody denies

that. I’ve expressed very strong skepticism for the President’s approach he articulated several weeks ago. I have indicated that taking up the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation of reaching out to

the Iraqis and the Syrians makes some sense, understanding that

the prospects for success are going to be limited. And I’m just curious as to your assessments of if we were to pursue that—although

it doesn’t appear that the Bush administration is willing to at this

point, but this is something that may be coming up in the future.

This issue may arise if, as I anticipate, the surge strategy does not

prove to be one that changes that dynamic significantly. I am interested what conditions or what framework or what approach you

would use to structure these conversations, in very practical terms?

And maybe I can start with you, Ambassador Ross. You know, how

would we frame these conversations so that it was most likely to

succeed, understanding that there’s a possibility that Iran and

Syria both decide it’s not worth it to them to pursue a constructive

strategy, as it is better off to just let the United States flounder

in the situation that it’s in right now?

Ambassador ROSS. I would say—I’d make a couple of points—

first is to understand that both Syria and Iran are more capable

of being spoilers within Iraq than fixers. Second, don’t single them

out; treat them as a part of a collective. They should be there in

a regional forum. The fact of the matter is, all the neighbors are

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going to be able to make certain kinds of contributions. Probably

the two most important neighbors, I would say, in this regard, are

probably Saudi Arabia and Iran. So, the question is: In a regional

context, a regional forum, is it possible, for their own reasons, to

help to facilitate what could be some understandings between the

two of them so that they would use their influence—the Iranians

on the Shia militias, the Saudis on the Sunni tribes? So, I’d try to

put it more in a regional context.

There can be other reasons to be talking to the Syrians and to

the Iranians on other questions. I wouldn’t put that in the regional

forum. But if we’re focused on Iraq and we’re trying to get them

to change their approach to Iraq, we need to be realistic about

what they can do and what they can’t do. We need to put it in this

larger context. We don’t want to exaggerate their significance, but

we also don’t want to ignore the kind of role that they can play.

Senator OBAMA. And, in terms of what’s on the table and what’s

not on the table for discussion, would you lay out some very clear

parameters? Are there some things that you would try to cordon off

that—we’re just going to talk about Iraq here, and we’re not going

to add a whole bunch of other issues to the agenda.

Ambassador ROSS. I would, yes; and I think, in the—at least—

again, if you’re going to put together a regional forum, if you don’t

have a very precise agenda, it will suddenly become completely unmanageable, and you’re going to have a lot of issues where, necessarily, we’re not going to be real thrilled to be talking about them

in that kind of a setting. You create a regional forum in that circumstance, and the Iranians could basically decide, ‘‘All right, we’re

not going to do anything in Iraq until we’re satisfied on what’s

going to happen for the Palestinians.’’ Suddenly, you’ve created a

forum where you can’t focus on what you need to focus on, and it’s

their agenda rather than yours. So, I would try to—I would certainly focus it that way.

Again, if you’re going to deal with them, you’re going to engage

them on a bilateral basis—by definition, that’s in a different setting, and you have a very different kind of basis on which to proceed.

Dr. NASR. I have—just quickly—I think, actually, it—at least in

terms of having this scenario succeed, it’s not productive for the

United States to show up at the regional setting as part of one

team—namely, part of Saudi Arabia’s team. I think, particularly in

Iraq, it’s important that, because everybody has a vested interest

and you want to arrive at a solution where everybody can live with,

that this be a genuinely regional forum. I think probably the direction that we’re going right now has made it more difficult for the

Iranians to come to a regional environment, because the perception

is that the United States is going to be doing what Saudi Arabia

wants, which I think, going to Ambassador Ross’s point, is actually

remove the kind of fear that would have made the Saudis really

be cooperative.

And I also think that even though, in the back of our minds,

there are larger issues, like the nuclear issue, like the issue of

Iran’s regional power, if the Iraq forum is going to succeed, those

issues, including the Palestinian and the Lebanese issue, should

not be on the table. The purpose of an Iraq forum should not be

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containment of Iran. Iranians would have absolutely no incentive

participating in a forum and in a foreign policy agenda that is not

directed at stabilizing Iraq, but as—directed as—at downsizing

them.

Senator OBAMA. Good.

Richard.

Ambassador HAASS. I’d say a few things. The United States

should not be the one calling for the diplomatic forum. I would suggest something like the United Nations. We’d need to have a powerful endorsement from the Iraqi Government. You could not have

this be, if you will, a reluctant exercise. You’d include the six

neighboring countries of Iraq, possibly the permanent members of

the Security Council or the Europeans could be represented by the

European Union. What you’d want to do on the agenda is have

such things as border security, and the responsibility of every

neighbor to police its borders. You’d want to have certain rules and

standards about things coming across the border—arms, money, socalled volunteers of any sort. You’d want to have a coordination

and pooling of economic resources. Again, we’ve had a pretty good

model, which is the Afghan ‘‘six plus two.’’ I was involved in it, for

a time, as the U.S. Representative, and it worked at my mid-level

and at the level of the Secretary of State. And we actually were

able to cooperate with Iran and others at trying to regulate some

of these issues, vis-a-vis Afghanistan, to bolster the Government

here.

Now, I’ll be honest with you, it will be more difficult now, given

that 3 or 4 years have elapsed. I’m sorry we didn’t set this up before the liberation of Iraq. This is the sort of thing that could usefully have been in place as part of getting ready to manage——

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Ambassador HAASS [continuing]. An aftermath. So, as usual,

we’re playing catchup. And, again, not everyone’s going to come to

the table, needless to say, with the same agenda. But I do think

we have some experience with this kind of a standing group. The

agenda is not beyond the wit of man to work out. And what I like

about it is is that it sets up clear standards that we can measure,

and it gets it out from under the United States and Iran. Coming

back to Vali’s point, we want this to be an international undertaking that actually puts the focus or the spotlight on Iraq’s neighbors and is designed to help a government that needs help.

Senator OBAMA. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, how am I doing on time? I wasn’t clear.

The CHAIRMAN. You’ve got 8 seconds. [Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. I have 8 seconds? That’s enough to get one question in. This question may have already been addressed, in which

case, let’s skip over it.

The CHAIRMAN. You’re out of time, but go ahead. [Laughter.]

Senator OBAMA. But—that was a quick 8 seconds. What risks

exist in a well-structured, well-designed forum of the sort that you

are describing? And, again, if this has already been answered, I

apologize. But if it hasn’t I’ve been curious as to the resistance to

taking this approach. Part of it apparently is the administration’s

belief that not talking to a country is punishment and somehow

gives us additional leverage. I think that’s absolutely wrongheaded.

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The CHAIRMAN. In the interest of time, gentlemen, would one of

you—you have answered that question already, but——

Senator OBAMA. OK.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. But would one of you answer it, very

briefly so other Senators can get questions in before the caucuses

begin?

Ambassador HAASS. The consensus here, Senator, is that there’s

not great risk. At worst, you would try it and it wouldn’t succeed;

at best, you would try it and it would be stabilizing for the situation. And I think there’s a consensus here that you want to keep

it narrow, if you will, Iraq-specific, and that, under those circumstances, it’s worth trying, though, people’s expectations are

modest.

Senator OBAMA. Good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I’d point out that, a year ago, not

just I, but Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Schultz and others,

all suggested this. It’s interesting to hear you all say that it really

should be something coming out of, in my case, I think, the Permanent Five of the United Nations, but, if it doesn’t come from above,

that ends up with a contact group, in effect, being left behind, it’s

not going to go very far.

Senator Vitter. Thank you——

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. For your patience.

Senator VITTER. Thanks to all of our witnesses.

I want to pick up on two things you’ve been discussing recently.

One is this regional forum focused very specifically on Iraq, not

every grievance everybody has in the region, and the second is the

idea of clearer benchmarks for our continued involvement.

It seems to me that both of these ideas could be possibly useful

additions to the sort of things the President has announced, and

they aren’t directly in conflict with it. Without asking you to endorse anything the President has announced, does that strike you

as the case, that they aren’t diametrically opposed, but they can be

part of the same general approach? All three of you, quickly.

Ambassador ROSS. Yes; I don’t see it as being in competition. You

might find it more difficult to put together a regional forum, on the

part of some, if they feel that they’re somehow endorsing what

we’re doing. But I think the fact is, it’s not in competition.

Dr. NASR. I would say that it actually can be beneficial if such

a forum would actually provide the missing piece of this strategy,

which is a political plan that then can actually bring some

stability.

Ambassador HAASS. Setting up a regional forum should not preclude the United States from also introducing bilateral dialogs with

both Syria and Iran. There are things that could be introduced in

a bilateral framework that could have consequences that conceivably could also help Iraq in ways that a regional dialog wouldn’t.

And on benchmarks we need to think about our reaction if and

when benchmarks aren’t met. We don’t want to get into the situation where we aim the gun at our own head. And so, we need to

think through: What’s the sanction? Because, again, doing less, beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00316 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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yond a certain point, might be the sort of threat we may not want

to follow through on because of the consequences.

Senator VITTER. On benchmarks, because I wanted to hit that,

too——

Ambassador HAASS. I’m sorry.

Senator VITTER. Strikes me that benchmarks are probably a very

good idea. It also strikes me that they should probably be very

clear, but private and not public. Can all three of you, very quickly,

react to the idea of private versus publicly announced benchmarks?

Ambassador ROSS. On that one, I would prefer to see them in

public, because I think we’ve had plenty of private benchmarks.

And, again, my experience in the Middle East—and I’ve done a lot

of negotiating out there—whatever is done in private, unless the—

who you’re dealing with knows there’s a public consequence, it

never changes their behavior.

Senator VITTER. Let me just follow up on that. Isn’t there a danger that public benchmarks give the enemy, whose clear focus is to

outlast us, a clear indication of what they have to do to beat us,

to outlast us?

Ambassador ROSS. Well, yes, that’s true, but we’re now 33⁄4 years

into this. If we were at the beginning of this, if we were having this

discussion 33⁄4 years ago, I would say I agree with you. At this

point, though, we’re 33⁄4 years into it, No. 1; No. 2, the President,

in his own—in his speech, when he laid out the—his explanation

for the surge, he’s identified a serious of benchmarks, which are

now in public. So, I think, in a sense, we’ve already passed that

point.

Dr. NASR. I would say public benchmarks are important, because

the Iraqi Government’s very different from any other Middle East

government we’re dealing with. It actually is functioning in a coalition that the Prime Minister has to be able to move with him if

it’s going to make any steps. And I personally think this is not just

about Maliki. It’s much more about, you know, the will of the entire Iraqi ruling coalition, and I think they ought to know where

the United States position is. And if—and, therefore, they would be

more supportive of the Prime Minister in making that——

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, let me give you a slightly different

answer, though. I agree that any benchmark made in private would

become public in around 30 minutes. You have to ask yourself:

What’s the purpose? Are these benchmarks designed to help the

Iraqi Government succeed, or are these benchmarks to set them up

for failure? They will likely fail, in which case it gives you a rationale for doing less, possibly nothing at all. That’s one rationale for

benchmarks, which would then place the onus of collapse and failure on the Iraqis. A different approach to benchmarks might be,

‘‘We think that by setting these, we’re more likely to get them to

actually meet these benchmarks, possibly in the context of a regional conference.’’ But that’s a far more ambitious foreign policy.

Senator VITTER. Yes. I also want to touch on the difference that

we’ve sort of talked about between multilateral regional talks, very

narrowly focused on Iraq, and maybe bilateral talks with Iran or

Syria, whomever. It seems to be a big difference between the two.

I can understand the usefulness—potential usefulness of the

former. I see some clear dangers of the latter. And I specifically

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want to go to, Mr. Ross, one of your comments, looking at the situation in Iran now, noting some real debate. Isn’t that—some of that

debate at least partially the result of our attempt to isolate the

government, and sort of somewhat of a validation of avoiding those

direct bilateral talks that are going to go straight to their nuclear

program, or whatever?

Ambassador ROSS. Yes; I think it is. And my view on the negotiations is, I start with the regional context, and that also becomes

an interesting way of measuring whether or not you see a value,

in terms of moving to a bilateral forum with each.

You know, in each case you also have different kinds of options.

I’ll give you an example. Let’s say that we wanted to begin to start

a discussion with the Syrians. Well, maybe we would start it

through the Europeans, right now. The Europeans have forces on

the ground in Lebanon. I believe that there is a flashpoint coming.

I think that we could see a reemergence of the war in Lebanon in

about a year’s time, because Hezbollah’s being resupplied, nothing

is being done to stop that. Now, the Europeans, having forces on

the ground in Lebanon, have a huge stake in ensuring there isn’t

a flashpoint. We could coordinate an approach with the Europeans

on how we would deal with the Syrians, and it could involve our

coming and joining it, at a certain point. You can be creative, in

terms of how you approach it. I wouldn’t start with us rushing to

bilateral negotiations with either the Syrians or the Iranians right

now, but I think it’s a mistake to think that talking, itself, is a sign

of weakness. Talking, itself, is not a surrender. It’s only a surrender if you choose to surrender when you talk. So, we should pick

the time when it’s most advantageous and when you’re also not

sending a message to them, either the Syrians or the Iranians, that

current postures that we think are the wrongheaded postures are

not, in fact, working.

Senator VITTER. Final question, Mr. Chairman. Go back to

benchmarks. Again, I can see the usefulness of benchmarks, but

another part of me reacts as follows. As an American citizen, I

don’t begin to understand the notion that it isn’t patently obvious

to the entire world that this is it. I mean, we’re debating whether

there’s going to be a final chance, and it seems beyond debate that

there’s not going to be a chance beyond this possible final chance.

Am I missing something? I mean, aren’t we making a little bit

much of these benchmarks? Isn’t that obvious to everybody?

The CHAIRMAN. Good question.

Ambassador ROSS. I don’t know, there’s a lot of things about Iraq

that I would have thought were—would have been obvious a long

time ago, so I’m not so sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, thank you. Thank you very much.

The Senator from Florida.

Senator BILL NELSON. OK. Was the Senator from Massachusetts——

The CHAIRMAN. He’s already asked his questions.

Senator KERRY. I haven’t——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you—I’m sorry. I beg your pardon. I beg your

pardon. [Laughter.]

Senator BILL NELSON. Is there——

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon.

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Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. Is there something rare at

this table among competition?

The CHAIRMAN. No, what’s rare is, I got up to make two phone

calls, and I’m sorry, I thought you already had gone, John.

Senator KERRY. It’s fine. I——

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize. I apologize.

Senator KERRY. No problem. No problem. Is that OK? Are you

comfortable—thank you.

I apologize, because I’ve been in and out of the hearing, and I

apologize for that to our witnesses, because we’ve had a competing

Finance Committee markup right across the hall, so—on the minimum wage tax bill.

Let me just confirm, if I can, quickly—first of all, thank you, all

of you, for being here. Thank you for your experience that you

bring to the table. And if I can just confirm what Ambassador Ross

said, I just came back a few weeks ago from the Middle East and

from Lebanon, among other places, and it was really shocking to

me, and an eye opener to me, the degree to which we’re missing

the boat there, too. For all of the talk of democracy and democracybuilding, there you have this struggling democracy and Hezbollah

is, indeed, not just being rearmed from Syria and Iran, but is receiving some extraordinary $500-million-plus, equivalent, coming in

to rebuild it. So, Hezbollah is doing a better job of rebuilding Lebanon than we are, and yet, we profess to care about the democracy

and those struggling for it. The Seniora government stood up remarkably, by many people’s judgment, to this press by Hezbollah

and Nasrallah and company, to throw them out, and we’re not

doing half enough to do this. So, I mean, you compare the billions

of dollars going into Iraq, and the first line, I think, of confrontation is in Lebanon; the second line is going to be Hamas and what’s

happening on the West Bank; and the third, indeed, is Iraq. So, we

are missing the boat in every regard, as far as I’m concerned.

Dr. Nasr, I want to congratulate you on your book. I read your

book before I went over. I wish I’d done it a long time ago. I wish

that book had been written some time ago. It’s a superb, superb

presentation of the foundation of this confrontation. And everybody

here ought to understand it in that context. I want to ask you a

few things about that, and all of you, about that.

As we think about, you know—I mean, I was listening to this

conversation about benchmarks and where we are and where we

find ourselves. You know, this thing is obviously—the clock is more

than ticking, this is running out, big time. And I think you would

agree with that. And if—the first question is: Are the consequences

of whatever chaos flows out of here as serious as they are being

described, or is there some sort of fallback position, where you have

troops in the desert, you have troops in Kuwait, you sort of make

it clear to Iran there’s no big move here, but you allow these forces

that have been released, that Dr. Nasr so aptly described in the

Shia revival, to sort of play out what they’re going to play out that

we can’t necessarily stop? So, there are several questions there. Are

the stakes as high as everybody says? And is there a fallback position that reduces the consequences? And is this a civil war that

may have to be fought?

Dr. NASR. Thank you, Senator.

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I think, you know, we can—without a doubt, I think the ripple

effects of Iraq are going to be with us. And I think the worse the

endgame in Iraq is, the more likely we’re going to be dealing with

a lot of fallout across the region. And I think we won’t be able to

deal with that without having some kind of a regional framework

or understanding that would help us. And I think Iraq is the place,

other than the stability of Iraq, that there is certain understanding

between the main players in the region, in terms of where their interests lie. And——

Senator KERRY. But let me just ask you about that. When you

say that—the main players in the region are Sunni.

Dr. NASR. Well, also including Iran. You know, I think, in some

ways, in terms of at least current military assets, size of population, geography, in many ways, Iran is the big asset. So, the

question for us is that, you know, in managing this region, do we

do so in continuous confrontation and containment with the largest

force there, or we will try to establish some kind of stable environment in dealing with it?

The second issue that I think we often don’t note is that, you

know, the physical outcome of Iraq, in terms of wars, civil wars,

some of which Ambassador Haass pointed out, to—it comes to the

question of what kind of assets we have. How thin can we get

spread and still handle it? And how long are we really willing to

have large numbers of troops deployed in the Persian Gulf? But

there is also a—an ideological fallout coming out of Iraq, which we

are only beginning to see; namely, the kind of, you know, extremism that is now brewing both on the Sunni and on the Shia side.

It ultimately is—if Iraq ends up escalating further, is not likely to

remain contained over there, and is likely to spread out of the region. And that’s something that, you know, has been——

Senator KERRY. But the only way to not have it spread—and I

want to get—I mean, the only way to not have it spread, it seems

to me, is, you’ve got to resolve the fundamental stakes between the

parties. Now, what you described in your book so aptly is centuries

of a force that has been released by giving the Shia, at the ballot

box, what they’ve never been able to achieve otherwise, and they’re

not about to give it up. I mean, I met with Mr. Hakim; he wants

no changes to the Constitution. Muqtada al-Sadr has his ambitions.

What are—how do you resolve those stakes in a way that then addresses the Sunni presumption of right to rule and of restoration?

Dr. NASR. We will not be able to do that, Senator. It’s—looking

at it the other way around is probably more appropriate. How can

we prevent it from becoming worse than it is? And I think American foreign policy not falling into the trap of sectarianism itself is

a beginning. I mean, not taking sides, not playing the sectarian

card, not sort of—and actually, I think it’s in our interest for the

main protagonists here at the regional level—Saudi Arabia and

Iran—that don’t go down the path of an intensified competition in

the Persian Gulf. We’re not going to be able to build this thing

from bottom up, as you said.

Senator KERRY. But do you believe that—any of—again, I want

to get the rest of you into this—are oil revenues and federalism

going to resolve that difference? It seems to me they’re not.

Dr. NASR. No; they’re not.

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Senator KERRY. So, if they’re not, aren’t you left with two parties

for whom the presence of our forces is now empowering them to basically play out their power struggle under the cover of our security

blanket?

Ambassador HAASS. I wouldn’t put it quite that way, because if

we were to leave, it’s quite possible that they would play out their

power struggle on a more intense level.

Senator KERRY. Well, we’re not talking about leaving. We talked

about——

Ambassador HAASS. OK, reducing, right.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Ways of——

Ambassador HAASS. Sure.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Redeploying that prevent that from

happening and still protect our interests. But if you can’t resolve

them to stop them from killing the way they are today, my question is: Can you stop them?

Ambassador HAASS. No. I won’t speak for my two colleagues, I’ll

just speak for myself, Senator, but that’s where I think we are and

where we’re heading. I simply can’t see the ingredients here of

solving the political dispute that’s at the basis of things. I don’t

think you can come up with a political choreography that—how

would I put it?—is enough for the Sunnis and is not too much for

the Shia. I simply don’t believe that you can thread the needle that

way.

Senator KERRY. Well, that’s a recipe for a long struggle between

them, isn’t it?

Ambassador HAASS. Yes, sir. And I believe that there will inevitably be a long struggle. And, coming back to Senator Corker’s

point before, what we may need to think about, then, is a long-term

strategy, where we try to keep a lid on events in Iraq, at the lowest

possible human, military, and economic cost for ourselves. I was involved for years with Northern Ireland, and one of the things you

realize in looking at these disputes that go for years or decades, is

they have a certain life cycle. And at some point you need a large

percentage of people on the various sides of the dispute to essentially get up one morning and say, ‘‘Hey, this isn’t worth it. We’ve

got to start compromising. I am tired of this being my life.’’ And

in Northern Ireland, thanks to a decade and a half or two decades

of British, Irish, and American diplomacy, we are right on the cusp

of that point. It may take years—indeed, it will take years—for

Iraq, and for the Shia and Sunni and the Kurds in Iraq, to reach

that political point where they’re prepared to compromise in order

to move away from a reality that’s become awful. But it will take

years to get to that point.

Ambassador ROSS. I would just echo that, I guess. Part of what

you—the question you’re asking, Senator: Is there a way to contain

this, and contain all the worst consequences of what could be a real

convulsion? If you don’t contain it, I do think that it’s a disaster.

I mean, there’s no question, you’ll have every neighbor intervening

in Iraq to carve out their own niche or to promote their own ally.

So, somehow you have to see if you—through a regional forum, you

can reach some baselines of understanding to contain it. You reposition our own forces in a way designed to contain it. And you

probably realize, even though—I mean, I’m a little—I’m pessiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00321 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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mistic, but I’m a—I haven’t—Richard knows it’s my nature not to

give up, so I still think there is a—there may be a possibility, if

you can sharpen the consequences on the inside, at a time when

I think we do keep the lid on in a way that makes it safe enough

for everybody to avoid the hard decisions, maybe you can yet

produce something politically. If you don’t produce something politically, nothing’s going to change. The alternative may well be—

which is what I’ve also feared—we’re going to see a 15-year civil

war—a 15-year civil war, and, at the end of that time, there may

be a level of exhaustion, where everybody wakes up and says, ‘‘All

right,’’ you know, ‘‘now we’ll agree to work out some basis of sharing the oil revenues. We’ll have some kind of extensive autonomy

within the provinces. We’ll have a central government with limited

powers.’’ You know, the hope was to try to create a transition—this

is basically what you were talking about—create a transition to

that that is much more peaceful, much less costly. The reality may

be, we’re headed toward this long, painful, brutal internal civil

war, and the question is: Given the danger of not containing it,

what do you have to do to be able to contain it?

Senator KERRY. My time is up, but, if I could just close out by

saying that the frustration for a lot of us here is that what seems

obvious has been ignored and simply shunted aside for years now

by the administration, which is why none of us have any confidence

about these steps that are being taken. Senator Biden and I, and

a few others, not many, have been advocating for almost 3 years

for this contact group, slash, forum, slash, summit, whatever you

want to call it, that only reluctantly are they even, you know, still

talking about it, let alone embracing it. It’s kind of shocking to see

your own Secretary of State of an administration go to the Middle

East and discover—and—that the Middle East peace process needs

to be accelerated and put on the table. It’s a little shocking to have

your new Secretary of Defense go to Afghanistan and find what

we’ve been saying for almost a year or more: We need more troops

there. I mean, it—it’s just stunning to me that commonsense step

after commonsense step has not crossed the threshold of this administration, and we’re paying a stunning price for it. And it’s tragic for those kids who are over there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Are you ready, Senator? I was trying to get you prepped there

earlier by calling you first. [Laughter.]

Go to it, it’s yours.

Senator BILL NELSON. There is frustration coming out of this,

Senator, over concern about the troops. A bipartisan commission

comes forth and says what we ought to do, and they do this in a

very methodical, substantive, bipartisan way, and the administration ignores this, and, as a result, puts our troops in greater harm’s

way in the middle of a religious war, while, at the same time, for

the long run, depleting our ability to replenish our Reserves, our

National Guard, and our equipment. It is quite frustrating. And

you all, all three of you, have testified that you don’t see the need

for this troop increase.

Let me ask you this. Ambassador Ross, you had previously said

that you don’t see any change happening, unless the United States

were to say privately to Maliki, ‘‘You’ve got 6 months. We can’t

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keep the lid on any longer without results.’’ So, if the administration is not saying this privately—and comment on that, if they are

saying it privately—but if they’re not saying it privately, what then

can we, as representatives of the people say publicly to push the

Iraqis to deliver in a timely fashion?

Ambassador ROSS. Well, I would—I am hoping the administration is saying that privately. My own preference has been that we

would announce that we were prepared to negotiate a timetable for

our withdrawal, which gives them a chance to have an input into

it, which gives them a chance to perform and have us change how

we approach the timing. But the administration hasn’t done that.

I don’t have high expectations that they’re saying privately what

I would wish they were saying. So, I think the most important

things for you to be saying are that, since the President has now

established that he has these commitments from Prime Minister

Maliki, that if—and we’re in a position now to judge whether these

commitments are going to be upheld or not—and if they’re not, you

make it clear there has to be a consequence, you make it clear that

our policy’s going to change.

You’ve heard a slight difference in opinion between us about

whether that can be used to get them to take political steps that

they haven’t been willing to take up until now, which is the key

to changing Iraq. And if they can’t, then you move toward more of

a containment strategy to try to contain what is, I think, the sort

of disaster that all of us would see taking place if there is an allout civil war because we simply withdrew. Or what I would also

say is—something as bad—I think it’s a mistake for us to stay in

the midst of a civil war. And we can’t—I said it earlier, we can’t

simply stay there because it’s going to get worse if we don’t. That’s

a prescription for being stuck there forever and being thrust into

the middle of a civil war, where our forces become the target of

both.

I would add just one last point and then turn it over to my colleagues. One of the concerns I’ve had about the surge from the beginning is that we run the risk that each side is going to see us

putting forces in to protect the other. And when each side sees us

putting forces in to protect the other, what that means, we’d become a target for both.

Ambassador HAASS. Senator, could I just say one thing?

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Secretary.

Ambassador HAASS. What’s often important, as you know, is not

simply what happens, but how it happens and how it’s perceived

to have happened. And you asked what Congress should do in this

circumstance. I understand the frustration, but my concern would

be that Congress not do things that would change the widespread

perception of causality away from Iraqis toward Americans. I think

that would be——

Senator BILL NELSON. Such as cutting off funding for the troops.

Ambassador HAASS. Yes, sir. I think that would be wrong, because it would make us the issue, and it would increase, dramatically, the repercussions of Iraq for American foreign policy around

the world.

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Senator BILL NELSON. I agree with you. I want to stand up for

the troops, and I want to stand up against the President’s wrongheaded policy.

Let me go back to this question of containment. What about

Chairman Biden’s idea of a tripartite arrangement?

Ambassador HAASS. I’ve long admired the chairman’s idea. It is

also put forward by my predecessor. The problem is not the idea.

The idea is a reasonable idea. It is a good idea. The problem facing

the idea is that it’s a reasonable idea that’s been introduced into

an unreasonable political environment. If Iraqis were willing to

sign on to this idea of distribution of political and economic power

and federalism, all Iraqis would be better off, and a large part of

the problem would fade. The problem is that we can’t get Iraqis to

sign onto a set of arrangements that would leave the bulk of them

better off. We can’t force them to be reasonable. And, at the moment, they have embarked on a path that is, in some ways, selfdestructive. The flaw is not inherent in the idea; it’s just the very

reasonableness that’s at the heart of the chairman’s idea is rejected

virtually across the board by Shia and Sunnis, because they can’t

agree on the precise balance of political and economic power within

their society. At the moment, there is no federal scheme they would

sign onto.

Ambassador ROSS. The only thing I would say, though, as I’ve

noted before, with 100,000 Iraqis being displaced a month, you’re

beginning to create the outlines of that on the ground. So, I was

actually in favor of the idea before, and I think it may have more

of a potential now, because of that reality.

Senator BILL NELSON. When does the pain between the Sunnis

and the Shiites get so bad that they finally say, ‘‘It’s time for us

to reconcile’’? Can we even answer that question?

Dr. NASR. It’s clear, at least, Senator, it’s not now. And I think

both sides have a perception that they can win militarily on the

ground. And I think, you know, that’s one point Ambassador Ross

and Ambassador Haass raised, that unless, you know, they actually

see a limit to their strategy that there’s not going to be a victor,

they’re not likely to look at the consequence. In fact, one of the

problems being every measure, every benchmark that we’ve put on

the table has actually accelerated the attempt for an endgame and

more ethnic cleansing, more capture of territory.

Senator BILL NELSON. And, all the time, our boys and girls are

getting killed.

What do you think about the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation that we go and embed advisors? Last week, I asked Secretary

Gates, sitting right at that table, ‘‘How are we going to protect the

embedded advisors?’’ And so, we have to have troops in there to

protect the embeds. But what do you all think about that recommendation.

Ambassador HAASS. My own emphasis would be far more on

training than advising. I’m just worried that advisors are going to

get caught in extraordinarily messy situations. And I just don’t

know, then, how we can look after the physical security of advisors.

If we really talk about distributing them among every conceivable

Iraqi unit, my concern would be a lot of American advisors are

going to become casualties. So, again, I would put far greater emVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00324 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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phasis on training because training need not happen right in the

center. Regarding advising—and I’m not enough of an expert, and

I see several people up here, like Senator Hagel and Senator Kerry

who would be—we need to consider ways of structuring advising so

that individuals are not put in highly vulnerable positions. We may

have to cluster them in certain ways or have certain rules of engagement or operations, so our advisors are not put in such an extraordinarily vulnerable position. It may be one of those ideas that

sounds better than it is actually possible and easy to implement.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I would note, in closing,

that at that very table, last week, the Secretary of Defense answered the question: ‘‘When are we going to know if these troops

are working in Baghdad—not Al Anbar, but Baghdad?’’ And he

said, ‘‘We should know, within 2 months, if the Maliki government

is getting its act together.’’ Last night on the news—I don’t remember who the official was, it may have been Secretary Rice—now has

changed that to 6 to 8 months. And this is more of the rope-a-dope

that is already emerging. It’s this Senator’s intention to hold the

Department of Defense and Secretary Gates to that 2-month time

limit.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. I think the whole

Nation’s going to do that, as well, but——

Senator Casey, you guys are probably wondering why I talked

you into coming on this committee, after this long, but I’m delighted you did. I hope we haven’t caused you to second-guess your

judgment about joining this committee.

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Not for a minute, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

And I’m going to be real focused, on my time, because Senator

Webb wants to get questions in, as well. But I’m grateful for this

opportunity, and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for assembling yet another great panel. We appreciate your expertise and

your patriotism by the work that you do.

And, at the risk of violating one of the ground rules for this series of hearings that Chairman Biden laid out, where he told us

very directly—and I’m glad he did—to focus as much, or more, on

the future as the past. I’m going to violate that, temporarily. And

he will gavel me down if I do this the wrong way, but I don’t think

he will. Because I want to take a little bit of a look back, but also

to look forward.

And I represent a State, Pennsylvania, which is now third on the

list of the death toll—third highest death toll—and it has a traumatic effect, as I said to Secretary Rice before questioning her—it

has a traumatic, and almost cataclysmic, effect on very small towns

and small communities in our State, as everyone here knows. But

it—despite that horror and despite the heartache that these communities and these families feel, I think they know in their gut

that this is as much about diplomacy and politics and—as it is

about military strategy. So, I’m not going to ask questions about

the surge today—the ‘‘escalation,’’ as I think it’s more aptly

called—but to focus on a broad question for each of you, and then

to have a couple more specific questions.

The first broad question, which I address to each for you is:

Looking back at just two calendar years, 2005 and 2006, how would

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you—and I’ll let you choose this, because sometimes these can be

too simplistic—but how would you rate or grade or assess this administration’s diplomatic strategy, just for those 2 years? And then,

the second part of the question is: In calendar year 2007, coming

up, what would you recommend as a strategy, as specifically as you

can? And I realize that giving letter grades to past performance can

sometimes be misleading, but I’d like to hear each of you, on 2005

and 2006, and then what you’d recommend as a strategy for 2007.

Ambassador HAASS. Gee, thanks, guys.

Let me push back slightly. It’s surprising that you chose 2005

and 2006, because I would have said that by then, a lot of the die

was cast. If there were moments to do things, it was 2003, sir. And

it ought to have been put in place before the battlefield phase of

the Iraq war or immediately afterward. That would have been the

time, for example, to have set up a regional forum, and I believe

it could have played a much larger role.

Or consider Iran, when oil was far cheaper than it is today, when

you had a leadership that was more moderate than the current

leadership is, before the United States got as bogged down, as it

has, in Iraq. We had far more leverage then. So, whatever diplomatic initiatives we would have launched, I believe, would have

fared much better.

We have paid a price in 2005 and 2006, as well as both before

and since, for our policy of isolation, particularly with the Iranians

and the Syrians. Diplomacy or dealing with problem states is not

like laying down a good bottle of French wine that tends to get better with the passage of time. I don’t see where either of these problems have evolved in ways where we find ourselves with more options. To the contrary, Iran is 5 or 6 years farther along on its path

toward developing a nuclear capability. We’ve now seen coming

into power in Iran a far more radical individual. Syria and Iran

have both exacerbated the problems in Iraq. There was an argument for dealing with them, both bilaterally and collectively, then,

before 2005–06, during 2005–06, and in 2007. We are denying ourselves one of our tools of national security, and it just seems to me

it tends to be a strategic error to place so much emphasis on the

military tool and not to place a greater emphasis on the diplomatic

tool. You never know if it will work or it would have worked. All

I’m saying is, it might have, and, if it hadn’t worked, that would

have clarified things, that would have been useful, because then we

would have understood, then, more clearly than we now do, what

our options were.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

Dr. NASR. I would, very briefly, say that when you talk to people

in the region, they would characterize this period of one of nonengagement by the United States, and also a perception that the

region has no solutions or no participation in the events that are

unfolding. Many of them think that this marks a time period where

they had very little influence in Washington. That’s among allies

themselves.

I also think it’s a period where the Middle East itself changed

very dramatically, in terms of Iranian power, in terms of the situation in Iraq, but our foreign policy, because of its nonengagement,

was still tailored to an earlier timeframe. And I think, looking forVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00326 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ward, right now we’re entering a phase where we’re trying to play

catchup. In other words, we’ll deal with the consequence of having

followed the foreign policy that was at odds with the reality on the

ground and a consequence of nonengagement.

Ambassador ROSS. I’d make a few points. One, picking up on

what Vali said, I am in the region a lot, and I would tell you, the

perception of nonengagement is overwhelming, and it comes from

everybody, those who would like—who, in fact, identify themselves

as our friends. So, it’s pretty hard to give a passing grade, when,

in a sense, there’s a perception of complete nonengagement.

I would say one of the basic problems would be that we never

identified objectives that were very realistic. We did an assessment

that didn’t seem to fit what was going on in the area. We didn’t

frame issues in a way that others could identify with and decide

that the purposes that we were pursuing were the right ones,

which makes it easier, therefore, to persuade them to join with us.

When you look at specifics—take a country like Syria—I think

our policy toward Syria has been ‘‘speak loudly and carry a small

stick.’’ We’ve been very tough rhetorically and very soft practically.

I would like to reverse that order. I think our bigger problem has—

continues to be one that we’re not seen as working on the issues

in the region that matter to most of the people within the region.

So, one of the reasons—I mean, I’m obviously someone who believes

we should have been much more active on the Israeli-Palestinian

issue, as I said earlier, not because of Iraq, because it’s not relevant to Iraq, but because here is an issue that many, certainly

throughout the Arab and Muslim world, identify as being a kind

of core grievance. And for 6 years, we’ve sent the message that

we’re indifferent to it. So, on something that matters fundamentally to them, what they see from us is a kind of indifference, and

that’s going to cost you. And I’m afraid it has.

Senator CASEY. And I’m almost out of time. Real quickly, based

upon what you know already and what you’ve seen transpire just

in the last couple of days with regard to Secretary Rice’s trip,

what’s your evaluation of what you know about her intentions

there, and her schedule, and what you’re seeing, in terms of positively impacting this? Do you think she’s on the right track? Do you

think she’s on the wrong track? I know we’re out of time, but just

quickly.

Ambassador ROSS. Well, I think it’s good that she is—she has

said publicly, ’’I’ve heard people say we need to be much more engaged, and I’ve heard them.’’ So, that’s a good sign. Again, the

question is going to be, when you become engaged, be sure that it’s

based upon a realistic set of assumptions, be sure you’ve done the

kind of analysis and you understand what’s possible and isn’t possible, and be sure you begin to prepare the ground behind the

scenes with people to get them conditioned to what you’re going to

do and put the focus on what it is they can do. I mean, one of the

problems we face in the area is, too often, I think, over the past

several years, we kind of lecture to people about what they should

do, but we don’t listen nearly as much as we ought to.

Senator CASEY. I know we’re out of time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Finally, Senator Webb——

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Senator WEBB. We have again——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. The floor is yours.

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Reached the—we have again reached

the end of the road, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

And I want you to know it’s a privilege to be on this committee.

And one of the advantages of having to wait so long is to able—

being able to listen to the superb testimony of people like these immensely qualified witnesses, and it certainly helps my understanding of the issues and the approaches.

In an ideal world, I will be able to ask two questions here. I

would like to, first, state my agreement with the notion that we do

need to move toward some sort of a regional forum on these issues.

And it is true, on the one hand, as Ambassador Ross pointed out,

that salvation in Iraq will take place only inside Iraq, but, at the

same time, because of so many things that have happened, the instruments for that salvation are unavoidably regional, at this

point—a weak central together, very similar, in my mind, to the

Lebanese situation there. And the reality that the centrifugal

forces from this chaos have expanded into the region indicate that

we have to move toward some sort of a regional conference in order

to resolve this.

The first question that I have was just alluded to a bit by you,

Ambassador Ross, when you talked about this need for an approach

on the Israeli-Palestinian situation. I’m very concerned about some

of the perceptions of why that’s important in our debate—the perceptions in our debate about why that’s so important. At the beginning of this process, there were three different issues on the table,

as we know. There was the Israeli-Palestinian situation, there was

the issue of international terrorism, and there was the issue of

Iraq. And, in many ways, we sort of conflated them at the same

time, to use your words in response to Senator Hagel, by sending

out a message of indifference. And it just seems to me that a vigorous approach in that area, not in the sense that it would apply

directly to a solution in Iraq, but because it would apply generally

and very importantly in terms of the perception of the United

States as being evenhanded, would affect the region because of its

impact on issues such as recruitment for terrorism and that sort

of thing. And I’m just not—I’m not quite sure why this isn’t happening in a way that it happened in past administrations where

you were taking such a strong position, in terms of leadership. Do

you have any idea of why this isn’t on the table?

Ambassador ROSS. Well, my feeling is that when the administration came in, it looked at what had been done in the Clinton administration by the President, by me, as something that was noble,

but futile, and that if you were really going to change the region,

it made much more sense to deal with the rogue states. They would

affect other moderates, or at least moderate states, if they saw that

the rogue states were going to be either changed, in terms of their

behavior, or, more likely, the regimes were changed, you would

have much more of a geopolitical effect, you’d establish a kind of

strength, and that—the presumption was that with Prime Minister

Sharon in, with who Arafat was, diplomacy would—couldn’t lead

anyplace, so why put more good money after bad? And the problem

with that assessment was that it tended to view the problem in,

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what I would say, completely polarized terms, that either you have

war or you have peace. And the problem is, when you set up the

equation that way, since you’re not going to produce peace, then

you’re going to guarantee war. I said, at the time, when I was

briefing, as—before I left—I said, ‘‘Look, our challenge now is not

to make peace, it’s to be sure that we engage in a kind of management of the situation so it doesn’t get much worse, because,’’ I said,

‘‘I promise you, it’ll get much worse.’’ One thing I’ve—the analogy

I always used, in terms of the Israelis and the Palestinians, is,

with a peace process, it’s like riding a bicycle, as long as you’re pedaling, at least you preserve something; as soon as you stop, you

crash. And you see what happens when you crash. The perception

of us as being indifferent has taken root. The—both sides have

come to believe that the other has no interest in peace and isn’t

a partner for it. So, now, trying to dig out of the hole is vastly more

difficult than if we had contained this and created an environment

where peacemaking was going to be possible later on. I think it

was a mistaken assessment that was made. I think that’s what accounts for it.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

The second question is—would be asked generally to all of you—

when I watched, from the third row in the bleachers last year, the

Israeli incursion against Hezbollah, I noticed that, at the beginning

of it, it—there was a moment—there was a moment there that we

may have lost, in terms of regional realignment, where there were

early condemnations from the Saudis and others against Hezbollah.

And we did not take advantage of this moment, as—the administration did not take advantage of this moment. And there is a potential there, I believe, if those types of moments are taken advantage of, that you could see different realignments in the region.

Would you have any comment on that?

Dr. NASR. I would say, you know, that had to do somewhat with,

also, this—both the sectarian divide and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

Senator WEBB. Right.

Dr. NASR. I think that moment, sort of, passed, because the war

ended up popularizing Hezbollah on the Arab street. But it also

points to another dynamic we’re likely to see, is that the more the

Shias and Sunnis begin to fight, the more they’re going to escalate

the heat on the issue of Israel in their competition for popularity

and support on the Arab street. And in that sense, it’s not going

to be very easy for the moderate Arab governments to now come

out and support, sort of, a realignment without having to guard

their flank against Hezbollah and Iran.

Ambassador HAASS. I think, Senator, there also may have been

something else. As you point out, in the initial phases of the summer’s conflict, there was Arab condemnation of Hezbollah—in part,

because of the terrorism, in part, because of the Iranian backing.

Israel, and also the United States, rather than grasping that opportunity and translating that into something political, essentially got

more ambitious at that moment. The two governments were hoping

that over the next days and weeks, that you would actually have

a strategic weakening of Hezbollah, which would produce a bigger

political opportunity. One lesson that came through is that when

one goes up against the sort of organization that Hezbollah is,

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some of the classic calculations of what can be accomplished militarily and how that translates into political gain simply don’t work.

That opportunity just came and went.

Senator WEBB. Not dissimilar in concept to your remarks about

the failure to engage Iran when we were in a position that was

more powerful, rather than to having to face that in a position

when we’ve become weakened.

Ambassador HAASS. Timing counts for a lot in life. And in diplomacy, just to give one other example, going back to Senator Casey’s

question about 2005–06, and I said 2003 was more important,

there were moments in the initial aftermath of the battlefield victory, when the initial looting took place, when I believe that, had

the United States acted with more forces in a more assertive way,

we may have changed the course of political and physical behavior

in Iraq from that point on. That said, you can’t go back. You can’t

recreate those moments. And, you know, it’s always less difficult to

identify critical moments in retrospect. Your rearview mirror tends

to be clearer than your windshield; I understand that. But, still,

we’ve got to understand what we are getting into and think ahead,

what are likely to be the turning points. Because this is not the

first time we have faced these sorts of situations.

Ambassador ROSS. I would just add to what Richard was saying.

I think that timing in diplomacy is like location in real estate: It’s

everything. If you don’t seize the moment—and in the Middle East,

I will tell you, every time you miss an opportunity, you’re always

worse off. If you hadn’t had the opportunity at all, you’d be better

off than to have missed one that’s come along. And we missed one.

In the first week of the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel, all

of the—almost all of the Arab leaderships, with the exception of

Syria, came out against Hezbollah. It was absolutely unprecedented. We needed, in that week—and, by the way, this is not a

rearview mirror view; there were many of us who were saying,

‘‘You have an opening. Go mediate between the Saudis and the

Israelis. Go to the Saudis and basically say to the Saudis, ‘You

want to get us to produce a cease-fire there? You produce a plan,

an Arab plan, and you have the Prime Minister of Lebanon, who’s

calling for an Arab plan.’ ’’ And Hezbollah, in the first week, was

completely on the defensive within Lebanon.

Senator WEBB. For the record, I was saying the same thing on

the campaign trail. Well, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Gentlemen, your testimony has been remarkable, in the sense

that all the testimony we’ve had, with the single exception—and

I’m not being facetious—of the Secretary of State, has agreed on

certain basic fundamental premises as it relates to Iraq and the region. I mean, it is amazing, because we’ve had testimony, as you

know, from men and women who have specific plans. And we’re

going to hear more from others who are going to come forward with

specific plans, proposals of how to proceed from here. And it’s remarkable that everyone agrees that there is—at a minimum,

there’s no good solution. The idea of a liberal democracy in Iraq is

not going to happen within our lifetime, and we should get on with

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understanding what a more realistic, optimal solution would be,

and it’s far less than that.

Second, Iraq occupies and consumes all of our attention, the bulk

of our military, the significant portion of our resources, and our

diplomatic flexibility, at this point. Today I met with a very bright

woman who was down in Nicaragua, coincidentally, at the time Ortega was being sworn in, and she said to me, ‘‘None of you are talking at all about anything happening in Latin America,’’ and she’s

right. And Secretary Haass talked about, you know, there are

really some big issues out there, like places like Asia, you know,

there are a few things going on there; the subcontinent, Africa. And

so, everybody agrees that it’s sapping our emotion, our intellect,

our resources, our military.

But the third thing everybody agrees on—it seemed to me, and

I ask my colleagues if they have a different view—is that the solution lies within Iraq, that the Iraqis have to come to the point

where their sense of vengeance and paranoia and desire has to

somehow expire so they get to the point where they’re willing to

make some real, genuine compromises. And nobody thinks any of

these compromises any of the parties have to make are easy. I

mean, these are really hard. And unlike compromises we make,

these men and women are going to have to put their lives on the

line to make the compromises. It’s not like: Make a compromise,

and if it doesn’t work, I get a pension. Make a compromise, if it

doesn’t work, I get killed. But everyone agrees on that.

Everyone seems to agree that precipitous withdrawal would be a

serious mistake. It would make bad things even worse, although

everyone also acknowledges that we can’t sustain this in a midst

of a civil war. As I’ve said a thousand times, my colleagues are tiring of hearing it, no foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of the—the important word, ‘‘consent’’—of the

American people. It’s just not gonna happen. A year from now, I

promise you, this ain’t gonna be where it is today. It may be much

worse, it may be better, but I promise you, the President will not

have 10 votes in this place to continue ‘‘stringing this out,’’ whatever that means.

And the other thing everyone agrees with is that, regardless of

whether or not it can affect internal Iraqi machinations, there is

a need for a regional—if not agreement, a regional consensus on

containing what may spiral out of control beyond what it is within

Iraq, because everyone fears, in the region, the total disintegration

of Iraq. But what that leads me to is this—and, by the way I’m repeating, but the conclusion that, sort of, reemerges—is that you

can’t stay in the midst of a civil war, and there’s a need for us to

stay in the region.

So, what I have observed, hanging around here as long as some

people—I got here when I was 29, and trying to absorb what—and

I mean this literally and sincerely—what experts like you have

been saying off and on over the years, is that we used to have a—

I used to have a nun in grade school—this is going to sound colloquial, but I think it makes the point. Every time you’d get engaged

in someone else’s problem and you end up disrupting the class,

you’d stay behind after school—and those of you who have gone to

Catholic school remember, nuns used to make you write on the

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board, you know, when you stayed after school, in detention, a certain saying. And one of the ones that they would say we had to

write—I’d have to write a lot—is that, ‘‘Everyone can solve a problem except he who has it.’’ And I’ve not seen any circumstance, Mr.

Ambassador, where parties in the midst of a life-and-death struggle—coming out of environments where there have not been, for

decades upon decades, any stable government representing a democratic instinct—I’ve not seen where they’ve been able to come up

with what is even in their own interest. And there’s always a need

for some catalyst.

And the last thing you all agree on is, we can’t be the sole catalyst, at this point; we’ve, sort of, eaten our seed corn here. And so,

we’ve got to get some portion of the international community to be

that catalyst.

Which leads me to what seems to me to be sort of a reality that

everybody seems to ignore. I mean, everybody. And that is that

we’re pretty far down the road here in Iraq. We embraced, we promoted, we helped put together, and we pushed a constitution that

the Iraqis, in a vote—for sectarian reasons, I would argue, but

overwhelmingly endorsed. So we have a constitution that’s in place

there. There’s two truisms that everyone except you, Dennis, recently—and maybe just you, me, and Gelb think this is possible—

but seem to ignore; one is that there’s already overwhelming ethnic

cleansing taking place in Iraq. We’ve got millions now displaced.

How many fit the absolute definition of being ‘‘cleansed’’ is another

question, No. 1. No. 2, the Iraqi Constitution lays out, specifically,

certain benchmarks. When it’s defining what a ‘‘region’’ is, it says,

in article 115, ‘‘The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made

up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governates, and local administration.’’ And it says—the next article says—by the way,

first—of the article 116, first clause, says, ‘‘We’re agreeing ahead

of time that Kurdistan is already a region. That’s not negotiable.’’

And then it says, second, ‘‘The Constitution shall also allow for new

regions to be set up.’’ And the Iraqi Parliament went ahead and

voted. It set up the mechanism to provide for those new regions.

And so, at the end of the day—and I’ll conclude with this—at the

end of the day, if we all agree that surging and embedding and—

inside placement of troops outside Baghdad, inside, are all tactics,

not a strategy, not a plan. I don’t know how we get from where we

are to the prospect of avoiding the worst case. And that is a civil

war that metastasizes, spreads beyond its borders, that becomes a

regional war, that imperils a whole lot of our interests, and the

world’s interests—unless you get more than us to agree to an outcome within Iraq that is preferable, and use as much collective

pressure as we can on those parties to accommodate the inevitable.

Because it seems to me, it is inevitable, without the Sunnis having

a guaranteed share of revenue and without the Shia being able to

have some part of the region become a ‘‘region,’’ there’s no way to

stop this spiral, and the American people aren’t going to hang

around.

So, I am not married to ‘‘the Biden/Gelb plan.’’ And I admit,

Richard, a year ago it made more sense, in terms of its possibilities, than it did 6 months ago and a month ago, but the irony is,

I think it may be becoming so obvious that something along those

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lines has to happen. When we had the experts and historians in

here, from Phebe Marr to others who were on that panel, they all

said, ‘‘You know, gosh, no one in the region likes it.’’ I agree with

that.

But I think part of the reason no one likes it is because no deal

works if one party really likes it. But there seems to me to be

enough of the Sunni leadership that might see their way to swallowing a regional system, as called for in the Constitution, if they

were guaranteed they got a piece of the action. And, conversely,

there’s enough of the Shia population and leadership that is beginning to look down this very narrowing hole and conclude that giving up a little more of the revenue gets them a whole lot more, at

the end of the day, in revenue, as well as stability.

So, I guess—those of you who have negotiated before and those

of us who serve in public life, I think that optimism is an occupational requirement. I think if we don’t think it is possible, then

we’re in real trouble. But I am hopeful that the President’s plan

will run its course, very rapidly—and I think it will, by the way.

I think we’re going to know something pretty soon. I agree that one

thing that kind of confused—that I suspect that if Maliki is able

to restrain the Mahdi Militia—and he doesn’t control it, I realize—

that this may look like progress for a while. That is possible. But

I would hope that the administration is thinking about a plan B.

I know they can’t say it publicly, but I pray to God they’re listening. I hope they are trying to reach some kind of consensus, because the one thing, understandably, in the interest of time, no one

mentioned today, imagine what happens in France, in Germany,

just those two European countries, if this is a full-blown civil war—

14 percent of your population, or 10, depending upon which you

pick—Arab, not satisfied; Kurds, looking if they’re going to have to

flee—it’s going to be Germany—I mean, you talk about attracting

the interest of the region.

And I’ll end with one little story. Our harshest critic has been

Chirac. Most of my trips—I can’t remember which of the seven

trips—to Iraq, I try to stop by and see Chirac on the way back,

with others. And I can say this now, a year and a half ago or 2

years ago, Chirac said, ‘‘The worst thing America could do is leave.’’

And I said, ‘‘Mr. President, I think until you’re aware we’re going

to leave, you’re not going to act very responsibly.’’

So, I guess what I’m saying is that you all have laid out—and

I welcome any comment anybody would wish to make about my

closing comments here—but there seems to me to be certain inevitable things. Leaving right away is a disaster. Limiting the number

of troops makes it difficult; even, practically, How do you do that?

Staying in the midst of a civil war is not tolerable. I don’t ever remember when we’ve asked the American people to stay and accept

casualties to prevent something worse from happening. Not a victory, just—we’re doing this to prevent—I don’t know that that’s

ever happened, and I know it can’t be sustained. And so, we’d better coalesce around something pretty quickly, and that is why I’m

working very, very hard, at the front end of this, to try to generate

some bipartisan—and I mean this sincerely; this is not the usual,

‘‘Let’s love and embrace each other and be bipartisan.’’ The only

thing that’s going to change this President’s mind is if he realizes

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folks on this side of the table are as dissatisfied with his initiative

as the folks on this side of the table, because then prices begin to

be paid beyond Iraq policy for them.

So, again, I can’t tell you how much I appreciate your testimony.

The public should know that your service to the country is not

merely you showing up here. Probably every one of us has called

on your time, hours and hours of your time, over the last months

and years. So, it has been helpful. Let me end with that and invite

any closing comment any of you would like to make. And you need

not make one, but I would invite it, if you wish.

Ambassador HAASS. Let me just make one brief one, Senator.

And thank you for having us today. You are right in highlighting

the debate that has to happen here about what it is we do. But I

do think there has also got to be a major debate in Iraq. And in

order to maintain good relations, not simply with you, but with my

predecessor, let me quote that famous strategist, Shakespeare,

‘‘Ripeness is all.’’ And the real question is whether Iraq is reaching

a point of ripeness or not, when the sort of compromise you and

others are suggesting has a chance of taking root. We would all

love it to be the case.

The CHAIRMAN. To make it clear, I’m not sure it is the case.

Ambassador HAASS. And we would like it to be the case. The

question is: Are there things we can say and do to slightly increase

the odds? And a lot of the benchmarks conversation is about that.

Iraq, though, is a society of 20-odd-million people, and it doesn’t

take a very high percentage there of spoilers to make it very, very

rough. And I simply don’t think that enough Iraqis are psychologically and politically ready to make the sort of compromises that

are in their own self-interest. An awful lot of history is about individuals and groups pursuing policies that are diametrically opposed

to their self-interest. That’s why history is as messy as it is. And

my concern is that Iraqis are not yet there.

And so, it comes back to the American debate. If they are not

there, and it may take them some painful time to get there, it

raises extraordinarily difficult questions for how we nurture that

process to both get them there sooner than they would otherwise

get there by themselves, and how we limit the fallout in that process. That is the next phase of our foreign policy debate.

The CHAIRMAN. I couldn’t agree with you more. There’s no

straight line here. Who knows what actions we take will impact on

actions they take or don’t take, and impact on actions the rest of

the world looks at. This is a very complicated process. The only

conclusion I would come to at this point is—that as the debate

takes place here, it is better to start, if possible, from a bipartisan

perspective on the things we can agree on.

Ambassador ROSS. I agree. I just would add that I think the key

is: How do we sharpen choices both within Iraq and outside Iraq?

And how do we do that in a way that still preserves containment

as an option? Those are the two measures, I think, that you have

to establish and try to orchestrate.

The CHAIRMAN. And I hope that—I think you will see there is an

overwhelming consensus on this committee to begin some version

of engaging the region. I think it has to come from, essentially, the

United Nations or from the Permanent Five or the major powers,

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but, whatever reason, to do that. And it’s dawning on people, I

think, Dennis, that it’s not so much because it may be able to affect, directly, the events within Iraq, but will be able to deal with

the failure in Iraq, if that is what—so, there are two reasons for

it.

Dr. NASR. If I may add, Senator, in closing, that I agree with

Ambassador Haass that people in Iraq are not there. But partly it

is, I think, because both the Shiites and Sunnis have an exaggerated sense of their own regional capabilities. And I think partly the

regional engagement or the international engagement’s benefit

would be to bring them down to Earth, that this is as good as it

gets. And if we’re going to go down the course of the plan that you

mention, I think there has to be a deflation of expectations on both

Shiites and Sunnis, in terms of how much the region will help

them.

The CHAIRMAN. I couldn’t agree with you more. And, by the way,

I want to make it clear, if anybody’s got a better plan that is more

likely to be accepted, now, next week, next month, next year, or 5

years from now, I am wide open to the plan. But it seems to me

the only real value remaining in our plan is that it’s mirrored in

reality, it’s mirrored in what’s happening.

Again, I thank you all very, very much. I thank my colleagues,

particularly the new colleagues. And, I might add, I think we have,

on this committee, picked up some really, really, really serious Senators who seriously engage this, know about it, care about it. And

so, I’m looking for this committee to be a very productive vehicle

for, at a minimum, this kind of discussion, because, again—I will

end where I began—you all know better than I do that this is not

a great legislative committee. We can’t legislate foreign policy. But

it seems to me our minimum responsibility is to expose our colleagues to the best alternatives available and to give the American

people a better look. Not that everybody is watching this. This is

a process, and a lot of people are going to find this boring. But I’m

going to continue this, continue this through the next 2 years or

as long as I’m the chairman, because I think it is a process, and

we owe it to the American people to conduct it.

Anyway, thank you, gentlemen, you’ve been very generous with

your time.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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MILITARY AND SECURITY STRATEGY

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SH–

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, Menendez,

Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich,

DeMint, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Hey, General, how are you?

General ODOM. Good morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I introduced a senseof-the-Senate resolution, along with Senators Hagel, Levin, and

Snowe, expressing opposition to the President’s plan to, from our

perspective, deepen the military involvement in Iraq. And that resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, was referred to this committee. As you and I have discussed, it was my intention to schedule a committee action on that resolution today, but you have

asked me, totally appropriately, to hold this matter over until next

week. And unless something has changed—which is totally consistent with the practices of this committee—we’ll honor that request and it will be held over until next week, if that’s appropriate.

Senator LUGAR. Yes; until next Wednesday——

The CHAIRMAN. Until next Wednesday.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. On the schedule, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. And last night, I say to our colleagues, we issued

a notice of a business meeting for next Wednesday at 9 a.m. to consider this resolution.

Gentlemen, welcome. What a distinguished panel.

Our focus today is on the military strategy that must complement a political and diplomatic strategy in Iraq. We have a profound appreciation for the sacrifices and courage of the men and

women you led, and that are being led by others now, have made

for this country, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, but particularly focusing today on Iraq. They have done everything—in my

seven trips over there I’ve seen it with my own eyes—they’ve done

everything that’s been asked of them, they have done it incredibly

well, and they’ve done it without question.

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But their efforts do not take place in a vacuum. Were Iraq purely

a military conflict, we would have prevailed a long time ago. But,

as we all know, the situation is far more complex. It combines elements of classic insurgency, fundamentalist terrorism, criminality,

and, increasingly, an intensifying sectarian civil war.

All of this occurs against the backdrop of a fragmenting country

and a failing state. I, quite frankly, think I worry more about the

fragmentation of the country than the civil war. I realize it is hard

to make these clear distinctions in what constitutes what. But it’s

clear to me that—well, let me put it this way—I’m not at all certain we have a clear and coherent mission for the U.S. Armed

Forces in such an environment, and I’m not sure I’ve heard one yet.

What’s the proper sequencing of military and political efforts? Is

security a prerequisite for political settlement, or is a political settlement a prerequisite for military success? What stresses are multiple rotations in Iraq placing upon our Armed Forces? And what

are the implications for our ability to respond to future crises?

To help us answer these and other questions, we are joined by

four witnesses with formidable records in leading our Armed

Forces.

GEN Barry McCaffrey served as the director of the National

Office of Drug Control Policy from 1996 to 2001. The poor guy had

to deal with me almost every day when I was chair or ranking

member of the Judiciary Committee, but it was a great pleasure for

me. Prior to that, he served as the commander in chief of the

Southern Command. The recommendations he has presented after

his trips to Iraq over the last couple of years have been valuable

and, in my view, farsighted.

GEN Jack Keane served, until 2003, as the Vice Chief of Staff

of the Army. He has contributed to a recent report, which I have

read in whole, which lays out a plan to increase United States

troop levels in Iraq in order to stabilize Baghdad.

GEN Joseph Hoar, who has always made himself available to

this committee and the Congress, and me in particular, is a very

familiar face. He retired from the Marine Corps after a distinguished career in 1994. In his last 3 years of active service, he was

commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command.

And GEN William Odom, who we’ve called on many times and

received the benefit of his wisdom, retired as Director of the National Security Agency in 1988. He is a senior fellow at the Hudson

Institute and teaches at Yale University. Perhaps most relevant for

our discussion today, was his role in planning and assessing the

‘‘National Pacification Plan’’ during the Vietnam war.

We look forward to the testimony of all our highly distinguished

witnesses. And I will turn to my colleague Senator Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for

this hearing and for the ongoing series of hearings in which we’re

trying to come to grips with our situation in Iraq.

As this committee continues inquiries, Congress is contemplating

nonbinding resolutions disapproving of the President’s strategy. It

appears, however, to me, that such resolutions are unlikely to have

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an impact on what the President does. Even as Congress begins to

stake out political turf on the Iraq issue, the President is moving

forward with his troop surge. In recent days, both the President

and Vice President have asserted that, irrespective of congressional

reaction to the President’s, the administration will proceed with additional deployment of United States troops in Iraq.

Although many Members have genuine and heartfelt opposition

to troop increase, it is unclear at this stage that any specific strategy commands a majority of informed opinion inside or outside of

the Congress. One can find advocates for the President’s plan for

troop increases larger than the President’s plan, for partition of

Iraq, for an immediate withdrawal of American forces, for a phased

withdrawal, for recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, and for

other plans.

In such a political environment, we risk having reasoned debate

descend into simplistic sloganeering. Notions of, ‘‘protecting democracy’’ or, ‘‘achieving victory’’ mean little at this point in our Iraq

interventions. Nonbinding resolutions may be appropriate, but, in

the face of a determined Commander in Chief, their utility for

American policy is likely to end with their passage. If Congress is

going to provide constructive oversight, we must get into the weeds

of the President’s current policy in ways that do more than confirm

political opposition against it. And regardless of how we vote in a

given resolution, we will still be confronted with a situation in Iraq

that requires our attention and our participation.

Yesterday, we tapped diplomatic experts to discuss the regional

context of our efforts in Iraq, and next week we’ll explore the necessary economic elements. Today, we have the benefit of an outstanding panel of former military commanders who have given

much thought to Iraq. They bring with them many decades of combined experience in our Army and Marine Corps.

The discussion that will unfold today may have some familiar

rings. On February 11, 2003, this committee, the Foreign Relations

Committee, assembled a panel of military experts, including one

former CENTCOM commander, to analyze the military situation in

Iraq. I stated, on that day, ‘‘Success in Iraq requires that the administration, the Congress, and the American people think beyond

current military preparations and move toward the enunciation of

a clear post-conflict plan for Iraq and the region. We must articulate a plan that commences with a sober analysis of the costs and

squarely addresses how Iraq will be secured and governed, and precisely what commitment the United States must undertake.’’

These statements, which Chairman Biden and others echoed,

still hold true today. The President has presented his plan to the

American people, and it has been further articulated in hearings by

Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, and General Pace. But I don’t believe that we have, yet, an adequate understanding of what is intended militarily, how this military strategy translates into Iraq

political reconciliation, and how the plan will be adjusted when it

encounters obstacles.

As veteran military planners and strategists, our panel’s opinions

will be helpful as we analyze the President’s proposal and attempt

to provide responsible oversight. And we’re grateful for this opporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00339 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tunity to pose fundamental questions about our capabilities and

our tactics on the ground in Iraq.

To begin with, I would ask our experts to give us their views of

the military significance of the President’s planned deployment.

Can 21,500 additional American troops make a discernible difference in Iraq? Can this boost in our capability stabilize Baghdad?

Quite apart from political constraints, how long can the United

States sustain this deployment militarily? Have we accounted for

the likely obstacles to military success?

Now, the President intends to embed troops with the Iraqi units,

a recommendation of the Iraq Study Group. In this—is this strategy likely to succeed? And to what extent are Iraqi units infiltrated

by officers and by enlisted personnel whose primary loyalty is to

a militia, a tribe, or an ethnic group? What risk do these competing

loyalties pose for U.S. troops embedded with those units? Any longterm stabilization strategy, other than, perhaps, the deliberate partition of Iraq, depends on the training of Iraqi forces. This has been

true for several years now, and members of this committee have focused much effort on getting accurate answers to questions related

to Iraqi troop training? But are we making progress in training the

Iraqi Army? And do Iraqi units have the capability to undertake

difficult missions on their own? Perhaps more importantly, what

rational evidence exists that an Iraqi Army will be cohesive and

will operate under the limitations imposed by the central government? Dr. Michael O’Hanlon, of the Brookings Institution, testified,

in our first hearing of this series, that there are only about

10,000—10,000 politically reliable forces in the Iraqi Army. Do

Iraqi units have sufficient equipment and logistics capability to operate effectively? And, if not, can we safely remedy those deficiencies? How much U.S.-provided equipment is being transferred

to militias now?

Congress has a duty not just to express its views, but also to ensure that the Commander in Chief’s course is scrutinized in anticipation of funding requests and other policy decisions. Our committee is committed to this course, and I remain hopeful that the

President and his team will engage us in a meaningful way. And

we thank our witnesses today for helping our understanding.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, let me begin by making two points

before I call on the witnesses.

One, there have been some positive comments made about the

quality of the witnesses that we’ve had before the committee. I

want to make it clear that this has been a total joint exercise, that

Senator Lugar’s staff and mine, and Senator Lugar and I, have

been cooperating I mean, either one of us could have been chairing

this and we would get to the same place. I think it’s important for

people out there to know that.

And No. 2, Senator, I wish more than the few people on this committee had paid heed to your opening salvo back when we were

contemplating going into Iraq. We might not be where we are.

I know I have four high-ranking military guys before me, and I

want to make sure that I go according to protocol here. I’m just an

Irish kid who’s not real big on protocol. I’ve never learned it very

well. But I understand, General Keane, that you technically outVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00340 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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rank McCaffrey, but McCaffrey was in the Cabinet, so we’re going

to start with McCaffrey first.

General McCaffrey, General Keane, General Hoar, and General

Odom, I invite your testimony in that order. I know we’re always

telling you to hurry. I don’t care whether you hurry. I think what

you have to say is very, very, very important to us. We’ll put your

entire statements in the record, but I don’t want you to feel too

constrained to try to spit it all out in a few minutes here. We’re

really anxious to hear what each of you has to say.

So, General McCaffrey.

STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY MCCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR MCCAFFREY ASSOCIATES LLC AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. MILITARY

ACADEMY, ARLINGTON, VA

General MCCAFFREY. Well, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, and

the other committee members, it’s really an honor to be here. I will

briefly try and make seven points, and I’ll look forward to responding to your own questions.

As you know, I am in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan and Kuwait, and I’ve tried to follow this issue closely, partially from a position as a faculty member at West Point, so I’ve

been using that position to try and stay engaged and objective and

nonpartisan on both home security and national security—international security issues.

Seven comments.

The first is, it seems to me that the situation in Iraq is clearly

desperate, but is not terminal. I see no reason why this beleaguered nation of 27 million people, with all of its problems, couldn’t

be turned around by sensible strategy and the sensible application

of resources.

Now, having said that, if you take a snapshot on what’s going on

in Iraq today, which is well known to all of us in the room, there

is, you know, looking at the situation, 26,000 killed and wounded,

maybe $400 billion expended, probably 3,000 Iraqi civilians murdered per month, hundreds of thousands of internal and external

refugees, a brain-drain flight of the middle class and professional

classes of Iraq out of the country. Our allies are leaving us—make

no mistake about that—and will be largely gone by the coming

summer. And when you look at Iraq’s six neighbors, none of them,

with the exception of the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, perhaps, have

positively engaged in support of the ongoing situation; and, indeed,

are unlikely to do so.

How would you characterize the ongoing struggle? And there has

been what some term a semantics distinction on: Is it a civil war?

What’s the nature of the struggle? Are they dead-enders? Are they

Baathists? Is it only the Saddamites trying to come back into

power?

I’d say there’s four struggles going on, only two of which are crucially important to U.S. national interests. There’s no question

there’s massive criminality and a dysfunctional police force, meaning urban neighborhood police forces. And if you’re an Iraqi mother, that may, indeed, be the most significant challenge you have:

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Fearing abduction of your children, extortion, robbery, the lawlessness of the streets. It’s not a strategic interest to the United States.

A second comment, which I may be a lone voice in, although

there is a foreign-fighter jihadist element in Iraq. As a general

statement, I do not believe we are generating international terrorism inside Iraq that remains a direct threat to the United States

or our Western allies. And, indeed, when you look at the operations

of the tier-one special forces units, in particular, we have been devastating in our effectiveness against these foreign fighters. By and

large, 70 to 100 a month come into the country, and they’re dead

within 2 weeks. So, I would argue that is not a strategic concern

of the United States.

Third, there is, no question, a Sunni insurgency against what—

in sort of a legal fiction—is an established government, to regain

power. So, there’s an element of insurgency there, and I would assume that, a decade from now, Anbar province will still be in a

state of lawless insurgency.

Finally, fourth, regardless of how we parse the phrases, in my

judgment Iraq has been in a civil war darn near from the time we

went in there. It’s a struggle not just for political power, but for

survival in the world that will exist after the expected U.S. withdrawal. In my judgment, the Iraqis and I have come to a similar

conclusion that we’re going to be out of there, by and large, in 36

months. And so, they’re watching the backfield in motion. I apologize for the sports metaphor. They’re saying, ‘‘How do I live

through the next phase of Iraq’s existence?’’ And it’s difficult for

them to sort that out.

Second observation: The Iraqi Army. Michael O’Hanlon, who,

along with Tony Cordesman, may be two of the most astute people

watching this issue—I’m disturbed by the notion of ‘‘10,000 politically reliable troops.’’ I’ve been in a lot of Iraqi Army battalions

that I think are patriots, they’re courageous, they’re mixed Shia

and Sunni, largely Sunni officers, in many cases, with Republican

Guard backgrounds. They do lack training, they do lack a political

legitimacy for the government that they allegedly are supposed to

fight for. But I would also underscore, they are grossly inadequately equipped and resourced. And so, if somebody wanted to

talk about a surge of United States support for Iraq, I would question why our Iraqi infantry battalions have 30 Toyota trucks, a collection of junk Soviet small arms, no artillery, no helicopters, no

tactical airlift, and the numbers, which I’ve been banging away at

for the last 3 years, are 5,000 light-armored vehicles, a couple of

hundred United States helicopters, 24 C–130s, all-United States

small arms, at least a battery of artillery per Iraqi division, and

the pushback will be—and some of it’s legitimate—‘‘Wait a minute,

we’re concerned about the ensuing large-scale civil war.’’ The other

pushback is, ‘‘Look, we’re not talking about fighting maneuver warfare against our neighbors, this is internal counterinsurgency.’’ Can

you imagine the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division being told

to hand over his light-armored vehicles, ‘‘Don’t operate with

counterbattery fire at the FOBs that are under nightly rocket and

mortar attack.’’ We’ve got to equip the Iraqis. If we’re going to

spend $8 billion a month fighting these people, why wouldn’t we

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consider a shot, over the coming 3 years, of equipping them so they

can replace us as we withdraw? And we will withdraw.

Point No. 3: Economic reconstruction. There is a good argument

you can’t do economic reconstruction effectively unless you have security. I understand that linkage. I cannot imagine—you—the Congress provided 18-billion-dollars-plus in economic reconstruction

aid. Much of it was badly spent, badly supervised. And, by the way,

much of it was implemented by 85,000 contractors. Maybe that’s a

right number, maybe 600 were killed, maybe 4,000 were wounded.

Without that contractor effort, this war would have ground to a

halt 2 years ago. But when you look at it, the President’s current

proposal says $1 billion in CERP money, which is well received by

our battalion and company commanders who want to do small

projects and engage local Iraqi political authorities, but, I would

argue, if we’re not willing to put a 10-billion-dollars-a-year pledge

for 5 years into Iraq—we’ve said the only option we’re moving forward with is the U.S. Armed Forces. So, again, I would say we

must stand with the Iraqis. And the answer you’re getting out of

the administration is, ‘‘Our allies have pledged $13 billion; they’ve

got to come through.’’ That’s silly, they’re not going to come

through. And a lot of it’s loans, not pledges, anyway.

Bullet No. 4, there’s much discussion on the hopelessness of a

political dialog with Syria and Iran, the hopelessness of really negotiating with Sunni insurgents who see their survival at stake. I

respect and understand that. Many of us in this room have been

involved in hopeless negotiations that went on for a decade or

longer and eventually bore fruit. So, I would argue, there must be

an Iraqi lead and an internal political dialog; I say ‘‘internally’’——

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon. You said ‘‘Iraqi lead?’’

General MCCAFFREY. Iraqi lead, not United States. The Iraqi

Government needs to be compelled, shaped, encouraged to open a

dialog, perhaps in a safe place, like Saudi Arabia, and talk to their

internal factions, as well as their neighbors.

Bullet No. 5: I’m privileged to teach, at West Point, policy classes, American Government. I always remind the cadets, Article 1 of

the Constitution—and I don’t mean to sound like I’m lecturing—

says the Congress of the United States has a responsibility to raise

and equip an Army and Navy. That is not the responsibility of either of the other two coequal branches of Government. Your Army,

somewhat the Marine Corps, are broken, our equipment is broken.

Hundreds of our armored vehicles are lined up at depots. It has

been grossly underresourced. We are in a position of strategic peril.

In my judgment, our manpower is inadequate. I’ve been saying

80,000 troops short in the Army, 25,000 in the Marine Corps. Our

recruiting is faltering. There is unquestionably, on the bottom end,

a decrease in the quality of the kids coming into the U.S. Army

now. We’re encountering all sorts of problems we didn’t see some

years ago. You must fix the Army and the Marine Corps, or we will

be incapable of responding to the next crisis.

Bullet No. 6: Our Air Force and Navy play a vital, but modest,

role in the ground combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are the

primary, in my view, deterrent force to greet the Chinese as they

emerge into the global arena as a major economic, political, and

military power. Fifty-five billion dollars, minimum, have been

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drained out of Air Force and Navy budgets and gone into small

arms ammunition to shoot at Iraqi insurgents and Afghans. We

must fix the Air Force and the Navy, or, a decade from now, we

will rue it.

A final notion. I personally think the surge of five U.S. Army brigades and two Marine battalions, dribbled out over 5 months,

where, potentially, they might start drawing down in November,

and where their mission allegedly would be to get down to detailed

granularity to fight a counterinsurgency battle in a city of 6 million

Arabs who are murdering each other with 120 mortars, drills, and

car bombs, is a fool’s errand. However, I don’t think it’s the most

significant part of going forward, which, I would argue, is equipping an Iraqi force and economic reconstruction and political

dialog.

I would argue very strongly, though, that this guy, Secretary Bob

Gates, who comes in with modesty, international connections, experience; GEN Dave Petraeus, who may be the most talented person

I ever met in my life—he is one terrific soldier; and Ambassador

Ryan Crocker, who I’ve observed in the U.S. Embassy Pakistan—

he may be the best ambassador I ever saw—that the three of them

ought to be allowed to get in there and exercise discretion. Sort of,

the response is: I would urge the Senate to be cautious in giving

steering instructions to our wartime commanders, and to allow

them to assess the situation and tell the administration and the

Congress what tools they need. I don’t mean political sense, but I

mean steering instruction in which we try and modify the tactics

or the operational guidance.

On that note, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to

share these ideas, and I look forward to responding to your own

questions.

[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY MCCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR

MCCAFFREY ASSOCIATES LLC AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS, U.S. MILITARY ACCADEMY, ARLINGTON, VA

A collapse of the Iraqi State would be catastrophic—for the people of Iraq, for the

Middle East, and for America’s strategic interests. We need a new political and military approach to head off this impending disaster—one crafted with bipartisan congressional support. But Baker-Hamilton isn’t it.

Our objective should be a large-scale U.S. military withdrawal within the next 36

months, leaving in place an Iraqi Government in a stable and mostly peaceful country that does not threaten its six neighboring states and does not intend to possess

weapons of mass destruction.

The courage and skill of the U.S. Armed Forces have been awe inspiring. Our soldiers, Marines and Special Operations forces have suffered 25,000 wounded and

killed, with many thousands permanently maimed, while fighting this $400 billion

war.

But the situation in Iraq is perilous and growing worse. Thousands of Iraqis are

killed each month; hundreds of thousands are refugees. The government of Prime

Minister Nouri al-Maliki is largely dysfunctional. Our allies, including the brave

and competent British, are nearly gone. Baghdad has become the central battlefield

in this struggle, which involves not just politically inspired civil war but also rampant criminality and violence carried out by foreign jihadists. Shiite and Sunni Arabs

overwhelmingly anticipate and endorse a U.S. strategic withdrawal and defeat.

We could immediately and totally withdraw. In less than 6 months, our 150,000

troops could fight their way along strategic withdrawal corridors back to the sea and

the safety provided by the Navy. Several million terrified refugees would follow, the

route of our columns marked by the burning pyres of abandoned military supplies

demolished by our rear guard. The resulting civil warfare would probably turn Iraq

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into a humanitarian disaster and might well draw in the Iranians and Syrians. It

would also deeply threaten the safety and stability of our allies in neighboring countries.

There is a better option. First, we must commit publicly to provide $10 billion a

year in economic support to the Iraqis over the next 5 years. In the military arena,

it would be feasible to equip and increase the Iraqi Armed Forces on a crash basis

over the next 24 months (but not the police or the Facilities Protection Service). The

goal would be 250,000 troops, provided with the material and training necessary to

maintain internal order.

Within the first 12 months we should drawdown the U.S. military presence from

15 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), of 5,000 troops each, to 10. Within the next 12

months, Centcom forces should further drawdown to seven BCTs and withdraw from

urban areas to isolated U.S. operating bases—where we could continue to provide

oversight and intervention when required to rescue our embedded U.S. training

teams, protect the population from violence, or save the legal government.

Finally, we have to design and empower a regional diplomatic peace dialog in

which the Iraqis can take the lead, engaging their regional neighbors as well as

their own alienated and fractured internal population.

We are in a very difficult position created by a micromanaged Rumsfeld war team

that has been incompetent, arrogant, and in denial. The departing Defense Secretary, in a recent farewell Pentagon townhall meeting, criticized the alleged distortions of the U.S. media, saying that they chose to report a few bombs going off in

Baghdad rather than the peaceful scene he witnessed from his helicopter flying over

the city. This was a perfect, and incredible, continuation of Donald Rumsfeld’s willful blindness in his approach to the war. From the safety of his helicopter, he apparently could not hear the nearly constant rattle of small-arms fire, did not know of

the hundreds of marines and soldiers being killed or wounded each month, or see

the chaos, murder, and desperation of daily life for Iraqi families.

Let me add a note of caution regarding a deceptive and unwise option that springs

from the work of the Iraq Study Group. We must not entertain the shallow, partisan

notion of rapidly withdrawing most organized Marine and Army fighting units by

early 2008 and substituting for them a much larger number of U.S. advisers—a 400-

percent increase—as a way to avoid a difficult debate for both parties in the New

Hampshire primaries.

This would leave some 40,000 U.S. logistics and adviser troops spread out and

vulnerable, all over Iraq. It would decrease our leverage with Iraq’s neighbors. It

would not get at the problem of a continuing civil war. In fact, significantly increasing the number of U.S. advisers in each company and battalion of the Iraqi Army

and police—to act as role models—is itself a bad idea. We are foreigners. They want

us gone.

Lack of combat experience is not the central issue Iraqis face. Their problems are

corrupt and incompetent ministries, poor equipment, an untrained and unreliable

sectarian officer corps (a result of Rumsfeld’s disbanding the Iraqi Army), and a lack

of political will caused by the failure of a legitimate Iraqi Government to emerge.

We need fewer advisers, not more—selected from elite, active military units and

with, at least, 90 days of immersion training in Arabic. Iraqi troops will not fight

because of iron discipline enforced by U.S. sergeants and officers. That is a self-serving domestic political concept that would put us at risk of a national military humiliation.

All of this may not work. We have very few options left. In my judgment, taking

down the Saddam Hussein regime was a huge gift to the Iraqi people. Done right,

it might have left the region and the United States safer for years to come. But the

American people have withdrawn their support for the war, although they remain

intensely committed to, and protective of, our Armed Forces. We have run out of

time. Our troops and their families will remain bitter for a generation if we abandon

the Iraqis, just as another generation did after we abandoned the South Vietnamese

for whom Americans had fought and died. We owe them and our own national interest this one last effort. If we cannot generate the political will to take this action,

it is time to pull out and search for those we will hold responsible in Congress and

the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Jack.

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STATEMENT OF GEN JACK KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, DC

General KEANE. Thank you, Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, and

members of the committee, for inviting me.

My judgments today are informed by multiple trips to Iraq, and

also—a member of Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was the Secretary

of Defense Policy Board, and received continuous and update briefings on Iraq and very aware of what the intelligence situation

there is for the last 3-plus years.

I want to start by making some assumptions; and some of these

are obvious, but they still need to be made. One is that obviously

we’re facing a crisis here in Iraq. You know, time is running out.

This government, as imperfect as it is, is on its way to being fractured, an all-out civil war—we don’t have to debate whether there

is one or not; it will be obvious to everyone, and also leading to a

failed state. With that, it requires a relook at what we are doing.

And it—the second assumption is that security is the issue that

subsumes all other issues in Iraq. It is a necessary precondition,

now, to be able to make political progress, economic progress, and

social progress. That’s the harsh reality of it. Look at the political

strategy we had—has failed. And that’s the truth of it. We underestimated the political culture in Iraq. The fact is that the Iraqis

do not compromise. When you lose, you lose forever. For an educated society that they are, the level of violence that they choose

to resolve their problems is staggering. And we underestimated, I

think, the psychological impact of what 35 years of repression

meant to the Shias, for the most part; to the Kurds, to a lesser degree. And we—while we all know about the Shia-Sunni schism that

existed for hundreds of years, certainly truly understanding what

that meant, in political terms, is another reality.

So, this country is not ready for what we tried to achieve politically. That’s the truth of it. And that political strategy has failed.

And, with that failure, we have to accept the recognition that the

Sunni insurgents who are the main issue here—and by that, I

mean is—they decided to not accept the occupation, they decided

to not accept a new form of government, and they are enabled by

the al-Qaeda. I agree with my esteemed colleague, Barry McCaffrey, that the al-Qaeda is not as much a threat as we make it out

to be, and we have done considerable damage to it. But, nonetheless, what it could become, in terms of an al-Qaeda sanctuary, is

something we all have to be concerned about.

This Sunni insurgency, since the winter of 2004—I’m talking November–December—the Sunni insurgents believed that they were

winning in Iraq. And then they raised the level of violence in 2005,

and then, in 2006, when they saw the government coming, after

the constitutional referendum in October and the general election

in December, they, enabled by the al-Qaeda, provoked the Shias,

getting the—what is predictable, an overreaction on their part, to

the level of violence that they introduced by the mosque bombings

we’re all aware of, and the assassination squads that they inflicted

on the Shia. It was predictable what they got, and they welcome

that, because they want to fracture this government.

So, when we say, ‘‘You’’—as part of our political strategy, ‘‘We

have to reconcile the Sunnis, bring them to the reconciliation table,

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throw amnesty on the table in front of them, put oil in front of

them,’’ they want none of that, because they believe they want all

the oil, and they believe they’re going to get it. They want—they

believe they’re going to get back control of this country.

Now, whether we think that’s realistic or not is sort of irrelevant.

The fact is, they believe it. And we see that by reading the documents that they’re exchanging with each other, listening to their

conversations with each other, and we know where they’re going.

So, Maliki has no leverage with this Sunni insurgency. That is

the harsh reality of it. So, the political strategy has failed.

The military strategy has failed, because we put our emphasis

primarily on training the Iraqi security forces. We made a conscious decision, in the summer of 2004, when we changed from

Sanchez to Casey and we developed our first campaign plan—the

truth be known, for 2003 and part of 2004, we were, by and large,

conducting conventional operations against an insurgency. And

then we brought a new commander in, and he developed a new

strategy, and it had a number of components to it.

The military component, and central to the strategy, was: Train

the Iraqi security forces so they could defeat the insurgency. It was

never, ever our mission to defeat the insurgency. This was full of

risk, but it was achievable. It overrelies on a political strategy to

work; that is, attempt to bring the Sunnis into the government and

they will not seek their objectives through armed violence.

But the fact is, what? The enemy never bought it. They didn’t

agree with it. And we have always underestimated this enemy. If

there is one constant we have here, it is we have underestimated

this enemy from the beginning. In 2005, they raised that level of

violence over what it was in 2004. And they believe they’re well on

their way to doing what they want as a fractured state. And that

put at risk our strategy. Why did it put at risk our strategy? Because it raised the level of violence way beyond the capacity of the

Iraqi security forces to cope with it. In my judgment, even if they

were fully trained and fully equipped, they will not have the capacity to deal with this level of violence. And so, we keep chasing this

thing, and we can’t get there. And we should have adjusted that

strategy sometime in 2005. I think there was enough evidence. I

was still supporting it in 2005, so I’m not hiding behind, you know,

some continuous criticism here. I did not start to make a change

in my thinking—while I had concern in 2005, when I started publicly talking about it, and privately with leaders, was in the summer of 2006. So, I’m part of the problem, as well, in terms of not

adjusting to a—to the strategy. But when you look at it harshly,

the fact is, we should have made some accommodation in 2005,

knowing that the Iraqi security forces will never be able to reach

this ever-increasing level of violence.

Now, all the things we want to do with the Iraqi security forces

make sense—fully equip them, give them better trained advisors,

give them more advisors, and make that force a lot larger than

what it is, and embed U.S. forces in it. All of that makes sense.

Problem is, we can’t solve that Iraqi security-force problem in time,

dealing with this crisis that’s in front us. The government will fracture before we get the Iraqi security forces to a high enough capacity level to cope with the problem.

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And those two points I’m making are essential to understanding,

you know, my perspective on this.

As part of the strategy, the military strategy, if we made the decision not to defeat the insurgency, we made a conscious decision

not to protect the population, and that was a conscious decision. So,

our emphasis has been on training the Iraqi security forces, not securing the population. We left that to the Iraqis. And what has

happened in 2006, and very clear to us, is that the Iraqis cannot

protect the population. We have never chosen to protect the population ourselves. So, we have a problem, because the Shias are running wild, and they waited 21⁄2 years. And I think there’s something to work with, given the fact that they did wait 21⁄2 years.

Other than some selected death squads that came out in 2004 and

a couple of other incidents, for the most part since the inception

the Shias held their fire, thinking that the Iraqis and us would protect that population. After the mosque bombing in February and

the level of violence that the Sunnis and the al-Qaeda inflicted on

the Shia, they were provoked.

Maliki has no instrument to deal with the Shias. And that’s the

truth of it. When we say we’ve got to put pressure on Maliki to get

the Shias to heel, what can he use? He has a conversation with a

Shia leader, al-Hakim or Muqtada al-Sadr. We know who these

people are. We know they’re seeking political advantage. We know

what they’re doing is horrific. And I’m not dismissing any of that.

But what is Maliki’s political leverage over these people? They look

at him right in the face and say, ‘‘What are you talking about? You

can’t protect us, and the Americans choose not to. What are we

going to do? We have to protect ourselves.’’ So, not only are they

protecting themselves, they’ve gone on the offense. We have got to

give Maliki some leverage to be able to use with those leaders.

That is an assumption that we have to consider.

And the other one is: Hard is not hopeless. This thing is complex,

to be sure. I mean, the Sunni insurgency is not a monolithic. The

Shias are not a monolithic. They fight among themselves. You have

the al-Qaeda in there, and we have huge amounts of criminality.

So, it is a complex human problem, but it is a human problem. And

when you break it down into its components, I believe it’s also resolvable by humans. We do not have to wring our hands and say,

‘‘This is hopeless. This is too hard, and we can’t resolve it.’’ I believe this can be resolved, and it certainly is worth trying.

So, it begs the question: What can we do? Well, while the purpose of this discussion here is military, and I will focus on that,

clearly a comprehensive strategy to deal with the political, economic, and diplomatic is very important, the other elements of national power. Iraq should be looked at as a regional problem with

global implications, and using the resources in the region to help

it. I’m not going to spend time discussing that, because I think

your interests are other here, and I’d be more than happy to take

that in Q&As.

But, in terms of the military strategy itself—so, can we do something, or is it just too late? And do we have enough forces to do

it? When I look at that problem and analyze it, the answer is yes.

The Iraqis—the insurgents and the Shias chose the—Baghdad as

the center of gravity, driven mainly by the Sunni insurgency. Al

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Anbar would have been a place to start to change the mission and

the strategy, but Baghdad is the center of gravity; we have no

choice, we have to start there.

And the mission and the change is: Secure the population. Why?

Because that will bring down the level of violence. And it helps you

to focus on truly what is really important, which is driving the

problem in Iraq—the Sunni mainstream insurgency is driving this

problem. That is why the al-Qaeda is there, to help enable it, and

they provoked the Shia violence that we’re dealing with today. And

I’m not saying you just focus on them. Far from it. But you have

to stay focused on what is really the issue so you can get to the

Sunnis eventually and solve the problem.

The military problem is one—and the mission is: Secure the population in Baghdad. And when you look at Baghdad, it’s 6 million,

for sure. But where do you start? In my judgment, there is key terrain in Baghdad, and the key terrain is the Shia-Sunni mixed

neighborhoods. Before they redistricted, just recently—those are 23

districts, east and west of the Tigris River where the Sunnis and

Shias lived, and there are—as you know, there’s some cleansing

going on in there today, horrific as it is. But that is a good place

to start. The population is 1.8 million—1.8 million. And you look—

go into those neighborhoods, and your operation on the ground is

different. Now, we’re going to get a little tactical here so you can

understand it, the operation itself. And I think you want to understand it.

The—what we have done in the past—we have been in Baghdad

before, so the reference is, ‘‘Well, we have done this in the past.

Why are we doing it again?’’ It looks like more of the same, and

that’s a reasonable point. The place and the location is the same,

but what we’re going to do is very different.

We were never able to secure the population in Baghdad. Why?

We never had enough resources to do it. We never had enough

United States resources to do it, and we never had sufficient Iraqi

resources even to get close to it.

So, what we have—what we did in Baghdad in those two other

operations, and what we have done, similarly, in Fallujah,

Samarra, Ramadi, is, we went in there, as you know, and we

cleared out the insurgents or the Shia death squads from the

neighborhoods. That was step one. We never had the resources to

stay there and protect the people. We took the resources we used

to clear out that neighborhood, and we would go to another neighborhood. And then what happened is predictable, as it has happened in the major cities we’ve done this, in the neighborhoods in

Baghdad the same thing happened. The death squads, the insurgents, and the al-Qaeda came back, as well as criminals, to terrorize and intimidate, and also to assassinate those who had been

cooperating with our forces or with the Iraqi security forces.

This mission, we would clear out of that neighborhood, but we

would fold in the neighborhood Iraqis and United States combined,

and they would stay in the neighborhood 24/7 and not go back to

their bases. Their mission would be to protect and secure the population.

Now, why is protecting and securing the population so important? Why are we so focused on this? Because the—the simple reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00349 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ality is, when you protect that population, it is the population

themselves, then, that begin to isolate the thugs and the killers

that have been preying on them. They begin to give it up. It takes

time to do this. This is not done in a few weeks. You have to bring

in an economic package, as well. And I thought an economic package would be basic services, and then a tier-two package, which

would have an incentive with it, only based on cooperation, for enhanced quality of life. And that connection you make with that population through local officials starts to begin to isolate the insurgents in that neighborhood. We’re there to protect them, and they

begin the isolation of them because they want no part of them.

They start to have some connection to their local government and

also to their direct—to the central government, indirectly. And I

don’t want to be Pollyannaish about it, certainly the central government is very problematic.

But that’s the basic nature of the issue. So, you begin with 1.8

million. You’re not dealing with 6 million. And the force ratios—

we’ve done the analysis—are right to deal with that. Five brigades

there, four brigades that are already there, United States. Now,

where I part with this plan a little bit is, I—why we would put the

Iraqis in the lead here makes no sense to me. I don’t understand

that. The—I know the Iraqis want to do that. Why we would do

that, when we’re trying to conduct the most decisive operation

we’ve done yet——

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you think they mean that? I’m not

being facetious.

General KEANE. That’s a good——

The CHAIRMAN. Put the Iraqis in——

General KEANE [continuing]. Question. I think they do mean it.

I think it—it’s fraught with problems, and I—it just makes it that

much more difficult for Petraeus and Odierno to work out something militarily.

Here’s what we—when we say ‘‘Iraqi in the lead,’’ that means the

Iraqis have a chain of command on the same streets that the

United States has a chain of command on, and we do not have

unity of command; therefore, you don’t have unity of effort. And

every time we do something like that—and all these guys sitting

at the table could cite examples of it—we have military problems.

So, Petraeus, Fallon, and Odierno, have got to resolve that.

But the fact is, is that we—the force ratios are right to be able

to deal with that problem, and it relies on the United States, principally, to solve this problem. Make no mistake about it. It may not

be—that’s not being said politically, but the reality is, it relies on

United States forces to help solve this problem, assisted by Iraqis,

to be sure.

The—that’s the basic nature of the military application of this

strategy.

Now, what about Sadr City? And what about the rest of Iraq?

Well, the rest of Iraq—the Sunni enclaves to the west, when you

analyze it, there’s not a lot of violence there. We need to put minimum force there and provide economic packages to them to assist

to raise up their quality of life.

To the east is the problem with the Shia militias and Sadr City.

And it is a problem. I would think this. If we can resolve that probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00350 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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lem politically, and not militarily, let’s try it. And by that, I mean,

if we go in and secure the 1.8 million people who are Shias and

Sunnis in the mixed neighborhoods, and we have demonstrated an

evenhanded approach to doing this, and we’re—al-Hakim and Sadr

and the vigilante groups will know whether we’re successful protecting their people in a number of weeks. At some point, in the

spring or summer, if we’re effective here, Maliki, for the first time,

has leverage with Sadr and al-Hakim, in the sense that now he’s

protecting his people. And it would seem to me he has leverage

over them, at a minimum, to get them to pull back from offensive

operations. It would be too ambitious to think he could begin to disarm them at that point, because they’re not going to buy that, but

at least to stop offensive operations, pull back behind his barricades. He gets political leverage to do that. That is worth a try.

If that doesn’t work, then we have to deal with that, militarily.

I mean, it’s feasible to deal with it, it’s not desirable to deal with

it. What you will do is, you will unite the Shia militias. They’re not

united now. If we go in to densely populated Sadr City with a military force to do what we’re doing in the mixed neighborhoods, they

will unite, and it will be a much larger problem that we have to

deal with. I think it’s avoidable, and we should certainly try to

avoid it if we can.

So, that is the basis of what we’re talking about. There’s a supporting operation in Al Anbar, mainly because that’s the sanctuary

for the al-Qaeda, that’s the Sunni mainstream insurgency’s base.

And it occurs to you, when you look at this, you need a supporting

operation, not to secure the population in Al Anbar—we don’t have

enough resources for that, but to conduct aggressive offensive operations to disrupt, to interdict, and to challenge that insurgency

that’s in Al Anbar so that they cannot undermine the operation in

Baghdad. That’s the basis for it. And you need additional resources

to do that so that you can have more aggressive military operations

than what we have right now.

I need to emphasize the importance of the economic package to

the success of this operation, and also to the use of the other elements of national power. The military leaders’ frustration, when

you hear them speak about it, they—and many of you who have

visited to the region know this—they have—believe that their activities, while central in Iraq, in terms of military operation—they

realize that—but it’s disproportionate, in terms of effectiveness,

from the other elements of national power, in terms of the political,

economic, and diplomatic. And the interagency effort in Iraq has

been a failure. And that’s the truth of it. We’ve got to be honest

about it. So, there’s still a concern now as to how effective are we

going to be, at this point, with the things other than the military.

And that is a concern that many of us have. And it remains to be

seen. There is a plan, but that doesn’t mean that we’re going to

have the kind of execution that we need, because, in the past, the

execution hasn’t been what it should be.

So, in wrapping that up, the—that is essentially the military outline of what we would do in Iraq. The leaders to do that—and General Odierno, who is the operational commander, has been in command about a month—wants to do this, knows how to do this, and

is working on detailed plans to do it, assisted by the Iraqis.

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Second, General Petraeus—and I agree with General McCaffrey’s

comments about him; he’s extraordinarily well-qualified to do this,

very thoughtful, and wants to do this, and agrees with the plan,

and he can speak for himself. And I think Fox Fallon, ADM Bill

Fallon, who is, hands down, the best combatant commander we

have right now—and I applaud the administration for taking their

best guy and putting him in the most difficult neighborhood, even

though he’s working with a challenging neighborhood, himself, with

China and North Korea and radical Islam in Indonesia, et cetera—

but clearly, taking the best we have and putting them in this command, and also with the new Ambassador—I think this new team

that’s going in there is as important as the strategy is, itself. And

I truly believe they’re going to make a difference. And I know

you’re going to enjoy working with them.

I thank you for the opportunity to make some comments, and I

look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

General Hoar.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH P. HOAR, USMC (RET.), FORMER

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, DEL MAR,

CA

General HOAR. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished

members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you for the third time to discuss the war in Iraq.

This administration’s handling of the war has been characterized

by deceit, mismanagement, and a shocking failure to understand

the social and political forces that influence events in the Middle

East.

In August 2002, I cautioned this committee about the lack of war

termination planning. There was no phase-four planning, and we

saw the results of that. At the time, I used the metaphor, ‘‘What

happens when the dog catches the car?’’ An axiom to take home is,

‘‘Wars don’t end until the losers decide that they end.’’ And we are

very much in that category today.

During my last testimony, I indicated we were looking into the

abyss. Sadly, the new strategy, deeply flawed solution to our current situation, reflects the chronic inability of this administration

to get it right.

The courageous men and women of our Armed Forces have been

superb. They have met all the challenges of this difficult war. Unfortunately, they have not been well-served by the civilian leadership.

I returned from the Middle East 2 days ago; I’ve also had the opportunity, before the holidays, to speak with several senior active

duty members of our Armed Forces. In virtually every case, knowledgeable people—military, political, academic. The solution to solve

this civil war in Iraq is political, not military. There is an acknowledgment in Washington that it is, after all, political.

Having said that, the proposed solution is to send more troops.

And it won’t work. The addition of 21,000 troops is too little and

too late. This is still not enough to quell the violence, and, without

major changes in command and control of forces within Baghdad,

the current setup for shared control is unsatisfactory.

343

The centerpiece of a change of direction should be to demand

that the Iraqi Government make significant changes in policy: To

constrain Muqtada al-Sadr; to disarm militias; to purge the police;

and to move rapidly on a host of other pressing issues. If Mr.

Maliki’s government can show progress by stepping up to meet

these political changes, then the issues of more troops would merit

some consideration.

Insurgencies are resolved by attacking root causes. Today, among

the root causes is the presence of American forces. The Economist

magazine, this week, quoting a survey, indicates that 61 percent of

the Iraqis approve of attacking coalition forces.

Recently, the Secretary of State, in response to a question of this

committee, indicated there was no alternative plan to the President’s current strategy. I urge this committee to insist that an alternative plan be developed and briefed to the relevant committees

of Congress. It should include diplomatic engagement with Syria

and Iran. It should also include a significant role for the Gulf

Cooperation Council countries, plus Egypt and Jordan. These countries reluctantly supported the invasion of Iraq. If we fail, the consequences for Iraqis’ neighbors are dire.

President Mubarak said, ‘‘The invasion of Iraq was a catastrophe. Early departure will be even a greater catastrophe.’’

Hamad bin Jassim, the Foreign Minister of Qatar, said, recently,

that, ‘‘The GCC was not consulted in the surge strategy. It’s time

we took our friends in the region into our confidence.’’

The goal of the plan should be to prevent the Middle East from

falling into chaos, should Iraq become a failed state. Victory, in the

conventional sense, is no longer possible. Our goal today in Iraq

should be to achieve a paradigm shift that will give the people of

Iraq an assured degree of stability and justice.

A final thought. T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of

Arabia, was an advisor to Winston Churchill when he was the Secretary of Colonial Affairs and presiding over the British debacle in

Iraq in the 20th century. Lawrence told Lord Curzon and other

members of the British Cabinet the following, ‘‘You people don’t understand yet the hole you have put us all into.’’

Gentlemen, lady, we are in a hole. In the Marines, we say,

‘‘When you’re in a hole, stop digging.’’

I’d be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Hoar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH P. HOAR, USMC (RET.), FORMER

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, DEL MAR, CA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, I thank

you for the opportunity to appear before you for the third time to discuss the war

in Iraq.

This administration’s handling of the war has been characterized by deceit, mismanagement, and a shocking failure to understand the social and political forces

that influence events in the Middle East.

In August 2002, I cautioned this committee about the lack of ‘‘war termination’’

planning. At that time, I used the metaphor, ‘‘What happens when the dog catches

the car?’’

During my last testimony, I indicated we were looking into the abyss. Sadly, the

new strategy, a deeply flawed solution to our current situation, reflects the continuing and chronic inability of the administration to get it right. The courageous

men and women of our Armed Forces have been superb. They have met all the chalVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00353 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
344

lenges of this difficult war. Unfortunately, they have not been well served by the

civilian leadership.

I returned from the Middle East 2 days ago. I’ve also had the opportunity before

the holidays to speak with several senior active duty members of our armed forces.

In virtually every case, knowledgeable people—military, political, and academic—

state that the solution to solving this civil war in Iraq is political; not military.

There is an acknowledgement in Washington that it is, after all, political. Having

said that, the proposed solution is: Send more troops, and it won’t work .

The addition of 20,000 troops is too little too late. This is still not enough to quell

the violence and without major changes in the command and control of forces within

Baghdad, the current setup of shared control is unsatisfactory.

The centerpiece of a change of direction should be to demand that the Iraqi Government make significant changes in policy, to constrain Muqtada al-Sadr, to disarm militias, purge the police, and move rapidly on a host of other pressing issues.

If Mr. Maliki’s government can show progress by stepping up to meet these political changes, then the issue of more troops would merit serious discussion.

Insurgencies are solved by attacking root causes. Today, among root causes is the

presence of American forces. The Economist indicates that 61 percent of Iraqis approved of attacking coalition forces.

Recently the Secretary of State, in response to a question before this committee,

indicated that there was no alternative plan to the President’s current strategy. I

urge this committee to insist that an alternative plan be developed and briefed to

the relevant committees in the Congress. It should include diplomatic engagement

with Syria and Iran. It should also include a significant role for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, plus Egypt and Jordan. These countries reluctantly supported the invasion of Iraq. If we fail, the consequences for Iraq’s neighbors are dire.

President Mubarek said, ‘‘The invasion of Iraq was a catastrophe. Early departure

will be a worse catastrophe.’’ Hamad bin Jassim, the Foreign Minister of Qatar, says

the GCC was not consulted about the surge strategy. It’s time we took our friends

in the region into our confidence.

The goal of the plan should be to prevent the Middle East from falling into chaos

should Iraq become a failed state.

Victory in the conventional sense is no longer possible. Our goal today in Iraq

should be to achieve a paradigm shift that will enable political changes sufficient

to give the people of Iraq an assured degree of stability and justice.

A final thought. T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, was an advisor to Winston Churchill, then the Secretary for Colonial Affairs who presided over

the British debacle in Iraq. Lawrence told Lord Curzon and other members of the

British Cabinet the following: ‘‘You people don’t understand yet the hole you have

put us all into.’’

In the Marines, we say, ‘‘If you’re in a hole, stop digging.’’

I’d be happy to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Odom.

STATEMENT OF LTG WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA (RET.), SENIOR

FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE; FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC

General ODOM. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity. It’s a grave responsibility to testify before you today, because the issue, the Iraq war, is of monumental importance.

You have my written statement, and——

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

General ODOM [continuing]. It deals with a lot of the questions

that the—particularly, Senator Lugar raised. And I want to direct

mine more to some that you raised and try to create a strategic

framework against which you test any of these ideas that are being

advanced. And I think you can test some you’ve heard here. Some

I think you will find persuasive in that regard; and others, not so.

Four points seem to me to define the realities we have to deal

with and to make us realize that we are creating contradictions in

the way we look at this by saying things like, ‘‘It will be a catasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00354 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
345

trophe beyond all belief if we withdraw,’’ et cetera. It is a catastrophe because we’re there. But let me go further and explain why

this is the case and why unraveling this paradox involves doing

some things we might otherwise think would not bring that outcome.

The first is the contradiction in war aims and what we’re trying

to achieve politically in the region. The war aims, if you recall, that

the President stated were: Destroy WMD, overthrow Saddam’s

regime——

Senator BOXER. Could he bring the mike closer?

General ODOM [continuing]. And create a liberal democracy——

The CHAIRMAN. General, can you pull that mike closer to you——

General ODOM. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you don’t mind?

General ODOM. The three——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s great, thank you.

General ODOM. Yeah.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

General ODOM. The three war aims the President set were to

overthrow Saddam, find WMD, and create a liberal democracy, proAmerican state there. The first two—one of the first two is irrelevant, because there was no WMD. The second one has been

achieved. And the third one is creating a disaster.

Why is it creating a disaster? That takes us to the second point.

If these war aims don’t serve U.S. interests, and we’re committing

forces to pursue goals that don’t serve our interests, who’s interests

are served? The interests that are primarily being served by our invasion are, first, Iran’s. No one could have been more pleased to

see us overthrow Saddam, and no one has been more supportive of

our program to create a democracy there; in fact, the Iranians were

advising the Shiites all along, ‘‘Do what the Americans tell you’’—

that’s why the Shiites initially didn’t enter this insurgency fight—

‘‘because the Americans are putting you in power.’’ And now, that

is becoming obvious to everybody, and if you want to understand

why we’re not going very far with any kind of troop increases out

there, I think that’s sort of the crux of it.

The other party whose interest is being served is al-Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden’s list of people to destroy did not have the United

States, or at least for a long time did not have the United States

up very high. All secular Arab leaders were ahead of us. So, we

have knocked one over for him and opened up a country and given

him a training ground for cadres that did not exist before.

Now, I’ve gone back and been reading my Clausewitz on this,

and I could cite numerous passages to make the point, but instead,

let me sum up and say the following: There is no way to win a war

that’s not in your interest. And that’s what we’re trying to do. And

once you understand that, then a lot of other things become clear.

The third thing is to understand that the war is not confined to

Iraq. We, in the military, try to do order of battle, figure out how

many enemy are against us. One of the great problems in Vietnam,

one of the great problems in Central America and other places

where we had client states dealing with these insurgencies, was a

failure to look at the order of battle beyond the boundaries of those

countries.

346

We face, at a maximum, 26 million Iraqis. They’re not all against

us, but, as you heard, General Hoar said 61 percent are for attacking us, others are not happy to have us there. So, the potential

order of battle on the other side is several millions against our

156,000 or 160,000 after the surge.

We should also include a large portion of the Iranians. They may

not be directly involved, but the Iranian state can provide an enormous amount of resources and influence on this area. They’re not

in there, big time, now. They could get in. So, when you start adding Iranians to the order of battle, many other sides are also involved here, and their capacity to change the order of battle in the

region is next.

You can be sure that the so-called ‘‘moderate Arab States’’ are

not benignly sitting aside and watching this. I cannot believe that

resources are not flowing from some of them into the Sunni coffers,

and supplies are not coming their way, certainly from Syria, but

probably other ways as well.

So, when you start beginning to add up who we could be facing,

we could be facing several states—populations in states where the

regime may be on our side, but the public is not—of scores of millions against us. That’s just not a good situation to be in.

Now, let me move to my third point. My third point is that the

United States does need to have other countries involved in solving

this. That’s the only way you’ll change the order of battle significantly in our favor. I don’t think we will have very effective cooperation from the states around Iraq until we withdraw. To me,

that is a precondition to getting any kind of cooperation. Why

should they—why should Iran cooperate with us while we’re suffering so? Why should some of these other people cooperate with

us while we’re suffering so? I mean, they’re wallowing in Schadenfreude over this. But when we start pulling out, their view of the

world will experience a polar shift. Iran doesn’t want a highly unstable Iraq, nor do most other countries want an unstable Iraq. If

we provided a forum, after we left, I have a feeling that diplomats

from these countries might show up if you invited them. None of

them could hold a conference and get the others to participate.

They may not like us, but they might find us, pragmatically, a useful host.

I would say this is also true in Europe. The Europeans have been

delighted to see us suffer in Iraq. Not all of them, but some. Why

should they change? They’ve been proven right. We got ourselves

into a hole they warned us not to get into.

I think if we get out, they will soon realize that they are going

to suffer the aftermath of this fiasco earlier and probably even

more severely than we do. Therefore, a withdrawal is not the road

to defeat; it’s the precondition for reframing our strategy for interests that are truly ours—for a campaign that is in our interest.

And I want to say that we can overcome the political, strategic, and

military, and diplomatic paralysis by beginning to withdraw. As

long as we’re in, we don’t have much room to maneuver.

Now, let me suggest a new strategy. And it’s not a new one; it’s

a return to an old one. I was the planner in the Carter administration for the so-called Persian Gulf security framework, and I had

to look at that region and think about what it meant when the

347

Shah fell. After the Shah’s collapse we began to try to figure out

what to do next. Well, as I looked back, I could see that, clearly,

since the 1950s, we had, if not an explicit, at least an implicit

American strategy of keeping a foot in three camps: The Arab

camp, the Israeli camp, and the Persian/Iranian camp. As long as

we had a foot in all three camps, the military requirements for

maintaining a balance in the region were not high. When we lost

our footing in the Iranian camp, they became very high, and that’s

why the Persian Gulf’s security framework’s key component was

the Central Command. There were many other aspects to this.

President Carter understood clearly that we needed it. He also understood something else: That need for greater military power

should be temporary, because it was costing us more to stabilize by

having Iran as an opponent. We saw that reestablishing some sort

of cooperative relationship with Iran was very much in our interest. And there were also many objective interests for Iran to restore

a relationship. Every administration since then, until this one, I

think, has realized this fact. The Reagan administration made

some very clumsy and feckless efforts to engage with Iran, but the

strategic aim was right, even if the operational tactics and diplomacy were wrong.

I think the first Bush administration didn’t pay a lot of attention

to it until the gulf war, and then they knew they had to do something about it then. The Clinton administration also tried. Maybe

not enough. But when the present administration found itself fighting the Taliban, it found Iran highly cooperative.

So, I could add additional objective reasons why Iran should

come around to cooperate with us.

There’s another factor that argues for having Iran back in the

game on our side: It would remove Russia’s negative influence. Iran

is being used by Russia now in a most unnatural alliance. It’s very

unnatural for Russians and Iranians to ally. There’s no precedent

for that in their history, and I think the Iranians pay a large price

for that. It gives the Russians a spoiling lever in the region.

So, a new strategy has to have as its aim not winning a victory

in Iraq, per se, but reachieving regional stability. And any strategy

that doesn’t set regional stability as its goal and then begin to allocate diplomatic efforts and military efforts to reachieve that strikes

me as seriously wanting. The problem with the administration’s

strategy in Iraq is that the means they have used to pursue regional stability has undercut regional stability. Both spreading democracy and the techniques of nonproliferation have accelerated

proliferation and added to instability. Therefore, I don’t think you

can get yourself out of that muddle militarily, diplomatically, any

other ways, by parsing these things into particular military, political, economic components. You have to come back to the tough reality and understand that withdrawal from Iraq now on some responsible phased schedule, but a serious and irreversible schedule,

is the only thing that will change the polarity of the situation to

give this President an opportunity to design a strategy that has

some prospect of victory.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT LTG WILLIAM E. ODOM, USA (RET.), SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE; FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC

Good afternoon, Senator Biden and members of the committee. It is a grave responsibility to testify before you today because the issue, the war in Iraq, is of such

monumental importance.

You have asked me to address primarily the military aspects of the war. Although

I shall comply, I must emphasize that it makes no sense to separate them from the

political aspects. Military actions are merely the most extreme form of politics. If

politics is the business of deciding ‘‘who gets what, when, how,’’ as Boss Tweed of

Tammany Hall in New York City once said, then the military aspects of war are

the most extreme form of politics. The war in Iraq will answer that question there.

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

The role that U.S. military forces can play in that conflict is seriously limited by

all the political decisions the U.S. Government has already taken. The most fundamental decision was setting, as its larger strategic purpose, the stabilization of the

region by building a democracy in Iraq and encouraging its spread. This, of course,

was to risk destabilizing the region by starting a war.

Military operations must be judged by whether and how they contribute to accomplishing war aims. No clear view is possible of where we are today and where we

are headed without constant focus on war aims and how they affect U.S. interests.

The interaction of interests, war aims, and military operations defines the strategic

context in which we find ourselves. We cannot have the slightest understanding of

the likely consequences of proposed changes in our war policy without relating them

to the strategic context. Here are the four major realities that define that context:

1. Confusion about war aims and U.S. interests. The President stated three war

aims clearly and repeatedly:

• The destruction of Iraqi WMD;

• The overthrow of Saddam Hussein;

• The creation of a liberal democratic Iraq.

The first war aim is moot because Iraq had no WMD. The second was achieved

by late spring 2003. Today people are waking up to what was obvious before the

war—the third aim has no real prospects of being achieved even in 10 or 20 years,

much less in the short time anticipated by the war planners. Implicit in that aim

was the belief that a pro-American post-Saddam regime could be established. This

too, it should now be clear, is mostly unlikely. Finally, is it in the U.S. interest to

have launched a war in pursuit of any of these aims? And is it in the U.S. interest

to continue pursuing the third? Or is it time to redefine our aims? And, concomitantly, to redefine what constitutes victory?

2. The war has served primarily the interests of Iran and al-Qaeda, not American

interests.

We cannot reverse this outcome by more use of military force in Iraq. To try to

do so would require siding with Sunni leaders and the Baathist insurgents against

pro-Iranian Shiite groups. The Baathist insurgents constitute the forces most

strongly opposed to Iraqi cooperation with Iran. At the same time, our democratization policy has installed Shiite majorities and pro-Iranians groups in power in Baghdad, especially in the Ministries of Interior and Defense. Moreover, our counterinsurgency operations are, as unintended (but easily foreseeable) consequences;

first, greater Shiite openness to Iranian influence and, second, al-Qaeda’s entry into

Iraq and rooting itself in some elements of Iraqi society.

3. On the international level, the war has effectively paralyzed the United States

militarily and strategically, denying it any prospect of revising its strategy toward

an attainable goal.

As long as U.S. forces remained engaged in Iraq, not only will the military costs

go up, but also the incentives will decline for other states to cooperate with Washington to find a constructive outcome. This includes not only countries contiguous

to Iraq but also Russia and key American allies in Europe. In their view, we deserve

the pain we are suffering for our arrogance and unilateralism.

4. Overthrowing the Iraqi regime in 2003 insured that the, country would fragment into at least three groups: Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. In other words, the invasion made it inevitable that a civil war would be required to create a new central

government able to control all of Iraq. Yet a civil war does not insure it. No faction

may win the struggle. A lengthy stalemate, or a permanent breakup of the country

is possible. The invasion also insured that outside countries and groups would beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00358 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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come involved. Al-Qaeda and Iran are the most conspicuous participants so far, Turkey and Syria less so. If some of the wealthy oil-producing countries on the Arabian

Peninsula are not already involved, they are most likely to support with resources,

any force in Iraq that opposes Iranian influence.

Many critics argue that, had the invasion been done ‘‘right,’’ such as sending in

much larger forces for reestablishing security and government services, the war

would have been a success. This argument is not convincing. Such actions might

have delayed a civil war but could not have prevented it. Therefore, any military

programs or operations having the aim of trying to reverse this reality, insisting

that we can now ‘‘do it right,’’ need to be treated with the deepest of suspicion. That

includes the proposal to sponsor the breakup by creating three successor states. To

do so would be to preside over the massive ethnic cleansing operations required for

the successor states to be reasonably stable. Ethnic cleansing is happening in spite

of the U.S. military in Iraq, but I see no political or moral advantage for the United

States to become its advocate. We are already being blamed as its facilitator.

Let me not turn to key aspects of the President’s revised approach to the war as

well as several other proposals.

In addition to the President, a number of people and groups have supported increased U.S. force levels. As GEN Colin Powell has said, before we consider sending

additional U.S. troops, we must examine what missions they will have. I would add

that we ask precisely what those troops must do to reverse any of these four present

realities created by the invasion. I cannot conceive of any achievable missions they

could be given to cause a reversal.

Just for purposes of analysis, let us suppose we had unlimited numbers of U.S.

troops to deploy in Iraq. Would that change my assessment? In principle, if 2 or 3

million troops were deployed there with the latitude to annihilate all resistance

without much attention to collateral civilian casualties and human rights, order

might well be temporarily reestablished under a reign of U.S. terror. The problem

we would then face is that we would be opposed not only by 26 million Iraqis but

also by millions of Arabs and Iranians surrounding Iraq; peoples angered by our

treatment of Muslims and Arabs. These outsiders are already involved to some degree in the internal war in Iraq, and any increase of U.S. forces is likely to be exceeded by additional outside support for insurgents.

I never cease to be amazed at our military commanders’ apparent belief that the

‘‘order of battle’’ of the opposition forces they face are limited to Iraq. I say ‘‘apparent’’ because those commanders may be constrained by the administration’s policies

from correcting this mistaken view. Once the invasion began, Muslims in general

and Arabs in particular could be expected to take sides against the United States.

In other words, we went to war not just against the Iraqi forces and insurgent

groups but also against a large part of the Arab world, scores and scores of millions.

Most Arab governments, of course, are neutral or somewhat supportive, but their

publics in growing numbers are against us.

It is a strategic error of monumental proportions to view the war as confined to

Iraq. Yet this is the implicit assumption on which the President’s new strategy is

based. We have turned it into two wars that vastly exceed the borders of Iraq. First,

there is the war against the U.S. occupation that draws both sympathy and material

support from other Arab countries. Second, there is the Shiite-Sunni war, a sectarian conflict, heretofore, sublimated within the Arab world but that now has

opened the door to Iranian influence in Iraq. In turn, it foreordains an expanding

Iranian-Arab regional conflict.

Any military proposals today that do not account for both larger wars, as well as

the Iranian threat to the Arab States on the Persian Gulf, must be judged wholly

inadequate if not counterproductive. Let me now turn to some specific proposals,

those advocated by independent voices and the Iraq Study Group as well as the administration.

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

Standing up Iraqi security forces to replace U.S. forces. Training the Iraqi military and police force has been proposed repeatedly as a way to bring stability to

Iraq and allow U.S. forces to withdraw. Recently new variants, such as embedding

U.S. troops within Iraqi units, are offered. The Iraq Study Group made much of this

technique.

I know of no historical precedent to suggest that any of them will succeed. The

problem is not the competency of Iraqi forces. It is political consolidation and gaining the troops’ loyalties to the government and their commanders as opposed to

their loyalties to sectarian leaders, clans, families, and relatives. For what political

authority are Iraqi soldiers and police willing to risk their lives? To the American

350

command? What if American forces depart? Won’t they be called traitors for supporting the invaders and occupiers? Will they trust in a Shiite-dominated government and Ministry of Interior, which is engaged in assassinations of Sunnis? Sunni

Arabs and Kurds would be foolish to do so, although financial desperation has driven many to risk it. What about to the leaders of independent militias? Here, soldiers

can find strong reasons for loyal service: To defend their fellow sectarians, families,

and relatives. And that is why the government cannot disband them. It has insufficient loyal troops to do so.

As a military planner working on the pacification programs in 1970–71 in Vietnam, I had the chance to judge the results of training both regular South Vietnamese forces and so-called ‘‘regional’’ and ‘‘popular’’ forces. Some were technically

proficient, but that did not ensure that they would always fight for the government

in Saigon. Nor were they always loyal to their commanders. And they occasionally

fought each other when bribed by Viet Cong agents to do so. The ‘‘popular forces’’

at the village level often failed to protect their villages. The reasons varied but in

several cases it was the result of how their salaries were funded. Local tax money

was not the source of their pay; rather it was U.S.-supplied funds. Thus these

troops, as well as ‘‘regional forces,’’ had little sense of obligation to protect villagers

in their areas of responsibility. For anyone who doubts that the Vietnam case is instructive for understanding the Iraqi case, recommend Ahmed S. Hashim’s recent

book, ‘‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.’’ A fluent Arab linguist and a Reserve U.S. Army colonel, who has served a year in Iraq and visited it several other

times, Hashim offers a textured study that struck me again and again as a rerun

of an old movie, especially where it concerned U.S. training of Iraqi forces.

U.S. military assistance training in El Salvador is often cited as a successful case.

In fact, this effort amounted to letting the old elites, who used death squads to impose order, come back to power in different guises. And death squads are again active there. The real cause of the defeat of the Salvadoran insurgency was

Gorbachev’s decision to cut off supplies to it, as he promised President George H.

Bush at the Malta summit meeting. Thus denied their resource base, and having

failed to create a self-supporting tax regime in the countryside as the Viet Cong did

in Vietnam, they could not survive for long. Does the administration’s new plan for

Iraq promise to eliminate all outside support to the warring factions? Is it even remotely possible? Hardly.

The oft-cited British success in Malaysia is only superficially relevant to the Iraq

case. British officials actually ruled the country. Thus they had decades of firsthand

knowledge of the local politics. They made such a mess of it, however, that an insurgency emerged in opposition. A new military commander and a cleanup of the colonial administration provided political consolidation and the isolation of the Communist insurgents, mostly members of an ethnic minority group. This pattern would

be impossible to duplicate in Iraq.

An infusion of new funds for reconstruction. A shortage of funds has not been the

cause of failed reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Administrative capacity to use funds

effectively was and remains the primary obstacle. Even support programs carried

out by American contractors for U.S. forces have yielded mixed results. Insurgent

attacks on the projects have provoked transfers of construction funds to security

measures, which have also failed.

A weak or nonexistent government administrative capacity allows most of the

money to be squandered. Putting another billion or so dollars into public works in

Iraq today—before a government is in place with an effective administrative capacity to penetrate to the neighborhood and village level—is like trying to build a roof

on a house before its walls have been erected. Moreover, a large part of that money

will find its way into the hands of insurgents and sectarian militias. That is exactly

what happened in Vietnam, and it has been happening in Iraq.

New and innovative counterinsurgency tactics. The cottage industry of counterinsurgency tactics is old and deceptive. When the U.S. military has been periodically

tasked to reinvent them—the last great surge in that industry was at the JFK

School in Fort Bragg in the 1960s—it has no choice but to pretend that

counterinsurgency tactics can succeed where no political consolidation in the government has yet been achieved. New counterinsurgency tactics cannot save Iraq today

because they are designed without account for the essence of any ‘‘internal war,’’

whether an insurgency or a civil war.

Such wars are about ‘‘who will rule,’’ and who will rule depends on ‘‘who can tax’’

and build an effective state apparatus down to the village level.

The taxation issue is not even on the agenda of U.S. programs for Iraq. Nor was

it a central focus in Vietnam, El Salvador, the Philippines, and most other cases

of U.S.-backed governments embroiled in internal wars. Where U.S. funding has

been amply provided to those governments, the recipient regime has treated those

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moneys as its tax base while failing to create an indigenous tax base. In my own

study of three counterinsurgency cases, and from my experience in Vietnam, I discovered that the regimes that received the least U.S. direct fiscal support had the

most success against the insurgents. Providing funding and forces to give an embattled regime more ‘‘time’’ to gain adequate strength is like asking a drunk to drink

more whiskey in order to sober up.

Saddam’s regime lived mostly on revenues from oil exports. Thus it never had to

create an effective apparatus to collect direct taxes. Were U.S. forces and counterinsurgency efforts to succeed in imposing order for a time, the issue of who will control the oil in Iraq would become the focus of conflict for competing factions. The

time would not be spent creating the administrative capacity to keep order and to

collect sufficient taxes to administer the country. At best, the war over who will

eventually rule the country would only be postponed.

This is the crux of the dilemma facing all such internal wars. I make this assertion not only based on my own study but also in light of considerable literature that

demonstrates that the single best index of the strength of any state is its ability

to collect direct taxes, not export-import tax or indirect taxes. The latter two are

relatively easy to collect by comparison, requiring much weaker state institutions.

The Iraq Study Group. The report of this group should not be taken as offering

a new or promising strategy for dealing with Iraq. Its virtue lies in its candid assessment of the realities in Iraq. Its great service has been to undercut the misleading assessments, claims, and judgment by the administration. It allows the several skeptical Republican Members of the Congress to speak out more candidly on

the war, and it makes it less easy for those Democrats who were, heretofore, supporters of the administration’s war to refuse to reconsider.

If one reads the ISG report in light of the four points in the strategic overview

above, one sees the key weakness of its proposals. It does not concede that the war,

as it was conceived and continues to be fought, is not ‘‘winnable.’’ It rejects the rapid

withdrawal of U.S. forces as unacceptable. No doubt a withdrawal will leave a terrible aftermath in Iraq, but we cannot avoid that. We can only make it worse by

waiting until we are forced to withdraw. In the meantime, we prevent ourselves

from escaping the paralysis imposed on us by the war, unable to redefine our war

aims, which have served Iranian and al-Qaeda interests instead of our own.

I do not criticize the report for this failure. As constructed, the group could not

advance a fundamental revision of our strategy. Its Republican and Democrat members could not be said to represent all members of their own parties. Thus the most

it could do was to make it politically easier for the administration to begin a fundamental revision of its strategy instead of offering a list of tactical changes for the

same old war aim of creating a liberal democracy with a pro-American orientation

in Iraq.

WHAT WOULD A REVISED STRATEGY LOOK LIKE?

How can the United States recover from this strategic blunder? It cannot as long

as it fails to revise its war aims. Wise leaders in war have many times admitted

that their war aims are misguided and then revised them to deal with realities beyond their control. Such leaders make tactical withdrawals, regroup, and revise

their aims, and design new strategies to pursue them. Those who cannot make such

adjustments eventually face defeat.

What war aim today is genuinely in the U.S. interest and offers realistic prospects

of success? And not just in Iraq but in the larger region?

Since the 1950s, the U.S. aim in this region has been ‘‘regional stability’’ above

all others. The strategy for achieving this aim of every administration until the

present one has been maintaining a regional balance of power among three regional

forces—Arabs, Israelis, and Iranians. The Arab-Persian conflict is older than the

Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States kept a diplomatic foothold in all three

camps until the fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran. Losing its footing in Tehran, it

began under President Carter’s leadership to compensate by building what he called

the Persian Gulf Security Framework. The U.S. Central Command with enhanced

military power was born as one of the main means for this purpose, but the longterm goal was a rapprochement. Until that time, the military costs for maintaining

the regional power balance would be much higher.

The Reagan administration, although it condemned Carter’s Persian Gulf Security

Framework, the so-called ‘‘Carter Doctrine,’’ continued Carter’s policies, even to the

point of supporting Iraq when Iran was close to overrunning it. Some of its efforts

to improve relations with Iran were feckless and counterproductive, but it maintained the proper strategic aim—regional stability.

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The Bush administration has broken with this strategy by invading Iraq and also

by threatening the existence of the regime in Iran. It presumed that establishing

a liberal democracy in Iraq would lead to regional stability. In fact, the policy of

spreading democracy by forces of arms has become the main source of regional instability.

This not only postponed any near-term chance of better relations with Iran but

also has moved the United States closer to losing its footing in the Arab camp as

well. That, of course, increases greatly the threats to Israel’s security, the very thing

it was supposed to improve, not to mention that it makes the military costs rise dramatically, exceeding what we can prudently bear, especially without the support of

our European allies and others.

Several critics of the administration show an appreciation of the requirement to

regain our allies’ and others’ support, but they do not recognize that withdrawal of

U.S. forces from Iraq is the sine qua non for achieving their cooperation. It will be

forthcoming once that withdrawal begins and looks irreversible. They will then realize that they can no longer sit on the sidelines. The aftermath will be worse for

them than for the United States, and they know that without U.S. participation and

leadership, they alone cannot restore regional stability. Until we understand this

critical point, we cannot design a strategy that can achieve what we can legitimately

call a victory.

Any new strategy that does realistically promise to achieve regional stability at

a cost we can prudently bear, and does not regain the confidence and support of

our allies, is doomed to failure. To date, I have seen no awareness that any political

leader in this country has gone beyond tactical proposals to offer a different strategic approach to limiting the damage in a war that is turning out to be the greatest

strategic disaster in our history.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

Impressive testimonies. Thank you very, very much.

We’ll do 8-minute rounds, if that’s OK. And if our colleagues

have an opportunity to stay, maybe we can have a second round.

I know everyone’s not here, but—is that all right with you, Mr.

Chairman?

What I’ve tried to do with these talented panels that we’ve had

is, as you’ve spoken, and as I’ve read your statements, I’ve tried to

discern where there are points of agreement and points of departure. So, we can sort of start from there. At least it helps my mind

order things a little better.

There’s universal judgment here that the mission—the strategy

and the mission—and they’re separable—have, thus far, been a

failure, that there’s a need for a new strategy and a more clearly

defined mission for the region. You all say the region is important,

so you can’t just view Iraq as a stand-alone proposition. And, second, that the mission inside Iraq has to be more clearly defined.

And the third thing you all agree on, I think—correct me if I’m

wrong—is, the allies are leaving; this is a wholly owned American

subsidiary here. I mean, there’s—there really isn’t anybody else in

the deal, as a practical matter, and no one’s coming. If anything,

people are going, correct?

Another thing that you all seem to agree on is that somewhere

between ‘‘if we surge, we really have to do it and stick around,’’ and

‘‘we shouldn’t even be surging, we should be using a different

method, announcing or, in fact, beginning to withdraw’’—we need

a real plan, from General Odom’s standpoint, to begin to shift the

burden more clearly, or to enable Iraqi forces, as General McCaffrey says. General, I’ve been there seven times, and, talking to our

men and women on the ground, they say they wouldn’t do what we

ask the Iraqis to do. They wouldn’t get in a Toyota pickup truck

and—you know, and arrive at such-and-such a place or go to suchand-such a deal.

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General Odom, your strategic vision here is, I think, not only fascinating, but I think I agree with it. The irony of all ironies is, the

underlying rationale, not just for Iraq, but for the region, has been

a mistake. The way we were going to have our interests solidified

and sustained and increased was to deal with the word you didn’t

use, ‘‘regime change.’’ The way to deal with the Iranian situation,

we no longer have a foot in the Persian camp, so get rid of the

foot—get rid of the present Persian camp.

General ODOM. I would even go so far as to say—I’d pay the price

of saying I’m not going to oppose, all that strongly, the Iranian nuclear weapons program if Iran becomes our ally.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. And——

General ODOM. I’d pay that price, I would buy that deal, it’s so

important.

The CHAIRMAN. So that—so, let me ask some specific questions

that we get asked a lot—I get asked a lot.

General Keane, I’ve read what you’ve written—in the past, as

well. This is not—I’m not going to be Tim Russert and flip up the

chart and say, ‘‘This is what you said last time.’’ But the essence

of what you said here today, if I read your testimony correctly, is

that you do think that pacification of the population, which has not

been a mission—by the way, I agreed. The irony is, 2 years ago in

this committee, and 2 years ago on the ground with General

Chiarelli and General Casey and General Abizaid—and, before

that, with their predecessors, and O’Donovan, a marine—my argument was: Why aren’t we protecting the populations? Because I’d

get in a Humvee, and we’d fly through a neighborhood at 35 miles

an hour, and the Iraqis looked at us as a distraction or as a problem, not as if anyone who’s flying through the neighborhood is

going to have a cop on the corner to protect them. It wasn’t going

to enable their kid to go, as I used to say, from their home to the

equivalent of the corner store to bring back the milk. But General,

I think that we have passed that point.

And so, my question for you, General Keane, is that we’re told,

surging 21,000 troops, 17,000 of which would go into Baghdad into

those 23 neighborhoods—although they’re saying they’re limited to

the 23 neighborhoods; I know politically, they’re saying that—and

they’re saying that it’ll be Iraqi-led. The Secretary of State was

very precise about, ‘‘There’s not going to be any American knocking

on the door; it’s going to be an Iraqi, and we’re going to be in a

background situation. And this is a short duration.’’

Can a surge plan work with those parameters—Iraqis in the

lead—if that’s true—Iraqis in the lead, a short duration? As one of

you said, 5 months to ramp it up to that peak of an additional

17,000, and then start to draw it down in November. Is that workable, or should we tell the American people that, from your perspective, the only way it can work is if we make a significant commitment here for a significant amount of time, meaning at least

the next year or so?

General KEANE. No. No; that’s not workable. The—when you

analyze this, it—it’ll take you 3 to 4 months to clear the neighborhoods, to get them—to bring the level of violence down. And then

you bring in a protect force that will stay in those neighborhoods,

both Iraqi and United States. And then, that’ll take months, as

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well, to be able to change the attitude of those people in there to—

where their quality-of-life experience starts to change rather dramatically and they’re getting back to some sense of normalcy. So,

you’re—now you’re into the fall and winter of the year, in Baghdad

alone——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

General KEANE [continuing]. To be able to do this. Now, will

there be some progress where people will see it, and—some nearterm progress? I would think yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But that only——

General KEANE. But——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Works if——

General KEANE. But——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If they stay, if you all stay.

General KEANE. Only if you stay. And then——

The CHAIRMAN. You’ve got to stay around.

General KEANE [continuing]. The economic packages have to

come in. And Baghdad is a beginning, not an end.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Well——

General KEANE. So, you have to go to Al Anbar and secure that

population. And I think you’re doing that in 2008.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Well, I think my colleagues are tired of

hearing me say this, but no foreign policy can be sustained without

the informed consent of the American people. You just can’t sustain

it. And so, if we’re going to do this thing, this surge, we should just

tell the American people what is the only possibility of it working.

In my humble opinion, in listening to you and some of your colleagues in and out of uniform, you’ve got to do more of it if you’re

going to do it. If it has any shot, you’ve got do more of it, and

you’ve got to do it for a longer period of time. You’ve got to sustain

it, and you’ve got to expand it beyond Baghdad. I——

General ODOM. I don’t agree.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Happen to be in your——

General ODOM. I don’t——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Camp, General Odom. I think the

only way you get any movement is, you’ve got to be moving the

other direction to change the dynamic here. But——

General ODOM. Well, I’m a dissenter on increasing anything now.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; I understand that. All I’m——

General ODOM. OK. I just——

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; what I’m——

General ODOM [continuing]. You said I had agreed to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that——

General ODOM. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Those whom I’ve spoken to who say increase,

say: If you’re going to increase, you better have a plan to increase

that has multiple pieces to it. One, that it is sustainable for an extended period of time, because you’ve got to go, clear, hold, maintain, build up, and so on, and that takes time. And two, you’re then

going to have to move from those 23 neighborhoods to Anbar province, and God only knows what we may or may not have to do relative to Sadr City, depending on how they accept or don’t accept

this as confirmation that we’re good guys, and we’re not going to

hurt them, and we’re helping their cause.

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The other side of the equation is whether or not you drawdown.

And the perils of drawing down create this catastrophe where we

have a regional war that spreads across the borders as a consequence.

General McCaffrey, why do you think that—well, let me just say

it, and then I’ll ask you to respond. In my trips to Iraq—I haven’t

been there since the Fourth of July—speaking off the record, because a lot of you guys in uniform at the time are in a difficult spot

with a guy like me and others coming over there. You have a mission stated by the Pentagon. You may or may not agree with it, so

you’re in a tough spot. When I ask, General, several folks with

more than one star on their shoulder, why we weren’t equipping

the Iraqis more, they gave me the answer that we may just be

equipping death squads and equipping competing factions of the

civil war, and we may come to regret it. Do you think that’s the

reason we haven’t equipped? Or do think there’s another reason, or

other reasons?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think, first of all, it’s a silly response, because it implies, ‘‘I believe we’re going to lose, and, therefore, I won’t start a program that’s a prerequisite to success, because I don’t think it’s going to work,’’ which, again, would argue

for beginning withdrawal and, ‘‘Let’s give up on this thing.’’

I’m not sure that equipping the Iraqi Army is going to work, providing 3,000 to 5,000 light-armored vehicles and 150 U.S. helicopters and decent small arms, but I do know that we’re not going

to pull the 1st Cavalry Division out of Baghdad until there’s an

Iraqi Army that can go—they took 12,000 killed last year, for God’s

sakes. We’re asking them to take on a mission for which they are

inadequately resourced.

I think the—you know, the second argument that you’ve—that

I’ve heard is, ‘‘Come on, these are simple people, they don’t understand how to do U.S. small arms,’’ which is ridiculous. These people

had the fourth largest air force on the face of the Earth. They’re

flying MIG–29 fighter aircraft. They’re pretty clever people. Of

course they can operate this equipment.

I think there was another argument that said, ‘‘You’d be—you

don’t understand the nature of the struggle. It’s really—they’re not

here to threaten the Syrians and the Iranians, they’re here to conduct counterinsurgency.’’ But, again, you know, the tools that we’re

using—we’re pretty good at this, actually. You know, counterinsurgency operations in urban areas up in Tal Afar, where the—this

very bright colonel, we did a classic job, but we did it trying to minimize U.S. casualties.

And then, the final argument, that I actually think is the major

argument—and I don’t pretend to be an economist, but if we’ve got

giant United States internal domestic budget problems with decreasing taxes and increasing expenses, and you’re shooting up $8

billion a month in Iraq and a billion or more in Afghanistan, when

I—the first time I came back, 3 years ago, and argued for equipping the Iraqis, a Wall Street Journal reporter—in fact, I came

down to see you, sir, if you——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I remember.

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General MCCAFFREY. He added up all the numbers——

The CHAIRMAN. Got me in trouble. I argued for equipping them,

too.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, they added up all——

The CHAIRMAN. I happen to think we should.

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. The numbers, and they said, ‘‘That’s silly. It’s something like $5 billion to do what he’s suggesting.’’ But the illogic of shooting $8 billion a month at them and

not being capable of equipping people so you could get out just escapes me.

So, I think the generals who are over there are in a box, and if

you ask them the question, ‘‘Have you got enough equipment?’’

they’ll say yes. The real question is, to the distinguished OMB Director Rob Portman, ‘‘Why haven’t we paid for this program, and

why hasn’t the Congress authorized it?’’

The CHAIRMAN. Well, my time is up. Matter of fact, it’s the first

time I’ve gone over here. I apologize. I agree with you about

Petraeus and Crocker. I spent 5 days with Crocker in that—I think

3 or 5 days after which he opened up the Afghanistan Embassy

that had been closed in Kabul. He is really a serious, serious guy,

and I don’t know anybody better than Petraeus. That’s the only

thing that gives me pause about this, that he supports it. But I still

don’t get it.

I yield to Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As I’ve listened to you, I’m not certain that any of the four of

you—and you can correct me if I’m wrong—believes that the socalled ‘‘benchmarks’’ that are being suggested by our new policy

can be met; certainly not within a period of a year, or maybe 2

years. By the ‘‘benchmarks,’’ I mean coming to resolution on the oil

law, including revenue distribution and the manner in which new

fields will be developed; the autonomy and federalism issues—that

is, which provinces are going to join together to form regional governments, and, therefore, what will the role of the central government be, vis-a-vis these autonomous regions. And perhaps a third

point, and that is, can there be recognition, of the roles and responsibilities of national army, that would be maintained by the central

governmenttoward these autonomous regions? And, of course the

others: De-Baathification and amnesty agreements, constitutional

amending process and a subsequent referendum, the capabilities of

the Iraqi security forces, and what have you.

Now, as we have heard rhetoric with regard to our plan, the

thought is that Maliki and/or the government that he heads, must

meet certain benchmarks, and it must do so fairly promptly, the

implication being that, if the benchmarks are not met, that we will

withdraw.

Now, maybe so, maybe not. The question, really, I have of you

is: Politically, is it conceivable that President Maliki and his government could meet any of these benchmarks within a year or two?

And, second, is it conceivable, picking up General Keane’s point,

that there is a citizenry that, in the event that we get rid of the

malefactors for a period of time, and hold the territory, that citizens will, in fact, discourage the insurgents, discourage people from

arming themselves? From what I’m listening to from the others, I

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would gather that you feel there are inclined to be many people

who are going to continue to arm themselves, because they see this

as a terminal problem, that either somebody prevails or does not,

and that there is not a good government ethic, for the moment, in

trying to pull together, to somehow back a central government or

Maliki or somebody else. If that is the case, then, perpetually people will be arming themselves and will be shooting at each other.

Now, in—whether it’s Baghdad or wherever else they try to resolve

their situations.

The third question I want to ask, and then I’ll retire for your responses, is: In the event that we get into a withdrawal strategy,

should the withdrawal be complete or should we, in fact, retain

some forces in Iraq, as opposed to the general region, on the basis

that we would still like to try to help the training or equipping of

an Iraqi Army and some forces for the future, and/or that we offer

a sense of stability to the surrounding countries that they would

not need to intervene immediately, whoever they may be and for

whatever purposes, because we are still there? Furthermore, our

presence, even diminished in terms of numbers, allows an opportunity, if not to engage the neighborhood in diplomacy, at least to

have a better basis on which to conduct diplomacy, vis-a-vis Iraq

or the Middle East. Or should the withdrawal be complete—staged,

orderly, but out of there altogether? In essence, troops and/or ships

of the fleet or air units or what have you in the region, but not in

Iraq?

Do any of you want to try on any of those for size? Yes, General

McCaffrey.

General MCCAFFREY. Senator Lugar, the last point, withdrawal,

was one of the things that really got me energized out of that

Baker-Hamilton report. It scared me half to death. The notion

that—we’ve got a domestic political problem. It’s hard to—going to

be difficult to ask either political party to explain, in 2008, what

they did about this mess. So, we will pull out our combat forces,

except for some unspecified over-the-horizon, modest, rescue cavalry presence, we’ll put 30,000, 40,000, 50,000 Americans scattered

about Iraq, we’ll embed them in squad-sized units at Iraqi company

level, not speaking Arabic, not having a support structure, and,

therefore, our casualties, our political vulnerability will disappear,

and we’ll be out of there. That, it seems to me, is a recipe for disaster on the order of what happened in Mogadishu, except, instead

of 150 casualties, it’ll be 5,000 to 15,000. So, I have urged the

President, personally, and others, that, as you drawdown—I arbitrarily picked a floor—you’ve got 15 brigades there now, you think

you’re going up to 20—that our lowest floor should be 7 brigades

in Iraq—a couple of Army divisions and a Marine regiment. If you

decide to go below that level—you can pull them out of the urban

areas and get them in concentrations—get out of Iraq—I think it

will—we are inviting a major disaster, you know, and I feel very

strongly about it.

So, again, the withdrawal, in the short run, I think, precipitous

withdrawal, would probably be a terrible blow to our interests in

the region.

358

Senator LUGAR. Well, just following up that, if the benchmarks

are not met—if you can’t meet these markers, then, is the President’s logic that we withdraw, as you understand his plan?

General MCCAFFREY. I don’t think there’s—we have—the current

administration, I don’t think, has any intention of withdrawing

from Iraq. They’re going to——

Senator LUGAR. Benchmarks or not.

General MCCAFFREY. They’re going to try and muscle this thing

out in the next 24 months with an urban counterinsurgency plan

that I personally believe, with all due respect, is a fool’s errand. So,

I’m looking for the economic component, the peace negotiation component, and the army—the Iraqi, component, as a way to cover our

withdrawal from Iraq.

Senator HAGEL. Senator Lugar, may I intervene to ask you a

question, and our panel? Because I don’t think you answered the

question, General. We’re threatening consequences? What are the

consequences?

General MCCAFFREY. There are none.

Senator HAGEL. No, what——

General MCCAFFREY. Nor are there any——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. What are the consequences, in your

opinion? I know he has not, I suspect, asked you that, but what

Senator Lugar’s asking, then, he’s—this rhetoric, ‘‘You either do

this, or else.’’ We heard Secretary Rice say this. So, in your opinion,

what are those consequences? Do we pull out?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, if you don’t have an economic incentive, you can’t withdraw it. If you’re not equipping their military

forces, you can’t stop equipping them. If there’s no peace dialog to

be enforced or encouraged with our good offices, you’re left with 15

Army and Marine combat teams fighting among 27 million angry

Arabs. So, I personally think, in the short run, the current strategy

is nonsensical.

Senator LUGAR. General Hoar.

General HOAR. Yes, sir. I’d like to, first of all, say that I agree

with General McCaffrey. But there is a larger issue, and that’s the

regional issue. The countries in that region that have supported us

are scared to death of the possibility of a failed state that is aligned

politically with Iran. And while Bill Odom, I think, makes some

very good points, there may be an interim step in there, where you

have an Iraqi Government that is responsive to the Iranian Government. And so, we must stay in the region. The possibilities of

destabilizing Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, are quite large——

Senator LUGAR. By ‘‘region,’’ you don’t necessarily mean Iraq,

right?

General HOAR. That’s right. This is quite different from Iraq.

Senator LUGAR. We might still get out of Iraq, but stay in the

region.

General HOAR. My crystal ball would say that in 2008, the Presidential candidates are all going to favor getting out.

Senator LUGAR. General Odom.

General ODOM. Yeah. The benchmark business, I think, you’ve

pretty well unraveled. It’s a charge or a demand that you can’t implement. And it reminds me of Vietnam. When you start these

metrics, what it tells you is, you don’t have the indigenous political

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apparatus to run the country, and you’re trying to run it by ventriloquy. And I——

[Laughter.]

General ODOM [continuing]. In a book I wrote, ‘‘On Internal

Wars,’’ that was what I called most U.S. cases of supporting client

states against insurgencies. You know, we can’t own them like the

British owned Malaysia, because we don’t have colonies, so we pay

them to say and do what we think that they should do. And, of

course, we eventually lose, or we’ve pasted over, in some way, so

that it looks like a success. I’ve heard some people say that El Salvador is an example of a success. I’ve looked around for a case that

you could say is a precedent for having any optimism about Iraq.

Well, if you look more closely at El Salvador, you discover that the

real reason the insurgency dried up there was that President Bush,

the first Bush, got a deal with Gorbachev to cut off the outside support. And we allowed was elections in which the old death-squad

parties changed their label and won the elections; the insurgents

weren’t running their own tax structure as the Vietcong did in

Vietnam, so they dried up, and the death-squad people are back in

power today.

No; you know, if you want to side with the Sunnis and their organizational capability and—in this war—you might have some

success in Iraq. But that makes you say, ‘‘Well, where’s Saddam

when we need him?’’ Saddam was stabilizing. You know, getting

rid of Saddam ensured that domestic order would come unglued.

Now, will the population stop fighting if we give them security?

And if we give them an economic package? Look, politics is about

who gets what, when, and how. Military action, or war is merely

the most extreme form of politics, when the military will determine

who gets what, when, how in Iraq. And what is there to be got?

Huge oil revenues. And we can’t offer an economic package that’s

going to match that. So, the idea that we’re going to have some economic package that’s going to get us out of this strikes me as just

not looking at what’s at stake. The order of battle is just not properly developed here, what you’re against. And the leaders who get

the oil will have to run the country with an iron-hand regime. They

can’t have a democracy or a pro-U.S. Government. That’s another

thing we ought to understand now. Nobody can rule Iraq, and keep

it from fragmenting, who’s pro-American. So, you know that a

priori. It’s like as if we were in the middle of our civil war and

somebody parachuted in from Britain and said, ‘‘Well, we’re going

to resolve this. You people must negotiate,’’ et cetera. We would

think they were crazy.

And, finally—I want to make this point on withdrawal, complete

or partial withdrawal. I agree with General McCaffrey: If you start

getting out, then get out all the way. You can stay in the region.

You can stay in Kuwait. We can stay on carriers or—we can keep

a force that can be airlifted in. Force projection back into the region

was a central element of the CENTCOM from its very beginning,

and has been, on up until today. So, the notion that you’ll get out

of Iraq does not mean you’re leaving the region. We should never

leave any mistake about that.

Senator LUGAR. General Keane.

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General KEANE. Yes. In reference to the benchmarks, I think it’s

within Maliki’s capability to certainly offer reconciliation and amnesty to adjust the de-Baathification program, to some of the mistakes that have been made with it, and certainly to do something

about the oil law. The problem with all of that is, is that the

Sunnis aren’t coming to that table. That’s the reality of it, and we

have to face that reality. The Sunnis absolutely believe that they

are winning. And these measures, though prudent from our perspective, are not going to be persuasive to them, when they believe

that they can fracture this government and they can begin to have

their way. It’s unclear, you know, how you go from fractured government to civil war to failed state and return to Sunni power. I

mean, they don’t describe that. But, clearly, they want to leverage

that. So, I don’t think that benchmarks are going to have any impact on the Sunnis, is my point.

Security on the streets. Establishing security on the street is an

achievable issue. I mean, the fact that we just throw up our hands

and say, ‘‘People are always going to kill each other, and a population in a given city, in that place, in that world will always be

at risk.’’ I don’t accept that. We can provide security. We provide

it for our own people. We can provide security in Baghdad, despite

some of the horrors of the conflicts that are taken. It is a definable

problem that can be achieved. It has to do with resources, obviously, to be able to do it.

The withdrawal strategy, certainly the—what would happen to

us during a withdrawal is—one is, we’re going to be—we will be

shot at going out as that country begins to fracture around us.

That—that’s the issue. And Brookings has done a thoughtful analysis, and it may be someone you should consider bringing over

here, if you haven’t done it already—Ken Pollack did an historical

analysis of, When you do have a civil war, what is the spillover

effect, and what are some of the conditions that drive a spillover

effect that lead to a regional war? And is Iraq one of those that

could lead to a regional war? He admits, when they started this

process, they thought maybe not, but, when they finished the historical analysis, he and his colleagues agreed that Iraq, in all likelihood, would spill over into a regional civil war because of the conditions in the countries around them and their interests in—and the

stakes that are there.

And then we have a much larger problem. And this is where I

part company with General Odom. If we have a regional civil war

raging there, we brought that on by our precipitous withdrawal,

and what are our challenges then, and what are our options, in

terms of dealing with that? Do we have a stake and an interest in

it? We are sitting on top of the second largest oil reserve in the region, and it puts the other oil reserves in the region also at risk.

These are realities that we have to deal with, in terms of our own

economic interest.

So, those are huge problems, I think. Again, the benchmarks—

in the end, it’s not going to work. Strategy is achievable on the

streets. And withdrawal, in my mind, does lead to a fractured

state, civil war, with the likelihood that we will have a regional

conflict then.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

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General ODOM. May I make a brief comment? We already have

a regional civil war. We’ve got one right now.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand your position, General, you’re

saying that if, in fact, we start to withdraw, that will wake up the

surrounding nations to their interest and avoid that war.

General ODOM. Yes. I said, we don’t have enough military power

in the region to prevent the war, and, to get enough power, we

have to start getting out in order to gain allies.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize we’ve done it a little bit differently here,

folks. I’ve let people go over, and even the questions of mine. I will

do that for each of you, as well. I mean, we try to end your questions by 8 minutes, but I find this, and I hope you all find it equally as enlightening, hearing them disagree.

General Keane, there’s a famous expression attributed to G.K.

Chesterton. He said, ‘‘It’s not that Christianity has been tried and

found wanting. It’s been found difficult and left untried.’’ That, to

me, is the dilemma I have about Iraq, whether we’ve actually tried.

But, Senator Boxer—Chairman Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for what

you’re doing—and Senator Lugar—in allowing us to take our time

and listen to these wise people.

Each of us may have different opinions as to who is responsible

for this horrific situation in Iraq, but I know all of us agree that

our military troops have done every single thing they’ve been asked

to do. Their work made three elections possible—actually, two elections and one referendum possible—in an amazing show of

strength, I think. And now, there’s an Iraqi Government that’s

been freely elected. And so, the question before us today is how

much more our brave men and women in uniform should be asked

to sacrifice in order to support the Iraqi Government, when 70

percent of the Iraqi people want us to leave within a year and 60

percent—61 percent of the Iraqis say it’s OK to shoot an American

soldier.

And, General Odom, I really thank you for mentioning that statistic, because it amazes me how many people just ignore it. They

say, ‘‘Oh, the Iraqi Government wants us here and there.’’ What

about the Iraqi people? Over 60 percent of them say it’s OK to

shoot an American soldier. And now, our President wants to send

more of our own into that circumstance. I believe, personally, our

military personnel have sacrificed enough. I’m staunchly opposed to

the President’s plan for the surge, because, to me, it’s time, as the

Iraqi Study Group said, for a major conference—and this is also

something my chairman has called for, for a very long time—to

find a political solution to a civil war.

Now, instead, this new policy that we thought was coming turns

out to be, really, a military surge. That does not a new policy

make. So, it seems to me we’re asking our troops—or the President

is, and I’m hoping that a majority of Senators will not agree with

it—the President is asking them to do the impossible, to rectify the

gross failures of political leaders, in both the United States and in

Iraq, and to turn Iraq around using military means, when almost

everyone I know agrees we need a political solution. This is far

more than unfair, it’s an enormous risk.

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And we should listen to General Schoomaker, the Army’s Chief

of Staff, who recently told Congress that the burden on the Army

is simply too great, and that, at the current pace of deployments,

‘‘We will break the active component.’’ I mean, that’s stunning. And

the strain on our servicemembers is intensifying.

During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, I asked a pretty simple question,

that got a lot of notoriety, which is, ‘‘Who pays the price?’’ And so,

I’m going to continue asking that at today’s hearing, and offer up

some facts.

Clearly, servicemembers suffer horrific injuries, lose their buddies in combat. It’s the military families who have to learn to adapt

to a severely wounded servicemember or the fact that their loved

one is never coming home. It’s the soldiers who are being sent on

multiple tours—two, three, four—and are spending years away

from their families. Marines are making similar sacrifices. And it’s

the servicemembers who are facing problems as a result of their experiences, their combat experiences.

One area I’ve been focusing on, Mr. Chairman, has been mental

illness, including post-traumatic stress. Both are skyrocketing. And

I won’t go into all the stats, except to say the rate of suicide for

the Army nearly doubled between 2004 and 2005. I became so concerned about mental health problems among our men and women

in uniform, that, with the support of Senators Warner and Levin,

I was able to establish the Defense Task Force on Mental Health.

The task force, which is headed by Army Surgeon General Kevin

Kiley—if you don’t know him—he is quite a wonderful man—is currently in the process of conducting hearings around the Nation.

I mention the task force because I want to briefly tell you about

one mother, who testified before the task force, whose son committed suicide after returning from his second tour in Iraq. His

mother spoke of conversations she had with her son. And I’m not

going to go into the details of this, it’s too graphic, but suffice it

to say his reaction to seeing dead and blackened bodies in Iraq, and

seeing his own commander killed in front of him—I understand

that these are the horrors of war. I am not naive about that. Indeed, I know these are the certainties of war. And that is why

making mistakes in a war have an immeasurable cost. You cannot

put a number to it. It is not like making a mistake in politics, it

is not like making a mistake in business, it not like making a mistake on the football field.

And so, this brings me to my first question, and I’d like to ask

it to General Odom. I am concerned about the will of many individuals in the current Iraqi Government to truly pursue a policy of national reconciliation. And in this month’s Atlantic Monthly, in an

article called ‘‘Streetwise,’’ the author, a former Assistant Secretary

of Defense, details the pervasive security problems that are destroying Iraq and the failures of the Iraqi Government to effectively

confront them. In particular, the author details the refusal of

Prime Minister al-Maliki to take on the Shiite militias who, we

know, are orchestrating horrific sectarian violence against the

Sunni population. One lieutenant colonel is even quoted as saying

he knows of, ‘‘police chiefs who have been relieved of duty by the

Maliki government for cracking down on militia members.’’ How

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confident are you, General, that Nouri al-Maliki and other Shiites,

particularly the hard-liners in the Iraqi Government, are truly

committed to national reconciliation with their counterparts?

General ODOM. I don’t think they’re committed to it at all. And

I think, as General Keane said here, the Sunnis certainly are not

committed to it. And I don’t think the Shiites have ever been committed to it. I was very impressed with Ahmad Hashim’s book on

the insurgency—counterinsurgency in Iraq, a man who’s spent

quite a bit of time there and is a Reserve Army colonel, who said

that his many discussions throughout Iraq was that the Shiites revealed that they feel it’s their turn to own the country and to own

the oil. They’re not about to give that up.

Senator BOXER. Well, this is very——

General ODOM. I think, also—I’d make one other point about——

Senator BOXER. Please.

General ODOM [continuing]. Mr. Maliki and the government.

They live in the Green Zone. If you want to see who owns and runs

Iraq, look at the people who do not look to the United States for

security and live outside the Green Zone. Otherwise, you don’t have

any troops, you have a government that has no administrative capacity to implement. So, if you tell them to implement these things,

you’re asking them to do the impossible. That’s why most all of

these economic and other programs that we propose have not the

least prospect of success.

Senator BOXER. Well, thank you, sir. I have just a little bit of

time left, so I will ask one more question, but I wanted to say, this

is the point that my chairman has been making over and over and

over again. He has said—asked very specifically: Can you ever

imagine a situation where a police force that’s dominated by the

Shia are going to go into a Sunni neighborhood and actually be

able to patrol? And not one person, no matter what their views on

this, has ever said, ‘‘I can imagine it.’’ So, I worry—I fear—we

know these things. This is—these are things we know. And yet,

we’re going to take our young people, already stressed to the

point—to a terrible point—and put them in such a circumstance,

where they’re partnering with a partner who we’re really very

nervous about.

So, my last question, because of time, I want to ask General

Hoar this question. What does it mean when only 35 percent of

servicemembers approve of the way that the President is handling

the Iraq war?

General HOAR. I’ve noticed, here in Washington, a change, Senator, among senior military people. I think there is a growing disillusionment among the senior people. I attribute it to the mismanagement of this war, and, more specifically, to the fact that the

civilian leadership is tone deaf. The execution of Saddam Hussein

on this—the first day of the Sunni feast day, of Eid—these kinds

of things should never happen; and yet, you can’t expect us to be

successful unless we have an understanding of the culture. And I

think that our colleagues on active duty have come to the conclusion that we’re not up to the task.

There was an editorial last week in the—one of the English-language Egyptian newspapers, that blamed the United States for the

execution of Saddam Hussein. And among the Shia population

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throughout the Middle East, he has become a hero and a martyr.

And that’s because, again, of our inability to see the consequences

of particular actions in the region.

Senator BOXER. Did you mean among the Sunni?

General HOAR. Yeah.

Senator BOXER. Because you said ‘‘Shia.’’

General HOAR. I’m sorry, I——

Senator BOXER. Among the Sunni, he’s become——

General HOAR [continuing]. I mean the Sunni.

Senator BOXER. Well, I just want to thank you for very much. I—

after listening to this, I’m just—I’m hopeful that, with a bipartisan

surge here in the Senate, maybe we can turn this around.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, thank you very much.

I want the witnesses to know—and I don’t know how much time

they have, but—the freshman members—we have a remarkable

group of new people on this committee—are required to attend an

11:30 meeting, at least on the Democratic side. They ought to be

able to be back within, I’m told, 20 minutes to half an hour. And

I think it’ll take that much time anyway before we get there, but

if you’re able to stay til they get back, which will be around 11

o’clock—excuse me, around 12, they have some very good questions.

If you’re able to do that, I’d appreciate it.

And I just want to explain, as they get up, it’s not lack of interest. It’s another obligation. Is that correct, General?

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

So, Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, as I was sitting listening attentively to each of you—

being an old Army sergeant, I always listen attentively to generals

and respect generals—I was thinking, Mr. Chairman, this panel before us represents, I suspect, around 150 years of distinguished

service to this country. That’s pretty remarkable. And you all deserve, certainly, our thanks, but also remarkable is the fact that

you are each still engaged on behalf of this country and are willing

to come before the people of our Nation, through the appropriate

congressional committees, and state your concerns, your thoughts,

your solutions. And for that, this country owes you a great deal. So,

thank you.

Mr. Chairman, as we all know on this panel, these are not only

military leaders, these are some of the best geopolitical thinkers in

our country. They have had to be not only very acute geopolitical

thinkers, but practitioners of all of these dynamics in the commands that they have held and the successful careers that they

have accomplished.

We could spend hours—and I suspect, if that it was up to the

chairman, he would—keeping you all here; but we don’t have

hours, and I have a limited amount of time, and I do have a couple

of questions. But I want to go to a point that General McCaffrey

made, and I think all three would agree. I believe you said, General, you are concerned that we are putting our generals in a box,

in Iraq. I, too, am concerned about that. And, as we sit here and

lavish great deserved praise on Crocker and Petraeus and Fallon

and others who will be the new team for us, we are putting them

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in a box, because if the policy is flawed, it won’t make any difference how brilliant and wonderful and dedicated and smart they

are. They are doomed for failure if the policy is flawed. I think our

policy is flawed.

I appreciate the four of you articulating some very specific areas

where that flaw exists. And I wish our country could hear this, because this is not about politics, this is not about theory, this is not

about bean-counting, this is about something very real for our

short-term and long-term interests in the country. And I—and, to

that point, here’s a question for each of you.

You noted, I suspect, this morning, in the front page of all the

papers, that, in an interview yesterday, the Prime Minister of Iraq

was quite critical of the President of the United States, was quite

critical of the Secretary of State of the United States. One specific

thing he mentioned about Secretary Rice—I believe she made that

comment before this committee last week—that the Maliki government was living on borrowed time. Well, if I was the Prime Minister of Iraq—specifically, Prime Minister Maliki—I might have

some issue with that, as well. I’m not certain that was a particularly astute thing to say, but Secretary Rice can answer for herself.

Surprisingly enough, we say a sovereign government, sovereign

country, so the Prime Minister of this sovereign country, a sovereign Prime Minister, takes some issue with its strongest ally,

Secretary of State, saying, ‘‘This guy’s living on borrowed time.’’

President Talibani said, a couple of weeks ago—and this goes

right back to the number of points that you each have made—in

particular, you, General McCaffrey, being quite critical of this administration—in training Iraqi troops, not providing Iraqi troops

with equipment, not doing the things that President Talibani believes, at least—and I suspect he speaks for a number of Iraqis—

that we should have been doing.

Well, does that not present to all of us some sense of disconnect

or contradiction or some dynamic here in—on one hand, we are

about to make a commitment of at least 22,000 more troops in the

most dangerous parts of Baghdad, where there will be more casualties, and billions of dollars of more money going in, but yet, we

have a government that is sovereign saying these things about our

leaders. Now, that may not strike you as strange. It strikes me as

strange.

So, how can, then, you put these great people that we are putting

over there, all our military, asking them to do the things that they

are doing, and have done brilliantly, as has been noted here today,

with that kind of disconnect with the two governments? How does

that possibly work? How can that work? We talk about—poll numbers and confidence of the American people and the Iraqi people

has been also noted here this morning. Well, no wonder. Does that

not confuse both publics? Does that not confuse the people of the

Middle East, when we have these major criticisms of each other

publicly? You all have noted, in some detail, some of the other

specifics.

So, I would like each of you, in the time I have, to reflect on that.

I do not know how this country can execute any kind of a policy

when you have two different governments, supposedly sovereign—

we say they’re a sovereign government, but we’re in the shadows

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over here, threatening them; we’re in the shadows over here, saying, ‘‘Well, we will pull out security’’—question that Senator Lugar

asked, which was a very important question, What are the consequences? Words have consequences. Words have meanings. We

should have figured that out 4 years ago, before we got ourselves

in the hole, as you all have suggested. We should have thought

about that. We did, on this committee. A lot of us asked tough

questions, and many of you came before this committee and gave

us some pretty good answers. We didn’t listen. We are where we

are. We’re not going to go back and unwind the bad decisions.

We can’t, obviously, leave the Middle East, just as all of you say.

That’s a false choice. That makes no sense, and that’s silly, and

those who try to make a political dynamic out of this do a great

disservice to this country, in both political parties. This isn’t a political issue, this is a—the most significant, divisive issue facing

this country since Vietnam. Since Vietnam. And we are in a box,

just as General McCaffrey said. And we are putting our soldiers

and our Marines in even more of a box and asking them to do

things that they can’t possibly do.

Now, if you would each respond to that observation about the

two governments being in conflict and thinking that somehow we’re

going to be able to move forward and hold hands with the constant

bludgeoning and public humiliation of our so-called sovereign

allies—how that—will that play out, then, with the new policy that

the President announced on Wednesday? Can it work with that

kind of a relationship?

I’ll just start right at the front end and—General McCaffrey—

and go down the line. Thank you.

And thank you, again, each of you, for your service and coming

before us today.

General MCCAFFREY. I’ve listened, Senator Hagel, very closely to

General John Abizaid throughout this war. I’ve admired him for 30

years. You know, I love to introduce the guy. He’s bilingual in Arabic, and, you know, a Stanford fellow and an Olmsted Scholar, and

on and on. He—plus, you’ve got the—he’s a real fighter, Ranger

company commander, airborne battalion commander, in combat.

And for—you know, from the start, I think he understood this conflict, tried to be candid in his dealings with the civilian leadership,

and then loyally followed his instructions.

Where we are now, looking at a snapshot of the notion of largely

withdrawing our combat forces and embedding trainers, minus the

equipment, minus the economic piece, minus the peace negotiations, it’s almost an out-of-body experience to me to listen to that

argument as to why it would work, why you would be putting 10

U.S. Army soldiers, at company level, 40–50 in a battalion, they

don’t speak Arabic, there’s dual chains of command—what—why

would you think that’s going to work? Why would they operate as

police storefront stations in the nine districts of Baghdad? Where

is their support base? And, you know, I’ve listened—out-of-body experience—getting denounced by former Attorney General Meese

and Vernon Jordan on CNN, that I obviously didn’t understand the

nature of combat advisors and why this really was——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s obviously clear.

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Going to work.

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The CHAIRMAN. That’s clear. You haven’t had much experience.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, you know, I—it struck me——

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, for the record——

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. As novel——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That is an attempt at—a very poor

attempt at humor. [Laughter.]

General MCCAFFREY. But it struck me as novel that, you know,

I—one of my earlier combat tours, a 1st—2d Vietnamese airborne

battalion, they spent 10 months getting us ready to go, to include

language training. We clearly weren’t there to inspire and take

command of those battalions, we were a liaison element to U.S.

logistics, intelligence, combat power, et cetera. I think that’s the

only useful role we will play with well-equipped and reliable Iraqi

Army forces. So, the notion that we will take a—it’ll be like the

Sepoy rebellion of India, we’re down there with our guys, sort of,

subverting their own chain of command, and they’re going to do the

right thing. It strikes me as laughable that we would think that

would work.

What I think might work—and, again, like you, I’m searching

for—given where we are, what’s the best outcome? Get them

more—more legs to this stool—economic and political and equipment—and start getting out at some measured pace, which, hopefully, we would communicate to the Iraqis and not to our enemies.

I don’t—since we can’t keep a secret, I—I don’t see how that would

work, but I do think we’re coming out.

General Hoar said, next President’s pulling the plug on this operation. I don’t think there’s much doubt about that. So, how can we

get it where it looks like it’s sort of working in 24 months? And

that’s Petraeus’s challenge.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

General Hoar.

General HOAR. Sir, I’ve had some experience with advising, as

well, in Vietnam, and I agree with Barry’s assessment. But, to the

specific question that you raised, I think there’s two elements of

this. One is that Maliki is, in fact, the Prime Minister, and he is

feeling his own position as being the senior political person in the

country, and certainly would take umbrage when he is criticized by

the President and the Secretary of State, which, in my judgment,

is unfortunate.

I think the next issue down, though, is to watch Maliki and see

what he has to say about what we’ve asked him to do. I think the

first indicator is, he’s apparently appointed a lieutenant general

from the south, a Shia, a guy that has not got a good reputation

with working with U.S. military. I think that’s an indication of

where this thing is going. And I think day by day we will see the

decisions that he makes in order to meet the requirements the

President of the United States has put on him. And I don’t think

we’re off to a good start.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

General Odom.

General ODOM. Well, I think you’ve framed the issue very

clearly. And the only thing I could add was, this was eminently

foreseeable. Once you crossed the border to invade this country,

this kind of outcome was inexorably going to be the case. And we’re

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just now getting around to it. The issue is not whether that’s the

case, the issue is whether you’re going to face up to it or continue

to buy a stock that is falling. I think this is a sunk-cost proposition,

to put it in economic terms. If you want to lose more money, keep

buying the stock. This place is headed to bankruptcy.

Senator HAGEL. General Keane.

General KEANE. Thank you.

Well, I think that’s a great question. And it really is, you know,

Who is Maliki and who is the Maliki government? And I don’t believe our Government—I don’t pretend to speak for them, but I—

I don’t believe our Government truly knows that answer. I mean,

is Maliki genuinely interested in a unified government with the

Sunnis participating in it, at some level of consequence for the

Sunnis, or is he truly interested in a Shia-dominated government

and living on the emotion and psychological energy from 35 years

of repression, and appealing to that power base? I don’t think we

really know that answer, to be honest.

This government’s been in power less than a year. His criticism,

I think, is flapping his wings. He’s got a—probably, a right to make

criticism like that. I’m more interested in what he does, what are

going to be his political steps here forward. We have an opportunity to strengthen his hand here. And remember this military operation; its only intended purpose is to seek a political solution.

That’s what this is all about. So, hopefully this will strengthen his

hand so that he can move in the right direction, but I don’t know,

myself, you know, who he really is and what that government

really is.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. May I—I’m sorry. No; go ahead.

Senator HAGEL. No; I’m done, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you fellows like a 5-minute break? Why

don’t we break for 5 minutes, and you can take a break back here,

if you’d like, and the staff can show you—if you need the phone or

anything else.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. If we could come back to order.

Senator Feingold, please.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, again, for

all of these hearings and for what you’re doing here.

And let me thank all of you, Generals, for testifying in front of

the committee today on such an important issue. You are all outstanding citizens, and I sincerely appreciate the service you’ve

given to our country.

Before I get to my questions, let me say that I was struck by

your opening statements. While you differ about how we can best

address the profound implications of the conflict in Iraq, you have

all highlighted, directly or indirectly, how damaging this administration’s present course in Iraq is to our national security. Each of

you, directly or indirectly, highlighted how important it is for our

Government to change course in Iraq, and each of you alluded to

the fact that the solutions in Iraq will not come from military efforts or from maintaining such a sizable military presence there indefinitely.

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I respect, of course, the opinion you’ve shared with us, and I’d

like to spend a few minutes with you talking about how we can

start preparing, strategically, to redeploy our brave troops from

Iraq. So, what I want to do is, without debating about when redeployment should occur, I think this is a valuable forum to share

your thoughts, as retired senior military officers, on how we should

plan and execute a redeployment strategy that will protect the

safety of our troops in Iraq and that will help position our forces

and our Government for success in other efforts—including

counterterrorism efforts—throughout the region and the world.

Again, I’m not interested in debating, today, when or why we

should redeploy. I’m operating under the assumption that we

should at least prepare to do so and that each of you will have valuable insights as to what we should be thinking about and how we

can best do that, while protecting our troops and strengthening our

national security.

So, let me begin with a general question for all of you. Putting

aside the political debate about whether or not the United States

troops should remain in Iraq, and for how long, I think we can all

assume that the United States will, at some point, begin a

redeployment or a drawdown or a phased withdrawal from Iraq.

Clearly, this is something we need to plan for. So, I’d like each of

you to briefly discuss what you feel would be the important elements of a redeployment plan on how we can redeploy U.S. military personnel safely, while mitigating any negative impact on the

Iraqis and our allies in the region.

General Hoar.

General HOAR. Yes; thank you, Senator.

I think that there are several things. First of all, as a preface to

your point, I think it’s essential that we go ahead and talk to Syria

and Iran about the region and what can be done. I think Syria is

the easier of the two. I think, while we still have a very serious

problem with respect to Lebanon, we have a country that, right

after 9/11, when they were helping us, was willing to open up to

the peace process, and we rebuffed them. I think that we would

help solve some other problems in the Middle East if we could come

to some agreement, as we had, early after 9/11, with Syria.

With respect to Iran, we have allowed the Brits, the French, and

the Germans to work with Iran. We are the only country that has

any traction with respect to—we have their money, we have them

embargoed, we have not given them political recognition. We have

a lot of things that we could offer.

Beyond that, within the region, we already have a sizable presence in Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar. We need to stay in the

area. We need to keep combat troops in the area. We have the capacity for over 10,000 troops in Kuwait, and we could keep them

very close to that area if we needed to. But we need to engage the

neighbors, all of them. And, of course, that includes the GCC plus

the two, Egypt and Jordan, but should also include Turkey, because they have a dog in this fight, as well.

Senator FEINGOLD. So, the notion I’d take would be to safely redeploy troops to some of the places you’ve mentioned.

General HOAR. To stay engaged in the region.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK.

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General HOAR. But we need to engage the other countries in the

neighborhood.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

General McCaffrey.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, Senator, if—one caution. It seems to

me that the idea that—with 150,000 troops in combat in Iraq who

are failing to achieve our political and military purpose—that we

can actually start thinning out and we can perch on lily pads in

the region and maintain influence, I think, is nonsense. The Kuwaitis, the Persian Gulf coast states, the Saudis, and others, if they

see is in a determined strategic withdrawal, are not going to be inclined to give us an alternative. They will now find ways to accommodate Iranian influences and others. So, I don’t believe, and I’ve

heard people suggest, that—and clearly we ought remain engaged—10,000 troops, Kuwait, maybe a brigade, a Marine battalion

afloat, that kind of thing, but if we start coming out, our military

power in the region will go down to a percent or so of what it is

today, not that today is necessarily useful.

Second, I think that clearly the only part of the redeployment

that’s easy is get out of the Iraqi cities, get into brigade- and division-protected positions in the south, in Tallil Air Base and—out at

Balad and out in the western province of Anbar, and protect yourself and be a force in readiness to protect the Iraqi Government in

the event of a coup, intervene, threaten the Syrians and Iranians

by our presence. So, getting out of the cities, not taking part in

urban warfare, is step one.

And then, finally, I would be—and, again, it’s a caution—I’d be

very careful as either a retired military officer or a Member of Congress, to get involved in the tactics of disengagement. The political

question is the important one for the Congress to answer.

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s fair, General.

General MCCAFFREY. And it’s——

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me just say——

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Not clear to me what that answer is.

Senator FEINGOLD. If I could respond to that, I think that’s a fair

point. In order for someone to responsibly vote for the policy, we

want to know, from people like you, that it can, in fact, be done.

And so, that’s the spirit of it, not being——

General MCCAFFREY. I think——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Interested in trying to——

General MCCAFFREY. I think we could——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Micromanage it, or me making a

decision.

General MCCAFFREY. Right.

Senator FEINGOLD. But I want to know, from these hearings—

and I think it’s one of the reasons it’s so good the chairman is

doing it——

General MCCAFFREY. I think we could come out——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. That this is something——

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. And 6 months——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. That can be done.

General MCCAFFREY. I wrote a—I left a Washington Post op-ed

I wrote with you, and I think, you know, literally, we could be out

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of there in 6 months, close down the whole thing, set fire to our

ammunition stockpiles, fight down corridors back to the sea and

the U.S. Navy, and withdraw. The consequences of that might be

catastrophic, but the withdrawal could clearly——

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand——

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Be achieved.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Your feelings on that, but I do

appreciate your practical observations, as well.

General Odom.

General ODOM. There are two levels from which to approach this,

and I think, at the level of practical implementation, the issue is

which question to ask. You’ve got to go back and ask the questions

that they’re raising, and I think you’ve got to ask how much sea

and airlift we have, and the inventory of other places in the region

you can keep U.S. troops. Then the issue comes up as to whether

our troups still will be welcome when we pull out. And I don’t

think that’s something we can answer today but these are the

questions that should be put to the Joint Chiefs and to the CINC

on a contingency basis. They should, in my view, have already been

put to the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs need to think about all scenarios, from an uncontested withdrawal down to fighting our way

out. And I think the kinds of concerns about whether the Saudis

and others—Kuwaitis—will want us to remain open, and that talking about that with them early and what we’ll do about the Iranian-Arab conflict that’s really going to be serious after this, that’s

got to be dealt with, and you’ve got to talk to those people so that

they understand what you’re willing to do, and they’ve got to let

you know what they’re willing to do in order to begin to develop

a strategy.

In my earlier remarks, I made that point. That’s one of the

things that must be developed. Once we start getting out, if other

countries in the region are not asking the kinds of questions you

are to the American Government, we should be asking them.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I really appreciate that comment, because, you know, as I said to some people at the Intelligence Committee hearing, you know, since we didn’t have a real plan getting

in, we’d darn well better have a plan to get out, and talk about it

a little bit. It doesn’t mean that everybody agrees, but we ought to

have a plan, instead of just being in——

General ODOM. I would add one last point about this. You know,

everybody sees this so-called catastrophe—there’s just going to be

a big bloodbath, all sorts of awful things. Well, I heard that about

Vietnam, and it wasn’t nearly as bad as a lot of people thought it

would be. And I’m prepared, for strategic reasons that I gave earlier, if there is a terrible disaster, we’re just going to have to accept

that. That’s a cost we’re going to have to bear. My own guess is

that it won’t be quite that bad, because it will not be in other countries’ interest—the neighbors’ interest to have the region destabilized. I don’t think they’ll want that, and, therefore, they will not

immediately launch into the fight and expand it without some

other provocations.

Senator FEINGOLD. I think that’s a very insightful remark, thank

you, General.

General Keane.

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General KEANE. Thank you, Senator.

Well, you know, I would—I disagree with the withdrawal policy

and the consequences that would take place, but, from a military

practitioner’s point, certainly that’s a military operation, we know

how to conduct it. Certainly, the—I would keep nothing in the

south. I would go north to Balad, where there’s a very good base

there. I would pull everything out of the Green Zone in Baghdad.

I would pull out of Victory, except for a very small security detachment there to maintain the—keep the airport running. And if we

could contract that out, we’d probably contract it out and let them

do it, pull us out of there. I’d also pull out of Al Anbar, as well.

So, you would pull back from the major contentious areas. And

I agree with General McCaffrey, probably, in 6 to 8 months you

could execute a military operation to do that. You’d be concerned

about the safety of your forces, certainly, while you’re doing this,

so it would be preeminent for you. But it is a military operation.

We know how to do it. And military had the mission, they would

develop the plans to do it and execute it properly.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Generals. I thought your answers

were very helpful and responsive, and I appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. I congratulate the chairman for

the hearings that he’s been having on this issue.

And I thank you very much for being here today.

Mr. Chairman, one of the books that largely affected my decisionmaking on Iraq, was ‘‘The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq’’ by Ken Pollack. I don’t know whether you have read it,

but I would be really interested to get Mr. Pollack here before the

committee to share with us what his opinion was then and what

his observations are now that we’ve been involved in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I think that’s a good idea. I want to

make it clear, these aren’t going to be the totality of the hearings

we’re going to have on Iraq. These are the important opening salvo.

So I think that’s a great idea. I will pursue that.

Senator VOINOVICH. The other influential book that I read—is

‘‘The War for Muslim Minds’’ by Gilles Kepel, which I read that

about 2 years ago. After reading it, I concluded that we were completely misreading this area of the world and need to learn a lot

more about it. Moqtada al-Sadr and his family have been revolutionaries for a long time. They are populists, and their goal in life

is to assume power over Iraq. In his mind, I believe Sadr wants to

be the next Ayatollah of Iraq, and, ultimately, wants to create a

theocracy there. Because of my concerns, I continue to ask questions in the committee’s closed sessions about Sadr. For example:

How can there be a unity government with Sadr? He is the dominant figure there. And I really don’t know where Sistani is anymore. He seems to have disappeared from the scene.

But, as I analyze the situation, the Shiites were previously out

of power, and only the Sunnis ruled—but now the Shiites are in,

and I think they will want a Shiite-dominated government. So then

the question is: What happens to the Sunnis if the Shiites take

over?

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The Sunnis are still there, and I think one of you mentioned that

Saddam is now their hero. What we failed to realize, at least from

what I read, is that this struggle between the Shiites and the

Sunnis has transpired for many, many years.

The central question is: If America leaves Iraq and things start

to unravel, what’s going to happen? Pollack says there could be a

regional confrontation that spirals out of Iraq. From what I understand, both Shiites and Sunnis want to dominate the area, from a

religious point of view. Saddam Hussein was a Sunni, and the

Sunnis are trying to draw even more Sunnis to the region to fight

in the conflict.

So will there be a regional conflict? The most important question

I want to address is: If the leaders in the region, Shiite and Sunni,

understand that utter chaos could very well erupt, what incentives

do they have to work together on reaching a political solution in

Iraq? Are there enough incentives for them to get involved there?

There are currently 700,000 refugees and probably more to come,

which creates a refugee problem. There’s a lot of disruption going

on in these respective countries. And if the Shiites fight the

Sunnis, will the Saudis be forced to intervene? Is there any way

the Saudis could avoid getting involved if this happens?

How do we leverage incentives to involve regional leaders? When

should an effort be made to do so? We’re discussing a military

surge and some argue that we should engage in regional diplomacy

after the military surge. But if it were my decision, I’d work on the

regional diplomacy immediately, because I think the real challenges are political. We need to focus on the associated political incentives so we can get the regional parties involved in bringing stability to the region.

General.

General HOAR. May I give a crack at that, Senator?

I would say, first of all, that the countries you mentioned are

all—the governments are dominated by the Sunni, they all have

substantial Shia minorities, and they’re all terribly worried about

this. My understanding today is that the Secretary of State is traveling in the region to encourage these governments to put pressure

on the Sunni in Iraq to support the central government, which is

quite different from the question that you asked, which is the bigger one, What are they going to do when this thing goes to a catastrophe? And I think this is why we need to be talking to them right

now. The Saudis’ answer to this question is to build a wall, which,

in my judgment, will be as—about as successful as our efforts to

put a barrier along the DMZ in Vietnam or the current planned

one between Mexico and the United States. Barriers don’t work.

The point is, we need to be engaged with them and explain to

them that they are in serious trouble if Iraq craters, and they need

to get involved in taking some steps now to protect their own political arrangements in their own countries.

Senator VOINOVICH. General Odom.

General ODOM. I think you’ve put your finger on a key issue

which I tried to highlight in my opening remarks, that the war was

never in our interest, that it actually was undercutting our interest

in the region: Regional stability. Because by going in and knocking

off Saddam, we ensured that this kind of conflict would eventually

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come about. And what we’ve been trying to do ever since is evade

the inevitable. And I tried to explain that the alignment of forces

is such that no matter how much we surge in Iraq, other surges

from outside, with money or people themselves, can more than

counter that. So, I think you’re exactly right. And the only option

left open to us, if we’re going to get back and try to achieve regional stability, is to get out. And it may cost us a lot, it may not

cost us as much, but we can’t turn our strategy around unless we

do. That’s the precondition. So, I agree with you, and I think it’s

really hard—it’s the thing that has everybody stopped in this debate. If they once realize that you don’t have a choice to stay in

there and get what was originally defined as victory—victory would

be a liberal, democratic, pro-American Iraqi—if you realize that’s

a mirage, then maybe you’ll wise up and realize that you’ve got to

adjust to those realities. So——

Senator VOINOVICH. That——

General ODOM [continuing]. It seems to me that is the crux of

the issue we’re facing. The issue just at what point do you say,

‘‘That’s a mirage and we’re not going to pay any more in pursuit

of it’’?

General KEANE. Well, you have to remember that the Sunnis

really do want it to blow. I mean, that—the armed conflict that

they are—that they are prosecuting is to fracture this government

and create the conditions for all-out civil war in a failed state. That

is what they want. So, I mean, the issue is, can we do anything——

Senator VOINOVICH. General, excuse me, how could the Sunnis

conclude that they could win, militarily?

General KEANE. It—I agree with that, it makes no sense——

General ODOM. I don’t. But go ahead.

General KEANE. It makes no sense, but, nonetheless, that is what

they believe. Out of the anarchy of a failed state, they believe it

suits their political objectives better than any course they have

right now. That’s a fact.

So, is there something to work with there? Right now, there’s

nothing to work with. That’s a fact. And you’ve got the Sunni Arab

States that are cheerleading the insurgency, not direct aiding and

abetting, like Syria is the insurgency and the Iranians, in terms of

the militias, but, nonetheless, cheerleading it. You have to change

that. You have to deal with the Sunnis and convince them that

their political objectives cannot be achieved by armed violence. And

I think we can do that. We can start to change that equation, and

then you have something to work with. Right now, there’s nothing

to work with. They’re not monolithic; I’m not suggesting that they

are. And there are different groups there, as we all know. And

their former regime element, the Saddamists, are clearly different

than some of the other more mainstream. But the fact is that they

want a fractured government. So, we have to stabilize this situation, bring this level of violence down, convince them that they cannot achieve their political objectives by armed violence. Then

Maliki has something to work with. And the question is: Is Maliki

willing to work with it?

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, you just said—and I wrote it down—

that you’re not sure who Maliki is exactly: Does he want a unity

government? Does he want a government that’s just dominated by

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the Shiites? You’ve indicated that we’ve got some real reservations

about this guy.

General KEANE. We do. And, at the same hand—time, I don’t

think we just pull the plug and deal with the consequences. What

I’m suggesting is, despite those reservations, despite the fact we

don’t know—and I don’t think anybody truly does know—we should

strengthen his hand. And——

Senator VOINOVICH. But the question——

General KEANE [continuing]. We had an opportunity to do that.

Senator VOINOVICH. The question I’ve got is—I was out at Bethesda Naval Hospital 2 days ago and visited a soldier who was in

Baghdad. He was responsible for several men in Iraq and he described how he gets up every morning with the goal of keeping

them alive. They were in one of the neighborhoods in which houses

were unoccupied. So he and his soldiers would go on patrols to

check them out. They would get information from people about

what they ought to look into. But in doing so, he said they would

take several potshots from the enemy, who would never directly engage them. He said that he doesn’t know how it happens, but the

improvised explosive devices constantly show up on the streets, and

they have to just deal with it. Well, he has dealt with one of them,

and now he’s not sure if he will ever see again, and what will happen with his arm. He told me: ‘‘Look, this is my third term over

here. I’ve got two kids out in California. I’m getting out.’’

General KEANE. Yeah.

Senator VOINOVICH. We also forget, sometimes, what impact

these tragedies have on the generals and how they feel about the

way things are going. There were times when I saw General

Abizaid at the end of the meetings—there weren’t tears, but he was

emotionally involved in this issue. He was really concerned, and he

just felt frustrated. I know he was. He would take a beating from

us with these questions. So, how do the tragedies impact these people? And how does it impact the men that we’re calling to go into

the war, when there are so many——

General KEANE. Well, I——

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Questions about whether or not

this whole thing is going to work, and they’re putting their lives

on the line?

General KEANE. Well, the human dimension of this in—is certainly staggering, and all of us have been around this most of our

adult lives, and, you know, we have a sense of what this is. Their

sacrifice is—they represent a body of people in the United States

that have true honor, in every sense of the word. And it—when you

ruck up and become a soldier, a marine, an airman, or a navy guy,

I mean, you’re always going to get some orders that you don’t like,

but being a soldier is about following your orders, regardless.

Senator VOINOVICH. Yeah, but the fact——

General KEANE. And——

Senator VOINOVICH. The fact is, we have a civilian control of the

military——

General KEANE. Sure.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. In this country. We, as civilians,

have something to say about that.

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General KEANE. And you do. And all I’m saying is, is that their

performance is absolutely extraordinary. What I’m trying to suggest is that we, for the first time, give them some of the conditions

so that they can be successful. And I don’t believe they’ve had those

conditions. And that’s one of my——

Senator VOINOVICH. Let me ask you——

General KEANE [continuing]. Concerns, that——

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. This. If you gave our military

the conditions to make success possible and you took them in there,

but you really believed in your heart that the end result was going

to be a Shiite-dominated government, that they’re going to take

over, and that Sadr and company are going to be in charge and

maybe end up with theocracy—if that’s what you really believed

was going to be the end result, then why would you stick them into

a——

General KEANE. We wouldn’t.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Temporary situation that

means that a lot of them are not going to not come home?

General KEANE. If we knew that for a fact, then we probably—

we’d have no business doing it. It would be absolutely irresponsible

to do what I’m suggesting or what the United States is about to

do. That would be irresponsible, if that’s what we knew.

And by the way, in terms of General Abizaid, there—what a

magnificent leader he truly is, and the sacrifice that he’s made, and

the—and we probably haven’t had a smarter guy put his mind on

this problem. And certainly, it is a really difficult problem. So, the

emotion that you see there is a reflection of that. Every question

that you’ve asked him, he’s probably asked himself many, many

times, over and over and over again. And that’s why I think you

see some of that emotion, because he knows what he represents.

He represents the honor of all those men and women who serve

him so loyally and so dedicated.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator.

Senator VOINOVICH. Is—anyone else want to comment?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, a quick comment.

Senator VOINOVICH. Is that OK?

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, sure.

General MCCAFFREY. It seems to me that I would define success

in Iraq, from where we now are—successful outcome would be that

we’re there for 10–15 years with 50–75,000 troops, we’re out of the

urban area, there’s a loose federal structure of government in

which the Shia and the Kurds mostly have autonomy for internal

security in their areas, and that our primary role there is to deter

outside active intervention, to guarantee against a countercoup,

and to protect the Sunnis from the justifiable rage of the Shia.

That, to me, would be a successful outcome. It wouldn’t mean $8

billion a month, it wouldn’t be 1,000 killed and wounded a month,

but it would be an enormous commitment of U.S. resources and

power.

If we’re not willing to see that as an option, if we don’t think it’s

worth it, then I personally would flip over and start arguing for a

measured, but deliberate, withdrawal from this current strategy,

because I don’t—do not believe we are there to fight a counterinsurgency campaign or to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi

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people. We’re trying to stand up a government, get the economy

going, get a security force in place, and get out of there.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I want a clarification on the last point

you just made. The political incentive you indicated—the political

dynamic—that needs to be in place for that outcome to occur is, essentially, that the Constitution let them form regions, like the

Kurds have, where they have local control over their local police,

their local security, correct?

General MCCAFFREY. Already happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I know. It’s the plan I’ve been promoting,

and everyone, up to now, has been saying——

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think there’s always anxiety about

the notion——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I just think it’s inevitable. It’s already

done. I mean——

General MCCAFFREY. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I’m not suggesting that it works, but I don’t

know how anything works without those two pieces in it.

Yes, General.

General ODOM. I’d like to comment on both the——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I’m sorry, I beg your pardon. I didn’t realize

you didn’t comment.

General ODOM. No; the—I’d like to add something to what’s——

The CHAIRMAN. I realize I’m going over it, General. I want you

to——

General ODOM [continuing]. Been said about the Sunnis.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Go over it as well.

General ODOM. I think General Keane is quite right about most

of what he said about the Sunnis, but I’d like to ask—add another

dimension to understanding their behavior as to why they’re determined to try to do this, no matter what, and that the odds may not

look very good to them.

The alternative for them is to be decimated by Shiites. All U.S.

policies are empowering the Shiites. They’ve done it from the day

we came in there. And now we’re in this position: Do we side with

the Shiites, and win? Well, you don’t want that, because you don’t

want an Islamic government. And why should the Sunnis sign up

for that? I would say, don’t count the Sunnis out. The Baathist

Party is based on Leninist-Stalinist organizational principles. That

organizational administrative capacity is lacking on the Shiite side.

And a minority could eventually win the struggle. I’m not saying

it will. I don’t think anybody knows who can win. But we’ve been

too quick to count the Baathists out, and we’re too quick to attribute far too much administrative political capacity to the Shiites.

I see it in some—in Sadr and some of these limited groups, but not

in the aggregate.

I would make one last point, on the partition business. The problem with that is, you end up presiding over ethnic cleansing, which

we’re doing anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. No; it’s not partitioning. If you read the

Constitution——

General ODOM. No; but if you start that way, it won’t stop with

the Constitution.

378

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, no, I understand, but my problem

is, they voted for a constitution. The Constitution explicitly

says——

General ODOM. Well, that——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Anybody—any governate can decide

to be a region, and, when you are, here are the authorities and

powers you have. They already wrote into the Constitution that the

Kurds have that status. They’ve already written into the Constitution that, in fact, this is how it would proceed. They’ve already

voted for the enabling law to do that. It’s like pushing a rope. I

mean, you know, if we want to change something, we’d better

change it. But I agree with the overarching principle, the strategic

notion you’ve laid out.

I’m now trespassing on my colleague’s time in a way that I won’t.

I’ve let everyone go over, so that——

Senator BILL NELSON. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make one last point, administratively. I

want to explain why we don’t have an afternoon hearing. We were

going to have Congressman Hamilton, and Secretary Baker initially indicated he did not want to participate in these hearings. He

subsequently has called and indicated that he would be prepared

to do that. And Congressman Hamilton indicated that he would

think it best that they appear as the chairpersons of the Iraq Study

Group. And we’ve worked out a common time, which I think is the

30th, where they’re going to be here. I want you to know that’s the

only reason the afternoon schedule has changed. That’s bad news

for you guys, because if you can, I’d like you to be able to stay—

not through the afternoon, but maybe well into the lunch hour, to

answer these guys’ questions.

But, anyway, my friend from Florida, the clock is yours.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, before you get to the clock, could

General Odom—he was continuing to answer, and I wanted to hear

the remainder of that answer, about——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, sure.

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. About the partition.

General ODOM. Well, the—constitutions don’t necessarily have to

be written on paper. And I’m—I’ve always been impressed with a

Russian proverb that Stalin loved, ‘‘Paper will put up with anything written on it.’’ [Laughter.]

So, you don’t have a constitution until the rules have been

agreed on by the elites. Who are the elites? Anybody with enough

guns or money to violate the rules with impunity. If the elites

agree, the constitution will stick. If they don’t, it won’t. The elites

don’t agree in Iraq; therefore, you don’t have a constitution, and

you will have violence until somebody wins out. That may be a long

time, but, until somebody can restore order on part of the terrain

or all of it, you won’t have an order.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I’ve said this to you privately, and I just want to say publicly, that this an outstanding series of hearings that you are doing, and I am very grateful, particularly because of the candor that we are hearing from different

points of view at that table. And that is in marked contrast to the

lack of candor that we have had in witness after witness representing the administration over the last 6 years. I erupted, in

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this committee last week, with the Secretary of State, saying that

time and time again I have not been told the truth.

Now, I want to ask you all a question, because I want to understand this. How can, over and over, the representatives at the highest level of the U.S. military come in here and say what they are

saying to us? And I would say that the one exception—and it’s not

just here, it’s also on other committees, including the Armed Services Committee—the one exception is General Abizaid. You all have

achieved the highest levels in the U.S. military. We’re supposed to

be getting the truth from the military. And we haven’t. Over and

over. Why?

General KEANE. I’d like to take that on. Well, first of all, I think

you have got the truth from them. Look, if John Abizaid and

George Casey put together a strategy in Iraq, that was principally

theirs. And that strategy had a political objective to it, and it had

this military objective to it that we’ve discussed, which was transition to the Iraqi security forces. And they believed in it. There’s a

thought in this town that this is really Secretary Rumsfeld’s strategy and he’s forced it on these generals and that’s one of the reasons why they never asked for more troops. Well, I think John

Abizaid—I find that very insulting to these generals to think that,

that they wouldn’t have the moral courage to stand up and tell the

Secretary, one, the strategy is—needs to be changed, or, two, they

need more troops as a manifestation of that change. They believed

in the strategy they were executing, and they thought it would

work. And I believe that. And I think when John or George talk

about they don’t need more troops, I think they’ve been very sincere about that, that that’s their belief. I don’t think they’re shading the truth whatsoever. And I find it insulting to suggest that

they are.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, you didn’t hear what I said. I said

the one exception is General Abizaid.

General KEANE. Uh-huh. I heard that.

Senator BILL NELSON. And, indeed, he sat at that table last—it

was November or December—and said that he did not think that

they needed additional troops.

General KEANE. And I believe that’s their conviction.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I believe it, too. But, for the last 6

years, we haven’t been—over and over, we’ve had generals come up

here and say, ‘‘The war is going very well. Victory is right around

the corner. We have 350–400,000 Iraqi troops that are trained.’’

You all have worn that uniform, you knew that wasn’t true. Why

are they saying that?

General MCCAFFREY. You know, this is a very difficult subject,

certainly for us to address, and there—I might add, there’s a good

reason why I was never the Chairman of the JCS. But let me, sort

of, underscore, there’s a bit of unfairness to how you characterize

this. First of all, if you pick up the phone or visit a senior military

officer in the field, and you say, ‘‘Off the record, tell me what you

think,’’ you will get 100 percent of what they think. And so,

throughout the last 4 years, the Congress has unmistakably heard

from field-level officers right through general officers—you know,

Senator Biden’s been in and out of there, they talk to him explicitly

every time he’s on the ground, so you knew what was going on, and

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you allowed the Secretary of Defense and his senior people to come

over here and baldly mischaracterize the situation, that there is no

insurgency going on, this is just like Germany in 1945, just like the

American Revolution, it’s crime rate in D.C. The denial of the evidence in front of their eyes has been preposterous. The broken

Army equipment—the country is currently at strategic peril, and it

was the Congress’s job to raise and equip an Army and Navy, and

people were telling you that. So, when you had Dr. Chu come over

here and say, ‘‘We’re not having a problem on recruiting’’—we’re

now taking 42-year-old grandmothers into the Army, and their current health is so good that, unlike 40 years ago, there’s no degradation in standards, while we quadruple the number of non-highschool graduates, quadruple the number of people with moral and

criminal waivers, and clearly had degraded the input to the

Army—so, again, I wouldn’t focus on the obedient generals and admirals who made their views known to the Secretary and his people and then came over here and signed up to support the President’s budget and his strategy. I think——

Senator BILL NELSON. Is that——

General MCCAFFREY. I think there’s been a huge failure in the

U.S. Congress, in both parties, to speak up and provide oversight

on this disastrously incompetently mismanaged war.

Senator BILL NELSON. I’m asking, because I admire each one of

you—going ahead in the future so that we can get correct information in—upon which to make, hopefully, correct judgments: Is it the

responsibility of an admiral or a general to sit at that table and

be silent when the Secretary of Defense says that the Iraqi Army

is well-trained and they have all these thousands of troops that are

ready to do the battle? Is it the responsibility of admirals and generals to sit there and be silent when the Secretary of Defense and

others in the civilian positions say that we’re meeting our recruiting goals and we don’t have a problem in the Reserves and in the

National Guard? Help educate us——

General ODOM. Can I——

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. To understand, so that we’ll

have a filter with which to sort out truth from nontruth in the future.

General ODOM. May I try and answer that?

Senator BILL NELSON. Please.

General ODOM. I used to discuss this issue with the late General

Goodpaster, because, when I was in Vietnam, I understood that we

were fighting a war the strategic consequences of which were much

more in the Soviet interest than ours, namely the containment of

China and of North Vietnam. So, it was very analogous to the

present situation, where we’ve charged off on a war that achieves

our enemy’s goals, and not ours.

Now, I was really upset in that war. We never heard from senior

generals, and I used to think that generals were a menace to the

national security because they didn’t speak up. One retired general

did speak out, Marine General Shoup. And I remember him extraordinarily well for that. He faced—he stood up and then took

the heat for it.

And you’ve had a young officer, a very outstanding young officer,

H.R. McMasters who’s written a book, ‘‘Dereliction of Duty,’’ in

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which he lays the blame on the Joint Chiefs for not standing up

to McNamara. And when I pressed General Goodpaster as to how

to come down on this—and I think this is a real dilemma, particularly ones that senior officers face—do you break with the policy

and put out the unvarnished truth, and quit, or do you say, as

Goodpaster said, ‘‘Isn’t it also professional integrity to stay with

these political leaders and try to help them in spite of themselves?’’

In other words, you’re really copping out if you don’t do the best

you can, and try to save the day.

So, I don’t think there’s a clear-cut answer to this, but in this

war it seemed to me, as it was in the Vietnam war, after you’d

been there for a while and quite a few things were becoming pretty

clear, the argument for abandoning ship and no longer doing the

best you can to help our political leaders would be reached, but

each individual has to decide what he thinks is professional integrity in that regard.

General HOAR. I’d like to add to the comments that have been

made. I think that all of us agree that civilian control of the military is an immutable concept. There’s no question that the President and Vice President and the people that they have appointed,

with the advice and consent of the Senate, are the people that

make these decisions. The difficult question is: How do you break

with your boss when you don’t agree with him? I would like to

think that all of us would stand up and be counted, but I don’t

think it’s that easy.

Because I have written and spoken repeatedly in the last 4 years

about my objection to the way this war has been handled, I find

that, in some forums, this question comes up. There are a lot of active duty officers that believe they are not responsible for speaking

up, that they have to follow the leadership of the civilians that are

over them. I don’t think that’s true, but I think it would be an interesting question in the Senate Armed Services Committee, when

a man is—or a woman, for that matter—is nominated for a third

or a fourth star, to ask this question.

Eric Shinseki, to the President of the United States, voiced his

discontent with the plan to invade Iraq, and he was publicly demeaned for that. I’m not sure, given that kind of behavior, how

people respond to this. I would prefer not to go into individual

cases and circumstances, but I don’t think, in all cases, people have

been entirely candid.

Senator BILL NELSON. In the last 6 years, we’ve had a credibility

problem. And what I’m trying to get at is the truth. And I’m asking

four generals who have given extraordinarily candid testimony

today about how to solve this problem going forward. I’m not talking about those officers lower down in the chain of command, I’m

talking about the officers that come here and present testimony to

us and sit by as if corroborating the testimony of their civilian

bosses.

General HOAR. I think it would help if you could frame the question in a way that you would ask them their personal opinion of

the value of a particular course of action. I think that’s how General Shinseki first went public, in my recollection. He was asked,

in the Senate Armed Services Committee, if there were enough

troops, and some other questions, and he gave his honest response.

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Senator BILL NELSON. I asked him the question, and the question was: How many will it take, and for how long? And he said

several hundred thousand for several years. And for that, he was

significantly—well, we know the rest of the story.

General HOAR. I think that’s the key, though, Senator. If you

have enough understanding of the issues to ask the hard questions

directly, I think you have a better chance of getting the answer.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for this

extraordinary panel.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of the generals for their service, individually

and collectively, to our country, and for their insights today. I had

another hearing, but I read all of your testimony last night, and

I got a synopsis of some of your answers, and I want to pursue

some questions.

And I would say, to my distinguished colleague from Florida,

that one of the things, I would think, that would make it easier is

to put witnesses under oath, in which case they would feel compelled to make sure that they gave an answer that would not put

them in violation of the law. And that might be something that the

chairmen of the committees, when appropriate, might consider.

You know, General Keane, let me start with you. I understand—

and correct me if I’m wrong—based upon press accounts, that you

and Dr. Kagan are sort of like the architects of the President’s latest plan. Is that a fair characterization?

General KEANE. All I can attest to is that I made a recommendation to the President, and I’ll let him speak in terms of what he

thought of that. I do know that the plan, as the administration has

announced, is remarkably similar to what we had talked about, you

know, Fred and I. But I wasn’t privy to their, you know, staff deliberations and——

Senator MENENDEZ. You made those recommendations directly to

the President, did you not?

General KEANE. I made a recommendation to the President, yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. And were there others? Was the Vice President involved?

General KEANE. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. And in the recommendations that you

made—in addition to the escalation, did you offer a form of benchmarks that you thought needed to be established, and consequences for benchmarks not achieved?

General KEANE. No. Did not.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, let me ask you this. I understand that,

during your answer to some of the questions, you said that Iraqis

should not be in the lead on this mission. Is that correct?

General KEANE. Well, yes; I have problems with it, because one—

what that really means, when you say Iraqis are in the lead, is

that we’re going to have two chain of commands. The—obviously,

we’re not going to work for the Iraqis, so we’ll have our own chain

of command, and the Iraqis will have their own chain of command.

That has not been the case in the operations that we’ve been conducting in Iraq to date. The Iraqis have been responding to us

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when we’re working combined operations together. So, we’ve made

a conscious decision here to make this their operation, and we’re

in support of it.

My problem with that is, we’re talking about a partnership. I

think that’s a business term, it’s not a military term. It doesn’t

have much application on a street where you have soldiers from

the Iraqi military who are responding to orders from a different

chain of command than the United States soldiers are responding

to. And that doesn’t make a lot of sense to me, militarily. Politically, it probably makes lots of sense, but militarily, it does not.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you this. Does it matter whether

the Iraqis show up or not, for our purposes of executing this plan?

General KEANE. It does matter that they show up.

Senator MENENDEZ. Does it matter that they show up in the

quantities that we have been told that they need to show up if——

General KEANE. We can afford for them not to show up in some

of the quantities that are expected. This plan takes into account

that the Iraqis may not be able to meet all of their expectations,

as they have in the past failed to meet those expectations, as well.

Senator MENENDEZ. Does it matter about the quality of the

troops that will show up on the Iraq side?

General KEANE. Well, certainly it does. Certainly it does. And the

Iraqis, as you well know, are a mixed group. Some perform well,

and some do not perform well at all.

Senator MENENDEZ. Here is my concern, in addition to my opposition to the war and my vote against it, and my opposition to this

escalation—even as I try to understand it, I cannot fathom, for the

life of me, how it is that every administration witness that has

come here—Secretary of State, most pointedly, but others, as

well—have clearly made the case that the administration has tried

to sell this, that this is an Iraqi initiative, that Iraqis will be at

the forefront, that they will conduct the missions, and we will be

in support of them. And I just don’t understand, when I hear—and

I will give you the title of the ‘‘architect of the plan’’—how it is possible that we are being told by the administration that the Iraqis

will finally be at the forefront of the fight for their own security,

and we will be in a supporting role. You have just described your

concerns about it, which are exemplified by a New York Times article, this Monday, in which the United States and Iraqis are wrangling over the war plans and exactly who commands what. When

there’s a dispute, what happens? And then we see today’s article,

or NPR story, where Kurdish soldiers are being sent as part of this

overall effort. And the Kurds don’t know the area, they don’t speak

Arabic, and their deployment is a question of extreme popularism.

Even one of the commanders of a team of American military advisors say there have already been desertions and that out of the battalion of 1,600 Kurdish soldiers, he only expects a few hundred to

show up.

So, we are being told by the administration that, in fact, this is

an Iraqi plan, Iraqis are going to take the lead, they’re going to

show up en masse, and that we are in support of that. Yet everything that we see unfolding shows that we clearly are in the lead;

we clearly are going to be at the greatest risk. And if that’s the

truth, versus what we are being told—aren’t we rolling the dice—

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General, when you say—and I think it’s a very true comment—

when you say that, in fact, we don’t know what Maliki is all about,

we don’t know what his true desires are. Why are we rolling the

dice for someone and something that we’re putting a lot of capital

into, both in lives and money, without knowing where it’s headed?

And why would the Sunnis—why would the Sunnis, based upon everything that we’re doing? Even listening to you, where you suggest that the Sunnis want an all-out civil war, a failed state; it’s

a better course than anything they have right now—it’s a better

course than anything they have right now because they’re not

doing very well under the present political process. So, if that’s the

case, we sound like we are going to be at the lead—we are going

to be at the lead of helping Shias ultimately suppress Sunnis,

under the goal that that will put them into submission so that they

will ultimately accept whatever deal is granted to them. That, to

me, is not a recipe for success. Now, tell me where I’m wrong in

this.

General KEANE. No; I agree with you. And, as I said, I think

there are real problems there.

What I would ask you to do is, in terms of the operation itself

and—is pause a little bit. Let’s get General Petraeus into this country—get him confirmed up there, get him into the country, let him

be able to analyze this, himself. I mean, obviously, he’s doing it

from afar here, but it’s not the same as the fidelity he will have

there. He knows a lot of these Iraqis, himself. And I think he’s capable of working out a much better command-and-control relationship than this appears to be right now, and resolving some of those

differences so that we do not have problems, you know, on the

streets of Baghdad, or in Al Anbar, because of who’s in the lead

and who’s not. I think it’s resolvable, and I would ask you to give

him an opportunity to resolve it and get on top of this situation.

Senator MENENDEZ. But not resolvable is taking a roll of the dice

with the lives of America’s sons and daughters and its national

treasure on a government that we have no idea whether they are

committed to the political reconciliation that’s necessary.

General Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said to

us—in an answer to a question in a briefing, he said, ‘‘We need to

get to have the Iraqis love their children more than they hate their

neighbors.’’ That’s probably a powerful truism, but it doesn’t come

through military might, achieving that—that they love their children more than they hate their neighbors. And so, it goes beyond

military equation and whether or not we have a partner who is

truly willing, with the benchmarks and consequences for not meeting those benchmarks, to move in the political process. We are also

risking the lives of America’s sons and daughters for a venture that

has already gone bad and doesn’t seem to change.

And I find that to be a problem. And I’d love to hear any of the

other generals’ views on this, if they have any, as a final question.

General HOAR. I think your questions are well founded,

Senator——

Senator MENENDEZ. General, you and I met a while back——

General HOAR [continuing]. About Mr. Maliki.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And one of the things you said

is about standing up—getting Iraqis to ultimately stand up as

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Iraqis—it seems to me that a good part of this mission needs Iraqis

to come together and stand up as Iraqis. How do we get them to

have that national spirit, versus the sectarian spirit they have

right now?

General ODOM. Well, that’s a—that’s an issue that T.E. [sic]

Lawrence faced, it’s an issue the British faced, it’s an issue that

Saddam faced, and——

Senator MENENDEZ. And it’s an issue we face.

General ODOM [continuing]. What the answer was. Fear, terror,

and repressive organizations.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Do you have any more

questions? You have time for another one.

Senator Casey, thank you.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to reiterate

what was mentioned before about the way these hearings have proceeded and the panels you’ve put together, in concert with Senator

Lugar, and we’re grateful for that.

And I know we have much more to do, but in particular today

when I look at this panel and listen to what you’ve said—I’ve heard

most of it, probably 80 percent, in and out of here, for other committee obligations—but it brings to mind something my father said

when he was Governor of Pennsylvania, the night before the 1991

gulf war. He was talking about the troops and obviously asking the

people of our State to pray for the troops, but he also said something I’ll never forget. He said, ‘‘We pray for the troops, but we also

pray for ourselves, that we may be worthy of their valor.’’ And I

think, by your service and your own valor, you have proven yourselves worthy of that on the battlefield, as well as the testimony

today and the dedication you bring to these issues, and the scholarship you bring.

And I’d love to talk to each of you about politics and diplomacy,

because you bring a lot more to this table than just your military

experience and knowledge, but, because of limited time and because of your experience, I want to focus on the military questions,

as best I can in the limited time.

I have one question about Iraqi security forces’ preparedness, but

I guess the underlying premise of my question is in itself a question—is this issue that we’ve read about in the press over the last

couple of years, but it doesn’t get much attention—as much attention now as before—level-one, level-two readiness, based upon Pentagon definitions—(a) is that kind of measuring stick operable, still,

today, and, (b) if it is, from—based upon your information, your

knowledge, how many Iraqi security forces do we have trained at

level one, meaning, in my layman’s term, that they can take the

lead independently, and level two, meaning that they take the lead,

with American forces supporting them? So, General Keane, if you

could start, and——

General KEANE. I can’t get at the number. I’ve been briefed on

it, a number of weeks ago, and, you know, I just can’t refine the

number, in terms of who’s level one and who’s level two.

Look at the—the command in Iraq was using these different levels as a measuring stick to measure the capacity of these forces,

not just in terms of their performance, but in terms of the number

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of people they had in it: Where had they been trained? Did they

get through those gates, in terms of officer/NCO training? And how

much time did they have in operational units? What is their equipment status? It’s a—it’s something very similar that United States

units go through every single month in assessing their own readiness. So, it was not too surprising that officers who grew up with

that system imposed that as a basis for making an evaluation. And

I think what it—where it serves a useful purpose is in attempting

to allocate resources, and realizing, you know, where you’re having

your shortfalls. And for that, I think it had some merit. I think we

also got too bogged down by it, you know, bureaucratically, in

terms of what it meant to us, and made far too much of it, in my

judgment.

But the—look, it—the overall issue dealing with the Iraqi security forces is, they still are not at the level where they can cope

with this violence, certainly by themselves, and will not be for some

time. That’s the harsh reality that we have to deal with, and that’s

the problem I have with just turning it over to them, because

they—the level of violence will go up in 2007. It’s actually predicted

to go up in 2007, unless we do something about it. So, that would

mean an even further step toward a fractured state and anarchy.

So, what this is about is bringing it down to a level where they

can cope with that reality. And it buys time for their growth and

development. They—we need to improve those forces. All the things

that have been suggested by the ISG in that make sense to me, in

terms of strengthening our advisory program, making certain

they’re better educated, our advisors, that they have much more

cultural awareness than they currently have before they go over

there, there’s more of them, embed some U.S. forces with them, as

well. And I would grow the size of the Iraqi security forces, also.

So, I mean, your emphasis is a right one. The Iraqi security forces

truly do matter. I mean, they are our exit strategy. We have to

turn this over to them at a level where they can perform. But to

help them, we must bring the violence down, in my judgment, so

they can cope with it.

Senator CASEY. Can you just put two numbers on this, if you can:

(a) Do you know any kind of a rough estimate of how many forces

you think—or forget level one or level two, just generally—do you

think we’re prepared to take on this responsibility? And, (b) whatever that number is, what do we need to get to? I mean—because

I think—I’m like a lot of Americans, we need to have some kind

of standard where we can say, at some point, in terms of troop

numbers and readiness, depending on how you define that—we’re

at a point now where we can have consequences that flow from

that, in terms of our own troops. And I know it’s not always easy,

you can’t do a numerical specific or precise numerical determination, but, I mean: How are we doing, in terms of identifying the

number of troops they have to take on this responsibility? Are we

way off? Are we halfway there? Is there any way you can put a

number on that?

General KEANE. Well, I still think—the administration—you

know, where we are is 325,000, and that totals every—all of it. Out

of that is—about 125,000 would be United—Iraqi military forces;

the rest are broken down into police and national police and border

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guards, et cetera. In my own mind, the best organization of the

Iraqi security forces is their army. They have performed the best.

And even they have serious problems. Sixty-five percent of them,

on average, show up any single day for duty. Some of them are on

leave, and some of them are just not showing up for duty. We call

it Absent Without Leave, or deserting. So, that’s still an issue, and

will continue to be an issue.

I think that you have to grow the size of this force, the military

piece of this force, at 125,000. I think it has to go beyond 300,000,

itself, and we would need advisors to do that.

The army size of the force, while it is their strongest institution

in Iraq, the numbers of that force is inadequate. The quality of the

force is improving. It’s not satisfactory where it is. That’s the truth

of it. And I think that strengthening it with our advisory program

and some of the other steps we’re going to take, certainly with better equipment, and, most importantly, the appropriate equipment,

all make sense. But that still will take time to get them to where

they need to be.

Senator CASEY. Thank you. And I wanted to leave some time for

the others to respond to that——

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I might just add to——

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Series of questions.

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. That, I—because I basically

agree with Jack Keane.

We should never, by the way, run too quickly to conclusion. I’ve

been in Iraqi battalions that I thought were patriots, courageous,

convinced that they’re going to create a new Iraqi nation. And, so

far, not an Iraqi Army battalion has flipped over to the other side,

so that at 2 o’clock in the morning, suddenly they seize their advisory group and they declare themselves to be Shia militia. That’s

good news, and we shouldn’t discount it.

I also believe that there has been such deliberate deception on

the part of the Secretary of Defense and his senior people over the

caliber, the status of these forces, that it boggles the mind.

Callous——

Senator CASEY. In terms of the——

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Open, disingenuous explanation, putting Iraqi protective security forces as part of total numbers, inventing a force that was growing at 100,000 per 60 days.

How could that be true? Where is the equipment? It was utter nonsense.

Senator CASEY. But you mean deception, in terms of

numbers——

General MCCAFFREY. Sure, numbers——

Senator CASEY [continuing]. In saying where we are?

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. Caliber, equipment, reliability.

They were making it up.

Now, where are we today? Probably—and I’ve watched numbers

out of Cordesman very closely, because I think he tries to be objective and neutral. I think there’s less than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers

who show up on a given day to defend the country. There’s 27 million of those people. It is a tiny force. It’s much smaller than the

U.S. military presence in country. Many of the other services are

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either inadequate, incompetent, or uniformed terrorists under the

control of one faction or another. So, you’ve got less than 100,000.

Their equipment status is so bad that, were they U.S. units on

this mission, they would be declared ineligible for military operations. They have no equipment appropriate for their task. And

then, finally, going forward—because I’ve been saying, ‘‘Look, you

know, 3 years from now we’re going to be gone,’’ and we’re going

to be gone, make no doubt about it. Who’s going to be flying helicopters in Iraq? It’s not going to be the U.S. Army. We—I think

we’ve got probably 1,000 aircraft there right now. It probably takes

36 months, on a crash basis——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General MCCAFFREY [continuing]. To manufacture a Black

Hawk, train the crew, put them in the field, and have them flying.

Have we started that process yet? And the answer is no. And,

therefore, 3 years from now, there will be no solution, there won’t

be an Iraqi security force adequate to maintain internal order.

Now, final thought, because I—you know, I think the five-brigade

surge is a surge of the wrong stuff, but if I was a three-star commander—General Odierno, a terrific soldier—I’d want five more

brigades, because in a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad today—and

I got this directly from General Abizaid, the neighborhood will beg

us to not leave. So, having a U.S. Army battalion or a Marine battalion there clearly dampens down the violence. It’s a good thing.

They’re honest kids, they’re—you know, they’re spending CERP

money, they’re—lots of good things comes out of it. So, my only

question is: How do we create a condition so we can leave? The

presence of U.S. forces is a boon to Iraq, is a gift to take that monster out of power and hang him. All that was a good thing. Now

we’re trying to figure out: How do we stand up a state and get out

of there? And the prerequisite is not to just say, ‘‘We’re going to

go in and clear and hold neighborhoods in Baghdad with U.S. privates.’’

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

General HOAR. I can’t add anything to Barry McCaffrey, sir.

Senator CASEY. Yes, General.

General ODOM. I would ask you to ask a prior question. Do you

know any examples where you’ve had weak governments, where

foreigners have gone in and stood up their military and it was a

success? I don’t know of any.

General HOAR. The United States.

General ODOM. When you try to get—well, you—there was political leadership. The Congress was in charge through the whole revolution. You could have said it pulled a coup, but it was Americans

standing up, it wasn’t other countries coming in and do it—doing

it by ventriloquy. So, I think it’s a bit like trying to put a roof on

a house before it has the walls built up.

Senator CASEY. You mean, the——

General ODOM. Dealing with training up Iraqis.

Senator CASEY [continuing]. The civilian government is the foundation of the house. Yeah.

General ODOM. The way it happens in most places. And very

often, the military—I mean, there were so many military regimes

in the world, because military power is political power. And if you

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stand up the military first, there’s a high chance you’ll have a

practorian, or military, regime take over. That’s what we found all

through Africa and South America in our 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, with

military assistance programs to these areas.

Senator CASEY. I have lots more, but I know I’m over.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, I am the last person between these people and lunch, but

I appreciate all of you hanging around. I appreciate your testimony.

I’ve been able to know some of you personally, read articles and

editorials that have been written about this issue, written by people at the table over the years. I want to know—I want you to

know that I respect the service of everyone at the table, and I certainly respect the integrity of everyone at the table. And the—no

matter where their views are on this, that this political/military

interface that we’ve been debating is probably the hardest issue, in

terms of how our government works. I’ve dealt with it every way

you can deal with it, I think, in my lifetime.

General Odom, I would like to say to you that I very much appreciate your writings over the past several years. They have been invaluable, I think, in providing a strategic umbrella under which

we’re able to examine the implications of our policy. This is a challenge that is not simply in Iraq. It’s—as you have written and as

other people have said, this challenge can only be addressed regionally and beyond. It relates to the stability of the region. It relates

to our ability to fight the war against terrorism elsewhere. It relates to strategic challenges that are in other than the region, and

we really do need to address this for the well-being of our military

and our country, I believe.

And, General Hoar, I’d like to say to you, first of all, General

Keane mentioned a phrase, a little while ago, ‘‘moral courage.’’ One

of my great heroes was GEN Bob Barrow, who was Commandant

of the Marine Corps, and used to say, frequently, ‘‘There’s physical

courage and then there’s moral courage, and moral courage is quite

often harder than physical courage.’’ And the courage that you

showed, standing up, speaking out about this early, along with people like Tony Zinni, who also commanded CENTCOM, people like

General Shinseki, General Newbold, who I admire greatly, and

General Van Riper, and others, I think is going to stand as a mark

when history looks at where we have gone and how we, hopefully,

will get out of this in a way that retains our national esteem

around the world—or regains our national esteem around the

world.

General McCaffrey, I want to clarify one thing that you said

about the Constitution. You said it twice. And I’m not a—I’m not

a constitutional lawyer, I am an attorney. But the language in the

Constitution, about armies and navies, is—it comes from two separate phrases in article 1, section 8. And this is important, I think,

when we examine what our responsibilities are, in terms of looking

at how the military has been used in this war.

The Constitution empowers the Congress to ‘‘raise and support

armies,’’ but to ‘‘provide and maintain a navy.’’ And the distinction

was put there for a reason, with the historical experiences in continental Europe, with turning over standing armies to monarchs and

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having militaries used for adventurism. And so, when I look, even

at the issue right now, of increasing end strength in the Army and

the Marine Corps—and I’m very—I had a lot of experience, when

I was ASD, in looking at Army force-structure issues, and, as you

know, I’m intimately familiar with the force-structure difficulties in

the Marine Corps right now. But my cautionary note has been that

I don’t want to put a vote in place that will ratify what I believe

has been the lack of strategy, just through the momentum of the

fact that we have troops at risk. I mentioned that to Secretary of

Defense Gates last week. He told me that there were off-ramps, as

he called them, in case our troop levels in Iraq went down, but

that’s one question that I’m going to be asking. And I hope my colleagues will be asking, is that the justification for these increases

in end strength should take into account, hopefully, what I would

see as a reduction in force structure.

I have two questions. The first is, General McCaffrey, on your proposal to—or your suggestion that $10 billion a year be put into

development programs, I know that you have a good bit of experience in this, and you’re on the boards of—according to your bio, of

companies that are more than likely doing business in Iraq. I’m

concerned about accountability on the funds that have been spent.

I’m also concerned about where this money would come from. Are

you suggesting a reprogramming or an addition to the budget?

General MCCAFFREY. By the way, I am on the board of directors

of one company, DynCorp, that is very heavily involved in providing 3,000 or 4,000 people in Iraq, and several hundred, I believe,

in Afghanistan. And I frequently make a point to underscore, because there’s the debate inside the profession on how come contractors are on the battlefield, providing almost all of our long-haul

communications, our logistics? For God’s sake, it’s incredible. I’d

prefer to have an active military force that does most of these functions, but the facts of the matter are, they’re not there, and, without these contractor operations, we would grind to a halt immediately.

So, I’m inclined to say, let’s treat them with respect, because

they’re getting killed and wounded in huge numbers. And they actually, when you talk to these kids, or older single women, they see

themselves doing a patriotic bit—KBR, Halliburton, et cetera. So—

but that’s an aside.

I think, back to your central question, the notion of ‘‘development

program,’’ I’m not sure you can spend $10 billion a year successfully in Iraq. The Congress provided $18.6 billion; it’s all gone, essentially. The President just said he wants a billion more CERP

funds, local employment. I don’t know that, given the lack of security, given the nature of the Maliki government, that that would

work. I am confident that if our only trick in this game is, ‘‘let’s

put five more brigades in downtown Baghdad and fight neighborhood by neighborhood,’’ this is a loser. So, I told the President, 2

years ago, ‘‘When the development money runs out, and when Congress won’t provide more, that’s the day you lost the war.’’ So, I

would have great oversight of $10 billion a year, or $1 billion a

year. Is it going to be spent effectively? You’ve clearly got to look

at waste, fraud, and abuse on U.S. or other contractors, but I think

it’s just a vital aspect of moving forward.

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Senator WEBB. Yeah, I obviously am new to this position, but

that’s one of the concerns that I’ve had, looking at this—the conduct of the war——

General MCCAFFREY. A legitimate concern.

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Throughout the past several years.

It——

General MCCAFFREY. Right.

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Trying to figure out where all this

money has gone already.

This is a general question, but I’ll go first—General Keane, your

comments very heavily involve the Sunni—you know, the need to

stand up to the Sunni insurgency. And one of the concerns that I’ve

had on that is, given the divisions—the obvious divisions in the

country, that we’re almost in what would be called a strategic

mousetrap here, where the harder we fight against the Sunni insurgency, the more the Shia population is empowered and the more

influence Iran has in Iraq. And so, I’m interested in the views of

all of you about the notion of that mousetrap.

General KEANE. Well, I think it’s a concern, certainly. I just mention that, because when you try to define the problem, it’s—I find

it useful to go back and understand how we got here. And it was

the Sunnis who were rejecting the—our occupation and rejecting

what we believe is a new form of government. And they started

this, and the al-Qaeda enabled it, and now we have, obviously, considerable sectarian Shia violence that’s provoked by the Sunnis.

You have to—certainly, if we go into these neighborhoods, as I

believe we will, we’re going to deal with al-Qaeda, we will deal with

Shia, and we will deal with Sunnis, to be sure, at the tactical level.

And—we’ll have the capacity to deal with all of that. Your question

is much more of a strategic one, in terms of: Are we picking sides

here? And what is the implications of that?

We are where we are. We have a government—and that government is a fledgling government, at best, trying to find itself—that’s

grown out of a consensus, and it has factions in it. And by anybody’s definition, it’s weak. What I think we need to do is help it

and strengthen it. And by doing so, and working with the Sunni

insurgency, we can get the Sunnis to participate in a way that

they’re not willing to do now.

And I’m absolutely convinced we can push back on the Shia violence by truly protecting the people. We can’t be Pollyannaish

about this. We know that Sadr and others are using the violence

against their people to seek their own political advantage and leverage in the country. That’s a given. But the reality is, also, that

by bringing that violence down, you start taking their issue away

for—from them that justifies what they’re doing.

So, I’m hopeful that we can do something that’s very constructive

here in—and it is a military application of force designed singularly

to get a political solution. It’s the only reason why we’re doing this.

You buy time for the growth and development of Iraqi security

forces, which helps in our ability to exit the country, and then you

strengthen Maliki’s hand, both with the Sunnis and with the Shias,

so that we can get a better form of government, in terms of representation, and move the Sunnis to that table and take away what

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is now their single option and what they believe is their only option, which is: Continue the armed violence.

So, you have to deal with them, but certainly you also have to

deal with the Shia violence that’s there and the incredible level of

it that took place. I recognize the mousetrap, but I still think we

have to go ahead and work this, because it’s the only thing we can

do, I believe, that will strengthen the government that we currently have. The benchmarks, by themselves, to me, don’t mean a

lot. I don’t think you’re going to get anything out of it.

Senator WEBB. General Hoar.

General HOAR. Yes, sir. I hesitate to recite history to you, but

when the two principal institutions in that country, the armed

forces and tribalism, were destroyed or dismembered as a conscious

policy of this Government, you automatically reduce the possibility

of finding good outcomes. Ninety-five percent of the people in Iraq

belong to a tribe. And tribes transcend religion and ethnicity. The

armed forces is a no-brainer, that there should have been a deBaathification at the top end, and retain that—all of that, that

went with it. So, we have few institutions to fall back on. And so,

as a result, we’re trying to build from the bottom up; and, in my

judgment, you can’t get there from here. It’s too late, we’re asking

too much of what needs to be done.

Senator WEBB. General McCaffrey, you have a thought on that?

General MCCAFFREY. The—I think I’d actually agree with General Odom’s characterization, and maybe—perhaps come to a

slightly different conclusion. When you step into Iraq, took out a

cruel ruling elite, maybe 15 percent of the population that had

dominated the military, the intelligence service, business, academics, et cetera, and you said, ‘‘We’re going to institute democratic

reforms,’’ then you gave the government to a Shia-Kurdish overwhelming majority who had been abused for hundreds of years, if

not for 30-plus by Saddam and his criminal regime. So, that was

the outcome we understood when we set foot in the country.

I’m not sure that’s necessarily unacceptable, if we maintained a

presence to ensure that there wouldn’t be a violent decimation in

retribution against the Sunnis, if we kept peace with their neighbors. I’m not quite sure why a Government of Iraq that was more

closely aligned, by far, with Iran than Saddam’s 7-year war against

the Iranians—I’m not quite sure why that doesn’t suit our own interests.

I do think that we ought to have a regional focus. Our focus

should be peace and some form of stability, and that our—as you

have said, though, the current mousetrap, in my view, is, our strategy is failing and our current responses, it seem to me, will not

break out of the box.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I just have a few closing questions, if I may. I can’t

tell you how much I appreciate your perseverance, as well as your

answers.

To continue with the conundrum that my friend from Virginia

has mentioned, one of the reasons I always have trouble—and I’m

not being facetious—with this administration, is understanding

their strategic objective. Internally in Iraq, the premise is, as statVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00402 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ed clearly and articulately by General Keane, that if we gain control of the insurgents who are needlessly going after our troops, but

also fomenting this sectarian war by going after Shia indiscriminately, that somehow the Shia will feel they can stand down, and

the political process can begin. Let’s assume that’s true.

At the same time, I don’t know whether this is true, but it seems

clear, overall—the administration and the President clearly stated

that he is going to do all he can to deal with Syria and Iran, but

particularly Iran.

Now, everything I read—and I’ve been here 34 years; I’ve learned

to read between the lines. I don’t always read it accurately, but

there is always a message between the lines. The President didn’t

have a throwaway phrase about Iran in his speech for nothing.

That was the red light that went on for me, beyond the surge. Of

the things that concern me about the speech, more than anything

else was the emphasis on Iran.

And, again, it seems to me, to raise the conundrum mentioned,

or the mousetrap, whatever you want to say, is that at the very

time we are taking on the Sunnis, which, I can tell you from my

personal discussions, upsets our allies in the region—they are very

uneasy about that in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt and other places—

at the very time that’s happening internally, the Shia, who seem

satisfied with that, are very upset that we seem to be focusing on

the Shia influence in the region, outside the country. So, I don’t

know how you square that. I don’t understand, strategically, how

you can accomplish both objectives. Am I missing something? Or

am I overreading? Anyone?

Yes, General.

General HOAR. Right on. That’s the short answer, sir. [Laughter.]

The longer answer is, there are people—Seymour Hersh among

them—that have been writing, for the last 8 or 10 months, in the

New Yorker about the plan to attack Iran. I think that replacing

an officer with ground combat experience in CENTCOM with an

admiral, by sending a second carrier battle group into the gulf,

by sending Patriot batteries into the region, are—I would use a

slightly different word than you, but ominous, nonetheless.

I would tell you a story that I believe to be true. Hamad bin

Jassim, the Foreign Minister of Qatar, went to Tehran. He told the

Iranians that, while his government had supported United States

efforts in Iraq, that he would not—their government would not support any adventurism toward Iran. The Iranians told him that he

had it all wrong, that they do not have the capability to strike the

United States, but, if attacked by the United States, they would attack infrastructure targets up and down the gulf among those

countries that have supported the United States.

If I were going to do this, I would assuage the concerns of my

friends in the region by bringing Patriot batteries in. I don’t know

why you have two carrier battle groups in the gulf, when fixedwing air, while an essential part of any campaign, doesn’t require

a lot of airplanes on a day-to-day basis, and why you would have

an admiral in charge of CENTCOM, when you have two essentially

ground combat operations going on in two separate campaigns,

would all indicate to me that there’s something moving right now

toward Iran.

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The CHAIRMAN. I happen to agree with that. You would know,

much better than I would, what these moves meant. That’s how I

read it. But I’m trying to get at the more fundamental question.

I never can understand—there seems to be no coherence to the

strategy of this administration, from the beginning. We seem to

have a little of this, a little of that; and the objectives, the stated

objectives, the stated missions, seem at odds with one another.

Again, let’s assume it made sense to go into Iran. Here, you have

the present Shia-dominated government opening up meetings with,

trying to establish a diplomatic relationship with, Tehran, trying to

extend a relationship to Syria, as well, at the very moment we

seem to be trying to satisfy them internally by staying out of Sadr

City, focusing on the Sunni. But at the same time at odds with

their stated, or at least apparent, foreign policy—regional policy. It

seems like we are our own worst enemy, in terms of the strategic

notions that we have. They seem inconsistent.

General MCCAFFREY. The—I think you, again, pose another principal strategic challenge we’re facing. I personally have been to see

the Secretary of State, my travels in the region, listening to our allies in the Persian Gulf—and I used, with General Hoar, a corny

story. I started with my first platoon Sergeant in the 82d Airborne.

He said, ‘‘Sir,’’ he said, ‘‘don’t you ever threaten people in public,

but make sure, if you do threaten them, you can carry out your

threat.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Bingo.

General MCCAFFREY. So, we’ve had a combination of public

threats to the Iranians, which has horrified our allies, which, it

seems to me, from a strictly military perspective, are sheer insanity

that we would try and end a nuclear capability of the Iranians,

take down their air defense in the process of doing it, neutralize

their naval threat to the Persian Gulf oil supplies, and to do it

while we have 150,000 GIs stuck 400 kilometers up into Iraq, with

our lines of communication back to the sea and the safety of the

Navy—going through 400 kilometers of Shia population. So, this

doesn’t make any sense.

I hope it’s just a lower-level notion, ‘‘Well, you’re always supposed to put a carrier out there to empower your ambassador demarche, but if it goes beyond that, this is truly the most significant

blunder in strategic thinking we will have seen since World War

II.

General ODOM. One——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, General.

General ODOM [continuing]. One brief comment. I’d like to commend you for bringing up that paradox and putting this light

directly on Iran. If I were in your position, or members of this committee, I would be thinking about how I will vote when an apparent Iranian terrorist attack occurs against the United States, not

necessarily in the United States, but against some of its interest

in the future—and the war cries for bombing Iran go up.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, quite frankly, General, I’m thinking of

going farther than this. I haven’t discussed this with my colleagues

yet. I’m in the process of trying to draft legislation that would

make it clear that the authorization for the use of force that was

passed, which I think is essentially no longer relevant. It was put

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forward to take out Saddam. It was put forward to deal with weapons of mass destruction. If they were there, they ain’t there now;

they never were, in my view. And he’s gone. So, what’s the raison

d’etat for this? I want to make it clear, I’ve been around here too

long—I take the President seriously when he says things that seem

to me to be outrageous. I’m not being a wise guy now, I—I’m not

trying to be disrespectful, I give you my word. But I take it seriously, because the first time out, when we gave the President the

authority to move forward, Lugar and I had a resolution that was

much more restrictive than the one that passed in the authorization of the use of force. And remember, everybody—not you guys,

but everybody has sort of a selective memory about the moment.

The moment we were voting on that, the issue was: Do we lift

sanctions on Saddam, which the rest of the world was pushing, or

do we give the President the political clout to demonstrate to the

world that we stood with him in insisting they stay on by giving

this authority to use force, if need be? And we had assurances, ‘‘No,

no, no, no, no; we’re not going to use the force, we’re not going to

move forward.’’ And then the writing began to be on the wall, when

every time it looked like Powell was making progress diplomatically, there would be a deliberate effort to undercut that, coming

from the administration.

And the press now says, ‘‘It was obvious to everyone that these

guys were going to do that.’’ It wasn’t obvious. They acted responsibly on Afghanistan. They did it in the right way. They marshaled

authority, they had the bill of particulars, they put forward the indictment, they sent folks out around the world, to the world capitals, including our friends and enemies alike, they dealt with Iran.

I mean, it was done logically, and it was done rationally, and it

gave some of us hope—and remember what was being written at

the time, gentlemen. I know you do remember. I was having scores

of interview requests, and some of you were also being asked, ‘‘Has

the administration become internationalist? Has the President

changed his mind? Has he moved from neoisolationism to engaging

the rest of the world?’’ Remember that? And there were all these

articles written in December, after we gave him the authority, but

before we went to war. And so, the idea that everybody knew they

would be, in my view, as incredibly irresponsible as they were is—

Matter of fact, back in the days when I was chairman, again, not

a whole lot of difference between Senator Lugar and me on these

things—we held a series of hearings, and it was an extensive series—before the authority was given. Not ‘‘What happens the day

after Saddam?’’ The title of the series was, ‘‘The Decade After.’’

Now, the reason I bother to state this, gentlemen, is that it

seems to me that we still don’t quite have a strategy. But let me

get into a tactical question, and then, with one other question, let

you all go. I really appreciate you doing this.

From a military perspective, again, I spent a lot of time, as I

think General McCaffrey knows—a lot of time with General

Petraeus—in theater, in e-mails. I mean, I find the guy to be exactly what you all advertise him to be. That’s my impression of

him, a really smart guy. Well, it’s often suggested by my friends

who have a different view about ‘‘the surge,’’ who think it’s a good

idea, that, ‘‘Look what he was able to do up in the north.’’ And my

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instinct is, we’re comparing apples and oranges here. And that’s

what I want to ask you, a tactical question.

Is there a difference between fighting foreign jihadis and domestic insurgents—Baathists, Saddamists, et cetera—and trying to

stop a sectarian war? In the north, where Petraeus did so well, in

Mosul and in Tal Afar, my recollection was, there was not a civil

war. It wasn’t predominantly Shia killing Sunni, Kurds killing

Shia, et cetera. It was dealing with an insurgency trying to kill

American forces and prevent an Iraqi Government from becoming

a reality. Now, I may be wrong. You don’t all have to comment, but

you are welcome to. But tell me: Is there a difference?

General MCCAFFREY. I think you summarized it correctly. I remember going up to see Dave Petraeus in his command post in

Mosul, and he had an unbelievable grasp of the—of how you go

about—economically, politically, militarily—jump-starting the region. He had incredible interpersonal relationships with the Arab

leadership. It was a phenomenal performance. He understood the

disastrous judgments of Mr. Bremer, et al., in the central government, standing down the army, firing the officer corps, deBaathicizing the country. He goes back to a totally different situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

General MCCAFFREY. I’ll guarantee you, he understands that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have no doubt that he does. Let me put

it this way. I’ve thought there is a fundamentally different circumstance, and, if it is, I’m confident he understands it. I am just

perplexed as to what happens.

My prediction, for what it’s worth—and I obviously am not a

military man, but I do know a fair amount about policing—as you

know, General, I’ve become a student of that for 35 years—what’s

needed here is, essentially, community policing, and that is a long,

long investment. That is gigantic—even in a metropolitan city in

America, where there’s not a civil war—and I don’t know whether

we have the stomach for it, or the capacity.

And my guess is, you’re going to see Sadr being smart enough

to stand down, take his folks out of uniform, put them in civilian

clothes, drop the checkpoints, take away the rationale for the U.S.

military to move on Sadr City, hopefully we—to use your point,

General—go do their work in the Sunni areas, and then step up.

Who are we benefiting? But that’s neither here nor there.

Last question, and it really is the last question, gentlemen. Underlying—the underlying issue here, for me, is: Assume I buy into

the rationale that you need a military solution to create an atmosphere in which a political solution can emerge. I’ve said, at the outset, in my strong opposition to this surge, that if you somehow convince me there is a connection and a correlation and an agreement

between an underlying political objective and the military—I could

see the possible rationale for it. But here’s my problem. When you

talk about ‘‘To give the Iraqis some breathing space by bringing

order in Baghdad to allow for a political settlement to emerge,’’ is

there any evidence anywhere that, even if tomorrow we dropped

500,000 troops into Iraq, completely shut down the civil war temporarily, that that is going to change the conditions that are required

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for the Sunni and Shia to make some serious, serious, serious and

dangerous political concessions?

What makes us think that that would have SCIRI or Dawa conclude that we’re going to give a big chunk of the revenues to the

Sunnis? What would make us think that the Sunnis are prepared

to sign on to essentially a Sunni constituency equivalent to

Kurdistan? What makes us think that these giant dividing issues

are going to be resolved? Is there any reason to think that, even

if there is not a single Iraqi killed in the next 6 months, there’s

incentive to make these very difficult political decisions that have

to be made to allow this country, once we lift the siege, to live together? I’ve not seen any. There may be.

That’s the question I have, and that’s the last question. And, as

I said, I’ve really trespassed on your time, but you’re all so darn

good, I can’t resist.

Senator CASEY. Senator, let me—can I just——

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator CASEY. I want to make sure I understand what you’re

asking. Your—and I was thinking about this before, and I ran out

of time—your question is basically: Will restoring order automatically trigger political momentum?

The CHAIRMAN. Will restoring it—or not even automatically—

will—is there any evidence that restoring order will make the

Dawa-SCIRI parties, Sadr’s party, the Sunni tribal leaders and the

Sunni party more inclined to settle what everyone acknowledges is

the underlying problem: Their significant political differences? And,

if so, what are those differences that have to be resolved so that,

when we do step back and say, ‘‘It’s yours, fellows,’’ that it’s not

going to immediately return to the sectarian chaos that exists

today?

General ODOM. Can I give a—I’ll give you a fairly short answer.

I don’t think there’s any evidence for that. The question, as you’ve

posed it, has been addressed since the fall—the breakup of the

Ottoman Empire, and there have been efforts, again and again, to

give somebody time to put it together. It always failed.

In Vietnam, I used to address this issue with the—in the Pacification Development Program. The country field submission for

more money for Vietnam would come out from the Embassy to the

MACV Headquarters for staffing, and they’d say, ‘‘Well, they need

more time, they’re not ready to take over yet, so we can’t give them

all they want, but let’s give most of what they want.’’ So, we—you

know, leave an incentive for them to—‘‘We won’t give everything,

but we won’t let them fall.’’

So, I pulled the files out for the last 6 years, and every year, you

had the same argument, and every year, the amount of money they

wanted, and we were willing to give them, went up. Well, I caused

a little disturbance by suggesting that to do this is like advocating

that a drunk man drink more in order to sober up.

And then, I’ve since seen a lot of literature on other countries,

cases that suggest that the worst thing you can do to help a client

against an insurgency in an internal war is to give them help. It—

an internal war is about who’s going to rule, and who’s going to

rule is the guy who can tax and control the resources. And if you

give these guys time, through money and resources, they will use

398

you as their tax base, and their opponents will take over the domestic tax.

The CHAIRMAN. I love that quote—and I must admit, I thought

I was a relatively good student of the Communist revolution, but

I love that quote, ‘‘Paper will put up with anything written on it.’’

That was Stalin’s, I guess you said?

General ODOM. Well, it’s an old Russian proverb.

The CHAIRMAN. An old—oh, a Russian proverb. I——

General ODOM. He loved that.

The CHAIRMAN. I must admit, I had not heard it before. But,

having said that, there still is a paper with stuff written on it out

there called a constitution. And if you look at the Constitution, interesting thing, the central government, as envisioned by the

Iraqis, has no taxing power. There is no taxing power.

General ODOM. Then it’s a joke.

The CHAIRMAN. I had this little debate with Prime Minister

Maliki, who—for the sake of discussion, I’ll acknowledge he has

this overwhelmingly difficult job, and it may be putting too much

on him, et cetera, but we were meeting, and I asked him about

what he was going to do about such and such? He said, ‘‘That’s already taken care of in the Constitution.’’ I said, ‘‘Mr. Prime Minister, you and I’’—this was in Baghdad, on July 7, 8, 9, 10; I don’t

recall exactly which day it was—I said, ‘‘Mr. Prime Minister, you

and I may be the only two people who have read the Constitution.’’

It’s fascinating. The strong central government our Government

keeps insisting on—under the organizing principle of that government, the Constitution, the central government has no power to

tax. Explicitly. Explicitly. And it explicitly states that governates,

the 18 of them, have explicit power, if they choose the title ‘‘region’’

rather than ‘‘governate,’’ to maintain their security.

And in Kurdistan, if I’m not mistaken, General, you can’t even

fly the Iraqi flag, and no Iraqi forces are allowed within what is

now called Kurdistan. You understand——

General KEANE. Can I have one comment?

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. My frustration.

Yes, please, General.

General KEANE. You know, to accept the premise that you just

suggested is—you know, that insurgencies, irregular warfare, internal conflicts, when they’re challenging like this, and they’re difficult, that it’s hopeless, that there’s no way to be able to resolve

it—and I don’t suggest, for a minute, that this is not very difficult,

and certainly General Petraeus is fully aware of what his challenges are in front of him, and they are very different than what

he faced in Mosul, much more—much more difficult—but the reality is that you can use military force to compel people’s wills. You

can change their will, using force. You can begin to set some conditions to get some political results.

The question that will remain—I’m convinced we can do that—

the question remains, for me, which—I’ve tried to be as straightforward about it as I can——

The CHAIRMAN. You have been.

General KEANE [continuing]. Is the government itself, where—

even if we do that, where will—their political will would be. I

would like to think that after we have strengthened his hand, and

399

then he can bring the Sunnis to the table, and the Shias are back

behind their barricades, and the violence has gone down, that those

benchmark things then make sense. But that remains an open

question. I’m not going to try to put a spin on this; it’s not my

style. But——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m not suggesting you were, General. I

think you’ve been straightforward——

General KEANE [continuing]. But the fact is, is that I believe you

can establish some conditions to get some results. It’ll still be

Maliki and his government, whether they’re committed to those results or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else?

General HOAR. Sure. I think that many people in this Government—or they don’t understand the depth of enmity that exists between Shia and Sunni. This is big-time and real, and it has been

for centuries, as we know. And my view, as I indicated to you earlier, is that if you got some political movement on the part of

Maliki, then you could perhaps talk about troops, but if he’s not

committed to make hard choices early on, there is no chance of

pulling this thing out, in my judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, you’ve been incredibly generous with

your time, your knowledge, your wisdom, and your straightforwardness. It is refreshing. It is welcome. It is needed. I thank you all

for allowing us to take you through the lunch hour.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

(401)

ALTERNATIVE PLANS CONTINUED—FEDERALISM, SIDE WITH THE MAJORITY, STRATEGIC

REDEPLOYMENT, OR NEGOTIATE?

TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007 [A.M.]

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:20 a.m., in room

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, Obama,

Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing will please come to order.

This morning, we begin our third week of hearings on the remaining options in Iraq. Today, we’ll have two distinguished panels

of witnesses presenting alternative proposals of the way forward in

Iraq.

I’d like to take a moment to outline, briefly, the schedule over

the next 2 weeks, if I may.

Tomorrow, we’ll take a break, of sorts, from our hearing schedule

to hold a business meeting in which we’ll consider a bipartisan

resolution on Iraq. We will return to our hearings on Thursday

morning with a panel on the administration’s new reconstruction

strategy, followed by an afternoon panel focusing on Iraq’s internal

politics.

A week from today, we’ll hear from Secretary Baker and Congressman Lee Hamilton, and the following day, we’ll be joined by

Secretaries of State Kissinger and Albright. We will close this series on Thursday of next week, with three former National Security

Advisors: General Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, and Mr. Berger.

And let me return to today’s hearings.

We have with us four articulate experts who will present specific

recommendations regarding our policy in Iraq.

Les Gelb is a president emeritus and board senior fellow at the

Council on Foreign Relations. He and I have put forward a plan for

a political settlement in which the unity of Iraq is preserved by creating three or more regions, as provided by the Iraqi Constitution.

The plan would guarantee the Iraqi Sunnis a fair share of oil revenues, and it urges the creation of a contact group to support the

402

political settlement among the Iraqis. And finally, it calls for the

redeployment of most of American troops over the next 18 months.

Edward Luttwak is a friend and a senior advisor to the Center

for Strategic International Studies. He argues, and I quote, ‘‘Only

with United States disengagement can Iraqis find their own equilibrium. Twenty thousand U.S. troops in desert bases suffice to

deter foreign intrusion.’’

And we have Robert Malley, who is the director of the Middle

East Program at the International Crisis Group. He advocates, and

I quote, ‘‘a clean break in the way the United States deals with the

Iraqi Government and the region. The United States should seek

to enlist broad international support for a new political compact

among Iraqis, cease treating the Iraqi Government as a privileged

partner and start seeing it as a party to the sectarian war, and engage in real diplomacy with all Iraqis’ neighbors, Iran and Syria

included.’’

And Larry Korb, who is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information. Mr. Korb has testified many times before this committee.

His plan calls for, and I quote, ‘‘a diplomatic surge and the strategic redeployment of our military forces. U.S. troops would redeploy completely from Iraq in the next 18 months, remain in the region, and be increased in Afghanistan.’’

We look forward to the testimony of all the witnesses. And now

I’ll turn to Senator Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for

holding this important hearing.

Today, we will have an opportunity to broaden our focus beyond

the President’s plan as we explore an array of strategies in Iraq.

The variance among the plans offered at this hearing underscores

the complexity of the situation in Iraq and the need to provide

close oversight of the administration’s policies.

Although the President is committed to his approach and has initiated steps to implement it, planning by the administration must

continue. We must plan for contingencies, including the failure of

the Iraqi Government to reach compromises and the persistence of

violence despite United States and Iraqi Government efforts.

Last week, our committee had the opportunity to engage military

experts on the President’s plan, as well as military conditions in

Iraq. Our panel of four distinguished retired generals voiced deep

concerns about how we translate our military position in Iraq into

political gains. It remains unclear how expanded, continued, or reduced United States military presence can be used to stimulate

Iraqi political reconciliation.

Wide, though not unanimous, agreement exists that our military

presence in Iraq represents leverage, either because it can be expanded or because it can be withdrawn, but there is little agreement on how to translate this leverage into effective action by the

Iraqi Government. Some commentators talk of ‘‘creating space’’ for

the Iraqi Government to establish itself, but it is far from clear

that the government can or will take advantage of such space.

403

In a previous hearing, Secretary Richard Haass highlighted a

fundamental disconnect that we must overcome for any plan to

work, when he observed, ‘‘The U.S. goal is to work with Iraqis to

establish a functioning democracy in which the interests and rights

of minorities are protected. The goal of the Iraqi Government appears to be to establish a country in which the rights and interests

of the Shia majority are protected above all else.’’

In such a situation, even if additional troops have a discernible

impact on the violence in Iraq, this progress in the street may be

immaterial to achieving political reconciliation. If this is true, all

we would gain with a surge is a temporary and partial reduction

of violence in Baghdad. That would have some salutary benefits for

some Iraqis, but it would not help us achieve our strategic objectives.

If we undertake the tremendous investment that sending more

American soldiers to Iraq represents, it should be in support of a

clear strategy for achieving a negotiated reconciliation. We should

not depend on theories or hopes that something good may happen

if we dampen violence in Baghdad.

Thus, as the administration increases troops, it becomes more

imperative to develop a backup plan and aggressively seek a framework for a political solution. It is not enough to set benchmarks to

measure the progress of the Iraqi Government. If the Iraqi Government has different timetables and objectives than we do, such

benchmarks will not be met in a way that transforms the politics

of the nation.

Backup plans must be synchronized with a wider strategic vision

for the Middle East. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the rise of

the Shia majority in Iraq have opened possibilities for broader conflict along sectarian lines. Sunni Arab regimes in the region are

deeply concerned about the influence of Iran and its growing aggressiveness. An Iran that is bolstered by an alliance with a Shiite

government in Iraq or a separate Shiite state in southern Iraq

would pose serious challenges for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and

other Arab governments. The underlying issue for American foreign

policy is how we defend our interests in the Middle East, given the

new realities that our 4 years in Iraq have imposed. We need frank

policy discussions in this country about our vital interests in the

region. The difficulties we have had in Iraq make a strong presence

in the Middle East more imperative, not less.

I welcome, along with you, Mr. Chairman, our distinguished

guests, and we look forward to a very thoughtful hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We’ll begin in order—starting with Mr. Gelb, Luttwak, Korb, and

Malley.

The floor is yours, Les. You have to press that button there to

turn this thing on.

Dr. GELB. Oh, there we go.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

404

STATEMENT OF HON. LESLIE H. GELB, PRESIDENT EMERITUS

AND BOARD SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY

Dr. GELB. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Former Chairman, member of the

committee, permit me a moment of reflection.

I know well the bipartisan power of this committee. I worked

here over 40 years ago for Senator Jacob Javits, and, in 1966, this

committee conducted hearings on Vietnam that really changed the

course of the debate in the United States about that war. It illuminated the situation in Vietnam, and our choices. Those hearings

were a monument to bipartisanship and to democracy.

I am honored to be here to present the proposal, strategic alternative, developed by the chairman and myself, now almost a year

ago. And since we first put it forward, it has been so misrepresented, maligned, and attacked that my wife now calls it ‘‘The

Biden Plan.’’ [Laughter.]

The essence of the idea, as the chairman just outlined it a moment ago, is that if there is to be a settlement of this war—and

we may be beyond that point—it has to be a political settlement

based on a power-sharing arrangement. And there are two kinds

of power-sharing arrangements. One can strive for a strong central

government or one can strive for a decentralized or federal system.

The administration has tried for over 3 years now to build a strong

central government. It has not worked, it will not work, because

there are not sufficient common interests and there’s almost total

lack of trust. That government is inefficient and corrupt.

Most of the ministers—and I know you’ve all been there—don’t

even leave the Green Zone to go to their ministries to run their departments. So, the alternative for the Iraqis is a decentralized system. And I say ‘‘for the Iraqis,’’ because they themselves, as the

chairman noted, have called what they have a federal system, and

in their Constitution, they put forward a federal structure and provide for provinces joining with other provinces to form regional governments. This is not an invention of Chairman Biden and myself;

it is in their Constitution. They also passed implementing legislation a few months ago to make this happen, though they deferred

it.

Now, what would a government like this look like? Why is there

opposition to the idea of actually getting it done, implementing the

federal system? And finally, how would you overcome that opposition and resistance?

The government would look like this. The central government

would be based on the areas where there are genuine common interests among the different Iraqi parties; that is, foreign affairs,

border defense, currency, and, above all, oil and gas production and

revenues. I’ll come back to that in a moment. But that’s where they

share real interests.

As for the regions, whether they be three or four or five, whatever it may be—it’s up to—all this is up to the Iraqis to decide—

would be responsible for legislation, administration, and internal

security. Very important. Because they would defend themselves.

They have that interest in taking care of their own people.

Now, 80 percent of the Iraqi people approved that constitution

and that federal system. Eighty percent of the national assembly

405

backed the idea of moving forward on the federal system because

it’s a way of letting the different communities run their own affairs

and, at the same time, keeping the country together.

So, why the opposition? The opposition comes principally from

the Sunnis and principally because they’ve been used to running

that country for hundreds of years, and they still view themselves

as the natural rules of the whole country; they don’t want to give

it up. And they are backed in that desire by their Sunni Arab

neighbors, who like the idea of the Sunnis running Iraq, don’t like

the idea of the Shiites running it, and don’t want to see Iraq broken up in any fashion whatsoever, because it’s a bad precedent for

them. And they’re, in turn, backed by the Bush administration and

by most of the Middle East experts in this country, who tend to follow the Sunni way of thinking on this.

There are Shiites opposed to this, too. And those Shiites are opposed to it because they think it’s now their turn to run all of Iraq,

so they don’t want to see it federalized to weaken their power. And

they’ve resisted it on those grounds.

The Kurds are all for it, and, for almost 13 years, they’ve been

running their own regional government, and very successfully.

Now, how do you overcome their resistance? This is a big problem, and it may not be doable, but here is what the chairman and

I have put forward.

First and foremost, you try to make the Sunnis an offer they

can’t refuse. You let them run their own region. And they have to

see that that’s preferable to their being a permanent minority in

a government run by the Shiites and the Kurds. This way, they can

run their own affairs, and it’s their last chance to do so.

Second, you’ve got to make it economically viable for the Sunnis

to have their own region. And the only way you can do that is by

changing the Constitution so that it guarantees the Sunnis 20 percent—based on their proportion of the population—20 percent of

the oil revenues, present and future. Right now, they’re guaranteed

nothing.

How do you convince the Shiites? Basically, you’ve got to convince them that, if they try to run the whole country, they’re going

to be faced with endless insurgencies, themselves; they’ll have to

pick up the civil war, they’ll never be able to enjoy the riches of

that country of Iraq.

But those arguments, even though they make sense, aren’t

enough, and we’ve got to go further. The second element of the plan

is how you use United States military withdrawals and redeployments, both within Iraq and within the region, to reinforce the

kind of political settlement we would hope the Iraqis could reach.

The chairman and I have a little disagreement over what that military plan should look like, because I don’t see it in terms of any

fixed timetables, I see it more as a process that we ask our military

to arrange with the Iraqi military over the course of, say, 2 years,

where we can make adjustments according to the situation.

Now, the withdrawal process opens up political doors for us that

reinforce this decentralization, or federal idea. In the first place, it

allows us to move toward an alliance with many of the Sunnis in

the center of that country—with the Baathists, with the sheikhs,

and with the secular leaders of that society—because once they see

406

we’re not going to be there and remain their central enemy, they

can band with us against the common enemy, the terrorists in

their midst, the jihadis, the al-Qaeda people, and they are the common enemy for both of us. Those are the people who are destroying

the homes of most of the Sunnis in the center of the country, destroying their lives. And once they see that we’re not there as a

permanent military factor in the center of that country, we can

begin to make that alliance with them. The same goes with the

Shias. Once they see that we’re in the process of leaving, we can

develop common interests with them, as well.

These are, in the last analysis, Iraqi Arab Shias, not Iranian Persian Shiites. And there’s an important historical difference there.

And we can play on that in order to develop a relationship with the

Shia that will help us advance a new government.

There’s also a difference in religious tradition, where the Iraqi

Shias are much less willing to have their high clergy be involved

directly in government than the Iranian Shiites. So, there’s area for

us to work with once they see we’re not going to be a permanent

military presence.

The diplomacy is the final factor here. And as we see the diplomacy, it is not something that can create a solution, nor should we

try to create or impose one on the Iraqis. The diplomacy can’t solve

the problem within Iraq, but it can reinforce any kind of arrangement that the Iraqis themselves are moving toward. The Iranians

or the Saudis are not going to impose a settlement on their allies

within Iraq, but they’ll support something they themselves want to

achieve.

Now, finally, Mr. Chairman, members, I know it’s very fashionable to talk about the United States being in a weak and waning

position in the Middle East and the gulf, and that Iran is in the

ascendancy. I think this is nonsense. The United States is a great

power, the Iranians are a puny power. Their importance in that

area is temporary and based on the fact that the people of that

area, the leaders, don’t see a coherent policy from the United

States of America. When we have a coherent policy, those countries

will come to us.

After the Vietnam war—and it ended in an awful way—President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger had a coherent

strategy, and the nations of Asia rallied to the United States, because they did not want to see United States weakened in their

part of the world. They understood that they could not do what

they wanted economically and protect their security without a

strong United States, and they rallied to us. The same will happen

in the Middle East and gulf once the leaders and peoples of that

area of the world believe we have a sensible strategy and have returned to a commonsense approach to the area.

I thank you very much for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gelb follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LESLIE H. GELB, PRESIDENT EMERITUS AND BOARD

SENIOR FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY

WE’RE FIGHTING NOT TO LOSE

(By Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, director of Columbia University’s Saltzman

Institute of War and Peace Studies—The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 2007)

407

Iraq is not Vietnam, yet history seems intent on harnessing them together. Three

years ago this seemed an unlikely pairing; surely President Bush would not take

the United States down the same trail as Lyndon B. Johnson. Yet, even though

Iraq’s story is far from complete, each day raises the odds that the U.S. fate in Iraq

could eventually be the same as it was in Vietnam—defeat.

The differences are clear. The policy consensus over the Vietnam war ran deeper

and lasted longer than on the Iraq conflict. While Johnson and his advisers slogged

deeper into Vietnam with realistic pessimism, Bush and his colleagues plunged

ahead in Iraq with reckless optimism. And in Vietnam, U.S. leaders made most of

their mistakes with their eyes wide open, while it is impossible to fathom exactly

what the Bush team thought it was doing after the fall of Baghdad.

Twenty-eight years ago, we wrote a book, ‘‘The Irony of Vietnam: The System

Worked,’’ which argued that although U.S. policy in that war was disastrous, the

policymaking process performed just as it was designed to. It seems odd that a good

system could produce awful results, but the subsequent declassified documents and

the public record showed it to be true. U.S. officials generally had accurate assessments of the difficulties in Vietnam, and they looked hard at the alternatives of winning or getting out.

On Iraq the insider documents are not available, but journalistic accounts suggest

that Bush’s policy process was much less realistic. The President did not take seriously the obstacles to his goals, did not send a military force adequate to accomplish

the tasks, failed to plan for occupation, and took few steps to solve the underlying

political conflicts among Iraqis.

Despite these different paths, Bush now faces Johnson’s dilemma, that of a war

in which defeat is unthinkable but victory unlikely. And Bush’s policy shift last

week suggests that he has come to the same conclusion as Johnson: Just do what

you can not to lose and pass the problem on to your successor.

In both cases, despite talk of ‘‘victory,’’ the overriding imperative became simply

to avoid defeat.

How did these tragedies begin? Although hindsight makes many forget, the Vietnam war was backed by a consensus of almost all foreign-policy experts and a majority of U.S. voters. Until late in the game, opponents were on the political fringe.

The consensus rested on the domino theory—if South Vietnam fell to communism,

other governments would topple. Most believed that communism was on the march

and a worldwide Soviet-Chinese threat on the upswing.

The consensus on Iraq was shallower and shorter lived. Bush may have been bent

on regime change in Baghdad from the start, but in any case a consensus emerged

among his advisers that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of securing nuclear

weapons capability—and that deterrence and containment would not suffice. That

judgment came to be shared by most of the national security community. Congress

also saluted early on. The vote to endorse the war was less impressive than the Gulf

of Tonkin resolution, which passed almost unanimously, but many Democrats

signed on to topple Hussein for fear of looking weak.

As soon as the war soured, the consensus crumbled. Without the vulnerability of

middle-class youth to conscription, and with the political left in a state of collapse

since Ronald Reagan’s Presidency, the antiwar movement on Iraq did not produce

sustained mass protests as Vietnam did by the late 1960s. But the sentiment shows

up just as clearly in the polls.

Consensus held longer over Vietnam because few in or out of the government had

ever expected a quick and easy resolution of the war. Officials knew what they were

up against—the force of nationalism embodied by Ho Chi Minh, and a succession

of corrupt, inefficient, and illegitimate South Vietnamese governments. Officials

usually put on a brave face, but they understood that Washington was in for the

long haul. In the Bush administration, by contrast, a gap opened almost immediately between senior political leaders on one side, and most military and diplomatic professionals, as well as the media, on the other. The steady optimism of the

former in the face of the reporting of the latter quickly undid public confidence in

the Pentagon’s and White House’s leadership.

By 1968, Johnson understood that victory was not in the cards at any reasonable

price, but that defeat would be catastrophic. The war had reached a deteriorating

stalemate. If victory were possible, it would require all-out use of military force

against North Vietnam, a move that the administration believed ran the risk of war

with the Soviet Union and China. If the United States were defeated, however, the

dominos would fall, and one of those dominos would be the occupant of the White

House. Periodically, top officials concluded that events in Vietnam had taken another turn for the worse, and to prevent defeat they had to dispatch more troops

and do more bombing—and so the steady escalation proceeded without lasting effect

on the balance of power in Vietnam.

408

Constrained against achieving victory or accepting defeat, Johnson and his aides

chose to do the minimum necessary to get through each crunch in Vietnam and at

home, hoping that something would turn up to save them. In the end, Johnson

made the ultimate political sacrifice and declined to run for reelection. But as he

announced a halt of the bombing and the offer of negotiations with Hanoi, he also

increased the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. Even as he was leaving office, he

had no intention of being ‘‘the first American President to lose a war.’’

By contrast, Bush never had to worry that escalation would bring an all-out global

war; the United States is the world’s sole superpower. Nonetheless, until last week,

he never chose to increase the combat commitment significantly; the ‘‘surge’’ announced last week is but the latest experiment with a temporary increase in forces.

At the beginning this was probably because he did not believe more troops were

needed to win. As the venture went bad, the Volunteer Army was stretched too thin

to provide an option for massive escalation. But now it is clear that Bush does not

believe he can possibly win with anything close to the number of forces currently

committed. The President certainly perceives the risks of losing, and at this moment

of truth, he is repeating Johnson’s decision pattern—doing the minimum necessary

not to lose.

Whatever the similarities in the way Washington dealt with Vietnam and Iraq,

there were few similarities between the two wars themselves. Vietnam was both a

nationalist war against outside powers—first the French, then the Americans—and

a civil war. In Iraq, the lines of conflict are messier. The main contest is the sectarian battle between Arab Shiites and Arab Sunnis. The Kurds, so far, are mostly

bystanders, while the Americans struggle to back a weak yet balky government they

hope can remain a secular alternative.

Combat in Vietnam was a combination of insurgency and conventional warfare,

and the conventional element played to U.S. strengths. By contrast, Washington’s

massive firepower advantages are nullified in Iraq because the fighting remains

at the level of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Iraq is harder for our military than

Vietnam was, yet we eventually had 540,000 troops in Vietnam compared with

barely a quarter of that number in Iraq. The current U.S. footprint in Iraq is much

smaller—only about one-tenth the density of U.S. and allied forces per square mile

in South Vietnam at the height of U.S. involvement, and with an Iraqi population

50 percent larger than South Vietnam’s. Consequently, the security situation was

never as bad in Vietnam as it is in Iraq today. In Vietnam, Americans could travel

most places day and night, while in Iraq it is dangerous to leave the Green Zone.

Even Bush’s planned 21,500-troop increase will not make a lasting difference if the

host government does not become far more effective. As in Vietnam after the Tet

Offensive of 1968, the enemy can lie low until we stand down. In both countries,

U.S. forces worked hard at training national armies. This job was probably done

better in Vietnam, and the United States certainly provided South Vietnamese

troops with relatively better equipment than they have given Iraqis so far. South

Vietnamese forces were more reliable, more effective, and far more numerous than

current Iraqi forces are.

In both cases, however, the governments we were trying to help proved inadequate. Unlike their opponents, neither Saigon nor Baghdad gained the legitimacy

to inspire their troops. At bottom, this was always the fundamental problem in both

wars. Americans hoped that time would help, but leaders such as South Vietnam’s

Nguyen Van Thieu and Iraq’s Nouri al-Maliki were never up to the job.

Americans have not stopped arguing about Vietnam—about whether the war

could have been won if fought differently, or was an impossible task from the outset,

or about who was to blame. Hawks claim that the United States could have won

in Vietnam if the military had been allowed to fight without restraint. Supporters

of the war in Iraq say that the United States could have prevented the resistance

if it had been better prepared for occupation after the fall of Baghdad. Doves in both

cases say that the objectives were never worth any appreciable price in blood and

treasure.

After Vietnam, recriminations over failure became a never-healed wound in American politics. Now Iraq is deepening that wound. With some luck, Washington may

yet escape Baghdad more cleanly than it did in the swarms of helicopters fleeing

Saigon in 1975. But even if the United States is that fortunate, the story of the parallel paths to disaster should be chiseled in stone—if only to avoid yet another tragedy in a distant land, a few decades down the road.

UNITY THROUGH AUTONOMY IN IRAQ

(By Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Leslie H. Gelb—The New York Times, May 1, 2006)

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A decade ago, Bosnia was torn apart by ethnic cleansing and facing its demise

as a single country. After much hesitation, the United States stepped in decisively

with the Dayton Accords, which kept the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing

it into ethnic federations, even allowing Muslims, Croats, and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of American and other forces, Bosnians have lived a decade in relative peace and are now slowly strengthening their common central government, including disbanding those separate armies last year.

Now the Bush administration, despite its profound strategic misjudgments in

Iraq, has a similar opportunity. To seize it, however, America must get beyond the

present false choice between ‘‘staying the course’’ and ‘‘bringing the troops home

now’’ and choose a third way that would wind down our military presence responsibly while preventing chaos and preserving our key security goals.

The idea, as in Bosnia, is to maintain a united Iraq by decentralizing it, giving

each ethnoreligious group—Kurd, Sunni Arab, and Shiite Arab—room to run its own

affairs, while leaving the central government in charge of common interests. We

could drive this in place with irresistible sweeteners for the Sunnis to join in, a plan

designed by the military for withdrawing and redeploying American forces, and a

regional nonaggression pact.

It is increasingly clear that President Bush does not have a strategy for victory

in Iraq. Rather, he hopes to prevent defeat and pass the problem along to his successor. Meanwhile, the frustration of Americans is mounting so fast that Congress

might end up mandating a rapid pullout, even at the risk of precipitating chaos and

a civil war that becomes a regional war.

As long as American troops are in Iraq in significant numbers, the insurgents

can’t win and we can’t lose. But intercommunal violence has surpassed the insurgency as the main security threat. Militias rule swathes of Iraq and death squads

kill dozens daily. Sectarian cleansing has recently forced tens of thousands from

their homes. On top of this, President Bush did not request additional reconstruction assistance and is slashing funds for groups promoting democracy.

Iraq’s new government of national unity will not stop the deterioration. Iraqis

have had three such governments in the last 3 years, each with Sunnis in key posts,

without noticeable effect. The alternative path out of this terrible trap has five elements. The first is to establish three largely autonomous regions with a viable central government in Baghdad. The Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite regions would each be

responsible for their own domestic laws, administration, and internal security. The

central government would control border defense, foreign affairs, and oil revenues.

Baghdad would become a federal zone, while densely populated areas of mixed populations would receive both multisectarian and international police protection.

Decentralization is hardly as radical as it may seem: The Iraqi Constitution, in

fact, already provides for a federal structure and a procedure for provinces to combine into regional governments.

Besides, things are already heading toward partition: Increasingly, each community supports federalism, if only as a last resort. The Sunnis, who until recently believed they would retake power in Iraq, are beginning to recognize that they won’t

and don’t want to live in a Shiite-controlled, highly centralized state with laws enforced by sectarian militias. The Shiites know they can dominate the government,

but they can’t defeat a Sunni insurrection. The Kurds will not give up their 15-yearold autonomy.

Some will say moving toward strong regionalism would ignite sectarian cleansing.

But that’s exactly what is going on already, in ever-bigger waves. Others will argue

that it would lead to partition. But a breakup is already under way. As it was in

Bosnia, a strong federal system is a viable means to prevent both perils in Iraq.

The second element would be to entice the Sunnis into joining the federal system

with an offer they couldn’t refuse. To begin with, running their own region should

be far preferable to the alternatives: Being dominated by Kurds and Shiites in a

central government or being the main victims of a civil war. But they also have to

be given money to make their oil-poor region viable. The constitution must be

amended to guarantee Sunni areas 20 percent (approximately their proportion of the

population) of all revenues.

The third component would be to ensure the protection of the rights of women

and ethnoreligious minorities by increasing American aid to Iraq but tying it to respect for those rights. Such protections will be difficult, especially in the Shiite-controlled south, but Washington has to be clear that widespread violations will stop

the cash flow.

Fourth, the President must direct the military to design a plan for withdrawing

and redeploying our troops from Iraq by 2008 (while providing for a small but effective residual force to combat terrorists and keep the neighbors honest). We must

avoid a precipitous withdrawal that would lead to a national meltdown, but we also

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can’t have a substantial long-term American military presence. That would do terrible damage to our Armed Forces, break American and Iraqi public support for the

mission, and leave Iraqis without any incentive to shape up.

Fifth, under an international or United Nations umbrella, we should convene a

regional conference to pledge respect for Iraq’s borders and its federal system. For

all that Iraq’s neighbors might gain by picking at its pieces, each faces the greater

danger of a regional war. A ‘‘contact group’’ of major powers would be set up to lean

on neighbors to comply with the deal.

Mr. Bush has spent 3 years in a futile effort to establish a strong central government in Baghdad, leaving us without a real political settlement, with a deteriorating

security situation—and with nothing but the most difficult policy choices. The fivepoint alternative plan offers a plausible path to that core political settlement among

Iraqis, along with the economic, military, and diplomatic levers to make the political

solution work. It is also a plausible way for Democrats and Republicans alike to protect our basic security interests and honor our country’s sacrifices.

The Chairman. Thank you. I still want to be associated with the

plan.

Dr. Luttwak.

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, SENIOR FELLOW,

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. LUTTWAK. I, of course, am honored to be before you today.

I emphatically agree with Mr. Gelb’s closing remarks. The Iranians stride around as if they have won great victories, but this

generation of Pasdaran, of Iranians, have only fought one war, with

Iraq, which they lost. I’d agree that they are not a great power.

Further, I believe that, inadvertently, what we have done, and

what certain Iranians have done, has brought about a fracture in

the Middle East. The ancient quarrel between the Shia interpretation and the Sunni interpretation of Islam has been activated and

turned into a dynamic conflict. This has had all kinds of unexpected consequences.

I notice that, for the first time in all the years I’ve followed foreign affairs, the Saudi Government has become a real ally of the

United States. Back in 2000, some Saudis supported al-Qaeda,

funded it, others let it operate, others winked at al-Qaeda. Today,

the Saudis are real allies in Lebanon, where they are helping

Prime Minister Siniora to block the Hezbollah.

The Jordanians are very active. They were, in the past, too, but

not as much.

The Egyptians were also real allies in the past but are much

more active today. Why? Because they’re afraid of the so-called

Shia ‘‘crescent’’: It starts with Iran, extends to a Shia-dominated

Iraq and the Alawite-dominated government of Syria—they are not

Twelver Shia and would be persecuted in Iran, but nevertheless cooperates politically with Iran, and then, of course, the Hezbollah of

Lebanon. That is the famous Shia ‘‘crescent’’ from Iran to the Mediterranean. The Sunni states are afraid of it, partly because of their

own Shia minorities, and the result is an unfriendly equilibrium

between Shia and Sunni states, but of course inside Iraq there is

Shia-Sunni violence instead of a strategic equipoise. Whether we

want it or not, the Bush administration—which certainly never intended it—has brought about a classic situation that critics might

describe as ‘‘Divide and Rule.’’ It is not what anyone wanted, but

this equilibrium means, in my view, that the risks and the costs

of whatever we do in Iraq are much less than they seem. Many

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people say that the war in Iraq has brought about a tremendous

geopolitical disaster in the Middle East. I would simply say that it’s

brought into existence a new equilibrium, where the Shia of Iraq

absolutely need American power, because, as Les Gelb correctly

pointed out, the Sunnis, minority as they are, they have always

ruled Iraq, for a reason because the Shia are always so divided. So,

the Shia of Iraq need the United States, absolutely. And that’s why

we’ve had the spectacle of Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, son of a radical Ayatollah, himself a radical—the same al-Hakim, who spent 23

years in Iran, where many times he declaimed ‘‘Death to America’’—coming to the White House and sitting with President Bush

to ask for American help. So, in Iraq, the Shia need us; outside

Iraq, the Sunnis need us. This is called ‘‘divide and rule,’’ whether

you wish it or not. You don’t have to be Machiavellian, you do not

have to be a Metternich; it just happens quite naturally. No great

cleverness brought it about, no great cleverness is needed to operate it in our interest. It means that the costs and risks of whatever

we do are much less than they would have been 5 years ago.

This is the context in which I recommend disengagement. It is

a context, which I do not see as tragic and disastrous, because it

is an equipoise. Disengagement is not withdrawal, it is not the leap

in the dark of abandonment. Disengagement means just that, that

is, you don’t patrol the villages and towns, you don’t outpost, you

don’t checkpoint the roads but still remain in Iraq with a fraction

of the present force.

I should inform you, parenthetically, that primarily I made my

living as a tactical consultant all these years, dealing with such

things as how to organize patrols and I have field experience.

Therefore, I am acutely aware of the difference disengagement

would make.

Disengagement is not withdrawal. What does it mean? You don’t

patrol, you don’t outpost, but you don’t leave the country; you stay,

for example, in ‘‘Camp Victory,’’ the Baghdad International Airport.

You might stay in the Green Zone, at least transitionally. You

would certainly stay in a major logistic base, which already exists

in western Iraq which is largely desert. Saddam Hussein, helpfully,

built a couple of good bases there that can easily be rehabilitated,

they just need some plumbing work done on them.

So, the United States would be there with what? With a forcelevel that has to be determined, but it should be of the order of

one-tenth of the force we now have.

And what would that force do? Well, it would give general political backing to the elected Government of Iraq. It is an elected government, it deserves our general political backing. It would stop

any invasions or rather, deter any invasions. And if anybody—let’s

say that some al-Qaeda-type extreme groups takes over a town and

starts going around with flags and making itself visible, a strike

force could sally out and hit it.

At the present moment, as you all know, we are not expending

a lot of ammunition in Iraq; and, therefore, the enormous costs of

the Iraq war have to do with the logistics. A lot of it is contractorprotected logistics, it’s moving things around to supply things to all

our forces scattered in what is, in fact, a vast country. With disengagement, the remaining bases would be, supplied the way bases

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are now supplied, which is primarily by Air Force C–130s from Kuwait, bringing the supplies. And, therefore, there would be no U.S.

traffic on the roads. Once in a while, heavy equipment would be

moved with road transporters. Once in a while, there would be a

rare convoy, unannounced, heavily protected, and so on. This is

not—these are not all ways of reducing casualties, although that is,

indeed, very important. These are ways to reduce our intrusions in

the life of the Iraqis.

Politically, disengagement would end what we are now doing.

And what are we doing now? We are interposing ourselves between

the peoples in Iraq. We are preventing the Iraqis from having their

own history, from doing their own thing. We are protecting the

Shia, as a whole, from the Sunnis. We are protecting them so well

that some of the Shia, mostly the Jaish al-Mahdi, politically headed

by Muqtada al-Sadr, feels free to attack Americans and British

troops. Disengagement would stop that—they would be busy defending themselves.

As for the wider context of disengagement, I believe the Iranian

strategy has failed. They tried to become the leaders of the Middle

East by being more anti-American than anybody else, more antiIsraeli, and, indeed, more anti-Jewish, with the Holocaust provocations of Ahmadinejad. The Sunni arabs have not been persuaded

to follow Iran. They call them Persians—Ajamis, which implies by

the way, pagan Persians, because when the Arabs first encountered

them, they were pagans, and today they are pagans again. Because

according to any orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam—and I

don’t mean fundamentalist or extremist, just orthodox—today’s

Twelver Shias of Iran with their Ayatollah-saints and temporary

marriages have become apostates, unlike most Shias in the past.

So, the entire Iranian strategy has failed. They are not gratefully

accepted as leaders by the Arabs. They are feared as enemies.

Given all of this, I respectfully disagree with any plan that would

seek to manage, micromanage, macromanage, or minimanage the

Iraqi reality. It is very complicated. Even the supposed facts are

misleading. For example, some of the Kurds are Shia. Some are

Sunni fundamentalists. They’re a small minority, but they happen

to be the toughest of all the extremists that we have encountered

in Iraq—they have accounted for some of the worst attacks. Some

of the Kurds are not Muslim at all, they are Yazidis. People talk

about Shia and Sunni, meaning Arab Shia Arab Sunni, but, in

Kirkuk, the No. 1 problem is the Turkmen, who are supposed to

be mostly Shia. The Turks claim they are Turks. They are not, they

are Azeris; and they are not Twelver Shia, they are mostly Alevis.

So, the fact is that the situation is extremely complicated. And in

this complicated situation, to talk in a facile manner, or even in a

well-pondered and serious manner, the way the chairman and Dr.

Gelb have done, is really risky.

What I see now happening in Iraq is that we have an emerging

equilibrium. Civil war is a terrible thing, but it does bring civil

peace by burning out the causes and opportunities of civil war.

Mosul is mostly quiet. Two and a half million people, the American

presence being less than 2,000, and Mosul is relatively quiet. You

can actually visit Mosul. You go to Kurdistan, you take a taxi, and

you go to Mosul.

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The Basrah area has seen relatively little violence, except when

the al-Mahdi Militia attacks the British to generate publicity for

themselves.

And, of course, as the chairman has pointed out, Kurdistan is

mostly quiet. Kurds, with all their divisions—tribal, linguistic, religious—are in equilibrium.

So, what is going on? There is a civil war in the remaining areas

where the populations haven’t been sorted out yet. Sorting out is

what civil wars do, and, when they finish, the civil war ends and

there is civil peace. The United States had a civil war. England

had a civil war. Even the Swiss Confederation had a civil war before it attained its perfect peace. And I believe that by interfering

with the civil war, we are prolonging it. And by trying to direct it

and decide how Iraqis should organize their affairs, we are intruding in matters that we cannot manage successfully. Therefore, I believe that disengagement is the right way to go. I believe that disengagement is also sustainable. Surge is not sustainable.

A few final tactical comments. Even if we had 400,000 troops, the

canonical number, it would not make a big difference. What actually do soldiers do? They outpost and go on patrol. That is effective

insofar as U.S. troops are successfully turned into a Mesopotamian

constabulary; that is, that they walk along, people come out and

tell them things. If people don’t tell them things, the patrol is useless.

As for outposting, that is useful when you know what to look for

and you can tell the difference between local and foreign Arabs, between Sunni and Shia, not if you have just arrived and you’re sitting there seeing people that you don’t recognize and don’t know.

So, even if we had 400,000 troops in Iraq it would be hard to use

them effectively. Intelligence is to counterinsurgency what firepower is to conventional war. We don’t have local intelligence,

because our soldiers are not an efficient constabulary. Precisely because they are very good combat soldiers they are not a good constabulary, they don’t even speak the languages of Iraq.

So you can send troops to Iraq, but you cannot tactically use

them well. When generals say, ‘‘We don’t need more troops in Iraq,’’

it is not that they were patsies playing along with the administration policy at the time. They did not want more troops because they

could not employ them usefully—you cannot patrol without intelligence. And, unfortunately, Central Intelligence doesn’t provide it.

We have raiding forces in Iraq which could be tremendously effective. They are hardly ever used, because to make a raid, you

need intelligence, and we don’t have the intelligence. That is why

even if you knew nothing of the politics or the strategy or the theater strategy, purely at the tactical level you would say, ‘‘Don’t

send me more troops. Reduce them.’’

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Luttwak follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Given all that has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for the United

States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of

the withdrawal of American forces from much of the country—while making due

provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempts to harass the withVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00423 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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drawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All

have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the American withdrawal is

carried out, and this gives Washington a great deal of leverage that should be used

to advance American interests.

The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order to obtain

concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conflicting promises about

the country’s future to different parties. But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw—or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the United

States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an

evacuation have begun—the calculus of other parties must change. In a reversal

of the usual sequence, the American hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and

Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq.

Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq’s neighbors are too short-sighted or

blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal

should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable

arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of American

diplomacy.

The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a

veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some

sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat

against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much

diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most

fundamental of realities: Geography alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than the United States itself.

PRECEDENTS

If Iraq could indeed be transformed into a successful democracy by a more prolonged occupation, as Germany and Japan were after 1945, then of course any disengagement would be a great mistake. In both of those countries, however, by the

time of the American occupation the populations were already well educated and

thoroughly disenthralled from violent ideologies, and so they eagerly collaborated

with their occupiers to construct democratic institutions. Unfortunately, because of

the hostile sentiments of the Iraqi population, the relevant precedents for Iraq are

far different.

The very word ‘‘guerilla’’ acquired its present meaning from the ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their would-be liberators under the leadership of their traditional oppressors. On July 6, 1808, King Joseph of Spain and

the Indies presented a draft constitution that, for the first time in the Spain’s history, offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the

remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and the church. Ecclesiastical overlords still owned 3,148 towns and villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe’s most wretched tenants. Yet the Spanish peasantry did not rise to demand the

immediate implementation of the new constitution. Instead, they obeyed the priests

who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader,

for Joseph was the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, placed on the Spanish throne

by French troops. That was all that mattered for most Spaniards—not what was

proposed, but by whom.

Actually, by then the French should have known better. In 1799 the same thing

had happened in Naples, whose liberals, supported by the French, were massacred

by the very peasants and plebeians they wanted to emancipate, mustered into a militia of the ‘‘Holy Faith’’ by Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, coincidentally scion of

Calabria’s largest land-owning family. Ruffo easily persuaded his followers that all

promises of merely material betterment were irrelevant, because the real aim of the

French and the liberals was to destroy the Catholic religion in the service of Satan.

Spain’s clergy repeated Ruffo’s feat, and their illiterate followers could not know

that the very first clause of Joseph’s draft constitution had declared the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church the only one allowed in Spain.

The same dynamic is playing itself out in Iraq now, down to the ineffectual

enshrinement of Islam in the draft constitution and the emergence of truculent clerical warlords. Since the invasion in 2003, both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been

repeating over and over again that the Americans and their mostly ‘‘Christian’’ allies are in Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland as well as to steal the

country’s oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy—except for women’s rights, which are promoted in earVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00424 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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nest, the clerics say, to induce Iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their families

by aping the shameless disobedience of Western women.

The vast majority of Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers and semiliterate at best, naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for

them is entirely incomprehensible—that foreigners have been unselfishly expending

their own blood and treasure to help them. As opinion polls and countless incidents

demonstrate, accordingly, Americans and their allies are widely hated as the worst

of invaders, out to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil, but also of

their religion and even their family honor.

The most direct and visible effects of these sentiments are the deadly attacks

against the occupiers and their Iraqi auxiliaries, the aiding and abetting of such attacks, and their gleeful celebration by impromptu crowds of spectators. When the

victims are members of the Iraqi police or National Guard, as is often the case these

days, bystanders, family members, and local clerics routinely accuse the Americans

of being the attackers—usually by missile strikes that cleverly simulate car bombs.

As to why the Americans would want to kill Iraqis they are themselves recruiting,

training, and paying, no explanation is offered, because no obligation is felt to unravel each and every subplot of the dark Christian conspiracy against Iraq, the Arab

world, and Islam.

But it is the indirect effects of the insurgency that end whatever hopes of genuine

democratization may still linger. The mass instruction of Germans and Japanese

into the norms and modes of democratic governance, already much facilitated by

preexisting if imperfect democratic institutions, was advanced by mass media of all

kinds as well as by countless educational efforts. The work was done by local teachers, preachers, journalists, and publicists who adopted as their own the democratic

values proclaimed by the occupiers. But the locals were recruited, instructed, motivated, and guided by occupation political officers, whose own cultural understanding

was enhanced by much communing with ordinary Germans and Japanese.

In Iraq, none of this has occurred. An already difficult task has been made altogether impossible by the refusal of Iraqi teachers, journalists, and publicists—let

alone preachers to be instructed and instruct others in democratic ways. In any

case, unlike Germany or Japan after 1945, Iraq after 2003 never became secure

enough for occupation personnel to operate effectively, let alone carry out mass political education in every city and town as was done in Germany and Japan.

NO DEMOCRATS, NO DEMOCRACY

Of course, many Iraqis would deny the need for any such instruction, viewing democracy as a simple affair that any child can understand. That is certainly the opinion of the spokesmen of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, for example. They have insistently

advocated early elections in Iraq, brushing aside the need for procedural and substantive preparations as basic as the compilation of voter rolls, and seeing no need

at all to allow time for the gathering of consensus by structured political parties.

However moderate he may ostensibly be, the pronouncements attributed to Sistani

reveal a confusion between democracy and the dictatorial rule of the majority, for

they imply that whoever wins 50.01 percent of the vote should have all of the government’s power. That much became clear when Sistani’s spokesmen vehemently rejected Kurdish demands for constitutional guarantees of minority rights. Shiite majority rule could thus end up being as undemocratic as the traditional Sunni-Arab

ascendancy.

The plain fact is that there are not enough aspiring democrats in Iraq to sustain

democratic institutions. The Shiite majority includes cosmopolitan figures but by far

its greater part has expressed in every possible way a strong preference for clerical

leadership. The clerics, in turn, reject any elected assembly that would be free to

legislate without their supervision, and could thus legalize, for example, the drinking of alcohol or the freedom to change one’s religion. The Sunni-Arab minority has

dominated Iraq from the time it was formed into a state and its leaders have consistently rejected democracy in principle for they refuse to accept a subordinate status. As for the Kurds, they have administered their separate de facto autonomies

with considerable success, but it is significant that they have not even attempted

to hold elections for themselves, preferring clan and tribal loyalties to the individualism of representative democracy.

Accordingly, while elections of some kind can still be held on schedule, they are

unlikely to be followed by the emergence of a functioning representative assembly,

let alone an effective cohesive government of democratic temper. It follows that the

United States has been depleting its military strength, diplomatic leverage and

treasure in Iraq to pursue a worthy but unrealistic aim.

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Yet Iraq cannot simply be evacuated, abandoning its occupation-sponsored government even if legitimized by elections, to face emboldened Baath loyalists and plain

Sunni-Arab revanchists with their many armed groups, local and foreign Islamists

with their terrorist skills, and whatever Shia militias are left out of the government.

In such a contest, the government, with its newly raised security forces of doubtful

loyalty, is unlikely to prevail. Nor are the victors likely to peacefully divide the

country among themselves, so that civil war of one kind or another would almost

certainly follow. An anarchical Iraq would both threaten the stability of neighboring

countries and offer opportunities for their interference—which might even escalate

to the point of outright invasions by Iran or Turkey or both, initiating new cycles

of resistance, repression, and violence.

HOW TO AVOID A ROUT

The probable consequences of an abandonment of Iraq are so bleak that few are

willing to contemplate them. That is a mistake, however; it is precisely because unpredictable mayhem is so predictable that the United States might be able to disengage from Iraq at little cost, or even perhaps advantageously.

To see how disengagement from Iraq might be achieved with few adverse effects,

or even turned into something of a success, it is useful to approach its undoubted

complications by first considering the much simpler case of a plain military retreat.

A retreat is notoriously the most difficult of military operations to pull off successfully. At worst, it can degenerate into a disastrous rout. But a well-calculated retreat can not only extricate a force from a difficult situation, but in doing so actually

turn the tide of battle by luring the enemy beyond the limits of its strength until

it is overstretched, unbalanced, and ripe for defeat. In Iraq the United States faces

no single enemy army it can exhaust in this way, but rather a number of different

enemies whose mutual hostility now lies dormant but could be catalyzed by a wellcrafted disengagement.

Because Iraq is under foreign occupation, nationalist, and pan-Arab sentiments

currently prevail over denominational identities, inducing Sunni and Shiite Arabs

to unite against the invaders. And so long as Iraqis of all kinds believe that the

United States has no intention of withdrawing, they can attack American forces to

express their nationalism or Islamism without calculating the consequences for

themselves of a post-American Iraq. That is why Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shiite militia

felt free to attack the U.S. troops that, elsewhere, were fighting Sunnis bent on

restoring their ancestral supremacy, and why the action was applauded by the

clerics and Shiite population at large. Yet if faced by the prospect of an imminent

American withdrawal, Shiite clerics and their followers would have to confront the

equally imminent threat of the Baath loyalist and Sunni fighters—the only Iraqis

with recent combat experience, and the least likely to accept Shiite clerical rule.

That is why, by moving to withdraw, the United States could secure what the occupation has never had, namely the active support of its greatest beneficiaries, the

Shiite clerics and population at large. What Washington needs from them is a total

cessation of violence against the coalition throughout Iraq, full cooperation with the

interim government in the conduct of elections, and the suspension of all forms of

support for other resisters. Given that there is already some acquiescence and even

cooperation, this would not require a full reversal in Shiite attitudes.

THE NEIGHBORS

Iran, for its part, has much to fear from anarchy in Iraq, which would offer it

more dangers than opportunities. At present, because the Iranians think the United

States is determined to remain in Iraq no matter what, the hard-liners in Iran’s

Government feel free to pursue their anti-American vendetta by political subversion,

by arming and training al-Sadr’s militia, and by encouraging the Syrians to favor

the infiltration of Islamist terrorists into Iraq.

Yet anarchy in Iraq would threaten not merely Iran’s stability but also its territorial integrity. Minorities account for more than half the population, yet the Government of Iran is not pluralist at all. It functions as an exclusively Persian empire

that suppresses all other ethnic identities and imposes the exclusive use of Farsi

in public education, thus condemning all others to illiteracy in their mother tongues.

Moreover, not only the Bahai but also more combative heterodox Muslims are now

persecuted. Except for some Kurds and Azeris, no minority is actively rebellious as

yet, but chaos in Iraq could energize communal loyalties in Iran—certainly of the

Kurds and Arabs. An anarchical Iraq would offer bases for Iranian dissidents and

exiles, at a time when the theocratic regime is certainly weaker than it once was;

its political support has measurably waned, its revolutionary and religious authority

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is now a distant memory, and its continued hold on power depends increasingly on

naked force—and it knows it.

Once the United States commits to a disengagement from Iraq, therefore, a suitably discreet dialog with Iranian rulers should be quite productive. Washington

would not need to demand much from the Iranians: Only the end of subversion,

arms trafficking, hostile propaganda, and Hezbollah infiltration in Iraq. Ever since

the 1979 revolution, the United States has often wished for restraint from the theocratic rulers of Iran, but has generally lacked the means to obtain it. Even the simultaneous presence of U.S. combat forces on both the eastern and western frontiers of Iran has had little impact on the actual conduct of the regime, which usually

diverges from its more moderate declared policies. But what the entry of troops

could not achieve, a withdrawal might, for it would expose the inherent vulnerability to dissidents of an increasingly isolated regime.

As an ally of longstanding, Turkey is in a wholly different category. It has helped

the occupation in important ways—after hindering the initial invasion—but it has

done less than it might have done. The reason is that Turkish policy on Iraq has

focused to an inordinate extent on the enhancement of the country’s Turkmen minority, driven not by a dubious ethnic solidarity (they are Azeris, not Turks) but

by a desire to weaken the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Turkmen are concentrated in and

around the city of Kirkuk, possession of which secures control of a good part of

Iraq’s oil-production capacity. By providing military aid to the Turkmen, the Turkish Government is, therefore, assisting the anti-Kurdish coalition in Kirkuk, which

includes Sunnis actively fighting Americans. This amounts to indirect action against

the United States at one remove. There is no valid justification for such activities,

which have increased communal violence and facilitated the sabotage of oil installations.

Like others, the Turkish Government must have calculated that with the United

States committed to the occupation, the added burden placed on Iraq’s stability by

their support of the Turkmen would make no difference. With disengagement, however, a negotiation could and should begin to see what favors might be exchanged

between Ankara and Washington in order to ensure that the American withdrawal

benefits Turkish interests while Turks stop making trouble in Iraqi Kurdistan.

WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE ...

Even Kuwait, whose very existence depends on American military power, now

does very little to help the occupation and the interim Iraqi Government. The Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society has sent the odd truck loads of food into Iraq, and a gift

of some $60 million has been announced, though not necessarily delivered it. Given

Kuwait’s exceptionally high oil revenues, however, not to mention the large revenues of Kuwaiti subcontractors working under Pentagon logistics contracts, this is

less than paltry. The serious amounts of aid that Kuwait could well afford would

allow the interim government to extend its authority, and help the post-election government to resolve differences and withstand the attacks destined to come against

it. In procuring such aid, it would not take much reminding that if the United

States cannot effect a satisfactory disengagement, the Kuwaitis will be more than

10,000 miles closer to the ensuing anarchy than the Americans themselves.

As for the Saudi regime, its relentlessly ambiguous attitude is exemplified by its

July 2003 offer of a contingent of ‘‘Islamic’’ troops to help garrison Iraq. Made with

much fanfare, the offer sounded both generous and courageous. Then it turned out

that the troops in question were not to be Saudi at all—in other words, the Saudis

were promising to send the troops of other, unspecified Muslim countries—and these

imaginary troops were to be sent on condition that an equal number of U.S. troops

be withdrawn.

In the realm of action rather than empty words, the Saudis have not actually

tried to worsen American difficulties in Iraq, but they have not been especially helpful either. As with Kuwait, their exploding oil revenues could underwrite substantial

gifts to the Iraqi Government, both before and after the elections. But Riyadh could

do even more. All evidence indicates that Saudi volunteers have been infiltrating

into Iraq in greater numbers than any other nationality. They join the other

Islamists whose attacks kill many Iraqis and some Americans. The Saudis share a

long border with Iraq along which there are few and rather languid patrols, rare

control posts, and no aerial surveillance, even though it could be readily provided.

And the Saudis could try to limit the flow of money to the Islamists from Saudi

Jihad enthusiasts, and do more to discourage the religious decrees that sanction the

sanctity killing of Americans in Iraq.

As it is, the Saudi authorities are doing none of this. Yet an anarchical Iraq would

endanger the Saudi regime’s already fragile security, not least by providing their

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opponents all the bases they need and offering Iran a tempting playground for expansion. Here too, therefore, hardheaded negotiations about the modalities of an

American withdrawal would seem to hold out possibilities for significant improvements.

The Syrian regime, finally, could also be engaged in a dialog, one in which the

United States presents two scenarios. The first is a well-prepared disengagement

conducted with much support from inside and outside Iraq, that leaves it with a

functioning government.

The second is all of the above reinforced by punitive action against Syria if it sabotages the disengagement—much easier to do once American forces are no longer

tied down in Iraq. For all its anti-American bluster, the Syrian regime is unlikely

to risk confrontation, especially when so little is asked of it: A closure of the SyrianIraqi border to extremists, and the end of Hezbollah activities in Iraq, funded by

Iran but authorized by Syria.

Of all Iraq’s neighbors only Jordan has been straightforwardly cooperative, incidentally without compromising any of its own sovereign interests.

THE ULTIMATE LOGIC OF DISENGAGEMENT

Even if the negotiations here advocated fail to yield all they might, indeed even

if they yield not much at all, the disengagement should still occur—and not only

to keep faith with the initial commitment to withdraw—the United States cannot

play diplomatic parlor games. Given the bitter Muslim hostility to the presence of

American troops—labeled ‘‘Christian Crusaders’’ by the preachers—its continuation

can only undermine the legitimacy of any American-supported Iraqi Government.

With Iraq more like Spain in 1808 than Germany or Japan after 1945, any democracy left behind is bound to be more veneer than substance in any case. Its chances

of survival will be much higher if pan-Arab nationalists, Islamists, and foreign meddlers are neutralized by diplomacy and disengagement. The alternative of a continuing garrison would only evoke continuing hostility to both Americans and any

Iraqi democrats. Once American soldiers leave Iraqi cities, towns, and villages, some

might remain awhile in remote desert bases to fight off full-scale military attacks

against the government but even this might incite opposition, as happened in Saudi

Arabia.

A strategy of disengagement would require much skill in conducting parallel negotiations. But its risks are actually lower than the alternative of an indefinite occupation, and its benefits might surprise us. An anarchical Iraq is a far greater danger

to those in or near it than to the United States. It is the time to collect on that

difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Korb.

STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW,

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you very much

for inviting me here today to talk about where we should go in

Iraq. And I commend the committee for holding these hearings. I

can’t think of a more critical issue facing this country and the

world.

Let me begin by saying that, given why we went in, the reasons

that we were given, which turned out not to be true, and the way

in which we’ve conducted the occupation, there are no good options.

No matter what we propose—and my distinguished colleagues here

have proposed various things—no one can guarantee that the

outcome will be what we want. Therefore, I think it’s important to

keep in mind that what we have to do is select an option that gives

us the best chance of protecting overall American security

interests.

And I would argue, as I do in my prepared statement, that surging militarily for the third time in a year is the wrong way to go,

we should surge diplomatically. I put myself—I support the comments that were made to you last week about a further—a military

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surge, by Generals Hoar and McCaffrey, that it’s too little, too late,

and a fool’s errand, because what it would mean, in my view, is

merely repeating a failed strategy.

We’ve seen that when that, when we’ve surged twice in the last

6 months, the violence and death of Americans and Iraqis has increased dramatically. An increased surge would only create more

targets, put more American lives at risk, increase Iraqi dependence

on the United States, further undermine the precarious readiness

of our ground forces, and, if we send all the troops that are supposed to go, we will have no Strategic Reserve left in the United

States, and this will be contrary, not only to the wishes of our commanders on the scene in Iraq—and to the American people and to

the Iraqi people. Keep in mind that more than 70 percent of the

Iraqis think we’re causing the violence; they want us out within a

year, and, more ominously, 60 percent think it’s OK to kill Americans. Rather than escalating militarily, the United States should

strategically redeploy all American forces from Iraq over the next

18 months, and we should not keep any permanent bases.

I first put forth this proposal in September 2005 with my colleague at the center, Brian Katulis. Since then, it has been completely mischaracterized. People have called it ‘‘cut and run,’’

they’ve talked about that it would undermine U.S. security, they’ve

called it ‘‘retreat.’’ When you use military force, it must enhance

the security of the United States. And if we do not strategically redeploy our forces from Iraq over the next 18 months, our security

is going to be undermined. We need more troops in Afghanistan.

If, in fact, you send these 21,500 more to Iraq, you simply cannot

put more troops in Afghanistan without really causing unfair burdens on our existing ground forces.

I commend the President for finally agreeing to increase the size

of our ground forces, but this is something that should have been

done several years ago.

If, in fact, we do redeploy our forces, this will also allow us to

bring our National Guard forces home here to focus on homeland

defense, which is a critical security mission.

If, by strategically redeploying, we can gain control over our own

security interests—in many ways we have put our security in the

hands of the Iraqis by saying, ‘‘We will stand down when you stand

up,’’ and, in my view, it’s the only real leverage that the United

States has to get the Iraqis to make the painful political compromises necessary to begin the reconciliation process. As has been

mentioned here, these compromises involve balancing the roles of

the central and provincial governments, distribution of oil revenues, protecting minority rights. Until that process is completed,

the United States can put a soldier or a marine on every street corner in Baghdad, and it would not make a real difference.

I would remind the committee that when President Reagan, the

President I had the privilege of serving, left from Lebanon, we did

not leave the area. We maintained our interest in the Middle East.

And our strategic redeployment plan would do the same. We’re not

going to leave the region. We can keep forces in Kuwait. We can

put a Marine expeditionary force in a carrier battle group in the

gulf.

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Let me explain to you how I think this would work. And it has

worked.

When Zarqawi was killed, the intelligence came to the Iraqis, the

Iraqis told us, and we sent in combat aircraft to attack them. We

could still do that. If, after we leave, Iraq should become a haven

for al-Qaeda, or a country like Iran should decide to invade, we

would be able to deal with that situation.

Now, the diplomatic surge that we urge would involve appointing

an individual with the stature of former Secretary of State Colin

Powell or Madeleine Albright as a special envoy. This individual

would be charged with getting all six of Iraq’s neighbors—Iran,

Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—involved more

constructively in stabilizing Iraq. It’s important to note that all of

these countries are already involved, in a bilateral self-interested

and disorganized way. And, in addition, this distinguished envoy

should convene a Dayton-style conference to get all of the factions

in Iraq, as well as all the countries in the region, together.

Now, a lot of people will argue: Why would countries like Iran

and Syria, whose interests are not identical to ours, want to get involved in such a conference? Remember that, after we leave, and

if we set a date, date certain, they do not want Iraq to become a

failed state or a humanitarian catastrophe that would involve sending millions of refugees into their country or a haven for terrorists—remember that if Iraq should become, as some people argue,

that—when we leave, a haven for groups like al-Qaeda, this would

not be in the interest of a country like Iran. And remember that

the Iranians have been very helpful to us in Afghanistan, not because their interests are—they want to help us, but because they

do not want to see the Taliban come back to power. The Iranians

have given close to $300 million in aid to the Karzai government.

They’re building roads and highways. They furnished us intelligence when we went in there. They were helpful in Iraq, according to Secretary Gates, until early 2004. So, the idea that somehow

they would not be helpful, to me, is simply mistaken.

We—I would expect this high-profile envoy to also address the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, and Iran’s rising influence in the region. Now, this—the aim

would not necessarily be to solve all these problems immediately,

but prevent them from getting worse, and, most importantly, to

show the Arab and the Muslim world that we share their concerns

about the problem in the region.

Now, let me be very specific here. I think we have to take, with

a grain of salt, the advice of those inside and outside the government arguing for further military escalation, not only because it’s

the wrong strategy, but because most of those people urging this

military surge are the same people who got us into the quagmire

in the first place. They told us the war would be a cakewalk, we’d

be greeted as liberators, we could rebuild Iraq at a cost of $1.5 billion, and we could reduce our military strength to 30,000 by the

end of 2003.

I think we should also take, with a grain of salt, what the administration is saying to us. The President assured us, as recently as

October, that we were winning. And if you look at his State of the

Union Address a year ago tonight, when he talked about how good

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the Iraqi security forces were, how Iraq was close to democracy,

how, in fact, our policy would allow us to withdraw, because the

Iraqi security forces were getting so well. And this idea that somehow things began to go downhill with the bombing of Samarra last

February—simply not true. Things were going downhill in 2005.

The Shiite death squads were already exacting revenge on the

Sunnis.

Now, let me conclude by saying that this committee and this

Congress has a responsibility to the American people to take a

greater role in shaping our Iraq policy. And although we all understand that you must provide the funding for the troops already in

Iraq, there are things that you can do to assert control over the

policy.

For example, you can make it very clear that if the administration wants to mobilize Guard and Reserve units again that have

already been, that they must come back to the Congress. The law

allows them to mobilize them for up to 2 years, as long as it’s not

consecutive. But this idea of sending them back for a couple of days

and bringing them back seems to me contrary to the desires of the

people who wrote the law and also would allow, again, the administration to get around whatever controls you put on the number of

active forces.

I think that you should require a new NIE, as you have asked

for, that talks about whether Iraq is in a civil war, a recertification

by the President that the war in Iraq does not undermine the war

on terror. Remember that this was in the authorization that was

passed, back in 2002, allowing the President to go to war.

And finally, that you should base funding and assistance on Iraqi

performance.

Let me conclude by saying that one more military escalation in

Iraq offers little hope for stabilizing the country, risks doing permanent damage to our U.S. ground forces, and could undermine U.S.

efforts to defeat what the President called the ‘‘global terrorist networks’’ that were responsible for attacking us on 9/11. The only responsible path forward is a new forceful integrated strategy that

marshals the right assets for the challenges the United States faces

not only in Iraq, but the Middle East and around the world.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Korb follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR

AMERICAN PROGRESS, SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,

WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the war in

Iraq. I cannot think of a more critical issue facing the Nation at this time.

It is important to note right upfront that, because of numerous mistakes made

during the last 46 months, no good options now exist. As the Iraq Study Group

(ISG) report noted, the situation in Iraq is ‘‘grave and deteriorating,’’ and no one

can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point will stop the sectarian

warfare, the growing violence, or the ongoing slide toward chaos. Inaction is drift,

and sticking with the ‘‘current strategy’’ is not an acceptable option.

In 2003, the Bush administration made a fundamental strategic mistake in diverting resources to an unnecessary war of choice in Iraq and leaving the mission

unaccomplished in Afghanistan. This error has allowed the Taliban to reconstitute

in Afghanistan, weakened the position of the United States in the world, and undermined the fighting strength of U.S. ground forces. It also diverted critical U.S. reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00431 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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sources from effectively addressing the Iranian nuclear threat, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the situation in Lebanon.

Today, the United States once again finds itself at a strategic crossroads. This

time, however, there are at least nine key lessons of the past 4 years of failure that

make choosing the right path forward abundantly clear. These nine lessons point

to the obvious—it is time to strategically redeploy our military forces from Iraq and

begin a diplomatic surge not a further military escalation as the President has proposed.

1. The fundamental security challenge in Iraq is a violent struggle for power

among empowered Shiites, embittered Sunnis, and secessionist Kurds.

The United States cannot solve Iraq’s problems militarily. No matter how long the

United States stays or how many troops are sent, Iraq will never become a stable,

peaceful state unless the Iraqis themselves make the painful political compromises

necessary to create a new Iraq. These compromises are hard because they involve

balancing the power of the provincial and central governments, sharing oil revenues,

and protecting minority rights. Only when the reconciliation process is complete will

the Iraqis be willing to disband their militias and cease their support for the insurgency. Until then, American forces, augmented or not, can no longer stop the civil

war. More than a year after its most recent national election, during which time the

United States has lost the equivalent of 13 battalions killed or wounded soldiers and

marines, Iraq’s leaders remain internally divided over critical issues of political and

economic sharing. The national unity government has not achieved sufficient

progress on addressing the key questions that drive Iraq’s violence. A fundamental

challenge in today’s Iraq is that too many Iraqi political leaders are hedging their

bets: They halfheartedly support the national government while simultaneously

maintaining their independent power bases through ties to militias and other

groups based on sect or ethnicity.

War is the most extreme form of politics. Since Iraq’s current government is neither taking control of the chaos swirling around it, nor settling disputes over key

issues that might bring an end to the sectarian bloodbath, more and more Iraqis

are turning to violence.

Resolving Iraq’s civil war requires a new political strategy, such as a Dayton style

peace conference supported by the international community and Iraq’s neighbors. In

1995 it would have been impossible for the United States and its allies to bring

peace to Bosnia without engaging Serbia and Croatia, the two states responsible for

the civil war in that country.

As Generals Abizaid and Casey, the commanders conducting the war, and the majority of Iraq’s elected leaders agree, additional military escalation, as proposed by

the President, runs a high risk of only inflaming Iraq’s violence and increasing

American casualties and Iraqi dependence on the United States.

2. The open-ended U.S. combat deployment fosters a culture of dependency in Iraq.

Iraqi leaders will have no incentive to undertake these painful steps unless the

United States and the international community apply significant pressure on Iraq’s

leaders. The best way to press Iraq’s leaders is to set a plan that aims to complete

the U.S. military mission by a certain date, thereby creating incentives for Iraq’s

leaders to settle their disputes and assume greater control of the country. Given our

moral obligation to the Iraqis and the practical considerations involved in redeploying about 150,000 troops, a reasonable target date for completing the U.S. combat mission should be 18 months from now, or the summer of 2008. If the Iraqis

do not make these difficult choices over the next 18 months, they will have to live

with the consequences. It would then be their problem, not just ours.

In the weeks before his dismissal, even former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, a

fervent supporter of staying the course and only standing down when the Iraqis

stand up, and a key figure responsible for the Iraq quagmire, finally admitted that

last October, ‘‘The biggest mistake would be not to pass things over to the Iraqis.

It’s their country. They are going to have to govern it, they’re going to have to provide security for it, and they’re going to have to do it sooner rather than later.’’

Further military escalation, or a so-called ‘‘surge’’ or augmentation of additional

U.S. troops, would only continue to prevent Iraqis from taking greater responsibility

and settling their disputes.

3. Iraq’s neighbors are already involved in Iraq and must be part of the solution.

Iraq’s six neighbors—Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait are

already involved in some fashion in Iraq. This involvement is bilateral, self-interested, disorganized, and not channeled toward a constructive purpose that benefits

the common good of all Iraqis, in large part because of the internal divisions among

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Iraqis on full display in the daily violence in Iraq’s streets. Moreover, the spillover

effects of Iraq’s civil war on the region have been growing throughout 2006 and into

2007, with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria receiving about 2 million Iraqis fleeing the

violence. Leaders throughout the region, not only on Iraq’s borders, fear the ripple

effects of the chaos on their immediate horizons.

To end Iraq’s civil war, the country’s neighbors need to be involved more constructively. These countries have an incentive to participate, and one way to increase

those incentives is to send a clear signal that the United States is setting a target

date for completing its military mission in Iraq and will not maintain any permanent bases in Iraq. None of the countries in the region including Iran, want to see

an Iraq that becomes a failed state or a humanitarian catastrophe that would lead

to it becoming a haven for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda or sending millions of more

refugees streaming into their countries.

Even U.S. adversaries such as Syria and Iran will have to alter their policies once

the United States begins to redeploy its military forces from Iraq. Both countries

recognize that, with the United States mired in the Iraq quagmire, it has reduced

its ability to confront Damascus and Tehran. These countries will continue to have

every incentive to work together to keep U.S. forces bleeding as long as we keep

increasing our forces.

Moreover, despite the fact that Syria and Iran do have different agendas than the

United States and are contributing to the problems in Iraq, both of these nations

have demonstrated a willingness to act in their own self-interest even if the United

States is also a beneficiary. For example, in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Syrians

contributed troops to the American-led coalition that evicted Iraq from Kuwait. In

2001, the Iranians worked with us by providing extensive assistance on intelligence,

logistics, diplomacy, and Afghan internal politics that helped to oust the Taliban

from Afghanistan. The Iranians also developed roads and power projects and dispersed more than $300 million of the $560 million it pledged to help the Karzai government. Moreover, in 2003, the Iranians sent Washington a detailed proposal for

comprehensive negotiations to resolve bilateral differences and according to Secretary Gates were helpful in Iraq as recently as 2004.

The administration’s refusal to deal with Syria and Iran, without preconditions,

not only harms U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East—it is deadly. To refuse

to talk to Syria and Iran, unless they change their foreign policies, means that

many Americans will die needlessly. This lack of confidence in the U.S. ability to

assert its interests diplomatically only further weakens the U.S. position in the Middle East.

As 2007 begins, the absence of a new diplomatic and political strategy is a missing link in getting Iraq’s neighbors to play a more constructive role.

4. The United States must deploy its full diplomatic weight to address the problems in Iraq and the Middle East.

A new political and diplomatic surge is necessary to address Iraq’s civil war and

the growing instability in the Middle East. So far, the United States has not deployed all of the assets in its arsenal to address the growing strategic challenges

in the Middle East. It is still relying too much on its military power rather than

integrating its military component with the diplomatic component.

Sporadic trips to the region by Secretary of State Rice are necessary but not sufficient. The Bush administration should send a signal of its seriousness by appointing

an individual with the stature such as that of former Secretaries of State Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright as special Middle East envoys. Former Presidents Bill

Clinton and George Bush have advanced U.S. interests and improved the U.S.

standing in the world by addressing the aftermath of the 2004 Asian tsunami. Individuals like Colin Powell and Madeleine Albright can help the United States address the geostrategic tsunami that has been unfolding in Iraq and the Middle East

during the past 4 years.

As special envoys, the former secretaries could spearhead a new, forceful diplomatic offensive aimed at achieving peace in Iraq and making progress on other key

fronts in the Middle East, including efforts to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of Hezbollah and Syria in Lebanon, Iran’s rising influence in the region, and the concerns that many traditional allies, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have about the shifting dynamics in the region.

This diplomatic surge must also focus on getting support and assistance from

other global powers like European countries to provide more political and economic

support in Iraq than they have over the last 4 years. U.S. diplomats must make

clear to the world that no nation anywhere in the world can escape the consequences of continued chaos in the Middle East.

5. Further U.S. military escalation in Iraq will not make Iraq more secure.

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Doubling down on a bad hand as we have done repeatedly by sending more troops

to Iraq will not change the outcome. Statements by President Bush and other top

officials that the United States is ‘‘not winning but not losing,’’ are misleading. In

asymmetrical guerilla warfare, the insurgents win if the occupying power does not.

The situation in Iraq has reached a point at which even former Secretary of State,

Henry Kissinger, a leading advocate of invading and staying the course, has acknowledged that military victory is no longer possible in Iraq.

The additional 21,500 U.S. troops that would be sent in over the next 5 months

represent a marginal increase in the U.S. combat presence in Iraq, not a decisive

number. Even if the United States had the necessary number of men and women

with the technical and language skills available to operate as a true stabilizing force

or to embed with the Iraqi units—which it does not—the additional troops would

likely be unable to significantly improve Iraq’s security situation, certainly not without a major shift in political and diplomatic strategy.

Iraq now has more than 300,000 members in its security forces which do not lack

the necessary training to quell the violence. In fact, some of them have more training than the young soldiers and marines the United States has sent to Iraq. Iraq’s

security forces are not tasked with fighting a major conventional war against a significant military power. Rather, what they need to do is essentially police work, that

is, to stop Iraqis from killing other Iraqis.

The central problem with Iraq’s security forces is not skill-building or training.

It is motivation and allegiance. Most of the 10 divisions in the Iraqi Army are not

multiethnic. They are staffed and led by members of their own sect. The problem

is that the units are reluctant to take military action against members of their own

groups who are perpetrating the violence.

Case in point: Only two of the six Iraqi battalions ordered to Baghdad this fall

by the Maliki government actually showed up. What leads us to believe that three

brigades now promised will show up or take military action against their own sect?

And what will we do if they fail to fulfill their promises? Moreover, many of the

security forces have been infiltrated by the insurgents and criminals who tip off the

enemy and that are supervised by corrupt and incompetent ministers who purge the

most effective commanders. As a result, the units then often employ the weapons

and tactics furnished by the United States against their sectarian enemies, not

those of the Iraqi State.

During the last 6 months the United States has increased, or ‘‘surged,’’ the number of American troops in Baghdad by 12,000, yet the violence and deaths of Americans and Iraqis has climbed alarmingly, averaging 960 a week since the latest troop

increase. This ‘‘surge,’’ known as Operation Together Forward, failed to stem the violence. This past October, Army MG William Caldwell IV said that the operation

‘‘has not met our overall expectations of sustaining a reduction in the levels of violence.’’

As U.S. military commanders in Iraq have acknowledged, the United States could

put a soldier or marine on every street corner in Baghdad and it would not make

a difference if the Iraqis have not begun the reconciliation process.

Sending more troops now will only increase the Iraqi dependence on us, deplete

our own Strategic Reserve, force the United States to extend the tours of those already deployed, send back soldiers and marines who have not yet spent at least a

year at home, and deploy units that are not adequately trained or equipped for the

deployments. Colin Powell, the former Secretary of State and former Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs, summarized the situation on December 19, 2006, when he said

that the Active Army was just about broken and he saw nothing to justify an increase in troops.

Powell’s comments echo those of LTG Peter Chiarelli, the deputy commander of

the Multi-National Corps in Iraq, who said that deploying more U.S. forces will not

solve Iraqis problems. A further U.S. military escalation will not tackle these core

problems and would likely further exacerbate the situation and make the challenges

more difficult to address.

6. The U.S. military escalation in Iraq will undermine the fight against global terrorist networks.

The brave soldiers and marines are not fighting the violent extremists who supported the attacks of September 11. They are essentially refereeing a civil war. It

is time to redeploy U.S. military assets where a real military surge is desperately

needed, like Afghanistan.

As President Reagan found out in Lebanon in the 1980s, U.S. military forces cannot serve as referees in a civil war. It is a no-win situation militarily. The United

States will end up serving as little more than a lightening rod for the blame. According to recent measures of Iraqi public sentiment, more than 70 percent of the Iraqis

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believe that American troops are responsible for the violence and 60 percent think

it is acceptable to kill Americans. A majority of Iraqis want U.S. troops out of the

country within a year.

If Iraqi leaders veto requests by U.S. military commanders to take on Shiite militias as happened this fall, and if Iraqi judges are frequently demanding the release

of captured insurgents, U.S. troops will continue to face an impossible situation—

no matter how qualified and motivated they are. As Senator Gordon Smith (R–OR)

recently noted, a policy that has U.S. soldiers and marines patrolling the same

streets in the same way and being blown up by the same bombs day after day is

absurd.

The al-Qaeda insurgents are no longer the main problem in Iraq. We are not (if,

in fact, we ever were) fighting them over there so we will not have to fight them

here. Military intelligence estimates they make up less than 2 to 3 percent of those

causing the chaos. Only 5 percent of the Iraqis support the philosophy of al-Qaeda,

and once U.S. forces leave, the Iraqis will turn against al-Qaeda as they have in

the past. The vast majority of the violence is caused by nearly two dozen Shiite

militias and Sunni insurgents who are maiming and killing each other mainly because of religious differences that go back over a thousand years. Meanwhile, the

real al-Qaeda problem in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia is not

being addressed adequately.

A phased strategic redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq should include sending

20,000 additional troops to Afghanistan leaving an Army brigade in Kuwait, and a

Marine Expeditionary Force and a carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf. This will

signal to the countries in the region that we will continue to be involved. Moreover,

this force will have sufficient military power to prevent Iraq from becoming a haven

for al-Qaeda or being invaded by its neighbors. A good example of how this would

work is illustrated by the killing of Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Iraqi

citizens provided the intelligence to Iraqi security forces, who in turn informed us.

The United States then sent F–16’s to bomb the hideout, something that we could

do after we implement a strategic redeployment.

7. Many of the proponents for the proposed U.S. military escalation of 21,500

troops got us into the Iraq quagmire.

The Congress and the American people should ignore the advice of those who got

us into this mess in the first place and pay attention to those who cautioned us not

to get involved in this misadventure, among them GEN Colin Powell, Vice President

Al Gore, and Senator Barack Obama.

Supporters of U.S. military escalation in Iraq in 2007 are among the same pundits

and so called experts who assured the country and the American people that the

U.S. invasion was necessary; that the war would be a cakewalk; that we would be

greeted as liberators; that we could rebuild Iraq at a cost of $1.5 billion a year; that

we could reduce our troop strength to 30,000 by the end of 2003. In addition many

of these same experts did not speak up for General Shinseki before the invasion;

made misleading assertions about mushroom clouds, yellowcake, and ersatz meetings in Prague; and told us as late as 2005 that the situation in Iraq was positive

and in 2006 that we needed a surge of as many as 80,000 more troops.

Now many of these same pundits, who apparently seem to have no sense of shame

about their previous errors, are telling us to ignore the bipartisan recommendations

of the Iraq Study Group to begin to withdraw combat troops, open a regional dialog

with Iran and Syria, and take a comprehensive diplomatic approach to the region.

Instead, they want to throw more good money after bad, by sending more troops

to achieve their version of victory in Iraq; i.e., a stable democratic Iraq that will

transform the Middle East.

8. The 110th Congress has a responsibility to the American people.

Any new proposal must have the support of the American people and the international community. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to wage

a war of choice, effectively, if it does not have the support of the American people.

After all it is they who must send their sons and daughters, husbands and wives

into the conflict and spend their hard earned dollars on waging this conflict.

The American people made it clear in the congressional elections and in recent

public opinion polls that they do not favor further military escalation but want a

diplomatic surge, and want us to begin to withdraw.

Similarly without international support, the ability of the United States to get

other nations to share the human and financial burden declines. Even our closest

allies, the British, refuse to join us in the latest military escalation and will continue to withdraw. By May the British will reduce the number of their soldiers and

marines from 7,000 to 3,000. In 2003, there were more than 20,000 coalition troops

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in Iraq. Today there are less than 10,000 and all will be out by this summer. Even

when the American people supported the initial invasion they did so on the condition that it be multilateral.

The President may say that he does not have to listen to the American people.

The Congress should not let him ignore this most fundamental principle of democracy.

The President will soon submit a supplemental funding request to the defense budget of at least $100 billion to fund the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

through the end of FY 2007. This is in addition to the $70 billion bridge fund Congress has already provided, bringing the total cost of the wars for this fiscal year

to $170 billion, more than $14 billion a month, the vast majority of which is for

Iraq.

The 110th Congress should heed the American people and fulfill their obligation

to protect American security by preventing a military escalation in Iraq. They can

fulfill this obligation in several ways, and one vehicle will is the supplemental funding request President Bush will present to Congress for an additional $100–$150 billion to fund military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a coequal branch of

government, Congress can place conditions for funding additional deployments to

Iraq. While Congress should not move to cut off funds for troops already deployed,

it can exercise its constitutional powers to halt President Bush’s proposed military

escalation with amendments to the budget request:

A. Require clarification on the law that allows the President to mobilize Guard

and Reserve units for up to 2 years. Congress can condition funding for a military

escalation on a measure that makes clear that the total mobilization of Guard and

Reserve units beginning on 9/11 cannot exceed 2 years in total, even if they are not

consecutive. This will prevent the administration from calling up Guard and Reserve units for a second time without congressional approval.

B. Require a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s internal conflict. Last

summer, congressional leaders requested that the Director of National Intelligence

prepare a National Intelligence Estimate that includes an assessment on whether

Iraq is in a civil war. The 110th Congress can condition funding for a military escalation on receiving this updated estimate and submitting a declassified version to

the American public.

C. Require recertification that the war in Iraq does not undermine the war against

global terror networks. The joint resolution of 2002, authorizing the use of force in

Iraq, required the Bush administration to certify that the Iraq war would not harm

the effort against terrorism. Congress can condition funding for a military escalation

on a recertification that the Iraq war does not undermine the war in Iraq.

D. Traunche funding and assistance on Iraqi performance. The 110th Congress

can require a transparent, verifiable plan that conditions funding for a military escalation on the performance of Iraqi leaders to fulfill their commitments and responsibilities. Congress can mandate that the Bush administration may not obligate or

expend funds unless periodic verification and certification is provided on key metrics

for progress, including: (1) Steps to disband ethnic and sectarian militias; (2) measures to ensure that Iraqi Government brings to justice Iraqi security personnel who

are credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights; and (3)

steps toward political and national reconciliation.

9. We must change course now.

The United States cannot wait for the next President to resolve the problems in

Iraq. In fact, we have already waited too long. Nor should they heed the dictates

of a President who has mislead us about this war for almost 4 years, most recently

on October 24, 2006, when he told us we were winning the war, constantly reinvents

history, and now has proposed yet another strategy for victory. We now know that

the President knew that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating 6 months ago, but

waited until after the election to change course. The 110th Congress has a special

responsibility to assert its constitutional role and make sure that the Bush administration does not sink the country deeper into Iraq’s civil war by escalating failure.

A U.S. military escalation in Iraq as proposed by President Bush holds little hope

for stabilizing the country, risks doing permanent damage to U.S. ground forces,

and would undermine U.S. efforts to defeat the global terrorist networks that attacked the United States on 9/11. Choosing this course would be, as Senator Smith

notes, is absurd and maybe even criminal. The only responsible path forward is a

new, forceful strategy that marshals the right assets for the challenges the United

States faces in Iraq, in the Middle East, and around the world and redeploys our

forces, strategically, over the next 18 months.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

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Mr. Malley.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST

AND NORTH AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. MALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. Thank

you very much for having me here today.

You’ve heard now, for some time, many descriptions of how calamitous the situation is in Iraq and in the region, and I don’t need

to expand on that. But I think what’s important, given all that, is

to cut to the chase and to be blunt and frank.

It’s very hard today to imagine a positive outcome to this war.

What we do know is that mere tinkering is not going to lead to success. And what we do know is that only a clean break, a dramatic

change in our approach to Iraq, to its government, and to the region presents a possible chance of getting out of this in a stable

way. So, either we undertake a clean break or we should stop the

illusion.

If we’re not prepared—if the administration is not prepared to

undertake a clean break, of if the—our Iraqi allies are not prepared

to undertake a clean break, we should stop pretending that we’re

in Iraq for a useful purpose, we should stop squandering our resources, we should stop losing the lives of young men and women;

we should bring this tragic episode to a close.

Unfortunately, the plan that President Bush put on the table

does not meet the test of a clean break. There are some welcome

changes, most of them overdue, but, in its underlying assumptions,

it basically is stay-the-course-plus-20,000—its underlying assumptions about the Iraqi Government, about our role, and about the

region. In other words, it’s an inadequate answer to a disastrous

situation that, at best, is going to delay what only a radical course

correction could prevent.

Three basic flaws that I then want to address, in terms of the

plan that the International Crisis Group has put on the table.

The first flaw is that it relies on military tools to resolve a political problem. A lot of people have said that, but I think it’s worth

emphasizing. This may not be a war of all against all in Iraq, but

it certainly is a war of many against many, not just Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, but within the Shiite community, within the Sunni

community. The government itself, we know, is supporting militias.

We know they’re part of the conflict. And, therefore, this is not a

struggle in which our goal is to strengthen one side to defeat another, it’s to see whether all sides can reach a political compact, or

else decided this is simply not solvable at this time.

The other problem with using a military tool to resolve a political

problem is that it’s a short-term answer to a long-term issue. And

we know—and we’re seeing it already—that the militias may melt

away, they may choose other places to go, rather than Baghdad.

And so, the administration’s strategy of ‘‘clear, build, and hold’’ is

no answer to the insurgents’ and the militia strategy of ‘‘recoil, redeploy, and spoil.’’

No. 2. To end the sectarian fighting, the President’s plan relies

on the Iraqi Government and our allies in Iraq, who are party to

the sectarian conflict. And that’s been evidenced, to us at least, for

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at least the last 2 years. It hasn’t started only in 2006, as Larry

Korb rightly pointed out. There is no government of national unity.

We may talk about it; there is no such thing. It’s not a partner in

our efforts to stabilize Iraq. It hasn’t been a partner in our efforts

to stem the violence. It’s one side in a growing and every-day-dirtier civil war.

We need to be—impose real conditionality, real toughness, including on those who we brought to power—in particular on those

that we brought to power—and we need to get them to adhere to

a real vision for Iraq, or, again, we should get out of that business.

The third problem with the President’s plan is that its regional

strategy is at war with its strategy for Iraq. If the priority today

is to stabilize Iraq and to get out of there with our vital interests

intact, we can’t, at the same time, try to destabilize Iran and Syria.

We have to choose what our goals for the region are. And right

now, unfortunately, the President’s plan has us going in two different directions at once. It’s not as if the region has played a determining role in leading us to where we are, but it’s hard for me

to see how we can get out of where we are if we don’t enlist the

support and cooperation of all countries in the region.

So, what is our proposal? The International Crisis Group, which

I have to say is based not on simply my abstract thinking at all,

it is—we have analysts and consultants who have been in Iraq nonstop since 2003. Many of them have met with members of your

staff. They go there, they meet not only with members of the government, but with insurgents and militia groups. And what I’m

saying now reflects, to the best of my ability, what they have said

to me. And, again, what they say is that only a radical and dramatic policy shift, which entails a different distribution of power in

Iraq, a different vision for the country, and a different set of outside pressures and influences exercised within Iraq, has a possibility of arresting the decline.

Three—the three assumptions that the President’s plan has, and

which we disagree with, is, No. 1, we think that the Iraqi Government and the parties that we support are one of the actors in the

sectarian violence and not partners in fighting extremists. We believe that the entire political structure that has been set up since

2003 has to be overhauled and not strengthened. And we believe

that the United States must engage with all parties, rather than

isolate those who precisely have the greatest capacity to sabotage

what we’re trying to do.

And so, what we need is a strategy that does, for the first time,

what has not been done since the outset, which is a strategy that

puts real pressure on all Iraqi parties to try to do the right thing.

It really is the last chance to see if we could salvage Iraq today as

a state.

It won’t be done simply by dealing with the government, for the

reasons I expressed before. And, to expand on it a little bit—and

I think you’ll hear about it more next week, or tomorrow, when you

have testimony on the internal situation in Iraq—though parties,

the politicians who are supporting, have turned out to be warlords

who are lining their pockets, who are promoting their own interests, who are advancing their own personal party agendas, they’ve

become increasingly indifferent to the country’s interests as they

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prepare to strengthen their own position within their community,

against other communities, and within their own communities.

They’re preying on state coffers, and they’re preying on the reconstruction funds that our taxpayers, in particular, have been paying

for.

So far, our strategy has been to provide unconditional support for

them, which gives them the best of both worlds. They can act like

warlords and they could have the appearance of being statesmen.

We have to tell them to choose. It’s either warlord or it’s statesmen, it can’t be both. To achieve that, we propose three interrelated steps, many of which echo what the Iraqi Study Group

has—says, many echo what Larry Korb just said.

The first thing is to try, for the first time, to get all Iraqi stakeholders around the table and to see whether we can come—they

could come up with a consensus plan. And that means not treating

the government as a privileged party, but as one of the actors in

this conference. And it means not to support the Iraqi Government,

but to support Iraq.

And we know the compromises that need to be made, whether it

has to do with the distribution of resources, with federalism, with

de-Baathification, with amnesty, with the rollup and integration of

militias into the security forces, and, of course, with the timetable

for the withdrawal of our own forces. And that has to be done, as

I said, not only with the Iraqi Government, but with members of

militias, insurgent groups, civil society, political parties, to the exclusion of the jihadist al-Qaeda group, but, other than that, erring

on the side of inclusiveness rather than narrowness.

How do we get to do that? The second point we need to emphasize is that we need, as I said earlier, regional and international

support. We can’t do this alone. And it’s not a matter of whether

the United States has become a weak party in the Middle East, although I would submit that we’ve lost a lot of our credibility and

a lot of our leverage in the region because of our policies over the

last few years, but it has to do with the fact that Iraq today has

become such a fragmented country in which there is no central

state institution and in which militia groups, insurgent groups, and

others build on this—on their ties to outside actors, and outside actors can always, if they want to, destabilize the situation by promoting the agendas of any group within Iraq. So, we need the help

of anyone in the region who is prepared to do so. The neighbors

didn’t instigate the crisis, it’s hard for me to imagine that the crisis

can be resolved without them today.

The third point, which is essential in order to get a multinational

strategy, is to engage with all parties in the region—and that

means Iran and Syria, in particular—and to revive the Arab-Israeli

peace process. It was a core recommendation of the Iraq Study

Group. It was one of the first to be summarily dismissed by the

President. But let me explain, again, why I think—and I think

Larry Korb made some of those points—why we need to engage

with Syria and Iran despite all the skepticism that one may have

about it.

Both of them have huge ability to spoil the situation in Iraq. We

know that. We know that they have ties to tribal groups. We know

that they have ties to Sunni Arabs, in the case of Syria; with Shiite

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militias, in the case of Iran; and they could do much worse than

they’ve done already, and they use their leverage to help if they

were brought to the table and they had that interest. And, again,

if we don’t bring them in, we know all the harm they can do.

Why revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process? And, Mr. Chairman, I know—I’ve read your remarks about how you don’t believe

that by resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, it’s going to make any

bit of difference between how Sunnis and Shiites——

The CHAIRMAN. No; I—just for clarification, that’s not what I

said. I said settling it——

Dr. MALLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Does not settle the other.

Dr. MALLEY. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. It would positively impact, but it does not settle.

Dr. MALLEY. OK. And I agree, I was going to say, I agree with

that. Of course, the notion that, because Arabs and Israelis are

going to be at peace, Sunnis and Shiites would be at peace, is a

fantasy. I do think that if we want to have a strategy that gains

credibility in the region, we need to revitalize, as I know you agree.

I also think it’s very important to revitalize the Syrian-Israeli

track, both because Syria plays a critical role in Iraq, vis-a-vis

Hamas, vis-a-vis Hezbollah, but because it also is quite ironic that,

for the first time, at least in my memory, the United States is

standing in the way of an Arab country that wants to negotiate

with Israel.

If—and I think this is an important part—I’ve put on the table

the three components that we need. If this is not undertaken by

the administration, or if it’s undertaken and our Iraqi partners are

not prepared to cooperate, then we should bring this adventure to

an end. And I say that aware of the moral and political responsibility the United States has. We played a critical role, if not the

determining role, in bringing Iraq to the situation in which it finds

itself today. And it’s a heavy responsibility to say today, ‘‘Well, because the Iraqis are not behaving the way we expected them to,

even though we’re at fault, we’re going to get out of this.’’ But there

is no possible justification for an open-ended commitment in a failing state, and there certainly is no possible justification to be

complicit in the nefarious acts of our allies in Iraq.

A word about troop levels, which has consumed a lot of the attention and the debate here as a result of the President’s request for

a surge. It’s the wrong question at the wrong time, disconnected

from realities. A troop surge, independent from a political strategy,

won’t make any difference. I think everyone today has agreed with

that. Maybe it will make a marginal and temporary difference, but,

if you don’t affect the underlying structural dynamics—at best, the

violence will resume the day this troop surge comes to an end; at

worst, the violence will simply move to other places.

If, on the other hand, a new compact can be reached, if we find

that the Iraqi actors, all of them, are prepared to turn the page,

then part of the dialog that they need to have with us is how to

negotiate a troop withdrawal. I don’t think the United States

should stay there a long time, in any event, but we should negotiate it, we should negotiate the timetable, we should talk—use it

as leverage to ensure that they hold their commitments. If, on the

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other hand the compact is not reached, or it’s reached but it’s not

implemented, then, of course, we should significantly accelerate the

withdrawal of our forces, perhaps maintaining some forces to maintain—to protect our vital interests, in terms of border security.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize, again, this is really not only

a last opportunity, it’s a feeble hope. I think we have to be candid

about it. It’s a hope that’s dependent on the fundamental shift on

the part of Iraqi actors who have shown themselves to be mainly

preoccupied with short-term gain. It’s a hope that’s dependent on

the radical rupture on the part of an administration that’s shown

itself reluctant and resistant to pragmatic change. It’s a hope that’s

dependent on a significant change in our relationship with countries in the region—in particular, Syria and Iran—a relationship

that’s been marked by deep distrust and strategic competition.

And, finally, it’s a hope that’s dependent on involvement by international actors who, so far, have seemed to be more content staying

on the sidelines.

But it is the only hope, at this point, that would justify remaining in Iraq in the way we—the administration intends to remain.

It’s the only possible justification for investing our resources and

the lives of our men and women. And it’s certainly the only justification for not bringing this misbegotten, tragic adventure to a

close. If we cannot do what I’ve laid out, I think it’s time to end

this chapter.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Malley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, first, let me express my deep appreciation for the invitation to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By now, you have had many

days of important testimony; virtually all your witnesses have emphasized the gravity of the situation in both Iraq and the region. The United States unmistakably

is at a crossroads. If it is poorly managed, our Nation will have to live with the consequences of regional instability, rising extremism and diminished American credibility for a long time to come.

It is difficult, at this late stage, to imagine a positive outcome to this war. But

to have any chance of success, mere tinkering will not do. What is needed today is

a dramatic change in our approach toward both Iraq and the region, so that we seek

to enlist broad international support for a new political compact among Iraqis, cease

treating the Iraqi Government as a privileged partner rather than an integral party

to the sectarian war; and engage in real diplomacy with all Iraq’s neighbours, Iran

and Syria included.

To be clear: If the administration is not prepared to undertake such a paradigm

shift, then our Nation has no business sending its men and women in harm’s way.

It has no business squandering its precious resources on a growing civil war. And

it will be time to bring this tragic episode to a close through the orderly withdrawal

of American troops in a manner that protects vital U.S. interests with some remaining to contain the civil war within Iraq’s borders.

Unfortunately, the plan announced by President Bush does not reflect the necessary clean break. It adheres to the same faulty premises that have guided its

approach since the onset of the war and, therefore, suffers from the same fatal

contradictions. In its essence it amounts to ‘‘stay the course plus 20,000’’—an inadequate answer to a disastrous situation that at most will delay what only radical

course correction can avert. Under the best case scenario, it will postpone what, increasingly, is looking like the most probable scenario: Iraq’s collapse into a failed

and fragmented state, an intensifying and long-lasting civil war, as well as increased foreign meddling that risks metastasising into a broad proxy war. Such a

situation could not be contained within Iraq’s borders.

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There is abundant reason to question whether the administration is capable of

such a dramatic course change. But there is no reason to question why we ought

to change direction, and what will happen if we do not.

Mr Chairman, at the outset it is important to begin with an honest assessment

of where things stand. My assessment is based on the longstanding field work performed by the International Crisis Group’s staff and consultants who have been in

Iraq repeatedly, outside of the Green Zone, in contact with militiamen and insurgents, almost without interruption since the war.

Two key factors are critical in understanding the country’s current condition. One

is the utter collapse of the state apparatus which created both a security and managerial vacuum that 31⁄2 years of reconstruction have failed to overcome. The security

vacuum has been filled by autonomous, violent actors—militias linked to the Shiite

Islamists (the Badr Corps and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army), as well as an array

of smaller groups, among them Mahdi Army offshoots, neighbourhood vigilantes,

private sector contractors guarding politicians as well as oil, power, and other key

facilities and criminal mafias. The armed groups’ and militias’ most important

source of legitimacy and power has become the conflict’s very radicalisation: The

more they can point to the extreme violence of the other, the more they can justify

their own in terms of protection (of one’s community) and revenge (against another).

In the absence of a state apparatus capable of safeguarding the population, civilians

are caught in a vicious cycle in which they must rely on armed groups.

The other factor is the rise of a class of politicians, predominantly former exiles

and emigres enjoying little legitimacy among ordinary Iraqis, who have treated the

country and its resources as their party or personal entitlement, have encouraged

a communal-based political system that has polarised the country and, in some

cases, have advanced separatist agendas that are tearing the nation apart. Political

actors have accentuated differences through their brand of identity politics and promotion of a political system in which positions are allocated according to communal

identities. With few exceptions, the parties and individuals that came to represent

these communities—themselves internally divided—carved out private fiefdoms in

the ministries and institutions they acquired, preying on state coffers and reconstruction largesse to finance their militias and line their pockets. The absence of politics also raised the stock of both Sunni and Shiite clerics and, over time, the more

radical among them, at the expense of secular minded forces.

Not unlike the groups they combat, the forces that dominate the current government thrive on identity politics, communal polarisation, and a cycle of intensifying

violence and counterviolence. Increasingly indifferent to the country’s interests, its

political leaders gradually are becoming local warlords when what Iraq desperately

needs are national leaders.

And so, hollowed out and fatally weakened, the Iraqi State today is prey to armed

militias, sectarian forces, and a political class that, by putting short-term personal

concerns ahead of long-term national interests, is complicit in Iraq’s tragic destruction.

The implication is clear and critical: The government—by which I mean the entire

institutional apparatus set up since the fall of Saddam—is not and cannot be a partner in an effort to stem the violence, nor will its strengthening contribute to Iraq’s

stability. The Sunni Arab representatives it includes lack meaningful support within

their community and have no sway with the armed opposition groups that are feeding civil war dynamics. Conversely, its most influential Shiite members control the

most powerful militias, which also are involved in brutal sectarian violence. Given

the depth of polarisation, the United States must come to terms with the fact that

the current government is merely one among many parties to the conflict. The manner of Saddam Hussein’s execution was only the latest and most vivid illustration:

It was Green Zone meets Red Zone, the pulling of the curtain that revealed the government in its rawest, crudest form.

One additional comment: It has been argued that the ongoing sectarian division

of the country could be a pathway toward Iraq’s eventual stabilisation through a

rough division into three entities. There is little doubt that Iraq’s territory is being

carved up into homogeneous sectarian zones, separated by de facto front lines. What

were once mixed neighbourhoods—and whose identity as chiefly Sunni or Shiite

areas would have been impossible to presume prior to the war—are in the process

of being consolidated according to a single religious identity.

But there remain countless disputed areas, resolution of which would entail far

greater and more savage levels of violence than currently is occurring. Even in

Baghdad, the mosaic has not disappeared; it has evolved. Sunni and Shiite

neighbourhoods are gradually being consolidated, but the process is far from complete, and in any event these neighbourhoods are still intermingled. Current confessional boundaries will be fiercely fought over; minority enclaves will be the targets

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of bloody assaults. Moreover, the violence is taking place within communities, with

intrasectarian tensions giving rise to fratricidal clashes. In other words, Iraq’s division may soon become inevitable. But it will not be a tidy three-way split and it

will entail violence on a scale far greater than anything witnessed so far. It may

become the final outcome. It should not be a U.S. goal.

The absence of an effective central state, coupled with Iraq’s growing fragmentation and increased power of autonomous groups and militias, has enhanced the role

of outside actors both as potential spoilers and as needed partners in any effort to

stabilise the country. This is an issue over which there has been considerable confusion, but the reality is simply this: The fact that Iraq’s neighbours did not instigate

the crisis does not mean they could not sustain it if they so desired, nor that it can

be resolved without their help. Given how dire things have become, it will take active cooperation by all foreign stakeholders to have any chance to redress the situation.

Regrettably, opposite dynamics today are at play. As it approaches its fifth year,

the conflict has become a magnet for deeper regional interference and a source of

greater regional instability. As the security vacuum has grown, various neighbours

and groups have sought to promote and protect their interests, prevent potential

threats and preempt their counterparts’ presumed hostile actions. In principle,

neighbouring countries and other regional powers share an interest in containing

the conflict and avoiding its ripple effects. But, divided by opposing agendas, mistrust and lack of communication, they, so far, have been unable to coordinate strategies to that effect. Most damaging has been competition between the United States

and Iran and the conviction in Tehran that Washington is seeking to build a hostile

regional order. As a result, instead of working together toward an outcome they all

could live with (a weak but prosperous and united Iraq that does not present a

threat to its neighbours), each appears to be taking measures in anticipation of the

outcome they all fear—Iraq’s descent into all-out chaos and fragmentation. By increasing support for some Iraqi actors against others, their actions have all the wisdom of a self-fulfilling prophecy: Steps that will accelerate the very process they

claim to wish to avoid.

Iraq’s sectarian tensions are also spreading throughout the region. They are exacerbating a Sunni-Shiite divide that is fast becoming the dominant lens through

which Middle East developments are apprehended. The most serious repercussions

are felt in confessionally mixed societies such as Lebanon, Syria, and some gulf

countries. One of the more perilous prospects is that of renewed conflict along an

Arab-Persian divide. The more it develops, the more Iraq will become the theatre

of deadly proxy wars waged by others. Should this happen, the United States will

be fighting a difficult and highly unpredictable battle.

Mr. Chairman, the President’s newly announced approach can only be properly

assessed in light of this assessment. And it is in light of this assessment that its

fundamental flaws and contradictions become clear: It seeks to provide a military

solution to a political crisis; it leaves the political dimension to an Iraqi Government

that is an integral party to the sectarian conflict; and it seeks to stabilise Iraq without offering a regional strategy or engagement with pivotal neighbours without

which such a goal simply is unattainable.

1. The President’s plan essentially relies on military means to resolve a political

problem: Iraq may not be experiencing a war of all against all, but it is at the very

least a war of many against many. Government-supported militias as much as

Sunni insurgents are part of this confrontation, and intersectarian fighting mixes

with intrasectarian struggles. The implication—critical in terms of devising an effective response—is that this is not a military challenge in which one side needs to

be strengthened and another defeated, but a political one in which new understandings need to be reached. Even if the addition of several thousand U.S. troops

quells the violence in Baghdad—an uncertain proposition at best—insurgent groups

and militias are likely to focus their efforts elsewhere and/or to melt away. The

President’s plan is at best a short-term answer to a long-term problem: The moment

the U.S. ‘‘surge’’ ends, violent actors will resume their fighting. In short, Washington’s contemplated strategy of ‘‘clear, build, and hold’’ is no response to the insurgents’ and militias’ strategy of ‘‘recoil, redeploy, and spoil.’’

2. To end the sectarian fighting, the President’s plan depends on an Iraqi Government that has become an integral party to the sectarian war: The President repeatedly describes the Iraqi Government as one of national unity. It is nothing of the

sort. It is not a partner in an effort to stem the violence nor will its strengthening

contribute to Iraq’s stabilisation. The administration must come to terms with the

fact that the current government has become one side in a growing dirty war. It

is incapable of generating the compromises required to restabilize the country and

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1The International Herald Tribune, 18 January 2007.

rebuild institutions that have decayed, been corrupted, and are today, unable to either provide security or distribute goods and services.

This does not mean, as sometimes is suggested, that the United States should engineer another Cabinet change, trying to forge an alliance that excludes Sadr and

may ultimately sacrifice Maliki. Maliki and the Cabinet are symptoms, not causes

of the underlying problem: The core issue is not with the identity of Cabinet members; it is with the entire political edifice put in place since 2003. No Prime Minster

operating under current circumstances could do what Prime Minister Maliki has

not. Structural, not personnel changes, are now needed.

3. The President’s plan is premised on contradictory and self-defeating regional

goals. One cannot simultaneously stabilise Iraq and destabilise Iran and Syria. Although neither Tehran nor Damascus is at the origins of, or even plays a major part

in, Iraq’s catastrophe, the situation has reached the point where resolution will be

impossible without their cooperation, as both states have the ability to sabotage any

U.S. initiative and as both are needed to pressure or persuade insurgents and militias to pursue a political path. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Jim Dobbins, no stranger to successful U.S. efforts at conflict resolution, put it well: It has

never been likely that the United States could stabilise Iraq and destabilise Iran

and Syria at the same time. As long as the United States continues to operate at

cross purposes with nearly all its neighbours, and particularly the most influential,

American efforts to promote peace and reconciliation are unlikely to prosper. In refusing to combine coercion with communication in its dealings (or nondealings) with

Iraq’s neighbours, the Bush administration is making peace in Iraq less likely, and

increasing the chances for war throughout the surrounding region.1

In lieu of talking to Iran and Syria, the administration is proposing a different

kind of engagement: Military threats addressed toward Iran, combined with attempts to build an anti-Iranian coalition of pro-Western Sunni Arab governments.

Besides raising the most obvious question (How can the United States rely on Iranian allies in Baghdad at the same time as it is developing a tough anti-Iranian

strategy for the region?), this approach runs the risk of promoting internecine conflict and, possibly, all-out and unwinnable civil wars in Lebanon and Palestine—yet

another series of catastrophes in the making.

At this late stage, only a radical and dramatic policy shift—entailing a different

distribution of power and resources within Iraq as well as a different set of outside

influences mobilised to achieve it—can conceivably arrest the spiralling decline. In

contrast to the President’s plan, the International Crisis Group bases its own on the

belief that the Iraqi Government is one of actors in sectarian violence, not a partner

in fighting extremists; that the entire post-2003 power structure must be overhauled, rather than strengthened; and that the United States must engage with all

relevant regional actors, rather than seek to succeed alone and isolate those who,

in response, are most likely to destabilise Iraq.

The International Crisis Group’s proposal aims to meet the three most important

challenges: To end the civil war, reconstruct the state and its institutions, and prevent dangerous regional spillover. This is not something the United States can do

alone nor is it something it can count on the Iraqi Government achieving. It needs

to reach out widely to seek collaboration from friends and foes alike. That will require not only requesting others to play a part in implementing a new policy but

also giving them a key role in shaping it. Crisis Group advocates three essential and

interrelated steps:

1. A new forceful multilateral approach that puts real pressure on all Iraqi parties:

The Baker-Hamilton report was right to call for the creation of a broad International Support Group; it should comprise the five permanent Security Council

members, Iraq’s six neighbours, and the United Nations represented by its Secretary General. But its purpose cannot be to support the Iraqi Government. It must

support Iraq, which means pressing the government, along with all other Iraqi constituents, to make the necessary compromises. It also means defining rules of the

game for outside powers vis-a-vis Iraq, agreeing on redlines none would cross, and,

crucially, guiding the full range of Iraqi political actors to consensus on an acceptable end-state. This does not entail a one-time conference, but sustained multilateral diplomacy.

The absence of an effective Iraqi State apparatus, the fragmented nature of Iraqi

society, and the proliferation of self-sustaining militias and armed groups underscore the urgency of a much more substantial role for the international community,

and in particular for neighbouring states. The United States, unfortunately, no

longer possesses the credibility or leverage to achieve its goals on its own and Iraqi

actors are unlikely to budge without concerted effort by all regional players with inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00444 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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fluence and leverage over them. Although what happens in Iraq will depend, above

all, on the creation of a new internal momentum, such momentum cannot be sustained without cooperation from neighbors who each possess considerable nuisance

and spoiling capacity.

2. A conference of all Iraqi and international stakeholders, modeled after the Dayton conference for Bosnia and the Bonn conference for Afghanistan, to forge a new

political compact: A new, more equitable and inclusive national compact needs to

be agreed upon by all relevant actors, including militias and insurgent groups, on

issues such as federalism, resource allocation, de-Baathification, the scope of the

amnesty, the structure of security forces, and the timetable for a U.S. withdrawal.

This can only be done if the International Support Group brings all of them to the

negotiating table and if its members steer their deliberations, deploying a mixture

of carrots and sticks to influence those on whom they have particular leverage.

Indeed, if enlarging the scope of international players is one essential pillar, enlarging the range of Iraqi actors and injecting new momentum in national reconciliation efforts must be another. Much of the past few years of diplomacy have had

an extraordinarily surreal and virtual quality: Pursuit of an Iraqi political process

that is wholly divorced from realities on the ground through dealings between the

United States and local leaders who possess neither the will nor the ability to fundamentally change current dynamics—who, indeed, have been complicit in entrenching them. The present government does not need to be strengthened—say, by expanding Iraqi security forces; it needs to have a different character and pursue different objectives. The time has come for a new, more inclusive Iraqi deal that puts

rebuilding a nonethnic, nonsectarian state at the top of its objectives.

The conference should include all Iraq’s political stakeholders—leaders of parties,

movements, militias, insurgent groups, tribal confederations, and civil society

organisations across the political spectrum. The point is to exercise pressure from

above—through foreign supporters of local groups—and below—by enlisting the far

more reasonable and conciliatory aspirations of most ordinary Iraqis. The conference’s objective should be to guide Iraqi actors toward an internal consensus on

the principal issues of dispute and amend the constitution accordingly.

3. A new U.S. regional strategy, including engagement with Syria and Iran, and

to end efforts at forcible regime change and revitalisation of all tracks of the ArabIsraeli peace process: Polite engagement of Iraq’s neighbours will not do. Rather a

clear redefinition of U.S. objectives in the region will be required to enlist regional,

but especially Iranian and Syrian help. The goal is not to bargain with them but

to seek agreement on an end-state for Iraq and the region that is no one’s first

choice, but with which everyone can live.

Engagement with Iran and Syria was one of the core recommendations of the Iraq

Study Group, and one of the first to be summarily dismissed by the President. Seriously engaging Syria and Iran will not be easy; bringing them around will be even

harder. But the United States has no workable alternative if its objective is to restore peace in Iraq and defuse dangerous tensions threatening regional stability. On

top of refraining from damaging steps, there is much Iran and Syria can do to help:

Enhance border control; using Damascus’s extensive intelligence on, and lines of

communication with, insurgent groups to facilitate negotiations; drawing on its

wide-ranging tribal networks to reach out to Sunni Arabs in the context of such negotiations; and utilising Iran’s leverage to control SCIRI and its channels in southern Iraq to convince the Sadrists they have a stake in the new compact.

Given current U.S. policy, neither Iran nor Syria today sees much to gain from

helping us extricate ourselves from Iraq. The question is not whether either side

will surrender to the other. The question is whether there exists some accommodation that, while short of either side’s ideal outcome, nonetheless meets each side’s

minimum vital interests. The answer is at best uncertain, given the considerable

mistrust that currently prevails. But there are considerable costs for all sides with

continuing along the present course: A deepening crisis for the United States in

Iraq, the prospect of further international sanctions and isolation for Iran and Syria,

and dissolution of the Iraqi State with potential harmful consequences for all. In

other words, the most powerful inducement for a compromise are the risks associated with the status quo.

The issue of troop levels, which has consumed so much of the debate and to which

the administration has offered its response, is the wrong question, disconnected

from ground realities. On its own, and in the absence of significant political change,

the addition of troops will have only marginal and temporary impact on the intensity of violence. Without fundamental changes in Iraq and in U.S. policy, a continued American presence serves little purpose. In fact, it risks making Washington

complicit in the worst excesses of the Iraqi Government, providing it with both public excuses and the security to operate with impunity.

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Rather, the issue of U.S. troops can only be properly understood in relation to

whether or not a new Iraqi political compact is reached. If it is, then what are

needed are negotiated arrangements for a relatively rapid coalition military withdrawal. The coalition’s military roles, rules of engagement, and withdrawal schedule

should be an item for discussion at the Dayton/Bonn-like conference, an instrument

of leverage for the United States and a means of ensuring an orderly withdrawal.

The coalition presence would be conditioned on this compact being reached and implemented; the schedule for its withdrawal should be agreed and, in any event,

should be completed within a reasonable time period, probably not more than 2 to

3 years. If a consensus emerges for longer stay, that could then be considered.

Should the consensus back a more rapid withdrawal, it should, of course, be carried

out.

But, and by the same token, if the compact is not reached or not implemented,

the United States should significantly accelerate the withdrawal of forces that then

will have lost their main purpose. A residual number may remain, for example at

the borders in order to contain the conflict within Iraq. Any such withdrawal raises

difficult political and even moral issues, as the United States undeniably bears responsibility for Iraq’s current calamity. But there can be no possible justification for

an open-ended investment in a failing state.

Mr. Chairman, implementation of the plan put forward by the International Crisis

Group would present one last opportunity. It is at best a feeble hope, dependent on

a fundamental shift among Iraqi political leaders who have long been preoccupied

with only short-term gain; on a radical rupture by an administration that has

proved resistant to pragmatic change; on a significant alteration in relations between the United States and key regional countries that have been marked by deep

distrust and strategic competition; and on involvement by international actors that

have warily watched from the sidelines. But it is the only hope to spare Iraq from

an all-out disintegration. And it would be the only possible justification for continuing to invest our troops and our resources in this misbegotten adventure.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all very much.

You know, this is one of those cases where I wish we had a mandatory session in this Senate, and all of you sat in the well, and

all four of you spoke to 100 Senators. They’re all very busy. They

all have other committee assignments. And they don’t have the

benefit of hearing the detail we just heard. I think the testimony

this morning has been really very enlightening.

Let me say, we’ll do 8-minute rounds. And, if possible, depending

on the time of—the availability of the witnesses and on the participation here, maybe have a second round.

Let me start, if I may, by suggesting that as I listened to all of

you, there is agreement on at least three or four items. One; the

surge is not a good idea. Matter of fact, it’s a very bad idea. Two;

if we should begin to redeploy American forces, the timeframe over

which that redeployment should take place, whether things are

going well or poorly, is a frame that begins now and has an outside

life of about 18 months. Three; that we need some regional interaction that is—engages all the neighbors. And four; that the United

States has vital interests in the region.

Now, the reason I mention these is, the first three are in direct

odds with the administration. It’s not merely the redeployment

that’s at odds with this administration’s strategy. It is all three of

the areas of agreement that I’ve mentioned. I know some of you

better than others, but I know of all of you, and one of the problems that you recognize, but that the vast majority of the public

has understandable difficulty recognizing, is: We don’t get to formulate foreign policy here. We get to react to it. We can, hopefully,

influence it, but that’s not always certain. And most times we’re

left with Hobson’s choices here. The other thing you all agree on

is, there’s no, really great choices here. None of you are bullish on

437

the notion that there is a good way out, a good way to resolve the

situation in Iraq. And we’re left with an administration who’s not

likely to listen, thus far, and a government in Iraq that left us with

a constitution that, as Les points out, 80 percent of the Iraqis voted

for. And yet, with the exception of Les, basically the three of you

are saying we should basically disregard that constitution. I’m not

suggesting I’m certain that is wrong, but that’s basically what

you’ve all said.

Now, one of the things that the Constitution says is—and we essentially helped write it—in article 115, ‘‘The federal system in the

Republic of Iraq’’—I’m quoting—‘‘is made up of decentralized capital regions and governates and local administration.’’ And to go

back to your point, Les, this administration has continued to push

a rope here, they continue—and all of you point out—to insist on

a strong central government that we would put our full faith and

credit behind and support, yet there is nothing I have seen in the

Constitution or in the conduct of the Iraqis that they’re inclined to

support a strong central government, which the very Constitution

doesn’t even call for.

So, my question is this: Do we essentially try to accommodate

this Constitution functioning, or do we just pretend like it doesn’t

even exist, as we move from this moment on, in terms of ‘‘a clean

break, a different policy, et cetera’’?

Let’s start with you, Les. Do we——

Dr. GELB. I completely agree with your question, Mr. Chairman.

There is no way we can get out of this without a disaster without

at least trying to help them to reach a political settlement. They

put themselves on a road to a federal or decentralized alternative,

and every time we raise this, people talk as if we’re trying to stuff

this down their throats. I think a majority of Iraqis would want to

live this way, would want to be able to run their own affairs in

their own regions. I’ve talked to them, too, and I do not ignore the

fact that 80 percent voted for that Constitution, or that 80 percent

voted for that implementing legislation. The support is there. The

resistance is also there. But unless we help them toward this kind

of political agreement, nothing is going to happen except trouble,

and worse trouble than we’ve had.

Now, I don’t disagree with Ed Luttwak about our inability to

transform other societies, but I do disagree that the United States

shouldn’t interfere in the domestic politics of another state, particularly where we have such deep involvement and where we have

real responsibility. That’s really what foreign policy is all about.

Foreign policy, serious foreign policy, is the interference by one

country in the domestic politics of another country. And if you don’t

interfere successfully, you don’t have a successful foreign policy.

But, in the end, this will work, or not, depending upon whether

the Iraqis want to do it. But we have the responsibility, I think,

to lean on them and to work with them.

One final point, quickly. I stress ‘‘to work with them,’’ because

there’s got to be working at two ends here. First of all, working between you folks on this committee and the administration for a real

bipartisan approach. It hasn’t happened. And, second, between our

administration and the Iraqis. And it hasn’t happened. A 2-hour

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visit by a senior official to Baghdad is not the way to work out a

common strategy or to move these issues forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me say, since my time is up, I don’t

want to start by asking a question that gets everyone involved, and

I end up spending 15 minutes, and my colleagues don’t get to ask

questions, so I’ll go back to ask you all to illuminate on that, as

well. I would like, in the minute I have left—there are several proposals put forward so far. One is to try to accommodate a bipartisan foreign policy, a bipartisan approach here to demonstrate to

the administration to cease and desist from what they’re doing. It

looks like there’s overwhelming support for that, in the sense that

you have the proposal put forward by me and Levin and Hagel and

Olympia Snowe. And then you have a proposal that says almost

the same thing being put forward by Warner and leading Republicans. So, my guess is, there’ll be an overwhelming rejection on the

record of this President’s continuing, as was stated by one of you,

to ‘‘stay the course with 20,000 more,’’ or whatever the phrase was

that was used.

But there are also other proposals that I’d like to ask your input

on. There are proposals just to cap the number of forces in Iraq and

make that law. There are proposals to cut off funding for the ‘‘war

in Iraq.’’ Would you, each of you, as briefly as you can, respond to

the efficacy of setting a cap? And what does that mean in Iraq, in

the region? What are the consequences of that? Hard number. And

two, the idea of cutting off funding, generically, for ‘‘the war in

Iraq.’’ And I’ll start with you, Ed, and then end up with Les.

Dr. LUTTWAK. I really believe that this committee, led as it now

is by people of unparalleled experience and seriousness, can acquire enough authority with your colleagues in the Congress—

enough authority to guide policy the right way without the—what

I—you know, the arbitrary cutoffs and putting yourself in a position where you, yourself, might hesitate about the absolute nature

of it, and so on. I think that, you know, Senators Lugar and Biden

and the—all their colleagues—as a voice of moderation, can guide

them in the right direction. But I would really be opposed to these

drastic sort of measures.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Korb.

Dr. KORB. I think that you can cap the forces, which doesn’t

mean that the President can’t send more, but he has to come back

to you to justify what more. And I would recommend that right

now, given the situation, you put a cap, say, at 150,000, which

would allow him to send more troops, because you don’t want to

hamstring him from having to deal with situations that occur, and

for what military commanders want. But that certainly would

enough. After that—and I think it’s been misunderstood—people

say, ‘‘Well, if you cap him, you’re undermining the authority of the

Commander in Chief.’’ No, you just ask him to come back and justify why it has to go more than 150,000.

I think you can also condition the funding, not, you know, this

year, but you’re going to take up—my understanding is, when they

submit the 2008 budget, they’re also going to submit the supplemental for 2008, it’s all going to be together—you can—you know,

can condition the funding in fiscal 2008, where the administration

provides verification and certification on key metrics for progress in

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Iraq, that they’ve talked about. After all, remember, Secretary

Gates has said, ‘‘If they don’t do what we said, we may not even

send all of the—all of the troops.’’ So, I think that you can require

steps to disband the ethnic and sectarian militias, measures to ensure that the Iraqi Government brings to justice Iraqi security personnel who are alleged to have committed gross violations of

human rights, and steps toward political and national reconciliation.

You can’t run foreign policy from here, but you can put the onus

on the administration to demonstrate why their policy is the right

policy.

The CHAIRMAN. The cap that’s being discussed is a cap to prevent

the troops from being able to be sent, so the cap is at 135 or whatever the number is. Would you support that?

Dr. KORB. Not right now, because, again, you started with 132,

you got one brigade in there, another one’s—to go. I mean, because

it seems to me—I don’t know what could happen there, but you

don’t ever want to put yourself in a position where the place goes

to hell in a handbasket and you stop the——

The CHAIRMAN. And you can’t—that would also prevent brigades

we have in the outlying countries from being able to surge——

Dr. KORB. That’s right. And the other thing that I recommended,

if you constrain their ability to mobilize Guard and Reserve units

for the second time, they’re the ones that are supposed to replace

the forces that have been sent, so this would give you an opportunity, again, to present this surge——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s a different——

Dr. KORB [continuing]. From going on.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Way than capping.

Dr. KORB. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. And, Mr. Malley, the cap and cutoff——

Dr. MALLEY. Well, let me start by saying I’m very comfortable,

as Les said, intervening in the domestic politics of other countries,

much less comfortable dealing with the domestic politics of the

Democratic or Republican Party. So, I—not going to get into the—

I don’t think——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there are people on both sides support all

of these things.

Dr. MALLEY. No; exact—but—and my view is that right now the

main priority is to send a message about what is not right, and

that that plan that was put on the table is not right. And then you

need to have an open discussion about what is right. And talking

about numbers and troops, as I said earlier, abstracted from the

political strategy, is an exercise in fantasy. I mean, let’s get the political strategy right, then we would know what kind of troops we

need. If we don’t get the political strategy right, any talk of capping

or anything else, for me, is surreal.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. But—

Les, you have a final word? And I’ll yield the floor.

Dr. GELB. I’m in favor of serious bipartisan consultations. The

initiative for that has to come from the administration. The only

decent way out of this situation is for the two parties and for the

two branches to share responsibility for the very tough decisions

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that have to be made. And if the administration won’t seriously

consult, then I think these resolutions are the least you can do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate not only the advice you have given with regard to

foreign policy, but the advice you have given to this committee, and

perhaps to advise our consultations with the President.

There could be, certainly, difference of judgment in this committee, how effective we can be. My hope is that, picking up the

theme that you have just enunciated, Les Gelb, that is possible to

work out, on a bipartisan basis, the best strategy for America, and

a perception on the part of the rest of the world that we have the

capability of doing that.

Now, the chairman has been pursuing that. I have been pursuing

it, in my own way, and I would just report, without breaching confidentiality, that I had an opportunity, with Senator Warner, to sit

down with the President for 15 minutes to talk about the things

we have talked about today, I presented, as precisely as I could,

most of the arguments that you have. We had another meeting 4

days later with at least eight other members of the Republican

leadership, joined by the Vice President, the Secretaries of State

and Defense, and so forth. Then, last week, we met with Steve

Hadley, our National Security Director, with eight or nine Republicans sitting around the table. And I’m sure other meetings have

occurred with Democratic Members of the Senate and the House.

At least I hope that’s the case. But I would just say that these have

been opportunities, at least, to make the case, to hear the President, to hear his advisers.

Now, I don’t think we have been necessarily overwhelmingly convincing in the arguments that we have made, although sometimes

in politics persistence and the ability to stay the course is important. But let me just say, the President’s arguments, as I have

jotted down this morning—if he were here, perhaps he would say

the same thing—is that he has a feeling there is going to be a large

human loss. People might well be killed in Baghdad by the forces

of the army or the police or the militia. He feels that, in essence,

without an American presence in the nine police districts, there is

going to be a great deal of killing perhaps, of Shiites by Sunnis,

and that, as a humanitarian situation, although there has been

counseling on the part of you and me and maybe others for, if not

a withdrawal, at least a disengagement from Baghdad. Let’s keep

from sending our people out on patrol or into the various stations

as you’ve talked about, Dr. Luttwak. The President believes that

this is probably the only way that this killing is to be mitigated.

You have argued that might be the case for a while. A surge denotes a discreet period of time. And to execute a proper ‘‘clear and

hold,’’ probably many more troops than 21,500 would be needed—

but, nevertheless, giving the argument its due, there is, on the part

of our President, a humanitarian feeling here with regard to people

that are going to be lost without our intervening.

And, second, he believes that the democratic structure of the

country is unlikely to be perfected without there being substantially more American intervention in this process, that the Iraqis

441

have got it right, in terms of various elections and constitutionbuilding and so forth, but that without these so-called benchmarks,

these messages, essentially, to Maliki or to others, the rest of the

job is unlikely to be perfected very well, if at all, and democracy

is very important to our country, very important to the objectives,

at least, that the President has stated. So, he sees that faltering

badly without our being more involved.

There is also—I believe I fairly state the President’s point of

view—a feeling that there is now an impression that our military

might is not as effective as it should be, or should have been, and

that it is important to establish that impression, that we cannot be

pushed around, that the assertion of these forces at this particular

time is important, once again, in terms of credibility of our military.

And, finally, the President argues, both publicly and privately,

that if we are not successful in this new strategy, it will be a setback in our overall war against terror. He brings up, frequently,

the thought that we, here in the United States, may feel the impact

of our failure to back our military, to perfect democracy, to take a

view of humanity.

What I would like to explore for a moment with you, Dr.

Luttwak, is the intriguing ideas that you have about disengagement. In essence, without being cynical about it, you suggested, in

your testimony using the Spanish example, back in 1800 or so, and

indicate that they were on the threshold of democracy, or at least

some felt that way, but there were others in the country with religious motivation, other leadership, who delayed that democracy for

several decades, if not longer. They felt that the time was not ripe,

given the demographics of the country or the religious affiliation,

and that the situation in Iraq now is much closer to that of Spain

in 1800 than it was to Germany and Japan in 1945, for example.

Therefore, disengagement, as you are suggesting, is a sophisticated

process in which, as a matter of fact, you might find some bases

in the desert, which you say were identified before. For a while,

you keep out the invaders, you probably help continue training of

Iraqi forces. You have an influence on democracy—but albeit from

afar—and you allow the fact that some civil war might occur, that

this is almost inevitable, given the artificial contrivance of the

country to begin with. And that, finally, you have some basis to negotiate with all the parties, either all eight at the same time, or

two plus six, or however you want to do it.

Nevertheless, all the parties in the region understand that we

are going to be a force in the Middle East for a significant time to

come. If not in the Iraqi desert, then certainly close by; but before

we get out of the desert, we at least have made sure we have provided for safe passage out of the country, rather than in a haphazard, expeditious manner.

You bring up an intriguing set of suggestions, and that’s why I

underline it again. But why do you feel that the civil war is inevitable, and that, unhappily, a very large amount of killing, bloodshed, and so forth, even if not our own, is almost inevitable, which

we must accept from afar, from the desert or from the boundaries,

or so forth, of Iraq?

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Dr. LUTTWAK. Senator, you have, indeed, presented many of my

ideas in such an effective way that I don’t want to repeat them. Instead, I’d like to address the specific point.

In the written statement, which will be submitted just after this

hearing, I specifically address, as I must, the impact of disengagement on civil violence. I cannot sit here calmly in Washington and

advocate a policy that will lead to the death of many people.

I believe that disengagement will not increase the level of violence, that reducing troop levels will not do it. And why is that?

The reason is not philosophical, but, again, very tactical. As you all

know from long experience, counterinsurgency without intelligence

is a form of malpractice, because you are there, you’re visible,

you’re spending money, you’re moving around, you’re wearing the

right boots, but you’re not doing the work. Now, you also know that

the enemy is elusive, that he’s low contrast, as they call it technically. You also know that there are so many different insurgent

groups that normal processes of penetration cannot work. Moreover, when groups are very unstable, even when you penetrate a

group, the group dissolves. There was a recent case, with a lot of

work to penetrate the group; all members of that group essentially

went out of business. So, without the intelligence, counterinsurgency is not effective.

Now, in a broader sense, what we’re doing is interposition. We

are trying to interpose ourselves, and yet, we cannot prevent the

attacks. Why? Because the attacks are carried out by elusive, unstable, low-contrast targets that we cannot identify even when we

see them. We cannot stop them. They go right through the checkpoints because they look like anybody else, and then they kill

people.

If I believed that the current troop level would prevent mass

death, I would never recommend its reduction. If I believed a surge

could reduce deaths, I would be very hesitant to speak against it.

On humanitarian grounds, that would be our duty.

However, I am convinced that because of tactical reasons, there

is no relationship between U.S. troop levels and the number of

Iraqi casualties and victims. And, moreover, I note that the fighting that’s taking place, the terrorism that’s taking place is over disputed zones. And by interposing ourselves, we are preserving those

disputed zones. That’s why you can take a taxi, right now, from

Arbil, got to Mosul—it takes a few hours—and drive around a quiet

Mosul, because the Arab Shia have gone from Mosul, it is dominated by Arab Sunnis.

Now, the final point—and, again, you take seriously the President’s concerns as I think we should—we certainly do not want to

disengage or withdraw, whatever the words are, and leave a vast

zone where, let’s say, groups such as al-Qaeda can run around.

Well, the fact is that in Mosul Arab Sunnis are running the show;

they don’t want competition. The foreign jihadis who call themselves al-Qaeda are Sunnis themselves, but they happen to be of

a different strain of Sunni. They are not nationalists at all. They

believe that nationalism is a sin, that there should be the undivided Ummah of the Muslim nation. So, if you’re an Iraqi nationalist, you are their enemy. If you’re a Baathist, you are their

enemy. They never forget that Baath was founded by Michel Aflaq,

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a Christian. And, therefore, there is no al-Qaeda Mosul. Al-Qaeda

exists in disputed areas created by our own interposition. That’s

why I’m convinced that disengagement and the refusal of the surge

would not increase deaths in Iraq.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I would note one thing. My last trip to Iraq I flew out to an airbase called Al Asad Airbase. Middle of nowhere. If you all look at

that map, those two lakes that you see up there—it was from

Fallujah north and west. And all of a sudden, I looked out there,

Ed, and I saw these—looked like two superhighways in the middle

of this vast desert. And there are two 10,000-foot runways sitting

there in pretty good shape. We landed there. There was a small fire

brigade for fire suppression, in case someone landed. We had a

young general, a very impressive guy, and a few troops out there.

And he pointed out that the nearest city was a place called

Baghdadi, which was only—was about, I don’t know, 20, 30, 40 kilometer—I can’t remember how far—6,000 people. And he pointed

out that he thought there would be an awful lot of American forces

there in the not-too-distant future. Is that the kind of prepositioning you guys are talking about, to drop 10–20,000 American forces

there, with the surge capacity to go other places? Is that what

you’re talking about?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Sir, first of all, the places where Americans would

remain must have airports, because the supply must be done by C–

130, with the shuttle, which already exits, out of Kuwait, with no

routine road convoys, because otherwise we would still be there,

still interfering, still taking casualties. Any remote base would be

suitable for a raiding force that would sally out to deal with any

bad guys who show themselves, al-Qaeda and such.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first, again, thank the chairman for holding these hearings. They are very important. They are measured, with excellent

witnesses. And I have been mostly in listening mode at these hearings, as I was at the excellent hearings that Senator Biden and

Senator Lugar held in 2002, where people like you came before this

committee. And, frankly, I couldn’t imagine how anyone could possibly have voted for the war, after I listened to those 2 days of

testimony. It made no sense to me. None of my questions were

answered.

Well, we know the history since then, and we know that the

President made a terrible mistake here. We know that that mistake continues. But let us remember that the Democrats were in

the majority of the U.S. Senate when this was approved. So, anyone who thinks that Congress gets off scot-free here is wrong.

This is the moment. We are going to decide whether we take the

most narrow view of our constitutional powers to end this or a reasonably broad view, based on history, based on the use of the power

of the purse in the past, whether it be Cambodia or Somalia in the

early nineties. I have to raise a concern. To the extent these hearings are used as a way to quell or limit Congress’s responsibility

444

and role, I have a problem. It is entirely reasonable to look at

whether it’s caps or fencing or using the power of the purse to try

to bring this disaster to an end. And it is our historic responsibility

in this committee and in this Senate to stand up now and not let

this taboo, this notion that you can’t reasonably talk about using

congressional power. It is irresponsible, and it puts us in the position of continuing a very unwise war that will cost many more

American lives unnecessarily.

Let me use the rest of my time to ask a question that puts that

aside, in terms of whether it’s a good idea or not, putting aside the

political debate about whether or not United States troops should

remain in Iraq. I think we can all assume that the United States

will, at some point, begin to redeploy troops from Iraq. So, leaving

alone the issue of when that deployment should begin or end, I’d

like each of you to briefly discuss what you feel would be the important elements of a deployment plan, and how we can redeploy

our United States military personnel safely while mitigating the

impact on the Iraqis and our allies in the region.

Let’s start with each of you. Go ahead. Korb.

Dr. KORB. I think you are quite right that if—when the history

of this war is written, you will find out that lots of institutions in

this country didn’t play their proper role—not only the Congress;

I think, the media; I think, the generals who didn’t back General

Shinseki; members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who didn’t speak

out; and even my own profession, the academic profession, many of

whom glossed over the real problems that you would have.

Now, in terms of leaving, let me make a—I think that we should

leave, and I—take 18 months. Actually, I recommended September

2005, but it hasn’t happened yet, so I think—all right. And I think

the way to leave in a responsible way is simply not to replace the

units that, when their time is up, they come home. And I don’t

think this is going to involve any risk to the troops. And if you go

18 months, that’s roughly about 8,000 troops a month. The reason

I pick 18 months, I think you can do that without endangering the

troops. It also, I think, fulfills our moral responsibility to the

Iraqis. As has been pointed out, we broke it, we have some responsibility. And I think 18 months is a reasonable time. That would

mean we’d be there to the middle of 2008, which is more than 5

years, which would—should be enough time for them to basically

get their act together. And I think leaving troops in the region protects American interests. Putting more troops in Afghanistan,

which is really the central front in the war on terror, putting our

National Guard back home here to provide for homeland defense,

overall will increase our security.

Let me quote a surprising person, Bill Buckley, editor of the National Review. He said, ‘‘Had we not left Vietnam, we would have

lost the cold war.’’ If you don’t leave Iraq, you’re not going to win

the war on terror.

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s just an excellent answer.

Mr. Malley.

Dr. MALLEY. So, I agree with what Larry said. I want to say one

thing about your first comments. As I said in my testimony, I believe that if we don’t take the political steps that are needed, then

there is no justification for remaining in Iraq, and we should leave.

445

And, at that point, I think this committee, the Congress, needs to

do what it needs to do to ensure that that takes place.

The issue of withdrawal, for me, is intimately tied to what happens politically in Iraq, and all the scenarios would dictate something different. Under any scenario, I think the withdrawal should

not last more than a few years—2 years, perhaps, at the outer

limit, depending, again, on what happens in Iraq and what Iraqis

themselves say they want from us and whether they’re taking the

steps that we believe are consistent with a residual or remaining

United States presence.

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you think it’s possible to construct a plan

to bring the troops home safely over that time period?

Dr. MALLEY. I would believe so. I would defer to military experts,

but I would believe that it’s—from what I’ve heard, that it is—that

it is possible. But, again, I would defer to others on that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Luttwak.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Senator, in spite of my rather weak-kneed response previously, I’m aware of the fact that, historically, a very

sharp congressional intervention, a very rigid one, worked out very

well. That famous case was El Salvador. Congress set a limit of 55

advisors, and that was the key to victory, because it forced responsibility on the Salvadorians, who rose up to it—militarily, because

they fought like hell instead of standing back waiting for our troops

to fight; and politically, because eventually, as you know, everything was resolved.

So, I’m not unsympathetic. It’s only that, in this context, because

of the considerations mentioned by Senator Lugar, placing the

President under some mechanical constraint could be damaging in

a broader sense. But I think that congressional action that would

prescribe a gradual withdrawal without an end date, without a

final exit date could work, if presented properly and with bipartisan support.

The CHAIRMAN. Gelb.

Dr. GELB. I’ve studied these matters all my life, and I don’t know

how to answer your question. I would have to sit down—and, if I

were in this administration, I would sit down—with our military

and work out, first and foremost, what our missions would need to

be over the next couple of years, and then I’d work with them on

how to redeploy troops within that country, and withdraw them

from the country, in order to fulfill that mission. I don’t believe this

is the job for professors and senior fellows at Washington thinktanks.

Senator FEINGOLD. And that’s fair enough. And I—you know, just

the theme I’m trying to pursue during these hearings, which,

again, I appreciate, is that, since we did not appear to have a plan

when we went into Iraq, isn’t it time that we construct a plan for

the possibility that we might be leaving Iraq, at some point——

Dr. GELB. Yes, I——

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Instead of acting as if it’s some

kind of thing that’ll never happen? That—and I’m—this isn’t directed at you.

Dr. GELB. Absolutely.

Senator FEINGOLD. This is what’s going on. People don’t want to

talk about redeployment in a serious way, they want to talk about

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taking the little steps that may lead to that. But we need a full

plan, with all the considerations of what it means for the troops,

what it means for the region. And these need to be open discussions from all of our people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator. I

happen to agree with you.

Senator Boxer, I guess.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for these

hearings.

I want to place in the record the eight times Congress used the

power of the purse to stop U.S. casualties. Could I do that?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

I might add, not on your time, all the statements, as submitted,

will be placed in the record in full, in addition to your oral testimony. I did not do that little mechanical thing at the front end.

Senator BOXER. OK. I’d like to start all over again, please.

I’d like to place in the record, at this time, the eight times the

Congress used the power of the purse to stop escalation of wars.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The information submitted by Senator Boxer follows:]

CONGRESS’S HISTORICAL ROLE IN POLICING MILITARY ESCALATION

On numerous occasions over the past several decades, Congress has exercised its

constitutional authority to limit the President’s ability to escalate existing military

engagements by capping the number of American military personnel available for

deployment and by refusing to release appropriated funds. It is incumbent upon

Congress to exercise that authority to ensure that our men and women are not put

in harm’s way unnecessarily or without a plan worthy of their great sacrifice.

• In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, P.L. 93–559, enacted during the Vietnam

war, Congress limited the number of American military personnel in South

Vietnam to 4,000 within 6 months and 3,000 within a year of the act’s enactment.

• The Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, P.L. 98–43, required the President to ‘‘obtain statutory authorization from the Congress with respect to any

substantial expansion in the number or role in Lebanon of the United States

Armed Forces, including any introduction of United States Armed Forces into

Lebanon in conjunction with agreements providing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon and for the creation of a new multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon.’’

• Through the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, P.L. 98–525,

Congress prohibited the use of funds appropriated in the act or in subsequent

acts from being used to increase the number of U.S. military personnel deployed

in European nations of NATO. The act provided that Congress might authorize

increased troop levels above the prescribed ceiling upon the Secretary of Defense’s certification to Congress that the European nations had taken significant

measures to improve their defense capacity.

• In the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001, P.L. 106–246, Congress limited the involvement of U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors

in counternarcotics activities in Colombia by prohibiting the use of appropriated

funds to expand their presence above specified levels.

• The Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973, P.L. 93–50, specified that

none of the funds appropriated by the act were to be used ‘‘to support directly

or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and

South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South

Vietnam by United States Forces and after August 15, 1973, no other funds

heretofore appropriated under any other act may be expended for such purpose.′′

• Congress authorized the use of U.S. Armed Forces in Somalia in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, P.L. 103–139, but set a deadline

after which appropriated funds could no longer be used to pay for their involveVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00456 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
447

ment. The act specified that the deadline could only be extended if requested

by the President and authorized by the Congress.

• In the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1995, P.L. 103–335, Congress required congressional approval of ‘‘any change in the United States mission in Rwanda from one of strict refugee relief to security, peace-enforcing, or

nation-building or any other substantive role’’ and blocked funding for continued

participation of the U.S. military in Operation Support Hope beyond a specified

date.

• The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, P.L. 105–85, provided that no funds appropriated for fiscal year 1998 or any subsequent year

could be used for the deployment of any U.S. ground combat forces in Bosnia

and Herzegovina after a specified cutoff date unless the President first consulted with Congress and then certified to Congress that certain conditions existed in the field.

Senator BOXER. And that started in the 1970s, and it—the most

recent one was in 2001. So, all this talk about, ‘‘Oh, my God, you

can’t do it’’—I want to commend Dr. Korb for laying out what I

think is a very smart and straightforward idea. You cap the forces.

What you cap it at is something that has to be debated. I would

discuss it with the military people. And then you say to the President, ‘‘Come back to us and tell us why it makes sense to redeploy

some of our people who have been there three and four times.’’

I wanted to thank you for that clarity, because I sense a lot of

weaving and bobbing among a lot of people, you know, on this

point.

Congress has the power of the purse. And, God forbid, if we

didn’t, because there’s checks and balances in the Constitution. Our

chairman’s an expert on the Constitution. He teaches. And I would

say that, particularly in a democracy like ours, which is being

tested every day, when people go the polls, Mr. Chairman, and they

register dissent, which I believe they did, and then, in the polls,

they register their very strong dissent with this President’s policies, and then the Iraq Study Group registers its dissent with this

President’s policies and says, ‘‘Change from a combat role to a support role’’—and I could just go on—all the generals on the ground,

including General Abizaid said, ‘‘This escalation makes no sense.’’

They call it a ‘‘surge,’’ whatever term is used, the same thing. It’s

more of my people, and our people, being put in the middle of a

civil war, which, as people know, I express myself every day on, because a lot of times we have these hearings and no one talks about

who’s paying the price. And that’s why I raised it with Secretary

Rice, and that’s why I raised it last time we had the experts. Who’s

paying the price? It’s all well and good for us to talk about this in

an abstract way, but who’s paying the price? And I always come

back to that.

Dr. Luttwak, I have a question for you, because you talked about

our enemies, and you were eloquent on the point. Do you think an

enemy of America would be someone who says, ‘‘If an American

troop is standing in my town, it’s OK to kill that American’’? Is

that person an enemy?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes; certainly. But in Iraq today, there are not just

friends and enemies. In Iraq, there are many different groups that

have many different orientations, some of which have been on our

side from the beginning very consistently, and others, who are not

against us, but don’t do anything for us, because we are doing the

fighting for them.

448

Senator BOXER. Yes.

Dr. LUTTWAK. So, what’s happening now, as I see it—and you

draw attention to our casualties—I’ve had my nephew in Iraq—is

that our troops are actually having very little affect on the situation.

Senator BOXER. OK. Excuse me, sir. I value your further explanation, but I’m running out of time, and I want to get to that point,

because I’m glad you said, if somebody says it’s OK to kill an

American soldier, that they should be considered an enemy. And I

would go to Dr. Korb’s testimony, and I would thank him for pointing out that 61 percent of the Iraqi people say it’s OK to kill an

American. So, you know, we can make excuses for those folks—you

didn’t; you said, ‘‘Yeah, that’s an enemy’’—you are now admitting

what I believe to be the case, where we’re in a country where 61

percent of the people say it’s OK to kill an American, 70 percent

say we should get out in a year. So, you know, sometimes I think

we need a reality check of what we are doing. It’s—we get so

caught up, you know, in, you know, a lot of minutia here, when I

think we need to keep our eye on what we’re trying to do. We’re

trying to bring a stable Iraq, and, instead of working on a political

solution, as many of you have called out very eloquently for today,

and my chairman has called out eloquently for, for a long time,

we’re sending our troops in the middle of a situation where 61 percent of the people say, ‘‘Yeah, it’s OK. Kill that soldier.’’ And I just

cannot sit back and say, ‘‘Well, I don’t know that I could vote to

cap the troops, because the executive branch should have the ability’’—I think we have a responsibility here, through this committee,

and I think that these hearings are giving us this opportunity.

I want to make the point that even the most far-reaching bringthe-troops-home resolution, which is the Feingold-Boxer resolution,

keeps our troops there, without a timeframe, to deal with the terrorism—for example, al-Qaeda in Anbar province—to deal with

training the Iraqis, to deal with protection of our forces. So, there

isn’t anyone here—and I heard the word ‘‘irresponsible’’—that basically says, ‘‘Tomorrow, we’re all leaving.’’ So, I think that’s an important point.

Now, the other thing is, no one conceived to tell us what the casualty numbers will be. We’ve tried to get that. And it seems to me,

if you’re going to turn over a new page, which is the President’s

point, ‘‘This is a new policy’’—of course, I don’t really think it is—

you at least owe that to the American people.

And, Dr. Luttwak, I was confused, you said you didn’t see increasing human cost by the surge. What did you, exactly, mean?

Dr. LUTTWAK. I said that rejecting surge would not lead to increasing casualties.

Senator BOXER. I’m sorry.

Dr. LUTTWAK. What I said was that if you oppose the surge——

Senator BOXER. Yes.

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. Nobody can say that you have, thereby, caused increased casualties for the Iraqis, because our troops—

because the enemy is so elusive, so transient, cannot be seen, has

no contrast, cannot be penetrated, because of the instability of the

insurgent groups, there is no relationship between troop levels and

the number of Iraqis who will die. Therefore, we are not, in fact,

449

containing the insurgency. And if you argue that you want to reduce troop levels, nobody can say that it will cause more deaths for

Iraqis because our troops are not preventing the deaths for Iraqis.

We have——

Senator BOXER. Because there’s a civil war going on. Is that——

Dr. LUTTWAK. Our—we have——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Correct?

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. Conventional forces in Iraq, structured to attack visible, high-contrast conventional forces. And they

cannot see the enemy, they cannot intercept him, they cannot detect him; therefore, the—at the tactical—that’s why these generals,

for the last few years, have been saying, ‘‘No, don’t send us more

troops.’’ It was not because they were insincerely lying patsies to

the administration. They actually know that, at the tactical level,

when you send a platoon to a locality, you don’t know what to do

with that platoon, because it’s not a constabulary. Constabulary

walks down the street, people talk to the—to them and tell them,

‘‘You know, there’s a bad guy around the corner.’’ When nobody

talks to you, the patrol is blind and achieves nothing. Hence, surge,

in detail, or the entire deployment as a whole, cannot achieve the

tactical effect, cannot reduce Iraqi casualties. Therefore, if you oppose surge, people can criticize you, but they cannot say, ‘‘Now you

will be responsible with death of’’——

Senator BOXER. Well, I don’t—you’re talking politics to me about

something that we’re trying——

Dr. LUTTWAK. It is not politics——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. To get beyond——

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. At all. I’m——

Senator BOXER. We’re trying——

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. I’m addressing a very serious issue,

that anybody who makes recommendations, one way or the other,

must carry the burden.

Senator BOXER. OK.

Dr. LUTTWAK. The burden. And I’m saying there is no burden,

because our—there is no relationship between our troop presence

and casualties.

Senator BOXER. Dr. Korb, could you respond to that? Because—

this is interesting, because when I met with General Casey—it was

a year and a half ago—he said our troop presence was fueling the

insurgency. So, I—is that what you’re saying? Our troop presence

is fueling the insurgency? That—am I missing what you’re saying?

Dr. LUTTWAK. No, Senator, what I’m saying is——

Senator BOXER. So, he’s not——

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. That our troop presence is, of course,

fueling the nationalist reaction, and, therefore, the insurgency.

Senator BOXER. You are saying——

Dr. LUTTWAK. But—yes—at the same time—you see, whenever

you introduce troops anywhere in the world, you will cause some

national reaction. But you, nevertheless, introduce them, because

they achieve tactical operational purposes. Iraq is different. That

is, by being there, you evoke a nationalist reaction, but you’re not

getting the tactical payoff, because they cannot even see the enemy.

Senator BOXER. Well, sir——

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Dr. LUTTWAK. And that is the reason why the position is taken

by Senator Biden and by all—by many people, including our generals, that we should not have more troops, but less troops.

Senator BOXER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He’s agreeing——

Dr. LUTTWAK. And be——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. With you.

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. Less visible.

Senator BOXER. I appreciate that.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes.

Senator BOXER. Dr. Korb, anything? And then I’ll stop. I’d just

like your response.

Dr. KORB. Well, I think that Ed makes a terrific point here, and

that the generals were correct that more troops will not stop more

Iraqis from dying. And one of the things I think we have to be very

careful of—I see this undercurrent from the administration and

some of their supporters, blaming Casey and Abizaid for the failed

strategy. No; they had the right strategy, and to put them up and

to blame them, to me, is simply irresponsible. What I do think is,

more American troops will mean more American casualties, rather

than the question that Ed talks about with the Iraqi casualties.

The CHAIRMAN. So, I understand that you both agree with the

Senator, that we should not surge, and a reduction in troops is

more likely to lead to a positive outcome than a negative outcome.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes, sir.

Dr. KORB. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. There you go. Governor.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say

that I congratulate you and Senator Lugar for the hearings that

you’ve had on Iraq, because I think it’s one of the most important

issues that have come before us, and it will have a longstanding

impact on our national security and peace in the world.

You all agree that we need to engage more in the region, and get

more parties involved in Iraq, but what is the best way to do that?

Do you agree that we should sit down at a summit or a conference

and talk about Iraq, or should it occur bilaterally? Should the

Iraqis lead this process, or should the United States? Should America reach out to Syria and Iran? Most of you have said that we

should. Is it possible to talk with Iran without involving Iran’s

President? And how would engagement with Iran and Syria affect

the internal political situation in Iraq?

So, there is a series of things I’d like you to comment on. And

the last one is the question I’ve been asking for 21⁄2 years studying

the history of Muqtada al-Sadr and his family. How can there possibly be a unity government with Sadr, who, from everything I

read, wants to be the next Ayatollah of Iraq, and who has very

close family connections with the Iranians—though some of you

have said that the Shiites in Iraq are somewhat different from

those in Iran?

Dr. MALLEY. Senator, as you know, I—as I said in my testimony,

I believe that a multilateral strategy of engagement with the region

is absolutely critical to success, not because the region—the neighVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00460 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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bors play—have played a critical role in instigating the crisis, but

because the crisis has gone so far that, without the help of all the

actors who have leverage, influence, contacts, whether with tribes,

militias, groups in Iraq, it’s simply going to be impossible to stabilize the situation.

Senator VOINOVICH. And what are the incentives for regional

parties to come to the table to help stabilize Iraq?

Dr. MALLEY. I think there are two series of incentives. Some of

them already exist. Basically, I don’t think any country in the region has a real incentive in seeing Iraq collapse into civil war.

We’re already seeing—we have a presence in Syria, and we’re

already seeing the—some Syrians being very worried about the impact of having a civil war in Iraq, possible civil war in Lebanon,

a minority Alawite regime in Damascus. That’s not a comfortable

position for them to be in. So, they are already built-in incentives

that the status quo is dangerous for them. But that’s not going to

be enough. I think we know that both Iran and Syria, if nothing

else changes, would prefer to see instability in Iraq rather than a

United States victory there—United States success there. So,

there’s going to have to be—if we really want to engage the region—and, in particular, Iran and Syria—a revisiting of our strategy toward those two countries.

Now, that’s doesn’t mean, as Secretary Rice has said, that we’re

going to give in to extortion or that we’re going to surrender to

them. This is what diplomacy is about, and you’ve had a lot of testimony over the last few weeks of people who have been saying

that. That’s what diplomacy is, it’s to try to put our interests on

the table and see whether there’s a way that their interests could

also be taken into account. It may not work. I—just one more—it

may not work, but at least it has to be tried. And for the last 6

years, we’ve given up diplomacy in the region, on the assumption

that talking to people we don’t agree with somehow is a sign of

weakness.

Dr. LUTTWAK. I respectfully disagree with this. I note that it’s

been espoused by the most distinguished people, but I still disagree. Our cooperation with Iran, which was very real over Afghanistan, took place situationally. They had been supporting the

Northern Alliance, keeping it alive. We needed to go in. They had

their own interest in the Hazara and Herat. They were very concerned about the Hazara, because they are Shia. You know, they

are the so-called oriental Shia of Afghanistan who were killed by

the Taliban. In this context, we didn’t discuss, we didn’t negotiate.

If we had negotiated with Iran at the time, we would not have had

cooperation, because whoever Iranian would have negotiated with

us would have been immediately attacked in his own country as a

traitor and undermined because he talked to us. Formal diplomacy

does not work in a situation where the politics within the ever-narrowing group of extremists who run Iran, mandates that whoever

talks to the Americans is a traitor. So, formal diplomacy advocated

by so many people—and I’d defer to their great experience and

high reputations—is bound to fail——

Senator VOINOVICH. So——

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. We’ve had with——

Senator VOINOVICH. So, you——

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Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes; you talk to them, you get nowhere, but——

Senator VOINOVICH. So, you would not talk with Iran, but you

would talk with the Saudis and with the Egyptians and with——

Dr. LUTTWAK. Again, it is not the talking—it’s the situation that

is driving things. We negotiated and talked to the Saudis for decades, and they were never our true allies. But when the Shia ‘‘crescent,’’ as they call it, from Pakistan to the Mediterranean, emerges,

suddenly here are the Saudis, spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Lebanon to help Prime Minister Siniora hold up the

Hezbollah with one finger. He’s holding them with one finger, because of—the Saudis are behind him. The Saudis have cut off

Hamas. The Saudis are really cooperating, for the first time, because they’re terrified of the Shia. Similarly, the Iranians cooperate

in Afghanistan because of the objective circumstances. The moment

you sit down and talk to them, you are entering in a negotiating

process in which the internal dynamics of it make it difficult or impossible for them to really cooperate with you.

So, what we have to do is to continue to handle the situation. We

did not create this division between Sunni and Shia. You could

argue that it was implicit as soon as the Sunnis became fundamentalists, the emergence of the Shia identified as heretics and

apostates——

Senator VOINOVICH. All right.

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. Was inevitable. The situation is——

Senator VOINOVICH. So, you’re saying that you wouldn not even

gather the different regional parties and factions together to talk

about——

Dr. LUTTWAK. What happens is that we—you are gathering, you

are influencing, you’re achieving an equilibrium. You disengage

American forces. You don’t abandon, you don’t run. You disengage.

And you force responsibility on people. You see, you can sit and

talk—you see, there are complexities here. For example, you mentioned Muqtada al-Sadr.

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes.

Dr. LUTTWAK. The Sadr family has historically been in a feud

with the al-Hakim family, which is the so-called Supreme Council

for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. And that’s how we saw the spectacle of al-Hakim coming to the White House and talking to President Bush—a man who spent 23 years in Iran declaiming ‘‘Marg

Barg America,’’ death to America. He was in Washington, talking

to President Bush. That’s the reality level.

You manage the situation, and then you have the substance of

diplomacy.

Senator VOINOVICH. All right, let me just——

Dr. LUTTWAK. But the act of talking destroys the substance.

Senator VOINOVICH. Let me get back to the last question. In your

opinion, can there be a political deal that achieves a unified Iraq,

with the presence of Muqtada al-Sadr?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Well, Sadr—you said that Sadr is pro-Iranian. Actually, Sadr’s polemic in Arabic, is constantly attacking Ayatollah

Sistani for being an Iranian. As you know, Sistan is the most remote province of Iran, on the Pakistani border. He’s saying, here

we have a remote Persian who is supposedly the leader of the Shia

in Iraq. That’s his polemic. So, again, there are great complexities.

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As you would not want to go and manage the school board politics in Mississippi because of complexities beyond you, similarly we

should not be going and trying to manage the complexities of Iraq.

By disengaging, we are imposing responsibilities on everybody, including the Iranians, including the Syrians. The Alawite regime in

Damascus is not even Shia, they’re only nominally Shia; they’re

Nusayris, who are considered apostates from Islam, and pagans by

orthodox Sunni Muslims. Once we withdraw, the Syrians will stop

cooperating with the bad guys. So, in other words, the substance

of diplomacy, but not its formality.

Dr. GELB. Senator, if I may respond to your question?

Dr. KORB. Well, let me——

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes.

Dr. KORB [continuing]. Go. I missed my chance here. It went

right by me. I was about to go, and Ed took the microphone here.

Once we announce that we’re leaving and we don’t want to have

any permanent bases in Iraq, the countries in the region, as well

as the Iraqi people, know that it’s no longer just our problem, it’s

theirs. None of the countries, including Iran and Syria, want to see

Iraq become a failed state or a haven for al-Qaeda. And so, therefore, I think, if you appoint a high-level envoy of the stature of

somebody like Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright, they will be able

to get the countries in the region together.

I don’t know if it’s true, I’ve seen reports that the Saudis may

have been responsible for the missile that shot down the American,

you know, helicopter. We—so, they’re involved, as well. They’re not

going to let the Sunnis lose, however you want to define that. So,

they all have an interest in stability, and once they know that we

will not be there forever, they’re going to be willing to cooperate.

Now, the form, I think, you know, becomes immaterial.

In terms of Sadr, it’s very interesting, what Sadr has said is he’s

coming back into the government, but he wants an American withdrawal, he wants us, you know, to set a date to—you know, to get

out. Remember that Maliki was not the original choice of the

Iraqis. We did not like the original choices of the Iraqis. Jaafari

and we put pressure on them to come up with someone else, so

we’re partly responsible, you know, for this. But, again, I think,

once you set a date to get out and they know you will not be there

permanently, a lot of the people will not continue to fight. Many

of the people over there are fighting simply because they see this

as an American occupation, and they will not, as has been pointed

out here, ally themselves with al-Qaeda. They don’t like al-Qaeda.

Less than 5 percent of the Iraqis support them. So, once it’s clear

we’re getting out, the violence, I think, should diminish.

But let me conclude with this on negotiations. Every time I hear

people say, ‘‘Well, you shouldn’t negotiate, it’s a sign of weakness,’’

I remember what the late Yitzhak Rabin said when they asked

him, ‘‘Why are you negotiating with Arafat? How can you negotiate’’—and he said, ‘‘You’ve got to negotiate with your enemies. It’s

your friends you consult with.’’

Dr. GELB. If I may, Senator, briefly, although your question deserves a long answer—and you may want to devote a session to the

diplomacy of the region, it’s worth it. To me, diplomacy is absolutely essential, but you can’t talk about diplomacy as if to do it

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represents American weakness. And I think that’s a fundamental

mistake that the administration is making. Diplomacy is going to

give us answers to questions we don’t really have good answers to

right now. That’s why you engage. We’ve engaged with some of our

worst enemies throughout our history, and we prevent some things

from getting worse, and we begin to use American power through

diplomacy. And we shouldn’t be afraid of doing it.

On the issue of Muqtada al-Sadr, I think none of the parties are

going to give up their militias. They just aren’t going to do it. You

don’t have any trust and confidence. You have hatred. And the militias protect the various sectarian groups, so they’re not going to

give them up. I think the only way to deal with them is in the context of a decentralization or federal system where the Shiites would

be responsible for dealing with Muqtada. And I think they’re better

able to do it than we or the Sunnis or the Kurds. Muqtada is going

to be a real problem, but let him be the Shiite problem, not ours.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, to all the panelists. This is an illuminating discussion.

I would just like to summarize what I’ve heard. Because we have

a very practical decision that Congress is facing, and that is, how

do we approach the administration’s proposal to escalate troop levels. And so, I just want to be focused on, and make sure that I’m

hearing your testimony properly.

Is there anybody on the panel who thinks that it is the right approach for us to escalate troop levels, at this point?

[No response.]

Senator OBAMA. As far as I could tell, I didn’t hear anybody suggest that increasing troop levels would be the correct approach. So,

the second question I have is: Would everybody be in agreement

with this premise that initiating some sort of phased redeployment

or withdrawal of our troop levels—understanding that some United

States troops would remain for force protection, training of Iraqi

security forces, and counterinsurgency activities—would be more

likely to result in a better outcome than the course that we’re on

right now? Is there anybody who disagrees with that?

[No response.]

Senator OBAMA. Since that is the case, I would like to note that

one of the difficulties that all of us here are grappling with is that

the tools available to Congress to force the administration’s hand

are quite limited. So, an issue that I’m interested in is the panel’s

assessment as to how quickly we could potentially begin a phased

withdrawal in a responsible fashion. And I’m wondering if anybody

has opinions on that. I’m interested if any of you have a timetable

that you would feel comfortable with, saying, let’s say, in May or

June, that we would begin some phased redeployment to send a

clear signal to the Iraqi Government, and to the factions involved,

that they’re going to have to move forward on a political solution.

Anybody want to address that question?

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Dr. GELB. My opinion is that we sit down with our military, on

an urgent basis, and get an answer to your question.

Senator OBAMA. OK.

Dr. KORB. I think that you should begin to withdraw right now,

take out about 8,000 troops a month, so you’d be there over the

next 18 months. When we withdrew from Vietnam, we took out

10,000 troops a month to get the number down to what it was at

the time of the Paris Peace Accords, which was about 21,000. I

think that can be done safely. I think it helps us fulfill our moral

responsibility to the Iraqis. It gives them time to do what they

need to do. And it also improves our ability to deal with our other

strategic interests around the world.

Senator OBAMA. Good.

Dr. MALLEY. Senator, two points. First, I think it’s not only a

matter of withdrawing. I mean, it is withdrawing, but also changing the task that our troops are currently involved in. The other

point, which I emphasized in the testimony, is I think it’s—the administration is taking this backward—it’s not a matter of deciding

the troop level, it’s having a political strategy that you could then

adapt your troop presence to. We could withdraw, but that needs

to be attached to a political strategy. If there is no political strategy, I think you accelerate the withdrawal far more——

Senator OBAMA. OK. So, let’s shift gears to address the political

strategy. I’ll start with Mr. Gelb. I know you and Senator Biden

have put forward a proposal that I believe makes some persuasive

points.

The only question I have on a more active federalist strategy of

the sort that you’re pursuing is whether that’s one that we should

be initiating, as opposed to letting that unfold as a consequence of

us putting more pressure on the Iraqis to figure out their problems.

In short, if we begin a phased withdrawal, it strikes me that this

places pressure on the Iraqis to forge and subsequently own a political settlement that is going to work. And, at that stage, then, it

might be that the proposals that you and the chairman have suggested are the ones around which we arrive at an Iraqi consensus.

But is there a concern that if we predetermine what that consensus

should be, and push that too hard, that there might be significant

suspicion on the part of the Sunnis that this is just a strategy to

disadvantage them?

Dr. GELB. Well, we haven’t predetermined it. It’s in their Constitution.

Senator OBAMA. OK.

Dr. GELB. And the chairman read from their Constitution, a moment ago.

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Dr. GELB. It explicitly calls it a federal system, it explicitly provides for provinces to unite with other provinces to create regional

governments. Eighty percent of the country approved. Eighty percent of the national assembly approved implementing legislation

for it, although they’ve deferred that because of the opposition. The

opposition is based on some legitimate arguments, because everything is hard. People say it’s going to lead to partition. But what’s

happening now is producing partition. People say it’s going to lead

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to ethnic cleansing. But that’s what we’ve been witnessing for the

last several years.

When you can’t reach reconciliation politically on the basis of a

strong central government, the historical alternative has been decentralization and federalism. We can’t shove it down their throats,

obviously, but we can help them to reach the conclusion that I

think the majority of Iraqis want to reach; namely, stay together

as a nation, with the central government performing certain essential functions, but with the regions doing the legislating and administering according to their own ethnic and religious wishes.

Senator OBAMA. OK.

Dr. LUTTWAK. May I?

Senator OBAMA. Please. Why don’t we just go down the line, and

then——

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. I will just listen and ask no followup questions.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Senator, I don’t like the word ‘‘withdrawal.’’ I like

the word ‘‘disengagement.’’ It means you don’t patrol the villages

and towns, you don’t interfere, you don’t go through their underwear searching for items in their houses. You do stay in bases, and

the number, therefore, you require—if you had no concern with

numbers and you had an infinite number of troops, you still would

not want more than 12,000, 15,000. And then, you allow the normal processes of politics to take place and allow the Iraqis to have

their own history. I’m very uncomfortable about this talk of a federal constitution based on the principles of Locke, Burke, and

Madison, which are—in the society that is tribal, that is multiethnic, multireligious, and which is in a completely different situation. And I believe that the act of disengagement will force responsibility on the Iraqis. And I believe that all their different politics

will not result in areas of Iraq where you’re going to have al-Qaeda

living comfortably, because they want to rule in their own homes.

And I additionally believe that the process will not increase the

number of people who die in the process.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

Dr. KORB. I think that they may end up in the situation described by Chairman Biden and Les Gelb, but I think we have to

be careful that it doesn’t look like a ‘‘Made in America’’ type of solution. I think, as I suggested in my testimony, that we convene a

Dayton-style conference, get the parties together, let them work out

the arrangements that are most amenable to them. And it—and as

long as those—that arrangement involves the—deciding what the

provincial government should do, what the central government

should do, the oil revenues are distributed fairly, minority rights

are protected, the role of religion in society—as long as those issues

are handled, the way they handle them really has got to be up to

them.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

Robert.

Dr. MALLEY. Four quick points.

First, we’ve not tried, really, to create a political reconciliation

between the parties. What we’ve done is, we’ve worked with a select group, many of whom, in fact, had as an explicit or implicit

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agenda, the division of the country and their own personal private

interests, as I said, acting—earlier—acting as warlords rather than

statesmen.

Second, yes; there’s going to have to be, if you want reconciliation, an amendment to the Constitution. I think, actually, the

Gelb-Biden plan does include amendments to the Constitution. A

constitution that is rejected almost en bloc by 20 percent of the

population defined through sectarian—in sectarian ways, is not a

constitution that could bring the country together. We know that,

and—we should know it from our own history.

The third point is—and this is not in the Gelb-Biden plan, but

there are some who are appealed—attracted to the notion that Iraq

could simply devolve into a three-way confederation. Let’s not kid

ourselves, that’s going to be extremely bloody, the lines are still

shifting, it’s a mosaic, but it’s a mosaic that’s continually being redefined. There are clashes within communities that sometimes are

as vicious as between communities. It may be the outcome. I think

that’s something that we’ve all agreed with. It may be that the

country just collapses. But it’s not something that we should be a

party to, it’s something that we should—if it happens, we should

stay away from.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of the panelists for their tremendous insights.

Let me just ask—I’ll start with you, Dr. Korb, but also anyone

who wants to respond—it seems to me, whether it’s disengagement,

strategic redeployment, or even the administration’s plan, which I

oppose, the question is: Don’t we need benchmarks that have consequences? We had the Secretary of State here, and she clearly did

not have that view. But it seems to me that benchmarks without

some form of consequences are merely aspirations. And we have

seen, already on several occasions, where benchmarks without consequences have come and gone. And it just seems to me that

they’re critical, both in our context for the Congress, in keeping

people accountable, particularly in Iraq and its leadership. Do you

believe that we need to have benchmarks with consequences?

Dr. KORB. Very definitely, because if we do not, then the Iraqis

will avoid making these painful political compromises that we spoken—because they are difficult, they want to remain in power and

keep the government together. So, without these benchmarks,

they’ll continue as they have.

Let me make a point which I think is very important. They had

their elections over a year ago. In that time, we have lost a battalion’s worth of soldiers and marines, killed or wounded, while they

have been dithering. They promised to modify the Constitution 4

months after the election. We’re now 13 months. We have seen, for

the last 5 years, ‘‘Give us 6 more months, give us 3 more months,

and things will change.’’ How many times do we have to do it? So,

I think, yes; you need to have benchmarks. If you don’t, there’s no

way in which you can use whatever leverage we have left to get

them to do what they need to do.

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Senator MENENDEZ. Now, National Security Advisor Hadley

seems to be, sort of spinning the escalation plan by discussing the

idea of benchmarks. He said on Friday, ‘‘It’s going to be a little bit

pay-as-you-go,’’ which is a budgetary provision we have here, or we

should have here, but we don’t have it right now—and it’s going

to depend a lot on Iraqi performance. But without benchmarks to

determine what those performances are, and consequences, it really

isn’t very much pay-as-you-go. Is that a fair statement?

Dr. KORB. Very, very definitely. I mean, one of the most interesting things I’ve seen on this is a column by Charles Krauthammer in the Washington Post on the 19th of this month, where

he basically said, ‘‘We need to find a redeployment strategy that

maintains as much latent American strength as possible, but with

minimal exposure. We say to Maliki, ‘Let us down, and we dismantle the Green Zone, leave Baghdad and let you fend for yourself. We keep the airport and certain strategic bases in the area.’ ’’

And he goes on and on with other things. And I think that’s the

key thing. We’ve got to put pressure on him.

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes.

Dr. MALLEY. If I could add, I think this is the key point. It’s

benchmarks, it’s accountability, it’s conditionality, things that have

been completely lacking so far. And the problem in the way that

I’m seeing the administration doing it is we’re first giving—we’ve

said we’re going to send the troops, we say we’re going to continue

support, before having gotten from them the kind of commitments

and the kind of proof that they’re acting in the way they need to

act. And I think that’s taking it backward and upside down. We

need to make sure that they are acting in the way that they need

to act, and we need to condition any support on them delivering on

those promises.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, Dr.——

Dr. GELB. May I respond to the question, too——

Senator MENENDEZ. Surely, yes; please.

Dr. GELB [continuing]. Senator? Two things. First, on the issue

of conditionality—to me, there’s only one condition, and that is political reconciliation. I think if they don’t achieve that, nothing else

is going to be possible. They can go through kabuki acts about dismantling militias, and arrest 400 militia from Muqtada al-Sadr,

and then release them 2 weeks later. The only thing that’s going

to work is political reconciliation, a political power-sharing agreement.

Meantime, I think the way to reinforce this and help bring it

about is to start the withdrawal process.

Senator MENENDEZ. Even under political reconciliation, you could

have benchmarks to determine whether you’re moving in that direction.

Dr. GELB. You could. It’s hard to define them, but I think we’d

know it when we see it.

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes.

Dr. Korb, let me just take a moment—because I think one of the

legacies here, one of the consequences of escalation, as the Congress thinks about its position on the votes that will be upcoming

on the President’s plan, is the consequences and the legacy of what

happens to both our Armed Services and Reserve. And since you

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were an Assistant Secretary of Defense, particularly on manpower

and Reserve affairs, and have written on some of that, it seems to

me that one of the important legacies of this war of choice for the

American people and its leaders is—to wrestle with for the foreseeable future—is the consequences on our force structures, our Reserves and our Guards. And I’d like to ask you to comment on that.

I know you were quoted, in December, talking about a post-deployment death spiral. Maybe you could speak a little bit to that. Also,

what are the consequences of the President’s plan, increasing the

number of troops in Iraq, on both the Armed Forces and the Guard

and Reserves, both in the short and the long term? I think those

are real consequences, when we think about national security in an

even broader context with some of our other challenges in the

world as we debate Iraq, specifically.

Dr. KORB. I—if, in fact, you—this surge becomes permanent, it

becomes—you’re going to keep 21,500 more troops in Iraq over the

long term, you’re going to have to mobilize Guard and Reserve

units who have already been mobilized at least once. When—as

they say, when I was in the building, our policy was not to mobilize

them for more than 1 year out of every 5, because the data showed,

if you do that, you’re going to lose a lot of the people. If you take

a man or woman who’s in the Guard, and you want to take more

than 20 percent of their time away from their civilian career,

they’re simply not going to stay, they might as well join the Active

Forces. So, you’re going to have to mobilize units again that have

already been mobilized at least once for close to 2 years, since September 11. And I think, if you do that, that will bring about this

death spiral.

In my testimony, I urge Congress to clarify the law and force the

President to come back if he wants to remobilize those units again

and present the—present the reasons.

Let me put it very bluntly. I think it’s—we have missed something in this whole war. When we created the volunteer military,

the idea was that we would have a small Active Army, and that

Guard and Reserve would be a bridge to conscription, to the draft,

if we had a long ground war. That was the idea. What has happened is, the Guard and Reserve have become an adjunct to the Active Force, and we haven’t even thought about going back to—going

back to the draft. It’s important to remember, this is the first extended conflict we’ve ever had where we have not had conscription

and we have actually lowered taxes, not raised taxes.

And so, I say, you know, as look at this, you cannot—you need

to understand, you’ve misused the Guard and Reserve. This was

not what we intended for the Army Guard and Reserve. The first

Persian Gulf war was the way the volunteer military was constructed, not the second Persian Gulf war.

And then, finally, one of the reasons I urge redeployment is, the

Guard, particularly, has a role in homeland defense. This has become a new critical area of security. If they are spending their time

away from—they’re not going to be able to fulfill that. Remember,

now, that you’ve taken a lot of the equipment, from the Guard particularly, sent it to Iraq, left at Iraq. The people home here do not

have enough equipment to train on. So, you had not only—that’s

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why I talked about the death spiral—it’s not just the personnel, it’s

also the training of these units.

Senator MENENDEZ. And, very quickly, several of the testimonies

we’ve had here talks about—including the architects of this plan—

talk about several years more of engagement, in a military context.

If that is the case, how long can we continue to go through the

present structure, engage for several years, and not, at some point,

look at the question of whether conscription is necessary?

Dr. KORB. Well, the President has belatedly agreed to raise the

size of the ground forces. This is something that should have been

done, and many of us urged, right after September 11. That was

the time when you could have gone and won. I don’t think you can

continue to maintain 150-or-so-thousand troops in Iraq, whatever—

you know, 20–30,000 in Afghanistan, indefinitely without breaking

your volunteer ground forces. You would have to really consider

going back to some form of conscription. After all, if people are registering for the draft, and you don’t use it now, when will you use

it? I mean, why—we go through this thing about having people register. And I have urged the Congress to take a look at Congressman Wrangle’s proposal. It doesn’t mean you have to adopt it, but

I do think it needs to be debated. And the American people have

no emotional involvement in this conflict, and, because of that, I

don’t think that, even though they voted one way, they’re going to

be as involved as we were, for example, back in Vietnam.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been in the confirmation hearings on General Petraeus.

And, of course, this same issue has been discussed quite extensively.

Thank you all for coming, and thank you for your expertise,

thank you for your public service.

With every mistake that has been made, we are where we are.

I guess the essential question I want to ask is: What do we do? Aggressive diplomacy? Bring the people and countries in the region in

to help us solve the problem? Reach out to those who have been

ignored, with aggressive diplomacy? And, possibly, Senator Biden’s

plan of trying to separate the various sectors, to try to bring stability to the region? Please comment.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Should I——

Dr. GELB. Please.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Senator, many things have happened since this

war started. Unplanned, unwanted. But some of the things that

have happened have gone in our way and not against us. The ancient quarrel between Sunni and Shia has become a dynamic conflict. That has terrible consequences, but it also gives us, for the

first time, real allies. Sunni states that, before, were taking our aid

and support, but never did anything for us, are now working for

us in Lebanon, they’re working for us with the Palestinians—for

example, the Saudis have finally cut off Hamas because of it, because they see how much it aligned with Iran, and anybody that’s

aligned with Iran is out. Another unexpected consequence is that

this entire campaign by the most extreme element in Iran, to beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00470 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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come leaders of the Middle East by being the most anti-American,

anti-Israeli, and anti-Jewish has entirely failed. Now they are no

longer considered Middle Eastern fellow brothers, they are called

Ajamis, which are apostates and so on.

Senator NELSON. So, on the——

Dr. LUTTWAK. So, in all these——

Senator NELSON. Let me just make a——

Dr. LUTTWAK. Sure.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Parenthetical that will corroborate

what you said. As I was sitting with King Abdullah, and he was

talking about the threat of Iran, if I had closed my eyes, he could

have been saying almost word for word what Benjamin Netanyahu

had said about the threat in the region by Iran, only 7 days earlier.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Indeed. And this is—has consequences. And, at the

same time, within Iraq, the different Shia groups rely on us to protect them from the Sunni revival, because, as you know, even

though the Sunnis have always been—the Arab Sunnis—a small

minority in Iraq, they’ve always ruled, because of—the Shia are

fragmented hopelessly. Now, in this environment, if we remove and

reduce—without disappearing or abandoning, we just withdraw our

active presence, we disengage—we will impose on them the obligation and necessity of resolving these issues. And we have large

areas of Iraq which already are at peace. And I mentioned the big

city of Mosul, most of Basrah—Basrah, most of the time, and the

areas are narrower and narrower. So, I think that the situation is

not catastrophic, and I believe that if we just disengage our forces,

we will allow more of this natural equilibrium to arise and that

we’ll be able to retain our influence.

I remember, in Vietnam—most of you are too young to remember

this, but when we had United States forces in Vietnam, there was

a ‘‘Hanoi Hilton,’’ the prison where they kept American POWs,

mostly pilots. Today in Hanoi, there is a Hilton and a Sheraton and

a Marriott, and they’re all coming up. In other words, the situation

is not so bad as it is, and paradoxically—and there, I agree with

the entire panel in every respect—by being, ourselves, active in the

environment, we are generating negative elements, and that is why

surge is a bad idea, why disengagement will bring, I think, positive

results.

Dr. GELB. Senator, if I would answer your question very briefly,

it is that we—if we have any chance of doing anything, given all

the blunders that have been committed, it’s got to be a strategy

where politics is in the lead, where political settlement is the first

thing we try for, and where we put forward a realistic way of doing

it; namely, a decentralized federal system. I don’t think anything

else will work. And the military withdrawals, which ought to be

taking place as soon as possible, and the diplomacy, should be in

support of that political settlement.

If that doesn’t happen, if the Iraqis don’t want to do it, and we

can’t help them to do it, then we’re going to have to think of more

direct means to disengage.

Dr. KORB. Senator, I think you’re right that we are where we

are; however, I hope that we’ve learned the lessons, over the last

couple of years, that will guide as the way to go forward. It’s also

important to keep in mind, as I mention in my testimony, that,

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given where we are, there are no good options. If we knew what

to do, we—you know, there would be complete agreement in the

country. The question is, Do you pick an alternative that maximizes the chances of protecting overall American security interests

and fulfills our moral obligation to the Iraqis? And as my colleagues have said, it’s got to be not a military surge, but a diplomatic surge. And I would argue for a phased redeployment that

gets completed by the summer of 2008. And, while I recognize that

taking all of our troops out of there could have some potential

drawbacks, the fact of the matter is, there are many people in Iraq

who don’t believe we’ll ever leave, many people in the Middle East

that think we see Iraq as another base to project American power,

and I think it would diminish that. And I am also convinced that

once we’re out of Iraq, al-Qaeda will not get the support from the

Iraqi population. Ninety-five percent of the Iraqis don’t like alQaeda, and they’re about 2 to 3 percent of the problem there right

now.

Senator NELSON. Before Dr. Malley comments—I just want to

say, regarding lessons learned, you’re absolutely right, Dr. Korb.

And, sadly, one of the questions I had to ask General Petraeus

today—and I told him, before, I was going to ask him this—‘‘Will

you sit silently by your civilian superiors when you know that they

are giving incorrect and misleading information?’’ In answer to that

question, he said no; he would not. But I had to ask that question.

Dr. MALLEY. Senator, first let me say, even though it may end

up that we disengage, as Ed Luttwak said, I don’t think we should

look at that complacently. We’ve rolled the dice once by going in.

Rolling the dice by coming out is—could be a very risky venture.

I’m not quite as optimistic about events in the region. I think the

sectarian strife in Iraq is fueling sectarian tensions outside of Iraq,

and vice versa, and that is not a very optimistic picture, I think,

for U.S. interests. That’s why I would argue—and along with what

Les Gelb said, I think he said it very well—we have one last

chance now to try to see whether we can achieve a political reconciliation, whether the Iraqis can achieve a political reconciliation.

And that means using two tools we haven’t used so far—multilateral diplomacy, diplomacy in the region, and a far more inclusive

approach to Iraqis, not simply playing with those who we’ve played

with so far, whose agendas have been, as I’ve said earlier, very personal partisan agendas rather than having an inclusive strategy in

Iraq itself—and trying to reach a new political compact, and giving

a real choice to those in Iraq who we’ve put in power, ‘‘Either you

act in a national interest or we’re going to cease supporting you.’’

If we take that chance, I think we should develop it immediately

and see whether it can work, and then use our troop presence or

withdrawal as leverage to achieve that end. If we don’t, if the administration chooses not to, or if our Iraqi allies are not prepared

to do it, then I think we need to very quickly accelerate our withdrawal and end this sad chapter in our history.

Dr. KORB. Senator Nelson, if I may, you raised the point about

General Petraeus, and I made it before, I do not want to see this

administration blaming the generals there for the policy. And General Abizaid and Casey were very honest with you, and it looks to

me that now people are, you know, blaming them for being honest.

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So, I think it’s important to keep in mind, it’s not that the predecessors haven’t been honest—and I assume that General Petraeus

will be as honest, as well—but that you ensure that people are not

being punished for being honest and testifying forthrightly before

the Congress.

Dr. GELB. Both General Abizaid and General Casey, I think,

have been incredibly up front on the central point of this war;

namely, that there is no military solution to it, there is only, if we

can do it, a political solution. And they’ve said it week after week.

Senator NELSON. I agree with you about both Abizaid and Casey.

And I was often the one asking the question of both of them, particularly Abizaid, because as I would tell him, ‘‘I trust you. I trust

your judgment’’—I’m referring to 6 years of the Secretary of Defense sitting at the table and saying such-and-such about troop levels, saying such-and-such about the cost of the war, saying suchand-such about weapons of mass destruction, saying such-and-such

about sectarian violence. And it wasn’t the truth. About the reenlistments, about the state and readiness of equipment of the

Guard and the Reserves. And, often, generals were sitting there silently. That’s what I’m referring to.

Dr. KORB. If I may, I think one—and I mentioned this before,

and I think it’s very important—when General Shinseki was asked

by Senator Levin how many troops we needed, there were other

generals sitting at the table who did not support him, and I think

that is a very, very critical issue. And, as you know, that he basically was told he didn’t know what he was talking about by civilian

leaders in the Pentagon. And I don’t remember, at that time, even

people who now are urging more troops, speaking up for General

Shinseki.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Sir—Senator, it’s not just General Shinseki, although what was said is completely accurate. My own experience

was, I was working with the Marine Corps in the preparation for

the war. There was a consensus—there were young Marine officers

in Quantico who had all the facts about Iraq. They knew about the

fact that, in addition to Sunni and Shia, there are Yazidis. They

knew about the situation of the Turkmen in Kirkuk. They knew

about the correct force level. There was a consensus. In fact, our

system worked. Their system worked. The professionals who were

supposed to know these things knew them. So, if you want to draw

a lesson from it, it is: There was a disconnect here between the policy level, that was much more optimistic and dealt in general categories called freedom and democracy, and the people who actually

had to worry about what they called ‘‘rear-area security.’’ Because

the actual territorial control was viewed under the heading of

‘‘rear-end security.’’ That’s how General Shinseki came up with the

number, because General Shinseki didn’t think you needed 400,000

troops to defeat Saddam Hussein, it was the consensus that it

would be very easy to defeat him. There was no disagreement. It

was about how many troops you would need to control the environment. And I got myself labeled as a racist, by a nameless policy

person in the Pentagon, because I said that our troops would have

to guard everything including protecting hospitals and schools from

the people who use those same hospitals and schools. I was labeled

a racist. But that was the consensus view of all the military officers

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I was dealing with professionally. So, that was a mistake. And

today, the consensus is against surge, simply because the enemy is

low contrast, unstable, cannot be seen. And we didn’t listen to

them before, we should listen to them now.

Dr. GELB. You know, Senator, I feel the military are in a particular bind on these questions. I sat and listened to your description of what they did while Rumsfeld testified, and it was heartaching, because you know that they felt very differently than he

was testifying. But they’re torn between telling what they believe

is the best military advice and the need to salute the Commander

and have a can-do attitude. And they’re torn between that all the

time.

Senator NELSON. But we are entitled to the truth.

Dr. GELB. Indeed. Indeed——

Senator NELSON. And the making——

Dr. GELB [continuing]. You are.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. Of policy is not just the executive

branch with a compliant Congress. The making of policy is with a

separate, but equal, branch of government asserting itself in the

making of policy.

Dr. GELB. It’s true. And you know the bind they’re in, in dealing

with it.

Senator NELSON. And that’s why I had to ask him the question.

Dr. GELB. Absolutely.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Well, General Petraeus is the author of the new

counterinsurgency manual, and that counterinsurgency manual

writes, page after page, chapter after chapter, how you can do this

and you can do that and do the other, but the actual historical experience is that the only people who do counterinsurgency well are

the ones who can out-terrorize the terrorists, that we absolutely

cannot do, must not do, will never consider. In fact, counterinsurgency is a form of malpractice. And there are issues here, beyond the can-do-ism and the desire to be loyal, and the desire to

tell the truth. Counterinsurgency worked for the Germans in World

War II. They sent a dispatch rider into a village, and he was killed,

they went and killed everybody in the village. That village and 50

villages round about were safe for the next—years. We cannot do

that. We will never compromise our values to win a war or anything of the kind. It’s unthinkable. And hence, we have a problem

beyond honesty, beyond can-do-ism, and that is a specific issue

called counterinsurgency.

Dr. KORB. Senator, if I might, because you raise something important, in terms of military people. They have an obligation before

you, that’s why you gave them fixed terms in office, so they could

be honest. One of the things that concerns me is them showing up

on Sunday morning talk shows, you know, and things like this.

And, for example, let me read you this, ‘‘Today, approximately

164,000 Iraqi police and soldiers—of which about 100,000 are

trained and equipped—and additional 74,000 facility protection

forces, are performing a wide variety of security missions. Six battalions of the Iraqi regular army and the Iraqi intervention force

are now conducting operations. Iraqi national guard battalions

have also been active in recent months. Some 40 of the 45 existing

battalions are conducting operations on a daily basis, most alongVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00474 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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side coalition forces, but many independently.’’ That was said—

written in the——

Senator NELSON. By General Petraeus.

Dr. KORB [continuing]. By—in September of 2004.

Senator NELSON. 21⁄2 years ago.

Dr. KORB. Why was he writing that?

Senator NELSON. I asked him that. I asked him that, this morning. And I said, ‘‘You say that they were trained, but they’re not,

so tell me: How do you think they’re going to be trained any better

today? And how many do we have trained?’’ And I didn’t get a clear

answer.

The CHAIRMAN. What we have here is a failure of communication.

Senator, we went almost 10 minutes over, because it was worthwhile.

Let me yield to the chairman, if you have any questions, and

then I know Senator Boxer has another question, and I have a few

as well. No?

Senator Boxer, I’ll yield to you.

Senator BOXER. Yes; thank you so much. This has been really illuminating.

I can’t thank you enough. It’s a hard time, when there are no

good choices, there are no great choices, and I think that’s the—

frankly, the worst kind of leadership, is when you’re left with no

good choices, but we’ll leave that for another time.

When I was in Iraq, I rode in a—in an armored vehicle with General Petraeus. And I just want to underscore, Senator Nelson, what

you were saying. When I was in Iraq, 18 months ago, I rode with

General Petraeus, and he showed me his whole thing he was doing

to train the Iraqis. We went out on the field, and they were driving

around, and they were simulating a hostage-taking, and they

jumped out of the truck, and it was impressive. And then he had

all the soldiers there, and he said, unequivocally, he was very,

very, very high on the quality of these soldiers. And when I came

back, I said, ‘‘Terrific, let’s get out, because General Petraeus

said’’—and remember that joke?

The CHAIRMAN. I do remember.

Senator BOXER. General Petraeus said, ‘‘This is fabulous, we’ve

got 200,000-plus, trained, ready to go,’’ and General Casey said,

‘‘The bigger our footprint, the worse off we are. We’re fueling the

insurgency.’’ Now, the tragedy is, as I hear you—you’re not the

tragedy, you’re helping us try to find the way here—I wrote down

the things I take away, which is exactly what I took away 18

months ago, that our presence is fueling the insurgency—and

whether you use the word ‘‘disengage,’’ which I respect your view

on that, or ‘‘get out’’ or some fancier word, ‘‘redeploy,’’ it doesn’t

matter—that’s part of the solution. And I take that away from you.

Now, I think one of the things that we never say, so I’m going

to say it—and I always get myself in trouble for saying the truth;

I’m going to say it—is that we do have to increase the end

strength. But one of the reasons is a lot of our folks are gone—

3,000-plus dead, and, I just asked, 10,000 of our wounded, out of

the 20, cannot come back to fight. So, when we talk about increasing the end strength—and I understand Defense Secretary Gates

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says 65,000—I hope we don’t lose sight of—one of the reasons we

have to do this is because some people can’t come back. So, I want

to put that out there.

The question I had—and I so very much—I have two questions,

and I’ll ask them now, and be quiet and let you finish, because I’ve

got 5 minutes left.

The CHAIRMAN. You can take your time.

Senator BOXER. I have not heard—and please correct me if I’m

wrong, because if I’m wrong, I’ll be happy—I have not heard Prime

Minister al-Maliki ever say—and he’s a leader of a country that is

going through hell—when we look at the pictures of the Iraqis, we

feel a pang, whether it’s at a supermarket, whether it’s at a

mosque, innocent children, babies, mothers, men, women, old,

young, screaming in pain, and running from the scene—I have

never heard him use the word ‘‘Cease fire. Let’s come around the

table. This is one country.’’

Now, I would like you—if I am wrong on this, please correct me,

because that’s the kind of leadership I’d like to see. If, in fact, it

is one country, which leads me to my comments about the BidenGelb idea—which I think is gaining ground, Mr. Chairman; I hope

you don’t give up, because I think, at the end of the day, it’s the

only way, it’s already happening—but I would say to Dr. Gelb,

when you talked about it, you said, ‘‘Ethnic cleansing, well, it’s already happening.’’ I would use the word—yours isn’t ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ it’s ‘‘ethnic separation,’’ to avoid ethnic cleansing. So, I hope

you’ll go back and read what you said and correct the record, because I—no, I feel you said ‘‘ethnic cleansing is already happening,’’

but I think the point is, your plan and the chairman’s isn’t for—

it’s to stop ethnic cleansing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. GELB. Absolutely.

Senator BOXER. Yes. And I think you should stick with it and—

listen, I’m someone who knows how people can pound on you and

pound on you and pound on you. You know, you have a solution,

a political solution—and I agree—somebody said, ‘‘It shouldn’t look

like it’s ‘Made in America.’ ’’ One person said that. Fine. Better

than a war that’s ‘‘Made in America.’’ OK? Better that a solution

percolates from America than this war continues without end in

the face of world opposition.

So, I guess I have—if you can comment if I’m wrong on al-Maliki.

If anyone says I’m wrong, I’d like to know. And my question deals

with a poll that just came out in—Tuesday, January 23.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I don’t know if you’ve seen

this, ‘‘Global opinion of U.S. foreign policy has sharply deteriorated

in the past 2 years, according to a BBC poll released today. Threequarters of those polled in 25 countries disapprove of U.S. policies

toward Iraq.’’ Seventy-five percent of those polled in 25 countries.

They asked 26,000 people, and the GlobeScan president said, ‘‘It’s

a horrible slide,’’ and, ‘‘If this keeps up, it’s going to be difficult for

the United States to exercise its moral suasion in the world.’’

Now, you are much wiser than I am on the whole big picture, but

this, to me, is frightening, because—we were attacked on September 11, 2001. The whole world was with us. Mr. Chairman, do

you remember that? The whole—and I remember going down to the

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floor of the Senate, just shaking and trembling after what had happened, and saying, ‘‘There’s only one thing I could see that—a piece

of sun—and that is that the world is with us, and, in this war

against terror, we can lead with moral authority and get the whole

world to stand with us.’’ Now we have a world, because of the Iraq

war—mostly, although there are other reasons, too—is against us.

So, I guess my question to you is: Could you respond to this poll?

Does it alarm you? What is it going to take for us to turn around

world opinion? Because it’s a global economy, it’s a global war on

terror. Everywhere you look, it’s global, global, and this is where

we are.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good questions, Senator. I’m anxious to

hear their answers.

Dr. LUTTWAK. I’d like to refer you to the testimony of Secretary

Condoleezza Rice, not her testimony now, but what she said at the

very beginning of the Bush administration. She said that American

foreign policy needs humility. The argument is that American economic, technological, and media power is so great that the world

could not also tolerate very assertive U.S. policies, let alone much

military action. That is to say, the moment a country is so inherently powerful in so many different dimensions of life, starts using

its military force, you immediately evoke a reaction, even by people

who are not anti-American, simply because they want to safeguard

their independence, their sense of independence. So, reducing our

profile, reducing our level of activity, could paradoxically increase

our real leverage. And different—I think the Biden plan, the GelbBiden plan, whichever way your wife calls it, is part of——

The CHAIRMAN. Depends on the outcome of this hearing.

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. Is recognizing, is disengaging the—allowing equilibrium to emerge naturally. Iraq is, indeed, a divided

country; it will not be a unitary country, unless it’s an evil dictatorship. So, I think that there’s a remedy, Senator, to the very real

situation that you have outlined, and the remedy is to go back to

the original intention of the Bush administration, which was to follow a low profile foreign policy of humility, where you oblige others

to come to us here in Washington, say, ‘‘Please intervene, please

help out in this multilateral venture or that.’’

The CHAIRMAN. I think he’s right.

Dr. KORB. To pick up on what Ed said in the debate between

then-Governor Bush and Vice President Gore, he said he wanted

a humble foreign policy, which I think underscores what Ed has

said. It’s not just Iraq, because we went in there without waiting

for a second U.N. resolution, not allowing the inspectors to do their

job, but it’s other things, like in saying we’re not bound by the Geneva Conventions, the renditions, Guantanamo. All of those things,

I think, have hurt us. And the real key thing is, we’re not going

to prevail in this war on terror without convincing people around

the world that what these al-Qaeda-like groups say about us is

simply not true, and it is a war of ideas, and—with a poll like this,

it doesn’t help us. Look how our opinion went up when we sent the

Marines to help Indonesia after the tsunami. Look how the opinion

in a Muslim country went up. And I think that that answers your

question.

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Dr. MALLEY. Senator, you raised several issues I want to address. First, on the issue of training, I think one of the big misconceptions of—from the beginning of the war is this notion that

by training the Iraqis in the abstract, it’s going to make a difference. That’s—it’s a question of loyalty and allegiance that matters, and if they are—if they’re loyal to their group or to their militia, it doesn’t matter how well trained they are, and that’s why so

often trained troops have not performed.

Second, on the issue of Maliki, I don’t know if he said—if he

called for a cease-fire. Frankly, even if he did, I’m not sure what

difference it would make. But I think that they would—it would be

wrong right now to focus on the person of Maliki. And there’s some

whispering about, ‘‘Well, maybe he’ll be changed, maybe we’ll bring

in a different alliance, with SCIRI and the Kurds and some Sunnis,

for a different form of government.’’ It’s a structural problem. And

if you just shift these actors, you’re not going to make a difference.

So, maybe Maliki today, Jaafari yesterday. And I remember when

Maliki was appointed, and people were saying, ‘‘Well, he’s much

better than Jaafari.’’ I’m not sure we see any difference. The next

person won’t be different unless you change—unless you reach a

political reconciliation.

And finally, on the issue of United States image, which has been

something I’ve been deeply preoccupied with for some time, of

course Iraq is, in great part, responsible. There are other things,

as well. I think our diplomacy in the Middle East has been notoriously absent. I think our disengagement from Arab-Israeli peacemaking has been extremely irresponsible. And I think there are

things that we’re going to have to do. Unfortunately, at this point,

because of our lack of credibility, even good things we might do risk

being perceived in a very negative way, so I think it’s a very uphill

battle, but we need to start.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer, thank you very much.

I’d like to ask a question, if it’s OK.

Gentlemen, again there’s been a remarkable consensus on the big

issues that have to be addressed relative to Iraq, not just from you

gentlemen, who are among the brightest people we have in the foreign policy establishment, but, quite frankly, from former generals

we had last week. We had a remarkable panel, I thought, of four

generals representing about 15 stars, and there was remarkable

consensus across the board of all the testimony we had, except

from Dr. Rice. And I’m trying to be facetious. I mean, when she testified—I’ve been here a while, I was here during the tail end of

Vietnam—as you know, Ed, that’s when you and I met. And I’ve

never attended a hearing that said as much by the response, universally, of a 21-member committee to a major initiative from a

President presented by his Secretary of State. I mean, it was truly,

in that sense, historic. I can’t think of any time in the 34 years I’ve

been here where there was such an outright range from skepticism

to hostility toward the proposal being put forward.

But one of the things that you all said here—and it relates to

what Senator Boxer raised, is that in order to have any salvageable

best-case outcome of the bad outcomes that are likely, and there’s

no great outcome that’s likely—there must be a political reconciliation in Iraq. Now, I keep trying to find points of common agreeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00478 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.002 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ment here, not just with you all, but across the board. Political

reconciliation, either as a consequence of a civil war, where the

objectives of the warring parties finally get resolved on the battlefield, or a reconciliation brought about by nudging from the international community, a reconciliation brought out of just self-interest being realized among the parties—does anybody picture that

reconciliation, by any means, resulting in a strong central government in Iraq?

Dr. MALLEY. Let—just—and, obviously, it’s a difficult question to

answer. What do you mean by a ‘‘strong central government’’? I

think——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean what the administration is talking about,

a central government—that’s a democracy—where you have a majority population—meaning that over 60 percent of it is likely to be

represented by the Shia, controlling the security of the entire country and controlling the security of each hamlet with a national

police force which is now envisioned—not just national army, a

national police force. You know what I mean by a ‘‘strong central

government.’’

Dr. MALLEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would—I think it’s—and it’s

in our plan, it’s in, I think, everyone’s plan, at this table at least,

the notion of federalism. It’s been what the Iraqis want, themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no—now, please answer my question.

Dr. MALLEY. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Can anybody envision a strong national government, as has been pushed by the administration for the last 5

years?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Every Arab country, Senator, from Morocco to

Iran, has a strong central government. But that is a strong central

government, because the—any—there are plenty of local autonomous tendencies of different entities—are simply suppressed by

dictatorship.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. LUTTWAK. Therefore, whoever advocates a strong central government in Iraq is advocating dictatorship.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you’ve——

Dr. LUTTWAK. Unless we are ready to install our own dictatorship—I mean, Saddam Hussein is no longer with us. I notice that

he seemed to be in good health before he died, and so on. Unless

we are prepared to find a Saddam Hussein and install him in

Baghdad, there cannot be a strong central government in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you’ve said it better than I asked it. In

other words, is it possible to have a strong central government

without a dictatorship or an authoritarian regime in Iraq? Is it possible for that to happen?

Dr. KORB. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Now everyone I’ve asked that question to

but the administration has stated that. I find it interesting that

there is this sort of nuance as to what constitutes a federal system.

Whatever it is, the idea that, in the next decade, I would say, that

there is an ability to have a united Iraq without an authoritarian

government rests upon the notion that there is local control over

their own personal security. I mean, does anybody think there’s

470

any time in the next 10 years, without an authoritarian regime in

Baghdad, that you’re going to have a national police force patrolling Fallujah without there being war, without there being civil

chaos? Does anybody think that’s possible? And I haven’t found

anybody who does.

So quite frankly—I’m expressing my own frustration about the

plan that used to be spearheaded by Gelb, but now is, I guess, just

Biden—I’m joking. But this is why I find it so fascinating that people seem to fixate on whether or not we’re splitting up a country,

why I find it so fascinating whether or not what we’re calling for

is just what the Constitution says. And what it says—again, I

know you all know this, but it’s amazing how few people have read

this document—it says in article 116, ‘‘This Constitution shall appropriate the region of Kurdistan.’’ It sets in place, in the Constitution, that Kurdistan is a region, right from the get-go. Then it says,

‘‘This Constitution shall establish new regions in accordance with

the provisions.’’ Then it goes on to state what power it gives you

if you decide to be a region. And it merely says what you’ve all

been saying, ‘‘regional authorities shall have the right to exercise

executive, legislative, and judicial authority in accordance with this

Constitution, except for the powers stipulated to the central government,’’ which Les laid out. Two; in the case of contradiction between regional and national, national wins. Three; region and

governate shall allocate an equitable share of the national revenues. Four; the regions and governates shall establish offices and

embassies and diplomatic missions. I mean, this is even beyond our

Articles of Confederation, 200 years ago. And regions shall be responsible for all administrative requirements in the region, particularly the establishment and organization of internal security forces.

So, why do we keep pushing a rope here?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Senator, I would not be frustrated, if I were you,

because it is an iron law of politics all over this planet that when

you have strongly constituted ethnic and religious identities, you

can only have one of two modes, either some form of decentralization, federalism, and so on, or an oppressive dictatorship. Indeed,

if and when Iran becomes a democracy, in the full sense, you will

see that Iran, too, will have to go federal, because they have the

Azeri—population, 20 million, they have the Kurds, they have the

Baluch, they have some—even some Tajiks, and they will have to

be federal. So, you’re going to win. Your proposal shall be reality

whenever there is no dictatorship—in Iraq, as in Iran. So, this will

succeed, and you shouldn’t be frustrated.

The reason there has been some hesitation even at this table—

Larry, for example—is the notion that we would prescribe a very

specifically written constitution——

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Dr. LUTTWAK [continuing]. That, as I say, is redolent and has

connotations. You can see, you know, Locke, Burke, Madison, and

these other strange creatures in it who do not correspond to their

culture and their history. And, you know, people like Sistani, in

their Web sites, have little notes about politics in which they evoke

discussions about democracy conducted in the ninth century——

Dr. GELB. But, Edward, I would just note that Locke did not

write the Iraqi Constitution.

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Dr. LUTTWAK. No. [Laughter.]

I will stop, then.

Dr. GELB. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I obviously cannot speak for Les Gelb, and

I’ll ask you to respond to this, Les, but I suspect that neither Les

nor I would quarrel with the idea that there would be some other

way in which reconciliation takes place. The central point of what

we are—we have been attempting to do, and it seems to be a consensus without people willing to state it’s a consensus—is that

we’ve got to get off this wicket of a strong central government, led

by Maliki or anybody else, who’s going to be in total control of the

security of the whole country, and who is going to be able to decide,

at a majority vote in the Parliament, how to distribute revenues,

when they feel like distributing them—in terms of oil—and expect

anything to happen positively within Iraq.

I can understand—and I’ll conclude with this—if you did not

think that a political solution and reconciliation was the key to

moving beyond the quagmire we find ourselves in, then I would say

it is rational and reasonable to argue that there’s still some basis

for suggesting that a military solution might be appropriate. But

nobody thinks it can be solve militarily. I just hope my colleagues,

as well as the administration—and I think my colleagues are way

ahead on this—understand that the elements of reconciliation relate to a little bit of political breathing room, a little bit less of forcing all the parties together under a strongly constituted central

government, which the Constitution doesn’t call for, and some way

to work out giving each of the major constituencies a reason to buy

in to the notion of a united Iraq.

And I think I’ll conclude by saying, Ed, I am always impressed

by your—I’m not being facetious—you talked about your tactical

input—by your strategic vision here. I happen to agree with you on

one overarching point, the same point made by Les—that Iran is

somehow this new, emboldened superpower in the region, or, second, that a disintegration of our efforts in Iraq will result in an

international catastrophe in the region that requires us, even when

we’re ‘‘losing,’’ keep American forces in Iraq.

And so, the last point I’d like to ask each of you to comment on,

as briefly as you can: If all fails—meaning that the administration

does not budge over the next 2 years on insisting that a military

solution has to predate the possibility of a political solution—if, in

fact, the surge is as counterproductive as all of us—well, five of us,

anyway—think it’s likely to be, and if the result will be—which I

predict, as Senator Boxer said—the American public will not sustain this effort for 2 more years, I predict that you will see a whole

cadre of people running, in both parties—new people, as well—in

2008, who will not only be calling for us to get out of Iraq, they’ll

be calling for us to get out of the region. And I think that would

be a real problem.

Here’s my question. What is the worst case that you can see if,

in fact, we end up having to, absent any political solution, disengage from Iraq? I refer to ‘‘disengage and contain,’’ and I don’t

think it’s the end of the world. If all this fails, what do you see as

the downside? Is it as bleak as the President paints it for our interests in the region and the country and the world?

472

Dr. KORB. Oh, I think he’s well overstating the danger to American foreign policy. I mean, when he talks about Iraq being the central front on the war on terror, and somehow, if we leave Iraq, you

know, they’re going to come over here and attack us, I mean, that

assumes there’s a sort of a finite number of terrorists, and they’re

all in Iraq, and so we keep them busy there, they won’t—they will

not come here.

To me, the real danger is the one you pointed out, is that Americans will tire of bearing their responsibilities around the world,

they will not trust their political leaders when they tell them about

danger. And that’s why I think it’s important that we have to stay

involved in the region, because we do have strategic interests. I

think the worst thing that could happen is that you would have

even more violence than you have now, though when people say,

‘‘Gee, if we leave, there will be a civil war.’’ Well, what’s going on

now? I mean, in terms of the number of—the number of casualties.

And as long as we’re in the region, we can prevent that from undermining regional stability.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Anyone else want to comment?

Dr. GELB. If I may, Mr. Chairman. And, again, thank you very

much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Former Chairman, for this opportunity.

I think the real catastrophe would be staying the course. That’s

the main thing causing all these problems. And they’ve been listed

ad nauseam from the beginning of this hearing and from the beginning of your hearings on this subject. And it’s a catastrophe, in my

point of view, that the President and the White House keep saying

there are no alternatives. There are alternatives. And until you recognize the legitimacy of these alternatives, you can’t have a decent

dialog. And that dialog is absolutely essential if we’re to have a bipartisan foreign policy on Iraq, and that bipartisanship is essential

for making the very tough decisions that lie ahead.

I would only remind the committee what I know many of you remember. In the waning days of the Vietnam war, President Nixon

said that losing would make the United States a pitiful helpless

giant. Well, heaven forfend, we did lose, or the South Vietnamese

lost, and we took Americans off the rooftops of our Embassy in Saigon, and we all shuddered at the thought. But then, having predicted the worst, having created the most fears, President Nixon

and Henry Kissinger set about to do diplomacy to blunt this. They

opened the door to China, they created the trilateral diplomacy to

put pressure on both Moscow and Beijing. They strengthened our

relations and our security relations with the countries of Asia. And

3 years after we lifted our people off the rooftops of the Embassy

in Saigon, the United States position in Asia was stronger than it

had been at any time since the end of World War II.

This country is still the paramount power in the world. We’re not

a hegemon. We can’t order anyone else around. But others still look

to us to prevent great harm and to do good. And that is a basis

for recovering from the horrors of these blunders of the last 3

years.

Dr. MALLEY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can do it briefly, if you would.

Dr. MALLEY. OK. Mr. Chairman—oh, you want to add something

there?

473

Mr. Chairman, first, on the issue of the internal disposition of

Iraq, I think the main issue on which there is consensus from all

of us is that the key is reconciliation, however the Iraqis choose to

reach their compromises on federalism, on a weak central government, but on keeping their country together, hopefully, in some

fashion.

The worst-case scenario, as you said, would be to stay the course

and then end up, a year or 2 years from now, doing what people

are calling for us to do today, but in a far weaker position. I don’t

think we should underestimate the damage that’s already been

done by the years we’ve been there. No doubt about it, I think, in

the region, there has been damage. We may not be a weak power,

but we are a weaker power. But, if in fact, we chose to listen—if

we try to do a political reconciliation, and it doesn’t work, and we

choose to leave more quickly, then our emphasis needs to be on reengaging diplomatically in the region, something we haven’t done,

to prevent the breakdown in Iraq from spreading to the rest of the

region. And I think we can do that.

Dr. LUTTWAK. There is now a so-called way of jihad, whereby you

go to Jordan, or you go to Syria, and then you go to Anbar province, and then you enter the jihadi group. They are not the largest

group, but they are the ones we are most troubled by. There is no

doubt that, if there is no way of jihad leading to Anbar, there will

be people who will attack elsewhere. So, Senator, I think that you

have an opportunity here, with Senator Lugar, of exercising great

influence over this policy and bringing everybody to their senses,

because I want to show you that the Bush administration is full

of people who agree with you two. Full of it. They’re—so, our—but

I don’t think one should give hostages to fortune and totally ignore

the considerations that Senator Lugar presented, which he got

from his encounters with President Bush. Yes; there could be dangers in some. But I believe that Les Gelb is entirely accurate, the

fundamental global equilibria are what they are. Iran is not a great

power. We are more than a great power. And, moreover, my concept of the division of the Middle East giving us equilibria. So, I

don’t think, in the macrosense—but there’s no reason to give hostages to fortune here, because there is a bit of a mechanical factor,

which is: Right now, if you’re a jihadi anywhere in the world, you

want to go to Anbar. You close down Anbar, they’ll find some other

places. But the totality of it will be trivial, as opposed to the—

what’s happening now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I hope we keep focus on

the big picture here. Your testimony has been incredibly helpful.

I was told, if it really is a brief question—do you have one question left, Senator? Would you mind asking it briefly, and maybe we

can let these folks go to lunch? Because we’re back here at 2:30

again.

Senator NELSON. I just wanted to say to Dr. Korb, in you quoting

the article by General Petraeus from 21⁄2 years ago, specifically,

when I asked him that today, ‘‘How many do you think we have

trained today?’’ And he said 300,000. And I said, ‘‘How many of

them are reliable?’’ And he said he didn’t know. And I said, ‘‘Well,

can you put a percentage on it?’’ And he said, no; he couldn’t.

474

Now, I’m going to insist, as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that we get an answer from the Government of the

United States as to how many, or what percentage, do we think,

of the Iraqi Army and police force, are trained.

The other thing I wanted to ask was—I went to Syria as part of

the Iraq Study Commission. And, of course, the White House

roundly criticized me. In this aggressive diplomatic initiative that

you all have been discussing, what part do you think Syria can

play in that, in helping us in our situation in Iraq?

Dr. MALLEY. Senator, I think I was in Syria the same time as

you, and, certainly from my discussion with Syrian officials, they

claim that they are prepared to do things if, in fact, there’s reciprocation.

I think there’s a lot they can do because of the links they have

to Sunni Arab tribes. I think there’s a lot they can do because of

links they have to the insurgents. I think there’s a lot they can do

because of their historical links with the Baath Party. So, there are

things they can do in the context of a political reconciliation that

is led by us in which they can then play a part. In the absence of

that, and if they don’t see any engagement with them, then I think

we could be pretty sure that they won’t be doing too much good to

help us stabilize the situation.

Dr. KORB. One good thing is, we have this—all the parties in the

region together, and the United States is clear that we’ll be leaving. We’re going to break this axis, if you will, between Syria and

Iran, because one is Sunni, the other is more Shia. And so, I think,

based upon what Rob said, you can get them involved, but you’ve

got to get all the countries involved, because even the Saudis, if we

can believe the press reports, are causing problems there now with

the money that they are sending in.

And if I can briefly—think—the problem with the Iraqi security

forces is not training, it’s motivation. That’s the real key. And you

won’t have that motivation until they make these political compromises.

The CHAIRMAN. Ed, if you make it brief, OK?

Dr. LUTTWAK. Yes; just very briefly. The word ‘‘militia’’ describes

somebody who is in a group that he believes in, that he identifies

with. He’s for real. It’s the army and police who are not for real.

Senator Biden’s plan—one of the reasons his plan will succeed,

unless it becomes a brutal dictatorship, is because, in effect, there’ll

be these regional forces which are true to their identity. So, this—

whenever I hear people now—and Larry made the same point, I

think everybody agrees—talking about numbers, numbers are irrelevant. They really are. The only ones I trust are the militias, which

is the militias reaching an equilibrium in what will be a decentralized system.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, I’m never going to get you all

back here if I don’t let you go. I would say to my colleagues and

anyone who’s listening, we’ll reconvene here at 2:30, and we’ll have

Congressman Murtha and former Speaker Gingrich, who will be

testifying.

I thank you for your input. It’s been invaluable.

We are recessed til 2:30.

[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

(475)

ALTERNATIVE PLANS (CONTINUED)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007 [P.M.]

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in room

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez,

Casey, Lugar, Coleman, Corker, Isakson, and Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

Let me suggest—we’ve got two very important witnesses who are

also significantly well grounded in the ways of the House and Senate. There’s a vote at 2:45. What I’d like to suggest we do when

that vote comes is to recess the committee so we all go and vote

and all come right back, because it’s too important what these two

gentlemen have to say to let this sort of go on, you know, one at

a time.

I also want to say to Senator Casey before I begin, when it comes

time to question, I’m going to yield my spot to you first, because

you had waited all this time to question our early morning panel.

You had to speak and preside, and so, I will do that, just so no

one’s surprised.

I have consulted with Chairman Lugar’s staff. He has no opening

statement and suggests that we get going right away. I have a very

brief opening statement.

This afternoon, we continue our thorough examination of the remaining options in Iraq, and we’re very honored—and we are honored—to have with us Chairman Murtha and Speaker Gingrich.

Both are men of stature, both are patriots, and both have offered

serious and provocative ideas that have helped frame this debate

on Iraq and our overall national security policies.

We will hear specific recommendations today. We have heard

specific recommendations from 18 witnesses in the past 2 weeks,

and we’ll hear specific recommendations over the next 2 weeks—

so much for Vice President Cheney’s assertion that Members of the

Congress ‘‘have absolutely nothing to offer’’ in place of the current

policy.

The White House has grown accustomed to policy debates in an

echo chamber. Dismissing competing ideas has become a matter of

routine, but it’s a dangerous way to govern and conduct this war.

476

And that’s the most partisan thing I’ve said since these hearings

began, but I want to make it clear—make no mistake—there are

a number of very serious people with very specific alternatives that

have been offered.

Our goal in these hearings is to strike a different tone, it’s to

start from the proposition that all of us are united in our devotion

to this country and our desire to help see it through a difficult

time. I believe no foreign policy can be sustained unless there are

two essential elements. First, it must be bipartisan, and, second, it

has to have the informed consent of the American people. I think

both are lacking right now.

Our policy today lacks these fundamental ingredients, in my

view, and it’s my hope that the hearings we have held the last 2

weeks and the next week and a half will help generate that bipartisan consensus on key elements of a successful strategy in Iraq.

Our witnesses today are going to contribute to that effort mightily. Chairman Murtha single-handedly shifted the debate—and I

can’t emphasize that enough; whether you agree or disagree with

him, he single-handedly shifted the debate in Iraq when he had the

courage to challenge a policy that was clearly failing. No one’s said

it more clearly, whether you agree with him or not. And, I might

add, Mr. Chairman, we’ve had a score of witnesses—I mean, left,

right, center, Democrat, Republican, military, retired military, et

cetera—I have not heard anybody—I’ve never heard the word ‘‘redeploy’’ used as much as when you said it, what, a year and a half

ago, or however long ago it was. And so—

Speaker Gingrich is one of the most eloquent spokesman of a

strategy on foreign policy. And he’s argued eloquently about what’s

at stake in Iraq. He’s offered creative proposals to succeed there

and in other foreign policy challenges confronting this Nation.

I just want you to know, if you call his cell phone, you’re not

going to get through. I left four messages on your cell phone to

come and testify. I don’t want you to think, Newt, I wasn’t trying

to get you here, because I think it’s real value-added, having you

here, and I appreciate it very much.

Senator, do you have anything you’d like to say?

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to

hearing from two good friends. I’ll forego another opening statement, so we could expedite the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

Let’s start with you, Chairman Murtha, and then—take what

time you need, and we will—when we get to questioning, we’ll limit

it to 8-minute rounds again, and if there’s time, and the witnesses’

physical constitution will bear it, we may ask them a second round,

if that works, based on their schedules.

So, Jack, it’s all yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. MURTHA, U.S. CONGRESSMAN

FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

DEFENSE, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I’m delighted to be here. And I

want to say that I won by 122 votes in my first election, and Joe

Biden came to Johnstown—he just had been elected Senator—and

477

he swung the election. I attribute my election to him. So, anybody

that’s got criticism can criticize Joe Biden, because he got me

elected. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, if you don’t mind the point

of personal privilege here, the word was, you would have won by

1,022 votes had I not shown up. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. But, at any rate, thank you.

Mr. MURTHA. And Senator Lugar and I went to the Philippines,

and, I have to say, we changed the election in the Philippines. We

made sure—we convinced President Reagan that—what was that

guy’s name that had to go? Marcos had to go, yeah.

And, of course, I’m delighted to be here with Bob Casey, who’s

such a good friend, his dad and his family have been such a good

friend, and two distinguished Senators.

So, let me say, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, for the past 5

years, the United States has had an average of 130,000 troops in

the ground in Iraq. The Pentagon reports that the Iraqi security

forces have grown in number, nearly reaching their goal of 325,000

equipped and trained. The Iraqis have a constitution and have held

national elections.

These milestones have been met, yet security in Iraq continues

to deteriorate. The past 4 years, the Iraq war has been plagued by

mischaracterizations based on optimism instead of realism. Reality

dictates that conditions on the ground are simply moving in the

wrong direction. There are limits to military power. And I’ve said

this over and over again. There’s no military solution to Iraq’s civil

war. It’s up to the Iraqis.

Beginning in May 2005, after 2 years of mischaracterizations and

misrepresentations, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee required the Department of Defense to submit quarterly reports to

the Congress on facts necessary to measure stability and security

in Iraq. Since July 2005, we’ve received these reports. They are dismal, and they demonstrate a clear lack of progress in the vital

areas of concern. Electricity, oil production, employment, and potable water are all below prewar level. The average weekly attacks

have grown, since I spoke out last year—from 430 per week, in

July 2005, to well over 1,000. Iraq casualties have increased from

63 per day to 127 per day, to date. The latest polls show that 91

percent of the Sunni Iraqis and 74 percent of the Shia Iraqis want

the United States forces out of Iraq. In January 2006, 47 percent

of Iraqis approved of attacks on United States-led forces. Now it’s

61 percent approve of attacks on U.S. forces. Support of the American public continues to erode, and there’s little confidence in the

current strategy. Today, less than 30 percent of Americans support

the war, and only 11 percent support the President’s plan to increase troop levels.

February 2006 polls showed that 72 percent of American troops—

and I picked this up long before I saw it in the polls—in Iraq believe the United States should exit Iraq within a year; and 42 percent said that their mission was unclear; they didn’t understand

what they were doing.

Wars cannot be won with slogans, there must be terms for measuring progress, and a clearly defined purpose, if success is ever to

be achieved.

478

General Schoomaker said, in a recent hearing, that in order for

a strategy to be effective, we have to be able to measure the purpose, yet the President sets forth a plan with no defined matrices

for measuring success, and a plan that, in my estimation, is simply

more of the same plan that has not worked. A new strategy that

is based on redeployment, rather than on further military engagement, and one that is centered on handing Iraq back to the Iraqis,

is what is needed. I do not believe that Iraq will make the political

progress necessary for its security and stability until the United

States forces redeploy.

Now, here’s what I believe, if we’re going to achieve stability in

Iraq and in the region. I believe the first step is to redeploy American forces; the execution of a robust diplomatic effort and a restoration of international credibility; the repairing of our military

readiness, and the rebuilding of our Strategic Reserve to face future threats—and this is probably as important as anything else

that I have found in my hearings that I’ve just concluded in the

last week or so.

Now, redeployment of United States forces in Iraq. To achieve

stability in Iraq, I believe we first must have a responsible phased

redeployment of U.S. forces. General Odom, Army retired, recently

testified, ‘‘We’re pursuing the wrong war. Stability and security in

the region should be the overarching strategy, not a victory in

Iraq.’’ I agree with General Odom, and I believe that regional stability can only be accomplished through redeployment.

Who wants us to stay in Iraq? I am convinced, in my opinion,

that Iran and al-Qaeda, because we intensify the very radical extremism we claim to be fighting against, while, at the same time,

depleting our financial and human resources.

As long as the United States military continues to occupy Iraq,

there’ll be no real security. Maintaining United States troop

strength in Iraq, or adding to the strength in specific areas, has not

proven effective in the past, it didn’t work recently in Baghdad. We

just put 10,000 to 15,000 troops in Baghdad, increased the

strength, and the violence has increased substantially. Nor do I believe it will work in the future. The Iraq war cannot be won by the

United States military, predominantly because of the way our military operates. They use overwhelming force—and I advocate that—

to save American lives. But, let me tell you, that makes enemies.

When you go and kick down the doors—and we have to do that in

order to protect our people—when you use mortars and all the ammunition we have to use to protect our Americans, you kill the

enemy, you kill other people, and inadvertently kill civilians, and

34,000 people have been killed—not by Americans, but have been

killed in this civil war—and it doesn’t help us to win the hearts

and minds of the people.

Now, how would you redeploy? I recommend the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Saddam’s palaces. That’s where we

are. We’re in the palaces. I’ve told them that when I was over

there, ‘‘Get them out of the palaces.’’ Then from the Green Zone,

get them out of the Green Zone. The Green Zone is surrounded by

Iraqis who have no electricity, no water, none of the things they

need, and yet, inside the Green Zone, they have everything that

479

they need. They have electricity, they have all the food that they

want, and everything else.

Next, from the prime real estate, redeploy from the prime real

estate of Iraq’s major cities—out of the factories and universities.

We own the best in the cities. We go in and take it over. Finally,

out of the country altogether.

We need to give the communities back to the Iraqis so they can

begin to self-govern, begin economic recovery, and return to some

sort of normality. I recommend the adoption of United States policy

that encourages and rewards reconstruction and regional investment, and one that is dictated and administered not by the United

States, but by the Iraqis.

Restoration of international credibility. I think this is just as important. I believe that a responsible redeployment from Iraq is the

first step necessary in restoring our tarnished international credibility. Since the United States invasion of Iraq, our international

credibility, even among allies, has plummeted. Stability in Iraq is

important, not only the United States, but it is important to the

region and important to the entire world.

Just this morning, the BBC released a poll showing that nearly

three-quarters of those polled in 25 countries disapproved of United

States policies toward Iraq. More than two-thirds of those polled

said the U.S. military presence in the Middle East does more harm

than good. And 29 percent of respondents said the United States

has a general positive influence in the world, down from 40 percent

2 years ago—29 percent.

How do we restore international credibility? I believe that it’s

necessary for the United States to completely denounce any aspirations of building permanent United States military bases in Iraq.

I believe we should shut down Guantanamo detention facility. We

must bulldoze Abu Ghraib, just because of the symbolism of it. We

must clearly articulate and demonstrate a policy of no torture, no

exceptions, and directly engage countries in the region with dialog

instead of directives. This includes allies, as well as our perceived

enemies.

Repairing our military readiness. Now, that’s the business I’m in.

Our annual defense spending budget is currently in excess of $450

billion. Above this amount, we are spending $8.4 billion a month

in the war in Iraq. And yet, our Strategic Reserve is in desperate

shape. While we are fighting an asymmetric threat in the short

term, we have weakened our ability to respond to what I believe

is a grave, long-term conventional and nuclear threat. At the beginning of the Iraq war, 80 percent of all Army units, and almost 100

percent of Active combat units, were rated at the highest state of

readiness. Hundred percent. Today, virtually all of our Active-Duty

combat units at home, in the continental United States, and all of

our Guard units are at the lowest state of readiness, primarily due

to equipment shortages resulting from the repeated and extended

deployments to Iraq.

In recent testimony given by a high-ranking Pentagon official, it

was reported that our country is threatened because we lack readiness at home. Our Army has no Strategic Reserve. None. No Strategic Reserve. And, while it’s true that the U.S. Navy and the Air

Force can be used to project power, there’s a limit to what they can

480

achieve. Overall, our military remains capable of projecting power.

We must be able, also, to sustain that projection. In this regard,

there’s no replacement for boots on the ground.

How do we repair readiness and rebuild our Strategic Reserve?

We must make it a national priority to restrengthen our military

and to repair readiness. I advocate an increase in overall troop

strength. The current authorized level is below what I believe is

needed to maintain an optimal military. In recent testimony, the

Defense Subcommittee I chair, the Army and Marine Corps commanders testified that they could not continue to sustain the current deployment practices without an adverse effect on the health

and well-being of servicemembers and their families.

For decades, the Army operated on a deployment policy that, for

every 1 year of deployment, 2 years were spent at home. This as

considered optimal for retraining, reequipping, and reconstituting.

Without relief, the Army will be forced to extend deployments to

Iraq to over 1 year in country. It will be forced to send troops back

with less than 1 year at home. The Army reported that a 9-month

deployment was preferable.

Medical experts testified, that, in intensive combat, deployments

of over 3 months would increase the likelihood of servicemembers

to develop post-traumatic stress syndrome. We must invest in the

health and well-being of our servicemembers, providing the right

amount of troops for the appropriate deployment and rotation

cycles.

Our military equipment inventories are unacceptably low. The

services report that at least $100 billion more is needed to get

them back in a ready state. In doing so, we must not neglect the

investment in military technologies of the future. While we remain

bogged down in Iraq, the size and sophistication of other militaries

are growing. We must not lose our capability to deter future

threats.

And let me conclude by saying, historically, whether it’s India,

Algeria, or Afghanistan, foreign occupations do not work. In fact,

they incite civil unrest. Our military remains the greatest military

in the world, but there are limits to its ability to control a population that considers them as occupiers. And I’ve said this before,

and I continue to say it, there are essentially only two plans. One

is to continue an occupation that has not worked and has shown

no progress toward stabilization, and the other, which I advocate,

is to end the occupation of Iraq, redeploy and restrengthen our

military, and turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murtha follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN P. MURTHA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of this committee, for

the past 5 years, the United States has had, on average, over 130,000 troops on the

ground in Iraq. The Pentagon reports that the Iraqi Security Forces have grown in

number, nearly reaching their goal of 325,000 trained and equipped. The Iraqis

have a constitution and have held national elections. These milestones have been

met, yet security in Iraq continues to deteriorate. The past 4 years of the Iraq war

have been plagued by mischaracterization based on unrealistic optimism instead of

realism. Reality dictates that conditions on the ground are simply moving in the

wrong direction.

481

There are limits to military power. There is no U.S. military solution to Iraq’s

civil war. It is up to the Iraqis.

Beginning in May 2005, after 2 years of mischaracterizations and misrepresentations by this administration, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee required the

Department of Defense to submit quarterly reports to Congress on the facts necessary to measure stability and security in Iraq. Since July 2005 we have received

these reports. They are dismal and demonstrate a clear lack of progress in vital

areas of concern. Electricity, oil production, employment, and potable water remain

at woeful levels.

The average weekly attacks have grown from 430 in July 2005 to well over 1,000

today. Iraqi casualties have increased from 63 per day in October 2005 to over 127

per day.

The latest polls show that 91 percent of Sunni Iraqis and 74 percent of Shia Iraqis

want the U.S. forces out of Iraq. In January 2006, 47 percent of Iraqis approved

of attacks on U.S.-led forces. When the same polling question was asked just 8

months later, 61 percent of Iraqis approved of attacks on U.S-led forces.

The support of the American public continues to erode and there is little confidence in the current strategy. Today only 30 percent of Americans support the war

and only 11 percent support the President’s plan to increase troop levels in Iraq.

A February 2006 poll showed that 72 percent of American troops serving in Iraq

believed the United States should exit Iraq within the year and 42 percent said

their mission was unclear.

Wars cannot be won with slogans. There must be terms for measuring progress

and a clearly defined purpose, if success is ever to be achieved. General Peter

Schoomaker, Chief of the United States Army, said in a recent hearing that in order

for a strategy to be effective we ‘‘have to be able to measure the purpose.’’ Yet the

President sets forth a plan with no defined matrices for measuring success and a

plan that in my estimation is simply more of the same plan that has not worked.

A new strategy that is based on redeployment rather than further U.S. military engagement, and one that is centered on handing Iraq back to the Iraqis, is what is

needed. I do not believe that Iraq will make the political progress necessary for its

security and stability until U.S. forces redeploy.

In order to achieve stability in Iraq and the region, I recommend

(1) The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq;

(2) The execution of a robust diplomatic effort and the restoration of our international credibility; and

(3) The repairing of our military readiness and the rebuilding of our Strategic

Reserve to face future threats.

Redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq

To achieve stability and security in Iraq, I believe we first must have a responsible phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq. GEN William Odom (U.S. Army,

Retired) recently testified, ‘‘We are pursuing the wrong war.’’

Stability and security in the region should be our overarching strategy, not a ‘‘victory in Iraq.’’ I agree with General Odom and believe that Regional Stability can

only be accomplished through the redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Who wants us to stay in Iraq? In my opinion, Iran and al-Qaeda, because we intensify the very radical extremism we claim to be fighting against, while at the

same time depleting our financial and human resources.

As long as the U.S. military continues to occupy Iraq, there will be no real security. Maintaining U.S. troop strength in Iraq or adding to the strength in specified

areas, has not proven effective in the past (it did not work recently in Baghdad) nor

do I believe it will work in the future. The Iraq war cannot be won by the U.S. military, predominantly because of the way our military operates. They use overwhelming force, which I advocate to save American lives, but it is counter to winning the hearts and minds of the people.

How to redeploy

I recommend the phased redeployment of U.S. forces, first from Saddam’s palaces,

then from the Green Zone. Next, from the prime real estate of Iraq’s major cities,

out of the factories and universities, and finally out of the country all together. We

need to give communities back to the Iraqis so they can begin to self-govern, begin

economic recovery, and return to some type of normality. I recommend the adoption

of a U.S policy that encourages and rewards reconstruction and regional investment

and one that is dictated and administered, not by the United States, but by the

Iraqis themselves.

482

Restoration of international credibility

I believe that a responsible redeployment from Iraq is the first step necessary in

restoring our tarnished international credibility. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, our

international credibility, even among allies, has plummeted. Stability in Iraq is important not only to the United States, but it is important to the region and to the

entire world. In a 2006 world opinion poll, France, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, India,

and China believed that the United States presence in Iraq was more of a danger

to world peace than Iran, North Korea, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2002,

public opinion in Great Britain was 75 percent favorable toward the United States;

today it is 56 percent favorable. In France, it was 63 percent favorable in 2002 and

is now 39 percent favorable. Germany has gone from 61 percent to 37 percent, Indonesia 61 percent to 30 percent, and Turkey now has only a 12-percent favorability

rating of the United States.

How to restore our international credibility

In order to restore international credibility, I believe it is necessary for the United

States to completely denounce any aspirations of building permanent U.S. military

bases in Iraq; I believe we should shut down the Guantanamo detention facility; and

we must bulldoze the Abu Ghraib prison. We must clearly articulate and demonstrate a policy of ‘‘no torture, no exceptions’’ and directly engage countries in the

region with dialog instead of directives. This includes allies as well as our perceived

adversaries.

Repairing of our military readiness and rebuilding our Strategic Reserve to face future threats

Our annual Defense spending budget is currently in excess of $450 billion. Above

this amount, we are spending $8.4 billion a month in the war in Iraq and yet our

Strategic Reserve is in desperate shape. While we are fighting an asymmetric threat

in the short term, we have weakened our ability to respond to what I believe is a

grave long-term conventional and nuclear threat.

At the beginning of the Iraq war, 80 percent of all Army units and almost 100

percent of Active combat units were rated at the highest state of readiness. Today,

virtually all of our Active-Duty combat units at home and all of our Guard units

are at the lowest state of readiness, primarily due to equipment shortages resulting

from repeated and extended deployments to Iraq. In recent testimony given by a

high-ranking Pentagon official it was reported that our country is threatened because we lack readiness at home.

Our Army has no Strategic Reserve, and while it is true that the U.S. Navy and

the U.S. Air Force can be used to project power, there is a limit to what they can

achieve. Overall, our military remains capable of projecting power, but we must also

be able to sustain that projection, and in this regard there is no replacement for

boots on the ground.

How do we repair readiness and rebuild our Strategic Reserve

We must make it a national priority to restrengthen our military and to repair

readiness. I advocate an increase in overall troop strength. The current authorized

level is below what I believe is needed to maintain an optimal military. In recent

testimony to the Defense Subcommittee that I chair, the Army and Marine Corps

commanders testified that they could not continue to sustain the current deployment practices without an adverse effect on the health and well-being of

servicemembers and their families.

For decades, the Army operated on a deployment policy, that for every 1 year of

deployment, 2 years were spent at home. This was considered optimal for retraining,

reequipping and reconstituting. Without relief, the Army will be forced to extend deployments to Iraq to over 1 year in-country and will be forced to send troops back

with less than 1 year at home. The Army reported that a 9-month deployment was

preferable. Medical experts testified that in intensive combat, deployments of over

3 months increased the likelihood for servicemembers to develop post traumatic

stress disorders.

We must invest in the health and well-being of our servicemembers by providing

for the right amount of troops and for appropriate deployment cycles.

Our military equipment inventories are unacceptably low. The Services report

that at least $100 billion more is needed to get them back to ready state. In doing

so, we must not neglect investment in military technologies of the future. While we

remain bogged down in Iraq, the size and sophistication of other militaries are growing. We must not lose our capability to deter future threats.

Let me conclude by saying historically, whether it was India, Algeria, or Afghanistan, foreign occupations do not work, and, in fact, incite civil unrest. Our military

483

remains the greatest military in the world, but there are limits to its ability to control a population that considers them occupiers.

I have said this before and I continue to say that there are essentially only two

plans. One is to continue an occupation that has not worked and that has shown

no progress toward stabilization. The other, which I advocate, is to end the occupation of Iraq, redeploy our military, and turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I say to the Speaker, there’s about 9 minutes left in this vote;

because I think it’s important we all hear you, I’d like to suggest,

Mr. Chairman, we recess to go vote, and get back here as quickly

as we can to hear the Speaker.

We’ll recess until the call of the Chair.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing will come to order.

Mr. Speaker, thank you for your number, as well as for your

time. I have never been in your presence when I haven’t learned

something, and so, I’m anxious to hear what you have to say, for

real. Welcome. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. NEWT GINGRICH, FORMER SPEAKER OF

THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; SENIOR FELLOW,

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. GINGRICH. Thank you very much.

And I just want to start by both commending you and reminding

you that almost ruined my career, I think, the last time I was before this committee, by recommending I become the Ambassador to

the United Nations. So, I’m hoping there’s nothing——

The CHAIRMAN. It was a good idea——

Mr. GINGRICH [continuing]. Nothing I say——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And it’s still a good idea.

Mr. GINGRICH [continuing]. Today will reinforce those kind of

thoughts.

But I want commend you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, for

going through these kind of hearings. And I want to build on a

comment you made earlier, which is that in the larger war—getting

beyond Iraq for a moment—in the larger threat that faces us, from

North Korea to Iran and Syrian to Venezuela, having the kind of

effort to reach out and develop a bipartisan national strategy, in

the way that Democratic President Truman and Republican Senator Vandenberg laid the base for a 44-year containment strategy,

I think, is probably the most important national security challenge

this country faces, and these hearings, which I am well aware of,

at times, contentious, are a part of that dialog and a part of that

process. And I really want to thank both of you for your joint leadership in working together in trying to move this entire process

forward.

I also want to say that, while I disagree with Chairman Murtha

on some things, which I’ll get to, I could not agree with him more

strongly on the need to develop and strengthen a larger military,

and particularly a larger Army and Marine Corps. And there, I

think those who have advocated a larger system have proven to be

entirely right, and those who are trying to defend getting along

with an inadequate system have been proven, I think, decisively

wrong. And I commend the chairman for that.

484

The real danger we face, if I can frame my comments, writ large,

and come down to Iraq, is that we live in a world in which the combination of nuclear and biological weapons, combined with a set of

dictators who hate the concept of freedom because it threatens

their dictatorships, and a religiously motivated movement that is

irreconcilable with the modern world, creates a danger that Americans have not yet come to grips with. I believe it is entirely possible that, in our lifetime, we will lose three or more cities to nuclear weapons, and I believe that my two grandchildren, who are

5 and 7, are in greater danger of being killed by enemy activity

than I was at any time when I was—throughout the cold war.

I first wrote on the danger of terrorists and nuclear weapons in

1984, in a book called ‘‘Window of Opportunity.’’ I participated,

working with President Clinton, on the Hart-Rudman Commission,

which, in March 2001, warned that the greatest danger to the

United States is a weapon of mass destruction going off in an

American city, probably by terrorists. And I think we have to start

with the following observation.

We find ourselves in a world in which there are determined

deadly enemies. Iraq is a campaign in that larger contest. It’s more

like Sicily as a part of the Second World War, rather than an isolated war on its own.

Let me say, bluntly, that Iraq is currently a mess. This is not

something from me that is new. In December 2003, I publicly said

we had gone off a cliff during the summer of 2003, and, both in a

long Newsweek interview and in an appearance on Meet the Press,

I was very explicit about how much I thought we were on the

wrong track.

Where we find ourselves is very hard. And I think there are

largely three paths, two of them at this table, and the third in the

White House.

The first path, the White House path, is to stay the course, with

marginal change. I believe, frankly, that that will fail. And I’ll

come back to that.

The second is to accept that we have not succeeded, to try to

manage the defeat, and to try to think through how you would reassure our allies, deal with people who might be—have their lives

threatened, and try to restabilize the system after the world comes

to recognize that we have, in fact, been defeated.

The third is to determine that we will take whatever changes are

necessary to defeat our enemies.

Let me start by saying that I think the present course is inadequate, and is based on an inherently confused argument. As I cite

in my—and I ask permission to submit for the record my much

longer testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Speaker will yield, I failed to mention,

both your written statements will be placed in the record as if delivered. Congressman Murtha has submitted—and I’ll make them

available to all Senators—a chronology of statements and comments made on this issue, which will also be put in.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The submitted material mentioned above was too

voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in

the permanent record of the committee.]

485

Mr. GINGRICH. In that context, in the written statement, I have

a much longer section, I’m not going to use in detail, of just

quoting—quote after quote in which President Bush says that Iraq

is a matter of vital national security of the United States, and then

ends up by saying, ‘‘And we’re going to do as well as the Iraqi Government lets us do.’’ Now, they can’t both be true. If Iraq is genuinely a matter of vital national interest, then, as Americans, we

have an obligation to do what it takes to win. If Iraq is so unimportant that it’s up to a new, relatively incompetent and untested

Iraqi Government, then why are we risking a single young American? They can’t both be true. We did not say, in the Second World

War, that as soon as the Free French liberated Normandy, we

would be glad to land. And this is the core problem the administration faces, that it has a harder problem than it wants to confront,

and, therefore, it doesn’t undertake the scale of change it needs.

Now, Chairman Murtha outlines a legitimate strategy that has,

I think he would agree, some hard consequences and would take

enormous management, but it’s—it is, nonetheless, a legitimate reaction to where we are.

I’m going to outline a different strategy, but I want to be clear,

up front, it’s equally hard. I think there are no easy solutions in

Iraq.

Essentially, what I want to suggest is that we can insist on defeating the enemies of America and the enemies of the Iraqi people,

and we can develop the strategies and the implementation mechanisms necessary to force victory, despite the incompetence of the

Iraqi Government, the unreliability of Iraqi leaders, and the interference of Syria and Iran on behalf of our enemies. But it will be

difficult. I would commend to all of the Members of the Senate,

General Petraeus’s comments this morning in front of the Armed

Services Committee, which I think are candid and which indicate

this is a hard road, and which also indicate that most of what we

have to get done is not combat military kinetic power. And I want

to emphasize that. So, I want to very briefly, without going into

great detail—and I’ll be available for questions, obviously—outline

18 steps. And they’re basically a sentence each.

One, place General Petraeus in charge of the Iraq campaign and

establish that the Ambassador is operating in support of the military commander. That’s how Eisenhower ran the Second World

War in Europe; that is how Wellington ran the campaign in Portugal. You cannot have two people trying to collaborate in a setting

like this.

Two, since General Petraeus would now be responsible for victory

in Iraq, all elements of achieving victory are within his purview,

and he should report daily to the White House on anything significant which is not working or is needed.

Three, create a Deputy Chief of Staff to the President and appoint a retired four-star general or admiral to manage Iraq implementation for the Commander in Chief on a daily basis.

Four, establish that the second briefing after the daily intelligence brief that the President gets every day is from his Deputy

Chief of Staff for Iraq Implementation.

Five, establish a War Cabinet, which will meet once a week to

review metrics of implementation and resolve failures and enforce

486

decisions. The President should chair the War Cabinet personally,

and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Iraq Implementation should prepare the agenda for the weekly review and meetings.

Six, establish three plans, one for achieving victory with the help

of the Iraqi Government, one for achieving victory with the passive

acquiescence of the Iraqi Government, one for achieving victory

even if the current Iraqi Government is unhappy. The third plan

may involve very significant shifts in troops and resources away

from Baghdad and a process of allowing the Iraqi central government to fend for itself if it refuses to cooperate.

Seven, communicate clearly to Syria and Iran that the United

States is determined to win in Iraq and that any further interference, such as the recent reports of sophisticated Iranian explosives being sent to Iraq to kill Americans, will lead to direct and

aggressive countermeasures.

Eight, pour as many intelligence assets into the fight as needed

to develop an overwhelming advantage in intelligence preparation

of the battlefield.

Nine, develop a commander’s capacity to spend money on local

activities sufficient to enable every local American commander to

have substantial leverage in dealing with local communities.

Ten, establish a job corps or civil conservation corps of sufficient

scale to bring unemployment for males under 30 below 10 percent.

And I have attached an op-ed that Mayor Giuliani and I wrote on

this topic.

Eleven, expand dramatically the integration of American purchasing power in buying from Iraqi firms, pioneered by Assistant

Secretary of Defense, Paul Brinkley, to maximize the rate of recovery of the Iraqi economy.

Twelve, as—and here, I think I’m totally in agreement with

Chairman Murtha—expand the American Army and Marine Corps

as much as needed to sustain the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan,

while also being prepared for other contingencies and maintaining

a sustainable rhythm for the families and the force.

Thirteen, demand a war budget for recapitalization of the military to continue modernization while defeating our enemies. And,

here again, I want to associate myself with Chairman Murtha.

They should quit trying to fund this war with supplementals, be

honest up front about the total budget, fight over the total budget,

and have a rational track of spending. I would point out that, as

big as the dollars sound, the current national security budget is

lower, as a percentage of the economy, than at any time from Pearl

Harbor through the end of the cold war. It is less than half the

level Truman sustained before the Korean war.

Fourteen, the State Department is too small, too undercapitalized, and too untrained for the demands of the 21st century. There

should be a 50-percent increase in the State Department budget

and a profound rethinking of the culture and systems of the State

Department so it can be an operationally effective system.

Fifteen, the Agency for International Development is hopelessly

unsuited to the new requirements of economic assistance and development and should be rethought from the ground up. The Marshall Plan, and Point Four, were as important as NATO in containing the Soviet empire. We do not have that capability today.

487

Sixteen, the President should issue executive orders, where possible, to reform the implementation system so it works with the

speed and effectiveness required by the 21st century.

Seventeen, where legislation is needed, the President should collaborate with Congress—and let me reemphasize those words, because I think the chairman will find them interesting words—the

President should collaborate with Congress in honestly reviewing

the systems that are failing and developing new merits—new

metrics, new structures, and new strategies.

Eighteen, under our Constitution, it is impossible to have this

scale of rethinking and reform without deep support from the legislative branch. Without Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg,

Democratic President Harry Truman could never have developed

the containment policies that saved freedom and ultimately defeated the Soviet empire. The President should ask the bipartisan

leaders of Congress to cooperate in establishing a joint legislative/

executive working group on winning the war, and should openly

brief the legislative branch on the problems which are weakening

the American system abroad. Only by educating and informing the

Congress can we achieve the level of mutual effort and mutual support that will be needed for a generation if we are to save this

country from the threats that exist.

And I appreciate very much the chance to offer these ideas.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gingrich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NEWT GINGRICH, FORMER SPEAKER OF THE U.S.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee, thank

you for allowing me to testify.

This is an extraordinarily important series of hearings on a topic of enormous national importance.

The United States finds itself in a global struggle with the forces of Islamic fascism and their dictatorial allies.

From a fanatic American near Chicago who attempted to buy hand grenades to

launch a personal jihad in a Christmas mall, to 18 Canadians arrested for terrorist

plots, to the Scotland Yard disruption of a plot in Britain to destroy 10 civilian airliners in one day that if successful would have shattered worldwide confidence in

commercial aviation and potentially thrown the world into a deep economic contraction.

We are confronted again and again with a worldwide effort to undermine and defeat the system of law and order which has created more prosperity and more freedom for more people than any previous system.

The threats seem to come in four different forms:

First, from individuals who are often self-recruited and randomly inspired through

the Internet, television, and charismatic social and religious friendships.

Second, from organized nonstate systems of terror of which al-Qaeda, Hezbollah,

and Hamas are the most famous. Additional groups have sprung up and provide

continuity, training, and support for terrorism.

Third, from dictatorships in the Middle East, most notably Iran and Syria who

have been consistently singled out by the State Department (including in 2006), as

the largest funders of state-supported terrorism in the world. These dictatorships

are investing in more advanced conventional weapons and in chemical and nuclear

weapons.

Fourth, from a strange assortment of anti-American dictatorships including North

Korea, Venezuela, and Cuba.

This coalition of the enemies of freedom has growing power around the world. Its

leaders are increasingly bold in their explicit hostility to the United States.

To take just two recent examples: Ahmadinejad of Iran has said ‘‘[t]o those who

doubt, to those who ask is it possible, or those who do not believe, I say accomplishment of a world without America and Israel is both possible and feasible.’’ He has

488

also said that Israel should be ‘‘wiped off the map.’’ Chavez of Venezuela, just last

week in a joint appearance with the Iranian leader in Latin America, announced

a multibillion-dollar fund to help countries willing to fight to end ‘‘American imperialism.’’

Both of these statements were on television and are not subject to misinterpretation.

Similarly, there are many Web pages and other public statements in which various terrorists have described in great detail their commitment to killing millions

of Americans. I described these publicly delivered threats in a speech on the fifth

anniversary of 9/11 which I gave at the American Enterprise Institute. The text of

this speech is attached to this testimony.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The attached speech mentioned above was too voluminous to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.]

These threats might be ignored if it were not for the consistent efforts to acquire

nuclear and biological weapons by these enemies of freedom.

I first wrote about the extraordinary increase in the threat to our civilization from

nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists in ‘‘Window of Opportunity’’ in 1984. Attached to this testimony is a copy of the relevant pages from this book.

It is not accurate to suggest today that people were not aware of terrorism or were

not warning about the threat to America’s very survival prior to 9/11.

Many sophisticated observers and professional military and intelligence officers

have been issuing these warnings for two decades.

What has been amazing to watch has been the absolute inability of our system

of government to analyze the problem and react effectively.

It is this collapse of capacity for effectiveness which is at the heart of our current

dilemma.

The United States is now in a decaying mess in Afghanistan and an obviously unacceptable mess in Iraq.

While this language may seem harsh to defenders of the current policy, it is sadly

an accurate statement of where we are.

Efforts to think through and solve the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq have to

be undertaken in a context of looking at a wider range of challenges to American

leadership around the world and potentially to our very survival as a country. These

larger challenges are described in my attached presentation entitled ‘‘The Real

World and The Real War.’’

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The attached presentation mentioned above was too voluminous

to include in the printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the

committee.]

With these caveats I want to focus on the challenge of Iraq.

TWO VERY HARD PATHS FORWARD IN IRAQ

America is faced with two very hard paths forward in Iraq.

We can accept defeat and try to rebuild our position in the region while accommodating the painful possibility that these enemies of freedom in Iraq—evil men, vicious murderers, and sadistic inflictors of atrocities will have defeated both the millions of Iraqis who voted for legal self-government and the American people and

their government.

Alternatively, we can insist on defeating the enemies of America and the enemies

of the Iraqi people and can develop the strategies and the implementation mechanisms necessary to force victory despite the incompetence of the Iraqi Government,

the unreliability of Iraqi leaders, and the interference of Syria and Iran on behalf

of our enemies.

Both these paths are hard. Both involve great risk. Both have unknowable difficulties and will produce surprise events.

Both will be complicated.

Yet either is preferable to continuing to accept an ineffective American implementation system while relying on the hope that the Iraqi system can be made to work

in the next 6 months.

THE INHERENT CONFUSION IN THE CURRENT STRATEGY

There are three fundamental weaknesses in the current strategy.

First, the strategy relies on the Iraqis somehow magically improving their performance in a very short time period. Yet the argument for staying in Iraq is that

it is a vital American interest. If we are seeking victory in Iraq because it is vital

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equate. We did not rely on the Free French to defeat Nazi Germany. We did not

rely on the South Koreans to stop North Korea and China during the Korean war.

When it mattered to American vital interests we accepted all the help we could get

but we made sure we had enough strength to win on our own if need be.

President Bush has asserted that Iraq is a vital American interest. In January

2007 alone he has said the following things:

‘‘But if we do not succeed in Iraq, we will leave behind a Middle East which

will endanger America in the future.’’

‘‘[F]ailure in one part of the world could lead to disaster here at home. It’s

important for our citizens to understand that as tempting as it might be, to understand the consequences of leaving before the job is done, radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength. They would be emboldened. It would make it

easier to recruit for their cause. They would be in a position to do that which

they have said they want to do, which is to topple moderate governments, to

spread their radical vision across an important region of the world.’’

‘‘If we were to leave before the job is done, if we were to fail in Iraq, Iran

would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would

have safe havens from which to launch attacks. People would look back at this

moment in history and say, what happened to them in America? How come they

couldn’t see the threats to a future generation?’’

‘‘The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow

in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple

moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund

their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks

on the American people. On September 11, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own

cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.’’

‘‘Iraq is a central component of defeating the extremists who want to establish

safe haven in the Middle East, extremists who would use their safe haven from

which to attack the United States, extremists and radicals who have stated that

they want to topple moderate governments in order to be able to achieve assets

necessary to effect their dream of spreading their totalitarian ideology as far

and wide as possible.’’

‘‘This is really the calling of our time, that is, to defeat these extremists and

radicals, and Iraq is a component part—an important part—of laying the foundation for peace.’’

The inherent contradiction in the administration strategy is simple. If Iraq matters as much as the President says it does (and here I agree with the President on

the supreme importance of victory) then the United States must not design and rely

on a strategy which relies on the Iraqis to win.

On the other hand if the war is so unimportant that the fate of Iraq can be allowed to rest with the efforts of a new, weak, untested, and inexperienced government then why are we risking American lives.

Both propositions cannot be true.

I accept the President’s analysis of the importance of winning in Iraq and, therefore, I am compelled to propose that his recently announced strategy is inadequate.

The second weakness is that the current strategy debate once again focuses too

much on the military and too little on everything that has not been working. The

one instrument that has been reasonably competent is the combat element of American military power. That is a very narrow definition and should not be expanded

to include the noncombat elements of the Department of Defense which also have

a lot of difficulties in performing adequately.

The great failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns have been in noncombat power. Intelligence, diplomacy, economic aid, information operations, support

from the civilian elements of national power. These have been the great centers of

failure in America’s recent conflicts. They are a major reason we have done so badly

in Iraq.

The gap between the President’s recent proposals and the required rethinking and

transforming of our noncombat instruments of power is simply breathtaking.

No military leader I have talked with believes military force is adequate to win

in Iraq. Every one of them insists that the civilian instruments of power are more

important than the combat elements. They all assert that they can hold the line for

a while with force but that holding the line will ultimately fail if we are not using

that time to achieve progress in nonmilitary areas.

490

This failure of the noncombat bureaucracies cannot be solved in Iraq. The heart

of the problem is in Washington and that brings us to the third weakness in the

current strategy.

The third weakness in the current strategy is its inability to impose war-time decisionmaking and accountability in Washington.

The interagency process is hopelessly broken.

This is not a new phenomenon. I first wrote about it in 1984 in ‘‘Window of Opportunity’’ when I asserted:

[W]e must decide what sort of executive-branch planning and implementation

system are desirable.

At a minimum, we will need closer relationships between the intelligence

agencies, the diplomatic agencies, the economic agencies, the military agencies,

the news media, and the political structure. There has to be a synergism in

which our assessment of what is happening relates to our policies as they are

developed and implemented. Both analyses and implementation must be related

to the new media and political system because all basic policies must have public support if they are to succeed.

Finally, once the professionals have mastered their professions and have

begun to work in systems that are effective and coordinated, those professionals

must teach both the news media and the elected politicians. No free society can

for long accept the level of ignorance about war, history, and the nature of

power which has become the norm for our news media and our elected politicians. An ignorant society is on its way to becoming an extinct society.

In 1991 my concern for replacing the broken interagency system with an integrated system of effective coordination was heightened when GEN Max Thurmond

who had planned and led the liberation of Panama told me, unequivocally, that the

interagency process was broken.

In 1995 that process was reinforced when General Hartzog described the failures

of the interagency in trying to deal with Haiti.

As early as 2002 it was clear that the interagency had broken down in Afghanistan and I gave a very strong speech in May 2003 at the American Enterprise Institute criticizing the process.

By the summer of 2003 it was clear the interagency was failing in Iraq and by

September and October 2003 we were getting consistent reports from the field of

the gap between the capability of the combat forces and the failure of the civilian

systems.

No senior officer in the Defense Department doubts that the current interagency

cannot work at the speed of modern war. They will not engage in a fight with the

National Security Council or the State Department or the various civilian agencies

which fail to do their job. But in private they will assert over and over again that

the interagency system is hopelessly broken.

It was very disappointing to have the President focus so much on 21,500 more

military personnel and so little on the reforms needed in all the other elements of

the executive branch.

The proposals for winning in Iraq, outlined below, follow from this analysis.

KEY STEPS TO VICTORY IN IRAQ

1. Place General Petraeus in charge of the Iraq campaign and establish that the

Ambassador is operating in support of the military commander.

2. Since General Petraeus will now have responsibility for victory in Iraq all elements of achieving victory are within his purview and he should report daily to the

White House on anything significant which is not working or is needed

3. Create a Deputy Chief of Staff to the President and appoint a retired four star

general or admiral to manage Iraq implementation for the Commander in Chief on

a daily basis.

4. Establish that the second briefing (after the daily intelligence brief) the President will get every day is from his Deputy Chief of Staff for Iraq implementation.

5. Establish a War Cabinet which will meet once a week to review metrics of implementation and resolve failures and enforce decisions. The President should chair

the War Cabinet personally and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Iraq implementation

should prepare the agenda for the weekly review and meeting.

6. Establish three plans: One for achieving victory with the help of the Iraqi Government, one for achieving victory with the passive acquiescence of the Iraqi Government, one for achieving victory even if the current Iraqi Government is unhappy.

The third plan may involve very significant shifts in troops and resources away from

Baghdad and a process of allowing the Iraqi central government to fend for itself

if it refuses to cooperate.

491

7. Communicate clearly to Syria and Iran that the United States is determined

to win in Iraq and that any further interference (such as the recent reports of sophisticated Iranian explosives being sent to Iraq to target Americans) will lead to

direct and aggressive countermeasures.

8. Pour as many intelligence assets into the fight as needed to develop an overwhelming advantage in intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

9. Develop a commander’s capacity to spend money on local activities sufficient

to enable every local American commander to have substantial leverage in dealing

with local communities.

10. Establish a jobs corps or civil conservation corps of sufficient scale to bring

unemployment for males under 30 below 10 percent (see the attached op-ed by

Mayor Giuliani and myself on this topic).

11. Expand dramatically the integration of American purchasing power in buying

from Iraqi firms pioneered by Assistant Secretary Paul Brinkley to maximize the

rate of recovery of the Iraqi economy.

12. Expand the American Army and Marine Corps as much as needed to sustain

the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan while also being prepared for other contingencies

and maintaining a sustainable rhythm for the families and the force.

13. Demand a war budget for recapitalization of the military to continue modernization while defeating our enemies. The current national security budget is

lower as a percentage of the economy than at any time from Pearl Harbor through

the end of the cold war. It is less than half the level Truman sustained before the

Korean war.

14. The State Department is too small, too undercapitalized, and too untrained

for the demands of the 21st century. There should be a 50-percent increase in the

State Department budget and a profound rethinking of the culture and systems of

the State Department so it can be an operationally effective system.

15. The Agency for International Development is hopelessly unsuited to the new

requirements of economic assistance and development and should be rethought from

the ground up. The Marshall Plan and Point Four were as important as NATO in

containing the Soviet empire. We do not have that capability today.

16. The President should issue executive orders where possible to reform the implementation system so it works with the speed and effectiveness required by the

21st century.

17. Where legislation is needed the President should collaborate with Congress in

honestly reviewing the systems that are failing and developing new metrics, new

structures, and new strategies.

18. Under our Constitution it is impossible to have this scale of rethinking and

reform without deep support from the legislative branch. Without Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg, Democratic President Harry Truman could never have

developed the containment policies that saved freedom and ultimately defeated the

Soviet empire. The President should ask the bipartisan leaders of Congress to cooperate in establishing a joint legislative-executive working group on winning the

war and should openly brief the legislative branch on the problems which are weakening the American system abroad. Only by educating and informing the Congress

can we achieve the level of mutual understanding and mutual commitment that this

long hard task will require.

Thank you for this opportunity to share these proposals.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 12, 2007]

GETTING IRAQ TO WORK

(By Newt Gingrich and Rudy Giuliani)

The American mission in Iraq must succeed. Our goal—promoting a stable, accountable democracy in the heart of the Middle East—cannot be achieved by purely

military means.

Iraqis need to establish a civil society. Without the support of mediating civic and

social associations—the informal ties that bind us together—no government can long

remain stable and no cohesive nation can be maintained. To establish a civil society,

Iraqis must rebuild their basic infrastructure. Iraqis must take control of their destiny by rebuilding houses, stores, schools, roads, highways, mosques and churches.

But the constant threat of violence, combined with a high unemployment rate estimated between 30 percent and 50 percent, fundamentally undermines that effort.

This not only sustains the fertile breeding ground for terrorist recruiters but has

the same corrosive effect as it would in any city—raising the likelihood of further

violence, civic decay, and a crippling sense of powerlessness.

492

A massive effort must be made to engage in a well-organized plan to rebuild Iraq.

The goal: An infrastructure to support and encourage a strong, stable, civil society.

The week before Christmas, the Pentagon asked Congress to approve a supple- mental $100 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, on top of the

estimated $500 billion spent to date. The administration should direct a small percent of that amount to create an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps, along the lines of FDR’s

civilian conservation corps during the Great Depression. The Job Corps can operate

under the supervision of our military and with its protection. The Army Corps of

Engineers might be particularly helpful in directing this effort. It will place our

military in a constructive relationship with the Iraqis—both literally and figuratively.

Today, Iraq has almost 200 state-owned factories that have been abandoned by

the governing authorities since the outbreak of war in 2003. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul A. Brinkley has led a team to 26 of those facilities, traveling

far beyond the Green Zone to idled plants from Fallujah to Ramadi. Mr. Brinkley

believes that under Department of Defense leadership, at least 10 of these facilities

could be reopened almost immediately, putting more than 10,000 Iraqis to work

within weeks. This should be done without delay—and it is only the beginning.

The wages that these thousands of gainfully employed workers receive will be

used to purchase goods and services that will employ other Iraqis. Those goods and

services must be produced by still other Iraqis. These are the first steps in creating

the requisite conditions of a stable functioning economy and the best hope of displacing retribution and violence with hope and opportunity.

We must try to achieve constructive and compassionate goals through conservative means—jump-starting civic improvement and the individual work ethic in

Iraq, without creating permanent subsidies. The goal is to get more Iraqis working,

especially young males, who are most susceptible to the terrorist and warlord recruiters.

There are many lessons from the successful welfare reforms in New York City

that can be readily applied in Iraq. In the early 1990s, New York City suffered an

average of 2,000 murders a year while more than 1.1 million people—one out of

every seven New Yorkers—were unemployed and on welfare. Too many neighborhoods were pervaded by a sense of hopelessness that came from a combination of

high crime, high unemployment and despair. ‘‘Workfare’’ proved an excellent method

to change this destructive decades-long paradigm. It required able-bodied welfare recipients to work 20 hours a week in exchange for their benefits. In the process, we

reasserted the value of the social contract, which says that for every right there is

a responsibility, for every benefit an obligation.

As many as 37,000 people participated at a single time, working in the neighborhoods that most needed their help, cleaning up streets with the Sanitation Department, removing graffiti from schools and government buildings, or helping to beautify public spaces in the Parks Department.

More than 250,000 individuals went through our Workfare Program between 1994

and 2001, and their effort helped to visibly improve the quality of life in New York

City. Many of them moved on to permanent employment. This change from welfare

to work did as much as the New York Police Department Compstat Program to keep

reducing crime. A similar model can work in Iraq.

There is an opportunity not only to increase employment by rebuilding roads,

houses, schools, and government buildings, but also to engage the Iraqi people to

participate in laying the foundation for a civil and prosperous society.

The population of Iraq is roughly 30 million with a prewar median annual income

equivalent to $700. Subsidizing unemployed Iraqis with a meaningful wage in exchange for meaningful work rebuilding their society is well within the means of the

United States and its allies.

The entire effort will help stabilize and grow the Iraqi economy. It should be open

to all willing Iraqis—Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—as a means of helping to create

a common culture through shared participation in work projects to rebuild and take

ownership of their nation.

One word of caution: The program should be overseen by the U.S. military, not

private contractors, to avoid unnecessary delays in deployment or accusations of cronyism in the bidding process. Our military will still be devoted to its primary role

of hunting down terrorists and patrolling the streets, but administering a jobs program would be a direct extension of their effort to secure law and order. After the

program has been started and becomes successful, it can be transferred to a civilian

authority within the Iraqi Government.

The creation of an Iraqi Citizen Job Corps will help expedite the establishment

of a more stable civil society and improve the growing Iraqi economy through the

transforming power of an honest day’s work.

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WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

(EXCERPTS ON TERRORISM AND STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS)

The fact is that we stand on the brink of a world of violence almost beyond our

imagination.

* * * * * * *

The picture is sobering indeed. Imagine the more extreme elements in any terrorist movement with weapons of mass destruction. It is a prospect likely to gray

the hair of any reasonable person.

* * * * * * *

Just as the comfortable Russian landowner before Stalin could not imagine the

horrors of collectivization and the comfortable bourgeois German Jew really could

not believe Hitler was serious in his speeches, so it is hard for us to believe that

these kinds of nightmares are possible. We keep rejecting information about the

world around us because it is too far outside our personal experiences, our historical

experience, and our shared general view of the world.

It is the refusal to think seriously about the violence we see each night on television and to develop a new explanation for the world we live in which keeps us

at a level of shock and surprise. Watch your own reactions the next three or four

times you see really violent news reports about a terrorist or a war or the latest

atrocity somewhere.

We are going to have to develop an intellectual split-vision which allows us to accept both the reality of our peaceful neighborhood and the reality of a horribly dangerous outside world. If we don’t develop a new sophistication to analyze and deal

with the dangers from abroad, we will find those dangers creeping closer and closer

to our neighborhood. If we don’t learn to take serious precautions and to be honest

with ourselves about all levels of violence—from individual terrorist-criminal all the

way up to a Soviet-American nuclear war—then we increase the danger that these

events will occur.

* * * * * * *

Yet our problem will not come only from terrorist, illegal organizations. There are

bandit nations willing to operate outside the tradition of modern international behavior. The three most obvious current bandit governments are North Korea, Libya,

and Iran. The leaders of all three countries are inner-directed and likely to do what

they personally decide is appropriate. All three leaders have proven themselves risktakers willing to subsidize terrorist organizations and willing to kill innocent people

in the pursuit of their goals. The thought of them having nuclear weapons is

daunting indeed.

. . . Furthermore, we must remember that it is only in the West that we focus

military power on military engagements. There is every reason to believe that Middle Eastern ideologies will strike at the American heartland rather than at our military power if we threaten them directly.

* * * * * * *

We have been surprised again and again by other nations because we refuse to

study their habits, their culture, and their history. Five hundred years before

Christ, Sun T’zu stated, ‘‘know the enemy and you have won half the battle. Know

yourself and the battle is yours.’’ We have a passion for knowing about technology,

hardware, and management, but we disdain knowing much about either the capacity of others or ourselves to endure (e.g. Vietnam) or our opponents’ techniques and

approaches.

Only this willful ignorance can explain our underestimation of the Japanese before Pearl Harbor. Bernard Fall warned us again and again in the early 1960s who

Ho Chi Minh was and how long he would fight, but we continued to underestimate

the North Vietnamese until they defeated us just as Fall had predicted. We underestimated the Lebanese-Syrian-Iranian-Soviet terrorist connections which had already used vehicle bombs and produced numerous young fanatic volunteers willing

to die for their cause, and 241 U.S. Marines died as a result.

Because we reject history as a serious preparation for understanding and operating in the work at large, we find ourselves consistently underestimating how difficult, how intractable, how brutal and violent that world can be. History is powerful

precisely because it carries us outside our peaceful neighborhoods and our calm communities. At its best, history can open our minds to possibilities which we would

never encounter in our own family or surroundings. The world that has been can

be again.

494

Americans in general tend to underestimate the savagery of the world, but Liberals in particular carry the tendency to extremes. Liberals seem to have an ideological block against accepting the notion that there really are dangerous people out

there who will do evil things unless they are stopped.

* * * * * * *

If we do not become practical and candid about the nature of the dilemma we

face, we will lose many more men, women, and children to bombings, and we will

begin to experience an erosion of civilization here at home. We must develop a doctrine which states clearly American policy toward violence aimed at the destruction

of our society. We must take the steps necessary to prove that no terrorist organization can kill Americans with impunity.

The long-term struggle against terrorism will be a dark and bloody one, involving

years of vigilant counterterrorism—a level of surveillance and spying that Liberals

will call intolerable—and a willingness to strike back with substantial force at the

originators of the action rather that the foot soldiers of the terrorist movement.

A free, open society cannot survive by trading violence for violence. If we kill an

Iranian extremist every time Iranians kill an American soldier, we will lose the

struggle. In the end, no free society can keep pace in enduring pain with a fanatical

terrorist organization. We must develop a doctrine which severely and directly

threatens the leaders of terrorist movements that they refrain from attacking the

United States because they fear personal consequences. Any other policy is an invitation to a blood bath in which we will certainly be losers.

The need to develop doctrines and tactics of aggressive counterterrorism goes

against the grain of the American historical memory as taught in modern schools.

By blotting out the wars against the Indians, the Barbary Pirates, the pacification

of the West, and the campaigns against guerrillas in the Philippines and Central

America, it has been possible for the Wilsonian intellectual tradition to dominate—

a tradition that argues for a sharp and vivid distinction between war and peace.

Liberals dominated by this tradition declare war on a country or are impotent to

challenge it; they have no capacity for a long and difficult struggle in the twilight

zone of low-intensity conflict.

* * * * * * *

Only when our professionals master their professions can we begin to design

structures that will work. Then we must decide what sort of executive-branch planning and implementation system are desirable.

At a minimum, we will need closer relationships between the intelligence agencies, the diplomatic agencies, the economic agencies, the military agencies, the news

media, and the political structure. There has to be a synergism in which our assessment of what is happening relates to our policies as they are developed and implemented. Both analyses and implementation must be related to the news media and

political system because all basic policies must have public support if they are to

succeed.

Finally, once the professionals have mastered their professions and have begun

to work in systems that are effective and coordinated, those professionals must

teach both the news media and the elected politicians. No free society can for long

accept the level of ignorance about war, history, and the nature of power which has

become the norm for our news media and our elected politicians. An ignorant society

is on its way to becoming an extinct society. It is to be the two great centers of political behavior, the news media and the politicians, that we must now turn.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate very much the breadth and the

depth of your recommendations.

I might note that one of the things I’ve been quoting—someone

in the press asked me to make sure I was quoting it correctly. I

want to say it again. I have quoted General Petraeus over the last

several months about armies of occupation when he was first in

Iraq. And in July 2004, he said, ‘‘An army of liberation has a certain half-life before it becomes an army of occupation.’’ And for

those who have asked me that question, that’s the answer. And my

rhetorical question is: Has that half-life passed? I think it has. But

that’s another question.

I’m going to proceed, Mr. Chairman, on my side, with—and I will

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vania, because he sat through the whole morning, and, by the time

it got his time to question, he had to preside over the Senate. And

that will not mean I will usurp my other two colleagues. I will ask

after my other two colleagues on this side, as well.

So, the floor is yours, Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that

point of personal privilege, but also for your leadership of this committee and the great hearings we’ve had already; and Senator

Lugar, you, as well. And I just want Senator Biden to know that

he’s made me look really good in front of the dean of our delegation

to the Congress of the United States.

But first of all, I want to commend both Chairman Murtha and

Speaker Gingrich for your presence here, for your patriotism, and

for your public service over many years. We’re grateful for all of

that.

I want to add a few personal comments, even though it’s against

my time, I think it’s important that I say hello and welcome in a

formal way to Chairman Murtha. I know that Speaker Gingrich is

a native of Harrisburg. He was born there. And I’m—we’re all a little bit Pennsylvania on this committee today, I guess. But I’m

grateful to Congressman Murtha for his leadership on the issues

that surround the important question of what we do in Iraq, for the

leadership he’s shown over many, many years, not just on the battlefield, as a solder, but also, of course, in the Congress of the

United States. And I wanted to direct my first question to Chairman Murtha.

You talked, at the outset here today, about a couple of very important points about readiness, specifically on pages 7 and 8 of

your testimony. I didn’t want to read all of that, obviously, but I

was struck by what you testified to and what you wrote. You wrote

that—this is in the middle of page 7—at the beginning of the Iraq

war, 80 percent of all Army units and almost 100 percent of Active

combat units were rated at the highest state of readiness. Today,

virtually all of our Active-Duty combat units at home, and all of

our Guard units, are at their lowest state of readiness, primarily

due to equipment shortages resulting from repeated and extended

deployments in Iraq.

If you had a chance to expound on that, because I think that’s

critically important, in terms of our ability to confront threats all

over the world. And I just wanted to give you that opportunity, if

you——

Mr. MURTHA. I appreciate that, Senator.

I want to say to the committee that there’s nothing more important to our subcommittee than trying to get the readiness back. If

Gingrich were still the Speaker, this wouldn’t have happened, he

would not have allowed this to happen, because the money we’re

spending in Iraq was diverted from the spending of the money at

home. There’s no question, if you go to any unit in the United

States today, in continental United States, Guard and Reserve, no

units are above the lowest state of readiness. The Active-Duty

units I’m talking about, our Strategic Reserve, is well below any

deployment level, partly because of equipment, but also because of

changed standards, also because the families are disrupted by

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ment shortages. For instance, I’m the one that found the shortage

of body armor when I went to Iraq in the first place. We sent insufficient forces with inadequate equipment to Iraq in the first place.

Then, during the war, we made sure that they had everything they

needed in the war zone, but then, back at home, we started to deplete the resources of our Strategic Reserve.

The Air Force and Navy aren’t so bad, but we only bought six

ships last year, so we are beginning to dissipate our ability to act

in the future, not only to deter a war, but to project and sustain

a war. As serious as the deployment schedule is, one of the most

serious problem we have, is this depletion of our Strategic Reserve.

And we’re going to fix that as quickly as we can. That’s one of the

things the subcommittee is working on.

Senator CASEY. I think I have two more. One that I’ll hold for

last. I’ll go to Speaker Gingrich on the second one. I wanted to ask

you two, but I may not have time for two.

I was struck by the list of recommendations you made, and we

could spend a lot of time on each of them, but I wanted to focus

for a moment on diplomacy, No. 14, where you assert the State Department is too small, too undercapitalized, too untrained for the

demands of the 21st century. I just wanted to have you expound

on that, if you could, because a lot of what we’re trying to grapple

with here on this committee, as everyone across America is, is not

just how we get the military strategy right, but also in terms of the

politics and the diplomacy involved. And I just want to give you a

chance to expound on that.

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I think that—let me tell you a very simple

example. If you go to a senior military command, Central Command in Tampa, the quality of their videoconference capabilities,

their ability to have secure conferences across the world, is a stunning ability to improve our communications, our leadership, our decisionmaking. If you go to the average embassy, they are operating

on 25-year-old capabilities. And so, you can’t have, for example, in

a region, a videoconference capability to get seven ambassadors to

talk with each other on a regular basis, to just share the problems.

And just take that one capital investment as an example.

Second, if you look at the career track of a rising military person,

they have time to go off to school, they have time, on occasion, to

be interns and do fellowships. The Foreign Service is—and you can

imagine, for a right-wing Republican, how difficult this conversation is—the Foreign Service is simply too small to have the level

of professional development necessary for the kind of ongoing complexity we need.

So, just take those two examples. And I must say, by the way,

I think that Secretary Powell did an extraordinary job in recognizing how badly underfunded the Department was. And I would

have to say that the Republican Congress, when I was Speaker,

was part of that problem, because what happens is, if you’re conservative, you don’t like many aspects of the Foreign Service, although you really wish we were more effective overseas, and if

you’re liberal, you, kind of, don’t want to reform the Foreign Service, because you like it. And so, the result is, they stay permanently underfunded and permanently too small. And I think Secretary Rice is working in this direction, but I also think that they

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need, frankly, dramatically more resources than she feels comfortable asking for. And I would strongly urge this committee to

look at comparative investment between DOD and State, and look

at the notion of bringing State up to the quality of information

flow, and also the quality of training, which inherently requires a

larger State Department.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

One last question. I’ll make it very brief. We’re going to listen

to the President tonight on a whole range of topics, very important

issues. The one part of his—what he calls a ‘‘surge,’’ what others

call an ‘‘escalation’’—the one aspect of it, I think, that doesn’t get

enough attention, to some degree, in the press—but, in terms of

your—both of you, in terms of your understanding of the reality on

the ground in Baghdad, in neighborhoods, from what you’ve heard

of the President’s plan and what you know about it, can you just

describe—and I know we only have less than a—less than half a

minute now—just describe, as best you can, in a few seconds, what

that means for the—for a combat soldier on the ground, going door

to door. What does that mean—the reality of that, apart from the

deployment—what does that mean, kind of, hour to hour, day to

day? What are they going to be doing on those streets?

Mr. MURTHA. Let me tell you, I go to the hospitals almost every

week. I go to Bethesda and Walter Reed. I’ve been to all the hospitals—Landstuhl—and the problem is—and we have tried to disassociate the policy from the guy on the field. We try to make sure

they understand we support them. But they go out in the most intense situation, where somebody in front of them gets blown up,

somebody behind them gets blown up, and the mental anguish that

they go through is absolutely unbelievable. IEDs or sniper fire,

whatever it might be—this is much more intense than Vietnam,

much harder emotionally. We’re going to have a lot of problems, a

lot of money we’re going to have to spend afterward for——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, did you say harder than in Vietnam?

Mr. MURTHA. Oh, I believe——

The CHAIRMAN. And you were in Vietnam.

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. I believe this is much more intense, much

harder, because you just never know—you don’t have any idea who

the enemy is. You’re walking down the street, and somebody pops

out or you don’t even see anybody and they’re blown up. In talking

to the troops—and I tell them, ‘‘Look, I was wounded in Vietnam,

but let me tell you something, I believe this is much worse than

Vietnam.’’

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. GINGRICH. Let me just say, for 1 minute—my dad was a career infantryman in the U.S. Army in World War II, Korea, and

Vietnam. I agree with Chairman Murtha, that—I think urban policing and warfare is far and away the most intense thing you have

going. I suspect, if you were to ask a number of the majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, they would tell you that the additional

troops will probably be useful, but they are, by themselves, not an

answer. They will tell you that they’re proud of what they’re doing,

and the reenlist rates prove they’re willing to walk those streets,

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but they, frankly, deserve dramatically larger changes in our policy

if we’re going to stay, and, if we’re not prepared to make the larger

changes, then, frankly, I think we have to look seriously at what

Chairman Murtha is saying, because—and General Petraeus said

this, this morning. The core to the—the key to this is not simply

military power, it’s an entire range of things, many of which have

to be driven from the White House if they’re going to be effective.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by making a comment on Speaker Gingrich’s thought that we ought to manage defeat. Now, I have a problem here, because clearly the idea of victory and defeat, success and failure, and so forth, bring forward

emotions, and my thought here is to quote a very novel interpretation of what has occurred that Ed Luttwak gave us this morning.

He said, ‘‘The Iraq war has, indeed, brought into existence a new

Middle East in which Arab Sunnis can no longer gleefully disregard American interests, because they need help against the

looming threat of Shiite supremacy, while in Iraq, at the core of the

Arab world, the Shias are allied with the United States. What past

imperial statesmen strove to achieve with much cunning and cynicism the Bush administration has brought about accidentally, but

the result is exactly the same.’’ Now, President Bush might not accept this as victory or success, but Ed Luttwak says, inadvertently,

accidentally, whatever the case is, there is progress here. And this

is what I want to emphasize, in a way.

I appreciate very much both of you stressing the Truman-Vandenberg relationship, and the 44 years of strategic bipartisanship

that flowed from their mutual vision of the security imperatives

our nation faced and which enabled American power to express

itself magnificently. This is a necessary part of our current predicament. And this morning, I tried to indicate, without breaking confidence, conversations with the President about this, one involving

Senator Warner and myself, for 50 minutes, talking about some of

the things that you’ve talked about. I won’t characterize the conversation as victory or defeat, or successful or unsuccessful. I would

say it’s ongoing. It has to be ongoing, because everything is very,

very serious for our country, quite apart from our President or the

Congress or the prestige of any of us.

Now, tomorrow we will have a debate about various motions, and

I appreciate the need for members to vent their feelings about this.

Some want to get on record, tweaking the President and others will

defend the President. My own view is that this is probably not particularly helpful, in that essentially what needs to happen is something you have suggested. Whether we do it in twos or fours or as

a group, there will have to be a coming to grips with the predicament, which is, as you’ve suggested, the need for a long-term strategy that talks about our whole Armed Forces and the civilian components of the government. How many people do we need, men and

women under arms, really, to do the job for America everywhere

against the war on terror or instability or however you wish to

characterize it? What sort of appropriate equipment is going to be

required to fulfill these missions? You’ve mentioned specifically

what kind of diplomacy is going to be required, an upgrading of the

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people on the ground, whether it’s the State Department or Commerce or Interior or whoever else is going to be required if we are

involved, really, in technical issues.

In other words, what I’m talking about is how we provide a complete situation with our military, our diplomacy, and comprehensive intelligence. We had testimony this morning that it’s very

difficult to succeed in quelling an insurgency, or in this case in

surging into cities—where you are putting forces on the street to

secure neighborhoods—without adequate intelligence. There is

doubt that we do not have adequate intelligence, and we will need

to perfect that a great deal more.

So, I would simply hope that there would be the potential for a

development that we would recognize over the course of time, and

that we would say, essentially, that, for the moment, we want to

provide presence—a long-term presence in the Middle East. We

want to do this so that economic development might occur, and provide greater hope for the people. We want to do this so that democratic development might occur over time, albeit incrementally. We

want finally, at least by having a presence there, to be able to prevent al-Qaeda from developing training camps or prevent others

who are able to gather in subversion; and, that we have bases for

our forces and improved intelligence capacities.

Now, if you come at it from that standpoint, then we’ve had all

sorts of testimony as to where our troops might be emplaced. Some

suggested there were desert locations in Iraq, in Al Anbar and elsewhere, that are being used and have been used before. We might

establish striking or reaction forces so if there are difficulties on

the border or if there’s lack of confidence of our allies, we can respond and reassure.

Now, I go through all of this, because it’s—it appears to me that

we need to have a dialog. For the moment, this evening in fact, the

President may present another program to the Nation. But some

of us do not accept that that’s the end of the affair. The dialog, engagement and consensus-building with the Congress and with the

Nation as a whole on what is to happen in Iraq and the Middle

East must continue.

Now, with all that precis, let me just ask either one of you: Do

you accept the fact that we ought to have a presence in the Middle

East in an attempt to develop relations with all of these countries

in a long-term pattern, and that, essentially, our basic objective

ought to be that, to have a presence, which is welcomed, or at least

supported, because that will be required for us to fight the war on

terrorism in the long term, as well as to advance Middle Eastern

people, who, for the moment, don’t like us, indicate frequently, as

they have an opportunity, that they would prefer not to be dealing

with us?

Mr. MURTHA. I think the Middle East, Iraq, the whole area is absolutely essential, not only to the United States, but to Europe. I

think we have to restore our credibility by opening a dialog with

them and getting suggestions from them, absolutely. I think we

need a presence there, I just don’t think we necessarily need a

presence in Iraq itself. So, I absolutely think it’s important that we

have an influence, because of the resources they have in the Middle

East, and because of our allies there.

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Senator LUGAR. But, Jack, would you accept, though, the thought

that, by having a presence in Iraq, we are in a better position to

keep the borders stable, to keep others from intervening, even if we

are not in the middle of Baghdad, in the nine districts?

Mr. MURTHA. No; I think the opposite. I think if we don’t get out,

if we stay there, we increase the intensity of the opposition. I think

there’s a civil war going on. I know a lot of people don’t define it

that way, but I see it, and we’re caught in that civil war. Our

troops are caught in that civil war. I think the Iraqis will get rid

of al-Qaeda. There’s not that many al-Qaeda, and they weren’t

there before we invaded. So, I’m convinced that, when we leave, the

Iraqis themselves will get rid of al-Qaeda. There’ll be instability,

but I just think we’re adding to the instability by being in Iraq

itself. So, my phased withdrawal, I think, is the answer to this

thing.

Mr. GINGRICH. Let me comment briefly. I think you’ve put your

finger on, maybe, a fundamental challenge. Let me say, first of all,

we do not have adequate intelligence. There is no reason to believe

we’re going to have adequate intelligence. We are no more than 10

percent into the process of reforming intelligence, and it is a fundamental problem, and should be a fairly large-scale scandal, how

bad our intelligence is, still. OK? That’s an institutional problem,

not a Bush administration problem, and it is a deep American

problem.

Second, there’s riots underway in Lebanon today. Hezbollah has

been rearmed in south Lebanon. Hamas is being paid for by Iran.

The Taliban elements in northwest Pakistan are stronger than

they were a year ago. This is a really dynamic, dangerous environment. And I want to make two points about it that I suspect will

be controversial.

The first is, the notion that Iran and Syria are going to be our

allies—and I’m not against talking with them, but I would talk

with them rather bluntly about what they need to do without us

hurting them. We can hurt them in lots of ways that don’t involve

ground troops, and in lots of ways that don’t involve bombing. Now,

there’s a virtue to having the largest navy in the world, and there

are many things you can do to make life stunningly harder for very

weak dictatorships. But this idea that Iran and Syria, which are

consistently listed by the State Department as the largest supporters of state terrorism in the world, and an Iranian leader who

comes to Venezuela to announce publicly the creation of a joint

Venezuelan-Iranian fund for the end of the American empire, and

who says publicly he wants to wipe Israel from the face of the

Earth and defeat the Americans, the idea that we’re now going to

find a way to have a dialog that will lead them to be nice to us

or help us win in Iraq just strikes me as a fundamental misunderstanding of the dynamics of the war that we’re in. The bigger war,

not just the Iraq war.

Second, historically, there is an enormous danger from the psychology of defeat. In 1977, I was in the Vice Chief of Staff of the

German Army trying to get them to help me with something, and

that morning they had announced that we were shifting a brigade

to Bremerhaven, and there was a lot of turmoil in Germany, and

I said, ‘‘Oh, they’re worried that we’re securing the brigade like

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Dunkirk.’’ He said, ‘‘No, like Saigon.’’ And I think we underestimate what defeat—al-Qaeda and the world, including the BBC,

which is often worse than al-Qaeda, will define an American-forced

withdrawal from Iraq as a defeat, no matter how you describe it.

The last time we were seen as weak in the Middle East, we had

a 444-day hostage crisis in Iran, the American Embassy in Pakistan burned, and the American Ambassador in Afghanistan killed.

A Marine general told me recently, ‘‘If we are perceived as having

lost our nerve, there are not enough Marine detachments to evacuate the number of embassies he suspects will be under siege.’’

And finally, if the Chinese conclude we’ve lost our nerve, Taiwan

is going to suddenly become a dramatically more dangerous place.

What we are talking about here—and the Congress has every right

to debate this, and if the Congress decides to cut off the funding,

the Congress has the legitimate constitutional right to do so, but

what we’re talking about here will be perceived in the world as defeat, and defeat in the world is a very dangerous commodity if you

are the leading guarantor of the system.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd indicated he’s prepared to yield to

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,

Senator Dodd, of course.

These have all been great hearings. This is a particularly distinguished and unique panel. And I have really enjoyed listening to

you.

Congressman Murtha, you have been tremendous on this issue.

You and I haven’t just been on the same page for years, we’ve been

on the same sentence. Everything you have said about this has

rung true for me, and I thank you for your leadership.

And Speaker Gingrich, you and I don’t always agree, but I am

impressed by your candor about the Foreign Service, about the

State Department, the examples you give. This is what I observe,

as well. And perhaps on a bipartisan basis, we can work together

to address some of those issues. So, I have limited time, so I want

to get directly—despite your different perspectives that you come

from, I want to get right to this.

Both of you have been critics of this President’s handling of this

war, and you’ve talked about the strain it’s put on our national security. So, what does Congress need to be doing right now to ensure that the President does not continue to pursue a course in

Iraq that is putting such a strain on our national security and that,

obviously, has not brought stability in Iraq?

Congressman Murtha.

Mr. MURTHA. What I’m trying to do is to build a case in the subcommittee for rebuilding our Strategic Reserve. I worry about defeat in Iraq, but I worry more about the fact that we’re going to

get out at some point. It doesn’t make any difference if it’s going

to be tomorrow or it’s going to be the next day—the way things are

going, I see no way that this is not going to ultimately lead to the

United States having to redeploy. But to restore our Strategic Reserve is absolutely essential. And then, I think we have to look at

how we restore international credibility, and I listed some of the

things I think are important. I think we need to close the GuantaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00511 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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namo detention facility. I think we need to bulldoze Abu Ghraib.

And I think we need to stop torture—when I say ‘‘stop torture,’’ we

need to make sure that the world knows we’re not torturing. Our

poll numbers are so low, we can’t get anybody to cooperate. I think

there’s a diplomatic element to this. And I’ve said this from the

very start. We have to use diplomacy, and diplomacy is going to be

the key in the end. And how we manage getting out or redeploying

is going to the key to how successful we’ll be in the end.

But events on the ground are going to control what happens.

And, so far, they’ve gotten worse and worse. Everything I predicted, unfortunately, has turned out to be true. It hasn’t gotten

any better.

So, we need to find out how we can reinvigorate our Reserves,

our Active-Duty Reserves, our Strategic Reserves. So, it’s not an

easy problem. It’s going to be very expensive. But when you’re

spending $8 billion a month—$2 billion just to get equipment back

and forth—we’ve got to find a way to reduce that expense.

Senator FEINGOLD. Speaker Gingrich, what should Congress be

doing right now about this?

Mr. GINGRICH. Let me say, first of all, as I indicated earlier, I

mean, the Congress does have constitutional authority, if it wants

to exercise it, but that is, (a) not very likely, and (b) an enormous

acceptance of responsibility.

I think General Petraeus has made an offer which is unique and

very important, in that he has indicated a willingness to brief the

Congress directly. I have a hunch that Secretary Gates is much

more open to the kind of genuine dialog I described in my earlier

comments.

And I think that there are two large-scale strategies that people

up here should be exploring. And I tried to define them earlier.

And I don’t—I—they’re—neither one’s easy. One is: What will it

take us to succeed? And here, we disagree on whether it’s even

possible, but what would it take? But the other is: If we are determined—if we decide, for whatever reason, that we truly cannot succeed, then how do you manage the consequences? I think sometimes the debate gets to be bunchball about Iraq—you know,

21,000 troops, more or less, frankly, in the end, is irrelevant. I

mean, it’s not going to decide this. What’s going to decide this is

either a dramatic change in the capacity of the American system

to be effective or a decision that we have lost, and, therefore, we’d

better—and we will still be the most powerful nation in the world,

even if we lose. I mean, our ability to rebuild our relations in the

region will be nontrivial, but may involve, frankly, greater violence,

in the long run.

But I think that—it’s important for you, up here, to explore, you

know, and to bring in experts and to—and, frankly, to send delegations to the region to find out from people who are our allies, ‘‘If

X happens, what’s your reaction going to be? If Y happens, what

are you going to do?’’ And, again, I mean—and I’m not—I’m talking, here, to some of the people who have traveled the most in the

history of the Senate. You all know every single one of these people

intimately, personally. Because we’ve got to be prepared, I think,

almost like an option playing football—we’ve got to be prepared either to drive to victory or to manage the cost of defeat and underVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00512 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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stand, you know, that this is just the nature of the world we’re

caught in.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I—Mr. Speaker, I certainly agree with

that, as I’ve said at a number of these hearings, since we didn’t

have a plan when we went into Iraq, we sure as heck better have

a plan for getting out. And that gets me back to Congressman Murtha, where you said what I believe is, obviously there is going to

be a redeployment at some point, whether it’s sooner or later. And

you’ve studied the approach, and you’ve talked with senior military

commanders. Can you say a little bit more, in terms of detail,

about how a redeployment would actually work and how we can be

sure that the lives of Americans will be protected as we redeploy?

The—of course, the statement that’s always made is, ‘‘Well, this

will endanger the troops.’’ Well, you know, could you talk about

that a little bit?

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah.

Senator FEINGOLD. Isn’t there a safe way to redeploy the troops?

Mr. MURTHA. Absolutely. And I think the first thing that I’ve

heard from all the experts—not necessarily just the military experts—is, ‘‘Get out of Saddam Hussein’s palace. Get out of the

Green Zone.’’ We have everything you need in the Green Zone. We

have all the amenities. The troops are eating the best food, they

have electricity, they have all the things that they need. And right

around them, people have 5 or 6 hours of electricity in Baghdad.

So, the psychological impact of getting out is so important. Then

you phase it out of the city itself, and then you phase them out of

Iraq.

The military can plan a redeployment, and it won’t be any problem at all. What I worry about more is restructuring our Strategic

Reserve. That’s where it’s going to take a lot of money. And the

minute the war ends, we’re not going to have the money to do that,

and that worries me as much as anything else. These supplementals, I don’t like them. But the minute the war’s over, money

for defense will be cut even more. And I can remember when Cheney was Secretary of Defense, he said it ought to be 5 percent over

GDP. Well, he’s the Vice President, and it’s a helluv a lot less than

5 percent. We need more troops to change the redeployment schedule.

But the big thing is, if you start redeployment, I think that

starts us on the road to reintroducing some dialog, reintroducing

credibility to the United States, and then these other things that

I’ve mentioned need to be done. I don’t think there’s any problem

at all with the redeployment.

Senator FEINGOLD. And if you could just elaborate, finally, as my

time expires, on your proposal for what the force presence should

be in the region. Could you be a little more specific about what you

envision there?

Mr. MURTHA. I think it’s very difficult to know what it ought to

be in the region. I think it could be much less. I think a division,

at the most, in the periphery, whether it’s Kurdistan or whether

it’s Bahrain or Qatar, wherever it is—or over the horizon. And I

don’t advocate going back in, unless it affects our national interests

or the interests of our allies. I mean, I don’t get involved in the

civil war. So, I think we could reduce our presence substantially

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and have the forces necessary to go in if it affects our national

security.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Dodd, again.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me say, to the chairman and to the witnesses, it’s possible,

in the next 10 minutes, I may have to leave and hopefully come

back, but, if I do not, Senator Dodd is able to stay. He will ask his

questions, but Senator Boxer has graciously indicated she would

stay and chair this, if that becomes necessary. So, if you see me

get up, gentlemen, it’s not out of a lack of respect. I just want you

to know why.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have great respect for you, though we probably

disagree on a number of things. And Speaker Gingrich, I find myself consistently being on the same page as you. I appreciate the

broad view that you take on this issue, and your mayor-like approach—from my perspective as a mayor—to getting things done.

Chairman Murtha, where I agree with you is on the rebuilding

of the Strategic Reserve of our Armed Forces. I think there is broad

bipartisan support for that. What I’m struggling with is the consequences of failure in Iraq. I’m one of those who is concerned

about whether 20,000 extra American troops in Baghdad is going

to make a difference in the midst of sectarian battle. On the other

hand, when I visited with General Zilmer in Anbar, I saw that our

Marines are doing what Marines do well there—they are killing the

enemy, and they’re making progress on stifling the insurgency

there. If the General needs more support in Anbar, I’m not going

to stand in the way of that. And I have consistently heard, in the

discussions we’ve had here, praise for General Petraeus. I don’t

know if there’s a finer military leader than him. But we still face

major challenges in our military campaign in Iraq.

I just want to be clear—as I understand, Mr. Chairman, when

you talk about redeployment, you are talking about an American

troop withdrawal. You want us out of Iraq. Is there a timeframe

for that withdrawal for you?

Mr. MURTHA. I’ve never set a timetable. I said, obviously they

could do it within 6 months if the military decides it’s going to do

it. But that’s purely an arbitrary figure that I said. I’m just saying

that I don’t think there’s anything that can stop the momentum in

the direction it’s going now. I think, at some point, we’re going to

have to get out, and I think the lack of support of the American

public—and I don’t think the 21,000 troops are going to make any

difference, because an increase in Baghdad for 5 months made no

difference; everything got worse.

What we measure it by is what we—the committee asked—electricity production, which is below prewar level, oil production,

water, all those kind of things, we measure. And, of course, unemployment is 30 to 60 percent. So, I see no way, the direction it’s

going now, that we can recover from this. So, I say we’re going to

have to get out, but we have to do it in a way that protects our

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thing happens that affects our national security, they can go back

in.

Senator COLEMAN. The concern that I have is with your statement that somehow we restore credibility through a U.S. withdrawal. The Iraqi Study Group said this, ‘‘A premature American

departure from Iraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of conditions, leading to a

number of the adverse consequences outlined above. The near-term

results would be a significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional destabilization, and a threat to the global economy.

Al-Qaeda would depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we

leave and Iraq descends into chaos, the long-term consequences

could eventually require the United States to return.’’

I would ask both of you: Do you agree or disagree with that

statement?

Chairman Murtha.

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I have a great regard for the Study Group,

and I don’t doubt that they may be accurate, but I’ve heard so

many predictions about how it was going, and none of them turned

out to be true. As the Speaker said, our intelligence has been abysmal. And so, these predictions have been abysmal. No matter what

the predictions were, they turned out not to be true.

My predictions, unfortunately, have been accurate in everything

that I’ve predicted. I’m not happy that that’s happened, but I saw—

in talking to the military commanders, in talking to wounded, I

saw there’s no way this thing can come to a happy conclusion for

us. So, we have to find a way, I think, to restore our credibility.

Now, how do we restore it? I think we have to do the things that

I listed before to restore part of our credibility. But I think redeployment is the first step. We, at first, were liberators, now we’re

the enemy. And we’re the enemy because of the way we have to

operate.

The military cannot win this. This is what I’ve said over and over

again. The military tactics that we have to use when we go into—

overwhelming force. I advocate that. I want to save American lives.

I want to protect American lives. But you make enemies when you

do that. If you fly a Black Hawk in, and they use missiles, if you

send mortars in, or artillery to protect Americans, you kill people

inadvertently, and we become the enemy. Even if they kill each

other, we get blamed for it. So, I just don’t see any way that we’re

not going to have to redeploy, at some point.

Senator COLEMAN. I don’t think there’s much disagreement on

that point. Speaker Gingrich talked about Iraq being ‘‘a mess.’’ But

the question gets back to the consequences of our actions in Iraq—

and the consequences of withdrawal that the Study Group laid out

are not only from intelligence analysts. A broad cross-section of

military folks, diplomats, and others, I think, would clearly come

to the conclusion Speaker Gingrich provided when he described the

consequences of defeat. I just want to make sure we understand

that the price that has been laid out here with regards to an immediate withdrawal is pretty dramatic.

Speaker Gingrich, do you have a perspective on that?

Mr. GINGRICH. Yeah; I want to—I mean, first of all, I do think

it’s important to emphasize that, no matter how clever we think we

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are, if we are driven out of Iraq—and Chairman Murtha may be

right, we may be driven out of Iraq—the world will see that as a

defeat. And so, we need to think through how you manage, on a

world basis, all the different implications of that.

Second, I think where I disagree—and I apologize, I’ve—I had a

very hard time figuring out how to say this—I don’t think it’s a

question of staying or leaving, because staying, without a—without

the drive and the energy and the toughness to win, is a dead loser

in the long run. I mean, presence is negative. And I agree entirely.

I was deeply opposed to an American occupation. That’s why, as

early as the fall of 2003, I spoke out so angrily, because I really

believe that that system was doomed to failure, and did fail. The

question is: Now that we are where we are, is it possible to win?

Now, it may not be possible. Let me be clear. I think the odds are—

they’re never 100 percent, because the enemy gets a vote.

I believe, with the 18 specific suggestions I brought today, on top

of what the President wants to do—if the President were driving

the system, if he was genuinely Commander in Chief, and if he had

a Deputy Chief of Staff with genuine ability to drive the system,

we would have at least a three-out-of-four chance of winning.

But nobody should kid themselves. I mean, General Petraeus,

General Mattis, General Odierno, these are first-rate people who

will do the best they can do. These are people who are very good

at their job. But in the end, if we can’t fix our systems—and I

would argue, the American bureaucracies are a bigger problem

than the Iraqi bureaucracy, and the American inability to deliver

economic aid, the American inability to get things done in a timely

way, is a bigger problem, because you can’t manage the Iraqis if

you can’t manage yourself. And I just think we’re faced with a lot

of problems.

I just wanted to say one other thing, Senator. One of the reasons

I—and I think we’re a lot like Lincoln, in 1862, when the Union

Army kept getting beaten in the east all the time, or like Lincoln

in August 1864, when he really thought he was going to lose reelection and was trying to figure out what they would do to try to save

the Union after they lost—after they lost the election. I mean, history is dynamic, you can’t be sure what’s going to happen. But

what worries me as much as anything is if we accept defeat, we

will never fix the large bureaucracies of our own system that are

failing—the intelligence bureaucracy, the State Department bureaucracy, the noncombat parts of defense, the problems in the

interagency, the problems with all the civilian agencies that refuse

to cooperate. And the next time we get hit, it’ll be worse. And I

think that if we don’t force ourselves to fix these systems now, we

will someday, down the road, pay a horrendous price for our growing bureaucratic incompetence.

Senator COLEMAN. I know my time is up—are we going to have

a second round, Mr. Chairman?

Senator DODD [presiding]. Well, I won’t be here, but I’m sure you

can.

Senator COLEMAN. There is so much more that I want to inquire

about, but I appreciate your perspective, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. DODD. Thank you, and I’ll—thank you both, two of my favorite people in public life. I agree with one more, probably, than the

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other, but always—to listen to Newt Gingrich and not be provoked

and to think is—there’s something wrong with you. I appreciate

your passion, Newt, and it’s good to have you. Jack, always good

to see you, and thank you for coming before us.

Sort of related questions, in a way. Chairman Murtha, I went to

the barber in Deep River, CT, the other day, and the barber’s son

is going to his fourth tour in Iraq. And I know that’s probably the

exception right now, but if you take the argument that many are

putting forth, and implicitly—and Newt will correct here on this—

but the idea the three options here, the third being that we sort

of have to do it whether the Iraqis like us or not. Do we have the

capacity to do that? Even if the President, tonight, decided that he

was going to massively increase the number of people in this surge,

decide that he really has to do what should have been done, many

argue, at the outset—give us a very specific reality-check, as to

whether or not, even if that were an option we’d want to exercise,

are we capable of exercising that option tonight if we wanted to?

Mr. MURTHA. We’re not capable of substantially increasing the

number of troops. But I don’t think we can win it militarily anyway. I think the military tactic we have to use in an occupied country to protect our military—and I agree with the tactic we use, but

I don’t think they work. We just can’t win it militarily. But as far

as the facts are, we don’t have a Strategic Reserve. We have none

of the units in the United States that are up to what I would call

the top level of readiness. As a matter of fact, 80 percent are not

at the top level. None of the National Guard units are.

We’re extending troops in Iraq, but we’re also sending troops

back that have not had a year at home. They like 2 years at home

to rebuild and rehabilitate them. But the next tranche is going to

be less than 1 year, they’re going to have 9 months at home. So,

we’re stretched so thin—now, if we had to deploy a substantially

larger number of troops, it would be impossible, because we don’t

have the equipment to do it, and we have to build up the equipment. We have a $100 billion shortage of equipment. So, we could

not increase it more than the surge. I would assume the President

probably asked the question, ‘‘Could I send in 40,000,’’ and the

military said, ‘‘You cannot.’’ And this is going to be a stretch, even

to do it this way. We can’t sustain it, even if we were able to deploy

20,000 troops, we won’t be able to sustain that deployment without

using National Guard and Reserve forces who now, in this country,

are below the readiness level to be deployed.

Senator DODD. So, as a practical matter, even if they wanted to

do it, they really could not.

Mr. MURTHA. They couldn’t do it, that’s exactly right.

Senator DODD. Newt, you were on the Defense Policy Board,

going back, with Don Rumsfeld, back earlier, and this transformational doctrine that he embraced. Share with us your views,

at the time that discussion was going on—were you supportive of

it, not supportive of it? What was your reaction to that approach

that became at least the tactical approach that the administration

took in 2003?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, let me——

Senator DODD. If you want to comment on——

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Mr. GINGRICH. Yeah; let me also comment, just for a second—I—

in my 18 recommendations, I don’t recommend any increase in

forces, except for intelligence. I don’t think combat forces are the

key to this, although I think you can reorganize them some. And

I agree with Chairman Murtha, that they should be repositioned

in certain ways, although I’d reposition them in the country, not

out of it. But I think there are things you can do to have more effective forces. But I think most of the major changes we need are,

in fact—and I’ll give you a specific example. We currently have tolerated an Iraqi policy of releasing people we arrest as terrorists

and as insurgents. So, we have a catch-and-release policy—and I’ve

been told about this by lieutenant colonels and colonels for the last

2 years—where we pick up the same person seven times. Well,

that’s not a number-of-troops problem, that’s a policy problem. And

there are a whole series of things like that, that could be reformed

pretty dramatically, I think.

Let me draw a distinction about transformation. And I think this

is a legitimate argument. I was with General Zinni the other night,

reminiscing about plans they had at CENTCOM when he was

there. And I know you’ve talked with him and have had testimony

from him. I think transformation is real. I think that there are

amazing things we are doing today, you couldn’t have done 5 or 10

years ago. And I think it gives us capabilities that are pretty

remarkable.

It is not a substitute for the right strategy in the right circumstance. Transformation clearly worked in Afghanistan, where a

much smaller land force was successful than anybody would have

predicted historically. Transformation worked reasonably well up

through capturing Baghdad. I mean, 23 days is about as good a

campaign as you’re going to get.

What didn’t work was that you had—you had to do one of two

things immediately after you occupied Baghdad. You either had to

hire the Iraqi Army, which is what I favored, and immediately—

because I didn’t want an occupation—or you had to do what Central Command had always planned, which is put about 400,000

people in, so you had physical presence everywhere. They adopted

the worst of both worlds. They had the right size army to not be

an occupation, and then sent in Ambassador Bremer to be an occupied leader, giving speeches on television. I mean, if you’re going

to do that, you’d better be so overwhelmingly dominant that nobody

becomes an insurgent because it’s physically impossible.

So, we literally created a mess that was unnecessary. But it

wasn’t because of transformation. It was because, at the key moment, when people like, by the way, David Petraeus, Jim Mattis,

were doing exactly the right things—Petraeus hired 15,000 Iraqi

soldiers, put them on the payroll, had them busy. Then the Coalition Provisional Authority reversed virtually everything.

So, I wouldn’t put the—I wouldn’t get in—personally, would not

associate transformation as part of the problem. The problem was

a fundamental mistake made, I presume, in the end, by the Commander in Chief. I’m not picking on Paul Bremer. He reported, ultimately, to the Commander in Chief. It was a fundamental mistake about the nature of what you do in a country once you’ve won

the campaign.

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Senator DODD. Thanks for that. And I’ll yield in a minute. I was

in Baghdad about a month ago. Senator Kerry and I were there,

in the region. We were in Lebanon and Syria and Jordan and

Israel, as well. I just want to share with both of you and my colleagues one of the—about 5 o’clock one evening, as our helicopter

came down in the Green Zone, a young man walked up to both of

us and introduced himself. I haven’t used his name. I will now.

Brian Freeman was his name. He was a West Point graduate, a

captain. And he pulled us both aside, Brian did, and said, ‘‘I want

to share with you what I’m concerned about.’’ In these days, it was

just a discussion of this surge, nothing had been laid out very specifically—but he warned us about it, and said, ‘‘This is a very bad

idea.’’ And he said, ‘‘Look, I’m sending 19-year-olds, and their mission is to go out on a patrol and be shot at or blown up and come

back, not to hold anything, not to secure anything, not to defend

anything. Their mission is really to become a target.’’ And he said,

‘‘I can’t do this much longer. I’m being asked to do State Department jobs I was never trained to do.’’ And he was just very impressive, about 6′2′′, 6′3′′—he’s about as handsome a kid as you’d ever

see.

We lost him on Saturday. I spent last evening talking to his parents, his wife. He’s got a 14-month-old and a 3-year-old. And losing

the Brian Freemans of this world just cannot go on. This is crazy.

And I would hope the President, tonight and in the coming weeks,

would listen to people like John Warner, listen to people like Norm

Coleman, listen to others who—good, card-carrying strong Republicans who have no interest in seeing this President fail at all. But

he needs to get this message. This has got to stop. And my hope

is, he’ll listen to people like you, Newt, and others.

I don’t want to hear about any more Brian Freemans—a remarkable young man, with a bright, bright future, who had the guts to

come up and talk to two Senators about what he thought was

wrong.

John.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Jack, I—first of all, it’s great to see you again. And I want to

apologize, I’m not going to ask you a question, because I’ve known

Newt Gingrich for 33 years, when we both entered politics in Georgia in 1974, and this is the first time I’ve had control of 8 minutes

when he and I were in the same room, so——

[Laughter.]

Senator ISAKSON [continuing]. This is a real treat for me, and I

want to be able to do that. But, Jack, it’s a privilege to have you

here.

Newt, you—we have heard a lot of testimony in the last 2 weeks

regarding what happens if we withdraw, redeploy, et cetera, but

don’t escalate our troop force in Baghdad. And to—and the ones

I’ve heard—and I haven’t heard all of them—almost to the one,

they’ve suspected that the violence has gotten so bad, the sectarian

violence, both inter- and intrasectarian violence, that there would

be an increase in violence—in Baghdad, in particular—if we did.

Do you agree with that? Or do you have an opinion on that?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I think it’s likely—I mean, you know, when

people talk—and I agree with Chairman Murtha, we can arrange

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an American withdrawal in a way which protects our troops reasonably well. What we can’t do—and we did this in Vietnam; we

didn’t lose many people, leaving—what we can’t do is protect all

the people who help the United States, who are going to get

slaughtered. And you—people just need to think through the cost

of defeat. I mean, it’s a legitimate strategy to say we can’t win, and

cutting our losses is better than continuing to get beaten up. But

when we make that decision, we’re going to watch a lot of people

killed.

I also believe the odds are at least even money that you’ll immediately have the Shia attempt to massacre the Sunnis, who they

outnumber by better than three to one, and you will then have the

Saudis finance the Sunni, who are better organized, who will then

promptly countermassacre the Shia, and you will have Lebanon

times 50, in terms of sheer violence. And I think—there’s a lot to

think about in this region. It’s a very hard region. And my only

point is, is that—is not that I think the President did the wrong

thing—here, we obviously would have some arguments—but that

the administration has consistently underestimated how hard this

region is and how difficult it is to get these things done, and that

we need to be dramatically more determined—because I agree entirely with what Senator Dodd said, I don’t think a single young

American should be sacrificed if we’re not serious about winning.

And, therefore, my reaction is to say I think we should—we should

be very serious about doing everything it takes to fix our own systems so these young men and women have a reasonable chance to

actually accomplish the mission.

Senator ISAKSON. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but

you correct me if I’m wrong. What I have heard you say is that the

President’s recommendation is incomplete, in terms of dealing with

the situation in Iraq, and, in the absence of substantially all, if not

all, of the 18 recommendations, then it is problematic that it will

be successful. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. GINGRICH. Yes. I had somebody I trust a great deal who, like

Chairman Murtha, has had long, sad experience of being correct in

their negative predictions, who said to me the other day that he

thought, in its current form, that we had about one chance in six

of succeeding, and that, as I walked him through these 18 recommendations, he thought it got you up to about three out of four.

You never get much above that in this kind of a conflict, because

the other side gets to vote, too. I mean, you can, in a Second World

War kind of environment, where you just drown the other side and

crush them, but we’re not prepared to do that. But I do not think

the President—I think the President’s intentions are correct, and

I would rather take the gamble of trying to win than take the gamble of trying to manage defeat. But I would hope that those members of the House and Senate who believe we should be successful

in Iraq would insist that the President take very seriously profound

changes in Washington, because most of the biggest implementation problems that General Petraeus is going to face are going to

be Washington problems, not Baghdad problems.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, you’ve led me to where I had hoped that

we would go in this ‘‘managing defeat’’ versus ‘‘winning’’—and I put

‘‘winning’’ in quotation marks—vis-a-vis the Iran and Syria quesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00520 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tion. And item seven in your recommendations was for us to make

it clear—I believe; I’m restating this—would make it clear to Iran

and Syria that we are determined to win, and call on them to behave. And I think—and, if they don’t, it’ll lead to direct and aggressive countermeasures. That was your statement. There have been

some on Capitol Hill in recent weeks that have been suggesting we,

in Congress, get into directing policy or resolutions not to engage

either Iran and Syria on any pretense, no matter whether there’s

provocation or not. Is that a faulty mentality for us to take at this

time?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I’m not opposed to talking with them, if

what we say to them is stunningly clear. But I think when you

have evidence, as was reported last week by Government officials,

that there are Iranian sophisticated explosives being sent into Iraq

for the purpose of killing Americans, and we don’t do anything

about it, there’s just something fundamentally wrong.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the——

Mr. GINGRICH. And we have enormous capacity to make life extraordinarily difficult for both of these fragile dictatorships; and,

for a variety of reasons, we are psychologically immobilized. The

Syrian dictatorship is a family-owned monopoly of power on behalf

of 15 percent of the country, the Alawites. The Iranian dictatorship

routinely has to stop people from running for office, because the

fact is there are thousands of candidates they kick off the ballot because they are moderates who are disgusted with the regime. And

they’re already suffering severe economic problems. They import 40

percent of their gasoline, because they don’t have adequate refinery

capability. And the idea that Iran is powerful and can bluff us, and

we are weak and timid and cannot bluff them, is entirely a figment

of Washington’s imagination.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, lastly—and I guess this is a combination

of a comment and a question. Your opening sobering remarks about

the potential dangers to this country, vis-a-vis terrorism, and, second, your acknowledgment—and I—again, I think I’m right—that

this is a battle in the overall war on terror, makes it very important that whatever we do—I think Chairman Lugar is very correct

in encouraging diplomacy all the time, and he is an absolute firstrate gentlemen of that, and has been in this Congress for years—

but we should not, as a Senate, preclude, by policy, the administration from taking measures that are appropriate against any

country if they’re going to be out to destroy us or to do harm to

our citizens. Is that not a fair statement?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I think all I—along that line, all I would

leave for the Senators to contemplate is—we told the North Koreans, this summer, that missile tests were unacceptable, so they

picked the Fourth of July to fire seven missiles, which we then

accepted. We then told the North Koreans that a nuclear test was

unacceptable, so they set off a nuclear weapon. Now, if you’re the

rest of the planet watching this dance, what you begin to learn is

that it’s absolutely irrelevant what the Americans say and that

they will put up with almost anything. So, you end up with

Chavez’s grotesque speech at the United Nations, followed by the

performance, this last week, where he and Ahmadinejad created a

fund for the defeat of the United States, publicly. And, over time,

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these dances have consequence. And all I would suggest is that—

if anything, my concern with the administration is that it zigzags

back and forth, that—I can’t figure out what their policies are toward North Korea, Iran, and Syria right now. I mean, are they

countries we should be talking with to try to find out what they

mean, or are they countries that we know what they mean, and we

should be doing something to stop them? Are they actually helping

kill young Americans, or are they people we should be chatting

with to help us solve Iraq? I mean, which country are they? And

my experience, looking at the open press, is that they’re actually

pretty straight. These are dictatorships who hate us and are determined to drive us out of the region, and are defined by our own

State Department as the two largest financers of terrorism in the

world. Now, what—so I would agree with Senator Lugar, there’s

nothing at all wrong with talking to them, but I would talk to them

in a fairly direct way, and have consequences to the conversation

as part of that process.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. And thank you, Jack.

Senator BOXER [presiding]. OK. I will ask some questions, and

then we’ll go back to Senator Vitter, and then to—have you already

asked questions? I think Senator Menendez is coming back.

Thank you both for being here. This has been really important

for us.

Congressman Murtha, I’ve known you for a very, very, very long

time, worked with you since 1983. It’s hard to believe. You always

have been tough. You’ve always been direct. You’ve always been

the best friend the military’s ever had. I think, in presenting your

views, and when you presented them, you were tough, you were direct, but, to me, you were correct. And to the vast majority of the

American people, who now agree with what you’re saying. And I

want to thank you from the bottom of my heart. When history is

written, you have a place in it, a very important place in it.

Now, anyone who takes the time to read your testimony will

have hope, because—here’s the point. I love to write. I used to be

a newspaper reporter and an editor. This is direct. This is clear.

You tell the truth. You don’t use, as the Speaker would say, bureaucratic, you know, dodging. You’re just right there. And everything you say makes sense, ‘‘The past 4 years of Iraq have been

plagued by mischaracterization based on unrealistic optimism instead of realism. The conditions on the ground are simply moving

in the wrong direction.’’ Who could argue with it? ‘‘There are limits

to military power. There is no U.S. military solution to Iraq’s civil

war. It’s up to the Iraqis.’’ Now, there—there may be a disagreement with the Speaker, because I read his, and his is very strong

for a military solution. I’m going to get to that. But I think most

people agree with you, that if there’s not a political solution,

there’ll never be an end to a civil war. Never. And there are some

great ideas out there. My chairman has, I think, a very sound idea

about following the Constitution, looking at semiautonomous regions, getting the neighbors to sit down, and so on.

So, I could go through this, and I—I won’t go through everything,

but I think your point that you made today, which Dr. Korb made

this morning, 61 percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on United

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science, I swear—and I must be missing something—could send our

troops to help liberate a country and rebuild it when 61 percent of

the people say it’s OK to shoot our soldiers. I just don’t get it. And

that’s, I think, one of the reasons why you see, in the Army Times

here, which I’ve talked about before, now only 35 percent of the

troops approve of the way this war is being handled. And if you—

if Speaker Gingrich is right, and the only way to win—and he talks

about winning; I want to talk about winning—is to have a good—

and, Speaker, if I don’t say this right, please correct me—that people are strong for winning, that they feel good about the mission,

they want to stay there, and the public supports it, and the troops

support it—if that’s the only way to win, then, unless something

major happens, this is a problem.

Now, I take a little different view about winning and losing, and

I’d like to put this out here. Maybe it’s because I think I’ve negotiated a lot of issues in Congress and in my household, where

everyone comes out a winner, which is what good leadership is.

Everyone comes out a winner. Now, I would ask both of you to comment on this, really tell me if I’m onto something or not.

If I were to have told both of you, years ago—let’s say, like, 5

years after gulf war one, that Saddam would have been overthrown

by the Americans, that there were—we were sure there were no

weapons of mass destruction, because our people could assure us

of that, that things were such that there—that the American military was able to make sure that there could be not one, not two,

but three elections where the turnout was huge and people were

excited about it and showed their purple dot on their finger—two

elections, one referendum—if I were to tell you that in the mid1990s, and say, ‘‘This is what America did for this country: The tyrant is gone, they’ve had their elections, and there are no weapons

of mass destruction,’’ would you say—would you have said, ‘‘What

an accomplishment’’? I just wonder if you would have said that, in

the—if somebody came up and said, ‘‘This is what’s going to happen in Iraq,’’ would you have said that was an accomplishment?

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I’ll tell you what they look at. They look at

the amount of electricity they have. They look at the employment.

They look at potable water. They look at the basic things that our

people in the United States look at. And that’s why it’s been so distressing to go from very popular to unpopular. So, those things are

certainly important, from an overall standpoint, but not near as

important as insecurity, increased incidence, unemployment, and

electricity——

Senator BOXER. OK. So, if I had said to you, that, in the 1990s,

you would have said, ‘‘Well, that’s good, but how’s their daily life?’’

Is that what you would have said at that point in the mid-1990s?

Or would you have said, ‘‘Barbara, there’s no way to get rid of Saddam. It would have been too hard. There’s no way he could have

had three elections.’’ See, I think it’s a huge accomplishment by our

military. And that’s why, when Newt Gingrich talks about losing,

losing, losing, I don’t look at what we’ve done there as a loss. I just

think it’s been changing missions. ‘‘Mission accomplished,’’ was

stated——

Mr. MURTHA. Let me tell you——

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Senator BOXER [continuing]. At a time when it wasn’t—it wasn’t

right to say that. But the bottom line is, it depends on your mission.

Mr. MURTHA. I thought we could prevail in Vietnam. When I

came back, in 1967, they had an election right after that, and

President Johnson said, ‘‘It’s all over. We had an election—Vietnam

had an election. Everything’s going to be all right.’’ We lost 35,000

people after that. There’s no question in my mind that I was mistaken. I went to Vietnam, asked by Gerry Ford to go there—and

I found that there was going to be a bloodbath. I said there’s going

to be a bloodbath in Cambodia, and that we’d have a terrible problem—that’s going to happen. There’s nothing we can do about that,

because we are not prevailing, and it’s getting worse.

So, yes; I agree with you, those kind of accomplishments are

magnificent. Our military did a marvelous job. But we can’t win

this, militarily. We’re considered occupiers, and the way we have

to operate is to use overwhelming force, and that forces us into a

position where we——

Senator BOXER. OK.

Mr. MURTHA [continuing]. Kill people.

Senator BOXER. So, just going a little further, if I were to just

summarize what I think you said to me, it’s that, yes, the military

did some magnificent things, in terms of getting rid of Saddam and

in terms of allowing the people to freely choose their leaders, but,

in your opinion right now, that can’t be perceived as a win.

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I think the polls and internationally, we’re

looking at it as being defeated. I understand what you’re saying,

but I think there’s no question in my mind that internationally and

in the United States people are fed up with it, they’ve lost confidence, they want out. That’s what they’re saying. Now, that’s not

necessarily the reason to leave, but I just don’t see any chance of

prevailing. I understand what you’re saying, and I praise the military all the time. Nobody has a higher regard for the military than

I do. But they can’t prevail in this thing, because of, just, the guerrilla war and the type—Algeria, India, Afghanistan—the Russians

had——

Senator BOXER. Well, I totally agree. The only place we disagree

is—I feel, just from my seat, what the military did was amazing

win for a people.

Mr. MURTHA. It is.

Senator BOXER. And the question is what they do with it. If they

choose not to treat each other the way they should and have a

country that can work, I don’t think we can fix it. But—so, I don’t

like to see things as losing and winning, which you and Newt, I

think, agree on, that it’s—if we leave, it’s a loss. You agree it would

be a loss. The situation is a loss.

So, I—my time has run out, but I’m going to ask, just, Newt, this

one question, then I’m going to go to Senator Vitter.

I read your 18 key steps to victory in Iraq. I notice that you say

something here, ‘‘Establish three plans, one for achieving victory

with the help of the Iraqis, one for achieving victory with the passive acquiescence of the Iraqis, one for achieving victory even if the

current Iraqi Government is unhappy.’’

515

If the current Iraqi Government said, ‘‘Get out. You’re making

things worse for us, you’re fueling the insurgency, you’re fueling alQaeda, and we just want to deal with our own country, ourselves,’’

would you not leave, at that point?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I think if the current Iraqi Government

said, ‘‘Get out,’’ we would leave.

Senator BOXER. But you say—but you say a plan—we should

have a plan. It seemed to me you’re implying that we would stay,

because you say, ‘‘achieving victory even if the current Iraqi

Government——

Mr. GINGRICH. Well——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. ‘‘Is unhappy,’’

Mr. GINGRICH [continuing]. Let me draw a distinction——

Senator BOXER. And before, you said, ‘‘Leaving is defeat.’’ So, explain that to me.

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I think—I think, as a practical matter, in

the modern world, if you have a sovereign government, and the

sovereign government asks you to leave you’d have a relatively difficult time staying. The question would be: What would be the odds

that the Iraqi Government could, in fact, achieve clarity of asking

you to leave, if all of your allies inside the Iraqi Government were

blocking them from doing so? So, you could end up in a situation

where Maliki’s unhappy, but is very constrained.

And the only reason I raised this is—I don’t—I don’t think you

can deal with Iraq in isolation. If you don’t wake up every day and

look at Iran first, Syria second, international terrorism third, and

say to yourself, ‘‘What’s the implication of our defeat on all of these

various moving parts?’’—and I think if the United States is

defeated in Iraq, that the consequences, in terms of an Iranian

surge in the Persian Gulf and an Iranian belief that their model

of terrorism will work, will be extraordinary and will be very, very

violent.

Senator BOXER. Well, you know, it’s interesting, because a lot of

things were said about Vietnam that would happen, and now the

President went there, and he is just thrilled to be there, and he’s

thrilled with what they’re doing. So, I think, you know, we all

heard that before. But I think—but I just worry a lot about this.

If I—you know, you set up a War Cabinet. I don’t see anything

about a political solution. I don’t see anything about a postwar solution here. And I just would urge you—because, you know, a lot

of these things are good and I do agree with, but I don’t see anything here that leads you to political solution. And I think right

now the biggest winner is Iran. My gosh, we’re doing for them

what they were unable to do for themselves. And that’s a disaster.

Senator Vitter.

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

And I join all my colleagues in thanking the two of you for your

service and ideas, and for being here. I deeply appreciate it, as

well.

Chairman Murtha, I believe a few minutes ago you talked about

a ‘‘phased withdrawal,’’ and you used that term, but resolution 18,

which you introduced, says withdrawal, ‘‘at the earliest practicable

date.’’ And neither of those is really precise about time, but they

sound different to me. So, would you advocate a phased withVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00525 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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drawal, or would you advocate getting our troops out as quickly as

is consistent with their safety?

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah, I would advocate getting out as quickly as

possible, but I think it still has to be phased. I’ve always believed

that the military could set the timetable, and that would give the

incentive to the Iraqis to take over their responsibility. For instance, I said earlier that they first ought to get out of the palaces.

You’ve been there, and you know the palaces are where Saddam

Hussein was. Then they ought to get out of the Green Zone. Then

they ought to get out of Baghdad. And then they ought to get out

of the country itself. I believe we need stability in the Middle East,

there’s no question about that. I think it’s absolutely essential to

our international interests, but I believe that both are consistent.

A phased withdrawal is something that it would have to be. I don’t

think you could protect our troops if you didn’t do it that way.

Senator VITTER. So, what I’m hearing is: Relatively quickly, consistent with the troops’ protection.

Mr. MURTHA. Exactly.

Senator VITTER. Is that fair to say?

Mr. MURTHA. Exactly, yeah.

Senator VITTER. What—none of us have a crystal ball, obviously,

but what would your prediction be about the level of violence and

sectarian conflict following that in Iraq?

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I think there would be instability. And I don’t

think any of us can predict how much there’ll be. And I’ve heard

all kinds of estimates. But they’re going to have to do this themselves. Just like our own Civil War, we had to settle it ourself, and

nobody else can settle it for us. Our troops are caught in the middle

of a civil war; you call it ‘‘sectarian violence.’’ That’s the thing that

worries me the most. We can’t do it militarily. The way we have

to operate militarily is overwhelming force, and that makes

enemies.

Senator VITTER. Right.

Mr. MURTHA. And so, I just believe that—even though there will

be instability—now, we should be——

Senator VITTER. Would you expect that violence, following our

relatively quick withdrawal, to go up, or not?

Mr. MURTHA. I don’t know that I could predict whether it would

go up or down, but one thing I do predict is: The longer we’re there,

the more troops are going to be killed, and we’re not going to make

any more progress. And so, I believe the sooner we get out, the better off we’d be, and the violence is going to come, whether we get

out now or we get out 6 months from now or a year from now. Unless, what the Speaker said, we were to put an overwhelming force

into place, 4 or 500,000 troops——

Senator VITTER. Well, I guess the biggest reason I ask is because

you say, ‘‘Well, we might have to go back in if certain things happen.’’ And so, therefore, it seems pretty important to me to understand the likely consequences of whatever action we’re going to

take. None of us have a crystal ball, but it seems pretty important

to try to figure out if violence would surge following a relatively

quick withdrawal, or not.

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Mr. MURTHA. Yeah; I appreciate that question, because what I’ve

said is, we wouldn’t go back in unless our national interests were

affected.

Senator VITTER. Right.

Mr. MURTHA. I wouldn’t go back in to interfere in the civil war,

and that’s where our troops are caught now.

Senator VITTER. Right.

Mr. MURTHA. So, I would have a very small force stationed in

Okinawa, even, which is a long ways off, but we could get back

there in a short period of time, and the periphery, even Kurdistan,

I would——

Senator VITTER. In that scenario, would our national interests be

affected if Iraq was being controlled by clearly extremist elements

which had a violent worldwide agenda, like other of our enemies

do?

Mr. MURTHA. Well, Iraq is an old established civilization, and I

don’t think they’re going to fall under the purview of Iran or anybody else. I know that’s what everybody thinks. I’m worried about

Iran. I’ve always worried about Iran.

Senator VITTER. Let me clarify. I’m not talking about Iran. I’m

talking about forces within Iraq that I think we would all agree to

characterize as extremist elements with a violent agenda.

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah, I see what you mean, and I think the Iraqis

will handle that. I think the al-Qaeda presence is minimal compared to the sectarian violence that’s going on. I absolutely believe

that they will get rid of them. In the Sunni areas——

Senator VITTER. Well, again, I’m—and I’m not trying to cut you

off, but I do have limited time.

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah.

Senator VITTER. I’m not talking only about al-Qaeda either. I’m

talking about, for the most part, religious-motivated, ultraextremist

groups who would have an anti-American violent agenda.

Mr. MURTHA. Well, the longer we’re there, the more possibility

of that happening, in my estimation. The sooner we redeploy, the

less chance of that happening.

Senator VITTER. OK. Another scenario. Would it be in our national interest if—to get reinvolved directly in the situation if that

sectarian and other violence was spilling over to the broader Middle East region?

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I think it depends on which countries you’re

talking about, and that certainly is something that we’d have to decide whether it’s in our national interest. The oil reserves are so

important to everyone. And this is why we need to get the Europeans involved; they’re the ones that have as much stake as we do.

In the first gulf war, you remember, we had 170,000 troops from

the coalition. They paid for it themselves. They understood the importance of the Reserves in that country. And that’s the same thing

today. But they haven’t gotten involved, because we’ve tried to do

it on our own. We need their involvement. I’m saying redeployment

is the first step to get them involved, and then a heavy diplomatic

effort, working with them and doing some of the things that I’ve

suggested.

Senator VITTER. But you’d admit, certainly, that if that violence

was spilling to the Middle East more broadly, it—something like

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that could get into that category you’re talking about, where it involves our national interests.

Mr. MURTHA. If it affected Saudi Arabia, if it affected Israel, if

it affected our allies in that area, certainly we’d have to think

about getting involved.

Senator VITTER. OK. Mr. Chairman, you seem to be saying that

it’s inevitable that the presence of United States forces cannot be

successful in Iraq. Is it also—is part of reaching the conclusion

you’ve reached that it is inevitable that this attempt to have a stable democracy in Iraq is a failure, or is that still a possibility?

Mr. MURTHA. I think—that’s a possibility, but I think the longer

we occupy Iraq—for instance, the examples I used, in Afghanistan

and India and countries like that, where their occupation created

civil unrest—I think the sooner we get out, the more chance we

have of democracy in Iraq.

Senator VITTER. So, you would allow for some possibility of that

success of a stable democracy.

Mr. MURTHA. Absolutely. They’ve had an election. They wanted

an election. They want to have a stable government. But they have

to settle it themselves. We cannot prevail, militarily, in Iraq.

There’s a limit to military power, and we’ve reached that limitation

by not getting it under control earlier.

Senator VITTER. Mr. Speaker, let me—I’m running out of time,

but let me pick up there with you, at least quickly.

Senator BOXER. This is the last question, because we need to vote

and——

Senator VITTER. Sure.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Senator Menendez still needs a

turn.

Senator VITTER. That’s fine. Sure.

You start your column with Mayor Giuliani saying that our goal

promoting a stable, accountable democracy in the heart of the Middle East cannot be achieved by purely military means. I think we

all agree with that. I assume you would also agree that achieving

that goal takes, under the present circumstances, some military security component.

Mr. GINGRICH. Absolutely. It takes a—it takes a substantial advantage in intelligence, it takes a capacity to impose security, it

takes a requirement to grow the Iraqi security forces so that

they’re capable, on their own, of helping implement security. But

if you read General Petraeus’s testimony this morning to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he is equally clear that the military, by itself, cannot succeed. I mean, even those of us who are

optimistic about the opportunity of success believe that there are

very substantial elements of the American Government, outside the

combat military, that have to be effective for us to be able to have

any hope of succeeding in Iraq.

Senator VITTER. Right. Thank you very much, to both of you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator, for being so

mindful that Senator Menendez has been waiting. And please go

ahead.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair.

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Let me thank both of you. I had the privilege of serving with

both of you in the House and appreciate your commitment to our

country and your leadership. Chairman Murtha, I always appreciated all of the insights and the plain-spokenness with which you

brought powerful arguments in our caucus and to the Congress,

and so I appreciate you coming over here today to share your insights.

Mr. Speaker, I will probably concern some people back in New

Jersey by saying there’s a lot I agree with in the statement that

you gave, and particularly in the written statement. I want to read

from part of it, as a preface to a question.

You said, ‘‘The second weakness is, the current strategy debate

once again focuses too much on the military and too little on everything that has not been working. The one instrument that has been

reasonably competent is American military power, but that’s a very

narrow definition and should not be expanded to include the noncombat elements of the Department of Defense, which also have a

lot of difficulties in performing adequately. The great failures in

the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns have been in noncombat

power: Intelligence, diplomacy, economic aid, information, operations, support from the civilian elements of national power. These

have been the great centers of failure in America’s recent conflicts.

They are a major reason why we’ve done so badly in Iraq. The gap

between the President’s recent proposals and the required rethinking and transforming of our noncombat instruments of power is

simply breathtaking.’’ And I agree with you on all of that.

So, as I look at your 18 points for success in Iraq, I ask: If one

were to accept that all of those 18 points were vital to success in

Iraq, how long do you think that would take to accomplish?

Mr. GINGRICH. Let me say, first, that what is truly discouraging

is—I included, as an appendix, some things I wrote in 1984 on the

fact, that the interagency was broken, and I reported on conversations, that Chairman Murtha will remember, with very fine people—General Thurmond, after the 1990 Panama campaign, and

General Hartzog, after Haiti, in which they both reported that the

interagency was broken. I mean, this is a longstanding reality.

I believe—and, again, General Petraeus talked about this some

this morning—I believe that it is possible, with luck, that, within

a year, there will be fewer American casualties, and there would

be a dramatically greater Iraqi capability. And I believe, if you did

all 18 points, which includes a great deal of economic breakthrough

and a great deal of effort to change the tone and the quality of life

for the Iraqi people, that you would have the beginnings of moving

in the right direction. But——

Senator MENENDEZ. But the——

Mr. GINGRICH [continuing]. But I think——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. The implementation of your 18

points would take a significant amount of time to achieve,

certainly——

Mr. GINGRICH. No; look——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Some of them.

Mr. GINGRICH. Here’s the great dilemma of the American system.

And I have to say, as somebody who spent 20 years representing

Georgia, that, in fact, we ended our Civil War not by political disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00529 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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cussion, but by defeat, as seen from a Georgia perspective. I mean,

there are moments in history—Yankees may not always fully appreciate this view, but there are moments in history when, in fact,

you just have to drive through. Lincoln changed things every day.

George Catlett Marshall, when he was creating the American Army

of the Second World War, changed things every day. If this President were to bring in a Deputy Chief of Staff who is a senior

retired military person of the right background and were to genuinely drive the system, 90 days from now we would be in a different system, we’d have—and, by the way, if he also brought in

the Congress, something that I mentioned when you weren’t here,

I think——

Senator MENENDEZ. I did——

Mr. GINGRICH [continuing]. OK—and genuinely worked, on a bipartisan basis, on those aspects of the law which are genuinely destructive—I mean, they’re not Republican or Democrat, liberal or

conservative, they’re just stupid——

Senator MENENDEZ. I don’t mean to interrupt you, but——

Mr. GINGRICH [continuing]. I think, that Congress would help

pass it.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. But the—I looked at your 18

points. Some of them clearly could be done by executive prerogative

and order, but there is a fair number there that would take a very

significant restructuring, which means time.

And so, my question is: In your defeat or victory, what is the

price of victory, as defined by you? How many American lives, how

much money, how much time? Because I think the American people need to have a sense—in the honesty that you were talking

about before, when I was listening to your testimony and your answer to questions—I mean, we are being told that this plan is the

Iraqis’—we’re following the Iraqis somehow. But I don’t believe it

for a moment. We’re being told that we’re following the Iraqis,

Iraqis are going to take the lead, we’re going to be there in a supportive context, and that’s what makes this plan so fundamentally

different than every other plan the President has had in the past

as it relates to surges or escalations in the process. And yet the reality is that when we listen to all the other expert testimony—

there’s no way that that’s going to happen, if we’re going to have

any degree of success—and I oppose the escalation—but if we’re

going to have any degree of success, it certainly is not going to be

under that scenario.

So, the question is: Isn’t it fair for the American people to know,

for those who advocate that, ‘‘We cannot accept a defeat, in classic

terms, that, therefore—and we must strive, at all costs, to have victory’’—what is the quantifiable aspects of victory, in both lives and

national treasure?

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I want to—I think, first of all, you shouldn’t

underestimate that it will cost lives. I think it’ll cost money. I think

it will cost time. I think the total lives engaged would probably be

less than 1 percent of the lives we’ll lose when we lose an American

city. I think that the amount of money we lose will be dramatically

less than it will take us to build one American city. And I think

that anybody who can make a decision on Iraq without worrying

about nuclear war and the degree to which our opponents in Iran,

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North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and elsewhere, are emboldened by

our defeat are kidding themselves. So, I would say to you, Senator,

how much do you think it’s going to cost in American lives when

the terrorists around the planet are emboldened?

Senator MENENDEZ. That’s if one accepts your proposition

that——

Mr. GINGRICH. And——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In fact, that’s what happens in

Iraq, as defined by you, in terms of success, means the loss of an

American city.

Chairman Murtha, do we lose an American city, thousands of

American lives, because we follow your plan in Iraq?

Mr. MURTHA. No; I think, actually, we reduce the intensity in the

recruiting that goes on in Iraq. We have become the enemy, and

that’s actually increasing the intensity of the recruiting against us.

So, I really believe the first step to rehabilitating ourselves is to

redeploy our troops and to lessen this intense aggravation and hate

that they have toward Americans. The BBC just did a poll showing

the whole world says we’re making a mistake. They believe we’re

more dangerous than Iran. This is people, ordinary people, of

course. But, no, I don’t think that solves the problem at all. I think

we’ve got to reduce our presence, and that is the start of stability

in Iraq.

Senator MENENDEZ. Isn’t it fair to say security is worse today

than it was before?

Mr. MURTHA. When I spoke out, there were 400 incidents—that’s

over a year ago—400 incidents a week, and now there’s over 1,000

a week. That’s attacks. So, it’s much worse than it was. Plus, the

things that I measure, the things that our subcommittee asked

them to measure, is potable water, electricity, oil production, and

unemployment. All those are worse than they were—or less than

prewar.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I’ll close by simply—and I see my

time’s now up—by saying that General Pace was giving a briefing

here, about 6 months ago, I guess it was, and he said something

that was fundamental. He said, ‘‘We have to get the Iraqis to love

their children more than they hate their neighbors.’’ And that’s

probably a very powerful truism, it’s just that it doesn’t happen by

military might.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator.

The reason I’m trying to move us along is because of a vote that’s

coming. And I know Senator Coleman wants to take a round. I’m

going to give you 4 minutes, I’m going to give you 4 minutes, Senator, and I’ll take 4 minutes, and we’ll be done.

I just wanted to recognize the military Reservists who are here

from all the different services. Will you just raise your hand?

You’re attending a course, at the National Defense University, on

national security and policy development. Well, we hope that this

is so clear today that you come away with a very good feeling that

we’re getting it together. But I think we are, and this is democracy,

and this is important in this great free country. And that’s why it

breaks my heart that we were able to offer this up to a country

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that doesn’t seem to be able to want to deal with it. And—well,

we’ll move on.

Senator Coleman, you have 4 minutes, please.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a good discussion.

What are the consequences of failure? What’s the—is there a

path to success? I share the Speaker’s concern about failure. I remember the al-Zawahiri letter to al-Zarqawi, where he says,

‘‘Here’s what we’re going to do. Americans are going to lose heart

in Iraq. We’ll establish a caliphate, take over the rest of the region,

destroy Israel, and then destroy you—destroy the West.’’ Take him

at his word.

On the other hand, what’s the path to success? I don’t know if

putting 21,000 more troops in the midst of what’s going on in

Baghdad, without the Iraqis showing that they’re going to take

greater responsibility—I don’t know if that will do anything.

I have two questions, then, for the Speaker.

No. 1, so—do I understand—does your 18-point plan—does it

necessarily involve an upsurge of—an increase in troops in order

for us to achieve some kind of victory?

Mr. GINGRICH. I think it accepts, as part of the plan, the President’s increase in forces, and it does suggest that a lot more intelligence people would be used in the area.

But if I could ask your indulgence, Senator, I just want to make

a point that I think is very hard for Americans to accept. If you

have people who hate you enough——

Senator COLEMAN. Let me—before you comment—I want you to

do this, in my 2 minutes, but maybe the second question——

Mr. GINGRICH. Good.

Senator COLEMAN. Fit it right in. You talk about achieving a bipartisan, and Congress—is there any way to get the American people to understand the cost of failure? And can we get the—right

now, there is not support for this war—is that at all possible? And

maybe your response can, kind of, tie those two together.

Mr. GINGRICH. Well, I—first of all, as I said a while ago, I mean,

in the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln fully expected to lose,

as late as August 1864, and didn’t think he’d get reelected. I mean,

wars are hard. People don’t like wars. People shouldn’t like wars.

They’re terrible. And they’re hard to sell, in that sense. So, I don’t

know that that’s what we should do.

The only point I wanted to make, because I think, intellectually,

the American leadership has to come to grips with this—what if

you have enemies, as we discovered this summer in Britain, when

Scotland Yard arrested a couple who were going to use their 8-

month-old baby to disguise the bomb as baby milk—if you have enemies who are prepared to kill their 8-month-old baby as long as

they get to kill you, you’re up against a hard problem.

And one of the places I guess I disagree with some of my friends

is that the Baker-Hamilton Commission was very clear that they

believe that a defeat in Iraq will lead to a substantial increase in

terrorist recruiting worldwide and a substantial increase in terrorist aggressiveness.

And, last, I would say, every American should simply be shown

what Ahmadinejad, the Iranian leader, says publicly and routinely

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about eliminating Israel from the face of the Earth and defeating

the Americans, and just ask: What do you think they mean? And

that’s why I think this is—this is a very serious period, where

we’re making decisions that may affect the lives of our children and

grandchildren for a very, very long time.

Senator COLEMAN. And is there any question in your mind that

precipitous withdrawal would embolden Iran in its effort—would

embolden the enemies of the United States? Any question in your

mind?

Mr. GINGRICH. There’s no—first of all, I don’t want to disagree

with my good friend, Chairman Murtha, with ‘‘precipitous.’’ There’s

no question in my mind that if we are perceived as having been

defeated, that the Iranian hard-liners, the Syrian dictatorship, and

the terrorists of al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and others will all

feel a surge of jubilation, increase their recruitment dramatically,

and be far more aggressive in pushing us than they have been up

till now. I have zero doubt that, historically, that’s what will happen.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. And I guess I will have the

last word, because I’m the last one here and I have the gavel.

But I want to thank both of you very, very much. It’s been very

provocative, very interesting. And I’m going to make my comments

on what I see here.

The greatest country in the world needs to respond to every

threat to its national security with all the power and force that we

have, if necessary. That’s why I think Congressman Murtha is so

on the right track, because what happened, when we went into

Iraq and stayed there too long, was that we took our eye off the

terrorism ball. I agree with everything that Speaker Gingrich says

about the enemy we face with the terrorists. That’s why it was

shocking to me, as someone who voted to go to war against Osama

bin Laden—and every Senator did—every Senator did—that suddenly we turned away from that and find ourselves in a situation

where we’re stretched thin. And that’s why I think what Congressman Murtha is doing—and I would posit—and this is always up for

debate—that of all the people in this room who are elected people,

knows more about the real thing of war than any of us do. I may

be wrong on that. Maybe reading books is important, too. We all

do that. But I’ve got to say, brings this credibility, as someone

who’s known to fight with every fiber in his body for our fighting

men and women. And when he came out, as he did—I’ll tell you,

it was a turning point with the American people, because of the

credibility.

So, I would argue, the kind of plan that you have put out—and

Russ Feingold and I have a similar—a bit different—we—I think

we stay right over the horizon to—with a force that could quickly

respond to terrorism, training the Iraqis, and protecting American

forces. But, other than that, it’s pretty similar. Nobody says precipitous. I mean, I think, in your plan, it’s done in an orderly way,

and you’ve laid that out, how you would even do it; you’ve gone

that far.

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So, what we would do, by redeploying our troops and changing

the mission from combat to support and freeing our troops up, is

make us stronger in the world.

The world, right now, doesn’t think much of us. This is true. And

Speaker Gingrich says, ‘‘Oh, my God, if you lose, you lose the support of the world.’’ Well, the world doesn’t support what we’re

doing. As you pointed out, Congressman Murtha, the latest poll

shows—it’s unbelievable. Even in Indonesia, where we were way up

there, we’ve slipped, even after what we did for them.

So, I would say that your plan makes us stronger, gets us ready

for everything that’s to come, stops fueling al-Qaeda, stops fueling

the insurgency, and, if we do this right, we can still have a rapidreaction force to go where we need to go, especially if things get

out of hand, which you talked to Senator Vitter about.

So, I think—you know, I look at where we are. Thirty-five

percent of the military now supports the President. I think that’s

shocking. The people don’t support this war, which I think—

Speaker Gingrich, I didn’t hear you make the point, but I think one

of the things we did learn after Vietnam is that the people have

to be behind it. You can’t—you can’t—this is not a dictatorship,

this is a democracy. People’s voices have to be heard.

But I think what you have put before us is the best. And I just—

I’d like to just close, asking you one quick question, Congressman,

about this surge. According to the Baltimore Sun, 21,500 troops,

who will be ordered into this escalation strategy, will not have access to specialized blast-resistant armored vehicles, because they’re

in such short supply. The Sun also reports the Army is 22-percent

short of the armored Humvees it needs in Iraq for the troops currently there. I want to know if you agree with this assessment and

if you have looked into what we’re going to do about sufficient

equipment if we do not succeed in stopping this surge.

Mr. MURTHA. We’re looking into, right now, whether those figures are accurate.

Senator BOXER. OK.

Mr. MURTHA. We don’t know, and we’ll find out. You remember,

we sent troops in, the first time, 44,000 of them didn’t have adequate armor, Humvees weren’t armored, all kinds of problems. So,

we’re looking into that. We’re going to make sure that we point out

whether that’s true or not. I just don’t know whether it’s true or

not.

Senator BOXER. Well I would really appreciate it if you would

keep in touch with us——

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. And let us know the fruits of your

research.

And I just want to say, there’s 5 minutes left in the vote. We

have made the most of every minute of your time. Speaker Gingrich, Congressman Murtha—Chairman Murtha—we’re just honored

that you’ve spent so much time with us, and I think this has been

very productive.

And the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

(525)

RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY

THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2007 [A.M.]

U.S. SENATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Obama, Cardin, Webb, Lugar,

Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson, and

Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

I apologize to my colleagues, as well as the witnesses and the

press for starting a few minutes late. Since I commute every day

on Amtrak from Wilmington, DE, as my colleagues—especially

Senator Lugar, after the last three decades—used to say, ‘‘Well, the

train was late.’’ Well, the truth of the matter was, I stayed down

here last night, and I was late. But I do apologize, it’s not Amtrak’s

fault this time.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by saying to my committee

members that, regardless of the outcome of the vote we had yesterday on the resolution, I want to say how proud I was to be a member of this committee. The way in which my colleagues on both

sides of the aisle were so articulate in expressing their concerns I

think was truly impressive.

And, one of the things that the chairman and I have talked about

in the different contexts over the years is that, what happens here,

more and more because of the rush of business regarding who is

in charge on the floor, and the like, we don’t have much real live

interaction with one another on the floor, or in the committee.

And I was enlightened yesterday, and I really mean it—I don’t

want to hurt anybody’s reputation, but I was really impressed with

Senator Murkowski. I was impressed with Senator Cardin, I was

impressed with all of you, the way you articulated your positions.

And I hope that doesn’t sound gratuitous, but I genuinely mean it.

I was proud of the committee. And I want to thank you.

And that is not self-congratulatory. The only guy who wasn’t so

good yesterday was me. You all were really impressive, and I appreciate it. Hopefully we can continue in the same spirit this has

started, and I’m confident we can.

526

Today we’re going to wind down the third week of intensive hearings—intensive, that’s a self-serving, self-descriptive adjective—but

the serious hearings we’ve had here on Iraq, and continuing the

pattern set by Chairman Lugar.

This morning, we’re going to hear from the administration about

its reconstruction strategy in Iraq. We go back in this committee

to hearing about reconstruction, legitimately, back to the first ‘‘$87

billion vote’’ on reconstruction. It’s been a long haul. It’s been a

tough road, and there were a lot of obstacles put in the way of this

effort on the ground.

This afternoon, we’re going to hear from experts on Iraq’s internal political dynamics, and appearing before the committee now,

Ambassador David Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of

State, and Coordinator for Iraq at the U.S. Department of State.

A man that I’ve come to respect and know, and I’m delighted he’s

here.

And BG Michael D. Jones, the Deputy Director for Middle East

Political-Military Affairs of the J–5 on the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

probably the toughest staff job on the joint chiefs, and we’re delighted he’s here. Both men have long, distinguished careers, but

most importantly, they have both also spent a lot of time on the

ground in Iraq, which is a different dynamic.

Ambassador Satterfield served for more than a year as Deputy

Chief of Mission in Baghdad. We crossed paths, I think, three

times, during his tenure in Iraq. And he was always, always

straightforward and helpful and informative to the delegations that

I was a part of.

From June 2003 until March 2005, General Jones served as the

Assistant Division Commander for the 1st Cavalry. I think he may

not remember, but when General Chiarelli gave us that first briefing, I think he was—I may be mistaken, General, but I think you

were an integral part of that. And I was impressed then, and came

away convinced that if—it’s a heck of a thing to say—if the military

had more leeway in terms of those funds, we might have gotten

even further. But you guys did a great job with what you were

given.

General, I’d like to offer you, as I said, a special word of appreciation for your willingness to appear before the committee on such

short notice.

General JONES. I’m honored, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In light of that, we understand that you didn’t

have time to prepare a detailed witness statement, and if you get

questions today that you would rather answer in writing, that’s

fine too. We’re just trying to get the facts as best we can.

To this point, we have not been successful in our mutual desire—

and in some cases Herculean efforts—to rebuild Iraq as we had

hoped we could. Three and a half years ago, we held a similar

hearing to this one. Ambassador Paul Bremer sat where you are

sitting now and told us about the administration’s need for an

$18.4 billion in reconstruction money.

Here’s what he said; he said, ‘‘We have a plan, with milestones, dates, and benchmarks. No one part of this $87 billion supplemental is dispensable, and no part is more important than any

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quest is urgent. The urgency of military operations is self-evident.

The funds for nonmilitary action in Iraq are equally urgent. The

link to the safety of our troops is indirect, but no less real.’’

Mr. Ambassador, General—$14.7 billion of that integrated $18.4

billion strategy that Ambassador Bremer presented has now been

distributed. And, as you know better than I do, the results aren’t

pretty.

Let me just cite two examples: Before the war began, Iraq

pumped an average of 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. The administration’s initial goal was 3 million barrels per day, later reduced

to 2.5 million barrels per day. Three and a half years later, we

have never met this reduced goal, to the best of our knowledge. The

average crude oil production last week was only 1.7 million barrels

per day, a third less than the prewar levels.

Of this total, according to an article in yesterday’s Washington

Post, 200,000 barrels are siphoned off and smuggled out of Iraq,

with much of the proceeds ending up fueling Iraqi violence.

Before the war began, Iraq’s electricity production was about

4,000 megawatt/hours. Ambassador Bremer warned the committee,

unless Congress quickly approved the administration’s reconstruction proposal, and I quote, ‘‘Iraqis face an indefinite period of blackouts, 8 hours per day.’’ The goal was to raise that level to 6,000

megawatts by July 2004. This month’s electric production is averaged 3,600 megawatts, below prewar levels. Last week, the average

Baghdadi only had 4.4 hours of electricity a day, and the average

Iraqi had an average of 7.7 hours of electricity a day. At this point,

the 8 hours of daily blackouts that Ambassador Bremer warned

about would be a dramatic step in the right direction.

The reconstruction efforts have not been a total failure, I might

add. The administration is moving toward small-bore reconstruction projects. I can remember, and I think it, coincidentally, was

the three of us sitting here in a row, who were in Baghdad shortly

after the statue fell, and I think—I’ll speak for myself—my recollection is that then, and subsequent to that, I made—and I think my

colleagues did as well, but they speak for themselves—arguments

that we should focus a lot more on small-bore projects, rather than

mega-projects.

General Chiarelli, your former commander, that was one of his

mantras. I remember him saying to us that, you know, we’ve got

a tertiary sewage treatment plant that’s being built that’s going to

cost X hundreds of million or billion dollars, it’s going to take Y

years, he said, ‘‘Just give me some PVC pipe, let me hook it into

the back of these homes,’’ and he showed us your Humvees going

through, in Sadr City going through—up to their hubcaps, you may

remember, I know you know this better than I do—up to their hubcaps in raw sewage. Literally, stepping off the front porch of

homes. And then he showed us 12 and 15 feet of piles of garbage

that were unable to be collected. And he said, ‘‘Let me drain that

swamp, let me—I know it’s not environmentally sound, but it’s urgent—let me put some PVC pipe in the back of the homes, and get

it to the Tigris River,’’ and you know, he said, ‘‘I’ll quiet this neighborhood, let me clean up this garbage.’’

528

So, the fact of the matter is that we’re now moving to smaller

bore projects that involve Iraqis in tribal areas, doing this stuff

themselves, as I understand it.

A first, General, in my seven trips to Iraq, I’ve been—as I’ve

said—highly impressed by the Commander’s Emergency Response

Program, which you will speak to. This program allows our soldiers

to fund low-cost, commonsense projects, which can potentially

produce big results, such as building wells, buying textbooks, or fixing up health clinics.

Second, the decision to focus on local capacity development with

the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, I believe, still has some

promise.

Third, the USAID Community Action Program—which partners

with communities in determining their own needs, I think, has had

impressive results. And I hope the program is going to continue.

I understand the President’s going to ask for an additional—I

don’t know this for a fact—but an additional $1.2 billion in reconstruction funds for Iraq. Though, in principle, I believe these programs are vitally important to our efforts in Iraq, I hope that we

will hear today some concrete details of why these funds will

achieve better results than we’ve been able to achieve before.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here. You are in front

of, not a hostile, but a friendly committee who wants very much to

make this work, but some of us have become very skeptical of your

capacity to organize this, and the capacity to actually implement it.

At least, speaking for myself, and I think some of my colleagues.

But again, welcome, and I now yield to Senator Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would

echo your thoughts about the importance of our meeting yesterday,

and the conduct of all members. That was at the highest level, I’m

sure that will be true today.

Although, I would just say, at the outset, that my opening comments will echo, I suspect, in a bipartisan way, many of the

thoughts that you have expressed so well.

Let me just reflect, that since the war in Iraq started, the United

States has allocated more than $35 billion for reconstruction assistance. We have achieved some successes: Children are being immunized, the deepwater port near Basra has been rebuilt, and thousands of schools have been rehabilitated.

But overall, the results have been disappointing to the Iraqi

people, to Congress, and to American taxpayers. Electricity remains in short supply, oil production is far below its potential,

scores of health clinics remain unfinished, and most roads still

need repair. The economy is encumbered by high unemployment,

high inflation, widespread poverty—all of which contribute to conditions that intensify the insurgency.

I would just say the Minister of Industry of Iraq visited with us

last week, estimated unemployment at 40 to 45 percent, described

how difficult it is—even for Iraqis—to fix the grid system, given restrictions maybe they have imposed, or we have imposed.

529

The security situation, including deliberate sabotage, has played

a major role in these failures. But so, too, has the inadequate performance by U.S. Government agencies, including poor planning,

shifting priorities, insufficient integration of civilian and military

activities, and uncertain lines of authority.

President Bush has said that as part of his decision to send more troops to Iraq, he will ask Congress for another $1.2 billion in reconstruction initiatives. This gives us a new opportunity to review

the basis for the President’s new request and we look forward to

exploring how the new funds might help us reach our reconstruction goals, and what measures should be put in place to ensure

that they will be spent effectively. The President’s proposed funding includes $350 million for the

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which has

proven effective in the past. This program allows American military officers to distribute development grants at the local level. Another $400 million is designated for the civilian version of CERP.

This funding must be accompanied by an effective sequencing plan,

so that the benefits flow quickly to neighborhoods in the wake of

any security progress made by United States or Iraqi forces. Also, the President has suggested adding $414 million to nearly

double the number of Provisional Reconstruction Teams that operate outside of Baghdad. This is designed to widen the effectiveness

of these teams, which have seen mixed results to date, and have

struggled to recruit qualified staff.

As we consider this reconstruction boost, Congress must know

the administration’s procedures for ensuring that funds are not stolen or siphoned off for other purposes. This plan must achieve a

difficult balance between anticorruption measures, and excessive

redtape. Reports indicate that bureaucratic obstacles and long

delays have occurred because both Iraqi and American officials are

afraid of being accused of corrupt practices. And this is one reason

why, according to some news reports, Iraqis last year were able to

utilize only about 20 percent of their $6 billion capital budget.

Oil production is at the heart of the Iraqi economic potential.

Iraq is still pumping less oil than it did before the war. What is

necessary to achieve an Iraq oil production? We surely must find

this. And under the best-case scenarios, how soon can we expect a

significant increase in oil revenue for the Iraqi Government? When

is it likely that the new Iraqi hydrocarbon law will take effect?

What impact will the law have on oil production, and on foreign investment in the petroleum sector, absent any significant change in

the security situation? Is there reason to believe that this law could

improve the security situation by guaranteeing the Sunnis a portion of the oil revenue?

Finally, one must ask how President Bush’s request fits into the

larger picture of getting the Iraqi economy on its feet, which is the

ultimate purpose of reconstruction. Is there a plan that will lead

to a sustainable economic growth? To complement the proposed

United States funds, Prime Minister Maliki has committed $10 billion of Iraqi funds for reconstruction, including a jobs program. Are

these make-work jobs that will expire when the funds dry up? Or

will they serve to prime the pump to create long-term employment?

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forts? And is it dependent on Congress appropriating all of the

funds the President will now request?

I welcome, as you do, Mr. Chairman, our distinguished panel, we

look forward to our discussion with you today. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Gentlemen, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR

IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. And I would like to talk about the reconstruction

efforts that we are currently undertaking, as well as our plans for

the future in the light of the President’s strategy, enunciated on

January 10. And I would ask concurrence in my more lengthy written remarks being entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be placed in the record.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. On January 10, the President outlined

the need for a new way forward in Iraq, and on January 11, Secretary Rice provided further detail on how we would be pursuing

this strategy.

I’d like to reiterate briefly both the premise of the strategy she

and the President outlined and then expand further. And in response to your specific questions during the course of the hearing

today, on how we plan to bring our civilian resources into the fight.

There are five core principles underlying our strategy. First, the

Government of Iraq is in the lead. It is not a question of putting

them in the lead, or encouraging them to take the lead—it is a recognition of reality. They are responsible for their country, they are

a sovereign government, and they have to act as such. Success will

not, in Iraq, be dependent primarily on United States resolve and

effort, however strong they are. It will depend on the commitment,

the performance, the will, and the skill of the Iraqi Government.

Second, we will support the Government of Iraq’s efforts to stabilize that country, to bolster their economy, to achieve national

reconciliation. Here again, Iraqis are in the lead, but we recognize

they require help in certain critical areas.

Third, we will decentralize; we will diversify our civilian presence

and our civilian assistance to the Iraqi people. While we will continue to work closely with the central government in Baghdad—

Baghdad is the center of gravity, both for governments, but also for

the sectarian violence now affecting that country. But we also have

to reach beyond the Green Zone. We have to reach to help local

communities and leaders transition to self-sufficiency, and to encourage moderates throughout that country.

Fourth, we will channel our targeted assistance to those Iraqi

leaders, regardless of party or sectarian affiliation, who reject violence and pursue their agendas through peaceful, democratic

means. We must isolate extremists, we must help empower moderates throughout the country.

Finally, we will be engaging in reinvigorated regional diplomacy,

beginning with the Secretary’s recent trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

and Kuwait, to try and strengthen support for the Government of

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Iraq. Iraq cannot emerge from its current situation without the

positive influence, without the positive role being played by its

neighbors.

We’re going to be applying these principles I’ve just articulated

on three critical fronts: Security, economic, and political. All of

which are inextricably tied to the others.

As you know, the President has decided to augment our force levels in Baghdad and Anbar by 21,500 forces. The mission of this enhanced force is to support Iraqi troops and commanders who are

in the lead, to help clear and secure neighborhoods, protect the

local population, provide essential services, and create conditions

necessary to spur local economic development—the ‘‘build’’ part of

Clear, Secure, Build.

The Department of State is contributing robustly to this effort,

by expanding our present, very close coordination with our military

counterparts in and outside of Baghdad, and with the Iraqi Government, to capitalize on expected security improvements by creating

jobs and promoting economic revitalization. There has to be the

fullest possible civil-military unity of effort, if we are to be successful. That is what our mission in Baghdad, that is what our missions at the existing PRTs, are committed to achieve.

But to help make this possible, we are immediately deploying

greater resources alongside our military, first in Baghdad and

Anbar province. The centerpiece of our efforts will be the expansion

of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the PRTs, which will be

doubled from a current number of 10 to 20. We will be adding more

than 300 new civilian personnel, and will be expanding our PRTs

in three phases.

The first phase is going to occur over the next 90 days and it will

coincide with, and complement, our expanded military efforts. We

hope to colocate nine new PRTs, six in Baghdad, three in Anbar,

with the brigade combat teams engaged in security operations

there.

Now, the Department of State will be recruiting and deploying

senior-level team leaders for these new Provincial Reconstruction

Teams. They will work closely with their brigade commander counterparts, to develop plans for that critical ‘‘build’’ part of Clear, Secure, Build. Well-qualified State Department officers have already

stepped forward for these assignments.

The PRTs will target both civilian and military resources, including foreign assistance in the commanders emergency response program, against a common of a jointly developed strategic plan to

sustain stability, promote economic growth, and foster Iraqi selfsufficiency where we have made security gains.

In the next two phases of our PRT expansion, we’re going to be

adding a new PRT in North Babil; we will augment our existing

PRTs in the country with specialized technical personnel, such as

irrigation specialists, veterinarians, and agricultural development

experts based on local needs. And I want to talk a little bit here

about how we developed our sense of what was needed, who was

needed.

This didn’t come from Washington. It was not a top-down process. It was developed from the ground up, in consultation between

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sional command, to Baghdad and then came back to here. This is

a real-world, ground-based assessment of what is needed, province

by province, area of operation by area of operation—it is designed

to affect the greatest possible synergy between our military and our

civilian experts.

The PRTs will have a role beyond simple development assistance.

They will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted

assistance such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses,

create new jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable manner. We intend to complete all three phases

of our PRT expansions by the end of this calendar year. Completion, I would note, though, is dependent both on funding levels and

on circumstances on the ground.

And with respect to funding levels, I’d like to express a particular note about funding. While we are currently applying fiscal

year 2006 funds to begin implementation of this new strategy, we

will need additional funds very shortly. Under the continuing resolution, we are now requesting $538 million to avoid a shutdown of

mission-critical programs—programs directly related to the ‘‘build’’

phase of Clear, Secure, and Build. Delaying funding of these programs until future budget requests would undermine our ability in

a very real sense, to support our military counterparts and our

Iraqi partners.

Now, those Iraqi partners must do their part, to invest in their

country’s own economic development, and follow through on our

joint strategy.

The Government of Iraq, as the chairman noted, is committed to

spending $10 billion to help create jobs, and to further national reconciliation. Serious progress has been made on the National Hydrocarbon Law, which we expect will be completed very shortly, and

then submitted to the Council of Representatives.

The Council of Representatives has taken the first steps toward

holding provincial elections, and drafting de-Baathification reform

legislation. They have also agreed to an impressive set of very farreaching and comprehensive economic reforms, as part of the

International Compact with Iraq. We expect that compact to be

completed formally in the coming few weeks.

The most pressing challenge facing Iraqis on the fiscal side, however, is budget execution. Simply put, the Government of Iraq has

available assets—the product of last year’s and previous year’s

underspent budgets, and profits from higher-than-anticipated oil

prices. But they do not have the mechanisms to spend those funds,

especially with the speed necessary for post-kinetic stabilization in

Baghdad and Anbar. Iraq must develop the means to put its money

to use, both for short-term build efforts, and longer term capital

investment.

To help the Iraqi Government face this challenge and take responsibility for its own economic future, Secretary Rice has appointed Ambassador Tim Carney as her new coordinator for

Economic Transition. Ambassador Carney will head to Embassy

Baghdad in the days ahead, to help the Government of Iraq meet

its financial responsibilities, especially on budget execution, job creation, and capital investment projects.

533

A note about the environment which Iraq faces, we face, in the

region as a whole. Iraq doesn’t exist in isolation from its neighbors.

It will require the help and support of the region to have a stable,

prosperous, and peaceful future. While we are working with our

partners in the region to strengthen peace, two governments—

Syria and Iran—have chosen to align themselves with the forces of

violent extremism in Iraq and elsewhere. The problem is not a lack

of dialog, but a lack of positive action by those states.

As you know, Secretary Rice recently returned from travel to

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, to urge support for the Government of Iraq and for our new strategy. Her interlocutors expressed

their very strong concern over the growth of negative Iranian influence in Iraq, and al-Qaeda terror. At the same time, they made

equally clear their concern that the current Iraqi Government was

acting in a manner that reflected a sectarian, rather than a national, agenda.

We understand these concerns. We believe the Iraqi Government

understands them as well. Prime Minister Maliki and his government have pledged not to tolerate any act of violence from any community or group. That means that all those engaged in killing, and

intimidation—whether Shia or Sunni—need to be confronted. We

have already begun to see positive steps taken by the Iraqi authorities in this regard. Notably, Iraqi security forces in recent weeks

have detained more than 600 Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters. They are

currently in detention, including over a dozen senior leaders, responsible for organizing and ordering sectarian attacks against innocent Sunnis.

Iraqi forces are operating in all areas of Baghdad, including Sadr

City. We will need to see more sustained, robust action in the

weeks and months ahead. And in this regard, Prime Minister

Maliki delivered a speech this morning to the Council of Representatives in Baghdad in which he stated his support—strong political

support—and that of his government, for the security efforts being

undertaken in the joint security plan now unfolding in Baghdad.

He noted that there would be no quarter for any involved in violence against civilians, that there would be no immunities granted

to Sunni or Shia mosques, that all those engaged in killing would

be confronted and would be stopped. This is a very positive step.

Only through fact on the ground—tangible evidence of action

against all those pursuing violence—can the Government of Iraq

establish the credibility at home, abroad, and here in the United

States that it needs to charter a successful future.

The President’s strategy is intended to lower the level of sectarian violence, and to ensure that Iraq’s political center has the

space it needs to negotiate lasting political accommodations

through Iraq’s new, democratic institutions. But, ultimately, Iraqis

must make the difficult decisions that are essential to the success

that is so critical for Iraq and the United States. We know there

are no silver bullets, no guarantees regarding the question of Iraq.

We know that most Americans are deeply concerned about the

prospects for success there. But the situation now in Iraq, and the

stakes for the United States, the region, and the international community are extraordinary. We believe that the strategy the PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00543 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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dent, after deep reflection and consultation, has outlined, is the

best approach possible to serve our vital national interests.

We ask for your support and time for this new course to work.

I thank you very much, and look forward to your questions.

[Prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DAVID M. SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR TO

THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen,

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss implementation

of the President’s new strategy for Iraq, to review what we have achieved with the

foreign assistance Congress has provided and to highlight the steps we have taken

to improve its administration.

NEW WAY FORWARD

On January 10 the President outlined the need for a New Way Forward in Iraq.

On January 11, Secretary Rice provided further detail on how specifically we will

pursue our new strategy. I would like to reiterate briefly both the premise of the

strategy she and the President outlined and then expand further on how we plan,

specifically, to bring our civilian resources to the fight.

There are five core principles underlying our strategy.

First, the Government of Iraq is in the lead. Success will not be dependent primarily on U.S. resolve and effort, but on the commitment and performance of the

Iraqi Government.

Second, we will support the Government of Iraq’s efforts to stabilize the country,

bolster the economy, and achieve national reconciliation. The Iraqis are in the lead,

but they require our help in certain critical areas.

Third, we will decentralize and diversify our civilian presence and assistance to

the Iraqi people. While we will continue to work closely with the central government

in Baghdad, we must reach beyond the Green Zone to help local communities’ and

leaders’ transition to self-sufficiency.

Fourth, we will channel targeted assistance to those Iraqi leaders regardless of

party or sectarian affiliation who reject violence and pursue their agendas through

peaceful, democratic means. We must isolate extremists and help empower moderates throughout the country.

Fifth, we will engage in reinvigorated regional diplomacy to try and strengthen

support for the Government of Iraq. Iraq cannot emerge from its current predicament without the positive influence of its neighbors.

We will apply these principles on three critical fronts—security, economic, and political—all of which are inextricably linked to the others.

IMPLEMENTATION

As you know, the President has decided to augment our own troop levels in Baghdad and Anbar by 21,500. The mission of this enhanced force is to support Iraqi

troops and commanders, who are now in the lead, to help clear and secure neighborhoods, protect the local population, provide essential services, and create conditions

necessary to spur local economic development.

The Department of State is contributing robustly to this effort by expanding our

present close coordination with our military counterparts in and outside of Baghdad,

as well as with the Iraqi Government, to capitalize on security improvements by creating jobs and promoting economic revitalization. There must be the fullest possible

civilian-military unity of effort if we are to be successful.

To that end, we will immediately begin deploying greater resources alongside our

military in Baghdad and Anbar. The centerpiece of this effort will be our expansion

of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We will double our PRTs from 10 to 20,

adding more than 300 new personnel. We will expand our PRTs in three phases

with the first phase occurring over the next 3 months to complement our enhanced

military efforts. In that time, we plan to colocate nine new PRTs—six in Baghdad

and three in Anbar—with brigade combat teams engaged in security operations.

The Department will recruit and deploy senior-level team leaders for these 9 new

PRTs who will work jointly with brigade commanders to develop plans for the

‘‘build’’ phase of Clear, Hold, and Build. Well-qualified officers have already stepped

forward for these assignments. These PRTs will also include USAID development

advisors, as well as civil affairs officers and bilingual advisors from the Department

535

of Defense. Although State will have the lead in recruiting and hiring staff, full

interagency support and robust interagency contributions will be necessary to deploy the new staff to Iraq as quickly as possible.

PRTs will target both civilian and military resources, including foreign assistance

and the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, against a common strategic

plan to sustain stability, promote economic growth, and foster Iraqi self-sufficiency

where we have made security gains.

In the next two phases of our PRT expansion, we will add a new PRT in North

Babil and augment our existing PRTs with specialized technical personnel, such as

irrigation specialists, veterinarians, and agribusiness development experts, based on

local provincial needs.

PRTs will support local moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance (e.g.,

microloans, vocational education, and grants) to foster new businesses, create jobs,

and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective and sustainable way. PRTs

will continue to play a leading role in coordinating several U.S. programs funded

by the Congress, including Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils

(PRDC) and USAID’s local governance, community stabilization, and community action programs.

We intend to complete all three phases of our PRT expansion by the end of the

calendar year. Completion, however, will be dependent both on the level of funding

appropriated in the FY07 supplemental (and its timing) and circumstances on the

ground in Iraq.

IRAQI EFFORTS

The Iraqi Government must also do its part to invest in its own economic development and to follow through on our joint strategy. The Government of Iraq is committed to spending $10 billion to help create jobs, to remove impediments to economic growth, and to further national reconciliation. Serious progress has been

made on the vital national hydrocarbon law, which we expect will be completed very

shortly and then submitted to the Council of Representatives. The Council of Representatives has taken the first steps toward holding provincial elections—essential

to ensuring full participation in local governance by all of Iraq’s communities—and

drafting de-Baathification reform legislation. They have also agreed to an impressive set of far-reaching and comprehensive economic reforms as part of the International Compact with Iraq. We expect the compact to be completed formally in the

coming weeks.

The most pressing funding challenge facing Iraqis is budget execution. Simply

put, the Government of Iraq has available assets, the product of last year’s

underspent budget and profits from higher than anticipated oil prices, but they do

not have the mechanisms to spend them—especially when money must move rapidly, as is the case with post-military action stabilization in Baghdad and Anbar.

Iraq must develop the means to put its money to use, both for short-term ‘‘build’’

efforts and longer term capital investment.

To help the Iraqi Government improve budget execution and take on more responsibility for Iraq’s own economic future, Secretary Rice has appointed Ambassador

Tim Carney as her new Coordinator for Economic Transition. Ambassador Carney

will head to Embassy Baghdad in the days ahead to help the Government of Iraq

meet its financial responsibilities, specifically on budget execution, job creation, and

capital investment projects.

REGIONAL DIPLOMACY

Iraq does not exist in isolation from the region. It will require the help and support of its neighbors to have a stable, prosperous, and peaceful future. As you know,

Secretary Rice recently returned from travel to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—

where she met with the Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

plus Egypt and Jordan to urge support for the Government of Iraq and the President’s new strategy. Her interlocutors expressed their strong concern over the

growth of negative Iranian involvement in Iraq and al-Qaeda terror. At the same

time, they made clear their concern that the current Iraqi Government was acting

in a manner that reflected a sectarian rather than national agenda.

We understand these concerns, and we believe the Iraqi Government understands

as well. Prime Minister Maliki and his government have pledged not to tolerate any

act of violence from any community or group. That means that all those engaged

in killing and intimidation, whether Shia or Sunni, need to be confronted.

We have already begun to see some positive steps taken by the Iraqi authorities

on this front. Notably, Iraqi security forces in recent weeks have detained more than

400 JAM fighters, including some high-level leaders responsible for ordering secVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00545 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tarian attacks against Sunni innocents. Iraqi forces have operated in all areas, including Sadr City. However, we will need to continue to see more sustained robust

action in the weeks and months ahead.

Only through new facts on the ground—tangible evidence of action against all

those who pursue violence—can the Government of Iraq establish the credibility at

home and abroad that it needs to chart a successful future.

While we are working with our partners in the region to strengthen peace, two

governments—Syria and Iran—have chosen to align themselves with the forces of

violent extremism in Iraq and elsewhere. The problem is not a lack of dialog, but

a lack of action by those states. As the President and Secretary Rice have stated,

we will continue, in particular, to work with the Iraqis and those who support peace

and stability in the region, using all our power to limit and counter the activities

of Iranian agents who are attacking our people and innocent civilians in Iraq.

SUPPORTING PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEMOCRACY WITH THE IRAQ RELIEF AND

RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF)

While our focus is on the way forward, we are also determined to manage, as effectively as possible, the remaining funds for Iraq reconstruction. In fiscal years 2003–04, we received $20.9 billion in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). This funding was intended to kick start the Iraqi economy,

and focused primarily on helping to reestablish the Iraqi security forces and police;

restore essential services like water, electricity, and oil; and improve health and

education. Despite challenges, including insurgent attacks, IRRF projects have made

significant improvements in Iraq. We have increased access to clean water for 4.2

million Iraqis and to sewerage for 5.1 million; installed, rehabilitated, or maintained

2,700 MW of electricity; and helped Iraq increase oil production over prewar levels.

Democracy programs also helped Iraq hold three elections and provided advisers to

support the drafting of the constitution.

We have obligated 98 percent, or $18.08 billion of IRRF II, and, as of January

9, have disbursed $14.7 billion (79.9 percent). The remaining funds under IRRF II

are ‘‘expired,’’ and will be used to cover any unanticipated increases in costs in ongoing projects. We expect to complete most ongoing IRRF II projects during the course

of 2007.

We have made significant improvements in essential services available to the people of Iraq, of which U.S. taxpayers and the Congress can be proud. But we know

that not every project has progressed as we would have wished. Some projects have

deservedly attracted attention, including from the Congress and from Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR), with whom we work very closely. In all such cases,

we have taken action to get them moving back in the right direction and have

moved over the past 18 months to put in place management oversight structures

to help ensure that similar problems do not occur.

SUPPORTING IRAQ’S TRANSITION TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY WITH THE FY06 SUPPLEMENTAL

AND FY07 BUDGET REQUEST

We carefully designed the FY06 supplemental and the FY07 budgets as two parts

of a coordinated whole. The FY06 supplemental was designed to be integrated with

the military’s counterinsurgency operations, recognizing that economic development

cannot take place without a secure environment, and that better economic and political prospects would undermine the recruiting efforts of the insurgency. The FY06

supplemental addressed the urgent programs needed to support military counterinsurgency programs, while the FY07 budget contained the programs needed to create and sustain economic, political, and rule-of-law improvements.

We received $61 million in the FY06 budget, and an additional $1.6 billion in the

FY06 supplemental budget at the end of FY06. Of total funding in FY06 (base and

supplemental), we have obligated $1.4 billion (86 percent) for programs in the security, economic, and political tracks of the President’s strategy. Of this funding, more

than $500 million is allocated to support programs coordinated by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to build the capacity of local and provincial governments

to provide services for the Iraqi people. Over $300 million is being used for programs to enhance the rule of law; governance, civil society, and political party development; and Iraqi ministerial capacity. Other programs in the FY06 supplemental

are also helping Iraq improve the protection of its critical oil and electricity infrastructure.

We directed the $771 million in the FY07 budget request to support a new phase

of policy engagement with the first full-term Government of Iraq (GOI) on a range

of programs, including rule of law, democracy, and economic reforms essential to

Iraq’s transition to self-reliance.

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NEED FOR FY07 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

While we are currently applying FY06 funds to begin implementation of our new

strategy, we will need additional funds very soon. Under a continuing resolution

(CR), we are now requesting $538 million to avoid a shutdown of mission critical

programs for which we requested funding 11 months ago.

Delaying funding of these programs until future budget requests would undermine our ability to support our military counterparts and our Iraqi partners. Without funding for our PRT expansion and programs to support economic development

and assistance to moderate Iraqi leaders, it will be difficult to achieve the unity of

effort we need to be successful.

ACHIEVING SUCCESS

The Iraqi Government must meet the goal it has set for itself—establishing a

democratic, unified, and secure Iraq. We believe the Iraqi Government understands

very well the consequences of failing to make the tough decisions necessary to allow

all Iraqis to live in peace and security. President Bush has been clear with Prime

Minister Maliki on this, as have Secretary Rice and other senior officials. We expect

the Prime Minister to follow through on the pledges he made to the President to

take difficult decisions.

A political solution in Iraq is indeed critical to long-term success, but since alQaeda launched the Samarra attack a year ago, extremists and terrorists have been

able to hold the political process hostage. The President’s strategy is intended to

lower the level of sectarian violence and to ensure that Iraq’s political center has

the space it needs to negotiate lasting political accommodations through Iraq’s new

democratic institutions.

The President has made clear to Prime Minister Maliki that America’s commitment is not open-ended. The Government of Iraq must—with our help, but with

their lead—articulate and achieve the political, security, and economic goals that

are essential to the success that is so critical for Iraq and for the United States.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions and ideas.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General.

STATEMENT OF BG MICHAEL D. JONES, USA, J–5 DEPUTY

DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS—MIDDLE

EAST, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WASHINGTON, DC

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of

the committee, I’m honored to be here. And, Mr. Chairman, I do

vividly remember your visit to Baghdad and I just want to say—

to all of the members of this committee—how grateful the military

is for the numerous trips that you all have made to Iraq to listen

to the commanders and the servicemembers on the ground about

the situation there. It means a great deal.

And also, to thank you for your steadfast support of the men and

women in uniform, and providing them the tools that they need to

accomplish their mission. And I’d be remiss if I didn’t also say,

thank you for your support of our civilians who serve with us sideby-side and are exposed to the same dangers. So, thank you very

much for your support, and I look forward to answering your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We’ll begin with 8-minute rounds of questioning, if that’s all

right with my colleagues.

Let me, Mr. Secretary, begin with one of the things that I still

find factually conflicting, and I don’t know who’s correct. You

quoted, and it’s been quoted repeatedly in the last week or so, that

to demonstrate that the Prime Minister is going to be even-handed

in dealing with the bad guys, that I think you said 600 and some

members of the Mahdi Militia have been arrested.

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Now, Sadr, when confronted with these numbers, indicated that

it was really 425 that had been arrested, and of that 425, 96 had

been arrested in 2006, and the remainder had been arrested in

2004, after the uprising in Najaf. So, for a point of clarification, if

you know, and if you don’t, submit it for the record—how many of

these 600 and some Mahdi Militia have been arrested in the last

2 months, or thereabouts?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, there are some 600

Jaysh al-Mahdi figures currently in coalition custody as a result of

joint Iraqi-United States operations. I will get back to you with the

details on the timing of their detention. What I can tell you is that

a very significant portion of those 600 were detained in operations

that have been undertaken over the course of the recent past.

The CHAIRMAN. Recent past meaning weeks? Or years?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Recent past meaning weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Well that would be——

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I’ll get you the numbers, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That’d be very useful, because, as you know, that

matters, because a lot of us have seen—have thought we have seen

an erosion of the willingness of the government to deal with Sadr—

as a matter of fact, it seemed to me in 2004 there was a greater

willingness to deal with him than there was in 2005, than there

was in 2006, and the question is: ‘‘What about 2007?’’ Anyway, that

was the first question.

[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]

As Vice President Cheney said on January 28, Iraqi forces have rounded up as

many as 600 members of the Jaysh al-Mahdi in the last couple of weeks. This number is changing due to ongoing operations. For the most current figures, we recommend you contact the Department of Defense.

Second, the supplemental that is being requested, $238 million—

how much of that supplemental, if you know, will go to private

security for contracts, and how much of that is actually going for

specific reconstruction projects? In other words, labor costs and material, versus private—and I’m not suggesting there’s anything

wrong or nefarious about hiring private security contractors—but

as we know, as your office has reported to us over the last year—

a significant portion of the reconstruction money has not gone to

physical bricks and mortars and paying employees, but it’s gone to

private security forces. Can you give us some sense, of the supplemental, what portion of that is really going to security, as opposed

to bricks, mortar, and labor costs?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, we will get

you those specific breakdowns.

[The information submitted by the State Department follows:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, February 1, 2007.

Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your question to Ambassador David

Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

January 25, we would like to provide you with the following information.

You asked about project security costs. Under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction

Fund (IRRF), security costs represent 16–22 percent of the overall cost of major

539

infrastructure reconstruction projects in Iraq. For nonconstruction projects such as

national capacity development or policy reform, USAID’s security costs represent

18–22 percent of overall costs, but can be as low as 4–5 percent. The U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers estimates that security costs are only 5–10 percent for nonconstruction projects, such as infrastructure sustainment or technical training.

Please note that we do not plan to use the FY06 Supplemental funds for new,

large-scale infrastructure construction. Therefore, given the current security environment, we expect that the great majority of funding (80–90 percent) will be used

for direct costs and project management costs, and the remainder for security costs.

The President’s forthcoming foreign assistance requests are also a critical part of

our strategy to assist Iraq’s transition to self-reliance, providing crucial support for

programs in democracy, economic growth, community stabilization, rule of law, and

other critical areas. We look forward to working with the committee to answer any

questions you may have on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

JEFFREY T. BERGNER,

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Third, are you able to report to us at this time

what progress is actually being made on de-Baathification? Again,

I have vivid memory of my second trip, and being with Ambassador

Bremer, and him very proudly announcing to our collective surprise

that we were going to shut down all of the government-run factories, and some of us pointed out that this wasn’t Poland, and Jeffrey Sachs wasn’t the economist running the show, and second,

that there was basically total de-Baathification, including teachers

and anyone that had ever belonged to the party. And a number of

us in this committee, including the chairman, thought that was

maybe not the smartest thing to do, and so we’ve been trying to

climb back out of that hole.

But then again, we’ve had our great ally in charge of deBaathification, the man who gave us all of the inside intelligence

as to what we’re going to find in Iraq—Ahmed Chalabi. Is he still

in charge of de-Baathification? And has he—as they say in the

southern part of my State, has the boy had an alter call? Has he

figured out anything?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, de-Baathification reform is a critical element in any meaningful national reconciliation.

The effect of how de-Baathification has been applied is to exclude

from participation in national life, large classes of Iraqis who have

no individual criminality associated with them. They need to come

back into national life, for a number of different reasons related to

the future of that country.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s a welcome change in our policy, it’s been

changed for awhile.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes; it has.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can you tell me what progress—you said,

I don’t want to put words in your mouth, I got the impression you

were optimistic about reforms that were going to take place within

the present unity government to deal with de-Baathification in the

sense that—say, commonsense terms, more folks will be brought in

out of the cold. Can you tell us anything about that progress?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes; I can Mr. Chairman. The Parliament is responsible, the Council of Representatives, for deBaathification. Ahmed Chalabi is indeed in charge of the committee responsible for this program. The initial outlinings of the

reforms proposed, frankly, are not adequate to meet the needs of

meaningful national reconciliation—they need to be changed. We

540

have had very direct conversations with Mr. Chalabi and others on

this issue; the Prime Minister has articulated publicly a very expansive intent with respect to de-Baathification reform, but that

expansive intent needs to be translated from rhetoric into reality

and it needs to happen soon.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if it goes through Chalabi, it will be a cold

day in Hades before I have confidence in anything he undertakes.

Just for the record—I want to emphasize it, I can’t emphasize it

enough—I have zero, zero, zero confidence in anything Mr. Chalabi

undertakes, just to be on the record. I find him to be a duplicitous

individual. And I have no faith, and I think he’s one of our giant

problems, and continues to be. But as you can see, I have no strong

feelings about it.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I might add my absolute agreement, and would the record show that I support everything you’ve said. I find it astounding. I find it astounding—it’s not

my time to question—that this man is still on the American payroll. You might, when I get my chance to question, recite Mr.

Chalabi’s record on behalf of this country.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if I could just——

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it’s your question.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Comment. Ahmed

Chalabi is not on the American payroll.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s good news.

Senator HAGEL. No; that’s a question, but what I’m saying is,

when I have my opportunity to question you, Mr. Ambassador, I

would like a reflection of his record, on our payroll, all the money

we’ve given him, what he did to us, the bad information, the

mischaracterization of what was going on—I’ll ask that for the

record, but you might want to be thinking about that, as well as

you, General, if you can offer anything. Thank you very much, I’m

sorry that——

The CHAIRMAN. No; that’s OK. We have a small enough group

here that I don’t mind at all any of this interchange.

I’ll just conclude, though, by asking you, General. I wasn’t being

solicitous when I said, I have been so impressed—so incredibly impressed—with the talent of our uniformed military, working with

the American civilians who—as you pointed out, are risking their

lives.

I can remember my son, when he was in, as a civilian—he’s now

in the military—but a civilian working in Kosovo for the Justice

Department, he was a representative for the U.S. Justice Department. And I remember him coming back, and the way he talked

about the military and what they did. As a matter of fact, you guys

were a bad influence on him. He got back and at 32 years old, he

joined the military. He’s now the attorney general of the State of

Delaware, and he’s joined the military. You guys. My wife will

never forgive you for being so good.

But, my point is this, and I’m not joking about this—the efficacious way in which you have used the funds in what is—what’s the

term of art again? It slipped my mind, the fund available to the

military for reconstruction?

General JONES. CERP funds, sir?

541

The CHAIRMAN. CERP funds. How much is plussed up on those

funds? What portion of this supplemental, what portion of the billion, if it is—it might turn out to be $2 billion—are they in the

same basket, or are they separate accounts? Can you tell us how

that works?

General JONES. Sir, my understanding is that all of the CERP

funds are out of the DOD portion of the supplemental, and they’re

designated as such.

The CHAIRMAN. So the $538 million supplemental would not

cover any of the CERP funds?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the $538 million is

continuing resolution moneys.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I’m sorry, that’s what I meant to say.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Under the supplemental, we will be

requesting a significant amount of funding, which the Secretary

will be enunciating when she comes up before the Congress shortly,

for what amounts to a civilian CERP program, with a request for

the kinds of authorities to spend those funds on the ground, as the

military commanders now have.

We view the military CERP program as an outstanding success.

We want to help augment, supplement, and expand along the purposes of the military CERP with a civilian CERP administered in

large part, through the new PRTs, the existing PRTs, with their

military columns. So, there will be a significant request coming.

The CHAIRMAN. I’m about 20 seconds over, if you’ll indulge me

for one more quick question. One of the things that all of us have

talked about on this committee, and both parties, I think, is the

need to get more talented civilians on the ground.

Under the leadership—and I’m not being solicitous here—sometimes, I think people think we’re just being solicitous, saying nice

things about this guy. Let me be precise—the chairman had hours

and hours and hours of meetings with Democrats and Republicans,

former high-ranking administration officials in previous administrations. The best that he could muster, and we agreed on, the

most talented people we’ve worked with, I’d say, in the last I don’t

know how many years, and the idea the chairman had, and I hope

you will expand on this, and I don’t want to suggest what he

should question, but I hope he talks about at some point, was the

recognition that the missing ingredient—among other things—and

such a massive undertaking as we did in Iraq, was to have a readily available cadre—essentially a civilian army—of people with

real, genuine skills, interagency cooperation. As the retired generals before you went in said to us in our July 2002 hearings: Look,

the problem we have with the proceedings in Iraq—of course this

is before we went in—is that we need as many talented civilians,

military police, civilian experts going in with the military to have

any chance of making it work in Iraq.

And so the chairman came up with a very, very thoughtful proposal that we ended up getting into the State Department legislation. The President referenced it in the written document, and I

guess, now that I say it, I’m a minute and 20 over—I’ll withhold,

because it will take awhile for you to answer that question. But I

want to come back and have you speak, for the record, to what the

President talked about. It comports with the legislation from the

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Senator from Indiana, and I was happy to cosponsor, and put it forward. And what that means in terms of a reorganization, is that

we have to have a different mindset about us when we project force

into another country. That’s a more complicated, longer subject, but

the real quick question that relates to that is, you indicated that

you were pleased that some talented State Department people have

signed up to step into the breach and go into Iraq. From our discussions in Iraq, at the Embassy, inside the Green Zone—between you

and me and others, I know firsthand that there are some very talented people at the State Department.

I asked the same question 6 months ago, about agriculture people, about Commerce Department people, about people who are in

the public works side of this event. The agencies that are basically—according to General Chiarelli—incapable. A great line I

heard from the General, ‘‘Senator, if you ever hear me criticize a

bureaucrat again, pop me.’’ There’s no bureaucracy here.

And he gave an example about you guys going out and spraying

the date palms because the Agriculture Department did not do it

and the State Department wasn’t particularly interested in it,

other than letting them do it. So, my specific question, and I’ll

cease—is how many State Department personnel are we talking

about that are going to be moving from the building in town to

Baghdad to help implement this new or more informed reconstruction effort?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the State Department

currently has over 140 Foreign Service officers in Baghdad, over 50

in the existing PRTs—that’s the largest presence of the Foreign

Service in any country in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Right, I know that.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We have an additional large number

of individuals contracted through the State Department who serve

as full-time employees working with IRMO and other entities in

the country. As a result of this surge, some dozen additional State

Department officers will be heading the new PRTs; but the skill

sets, of the over 300 civilians whom our brigade commanders, our

own PRT staffs want out there, are not skill sets which one finds

within, typically, the Department of State. They’re camel vets——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. They’re agricultural irrigation specialists. They are very highly——

The CHAIRMAN. Are they contractors, or are they out of the Department of Agriculture? Are they out of——

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we are going to be working—

and are working now—with the Department of Defense as well as

with other agencies, including Agriculture, when identifying who

and when bodies will be produced. I can tell you that for the initial

surge, the majority of the individuals that we will be bringing in—

let’s look at the next 6 to 9 months, period—where we’ve got to get

guys on the ground—will be coming out of Department of Defense

resources. They can tap—they can move people with these skills.

The CHAIRMAN. Contractors? Contract personnel? That’s not bad;

I just want to understand what we’re talking about here. I

mean——

543

General JONES. Sir, I believe that between the two Secretaries

what they’ve discussed are actually reservists who have skill sets

which in our Reserve component——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s what I thought.

General JONES. They’re very talented.

The CHAIRMAN. So, you’re talking a total of roughly a dozen

State Department officers——

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. To head the PRTs.

The CHAIRMAN. Head the Department. OK; thank you. I’ve gone

well over my time, 5 minutes, and I apologize.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to carry on in that area, is that Senator Biden has

generously referenced our meetings with people from various Departments. The total view was that in the old days we were not involved in ‘‘nation-building.’’ And some people feel we should still

not be involved, but we are, in fact, and we’re talking about this

very explicitly today. And in order to have the Civilian Reserve

Corps that we need—whether lawyers, attorneys, economists, engineers, health workers, and so forth—this is going to require a lot

of organization.

Now, we didn’t raise the question of who does it. But, at some

point—and I was intrigued, as Senator Biden was, when the President in his State of the Union Message mentioned this Civilian Reserve Corp. We are not asking you today to flesh this out, but it

almost is as revolutionary as the year before when the President

said we were addicted to Middle East oil. In other words, it was

an extraordinary breakthrough.

Now, bureaucrats, or even the Secretaries may not understand

what the President has in mind yet. I hope that they do. There is

no possible way in which the United States can become successfully

involved in one country after another, without having a huge number of people who are willing to serve in a Reserve capacity, willing

to go when called, and who have skills.

When the three of us were in Baghdad at the time the chairman

has referenced, fortunately, the security was better. We were venturing out into neighborhoods. We visited a neighborhood council

meeting in which people raising concerns about what was going to

happen in their schools, or what was going to happen in the neighborhood group, and so forth.

Now, unfortunately, in one of these meetings, there was a brilliant second lieutenant——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s right, yeah.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Who was, really, serving almost like

the superintendent of schools for this area. For that matter, he had

legal training, he was able to advise these people, they had extraordinary confidence in him. And I thought, thank goodness, somehow

or other, in the course of all of this, somebody like this arrived

quite by chance as it was explained to us.

But we really cannot always guess that this will happen, and

this, in fact, was an Army reservist as I—and he was going to be

gone in 3 months, and so, you know, we’re back to ground zero.

And I just ask you not, today, to produce, in response to this question, all the explicit details, but please, you know, for the record,

give us some idea of how serious the President’s proposal is going

544

to be taken? The legislation we passed last year, in 2006, that several of us cosponsored, is there for the taking, and we’ll have another go at it legislatively and hopefully see it pass the House this

time around. But ultimately, someone in the administration has to

act upon it—and really press the action.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator and Mr. Chairman, because

you both referred to the same concept—this is an extraordinarily

good idea; it’s a very necessary thing. State Department Foreign

Service officers are commissioned officers, the military are commissioned officers, we can order service. The Department of Agriculture doesn’t have the ability to order its civilians to deploy to

a combat zone. There needs to be a reserve of talented individuals

in a database that can be tapped—not just for Iraq—but for other

situations like this. And we very much want to move forward on

this, it’s very necessary.

And just a word on the date-palm spraying—this was an extraordinary example of civilian military coordination. The Iraqi agriculture authorities were unable in the end to organize themselves

to obtain the necessary spraying equipment for this vital undertaking. Through close work with our military, the Corps, General

Chiarelli, our Embassy in Maldova, I was directly involved in

this—we mobilize the delivery of the helicopters necessary—but

this was very much a State Department and military joint undertaking.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I’m—we congratulate you on that coordination.

Let me just say, getting back to the beginning of your statement as you talked about the $538 million and the continuing resolution

to avoid the shutdown—quite apart from the additional moneys—

what, I’ve found, at least in our oversight thus far, is that the State

Department is not unique in this, but today I’ll—since you’re here,

Secretary Satterfield, I would just say, there’s never been very

much explicit detail as to how many persons were going, what they

were doing, and so forth.

In other words, we have on the one hand, now, a much more explicit detail in terms of the armed services, how many persons are

going where, and almost detailing neighborhood by neighborhood—

but when it comes to the civilian side, this has never been quite

so explicit.

My general feeling is from the tenor of the conversation we had

around the table yesterday, that this committee, maybe others, in

terms of our oversight, are going to request frequently—if not

weekly, biweekly—what’s happening? In other words, this is not a

situation now in which we go on from year to year and we take a

look back a couple of years ago, and see how it all went. This is

very much on the minds of the American people now. As to, physically, who gets there, and where they go and what they do. So I—

once again, you cannot furnish a book today for us, but I’m really

asking you to begin to prepare something that is much more detailed, in terms of the precise amounts of money. Otherwise, the

$538 in the minds of many—hopefully not around this table, but

elsewhere—will be lumped with the military, somewhere, as just

additional funds. And, in fact, you’ve tried to give an explicit way

in which these, other than military procedures, are going to

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progress. And we’re going to have to try segregate those in our

minds, and the minds of press people who cover this and the audience that witnesses, because it’s very important.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, I appreciate that point, and

it’s a very good one. And it is very germane to what we will be

doing along with our military colleagues with this committee, and

I think with others, here and in the House, over the time ahead.

There is a synergy between our request, and programs, and what

the military is requesting and doing on the ground.

Senator LUGAR. Exactly.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. But, there is also a distinction. And

we know that there is a requirement, that we not only explain

heading in what we want these funds for and what they will do,

but explain to you as time progresses what is happening on the

ground. We are full scale and we do have a report on this, which

we will look forward to discussing in great detail.

Senator LUGAR. That would be important, and there is a distinction between—they’re all a part of a synergy, but nevertheless, we

need to know the facts.

My office has been sending out the facts that you, or others,

produce monthly to all of our colleagues. So, we know how many

barrels of oil, how many kilowatts in Baghdad—we’re trying to

finally get down to the facts, as opposed to some generalization

about the country. Having more details would be extremely important here.

Now, finally, let me just say, we like to know the facts about

what Ambassador Tim Carney will actually do. Now, we want to

know whether his role will be different, say, from the Office of

Strategic Effects, the Reconstruction Management Office, the

USAID Mission Director—in essence, there are people doing various things. And it does not occur to some of us what they do,

either. But now that we’re explicitly sending Ambassador Tim Carney, and I think that’s a very important move. What is his authority? What will he do? Does he supervise the rest of this crew? Or,

if not—try, if you can, in some additional testimony for the record,

so that we have some idea of how to follow him. How oversight can

occur with regard to this very important appointment.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Certainly, Senator, we will get back to

you with more detailed commentary on Ambassador Carney and

his role, but if I can, I can summarize it very shortly.

Ambassador Carney will be going out to oversee Iraqi performance and to help coordinate United States performance with all of

the entities, all of the offices now responsible—IRMO, AID, our

own economic section working closely with MNF–I and MNC–I on

execution of the economic ‘‘build’’ part of the current security undertaking. This is not the job which existed before this surge; it is

something very much related to making effective what Iraq has to

bring to the fight, and coordinate what we are bringing to the fight.

It is to bird-dog, if you want to use that term, Iraqi performance

in a constant dialog. You need a dedicated person, a single person

to be focused on that effort, and to have the resources and the data

from our side, collectively, on what we’re bringing in, to make sure

the two work together. That, in a nutshell, will be Ambassador

Carney’s role.

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Senator LUGAR. Will you be able to share his reports with us, in

other words, as a part of this oversight, what he’s going to be seeing, what you’ve just described he’s going to be doing. It’s tremendously important for all of us to know. Is there likely to be some

reporting flow, in which you get information from the Ambassador

and you can share that for us?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, he will be under Chief of

Mission authority, reporting through the Deputy Chief of Mission

and the Ambassador back to the Department of State, and we’d be

delighted to keep you updated on the progress of those undertakings.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that would be great, hopefully whatever he

has to say will not be muffled by the rest of this. In other words,

we really want to know from somebody on the ground, what the

Iraqis are doing, what they’re contributing, the whole raft of questions, others will ask about that, but maybe Ambassador Carney

can be illuminating.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, if I could just comment a moment longer on what you just raised—what’s happening on the

ground? What are Iraqis doing? And I’ll be expansive in this response.

Whether it is on the security side, the political side, or the economic side, the American people—we in the Government—will demand an updating on what is actually happening. Are Iraqis doing

what they need to do? They’ve got to be held to a standard, which

is ultimately not ours. But the standard the Iraqi people demand.

That information will be available, and it is something we will all

be following very closely.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Let me defer to Senator Webb.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. Chairman,

I ask you a question, I’m new to this committee, although I did

work as a committee counsel for a number of years on the House

side, and I’m curious about the general rules in the committee

about when testimony is supposed to be submitted? Witness testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, generally, I think it’s 24 hours, 24 hours

before. But, in the case of General Jones, I’m told we went to him,

we got to him fairly late, is that correct?

Senator WEBB. Well, Ambassador, we got your testimony, I

think, after 7 o’clock last night? That makes it very difficult for myself and my staff to prepare. And I hope that you can show us a

greater courtesy in the future.

I’d like to first make a statement, a statement of strong concern

here. I’m new to this committee, I’m not new to the issues, I spent

4 years on the Defense Resources Board, going through these kinds

of programs. I’m a data guy, I intend to really develop some energy—devote some energy to these programs, not only the State

Department side, but I’m on the Armed Services Committee as you

know, and on the Department of Defense side.

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The administration’s Iraq construction programs have been

plagued by miserable planning. Iraq is, obviously, not a safe or an

easy place to work, but according to the Special Inspector General

for Iraq Reconstruction, as well as numerous public reports, this

has been the most poorly managed reconstruction program in recent memory.

The inspector general has dozens of cases pending, regarding

fraud and abuse. The worst blunders have been made by the CPA

in the Department of Defense. I want you to know that I am not

inclined to support any additional funding in this area without

strong assurances that this sort of mismanagement has been alleviated.

I’ve got a number of reports that have been provided to me by

staff, and by the way, this is not anecdotal, and I don’t think it’s

below the belt to make that comment. Report after report, oil revenues are in the billions, but Iraq is failing to spend them—they

don’t know how to spend the money. I know this is a chaotic country, but I don’t think that really answers the mail on this kind of

stuff.

Idle contractors add millions to Iraq rebuilding. The highest proportion of overhead—and this is from the New York Times—overhead costs have consumed more than half of the budget of some of

these reconstruction projects. The highest percentage was incurred

in oil facility contracts—one by KBR, a Halliburton subsidiary

which frequently has been challenged by Congress—more than half

of their money is oversight, just housing people.

The United States has said to fail on tracking arms shipped to

Iraqis. We don’t know, in some cases, whether the weapons we are

sending them are actually ending up in the hands of the insurgents.

I’ve got a Special Inspector General Report here on Iraq reconstruction—I’m sure you’re aware of it, I intend to go through it in

detail. I have a GAO study, and what I would like to ask of you,

first of all, here, is that you can make yourselves available, and if

you are otherwise occupied, key members of your staff. I would like

to meet in other than a committee forum, and to talk with you

about these issues.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we are delighted to meet

with you to discuss these issues. And we can certainly bring the

staff that is necessary to——

Senator WEBB. I appreciate that.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Explore in detail these

reports.

Senator WEBB. When you address your fourth point in here, you

say that you will target, or you will ‘‘channel targeted assistance

to Iraqi leaders, regardless of party or sectarian affiliation who reject violence and pursue their agendas through peaceful, democratic means,’’ how are you going to measure this? How are you

going to quantify that?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There’s a very simple test: Are individuals engaged in violence as a pursuit of their political or individual ambitions? Or are they working through a political process?

Senator WEBB. Who makes that determination? Who’s going to

make that determination?

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Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It is the U.S. officials on the ground—

civilian and military—in their direct contact on the ground who

make that determination.

Senator WEBB. It’s a fairly vague standard, wouldn’t you agree?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No; I think it’s a very crisp standard.

I think it is very clear who is engaged in violence, and who is engaged in the political process.

Senator WEBB. It’s only clear if you have adequate intelligence.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. That’s correct, Senator, and we do

have intelligence.

Senator WEBB. I think we’ve pretty well demonstrated, throughout this war, that on the ground there is frequently inadequate intelligence.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the purpose of the expansion

of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the additional pairing with

our brigade commanders, is to enhance our ability at a finer and

finer level. To have a better sense——

Senator WEBB. I understand. I understand that.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Of development on the

ground——

Senator WEBB. I understand that.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. For exactly this reason.

Senator WEBB. I understand that, Ambassador. I understand

that. These are judgments, though, right? These are going to be

judgments by people on the ground?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. They are, of course, judgments by people on the ground.

Senator WEBB. OK. So, are you gonna let us know exactly what

kind of standards are being used?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We certainly can discuss with you the

kinds of criteria, the kinds of information that we use in making

these determinations.

Senator WEBB. You know, basically saying—and having been in

that environment, in this environment, not only in the military, but

as a journalist—including in Afghanistan in 2004, basically saying

that someone has rejected violence, to me, is just a vague standard.

We don’t know—unless you can document that in some way—unless you have some assurance. You’re going to be giving people

money other than, sort of, some vague form of payola?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we take very seriously, the

issue of who U.S. funding——

Senator WEBB. I understand the intention, Ambassador.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It is based upon a best and better

assessment——

Senator WEBB. I understand the intention, and I agree with the

intention. What I’m asking for is some assurance that, in carrying

out that intention, there are measurable standards that we can

apply with respect to intelligence.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I can certainly give you that assurance.

Senator WEBB. OK. Can you tell us what percentage of the funding in these programs has gone to American companies?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. For the extended IRRF funds?

Senator WEBB. For the reconstruction programs.

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Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We can get you that information.

Senator WEBB. Particularly the construction programs.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We can get you that information.

Senator WEBB. You don’t know that at this moment?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I don’t have those numbers in front of

me. What I can tell you is that the majority of the funds in the initial phases of execution went primarily to American and other multinational design/build companies. That has turned around, almost

completely. The majority of that funding is now going over 80 percent to Iraqi firms. That is part of a fundamental reform, from the

bottom up, of the reconstruction program undertaken over the last

18 months. It is a different program than the program that was

initiated in 2006.

Senator WEBB. So, in terms of the funding that has been going

forward from what point? Are they now principally Iraqi?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Particularly in the course of the last

year, but really, the last 18 months, there has been a steady shift

in funds away from the large design/build multinationals, including

United States firms, to Iraqi contractors.

Senator WEBB. And so you can provide us the information in

terms of the aggregate amounts, and then where your present contracts are?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We can indeed, sir.

Senator WEBB. OK; I would like to see that.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. You will, sir.

Senator WEBB. And, again——

The CHAIRMAN. You will submit that for the record?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Certainly, sir.

[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT,

Washington, DC, March 16, 2007.

Hon. JIM WEBB,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR WEBB: In response to your question to Ambassador David

Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

January 27, we would like to provide you with the following additional information.

You asked for a breakout of reconstruction funds that have gone to American

firms vs. local Iraqis. In our interim response we provided general information about

the evolution of U.S. implementing agencies’ contracting practices. We also undertook to investigate your question more thoroughly and to provide additional information.

From October 2003 to December 2005, an average of 5.4 percent of all USG-funded contracts was awarded to Iraqi contractors. However, in the last 6 months this

average has increased to approximately 80 percent. This change reflects a major

shift from large, multi-year contracts implemented by international firms, including

U.S. and regional firms, to small contracts awarded to Iraqi firms.In addition, many

international contractors, including U.S. firms, employ local staff to execute projects;

this should be considered when evaluating where contract dollars are spent to benefit local employment.

Sincerely,

JEFFREY T. BERGNER,

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Senator WEBB. And I—as I said—I would reiterate my desire to

be able to meet with you, or your key members in an, other than

a committee setting, so that we can try to get into this data and

550

try to get a—from my perspective, being a new member on a committee, an examination of where this past money has gone.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Certainly, sir.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

There is a vote on, and I’m happy to yield to the Senator from

Tennessee. He’ll have time to do his 8 minutes, and then what we’ll

do if, by that time, anyone is back from having voted, we’ll just

continue the hearing. If not, we’ll recess very briefly.

I want to point out for the record that a number of Senators who

couldn’t be here today have expressed the desire to submit questions in writing, and so, with your permission, we will submit those

to you.

And I hope that the response is quicker than—and I ask you to

make it quicker—than those Senators submitted last July, which

weren’t received until December. So, we’re not going to overburden

you, but we expect you to answer them in 10 days or so. By the

time we get the answers, they’re almost no longer relevant.

And one last point before I yield is that, I’m going to enter into

the record, there’s two very distinguished people in our audience

today—Paul and Rosemary, Paul Schroeder and Rosemary Palmer—who are parents of Marine LCpl Edward ‘‘Augie’’ Schroeder,

who was killed on August 3, 2005, near Haditha. They formed an

organization called Families for the Fallen for Change. It’s a nonpartisan organization representing an awful lot of people.

And I’d like to submit, for the record, for the edification of all of

you, the letter that they addressed to me, but it is, I think, worthy

of every member on the committee having it available to them. And

there’s just one quote I’d like to read, ‘‘In our last conversation

with Augie,’’ that is their son, ‘‘In our last conversation with Augie,

he said, ‘Pop, the closer we get to leaving, it’s clear this is less and

less worth the cost.’ ’’ That’s really the question I think we’re all

wrestling with here. Is it worth the cost?

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator, I’m really pleased that you’re submitting the letter from these parents to the record. The Schroeders

are from Ohio, I’ve met with them——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, is that right? I apologize; I should have let

you do that.

Senator VOINOVICH. I’m meeting with them today again, and

they’re very serious people, they’re very concerned, and I think

they’ve got some questions, it’s constructive to hear from them.

The CHAIRMAN. They’re here today, I’m corresponding with them,

and I’m glad to hear you say that. We welcome them, and they

have our deepest sympathy.

With that, let me yield now to my friend from Tennessee, and I’m

going to go vote, and come back.

Senator CORKER. I’m going to let you’re—I think we’re under 6

minutes now on the vote, and I don’t know if it’s practical to

actually——

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, as you all know, we never let the

vote go off on time, but I think you’re probably right. Maybe what

we should do is recess, recall the chair, and when Senator Lugar

gets back, or whomever gets back, we’ll yield immediately to the

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Senator from Tennessee, and so we’ll temporarily recess. I thank

the witnesses.

[Recess at 10:42 a.m.]

[Reconvened at 11:02 a.m.]

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. For the sake of continuity, the chairman has asked me to continue the meeting, and I’ll recognize now

Senator Hagel for his questions.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you, for your time this morning, as well as

your good work and your efforts on behalf of our country, and

please, relay to your colleagues that we appreciate your efforts and

your good work.

I wanted to go back, Mr. Ambassador, briefly to the point I made

regarding the chairman’s reference and question regarding Mr.

Chalabi. I don’t want to take any of my time dealing with Mr.

Chalabi, but what I would request if you and General Jones could

provide some history of Mr. Chalabi’s relationship with this Government, with this country, including the contracts that our Government had with him, how much money he got per month, what

was he required to do for that money, and some history of his

record, involvement with the Iranians, and other pertinent issues

that would be helpful to this committee, and I appreciate that very

much. Both DOD and State Department, thank you.

[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]

In response to your question, we have reviewed this matter and have determined

that the relationship between Dr. Chalabi and the U.S. Government was addressed

in considerable detail by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in a

report entitled ‘‘The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by

the Iraqi National Congress,’’ issued September 8, 2006, in both unclassified and

classified versions. Specifically, section II of the report, entitled ‘‘Background on IC

Relationships With the INC,’’ contains a history of the U.S. Government’s relationship with the INC and Dr. Chalabi, beginning in May 1991 through May 2004,

when the Department of Defense announced a termination of its funding relationsip.

As this is a report of the Senate Select Committee, I do not wish to comment on

its overall findings. Nevertheless, the Department of State provided extensive information for that report and made numerous officials available for interview by the

committee. except for some minor issues and omissions, we find this report, particularly the classified version, a factually accurate account of the USG’s relationship

with Dr. Chalabi.

Since the termination of the relationship with the DOD in 2004, the U.S. Government has maintained contacts with Dr. Chalabi, as we do with Iraqi officials and

other influential members of Iraqi society. Dr. Chalabi was from 2005 to 2006 the

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and has been a member of the Higher National deBaathification Commission from its inception to the present. Since 2004, however,

Mr. Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress have not received any direct or indirect funding from the U.S. Government.

We have coordinated this response with the Department of Defense, the Central

Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council staff.

[The information supplied by DOD follows:]

Elements of the USG maintained contacts with a wide variety of individuals and

groups opposed to Saddam Hussein’s regime prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,

including Dr. Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) did not have a relationship with Dr. Chalabi personally, but

rather with the INC, a coalition of Iraqi opposition parties in which Dr. Chalabi

served as the chairman. DIA’s routine points of contact with the INC in the United

States were Mr. Intifadh Qanbar and Frances Brooke, the INC representatives in

Washington. DIA maintained contact prior to the war and in Iraq with Mr. Arras

Habib Kareem, Chief of Intelligence for the INC, in the INC offices in London and

Baghdad. DIA was directed by the Department of Defense to establish an overt Information Collection Program with the INC, which began in October 2002 and

552

lasted until May 2004. Prior to October 2002, this program was managed by the Department of State.

DIA did not have any contracts with Dr. Chalabi and therefore he was not provided any funds. The INC was provided $350,000 each month to their INC bank account for operational expenses. They submitted a monthly voucher/expense report

that was audited by the DIA Inspector General’s office, and there were no findings.

(U) Like almost all groups opposed to Saddam Hussein’s regime, Dr. Ahmad

Chalabi dealt with the Iranians prior to operation IRAQI FREEDOM as a means

to operating in Iraq and surviving Saddam’s tyrannical regime. [Deleted]

Senator HAGEL. As I listened carefully, as I always do, Ambassador Satterfield, to what you have to say, you are one of our most

respected and senior diplomats, and for those years of service, we

appreciate it.

You talked, in your testimony, in fact it was a subheading, ‘‘Regional Diplomacy,’’ and you went into a paragraph saying, ‘‘While

we are working with our partners in the region to strengthen

peace, two governments—Syria and Iran—have chosen to align

themselves with the forces of violent extremism in Iraq and elsewhere. The problem is not a lack of dialog, but a lack of action by

those states.’’ My question is this: What new diplomatic U.S. initiatives are we putting forward in the region, as you have noted here,

Regional Diplomacy, trying to build, focus on a regional strategic

framework that would be, I hope, a rather significant part of what

the President is talking about in his total package.

And, I would add to that, in way of addressing this, somewhat

directly to you, General Jones, as General Petraeus assumes his

new, critically important position in Iraq—and we all have the

highest regard for General Petraeus—he, as you know, has recently

finished rewriting our counterinsurgency field manual.

And, in that I have not read every page of it, I have read some

of it, in that he notes that probably the most significant part of success in dealing with counterinsurgencies, is to have and employ a

political strategy. In fact, I think he says something to the effect

that it’s almost more important than a military strategy.

So, with that added into the mix of my question, I would very

much appreciate your thoughts, and if you could enlighten our committee on what new diplomatic efforts, regarding what you said

here, the United States is taking, and General Jones, I’d like to

hear from you on this, as well. Thank you very much.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you, Senator.

Secretary Rice, commencing in September of the past year, has

been working with our partners in the gulf, with Jordan and with

Egypt to construct a new framework, we call it the GCC for Gulf

Coordination Council, plus two—Jordan and Egypt—as a framework in which strategic issues can be discussed in a strategic

frame, rather than purely in bilateral fashion.

The Secretary has had several meetings with the GCC-plus-two

Foreign Ministers, most recently this past week in Kuwait. The

topics discussed there were broad: Iraq, Iran—Iran, not just with

respect to its threats to Iraqi security and stability, but also Iran

in a broader regional context, the Palestinian-Israeli issue—and

you know the Secretary had just been involved prior to her visit to

Kuwait in rather intense diplomacy that established a meeting to

take place between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abu

Mazen—as well as the issues of Lebanon, broad discussion of how

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those in the region who are committed to a political process can be

strengthened, can be invigorated, against those radicals who are

using violence; whether that violence is in Palestinian territories,

in Lebanon, in Iraq, or elsewhere, to achieve their ends.

The GCC-plus-two is a very good format for this, because there’s

enormous receptivity to the strategic view of the region, rather

than taking each issue independently. I said in my oral remarks,

Iraq can’t be considered in isolation from the region, Iran can’t be

considered solely as an Iraq-related issue, either. They need to be

addressed comprehensively.

We are seeing progress made, this is the beginning, it’s not the

end, of a long process. But we have seen the beginning taken. But

I will note again, with respect to Iraq, there is a significant impediment to moving forward in mobilization of real and effective support from the Gulf States for Iraq. And that is the perception that

this government in Baghdad is not acting from national motivations, but indeed is pursuing a sectarian agenda.

This is a reality. Whatever one discusses on reality versus perceptions, it is what they see. And they need to change what they

see. That is why it is so important for the Iraqi Government, and

the conduct of the Baghdad Security Campaign, in the political initiatives which the government itself is committed to undertake,

that it shows it is a national government, and is not operating from

sectarian motives.

Senator, we can say—the Secretary, the President—all we want,

to our colleagues in the gulf. But they’re going to watch, and what

they’re going to pay attention to is what happens on the ground,

in Baghdad and elsewhere. And this is a message we believe Prime

Minister Maliki and the senior leaders around him understand as

well.

Senator HAGEL. Well, let me follow up a little bit on what you’ve

said. If I’m hearing this correctly then, what you’re saying there is

that there’s not going to be a military solution to this, it’s the Iraqi

Government, representing the Iraqi people, representing the various sectarian factions that must come together to bring stability,

security, and peace to their nation. Is that right?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, there is no question that the

ultimate resolution in Iraq, on security as well as on other issues,

has to be political. But there are real security deficits right now,

because of the sectarian violence focused in Baghdad that are

affecting the ability of Iraqis to move forward to that political

solution.

Senator HAGEL. What are the regional partners doing in the way

of, for example, the President laid out a plan to increase our troop

levels—Americans—by 22,000, roughly. Tens of billions of dollars of

new American taxpayers’ money going in. What are we getting

from our regional partners? For example, our coalition of the willing, and you, General, tell me this is not correct, the Ambassador

certainly knows this one way or the other, but put it on the record.

The British are pulling out their troops, most all of our allies have

been there are withdrawing troops, or have gone.

I asked Secretary Rice when she was here a week and a half ago,

who is putting more troops in, for example. Unless something’s

changed, no one is. Who is putting more billions of dollars in? Who

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is putting more investment in? Who is doing more? If you’ll answer

that, I’d appreciate it, because I do not see, or have not been told

that anybody is doing anything, other than United States putting

more of its blood and treasure into Iraq. But yet, as you have just

noted, Ambassador, this is Iraqi—this is an Iraqi issue that will be

resolved by the Iraqis. I understand the security issue, and I don’t

think there’s anybody who doesn’t quite get that. But when we talk

about regional diplomacy and regional issues, and working with

our partners, what are our partners doing?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, and I’ll defer to my colleague,

General Jones, for specific commentary on the military side.

What we are doing is trying to mobilize on two different fronts.

To mobilize both politically and in terms of meaningful economic

support—primarily through debt forgiveness, but also private sector investment. Support, not just from the region, the primary

debtholders we’re talking about are in the gulf—but also from the

broader international community, including Asia and the European

Union.

The Iraqis have moved forward with a very bold, very progressive, economic statement of principles, much of which have already

been implemented, or are being implemented, and deserve quite a

bit of praise. But the ability to rally meaningful support in the face

of these positive steps on macroeconomic issues by the Iraqis is colored by the security situation on the ground in Baghdad, and with

respect to the Gulf States, by this perception of sectarian/vicenational agenda, and that needs to be addressed by Iraqis.

On the coalition side, the coalition remains intact. Our critical

partners, the United Kingdom, which has indicated a desire over

the course of the next several months to reduce force levels to, I

believe, 4,500, but to keep forces in Iraq at least through the end

of this year. Poland, which is similarly committed to retaining its

forces, El Salvador, the South Koreans, our key partners are not

moving.

But they are not engaged——

Senator HAGEL. They are moving; they’re reducing their forces.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. But they are not leaving.

Senator HAGEL. But they’re not increasing, like we are, and

that’s my overall question: Who is putting more investment in, like

we are? Who is putting more dollars? Who is putting more of their

reputation, their treasure, their blood, their investment, in? That’s

my question.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, there is—the Baghdad Security Plan augmentation is U.S., it is not a coalition issue. And

that’s based upon our own commander’s assessment of the kind of

forces, the numbers of forces and the timing for the application of

those forces required.

On the economic side, there is continued fund flow from partners,

such as the European Union, from Japan, from others, but not directly associated with this surge.

Senator HAGEL. Well, my time is up, and I’ve gone over and I appreciate that, and if we have another round, I’ll have a chance to

come back.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Certainly.

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Senator HAGEL. But, General Jones, I know you’ve not had a

chance to answer, but we’ll come back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, General Jones and Ambassador

Satterfield, thank you for coming today.

Ambassador, let me take a minute to thank the men and women

who work at the State Department. At this and other hearings we,

of course, appropriately and often recognize the sacrifices and valor

of U.S. military personnel in Iraq, and rightly so. We should not

forget the dedication and determination and courage of the members of the U.S. Foreign Service and civil servants, that they have

displayed in Iraq.

State Department personnel are accustomed to hardship assignments—which are now becoming almost the norm in the world—

and these mostly, unarmed, individuals are working hard in Iraq

under the most dangerous of circumstances. My colleagues and I

appreciate the U.S. Foreign Service and their families, and the civil

servants at the State Department for their unique efforts in Iraq,

and around the world.

Ambassador and General, let me move to some questions. Given

the fact that the topline indicators in Iraq—things like the number

of displaced persons, and attacks on civilians, and the strength of

militias, just to name a few—are all increasing, it appears that our

efforts in Iraq—whether political, military, or economic—have yet

to yield significant results.

Can you explain how, given this rising instability, the administration is adjusting or calibrating its efforts to continue reconstruction efforts in the future? More specifically, what are you going to

do differently, in the President’s, so-called, ‘‘New Wave Forward’’

that we’ve heard a lot—we’ve heard a lot about these kinds of

things before, including the PRTs.

Ambassador.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Certainly.

Senator, first let me thank you for your kind remarks regarding

the Foreign Service and our civilian colleagues, and I’d just like to

note, five of those colleagues perished this week from BlackWater

in a shoot-down that was attendant to their efforts to secure one

of our reconstruction officer’s safety as he moved from one of his

official meetings back to the Embassy compound. And we remember them, as well as our other colleagues who have sacrificed so

much in Iraq, both from the military and civilian services.

With respect to your question—we have radically transformed—

and I use the term radically in an advised fashion—over the course

of the last 18 months. And we will continue that reformation of

how and what we do with taxpayer moneys in Iraq. We took the IRRF program—that’s the large $20 billion reconstruction program launched in 2003—we reexamined it from the

bottom up, starting in the late summer of 2005. We relooked at

where we could reallocate funds to achievable projects, to Iraqi-contracted projects, rather than multinational or design/build contracts, to place greater responsibility and accountability into Iraqi

hands and to ensure that we had—the U.S. Government—a much

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greater ability than the admittedly, very defective oversight mechanisms which existed during the earlier part of the IRRF program.

And with the good work of Stu Bowen, and the SIGIR, we have

been able to affect very significant changes.

We’re going to continue those because, Senator, we’re getting out

of the reconstruction business in Iraq. Over the course of 2007, the

calendar year, at the latest, the beginning of 2008, the remaining

unspent, but obligated, IRRF funds will burn through. They will be

spent on projects.

What we are asking money for is not more reconstruction. Iraqis

need to take charge of reconstruction of their country; the international community needs to come up to the table on reconstruction, as they always have needed to do.

We’re going to be focused on programs like community support.

Working with local leaders, local figures, local projects that are

Iraqi-designed, that have Iraqi stakeholders, that are designed to

improve the situation at a local level. Obviously, we’re not ignoring

Baghdad. There is a critical post-kinetic stabilization requirement

in Baghdad as we move from Clear and Secure, to Build. And there

will be a similar need in Anbar province. And we’ve asked for the

resources in terms of people and in terms of money to do that.

But it’s not going to be big-ticket reconstruction anymore. It’s

going to be small projects, microenterprise lending, job generation.

And the chairman asked a question about: What kind of jobs are

we talking about here? Well, we’re talking about, on the Iraqi and

the United States side, in the immediate term, after you clear and

secure a neighborhood, getting people back to work. That’s a shortterm undertaking. But short-term, 60/90/128 job programs really

can’t be sustained over time, and they’re not good to sustain over

time. You need a longer term, employment generating program

that brings meaningful jobs to people—not just picking up trash,

not just rebuilding damaged roads.

And that’s where the Iraqis kick in. Their $10 billion needs to

be applied, in large measure, to those longer term programs. We’re

working with them on the kinds of training, structures they will

need to generate those kinds of jobs in Baghdad, Anbar, and other

troubled areas.

Senator FEINGOLD. General.

General JONES. Senator, first of all, I would endorse this change

in direction that the Ambassador just outlined, in terms of the

types of projects and the effect that they will have. Essential to

that, I believe, are the PRTs, as well as the Minister of Capacity

Development that is going on, because as we do this shift, what I

believe is important is Iraqi capacity.

The reconstruction teams, one of—if I had to say what I thought

their most important contribution will be—is in helping the Iraqis

to develop capacity of their government to do the things to, for instance, spend this $10 billion in a productive way that’s going to

make a real difference in the country for its people.

So, I think the renewed emphasis by the Iraqis on using their

money to do reconstruction will make a significant change, as well

as our commitment to helping them develop the capacity to spend

it well.

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Senator FEINGOLD. But, you know, I hear the ideas of a different

approach, but let me just ask you this: I’ve been given this horrible

story, Ambassador, you just told about trying to secure a reconstruction site—does the administration have a contingency plan? If

security and economic and military efforts don’t work in this President’s New Way Forward?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, I’ll answer that in two different parts.

First, with respect to the specific funding that we will be requesting—the projects, the kinds of purposes we were applying those

moneys to very much reflect the reality, the stark reality of the security situation on the ground. We’re not engaging in projects we

don’t believe can be completed, and completed by Iraqis under the

conditions that prevail today. We’re trying to change those conditions, but we’re not blue-skying this. This is a very reality-based

set of programs.

The second answer to your question, which is really—if I can

take it—what’s the plan B? We’re focused on making plan A a success, we believe it can succeed, and we’re not going to discuss the

alternatives, that is, the plan for a less than successful option

while we are trying now to initiate the steps necessary to make our

primary strategy succeed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I hope you’ll consider that, because I

think one of the problems we have here is that we, obviously, hope

things work out, and this has to do with the whole mission, with

the whole military issue. But I think we do have to think at two

different levels at the same time and have a contingency plan.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we appreciate——

Senator FEINGOLD. Because there’s so many things that have

been tried haven’t worked. So I would urge you to do both, I know

you have a lot on your plate.

And just, again, on the PRTs you said that the State Department

plans on doubling the number of PRTs, and sending an additional

300 new personnel to staff them.

Given that these have worked pretty well in Afghanistan, why

has it taken so long to get PRTs up and running in Iraq? I know

there’s security concerns, but why hasn’t it been made more of a

priority in the past?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Several issues here, Senator. The

Baghdad, or I’m sorry, the Iraqi PRTs—going back to their launch

in late summer of 2005/early fall 2005, are fundamentally different

from the Afghan PRTs, both in their structure—the Afghan PRTs

are almost entirely military—they are very small scale. The Baghdad and the non-Baghdad PRTs in Iraq are very large entities,

they are located in areas which are often contested, they are active

combat zones, and they are very much a civil military undertaking.

They are a much more sophisticated and complex set of bodies.

They have taken off. The 10 PRTs that exist today have been up

and running for some time, they’ve got a lot of successes under

their belts, and we’re moving these next 10 PRTs, starting with the

critical nine in Anbar and Baghdad very, very swiftly. This is a 60-

to-90-day up and running timeframe.

Senator FEINGOLD. My time is up, but General, do you want to

quickly respond to that?

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General JONES. Yes, Senator. I’d reinforce that they are two significantly different situations. In Afghanistan, a lot of what the

PRTs are doing is trying to create those efforts in order to tie into

what has been a very weak central government in that country.

In Iraq, you have a fundamentally opposite problem, and that is

overcentralization of the government, so now the PRTs need to help

create capacity in provinces and in municipalities where before,

they didn’t have the authority or the resources to be able to function. So, there are significant differences between the two.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks to both of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I want to associate myself with the praise that my colleague from Wisconsin has offered to the State Department folks

for their service and their sacrifice—you’ve got some extraordinary

people there. In Iraq I met with Ambassador Joe Saloom, who is

overseeing reconstruction efforts—I don’t know if there’s anybody

better in that area. And Bob Murphy, dealing with rule of law and

Par Sido and others, and they’re really extraordinary folks.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN. And I hope they know how much we appreciate their service, and the challenge of their service.

Let me talk a little bit about oil production. I think it was the

chairman who noted in his opening comments that we may be looking at 200,000 barrels a day of what I call ‘‘corruption leakage’’

from the production output. When we were there, in the briefings

we received, it was indicated that it’s hard to distinguish between

the common criminals, the terrorists, and the government folks.

And I’m wondering if we have a New Way Forward in terms of

dealing with the oil production issue, dealing with the security

issue, dealing with the corruption issue. Is there a New Way Forward in protecting oil production, a New Way Forward in dealing

with the corruption leakage?

I believe that this ‘‘corruption leakage’’ from the oil production is

clearly, at least in part funding some of the violence in Iraq. It is

funding the extremist killings that are taking place. So this is a

critical element, I think, of security. Not just the economy, but security. I would like to be updated as to what our plan is to do a

better job of protecting oil production and limiting corruption associated with it.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, oil production has steadily

increased, and at a sustainable figure over the course of 2006. And,

in fact, both production and export levels are up over all but the

2 weeks that immediately preceded the March invasion of Iraq.

Over the average of production and exports from Iraq in 2002, and

that’s a very positive sign. Because oil remains the primary money

earner for the Iraqi economy, and frankly, will for some time to

come.

Corruption robs Iraq of a considerable share of what should be

national resources, national revenues. It is a critical problem; indeed, it is one of the fundamental problems affecting the economy,

along with execution skills.

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There are two aspects to this corruption. First is the northern oil

sector, second is the south. In the north, the sector is essentially

shut down for export purposes, and has been for some years. The

attacks on the pipelines which feed the export routes to Turkey

have been so consistent, so professional, so well done, that our very

good efforts, Iraqi good efforts to build new pipelines, to get old

pipelines in operation, are thwarted at just the moment when we’re

ready to start moving product, or crude, through those lines.

If you’d asked us 2 years ago: What’s the major source of those

attacks? We would have answered insurgency. They are ideological

and insurgency-motivated. That’s not our answer today, they’re

criminal. They may well involve insurgents, but profit’s the motive

here. It’s redirecting product or crude to another place where it can

be profited from.

How do you get at this? I could tell you it’s by fighting corruption

in Iraq, but that’s going to be a generational undertaking, and a

very significant one.

But there’s a more immediate way to get at it, and that is by

disincentivizing oil sector corruption, by raising the prices of fuel

and product to a level that at least matches regional prices. When

it pays a smuggler to move a small quantity of crude or refined

product to Kuwait, to Iran, to Saudi Arabia, because it’s at a cheaper price in Iraq, then they’re going to smuggle it. When you raise

market prices, then you not only increase revenues to the central

government, you disincentivize smuggling.

The Iraqi Government has moved over the course of the past

year-plus, to double the price, the market price, of crude and products. They need to take additional steps now, we want to see it

come up fully, at least to the regional market price, and that’s a

big step forward.

Senator COLEMAN. I presume there’s a political challenge to increasing the market price of oil in Iraq. You’ve got a populace in

Iraq that had gotten used to subsidized oil, and now all of a sudden

the price is increased. Oil was so much cheaper under Saddam’s regime because it was given away. Do the Iraqis have the political

will to meet this challenge?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator——

Senator COLEMAN. To do what has to be done?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yeah.

Senator COLEMAN. To deal with this market price issue, so as to

undercut some of the corruption?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. They have, indeed, the picture is very

positive on that.

The Iraqis moved, as I said, over the course of the last year to

meet and exceed the standard set by the IMF by the standby arrangement on fuel price increases. There’s another increase which

is due now, very shortly, which they will need to meet as well. But,

yes, they have taken those steps.

But you touch upon a very important issue, and it’s a public

issue. When people were used to free electricity, to free gasoline,

they’re willing to pay a black marketer outrageous prices to get it.

But when the government comes in, they expect it to be free. That’s

a mentality, that’s a mindset, not just in Iraq, but elsewhere in the

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region, that very much needs to change. And that’s something

where the government needs to take the lead.

Senator COLEMAN. General Jones, is there more we can be doing

on the military side to deal with the terrorism that is disrupting

the oil production?

General JONES. Senator, that’s a very good question. And, in fact,

over the course of the last year, there have been a lot of work that’s

been done in order to try to reduce the number of attacks, and in

fact, it has happened. If you look at the attack trends, the attack

trends are down significantly. And I’d be happy to take that for the

record, and provide that information to the committee.

Senator COLEMAN. I would appreciate that.

Can we just turn, in the time left to electricity? It is a somewhat

similar issue to that of oil production. I’m a former mayor, and it

is these kind of basic needs such as electricity that keep people satisfied with their local government. If people have electricity, they

feel better about a lot of things. On the electricity front, one of the

things that I heard when I was in Iraq is that there is a profit

issue there, too. Folks don’t want electricity flowing from one region into the other. I also observed, for the first time, a kind of

black market electricity operation. You fly over Baghdad at night,

and you’ll see lights on, even though the electricity is shut off for

the city. And I understand that there are private generators. In my

conversations in Iraq I was told that some of the folks on the private side cut the government lines, because they don’t want the

government to be providing electricity. How do you deal with that?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, there are overlapping issues

that affect electricity, particularly in Baghdad. The first is, the

provinces are reluctant to shed electricity to the capitols—the opposite of the system Saddam built, where provinces could only send

their power into Baghdad, and Baghdad had to shed back out

again. That system was physically destroyed in 2003.

The provinces now, Anbar province, enjoys perhaps the highest

level of electricity anywhere in Iraq—they don’t shed to Baghdad.

Baghdad has suffered from—here it is an insurgent campaign to

cut off both power-line supplies and fuel supplies for the plants in

Baghdad as a metropolis, deliberately to deny the government the

ability to be seen as providing essential services to that capitol.

O&M has been badly mismanaged by Iraqis. We have put in, taxpayer money has put in, half—2,500 megawatts—of generation capacity in Iraq. That is very significant, but it’s underutilized because of O&M issues, wrong fueling issues, and then because of the

effect of the insurgency on supplies. And an entrepreneurial body

has, indeed, arisen. Perhaps some 2,000 megawatts a day of power

in Baghdad are supplied by the black market, by private entrepreneurs.

It is a significant problem, how do you get to that? You get to

it by a government that is committed rationally to using the generation facilities it has, to applying the right resources to protecting those facilities, and to putting those involved in the black

market out of business, because the government shows that it can

deliver a product more cheaply.

Senator COLEMAN. And again, I think my time is up.

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But General, the question I had, for you to think about, is whether there is a military piece to the issues we’ve described here? Do

we need a new way to deal with things like oil production and electricity production? These are things where the indicators aren’t

where we’d like them to be and if they were raised, I think the situation would be much better.

General JONES. Senator, I’ll just take that for the record, and

give you a written response, if that’s OK.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, General.

[The information previously referred to follows:]

The U.S. military is engaged in training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

responsible for securing critical infrastructure. Coalition forces work side by side

with the ISF along critical infrastructure nodes. Part of this effort includes developing 17 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions; units which did not exist prior to 2005.

Infrastructure hardening projects have been accomplished to increase physical security measures along infrastructure corridors. Additional hardening measures are

planned or underway. Attacks on infrastructure were down to 1.4 attacks per week

from 6.7 per week in 2004. However, attacks on infrastructure have continued to

result in disruption of services. In addition, weak ministerial oversight, ineffectual

rapid-repair teams, and criminal harvesting of infrastructure assets (e.g., copper

from power lines) have proved to be major impediments to improving the supply of

essential services.

Coalition forces are actively supporting Embassy Baghdad’s Anti-Corruption

Strategy for Iraq, which includes initiatives in the energy sector. Working closely

with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces, MNF–I advisors are assisting the Iraqi Army with their security operations supporting ground transportation

of petroleum products to facilitate careful accounting of the quantities of product at

both departure and arrival points. Most corruption in the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Electricity is not observable by military advisors of security forces, and is

therefore in the domain of Embassy Ministerial Advisory Teams. For greater detail

on Iraq’s efforts toward market reform, financial transparency, and public integrity

in their energy sector, we recommend you contact the Department of State.

Coalition forces are determined to work closely with the ISF, the Ministries of

Electricity and Oil, and U.S. Embassy Baghdad to resolve issues related to the security of Iraq’s critical infrastructure.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much. The Senator

from Georgia.

Senator Corker, have you already gone? I didn’t see you there.

I apologize.

Senator CORKER. No; no problem.

Thank you, gentlemen, both for being here, I would like to say

that General Jones is a constituent of mine. He was educated in

Tennessee and, more importantly, met his wife in Tennessee, and

my understanding is he votes in Tennessee. Don’t know how he

votes, but thank you for your—thank you for being here.

Listen, I—we’re looking at the economic efforts that are underway. And Ambassador Carney is in this new position, I guess, to

coordinate those efforts.

And yet there’s been a lot of discussion about the fact that security depends a great deal on Iraqis having jobs that take them

away from being part of sectarian violence, take them apart from

criminality. And yet, it does seem that there’s a lot of impatience,

if you will. That, in essence, people are focusing on this effort as

something that needs to take place in a very short amount of time

as far as showing results.

And I look at our own country, you look at what happened in

Louisiana and Mississippi, and here we are a sophisticated society

562

with everything working and bureaucrats to deal with these kind

of things that certainly do a good job at what they do, and yet, we

have trouble ourselves doing that. We have a very low-functioning

government in Iraq today.

Talk to us about the realities, if you will, of those moneys actually doing the kind of good that people are placing a lot of faith in

happening in a very short amount of time?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we’re going to be asking the

administration, Congress and the American people through the

Congress to approve an extraordinary thing. To approve a significant amount of assistance to a country that has significant resources, financial resources of its own. We do this very rarely, if at

all.

We’re justifying this request in the case of Iraq for a reason directly related to the question you posed. Iraq does have fiscal resources; it has money in the bank, some $12.5 billion from unspent

prior budget years, and also a certain amount from windfall profits

from unexpected oil prices. They lack the resources, the mechanisms to move that money within their own budget. On an urgent

basis, they lack it, frankly, to move it on even a year budget-cycle

basis. And we’re working with them on developing, over the course

of this year, the mechanisms to do that.

But, when we look at Clear, Secure, Build, at the employment

generation part of it, at the nonemployment generation, but financial part of that picture—money has to be moved quickly. We are

the body to do that, in this immediate time ahead.

Now, the Iraqis have to be in the fight as well, both on developing budget execution mechanisms, and also moving moneys of

their own as rapidly as possible for the ‘‘build’’ part of things. But

we have a critical obligation here, to make our military strategy—

our joint military strategy—succeed over the long run. And that requires an economic plan as well.

So, we do believe we have the ability to move these resources out

of the box, onto the street, rapidly in the days and weeks that follow the ‘‘secure’’ part of Clear, Secure, and Build. We need the support of Congress, though, both in approving those moneys, and

moving them out expeditiously so that we and our military colleagues have them available at the right time in Baghdad and in

Anbar.

Senator CORKER. And so you’re talking about timeframes where

30, 60 days after approval, the moneys will be on the streets, in

people’s hands.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We are talking, ideally, Senator, of a

situation in which if—on a given day, a neighborhood has been

cleared and secured, we—the U.S. Government, and to the maximum extent, the Iraqi Government—are able to move moneys to

begin employing people, taking them out of their houses, putting

them onto the streets, in a positive sense, working, and then to

build longer term, sustainable projects to give a stake in the economy, those areas, those neighborhoods.

General JONES. Senator, if I could, just as an example. We had

a significant fight in Sadr City in the August/September timeframe

of 2004. About the southwest third of that city, we had very good

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control of, and even during that fighting, we were continuing to

employ and to do projects in that part.

What we saw was a difference in the population, in terms of

their response to the Mahdi Militia—in the April 2004 timeframe,

in those same areas, in those same fights, when we would have an

engagement, generally a militiaman would run back through a

house, go into an alley and we would lose them.

After we had worked those construction projects, worked with

those people, developed confidence, when they went to houses, they

found doors locked. So, it makes—you can, as close as you can to

where military operations are being conducted, have integrated the

economic part of this; it is a combat multiplier from a military perspective.

Senator CORKER. I know that this is not our subject today, but

I know that based on your backgrounds you both know much about

this.

A lot has been said about the fact that the Iraqi Army is way

underequipped. We had General McCaffrey in the other day and

talked about the fact that we’re spending $8.4 billion a month, and

yet have been—have decided not to actually equip the military side

of the Iraqi operations the way that they need to be equipped. He

suggested a number of $5 billion necessary to actually cause them

to have a helicopter, the tanks, the things they need to actually be

an army.

I’ve had other comments made offhanded that actually are stunning, I referred to those yesterday. I’d like for you all to just, if you

will, talk a little bit about what really is happening there. Whether

there are, in fact, serious deficiencies as it relates to having an

army, in Iraq, by the Iraqi people that really has people, but not

the equipment resources to actually defend themselves, secure

themselves, do the things that we’re depending upon them to do.

General JONES. Yes, Senator, I can address that.

In terms of the equipment that the Iraqi forces have, the thinking that they are somehow out-gunned or somehow out-equipped by

the people that they fight, I believe, is erroneous. The, typically—

the kinds of insurgents that the Iraqi Army has been fighting has

small arms, machine guns, on occasion you see body armor or

something, but rarely. The Iraqi Armed Forces are not nearly as

well equipped as United States forces. There are no forces I know

of that are as well equipped as U.S. forces. But, in addition to those

kinds of things, they have body armor—we started to design this

force as a counterinsurgency force, which is relatively light infantry

with some mechanized capability.

We have adjusted over time, to give them increasing capabilities

for the counterinsurgency force that we are building, based on the

enemy’s increase in attacks, increase in capabilities. We are fielding up-armored systems—they do have tanks, they do have armored personnel-carrier kinds of vehicles—not in the quantities it

takes to have a defense force, where they can defend their country

from outside aggression. That plan is in the works, and will be a

future fielding plan that will have to happen in order to transition

them once they have succeeded against the insurgency.

I will say, however, that in terms of equipment, the Iraqis have,

in fact, stepped up to the plate. I believe they’ve committed about

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$700 million—and I’ll get the numbers for the record, if it’s OK,

Senator, but I think it’s about $700 million of their own funds to

buy additional equipment. They also have, I believe, $1.5 billion in

a foreign military sales account in order to buy additional equipment that they think will help them meet needs.

[The information submitted by DOD follow:]

Answer. The GoI has committed nearly $1.2B of CY06 Security Funding against

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for equipment requirements. There are additional cases for infrastructure and sustainment requirements which total approximately $500M. Furthermore, the GoI is on the verge of committing approximately

up to $1B of its currently available CY07 Security Funding against additional equipment, infrastructure, and sustainment FMS cases.

So, I think that we have had to adapt because the situation has

changed, I think that they are absorbing equipment at the ability

that they have, and we have not fielded some types of systems like

aircraft, and other kinds of things that are much more sophisticated, because we’ve given priority to the insurgency fight that

they’re in, where those kinds of assets aren’t quite as important.

Senator CORKER. I think my time is up, but I want to thank you

both for your testimony, for your service, and what you’re doing on

behalf of our country, thank you.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to echo what Senator Feingold, Senator Colman, and

others have said about the State Department. In my experiences

around the world where I have encountered State Department people, they’re the unsung heroes of America around the world, and

we appreciate very much what you do.

In your printed testimony, Ambassador Satterfield, you said, ‘‘Serious progress has been made on the vital national hydrocarbon

law,’’ and then in the answer to Senator Coleman you said, I believe you said, and I want to make sure I heard this right, or it

gets corrected if I heard it wrong, you virtually said, at this time

we can’t secure the oil pipeline, because of the criminal element

more than the insurgents, is that correct?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. With respect to the northern oil

production——

Senator ISAKSON. Right.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. At the northern oil export

facilities, it has been an exceedingly difficult task of securing that

in a sustained fashion over the last several years; yes, Senator.

Senator ISAKSON. And you then said that the best hope to secure

it is to increase the price, so there’s not profit to attract the criminal element. It would seem like, to me, that it’s equally important

that this hydrocarbon deal become completed. The Middle East—

and I said this in one of the other testimonies—suffers, and Iraq

principally suffers, from what’s known as the Dutch Disease, where

the governments have run off the profit of oil, the countries have

not developed, because they have a rich, natural resource. People

aren’t used to entrepreneurship, running businesses or anything

else, and one of the key things to stability in that country is going

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to be for the people themselves to get a piece of the action, which

is petroleum.

So, my first question is how: How serious is the progress and

what are the obstacles that remain for them to complete the deal?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the progress is critical, just

as you have outlined. It’s critical to developing a free market economy in this critical sector. There are many investors outside Iraq

who want to come in, if they see a stable, economic framework—

business framework—for their investments.

The law that is under consideration is a very progressive one. It

is part of a set of laws that will reform the hydrocarbon sector in

Iraq, but it’s the beginning, it’s the frame. And it’s a framework

that contemplates several very important principles.

First, that oil is a national resource. It should be maximized for

the benefit of all Iraqis. That the central government is responsible

in the first instance for receiving revenues, and then distributing

revenues back out, because that avoids the chaos of revenues being

managed at a local level entirely.

But, it has the important corollary principle, that the federal government, the central oil authority will redistribute revenues to

local authorities, and that local authorities will have the initial responsibility for soliciting investment opportunities, for working on

a national model of working contracts, which will then be submitted for some form of national consideration.

And on that last point, Senator, lies the essential controversy, or

dispute that has held up moving this law forward this law. What

will be the nature of the relationship between a national oil authority, and local oil authorities with respect to either disapproval, or

approval—and there’s a difference between the two—of contracts

that are set. We believe the road is open to a resolution of this

issue within the coming days, if not weeks.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I think this is probably the most critical

thing that needs to be accomplished, personally.

I’m going to send you a paper that a constituent of mine, who

is a distinguished citizen of Georgia and has been in the bond business for the better part of 30 years, has written. It’s an intriguing

suggestion, dealing with the deployment of capital, and the difficulty you referenced the Iraqis have.

If we could get an oil deal, and we had a reasonably secure situation in Iraq, you could actually bond the Iraqi oil production to

front-end the flow of money in the world marketplace and get it deployed almost immediately, rather than on a cash-flow basis. His

name is John Mobley, and I’m going to send you that information,

because it is very intriguing. I know Senator Clinton and Senator

Murkowski and some others have talked about some way to get

that benefit to the people; Mr. Mobley has an outstanding proposal,

and I would like for you to, at least, get it in the right hands and

see if it has some merit.

Mr. Chairman, if I could ask you a question while I’ve got my

time——

The CHAIRMAN. Take what time you need, there are not many

people here.

Senator ISAKSON. Have we scheduled, yet, a hearing on John

Negroponte?

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The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have scheduled it. Tuesday, at 9:30.

Senator ISAKSON. I want to commend the Chair—although the

mind can only absorb what the seat can endure—I’ve enjoyed all

of our hearings, and being here, listening to everything that we’ve

heard. But in particular, I appreciate that, because I think John

Negroponte comes to the State Department at a critical time. When

you talk about the accountability measures, you talk about the civilian and the military efforts that are going on, you talk about the

difficulty the centralization of the Iraqi Government as it is right

now, and makes it somewhat stodgy and removed from the people,

we have in Negroponte somebody who’s been there and done that.

And I had the privilege of being in Iraq when he was there, and

I think he will bring a wealth of knowledge to State as you’re involved with the Department of Defense and everyone else in this

plan.

Last, I guess, my final point is: I can’t stress how important I

think the accountability factor of this New Way Forward is. For

whatever the reasons that we haven’t had good accountability on

the part of the Iraqis, I have said in my statements that the New

Way Forward is also to me, the last way forward, or the last best

way forward. And, its success is going to be dependent on the

Iraqis and them delivering. And, I want to commend you on what

you’re doing, and commend the general on what the Joint Chiefs

are doing to see to it there’s meaningful accountability on the

Iraqis, because if they drop the ball on their part, then there’s no

way we can have the type of success that we need to have to ultimately have the reconciliation in that country. And that’s not a

question, that’s just a comment.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We fully agree, sir.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I just have one question, Mr. Ambassador. Last July when we

met in Baghdad, you indicated to me you’d provide the committee

with a plan to build the capacity of the Iraqi Ministries. And then

I asked the Ambassador that question later, and before these hearings, he said he would provide such a plan as well. And, I haven’t

received it—is it because there isn’t one, or there is a plan and you

don’t want to share it with us? Or there is a plan and you thought

you shared it with us?

And I will say that, from an unclassified report, I don’t know the

exact date, but during early 2005, you attempted to take all of the

Ministries of Iraq, from Finance through Agriculture—Finance, Oil,

Electricity, Municipalities, Water Resources, Justice, Education,

Health, Planning and Development, Agriculture—and you gave

them a rating, based on a color chart, of whether or not they had

performed—from red, essentially no capacity to perform the function, to green, indicating developed capacity to perform ministerial

functions. And you broke it down by leadership, strategy and planning, partnership, resources, program, budget, et cetera.

Can you tell us, do you have a plan to build capacity in the Iraqi

Ministries that have so far shown very little capacity to function

on their own?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we certainly do, and we certainly have, and I will follow up on——

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The CHAIRMAN. Can you follow up within the next 3 days?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Standing request which I

thought had been answered.

The CHAIRMAN. No, within the next 3 days? If you have a plan,

you ought to be able to get it to me, literally, you ought to be able

to e-mail it to me in the next 2 hours. We waited now for 6 months,

and I would truly appreciate it.

You talk about these new plans, though I’ve yet to find out what

you have underway already. Quite frankly, it undermines my confidence in what you all are doing.

[The information supplied by the State Department follows:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, January 30, 2007.

Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your question to Ambassador David

Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

January 25, we would like to provide you with the following information.

You asked for information about our Ministerial Capacity Strategy and related

progress chart (from July 2006 and a current version). You also asked for information on metrics or indicators used to measure progress. The interagency Embassy

team in Baghdad has developed a robust Ministerial Capacity development program, which began with a baseline assessment of the capacity of ten key Iraqi Ministries in nine areas, such as leadership, strategy and budgeting. Ambassador

Satterfield’s staff has contacted your staff to arrange a more detailed briefing on the

details of these programs.

Continuing these efforts to build Iraqi ministerial capacity to perform core functions, such as design and execution of budgets, will be a key component of ‘‘The New

Way Forward’’ announced by the President.

I hope this information is useful for you.

Sincerely,

JEFFREY T. BERGNER,

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. The second half of that question is: Is there a relationship between, I ask you both this question, between the potential efficacy of this new plan with regard to PRTs and their

backup capacity to go in and build, et cetera; and the capacity of

the Iraqi Ministries? In other words, we’re going in there, and

you’re bringing in folks who are going to try to get potable water

to every part of the city, and other places; you’re going to try to

get their electricity and educational systems back up and running.

But is our doing this going to improve the capacity of the Iraqis

to be able to eventually run their own government?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Absolutely, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There’s a very material relationship,

and it falls into two categories. One encompasses all of the Iraqi

Ministries, and its budget execution—it’s their ability to move their

own moneys out, onto the street, into the field, in Baghdad and beyond. Which is very, very defective, and deficient and we are focusing, perhaps, the largest share of our ministerial capacity efforts,

right now, on budget execution governmentwide, but focused on the

critical Ministries. Finance, above all, Planning, Oil, Electricity.

That’s the first step.

The CHAIRMAN. Beyond moving the moneys out, what about the

operational control of whatever it is you’re moving them out for?

568

Increasing the effectiveness of the electric grid, getting more oil

pumped through the pipeline, so that the central government has

resources, et cetera. What is the relationship? Do you have confidence that you have a partner in the Iraqi Ministries that you can

essentially hand this off to?

I mean, I’ll give you one example. Your former commanding officer, General Chiarelli, used a specific example, and I’ll not belabor

the point, it was along the lines of what Senator Webb was talking

about. He said, ‘‘We build a first class,’’ he called it, ‘‘the biggest

water fountain in the Middle East.’’ He talked about how we had

successfully built within Baghdad a water facility that could provide potable water to all of the city. But, we decided—if I understood him correctly—that it was up to the Iraqis to connect—what

he referred to as the fountain—to Iraqi homes. And that meant laying pipe. That meant laying the facility to get the water from the

facility to the spickets of Iraqi homes. And he talked about the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi Ministry to get that done.

So, these are very practical considerations. And tell me, I would

like for the record, if you’re willing, to update us on the present

status of these Ministries? Because to go back to what Senator

Webb and also, I think, Senator Lugar talked about—we’re not

even rebuilding, sufficiently, New Orleans. We’re not rebuilding,

we’re surging into Baghdad, and we’re surging police out of American cities as the crime rate rises. We’re eliminating the crime bill,

we’re eliminating funding for local law enforcement, or drastically

cutting it by $2 billion a year.

And so, we want to help—I speak for myself—I want to help. But

it’s kind of hard to go back and explain to my constituency why I

am conceding to the President’s request for another, total this calendar year, as it will turn out, year and a half, probably a billion

and three-quarters dollars. You know, your $588 million supplemental, your billion, two or three, whatever. It’s a big number. It’s

a big number, and that billion dollars would go a long way to providing housing in the ninth ward. It would go a long way to reinstate the cops in the 34 largest cities in America. It would go a long

way to provide interoperability to cities that have no interoperability if another hurricane or disaster strikes.

So, we have to get down to the weeds. Not now, I’m not asking

for an answer, unless you want to provide one, I’d like one in writing, where you’re able to demonstrate to us that we’re going to go

in, risk American lives to clear, we’re going to risk American lives,

as stated, to hold, and then we’re going to build. Once we build,

we’ve got to turn it over to somebody. And is there any reason for

us to believe this time out that there no longer exists, what I believe to be, an almost totally ineffectual ministerial bureaucracy in

almost all of the Ministries?

Now, I may be dated here, maybe things have really progressed

in the last year or 6 months. But we need some hard data. We need

your best assessment to pile onto what my friend from Virginia is

saying, we need some metrics. We want to know what it is you are

basing it on. Because I do agree, and I’ll conclude with this, there

is a correlation between the standard of living for Iraqis increasing,

and the likelihood of them wanting to shoot at our men and women

in uniform. I do think there’s a correlation.

569

And thus far—and I don’t want to go back, I said these hearings

would not be about the past, but about the future—I am very skeptical of taking very limited resources and assigning them to a worthy goal without much, much, much harder data. Much tighter

reasoning, and much closer oversight on a monthly basis as to

what’s going on. And I think you will find that it’s not just Senator

Webb who is knowledgeable about these things due to his past duties at the Pentagon, but I think you’re going to find a lot of us

are equally knowledgeable, on both sides of the aisle.

Senator WEBB. Mr. Chairman, if I may?

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Senator WEBB. I—Mr. Ambassador, I want to clarify the concern

that was behind the questions that I asked, and the exchange that

we had. I have a great deal of respect for your career of focusing

on this region and the positions that you’ve held, and at the same

time, I’m very mindful that you’re here as a member of the administration. And these kinds of concerns are not simply whether the

programs are working inside Iraq—although there is a great deal

of concern. And the questions that I asked about where these contracts have gone, you know, to American companies, and et cetera,

I think they are relevant to the way that we’re trying to examine

fairness, misuse of funds, those sorts of things.

And it’s not only how this impacts the region. It’s how we’re trying to look at fairness in terms of situations like the aftermath of

Katrina, and the obligations that we have. And so, one of the questions, really, honestly at this point, is to what extent is the United

States actually responsible for the full reconstruction of Iraq—this

is not a question for you, it’s just a clarification of what I was saying before—and to what extent the Iraqis themselves are ultimately going to have to be responsible. They have a long history

of entrepreneurial activities, notwithstanding some of the more recent events under Saddam Hussein, so you know, for me looking

at this and coming here, and having heard again, and again, and

again, on the campaign trail and through the course of this war,

about the misuse of money, and the favoritism that went into contracts, and a lack of performance, and these sorts of things.

I believe that a lot of arguments that are fueled by emotion are

best resolved by going to the facts. And that’s the motivation behind my questions, and I’m looking forward to being able to sit

down, again, as I said, with you, or someone who is a representative of your office, and also with people from the Department of Defense and let’s start breaking down the facts, and reporting to the

American people.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, Senator, we’ll certainly

respond, Mr. Chairman, to the various questions that you posed.

But, the last point that you raised—confidence in execution because that’s really, if I take it, what you’re asking.

The CHAIRMAN. At the end of the day.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. In the ability of Iraqis and the United

States to execute the critical economic steps necessary to build a

success. We would be happy to brief you on the considerations that

have gone into our planning, how we are working with the Iraqi

Government on this score because it is the fundamental challenge,

and it’s the fundamental element in success on this part.

570

Which leads me, Senator Webb, to your question—are we responsible, the United States, the American people, for the reconstruction of Iraq? Absolutely not.

In 2003, the World Bank estimated the reconstruction figure for Iraq to be something around $100 billion. With all of the generosity

of the American people and the U.S. Congress, the $20 billion that

was allocated—and those portions of it that were actually applied

to reconstruction—were only intended to, if you will, jumpstart,

other than security, efforts in oil, electricity and certain other sectors. There was every expectation that the Iraqis themselves, the

international community, the region, would come to the table and

play their part.

And I can assure you, Senator, there is more than an expectation

right now that Iraqis are, and must be, responsible for the reconstruction of their country. They need help from outside, they should

get that help, but they are going to have to take the lead on this.

This is not a U.S. challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. The jumpstart—I’m sorry, General, please.

General JONES. I’m sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. No——

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is responsible for two Ministries—Ministry of Interior and Ministry of

Defense—and we will provide you those assessments promptly.

[The information provided on the slides submitted by General

Jones follows:]

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572

573

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that because I know that it’s beyond.

I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your willingness to sit down and further discuss with us these issues. But you all have produced, in

making this assessment, specific data. We’d like to have the data.

Not just the explanation, generically, of why you’ve arrived at the

conclusions you have reached.

And, in terms of the international community, I was voting when

Senator Hagel was questioning, but my understanding from my

staff was that there was some discussion about whether this is a

wholly owned American subsidiary here. Whether or not we really

are getting cooperation from a consortia of other countries.

I noticed we are rightfully dropping the charade of speaking of

Coalition Forces—the Brits are on their way out, in large part.

They only have 7,000 folks there, and you add up every other force

from every other country in the region and you don’t get as many

people as are in the Washington, DC, police force.

So, I guess what I’m trying to say is, it goes down a little bit to

truth in advertising here. For me to go back to my home constituents and justify voting, again, for ‘‘reconstruction’’ moneys, I’d better have a much, much tighter understanding of the process and

be able to demonstrate with specificity to my constituents why I

think this may work.

With regard to the international community—my observation,

and it may not be complete—my observation is that there is an

awful lot of people sitting on their hands. It seems to me there

would be an overwhelming interest on the part of the Saudis who

are awash in oil money to commit moneys to the reconstruction of

Iraq. The Saudis who have more money than the Lord Almighty

these days, and for them to commit $10, $20, $30 billion would not

take up a month’s profit. Whether it’s literally a month’s profit or

not, I don’t know—but this is not a heavy lift for them financially.

I guess it is a heavy lift in terms of diplomacy and politics, and the

question is: How are we going to feel if, in fact, there is continued

financial assistance and outreach from the existing government of

Iran? Iran has a fair amount of money right now because of oil.

And so, I hope at some point we’ll be able to discuss that. So, I’m

not asking you to respond, but I’d invite your response, if you could

tell us about, or if you’d rather do it for the record—about what are

the hard donor commitments, other than from the United States

Government, for the reconstruction of Iraq.

And I’ll conclude by saying, the World Bank has concluded that

we’re talking about $100 billion, thereabouts. Well, if it takes $100

billion to rebuild it, and we spend $10 billion to rebuild it, we’re

not likely to succeed. And so, if we’re pouring our $10 billion into

an empty bucket here, that there’s no prospect of Iraq and the

international community keeping the pace to get to $60 billion,

$100 billion, or $120 billion. It makes you sort of reassess the investment.

So, that’s why I ask the question, but if you want to respond to

the participation of the international community, feel free. My time

is up and I will close the hearing after this, unless my friend has

more questions.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, we’ll respond on the

hard commitments and the delivered commitments.

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We’ve got some significant partners—the Japanese, the Canadians, the Italians, the European Union—have all moved forward

with significant amounts of economic assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me a sense, have they moved

forward——

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. And we can give you the specifics on

that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say ‘‘significant amounts’’ could you be

more specific, because without specifying we’ll leave this public

hearing believing that the international community is contributing

‘‘significant amounts’’ of economic assistance to the reconstruction

effort. When you say significant amounts, I suspect the average

Senator watching this in their office, or their staff, or the public

watching it, thinks that means ‘‘significant,’’ like us. That means,

you know, hundreds of millions, billions of dollars, combined. Is

that what we’re talking about?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. In the aggregate, it is in the hundreds

of millions.

The CHAIRMAN. Hundred of millions?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Hundreds of millions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. But, there are very significant donor

pledges which have not been fulfilled, that date back to the Madrid

Conference, and as significantly, there are tens of billions of debt

forgiveness from the Gulf States, over $30 billion from Saudi Arabia alone.

The CHAIRMAN. How much from us?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Which we’re pledged. We have forgiven all of Iraq’s debt.

The CHAIRMAN. But how much did that add up to?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It was around $4 billion, I believe,

Senator. I will get you the precise number.

But, those commitments remain to be fulfilled.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, I thank you.

Senator Webb, do you have any further questions?

Senator WEBB. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the

testimony of the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. And I thank you and look forward to your written comments, as well as to the reports we’ve requested. I thank

you for your cooperation, and—to state the obvious—we hope it

works. We hope it works.

We are recessed. Adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

‘‘FAMILIES OF THE FALLEN FOR CHANGE’’ LETTER SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R.

BIDEN, JR.

FAMILIES OF THE FALLEN FOR CHANGE,

Cleveland, OH, January 15, 2007.

Senator JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,

Chairman and Members, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND COMMITTEE MEMBERS: Recognizing error, cutting losses, altering course, is not something governments are good at. Changing course requires conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00584 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
575

siderable self-confidence on the part of leaders, something we are hoping you have

today.

We are the parents of Marine Lance Corporal Edward ‘‘Augie’’ Schroeder who was

killed August 3, 2005, near Haditha, Iraq, while deployed with the Third Battalion,

25th Marines, a Reserve unit based in Brook Park, Ohio.

In November 2005 we founded Families of the Fallen for Change, a non-profit organization that seeks to bring about change in overall Iraq policy and strategy.

Today, Families of the Fallen for Change has more than 1,500 members nationwide,

half of whom are veterans.

Though we are not novices at foreign relations (one doctorate in international relations and several years of living and working abroad), we remain amateurs in

Middle East affairs in comparison to those who have testified and are scheduled to

testify before the committee.

Thus we do not speak from the head, so to speak, but from the heart, and our

hearts are broken. Though family members of American service men and women

who have been killed in Iraq may differ on the validity of American efforts there,

I am certain that their hearts, too, are broken.

We grieve as each additional American KIA is announced, for we feel the pain

of each new broken heart added to the list.

Further, we understand that the families and friends of the 140,000 or so Americans remaining in Iraq—and those of others about to be deployed—are living each

day with the anxiety that comes from fear their loved one may be killed or grievously injured.

In our last conversation with Augie, he said, ‘‘Pop, the closer we get to leaving,

it’s clear this is less and less worth the cost.’’

He described his unit’s repeated efforts to clear the same cities and towns of insurgents, only to leave and let the insurgents come back. Augie said: ‘‘We don’t have

enough troops to do this. We can’t hold these places.’’

He went on: ‘‘Two guys were killed walking past a wall. The wall just blew up.

We all walked past that wall everyday. It could have been any one of us. It’s just

a crap shoot.’’

We heard the fear in his voice. We’ve seen a haunted expression in some of the

last photos taken of him. We felt the helplessness of being unable to do anything

to take care of our only son.

Augie’s KIA number was 1,824 if we go alphabetically (he died with 13 comrades

in a single explosion). Today, that number is 3,020. In Augie’s estimation, the efforts

in Iraq were not worth the cost nearly 1,200 deaths ago. In his estimation, survival

for American marines and soldiers in Iraq was ‘‘just a crap shoot.’’ To be sure, this

is the case in any war, and we believe that at times war is necessary. But in the

case of Iraq, it was not.

It is obvious from the reaction of many committee members and others in Congess

that you understand the human costs of this war. For the sake of urgency, however,

there is a need to consider these costs in terms of what lies ahead. At the current

daily Killed-in-Action rate of 2.34 since the war started (according to http://

icasualties.org/oif/):

• Number 4,000 will be recorded on or about March 7, 2008. That is an additional

982 American lives as of today.

• The death toll on January 1, 2008 (first day of troop withdrawal recommended

by the Iraq Study Group—first quarter next year), will be 3,846. That is an additional 828 American lives as of today.

• The death toll on January 20, 2009 (Inauguration Day), is 4,747. That is an additional 1,729 American lives as of today.

These estimates do not consider that attacks on American troops could escalate,

which would push the daily KIA rate higher. It also does not consider the hundreds

of thousands of Iraqi civilians who have been killed, wounded, or displaced.

Nonetheless, additional American lives will be lost after a majority of the American public, the American military, and Members of Congress have recognized that

this war cannot be won militarily and that a political solution must be sought as

soon as possible.

These lives are worth much more than Secretary of State Rice’s concern about negotiating a political solution from a ‘‘supplicant’’ position.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is long past time to withdraw

our troops. It is a moral imperative that we do so.

In the last 18 months, we have given a lot of thought to one question: Why did

our son die?

576

We don’t mean the manner of his death. We don’t mean the reasons why he joined

the Marines. And we don’t mean the specifics of why and how we got involved in

Iraq in the first place.

We’re trying to get at the larger Gestalt, the historical, perhaps even the philosophical reasons that prompted his death.

Augie is part of that long line of ghosts whose lives were taken by the folly of

governments.

The lessons of history are seldom heeded. Samuel Taylor Coleridge said that ‘‘passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives us is a lantern

on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us.’’

Barbara Tuchman, in her book ‘‘The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam.’’

(1984, Michael Joseph, Ltd.) wondered why governments pursue policies that are

clearly not in the best interests of their nation or the people.

She identifies three stages of folly.

First is a standstill, when principles and boundaries governing a political problem

are fixed.

Second, failure and criticism begin to appear, which in her words ‘‘rigidify’’ those

principles and boundaries.

It is here that changes in policy are possible, but Tuchman calls them ‘‘rare as

rubies in the backyard.’’

More typical in this stage are increased investments along with an increasing

need to protect egos that make a change in course next to impossible.

In the third stage, the pursuit of failure enlarges the damages until it causes the

fall of Troy or the American humiliation in Vietnam.

So Augie is dead because of folly. American folly that all the world sees. Iraq is

just another chapter in Barbara Tuchman’s book.

How sad that we haven’t come any further than the Trojans, who let that horse

into the gates. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we have a request.

These two parents—and a large number of other parents with whom we have spoken—turn to you and all Members of Congress to consider the lives now at risk.

Consider the additional families and the broken hearts they will suffer by inaction

or delay.

As soon as possible, bring ’em home Senators, bring ’em home.

Thank you.

PAUL E. SCHROEDER, ROSEMARY A. PALMER,

Families of the Fallen for Change.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR DAVID SATTERFIELD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JIM WEBB

Question. Please provide a description of measurable standards—criteria used by

the USG to award reconstruction contracts and prioritize and control distribution

of funds.

Answer. After consultations with the administration, Congress provided specific

funding levels for sectors under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF).

This allowed Congress to give the initial legislative direction on the prioritization

of funds. Following the closure of the CPA, the State Department, through the Iraq

Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), determined specific USG implementing

agencies for IRRF sector projects, within guidelines established by Congress. The

primary IRRF implementing agencies are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf

Region Division (USACE–GRD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID).

The more than 13,000 IRRF projects vary widely in their scope and purpose. Some

are relatively simple contracts for procurement of goods and services, while others

involve the construction of large, complex electricity, oil, and water facilities. For

more complex construction projects, the implementing agencies write detailed scopes

of work for projects, which form the basis for requests for proposals from contractors. Depending on the nature of the project, these scopes of work tend to be very

detailed, and are project specific. The implementing agencies follow their relevant

Federal Acquisition Rules governing contract award, which allow a range of procurement approaches. For example, the Department of State has asked contractors to

comply with FAR competitive contracting to the greatest extent practicable in a

post-conflict environment.

IRMO prioritizes and manages funds by developing and coordinating the Iraq foreign assistance budget request. The implementing agencies make every effort to

monitor the contracts for compliance with the specific requirements, and verify that

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work has been completed satisfactorily before disbursing payment. They also work

closely with our auditors, including SIGIR and GAO, to ensure that we are conducting adequate project oversight. While SIGIR and GAO have identified specific

problems, SIGIR has consistently noted that most U.S. reconstruction projects have

been completed satisfactorily. Finally, reporting mechanisms are in place to assist

implementing agencies and IRMO in identifying early any potential issues with

project progress and compliance.

Over the last 3 years, we have learned a number of lessons in managing our reconstruction contracts in Iraq. Although we initially awarded large contracts to

international design-build contractors, we have increasingly shifted our focus toward

specific, fixed-cost contracts, which we have awarded to regional and Iraqi contractors in larger numbers. Along the way, we have improved our management capabilities, including on-sight inspections and financial tracking. These efforts contributed

to improved distribution of funds by providing greater information on which reform

and reconstruction efforts may require greater or lesser resources to achieve U.S.

policy objectives. We will continue to work closely with our auditors to improve our

project management as we complete the remaining IRRF projects.

Question. Please provide a breakout of reconstruction funds that have gone to U.S.

companies versus local Iraqis. Ambassador Satterfield said 80 percent of assistance

is now going to Iraqis. Since when?

Answer. We are currently working with IRMO and the agencies responsible for

implementing IRRF projects to compile a specific response to your inquiry, and we

expect to respond more completely by February 16.

As a general matter, early in the reconstruction effort U.S. implementing agencies

entered into contracts with large American international design-build contractors.

Later, in an effort to complete reconstruction projects more effectively and at lower

cost, the implementing agencies shifted toward direct fixed-price contracts with

Iraqi and regional firms and labor to the greatest possible extent.

This allowed quicker disbursement of funds while reducing security risks to Americans, lowering overhead costs and increasing employment opportunities for Iraqis.

Question. Please provide a chart of all Iraq reconstruction funds to reflect how

much has been appropriated, obligated, expended, and for what activities.

Answer.

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IRRF FINANCIAL SUMMARY—JANUARY 30, 2007

(In millions of USD)

Sector Apportion

Committed Obligated Disbursed

Last week Current Change Last week Current Change Last week Current Change

Security and Law Enforcement .......................................... $5,002.59 $4,988.66 $4,988.17 ($O.49) $4,986.19 $4,986.19 0.00 $4,715.92 $4,716.47 $0.56Electricity Sector ................................................................ 4,239.51 4,222.70 4,224.34 1.64 4,079.16 4,080.91 $1.75 3,016.61 3,029.57 12.95Oil Infrastructure ............................................................... 1,724.70 1,678.03 1,678.03 0.00 1,584.47 1,584.47 0.00 1,318.17 1,318.28 0.12Justice, Public Safety and Civil Society ............................ 1,304.15 1,303.93 1,303.93 0.00 1,297.72 1,297.72 0.00 981.13 982.42 1.28Democracy .......................................................................... 1,001.85 1,001.71 1,001.74 0.03 1,001.71 1,001.74 0.03 893.05 893.61 0.55Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance ............ 401.50 401.33 401.26 (0.08) 401.33 401.26 (0.08) 343.90 354.55 10.65Roads, Bridges and Construction ...................................... 333.60 331.94 331.95 0.00 325.84 324.59 (1.26) 209.56 209.55 (0.01)Health Care ........................................................................ 818.90 817.57 817.61 0.04 801.69 801.76 0.07 614.47 621.37 6.90Transportation and Communications ................................ 464.12 464.11 464.11 0.00 458.23 458.30 0.068 339.70 339.69 (0.01)Water Resources and Sanitation ....................................... 2,131.08 2,121.16 2,119.78 1.38 2,049.75 2,048.37 (1.38) 1,436.47 1,444.08 7.61Private Sector Development ............................................... 813.95 813.91 813.95 0.04 813.91 813.95 0.04 764.90 765.96 1.06Admin. Expense (USAID, State) ......................................... 213.00 212.45 212.45 0.00 212.45 212.45 0.00 164.05 164.24 0.19

Total ...................................................................... 18,448.95 18,357.52 18,357.33 (0.19) 18,012.46 18,011.71 (0.74) 14,797.93 14,839.79 41.85

IRRF II Construction ........................................................... 10,573.40 10,573.21 (0.19) 10,250.09 10,249.35 (0.75) 8,027.37 8,053.62 26.25IRRF II Non-Construction ................................................... 6,782.41 6,782.38 (0.03) 6,760.65 6,760.62 (0.03) 5,877.51 5,892.56 15.05IRRF II Democracy .............................................................. 1,001.71 1,001.75 0.03 1,001.71 1,001.75 0.03 893.05 893.61 0.55

IRRF I Total .......................................................... 2,473.30 2,473.30 2,473.30 0.00 2,232.30 2,232.30 0.00 2,139.00 2,139.00 0.00Grand Total IRRF I & II ........................................ 20,922.25 20,830.82 20,830.63 (0.19) 20,244.76 20,244.01 (0.74) 16,936.93 16,978.79 41.85

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CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER DONORS SUPPLIED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, DC, February 1, 2007.

Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your question to Ambassador David

Satterfield during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

January 25, we would like to provide you with the following information.

You asked about the latest information on non-United States international donor

contributions to the reconstruction of Iraq. We are therefore including the most recently relevant edition of the October 2006, 2207 Report. As you will note, significant progress has been made on the International Compact for Iraq.

More recent and updated information will be included in the new 2207 Report set

for release early this year.

We look forward to working with the committee to answer any further questions

you may have on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

JEFFREY BERGNER,

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Attachment: Appendix II

APPENDIX II

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER DONORS

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ

During this past quarter, the United States has been continuing to work very

closely with Iraq and international donors to broaden and deepen international assistance for Iraq. A major development was the launching on July 27 of work on

a new International Compact for Iraq that is similar to the International Compact

for Afghanistan that was adopted in January 2006. Iraq and the United Nations,

in close cooperation with the World Bank, share the lead in developing this new

agreement between Iraq and the international community. Under the Compact, the

Iraqi Government will undertake a series of economic reforms and initiatives for

good governance (for example, to combat corruption) in return for commitments of

financial and other forms of foreign assistance. On September 18, 2006, at sessions

held to inform about the Compact held alongside the U.N. General Assembly and

IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in New York and Singapore to inform the international community about the Compact, the Foreign and Finance Ministers of more

than 35 countries and international organizations expressed their support for the

Compact. Final work on the Compact is expected to be completed in time for formal

adoption before the end of November 2006, by Iraq and an even larger group of

countries and organizations. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt and

State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow are co-leads in USG efforts in support

of the Compact.

At the October 2003 Madrid International Donors’ Conference, donors other than

the United States pledged over $13.5 billion in assistance for the reconstruction of

Iraq. This includes $8 billion in assistance from foreign governments and $5.5 billion in lending from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)—all

to be disbursed between 2004 and 2007. In January 2006, $3.2 billion of the pledges

of non-U.S. assistance had been disbursed. By August 2006, disbursements of nonU.S. assistance had increased significantly, to about $3.7 billion; approximately $3

billion of this was from other donor governments, either in bilateral projects, or

through the World Bank and U.N.-administered International Reconstruction Fund

Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). (Currently, United Nations and World Bank projects in

water, electricity, education, health and other areas are in various stages of completion.) By the end of August 2006, of a total of $1.16 billion deposited in the U.N.

Trust Fund, $861 million had been committed to specific projects and $534 million

disbursed. Of the $456.8 billion pledged to the World Bank, $395 million had been

committed and $67.5 million disbursed. The IMF approved $436 million in balanceof-payments support in September 2004 and an additional $685 million of such support in December 2005.

Since Madrid, donors have pledged an additional $652 million. A number of countries and institutions have disbursed assistance above and beyond what they

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pledged at the 2003 Madrid Conference, including Australia, the European Commission, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.

Donor government disbursements are defined here as funds that have left government treasuries. Because, however, much of the assistance is being channeled for

implementation through trust funds, contractors, NGOs, international organizations

and Iraqi institutions, there is normally some time between disbursement by the

donor and impact on the ground in Iraq.

Donors committed an additional $235 million in new contributions to the IRFFI

at the July 2005 meeting of the IRFFI Donors’ Committee at the Dead Sea in Jordan. Most of this was new pledges since Madrid, and most has already been deposited in the IRFFI. The Islamic Development Bank agreed that it would make $300

million in new concessional financing available in November 2005. The World Bank

and Iraq agreed in principle on an up to $500 million framework program for

concessional IDA lending. The World Bank Board has approved two IDA loans

under this program: A $100 million education project and a $135 million transportation project, approved in June 2006, that will help rehabilitate roads and bridges.

In December 2005, the IMF agreed to a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Iraq

that makes $685 million available for balance-of-payment support.

THE INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUND FACILITY FOR IRAQ (IRFFI)

The Madrid Conference authorized the establishment of the IRFFI, which gives

donors a multilateral channel for their Iraq assistance—in addition to their bilateral

efforts. The IRFFI contains two primary trust funds, one managed by the World

Bank, the other by the United Nations. Funds channeled through the IRFFI come

from donors’ pledges made at the Madrid Conference and those made subsequently.

There are currently 116 IRFFI projects (103 United Nations, 13 World Bank) in various stages of completion. Details on the IRFFI can be found at www.irffi.org.

• Current donor commitments to the IRFFI total about $1.6 billion. Of this

amount, $491 million is from Japan; $620 million from the European Commission; $127 million from the United Kingdom; $69 million from Canada; $40 million from Spain; $36 million from Australia, $29.8 million from Italy; $13.7 million from Norway; $12.9 million from the Netherlands; $16.4 million from

Sweden; $15 million from the Republic of Korea; $10 million each from the

United States, Denmark, Germany, India, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar. Belgium,

Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Turkey have

committed varying amounts under $10 million.

• Of the approximately $1.6 billion in commitments, donors (including the United

States) have deposited $1.54 billion in the IRFFI trust funds as of August 31,

2006.

• The United Nations and World Bank submit their project proposals for approval

to the Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB). The ISRB is an Iraqi coordinating

body chaired by the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation that reviews requests for and offers of external donor assistance.

• The IRFFI Donors’ Committee held its fourth meeting at the Dead Sea in Jordan, on July 18–19, 2005. The Donors’ Committee consists of 18 countries that

have committed at least $10 million to the fund facility and two rotating representatives (currently Finland and Turkey) from countries that have committed less than $10 million. As of the end of September 2006, the implementing U.N. agencies have legally committed $644 million and disbursed $546

million of total approved projects amounting to $861 million. So far in 2006, the

IRFFI has received approximately $168 million in new commitments ($152 million from the European Union, $10 million from Germany, $2.4 million from

Spain, $1.5 from Australia, $1.1 from Luxembourg, $1 million from New Zealand and smaller contributions from Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, the

Netherlands, and Norway). Canada continued its chairmanship of the IRFFI

Donors’ Committee, which it assumed from Japan in February, 2005.

• At the Dead Sea meeting, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) assumed its

central role in soliciting and coordinating international support for Iraqi reconstruction. It presented an updated National Development Strategy and a series

of new donor coordination mechanisms on the ground in Iraq. Together these

efforts represented an important shift toward an Iraq-led reconstruction process, strongly supported by the international community. Chaired by the ITG,

but supported by the United Nations and World Bank, these new coordinating

bodies, which include a ‘‘Baghdad Coordination Group’’ of all donors on the

ground and ‘‘Sectoral Working Groups,’’ have been holding meetings since AuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00590 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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gust 2005. So far, Sectoral Working Groups have been established for Health,

Education, Rule of Law, and Electricity. • The next IRFFI Donors’ Committee meeting will be scheduled, after close consultation with the new Iraqi Government, and depending on developments with

the International Compact with Iraq. The Donor Committee will discuss how to

best align IRFFI with the Compact Process.

UPDATES ON SELECTED MAJOR DONORS

The January 2004 report to Congress included a table of pledges made at the Madrid International Donors Conference. Since that report, donors have begun disbursing and implementing their assistance. Below are major donor highlights:

Japan

Japan has pledged and disbursed more assistance to Iraq than any other country except the United States. By May 2005, Japan had entirely obligated the $1.5 billion

of grant aid that it had pledged in Madrid. Japan is currently in discussions with

Iraq on the first projects to be implemented from its $3.5 billion concessional loan

program. Moreover, based on the agreement of the Paris Club concerning the treatment of Iraq’s debt, the Government of Japan and the Government of Iraq agreed

upon the details of the conditions for debt relief. Notes to this effect were exchanged

on November 24, 2005, in Tokyo between both Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

The debt will be cancelled by 80 percent in three stages, which amounts to a re- duction of approximately US$6 billion. In late March, Japan announced and notified

the Iraqi side of its intention to provide yen loans up to the total amount of 76,489

million yen (approximately $655 million) toward three projects in Iraq. On June 18,

Japan confirmed with the new Iraqi Government the decision to extend yen-loan up

to 3,348 million yen (approximately $28 million) for implementing another project

in Samawah. Exchange of Notes will be signed with the new Iraqi Government regarding the provision of these loans. The four projects are:

• Umm-Qasr Port Sector Rehabilitation Project (∼$259 million): To dredge the

port and surrounding shipping lanes, remove wrecked ships and rehabilitate the

port facilities, as well as to provide equipment and materials such as dredgers

and other items. This project aims to reconstruct the Port of Umm-Qasr and its

function as the transportation and distribution network hub.

• Irrigation Sector Loan (∼$81 million): To provide irrigation drainage pumps and

equipment and materials for maintaining the operation of irrigation channels

in some sites where agriculture is important, including in the Governorate of

Al-Muthanna. This sector loan aims to improve the agricultural production and

increase employment in Iraq.

• Al-Mussaib Thermal Power Plant Rehabilitation Project (∼$315 million): To rehabilitate the existing Al-Mussaib thermal power plants (units 1 and 3), located

in the Baghdad suburbs. This project aims to improve the power supply mainly

targeting Baghdad.

• Samawah Bridges and Roads Construction Project ($28 million): To construct

a new bridge (Samawah North Bridge), rebuild provisional bridges (Mandi

Bridge and Hillal Bridge) to cross over the Euphrates and construct their connecting roads in Al-Samawah and its vicinity.

In December 2005, Japan decided to extend a grant of $14.4 million to UNDP for

the Iraqi Reconstruction and Employment Program and Electricity Network enforcement Program in Al-Muthanna.

In earlier disbursements of its grants assistance, Japan deposited a total of $491

million to the IRFFI ($361 million to the U.N. fund and $130 million to the World

Bank fund). Japan has also deposited $10 million to the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Small Business Financing Facility. In addition, Japan has disbursed $116 million directly to international organizations to implement projects

such as restoration of water and sewage systems, garbage collection and sanitation.

The balance of Japan’s disbursements, $938 million, have been in direct bilateral

projects or channeled through Iraqi institutions and NGOs for implementation.

Major Japanese contributions (in grants):

• Electricity: Rehabilitation of four electrical power stations (Taji Gas Turbine,

Mosul Gas Turbine, Mosul Hydroelectric and Hartha Power), construction of a

diesel power station and provision of generators in Samawah, rehabilitation of

the National Dispatch Center and provision of 27 mobile electricity substations.

• Water and Sanitation: Provision of 38 water tankers, 311 water tanks and 6

water treatment units in the Al-Muthanna governorate. Provision of 30 compact

water treatment units in Baghdad and rehabilitation of water and sewage facilities in schools in Baghdad and Nineveh.

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• Health: Grant assistance for Japanese NGO projects to the Samawah Maternity

and Children’s Hospital, which have provided medical equipment, including infant incubators, phototherapy units for incubators and electrocardiographs to

the only children’s and maternity hospital in the Al-Muthanna Governorate.

Medical supplies and equipment also have been provided to the Samawah General Hospital and Al-Rumaytha and Al-Khidhur hospitals and to 32 primary

health centers in the Al-Muthanna governorate. Rehabilitation and equipping

of four general hospitals (Nasiriyah, Najaf, Diwaniyah and Samawah) in southern Iraq, four more in northern Iraq (Kirkuk, Erbil, Mosul, and Dahuk) and

three in Central Iraq (Baghdad, Amarah, and Kut). • Roads and Bridges: The repair of roads between Al-Khidhur and Darraji and

between Mandi and Sawa and other roads in Al-Muthanna governorate as well

as the provision of construction equipment to restore damaged roads and

bridges in the governorate. Rehabilitation of 90 kilometers of roads in AlMuthanna governorate. • Education and Culture: Contributions to UNESCO, which are building capacity

at the Ministry of Education and restoring the Iraqi National Museum’s restoration laboratory. Through HABITAT, assistance for rehabilitation of about 200

schools in Basrah, Samawah, Nashiria and Amra and of about 3,000 houses and

community facilities in Baghdad, Samawah and Kirkuk. • Security: Donation of 1,150 police vehicles, 150 police buses, 500 police motorcycles and 20 armored vehicles. Donation of 70 fire trucks to Baghdad, Basrah,

and Al-Muthanna. Donation of 742 ambulances. • Capacity Building: Training over 1,200 Iraqis, including Iraqi diplomats, staff

of the Al-Muthanna TV station, museum officials, statisticians, election officials,

medical staff, and hospital directors.

The United Kingdom

At Madrid, the United Kingdom pledged £296 million ($545 million) for the Iraq

reconstruction effort for 2004 through 2006. This was included in the United Kingdom’s total pledge of £544 million ($920 million), which counted the United Kingdom’s previously announced assistance for the humanitarian effort and its assessed

portion of the European Commission’s assistance. As of September 2006, the United

Kingdom had disbursed £277 million ($521 million) of its Madrid $545 million reconstruction pledge.

The United Kingdom has disbursed approximately £193 million ($360 million) for

projects in support of reconstruction in southern Iraq, governance and economic capacity-building, the justice sector, independent media and civil society. The United

Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) is responsible for

these projects. The United Kingdom also deposited $127 million in the IRFFI—$71

million to the World Bank Trust Fund and $56 million to the U.N. Trust Fund.

The DFID program in 2006–2007 is entirely bilateral and focuses on economic reform; infrastructure (improving power and water services in the south); governance

and institutional-building in Baghdad and in the south; and support for civil society

and political participation.

In southern Iraq, the United Kingdom has provided support to rehabilitate emergency infrastructure, working closely with the United Kingdom military; an infrastructure project to deliver improved power and water services; support to build the

institutional capacity of the four southern governorates and private sector development; a team of technical specialists to advise local councils, U.K. military and other

donors on infrastructure rehabilitation and construction; and support to strengthen

independent broadcasting.

In central Iraq, the United Kingdom has supported the Iraqi Government on economic reform issues; supported the Center of Government Program to improve functions of government; supported the justice sector; provided funds for a Civil Society

Fund (CSF) to develop legitimate and representative Iraqi NGOs; and provided

funds for a Political Participation Fund (PPF) to encourage poor and marginalized

sections of Iraqi society to engage in the constitutional process. Major U.K. contributions:

• Electricity: Repaired transmission lines from Hartha Power station to Basrah

city, securing electricity supplies for 1.5 million residents; improved power distribution to 13 areas of Basrah. U.K. support will add or secure an additional

470 MW of power equivalent to a 24-hour supply to over 235,000 households.

• Water and Sanitation: Replaced 800 km of water mains, repaired over 5,000

leaks, cleared out 7,000 septic tanks and cleared over 40 kms of drains across

the four southern governorates; constructed a water training center in Basra to

increase the skills of Iraqi engineers in water treatment and leakage repair, and

improved water supply to 60,000 people in Al Amtahiyah. Current activities inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00592 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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clude refurbishing a reverse osmosis unit, building water towers and reservoirs,

and refurbishing a pump station. These will directly benefit up to 1 million people in Basra. • Capacity-Building: Supported new Provincial Development Committees which

produced Iraq-led draft Provincial Development Strategies, which included resource statements to bid for funding from the central government. Trained 216

Iraqi judges, lawyers, and prosecutors in human rights, international humanitarian law and independence of the judiciary. Trained 182 journalists, editors

and media managers on humanitarian and independent reporting. New, independent TV and radio programs in southern Iraq went on air during summer

2005 through DFID funding. • Supporting Iraqi Humanitarian Response: DFID consultants to the IIG Fallujah

Core Coordination Group from December 2004 helped set up mechanisms for

the Iraqi Government to respond to future crises. • Macroeconomic Reform: Assisted the Iraqi Government in drawing up its 2006 budget, reaching agreement with the IMF on a $436 million Emergency PostConflict Assistance package, negotiating the Paris Club debt reduction deal and

drafting a National Development Strategy. • Support to the Political Process: Helped to promote the political process through support for the electoral commission ($10 million plus advisers on security and

public information), civil society organizations (∼$8.7 million) and public participation in the elections (∼$12.6 million). Helped to set up the Prime Minister’s

office and the Cabinet and Committee system. Helped achieve continuity in the

transition to the new elected administration.

Further information on the DFID program in Iraq, including quarterly updates,

is available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/iraq.asp.

Canada

Canada has pledged C$300 million (about $230 million) for Iraq’s humanitarian relief and reconstruction, including C$245 million ($187 million) pledged at Madrid

and C$55 million ($42 million) in urgent humanitarian relief disbursed through

multilateral relief agencies in response to the U.N. Humanitarian Appeal. Canada

became Chair of the IRFFI Donors’ Committee in 2005. Canada has committed

C$100 million (about $76 million) to the IRFFI, of which it initially deposited C$60

million ($44.7 million) equally divided between the United Nations and the World

Bank trust funds. In September 2004, Canada deposited another C$20 million

($15.3 million) in the U.N. trust fund to be used to support Iraqi elections. In December 2005, an additional C$10 million (about $8.5 million) was deposited to support United Nations support to elections and human rights. In addition to funding to IRFFI, Canada has allocated over C$100 million in other, non-IRFFI assistance. This includes C$40 million (about $34 million) to

UNICEF for social sector funding and bilateral assistance through CARE Canada

for reconstruction work to improve basic services in water and sanitation, basic

health and education and child protection. CIDA also allocated C$3 million (about

$2.6 million) to assist in the restoration and management of the ecological health

of the ‘‘Mesopotamian Marshes.’’

In the area of governance, human rights and civil society capacity-building, Canada is supporting a number of projects including: C$15 million (about $12.8 million)

for the Rapid Civilian Deployment Mechanism for capacity-building, including governance; C$10 million (about $8.5 million) for a civil society capacity-building fund,

including media and human rights training; C$5 million (about $4.2 million) to the

Middle East Good Governance Fund; $C2 million (about $1.7 million) for human

rights and diversity management training; C$2 million (about $1.7 million) for support to the constitutional process and federal systems; C$700,000 million (about

$600,000) to UNDP for research on governance questions; and a small fund for

building a culture of human rights in Iraq and the Middle East. Canada also supported elections with an additional C$7 million (about $5.8 million) allocated to the

International Mission for Iraq Elections. In the security sector, Canada allocated

C$10 million (about $7.9 million) over 2 years for deployment of Canadian police

instructors to assist in the training of Iraqi police at the Jordan International Police

Training Center (JIPTIC) as well as funding to deploy senior police advisors to the

Ministry of Interior. Since January, Canada has provided an additional C$7.5 million (about $6.4 million) to these activities. Total Canadian assistance to the security sector is now C$17.5 million (about $15 million). Canada plans to focus the remainder of its assistance on good governance and the promotion of human rights

including women’s rights.

More details on Canadian assistance to Iraq are available at www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/

iraq.

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The European Commission (EC)

There have been several notable developments in EC assistance to Iraq. Since

April, the EC has prepared a communication entitled, ‘‘The EU and Iraq: A Framework for Engagement,’’ which is intended to provide the basis for an EU-wide strategy and proposes EU support to the new Iraqi Government in five areas:

• To further an inclusive democracy;

• To strengthen rule of law and respect for human rights;

• To support basic services and job creation;

• To economic recovery and reform; and,

• To the development of a functioning administration.

Additional information on the EU Framework for Engagement can be found at:

http://europa.eu.int.

Following discussions among member states, 120 million euros of the EC’s ÷200m

allocated for 2006, was designated for IRFFI, to support provision of basic services,

as was previous financing. At the same meeting, a 6-million-euro proposal to provide

a technical assistance facility was agreed upon. The EC will be entering into discussion with member states on the balance of the 200 million euro pledge for 2006 later

in October 2006.

The Head of the EC Delegation has been in Baghdad for the past few months and

the Commission is in the process of training and deploying additional staff. In addition, with the new Iraqi Government in place, the EC soon expects to launch negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

United Nations (U.N.)

As of August 31, 2006, donors had committed approximately $1.1 billion to the

U.N. trust fund of the IRFFI. Of this, about $1 billion had been deposited. The

United Nations has developed a strategic planning framework and organized their

programs into ‘‘clusters’’ with various U.N. specialized agencies working together

under a cluster lead agency in each. Originally comprised of 11 clusters, the United

Nations reorganized the clusters into 7 lettered clusters adopted in July 2005. The

clusters are:

A. Agriculture, Food Security, Environment and Natural Resource Management

B. Education and Culture

C. Governance and Human Development

D. Health and Nutrition

E. Infrastructure Rehabilitation

F. Refugees, IDPs and Durable Solutions

G. Support to Electoral Process

As of August 2006, the United Nations had developed 103 projects, valued at $861

million, all of which have been approved for implementation by the Iraqi Government. Among these projects, the United Nations has provided school supplies, rehabilitated schools, provided vaccines, supported internally displaced persons (IDPs)

and refugees, conducted capacity-building training programs for Iraqi officials and

assisted in the elections. In January 2006, the U.N. trust fund had legally committed $564 million and disbursed $430 million of the total approved funding. By

the end of August 2006, the U.N. trust fund had obligated $644 million in binding

contracts for implementation and had disbursed $546 million. A full list of the

U.N.’s IRFFI projects is available at the www.irffi.org Web site.

World Bank

As of September 2006, donors had pledged approximately $457 million to the

World Bank trust fund of the IRFFI, of which approximately $454 million had been

deposited. With these deposits, the World Bank is implementing the following 13

projects amounting to US$401 million:

[In millions of dollars]

Projected

Operation costs

Emergency Textbooks ...................................................................................... $40

Emergency School Rehabilitation ................................................................... 60

Emergency Baghdad Water Supply and Sanitation ..................................... 65

Emergency Water Supply, Sanitation and Urban Reconstruction .............. 90

Emergency Health Rehabilitation .................................................................. 25

Emergency Private Sector Development I ..................................................... 55

Capacity Building I ......................................................................................... 3.6

Capacity Building II ........................................................................................ 7

Emergency Community Infrastructure .......................................................... 20

585

Projected

Operation costs

Emergency Disabilities .................................................................................... 19.5

Emergency Social Protection .......................................................................... 8

Emergency Household Survey, Technical Assistance ................................... 1.5

Emergency Household Survey & Policies for Policy Reduction ................... 5.1

Ten of the thirteen World Bank trust fund-financed projects, valued at US$388

million, are grants implemented directly by Iraqi governmental authorities. Three

projects, amounting to US$12 million, are capacity-building and technical assistance

activities implemented by the World Bank.

Through these projects, the World Bank has financed more than 79 million textbooks, rehabilitated or constructed more than a hundred schools, trained hundreds

of Iraqi officials, and rehabilitated dozens of rural irrigation or drainage schemes.

The World Bank is also rehabilitating and upgrading hospitals, centers for the disabled, and telecom and water supply systems in Iraq. The latest World Bank ITFfinanced projects focus on helping Iraq develop strategic approaches to reducing poverty, protecting the vulnerable, and designing sustainable economic programs. These

new projects support the Bank’s core objective to help Iraq develop institutional

frameworks, policies, and systems for more effective and transparent use of Iraq’s

resources. The World Bank relies mainly on a cadre of high-level Iraqi staff providing daily

support in Iraq to protect management teams. The Bank also has two contracted

international staff in Baghdad’s International Zone, and is in the process of further

strengthening its presence in Baghdad. The Bank has several video-conferencing facilities in Baghdad and an office in Amman that supports the Iraqi program.

The World Bank places a major emphasis on capacity-building, policy advice, and

economic and sector work, which are funded from the Bank’s own budget. The Bank

has prepared policy papers for the Iraqi Government on a wide range of topics, responding to urgent Iraqi Government requests for policy advice. In July 2006, the

Bank provided the Iraqi Government with a Briefing Book on core reforms, which

was prepared in close cooperation with Iraqi authorities. The Briefing Book gives

priority to strengthening governance and institutions, modernizing social safety

nets, and accelerating economic reforms. The Bank is currently providing technical

support to the Iraqi Government in the formulation of the International Compact.

In 2007, the Bank plans to undertake, in partnership with the Iraqis, a Public Institutional and Expenditure Assessment to outline the steps for strengthening the

transparency and accountability of Iraq’s public finance policies and institutions,

and help Iraq meet the goals set in the Iraq Compact. At Madrid, the World Bank announced an anticipated lending envelope of $3 to $5 billion, conditional on Iraq’s creditworthiness. In December 2004, Iraq cleared its

arrears to the World Bank, one of the requirements to resume lending. The World

Bank provides a framework for up to $500 million of IDA (International Development Association) concessional lending. The strategy also provides for up to $500

million in IBRD (nonconcessional) lending, assuming Iraq makes critical progress

regarding IBRD creditworthiness. In November 2005, the World Bank Executive

Board approved the first $100 million IDA loan within the $500 million program.

The $100 million Third Emergency Education Project (TEEP) will help the Government of Iraq alleviate school overcrowding and lay the groundwork for educational

reform. In June 2006, the Bank approved a $135 million IDA transportation project

that will help rehabilitate Iraqi roads and bridges.

IMF

At the Madrid Donors’ Conference, the IMF pledged to provide over $2.55 billion

in lending to Iraq. On September 29, 2004, the IMF Board approved an Emergency

Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) package that provided Iraq SDR 297.1 million

(about $430 million) in balance-of-payments support. The main goals under the

EPCA were to maintain macroeconomic stability and lay the groundwork for a longterm development and reform program. On December 23, 2005, the IMF approved

a Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) for Iraq that provides SDR 475 million (about $685

million) in balance-of-payments support. The 15-month SBA provides a comprehensive framework of policies for economic reform and growth in coming years. The first

tranche of the SBA, worth $114 million, became available to the Iraqi Government

at the time of SBA approval. To date, Iraq has not drawn against the funds in either the EPCA or SBA programs. The IMF was to do quarterly reviews of Iraq’s

progress under the SBA. The first such review, scheduled for March 2006, was postponed because of the lengthy Iraqi Government formation process. IMF Executive

Board consideration of the combined first and second quarterly reviews is now

scheduled for August 2.

586

Reaching the SBA also triggered the second 30 percent tranche of debt reduction

under Iraq’s agreement with the Paris Club. To obtain the final 20 percent tranche

of Paris Club debt relief, Iraq must complete 3 years of successful performance

under the SBA.

The IMF also provides technical assistance to Iraq, including training in such policy areas as public expenditure management, fiscal federalism, tax policy, tax and

customs administration, monetary operations, banking supervision, payments system reform and statistics. Some of this training has been done jointly with the

World Bank. The IMF has assisted in coordinating macroeconomic training with the

other major providers: The World Bank, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

DEBT FORGIVENESS

Reduction of Iraq’s external debt burden to sustainable levels, another top priority

for Iraq’s economic development, is a key component of U.S. donor coordination. In

November 2004, the Paris Club group of creditors agreed to forgive, in phases, 80

percent of approximately $40 billion in Iraqi debt held by its members. As of July

2006, 17 of 18 Paris Club signatories of that agreement have signed bilateral debt

agreements with the Iraqis implementing the 2004 agreement. Russia is the only

remaining Paris Club signatory not to have signed a bilateral debt agreement with

Iraq; Russia has indicated it could conclude an agreement soon. The United States

itself went beyond Paris Club terms and has forgiven 100 percent of the $4.1 billion

in U.S.-held Iraqi debt. In total, over $30 billion in Iraqi debt either has been forgiven, or will be, by Paris Club and several non-Paris Club countries, provided Iraq

meets agreed-upon conditions, including 3 years of successful performance under the

SBA. The United States continues to encourage non-Paris Club countries to provide

debt reduction to Iraq at terms at least comparable to those offered by the Paris

Club. The terms for forgiveness of what Iraq owes to non-Paris Club countries and

commercial creditors are closely tied to the Paris Club deal. Iraq has completed a

debt exchange with its commercial creditors on terms comparable to the Paris Club

deal. One hundred percent of eligible large commercial creditors contacted accepted

Iraq’s offer. Iraq offered smaller creditors cash for debt, rather than new debt. Altogether, an overwhelming majority of commercial claimants has accepted Iraq’s offer,

covering about $20 billion in debt, which will result in approximately $16 billion in

debt reduction over time.

OTHER MAJOR EFFORTS

With the help of U.S. advisors, the Ministry of Planning and Development Coordination has completed plans to eliminate the major hurdles faced by donors on the

ground in Baghdad. Plans are being implemented to provide security, housing and

office space to potential donors inside the International Zone. The accommodations,

called ‘‘Donor Village,’’ are inside the secure Army Corps of Engineers/PCO compound. Donors can occupy space, and they will reimburse the USG for billeting arrangements, office space, and meals. The cost-prohibitive nature of setting up individual offices and providing security for accommodations had previously been a

major impediment to obtaining further donor assistance, and this integrated plan

has been well received and coordinated.

USEFUL REFERENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL DONOR ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ

• The Donor Assistance Database: http://www.mop-iraq.org/dad.

• The UNDG Iraq Trust Fund and the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Newsletters,

updated every 2–3 months and both accessible at: http://www.irffi.org.

(587)

POLITICAL STRATEGY

THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2007 [P.M.]

U.S. SENATE, COMMITEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:47 p.m., in room

SD–628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Menendez, Casey, Webb, Lugar,

Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

This afternoon’s hearing may be one of the most important in the

series of hearings we’ve had, and I’m not being solicitous to the

witnesses that are here. We’ve heard repeatedly that there can be

no stability in Iraq absent a political settlement. And I don’t say

what I’m about to say being critical of anyone particular. But, we

are—find ourselves in a part of the world where our experience is

not that deep. And where a lot of people formed opinions about

what our policy should be in this capital without knowing, not just

some of the basic history, but also the nuances based on religion,

ethnicity, tribalism—very complicated. And although I’m sure everyone in this body and the press covering it was fully aware of the

nature of the formation of what is now the Republic of Iraq and

World War II, the panel we have before us today are eminently familiar with the intricacies of Iraqi politics. They are going to help

us understand the likelihood of what everyone is saying is needed.

We say it, everyone says there is no military solution, even those

who are strongly supporting the President’s new mission. And

there’s a need for a political solution.

We have asked the panel prior to their being here, to offer their

assessment of the main elements of what any such political solution, assuming they believe one is possible, would look like. What

compromises would be required and by whom. And what is a reasonable timeframe, if any, in which a settlement could be achieved,

a political settlement.

What are likely to be the main sticking points? Has, as they say,

too much water gone under the bridge to be able to get to the point

where there is a possibility of a political solution? And we’re very

interested in their views on influence capacity and will of the main

political actors to bring about national reconciliation. We also want

to better understand the political objectives of the various actors,

588

such as the insurgents, the terrorists, the jihadis, the militia

groups, some of the religious leaders, Sunni and Shia alike, Arab

and Kurd.

And finally, we have asked the witnesses to comment on the role

the United States and the international committee can play, if

any, in facilitating a political settlement. And our witnesses are

uniquely qualified to address these questions.

Not necessarily in this order, but first we will have the executive

director of the Iraqi Foundation and senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Ms. Rahim. The fact is she served as Iraq’s representative to the United States. In 2003 and 2004 she testified before this committee, back in August 2002, and Madam, we welcome

you back. It’s a delight to have you here.

We also have the director for Middle East and North African

Affairs of the National Endowment of Democracy, who has served

as a spokesman for the Government of Iraq during the tenure of

Prime Minister Jaafari. And we appreciate his interrupting his trip

to London to fly. Doctor, thank you for literally having a little bit

of a detour here. It’s a significant detour to join us.

And, Mr. Talabani is the Washington representative of Kurdistan

Regional Government, and we welcome you here today. You were

kind enough to host Senator Hagel and me several years ago in

Kurdistan, in what turned out to be a very bumpy ride for 7 hours

through the mountains to get to that hospitality, and we appreciate

it very much.

And Dr. Toby Dodge is a consulting senior fellow for the Middle

East at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is the

author of two similar books that I would strongly recommend to everyone. I’m not even asking for a share of the royalties. ‘‘Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change,’’ and ‘‘Inventing Iraq: The

Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied.’’ He has testified

before this committee previously. He is articulate and insightful,

and we want to thank him for coming today. It’s not like he walked

across the street. He had to come from London to do this and alter

his schedule, and we truly appreciate it. So, I look forward to the

testimony from all of you.

And I now yield to Senator Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank

you, again, for holding this hearing, and for the continuing series

of hearings that we are enjoying on Iraq.

During the last several weeks, the Foreign Relations Committee

has had the opportunity to engage policy experts and administration officials in a wide range of questions related to Iraq, including

military strategy, economic reconstruction, regional dynamics. We

have reviewed the President’s current plan, and at least half a

dozen alternatives. We have discussed what impact these plans

might have on United States national security. We have examined

our obligations to our troops, to the American people, and to our

Iraqi allies.

Virtually all these inquiries have confirmed that the outcome in

Iraq will hinge on whether a political reconciliation can be achieved

589

in that country. As I have said on many occasions during the last

several years, it depends on whether Iraqis want to be Iraqis. Will

various factions and subfactions within Iraq buy into a political

compromise, and can such a political deal create stability and prevent violent fragmentation of the country? Can the Maliki government manage this process effectively and lead the nation, rather

than act as representatives of the Shiite majority?

These questions are especially vital to our current policy discussions because the President’s plan depends on the premise that reducing violence in Baghdad will create political stability that is a

precondition for political reconciliation. In previous testimony, Secretary Richard Haass, highlighted the fundamental disconnect with

which we are contending when he observed, and I quote from Secretary Haass, ‘‘The U.S. goal is to work with Iraqis to establish a

functioning democracy in which the interests and right of minorities are protected. The goal of the Iraqi Government appears to be

to establish a country in which the rights and interests of the Shia

majority are protected above all else.’’

In such a situation, even if additional troops have a discernable

impact on the violence in Baghdad, this progress in the streets may

be immaterial to achieving political reconciliation. And if this is

true, all we can gain from a troop surge is a temporary and partial

reduction of violence in Baghdad. That would have some salutary

benefits for some Iraqis, but it would not help us achieve our strategic objectives.

In the absence of a clear connection between additional troops

and political reconciliation, we might be better served by a course

in which United States forces in Iraq are redeployed outside urban

areas. From such positions they would still be a source of stability

in the region and a deterrent to terrorism, adventurism by Iraq’s

neighbors, or a broader regional war.

We are grateful to our panel for joining us to discuss these critical questions this afternoon. We look forward to a thoughtful discussion about whether a political reconciliation in Iraq is possible.

Whether the United States can affect the chances for such a reconciliation and whether the President’s plan, or other alternatives,

offer the best hope for accelerating that process.

I welcome the witnesses and look forward to their comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. With such a distinguished

panel I always—the Chairman is better than me at knowing what

the protocol should be, but I think on two measures, Ms. Rahim,

you should begin first, and then with your permission we’ll move

to Mr. Talabani, then to Dr. Kubba, and then to Dr. Dodge. And

I still love your books and I like you best. Anyway, very seriously,

thank you for being here, Ms. Rahim, and the floor is yours. We

look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF REND AL-RAHIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE

IRAQ FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ms. RAHIM. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee and it’s certainly a pleasure

to see you, and Senator Lugar again. I want to say that the views

I express here are mine alone, they are not the views of any of the

590

institutions with which I am affiliated. I was asked to speak for 8

minutes, which is an incredibly short period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. If you need to speak for more, you go ahead. Just

try to——

Ms. RAHIM. I will make short remarks. A written statement is

filed for the record and I——

The CHAIRMAN. It will be entered in—all of your written statements will be placed in the record.

Ms. RAHIM. And I’m hoping that in the question-and-answer period, we’ll be able to elaborate on more issues and I can talk about

it in my presented statement.

I want to focus on the Shia-Sunni relationship in Iraq because

I believe that, at present, this is the nexus of the problem that we

have.

The situation in Iraq is indeed bleak, and as General Batraiz

said, dire. We have an insurgency that is composed of many groups

with different agendas. We have sectarian violence in which the actors are shadowy and the motives are murky. We have a political

structure that feeds on and strengthens sectarian and ethnic divisions. We have political deadlock and a national reconciliation process that is going absolutely nowhere, state institutions that are

undercapacitated or downright dysfunctional and a government

that is ineffective in its primary task of serving the people.

Despite this, we should not fall into the fallacy of post hoc ergo

propter hoc. The situation we have now in Iraq is not the inestimable result of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Instead,

it is my firm view, that the political structure that was adopted by

the CPA, in the early days, along with policies that were flawed

and decisions that were disastrous for the country taken by the

CPA—and I might add with the support of many Iraqi actors made

the outcome that we see today virtually certain.

The cardinal and root error committed by the CPA with Iraqi collusion was to place Iraqi politics along purely sectarian and ethnic

lines. This was a gross oversimplification of Iraqi society, arising

from ignorance and intellectual laziness. And it ignored the complex texture and weave of the Iraqi social fabric.

This reductionist model served certain vested interests amongst

Iraqi political groups. And yet the structure also increased religious, sectarian, and ethnic fanaticism in the country. It has entrenched the groups in their positions and deepened the divides instead of bridging the gaps.

What should our goals be in Iraq now? There is some short-term

goals and some medium-term goals and the short-term I would single out the following very broadly: The reduction of violence in

Baghdad and in the surrounding five governorates is essential; a

political settlement that can give confidence to all groups in Iraq

is absolutely indispensable; and, the strengthening of Iraq’s national institutions is an essential component of building a viable

state. Those are our three broad goals.

There are some medium goals that I will not go into in my oral

statement, but I want to point out here that the vast majority of

Iraqis want coexistence. They want a national political agenda, as

opposed to a sectarian agenda. However, as in most countries, the

majority is disempowered and voiceless.

591

I also want to address a misconception common today in Washington, which is that Sunnis and Shias in Iraq have been fighting

it out for centuries. That is not accurate. The incidents of sectarian

violence in Iraq’s history is rare. Certainly nothing like the religious wars that raged in Europe intermittently for many centuries.

The fighting we see today in Iraq is absolutely the worst in Iraq’s

history.

While it’s true that the solutions to Iraq’s problems are political,

the violence impedes the quest for a political settlement. The violence in Baghdad and surrounding areas exacerbates the political

tensions and deepens the sectarian divide. This level of violence

also blinds the politicians, and the public, and saps the national

will for reconciliation and for compromise. We need to reduce the

level of violence in order to move the reconciliation process forward.

We need to break the vicious cycle that currently dominates Iraqi

politics and turn it, if possible, into a virtuous cycle in which a reduction of violence leads to a step in the right direction in politics

and a step in the right direction in politics reduces the violence and

so on and so forth. This is the opposite of what we have now.

So, instead of thinking of ending the violence, I would like to

speak about breaking the cycle of violence in order to give Iraqis

the opportunity to address and implement political objective.

Moreover, the model of ‘‘Clear, Hold, and Rebuild,’’ although frequently annunciated has never actually been implemented. This

needs to be implemented now. And whenever possible, Iraqi troops

should be in the forefront of the rebuild phase of the Clear, Hold,

and Rebuild because Iraqi forces need to be seen rebuilding in

order to gain the trust of the people and to build their own confidence in themselves.

Simultaneously, the Government of Iraq should substantially increase the size of the Iraqi Army, and with multinational assistance, improve training, equipment, and command and control

structures.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that there is ever a possibility of

handing over to the Iraqi forces unless there is a serious effort, and

the accomplishment of a much larger, much better trained, much

better equipped Iraqi Army. At present, it is my view that the Iraqi

forces that we have are simply unable to take over.

I spoke about broad objectives and I want to single out some of

the prerequisites for a successful dialog. Iraqi political leaders have

to abandon the ‘‘winner takes all’’ concept of politics. And for the

time being politicians must abandon majoritarian and minoritarian

modes of thinking. The Shia must accept that—however large their

majority—they must share the territory, the resources, and the

State of Iraq with all the others. The Shia leaders must change

their rhetoric, which currently swings between victimhood and

triumphantism.

The Sunnis on the other hand must relinquish the power they

have been accustomed to and accept that there is a new order in

Iraq. And the Sunni leaders have to declare against the insurgency

and condemn the violence in a way that they have failed to do so

far. They need to be squarely within the political framework, and

can not continue to straddle both sides of the fence.

592

In practice, there are several areas that will contribute to national reconciliation. The first one is a constitutional revision. The

current Constitution, Mr. Chairman, is not conducive to a viable

state. And furthermore, it enshrines many of the problems that

plague the Iraqi political process right now, and that divide the

communities from one another. The Constitution has to be redrafted, both in terms of individual articles, and in terms of the

architecture of the state that it envisions. The Sunnis were not

involved in the writing of this Constitution to any significant measure. They need to have a strong say in what kind of constitution

they are going to be living under. So, a constitutional revision must

be an important element of the political framework, and it has to

be started as soon as possible.

There is a committee that was established to review the Constitution, but I know that there is a certain level of resistance to

such a review, both from some Shia groups and to some extent by

the Kurds. And I think if we have this resistance continue, we are

going to be in serious problems.

Another element of national reconciliation is a legislative agenda.

And within that there is a de-Baathification law that needs to be

revised. There is a new draft, but that draft has not gone to Parliament, and has been languishing in the de-Baathification committee.

An amnesty law has been talked about, but to my knowledge an

amnesty law has not been drafted. Both of these need to be drafted,

voted on by Parliament, and they need to be very closely linked to

a credible judicial process. These laws should not be an excuse either for scapegoating or for allowing Baathis criminals back into

politics. So a judicial process that is linked to those laws is essential.

At the same time we ought to have laws against hate speech and

incitement to violence. A further element of legislation is that the

Constitution talks about a bicameral Parliament. Nothing has been

done to create a Iraqi Senate so far. It is my view that an Iraqi

Senate, which does not depend on proportionality, and does not depend on majorities and minorities can be an important element in

creating national consensus and in creating a forum for dialog and

for problemsolving. I would urge the Iraqi Government to move forward with legislation on a Senate as quickly as possible.

On the issue of disarming the militias, I think a great deal has

been said about this, but I do not think that it’s possible to disarm

the militias at this stage. Operationally the Iraqi Government does

not have the forces to disarm the militias. Much more seriously,

the political parties, which are all important, don’t have the will for

disarming the militias. All the political parties have their own militias, and if we start disarming one we must disarm all. There is

simply no appetite in Iraq for doing that at present.

I think the best thing that we can do, for the moment, is to go

after the renegade elements of the militias, to go after the criminal

elements, to seize those and to curtail their activities. And as far

as the orderly militias that are actually answerable to political parties, we should put pressure on the political parties to reign in

those militias, to keep them at home, and to put them under strict

discipline. The eventual disbanding of militias is going to be essenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00602 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
593

tial in Iraq’s future. However, that will have to wait until a time

when we do have a political compact, when Iraqi institutions are

credible and powerful, and furthermore, when we have an economic

cycle that can ensure jobs and an economic life for the members of

those militias.

A further point in national reconciliation is reaching out to

Sunnis, and I mean here, those Sunni groups that have not entered

into the political process yet. The Iraqi Government and different

Iraqi political parties have, from time to time, made an effort to

reach out to those groups of Sunnis who are perhaps part of the

insurgency or who are certainly supportive of the insurgency.

This in itself is a very important undertaking, but it has yielded

limited outcome so far. The contacts have not resulted in an abatement of insurgency activities and have not promoted a national dialog with those insurgent groups. The demands of militant groups

are frequently unrealistic and they cause deep concern particularly

to the Shia. We should certainly not make national dialog contingent on the participation of militant Sunni groups, but we must accept those Sunni groups if they voluntarily wish to participate in

political dialog.

Very quickly, I want to address some of the impediments to a national reconciliation. First of all, we should say that the Prime Minister has expressed a national reconciliation plan. He presented one

back in June and it was very laudable, but we haven’t seen very

much happen. We can only assume that the Iraqi Government has

the desire to affect such a national reconciliation, but we are not

sure as to its ability.

And I think here we should not think about Prime Minister

Maliki, himself, and we should not personalize it. The will and the

capability has to come from a much wider group of political leaders.

They as a totality, as a collective, have to have a will for this national reconciliation.

However, as far as the Shia are concerned, they are reluctant to

relinquish any of their newfound power, and they are intellectually

still afraid of the return of the Baathis in any guise or form, and

although they will not admit that, this really—they are afraid of

the Sunnis as being a broad cover of a return of the Baath.

The Sunnis, on the other hand, approach the political process

with great distrust. They can not reconcile themselves yet to their

loss of status and they have watched their position erode in state

institutions that are built on proportionality and ethnicity and sectarianism. As a consequence, the Sunni political groups tacitly, or

even openly, support the insurgency as their ultimate insurance

policy.

Another major problem is the way that these groups view the nature of the Iraqi State. The Sunnis wish to see a stronger national

government, which has the ability to acquire income and distribute

income. The Shia prefer a much weaker government in which they

could have a strong southern federation and they can order their

own affairs. They have access to huge oil resources, they have agricultural resources, and importantly, they have access to ports. The

Shia also want to have their own social and religious system in the

south, and they want minimal interference in the government. Unfortunately, the Sunnis view such a system of government as deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00603 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
594

priving them of all resources and relegating them to the poor cousins in the countryside.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I do not want to take the time

from my colleagues. I would like to stop here, but I will be very

glad to answer questions on a host of other issues.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rahim follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REND AL-RAHIM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE IRAQ

FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee.

The views I express are mine only, and not those of any organization with which

I am affiliated.

I will focus on the impact of Shia-Sunni relations on the situation in Iraq, as I

believe this to be the nexus of the problems.

At present the situation in Iraq looks bleak. We have,

• An insurgency composed of many groups with different agendas. • Sectarian violence in which the actors are shadowy and the motives are murky. • A political structure that feeds on and strengthens sectarian and ethnic divisions. • Political deadlock and a national reconciliation process that is going nowhere. • State institutions that are undercapacitated or downright dysfunctional • A government that is ineffective in its primary task of serving the people.

Despite this, we should not fall into the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc: The

situation we have now is not the inevitable result of the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Instead, the political structure that was adopted by the CPA in the

early days, along with flawed policies and decision on the part of the CPA and Iraqi

political actors, made this outcome virtually certain. The cardinal, root error committed by the CPA was to define and build Iraqi politics along purely sectarian and

ethnic lines. This was a gross oversimplification of Iraqi society arising from ignorance and intellectual laziness, and it ignored the complex texture and weave of the

Iraqi social fabric. Unfortunately, this reductionist model was encouraged by some

Iraqi political groups that had a vested interest in promoting a sectarian or ethnic

agenda. This structure has in turn increased religious, sectarian, and ethnic fanaticism in the country. It has entrenched the groups in their positions and deepened

the divides instead of bridging the gaps.

In this regard, I would like to quote from a report I wrote in September 26, 2003:

[When] the CPA appointed the GC, it promoted a blueprint for sectarian

and ethnic proportional representation, rather than political representation.

The sectarian and ethnic basis of the political process in Iraq and the

prevalence of a clientage system are contrary to the establishment of democracy in Iraq based on a common and equal Iraqi citizenship. This puts

Iraq well on the road to Lebanonization, a prospect (allegedly condemned

by Iraqi politicians) that carries with it the seeds for grave future dangers

in Iraq. As in Lebanon, it paves the way for future friction and the interference of external influences, two dangers that a still vulnerable Iraq is

ill-equipped to face. The constitutional process that is taking shape is likely

to entrench the flawed nature of this political process. Unless this tendency

is countered by the emergence of national, recognizable political parties,

particularly from the democratic center, the prospects for a true democracy

are limited.

What should our goals in Iraq be? In the short term, we should aim for:

1. Reduction of violence in Baghdad and the five central governorates;

2. A political settlement that can give confidence to all groups in Iraq;

3. Strengthening of national institutions.

For these short-term goals to be sustainable, we need to set medium-term goals:

4. An end to zero-sum politics;

5. The development of national political platforms in lieu of sectarian and ethnic platforms;

6. A rational system of devolution of power to provinces or federated regions.

I would like to underline that the vast majority of Iraqis want coexistence, want

a national political agenda, and are opposed to sectarian violence. However, as in

most countries, the majority is disempowered. May I also address the misperception

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common today in Washington, that the Sunnis and the Shia in Iraq have been

‘‘fighting it out for centuries.’’ That is not accurate. The incidence of sectarian violence in Iraq’s history is rare: Certainly nothing like the religious wars that raged

in Europe intermittently for many centuries. The fighting we see today is the worst

it has ever been in Iraq’s history.

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

While it is true that the solution to Iraq’s problems is political, the violence impedes the quest for a political settlement. The violence in Baghdad and surrounding

areas exacerbates the political tensions and deepens the sectarian divide. Whether

perpetrated by insurgents or death squads, every killing calls forth an act of revenge

in an endless bloody cycle of retaliation and counterretaliation. Every bombing in

a Shia market inflames the Shia community against the Sunnis. In the mayhem,

a Shia backlash against innocent Sunnis is inevitable.

This level of violence blinds the politicians and the public and saps the national

will for reconciliation and compromise. It is imperative to reduce the level of violence in order to ease sectarian tensions and launch a credible reconciliation process. We need to break the vicious cycle that currently dominates Iraq and turn it

into a virtuous cycle, in which lower levels of violence encourage reconciliation efforts, and more compromises reduce the violence.

Instead of thinking in terms of ‘‘ending the violence,’’ it may be more useful to

think of ‘‘breaking the cycle of violence,’’ especially in Baghdad, in order to provide

an opportunity for Iraqis to address and implement political objectives. The model

of ‘‘clear, hold, and rebuild’’ has never been fully implemented because of lack of assets, and needs to be implemented now. Whenever possible, Iraqi troops should be

in the forefront of the ‘‘rebuild’’ phase, to gain the trust of the people and build up

their own confidence.

Simultaneously, the GOI needs to substantially increase the size of the Iraqi

Army and, with multinational assistance, improve training, equipment, and command and control structures. But operational improvements alone cannot do the job:

The Iraqi Army has to be infused with a sense of national mission, determination,

and pride. Such intangible buildup is best provided by Iraqi commanders.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

National dialog in Iraq is overdue. Iraqi political actors need to enter into a meaningful national dialog aimed at national reconciliation and a political compact. So

far, there have only been large conferences full of fanfare and feel-good speeches in

full view of the media. The dialog must be sustained, serious, and far-reaching in

confronting differences and resolving disagreements.

There are prerequisites for a successful dialog:

• Iraqi political leaders have to abandon the ‘‘winner takes all’’ and ‘‘loser loses

all’’ mentality.

• For the time being, politicians must abandon ‘‘majoritarian’’ and ‘‘minoritarian’’

thinking.

• The Shia must accept that, however large their majority, they must share the

territory, the resources, and the state of Iraq with others.

• Shia leaders must change their rhetoric, which currently swings between

victimhood and triumphalism.

• The Sunnis must learn to relinquish the power they have been accustomed to

and accept the new political order.

• Sunni leaders have to declare against the insurgency and condemn violence.

They need to be squarely within the political framework, and cannot continue

to straddle both sides of the fence.

Constitutional revision

More specifically, revision of the Constitution is a central component of national

reconciliation. The present Constitution is not conducive to a viable state and it enshrines many of the problems that plague Iraqi politics now. It has to be redrafted

in terms of individual articles and in terms of the structure of the state it projects.

Additionally, the Constitution was written by the Shia and the Kurdish parties; the

Sunnis were invited into the process late and did not have a significant input. The

Sunnis have deep fears about aspects of the Constitution, and their concerns must

be addressed.

Legislative agenda

Specific laws have to be revised or enacted that bolster confidence among the different social groups. Among these are the de-Baathification law and an amnesty

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law, both of which should be tightly linked to a credible judicial process. There cannot be national reconciliation while Sunnis continue to be eyed with suspicion and

stereotyped as covert Saddam loyalists. At the same time, laws against hate speech

and incitement to violence must be enacted to reassure the Shia and ease their

fears. The Constitution provides for a bicameral Parliament. An Upper House can

serve as a forum for national dialog and provide a much needed counterweight to

the sectarian and ethnic dynamics governing Iraqi politics today. The Iraqi Parliament should begin looking at models and drafting legislation for a second chamber that is not based on demographic proportionality or electoral majorities and minorities.

Disarming the militias

Most political groups in Iraq have militias. The political groups need the militias

not only for protection; they are a means to political power, territorial control, and

economic control. In addition, there are local gangs that have acquired the status

of militias. The GOI should not pick and choose: If it disbands one, it must eventually disband all. This is the principle that only the state has the legitimate use of

force.

Operationally, the Iraqi Government does not have adequate army forces; the

troops are not sufficiently equipped and trained, and their resolve in such politically

sensitive operations may waver. Shia army troops may be reluctant to seize and disarm Shia militias. Sunni troops may have the same problem. Far more important,

the GOI needs the broad support, consensus, and cooperation of the political parties

in order to disarm the militias. Although everyone pays lip service to the need to

eliminate militias, currently there is no visible political support for disarming or disbanding them.

At present, it is perhaps a more realistic strategy to pursue and eliminate the renegade groups that are guilty of crimes rather than attempt a wholesale policy toward militias. This, in fact, is happening in Baghdad, Basra, and other cities. In

the meantime, the more orderly militias should be contained. Eventually, the demobilization and disarming of militias will require a political compact, easing sectarian

tensions, economic recovery, job-creation, and a number of other transformations in

political and economic life that are not available now.

Broadening outreach to Sunnis

The GOI has made efforts to reach out to groups of Sunnis who have so far stayed

out of the political process and who may be part of, or supportive of, the homegrown

elements of the insurgency. This in itself is an important undertaking, but it has

yielded limited outcomes. The depth of the problem is demonstrated by the nomenclature: The Sunnis call these groups ‘‘the honorable national resistance,’’ while the

Shia call them ‘‘terrorists.’’

In Anbar province, and to some extent in Diyala, local tribes have indeed been

battling al-Qaeda, but this may be because of local conflicts of interest and tribal

divisions rather than an outcome of national outreach. The insurgency has not

abated as a result of dialog with Sunni militant groups. The demands of militant

groups are frequently unrealistic and cause deep concern to the Shia. We should certainly not make national dialog contingent on the participation of militant Sunni

groups, although they should be welcomed if they choose to join.

IMPEDIMENTS TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Maliki presented an ambitious national

agenda which included a 24-point reconciliation plan, a proposal for a national amnesty law, a decision to disband the militias, and a commitment to reform the Ministry of Interior. To date, the national reconciliation project has been confined to the

level of rhetoric; the revised de-Baathification law has not been presented to Parliament; the militias are still going strong; and the Ministry of Interior still has a

long way to go.

Because of the PM’s statements, we must assume that the Government of Iraq

has the desire to achieve these objectives. The reality is that it is under severe constraints, some of which are operational but the more important ones are of political.

The phrase ‘‘Iraqi leadership’’ rightly refers to a collective that lies beyond the institutions of the state, and includes the leaders of the major political groups in Iraq,

who may or may not be members of state institutions. The government’s ability to

execute policy is contingent upon the willingness of others to support and help implement policies. Without the support of this broader leadership, the Government

of Iraq is seriously hampered.

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Thus a national compact is not dependent solely on the will of the government.

Political actors have to reach agreements, but at present even the parameters of a

national dialog are in dispute.

After decades of disenfranchisement, the Shia are now enjoying the spoils of victory, and are reluctant to give up any of their new-found supremacy. Intellectually,

the Shia concede that not every Sunni is a Baathi and Saddam supporter, but viscerally their suspicions linger. They are mortally afraid of the return of the Baathis

to power, even under other names and other guises, and, therefore, the deBaathfication law and the amnesty law present difficulties.

Sunnis approach the political process with distrust and misgivings. They cannot

reconcile themselves to their loss of status, and they have watched their position

erode in the institutions of the state under a system of sectarian and ethnic proportional representation. They fear that they will be the new underdog and will be subject to persecution and revenge measures by the Shia. As a consequence, they tacitly

or openly support the insurgency as their insurance policy.

From these central reciprocal fears stem a host of subsidiary problems that impede national reconciliation. The Shia and the Sunnis do not agree on who should

be included in the national dialog. Currently the Baath Party is banned in Iraq. Can

a reformed Baath Party be part of the political process? Should any of the armed

Sunni groups be included and on what conditions?

Another major problem is the nature of the Iraqi State. The Sunnis wish to see

a stronger national government, whereas some Shia religious parties want a weak

one. These Shia groups see an enormous advantage to a grand federated state in

the south, with huge oil resources, agricultural opportunities, and access to ports.

They also want to organize their social and civic affairs along religious lines, and

want minimal interference by the national government. Should Iraq have loose federations in the north and south, with little national authority to earn income and

distribute revenue, they will be bereft of resources.

Despite these difficulties, national reconciliation must proceed at full speed. The

alternatives: Continued bloodshed, ethnic cleansing, civil war, are horrific and the

spillover into the region is inevitable.

MEDIUM-TERM STRATEGIES

Iraq is too important to United States strategic interests to be allowed to descend

into chaos. In order for a national compact to take root and for the state to function

effectively, the nature of politics of Iraq must be changed from a sectarian/ethnic

base to a base of cross-sectarian, multiethnic national parties. It will be essential

to develop national institutions that have both capacity and credibility. The responsibility for carrying this out obviously lies, first and foremost, with this and successive Iraqi governments, but the United States, Iraq’s neighbors, and the international community must recognize that they have a role to play if only for their

own self-interest.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Mr. Talabani.

STATEMENT OF QUBAD TALABANI, REPRESENTATIVE TO THE

UNITED STATES, KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. TALABANI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator

Lugar, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee for the opportunity to testify on the topic of a political

strategy for Iraq.

I’d also like to take the opportunity to thank the chairman and

Senator Lugar for your leadership and support throughout the

years, when we were in the opposition, and today.

I’d also like to take this chance to thank the chairman for introducing to the debate on Iraq, the modalities of a plan that I believe

will work. A plan that is not too dissimilar from what most Iraqis

actually want.

Key components of the so-called Biden-Gelb plan are viable, because there is in it an appreciation of history, and of modern-day

reality. Let me also take this opportunity to thank all those—

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whether civilian or military—that were, and are still part, of this

noble effort to liberate and rebuild Iraq, as well as express the

Kurdistan Regional Government’s appreciation for the support and

sacrifice of the American people and Government.

On that note, a special note must go out to the outgoing Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad. The Ambassador’s work was as unique as

it was effective. Many in the Iraqi leadership, including Iraq’s

President are sad that Ambassador Khalilzad will be leaving us at

this critical time, and while everyone is looking forward to working

with Ambassador Crocker, if he is approved, Zal—as we’ve all come

to know him by—will be sorely missed.

Allow me to open by stating that, while many of you may know

me as the son of Iraq’s President, I’m in no way representing his,

or the Government of Iraq’s view, in this testimony. I am testifying

in my official capacity as the representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government to the United States.

A political strategy for Iraq must be just that—political. We are

still too focused on the military aspect of this strategy. The talk of

a potential escalation, or deescalation in Iraq has overshadowed

what really needs to be done in Iraq, and by whom. A successful

strategy in Iraq that will alter Iraq’s current, deteriorating situation, must come from within Iraq, and not Washington.

It is precisely for this reason that the Iraq Study Group report

was met with such visceral opposition by Iraqis on the ground. An

imposition of a policy from the outside, especially one that ignores

the glaring realities on the ground, will always lead to failure. Only

a sound political and economic strategy, combined with a military

strategy, if implemented, will greatly improve Iraq’s security situation.

There can be no successful strategy to resolve Iraq’s problems,

however, if Iraq’s leaders themselves do not wish to reach a resolution. If they desire reaching a political settlement and wish to end

the violence—and I believe that, at least some do—then they must

begin to act as leaders, and come to the realization that they are

on the brink to leading Iraq to failure. The failure of successive

Iraqi regimes to rule justly has created irreparable divisions, and

insurmountable insecurities within Iraq. It is precisely these insecurities that exacerbate the mistrust between Iraq’s Sunni-Arab,

and Shia-Arab communities. Iraq’s Kurds, not lacking insecurities

of our own, have gone to great lengths to attempt to ease the tension between these groups. We have led most, if not all, the negotiations between the conflicting parties, and continue to lead efforts

to resolve the outstanding issues.

A sustainable political settlement in Iraq cannot be reached unless certain issues are tackled—swiftly, and by Iraqis. These include: Resolving and passing Iraq’s national oil, revenue-sharing,

and budget laws, all of which are critical to national reconciliation.

Revising and implementing a sound de-Baathification policy that

does not exclude all members of the outlawed party from public

service, just those that, because of the crimes that they had committed, could never be accepted back into government.

Also, as Rend Rahim stated, that devising an amnesty program

that separates terrorists from those that have legitimate grievances, and could be encouraged to return to a political process. We

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must take necessary steps at disarming, and bringing to justice

death squads and rogue militias that act outside of the law. We

must also address, once and for all, the issue of Kirkuk and its

future.

Rather than coming up with solutions to our problems, the

United States should work harder to foster and nurture the ongoing negotiations on these issues. The United States must have a

comprehensive strategy, that does not deal with the various communities in isolation. Simultaneous messages must be related to

both Iraq’s Sunni-Arab, and Shia communities. Sunni-Arab leaders

must be warned that if they continue along this path of using both

violence and politics, that they will lose, and that the United States

will not be there to save them.

At the same time, it is critical to pressure Iraq’s Shias to follow

for a genuine, inclusive political process for a system of government

that shares power, and the country’s wealth, equitably.

International pressure can be applied to Iraq’s unity government,

by making assistance programs, and the World Bank and IMF assistance packages contingent on good governance. Iraq’s leaders

must be held accountable for the actions of their constituents.

Their legitimacy, and that of the government’s, in the eyes of the

international community must hinge on a strong and tangible commitment to accountability.

There can be no political settlement without addressing the issue

of federalism. Federalism as defined by Iraq’s democratically ratified Constitution, and further put into law by Iraq’s Parliament,

should not be met with fear or suspicion in Washington. Although

it will be initially met with skepticism, it will, over time, in my

opinion, foster success stories similar to that which we see in the

Kurdistan region.

Iraqi-Kurdistan stands today as a federal region with its own

government, security structure, and development plan. Indeed, it is

one of the few successes in Iraq.

In this instance, it is not about what the United States should

do, but rather what the United States should not do. If other Iraqis

want to federalize the rest of the country, providing that such steps

are taken democratically, and with the support of the people who

live in those regions, then we must stand on the side of the Constitution, and not obstruct democracy. As long as the political prize

remains Baghdad, and all of the decisionmaking powers rest within

a central authority that is not trusted, then there will remain violence.

No federal system can succeed without a sound natural resources

policy. Cooperation on Iraqi oil production and revenue-sharing

presents an opportunity to bring peace and stability to Iraq. Significant progress has been made in establishing a cooperative

agreement on oil. A draft oil law was prepared in December last

year, which includes the creation of an intergovernmental entity,

the Federal Council for Oil and Gas, with both federal and regional

membership. This will be the supreme body for establishment of

petroleum policy in Iraq.

A revenue-sharing law will soon be prepared, that will ensure

that all petroleum revenues in Iraq are forwarded, again, to this

intergovernmental body, and shared equitably across Iraq, based

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on population. We must guarantee that the flow of oil revenues to

parts of Iraq that lack oil resources—including the so-called Sunni

Triangle—which is the source of so much violence today.

These two laws will each constitute major achievements. I am

proud to say that the KRG has been at the very forefront of these

drafting efforts. Importantly, these two laws will contain major

concessions by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Although the

Constitution of Iraq gives us the sole authority to develop new

fields, and receive revenues from those fields, we have agreed to

share those revenues with the rest of Iraq.

It is—we have also agreed to share information with the central

government about future petroleum contracts, and provide it with

the ability to object to those contracts, based on economic or technical grounds.

However—and this is important—this cooperative agreement will

depend on it respecting the right of the regions to make the final

decision on petroleum contracting in the region, while at the same

time, respecting the right of the regions to receive its proportionate

share of the national revenue. Let me be very clear, that while we

are prepared to cooperate fully, there will be no Iraqi law or revenue-sharing law that violates these rights.

The KRG very much looks forward of receiving the advice of

international institutions on the creation of a transparent, corruption-free, Iraq revenue-sharing system that can guarantee the viability of the central government, and the right of regions to their

proportionate share of the revenue.

A sound national development plan is also critical for Iraq’s stability. Advancements in the political process and security will not,

alone, bring peace and prosperity. Collectively, we must devise an

approach that expands on the successes of the stable parts of the

country, in order to isolate the trouble spots, and spread the circles

of stability across the country.

If successful, citizens will see that the government is actually

working to provide the basic services, and is putting money into development. In turn, the population will have more to lose by turning a blind eye to the terrorists. As part of national reconciliation,

we must turn the Iraqi citizens against al-Qaeda, and other extremists.

National reconciliation can never be reached, unless the status of

Kirkuk is resolved. Kirkuk, a governorate that underwent decades

of ethnic cleansing of Kurds and Turkomans by Saddam’s regime

symbolizes Iraq’s tragedy today. While we are bringing to justice

the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, their racist handiwork remains intact. Significantly, Iraqis themselves have devised a process to rectify this injustice, committed by the former regime.

It would be wise for the United States to allow this process to

progress naturally, and according to a timetable that Iraq’s leaders

have agreed upon. Imposing a delay on the proposed referendum

that determines whether Kirkuk will be administered by the

Kurdistan Regional Government or by the central government, will

only raise the risk of the situation erupting out of control. The grim

reality is, that whether we tackle this issue now, or 10 years from

now, the final outcome will still be messy. The longer we delay the

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process, the greater the tensions will become, and the uglier the

fallout will be.

To conclude, whether or not a political settlement in Iraq can be

reached will depend largely on Iraq’s leaders themselves, and not

on a strategy imposed from the outside. If all sides involved can

come to the realization—and most have—that a centralized system

of governance cannot and will not work in Iraq, and that a sound

federal system is set in place, then we can begin to take steps to

reduce the people’s insecurities.

The international community, and in particular, the United

States can be helpful in managing and nurturing this dialog, not

dictating it. We must be pressured to implement our own national

reconciliation plan. All sides must make compromises: Sunnis must

compromise on their demands for a unitary state, Shiites must

compromise by loosening their grip on power, and we Kurds have

to come to an agreement with a central government on certain

mechanisms of governance and revenue-sharing, as has been done

thus far.

Having just returned from a trip to my homeland, where I’m

happy to say we no longer have to take the 7 bumpy hours’ drive,

we can fly directly from many European cities, I would like to take

this opportunity to express some of the grievances of the people of

Kurdistan. Most, if not all Kurds feel, that all of goodwill shown

by the Kurdish side, and its proactive, positive engagement in the

new Iraq have yielded limited gains for our people.

While clearly no longer fearing that Saddam Hussein or his regime cannot commit genocide against us is not insignificant, certain United States policies continue to irk the whole community in

Iraq that most closely shares American values, and considers the

United States a close friend and partner.

The United States development strategy for Iraq is a case in point. Of the $21 billion or so put aside for Iraq reconstruction, a

comparatively small $600 million has been spent in the Kurdistan

region, a figure of 3 percent, a figure that bemuses our citizens.

While, in some areas, we are advanced, we still lack the critical infrastructure and the industries that exist elsewhere in Iraq.

During a talk that I gave at the University of Suleimani in IraqiKurdistan last week, I was constantly asked this question, ‘‘When

Iraq fails, and the United States leaves, what guarantee is there

that they—the United States—will protect our hard-earned gains?’’

It is fair to say that both the Kurds in Iraq and the United States

have put all our eggs in one basket, that is Baghdad. I fear that

this basket will burn in the fire of that city, and all that we have

accomplished together over the past 15 years will be in jeopardy.

Distinguished Senators, the Kurds will remain forever grateful

for the protection provided under Operation Northern Watch, and

for the ouster of Saddam and his regime. However, we still remember the American abandonment of 1975, and the miscalculation of

1991. And while we will continue to commit to do all that we can

to ensure a viable, political solution for Iraq, including not breaking away from Iraq, we cannot guarantee that Iraq will not break

away from us.

In such a scenario, resulting also in a likely American withdrawal, we seek a guarantee that our success story—one of the few

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that the United States has helped with in the Middle East—will

be protected. After all the Americans and the Kurds have been

through, a relatively democratic and open Kurdistan in the heart

of the Islamic Middle East, should be protected. It is in the United

States interest, and should be the moral obligation.

I will end with four goals for which our people seek your support.

And one is, to provide an American security guarantee to the people of Iraqi-Kurdistan no matter what happens in Iraq. And a commitment that the United States spend at least 17 percent of congressionally appropriated funds intended for Iraq’s development in

the Kurdistan region. This goes in line with the Government of

Iraq’s own economic policy, of allocating the Kurdistan region the

17 percent of revenues gleaned from sale of oil.

We also seek a commitment to assist in the development—developing greater public/private partnerships between the United

States and the Kurdistan Region. We feel that our region has not—

the United States has not used our region enough, to the fact that

it’s stable and secure, to promote greater business investment that

could ultimately help all of Iraq, and not just the Kurdistan region.

And finally, I call on all Members of Congress visiting Iraq to

move beyond the Green Zone, and come visit us up in the North,

to see some of the successes that you’ve invested so much in.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Talabani follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF QUBAD TALABANI, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KURDISTAN

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, for the opportunity to testify on the topic of a political

strategy for Iraq. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the chairman

and Senator Lugar for your leadership. Your support to Iraq goes back to the days

when we were in the Iraqi Opposition. While I am grateful for the many visits committee members have taken to Iraq, I do hope that congressional delegations will

visit Iraq’s Kurdistan region as well. As you know, Mr. Chairman, an accurate analysis of Iraq requires visits to every region of the country.

I would also like to take this chance to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for introducing

to the debate on Iraq the modalities of a plan that I believe will work. Key components of the so called ‘‘Biden-Gelb’’ plan are viable because there is in that plan an

appreciation for history and modern day reality. Indeed, we must understand Iraq’s

faulty past to reach a political settlement that sticks in the future, while recognizing

that Iraq has changed as a country and new realities have become facts on the

ground. I commend you for offering an alternative approach.

Let me take this opportunity to thank the brave men and women of the U.S.

Armed Forces who are serving or who have served in Iraq as well as the American

diplomatic corps and civilian employees who labor tirelessly with Iraqi officials to

ensure that the fruit of our partnership is a prosperous and peaceful Iraq. A special

note must go to Ambassador Khalilzad. The Ambassador’s work was as unique as

it was effective. Many in the Iraqi leadership, including Iraq’s President are unhappy that Ambassador Khalilzad is leaving at this critical time. While everyone

is looking forward to working with Ambassador Crocker, Zal, as we have all come

to know him, will be sorely missed.

Allow me to open by stating that while many of you may know me as the son

of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, I am in no way representing his, or the Government of Iraq’s view in this testimony. I am testifying in my official capacity as the

representative to the United States of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government

(KRG). I was also asked by the committee staff to provide a quick description of my

post. In my capacity, I work closely with the executive and legislative branches of

the U.S. Government as well as the media and research institutions, providing analysis and up-to-date information about the situation in Iraq and the Kurdistan region. Finally, there may be instances during the question and answer segment when

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it would be more advantageous to committee members that I speak in a closed session. I would be happy to do so.

Distinguished Senators, excuse me if I appear blunt in some of what I say today.

There is a time for more diplomatic speeches, but given the gravity of the situation,

and the fact that American and Iraqi lives are being lost every day, now is not such

a time.

A political strategy for Iraq must be just that, political. We are still too focused

on the military component of the Iraq debate. The talk of a potential escalation or

deescalation in Iraq has overshadowed what really needs to be done in Iraq and by

whom.

The reality is that upon handing over sovereignty in June 2004, the ability of the

United States to effectively direct the situation on the ground has been reduced.

This means that a successful strategy in Iraq, one that will alter Iraq’s current deteriorating situation, must come from within Iraq, not Washington. It is precisely for

this reason that the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report was met with such visceral opposition by Iraqis. An imposition of a policy from outside, especially one that ignores

the glaring realities on the ground will lead to more failure and more bloodshed in

Iraq.

There are, of course, aspects of any strategy for Iraq that must be coordinated between Baghdad and Washington, such as the roles and responsibilities of the U.S.

Armed Forces in theater, and their interaction and coordination with Iraq’s developing security forces. But in my honest opinion, it will be a sound political and economic strategy, not a military strategy alone, which, if developed and undertaken,

will greatly improve Iraq’s security situation.

There can be no successful strategy to resolve Iraq’s problems if Iraqi leaders

themselves do not wish to reach a resolution. If they desire reaching a political settlement and wish to end the violence, and I believe that at least some do, then they

must begin to act as leaders and come to the realization that they are on the brink

of leading Iraq to failure.

Iraq is a country, that in the eyes of many, was founded on faulty logic. It was

founded on a principle that a representative of a minority can rule a multiethnic

and multisectarian society. Such logic could have succeeded if Iraq’s past rulers had

ruled justly, treating all as equal. However, successive Iraqi regimes have failed to

do just that, creating irreparable divisions and insurmountable insecurities within

Iraqi society.

Today, insecurities run deep within all segments of Iraqi society. Indeed, it is precisely these insecurities that exacerbate the mistrust between Iraq’s Sunni Arab and

Shiite Arab communities; a mistrust that has resulted in the violence we see today.

Iraq’s Kurds, not lacking insecurities of our own, have gone to great lengths to attempt to ease the tension between these groups. We have led most, if not all, negotiations between the conflicting groups. We have and will continue to bridge the

many significant and potentially damaging differences that exist within the Iraqi

polity today, sometimes to the disadvantage of our interests and against the wishes

of our own constituency.

A sustainable political settlement in Iraq cannot be reached unless certain issues

are tackled swiftly, and by Iraqis. These include:

• Resolving and passing Iraq’s national oil, revenue-sharing, and budget laws—

all of which are critical to national reconciliation;

• Revising and implementing a sound de-Baathification policy that does not exclude all members of the outlawed party from public service, just those that,

because of crimes they had committed, will never be accepted back into government;

• Devising an amnesty program that separates terrorists from those that have legitimate grievances and could be encouraged to return to a political process;

• Taking necessary steps to disarm and bring to justice death squads and rogue

militias;

• Addressing, once and for all, the tense issue of Kirkuk and its future.

Rather than coming up with solutions to our problems, the United States should

work harder to foster and nurture the ongoing negotiations on these key issues.

The United States must have a comprehensive strategy that does not deal with

the various communities in isolation. Simultaneous messages must be related to

both Iraq’s Sunni Arab and Shiite communities.

Sunni Arab leaders must be warned that if they continue along this path of using

both violence and politics, they will lose, and the United States will not be there

to save them. A political settlement will more likely be reached if and when our

Sunni Arab brothers come to the realization that they will no longer hold the ascendancy in Iraq. Our American friends must help to make Iraq’s neighbors aware

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of this reality. The days of a minority dominating all aspects of Iraqi politics are

over. At the same time, it is critical to (1) alleviate the insecurities of Iraq’s Shiites

by clarifying that the United States and the West do not see them as Iranian proxies, and (2) pressure them to allow for a genuine inclusive political process through

a system of governance that shares power and the country’s wealth equitably.

International pressure can be applied to a Shiite-led unity government by limiting

assistance programs and/or restricting World Bank and IMF assistance packages.

Pressure must also be applied to the Shiite leadership to stand up to rogue militias

and death squads that have fueled this ever-increasing sectarian bloodshed. Leaders

of both Shiite and Sunni communities must be held accountable for the actions of

their constituents. Their legitimacy, and that of the government’s, in the eyes of the

international community, must hinge on a strong and tangible commitment for accountability.

There can be no political settlement without addressing federalism. Federalism in

Iraq will be key to ensuring a longer term, sustainable political settlement.

The creation of federal regions, as defined by Iraq’s democratically ratified Constitution and further put into law by Iraq’s Parliament, should not be met with fear

or suspicion in Washington. Allowing Iraqis the right to determine their own future

by devolving power to communities governing their own areas will most probably

be met with skepticism at first. Over time, in my opinion, this approach will foster

success stories similar to those that we see in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan

stands today as a federal region with its own government, security structure, and

development plan. Indeed, it is one of the few successes in Iraq. As long as the political prize remains, Baghdad and all decisionmaking powers rest within a central authority, there will remain violence, especially as there exists today very little trust

between the various communities in Iraq.

In this instance, it is not about what the United States should do, but rather what

the United States should not do. If other Iraqis want to federalize the rest of the

country, providing such steps are taken democratically and with support of the people who live in those regions, then we must stand on the side of the Constitution,

and not obstruct democracy. Attempts to impose an unworkable unity, merely for

the sake of addressing the concerns of Iraq’s neighbors or for the purpose of creating

an illusion against the will of its people, will lead to disaster.

No federal system can succeed without a sound natural resources policy. Cooperation on Iraqi oil production and revenue-sharing presents an opportunity to bring

peace and stability to Iraq. This has been the constant message of the Kurdistan

Regional Government (KRG) leadership, and particularly its Minister for Natural

Resources, Dr. Ashti Hawrami. It is excellent to see in Washington that others are

reaching the same conclusion. Oil revenues, if managed well, can ensure both a viable federal government as well as strong, self-sustaining federal regions, as the Constitution of Iraq envisages. There is an opportunity to guarantee the flow of oil revenues to parts of Iraq that lack oil resources, including the so-called Sunni Triangle,

which is the source of so much violence.

Significant progress has been made in establishing this cooperative agreement. A

draft oil law was prepared in December last year that includes the creation of an

intergovernmental entity, the ‘‘Federal Council for Oil and Gas,’’ with both federal

and regional membership. This will be the Supreme Body responsible for petroleum

policy. Significantly, under that law there will be a role for private sector petroleum

investment, to maximize the speed and size of the returns to the Iraqi people. A

revenue-sharing law will soon be prepared that will ensure that all petroleum revenues in Iraq are forwarded—again to an intergovernmental body—and shared equitably across Iraq based on population. These two laws will each constitute major

achievements. They are achievements, I might add, which are genuine Iraqi agreements, and not the product of outside influence or pressure. I am proud to say that

the KRG has been at the very forefront of these drafting efforts. Indeed, it is

Kurdistan’s own investor-friendly legislation that is serving as a model for the Iraqwide regime.

Importantly, these two laws will contain major concessions by the KRG. Although

the Constitution of Iraq gives the KRG the sole authority to develop new fields and

receive revenue from those fields, the KRG has agreed to share those revenues with

the rest of Iraq. It has agreed to share information with the central government

about future KRG petroleum contracts, and provide it the ability to object to those

contracts on technical or economic grounds.

However—and this is important—this cooperative agreement will depend on two

things. First, it must respect the right of regions to make the final decision on petroleum contracting in the region.

Second, it must respect the right of any region to receive its proportionate share

of the national revenue. (These rights are contained in articles 110, 112, 115, and

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141 of the Constitution.) Let me be very clear: While the KRG is prepared to cooperate fully, there will be no Iraq oil law or revenue-sharing law that violates these

rights. Reports that arose last week that there will be a new oil law that ‘‘centralizes’’ control of Iraq’s oil are incorrect. From now on, in Iraq, petroleum policy will

be a cooperative agreement, not one that is imposed from Baghdad or anywhere

else. The oil law that was prepared last December has not been altered and will

hopefully be finalized as quickly as possible. And as we begin our talks on the revenue-sharing law, the KRG very much looks forward to receiving the advice of international institutions on the creation of a transparent, corruption-free Iraq revenuesharing system that can guarantee the viability of the central government and the

right of regions to their proportionate share of revenue.

A sound national development plan is also critical to Iraq’s stability; advancements in the political process and security will not alone bring peace and prosperity.

The Iraqi Government should work closely with the U.S. Government as well as

other nations and international institutions to devise an approach that expands on

the successes of the Kurdistan region as well as parts of the south and east. Working in areas of the country that are more stable and accommodating will isolate

those in trouble spots that seek only to attack reconstruction projects and everyday

services. Certainly, such an approach is a better use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Successful development projects will increase the circles of stability and progress across

the country. Indeed, citizens will see that the government both provides services and

is putting money into development, and in turn the population will have more to

lose by turning a blind eye to terrorists and criminals.

National reconciliation can never be reached unless the issue of Kirkuk is resolved

once and for all. Kirkuk, a governorate that had been ethnically cleansed by

Saddam’s regime, where several hundreds of thousands of Kurds and many

Turkomans had been evicted from their homes purely because of their identity, symbolizes Iraq’s current tragedy. It is a tragedy because communities have been pitted

against one another. While Baath leaders are facing trial in Baghdad, and the head

architect of a policy of genocide in Kirkuk, Saddam Hussein, is no longer with us,

his racist handiwork remains intact.

While we are bringing to justice the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, Iraqis themselves have devised a process to rectify the injustices committed by the former,

criminal regime. It would be wise for the United States to allow this process to move

forward naturally and according to a timetable that Iraq’s leaders agreed upon in

the most important document: The nation’s constitution. Imposing a delay on the

proposed referendum that resolves the status of Kirkuk—i.e., whether it will be administered by the KRG or by the central government—will only lead to increasing,

already high tensions and will raise the risk of the situation erupting into full-scale

bloodshed. The grim reality is that whether we tackle this issue now or in 10 years,

the final outcome will still be messy. However, the longer we delay the process, the

greater the tensions will become, and the uglier the fallout will be. We have kicked

this explosive can down the road for too long.

Finally, a word about Kirkuk’s oil. In advance of the referendum on Kirkuk, the

KRG has taken great care to ensure that tensions are not raised on Kirkuk’s petroleum. Even at such time when Kirkuk becomes part of the Kurdistan region following the referendum, the KRG has confirmed, and here I will reaffirm, that it has

no unilateral claim to the rights or revenues on the Kirkuk oil fields. Under the Iraq

Constitution—which must always be our guide—the management of those fields is

to be shared by the central government and the region, and the revenues shared

throughout the country.

To conclude: Whether or not a political settlement in Iraq can be reached will depend largely on Iraq’s leaders, and not a strategy imposed from outside. Iraq’s leaders, except by and large the Kurds, have yet to demonstrate a true willingness to

reach across ethnic or sectarian boundaries and offer compromises that will lead to

a calming of the situation.

If all sides involved can come to the realization, and most have, that a centralized

system of governance cannot and will not work in Iraq and a sound federal system

is set in place, then we can begin to take steps to reduce the peoples’ insecurities.

The international community, and in particular the United States, can be helpful

in managing and nurturing this dialog, not dictating it.

All sides must also make compromises. All or nothing polices will inevitably lead

to failure. Sunnis must compromise on their demands for a unitary state. Shiites

must compromise on loosening their grip on power. And we Kurds have to come to

an agreement with the central government on certain mechanisms of governance

and revenue-sharing as has been done thus far.

Having just returned from Kurdistan, I would like to take this opportunity, as the

KRG representative in the United States, to express the grievances of the people

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of Kurdistan. Most, if not all, Kurds feel that time after time they have been taken

for granted by the U.S. Government. All the good will shown by the Kurdish side

in its proactive, positive engagement in the new Iraq has yielded limited gains for

our people. It is significant that the fear of Saddam Hussein’s regime and its genocide are gone. However, certain policies and statements by senior United States

Government officials continue to irk an entire community in Iraq that most closely

shares American values and considers the United States a close friend and partner. The American development strategy for Iraq is a case in point. Of the $21 billion or so put aside for Iraq reconstruction, a very small $600 million has been earmarked or spent in the Kurdistan region. That is 3 percent, a figure that bemuses

our citizens precisely because the Kurdish population in Iraq is closer to 20 percent.

While in some areas we are advanced, we still lack the critical infrastructure and

industries that exist elsewhere in Iraq. The U.S. Government’s official line on Iraq

reconstruction, of working by sector not region or province, has never sat well with

the Kurdish leadership or our ever increasingly frustrated population.

We hope that with the opening of the Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) in

Erbil, thanks in great measure to the United States, we will begin to see a change

in strategy that takes into account the efforts and the hard work of the Kurdish

side and translates into significant improvements in the region’s development. One

stark example: After all that has been achieved, the Kurdistan region only gets 2–

3 hours of electricity a day. The region is constantly touted as a success story and

given Iraq’s current predicament one can say that we are. However, we are a success because of, and I’m sorry to say sometimes despite of, U.S. foreign policy.

I will end by sharing a story. During a talk I gave at the University of Suleimani,

in Kurdistan, I was constantly asked, ‘‘When Iraq fails, and the United States

leaves, what guarantee is there that they—the United States—will protect our hardearned gains?’’ It is fair to say that both the Kurds of Iraq and the United States

have put all our eggs in one basket. That is, Baghdad. I fear that our basket will

burn in the fire of that city, and all that we have accomplished together over the

past 15 years will be in jeopardy. Distinguished Senators, the Kurds will remain forever grateful for the protection provided under Operation Northern Watch, and for

the ouster of Saddam and his regime. However, we still remember the American

abandonment of 1975, and the miscalculation of 1991. While we will continue to

commit to do all that we can to ensure a viable political solution for Iraq including

not breaking away from it, we cannot guarantee that Iraq will not break away from

us. In such a scenario, resulting also in a likely American withdrawal, we seek a

guarantee that our success story—one of the few that the United States has helped

with in the Middle East—will be protected. After all that Americans and Kurds

have been through, good and bad, a relatively democratic and open Kurdistan, in

the heart of the Islamic Middle East, should be protected. It is in the U.S. strategic

interest and should be your moral obligation.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Talabani.

The Chair will recognize now, Dr. Kubba.

STATEMENT OF DR. LAITH KUBBA, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. KUBBA. Thank you, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished

members of the committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee on Iraq

at such a critical moment. And, I am aware of the difficulties facing

decisionmakers who have to strike painful balances between so

many conflicting demands.

Without repeating some of the views my colleague Rend Rahim

had mentioned, I’d like to focus more on how to deal with the Iraqi

politics, on the future rather than the past, and make, maybe one

or two recommendations in view of the prognosis of Iraqi politics.

I will be brief, for the record, I do not oversee the Iraq Program

at the National Endowment for Democracy, and the views I express

are mine, and not those of the endowment.

I want to start by emphasizing the obvious, and that is, failure

in Iraq is not an option, that the essence of the problem is political,

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and that the responsibility is mainly with the Iraqi Government

and its elected politicians. My main remarks will be more, or

mainly, on Arab-Iraq and, to a lesser extent, on the Kurdish-Iraq

or Kurdistan.

Iraq faces multiple, interwined challenges, ranging from violence,

sectarianism, terrorism, to developing the economy, expanding the

job market, to controlling and influencing—controlling the influence of Iraq’s neighbors. Most of these challenges have been complicated by one cause—the breakdown of the Iraqi State, and the

continued absence of an effective government.

Iraqi politicians, and its government could and should do more.

But under current circumstances, they will not. They are dug deep

in a zero-sum survival game—survival struggle—and are prepared

to go down, and take Iraq down with them. However, to leave Iraq

or simply hand over the problem to the Iraqi Government will

make it even worse.

There are huge hidden dangers, and suggestions to encourage dividing Iraq or pulling back troops to safe areas, where Arab Shias

and Sunnis militias exhaust themselves and the country to death

in their fights. Iraq’s current mess has already happened on America’s watch, and more should not be allowed to happen, as such.

Whatever the plans might be, the United States needs, in the

Iraqi Government, a partner who is willing and capable to rebuild

Iraq as a nation-state. The government currently lacks such a collective will, and/or vision on how to do it. It is yet to build its own

effective army and democracy above communal loyalties and sectarian politics. Without such collective will and shared vision, Iraqi

politicians and the government cannot build a strong, functioning

institution.

Millions of Iraqis suffer the consequences of a dysfunctional

state, controlled by ethnoreligious politics, with many regional ties.

It is wishful thinking to assume that the threat of withdrawal—

American withdrawal—or suspending financial aid to Iraq will

pressure the Iraqi Government into the right course. Only through

much closer and accurate diagnosis of the predicament of Iraq—of

Iraqi politics—the United States can find the right pressure points

that will force politicians into compromise.

It is unrealistic to expect the Prime Minister, the Iraqi Prime

Minister, alone, to change the nature of the Iraqi Government or

the politics behind it. Prime Minister Maliki, I think, is a willing

partner who shares a vision of building a state above identity politics. Firm statements of U.S. support and troop surge, recent troop

surges in Baghdad, have strengthened his hand. But this will not

be sufficient to change the behavior of elected Iraqi politicians.

With the best of his will and ability, and with the maximum support the United States can afford, and maximum pressure the

United States can put on Prime Minister Maliki, there is obviously

a very clear limit to how far he, and his government, can go. By

design, the Prime Minister’s position is weak, and controlled by the

politicians, who will not loosen their grip over the State, having

tasted its privileges, and the power that comes with it.

I would like to sum the predicament of the Iraqi State Government and its politics. Since June 2003, the United States effort in

Iraq focused on three tracks—delivering a political process, ensurVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00617 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ing security, and developing the economy. The political process was

real and successful. It brought about important and valuable outcomes, an elected legitimate Parliament, and a coalition government. However, this successful political process took place while

Iraq had no effective state institutions to deliver security and services to all citizens.

The state was dismantled in April 2003, and since then, all attempts to rebuild it took place parallel to formulating a democratic

process. Nearly all Iraqi administrative and security problems

branched out of an absent state. Without a functioning state, identity politics flourished.

There was a rapid emergence of communal, tribal, religious, and

ethnic politics. The prolonged absence of the state led to the emergence of militias and alternative power centers. Identity politics

today dominates Iraq.

Iraq’s democratic political process is now seriously undermined

by the weakness and absence of the state from citizens’ lives. People left to their own devices, they rallied naturally behind their

ethnic, tribal, and religious leaders. Today, a new class of politicians thrive, they play on identity politics, hating and fearing the

other.

Elections, unfortunately, legitimized and empowered them. They

control Iraq, its resources, and its people, and will continue to fight

their own narrow agendas over turf and resources, and expose the

whole country to the consequences.

Today, Iraq is in a vicious circle, where rebuilding the state requires national politics, but that in turn, requires the presence of

a strong state. The past investment in rebuilding the state failed

because of the ethnosectarian politics. More of the same will not

work: More time, more trained Iraqi police and army, more resources—all of these previously tried measures may be necessary,

but surely insufficient.

It is clear by now that Iraqi politics needs a fix, without which,

a surge in security measures can bring temporary relief, but not a

cure for the problem. It is unrealistic to assume that the threat of

withdrawal from Iraq would pressure politicians into political compromise, cooperation, or better behavior. Some would welcome it.

Due to the geographical, historical, and political factors, I would

suggest that the prospect of involving Iraq’s neighbors, resolving

Iraq’s security problems, has the potential to force Iraqi politicians

to make the necessary compromises, and take the right course. The

Prime Minister needs United States support to lead a roundtable

conference for Iraq’s neighbors to agree a compact on security, to

include border controls, the flow of cash and arms to communities,

and rebuilding Iraq.

Only through the prospect of such a regional involvement, Iraqi

politicians will compromise their positions, and work out a shared

vision on future Iraq. Only a united Iraq, with an effective government, and an agreement with its neighbors can deny al-Qaeda its

breeding grounds in lawless Iraqi cities, and end sectarian violence.

The stakes could not be higher for America, and hence domestic

politics, regional concerns, and any other special interest must all

be balanced to ensure success in Iraq.

Thank you.

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[The prepared statement of Dr. Kubba follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAITH KUBBA, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

AND NORTH AFRICA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of the committee, let me begin by expressing my appreciation for the opportunity to address

the committee on Iraq at such a critical time, and as an Iraqi American, to express

my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, for your thoughtful insights and firm commitment to ensure that America succeeds in Iraq. In 2005, I took a leave of absence

from the National Endowment for Democracy to become the spokesman for the

former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim Jaafari. I had the pleasure of meeting you,

Mr. Chairman, and many of your distinguished colleagues during your frequent visits to Baghdad. For the record, I do not oversee the Iraq program at the National

Endowment for Democracy and the views I express today are mine and not those

of the Endowment.

At the outset, I would like to express my respect, appreciation, and admiration

to all the men and women, military and civilians, Iraqis and Americans, who are

trying hard to make Iraq succeed. I have seen the difficulties facing decisionmakers

who have to strike painful balances between so many conflicting demands. I would

like to focus on the future rather than the past, and make recommendations in view

of a prognosis of Iraqi politics.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to start my testimony by stating the obvious.

President Bush rightly reminds us that victory in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest and

failure is not an option. Sustaining such message is critical. Leaving Iraq torn with

violence and sectarianism is not an option. Al-Qaeda will expand in the ruins of

Iraqi cities and torn communities. In a failed Iraq, al-Qaeda will become stronger,

recruit more terrorists, advance its training and carry out more 9/11s. Simply put,

Iraq is a zero-sum equation between the United States and al-Qaeda.

Iraq faces multiple intertwined challenges, ranging from violence and sectarianism to developing the economy and expanding the job market to controlling

the influence of its neighbors. Most of these challenges originated from one cause,

the breakdown of the Iraqi State, and they have become difficult to resolve because

of the continued absence of an effective government.

Disarming the militias is a case in point. Shia militias filled the streets in districts left exposed to persistent al-Qaeda attacks. Under the watchful eyes of a dysfunctional government, the militias displayed their arms, exploited Shia needs for

protection and grew unchallenged in most districts. Similarly, Sunni districts suffered the wrath of Shia militias revenge and were not protected by the Iraqi police.

Local Sunni-armed groups saw the need to collaborate with insurgents in order to

protect themselves in a brutal mad conflict. Not surprisingly, most Sunni politicians

and some armed groups have welcomed the recent surge in American troops as

means to disarm rival militias. Without expanding and elevating the Iraqi Army

and police force above sectarian, ethnic, and political loyalties, all security measures

remain short term and unsustainable.

Building modern state institutions transcending ethnoreligious lines has been the

U.S. goal for the past 3 years. All opinion polls showed that throughout 2003, 2004,

and 2005, Iraqis wanted a central government with strong national institutions controlling arms, intelligence, and borders and strong local administrations providing

services and jobs. The United States has provided enormous technical assistance to

build Iraqi ministries and bureaus. The United States acted on good faith that a

legitimate political process would eventually bring peace and national unity. The political process successfully delivered a legitimate government but failed to bring either an effective government or a government of national unity. This failure lies

today exclusively in the hands of post-Saddam Iraqi politicians, who have risen to

power in deadly exceptional circumstances. It is dangerously misleading to assume

that the problem is historically rooted in Iraqi communities or externally caused by

rouge neighbors.

Iraq’s predicament is found in its current electoral laws and in fundamental disagreement among its communal leaders over the concept of the state and the design

of government. Under current electoral rules, Iraq will always have a weak executive and a fragile coalition government, where the Prime Minister cannot hire and

fire incompetent or corrupt ministers without causing a political crisis. It took

months to form a Cabinet whose success is not defined by services but by continuity.

It is formed without a shared vision but with a complex quota system dividing ministries. Inevitably autonomous ministers are more accountable to their party bosses

and less to the Prime Minister. Such a system will not deliver an effective government.

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Changing the current system to bring about a strong government requires prior

agreements and a high level of trust between its communities. There is little reason

to believe that Iraqi politicians will reach agreement by themselves. Today there are

two Iraqs, Kurdish and Arab, and three main parliamentary blocs with tens of political groups. Kurdish Iraq is stable, prosperous, and determined to expand and maximize its control to ethnically mixed areas beyond its current regional border. Arab

Iraq is at war with itself and approaching a full-blown civil war. The Kurds can factor in this effort in as much as they may help or hinder rebuilding Arab Iraq. The

key to bringing stability back to Iraq depends on Shia and Sunni agreement on how

to govern Iraq. So far, there are no signs of any agreement.

Last June, Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki launched a reconciliation initiative to

reach out to Sunni insurgents and consolidate his government of national unity. He

solicited support from Gulf States, supported reconciliation conferences in Baghdad

and Mecca, and pledged that only government forces will bear arms. His Ministries

of Defense and Interior have no ties to armed political groups and militias and he

started his campaign against the al-Mahdi Militias. However, such measures and

gestures are helpful but dwarf in significance compared to the challenge of bringing

unity of vision among the three main communities in Iraq (Sunnis, Shias, and

Kurds) to agree on constitutional amendments.

Iraq passed the Constitution in a national referendum in October 2005 despite

Sunnis’ overwhelming rejection. Only the promise and hope of future constitutional

amendments brought back the Sunnis to participate in December 2005 elections and

Maliki’s government. Since then, no progress has been made on constitutional

amendments. Behind the political paralysis is a lack of clear ideas on how to reconcile differing views. Pushing amendments without prior agreements will escalate

the political crisis and violence even further and deny Iraq its last chance to resolve

constitutional differences. If the minimum of Sunni hopes in amendments are not

realized, then the country will sink into more violence. Without accommodating

Sunni grievances and fully engaging them in rebuilding the state and running the

government, it would not be possible to separate al-Qaeda and criminal networks

from the rest of the insurgency.

IS COMPROMISE POSSIBLE?

Differences run deep among the three major groups on nation-state-building. Behind their commitment to national unity are different visions on how to build Iraqi

governing institutions, in particular on the nature of the state, the mandate of central government, and the control of security and natural recourses. Reconciliations

are difficult because of hardened positions, zero-sum perspectives to politics, historical grievances, mistrust, inflated assumptions about negotiating positions, and lack

of experience. A closer look at their differences suggests that not all can easily or

quickly be resolved. Arab Sunnis, who are most experienced in administrating a central state and least in negotiating with local politicians, seek the return of a centralized Iraq with an autonomous Kurdish administrative region. Kurds, who secured

a constitutionally recognized and highly empowered federal region with strong hold

in Baghdad, will not accept any rollback from such position. Moreover, they expect

to add Kirkuk to their region. Arab Shias, with least experience in government,

have mixed positions about the return of a centralized state without the Kurdish

region. Some groups are pushing toward a southern federal region, similar to the

Kurdish one. The parliamentarian committee to be tasked with drafting amendments has not brought forward new ideas on how to proceed. The future of Kirkuk

and the prospect of forming a southern region are perceived by Arab Sunnis as most

problematic. At dispute are articles on the control of natural resources and the concept of citizenship and state institutions. If Iraqis fail to agree peacefully through

parliamentary daytime debates, they will fight street battles outside Parliament at

night.

Iraq’s destiny is in the hands of elected politicians who have no incentive to compromise. They thrive on hard-line identity and communal politics. They are deeply

linked to militias and illicit siphoning of Iraq’s petro-dollars. They have adjusted to

violence, established supply lines to a prolonged conflict, and shielded themselves

from the suffering of ordinary people. Iraq awaits the move of these politicians to

compromise and come to agreement on their differences, work toward a shared vision, and allow technocrats to rebuild the state. Without pressure, Iraqi politicians

will not move. The United States can bring in additional leverage over Iraqi politics

through Iraq’s neighbors. The threats of bringing in the neighbors will change the

dynamic and force compromises. Unlike the United States, Iraq’s neighbors are

there to stay and Iraqi politicians fear their intervention. Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds

are all exposed to the influence of neighbors, who have legitimate concerns about

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the deteriorating security conditions in Iraq. The alternative to direct discussions

with the neighbors is war by proxy and indirect and unregulated competition over

Iraq. This can provide sufficient deterrent and incentive to affect Iraqi politicians

and community leaders. Iraq can call its neighbors to a conference on border security, disarming militias, and reconstruction.

The most important and urgent issue in such a conference is restoring the ability

of the state to control all armed groups and exert authority all over Iraq. The government has to negotiate disarming militias whose loyalties—ethnic, religious, or

political—to their leaders are above their loyalty to the state. The top three militias

are the Kurdish Peshmerga, who are the best trained and disciplined; the Shia

Bader Brigade with its extended networks of social organizations; and the least organized and most thuggish, the Mahdi Army. Integrating members of these groups

into Iraqi units must come through rigorous selection and training procedures. Some

Sunni armed groups are tribal but most are not affiliated with Sunni political leaders.The United States should continue to be involved in security planning and leverage its political influence to ensure a buy-in from all parties to Iraq’s national security policies. In confronting complex networks of kidnappers, smugglers, white collar

criminals, and financers of armed groups and political parties, Iraq needs U.S. advanced technical support and expertise. Iraq also needs to revive its own security

agencies and measures that were effective in fighting crime under the previous regime. For example, the previous regime ran successful undercover security agency

to expose white collar corruption in all ministries.

THREATS OF CIVIL WAR

Fixing Iraqi politics is the most important challenge but putting down the rapidly

spreading sectarian violence has become most urgent. Iraq did not have communal

conflicts in its history, and until 2003, Iraqis prided themselves with the extent of

mixed marriages and neighborhoods. For more than three decades, Saddam played

communities against each other, elevated mistrust between citizens and caused communal tensions. Still Iraqis blamed the government but not each other for Saddam’s

repression of Shias and Kurds and refused sectarianism. Some Iraqi exile leaders

with external influence fed ethnoreligious agendas into Iraqi politics and institutionalized sectarian quotas at all state levels. For obvious political gains, they, too,

pushed sectarianism. That partially explains the passive slow reaction of some Iraqi

political elites to growing sectarian conflicts.

Until recently, al-Qaeda was the number one threat to Iraq, followed by the other

two deadly forces: Sunni insurgency and sectarianism. Although it exploited Sunni

political isolation and dysfunctional government security agencies, al-Qaeda failed

to block the political process and the emergence of an Iraqi national unity government. The killing of Zarqawi was a severe blow. As al-Qaeda and Saddam loyalists

were running out of time, they unleashed their most devastating weapon: Sectarianism. For the past 3 years, they have been trying to stir up Arab Shia-Sunni

violence. They brutally beheaded Shias, blew up their mosques, and destroyed their

most holy shrine. Now, their fire of sectarian violence is spreading and threatening

the whole process. Iraqi police and army units can easily get sucked into sectarian

violence. Without agreement with Iraq’s neighbors on ending sectarianism, Iraq’s

modest political progress and the unity of its Armed Forces may not survive long.

Within this fragile and problematic political setting, al-Qaeda succeeded in

unleashing sectarian violence with far reaching consequences. Sectarian violence

has seriously undermined the political process and changed Iraq’s landscape. Persistent communal violence and politicians’ failure to agree on constitutional amendments will bring about a de facto breakdown of Iraq along communal lines. Such

an outcome will prolong the conflict and sew seeds of additional communal and regional violence

LOWERING EXPECTATIONS

This Iraqi Government has a long way to go before making any noticeable difference. The alternative to a national unity government is a full meltdown into violence and chaos. Iraq needs help in both tracks: Security and politics while the

United States can no longer instruct the Iraqis on how to govern, the security of

the government and the delicate balance among Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish parliamentary blocs still hinge on U.S. support. This gives the United States significant

influence and leverage over the course of Iraqi politics and the development of its

security.

Only a united Iraq with an effective government and in agreement with its neighbors can deny al-Qaeda its breeding grounds in lawless Iraqi cities and end secVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00621 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tarian violence. The stakes cannot be higher for America and hence domestic politics, regional concerns, and special interests must all be balanced to ensure success

in Iraq.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Dr. Kubba.

Let me mention that rollcall votes are anticipated at 3:45, and

this is always an unfortunate occurrence as we proceed through

hearings, but we’ll have time for your testimony, Dr. Dodge, and

then the chairman will probably return, and we will make some determination as to how to proceed so that we can ask questions of

you, and continue the hearing.

Dr. Dodge.

STATEMENT OF DR. TOBY DODGE, CONSULTING SENIOR FELLOW FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE

FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM

Dr. DODGE. Thank you.

First, can I say that it’s an honor to be here today. Second, I’ve

submitted a longer written testimony that I’d like to be placed on

the record.

I think that the publication of the Iraq Study Group report in

early December, and the President’s major policy speech on Iraq on

January 10, marked a decisive change in attitudes toward Iraq

here in Washington. The acceptance in policy circles of clear-eyed,

realistic, and necessarily pessimistic assessment is clearly to be

welcomed.

However, acknowledgement that the situation is dire, and getting worse, conceals both disagreement and confusion about the underlying causes of the violent civil war, and how it dominates the

country, and hence, possible solutions.

What I want to do this afternoon is run through the major drivers of the conflict, and suggest that neither the Baker-Hamilton report, nor President Bush’s new policy, fully deal with the causes of

the problem. To explain the evolution of violent instability in the

wake of regime change, the collapse of the Iraqi State is of much

greater importance than the existence of communal antipathies, or

indeed, the ineptitude of Iraq’s new ruling elite.

The entrance of U.S. troops into Baghdad triggered 3 weeks of

violence and looting that destroyed the state’s administrative capacity. As we know, 17 of Baghdad’s 23 ministry buildings were

completely gutted.

Finally, de-Baathification removed what was left—its institutional memory, and a large section of its skilled personnel. This,

along with the disbanding of the Iraqi Army resulted in the acute

security vacuum that we have today.

Second, the lack of the Iraqi Government capacity and coherence,

has taken away the legitimacy that began to accrue to the government after the elections of 2005. The collapse of the state, and the

resulting security vacuum that has driven Iraq into civil war has

created—or at least empowered—three distinct sets of groups deploying violence for their own ends.

The first are the industrial-strength criminal gangs, who terrorize what is left of Iraq’s middle class. The persistent reports of

crime is as big a problem for the citizens as Basra, as Baghdad,

indicates that the State’s inability to impose and guarantee order

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is a general problem across large swathes of southern and central

Iraq, going well beyond the government’s inability to increase electrical output, or stimulate the job market, the continued ability of

criminals to operate is indicative of a failed state.

The second type of organization capitalizing on the collapse of

the state are the myriad groups that make up the Iraqi insurgency,

thought to have between 20–50,000 fighters in their ranks.

The violence that erupted following the destruction of the alAskariya Mosque in the city of Samarra on February 22, 2006, saw

a third group of who have capitalized on the failure to impose

order. The militia is estimated to hold between 60 and 102,000

fighters in their ranks.

The militias themselves can be divided into three broad categories, depending on their organizational coherence and relation

to national politics.

The first, including the most disciplined group, consists of the

two Kurdish militias associated with the Kurdish Democratic

Party, and the Party for the Union of Kurdistan.

The second set of those that were created in exile, and brought

back to Iraq in the wake of Saddam’s fall. The most powerful of

these is the Badr Brigade, the military arm of the Supreme Council

of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, estimated to have roughly 15,000

fighters in its ranks. It is the Badr Brigade’s colonization of large

swathes of the security forces, notably the police and paramilitary

units associated with the Ministry of Interior, which has done so

much to delegitimize the already extremely limited power of statecontrolled law and order.

Jawad al-Bulani, the Minister of Interior since May 2006, has

clearly struggled to reform this Ministry. He has reportedly sacked

more than 3,000 employees, but the Ministry is still dogged by repeated allegations that its forces and prisons are using murder and

torture with impunity.

The third group of militias that dominate society are those that

were created in Iraq since regime change. The largest and most coherent of this is the 50,000-strong Jaish al-Mahdi, set up by

Muqtada al-Sadr.

Now, the speed with which the militia itself was built, and the

two prolonged conflicts it’s had with the U.S. military, has taken

its toll on its coherence. Muqtada militia commanders have become

more financially independent of Sadr through hostage-taking, ransom, and the smuggling of antiques and petroleum. In spite of

Sadr’s repeated calls for calm, it was the Muqtada army that was

blamed for the majority of the violence in and around Baghdad, following the destruction of the al-Askariya Shrine in February.

The Badr Brigade and the Muqtada army are in competition to

control Iraq’s Shias. This has led to a low-level civil war between

them. This struggle erupted in Basra in April and May 2006, and

then again in Amarah in October. The fighting in April was not

caused by religion, or even ideological differences, but money.

Basra is the center of Iraq’a oil exports, and the conflict was primarily concerned with the division of the spoils.

The fighting in Amarah in October was again about the dominance of the town, once British forces had left. In each case, none

of these groups involved were strong enough to win outright, and

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so the conflict simmers on, erupting periodically, triggered either

by competition, or Iranian interference.

The dominance of the militias was not an inevitable result of regime change, but a direct response to the collapse of the state. If

Iraq is to be stabilized, if central government—a central government with a monopoly on coercion must be rebuilt with administrative capacity to give it legitimacy. Sadly, there’s no shortcut to this

end-state. If it’s possible at all, it could take many years, and a

great deal of resources to achieve.

Ever since 2003, when Paul Bremer signed a November the 15th

agreement, the U.S. Government has subcontracted this complex

job of rebuilding the state to a small group of inexperienced, formerly exiled Iraqis who were long absent from the country.

Two elections and a referendum in 2005, were meant to give

Iraq’s new political elite democratic legitimacy. However, the nature of the electoral system chosen, the way the parties decided to

fight the elections, and the constitutional position of the Prime

Minister in their aftermath, have all combined to break the political coherence and administrative efficiency of this government.

The Office of Prime Minister has become the main vehicle for delivering government coherence. However, the Prime Minister is in

a very weak position, both constitutionally, and electorally. Real

power is vested in the parties who fight the election.

For the parties, electoral success within larger coalitions is rewarded by dividing up the spoils of government, cabinet portfolios,

and the jobs and resources they bring. Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki has acted as a broker, facilitating negotiations within his

own coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, between it, the American

Ambassador, and the other coalitions. The Prime Minister’s decisions are based on the comparative power of the parties, and the

coalitions he’s negotiating with, not on his own political vision, or

agenda for rebuilding the Iraqi State.

The Cabinet, instead of acting as a vehicle for national unity and

state-building, has become a mechanism for dividing up the spoils

of electoral success. If government ministers are answerable to anyone, it’s to their party bosses, not the Prime Minister, or beyond

him, the electorate. The ministries these politicians now run have

become personal and party fiefdoms. At best, and this is at best,

scarce government resources are diverted to build party constituencies, with each minister clearing out the payrolls of their ministries to appoint friends, followers, and faction members. At worst,

there is little or no Cabinet responsibility or administrative oversight. This system encourages both personal and political corruption to flourish.

Against this background of state collapse and the resultant civil

war, both the Iraq Study Group, and President Bush argue that

only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people.

However, once state capacity has collapsed, civil society’s ability to

positively influence events quickly disappears.

The Iraq Study Group’s main suggestion is a dramatic empowerment of Iraq’s current governing elite. However, the current governing elite is not coherent enough to fulfill this role. It does not

act with anything approaching unity, and Prime Minister Maliki’s

position is not strong enough to impose his will, or indeed, the

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United States will in this disparate group of, basically, squabbling

politicians.

President Bush, on the other hand, favors a dramatic increase in

United States troops to impose some order on Baghdad and northwest Iraq, adding a further 21,000 troops to the current, roughly,

132,000 American troops in the country. Even with a new total of

153,000 troops, U.S. troops, this number would be far short of the

number needed to impose order on the country.

President Bush’s new approach would see a total of 32,000 U.S.

troops in Baghdad, a city of roughly 6 million. This gives commanders one American soldier for every 184 Baghdadians. This

new, enlarged number of U.S. troops is still well below even the 50

per 1,000 that the new Army and Marines field manual on counterinsurgency recommends.

In addition, simply flooding one area of Iraq—in this case, Baghdad—with troops, neglects the subtler aspects of counterinsurgency

doctrine. For a surge in troops to Baghdad to be sustainable, it has

to be married with the second stage of the process. After areas

have been cleared of insurgents, the government needs to reconstitute sustainable security, building up its administrative capacity,

and then establishing the rule of law.

The Iraqi Government, I would argue, is neither willing nor able

to follow up the ‘‘clear’’ phase of counterinsurgency with the ‘‘build’’

stage. First, in the aftermath of a successful U.S. counterinsurgency operation to gain control of the northern city of Tel-Afar, the

Iraqi Government proved remarkably reluctant to secure this victory by employing enhanced government resources.

Second, in a country dominated by the collapse of the state, the

ability of the government to build up its capacity across a sustained

geographical area is highly limited. There is a distinct danger that

neither President Bush nor the Iraq Study Group’s proposals for

extracting the United States from Iraq recognize the root cause of

the violence.

The origins of the Iraqi civil war lie in the complete collapse of

both the administrative and coercive capacity of the state. It is the

United States inability to date to reconstruct them that lies at the

heart of the Iraqi problem. If, and until, the state’s capacity is substantially rebuilt, then Iraq will continue to be a wellspring of violence and instability.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Dodge follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. TOBY DODGE, CONSULTING SENIOR FELLOW FOR THE

MIDDLE EAST, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, LONDON,

UNITED KINGDOM

INTRODUCTION: STATE COLLAPSE IN IRAQ

The publication of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report in early December 2006 and

President George W. Bush’s major policy speech on Iraq in January 2007, marked

a decisive change in attitudes in Washington. The acceptance in policy circles of a

clear-eyed, realistic, and necessarily pessimistic assessment of Iraq, is clearly to be

welcomed. However, acknowledgement that the situation is dire and getting worse,

may conceal both disagreement and confusion about the underlying causes of the

violent civil war that now dominates the country.

To explain the evolution of violent instability in the wake of regime change, the

collapse of the state is of much greater significance than the supposedly transhistorical existence of communal antipathies or indeed the ineptitude of Iraq’s new

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ruling elite. The entrance of U.S. troops into Baghdad in the first weeks of April

2003, resulted in the death of the Iraqi State. Faced with the widespread lawlessness that is common after violent regime change, the United States did not have

the numbers of troops needed to control the situation. After 3 weeks of violence and

looting, the state’s administrative capacity was destroyed. Seventeen of Baghdad’s

twenty-three ministry buildings were completely gutted. Looters first took portable

items of value such as computers, then furniture and fittings. By the time I reached

Baghdad, a month after U.S. forces, they were systematically stripping the electric

wiring from the walls of former government buildings, to sell for scrap. Following

the destruction of government infrastructure across the country, de-Baathification

purged the civil service of its top layer of management, making between 20,000 and

120,000 people unemployed. The administrational capacity of the state was shattered by over a decade of sanctions, three wars in 20 years and then 3 weeks of

uncontrolled looting. Finally de-Baathification removed what was left: Its institutional memory and a large section of its skilled personnel.

Iraq today finds itself in a situation of state failure. Against this background instability is driven by two interlinked problems, which have caused the profound insecurity and violence that now dominates the country. The complete collapse of state

capacity and the U.S. disbanding of the Iraqi Army resulted in an acute security

vacuum. This was seized upon by myriad groups deploying violence for their own

gain. Organized crime became a dominant source of insecurity for ordinary Iraqis.

For coalition and Iraqi security forces, it is the diffuse groups fighting the insurgency in the name of Iraqi nationalism, increasingly fused with a militant Islamism,

that have caused the highest loss of life. But in early 2006, a new crisis arose with

even greater potential for destabilization: Civil war. The explosion that destroyed

the al-Askariya Mosque in the Iraqi city of Samarra, on February 22, 2006, marked

a watershed, exacerbating already mounting sectarian violence and the resultant

population transfers.

The second problem that has dominated the politics of the country since the fall

of Saddam Hussein, is the question who should rule? How to find Iraqis who after

35 years of dictatorship have both the technical capacity and national legitimacy to

rule over a country of 26 million people? 2005 was dominated by the struggle to

build a representative government that could act as a rallying point for the country;

allowing the population to invest hope and legitimacy in a new ruling elite that

could stabilize the nation and move toward rebuilding the state. For Iraq to stabilize

a regime change to be a success, sustained progress will have to be made in two

areas: The building of countrywide state capacity and the growth of a legitimate and

competent governing elite.

STATE COLLAPSE LEADS TO CIVIL WAR

The collapse of the state and the resultant security vacuum that has driven Iraq

into civil war has created, or at least empowered, three distinct sets of groups deploying violence for their own ends. The first are the ‘‘industrial strength’’ criminal

gangs who terrorize what is left of Iraq’s middle class. Although there is a clear

overlap between simple criminality and politically motivated violence, especially

where kidnapping is concerned, the continuing crime wave is a glaring example of

state incapacity. The persistent reports that crime is as big a problem for the citizens of Basra as Baghdad, indicates that the state’s inability to impose and guarantee order, is a general problem across large swathes of southern and central Iraq.

The high levels of criminal activity indicates that violence is driven primarily by opportunity, springing from state weakness, not the antipathy of competing groups

within Iraqi society. Crime is obviously instrumentally driven, primarily noncommunal and a key factor delegitimizing the new Iraqi ruling elite. Exceeding the government’s inability to increase electrical output or stimulate the job market, the continued ability of criminal gangs to operate is indicative of a failed state.

The second type of organization capitalizing on the collapse of the state are the

myriad groups that make up the Iraqi insurgency. In the aftermath of regime

change, the insurgency was born in a reactive and highly localized fashion, as the

U.S. military’s inability to control Iraq became apparent. This process saw the creation of a number of small fighting groups built around personal ties of trust, cemented by family, locality, or many years of friendship. Disparate groups, formed

to rid the country of U.S. forces are estimated to consist of between 50 and 74 separate autonomous units, with between 20,000 to 50,000 fighters in their ranks. Over

the past 3 years they have been innovative in the technology they deploy and the

tactics they use. Since 2005 however, the insurgency, has to some degree, consolidated around four or five main groups. These organizations include the Islamic

Army in Iraq, the Partisans of the Sunna Army, the Mujahidin’s Army,

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Muhammad’s Army, and Islamic Resistance Movement in Iraq. As their names suggest, political violence has been increasingly justified in religious terms. Over the

last year these main insurgent groups have found ideological coherence by fusing

a powerful appeal to Iraqi nationalism with an austere and extreme Sunni Salafism:

The attraction of the Salalfist doctrine for the insurgents is that it allows a distinction to be drawn between those involved in the jihad or struggle (the true believers), and those who are not. Under Salafism those not backing the struggle can be

branded nonbelievers and as such be killed. This Salafist approach has also lent

itself to the increased use of sectarian violence. Shias can be murdered both because

they do not follow the ‘‘true path of Islam’’ and because they form the majority of

those staffing the security forces against whom the violence is directed.

The numbers and role played by Arabs from neighboring countries and beyond

them the organizing capacity of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, is estimated by the U.S.

military to be between 5 and 10 percent of the total. These foreign fighters have

played a disproportionately large role in the insurgency’s ideological coherence. It

is al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia that has driven the rising influence of Salafist doctrine

and has claimed responsibility or been blamed for the majority of the violence that

has increased sectarian tensions in the country. This dynamic reached it peak with

the destruction of the al-Askariya Mosque. Although the city of Samarra has long

been dominated by the insurgency, the destruction of the mosque, one of Shia Islam’s most important shrines, was an act calculated to outrage Shia opinion.

The violence that erupted following the Samarra bombing saw criminals and insurgents combine with a third group who have capitalized on the failure of occupation forces and the Iraqi Government to impose order. The plethora of independent

militias is estimated to hold between 60,000 to 102,000 fighters in their ranks. The

militias have overtly organized and legitimized themselves by reference to sectarian

ideology. Their existence is testament to the inability of the Iraqi Government to

guarantee the personal safety of Iraqis on the basis of equal citizenship, not sectarian identity.

The militias themselves can be divided into three broad groups, depending on

their organizational coherence and relationship to national politics. The first and

most disciplined group consists of the two Kurdish militias of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The second set are

those that were created in exile and brought back to Iraq in the wake of Saddam’s

fall. The most powerful of these is the Badr Brigade, the military arm of Supreme

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), estimated to have 15,000 fighters

in its ranks. The Badr Brigade along with SCIRI itself, was set up as a foreign policy vehicle for the Iranian Government. Indeed the Badr Brigade was trained and

officered by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, at least until their return to Iraq. It

remains comparatively disciplined and responsive to its senior commanders. However it is the Badr Brigade’s colonization of large swathes of the security forces, notably the police and paramilitary units associated with the Ministry of Interior,

which has done so much to delegitimize the already limited power of the state-controlled forces of law and order. Badr’s dominance of the Ministry of Interior reached

its peak when one of its former commanders, Bayan Jabr, served as a minister

under the Jaafari government. The Ministry’s Wolf Brigade commandos were repeatedly accused of acting as a death squad, frequently resorting to extra-judicial

execution and torture. Complaints reached their peak in November 2005, when U.S.

forces raided a Ministry of Interior detention facility and found 170 detainees ‘‘who

had been held in appalling conditions.’’ However SCIRI’s dominance of government

was such that Jabr was not removed until the end of May 2006. His replacement,

Jawad al-Bulani, a nonaligned politician, has struggled to reform the Ministry. He

has reportedly sacked more than 3,000 employees, but the Ministry is still dogged

by repeated allegations that its forces and prisons are still using murder and torture

with impunity.

The third group of militias that dominate society in the absence of a state are

those that have been created in Iraq since regime change. They vary in size, organization, and discipline, from a few thugs with guns controlling a street or a neighborhood to militias capable of running whole towns. The largest and most coherent is

the 50,000-strong Jaish al-Mahdi, set up by Muqtada al-Sadr. The core of the Mahdi

militia is organized around the offices of Sadr’s religious charity, the Martyr alSadr. Each office is run by a cleric appointed by Sadr’s headquarters in Najaf, with

full-time fighters paid as much as $300 a week. However, the speed with which the

militia was built after regime change and the two prolonged conflicts with the U.S.

military have taken a toll on its organizational coherence. Mahdi militia commanders have become more financially independent of Najaf through hostage-taking, ransom, and the smuggling of antiquities and petroleum. Sadr has repeatedly

tried to instil discipline but, as one of his own commanders admitted, ‘‘Even when

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Sadr fires the brigade commanders, their soldiers follow them and not Sadr. Now

Sadr fires commanders every month, so their fighters will not become too loyal to

them.’’ In spite of Sadr’s repeated calls for calm, it was the Mahdi Army that was

blamed for the majority of violence in and around Baghdad following the destruction

of the al-Askariya shrine in February.

The Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army both claim to represent the same constituency, urban Iraqi Shias. They have both tried to legitimize their coercive role in

terms of defending this section of the population against violence and instability.

However the instrumental basis to their actions, capitalizing on the absence of the

state, as opposed to their alleged position as protectors of the Shia population, has

been highlighted by the low-level civil war they have been fighting against each

other. This struggle erupted in Basra in April and May 2006 and then again in

Amarah in October. Basra has a very small Sunni population, the fighting in April

that was responsible for the deaths of 174 Iraqis was not caused by religious or even

ideological differences, but money. Basra is the centre of Iraq’s oil exports and the

conflict was primarily concerned with the division of the spoils. The fighting in

Amarah in October was again about the dominance of the town once British forces

had left. In each case, none of the groups involved were strong enough to win outright and so the conflict simmers on, erupting periodically, triggered by rival machinations and Iranian interference.

Once a state has failed, once its coercive and administrative capacity is removed

from society, the population has to seek new local ways to survive, to gain some degree of day-to-day predictability. This is the quest that has haunted the majority

of Iraq’s population since regime change. The result has been the rise of the militias. The quality of an individual Iraqi’s life depends on the discipline, organizational coherence and central control of the militias that dominate their streets,

neighborhoods, and towns. In the areas of northern Iraq, the Kurdish militias of the

KDP and PUK, since fighting a civil war against each other in the mid-1990s, have

centralized and largely institutionalized their military forces. Elsewhere in Iraq, the

militias who came into existence after regime change are far more unstable, prone

to criminality and divided loyalties. Although the militias were formed as an instrumental response to the security vacuum, they have attempted to legitimize themselves by the deployment of hybrid ideologies; sectarian, religious, and nationalist.

This has caused the ethnic and religious cleansing across the country from Kirkuk

in the north, to Basra in the south, but most powerfully in Baghdad. This was not

an inevitable result of regime change but a direct response to the collapse of the

state. If Iraq is to be stabilized, a central government with a monopoly on coercion

must be rebuilt with administrative capacity to give it legitimacy. Sadly there is no

shortcut to this end-state, if it is possible, it could take many years and a great deal

of resources to achieve.

IRAQ’S NEW POLITICAL ELITE: PART OF THE PROBLEM

Ever since 2003, when Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority,

signed the ‘‘November 15 agreement,’’ the U.S. Government has subcontracted the

complex job of rebuilding the state to a small group of inexperienced, formally exiled

Iraqis who were long absent from the country. Their task was to erect a sustainable

and legitimate post-regime change political order. This has been hampered by the

two dominant facts of Iraqi politics today. The major political problem they face is

the legacy left by 35 years of Baathist rule. Before the imposition of sanctions in

1990, Saddam Hussein used oil wealth and hitherto unheard of levels of state violence, to break any organizing capacity within Iraqi society. Those who were active

in antiregime politics were murdered, imprisoned, tortured, or driven into exile.

Those who stayed in the country increasingly realized that survival and economic

well-being were directly linked to complete political passivity. Consequently indigenous political organization beyond the Baath did not exist in any measurable form.

There was no civil society in Iraq before the U.S. military reached Baghdad. Iraqi

politics began from scratch in April 2003.

The Iraqi politicians subcontracted by the Americans to rebuild the state have

been active in indigenous politics for less than 4 years. The majority were also long

absent from the country. Hence they have had to battle against indigenous hostility

and suspicion since their return. The intense political process that stretched across

2005 was meant to overcome these two hurdles: Anointing Iraq’s new political elite

with the legitimacy of two electoral mandates and a constitution approved by popular referendum. However the nature of the electoral system chosen, the way the

parties decided to fight the elections, and the constitutional position of the Prime

Minister in the aftermath, all combined to break the political coherence and

administrational efficiency of the government created by this process.

619

Iraq’s new electoral system, based on large multiparty coalitions, is one of the

major problems dominating the politics of government. Whilst the President fulfills

a mainly ceremonial role, the office of Prime Minister has become the main vehicle

for delivering governmental coherence. However the Prime Minister is in a weak position both constitutionally and electorally. Real political power is vested in the parties who fight the elections. For them, electoral success within larger coalitions is

rewarded by dividing up the spoils of government, Cabinet portfolios, and the jobs

and resources they bring. The Prime Minister does not dominate the Cabinet as first

among equals. Instead Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has to act as a broker, facilitating negotiations within his own coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance and between

it, the American Ambassador and the other coalitions. The Prime Minister’s decisions are based on the comparative power of the parties and coalitions he is negotiating with, not his own political vision or agenda for rebuilding the Iraqi State.

In the aftermath of the December 2005 elections Prime Minister al-Maliki’s task

was to build a government of national unity. This involved rewarding the main coalitions while also seeking to balance electoral achievement with the identity politics

that the main parties claim to personify. In addition, al-Maliki had to move ministers who under his predecessor, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, were too inefficient, scandal

ridden, or controversial to continue in office. The Cabinet that was created sacrificed

the needs of a population traumatized by the invasion, occupation, collapse of the

state, a crime wave, and the growing civil war, at the altar of party politics and

electoral outcomes. An unintended consequence of this system was to prevent the

Prime Minister sacking incompetent or corrupt ministers without the agreement of

their party bosses. Even when this was possible, party, coalition, and sectarian

mathematics meant that other senior party figures replaced them.

The limitations placed upon the Prime Minister’s powers of appointment were personified by his relations with Bayan Jabr. Jabr is a key member of SCIRI and a

former commander in its militia, the Badr Brigade. As Minister of Interior in the

Jaafari government, he was the focus of sustained criticism for politicizing the Ministry of Interior, sacking longstanding members of staff, only to replace them with

loyal lieutenants from his own militia and party. Maliki eventually succeeded in

moving Jabr from the Interior Ministry, replacing him with the nonaligned Jawad

al-Bulani. However the weakness of the Prime Minister’s position meant that Jabr

could not simply be sacked from the Cabinet, but was instead moved sideways, to

become Minister of Finance. In his new job Jabr has been accused of obstructing

reconstruction initiatives, designed to rebuild support for the government in the

Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad following the counterinsurgency operation Together Forward II, in the summer and autumn of 2006.

During 2005 Iraq did indeed hold two comparatively successful elections and a

referendum for the new Constitution. However the government and Cabinet that

this electoral process delivered are unfit for their purpose: Rebuilding the Iraqi

State. The weakness of a Prime Minister in a system dominated by parties has directly undermined the coherence of the government. The Cabinet, instead of acting

as a vehicle for national unity and state-building has become a mechanism for dividing up the spoils of electoral success. If the ministers that al-Maliki appointed are

answerable to anyone it is to their party bosses, not the Prime Minister or the electorate. The ministries these politicians now run have become personal and party

fiefdoms. At best, scarce government resources are diverted to build party constituencies, with each minister clearing out the payrolls of their ministries to appoint

friends, followers, and faction members. At worst, with little or no Cabinet responsibility or administrational oversight, this system encourages both personal and political corruption to flourish.

Under the transition from regime change, 2005 was meant to give Iraq’s new ruling elite the legitimacy to rule the country. However the way that electoral mandate

was delivered, through large multiparty coalitions, has directly hindered the government’s main and crucial task: The rebuilding of the Iraqi State. Instead the Cabinet

has become highly fractured. Ministries have been turned into party fiefdoms directly breaking governmental coherence. In the aftermath of each election, politicians were locked away within the fortified Green Zone in the centre of Baghdad.

They became quickly removed from the everyday concerns of a population struggling

to survive in the midst of an increasingly bloody civil war. The new government has

followed the path of its two predecessors; it has become mired in the incestuous politics of zero-sum party competition. The state, both coercively and administrationally, is still largely irrelevant to the Iraqi population’s lives. As such, it is hastening Iraq’s further descent into intercommunal strife and collapse.

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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Against a background of state collapse and the resultant civil war both the Iraq

Study Group and President Bush argue, ‘‘Only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence

and secure their people.’’ However once state capacity has collapsed, civil society’s

ability to positively influence events quickly disappears. The Iraq Study Group’s

main suggestion is a dramatic empowerment of Iraq’s current governing elite. They

would be forced to take on the role of state-builders by the application of both carrots and sticks; greater and speedier devolution of power, increased funding but also

the threat of reduced aid or complete U.S. withdrawal. Under these policy proposals

the United States would exercise influence over the Iraqi Government in two ways.

First, it would make Iraq’s rulers understand that America’s commitment to the

country was not open-ended. U.S. troops would be reduced and eventually withdrawn from Iraq, irrespective of the progress made on the ground. The minds of

those in the Iraqi Government would be focused by a clear and unambiguous time

limit placed upon U.S. support for the country. They would have no American safety

net. If the current ruling elite failed it would be their own lives that would be put

at risk. More immediately the Iraq Study Group suggested the imposition of strict

conditionality on further U.S. aid. If specific milestones were not reached by the

Iraqi Government over the next 2 years, then U.S. troops and money would be reduced incrementally, until Iraqi Government policy was changed for the better.

Given that the Iraqi governing elite play such a central role in the ISG’s recommendations, their response is instructive. The Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani,

gave the government’s most sustained and detailed reaction stating, ‘‘as a whole I

reject this report.’’ Talabani rejected the report’s suggestion of embedding up to

17,000 U.S. advisers across the Iraqi Army and police force. This he claimed, ‘‘is not

respecting the desire of the Iraqi people to control its army and to be able to rearm

and train Iraqi forces under the leadership of the Iraqi Government.’’ Talabani also

minimized the potential for aid conditionality to influence the government. Overall,

Iraq’s President saw the ISG’s recommendations as a negation of Iraq’s hard-won

sovereignty and thus unacceptable to his government.

Hoshyar Zebari, the Foreign Minister, and Mowaffak al-Rubaie, the National Security Adviser, developed a much more cautious critique of the report. Speaking at

the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, alRubaie broadly agreed with the change in the U.S. military mission suggested by

the ISG. The government, he argued, has been asking for the accelerated training

and equipping of Iraqi security forces. Zebari claimed that on the military front the

ISG recommendations were in line with the agreement recently reached between

President Bush and Prime Minister al-Maliki at their meeting in Amman. This was

to accelerate the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi troops in command and

control, training, arming, and equipment.

However, the final response to the report was not at all positive. If the ISG’s recommendations on national reconciliation were meant to be perceived as an olive

branch to the insurgency then the reaction of the Baath Party cannot have given

its author’s much room for optimism. The Baath Party, in its official response, saw

the ISG report as confirmation of America’s dire position in Iraq, commenting that

the United States had been defeated and ‘‘the Iraqi national resistance has achieved

a practical victory. This much was clear from the Baker report. Now Bush has also

admitted that America had failed.’’

The ISG’s report selected the ruling elite of Iraq as the best tool available to the

United States, to shape events on the ground. However the logic of two nationwide

elections and a constitutional referendum since the invasion works against this

strategy. It means that Iraqi politicians like Talabani feel they have developed a

large degree of autonomy from the U.S. Government who originally put them in

power. This explains why the ISG’s call for conditionality was rejected in the name

of Iraqi sovereignty and the government’s electoral mandate. Amongst both American diplomats and Iraqi politicians working in the Green Zone, there is a recognition that the negative consequences of a precipitous American withdrawal from Iraq

would be as great for the U.S. Government as it would be for the Iraqi ruling elite,

many of whom are very lightly attached to their country. This gives Iraqi politicians

a good deal of leverage over their American colleagues. Their response to the ISG

report has been to call America’s bluff, not taking seriously either its demands for

conditionality or threats of withdrawal. This means Iraqi politicians will continue

to squabble amongst themselves directly undermining the coherence of the government and the rebuilding of the state.

President Bush, on the other hand, favours a dramatic increase in U.S. troops to

impose some order on Baghdad and the northwest of Iraq, adding a further 21,500

troops to the current 132,000 troops in the country. His desire for greater numbers

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of U.S. troops in Iraq has been shaped by the military and political difficulties faced

by the most recent attempt to control Baghdad, operation Together Forward II. This

operation began in August 2006, with plans to deploy 7,000 extra U.S. troops in

combination with a similar number of Iraqis. However the Iraqi Government found

itself unable to deliver the troops or reconstruction assistance it had promised. Several battalions refused orders to deploy to Baghdad. In addition, U.S. commanders

had to counter sustained political interference in their operations from the highest

levels of the Iraqi Government.

President Bush’s new proposals for a surge in troops may also suffer from

logistical and strategic shortcomings. Even a new total of 153,500 U.S. troops would

be far short of the numbers needed to impose order on the country. A technocratic

study on state-building published just after the invasion concluded that occupying

forces would need 20 security personnel, (both police and troops), per thousand people. It estimated that coalition forces should have had between 400,000 and 500,000

soldiers to impose order on Iraq. Even this figure compares unfavourably to the estimated 43 per 1,000 that sustained Saddam in power. President Bush’s new approach would see a new total of 32,500 U.S. troops in Baghdad, a city of 6 million

people. This gives commanders 1 American solider for every 184 Baghdadis. This

new enlarged number of U.S. troops is still well below even the 50 per 1,000 that

the new Army and Marines field manual on counterinsurgency recommends.

In addition, simply flooding one area of Iraq, in this case parts of Baghdad with

troops, neglects the subtler aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine. A surge in troops

to Baghdad may be understood as the beginning of an ‘‘oil spot’’ strategy. But to

be sustainable this has to be married with the second stage of the process. After

areas have been cleared of insurgents the government needs to reconstitute sustainable security (particularly police forces), build up its administrative capacity, establish the rule of law, and transform its despotic capacity for violence into an

infrastructural power for governance. The Iraqi Government is neither willing nor

able to follow up the clear phase of counterinsurgency with the infrastructural build

stage. First, in the aftermath of a successful U.S. counterinsurgency operation to

gain control of the northern city of Tel Afar, the Iraqi Government proved remarkably reluctant to secure this victory by deploying enhanced government resources.

After the clear phase U.S. forces found themselves overtly cajoling the Iraqi Government, in an effort to get funds released for the area, while trying to stop covert attempts at undermining the whole operation. Second, in a country dominated by a

collapsed state, the ability of the government to build up its capacity across a sustained geographical area is very limited.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a distinct danger that neither President Bush nor the Iraqi Study

Group’s proposals for extracting the United States from the debacle that Iraq has

become have recognized the root causes of the violence and instability that has

plagued the country since April 2003. The origins of the Iraqi civil war lie in the

complete collapse of both the administrative and coercive capacity of the state. The

Iraqi State, its ministries, civil servants, police force and army ceased to exist in

a meaningful way in the aftermath of regime change. It is the United States inability to reconstruct them that lies at the heart of the Iraq problem. If and until the

state’s capacity is substantially rebuilt, then Iraq will continue to be a wellspring

of violent instability, with the population dominated by the Hobbsian nightmare

that their lives will be nasty, brutish, and short.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Let me explain and apologize to the two witnesses I didn’t hear.

I was on the phone with one of the former Secretaries of State who

was supposed to testify—he will testify—trying to work out a

scheduling problem, and I apologize for my absence during your

testimony.

We’ve just been told that the vote that was supposed to take

place at 2:45 has been pushed back a little bit, and again, since my

colleagues are always so patient, I’m going to begin by yielding to

the Senator from New Jersey, to give him a chance to ask questions first.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.

Let me say——

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The CHAIRMAN. We’ll do 8-minute rounds today.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me say that, having sat through all of

these hearings, and they’ve all been incredibly instructive, and I

appreciate you and Senator Lugar bringing us together on this, I

don’t know which one has created a greater frustration for me.

Having listened to what you all had to say, which was very insightful, I’m trying to reconcile what you all had to say, and I think

there’s some elements that I heard that have a common thread. I

was also reading as you gave your more concise statements, which

are in conflict with what I’ve heard from other panels.

And that is—I’ve heard time and time again, particularly from

the administration, that in essence, this government, the Maliki

government, is now ready to deal with the substantive and political

issues that are critical for the possibility of a government of national unity to be realized, if it can be realized—regarding the deployment of Iraqi troops, as it relates to the President’s escalation

of the war and seeking security in Baghdad, as it relates to the political issues, as it relates to the economic issues, on the oil revenues redistribution—all of these things. And yet, I listened to what

I think was the one thread that unified your testimony—that the

political players beyond the Maliki government that obviously have

enormous impact here, are not quite at the table and have not been

incentivized by either the inclusion of regional partners or by other

ways, to come to the process of what is necessary to move forward

on the possibility of a national agenda, and reconciliation, reconstruction, and moving forward.

If that is the case, then everything we hear from the administration about that the way in which we are going to achieve success

is not possible because it depends on a government that you, Dr.

Dodge, described as basically incapable, because of the structural

way in which we took action after the invasion.

And then I listened to several of the other testimonies talk about

how the political players are not there, or are not incentivized and

have reaped the benefits of being in power through their party

process and the powers of appointment, Cabinet positions, and

what not. And then, listening to Mr. Talabani—tell me: How do we

move this forward? Because we’re being asked to send 22,000 of

America’s sons and daughters into a fight, an escalation of a fight,

in which the political will doesn’t seem to be there to accomplish

what is—at least at this point in time—what is necessary on behalf

of its own people, and possibility of its own nation? And yet, we are

being told that’s the very essence of what we should do. So that we

can give them all the wherewithal to achieve that. I don’t hear it,

in all of your respective testimonies. So, I open it to whoever wants

to comment.

Dr. DODGE. You’ve got my message exactly right, and I think

Laith and at least two of my colleagues probably wouldn’t disagree

with the sentiment, if not the way it was delivered.

I think it is the electoral system, I think the electoral system has

deliberately structured a weak Prime Minister, I think once the

representatives of the parties get hold of their ministries, they do

what they please with them. And the course of what—that the

painful example of this is by in Jaabar, first in Interior, and now

in Finance. There was a series of scandals in the Interior Ministry,

623

highlighted by the U.S. military in, I think, November 2005, finding detention centers which were truly horrific, but it was not until

May 2006 that anyone could remove that minister from his post,

and then he wasn’t removed, he was shifted sideways into anything, a more important job in the Finance Ministry. What does

that tell us about the government? It’s not fit for purpose.

Now, I could explain it by detail I have in my testimony, what

it is about the electoral system that’s delivered this, but I think,

if the surge has one positive aspect, it is in protecting—on a very

flat terrain—the one institution of the Iraqi Government that is, at

the moment, coherent, and is not politicized or sectarianized to the

degree that the others are, the Iraqi Army. By pumping in these

new troops to Baghdad, what you’re doing is putting an American

shield round the only institution that has the capacity to deliver

services to the Iraqi population that it needs: Law and order.

So, I think, although I’ve criticized the surge for being too small,

and actually, for neglecting the second phase of counterinsurgency,

it may have, possibly the unintended consequence of protecting the

Iraqi Army from the way that the rest of the institutions

theoretically——

Senator MENENDEZ. This is an institution that is, at least at this

stage, clearly not delivering on behalf of the Iraqi people. It doesn’t

seem to have the political will to do what is necessary to achieve

real delivery service. How is it—as you answer these questions, I

would ask, in my time that’s left—tell me how is it that you would

change the dynamics? What is it that we can do to change the dynamics, externally or internally, in order to move the political players to a much higher calling?

Dr. DODGE. Well, I think when you look at President’s Talabani’s

response to Baker-Hamilton, all Baker-Hamilton was merely suggesting, and I think, on a misunderstanding of the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Government must do specific things for the money

that it’s being given, and that it must accept large number of

American trainers into the Iraqi Army. President Talabani said, ‘‘I

reject this report. I won’t have anything to do with this report.’’

So, you have a problem that those two elections and that referendum have given a degree of perceived autonomy and sovereignty to the Iraqi politicians who are not doing their job.

Dr. KUBBA. If I may, I just want to remark—irrespective of how

we go there today, we have a reality, that political landscape that

has its hold over the State, it’s stagnant and we can spend the next

3 years going round and round. The country is rich enough, it’s

pumping oils, there are beneficiaries that are controlling this state,

they will not let it go. Even if 4 million Iraqis are displaced as refugees and hundreds are killed every week, they will not let go.

In my understanding, the only way is to change the dynamic of

the Iraqi politics. The only way I can see it, is something strong

enough that will make them shift and seriously think about it, they

know the neighbors are not going to go away, unlike American

troops, which are bound to go away. They know that the neighbors

have influences over them, and they do not want them in Iraq at

all. Maybe that thing they fear most can be leveraged to bring a

real change in dynamic, and force them—if they want their country, then work toward it, and do not run it down.

624

Ms. RAHIM. Mr. Chairman, may I add? I agree with my colleagues, but I want to add one or two points.

First of all, the Prime Minister is constrained both constitutionally, and also by the fact that he is head of a coalition government. As Prime Minister, in the Constitution, he already doesn’t

have very many powers. But as the head of a coalition government,

he has even fewer powers.

I can tell you that the Prime Minister cannot fire any of his ministers. He has been talking about firing three ministers since last

July, and has not been able to do so. So, that is a given. However,

we also have a National Emergency Law, which in my view, we

have not taken advantage of fully. And I think we ought to be looking at that law, and seeing whether the Iraqi Government, the

Iraqi Cabinet and Prime Minister Maliki, specifically, can actually

use that law to give himself some greater capacities than he already has.

That’s one point. The second point is that we need to pressure—

the United States needs to pressure—not just Prime Minister

Maliki. The pressure has to be applied on all those recalcitrant political actors who are unwilling to make concessions and compromises. And, in order to do so, I think the United States needs

to do something that we really have not done a good job of, and

that is assess our leverage.

What is United States leverage in Iraq today? Where does it reside? Where are the points where the United States can actually

make an impact on the political process? Now, it seems to me that

there definitely has to be leverage with 150,000 troops there, but

I do think we’ve done a very good job of identifying where it is, specifically, and we perhaps should be engaging in that kind of exercise.

Mr. TALABANI. I think, Senator, if I could just add. The problems

are clear for all to see. There is a major mistrust between the people that are, today, sitting around the table, deciding the future of

this country. It is not the fact that it’s a faulty political system, or

it’s a faulty electoral system, or it’s a faulty constitution that has

got us to this. It is about bad leadership, politically immature leadership.

And this cannot, most of the people that are in government today

were in the opposition. Few have had experience at administering,

and one of the reasons of the Kurdistan region today is a little

more stable than the rest is because we’ve had 15 years of administering our affairs. If you look back at the Kurdistan region in the

early nineties, it was as bad as Iraqis today—the parties were

fighting each other, there was mistrust, there were rivalries about

money, about power.

Eventually, as we saw a larger goal, the mistrust began to go

away, and it ultimately was a major role of the United States that

brought the two Kurdish parties together, sat them down at the

table and gradually—slowly but surely—trust began to develop.

Now, I don’t think Iraq has 15 years to wait before the trust can

begin to develop, and that just shows you what a major task we

have ahead of us, to eliminate centuries of mistrust that has existed within Iraqi society, the mistrust between Sunni-Arab and

Shia-Arab communities hasn’t just been created since the removal

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of Saddam’s regime—these are deep-rooted insecurities. And you

cannot address these people’s insecurities with a policy or a strategy. It ultimately has to come about by leaders leading. And reaching beyond their ethnic and sectarian boundaries, and I don’t know

how we do it, to be honest with you, sir.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. There are about 5 minutes left of the vote. Senator Casey, I believe, is coming back, and possibly Senator Webb.

I would like to come back and ask you some questions.

If you would like to continue for a few, if you have anything you

want to finish up with, I——

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Because I don’t want to make you have to come

back again.

Senator MENENDEZ. I would—you know, you spoke of, is it, Ms.

al-Rahim? You spoke of us assessing what leverage we have, and

making a decision to use it on the other political players within

Iraq. Do you, would you have any suggestions in that regard?

Ms. RAHIM. Senator, it’s not really up to me to make those decisions, I think that American policymakers ought to sit down and

assess what kinds of leverage they can have.

But while I have the opportunity, I want to recall something, and

that is, I believe way back when I testified before this committee

in 2002, I spoke about a date in process that was required in Iraq,

that we really need to bring the Iraqi players.

And I don’t see, necessarily, just the United States bringing the

players, but there has to be some way by which we can persuade,

and put pressure on those players to come together and say, ‘‘OK,

you’ve got, you know, we’ve got a week,’’——

The CHAIRMAN. What do the rest of you think about that idea of

a date in process?

Excuse me for interrupting.

Senator MENENDEZ. Sure, no, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Because it wasn’t the United States just bringing

them together. Russia was there, France, I mean, there were other

nations. It was a major effort—what do you all think about that

notion?

Dr. DODGE. I think I’ve written at length about, and when I testified before this committee last time, spoke about the desperate

need to multilateralize. But on two levels.

First, I think, undoubtedly, no one around this table would disagree that certain neighbors, and I think, increasingly more neighbors will start to play into Iraq with destabilizing effect. So, you

need to put the neighbors in a multilateral framework that convinces them that collective cooperation as opposed to individual

machinations will be to their benefit.

But you need, certainly, to bring the United Nations back in,

maybe not for the structure of the United Nations, but for the resources that the Permanent Five can deploy, and also the diplomatic cover that it would give to the United States, it would be

much more muscular in Iraq.

Over a period of 2 months I met three very senior Iraqi politicians who’d been in the first two governments, and then had left

government, and they were the most haunted and profoundly deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00635 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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pressed individuals who said, ‘‘You know what you did? You gave

us power back too soon.’’ And I think the Iraqi people are reaping

the hell of that mistake around the November 15, 2003.

So, I think the United Nations, or at least a multinational framework needs to be, Iraq needs to be inserted within that, to bear the

burden of state-building.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Talabani, Dr. Kubba. Briefly, if you can, because I think we’ve got about a minute left in the vote with the

time.

Mr. TALABANI. Sure, I think some sort of international process

could be helpful, but only if it helps to alleviate, again, the concerns of the various players in the country. I’m skeptical of how

much pressure could be applied by the United States, by an international body. It’s not about pressure—it’s about some sort of incentives that will ultimately help create some sort of rational

thinking and wise judgment that doesn’t exist today.

Dr. KUBBA. I clearly see that the pressure point that can come

is from Iraq’s neighbors for—on many grounds. They can contribute

to security, they can assure the communities, or have the opposite

effect on others. But more importantly, I think if the Iraqi Government takes the lead, with the support of the United States, the

focus on bringing Iraq’s neighbors would definitely bring the right

change in the environment, and some results.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, we’re going to recess, with your

permission, for about—it takes about 10 minutes to get over, and

there’s two votes in a row, but one vote is almost out, and the other

we’ll vote at the front end, so with a little bit of luck, we’ll be back

here at about a quarter after, OK?

We’ll recess until the call of the Chair.

[Recess 4:05 p.m.]

[Reconvened at 4:28 p.m.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

I thank the panel for their indulgence. Because of so much happening on the floor of the Senate now, I’m not sure who’s going to

be able to come back, but I do have some questions, with your forbearance here, if I may.

I’m going to ask some pretty broad questions, if I may, and

they’re going to sound—well, I won’t characterize how those sound,

you can make a judgment. What happens if the United States just

gets up and leaves? What happens if the United States of America

announces that over the next 6 months we’re going to engage in an

‘‘early’’ withdrawal, we’re leaving Iraq. What happens?

Rend, I’ll start with you——

Ms. RAHIM. Mr. Chairman. Yes——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And work our way across.

Ms. RAHIM. Looking almost exclusively at U.S. interests in the

region, I would say it would be catastrophic. There would be——

The CHAIRMAN. Catastrophic for U.S. interests?

Ms. RAHIM. For the—for the United—yes; for U.S. interests.

The CHAIRMAN. In what sense? How would it be catastrophic?

Ms. RAHIM. The——

The CHAIRMAN. I’m just being the Devil’s advocate here. I

like——

Ms. RAHIM. Yes, yes. And we’ll parry here.

627

The situation in Iraq will deteriorate into total chaos and mayhem, there will be—if we’re not now in civil war, we will be definitely in civil war. I believe that neighboring countries will not

stand by, they will intervene in that civil war, either by sending

in their own forces, or by funding and facilitating. I think the civil

war——

The CHAIRMAN. A cynic would say that’s already happening,

funding and facilitating.

Ms. RAHIM. Well, even more so.

And I would also suggest that this civil war may actually spill

over into some neighboring countries, particularly in Kuwait, Saudi

Arabia, perhaps Syria, Jordan, so on. So, I don’t think we can contain what goes on in Iraq if it deteriorates.

Obviously, oil flows will be disrupted and——

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to Iraq, they’ll be disrupted in other

countries as well?

Ms. RAHIM. Yes; oh, absolutely.

Of course, we will also be giving major players that we are not

necessarily friends with, such as Iran, the ability to manipulate

Iraqi affairs, even, to an even greater degree than they are doing

now. And I don’t think that’s a desirable outcome.

So, I think we need to think very, very carefully about consequences of withdrawal.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Dodge.

Dr. DODGE. I agree with President Bush on this, he said it would

force a collapse of the Iraqi Government, tear the country apart,

and result in mass killings, I think that, that’s—I think he’s spot

on there.

I think the—if we look at the comparison with the Lebanese civil

war, the region was comparatively successful in containing this

struggle, but what resulted? As the region, and more importantly,

the international community invariably turned its back on Lebanon, one state through murder, bribery or whatever, dominated

Syria. So, I think the example would be as the United States draws

out, pulls out, the Iranians will come in and dominate the terrain

through nefarious means, and through violence. So, I think it

would be disastrous for Iraq. It may not spread the civil war beyond the boundaries, but Iraq would then become a regional cockpit where Iran and Saudi Arabia, Jordan would then fight this socalled presence of crisis war for——

The CHAIRMAN. Including Kurdistan?

Dr. DODGE. Pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. Including Kurdistan?

Dr. DODGE. Well, I think it depends on the Turkish general staff

there, doesn’t it? And one hears two different arguments, one that

the opinion in membership is a constraining factor, but two, all of

the opinion poll data coming out of Turkey suggests that Turks

have waited too long, and are turning away from the Holy Grail

of Europe, which means Turkey then would, as it turns back to the

region, have greater capacity to pursue its interests in the North.

Mr. TALABANI. I think——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Talabani.

Mr. TALABANI. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add to my

esteemed colleagues’ comments, which I agree with in their enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00637 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.003 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tirety, is the free access that would be given to al-Qaeda to come

in a benefit from this failed state. And wreck havoc, really, from

a failed state like Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. How would that happen, since each of the major

constituencies have no interest in al-Qaeda occupying any part of

their territory?

Mr. TALABANI. I think they will most likely benefit the western

part of the country. They will use their ability to move around in

the western part of the country to impose on the people in that

part of the country a rule of fear. They won’t have success in

Kurdistan, they won’t be able to walk around freely in the southern

part of the country, but I think we will see an emergence of an extreme Taliban-style way of life in western Iraq.

Dr. KUBBA. If I may, Senator, the—I think the communities are

more or less prepared for that eventuality in the worst possible

way, which is going to lead to, naturally—to suck in the neighbors

into Iraq. Iraq’s immediate neighbors have their own national interest tied with what happens in their country, if the United States

was to abandon it, abandon a weak Iraq without a state to defend

itself, it’s basically inviting neighbors to step in, and the communities will rush to neighbors to find protection.

So, for sure we’re going to have a much prolonged war within

Iraq that involved the neighbors. And I think in the atmosphere of

ruins and no government, al-Qaeda will flourish. They’ll find fresh

grounds for recruits, for training people, creating networks of murderers, it will just be ideal grounds for them.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me ask you a second question. Does the

leadership among the Sunnis and the Shia and the Kurds understand that that’s going to be an inevitability if things don’t start

to straighten up? Does anybody think that the United States of

America, forget what I think, is going to, 18 months from now—

there’s a lovely woman in here with a shirt that said ‘‘3061’’ on her

chest. Do they think they’re going to let it go to 6058? With no maturation of the political system or circumstance? What do you think

they think?

Dr. KUBBA. My belief is that they are prepared for it. They think

they are in a survival game, very much as Euros fight, and they

are prepared for it. The Sunnis have their strategic depth in other

countries, they think the flow of money and volunteers will continue, the Shia have their strategic depth in Iran, and I think the

Kurds are fairly strong in their region to face that eventuality if

it comes.

The CHAIRMAN. So, then, we talked about earlier, Ms. Rahim, the

notion that the United States has to figure out where its pressure

point is, where its—I forget the exact phrase you used for Senator

Menendez, and he asked you what that was, and you said, obviously, that’s for us to determine as a country, not for you to presume. But it seems to me you all are painting—and I’m not taking

issue, I’m just trying to understand, a fairly bleak picture here.

If, in fact, we do not stay and keep ourselves interposed as sort

of ‘‘apartheid cops’’ keeping things from blowing out of control fully,

we will reap the whirlwind. That, if we stay, there’s very little

prospect to think that any of the present actors who are the major

players in determining outcomes, whether it’s the militia, whether

629

it’s the political parties they’re attached to, whether it’s the political leadership that exists in the so-called central government now,

that they have no incentive to see things change. And, because of

the reasons you’ve stated, Dr. Kubba. And so it is a bit of, as I say,

a conundrum here.

And, one of the things I’ve observed is, and Dr. Dodge, you’re a

historian and you, and all of you may know better than I, but I

can’t think of a circumstance in the 20th century where a nation

has been willing to continue to have its blood and treasure bled for

the express mission of just keeping things from getting worse. I

don’t know when that’s ever happened.

And so, I know you all fully understand, I mean, you’ve said

things, and as you know—I’m not being solicitous, I have great respect for you all—you’ve all laid out the elements of what, if it occurred, would be the building blocks for the United States to be

able to, over time, leave Iraq without leaving chaos behind, and

having some sense of stability in a country that did not invite the

neighbors in, was secure within its own borders, not a haven for

al-Qaeda, and not a threat to its neighbors.

But all of the things you have stated, and all of you have used

the same kind of terminology, and you’ve cited the same goals—you

basically all say, with the exception of Mr. Talabani, that the system that was set up, the governmental system, is broken. It is not,

it cannot carry the weight of the change that’s required. Yes—and

I happen to agree with your—some of your criticism about how we

got to where we got to—but as an old bad, tried expression goes,

‘‘We are where we are.’’ You have this overwhelming portion of

Iraqis voting for a constitution, that everyone who comes and testifies before us says, basically, ‘‘Ignore it, ignore it.’’

That’s—when you cut through all of the terminology with notable

exceptions like Mr. Talabani, most people say, ‘‘Hey, the political

vehicle that’s in place, that’s designed to bring about political accommodation, makes political accommodation impossible, so, therefore, ignore it.’’ And the international community has put its stamp

of approval on this thing called a constitution, and the Constitution

calls for regionalism, and locks, Mr. Talabani, it locks the Kurds

into a position—which they want—a position of regional autonomy.

It says it straight out in the Constitution, and then it says, I forget,

I think it’s section 115, or article 115, and it says right below that,

subsection—or part two of that—I should have it committed to

memory like my own Constitution, I’ve read it enough—but it says

that any other governorate can determine it should be a region,

and it defines what the responsibility of a region is. What authority

they have. And it says that it cannot contravene the laws of the

national government, but the laws of the national government, as

you point out, there’s a weak Prime Minister, and a weak national

government, the national government can’t even tax. There’s not

even the power in Baghdad to tax.

And that’s the system set up, and yet, every expert that comes

before us, with notable exceptions says, ‘‘You can’t have these regions, you allow these regions to occur and you have chaos, and you

just increase the sectarian identity, and you increase the—’’ and

you know, it goes on.

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We have an expression that, I think, comes from you Brits: It’s

like pushing a rope. So, I mean, tell me, straight up—do we disavow the Constitution, say, ‘‘from this moment on, the United

States of America does not think that implementing the terms of

the Iraqi Constitution are in the interests of the Iraqis or the

United States?’’ Do we say that?

Mr. TALABANI. Mr. Chairman, if I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. TALABANI. Iraq has been a failed state since its inception. It’s

been a failed state, because its been ruled by a minority from a

center that has imposed its will, through fear and terror, on the

majority of the country. This has created the situation that we

have today. It wasn’t Ambassador Bremer that created this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I didn’t say that, as you know.

Mr. TALABANI. The CPA made many mistakes, we made many

mistakes, but it’s the fact that Iraq’s history has created the situation. The mistrust that exists between these communities.

So, people have come forward and have put forward a system—

a proposed system of government, through a federal structure that

takes away the insecurities. It tells the Sunni-Arab that no longer

will the Shia dominate them. It tells the Shia that no longer will

the Baathis dominate them. It tells the Kurds that no longer will

we be deprived of our own oil. It puts in place sound mechanisms

for coexistence. It is the only way that we can keep this country

together.

The country today stands divided, Mr. Chairman. And through

a federal structure, and through creating regions that can administer their own affairs, we can keep Iraq as one country.

The CHAIRMAN. As one of my friends says, ‘‘Let’s get up to 30,000

feet here, and look down.’’ It has been argued by some equally

bright and dedicated people who have been before this committee

in the past 3 weeks, with regard to a failed state, if it is, and was,

there’s generally only two prescriptions. One is a strong man, and/

or an empire being able to govern it, or two, federalization. Federalize it. That there is very little prospect of transitioning from a

strong-man/empire-dominated country constructed by an Englishman drawing a pen along a piece of paper representing the map

of the world—there’s no way to get from here to there. There’s no

way to get to a strong, central government that does not rely on

ethnic and/or religious blocks as the instruments of political accommodation, that allows you to have a unified, central government.

So, the transition, if there is any, has to be to an imperfect regional

government—not necessarily a Balkanization, not necessarily. Not

necessarily splitting up the country. But at a minimum, a very

loosely federated government. What’s the alternative?

Ms. RAHIM. Mr. Chairman, I think that Iraqis have accepted the

principle of federalism. I don’t think there are many Iraqis that

will oppose federalism, it is what kind of federalism, and at what

pace, and what are the residual——

The CHAIRMAN. Let me define it so we can get into it, OK?

Ms. RAHIM. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. What the Constitution says is: If you seek to participate and become a player in the federal system, any governorate

631

on its own or joining another can become a region, a term of art

in the Constitution, and it’s very explicit about the powers of the

region.

One of those powers, I think it’s section 5, if anybody has a Constitution, section 5 says—let me make sure, he just handed me the

whole Constitution here, but let me find the exact part. I’m looking

at it—section 6, article 109, subsection—is this right? I’m sorry, I

beg your pardon. Article 113, subsection, it’s listed sixth: ‘‘To formulate public,’’ excuse me, let me find the right section here, because I’ve got this backward.

Where’s that section about control over security? Oh, here it is.

I unfortunately know more about this than my staff, which worries

me.

Article 120, they talk about having the responsibility if you

choose to be a region. And the fifth section says, ‘‘The regional government shall have responsibility for all administrative requirements in the region, particularly the establishment and organization of internal security forces for the region, such as police,

security forces, and guards of the region.’’ Now that’s pretty basic

stuff. Article 120 lists a total of six, excuse me, five powers that

inure to a region if a governorate chooses to become a region or

part of a region.

Article 119 says, ‘‘the region shall adopt a constitution that defines the structure of the regional government, it’s authorities and

mechanisms for exercising those authorities, provided they do not

contradict with the constitution.’’

Article 120 says, first, ‘‘regional authorities shall have the right

to exercise executive, legislative,’’ and it defines them. But the fifth

one is pretty profound. Every expert and every historian we’ve had

here said, ‘‘Whoa, you can’t do that. You can’t let these guys have

control over, like you do, with the pesh merga, the total security

of your country.’’ We all act like we’re, you know, we’re in Alice in

Wonderland here.

These guys are up there saying, ‘‘By the way, you can’t even put

the Iraqi Army in my neighborhood, unless we agree. The Constitution says, they can say, your dad can say, ‘‘Nobody; forget it. General so-and-so, you cannot.’’ You can’t even fly the Iraqi flag if you

all don’t want them to fly it in your territory. And you all are talking about a united Iraq, like somehow there’s going to be a strong,

central government, where we pretend there isn’t anything having

to do with these sectarian and regional, ethnic, and tribal differences. So, what are we talking about here?

Dr. DODGE. Mr. Chairman, if you’d let me blunt——

The CHAIRMAN. I’d like you to be, believe me. I need bluntness

right now.

Dr. DODGE. The Constitution is irrelevant to Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Dr. DODGE. It’s like rearranging the deck chairs of the Titanic as

it slips between the icy waves of chaos and violence.

But basically, we have a representative from the Syrians in the

audience, apparently the Syrians have been promised Ninewa. Who

is going to protect them when they’re given Ninewa. What are they

going to do with Ninewa?

And the point that I—in my testimony about the——

632

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll tell you one thing. Americans don’t want to

die over Ninewa, while you all are figuring it out.

Dr. DODGE. The point about Badr and Sadr’s low-level civil war,

it goes straight to your point. You divide the country up, you give

the South to who? The Iraqi people don’t care about a constitution,

what they care about is the day-to-day struggle to survive, which

is getting more and more difficult in the chaos that’s Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me play Devil’s advocate. Let’s assume that

the law passed by the Parliament, suspended for 18 months now,

what, 10 months left?

Mr. TALABANI. Ten months, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Or 12 or whatever months left, allowing these regions to be set up. You come along and what happens is two, three,

five, seven governorates in the south made up of a Shia coalition

that’s at odds with itself, becomes a region. Well, if I’m sitting in

Kurdistan, and if I’m sitting in the Sunni province, I think, ‘‘You

know, the good thing is, Sadr’s going to have to go kill somebody

in that outfit that I don’t like anyway, that the SCIRI part that

was trained by the Iranians, the Badr Brigade. At least they’re not

in my neighborhood killing me.’’

Dr. DODGE. But they will be as well, won’t they?

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Dr. DODGE. Because Baghdad is 6 million people, the most ethnically mixed city in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, being the Devil’s advocate, you’ve got a

million, 200,000 people already headed out. You’ve got ethnic

cleansing already occurring in a race. I mean, it is a deluge that’s

occurring without any regional government being set up except

Kurdistan. And so, again, I’m trying to figure out—I agree with

you, the ideal thing is to have a Democratic central government

that has figured out a mechanism for sharing the oil, for controlling the militia, from allowing the neighbors to interfere in internal

affairs. That is what I’d like to see.

Now I sit here and say—and I’ll end with this and yield to my

colleague—I sit here and say, ‘‘Do I continue to vote to keep somewhere between 135,000 and 160,000 forces, while all you Brits are

heading home real quick?’’ You’re packing up and leaving, no one

else is in the deal. I mean, if you notice, no one talks about the

coalition forces anymore. At least they have the good grace to drop

the facade, that there’s a coalition force.

And I say, ‘‘But I tell you what, I’m going to send my son, who

is in the National Guard, let him go on over there, and let him take

care of helping you guys from killing each other, even though we

may have been the reason you started killing each other. And we’re

going to do this for awhile, and we have no real hope that you all

are going to get together, but we’re going to do this, because we

think a central government is a good idea.’’

Mr. TALABANI. Mr. Chairman.

Ms. RAHIM. Mr. Chairman, may I——

Mr. TALABANI. Please.

Ms. RAHIM. May I say a couple of things about this?

First of all, I have two problems with this scenario, or three.

The CHAIRMAN. I got a bunch.

633

Ms. RAHIM. One of them is that the—if the National Government

has dysfunctional institutions, I can assure you that with the exception of Kurdistan the other provincial governments are nonexistent. They are——

The. CHAIRMAN. I agree.

Ms. RAHIM [continuing]. Even more dysfunctional, if that were

possible. And so what is there to federate to? I am a proponent of

federation in Iraq, and not only of Arab-Kurdish federalism, but a

more complex federal system. It is just that I think this is not the

way to go about it because those provinces simply are not ready.

There is nothing there, there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with Dr. Dodge that the Constitution that exists in Iraq is really, you know—someone told me

there’s a famous phrase that a paper can hold anything that’s written upon it, or some phrase like that—do you think it means anything?

Ms. RAHIM. I think this Constitution does not make for a viable

state.

The CHAIRMAN. So does the United States come along and say,

‘‘We’re changing your Constitution?’’

Ms. RAHIM. No.

The CHAIRMAN. So what do we do to change the Constitution?

Ms. RAHIM. But I think we ought to have a constitutional convention in Iraq. And this must be, ours must be, or the Iraqi

Constitution——

The CHAIRMAN. Now who’s going to do that? I apologize for being

precise here. You say we should have a constitutional convention;

don’t disagree with you.

Mr. TALABANI. We’ve already had that, though.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s my point.

Mr. TALABANI. We’ve already been through this.

The CHAIRMAN. Who’s going to show up? Who’s going to call it?

Mr. TALABANI. The Constitution today is a compromise, it’s a

compromise by those that sat there and fought for days to try to

get something out of this. It’s not that we haven’t tried this. It’s

not that we haven’t tried to create a central government. It’s the

fact that central governments have failed in Iraq. It’s failed because Iraq is a multiethnic, multisectarian society, which has complete and immense mistrust within it.

And I think that in 1992 when we came down from the mountains into Kurdistan, we had nothing. There were no administrative structures in Kurdistan. The Iraqi regime had pulled out completely. We encountered a completely decimated region. And it took

us time to develop the political institutions. We held elections, they

weren’t the best. We had a government, it wasn’t the most competent. But in time, after even some skirmishes, we built what we

have today.

And I don’t think that this can’t be done in the south. I don’t

think this can’t be done in other parts of the country, but all I can

tell you is centralized governments have failed in Iraq. And I think

they’ll continue to fail, and will lead to more bloodshed the more

we try to create something for the sake of illusions over the sake

of pleasing the Iraq’s neighbors.

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The CHAIRMAN. I yield to Senator Casey, but Dr. Kubba, you

wanted to say something and the floor is yours, sir.

Dr. KUBBA. Mr. Chairman, Iraq today is two Iraqs. There is

Kurdish Iraq, which is stable, prosperous running itself in a very

good position. And there is the rest of Iraq, Arab Iraq, which is

very much on fire. And I can understand every reason for the

Kurdish region absolutely to try consolidate what has been

achieved after a long period of struggle.

Putting that out of the equation, we need to focus on where the

problem is. And the problem is very much in Arab Iraq. The current Constitution allows all the 15 remaining provinces, even to

come up and be one region if they want to. The real problem is political, it’s not to do with the Constitution. And the way the politics

is set at the moment, unless we push that—change the dynamic

that governs the politicians—they’re going to drag Iraq and the

rest of the region down with them.

My own assessment, left to the Iraqis alone, they will not do it.

The United States can not brighten open chat and do it indefinitely. I do firmly believe time has come to call up for a roundtable

conference where Iraq’s neighbors who have genuine interest in the

stability of their neighborhood, be participants and they pull the

rug from underneath the players who think they have the strategic

depth and can play neighbors to their advantage. I believe if we do

not do this now, we will be forced to do it at much worse conditions

later.

The CHAIRMAN. I happen to agree with you, but—Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity

again.

This is, as the panelists may know and the audience knows, one

of many great hearings we’ve had in this committee and I appreciate the chairman’s work on that, putting these together.

This is a rare opportunity because we have probably more time

than I’d get otherwise, but I’ll try not to press too long.

The CHAIRMAN. But take your time.

Senator CASEY. He’s been very generous with our time.

My first question, I guess, Doctor, is I want to pick up on where

you just left off. In terms of this, we’ve heard and we read in American newspapers all the time, the need for—obviously to get the

military strategy right, the political strategy, and the diplomatic

initiatives right. I think the administration has fallen short on all

three in one way or another. We’ve heard a lot about, in the last

couple of weeks now about, and experts have sat at a similar table

talking about military aspects.

You’re here talking mostly about the politics and governance,

and that’s why it’s important we’re here listening. But pick up

where you just left off from two vantage points. One, and I’d also

open this up to other panelists, when you talk about getting the

politics right on the ground and having an effort in the region. (A)

How should that work? If you had a magic wand, so to speak, if

you could charter a course that would be, in your judgment, the

best.

And then second, how has this Government, the Government of

the United States, done or not done things in the last couple of,

certainly the last 2 years, to move that forward? Just the political

635

effort. Start with the ideal, and then move to an evaluation of what

our Government has done or not done effectively to make that

happen.

Dr. KUBBA. Well on the realistic——

Senator CASEY. I know it’s broad, but——

Dr. KUBBA [continuing]. On the realistic ideal, I wouldn’t say just

abstract ideal, I think what can be done now is for the Iraqi Prime

Minister, with the clear support from the United States, calls for

a roundtable for Iraq’s neighbors directly to discuss security, not

only control over borders, but political, financial, and other forms

of interaction taking place between the different players in Iraq

and the neighbors. The United States ought to be clearly present

in that meeting, and I do believe if we can reach a compact with

Iraq neighbors on these issues, this will put a ceiling to how far

Iraqi politicians can indulge while the country is on fire.

So, I think this is something feasible—doable—it takes, including

Iran and Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan, all these

countries, six of them must be involved to very much the displeasure of the Iraqi politicians, but to the need to save Iraq. I

think this ought to take place.

Senator CASEY. I just want to interrupt you for one second just

so I’m hearing you right. You called that a roundtable. Is that the

term you used?

Dr. KUBBA. Yes.

Senator CASEY. And you think that should be called by whom?

Dr. KUBBA. The Iraqi Prime Minister, the Iraqi Government.

Senator CASEY. OK; so let’s say Prime Minister Maliki calls that

kind of a roundtable. You’re saying at that table should be which

countries.

Dr. KUBBA. I think America and Britain because of——

Senator CASEY. Right.

Dr. KUBBA [continuing]. The size of their involvement. Of course,

not only the Iraqi Government led by the Prime Minister, but the

six of Iraq’s neighbors, all of them.

Senator CASEY. OK. So that’s a specific step that could be taken.

Dr. KUBBA. Yes.

Senator CASEY. Let me, and I don’t want to press too hard on the

details, but I think it’s important. The American people pick up

their newspaper everyday, they turn on the television set, and they

see something very specific on the military part of this. They see

that the President has proposed having a surge, what I and many

others call an escalation of troops. So, it’s something specific and

it’s got a number on it. It’s very easy to understand that, right?

But then they hear all this, it’s kind of murky when it gets to

these others steps that are diplomatic and political. That’s very

helpful just to identify that step that you just pointed out.

So, let’s say in this ideal situation that the Prime Minister calls

that kind of a roundtable, that’s one. What else do you think you’d

put on your list in terms of a next—let’s say it’s reasonably successful, and try to play this out as best you can. And I know this

is hypothetical, but believe me, it helps. Because we don’t have

enough of this.

Dr. KUBBA. Well, I believe if that takes place, of course that will

be step one to create a mechanism to build not only trust, but to

636

look at specific measures, maybe and building a confidence, working issues on security, which is a collective interest shared by everybody, all of——

Senator CASEY. Right.

Dr. KUBBA [continuing]. Iraq’s neighbors. This can happen. It can

start a process. And I am certain if this was to be triggered then

Iraqi politicians, themselves, would rush against the clock to try to

come up with their own visions because they all will be threatened

by the prospect of losing control of the situation at the moment. I

believe this can take place.

The issues on constitutional amendments, how to resolve other

issues, I do have specific proposals, but I believe it’s not for the

United States to do it for the Iraqis. It must come from the Iraqis

themselves. What the United States can do is create a better environment and help change the dynamic of Iraqi politics. This is

something doable and the United States not only has an interest

in seeing it done—the alternative if it’s not done, I think the

United States can not simply pack and leave.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, would you tell me, specifically, how

would the United States do that?

Senator CASEY. Yes.

Dr. KUBBA. I think, again, to be specific, there are two channels.

Publicly, I think the United States ought to make it clear to Prime

Minister Maliki that it is important to hold a conference with Iraq’s

neighbors, specifically on the issues——

The CHAIRMAN. And if he says no?

Dr. KUBBA. My own information; he is for the idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let’s just assume, like most other things

we’ve suggested, he says no. Now you may have inside information

and I’m not being facetious, You may very well. I don’t doubt that.

Dr. KUBBA. I think, Mr. Chairman, the next best step is for the

United States to talk directly to Iraq’s neighbors and that will then

send a clearer and louder message. If you’re not going to fix your

country, we’ll bring others to fix it for you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we asked for that, and the others say,

‘‘You’re on your own. We like it the way it is.’’ Iran says, ‘‘It’s kind

of nice. You’re there and you’re spending $8.5 billion a month.

You’re losing thousands of Americans. You’re not able to rally any

military capacity to threaten us, and we kind of like it just the way

it is.’’

Dr. KUBBA. If that fails, I have no answers.

Dr. DODGE. Mr. Chairman, if I can just add——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your honesty. I’m sorry, Senator,

go ahead.

Senator CASEY. I want to get other reactions too, but often when

we, in America, when people out there who aren’t sitting through

hearings and don’t have, frankly, the luxury that we all have up

here to listen and to ask a lot of questions.

When they hear that someone says in order for the Iraqis to do

what they must do politically, the Americans must create—and you

used these words, Doctor; everyone has used similar words—but

create a better environment, OK?

Now most people hearing that—when I hear it as well—this is

how it’s translated to me, ‘‘create a better environment’’ means

637

boots on the ground, so you can stabilize things. It’s the foundation

of the President’s escalation, OK? But let’s set that aside for a moment.

Creating a better environment, because it seems like nothing’s

going to happen unless Americans take the lead on something like

this, even if it’s in the political sphere. What do we have to do,

other than having the President of the United States call Prime

Minister al-Maliki and saying, ‘‘Please convene a roundtable,’’ or

‘‘I’m directing you,’’ or ‘‘I’m urging you,’’ whatever way he conveys

that. Other than that kind of a communication of the Prime Minister, what does the Government of the United States have to do,

or if not directly, how else do you create a better environment?

Should we have an envoy there who has sustained involvement,

or do you need an envoy just to do diplomacy and then another person, pick the term, envoy or assistant to the President who’s on the

ground every day pushing and pushing and pushing relentlessly on

the politics? I’m just trying to get a sense of very specific things

we can recommend here.

Dr. KUBBA. Senator, I served nearly 1 year at the Prime Minister’s office in Baghdad. I think the American Embassy is one of

the largest in the world. I know for sure, not only through the Embassy, but through so many other channels, America has a lot of

influence over Iraqi politicians. I know that many Iraqi groups acknowledge that influence and know that in the long term they need

to keep good relationship with the United States. I believe all these

assets can be put in an effective way if there was a strategy that

is mainly political that looks at the big picture, and, of course, not

only at troop level.

Senator CASEY. I want to give others a chance, but I’m, I’ll ask

another question later. I want to go down the list so you don’t——

Mr. TALABANI. Thank you Senator.

Senator CASEY [continuing]. I don’t dominate here.

Mr. TALABANI. Senator, I think that we tried something collectively with the United States and the Iraqis and to try to bring in

the region and that was the International Compact for Iraq. This

was a, quite and ingenious idea that Iraq would receive certain economic assistance or debt relief and positive engagement from the

region and the international community, only if Iraq met certain

benchmarks, certain criteria, economic criteria, governance

criterias, economic reforms.

And it was, it created quite a bit of excitement. And a lot of the

region were interested. The United States did a major diplomatic

offensive to try to get Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, some European

countries interested in this. And there was quite a bit of interest.

And I think certain actions by the Government of Iraq over the last

4 or 5 months have caused that situation, the way that Saddam

was executed, for example, made many of the countries in the region kind of back off this idea. And this idea is somewhat dead in

the waters now, as we speak.

I think that we have to be strategic in the way we think about

how we include the region, and our neighbors. We have to be realistic to think that many of our neighbors are strong today because

Iraq is weak. And deep in their minds they may not want Iraq to

638

one day regain the strength that it had in the region. So we have

to be somewhat cynical of the motives of some of our neighbors.

Not to say we shouldn’t rule out some sort of international dialog. I wouldn’t limit it just to our neighbors. I would bring in other

major powers. Japan has major influence, and has donated a lot of

funds to Iraq, for example. Korea has made a significant investment. And I think if we do have some sort of forum, it’s got to be

along the lines and the thinking that existed with the international

compact where it’s not just assistance given to Iraq, it’s assistance

given to Iraq, only if Iraq meets certain benchmarks and certain

standards.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

Doctor.

Dr. DODGE. I think Laith’s suggestion is explicitly designed to

scare the politicians of Iraq into some constructive dialog, constructive movement and I think that we’ve got to this, that it needs to

be external to do that. And I think that’s right. So if there is a future for Iraq, it’s external, it’s not in the Green Zone amongst those

squabbling politicians.

Now, two things need to be done. First, I would agree exactly

with calling not a roundtable, but a regional conference. And, you

know, Iraq is, the United States major foreign policy issue for a

generation. Their regional policy, Iraq, regional United States policy should tie Iraq into the wider region and a regional conference

should say to Iran, ‘‘Yes, we’ll talk to you, but on the basis of a

quid pro quo that you give us cooperation on Iraq,’’ same with Turkey, Saudi, and especially Syria.

So there needs to—Hamilton was right on that basis, that Iraq

needs to be the primary issue for the United States in the region,

and the United States needs to get behind a major regional conference.

Second, conditionality, I think, my colleague has said that—that

money, troops, advisors should be delivered with specific demands

tied to them. And if that means riding rough-shod over the Constitution or the precious, but largely irrelevant sovereignty of the

Iraqis, that should be done. Because Iraq doesn’t exist without

United States forces and United States money and those forces and

money should be deployed to some positive end, which they’re not

being done at the moment.

Ms. RAHIM. Senator.

Senator CASEY. I have more, but——

The CHAIRMAN. Take your time, you keep going.

Ms. RAHIM. May I address——

Senator CASEY. Sure.

Ms. RAHIM. First of all you mentioned, should the United States

take the lead? Indeed the United States must take the lead. Nobody else will and we need that. The other thing is about this

roundtable, regional, or whatever. Remember we not only have had

the meeting called ‘‘Iraq’s Compact,’’ which was an international

meeting. Before that we also had Arab League meetings——

Senator CASEY. Right.

Ms. RAHIM [continuing]. About Iraq. Unfortunately, none of these

meetings have yielded anything and although I am not against a

regional meeting, I am in favor of one, but it has to be used as a

639

tool toward another end. And what we need to use that regional

meeting for, is to pressure the Iraqi political leaders to then talk

to each other and solve their problems.

I think it is much more useful to force the Iraqi politicians to sit

together and solve their problems. If we can do that without a regional meeting, so be it. If we think that the regional meeting is

a good vehicle, good pressure point, in order to force the Iraqis to

sit together, then by all means let’s do it through this regional

meeting. But that is not going to solve the problem. Unless the

Iraqi politicians sit down together and resolve their differences,

they will, they are likely to ignore all those meetings.

They have ignored the Iraq compact, they have ignored Arab

League meetings, they’ve ignored the Conference of Islamic State

meetings on Iraq, and so on and so on. They have entrenched,

vested, interests that they are finding it very hard to overcome.

So this is, the other thing that I want to caution against and

please don’t misunderstand me, I’m in favor of a regional roundtable. I am highly doubtful that our neighbors, and particularly

Iran, will be willing to help—let’s forget about the United States—

I am doubtful that they are willing to help Iraqis resolve their differences. I think many countries in the region are just very happy

to see where Iraq is now, provided it stays where it is now. In other

words, they’ve got us exactly where they want us. Both the United

States, and in terms of Iraq, it’s just what they want to see. So,

let us not overestimate the willingness of our neighbors and particularly Iran, to step forth and make concessions or come up with

solutions and provide assistance. I think that is a little bit of a

Pollyannaish approach. However, I want to insist, I think we

should also take that tact and see what it yields and use it as a

vehicle and a point of pressure if possible.

Senator CASEY. Well let’s assume that that won’t happen or they

try and it doesn’t work. What’s plan B? Because I think a lot of

people in this country have had the patience of, it’s almost Biblical—Joab, pick your figure—tremendous patience and, with an

awful lot of sacrifice. And you know the story, I don’t have to repeat it, about the sacrifice of this country, not to mention the horror that the people of Iraq have suffered.

But let’s, I think what people expect is, OK, if A’s not going to

work we want to see plan B. If B’s not going to work we want to

see C, D, E, and F. They want to go down, somewhat down the alphabet, so to speak, but they’re getting pretty desperate now, I

think, in terms of their willingness to allow this to go on much

longer. They’ve kind of reached their boiling point.

So say that doesn’t work, what’s plan B in terms of getting the

Iraqis to get it right politically? What can this country do to

incentivize that, to nudge it along, to push it along? Give us some

ideas.

Ms. RAHIM. Well——

Senator CASEY. Which you’ve already given by the way, I know.

Ms. RAHIM. If I may say that, we have to assume that our goal

is to get the Iraqis to reach a political settlement amongst themselves. That’s the goal.

Senator CASEY. Right.

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Ms. RAHIM. And then we say, OK, what are the tools, what are

the mechanisms that are most likely to get us to that point. Now

one tool could be this regional conference. Another tool could be an

international conference. Conditionality of aid, and so on could be

other tools. I have mentioned possible points of pressure that the

United States can apply in different ways other than money, and

so on that could be applied. All of these are different ways that we

can try.

Also none of these are mutually exclusive. We could use several

of them at the same time. And I think we should, in fact, not be

trying one item at a time and going down the list. This is no time

to work consecutively. We need to work simultaneously.

Senator CASEY. And I know you have those in your testimony.

Dr. Dodge, any?

Dr. DODGE. I think plan C will come into action when the next

President of the United States comes into power. He will be, he or

she, sorry, will be greeted with a sigh of relief in Europe and, to

be frank, in the Security Council in the United Nations. She or he

will then say, as you’ve said, ‘‘the patience of Joab is ending. We’ve

suffered enough. Last time we looked Iraq is on the edge of Europe,

not on the edge of the United States, and we need to

multilateralize because we can’t do it anymore.’’ And then we’d be

seeing a tipping point, one would hope, in Europe and in the Security Council and we’d step forward.

Now one of the many things Senator Biden said that I didn’t

have time to pick up on was, failed states are rebuilt by strong men

or empires. What I would be describing then is a temporary multilateral empire under the legal agreement of the United Nations. I

think that’s the only way to go.

Now plan D, by the way, if that fails and I’m not very optimistic,

is not emirates or regional fragmentation, it’s fragmentation down

to streets and house level. It’s the complete fracturing of Iraq. This

won’t fall into easy pieces; it will fall into a vicious war against all,

all against all.

Now, to a certain extent, the North because of the strides it’s

made and the fact that it’s finished its own civil war in the nineties

can, to some extent, immunize itself from that. But the rest is an

absolute—is absolute chaos at the heart of the most strategic and

economically important area in the world. Now the tipping point

may happen in Washington, but one would hope it would happen

Paris and New York at the same time. If we get that out of sequence, as Laith has said, then we will revisit Iraq, but 10 years

down the line when the situation is much, much worse and there’s

no stomach whatsoever for doing anything about it. Somalia or Afghanistan is then the comparative example I have in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Someone suggested to the Senator, that

Kurdistan is the example. They had their civil war. They exhausted that. They figured out that—some very smart people here,

people you know, not in this Chamber, but foreign policy gurus, as

they say here in town, have suggested that until they exhaust—the

civil war is exhausted, there’s not much that’s going to happen, and

they point to Kurdistan. I remember going into Kurdistan, as I

said, before the war began.

Mr. TALABANI. Two thousand and two.

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The CHAIRMAN. The reason I went was, quite frankly, we didn’t

know whether or not the Talabani and Brazani were going to, in

fact, join us, whether they really wanted us to overthrow Saddam,

and whether or not they had reached an accommodation, because

2 years earlier it wasn’t so sure.

Ms. RAHIM. Senator, in 1998, as I recall, and my colleague Qubad

can correct me, the war amongst the Kurdish parties was actually

ended by very strong U.S. intervention and at the time the, Secretary Albright, asked those—the parties to come to Washington

and, in a sense, the United States, I won’t say enforced, but——

Mr. TALABANI. Brokered.

Ms. RAHIM [continuing]. Brokered a peace agreement between

the two.

The CHAIRMAN. We had an incredible incentive. There was a

thing called no-fly zone. You didn’t come, we wouldn’t fly.

Ms. RAHIM. So I want to say that——

The CHAIRMAN. So there was an overwhelming incentive. So I

think it’s totally irrelevant, the example you just gave, with all due

respect. Totally completely irrelevant, because we had what you

were talking about now; leverage. There was overwhelming leverage. So we didn’t fly, you had a problem. So guess what? There’s

nothing like a hanging to focus one’s attention, as Ben Johnson

said, or some version of that.

Anyway, I apologize. I truly am not being dismissive of your suggestions, but you understand the frustration, and it’s getting very

hard to convince the American people that other major investments

in what is—by any stretch of the imagination. Let me ask you another way: Do any of you think there’s going to be a national police

force in Iraq that patrols the streets of Ramadi in your lifetime?

Raise your hand.

Dr. KUBBA. Mr. Chairman, police is always local and I can not

see it other than being local.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not now.

Dr. KUBBA. It’s not now. I can not envisage Iraq, for example, not

having a national intelligence agency, but I can——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s a different issue.

Dr. KUBBA. I can’t envision Iraq having local police, not necessarily all under one administration.

The CHAIRMAN. You all agree with that?

Ms. RAHIM. Senator——

Mr. TALABANI. Yes.

Ms. RAHIM [continuing]. Actually we do have local police now,

and not just in Kurdistan. If I may say something here. We do

have local police, and we have a national police force. But local police is the way to go and that is part of the federalism and evolution of power that we all believe in fervently.

But, if I could just say something here that hasn’t been said.

Eventually, Iraq can not survive unless we change the course of

politics. If we continue on the path of ethnic, sectarian politics the

end result is civil war inevitably, just as happened in Lebanon.

This always ends in the same way.

We must, in the medium term, and the reason I didn’t raise this

is because we’re looking at a very short window of time, but in the

medium term we must foster a brand of national politics, national

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agendas, national platforms. And if that can take root in Iraq, then

indeed some of the police force could be a national police force. It

may not be necessary, but it would be possible. But we have to

work——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey, I will not interrupt again. Why

don’t you finish up.

Senator CASEY. He didn’t interrupt, I stopped. I was trying to

think of some other questions. One question I had, and this is a

question that some of you may have a sense of or maybe it’s very

hard to determine the answer to this question, but let me try.

We’ve had an ambassador there and he’s gotten pretty good reviews and my sense of him is that he’s had a significant amount

of respect. I know that’s in transition now, but answer me this

question: Do you think that the normal structure we have in

place—meaning this government has an ambassador in this country, in this case Iraq—do you think that’s enough? And do you

think that more traditional structure works?

In other words, do you think that the Prime Minister or any significant leader in Iraq thinks that that ambassador is vested with

real power or has a direct line to the President? And if that’s not

the case, is there some other—in other words, do you think the

Iraqi Government looks upon that structure as something that

really isn’t connected to the reality of how decisions are made in

the White House or by the President? In other words, do we need

someone, even if you have an effective ambassador in place, do you

need yet another person that has, I don’t know, the perception of

a more stature, or more experience, or more clout? I just throw that

out as a—because you know what it’s like in the halls of the government over there.

Dr. KUBBA. Senator, I can tell you that the chronic problem of

Iraq that is branching out and mushrooming into other problems,

is we do not have effective government institutions. Including one

which is the Foreign Office and the other embassies, including the

day to day running of all these missions.

The reason why we have spent so much money and put so much

effort in the last 3 years, yet we do not have an effective government, because the block of politicians who are controlling Parliament, who are running government by coalition do not share a

vision on what sort of state they want to build.

So, everything is on—ongoing mode and more or less every minister is a government, or every minister is an island on its own.

And there is really no coherent effective government. And the main

cause why we don’t have that, because the politicians are not really

interested in doing that. They are interested in other benefits they

are getting.

Senator CASEY. And you are talking the Iraqi ministries, the

governorates.

Dr. KUBBA. Correct.

Senator CASEY. And I guess I’m thinking more along the lines of

what our Government can do to foster a political settlement, even

apart from what the ministries do day-to-day. Just in terms of the

Ambassador, our State Department, which I think is something

that doesn’t get enough attention, but, I’m sorry.

Talabani.

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Mr. TALABANI. Senator, I think, obviously Ambassador Khalilzad,

when he was there, was treated with much respect and people

knew that when they were speaking with him, they were speaking

with the U.S. Government. I think he fostered a very good relationship with everybody and earned the trust of a lot of people, as well.

I can say that something that, if I’m allowed to be a little critical,

and that is that sometimes the—especially in the past—the interagency battles that took place in Washington have had a very negative impact on the situation on the ground. We do see that less

these days, but certainly in the early part of post-Saddam Iraq that

kind of interagency tension was quite prevalent and was quite visible to the Iraqis on the ground.

Senator CASEY. Doctor, anything?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I think maybe we should——

Senator CASEY. We have to vote again.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Begin to wind up. We’re going to

vote, and let the witnesses go. So, I’m not, I don’t want to cut you

off, but if you have additional questions I think it would be a good

time, but we’ll promise we’ll have you out of here at 5:30 or thereabouts, OK? I know we trespass on your time a lot and it’s important to us that we hear what you have to say and we appreciate

it.

Senator CASEY. No, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I thank the

panel. I appreciate your scholarship and what you contributed here

today.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me conclude by thanking you all. It’s hard

to disagree with the aspirational notions you’ve all put forward. It’s

a lot harder to figure out the means to accomplish those aspirational goals. And, but that’s the nature of what we do, and as one

of my colleagues said the other day, ‘‘If you don’t want to make difficult decisions, sell shoes.’’ Well, that sounds like there’s some difficult decisions there, too.

But let me conclude by reading from today’s New York Times.

And I know you know it, but it’s important to get a sense of why

so many Americans are wary of the new proposal of the President

to provide this breathing space by establishing security in order to

allow a political settlement, a germination of a political settlement.

‘‘Baghdad, January 24: In the battle for Baghdad, Haifa Street

has changed hands so often that it has taken on the feel of a noman’s land, the deadly space between opposing trenches.

‘‘On Wednesday, as American and Iraqi troops poured in, the

street showed why it was a sensitive gauge of an American, of an

urban conflict marked by front lines that melted into confusion.

Enemies with no clear identity, and allies who disappear or do not

show up at all. In a miniature version of the troop increase, the

United States hopes to secure the city. American soldiers in armored vehicles raced into Haifa Street before dawn to dislodge

Sunni insurgents and Shia militia who’ve been battling for a

stretch of the ragged slums and most abandoned high rises.

‘‘But as the sun rose, many of the Iraqi units who were supposed

to do the actual searches of the buildings did not arrive on time,

surprise. Forcing the American’s to start the job on their own.

When the Iraqi units finally did show up, it was with the air of a

class outing. Cheering and laughing, as the Americans blew locks

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off the doors with shotguns. As the morning wore on, and the

troops came under fire from all directions another apparent flaw in

this strategy became clear. As empty apartments became lairs for

gunmen who flitted from window to window and killed at least one

American soldier with a shot in the head.

‘‘Whether the gunfire was coming from the Sunni or Shia insurgents, or the militia fighters, or some of the Iraqi soldiers themselves who had disappeared into the Gotham-like cityscape, no one

could say. ‘Who in the hell is shooting at us?’ shouted Sergeant

First Class Marc Biletski, whose platoon was jammed into a small

room off an alley that was being swept by sniper bullets. ‘Who’s

shooting at us? Do we know who they are?’

‘‘Just before the platoon tossed smoke bombs and sprinted

through the alley to a more secure position, Sergeant Biletski had

a moment to reflect on his spot, which the United States has now

fought to regain from a mysterious enemy at least three times in

the last 2 years. ‘This place is a failure. Every time we come here

we have to come back.’ He paused there and said, ‘Well, maybe not

a total failure, since American troops have smashed opposition in

Haifa Street each time they have come in.’ ’’

Hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

(645)

ALTERNATIVE PLANS: THE IRAQ STUDY

GROUP

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb,

Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Sununu, and Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here,

and thank you, Congressman Hamilton.

I want to say, from the outset, both of these gentlemen were prepared to be here. The problem is, they have very, very busy schedules. And I want to thank the Secretary for extending his schedule

here in Washington, and Congressman Hamilton for adjusting his

and changing the timing. Last week, the Secretary was just not

able to be here. And so, it’s very important you’re both here, and

we thank you.

I also want to explain to you, as you both know this place well,

there will be people coming in and out in order to accommodate

their schedules. We are starting the afternoon session earlier than

we usually would, because it’s so important to have both these distinguished men before us. So, Senator Lugar, for example, is required to be in his leadership caucus, party luncheon that’s going

on now, as others are. And so, there will be a little bit of in and

out.

I’m going to urge my colleagues, as they come in, and their staffs

to let them know, that I told the witnesses, again, we would try

to see that they’re out of here by 3 o’clock. They have planes and

trains and commitments to meet, and this is not their first testimony before the U.S. Congress.

But having said all of that, we’ll try our best—Lee, you know

how the place works but, so far, we’ve had some considerable cooperation.

We begin the fourth and final week of the hearings on the remaining options for the United States in Iraq. And these will not

be the last hearings we hold, because we’re going to be engaged in

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vigorous oversight for the remainder of this Congress, which I

think everyone expects.

But we’re privileged today to be joined by Secretary James Baker

and Chairman Lee Hamilton, who are cochairs of the Iraq Study

Group, and the country owes both of you an enormous debt. Your

willingness to seek a bipartisan solution, which is a dangerous

thing to do in this town, to take on that responsibility, to our most

urgent and vexing national security problem is appreciated by everyone, and your statesmanship has been obvious.

The bipartisan commission produced a very worthwhile document. Bipartisan commissions are often criticized for producing the

lowest common denominator, but your report broke new ground

and changed the debate in this country. I don’t agree with every

detail of it, and I have proposed a different plan for Iraq, but I am

in total agreement with your central recommendations.

To quote the report, ‘‘The most important recommendations call

for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and

the region and a change in the primary mission of forces that will

enable the United States to begin to move combat forces out of Iraq

responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations are

equally important and reinforce one another.’’

The report goes on to recommend that, ‘‘By the first quarter of

2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation

on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.’’

You also state, ‘‘The recommendations should not be separated or

carried out in isolation.’’ As you said, Mr. Secretary, ‘‘This report

should not be treated as a fruit salad.’’

Unfortunately, it appears to be exactly what’s happening here,

and I hope we get a chance to pursue some of the debate that is

now swirling around the report and the President’s present posture

relative to Iraq.

We’re very anxious to hear your thoughts, as well, on how we can

contain Iraq’s civil war in the event your recommendations are not

implemented and the situation continues to deteriorate, which we

hope it won’t, but we have to be prepared.

So, I thank you.

In the absence of the distinguished ranking member, Senator

Lugar, I would like to invite Senator Hagel, if he wishes to make

any opening comments.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would just add my

welcome to our distinguished witnesses and to say, again, how

much we appreciate your continued service to our country and important contributions at, I believe, one of the most critically important and defining times in our history. So, thank you. I look

forward to your comments.

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, I should add as they say, a housekeeping measure. On Wednesday, we will hear from former Secretaries Kissinger and Albright, who will testify separately. And on

Thursday, we’ll hear from National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who will also testify separately. So,

there will be two more days of hearings.

Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. And, again, thank you for accommodating the schedule.

647

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. BAKER III, COCHAIR, IRAQ

STUDY GROUP; PARTNER, BAKER-BOTTS LLP, HOUSTON, TX

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator

Hagel and distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations. It’s an honor for me to be before you this afternoon, as I’m

sure it is for cochairman, Lee Hamilton.

I’ll take the first part of our written statement, Mr. Chairman,

and Lee will take the second part.

I’ll begin by thanking you for the opportunity to appear and to

discuss our recommendations. We’d like to begin, I think, by noting

some common elements in the Study Group Report and the President’s speech of January 10. For example, we agree with President

Bush that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American

people, that the consequences of failure would be severe, that it is

clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq, and that only

Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people.

We support increasing the number of American advisors embedded in the Iraqi Army, with the goal that the Iraqi Government

will assume control of security in all provinces in Iraq by November

2007, as the President stated.

We support the benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq,

and we agree that now is the time for the Iraqi Government to act.

As part of our testimony, we’ve attached a joint statement that

we released right after the President’s speech on January 10.

Now, the report of our Study Group, Mr. Chairman, has been

analyzed at length, so we would like to be fairly brief, and we will

concentrate on a few points: First, the security mission; second,

benchmark performance; third, diplomacy; fourth, economic assistance; and fifth, the Iraqi Government.

There are some very important points of similarity between the

Study Group’s Report and the President’s plan for security. Both of

them keep rapid-reaction and special-operations forces available to

undertake force protection and strike missions against al-Qaeda in

Iraq, as well as for other missions considered vital by the United

States commander in Iraq. Both increase the number of United

States personnel embedded with Iraqi Army units, and both emphasize the mission of training Iraqi troops.

The President said, ‘‘We will accelerate the training of Iraqi

forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq.’’

To accomplish that goal, the President intends to double the number of advisors that are embedded with Iraqi Army units.

The Study Group Report stated, ‘‘The primary mission of U.S.

forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi Army,

which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations.’’ The Study Group suggested that such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops.

The Study Group stated that the United States should not make

an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American

troops in Iraq. We rejected an immediate withdrawal, because we

believe that so much is at stake.

The Study Group further stated, ‘‘While these training and supporting efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are

being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of

Iraq.’’ And we said, ‘‘By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00657 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
648

pected developments in the security situation on the ground, all

combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of

Iraq.’’

But the Study Group set no timetables, and we set no deadlines.

We believe that military commanders must have the flexibility to

respond to events on the ground. We also believe, however, that if

the important recommendations of the study group are implemented, it will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.

The Study Group Report recognizes that even after the United

States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in the region with our stillsignificant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and

naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an

increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi

Government, to avoid the Iraqi Government’s collapse and the disintegration of the country. They would be sufficiently robust to

fight al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using

special-operations teams and to train, equip, and support the Iraqi

security forces, and sufficiently robust to deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran.

With regard to the military planning of the United States and

Iraq and the region, the Study Group said, ‘‘The United States

must make it clear to the Iraqi Government that the United States

could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if

Iraq does not implement its planned changes.’’ And we further said,

‘‘America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or the inactions of the Iraqi

Government.’’

The President’s plan does not mention the possibility of combat

troops moving out of Iraq as the training mission proceeds. The

President’s plan makes clear that United States forces will be sent

to Baghdad to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods. That

means combat operations, including, possibly, door-to-door sweeps.

The Study Group made the assessment that the security of Baghdad is crucial to security in Iraq, more generally. And while we

were in Baghdad at the end of the summer, Iraqi and American

leaders told us that, ‘‘as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.’’ We state in

our report that there is no action the American military can take

that, by itself, can bring success in Iraq. To reduce the violence in

Baghdad and in Iraq, national reconciliation is essential.

To provide for the long-term security of the Iraqi people, the

Iraqi Government must step up and take responsibility for the security of its citizens. The Study Group, however, did state that it

could support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the training-andequipping mission, if the United States commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective. Our soldiers have the

ability to undertake both missions. It is critically important, however, that the training mission not suffer while the United States

military is engaged in a surge for Baghdad.

The Study Group believes the training mission should be the primary mission. Otherwise, United States risks delays in the compleVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00658 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
649

tion of the training mission, in the handover of responsibility to the

Iraqis, and thereby in the departure of United States forces from

Iraq. No security plan can work, however, in the absence of national reconciliation.

The Study Group Report stated that the United States forces

cannot stop the violence, or even contain it, if there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their

country.

The Study Group, the President, and Prime Minister Maliki

agree on key measures that the Iraqis need to take, and they include: Legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis; provincial

elections later this year; reform of the de-Baathification laws; and

a fair process for considering amendments to Iraqi’s Constitution.

The Study Group Report calls on the United States to consult

closely with the Iraqi Government to develop additional milestones

which are tied to calendar dates. The Iraqi Government’s words on

behalf of these measures have been good, Mr. Chairman, but its

performance has been weak.

We commend the President’s statement in which he made clear

to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi Government does not follow

through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American

people and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the

time to act.

We believe the administration must hold Iraqi leaders to those

specific benchmarks and those specific dates for performance. The

United States needs to use its leverage to get Iraqi leaders to perform. We use conditionality, Mr. Chairman, with many other recipients of United States assistance, and we should do so with Iraq.

The Study Group stated in its recommendation No. 21, ‘‘If the

Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress toward the

achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and

governance, the United States should reduce its political, military,

or economic support for the Iraqi Government. Conditionality is

necessary to press the Iraqi Government to perform. Conditionality

is necessary to press for national reconciliation. In the absence of

national reconciliation, there will be sectarian violence without

end.’’

And now, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Hamilton will present the

balance of our joint statement.

But, before he does, let me just say to you and other members

of the committee that it has been a great pleasure for me to work

with Lee on this matter. I need not tell this committee that passions in this country on Iraq understandably run very, very high.

But, thanks to Lee Hamilton’s broad-gauged and steady commitment to our effort, we have been able to maintain/sustain a bipartisan approach from the beginning of our efforts.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

650

STATEMENT OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON, COCHAIR, IRAQ

STUDY GROUP; DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman Biden, Senator Hagel, and other

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for

letting us appear before your committee this afternoon to talk

about the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.

Chairman Biden, I remember that you were instrumental in the

rollout of the Iraq Study Group, way back, early last year, and we

deeply appreciated that.

Let me also say what a great privilege it has been for me to work

with Secretary Baker. He is easily one of the most distinguished

public servants of our generation, and I found, in every respect, at

times when we agreed and at times when we disagreed, that it was

a genuine pleasure to work with him.

But both Jim and I would say that we were merely the chairmen,

and that each of the members of the group made very important

contributions to the report.

I take up with diplomatic recommendations.

We were encouraged by the President’s statement that we will

use America’s full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq

from nations throughout the Middle East. We believe there are additional steps, specific steps, that should be taken.

The President did not endorse a diplomatic effort including all of

Iraq’s neighbors. The Study Group took the view that the United

States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try

to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and

other regional issues. We recognize, of course, that dealing with

Iran and Syria is controversial, but it is clear that Iran and Syria

have influence in Iraq. They are part of the problem. It is also our

assessment that neither Syria nor Iran have a long-term interest

in a chaotic Iraq which could negatively affect their own national

security interests. Accordingly, it was our view that the United

States should try to make them a part of the solution.

Sometimes, the argument is made that Iran has momentum in

the region, and the United States should not negotiate until it has

more leverage over Iran. We disagree. We negotiated with the Soviet Union during the cold war. We can negotiate with Iran on behalf of stability and our interests in Iraq. The United States and

Iraq cooperated in Afghanistan, and they should explore replicating

that model.

The Study Group also calls for a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to an Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts.

The group laid out specific and detailed steps that should be undertaken in order to achieve a comprehensive peace on all fronts, including Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Lebanese, and Israeli-Syrian.

Secretary of State Rice has been traveling in the region. Her

efforts to launch informal talks between Palestinian and Israelis

are a positive development, but they do not yet include the IsraeliLebanese and the Israeli-Syrian tracks of a comprehensive peace.

We feel particularly strong that the United States is missing an opportunity to promote its goals in Iraq and the broader region by not

talking to Syria.

651

Some have asked us: What does the Arab-Israeli conflict have to

do with the war in Iraq? Why make one problem harder by taking

on two? The answer is simple. It is difficult to establish regional

stability in the Middle East without addressing the Arab-Israeli

issue. We want other countries, especially the Sunni Arab countries, to help us. When we go to talk to them about Iraq, they will

want to talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The United States says it wants to empower moderate Muslims,

yet the only way to empower the moderates is to take away the

most potent grievance of the extremists, that the United States

does not care about the Palestinians. A comprehensive Arab-Israeli

peace would deal the extremists a blow in Baghdad, Beirut, the

Palestinian territories, and elsewhere. It would certainly bolster

America’s prestige. And, above all, it would guarantee the longterm security of America’s ally: Israel.

All of us understand that the peace process is difficult, that results will be measured in years, not months, but a sustained and

comprehensive effort counts. A sustained effort will help us with

Iraq and will win us important diplomatic leverage across the

board in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The President asked for over $1.1 billion in additional economic

assistance for Iraq. That, too, is a step in the right direction. The

Study Group believes the commitment should be substantially

larger, $5 billion per year. We need to do many things right in Iraq

if we’re going to succeed. We certainly need to devote resources to

job creation and capacity-building. The President has stated that Iraq will spend $10 billion of its

own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will

create new jobs. We agree that job creation is necessary to give

some hope and purpose to young Iraqis. Too many of them are frustrated and cannot provide for their families. Too many have turned

to militias and the insurgency. Our commitment to job creation

should include the Commander’s Emergency Response Program,

but it must be broader; we need to help Iraqis restart their many

idle factories.

Capacity-building is also necessary, because the Iraqi Government is weak. It cannot deliver the basic services of government.

It falls short in providing electricity and water, it falls short in providing security. The current Government of Iraq can succeed only

if it starts to win the confidence of those it governs. Capacity-building means technical assistance and advice, it means better procedures in government agencies, including a greater delegation of authority and better internal controls.

The Secretary of State has named a reconstruction coordinator in

Baghdad. That will be helpful, but that will not address another

problem we described in our report. The problem of coordination is

interagency. It is most acute in Washington. The new coordinator

is capable, but he is the Secretary of State’s appointee, not the

President’s appointee. He cannot make other agencies do what he

tells them to do.

Mr. Chairman, the President has decided on a new strategy.

Much of the attention right now is on the troop surge. To some degree, that is understandable. We are all concerned when more of

our young men and women are put in harm’s way. The political,

652

diplomatic, and economic pieces of our policy are just as important

as the military piece.

The Study Group was explicit on the importance of a comprehensive approach. All elements of our policy should be pursued at the

same time. National reconciliation cannot wait. Make no mistake,

the violence in Baghdad will not end without national reconciliation. The violence will not end unless Iraq’s leaders step up and

make difficult decisions about the future of their country.

The President correctly stated that only the Iraqis can end the

sectarian violence. We are placing all of our bets on the performance of the Iraqi Government. The rhetoric of the Iraqi Government has been good. Its performance has been disappointing. Too

often, Iraqi leaders have acted in their sectarian interests, not the

national interests.

The Study Group believes in a comprehensive military, diplomatic, economic, and political approach: Training as the primary

United States military mission in Iraq; engaging Iraq’s neighbors

and the international community on behalf of stability in Iraq and

the region; building the capacity of the Iraqi Government, and focusing on job creation as a part of a robust economic program; and,

of course, holding the Iraqi Government to performance benchmarks, particularly on national reconciliation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for

your attention. We would be pleased to respond to your questions.

[The prepared joint statement of Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton

follows:]

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT BY HON. JAMES A. BAKER III AND HON. LEE H.

HAMILTON, COCHAIRS OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it is a distinct honor to appear before you this afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the recommendations of the Iraq

Study Group report.

INTRODUCTION

We would like to begin by noting some common elements in the Study Group report and the President’s recent speech. We agree with President Bush:

• The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people;

• The consequences of failure would be severe;

• It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq; and

• Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people.

We support increasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army

units with the goal that the Iraq Government will assume control of security in all

provinces in Iraq by November 2007, as the President has stated.

We support the benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq, and agree that now

is the time for the Iraqi Government to act.

As part of our testimony, we have attached a joint statement that we released

after the President’s speech on January 10.

The report of the Study Group already has been analyzed at length. So, we would

like to be fairly brief in our opening remarks and concentrate on a few points:

• The security mission;

• Benchmark performance;

• Diplomacy;

• Economic assistance; and

• The Iraqi Government.

THE SECURITY MISSION

There are important points of similarity between the Study Group report and the

President’s plan for security. Both keep rapid reaction and special operations forces

653

available to undertake force protection and strike missions against al-Qaeda in Iraq,

as well as for other missions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq. Both

increase the number of U.S. personnel embedded with Iraqi Army units. Both emphasize the mission of training Iraqi troops.

Training. The President stated: ‘‘. . . we will accelerate the training of Iraqi

forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq.’’ To accomplish

that goal, the President intends to double the number of advisors embedded with

Iraqi Army units.

The Study Group stated: ‘‘The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve

to one of supporting the Iraqi Army, which would take over primary responsibility

for combat operations.’’ The Study Group suggested that ‘‘such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops.’’

Troop Levels. The Study Group stated that ‘‘the United States should not make

an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops in Iraq.’’ We

rejected an immediate withdrawal because we believe that so much is at stake.

The Study Group stated: ‘‘While these (training and supporting) efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades

could begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected

developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.’’

The Study Group set no timetable and set no deadlines. We believe that military

commanders must have the flexibility to respond to events on the ground. We believe, however, that if the important recommendations of the Iraq Study Group are

implemented, it ‘‘will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces

out of Iraq responsibly.’’

The Study Group recognizes that ‘‘even after the United States has moved all

combat brigades out if Iraq, we would maintain a considerable military presence in

the region, with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground,

and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently robust to permit the United

States, working with the Iraqi Government, to avoid the Iraqi Government’s collapse and the disintegration of the country; fight al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq, using special operations teams; train, equip, and support the Iraqi

security forces; and deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and

Iran.’’

With regard to the military planning of the United States in Iraq and the region,

the Study Group recommended, ‘‘The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi

Government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other

security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions

or inactions of the Iraqi Government.’’

The President’s plan does not mention the possibility of combat troops moving out

of Iraq as the training mission proceeds.

Troop Surge. The President’s plan makes clear that U.S. forces will be sent to

Baghdad to ‘‘help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods.’’ That means combat operations, including possibly door-to-door sweeps.

The Study Group made the assessment that ‘‘the security of Baghdad is crucial

to security in Iraq more generally.’’ While we were in Baghdad at the end of the

summer, Iraqi and American leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.

We state in our report that, ‘‘there is no action the American military can take

that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq.’’ To reduce the violence in Baghdad

and in Iraq, national reconciliation is essential. To provide for the long-term security

of the Iraqi people, the Iraqi Government must step up and take responsibility for

the security of its citizens.

The Study Group did state that it could ‘‘support a short-term redeployment or

surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training

and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps

would be effective.’’

Our soldiers have the ability to undertake both missions. It is critically important,

however, that the training mission not suffer while the U.S. military is engaged in

a surge for Baghdad. The Study Group believes the training mission should be the

primary mission. Otherwise, the United States risks delays in the completion of the

training mission, in the handover of responsibility to the Iraqis, and thereby in the

departure of U.S. forces from Iraq.

654

PERFORMANCE ON BENCHMARKS

No security plan can work in the absence of national reconciliation. The Study

Group report stated that U.S. forces ‘‘cannot stop the violence—or even contain it—

if there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their

country.’’

The Study Group, the President, and Prime Minister Maliki agree on key measures the Iraqis need to take. Those measures include: Legislation to share oil

revenues among all Iraqis; provincial elections later this year; reform of the deBaathification laws; and a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq’s Constitution. The Study Group calls on the United States to consult closely with the

Iraqi Government to develop additional milestones tied to calendar dates.

The Iraqi Government’s words on behalf of these measures have been good, but

its performance has been weak. We commend the President’s statement: ‘‘I have

made clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi Government does not follow through on its

promises, it will lose the support of the American people and it will lose the support

of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act.’’

We believe the administration must hold Iraqi leaders to those specific benchmarks and specific dates for performance. The United States needs to use its leverage to get Iraqi leaders to perform. We use conditionality with many other recipients of U.S. assistance. We should do so with Iraq. The Study Group stated in its

Recommendation 21: ‘‘If the Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress

toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support

for the Iraqi Government.’’

Conditionality is necessary to press the Iraqi Government to perform. Conditionality is necessary to press for national reconciliation. In the absence of national reconciliation, there will be sectarian violence without end.

DIPLOMACY

We were encouraged by the President’s statement that ‘‘We will use America’s full

diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle

East.’’

We believe there are additional specific steps he should take. The President did

not endorse a diplomatic effort including all of Iraq’s neighbors. The Study Group

took the view that ‘‘the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria

in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and

other regional issues.’’

We recognize that dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. But it is clear that

Iran and Syria have influence in Iraq. They are part of the problem. It is also our

assessment that neither Syria nor Iran have a long-term interest in a chaotic Iraq

which could negatively affect their own national security interests. Accordingly, it

is the view of the Study Group that the United States should try to make them part

of the solution.

Sometimes the argument is made that Iran has momentum in the region, and the

United States should not negotiate until it has more leverage over Iran. We disagree. We negotiated with the Soviet Union during the cold war. We can negotiate

with Iran on behalf of stability and our interests in Iraq. The United States and

Iran cooperated in Afghanistan, and they should explore replicating this model.

The Study Group also calls for a renewed and sustained commitment by the

United States to an Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts. The Study Group laid out specific and detailed steps that should be undertaken in order to achieve a comprehensive peace on all fronts, including Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Lebanese, and IsraeliSyrian. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, has been traveling in the region. Her

efforts to launch informal talks between Palestinians and Israelis are a positive development, but they do not yet include the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Syrian

tracks of a comprehensive peace. We feel particularly strongly that the United

States is missing an opportunity to promote its goals in Iraq and the broader region

by not talking to Syria.

Some have asked us: What does the Arab-Israeli conflict have to do with the war

in Iraq? Why make one problem harder by taking on two?

The answer is simple. It is difficult to establish regional stability in the Middle

East without addressing the Arab-Israeli issue. We want other countries, especially

the Sunni Arab countries, to help us. When we go to talk to them about Iraq, they

will want to talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

655

The United States says it wants to empower ‘‘moderate Muslims.’’ Yet the only

way to empower the moderates is to take away the most potent grievance of the

extremists: That the United States does not care about the Palestinians.

A comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would deal the extremists a blow in Baghdad,

Beirut, the Palestinian territories, and elsewhere. It would bolster America’s prestige. And, above all, it would guarantee the long-term security of America’s ally:

Israel.

All of us understand that the peace process is difficult, and that results will be

measured in years, not months. But a sustained and comprehensive effort counts.

A sustained effort will help us with Iraq and will win us important diplomatic leverage across the board in the Middle East and elsewhere.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The President asked for over $1.1 billion in additional economic assistance for

Iraq. That is a step in the right direction. The Study Group believes the commitment should be substantially larger—$5 billion per year. We need to do many things

right in Iraq if we are going to succeed. We need to devote resources to job creation

and capacity-building.

The President has stated that Iraq will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. The Study Group

agrees that job creation is necessary to give some hope and purpose to young Iraqis.

Too many of them are frustrated and cannot provide for their families. Too many

have turned to militias and the insurgency. Our commitment to job creation should

include the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, but it must be broader. We

need to help Iraqis restart their many idle factories.

Capacity-building is necessary because the Iraqi Government is weak. It cannot

deliver the basic services of government. It falls short in providing electricity and

water. It falls short in providing security. The current Government of Iraq can succeed only if it starts to win the confidence of those it governs. Capacity-building

means technical assistance and advice. It means better procedures in government

agencies, including a greater delegation of authority and better internal controls.

The Secretary of State has named a reconstruction coordinator in Baghdad. That

will be helpful, but that will not address another problem we described in our report. The problem of coordination is interagency. It is most acute in Washington.

The new coordinator is capable, but he is the Secretary of State’s appointee, not the

President’s appointee. He cannot make other agencies do what he tells them to do.

CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Chairman, the President has decided on a new strategy.

Much of the attention right now is on the troop surge. To some degree, that is

understandable. We are all concerned when more of our young men and women are

put in harm’s way.

The political, diplomatic, and economic pieces of our policy are just as important

as the military piece. The Study Group was explicit on the importance of a comprehensive approach. All elements of our policy should be pursued at the same time.

National reconciliation cannot wait. Make no mistake: The violence in Baghdad

will not end without national reconciliation. The violence will not end unless Iraq’s

leaders step up and make difficult decisions about the future of their country.

The President correctly stated that only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence.

We are placing all of our bets on the performance of the Iraqi Government. The

rhetoric of the Iraqi Government has been good. Its performance has been disappointing. Too often, Iraqi leaders have acted in their sectarian interest, not the

national interest.

The Study Group believes in a comprehensive military, diplomatic, economic, and

political approach:

• Training as the primary U.S. military mission in Iraq;

• Engaging Iraq’s neighbors—and the international community—on behalf of stability in Iraq and the region;

• Building the capacity of the Iraqi Government and focusing on job creation as

part of a robust economic program; and

• Holding the Iraqi Government to performance benchmarks, particularly on national reconciliation.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we would be pleased to respond

to your questions.

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APPENDIX NO. 1

STATEMENT OF THE COCHAIRS OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP, JAMES A. BAKER III AND LEE

HAMILTON, JANUARY 11, 2007

We are pleased that the President reviewed the report of the Iraq Study Group

carefully and seriously. Some of our recommendations are reflected in the new approach that he outlined Wednesday, while others have not been adopted.

We agree with President Bush that, ‘‘the situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the

American people,’’ the consequences of failure are severe, and ‘‘only the Iraqis can

end the sectarian violence and secure their people.’’ As the President said, ‘‘the essential U.S. security mission’’ in Iraq is the training of Iraqi forces. We support increasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army units with the

goal that the Iraq Government will assume control of security in all provinces in

Iraq by November 2007. We recommended many of the benchmarks President Bush

outlined for Iraq, and agree that now is the time for the Iraqi Government to act.

We hope the President and his administration will further consider other recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. The President did not suggest the possibility of a transition that could enable U.S. combat forces to begin to leave Iraq. The

President did not state that political, military, or economic support for Iraq would

be conditional on the Iraqi Government’s ability to meet benchmarks. Within the

region, the President did not announce an international support group for Iraq including all of Iraq’s neighbors, nor mention measures we suggested to reach a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.

The Iraq Study Group indicated that it could ‘‘support a short-term redeployment

or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad’’ complemented by comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic efforts. Questions, of course, remain

about the nature of the surge. We are encouraged by the President’s statement that

‘‘America’s commitment is not open-ended’’ and Secretary Gates’ statement that the

addition of 21,000 troops would be viewed as a temporary surge. The violence in

Baghdad will not end without national reconciliation.

America’s political leaders have a responsibility to seek a bipartisan consensus on

issues of war and peace. We want to be helpful in forging that unity of effort. We

welcome President Bush’s commitment to form a working group with congressional

leaders that will work across party lines in pursuit of a common policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We’ll go 8-minute rounds.

And let me begin by asking either, or both, of you to expand on

what is throughout the report, that it is not in the interest of Iran

for there to be chaos in Iraq. That has met with overwhelming

skepticism by the administration and many others. Could you be

more specific? Why is it that Iran would not be interested, ‘‘in more

chaos in Iraq’’?

Mr. BAKER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I’ll take a shot at that, and

then Lee can add to it.

Iran has many disparate elements in its polity, and they have

differing views among those elements. If there were absolute chaos

in Iraq, Iran could be expected to be overrun by literally thousands

of refugees, in our opinion. With respect to Iraq—and so, I think

that’s the main reason that they would not have an interest in a

chaotic Iraq. Having said that, there’s no doubt but what they

are—they take great pleasure in seeing the United States tied

down there and the United States facing difficulties there.

And with respect to Iran, generally, may I just say that the recommendation in our report regarding talking to Iran is really a recommendation about talking to them in the context of the formation

of an international Iraq support group. That is, a group of nations—a coalition, if you will—that would help us with some of the

difficulties we have in Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors.

I was authorized by the President to approach the Government

of Iran as we were conducting our Study Group’s efforts. We did

657

so. We broached this possibility to them that you’ve heard us articulate here this afternoon—that is, they helped us in Afghanistan

when we approached them, it was to the joint benefit of both Iran

and the United States that they did so; and our view is, we ought

to try to replicate that situation. But we make—we take great

pains to point out we should not—we are not talking about a

broad-based dialog with Iran that would, for instance, include her

nuclear efforts, which we specifically say in the report, should remain in the United States—in the U.N. Security Council.

When I approached a representative of the Government of Iran,

the answer came back that they would have little interest in participating to help because of the attitude of our Government. We

say, however, in our report, we still think we ought ask them, and,

when they refuse, alone, we think, among all of Iraq’s neighbors,

we can hold them up for—to be the rejectionist government or state

that they really are.

The CHAIRMAN. We heard today from the——

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, let me just——

The CHAIRMAN. I’m sorry.

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. If I may, add to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. HAMILTON. Of course, I agree with what Jim has said. We

tend to look at Iran as a very monolithic state, which it is not. A

little under 50 percent of the Iranian population is Persian, but

about 24–25 percent of the population is Azeri. There are a lot of

Kurds in that country. All you have to do is read the press in the

last 2 or 3 days to see that there are a lot of centrifugal forces operating inside Iraq today.

If you had a territorial disintegration in Iraq, if you had chaos

there, you could certainly inflame sectarian tensions in that region,

which would be very, very adverse to Iran. So, we——

The CHAIRMAN. In what way? Again, I know—I believe—I share

your view, and I think I know the answer, but we use those

phrases, because we’re involved in this foreign-policy-speak a lot.

The administration made it clear today, and has made it clear

throughout, that merely having them part of a support group

would enhance their influence in the region. We don’t want to enhance their influence. So, when you say this disintegration would

cause great difficulty, beyond population flows of refugees, what

other aspect with——

Mr. BAKER. Regional—the possibility of regional conflagration, I

think, Mr. Chairman. I mean, if you had a chaotic situation in

Iraq, you’re much more likely to have Iraq’s neighbors move in

there to—each to protect its own particular interest.

The CHAIRMAN. The argument that is made again by administration supporters, is that’s exactly what Iraq would want, to allow

them to essentially annex the Shia territories, which make up 60

percent of the population and a considerable part of the territory.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let’s take a look at present policy today, Mr.

Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Make it clear, I agree with you guys, but it’s——

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that, but——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Important that this be discussed.

658

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. Let’s make it clear that the current

policy is not working. There’s a big article on the front page of the

Washington Post about that today. We’ve tried to isolate Iran,

we’ve tried to isolate Syria, and it simply hasn’t worked. What’s

happened? Iran has become the most powerful country in the region. It continues to support terrorist organizations, it’s continuing

to develop its nuclear potential. How can anyone say, today, that

our policy toward Iran is working? It is not.

Likewise, Syria—Syria has certainly been a negative force in

Iraq. It continues to support terrorist organizations in Lebanon and

the Palestinian territories.

But our policy of isolation is not working. We don’t have a lot to

lose, frankly, by engaging these countries. Now, Jim and I are not

starry-eyed about this. We don’t think you sit down with these

folks and immediately come to solutions. There isn’t any country on

the face of the Earth that has caused us more heartburn over the

last several decades than Iran has. So, these solutions are going to

come hard.

We do not view talking as appeasement. And the argument you

mentioned a moment ago is that we enhance their influence when

we sit down with them.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s what is being stated by——

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that. But, my goodness, surely we

have enough confidence in American diplomats to know, or to

think, that if they sit down with Iran, we are not putting our

stamp of approval on Iran, nor are we agreeing to concessions.

Look, you sit down to talk to people for a lot of different reasons,

and among those is to collect intelligence, to dispel misunderstandings, and to explain our policies and a lot of other reasons.

The Iranians have a lot of influence in Iraq today. And they are

certainly part of the problem, but they also have to be part of the

solution, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman, we don’t think they’ll help us, as I

indicated. We say that in our report. On the other hand, the engagement we’re talking about is a very limited engagement, it’s to

do the same thing with us that they did in Afghanistan. And, as

you probably know, the Iranians were—are members of the socalled ‘‘compact.’’ They attended the meetings in New York, the Iranian Foreign Minister and our Secretary of State. So, we’re not——

The CHAIRMAN. I——

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. Going much——

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen——

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. Beyond where we are.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. I agree with you completely. My

time is almost up.

Let me just conclude by asking you—you point out that you

would support a short-term redeployment or surge of American

combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, but you condition it in two

ways. The remainder of that sentence says, ‘‘complemented by a

comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic effort and if the

commanding officers ask for it.’’ When you write the report, the

commanding officers were explicit that they did not want it. General Abizaid and General Casey were explicit that they did not

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want the surge. Did that in any way color your recommendation?

And do you think there is the necessary complementary, comprehensive economic and political effort going on? Obviously, the

diplomatic is not. What about the other two?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, it makes all the difference,

when you talk about a surge, how it is done, for how long it is

done, for what purpose it is done, and in what context it is done.

And where we clearly say that we can support a surge for Baghdad, or, we put it in the alternative, for training, we also put it in

the context that there must be an effort at national reconciliation

at the same time.

Now, one of the major differences we have here with the administration, at this point, is highlighted in Mr. Hadley’s article this

morning. He has this——

Mr. BAKER. Yesterday.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yesterday, thank you. He says, ‘‘Ultimately, a

strategy for success must present a realistic plan for bringing security to the people of Baghdad.’’ Then, this is the key sentence, ‘‘This

is a precondition to advancing other goals.’’ In other words, he is

saying that you must have security before you can advance other

goals.

Our approach in the Iraq Study Group was that you’ve got to

deal with these problems comprehensively, and that if you are focused solely on the question of security, you’re not going to get

there, because you cannot isolate that security from the other aspects of the——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for making——

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. Problem.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That very, very important statement.

Mr. BAKER. But let me add to that, Mr. Chairman, if I might, the

comment that I think I made in my portion of our formal statement, and that is, when we were in Baghdad, everybody told us—

everybody told us that, ‘‘As Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.’’ And we

believe that our forces are able to undertake both a surge in Baghdad, under the conditions we laid out—short term, and provided

the commander on the ground authorizes it—and the training of

Iraqi forces. Our report, I think, makes that clear, and I need to

say that, because——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it doesn’t sound like that’s what Congressman Hamilton is saying.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, there’s another point here that’s very important, Mr. Chairman. I’m sorry to go on and——

The CHAIRMAN. No, this is—this is the key distinction, and it’s

worth you——

Mr. HAMILTON. We say——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Taking time——

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. That the training of the Iraqi forces

must be the primary mission. By ‘‘primary mission,’’ we mean we

have to put the highest priority on training the Iraqi forces. The

sooner you get to that, the sooner you do it, the sooner you are able

to withdraw American forces. I don’t think you’re going to be able

to withdraw American forces until you train the Iraqis. So, the

highest priority is training Iraqi forces.

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Now, if your focus is all on the surge, as it has been, frankly, up

to this date—if it’s all on the surge, you make secondary the training of Iraqi forces. And we said the primary mission has to be the

Iraqi forces.

Now, I think it’s a positive thing that, in Mr. Hadley’s article, he

uses the words ‘‘training and supporting Iraqi troops will remain

our military’s essential’’—that’s what the President said—‘‘and primary mission. My concern about this article, frankly, is that he

then goes on to talk in some detail about the surge and what you

do to get the security of Baghdad. He does not give us any detail

about what he means by ‘‘the primary function of training.’’

Mr. BAKER. At the same time, we do know that the President’s

plan contemplates doubling the number of our combat forces engaged in the training mission, so there has been an enhancement

of the training function, as we recommended. Excuse me.

Mr. HAMILTON. That was for embedding forces, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. I would love to continue this, but my time is up.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, again, gentlemen, we are grateful, this country is grateful,

for the contributions that you and your eight distinguished colleagues made, and continue to make, who served on the Iraqi

Study Commission.

In pursuing the conversation that the two of you are having with

Chairman Biden, the question of: Well, why would Iraq be interested in cooperating?—and you both have answered it, I think,

clearly. And I would be remiss if I didn’t say, which I have a number of times, that I am strongly supportive of what your commission has recommended.

There’s an old saying, that you all are both aware of, because you

are practitioners of this business, and that is, ‘‘Nations respond in

their own self-interest.’’ There is something rather reassuring

about that. That means that there’s some consistency and continuity. As you both know, what is most dangerous is the unpredictable. And we have that, I think, in a constant state of play with

North Korea.

Now, if, as you have both articulated, that it would be in the interest of Iran to find some solution, resolution for their interest—

not that they would like to help us out, necessarily, we know that’s

not the case; and, as Secretary Baker said, you both come at this,

as your commission, very clear-eyed; I don’t think anyone would

ever accuse Ed Meese, for example, of being a squishy person on

these kinds of things—and, as you have each said, as has been

framed in the commission’s report, that a comprehensive Middle

East peace deal must be part of this—you’ve used, a number of

times, ‘‘comprehensive’’—your 79 recommendations, ‘‘comprehensive’’—you talk about maybe a surge of troops, training, primary

mission—but what, in my opinion, has been dangerously missing

from what the President laid out the other day is that I see no new

diplomatic initiatives. I see no diplomatic focus or efforts. Take the

Hadley piece that Chairman Hamilton has just referred to; it is all

military, it is all surge. There is training, but where is the diplomatic focus and effort?

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I find it almost incomprehensible, when you talk about Iraq and

Iran and America’s policy, that we won’t talk with them, we won’t

engage them, when, in fact, our allies, the sovereign Government

of Iraq, is engaging the Iranians. The Prime Minister of Iraq, the

President of Iraq, in and out of Tehran, meeting. You all saw this

piece in the New York Times a couple of days ago regarding the

Iranian Ambassador to Iraq saying that the Iranians are going to

deepen their political, economic, and security ties with Iraq. But

yet, the contradiction, at least in my mind, is our Government, that

we are supportive of, in Iraq, is going down one path with the Iranians and we’re going down another.

Now, you have said, both of you today and in—again in your report, that the outcome in Iraq is not going to come from the military, it’s going to come from a comprehensive policy, which you’ve

articulated rather clearly. But, again, what I heard from the President—another carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf, Patriot

antimissile batteries going in, more troops—as well as the Hadley

piece. And I think there’s rather significant evidence of further

focus on this administration’s policy.

So, my question is, then: If all of this is playing out, as the two

of you have noted today and is articulated quite clearly in your

commission report, then what do you believe is the outcome? It

seems to me folly to believe, as Chairman Hamilton has said—the

Iranians are already in there, they already have an immense

amount of influence—that we can’t stop that. That is part of it. I

mean, let’s be real here. Many of the senior Iraqi Government officials were exiled in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s time. So, I think

we somehow are getting a foggy sense of this.

So, my question to each of you is: If all these dynamics are in

play, as you have just noted, then where is this going? Where is

this going without any American diplomatic effort here, or initiative, to try to frame up the very things that you have all focused

on in your 79 recommendations?

Mr. BAKER. Well, Senator, there are diplomatic efforts. That’s

mentioned, of course, in Steve Hadley’s piece. And, by the way, before we say that that piece only deals with surge, let’s remember

that there are resolutions pending up here to, in effect, say the

surge is not a national interest, so, quite naturally, he’s going to

concentrate on the surge in his piece.

The President has said that the training is the essential mission

for our—us in Iraq. And Steve has said that training and supporting Iraqi troops will remain our military’s essential and primary mission. Now, I think we ought to take that—take them at

their word, and we ought to be glad that they are, in effect, reiterating one of the principal recommendations of our Iraq Study

Group.

But, you know, when we talk about ‘‘talking to Iran’’—and neither Lee nor I are suggesting that you just talk to them about

incentives. We say, in fact, in here, that when we contemplate talking to Syria or Iran, we talk about using incentives and disincentives. I think, to some extent, that’s what you’re seeing happening

now, when you talk about carrier battle groups and so forth.

And our report also makes clear, Senator Hagel, that we don’t

think Iran will talk to us about helping in Iraq, the way they did

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in Afghanistan, even though they might fear a chaotic Iraq. We

don’t think it’s going to happen. But we still think we ought to

make the proffer. And, as I indicated earlier, we have sat down

with Iran, in the compact group, at the level of Foreign Minister,

so it’s not as if nothing’s being done.

Where I think we’re missing the boat, if I might jump ahead a

little bit—and I know Lee probably has comment on this, too—

where I think we’re really missing the boat is Syria. I think we

have tremendous opportunity here to perhaps move them away

from a marriage of convenience with Iran. And in our report, on

page—let me refer you to page 56 and 57—we lay out, in specific

detail there, Senator Hagel, what we ought to be talking to Syria

about. And it’s—there are a lot of issues. But they’re things that

Syria is—has to deal with. We lay it all out there. And I really

hope that, if you haven’t focused on that—the committee—that

you’ll focus on it. I think there’s a real opportunity there to move

them away from Iran without giving up anything, where—you

know, as Lee said, we’re not talking about starry-eyed naive—talking to them about giving them this or that without getting something that’s really important for us. But if we were able to flip

Syria away from Iran and back toward where I think they would

like to be, based on a 21⁄2- to 3-hour discussion I had at the—with

the President’s approval—with the Syrian Foreign Minister, I think

they’re ready to come back. And what could we do? We could get

them to get Hamas, which is headquartered in Damascus, to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Boy, would that be a step in the right

direction. You’d give Israel a negotiating partner on the Palestinian

track. I think we could cut off the flow of arms to Hezbollah, because Syria is the transit point for all of those. And I’m not—we’re

not suggesting you give up anything. Certainly you hold their feet

to the fire on the investigations going on with the assassinations

in Lebanon; you get them to stop screwing around in Lebanon, to

the degree and extent that they have been; you get them to do a

better job of closing their borders.

So, that’s a long-winded answer to your question, and I know Lee

wants to add to all of it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me just——

Senator HAGEL. Before I ask the chairman to respond, Mr. Secretary, you still didn’t answer the question. But what’s interesting

about your point is, you used the term ‘‘if’’ more than once—‘‘if

Syria’’—and I—by the way, I agree with everything you’ve just

said. But that isn’t the case, that’s not reality, unless this administration changes, rather significantly, its direction. So, your ‘‘ifs, ifs,

ifs’’ are not the reality of what we’re dealing with.

Mr. BAKER. The ‘‘ifs’’ relate—that’s why we have to talk to them,

Senator.

Senator HAGEL. I’m a—I agree with you. Is the President listening to this? He—as of today at 1 o’clock, what you have just talked

about—‘‘if, if, if’’—that isn’t where the administration is going.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator——

Mr. BAKER. Well, I didn’t suggest that it was. I——

Senator HAGEL. I asked you——

Mr. BAKER. I know that.

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Senator HAGEL [continuing]. What you thought was the outcome

of the reality of where we’re going. And—but that isn’t reality,

when you say, ‘‘Well, if we would do this, if we would do this.’’

Mr. BAKER. Well, they aren’t—the administration is—they are

pursuing a diplomatic approach, not the one, necessarily, that we

lay out in here, perhaps——

Senator HAGEL. Well, can you——

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. Not as——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Define that diplomatic approach?

Mr. BAKER. Yes. They’re lining up our historic allies in the region

to enlist them in adopting the same policy toward Iran that we

have, which is a policy of isolation. Now, they are doing that. And

they are also doing—Secretary Rice has lined up—I think it’s confirmed—a meeting between President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority, and Prime Minister Olmert, so she’s working the

Israeli-Palestinian track, not working the Israeli-Syrian or -Lebanese track right now, but they are—they are pursuing diplomacy,

it’s just not as broad and extensive as what we recommend.

Senator HAGEL. Well, thank you. And I know I’m over my time,

but I do want to get the chairman’s point on this.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me make one point, very quickly, about

talking with Iran. In today’s context, part of the reason for talks

with Iran is to prevent the unnecessary inadvertent escalation of

tensions. That can become hugely important in the days ahead.

Now, in listening to your question, Senator, I think you’ve got it

right when you understand that in order to be effective in Iraq, you

have to integrate all of the tools of American power. You cannot

just emphasize the military and expect to succeed. You cannot just

emphasize diplomatic. You cannot just emphasize political and economic. You have to integrate. And this is the tough challenge in

Iraq.

Now, part of the use of the tools of American power is the tool

that Secretary Baker—Jim—has been talking about, and that is

the diplomatic offensive. I want you to take a careful look if—

you’ve probably already done it—at our recommendations on the

new diplomatic offensive. We recommended that it be launched in

December; in other words, immediately. We believe there is a genuine urgency about it. And then, look at the countries that we

talked about. All of the attention, of course, has been on Iran and

Syria, for understandable reasons. But when we’re talking about

this new diplomatic initiative, we’re talking about engaging the

Arab League, we’re talking about engaging all of the key regional

states, we’re talking about the states bordering Iraq, we’re talking

about the European Union, possibly Germany, Japan, South Korea.

In other words, we need a lot of help in stabilizing things in Iraq.

And we think there is a high degree of urgency needed on a diplomatic offensive.

I take the initial steps by Secretary Rice to be positive. I think

they’re very modest, but they’re positive. But we certainly need to

build on them, and we need to build on them with a much, much

greater sense of urgency than I see.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Senator DODD [presiding]. Thank you.

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Senator Biden’s out of the room momentarily, so I’m now in command here. I’m going to deal myself several hours, here, of questioning. [Laughter.]

Well, thank you both. And you’ve heard this repeatedly from others, and I’m sure you’ll convey this to your colleagues who did the

work over these 9 or 10 months, it was a tremendous effort, and

I think all of us in the country are grateful to both of you for putting your time and effort.

I’ve read this so many times, I can almost quote it without reading it, but it just deserves being repeated over again. The opening

sentence in your executive summary in December, ‘‘The situation

in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.’’ That sentence is a compelling

sentence. And, skipping down to the next paragraph, ‘‘Our most

important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic

and political efforts in Iraq and the region and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United

States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.

These recommendations, the two recommendations, are equally important and reinforce one another.’’

I’d want you to—to come back to Syria in a minute, and I want

to thank Secretary Baker for talking about it. We were in Syria,

Senator Kerry and I, in December, and we were in Lebanon, as

well as Jordan and Israel, and in Iraq. And we had Embassy people in the room there. This was obviously a conversation, but, as

I said, what went on there, the offer to really work with the United

States and others—the first time in 24 years you have an exchange

of ambassadors between Baghdad and Damascus. Maliki, the

Prime Minister, was in exile in Damascus during much of that period of Saddam Hussein’s rule. They were exchanging ministers

back and forth. And I don’t want to exaggerate the point, but when

asked, to Assad, what his goals were in Iraq, his answer was, ‘‘I

want a pluralistic Arab State. We’re not interested in having an

Iranian Shia-dominated fundamentalist state.’’ Now, it was said in

English in a private meeting. I’m repeating what he said to us in

that room, and it was reported in cable traffic back. I’m not going

to verify for the voracity of the statement, but it seems to me if two

United States Senators, in the presence of Embassy personnel,

have a President of Syria saying this is what he’s interested in,

why wouldn’t you pursue that, in my view? I called the State Department when I got back, and repeated privately what the answer

was. This was now 21⁄2 months ago. You could prove me wrong.

Maybe he was just saying that for our consumption, maybe it was

a political trick. I don’t know what the purpose was. It also may

have been true, in which case, it seems to me, we are wasting valuable time to get someone with whom we have significant disagreements on a variety of issues, but who may agree with us on this

issue, to play a constructive role.

And so, I, at some point, would like both of you to respond to

whether or not you believe the situation is still as you describe it

in the first sentence, or maybe worse, today, as we approach the

month of February; and, second, as a practical matter, on the surge

question, putting 17,000 young men and women in a city of 6 million people where there are 23 militias operating, not to mention

Baathist insurgents, maybe some al-Qaeda elements—how is this

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in any way going to enhance the recommendations you make here,

given the goal would be to either arrest or engage Shia or Sunni

militias, which, in an article written by Fareed Zakaria, it talks

about failing or succeeding absolutely makes the goal of political

reconciliation maybe that much more difficult, even if it succeeds,

because, once we’ve engaged these elements, rather than figure out

ways to bring them together, you get further away from the strong

recommendation you make about internal reconciliation, political

reconciliation.

So, I’d like you to respond to how, in any way, you can see this

surge contributing to the very recommendations, the most serious

recommendations you make in your report.

So, on Syria—and, Secretary Baker, you might just, for the purpose of discussion here, share with us your experience back in October—it was—1991, the gulf war. I know I’ve heard you talk about

15 trips to Syria. I think you said it was the 15th trip.

Mr. BAKER. I made 16 trips.

Senator DODD. Well, it might be——

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. Senator——

Senator DODD [continuing]. Constructive just to talk about that

and how long it took and why you did it.

Mr. BAKER. Let me just say that, at the time, it was not particularly popular to talk to Syria. On the 16th trip, Syria changed 25

years of policy refusing to sit down to negotiate peace with Israel,

and they came to the Madrid Conference and sat down and negotiated peace with Israel. Syria, at that time, was on our list of

states that sponsored terrorism, but we talked to them, we spent

a lot of time, we practiced diplomacy full time, and it paid off.

Senator DODD. On the 16th trip.

Mr. BAKER. On the 16th trip. Now, let me just say, with respect—one other thing with respect to Syria and your comment

about it—their exchanging ambassadors with Iraq——

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. And that they—and that Assad wants a

secular Iraq, which is quite true. But Syria, if we could—if we

could—and I believe we can—move them away from their—again,

their marriage of convenience with Iran, that would do a lot—that

would do a lot more than, I think, we are able to do right now to

marginalize Iran.

Senator DODD. Right.

Mr. BAKER. And it would—and it would really help us with

Hezbollah and Hamas. If the Syrian Foreign Minister—and I have

no reason to think he is not right—if he’s right that Hamas officers

are in Damascus, if they could get Hamas to come—to recognize

Israel’s right to exist, maybe they could get a unity government

with Fatah, and then you’d have a negotiating partner for Israel

with the Palestinians. It would be a huge step in the right direction.

Senator DODD. He also added, by the way—and I just say this

to you—we asked about a direct negotiation between Syria and

Israel. In the past, the Golan has been the precondition.

Mr. BAKER. That’s right.

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Senator DODD. He said, ‘‘I’m dropping the precondition. I’d negotiate without—I want the Golan back,’’ he said, ‘‘but I’m not going

to make it a precondition.’’

Mr. BAKER. That is the key, of course, to an ultimate peace.

There—someday—and hopefully in my, and in your, lifetime, Senator—there will be peace between Israel and Syria. I believe there

will be. That will be the key. We mention that in our report, but

we go further—further, I think, than any other—than any administration has gone to date—and we suggest that we give Israel a

United States security guarantee in order to assuage their concern—their security concerns in the event that they were to trade

the Golan for a full, complete, and secure peace with Syria.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, let me make a few comments, if I may,

first of all on the Syrian matter. I think there are a lot of indications coming out of Syria today, including your conversations,

which indicate that they’re very, very interested in engagement

with the United States. Not all of those are official contacts, like

yours, but there are many, many contacts in the nonofficial private

sector. They are sending signals to us.

Now, when you stop to think about it, the alliance between Syria

and Iran is an unnatural one. Syria is Sunni, Iran is Shia. And it’s

not something that is bound to stay permanent. And we ought to

be, as Jim has said, ready to exploit that.

You also asked about the trend line since the Iraqi report——

Senator DODD. Right.

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. Was issued. I don’t think the trends

have gotten much better. December was the deadliest month of the

year for 2006. We had 108 fatalities in that month. The United Nations reported, recently, 3.7 million refugees since we issued our report. That’s one in eight Iraqis. Saddam Hussein’s execution made

him a martyr in the Arab world, in the manner in which it was

handled. Oil production is still down below prewar levels. General

Petraeus testified before one of your committees the other day, that

life is a daily struggle to survive in Iraq. And the end of the year

passed and the Iraqi Government hasn’t met—still hasn’t met any

of these benchmarks. These benchmarks are all agreed upon,

they’ve been known for months, but still have not met those benchmarks. What’s happening? Why are they not acting to meet those

benchmarks? And weeks have passed since our report came out.

And, of course, the American people, the polls show very clearly

they continue to sour on this war. So, the trend lines are not positive with regard to Iraq since the report came out. They continue

to be negative.

Senator DODD. But to go back to the first question I asked: As

a practical matter, given the number of troops we’re going to place

on the ground in Baghdad, given the size of that city, the number

of militias operating, given your strong recommendations here, the

two strong recommendations, how does that in any way contribute

to achieving the goals that you two have outlined, along with your

colleagues, in this report in December?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, it——

Senator DODD. Putting 17,000 kids——

Mr. HAMILTON. I know——

Senator DODD [continuing]. In a cauldron like Baghdad.

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Mr. HAMILTON. I understand. It is possible, Senator, that the infusion of 20,000 additional troops will bring about—as the Generals

said to us, and they didn’t recommend it, it is possible, if you put

in a lot of additional troops into a fairly localized area, you can

bring about a temporary improvement in the situation there. That

could happen with the surge. We hope it does happen. But—I’m not

predicting it, but it could happen.

Senator DODD. But even if it does succeed, don’t you run the risk

of keeping the Shia and Sunni further apart, given the policing role

they’ll function, which runs directly contrary to exactly what we’re

trying to achieve here, and that is political reconciliation.

Mr. BAKER. I don’t think so, Senator. I don’t think you run the

risk of—you can’t—you couldn’t get them much further apart today

than they are in Baghdad. And let me say, one more time, everybody we talk to says that, ‘‘As Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.’’ And

one of our first tentative conclusions was that we needed to put

even more forces into Baghdad, but we concluded we didn’t have

them available. Now, that was not a conclusion of the Iraq Study

Group, it was an informal discussion we had among ourselves.

So, I guess the bottom line—my bottom line on the surge is, look,

the President’s plan ought to be given a chance. Give it a chance.

Because we heard all of this. The general that you confirmed, 81

to nothing, day before yesterday, this is his idea. He’s the supporter of it. He’s now the commander on the ground in Iraq. Give

it a chance.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, to both of you. Congressman Hamilton, I well remember serving in the House with you, and, while I’m sure you don’t

remember it—there’s no reason that you should—I always found it

extremely helpful, whether I was voting with you or against you,

to ask you why you were voting the way you were. And it always

seemed to be revealing of some aspect of the debate that I didn’t

have the opportunity to consider. So, I very much appreciate you

both being here.

And I enjoyed, to the extent that anyone could, reading the

Study Group Report, and I will make the observation, as I’ve made

to a number of people who asked me about it, some of them being

in the press, it was very clearly written. I mean, it wasn’t—it was

a dark assessment, in many ways, but it was clear, it was direct,

and it was to the point, which makes it especially ironic that, over

the last 3 or 4 weeks, everyone has looked at that report and

walked away with it perceiving, in some ways, what they wanted

to perceive, that they used it to reinforce preconceptions rather

than to engage in a discussion of how best to implement as many

of the recommendations in the report, the vast majority of which

I agree with. And, in fact, to that end, some of my colleagues probably read the benchmarks that come out every week about what’s

happening, and, you know, we’ve mentioned electricity and the performance—our performance and the Iraqi performance on electricity has been an absolute disaster. But I noted that, last week,

the oil output, the exports of oil, plummeted, I mean, to the lowest

level, perhaps, in 3 or 4 years. And, fortunately—I didn’t have to

make too much of a commotion—there was a footnote; the reason

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for that was that they finally installed meters. They went to the

port, and they installed meters, so that they could actually measure throughput, which is, you know, one of the recommendations,

in the oil sector, that you made. And it is a shame, in some ways,

that it’s taken so long. I’ve talked a great deal in this committee

about the importance of distribution of oil revenues and actually

measuring economic performance, because you want to enfranchise

people economically, and that’s the way to do it. So, there is a recommendation that I think we’ve made progress on. Unfortunately,

in other areas, perhaps not so much.

Secretary Baker, I want to ask a question about conditionality.

You mentioned conditionality. First, what specific conditions should

we look at and consider most strongly? And, second, on conditions,

or on encouraging Iraqis to take the various steps, measures that

we’ve encouraged them to do on oil and elections and in reconciliation, are there other methods to facilitate their active engagement

on these issues, or are hard conditions the best way to do it?

Mr. BAKER. Well, we—Senator, we call for, in our report, additional benchmarks to be worked out with the Iraqi Government, in

addition to those benchmarks that the administration has already

come up with. We suggest that they be tied to specific dates. We

do not—we do not spell out, in exquisite detail, the conditionality,

but we have that one sentence that I read in my part of the prepared statement that says if they don’t meet these benchmarks, the

United States should either make it clear or reduce—I guess we

said ‘‘should reduce its political, military, or economic support.’’

And we wrote it that way intentionally. It’s general, it’s a bit

vague, but the administration would then have, we think, all the

flexibility they need to say, ‘‘If you don’t do this, we’re going to take

this away or do this. If you don’t do that, we’re going to take that

away or do that.’’ I mean, there’s a lot of flexibility in there, but

we make it very clear that there ought to be conditionality.

Senator SUNUNU. Understood that you don’t want to be more

specific. Let me ask you a question, though, about approaching the

Iraqis on conditions. Simply put, there are two ways to do it. You

can do it publicly and make it known what you expect them to do,

and, in return, what conditions you’re going to impose on it. Or you

can ask—or you can make the point privately.

Mr. BAKER. Well, let me just——

Senator SUNUNU. Two questions. One, which is more effective?

And, or two, what do you—what factors do you use to determine

whether you’re private in your setting conditions——

Mr. BAKER. I was just whispering——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Or public?

Mr. BAKER. I was just whispering to Lee, this is the very debate

that we had, on any many occasions, in—during the preparation of

this report, because Lee wanted us to be—to say that the President

should lay it all out there publicly, and, in effect, make a public

statement or a threat. And maybe it was because I was a former

Secretary of State, I thought it might be better done privately.

Senator SUNUNU. I’m sorry to have driven such a sharp

wedge——

Mr. BAKER. Well——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Between the two of you.

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Mr. BAKER [continuing]. You didn’t—no; you didn’t. The wedge

was there, but we worked it out. And I think sometimes publicly

it might work better. Generally speaking, I think that it—sometimes when you do it publicly, you put a government in a position

to where it can’t take the action you want them to take.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, first of all, I want to say that neither

Jim nor I can claim credit for the clear writing. The people that

did it are sitting behind us here——

Mr. BAKER. That’s right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Chris Kojm and John Williams and Ben Rhodes.

They’re the gentlemen who deserve the credit for that.

I was amused by your comment that everybody reads the report

and sees something in it they can support. I suppose that’s the result of a bipartisan effort. And there isn’t any doubt that we tried

to deal pragmatically and realistically with the political situation

in two countries—Baghdad and Washington—and to reach an

agreement—and, as you know, that’s not easy to do.

I think Jim’s expressed my view on conditionality. I—quite

frankly, I’ve lost my patience with Maliki. He has known what he

needs to do for a long time. I would give preference to an approach

that deals with it privately, but we’ve used that approach for better

than a half a year now, and it hasn’t worked. And I think we’ve

got to put the screws on this fellow.

Senator SUNUNU. I want to ask a question, next, about discussions, not necessarily negotiations, but involved discussions with

those in the region—in particular, Syria and Iran—but it could

apply to any adversary. When those countries come up, there are

two specific concerns that are raised, or at least that I’ve heard

raised over again. And I want you to respond to both of them. One

concern is that we’re reluctant to engage in discussions because the

counterpart might insist on something that we’re not prepared to

agree to or that we may find unacceptable. The second concern

that’s often raised, or point that’s often made, is that the adversary

understands what they need to do and what we want them to do,

so there’s no point in speaking with them. Can you address both

of those concerns?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, on the first point, if they will insist on us

doing something that we object to, we just tell them no. Do we

have no confidence in American diplomats? Do we assume that, if

the American diplomats sit down at the table with them, they’re

just going to agree to everything? My goodness, no. So, all you’ve

got to do is say no. And, believe you me, there would be plenty of

things they’d ask us to do that we’d say no to.

On the second point, the adversaries——

Senator SUNUNU. That they know everything they need——

Mr. HAMILTON. They know——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. To do, we’ve already instructed

or——

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, look——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Given an indication of what our

objectives are.

Mr. HAMILTON. It’s very easy to sit in Washington and speculate

about the intentions and the motivations of the other side. And you

can—you know, every op-ed is filled with these guesses. They’re

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guesses. We don’t really know. Now, we can make an educated

guess, but we don’t really know. The only way you really know is

to put them down at the table and test them. And you may not get

it the first time, either, but you may get it the 50th time when you

talk to them.

I just find rather disconcerting the speculation that we enter into

about the intent of the other side with such assurance. Now, we

may be right, and we may also be wrong.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you both very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, and Congressman Hamilton, who I had the privilege of serving with in the House and under your leadership as the

chairman of the International Relations Committee, I appreciate

both of your work. And I appreciate a lot of what you put in the

Iraq Study Report.

My sense—and I’ve tried to pursue this with Secretary Rice

when she was here earlier today with Ambassador Negroponte in

his confirmation hearing—is that, while our focus has been, obviously on the President’s escalation, it seems to me that everything

I read from your report, the whole assessment part of it, for starters, speaks volumes on the urgency of the moment. And second,

that that urgency is overwhelmingly in the context of having a diplomatic surge. When I look at the assessments that you made

about how Iraq has an elected government that acts in a sectarian

context; at the corruption that is involved; at the lack of capacity

that is involved, by virtue of de-Baathification; of an Iraqi Army

where the equal-number divisions sign up only to serve in certain

parts of the country, unwilling to respond to a national context,

and a whole host of other things—it just seems to me that when

I see the President’s response, which I personally disagree with, I

don’t understand how we have not seen a surge in all of the diplomacy and the actions necessary to achieve all those other elements

that are really about success. When we speak about success in

Iraq, in my mind that’s what success is.

So, my question is: Is there not a real sense of urgency? Has

much changed since you issued your report, in the context of that

assessment? Third, you refer to benchmarks in the report, but is

it not necessary to have benchmarks with some form of conditionality? Whether it is timeframe or consequential, or for not meeting

in some way? Because we’ve had benchmarks, and those benchmarks have, many times, not been achieved. So, at the end of the

day, benchmarks without consequences are aspirations, nothing

else. I’d like to hear some of your responses in those three areas:

Sense of urgency, a sense of having the surge be more diplomatic

than anything else, and the consequences—the necessity to have

benchmarks with real consequences, combination deadlines and/or

actual consequences that are invoked for not meeting them, when

we believe that they’re not being met.

Mr. BAKER. Senator, we just had a—we just had a colloquy here

about conditionality on the benchmarks, and we think there should

be conditionality. There should be consequences. I don’t want to

speak for Lee, but I believe he would agree with the statement that

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I think there’s a sense of urgency here in our report with respect

to all of our recommendations because of the grave and deteriorating situation we found in Iraq as we studied this problem. And

so, I don’t know that you can say that there’s no sense of urgency

with respect to military, but there is with respect to diplomatic—

I think there’s a sense of urgency with respect to both.

Do you want to add anything?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Senator, as you correctly note, in the report

there is a sense of urgency almost with every recommendation,

whether it’s diplomatic or changing the mission of American forces

or conditionality, or other aspects of the report. So, the urgency is

clearly there. We do not believe we have a lot of time. We’ve got

to get this right, and we’ve got to get it right pretty quickly, because events are continuing to move against us. I spelled out those

events a moment ago, I think before you were in the room, that are

moving against us since we issued our report. And so, all of us

have a great sense of urgency.

And with regard to the surge, we say in the report that we can

support a surge but that is in the context of doing a lot of other

things at the same time, including political, diplomatic, and economic action.

Senator MENENDEZ. But, with all due respect——

Mr. HAMILTON. You have to integrate all of these things.

Senator MENENDEZ. With all due respect, do you sense that this

administration has captured that same sense of urgency on these

other matters?

Mr. HAMILTON. No; I do not. I think that, for example, on the

conditionality question, the President’s approach has been, ‘‘I must

try to give Mr. Maliki confidence.’’ And he has been unwilling to

be critical of Mr. Maliki. Now, maybe that’s the approach by which

you would begin. I think you’re at a point now where you have to

bear down on the Maliki government because of their nonperformance over a period of time. And if they don’t perform, and if they

don’t perform pretty quickly, then we will lose it. I don’t care how

many troops you put in there, we’re going to lose it. They must

begin to perform, and they must begin to perform promptly.

Senator MENENDEZ. We’ve heard about the escalation of the war,

and what we’ve heard, starting with Secretary Rice and others, is

that the Iraqis will be at the forefront of this and we’ll be assisting

them. And then we’ve heard testimony quite to the contrary of

that. I looked at your report, and clearly, based upon that report’s

assessment of Iraqi troop strength, capability, preparedness, and

willingness to fight in a national context, and surge is just simply

not there at this time.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you’re correct. The surge is not a new idea.

We’ve had several surges there. And what has been very clear is

that the Iraqi forces have not performed. They didn’t show up, on

some occasions, or they showed up much fewer in strength than we

had anticipated. Now, the argument is made that things have

changed, that they’re ready to go. I hope that’s the case. But we

certainly haven’t seen solid evidence of that up to this point.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, it seems to me we’re rolling the dice

on putting 20-some-odd-thousand extra troops up first, in the hope

and expectation of a quantity that has been proven to date not to

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meet the obligations that we would want to see, and that, therefore, if the troop strength isn’t there, their ability to fight in a national context isn’t there. If we’re told that that’s what’s necessary

and they’re going to lead the way and we’re going to follow them,

and if all of the diplomatic efforts necessary, and conditionality on

benchmarks necessary are not being pursued with the urgency that

is needed, I don’t understand how we are moving forward, in this

context, to success.

Mr. HAMILTON. What we said was, ‘‘If you do the things we recommend, we have a chance, and we——

Senator MENENDEZ. But the clock is ticking.

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. ‘‘And we believe there is a chance,

at this point.’’ In other words, we did not, in the Iraq Study Group

Report, come to the conclusion that it was hopeless, and, therefore,

we should just pull out immediately. We believe, if a lot of things

happen, quickly, there is a chance we can succeed. Now, you can

get into some dispute as to definitions of ‘‘success,’’ but we can reasonably succeed. But we recognize that that is a very, very

daunting challenge, and we recognize that you’ve got to get at it

with a great sense of urgency.

The questions you are raising relate to the competence of the

Iraqi Government. Can they perform? There isn’t any doubt, in the

President’s proposals and in ours, that we are depending on—very

heavily—an improvement in the performance of the Iraqi Government. Will it happen? I don’t know. If it doesn’t happen, then the

result will be very, very bad. But if we can put this together,

there’s a chance we can reasonably succeed.

We do believe that we have a lot of interests in this region that

need to be protected, and we think that we have to behave very

carefully and very responsibly in order to protect those interests.

And we, therefore, rejected the idea of just pulling out immediately.

But it does make you uneasy—there is no doubt it—it makes you

uneasy when you have to depend on this government, which, as

you say, hasn’t performed very well in the past. But what other alternative do you have?

Mr. BAKER. One of the purposes——

Mr. HAMILTON. You can’t go out on the street of Baghdad and

pick 10 people and put your confidence in them. This is a duly

elected government, it is a democratically elected government. It

has a lot of problems, but it does have a basic legitimacy. Therefore, you have to deal with it.

Mr. BAKER. Senator, one of the purposes of the surge, as I’m sure

you heard from General Petraeus when you confirmed him, is to

give the Iraqi Government a little more running room in order to

help it achieve national reconciliation by tamping down the violence, or pacifying, if you will, Baghdad.

Let me, if I might, Mr. Chairman, read from the report with respect to this issue of a surge, because there are only two conditions

upon our support for a surge. One is that it be short term, and the

other is that it be—is that it be called for by the commander in

Iraq. President Bush said this is not an open-ended commitment.

Secretary Gates said this is a temporary surge. And, of course,

General Petraeus is the guy that’s to carry it out, and he was the

person that originally recommended it. This is the—this is the lanVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00682 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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guage, and all of the language, of the report with respect to a

surge, ‘‘We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or

surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to speed

up the training-and-equipping mission if the United States commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective.’’ The

only two conditions are: Short term, commander in Iraq determines

it would be effective. Both of those conditions have been met, unless you disbelieve the President and his National Security Advisor

and General Petraeus.

Mr. HAMILTON. I do think, Senator, in addition to what Secretary

Baker said, is that we recommended the surge but we believe that

that surge has to take place in the context of a lot of other things

happening, including political action, diplomatic action, and economic action. And that sentence that is quoted about the surge—

that sentence that is quoted in the report—is in a section that talks

about the importance of national reconciliation.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I just would

note that giving the Iraqis running room suggests that they’re

ready to run the race. And, second, I know the temporary nature,

Mr. Secretary, that you cited in the report. A problem is that, as

presented to us, there’s no timeframe here whatsoever. So, it may

be suggested that it is temporary, but there’s no clear timeframe

as to how long these troops would be committed.

Mr. BAKER. The Secretary of Defense says it’s going to be a temporary surge, and the President says it’s not going to be openended, and then there have been some suggestions from some quarters—and, again, I don’t know whether this came up in General

Petraeus’s hearing in the—before Armed Services—but there were

some suggestions that we would pretty well know whether this

works by the summer or early fall. I don’t know exactly who said

it, but I know it’s out there.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to make it clear what I

read—your statement—was the appendix 1 on your July 11, 2007,

statement that you and——

Mr. BAKER. You mean January 11?

The CHAIRMAN. January 11, 2007. It says ‘‘Statement of CoChairs, January 11, 2007, Appendix 1, James Baker, Lee

Hamilton.’’ I’m not in any way contradicting what you’re saying. I

wanted you to understand where I got the phrase——

Mr. BAKER. Yes; I see it there.

The CHAIRMAN. The phrase I got was ‘‘complemented by’’—it says

‘‘The Iraq Study Group indicated it could support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad complemented by comprehensive political, economic, and

diplomatic——

Mr. BAKER. That’s right.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. ‘‘Efforts.’’ I assume that’s the context that——

Mr. BAKER. That’s the——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Secretary Baker——

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. Context.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Was talking about. I didn’t mean to

imply, if you thought I did, that the actual page 72 said that.

Mr. BAKER. Thank you.

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The CHAIRMAN. Now, everyone’s being very generous. The ranking member is here, as is Senator Coleman, and they both had indicated that, since Senator Voinovich has been here, they would be

prepared to yield to him to go next.

I want to make it clear, I’m going to be stepping out of the room,

and, in my absence, I’d ask Senator Dodd to chair this, but we’re

going to promise, we’re going to try to get you out of here around

3 o’clock. So, lots of luck in your senior year. But, at any rate, all

kidding aside, I appreciate your patience.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you for your service to your country. Lee,

you have been involved in numerous public service projects and

committees. And, Secretary Baker, we are fortunate to have you

contribute your insight and best judgment on the Iraq issue. You

have certainly been through the mill over the years.

When the President’s new plan for a troop surge in Iraq was announced, I indicated that I was skeptical of it because, first of all,

Generals Casey and Abizaid—whom we have long relied upon—

were not enthusiastic about it, and many other experts and witnesses believed a surge might exacerbate the situation and make

America a greater target for attacks in Iraq.

I also considered the hearings that we had earlier in the war.

And, Mr. Chairman, at that time, we were given the impression

that certain critical activities needed to accompany our invasion.

We discussed political issues, security, infrastructure, economy,

and we believed the administration was sufficiently planning for

these things. Jay Garner was sent to Iraq as the post-war administrator and had begun to implement some of his plans, but then

suddenly Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer, who pulled the

plug on much of the progress and existing structure in the Iraqi society. So, my confidence in the fastidiousness necessary to our current work is a little low.

You said that you support both the surge and ‘‘comprehensive political, economic, and diplomatic efforts.’’ Deputy Secretary

Negroponte was here today and we asked him whether or not the

diplomatic issue had been carried as far as possible. Of course, Secretary Rice has been out talking with other nations, but it seems

to me that at this stage of the game I don’t think that we have

made the diplomatic efforts that we need to make. I’d like your

comment on that.

Second, concerning economic issues, some officials were here discussing Provisional Reconstruction Teams, and we found out that

they have about $11 billion in their treasury but don’t know how

to spend it properly.

So it seems these conditions that you laid out as part of the

surge have not been met. I would like your opinion on that.

You also mentioned that America’s commitment is not openended, but when does it end? What does that mean? How do you

determine that? Are there measures in place that we can use to determine whether conditions warranting America’s continued support have actually been met?

I’d like you to comment on that.

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Mr. BAKER. Senator, I’ll comment on the first part, because it

was the same discussion we just had with the chairman.

The diplomatic, economic, and so forth, complementary issues are

not conditions to the surge. The surge is conditioned—our approval

of a surge is conditioned only by the fact that it be short term and,

second, that it be approved by the commander in Iraq.

Senator VOINOVICH. When you said ‘‘short term,’’ what do you

mean?

Mr. BAKER. Yes; OK. ‘‘Short term,’’ I’ve already set out the—you

have to look at Secretary Gates’s comment, ‘‘this is a temporary

surge.’’ Now, does that mean 2 months? Does that mean 12

months? I can’t answer that. The President said it’s not going to

be open-ended. Now, has there been a specific date put on there?

No; there hasn’t. The commander on the ground, we think—and I

think the President obviously feels—has to have the flexibility to

conduct the surge in the best manner possible to pacify Baghdad,

so you don’t have a date put on it. But the language that you read

is context language as to—as Chairman Hamilton has indicated.

Those are not conditions to our approval of a surge.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Senator, I agree with your observation. The

diplomatic effort has not been full enough. I said, earlier, that I

thought Secretary Rice’s trip was a positive step. But if you look

at the recommendations we make, we really make recommendations for a very, very comprehensive diplomatic offensive in which

we engage all of the countries in the region, the Perm 5, the Arab

League, and a lot of others, not all at once, but in stages. And we

see that diplomatic effort as a very important reinforcing mechanism, along with the other steps you take internally in Iraq, in

order to bring stability to Iraq. And we think there is a real urgency to that diplomatic effort, that we cannot proceed with ‘‘business as usual’’ here. We think it’s terribly important——

Senator VOINOVICH. But do you think it would be easier to begin

that urgent diplomatic effort in the region now or later? Do you

think that now is the time to clearly state that ultimately we are

leaving Iraq?

Mr. HAMILTON. Look, I think things in Iraq continue to go down.

We don’t have the time to wait on any of the recommendations we

made. I feel a real sense of urgency on all of these recommendations. We recommended that the diplomatic offensive that we spell

out start in December 2006. And here we are, almost February

2007, and a very modest step, I think, has been taken.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well I——

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, on the——

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. I think that the American people probably would feel a whole lot better if we had already started

the diplomatic effort recommended by the Iraq Study Group or had

announced that we are aggressively going to do it, or at least if we

got Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to say that he needs help from his

neighbors and then have him convene them.

Mr. HAMILTON. I agree with that. You asked about ‘‘not an openended commitment.’’ We’re quite specific here about what the

Iraqis must do, and we are demanding that they make, in the

phrase of the report, ‘‘substantial progress’’ toward very specific

goals that are broadly agreed upon, and that if they do not make

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substantial progress, then we are going to reduce our commitment.

Now, how much time do you give them to make substantial

progress? Well, I guess people would vary in their judgment about

that, and, at the end of the day, it’s going to be the President’s call

what constitutes ‘‘substantial progress,’’ and how quickly. The point

we make is that you set out these benchmarks, they have to make

substantial progress in hitting those benchmarks pretty soon, in

our judgment, or we’re going to reduce our commitment. If you do

not get a bona fide effort by the Iraqi Government to perform—in

governance, in national reconciliation, and in carrying their share

of the load on security, recognizing they’re going to need some

United States help—then there is no way that the United States

is going to succeed there, no matter what we do. The Iraqi Government has to perform.

Mr. BAKER. Senator, if you look at the President’s speech of January 10—and I mentioned this in my opening remarks—he says—

he talks about increasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army units, ‘‘with the goal that the Iraqi Government

will assume control of security in all provinces in Iraq by November

2007.’’ Now, that’s further out than the summer that I mentioned

in my answer to Senator Menendez.

Mr. HAMILTON. I might just say, on this surge question, that

there isn’t any doubt in my mind that the United States forces are

going to win every battle. That’s not the problem. I’m not suggesting that it’s easy, but it’s not the problem. We can clear out

any neighborhood we want to clear out. We did it, last summer.

The question is: Can you hold it, and can you build it after you’ve

cleared it out? And that has to be primarily, it seems to me, up to

the Iraqis, not up to us to do that. And, to date, no one can claim

that their performance has been very good.

I want to point out, on this surge question, which keeps coming

up here, the surge was not one of our 79 recommendations; it was

a part of a discussion of the military options that are available to

us there; and we continued to say throughout the report, that the

primary mission of U.S. forces, as I said earlier in the testimony,

should be to train Iraqis. The question in my mind, frankly, is not

whether you should train Iraqis, but when. We’re going to have to

do it. We’ve been working at it for several years. We didn’t do a

very good job of it, to be blunt about it, for several years. I think

we’ve improved. I think we’re much better today at training the

Iraqis than we were 3 or 4 years ago. But we’ve still got a long way

to go. And I think that has to be the primary mission, and it has

to be accelerated. And the more you talk about the surge and the

details of the surge, the less likely it is that you are to focus on

what we consider the primary mission, which is training those

Iraqis. If you want to get out of Iraq, the best way, most feasible

way, to get out of Iraq is to train those forces.

Senator DODD [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Secretary Baker and Congressman Hamilton, I

want to thank both of you for your service.

The Iraq Study Group was created by Congress to help us and

the American people better understand our options in Iraq. Now,

I’m going to be—as you probably know, I voted against the war 4

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years ago—I want us to win in Iraq. I want us to succeed in our

mission. And, Congressman Hamilton, I appreciate the manner in

which you have presented the options that we have available—and

Secretary Baker.

My concern is—I go back to the original justification for entering

Iraq. The President talked about the attack on our country on September 11, talked about weapons of mass destruction. And now I’m

trying to figure out the justification for the escalation of our military presence as the President talks about benchmarks and talks

about diplomatic efforts. And I’m concerned that that’s liable to get

lost in the President’s desire to win a military victory in Iraq,

where, as your report underscores, a military victory in Iraq is not

possible, that it needs to be—it needs to have the diplomacy and

the economic reforms and all the other issues that are spelled out

in your report.

So, I guess my question to you, particularly to Congressman

Hamilton—you served this Nation with great distinction, not as a

Member of Congress, but in the 9/11 Commission. And the thing

that impressed me the most is that, when that commission issued

its report, it didn’t go out of existence. Some may have thought it

would, but it didn’t. And it’s helped us, and assisted us, to stay on

track to try to accomplish an objective to make this Nation safer.

I would like to solicit your help, as we go forward in Iraq, as to

whether, in fact, we have effective and enforceable benchmarks. I

must tell you, I am somewhat confused as to what the benchmarks

are. I’ve listened to the Secretary of State, I’ve listened to the

President, I’ve heard what they’ve said about the Iraqis standing

up and taking responsibility for their own country and doing all

these other things. But I also could find that, a couple of months

from now, the President said, ‘‘Well, they’re doing better here,

they’re doing—there,’’ and that the benchmarks are certainly not

very definitive as to what they have to do by certain dates, and the

consequences if they don’t.

As far as diplomatic efforts are concerned, I’ve listened very carefully to this administration, and I have yet to see them engage allout effort in the region or internationally for effective diplomacy. It

still appears to be America, rather than looking at the region and

an international community for an effective solution to the political

problems in Iraq and the region.

So, I welcome your thoughts as to whether—going forward. I certainly hope the President will change his policies in Iraq, but I do

think that this Study Group Report and your recommendations

gives us a comprehensive plan that could succeed in Iraq. And I

think it would be very helpful to us to get your continued involvement as to—you pointed out, in the last 21⁄2 months, very little has

happened, and your report talked about the urgency of the situation—but I would find it helpful if you would continue to give your

views as to whether the recommendations that have been made by

the Study Group are, in fact, being followed by the players.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I think our view is that many of the recommendations have been partially accepted, not totally accepted.

Some have been totally accepted. One or two, three maybe, have

been outright rejected. But there isn’t the view, in the Iraq Study

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Group, to engage in the kind of a followup effort that we had in

the 9/11 Commission.

Now, I am doing quite a bit of testifying and speaking with regard to the Iraq Study Group. I think other members of the Iraq

Study Group, including Secretary Baker, are doing likewise. But it

is not—we no longer meet, we’re out of existence, and there isn’t

any followup taking place as a group. There is followup on an individual basis. I have seen statements, for example, by several of the

members of the Study Group as they have spoken to press around

the country and to groups around the country.

I do want to say a word about these benchmarks. I think the

benchmarks, where we’re asking the Iraqi Government to perform,

are very clear. And we’re asking them to be more inclusive in that

constitution, to include the Sunnis. We’re asking them to put in a

program of de-Baathification that requires the reintegration of the

Baathists, except those at the very top level of Saddam Hussein’s

regime, to get them into the national life of the country. We’re asking for an oil revenue-sharing program that is fair.

Senator CARDIN. But oil revenue, I think we’ve seen some action.

But on the other——

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, not much.

Senator CARDIN. Are you comfortable that there’s a reasonable

timeframe that would have consequences?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well—no, I’m not comfortable on the timeframe.

I think these things need to be done urgently. And I’m very impatient.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I—let me put it a different way. Are you—

do you believe that the Iraqis are under the impression—the current government—of consequences and a timeframe in which they

have to perform?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not believe they are sufficiently alert to that.

Now, I think our administration has talked to them about it. I

think they’ve agreed on benchmarks. I think they even now have

dates. We’ve put out a lot of the dates in our report. They have to

achieve certain things by certain dates. But these dates have

slipped in the past, and they are not performing on time, in my

judgment about it.

How do you change that? Well, you change it, I think, by putting

more leverage on Maliki through conditionality, and perhaps some

opportunities would arise on the diplomatic track, as well. It is not

an easy thing to do. But it is key.

Mr. BAKER. Senator Cardin, I think they are much more aware

of it today, let’s say, than they were 4 or 5 months ago. And I think

that—without doing it publicly, that the President and the administration have made it pretty clear to that government that we

need to see performance on these benchmarks. Now, I can’t tell you

that for a fact, because I wasn’t in any of the meetings or anything

else, but I think—I think they’re much more focused on it today

than they have been in the past.

Just here, the other day, they arrested 40—as I understand, 40

followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. That—they got an oil law. They’ve

done a few other things like that, that looked like things are finally

beginning, maybe, to happen. Time will tell. We’ll just have to see.

But I think the President—and I don’t know this for a fact, and I

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don’t mean to be suggesting that I do know it for a fact, but I’m—

I think he had to come to you-know-what meeting with the Prime

Minister when he last met with him—pretty well made it clear

that—you know, and he—as he said in his speech, the patience of

the American people is not unending, ‘‘If you don’t perform, you’re

going to lose the support of the American people,’’ and if you read

that carefully, I think that means you’ll lose the support of the

administration.

Senator CARDIN. I just want to compliment the bipartisan leadership of our committee and Congress, because I think it’s also

helped get the message out. We’ll see whether there is accountability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thanks very much for coming. I’m going to make

a comment, and I would like for your reflections on this idea.

Secretary Rice has recently outlined what appears to be a shift

in emphasis in United States policy toward countering the challenges posed by Iran. Under this new approach, the United States

would apparently organize regional players—Saudi Arabia, Jordan,

Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States, and others—behind a program of

containing Iran’s disruptive agenda in the region. Such a realignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq and bringing security to

other areas of conflict, such as Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Moderate states in the Middle East are concerned by Iran’s

aggressiveness and the possibility of sectarian conflict beyond

Iraq’s borders. They recognize the United States as indispensable

counterweight to Iran and a source of stability in the region. The

United States has the leverage to enlist greater support for our objectives inside Iraq and throughout the region.

Now, quite apart from the military-diplomatic surge in Iraq

that’s been the focus of our attention, we’re now seeing the outlines

of a new United States regional approach, more assertive stance by

our military toward Iranian interference in Iraq, a renewed

diplomatic effort on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, substantial U.S.

security assistance to Palestinian President Abbas, and a United

States-led effort to bolster the Lebanese Government against

Hezbollah.

In the Washington Post today, I noted that the United States

should recalibrate our reference points on Iraq. We should not see

the President’s current Iraq plan as an endgame, but rather as one

element in a larger Middle East struggle that is in the early stages.

The President’s Baghdad strategy is still aimed at an optimal

outcome, the creation of a democratic pluralist society that would

cooperate with us to achieve regional security. But, at this state,

that is a goal we’re pursuing, but our strategy in Iraq must be

flexible enough to allow for changing circumstances. And even as

the President’s Baghdad strategy proceeds, we need to be preparing

for how we will array U.S. forces in the region to defend oil assets,

target terrorist enclaves, deter adventures by Iran, provide a buffer

against regional sectarian conflict, and generally reassure friendly

governments the United States is committed to the Middle East security.

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Such a redeployment might well involve bases inside Iraq that

would allow us to continue training Iraqi troops and delivering economic assistance, but would not require us to interpose American

soldiers between Iraqi sectarian factions.

One of the ironies of the highly contentious debate over President

Bush’s new Iraq plan is that it is focused on the strategically narrow issue of what United States troops do in a limited number of

multiethnic neighborhoods in Baghdad that contain only about 7

percent of the Iraqi population, what GEN Jack Keane has called

the ‘‘key terrain.’’ Undoubtedly, what happens in those Baghdad

neighborhoods is important, but it is unlikely that this mission will

determine our fate in the Middle East. And, remaking Iraq, in and

of itself, does not constitute a strategic objective. The risk is that

we will define success and failure in Iraq so rigidly that our Iraq

policy will become disconnected or even contradictory to broader regional goals.

Do either of you have a comment on that outlook?

Mr. BAKER. I don’t think anything that I heard in there, Senator—and I don’t—you read it fairly quickly, but nothing that I

heard in there is inconsistent in any way with the call we made

in the Iraq Study Group Report for a new diplomatic offensive and

an international Iraqi support group. I think it’s complementary of

it. What we suggest would be complementary of those efforts, and

vice versa.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I think the diplomatic initiatives that

you mentioned are all worthy. I guess I’m a little impatient. I want

to see them proceed more quickly and with a greater sense of urgency than I have, thus far, seen.

But what really interested me about your excellent piece this

morning in the Post was the so-called plan B. We were urged, on

occasion, in the Iraq Study Group, to go beyond what we recommended and develop a plan B. We rejected that idea, because we

reasoned that if you’re going to make a proposal, you ought to advocate it and ought not to immediately begin thinking about a

second plan. But there is, very clearly, need for policymakers, including yourself, to be thinking about a plan B. And you call for

a redeployment of forces in the region to defend the oil and target

the terrorist enclaves, deter adventurism. We would certainly agree

to all of that.

So, I react positively to your statements here, with the caveat,

I guess, that full speed ahead is necessary on the diplomatic side.

Mr. BAKER. And may I add to that, Senator Lugar, that when

Lee says ‘‘we were urged to take a look at a plan B,’’ I suppose I

was the primary urger, because I was, and still am, interested in

the proposal that Senator Biden and Les Gelb put forward with respect to the idea that ultimately you may end up with three autonomous regions in Iraq, because I was worried that there’s—that

there are indications that that might be happening, in fact, on the

ground anyway, and, if it is, we ought to be prepared to try and

manage the situation. So, we have a sentence in our report that

says, ‘‘If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, the

United States should manage the situation to ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the violence, and minimize regional

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stability.’’ That’s, of course, with respect to the Biden-Gelb proposal.

But, again, let me repeat, there’s nothing in your proposal that

I heard that would be in any way inconsistent with, and would, in

fact, be complementary of, the new diplomatic offensive that we

call for in the Iraq Study Group Report.

Senator LUGAR. Well, the reason I shamelessly cite the Washington Post editorial I wrote for this morning’s paper, and repeat

it here, is that I hear, both on the Republican and Democratic

sides, that people are formulating resolutions that they might offer

next week in our debate. They are using such terms as ‘‘last

chance.’’ In other words, a number of people are saying the surge

is the last chance, or, second, that there have to be rigid benchmarks, or that we’ve got to tell the Iraqis, ‘‘By golly, this is your

last chance. Either you pass the oil law, you get the devolution of

authority or the provinces done, or all the rest of it, or,’’ the

thought is, ‘‘we’re out of there.’’

Now, that is my worry. In other words, if we come into a debate

in which we—I characterize the situation today in football terms—

this is like 3rd down and 20, and you call a draw play. Well, it

turns out you can get 6 yards, and you punt on 4th down. It is in

the first quarter, and so you are now in more favorable territory

to try another strategy. What I fear we are heading toward, on

both sides, is a situation in which we say, we are either tired of

it, stop the funds, bring home the troops, or, maybe some on the

Republican side are saying this is it, this is the surge, these are

the benchmarks. An interesting pretense, when, in my judgment,

there’s not a scintilla of hope that the Iraq Government, could fulfill all of this. And so, then you—as suggested, I think, by Senator

Cardin—get some fudging, ‘‘Well, there was progress made,’’ and

we note a little headway here and there, and, once again, we’re

back into the same debate.

What I would hope is that the diplomatic side, which I think Secretary Rice is now beginning to put together, offers several years

of evolving activities not only focused on Iraq, but, likewise, involving the entire Middle East.

Thank you, Mr.——

Mr. BAKER. You didn’t ask this question, Senator, but I—and I

don’t mean to speak for my cochairman—I think we’re going to be

there a long, long time, and that’s why, in my formal remarks, I

mentioned the continuing presence—large, substantial, robust presence—of the U.S. military in the region, in the area.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Senator DODD. Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Baker, Chairman Hamilton, this is my first opportunity to publicly thank you for the work that you did on this Iraq

Study Group. It’s been enormously valuable to the country, for people who have had strong concerns. And everybody said all this to

you before, but I want you to know that you’ve set an example here

for a lot of people, showing that we can work across party divides

and other divides, and try to come to some sort of a solution.

I want to associate myself with the views that both of you expressed with respect to Syria. We tend to focus on Iran, and rightly

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so, but, as you’ve said, as I’ve tried to say a number of times, Iran

and Syria are not natural allies, and it’s very much in our strategy

interest that we should be dealing with these two countries rather

than causing them to be working together largely because they’re

on the other side of the diplomatic fence. I can’t say it any more

clearly than the two of you did. I think it’s vitally important that

we do that.

With respect to this discussion now about the surge and, quite

frankly, how this is going to be used in our debate that will be coming up on the floor, I would like to start off, first, by saying we had

Admiral Fallon at a confirmation hearing this morning on the

Armed Services Committee, and he gave some very nuanced answers, which encouraged me a great deal. One of the points that

he made was that it’s not particularly the number of troops that

are involved in any of these endeavors, it’s how they’re used. And

one of the concerns that I have had with where we are right now

is that I don’t see anything that’s been proposed over the last

month as truly a change in strategy, I see it as more an adjustment, a tactical adjustment, without changing our national strategy. And, in that respect, what we’re doing is moving forward on

one area without having implemented the other key recommendations in your Iraq Study Group. There is not a robust diplomatic

effort that, as Chairman Hamilton has mentioned several times,

should have begun a month or so ago.

And so, the down side of that, from people like myself who have

a concern about how our Army and Marine Corps have been used

on the ground there, is that we may end up, just through momentum, continuing the same practices, which is going to have an impact on the force-structure issues in the Army and the Marine

Corps, on troop rotations and these sorts of things, without a

change in strategy.

And, just for the record, I want to say that I voted for General

Petraeus. I listened to him in the Armed Services Committee hearings, and I did not vote on him because I believe in his strategy,

I voted for him because I believe he is a person who is eminently

capable of assuming that command. And he has told us, in clear

terms, that he is going to be candid with us about his operational

matters as they go forward.

What I really have a concern on here—and this is a great opportunity for me, just sitting, listening—I know it’s never particularly

fun to testify like this, as has been intimated a few times, but it’s

a great opportunity for me to sit and listen to your views. And the

question I really have is: How do we get to the end of this? You

know? And that’s a substantive question that we’ve been kicking

around. But, Secretary Baker, you’ve got as much experience as

anyone in the country, in terms of dealing with these issues in a

procedural way, and I know there are a broad range of diplomatic

efforts that are mentioned in your report, but what would be the

best procedural format for us to be able to create this international

support structure that we’ve been talking about? How do we get

there from here?

Mr. BAKER. Well, Senator, we—we’re fairly specific in the diplomatic portion of our report, in laying out the steps we think need

to be taken. We call for a new diplomatic offensive. We call for the

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creation of an international Iraq support group. We call for the convening of various meetings. We mentioned the countries we think

ought to be in that international support group, including all of

Iraq’s neighbors, which, of course, would include Iran and Syria.

We go further with respect to Syria, because we see that as a distinctly different case than Iran, and that it has—it has fundamental application with respect to the issue of Arab-Israeli peace.

So, it’s pretty much all laid out there.

You say: How do we get to the end of this? Let me make—let me

throw something out here that maybe nobody will stand up and

salute, and I haven’t talked to anybody downtown about this, and

I don’t speak for the administration, and—but, look, neither the administration nor the Congress has adopted all of the recommendations of our report, or all of the conclusions of our report. The administration has—as Lee put it earlier, has—and as you’ve just put

it, Senator—has not gone as far, diplomatically, as we proposed.

The Congress is not in favor—or at least it looks like there may

be a majority of the Congress that is opposed to the surge and is

preparing to vote a resolution of disapproval.

Back in 1983, when I was Ronald Reagan’s Chief of Staff, we decided we wanted to try to do something with Social Security, if we

could. Social Security was the third rail of American politics, and

still is today, in my view. We concluded we weren’t going to ever

be able to do anything with Social Security unless we got the leadership of both parties together. And they sat down—I’m talking,

now, about—at the level of the Senate majority leader and the

Speaker of the House and the President of the United States—and

they sit down, and they decide, ‘‘This problem is of such fundamental importance to our country that we need to take it out of

politics, we need to give each other cover in a way that would permit us to deal with this and to move forward.’’

And I know the chairman is, I guess, gone to another appointment, but I have to tell you, I look at this situation today a little

bit in those same terms. And we were able, in 1983, to come up

with a—with an agreed solution, a bipartisan solution, Republicans

and Democrats, that made Social Security whole for at least 30

years. And this issue of Iraq is every bit as emotional, and certainly every bit as important to the country, as what we were dealing with back then.

So, I guess what I would like to throw out here for people to

consider is whether or not there couldn’t be some sort of a grand

negotiation between the executive and the legislative branches of

our Government to come together on a way forward in Iraq. There

are things that the majority up here on the Hill think should be

undertaken by the administration that are laid out in this report,

and there are things that the President, as Commander in Chief,

and his military advisors, think ought to be done; specifically, the

surge. Why not get together and agree that both sides are going to

do some or all of those things so we can move forward together on

Iraq in a bipartisan way? Wouldn’t that be better than what we

have now?

Again, that’s not something I’ve even ever discussed with my cochairman. He may disagree with me on that. But it ought—we

ought to be able to work across party lines on something as imporVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00693 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tant as this. So, how about at least giving it some thought? That’s,

maybe, not really a direct answer to your question, Senator.

Senator WEBB. If I may clarify, procedurally, here. I mean, this

is—and I—by the way, I think that’s what you all have been

doing—you know, that’s what your Study Group has been doing, is

a first step in that direction.

Procedurally, the United States has lost so much esteem in that

part of the world as a result of this Iraq endeavor. It would be an

awkward thing for the United States to step forward and say, ‘‘OK,

we are going to convene an Iraq Study Group, and we want Iran

and Syria to the table.’’ Procedurally, how do we—where do we go

to get that issue on the table? It doesn’t have to be a long answer.

I’ve—it’s a question I’ve had for some time.

Mr. HAMILTON. We put the responsibility on the President and

the Secretary of State. They’ve got to take the action.

Senator WEBB. Wouldn’t you think that the United Nations——

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, OK, the——

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Would be——

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. They have to launch this effort. We

were not all that specific as how to launch it, but you are dealing

with a sovereign country here—Iraq. You are dealing in an environment where the United States has lost standing and prestige.

But, at the same time, there is a recognition that nothing is going

to happen in that region if the United States doesn’t lead. So, I

think we have to step forward. And we recommend a very, very

comprehensive effort, multilaterally, bilaterally, with the establishment of the support group as a principal objective, and involving

many, many countries in the region and outside the region. We

can’t tell exactly how that would proceed. I’m hoping that’s what

Secretary Rice was doing while she was out there.

Senator WEBB. Well, my time is expired, but—Mr. Chairman,

just if I can nail this down. From my perspective, this is the key

issue here, because, on the one hand, we have lost so much standing in the region, and, on the other, this administration refuses to

negotiate with Iran and Syria, and yet, there has to be a vehicle

in order to bring this forward. And that’s the concern that I have.

And I’ll——

Mr. BAKER. Well, Senator Webb, there is—the administration

has, ongoing, the compact for Iraq, which is essentially a collection

of the same countries. That was organized, procedurally, by Iraq

and the United Nations. It was called for by Iraq. It contains Iran,

it contains Syria. We attend, and they attend. And so, something

like that. But we did specifically, as Lee said, avoid the difficult

question of exactly how to call this, leaving it up to the President.

And we didn’t have a specific suggestion on that point, but that you

could do it the way the administration did the compact for Iraq.

Senator WEBB. Well, I would hope they would consider doing

that. I appreciate your testimony.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, I’ll make one other comment here. You

folks are headed for some rough patches in your relationship with

the executive branch. And they probably begin next week, if I understand your schedule. My hope is that, as you go through this

process—and I don’t think it’ll be an easy one for you—resolutions

that are nonbinding, a supplemental, then the appropriation bills,

685

down the line—you’re going to have all kinds of amendments and

clashes in that process. And, maybe it’s being a little Pollyannaish,

I hope not, but, in that process, I hope, at the end of the day, we

come to a little better unity of effort in this country on Iraq.

I wouldn’t, for a minute, think it’ll be unanimous. I think the divisions are just too deep. But everybody in this room understands

the importance of unity of effort in foreign policy if you’re going to

have an effective foreign policy. So, it’s not an easy process for you,

and you’re going to have some tough debates, and there are going

to be some hard edges to it, and maybe some bad feelings now and

then, but it is the process we have to work toward a greater unity

of effort.

Senator DODD. Let me just say, Jim Baker—before I turn to Senator Coleman—the case you cited, the Social Security case—I remember another case. I remember you walking into my office in

1989 and saying to me, ‘‘We’re not going to spend all day in the

White House debating Central America. We’re going to sit down

and figure what has to be done on this. We’re going to come up

with some common answers.’’ We went through some difficult negotiations back and forth, but, under your leadership, we came up

with a common plan and a common idea that got us out of the daily

quagmire of dealing, in Central America, with all the other issues

we had to grapple with.

The point I want to make is, I think the United States has to

lead, but leadership in this country begins at the executive branch.

Asking 535 Members of Congress with disparate districts and constituencies to lead on this issue is—we can play an important

role—and we will, in a vacuum, otherwise—but the real leadership

has to come from the President and that office. That’s what you

did, and I’ll never forget it. Because you said, ‘‘Enough of this stuff,

we’re going to work together and find some answers here.’’ That

has to start at the White House.

Mr. BAKER. In those days, Senator, you remember very well, that

the war in Central America was the Holy Grail of the left in this

country and the Holy Grail——

Senator DODD. Right.

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. Of the right in this country. And I tell

people, even to this day, many years later, that my first serious negotiation as Secretary of State was not with a foreign power——

Senator DODD. No.

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. It was with the Congress of the United

States. And we got it done.

Senator DODD. Got it done.

Mr. BAKER. And I’m—and all I’m saying is, we ought to be thinking about something like that here. This—these issues are tough,

as Lee says, and they’re very emotional, as I mentioned in my

opening comments, but there are some things here that you oppose

that the President wants, and there are some things here that you

want that the President opposes, and rather than just doing this

for a couple of years, why don’t we see if there’s not a way—the

country has a huge interest in a successful conclusion of this

problem.

Senator DODD. Well, again——

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Mr. BAKER. Why not find out if there’s not a way to do it?

And——

Senator DODD. Again, I’ll make the point, it was the guy who

was going through a confirmation process to be Secretary of the

State, who took the leadership—with the approval and support of

the President, I might add——

Mr. BAKER. Yes, yes.

Senator DODD [continuing]. To get that ball moving. And that’s

missing today, I must tell you, must in candor, in this hearing

room.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would say, first of all, gentlemen, thank you for your service.

Thank you for your service on this and so many other issues. We’re

certainly very, very appreciative.

Mr. Congressman—I don’t think there is any lack of appetite for

clashing with the executive in both parties right now. I think there

is a common understanding that a lot of things have gone wrong

in Iraq. I think the real challenge is not about a willingness to

clash with the executive, but I would like to share at least two concerns that I have as we move forward. The most important one is

the impact of our actions on the troops on the ground. Things that

we do and we say have consequences. They are young men and

women in harm’s way. Many of us have visited them on a number

of occasions. We’ve been to Walter Reed.

The second concern I’ll share—where perhaps there isn’t a common ground right now, and maybe we have to get to that point—

is regarding an understanding of the long-term consequences of

failure in Iraq. The ISG report itself, on page 37 as I recall, discusses the consequences of failure. And we’ve had a number of

hearings that have discussed the near-term results associated with

a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq. The report uses words such as

‘‘precipitate’’ and ‘‘premature.’’

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Senator COLEMAN. I’m going to ask, in a second, what you mean

by the terms used in the report. Talk about the significant power

vacuum, greater human suffering, regional destabilization, and the

threat to the global economy; talk about al-Qaeda declaring our

withdrawal as a victory, Iraq descending into chaos, and how the

long-term consequences could eventually require the United States

to return.

And as we’ve had a number of hearings, I have observed that

people have different perspectives on the consequences of failure.

Some folks have said, ‘‘Well, Iraq’s a mess.’’ They say so as if it

can’t get any worse. My sense is that it could get worse if we take

the wrong steps.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. It clearly is. And we think that the emphasis you’re making in your second point, on the consequences of failure, are terribly important to focus on. We want to try to avoid the

expansion of Iranian influence in the region. We don’t want to jeopardize the energy resources. We don’t want to abandon our Arab

friends, the so-called moderates. We don’t want America to have a

strategic defeat in the region. We don’t want to have the stability

of Iraq jeopardized. We don’t want to see Sunni and Shia clashes

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across the region. We don’t want to see chaos in the region. We

don’t want to see terrorism grow, and al-Qaeda. There are a lot of

very, very important consequences here, that people who favor a

precipitate withdrawal just, I don’t think, have encountered.

On the first point, incidentally, the impact on U.S. troops, you

brought us to the right point there, I believe. The section in our

report about restoring U.S. military is in a very important section.

It begins on page 76. And we are deeply concerned about resetting

the American military as a result of the drain in Iraq.

Senator COLEMAN. And I think the one area on which there is

a bipartisan vision is on that issue——

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes; I think so, too.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. And I think——

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. That’s a good thing.

The other issue where I see a divergence of views—and I’m trying to figure out if we can reconcile them—is on the issue of the

loss of esteem of the United States in connection to its actions in

Iraq. We tend to reflect mainly upon the loss of esteem for the

United States that is related to what we currently see in Iraq. On

the other hand, I look at this issue of consequences of failure again.

The President has talked about this. If we were to withdraw precipitously, if we were to leave without finishing the mission, what

does that do to the esteem of America abroad? Mr. Secretary,

you’ve been in this business a long time. What does that do?

Mr. BAKER. It destroys—well, it would destroy our credibility, not

just in the region, but around the world. And, of course, as Lee

pointed out, we are strongly against a precipitate withdrawal. I

mean, we think the consequences, as we say, would be severe. I

think they would be catastrophic. You’d see a regional war in the

Middle East.

Senator COLEMAN. OK, I’m going to try to tie these different perspectives together in the time I have remaining. Mr. Secretary, you

reflected that we’re going to be in Iraq a long time.

Mr. BAKER. Yes; we are.

Senator COLEMAN. We’re going to be there a long time. On the

other hand, Mr. Congressman, you used the phrase that ‘‘nothing’s

going to happen’’ in the Middle East, until we leave. Can you help

me understand the seeming discrepancy between these statements?

Is there a difference in views between the two of you?

Mr. BAKER. I don’t think so.

Senator COLEMAN. Can you please help me reconcile the idea

that we’re going to be in Iraq a long time with the idea that we

can’t get things moving forward until we leave?

Mr. BAKER. Well, let me explain what I meant when I said we’re

going to be there a long time. In addition to being in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar to protect our interests in the region, we’re going

to have a fairly large residual presence in Iraq itself, as our report

says. We don’t spell out the numbers. They’re going to be significant. We talk about leaving special operations forces. We talk

about leaving rapid-reaction forces to go after al-Qaeda and for

other missions that the commander on the ground thinks is important, particularly with respect to the war on terror. And we talk

about force protection units that would be left there.

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So, when I say we’re going to have a presence for a long time in

the region, we’re going to have a presence in Iraq, for those purposes, and in the region, in my opinion, for a long time.

Mr. HAMILTON. I’d simply emphasize, Senator, in response, that

I just don’t think things will happen in that region unless the

United States leaves.

Senator COLEMAN. Does your use of the term ‘‘leave’’ have a different sense than the way the Secretary has used it?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, he’s talking about a military presence in

Iraq, but also a military presence in the region. We’re going to have

a large military presence in that region for a very, very long time

to come. I agree with that part of it. Will we have a large military

presence in Iraq? I don’t know. But I can certainly see, if you’re

going to be embedding troops, if you’re going to be training troops,

if you’re going to be going after al-Qaeda, if you’re going to be protecting the United States troops who are embedded with the Iraqi

troops, you’re going to have to have substantial American combat

power in Iraq for a period of time. I don’t know how long that is,

but it’s an extended period of time. But in the region itself, there

has to be—will be for a long, long time to come—substantial American military and diplomatic and political presence.

Senator COLEMAN. If I can, I’d like to ask two other questions.

One question is that some of us see a qualitative difference between the battle that’s being waged, in, let’s say, the Anbar province—against al-Qaeda, against the foreign fighters, against the

insurgents—and what we’ve seen in Baghdad, where there is a sectarian battle going on between the Sunni extremists and the Shia

extremists—and I was there about a month ago. And the concern

I have is, at this point, putting Americans in the center of the sectarian battle in Baghdad before the Iraqis have met the benchmarks that you’ve talked about, and that some of us here in Congress have talked about.

Did you at all, either in the Study Group Report or through your

own reflections, see that kind of distinction between the type of violence that is seen in places like Anbar versus that which is seen

in Baghdad?

Mr. BAKER. We did see that difference, when we were there. I

think it’s valid. I think there is a difference.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes; I agree with Jim on it. We did not make any

recommendation with regard to Anbar province. We did, as Jim has

pointed out, with regard to Baghdad, but we did not make it with

regard to Anbar.

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Nelson——

Mr. BAKER. But the difference in function of our troops is something we recognized.

Mr. HAMILTON. Oh, yes. Al-Qaeda has much more of a presence

there.

Mr. BAKER. That’s right. And sectarian violence in Baghdad.

Senator COLEMAN. Very last question, then. Mr. Secretary, you

talked about your experience in addressing the Social Security

issue and about resolving things here with the Congress, and the

chairman talked about leadership. But, on this issue, it’s the American public that clearly does not have any sense of confidence of

where we’re at in Iraq. The American public has clearly lost the apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00698 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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petite for the long-term commitment in Iraq, of whatever level, particularly if we continue to suffer loss of life. How do you get the

American public to understand the consequences of failure?

Mr. BAKER. If you have——

Senator COLEMAN. How do we do that?

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. If you have a truly bipartisan policy,

and you have the executive branch and the legislative branch pulling together on the same oar, I dare say you’re going to see the

numbers on the public perception change.

Senator DODD. Officer.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Pause.]

Senator DODD. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much.

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’m the last questioner, and I know that’s good news to both of

you. And I’ll stay within my time.

I want to focus and try to direct your attention to a very important aspect of what you’ve already testified to. And, of course, before doing that, I want to thank you for your contribution, your

public service already, prior to this work, your ongoing scholarship

and work that has gone into this, and the questions you’ve been

asked and the way you’ve dealt with them. We’re in your debt for

that. And I’m certainly grateful, as a first-year Senator.

I want to direct your attention at the training aspect of what you

testified to today. And I think both of you, in one way or another,

said that training is the primary mission, or must be the primary

mission. And I think we’ve heard about training for a long time

now—many, many years, since 2003, when this engagement

started. And we’ve heard it over and over again, how important it

is. I appreciate the fact that you highlighted it today as the primary mission. I think, Congressman Hamilton, you not only have

it in the report, but you’ve enunciated it as the foundation of how

we get American sons and daughters home from Iraq.

Here’s the question. What, in your judgment, based upon what

you know up to this moment, the work that went into the Iraq

Study Group conclusions, all of the testimony you’ve heard, everything you’ve read—based upon all of that, what do you think is the

problem with this mission of training of these Iraqi security forces?

What’s the——

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the problem, Senator, is, we just haven’t

given it enough priority. And—or, to put it another way—and I

don’t mean to disparage anyone here, but we have not put our best

people into training. If you look at it in terms of a career path in

the military, that’s not the way you get to be a general. That

mindset has to change. And we have to understand, in this situation we’re confronted with in Iraq, that we have to put our very

best people in there to train these forces. So, it’s a question of resources. It’s also a question of priorities.

Now, I want to repeat what I said earlier. I think we didn’t do

a very good job of this for about 3 years because of that. And I

really do think there’s been improvement in the training of the

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Iraqi Army—I have a lot of doubt, still, about the police—but the

training of the Iraqi Army is better. And we are saying that the

military priorities in Iraq must change. That’s one of the recommendations. They must change. And we have to give highest

priority to this effort.

Senator CASEY. So that those who are training have elevated status. Is that what you mean? In other words, they’re recognized as

important as any other——

Mr. HAMILTON. The Iraqi——

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Military——

Mr. HAMILTON. I’m no expert on all the incentives that can be

offered. Maybe it’s financial. But I think, more important even than

the financial, is status and a career path for promotion within the

services, because these people all are ambitious, and we encourage

that.

Mr. BAKER. Senator Casey, the President’s plan calls for doubling

the number of troops we have embedded with Iraqi forces and engaged in training, as I understand it. And the President himself

said that training is the essential mission of our forces. And I think

it was Steve Hadley’s op-ed piece yesterday in which he said that

training and supporting Iraqi troops will remain our military’s essential and primary mission.

So, at least—I mean, there’s not a lot of daylight between what

we call for in this report and where the President—where the

President’s plan is, assuming that those comments are true. And

I, for one, take them at their word.

Senator CASEY. Well, I appreciate that highlight of his plan. But,

I’ll tell you, in your report, very early in your report, first of all,

you talk about the Iraqi Army, and said the police are a lot worse.

But when you’re——

Mr. BAKER. They are.

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Talking about the army, you’re

saying they lack leadership, equipment, personnel, logistics, and

support.

Mr. BAKER. Yes; well, that’s what Lee said, that we—that we did

a bad job for a number of years.

Senator CASEY. Well, it’s been going on for several years, and I’m

glad you pointed it out, but when you—here’s my problem. All

right? I come from a State—we lost 140 lives already. You know

that. I mean, we’re third on the death toll. Hundreds and hundreds

of kids have lost their lives there. And we’ve been hearing about

this for years now. And it should never have taken the administration all these years—and it, frankly, should not have taken your

report for them to get the message about training. They’ve had this

problem for years. People have had it up to here. Their patience is

gone, virtually, on this, because of the sacrifices they’ve made.

And then, you pick up the New York Times, last week—and this

is a predicate of the whole escalation—you pick up the New York

Times, and they talk about the main mission, they call it a miniature version of what the troops will be doing in the so-called surge,

‘‘As the sun rose, many of the Iraqi Army units, who were supposed

to do the actual searches of the buildings, did not arrive on time,

forcing the Americans to start to doing the job on their own. When

the Iraqi units finally did show up, it was the air of a class outing,

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cheering and laughing as the Americans blew locks off the doors

with shotguns. An American soldier is shot in the head.’’ And then,

it goes on later, ‘‘Many of the Iraqi units that showed up late never

seemed to take the task seriously. At one point, Iraqis completely

disappeared, leaving the American units working with them flabbergasted.’’ It goes on and on and on.

So, my question is—and you’ve done the hard work already. I

just wish the President would read and internalize and act upon

what you have already found is a major problem. But he doesn’t

seem to want to do that. And so, you pick up the paper, and you

read that, and families out there, who—every one of those families

who lost someone in Iraq, I think, today would stand up and say,

‘‘We support this mission. We support this President.’’ Most of

them would say that. But they have the right to expect that, when

American sons and daughters are going into those dangerous

neighborhoods, that some of what you have pointed out becomes a

real priority. I have seen no evidence of that. And the whole escalation is based upon the fact that these Iraqi Army units and soldiers are going to be up to a certain level to take the lead. And

there’s no evidence that I can see that that is happening. It’s more

commentary than question, but there doesn’t seem to be any evidence, in your report and in recent reporting right on the ground

in real time, that this thing is getting any better when it comes to

training. And I leave that for——

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator——

Senator CASEY [continuing]. For comment.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, one thing, in the Iraq Study Group we did

not look back——

Senator DODD. Please.

[Pause.]

Senator DODD. The hearing will come to order.

Congressman.

Mr. HAMILTON. We did not look back, and we did not criticize

mistakes that have been made. That was one point. But the second

point you make, I personally agree with. In other words, I see some

positive movement in Steve Hadley’s statement here, where he

says that training and supporting will remain our military’s essential and primary mission. I do not yet see enough action to support

that. And I am concerned about it. I am pleased that Mr. Hadley

has recognized training as a primary mission. The President did

not mention that as a primary mission in the State of the Union

Address, he did not use the word ‘‘primary’’ in his comments in his

speech on Iraq. But the National Security Advisor’s statement is

encouraging. I hope the President repeats it. And I hope that we

are now in a position to really put the highest priority on training.

Now, one of the risks of a surge is that you lose emphasis and

priority on the training mission. You’ve got to keep them both, I

guess.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BAKER. I would agree with that. I—well, but let me just say,

I take the President at his word when he said, in that speech, that

this will be ‘‘the essential mission.’’ I don’t see the difference

between if it’s ‘‘the essential’’ and ‘‘primary.’’ He didn’t say ‘‘one essential mission,’’ he didn’t say ‘‘an essential mission,’’ he said trainVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00701 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ing will be ‘‘the essential mission.’’ That means, to me, that it’ll be

the primary mission. He didn’t use the word ‘‘primary.’’ Lee’s right

about that. But Steve Hadley has.

Senator CASEY. I think that’s progress. Let me make one more

point. Not enough progress, but they’re moving in the right direction. But they’ve got a long way to go.

I was heartened by—and I want to commend you, not only for

your report and your testimony today, but this statement on January 11, which I didn’t focus on at the time. I’m glad you included

it. What you talked about here with regard to what the President

had said, in respect to his policy, you say the following, in the third

paragraph—you say—and I quote from the January 11 statement—

‘‘The President did not suggest the possibility of a transition that

could enable U.S. combat forces to begin to leave Iraq.’’ That’s No.

1. ‘‘The President did not state that political, military, or economic

support for Iraq would be conditional on the Iraqi Government’s

ability to meet benchmarks.’’ No. 2 thing; he didn’t say. And third,

you say, ‘‘Within the region, the President did not announce an

international support group for Iraq,’’ and it goes on from there.

And I appreciate the fact that you carefully examined what he

said, and highlighted that, because I think that kind of accountability, or oversight, in a sense, has been missing for the last couple of years.

Thank you very much.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Senator Casey.

I just have a couple of quick points.

I was impressed, in the report, on page 39, the—paragraph 4, the

devolution into three regions, which the commission, or the committee, the group, was pretty firm, in pretty good language, I

thought—and a position I share with you—about trying to keep

this country together, not—the idea of spreading it up into three

loose federated states—may end up there, but it should be our position to do what’s possible to keep this country together.

I was disturbed to hear, the other day, that there was apparently

a secret meeting of the Turkish Parliament, debating whether or

not to send Turkish troops into northern Iraq—on the border with

northern Iraq. One of the points you raise in concern—why this

ought to concern all of us—Secretary Baker, I—in talking about the

proposal has been made by some, to actually have this become a

part of policy. I’ll be curious as to whether or not you’re in any way

retreating from the recommendations here in the report, in light

of—that was December, this is almost February. Are there events

now that would cause you to feel less certain about that conclusion?

Mr. BAKER. No.

Senator DODD. OK.

Mr. BAKER. We stand by the report, and particularly that conclusion. I mentioned, earlier, Senator Dodd, the sentence on that page

39 that says, ‘‘If events were to move irreversibly in this direction,

we ought to jump in there and manage it.’’

Senator DODD. And it——

Mr. BAKER. But, no, we still feel that there’s serious questions

about that approach, having to do with such things as: Where do

you draw the boundaries between Sunni areas and Shia areas?

693

What do you do about the major cities? Wouldn’t this encourage regional players to come in to begin to protect their interests more

so than they’re even doing today, if they thought there were going

to be three semiautonomous regions, or three autonomous regions?

Senator DODD. So, your concerns expressed then are the same

today. In fact——

Mr. BAKER. Same today as they were——

Senator DODD. Do you agree with that, Lee?

Mr. BAKER. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. I do agree with it. I think our concerns about

that devolution plan is that it goes against a unified Iraq——

Senator DODD. I agree with that.

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. Fundamentally. And then, for the

other reasons we state in the report.

Senator DODD. Let me ask you two other quick questions, if I

can.

One is on—and I’m picking up with Jim Webb’s questions here

in the—I think Dick Lugar raised the—in his points, too—we’ve

talked a lot about Syria and Iran, and I think many of us here

agree with the points that have been raised by the—both of you

this afternoon, as well as the comments made by our colleagues

here about how we ought to approach those two. But you point out,

as well, that there’s almost as much of an emphasis on the socalled moderate Arab States. Answer, if you can, the question—I’ve

been surprised there hasn’t been at least more of an expression of

concern from the moderate Arab States about events in Iraq and

the growing concerns of Iranian influence. And there are a lot of

ways of doing this. I realize they’re not societies that have a lot of

forums such as we’re having here today, but this has gone on now

for 4 years, where they have some very immediate threats. I know

there are things going on quietly, but I’m a little mystified as to

why there has not been a more outspoken support for the efforts

to achieve some success in Iraq and bring about some stability,

given the immediately implications to many of these countries, if

this situation continues to crater, as it is. We, obviously, are concerned about it, for all the reasons you’ve outlined. But if I were

sitting in Riyadh or sitting in a Amman, Jordan, or Cairo or Beirut, I’d be a lot more concerned, in the shorter term, about my conditions and what’s apt to happen here as a result of what goes on.

Why aren’t we hearing more from these countries? Why doesn’t

there seem to be more of a willingness to participate in some solution here, despite the outcry from you and others about being involved in a political-diplomatic solution here?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, first of all, we share your concern. I think

one of the things that has marked the response of these regimes

is passivity, in all respects. They haven’t helped us on the money

side, with resources, and they haven’t been very helpful diplomatically. They’ve done some training, they’ve done some things that

are mildly helpful, but they haven’t really been engaged on it.

I’m not sure I know the answer to your question, except I think

they’re still waiting to see how this thing comes out.

Senator DODD. Well, doesn’t it—I mean, that’s kind of a—‘‘wait

til you see how it comes out.’’

694

Mr. HAMILTON. They’re hanging back. There is a strong feeling

in the region there that America is losing and that Iran may

emerge as the winner.

Senator DODD. I’ve also heard the concern——

Mr. HAMILTON. If that’s the case——

Senator DODD [continuing]. Expressed there that——

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. That’s a very different environment.

Now, I’m——

Senator DODD [continuing]. I’m going to be——

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me be——

Senator DODD [continuing]. One head of state——

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing]. Clear here, I’m speculating. I don’t

know this.

Senator DODD. One head of state said to me—and I’m going back

about 4 or 5 months ago, when I was there—said, ‘‘My great concern is that the United States is going to cut its own deal with Iran

at our expense.’’

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. Yes.

Mr. BAKER. There is concern about that. There is concern about

that on the part of these countries. I mentioned—if you’ll look on

page 44, Senator, we mention the efforts under—with the ‘‘Gulfplus-Two’’——

Senator DODD. Yes.

Mr. BAKER [continuing]. That the Secretary of State is—has been

engaged in. These are very beneficial, in my opinion. We indicated

in our report that it didn’t—maybe it didn’t go as far as it should,

in terms of creating an Iraq international support group. But nothing but positive, I don’t think, can come from those efforts. So, it’s

a good thing to be doing, but that maybe that it would be good to

fold those into a broader effort.

Senator DODD. Uh-huh.

Mr. BAKER. Same with the compact for Iraq. These countries do

participate in the compact for Iraq.

Senator DODD. Uh-huh.

Mr. BAKER. The countries you’re talking about, the Gulf-plusTwo.

Senator DODD. Last, at some point, you might want to expound

on this further. And, Secretary Baker, you’ve had years of experience dealing very directly with some of these folks as to why there

isn’t a more aggressive approach on being active in the diplomatic

front.

One of the problems I hear all the time from people—and it sort

of underscores the point that my colleague from Pennsylvania has

raised here this afternoon. I don’t know how accurate, again, polling data is in these matters. I’m not sure how you do a good poll

in a place like Iraq today, given the circumstances. The number we

hear bandied around quite a bit is: Something in the neighborhood

of 60 percent of the Iraqi people are hostile to the notion of us even

being there. One number has 61 percent suggesting that they were

not opposed to attacks on American forces in Iraq. It’s a pretty difficult deal to explain to anyone why you’re here sending your sons

and daughters to this situation, when a majority—not an insignificant majority of these people, if these numbers are even remotely

close—are hostile to the very presence of the people who are there

695

for the purposes of providing them a better opportunity. How do

you make a case when people here—

Could I please just finish the thought here? Thank you.

[Pause.]

Senator DODD. My point being, here, is it’s one thing about the

polling data here—and there’s, obviously, numbers that think we

ought to be removing troops—but the polling data in Iraq suggesting that they’re opposed and hostile to use being there makes

it very difficult for us to sustain the kind of support in this country

and elsewhere, if, in fact, people are cheering when American soldiers are being shot at, wounded, or killed. I don’t know how we

sustain a policy with that kind of activity going on in a country

where we talk about giving them some hope for the future.

Mr. BAKER. Very true. I can’t quarrel with the conclusion. It

makes it very difficult. That doesn’t mean we ought not to try. We

have a lot at stake. We’ve talked here today about the consequences of failure. And they’re severe. Catastrophic, in my view.

Senator DODD. Lee, any final point on that?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, the perceptions that we have of what we’re

trying to do, and the perceptions they have of what we’re trying to

do, are just miles and miles apart. And bridging those perceptions

will just be exceedingly difficult to do, but, you know, these people

today are living a miserable life. And anybody who visits Baghdad

gets a sense of the hopelessness of life there for these people. And

when you’re in that circumstance, you blame somebody. And we

happen to be the foreign power that’s present, and I guess a lot of

them blame us.

Senator DODD. Well, I thank you both. We’ve kept you a little

longer than we promised, and I apologize to that.

Do any of my colleagues have any final comments?

We’ve kept you beyond 3 o’clock. Again, I think all of us have

deep appreciation for the amount of effort you’ve put into your

staffs—they were here, as well, should be recognized, and other

members of the group. So, we thank you immensely for your effort.

Senator DODD. Thank you for your presence, and this committee

will stand adjourned until further call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

I thank Senator Biden for holding this hearing, and I welcome two good friends

to the committee. It is a privilege to have the benefit of their long experience and

the impressive study that went into their report.

This hearing is timely because the Iraq Study Group Report represents the only

comprehensive policy prescription for Iraq undertaken by a bipartisan group of experienced decisionmakers under time pressure. The process that led to its conclusions, therefore, bears some resemblance to the task before the President and Congress. For this reason, as well as the insight of the group’s members, the report is

especially relevant to our own decisionmaking process.

Although the report offered many recommendations, it underscored that there are

no foolproof options in Iraq. It stated: ‘‘During the past 9 months, we have considered a full range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws.’’ Our experience

on this committee during the last 3 weeks of hearings has been similar. We are

seeking the best course, while knowing that we are choosing from among imperfect

options.

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A key point that requires much greater clarification is how expanded, continued,

or reduced U.S. military presence can be used to stimulate Iraqi political reconciliation. There is wide, though not unanimous, agreement that our military presence

in Iraq represents leverage either because it can be expanded or because it can be

withdrawn. But there is little clarity on how to translate this leverage into action

by the Iraqi Government. Many commentators talk of ‘‘creating space’’ for the Iraqi

Government to establish itself, but it is far from clar that the government can or

will take advantage of such space.

Thus, as the administration increases troops, it becomes even more imperative to

develop a backup plan and aggressively seek a framework for a political solution.

It is not enough to set benchmarks to measure the progress of the Iraqi Government. If the Iraqi Government has different timetables and objectives than us, such

benchmarks will not be met in a way that transforms the politics of the nation.

If we undertake the tremendous investment that sending more American soldiers

to Iraq represents, it should be in support of a clear strategy for achieving a negotiated reconciliation. We should not depend on theories or hopes that something

good may happen if we dampen violence in Baghdad.

The Iraq Study Group has been one of the most definitive advocates for a broader

regional dialog accompanying our efforts inside Iraq. We need frank policy discussions in this country about our vital interests in the region. The difficulties we have

had in Iraq make a strong presence in the Middle East more imperative, not less.

Our nation must understand that if and when withdrawal or redeployment from

Iraq occurs, it will not mean that our interests in the Middle East have diminished.

In fact, it may mean that we will need to bolster our military, diplomatic, and economic presence elsewhere in the Middle East.

I have urged the Bush administration to be aggressive and creative in pursuing

a regional dialog that is not limited to our friends. If we lack the flexibility to communicate with unfriendly regimes, we increase the chances of miscalculations, undercut our ability to take advantage of any favorable situations, and potentially

limit the regional leverage with which we can confront Iran and Syria.

Again, I welcome our distinguished guests and look forward to a thoughtful

hearing.

(697)

IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT,

SESSION 1

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson,

Obama, Menendez, Casey, Lugar, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich,

Murkowski, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.

This morning, we are privileged to have with us former Secretary

of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose name is synonymous with effective diplomacy, effective American diplomacy, and, I think few

would argue with the fact, one of the best strategic minds in the

country.

Before we begin, I’d like to take a moment to present some of the

key findings, in my view, that we’ve found in the last 4 weeks,

where there is consensus. While no unanimous prescription has

emerged thus far from our hearings, there is remarkably broad

consensus, in my view, on three points. First, our troops can’t stop

the sectarian warfare in Iraq, only a political settlement can do

that. Second, we should be engaging in intensive regional diplomacy to support such a settlement among the Iraqis. And third, the

United States military should focus on combating terrorist—i.e.,

jihadists and al-Qaeda; keeping Iraq’s neighbors honest, and training Iraqis, not policing a civil war. Indeed, combat troops should

start to redeploy, and redeploy soon.

Since a political settlement is so critical, we’ve examined some of

the likely components. We’ve discussed the benchmarks the President has proposed—the oil law, de-Baathification reform, constitutional reform, and provincial elections. But the divisions are so

deep and the passions are so high within Iraq that I believe that

we are well past the point of implementing such modest measures

in order to make a meaningful difference in stabilizing Iraq. I believe some bolder moves are necessary.

A colleague of our witness and our next witness, the former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Les Gelb, put forward such a

proposal with me 9 months ago. It is premised on our conviction

698

that the heart of the administration’s strategy—building a strong

central government—cannot succeed. There is not enough trust

within the government, no trust of the government by the people,

and no capacity of the present government to deliver services and

security. Instead, we must bring Iraqis’ problems and the responsibilities for managing them, in our view, down to the local and regional level, where it can help the Iraqis build trust and capacity

more quickly and more efficiently.

We have proposed that Iraqis create three or more regions, consistent with what their Constitution calls for, and we call for oil to

be shared equitably, with a guaranteed share going to the Sunnis

enshrined in their Constitution. We also call for aggressive diplomacy and the creation of a contact group consisting of Iraqis’ neighbors—Iraq’s neighbors and the other major powers necessary for a

political settlement, not unlike we did, I might add, when we went

into Afghanistan.

We believe that we can redeploy most, if not all, of our troops in

Iraq within 18 months under this plan, leaving behind a small

force in the region to strike at terrorists and keep the neighbors

honest while training Iraqis. I believe this plan is more relevant

than ever. It takes into account the harsh realities of self-sustaining sectarian violence. I believe it’s consistent—I know it’s consistent with the Iraqi Constitution. And it can help produce, I hope,

a soft landing for Iraq and prevent a full-blown civil war that tears

the country apart and spreads beyond the region.

I found it interesting that one of the leading columnists in the

New York Times, David Brooks, referred to it as ‘‘soft partition.’’

I never thought of it. His words, not mine.

It may be too late for our plan, or any other plan, to work, I have

to acknowledge. Iraqis may be too blinded by their sectarian hatred

and revenge to see their own self-interest. And if that’s the case,

then we need to consider, more rapidly, how we disengage and contain the war within Iraq. And that will not be easy. But we have—

we don’t have the luxury—we don’t have the luxury, as you’ve

heard the chairman and others say, of walking away. Confining the

violence to Iraq and preventing a regional war, proxies or otherwise, is going to require an awful lot of heavy lifting if we don’t

get it right inside Iraq.

I hope that you will share with us what you think we need to

be doing now to put in place such a strategy, if you agree that that

may come to pass, Mr. Secretary—and I’m not suggesting you do—

if all our efforts within Iraq fail. One of the things I’ve noticed in

my long years of having an opportunity to learn from you is, we

should always have alternative plans. Whether they’re announced

or not, we should always be prepared to deal with the possibility

that the present strategy may not work. And I am absolutely convinced that the present strategy of this administration is not going

to work.

So, I’m eager to hear your testimony, Mr. Secretary. Again, I

know you had to go way out of your way to be here. You’re kind

to do this. You will find a receptive and friendly audience here.

We’re anxious to hear what you have to say. And I now yield to

my colleague, Senator Lugar.

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, I thank Chairman Biden for holding this

hearing. I welcome our distinguished former Secretaries of State.

The United States has vital and enduring interests in the Middle

East, including preventing terrorism and proliferation, protecting

the free flow of oil and commerce, ensuring the security of our

friends and our allies. Our intervention in Iraq has dramatically

changed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, with unpredictable consequences. Today, we’ll explore our strategic options for

advancing our interests in this evolving region.

Secretary Rice has recently outlined what appears to be a shift

in emphasis in United States policy toward countering the challenges posed by Iran. Under this new approach, the United States

would organize regional players—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt,

Turkey, the Gulf States, and others—behind a program of containing Iran’s disruptive agenda in the region.

Such a realignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq and bringing security to other areas of conflict in the region, such as Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Moderate states in the Middle

East are concerned by Iran’s aggressiveness and by the possibility

of sectarian conflict beyond Iraq’s borders. They recognize the

United States is an indispensable counterweight to Iran and a

source of stability in the region. The United States has leverage to

enlist greater support for our objectives inside Iraq and throughout

the Middle East.

Quite apart from the military-diplomatic ‘‘surge’’ in Iraq that has

been the focus of so much attention, we are now seeing the outlines

of a new, United States regional approach: A more assertive stance

by our military toward Iranian interference in Iraq, a renewed diplomatic effort on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, substantial United

States security assistance to Palestinian President Abbas, and a

United States-led effort to bolster the Lebanese Government

against Hezbollah.

Writing in the Washington Post yesterday, I noted that the

United States should recalibrate our reference points on Iraq. We

should not see the President’s current Iraq plan as an endgame,

but rather as one element in a larger Middle East struggle that is

in early stages. The President’s Baghdad strategy is still aimed at

an optimal outcome: The creation of a democratic pluralist society

that will cooperate with us in achieving regional stability. At this

stage, that is a goal worth pursuing, but our strategy in Iraq must

be flexible enough to allow for changing circumstances.

Even as the President’s Baghdad strategy proceeds, we need to

be preparing for how we will array United States forces in the region to defend oil assets, target terrorist enclaves, deter adventurism by Iran, provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict,

and generally reassure friendly governments that the United

States is committed to Middle East security. Such a redeployment

might well involve bases inside Iraq that would allow us to continue training Iraqi troops and delivering economic assistance, but

would not require us to interpose American soldiers between Iraqi

sectarian factions.

700

One of the ironies of the highly contentious debate over President

Bush’s new Iraq plan is that it’s focused on the strategically narrow issue of what United States troops do in a limited number of

multiethnic neighborhoods in Baghdad that contain only about 7

percent of the Iraqi population, what General Jack Keane has

called the ‘‘key terrain.’’ Undoubtedly, what happens in those Baghdad neighborhoods is important, but it’s unlikely that this mission

will determine our fate in the Middle East. Remaking Iraq, in and

of itself, does not constitute a strategic objective. The risk is that

we will define success and failure in Iraq so rigidly that our Iraq

policy will become disconnected, or even contradictory, to broader

regional goals.

It is important that the Congress and the public fully understand

any strategic shift in our policy. The President should be reaching

out to the Congress in an effort to construct a consensus on how

we will protect our broader strategic interests, regardless of what

happens in Baghdad during the next several months.

The worst outcome would be a wholesale exit from vital areas

and missions in the Middle East precipitated by United States domestic political conflict and, simply, fatigue over an unsustainable

Iraq policy.

We look forward, Dr. Kissinger, to your thoughts on these questions, your advice and counsel on the best way forward for the

United States in this important part of the world.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary——

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have 1 minute, I’d

appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Just 1 minute, Senator, or we’ll have everybody

else——

Senator KERRY. Oh, no, no, no, I just wanted to make my excuses

to the Secretary——

The CHAIRMAN. Oh——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Because I have——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Please.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. To go chair another hearing, and I

wanted to apologize for not being able to be here to listen to your

testimony. I’m going to take it with me, read it. I hope to get back

before the end of it, but I just wanted to welcome you here and

thank you for taking time to be with us, and we really look forward

to the advice and counsel you’ll give us.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, that’s——

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That is necessary. And I—in a moment, Mr. Secretary, I will—I’ll wait until your testimony is finished. Senator Hagel is not here, because he’s attending the funeral

of a young lieutenant who was recently killed in Iraq, whom he appointed to the Academy, and whose younger brother is at the Academy. But I want to honor the young man, I want his name in the

record. It is Army First Lieutenant Jacob Fritz of Verdon, Nebraska, Senator Lugar wanted me to express his apologies as to

why he is not here.

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Please proceed, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; CHAIRMAN, KISSINGER MCLARTY ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NY

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted an article I

wrote a week ago in lieu of a statement. But I will make a few extemporaneous remarks to begin this discussion.

The fundamental issue in the region is not the tactical issue that

we—that’s received so much of attention—namely, the specific deployments inside Baghdad; the fundamental issue is the one that

has been identified by you and by Senator Lugar about the longterm role of the United States in the region and the basic challenges that it faces.

The United States has been involved in military actions in the

region now since the 1950s—in Lebanon in 1958; in the alert over

Jordan in 1970; an alert over the Middle East war, or the conclusion of the Middle East war, in 1973; over the evacuation of Lebanon in 1975; in the—with a military force in Lebanon in the

1980s; military action over Iraq and Kuwait in 1991; in several air

attacks on Iraq in the late 1990s; and then again in the war in

which we face. This must reflect the judgment of a succession of

Presidents of the vital importance of Middle East—the Middle

East, and of stability in the Middle East, to the United States.

Now, the current situation in the Middle East has some features

that are relatively unique. Most of the crises that I described earlier were between states and arose out of the conflict of states or

out of the Palestinian issue. The current crisis arises out of the fact

that the state, which we take for granted as the organization of

international affairs, is weakening all over the region, because in

most countries it is a product of the post-World War I period that

was introduced into the area by Western nations. And, in many

countries, it is not tied to the nation as it is in Europe, the United

States, and many other parts of the world. The borders were artificially drawn. And, indeed, this is one of the dilemmas of Iraq, that

Iraq was created out of three provinces of the Ottoman Empire in

order to provide a strategic buffer between French and British

zones that, themselves, were artificially created. So, the disintegration of that system is one of the factors of the region.

One of the attributes of such a disintegration is that ideologies

trump traditional loyalties, and so that the Islamic religion, and

the radical aspect of the Islamic religion, is—goes across borders.

One result is the existence—on the territory of what we consider

sovereign states and what international law has considered sovereign states—of units that have the character of states but are not

really states, like the Hezbollah, like the Hamas, like the Mahdi

Army in Baghdad, organizations that, on the one hand, participate

in the government, but, on the other, are tied to loyalties that go

beyond the national borders, and whose outcome is—cannot be defined by national interests as it has been, heretofore, conceived. So,

we are dealing with an upheaval that goes across the whole region.

And, given the fact that much of it receives its impetus from the

Islamic religion and from the attempt to restore the significance of

the Islamic methods, the impact of what occurs in that region will

702

be not confined to the region, it will go from Indonesia, which is

a Muslim—which is the largest Muslim state, to Malaysia, to India,

which has—it’s the second largest Muslim state, even though its

160 million Muslims are a minority, to the suburbs of Paris, where

there are large Islamic populations. So, this is what is at stake in

that region and in terms of which the impact must be considered.

Now, the United States has been attempting, for 50 years, to contribute to stability and progress and peace in the region by leading

negotiations, by intervening militarily. And it’s in this context, Mr.

Chairman, that I look at what we are now facing in Iraq.

Major mistakes have been made. We have reached a very difficult situation, because we have not found it easy to bring the—

some traditional American premises in line with cultural and regional realities. But I will confine myself to where we are—where

we are today.

In Iraq, we face a number of only partially connected problems.

We face the impact of neighbors from across the border: Iran, with

respect to the Shia south; Turkey, indirectly, with respect to the

Kurdish north; Syria, with respect to the Sunni west; and others

that have an interest, partly because Iraq is also the tipping point

for a Shia-Sunni confrontation that is taking its most acute form

precisely on the territory of Iraq.

Second, we have the insurrection of the Sunni population against

the shift in power from its traditional dominance to a democratic

principle of majority rule, which empowers the Shiites and the—

and, to some extent, the Kurds.

Third, we have the al-Qaeda influence that—it’s a cross-border

assault, but—not on a national basis, but on an ideological basis.

And then, we have the Shia-Sunni conflict. And they’re all merging

together in a sort of amorphous explosion of violence. The American interest is in preventing the radical Islamic element from

achieving a domination that will then infect the other regions that

I have already discussed. The—America has no interest in the outcome of a Sunni-Shia rivalry, as long as it is not achieved by ethnic

cleansing and genocidal practices.

So, I would say that if we are talking about long-range strategy,

we should move into a position from which our forces can intervene

against the threats to the regional security that I have identified

and becomes a lesser and lesser element in the purely Shia-Sunni

struggle.

The only—the principal relevance of the current debate about

Baghdad is the judgment whether suppressing the militias in

Baghdad can make a contribution to this process. And this is where

opinions divide. I lean toward the fact that they—that it is something that should be attempted.

There will be two possible outcomes: That it succeeds, in which

case, the government could pursue preferred policies of reconciliation, if it is able to, and we concentrate in the strategic issues that

I have mentioned before. If it fails, our strategic mission will still

be the same, except we will then have to take care to separate ourselves from the sectarian civil war that will emerge.

Now, all this needs to be conducted within the framework of a

diplomacy that permits other nations to participate increasingly in

703

the political future of the region. And I would—I have to define my

perception of diplomacy, which is not always identical with others.

I very often hear the statement that something should be left to

a political solution rather than a military solution. In my view, diplomacy is an amalgam of penalties and rewards, and it cannot be

segmented into a political phase, into a military phase. But, by the

same token, the military actions—just as the political actions require some understanding of the military element, so the military

element has to be geared to a possible political outcome.

There has been much discussion about whether to negotiate with

Iran and Syria. I would separate those two countries. The Iranian

issue is—the Syrian concern is primarily one of national interest.

Its primary concern is Lebanon and the Golan, and its influence in

Iraq is relatively marginal. The Iranian problem is one that will

beset us for many administrations, because it is not only the

strongest country in the region, but it is also, at this precise moment, developing nuclear weapons, in defiance of the Security

Council plus Germany. And if one—if an outcome emerges in which

Iran has nuclear weapons and a vacuum in front of it in Iraq, that

would be a potentially disastrous outcome for the peace in the

region.

I have always had the view that the issue of whether one should

negotiate is—should not be a central issue. We should always be

prepared to negotiate. The fundamental issue is what to negotiate

about and what the purpose of the negotiation should be. I see little incentive Iran has to help us solve the Iraqi problem unless it

occurs in a constellation in which there can also—in which they

cannot achieve their maximum objective by themselves. And, therefore, a diplomacy has to include, as Senator Lugar pointed out, a

creation of a group of states that have their own interest in preventing Iranian domination. And, to make the matter more complex, all of this has to be in the context of a willingness to talk to

Iran.

Now—but that has to take into—but that has to be based, in my

opinion, on the following theme. I don’t think Iran will help us in

Iraq, as such. And, therefore, we cannot avoid creating conditions

in Iran that make it unattractive for them. But the challenge that

Iraqi leaders will have—Iranian leaders will have to face at some

point is this: We have no quarrel with Iran as a nation. We can

respect Iran as a major player in the region with a significant role

in the region. What we cannot accept is an Iran that seeks to dominate the region on the basis of a religious ideology and using the

Shia base in other countries to undermine stability in a region on

which the economic well-being of such a large part of the world

depends.

Under the previous Iranian Government, the United States had

excellent relations with Iran. And they were not tied to the personality of the ruler, but to the importance of the country. So, the

question before our diplomacy and before the Iranian diplomacy is:

Can we define objectives that bring peace and progress to the region? And that gets me to my final point.

If all of what I’ve said is correct, or most of it is correct, then

the United States must be present in the region for a foreseeable

future. It cannot be ended in one administration, because even

704

total withdrawal will have consequences that the next administration will have to live with.

This is—so, the key question is: What kind of a presence, in what

manner, and for what outcome, in Iraq? And it’s in this spirit, Mr.

Chairman, that I’ve taken the liberty of stating some semiphilosophical points, in anticipation of your questions.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE;

CHAIRMAN, KISSINGER MCLARTY ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NY

[From the International Herald Tribune, Jan. 18, 2007]

WITHDRAWAL IS NOT AN OPTION

(By Henry A. Kissinger)

President Bush’s bold decision to order a ‘‘surge’’ of some 20,000 American troops

for Iraq has brought the debate over the war to a defining stage. There will not be

an opportunity for another reassessment.

The Baker-Hamilton commission powerfully described the impasse on the ground.

It is the result of cumulative choices—some enumerated by the President—in which

worthy objectives and fundamental American values clashed with regional and cultural realities.

The important goal of modernizing U.S. Armed Forces led to inadequate troop levels for the military occupation of Iraq. The reliance on early elections as the key

to political evolution, in a country lacking a sense of national identity, caused the

newly enfranchised to vote almost exclusively for sectarian parties, deepening historic divisions into chasms. The understandable—but, in retrospect, premature—

strategy of replacing American troops with indigenous forces deflected U.S. forces

from a military mission, and it could not deal with the most flagrant shortcoming

of Iraqi forces, which is to define what the Iraqi forces are supposed to fight for and

under what banner.

These circumstances have merged into an almost perfect storm of mutually reinforcing crises: Within Iraq, the sectarian militias are engaged in civil war or something so close to it as to make little practical difference. The conflict between Shiites

and Sunnis goes back 1,400 years. In most Middle Eastern countries, Shiite minorities coexist precariously with Sunni majorities. The civil war in Iraq threatens to

usher in a cycle of domestic upheavals and a war between Shiite and Sunni states,

with a high potential of drawing in countries from outside the region. In addition,

Iraqi Kurds seek full autonomy from Sunnis and Shiites; their independence would

raise the prospect of intervention from Turkey and Iran.

The war in Iraq is part of another war that cuts across the Shiite-Sunni issue:

The assault on the international order conducted by radical groups in both Islamic

sects. Functioning as states within states and by brutal demonstrations of the inability of established governments to protect their populations, such organizations

as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Mahdi Army in Iraq, and the al-Qaeda groups all over

the Middle East seek to reassert an Islamic identity submerged, in their view, by

Western values. Any enhancement of radical Islamist self-confidence, therefore,

threatens all the traditional states of the region, as well as others with significant

Islamic populations, from Indonesia through India to Western Europe. The most important target is the United States, as the most powerful Western country and the

indispensable component of any attempt to build a new world order.

The disenchantment of the American public with the burdens it has borne largely

alone for nearly 4 years has generated growing demands for some type of unilateral

withdrawal, usually expressed as benchmarks to be put to the Baghdad government

that, if not fulfilled in specific timeframes, would trigger American disengagement.

But under present conditions, withdrawal is not an option. American forces are

indispensable. They are in Iraq not as a favor to its government or as a reward for

its conduct. They are there as an expression of the American national interest to

prevent the Iranian combination of imperialism and fundamentalist ideology from

dominating a region on which the energy supplies of the industrial democracies depend. An abrupt American departure would greatly complicate efforts to stem the

terrorist tide far beyond Iraq; fragile governments from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf

would be tempted into preemptive concessions. It might drive the sectarian conflict

in Iraq to genocidal dimensions beyond levels that impelled U.S. intervention in the

705

Balkans. Graduated withdrawal would not ease these dangers until a different

strategy was in place and showed progress. For now, it would be treated within Iraq

and in the region as the forerunner of a total withdrawal, and all parties would

make their dispositions on that basis.

President Bush’s decision should, therefore, not be debated in terms of the ‘‘stay

the course’’ strategy he has repeatedly disavowed in recent days. Rather, it should

be seen as the first step toward a new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy

for the entire region, ideally on a nonpartisan basis.

The purpose of the new strategy should be to demonstrate that the United States

is determined to remain relevant to the outcome in the region; to adjust American

military deployments and numbers to emerging realities; and to provide the maneuvering room for a major diplomatic effort to stabilize the Middle East.

Of the current security threats in Iraq—the intervention of outside countries, the

presence of al-Qaeda fighters, an extraordinarily large criminal element, the sectarian conflict—the United States has a national interest in defeating the first two;

it must not involve itself in the sectarian conflict for any extended period, much less

let itself be used by one side for its sectarian goals.

The sectarian conflict confines the Iraqi Government’s unchallenged writ to the

sector of Baghdad defined as the Green Zone. In many areas the militias exceed the

strength of the Iraqi national army. Appeals to the Iraqi Government to undertake

reconciliation and economic reforms are not implemented, partly because the will to

do so is absent but essentially because it lacks the power to put such policies in

place, even if the will to do so could suddenly be mobilized. If the influence of the

militias could be eliminated—or greatly reduced—the Baghdad government would

have a better opportunity to pursue a national policy.

The new strategy has begun with attempts to clear the insurrectional Sunni parts

of Baghdad. But it must not turn into ethnic cleansing or the emergence of another

tyrannical state, only with a different sectarian allegiance. Side by side with disarming the Sunni militias and death squads, the Baghdad government must show

comparable willingness to disarm Shiite militias and death squads. American policy

should not deviate from the goal of a civil state whose political process is available

to all citizens.

As the comprehensive strategy evolves, a repositioning of American forces from

the cities into enclaves should be undertaken so that they can separate themselves

from the civil war and concentrate on the threats to international security described

above. The principal mission would be to protect the borders against infiltration and

to prevent the establishment of terrorist training areas or Taliban-type control over

significant regions. At that point, too, significant reductions of U.S. forces should be

possible. Such a strategy would make withdrawals depend on conditions on the

ground instead of the other way around. It could also provide the time to elaborate

a cooperative diplomacy for rebuilding the region, including progress toward a settlement of the Palestine issue.

For such a strategy, it is not possible to jettison the military instrument and rely,

as some argue, on purely political means. A free-standing diplomacy is an ancient

American illusion. History offers few examples of it. The attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power-lacking direction and diplomacy being deprived of

incentives.

Diplomacy is the attempt to persuade another party to pursue a course compatible

with a society’s strategic interests. Obviously this involves the ability to create a calculus that impels or rewards the desired direction. The outcome, by definition, is

rarely the ability to impose one’s will but a compromise that gives each party a

stake in maintaining it.

Few diplomatic challenges are as complex as that surrounding Iraq.

Diplomacy must mediate between Iraqi sects that, though in many respects mortal enemies, are assembled in a common governmental structure. It needs to relate

that process to an international concept involving Iraq’s neighbors and other countries that have a significant interest in the outcome.

Two levels of diplomatic effort are necessary:

• A contact group should be created, assembling neighboring countries whose interests are directly affected and which rely on American support. This group

should include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. Its function should be

to advise on ending the internal conflict and to create a united front against

outside domination.

• Parallel negotiations should be conducted with Syria and Iran, which now appear as adversaries, to give them an opportunity to participate in a peaceful regional order. Both categories of consultations should lead to an international

conference including all countries that have to play a stabilizing role in the outVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00715 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
706

come, specifically the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council as well

as such countries as Indonesia, India, and Pakistan.

Too much of the current discussion focuses on the procedural aspect of starting

a dialogue with adversaries. In fact, a balance of risks and opportunities needs to

be created so that Iran is obliged to choose between a significant but not dominant

role or riding the crest of Shiite fundamentalism. In the latter case, it must pay a

serious, not rhetorical, price for choosing the militant option. An outcome in which

Iran is approaching nuclear status because of hesitant and timid nonproliferation

policies in the Security Council, coupled with a political vacuum in the region, must

lead to catastrophic consequences.

Similar principles apply to the prospects for settlement in Palestine.

Moderates in Israel and the neighboring Arab countries are evolving compromises

unimaginable a decade ago. But if the necessary outcomes are perceived as the result of panic by moderates and an exit from the region by the United States, radicals could raise unfulfillable demands and turn the peace process against the moderates.

In all this, the United States cannot indefinitely bear alone the burden for both

the military outcome and the political structure. At some point, Iraq has to be restored to the international community, and other countries must be prepared to

share responsibilities for regional peace. Some of America’s allies and other countries seek to escape the upheavals around them by disassociating from the United

States. But just as it is impossible for America to deal with these trends unilaterally, sooner or later a common effort to rebuild the international order will be imposed on all the potential targets. The time has come for an effort to define the

shoals within which diplomacy is obliged to navigate and to anchor any outcome in

some broader understanding that accommodates the interests of the affected parties.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 24, 2006]

DEAL WITH TEHRAN, NOT ITS CRUSADE

(By Henry A. Kissinger)

Iran’s nuclear program and considerable resources enable it to strive for strategic

dominance in its region. With the impetus of a radical Shiite ideology and the symbolism of defiance of the U.N. Security Council’s resolution, Iran challenges the established order in the Middle East and perhaps wherever Islamic populations face

dominant, non-Islamic majorities.

The appeal for diplomacy to overcome these dangers has so far proved futile. The

negotiating forum the world has put in place for the nuclear issue is heading for

a deadlock. Divisions among the negotiating partners inhibit a clear sense of direction.

The five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany—known as

the ‘‘Six’’—have submitted a package of incentives to get Tehran to end enrichment

of uranium as a key step toward putting an end to the weapons program. They have

threatened sanctions if their proposal is rejected. Iran has insisted on its ‘‘right’’ to

proceed with enrichment, triggering an allied debate about the nature of the sanctions to which the Six have committed themselves. Even the minimal sanctions proposed by Europe’s ‘‘E3’’ (Britain, France, and Germany) have been rejected by Russia.

Reluctant to negotiate directly with a member of the ‘‘axis of evil,’’ the United

States has not participated in the negotiations. But recently Secretary of State,

Condoleezza Rice, has announced a reversal of policy. The United States—and she

herself—will participate in the nuclear talks, provided Iran suspends its enrichment

program while discussions take place.

Tehran, however, has so far shown no interest in negotiating with the United

States, either in the multilateral forum or separately. This is because Iran sees no

compelling national interest in giving up its claim to nuclear power status, and

strong domestic political reasons to persist. Pursuing the nuclear weapons program

is a way of appealing to national pride, and it shores up otherwise shaky domestic

support. The proposed incentives, even if they were believed, would increase Iran’s

dependence on the international system that Iran’s current leaders reject.

The European negotiators accept the importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But they govern societies increasingly loath to make immediate sacrifices for the sake of the future—witness the difficulty of passing legislation on domestic reform. Europe’s leaders know that their publics wouldn’t support military

action against Iran and would probably prove very shaky in a prolonged political

crisis over sanctions.

707

America’s European allies have decided to opt for minimum sanctions because

they hope that the mere fact of united action by the Six will give Iran’s leaders

pause. The conviction expressed by some European diplomats that Iran will not

wish to be a pariah nation indefinitely, and will, therefore, come to an agreement,

is probably wishful thinking. As this becomes apparent, the European allies will

probably move reluctantly toward escalation of sanctions, up to a point where Iran

undertakes a confrontational response. Then they will have to choose between the

immediate crisis and the permanent crisis of letting the Iranian nuclear program

run free.

The dilemma is inherent in any gradual escalation. If initial steps are minimal,

they are presumably endurable (and are indeed chosen for that reason). The adversary may be tempted to wait for the next increment. Thus gradualism may, in the

end, promote escalation and make inevitable the very decision being evaded.

Russia’s position is more complex. Probably no country—not even the United

States—fears an Iranian nuclear capability more than Russia, whose large Islamic

population lies just north of the Iranian border. No country is more exposed to the

seepage of Iranian nuclear capabilities into terrorist hands or to the jihadist ideological wave that the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, encourages. For that

reason, Russia does not want to unleash Iranian hostility on itself without a prospect of probable success.

In addition, Russian attitudes toward the United States have undergone a significant change. There is a lessened commitment to strategic partnership. Suspicion has

grown on both sides. The United States fears that Russia is striving to rebuild its

imperial influence in what Russia calls the ‘‘near-abroad’’; Russia believes that

America is seeking to pressure the Kremlin to change its domestic policies and to

reduce Russia’s international influence.

Because of its conviction that Iran will be a formidable adversary and its low assessment of the American effort in Iraq, the Kremlin doubts that the United States

has the staying power for a prolonged confrontation with Iran and chooses to avoid

manning barricades on which it might be left alone. In consequence, Moscow has

shifted its emphasis toward Europe and, on Iran, shares Europe’s hesitation. The

difference is that if matters reach a final crunch, Russia is more likely to take a

stand, especially when an Iranian nuclear capability begins to look inevitable and

even more so when it emerges as imminent.

The nuclear negotiations with Iran are moving toward an inconclusive outcome.

The Six eventually will have to choose either effective sanctions or the consequences

of an Iranian military nuclear capability and the world of proliferation that implies.

Military action by the United States is extremely improbable in the final 2 years

of a presidency facing a hostile Congress—though it may be taken more seriously

in Tehran. Tehran surely cannot ignore the possibility of a unilateral Israeli strike

if all negotiation options close.

More likely, the nuclear issue will be absorbed into a more comprehensive negotiation based on geopolitical factors. It is important, however, to be clear as to what

this increasingly fashionable term implies. The argument has become widespread

that Iran (and Syria) should be drawn into a negotiating process in the hope of

bringing about a change of their attitudes, as happened, for example, in the opening

to China a generation ago. This, it is said, would facilitate a retreat by the United

States to more strategically sustainable positions.

A diplomacy that excludes adversaries is a contradiction in terms. But the argument on behalf of negotiating focuses too often on the opening of talks rather than

on their substance. The fact of talks is assumed to represent a psychological breakthrough. However, the relief supplied by a change of atmosphere is bound to be temporary. Diplomacy—especially with an adversary—can succeed only if it brings

about a balance of interests. Failing that, it runs the risk of turning into an alibi

for procrastination or a palliative to ease the process of defeat without, however,

eliminating the consequences of defeat.

The opening to China was facilitated by Soviet military pressures on China’s

northern borders; rapprochement between the United States and China implemented an existing common interest in preventing Soviet hegemony. Similarly, the

shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East made progress because it was built on a preexisting equilibrium that neither side was able to alter unilaterally.

To the extent that talk becomes its own objective, there will emerge forums without progress and incentives for stonewalling. If, at the end of such a diplomacy,

stands an Iranian nuclear capability and a political vacuum being filled by Iran, the

impact on order in the Middle East will be catastrophic.

Understanding the way Tehran views the world is crucial in assessing the prospects of a dialogue. The school of thought represented by President Ahmadinejad

may well perceive Iranian prospects as more promising than they have been in cenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00717 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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turies. Iraq has collapsed as a counterweight; within Iraq, Shiite forces are led by

men who were trained in Tehran and spent decades there. Democratic institutions

in Iraq favor dominance by the majority Shiite groups. In Lebanon, Hezbollah,

trained and guided by Iran, is the strongest military force.

In the face of this looming Shiite belt and its appeal to the Shiite population in

northeast Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf, attitudes in the Sunni states—

Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia—and the Gulf States range from unease to incipient

panic. This may explain Ahmadinejad’s insolent behavior during his visit to New

York. His theme seemed to be: ‘‘Don’t talk to me about your world order, whose

rules we did not participate in making and which we disdain. From now on, jihad

will define the rules or at least participate in shaping them.’’

These attitudes will not be changed simply for the opportunity of talking to the

United States. The self-confident Iranian leaders may facilitate a local American retreat but, in their present mood, only for the purpose of turning it into a long-term

rout. The argument that Iran has an interest in negotiating over Iraq to avoid chaos

along its borders is valid only as long as the United States retains a capacity to

help control the chaos. There are only two incentives for Iran to negotiate: The

emergence of a regional structure that makes imperialist policies unattractive and

the concern that, if matters are pushed too far, America might yet strike out.

So long as Iran views itself as a crusade rather than a nation, a common interest

will not emerge from negotiations. To evoke a more balanced view should be an important goal for U.S. diplomacy. Iran may come to understand sooner or later that,

for the foreseeable future, it is a relatively poor developing country in no position

to challenge all the industrialized nations. But such an evolution presupposes the

development of a precise and concrete strategic and negotiating program by the

United States and its associates.

With the Sunni states of the region terrified by the Shiite wave, negotiation between Iran and the United States could generate a stampede toward preemptive

concessions, unless preceded, or at least accompanied, by a significant effort to rally

those states to a policy of equilibrium. In such a policy, Iran must find a respected,

but not dominant, place. A restarted Palestinian peace process should play a significant role in that design, which presupposes close cooperation among the United

States, Europe, and the moderate Arab States. What must not happen is to trade

relief from geopolitical pressures for acquiescence in an Iranian military nuclear

program. That would mortgage the future, not only for the region but for the entire

global order.

Iran needs to be encouraged to act as a nation, not a cause. It has no incentive

to appear as a deus ex machina to enable America to escape its embarrassments,

unless the United States retains an ability to fill the vacuum or at least be a factor

in filling it. America will need to reposition its strategic deployments, but if such

actions are viewed as the prelude to an exit from the region, a collapse of existing

structures is probable.

A purposeful and creative diplomacy toward Iran is important for building a more

promising region—but only if Iran does not, in the process, come to believe that it

is able to shape the future on its own or if the potential building blocks of a new

order disintegrate while America sorts out its purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Quite

frankly, that’s the very reason why we wanted you and Secretary

Albright and two former National Security Advisors to close this

first, initial set of hearings.

Mr. Secretary, I had the opportunity to speak to you in private

over the last couple of months, and you’ve always been available

to all of us, I know, for your counsel. And it seems to me that the

case you make is a fairly compelling philosophic case, as well as

a reality check of what’s happened on the ground. You have, essentially, a nontraditional state, where ideology is the dominant competing unifying element within it—that is, it’s causing it to split

the country, as well. You point out that, in Iraq, the impact of the

neighbors, the Sunni insurrection they’re dealing with, their lack

of dominance, the al-Qaeda, ideologically driven nonstate actors;

and the Shia difficulty in coming to grips with their now being in

the ascendancy. And you said these all merge together, and the

greatest concern is, they create an explosion that could result in

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radical domination, a radical notion dominating the region, and it’s

then spreading.

What that adds up to, to me—and I don’t disagree with what

you’ve said, and I also don’t disagree that there is a need that

there—military force is necessary, but not sufficient, to solve this,

and we’re going to have to be in the region a long time. That leads

me—if I understood you correctly—to this question. A number of

witnesses have testified that in nontraditional states that are infected by this ideology and this competition, one of two things

works. You either have a strongman or a dominant power, an imperial power, dominating, or you have federation, where, in order

to keep these—this country intact, although it was an artificial construct, you have to give breathing room to those elements that

you’ve outlined—Sunni, Shia, et cetera—to prevent the very explosion.

So, why is it—why does it not make sense, consistent with our

military presence, to be accommodating what history seems to dictate, as well as what their Constitution calls for, and that is allowing more local control over the physical security and safety of their

ideologically defined and/or tribally defined areas, while, at the

same time, promoting a central government that has broad responsibilities, instead of insisting on a strong central government,

which seems to me to be, to use a slang expression, like pushing

a rope right now?

Dr. KISSINGER. I’m sympathetic to an outcome that permits large

regional autonomy. In fact, I think it is very likely that this will

emerge out of the conflict that we are now witnessing. Now, the

conventional wisdom of many experts in the region is that we must

not be perceived as bringing that about, because doing so would

have—would inflame the Shia community and enhance Iranian influence, and also because of the danger of Turkish intervention in

the Kurdish area. And I think that’s an opinion we should take

seriously.

I neglected to mention one thought I have, which—actually, I

think it’s fairly central; I got carried away, I didn’t get to it—which

is this: Somewhere along this process in which we’re now engaged,

there is the need for an international conference on Iraq, because

Iraq has to be reintegrated into the international system, and because other nations have to be brought into assuming the responsibility for the political future of the region. It may be premature at

this moment, but in the process that we foresee over, say, the rest

of this year, there should be some such concept. And, in my view,

that should include the neighbors, the Security Council, and countries like Indonesia, India, possibly Pakistan. And that would be a

rather large and unwieldy body that could then form subgroups for

certain regional issues.

But the importance is that only in such a framework can you

really deal with the issue of autonomy, because you have then to

create a wider legitimacy for what is emerging and against intervention from outside countries.

The CHAIRMAN. I would argue it’s the only thing that will lead

the bordering countries to conclude that intervention is not in their

interest. But I fully agree with you.

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I have a minute left of my time, but I will yield to my friend,

Senator Lugar.

I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Kissinger, I appreciate your opening comments about

the importance of the region, the continuity, in a way, of American

foreign policy, and its interest in the area over a long period of

time, and now your suggestion that there be an international conference, is something, in my judgment, that would strengthen Secretary Rice’s attempts to make certain that other countries know

of our continuing interest in the area and might be prepared, under

various circumstances, to work with us. For the moment, out of

fear of Iranian domination of Iraq, but, more importantly, because

there are conflicting interests among the group, and we have been

a stabilizer.

With regard to the current situation in Iraq, what are the possibilities for the Iraqi Parliament, or its government, as constituted

now, to reach an oil agreement that, in essence parses out the revenues and the development rights? And, secondarily, what are the

possibilities for autonomous regions; for that idea to proceed, there

may be some agreement among Shiite to come together; likewise,

the Kurds, who have moved out strongly to set up their region, will

there be an acceptance then by the Sunnis? Is that predicated on

their sharing the oil wealth? I ask those two questions, because

very frequently, as Senators and Members of the House discuss

this problem, they talk about so-called benchmarks for Prime Minister, Mr. Maliki, or his government. The suggestion is that they

need to get on with this rather swiftly, that the United States is

losing patience in their inability to come together, to get a quorum

in the Parliament, for example, and to act. But as a practical political matter, what is your prediction on the potential for their making these solutions? And, even if they make them, how does that

fit into the overall testimony you have given about Iraq being reintegrated with the rest of the countries in the region?

Dr. KISSINGER. The difficulty of the democratic process in multiethnic societies is that the democratic process is predicated on the

possibility of a minority becoming a majority; and, therefore, the

minority can accept the decisions of the majority, in the hope of reversing it later on. The essence of multiethnic societies is that minorities are permanent and that, therefore, the democratic process,

to the minority, appears like a—like just another form of domination. Therefore, it is, first, difficult to come to an agreement; and,

second, difficult to implement the agreement, even if it should be

made, because the Parliament does not have the same legitimate

quality in the whole country that the American Congress or British

Parliament have in our country or in Britain. That is the inherent

problem.

Usually, civil wars are ended with the victory of one side or the

other, or with exhaustion. I know no civil war that has been

ended—well, I may be wrong—by a—it’s, in any rate, very rare, or

it takes a dominating figure like Mandela in South Africa, who

rises to spiritual heights.

I’m not very optimistic, even if this is achieved in Iraq as a parliament. It’s a worthy goal. We are right to support it. It would be

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the best outcome, if it could be achieved. But—there may be a

thousand years of history against it, but it has to be our objective.

Senator LUGAR. You are somewhat pessimistic about this outcome. What I fear in the current argument some of us are having

is that some would say if this is not achieved, if certain benchmarks are not arrived at by the current government, then this is

the last chance; we’re out of there. This is one reason why I appreciate so much your statement this morning. And I’ve made an

opening comment which indicates that we are—we cannot be in a

situation in which we say we’re out of there. Rather, we are talking

about 50 years of history in which we have been in there. Maybe

not in Baghdad, in nine police districts, but in the region where we

could be effective in terms of American security and American interest.

In talking about the war against terrorism, it’s very important

to be effective and to be working with these other nations who, otherwise, might have some terrorist tendencies of their own or be

subverted by such persons. So, I think we’re on the same page, but

I just take advantage of your testimony to make these comments

and to ask for your comment.

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe very strongly that we cannot withdraw

from the region, and we should not conduct a debate with the expectation of a total withdrawal of American forces from the region.

We can discuss, and should discuss, the deployment of our forces

in such a way that it can serve the strategic objectives that we

have discussed earlier, or other strategic objectives that might be

defined.

And with respect to the Government in Iraq, I think one should

distinguish two aspects. Is it as efficient as it can be within its capabilities? Probably not. But will its capabilities ever be up to, in

the foreseeable future, for what we would consider adequate, by

American standards? Also probably not, because it is, after all, a

collection of ministers. The Prime Minister doesn’t have a militia

of his own. Others have access to militias. So, it’s a balance of

forces without the authority that we associate with government.

And, therefore, one has to have some understanding for what it is

possible to do.

But, to sum up my answer, I do not believe we should set benchmarks, the penalty for which is our withdrawal. There may be

other penalties, but withdrawal should not be one of them.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until the police please remove the demonstrator.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come back to order.

I’d just like to ask one point of clarification in taking advantage

of the minute I didn’t use. Do you make a distinction between the

region and Iraq, Mr. Secretary? Can you picture the circumstance

where we may have to have most of our troops out of Iraq, but still

in the region? Or do you make that distinction?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would have difficulty defining exactly where in

the region they could be in substantial numbers, especially if we

withdraw from Iraq in a way that is considered a major withdrawal. But I would put this in relation to time. There’s certainly

712

no magic number of American forces that must be in Iraq forever

or for a long period. We should be flexible about this.

The CHAIRMAN. Almost every plan that’s been put forward contemplates some American forces being left in Iraq, in a totally different—with a totally different mission. But I thank you.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

And, Dr. Kissinger, it’s always good to hear your views.

I want to, sort of, follow on what both Senator Lugar and the

chairman were getting at, this question of not so much whether we

withdraw from the region—I certainly agree with you that we

cannot disengage from the region—but what about redeployment

from Iraq? Leaving aside the question of whether it’s a good idea,

whether—when it should begin or end, maybe you can help us

with, what are some of the key diplomatic steps in the region that

we have to do to ensure that Iraq’s neighbors are sufficiently engaged to deal with Iraq’s challenges, and how can we best prepare

that aspect of whatever kind of withdrawal we will ultimately engage in?

Dr. KISSINGER. Of course, an important step would be if the militias in Iraq could be eliminated or sharply reduced, because they

constrict the ability of the government to take actions that we have

identified with government. Second, the development of a national

Iraqi Army that can deal with some of the problems that I have

described, like cross-border incursions, acts by al-Qaeda. Third, the

development of—we have, up to now, carried the political responsibility for the future of Iraq, entirely by ourselves. I believe the time

has come to engage the international community, to some degree,

and to an increasing degree, in the political future of Iraq, without

raising the question of what participation they might have in military actions.

And, therefore, I believe that a diplomacy should start, and probably it’s been started, to begin consultation on the manner in which

this—it can be brought about in such a framework.

Of course, significant American forces can be withdrawn. What

we should avoid is a redeployment of a nature that creates the perception that America separates itself from the region and from its

interests that we have defined here. And so, the staging of these

measures is of great importance.

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand the answer with regard to the

international community, as a whole. What I was especially interested in is Iraq’s neighbors. How do we engage Jordan, Kuwait,

others, in a more serious way in the steps that need to occur?

Dr. KISSINGER. Of course, one of the great dangers when we talk

about Iran’s neighbors is that—Iraq’s neighbors—is that Iran pursues its objectives, and that then the Sunni states will organize to

create a counterweight, and then we’ll see a reoccurrence of the

Sunni-Shia wars, traditional Sunni-Shia wars, on Iraqi soil, and

that would have extraordinary consequences for the whole region.

So, it’s—but, the question of how to engage Iran, one of the unfortunate aspects of a concentration on Iraq is that the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons to Iran is sort of being swept under

the table, and yet, for the peace of the world, nuclear proliferation

to Iran could be an—much greater—of an even greater significance,

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because it may really be the country which will then trigger a

whole series of other countries. And, after that, the calculations of

deterrence, as we have known it, will no longer be operational.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, Dr. Kissinger, that really relates to my

next question. What you’ve just, sort of, indicated, a problem with

a great emphasis on Iraq, vis-a-vis our attention to Iran—a lot—

many observers, in my view, even some very good ones, tend to

make the mistake of looking at Iraq in isolation. Obviously, this

doesn’t apply to you. But many will say, ‘‘What will happen to Iraq

if we redeploy our troops?’’ But I don’t hear them asking, very

often, ‘‘What will happen in Somalia or Afghanistan or many other

trouble spots in the world, if we remain bogged down in Iraq?’’ Do

you share my concern that we’re devoting too many of our resources to Iraq and not enough to other areas, or to the, clearly,

global fight against al-Qaeda?

Dr. KISSINGER. We should not be bogged down in an inconclusive

operation in Iraq. I supported the original decision. It has taken

forms that went beyond many expectations. But we should deal

with that new situation in a way that does not accentuate the dangers that you mention, because we have to balance our presence in

Iraq against the impetus to radical self-confidence that might be

achieved if we suddenly withdrew from Iraq. So, a staged withdrawal geared to specific criteria, along the lines we have discussed

here—that is, a strengthening of the central government, some relationship to the outside world—would, of course, be helpful.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. And, again, I want to emphasize—excuse me;

don’t start the clock yet—that it was very important to Senator

Hagel that you know that it’s—that this young man, First Lieutenant Fritz, who was killed in the Karbala action recently, he is flying to his home State to attend the funeral.

I thank you for the interruption.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A key point, Mr. Secretary, that you keep referring to is the danger of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. We could tie in that point

with another point where I think there’s bipartisan agreement,

which is that what we do in Iraq has an impact not just on Iraq,

but upon the region. And you used the phrase ‘‘radical self-confidence.’’ People talk a lot about American standing and how it’s

being impacted by what we’re doing in Iraq. Is it your belief that

a precipitate withdrawal, which the Iraq Study Group warned

against, and that would generate a radical self-confidence would

have a greater negative long-term impact on the U.S. standing in

the region and peace and stability in the region?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is my conviction. A withdrawal geared to

American internal debates and not to the local situation would

have some of these consequences.

Senator COLEMAN. I’d like to raise another issue so I can get a

clear understanding of it, and maybe, again, it is one where there

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is some agreement. There is a lot of talk about redeployment. And

my understanding of what I heard the chairman say is that redeployment doesn’t mean moving all of our troops outside of Iraq, but

perhaps reposition them in a way that doesn’t lead them into the

middle of sectarian civil wars. My question, just so I can be clear,

relates to a statement made by Secretary Baker yesterday—he said

that we’re going to be in Iraq for a long time. Is it your belief that

we’re going to be in Iraq—not just in the region, but in Iraq, in

some capacity, for a long time?

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree with Senator Baker—with Secretary

Baker.

Senator COLEMAN. And another issue where I think there is

agreement on is reintegrating Iraq into the international community, but here’s my question. One way to phrase it might be, ‘‘What

is Iraq?’’ In other words, if Iraq is seen as simply being a tool for

protecting the Shia militia—rather than a civic Iraqi State encompassing all groups, but instead as a religious state dominated by

the Shia majority—my sense is that countries such as Egypt and

Saudi Arabia and others, where the Sunni population is dominant,

will have less of an interest in being involved in an ultimate solution, because of their fear that the Iranians are really in control.

So my question is: Does there have to be a clear sense from the

Iraqi Government that it represents an inclusive national government that is not being directed by Iran, or dictated to by Muqtada

al-Sadr, in order to get anything out of this international conference on Iraq that you’ve talked about?

Dr. KISSINGER. The best outcome would, of course, be if the Shia

government that is now dominant in Baghdad created a truly national government, and if the Sunni part of the population felt that

there is such a thing as an Iraqi nationality and they are being

dealt with fairly. And when you look at what Mandela has done in

South Africa, something along that line would, of course, be—with

all the shortcomings that one might see in South Africa, would be

an—very desirable outcome. The likelihood of this is not great, but

we should certainly encourage it. And it may come about if the

Shia realize that they will not be able, by themselves, to impose a

theocratic state over the whole country. And if we do not participate in an effort to create a theocratic state, we have to walk a fine

line. On the one hand, there is the danger you describe, that we

do not want to demoralize our Sunni potential allies, and we want

to have them in a position where they are willing—where they

want to resist Iranian domination. On the other hand, we want to

leave open the possibility of an ultimate settlement with Iran if it

can put its nuclear program into some framework that the international community can accept, and if it confines itself to objectives

of a national state. So, we have to maneuver between those two extremes. The Sunni states must know that we will back them

against Iranian domination, but not on a jihad of their own. And

the same is true for the theocratic Shia part.

Senator COLEMAN. But if the Iraqis themselves are either not

ready, or not able, to do that right now, what is it that we can do

that we’re not doing? This whole discussion of benchmarks, I think,

is to say to the Iraqis, ‘‘We need you to show us that you’re doing

this,’’ because of the consequences we’re talking about.

715

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not believe that American withdrawal is a

way of enforcing benchmarks. There may be—there must be other

ways of the degree of aid we give, and it may be that there is nothing we can do, beyond a certain point. From some of the verbal

things that I’ve seen, it seems to me that the Iraqi Prime Minister

at least has taken aboard some of the principles that we have put

forward. We have, now, to see whether he will execute them.

Senator COLEMAN. We have talked about a regional conference

for Iraq. Should there be a regional conference about Iran? In other

words, if we don’t deal with the Iran issue, how will we achieve

stability in that part of the world?

Dr. KISSINGER. In a way, there is a regional conference. There’s

an international conference about the nuclear program of Iran. And

I believe that if that ever makes progress, as it should, it could

merge into a discussion of the political role of Iran in the region,

because if Iran is really interested in security, and not in fulfilling

old imperial order that it dreams, then this ought to be an element

of the discussion with respect to nuclear weapons.

Senator COLEMAN. And the consequence of Iran getting a nuclear

weapon would be disastrous, not just for the region, but for the

world.

Dr. KISSINGER. The consequence of Iran getting nuclear weapons

is disastrous, and we must keep the diplomacy focused on that.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. And I do agree with your call for a regional conference. It’s long overdue. And I think one of the most

disappointing things for me is that the Iraq Study Group was so

clear in their call. They issued an urgent call, they said by the end

of last year, right now. And it never happened. And what happened

is, the American people went to the polls, they voted for, in my

opinion, a new strategy to end the war in Iraq—to end the war in

Iraq—and, instead, what they’re getting is a military strategy to

have a surge. And many Americans believe—and I agree with

them—that it’s time for a political solution.

Now, I want to probe what you said to my chairman, because if

I heard you right—I want to make sure I heard you right, because

it’s hard to hear you. So, tell me if I heard you right. Senator——

Dr. KISSINGER. Which one?

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Biden has been working—the chairman of the committee, Senator Biden—is working with Leslie Gelb,

and they have come up with a proposal, which has been out there

for quite a while now, to have semiautonomous regions—Kurds,

Shia, Sunni—and a—not three separate countries, but one country

with semiautonomous regions, to essentially separate the warring

parties, and have a—still have, of course, a national government be

involved in redistributing the oil, and tax policy, and other very important functions. Now, when he asked you about it—I think I

heard you say this, so please tell me if I heard you right—‘‘that

may well be the outcome, at the end of the day.’’ Is that approximately what you said?

716

Dr. KISSINGER. That’s correct.

Senator BOXER. OK. Now—but then, you went on to say, ‘‘But we

shouldn’t be perceived as pushing this forward.’’ Is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. That’s correct.

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, I’d like to challenge that, because, as

I see it, you know, every option has its drawbacks, but it seems to

me either we’re in the middle of a solution or in—we’re in the middle of a civil war. And what Senator Biden, I think, has been pushing is, yes; let’s get in the middle of a political solution and out of

the civil war. So, I know that diplomats—because I’ve been around

here a long time, and, as you know, I could never be a

diplomat——

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, don’t say——

Senator BOXER. Admit it.

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Chairman, I’m not sure——

Senator BOXER. I admit it.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That’s true. [Laughter.]

Senator BOXER. I——

The CHAIRMAN. You got Fritz Hollings to want you on this committee.

Senator BOXER. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. You surely could be a diplomat.

Senator BOXER. Well, all I could tell you is, I respectfully admit

that.

But I think what happens is, sometimes diplomats get stuck in

a kind of a ‘‘think.’’ And their ‘‘think’’ is, ‘‘Well, we have to be careful, we have to sit back in this case, not go out there with a political solution.’’ I think, given events on the ground—and I would

urge you—you don’t have to even respond to this, but I want to

urge you to please break free from this diplomatic ‘‘think.’’ Because

I think, at this stage, all you have to do is read the details of

what’s coming out of Iraq on the ground, for our beautiful men and

women thrust in the middle of a civil war, I don’t think anyone

who voted for that resolution—and I thank God, every day, I

didn’t—ever dreamed that that would be the end result, that our

troops would be in the middle of this civil war, there would be

3,080 dead, 22,000 wounded, half of those never come back to the

military again, many, many more with post-traumatic stress and

all these problems. And so, it seems to me, at this stage of what

a lot of people are saying have been a failure, including people in

this administration admitting it, that we shouldn’t worry so much

that we may be perceived as pushing one political solution or another. And I think if just one establishment diplomat came out and

said, ‘‘You know, normally I wouldn’t say this, but, given where we

are’’—I hope you’ll think about that.

Mr. Secretary, you said—you were quoted in State of Denial

here—and I’m assuming it’s an accurate quote; it’s in quotation

marks—‘‘In early September 2005, Mike Gerson went to see Kissinger in New York. ‘Why did you support the Iraq war?’ Gerson

asked him. ‘Because Afghanistan wasn’t enough,’ Kissinger answered. ‘In the conflict with radical Islam,’ he said, ‘they want to

humiliate us, and we need to humiliate them.’ ’’ And that’s a quote.

717

Now, a year before that, Peter Bergen, CNN analyst, said, ‘‘What

we have done in Iraq is what bin Laden could not have hoped for

in his wildest dreams. We invaded an oil-rich Muslim nation in the

heart of the Middle East, the very type of imperial adventure that

bin Laden had long predicted was the United States long-term goal

in the region. We deposed the secular socialist Saddam, whom bin

Laden had long despised, ignited Sunni and Shia fundamentalist

fervor in Iraq, and have now provoked a defensive jihad that has

galvanized jihad-minded Muslims around the world.’’ And this is

what he said, ‘‘It’s hard to imagine a set of policies better designed

to sabotage the war on terrorism.’’

So, I juxtapose these things. This is terrorist—terrorism analyst

Peter Bergen in 2004. And in 2005, you say you supported the war

in Iraq because we need to humiliate radical Islam.

So, could you please—I mean, I think what we see here is—what

Peter Bergen said looks to be happening. And I wonder if you could

comment on: Who do you think is right, at the end of the day, at

this stage?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it’s alleged quotation. It’s a kind of journalism that uses a quotation that somebody may have made, and

then spins a whole theory about—around it. It grew out of a conversation I had with Mr. Gerson, a speechwriter of President Bush,

who then reported his version of the conversation to Woodward.

I’ve written a lot of articles on the subject, and I’ve never said anything like this.

Senator BOXER. OK.

Dr. KISSINGER. And so, whether phrases like this floated through

the conversation—I wrote an article in August 2002, prior to the

war, in which I stated my view on the subject. I did believe there

was a geostrategic reason for doing it, based on the fact that here

was a country, with the second largest oil revenues, that had violated the U.N. cease-fire 16 times, that was believed to have weapons of mass destruction. And I thought, if those resources would be

put at the service of a terrorist, or even of a regime that was undermining our interests, it would be too dangerous, and the American Senate had voted for regime change. But what I also said in

that article was that if we did it, we should move it to international

control as quickly as possible, and not try to run it on a unilateral

basis. So, those two have to be put together. And those are my

views, not what Woodward reports having heard from Mr. Gerson,

even if fragments of the—of such sentences floated through a conversation. I’ve only met Mr. Gerson once, for less than half an

hour.

The CHAIRMAN. Last time you’ll help him write a speech, huh?

[Laughter.]

Dr. KISSINGER. He wrote a good speech on it. [Laughter.]

If I may make a point on your first thing—your first observation,

which—I mean, it’s an important observation. The hesitancy one

has in pushing for the solution is that one has to think of the impact on Turkey of a Kurdish independent state——

Senator BOXER. Undependent? On an independent state.

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. On the temptation it may create for

an Iranian push into—so, one has to stage it in such a way that

a significant Iraqi support for it exists, and where we are not perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00727 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ceived as doing this in order to break up an Arab State for our own

purposes. But if the Iraqis cannot solve the problems that have

been described, I’ve told the chairman privately that I thought that

this was a possible outcome, and, at the right moment, we should

work in the direction that—for maximum stability and for maximum chances of peace. But it’s—unfortunately, everything in that

region is so fraught with implications that one has to move with

care and thoughtfulness.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Could I

have just 10 seconds to wrap up?

What I think we heard here is good, because I think that when

you look at what our chairman is talking about, it’s not three separate countries, it’s semiautonomous regions within Iraq. So, I think

that he and Mr. Gelb have looked at that. But I do appreciate—

because I think even what you just said now moves us a little bit

more toward maybe pushing harder for a specific diplomatic

solution.

Thank you.

Dr. KISSINGER. I also think it would occur more naturally if part

of an international conference——

The CHAIRMAN. That was the point.

Senator BOXER. Yes.

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. Than as an American national

policy.

Senator BOXER. I think you’re right

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for speaking, since the

plan has been discussed over—I’m glad this—the Secretary added

the last point of our private conversations. I think if there were—

and that’s what we call for, an international conference—that if it’s

in the context of that, it doesn’t appear to be us enforcing it. I

think we should start to call this the Boxer Plan, because you’re

more articulate than I am about pushing it. And I really——

Senator BOXER. I’m not the diplomat.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, well, you’re doing pretty well. I—and I

thank you for it.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony.

And I think what I’m seeing here is someone testifying, and almost

everyone on this committee agreeing with much of what you have

to say. And it’s an interesting thing to watch here.

You’ve talked a lot about the long-term issues that we’re going

to be dealing with, the fact that we’ve been there for 50 years, and

that we’re going to be there for many more years down the road.

One of the concerns that I hear debated a lot privately is that

so much focus has been placed on this surge, which is really not

a strategy, but a tactic, something that you said you even lean toward. But the fact that we’ve focused so much on this surge that

many people, who do believe we’re going to be in Iraq for many,

many years, and in the Middle East for many years, are concerned

that, with so much focus on it, so much discussion on it, that if

nothing good comes out of that in the next 5 or 6 months, that

what’s going to happen is going to be a reaction, an adverse reacVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00728 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tion, if you will, that really does affect our actions in the Middle

East for many, many years down the road. And I think there’s a

concern that if something—if no positive comes out of this, there’s

going to be a greater push, if you will, to withdraw from the region—and I wonder if you could respond to that—in ways that

would not be beneficial to our national interests down the road.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, under present conditions, as I have said, I

would—I think the surge is the better option, but we have to keep

in mind that at whatever point we decide whether it has succeeded

or failed, we—it’s a tactical move to give us the maneuvering room

to move to the strategy on which, it seems to me, a considerable

consensus has emerged, to me, out of what I have heard in front

of this committee and of what I believe needs to be done.

I do not believe we can withdraw from Iraq. That is the key

question. We can discuss the kind of deployment, size of the deployment, but it should be done in relation to the conditions on the

ground and to our national objectives, and not to abstract timetables.

Senator CORKER. This may not be the kind of question to ask

someone coming before our committee, but, because you do feel sort

of a consensus around much of your testimony, and because you

see a sense of the Senate wanting to express itself out of frustration, and because you have said that you don’t think benchmarks

predicated on not being met, or benchmarks not being met, causing

withdrawal, that that’s the penalty, what would be a resolution, if

one has to be—if the Senate has to express itself on this matter—

what would be some of the components of a resolution that you

think might be sensible?

Dr. KISSINGER. I’m very flattered. That’s not the sort of question

I’m usually asked. And I would think that a resolution that states

a concept of national objectives, that’s not ambiguous, but indicates

a direction around which the country could rally, I think would be

important, because I don’t think we can go on with the appearance

of such basic divisions, because whichever way it is interpreted

abroad, it’s not helpful. And so, if it were possible to—I would not

have recommended it to begin with, but I think a resolution that

states a direction, which hopefully the administration would join,

too, would then create a benchmark for everybody.

And on the substance, when we—if we separate the surge from

it—on where to go afterward, I think there is a—more of a coming

together than there is on the surge option itself, at least from what

I’ve read. But it’s my strong view that it cannot include a time

limit for withdrawal or a withdrawal geared to our domestic

calendar.

Senator CORKER. Would you state the last phrase again? Or—

withdrawal based on?

Dr. KISSINGER. Our domestic calendar.

Senator CORKER. Would you want to expand a little bit on who

the audience really is as it relates to these resolutions, the audience that really matters most as it relates to these resolutions?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, of course, you all are running for election

at some point. Some of you know your audiences well, at least

those of you who are here. But I would say, of course, a principal

audience has to be the American people, and one has to keep in

720

mind there, not only what the American people think today, but

what they will think 2 years, 3 years from now, when the consequences of some decisions become apparent, and when it could

happen that they will not approve of decisions, even if those

decisions seem to reflect the mood of a moment, which has happened before. So, of course one has to think of the American people

first, but one also has to think of the actors internationally who

gear their action to their expectation of an American performance,

and how they interpret actions in terms of their own judgments.

And that, I think, is a major responsibility, as well, in drafting a

resolution.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. I’m going to defer to——

The CHAIRMAN. You’re going to yield to Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank

my colleague from Illinois. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your testimony, and I just want to explore some areas with you. Let me ask

you: Would you agree that every course of action, at this point of

time, every alternative, carries with it some rather grave risks and

the potential for even deeper and wider strife?

Dr. KISSINGER. Absolutely.

Senator MENENDEZ. Would you also agree that success—or,

should I say not success but that each of those alternatives for success depends far more on what others are going to do, or can do,

than what we can do by ourselves?

Dr. KISSINGER. I’m not sure I would agree completely with that.

I think it depends on what others can do. But that will be heavily

influenced by our——

Senator MENENDEZ. Well——

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. Actions.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Listening to Secretary Baker

and Congressman Hamilton yesterday, among others, and listening

to the administration talk about how the Iraqis themselves have to

make some hard choices, compromises, negotiations for a government of national unity, security forces have to be built up in a way

that they can respond and stand up for their own country, the context of regional partners and some of your own testimony, it seems

to me that, while we may lead, at the end of the day success in

Iraq depends, to a great deal, upon what others—the Maliki government, the Iraqis, the regional partners—will or will not do than

what we will do just by ourselves.

Dr. KISSINGER. I would turn it around. We cannot do it all by

ourselves, but we can act in such a way as to evoke actions from

others that create the maximum chance for success.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, let me ask you—you say, in the testimony, that the United States, ‘‘must not involve itself in the sectarian conflict for any extended period, much less let itself be used

by one side for its own sectarian goals.’’

Dr. KISSINGER. Right.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, I listen to that, and I say, isn’t that,

in essence, what we’re doing? Aren’t we largely involved in a sectarian conflict? The Sunnis want us to protect them from the ShiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00730 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
721

ites. The Shiites want us on the sidelines so they can consolidate

power. Both are divided among themselves. I’ve heard some of my

colleagues here talk about the escalation and sending a very significant amount into Anbar province, where the Sunnis and the

concerns about al-Qaeda are. But it seems to me that we, and I’ve

heard other testimony from other witnesses who suggest similarily,

need to break the back of the Sunnis so that they stop their insurgency and come to a realization that they need a political process.

At the end of the day, though, isn’t that taking sides?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, of course we’re taking sides against some of

the groups that I have mentioned. And, to some extent, what you

say is quite valid, in the sense that if the government is a primarily Shia government, and it wants to extend its authority, that

will not be appreciated by the Sunnis. So, what we should attempt

to do, and what I think we are attempting to do, is to make this

attempt to break the back or reduce the impact of the militias, both

the Sunni militias and the Shia militias. Now, at that point, the

national government could then perform the police functions with

its own forces, and our effort will be directed against terrorism and

outside forces, recognizing that the dividing line is not absolute. If

the effort does not succeed in reducing the militias, then we have

to draw the dividing line between sectarian violence and the American participation much more sharply, because—and then, our deployments should reflect that.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you this. I’ve listened to you talk about withdrawal. But is there not a difference

between withdrawal from Iraq at a certain point of time, taking in

consideration even under your own statement that we cannot involve ourselves in a sectarian conflict for an extended period—and

a withdrawal from the region? One can, over time, withdraw from

Iraq, but not withdraw from the region, if it doesn’t go in a certain

way that we believe that our success there would not be better

transformed by having a phased withdrawal. And how do we get

the Iraqis to come to the conclusion that they have to make the

hard choices, compromises, and negotiations necessary, if it’s possible, for a government of national unity, if they believe that we are

there in an open-ended commitment? And, last, how do we get the

regional partners, and I appreciate you yourself describing this as

desirable to participate in, when, in fact—there’s no real incentive

from some of them? We know that an unstable Iraq is an incentive,

but there’s been some testimony here that it hasn’t gotten so bad

that other regional partners are willing to participate at this time

because they believe that, in fact, we will continue to stay there

with our blood and our national treasure. And, therefore, it’s not

necessary for them, at this time to engage. How would you respond

to that?

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to your first point, of course, the

danger is that withdrawal from Iraq of a certain type could trigger

withdrawal from the region, because everybody will then accommodate, or might—may accommodate to the dominant trends. In addition, it’s not easy to see where one would deploy in the region after

a debacle—after a debacle in Iraq.

Now, I’ve forgotten your second point.

Senator MENENDEZ. How do we get the Iraqis——

722

Dr. KISSINGER. Oh, how do we get—yeah.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And the regional partners to

understand that they have to move——

Dr. KISSINGER. Now——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. In a different direction; and

move, in the case of the regional partners?

Dr. KISSINGER. Much of the discussion around the table here is

of a regional conference. I differ somewhat with—I prefer an international conference in which countries that have broader interests,

and that ought to have a direct experience of the Islamic challenge,

participate, because if you take the countries of the region only,

they are either threatened, some of them, or aggressive, some of

them, or potentially aggressive, some of them, so their conflicting

interests may be so great that it is difficult to distill them into

some kind of consensus, while I think a wider international conference might create some criteria which then can be guideposts to

the more immediately involved countries. But that, of course,

would require careful exploration by the Secretary of State and

others. But, how do we get them to do it? That’s, of course, our

challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I apologize, but we promised this—the

Secretary that we’d have him out of here by 11:30, because he’s got

to catch a flight, and if we do it, we can——

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. We can try to get that done, I’d—

try to keep——

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Secretary Kissinger, I would like to say that

the testimony you have submitted for this hearing is the best paper

that I have seen in all of the hearings the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee has had with various people that have come before us.

It is concise, relevant, comprehensive, and it explains how important the state of Iraq is to world peace, to peace in the region, and

to our national and economic security. What I really like is that although we have been talking about a plan B, we have not really

defined what plan B is, but your paper does.

Starting on page 2 of your paper, you state, ‘‘The purpose of the

new strategy should be to demonstrate that the United States is

determined to remain relevant to the outcome in the region, to adjust American military deployments and numbers to emerging realities, and provide the maneuvering room for a major diplomatic

effort to stabilize the Middle East.’’ That effectively summarizes

the plan.

I would like you to comment on two things. First of all, do you

believe that the President of the United States has done a sufficient job explaining to the American people how strategic our involvement in the Middle East is to our national security and to our

economic security? Second, if you were the Secretary of State or the

President, how would you go about speaking to the Arab League,

to the U.N. Security Council, or the international community, to

say, ‘‘Here are the important reasons why you should be interested

in what has happened in Iraq, and why it is in your best interest

to come together to help us try to stabilize that region?’’

723

Dr. KISSINGER. I’ve seen the President on television, on many

talk shows on which one normally hasn’t seen Presidents before, in

recent weeks, making a major attempt to explain his position to the

American public. And I don’t—I think it would be presumptuous

for me to tell somebody who’s been elected twice by the American

public in what form he should present his case. He’s certainly

doing it in a dedicated and serious manner, and he should be listened to carefully.

Senator VOINOVICH. Pardon me, but would you agree that we

have not done an adequate job talking about plan B, in concert

with what we are now doing in Baghdad and the surge, putting it

in context with the big picture about how we would like to proceed

in the region?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think the focus has been on the surge. My focus,

it’s the other way around, to explain the surge in terms of the

strategy to which we should go. Whatever we—happens in the

surge, I look at the surge as giving us maneuvering room to go do

what you call plan B and what I call the necessary strategy.

Senator VOINOVICH. How would you convince other nations to attend an international conference or regional conference? What

would you say to the Saudis?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think the Secretary of State is extremely

articulate, and she should certainly—I mean, once the concept is

established, I have every confidence in her being able to do this.

Senator VOINOVICH. When would we engage these other nations?

Lee Hamilton was here before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday with the Iraq Task Force. The task force said that

we should begin diplomacy and engage our partners in the region

immediately. When will we do this? Tomorrow? Next week? Six

months from now?

Dr. KISSINGER. No; now.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well——

Dr. KISSINGER. I think you cannot segment policy. If you have a

concept where to go, you ought to start preparing the ground for

it as soon as you have agreed on what you’re going to do.

Senator VOINOVICH. I think we have a big public relations problem with the American people, because I don’t think we are effectively communicating what we are really doing in Iraq and how important the entire region is to our future. I think that is part of

the reason why so many people are taking the position that we

should pull our troops out of Iraq. For example, I don’t think we

have made it clear that we have been protecting American oil interests in that area for years. I did not know, until I joined this

committee how many billions of dollars we spend every year to protect American oil interests in the region, which are crucial to the

economic security of the United States. This starts back from President Roosevelt’s administration. I did not know that prior to serving on the Foreign Relations Committee, and many Americans are

not aware of that. We have been spending money in the Middle

East for years to protect oil. If Iraq and the region disintegrate, our

economy could come to its knees.

Dr. KISSINGER. We have permanent interests there. The situation

is changing rapidly in directions which are unfamiliar to Americans, because we are not used to dealing with people who are willVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00733 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ing to kill themselves for—in this manner. And we have to understand conditions in this area and not act impulsively at a moment

that will affect the next decade.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. I have to ask just

a couple of questions based on, sort of, the interaction here, because I—from what I understand, the implication of your testimony

and some of the responses to your questions is that you think the

only way to express our understanding that there are permanent

interests in the Middle East is to maintain our troop levels in Iraq

or, in fact, increase them, and that if we did not maintain current

troop levels or increase them, that somehow that would be abdicating responsibility and suggesting that we didn’t have permanent

interests in the region. Is that my understanding of your testimony, or did I misunderstand it?

Dr. KISSINGER. No; I believe that, at this moment, if the option

proposed by the administration is the best way to get the maneuvering room to the changes in deployment and strategy that will

be required by the evolving situation. At that point, we can decide

what levels we should have and in what mix. But it should not be

debated, in terms of, ‘‘Are you for withdrawal or for an increase in

the present situation?’’ You have correctly characterized my view,

but not as a permanent view of that.

Senator OBAMA. Well, let’s focus on this. I mean, the—because I

completely agree with you that the argument about an additional

20,000 troops, in and of itself, is not the central issue. The central

issue: What is this grand strategy in Iraq?

Dr. KISSINGER. Right.

Senator OBAMA. Now, you suggest that this is a precursor to a

grand strategy. You indicate that this will provide us maneuvering

room to pursue this strategy. Do you know what the strategy is?

Has the President articulated what this strategy is, this grand new

strategy? Because, as far as I can tell, nobody on this committee

knows what this grand strategy is.

Dr. KISSINGER. No; I’m speaking here——

Senator OBAMA. And the American public doesn’t seem to understand what it is. So——

Dr. KISSINGER. I’m speaking here on my own behalf.

Senator OBAMA. No; I understand, but I’m—it was—I just want

to establish, for the record, is there—because the notion is, is that

this is a precursor—this lays the groundwork, the foundation provides us the maneuvering room, for a grand strategy that will stabilize the situation there. Is there any place that you’re familiar

with where the administration has articulated this strategy?

Dr. KISSINGER. I don’t know anyplace where the administration

has articulated this particular strategy. From my acquaintance

with some of the people, I think it is possible that they will come

to this strategy, but I’m not here as their spokesman.

Senator OBAMA. Well, I understand. But I think it’s important,

I guess. Obviously, Mr. Secretary, you know, you have enormous

experience in this field, and are very well respected. What I gather,

then, is you’re presuming that there’s a grand strategy in which—

725

would justify the escalation of troop levels, or at least preclude

withdrawal. And yet, what I’m hearing is, is that, in fact, there is

no articulation of that strategy, that you’re aware of right now, and

you’re presuming that somebody, somewhere, must have one.

Dr. KISSINGER. No; I’m making two points. I’m saying that if we

now act out of frustration——

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. We may set—we may start a process

that prevents a grand strategy and that will drive us into an outcome that nobody wants. If we do this, we should do it in the expectation of a grand strategy. And, as I’ve said before, I would not

object to a statement that outlines a grand strategy that—especially if it were done on a bipartisan basis the——

Senator OBAMA. Well, let me suggest that, within your——

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. Administration would then join.

Senator OBAMA. I’m sorry. Let me suggest that, within your—the

papers that you provided us, I think your approach, in terms of a

regional diplomatic strategy makes perfect sense. I think that the

Baker-Hamilton Commission recommended this, as well. As far as

we can see—and I think your interaction with Senator Voinovich

indicates this—the administration doesn’t seem to be embarking on

this particular strategy. It’s not clear to me that we could not pursue that strategy, even as we were initiating a phased redeployment, as opposed to a precipitous one, and which brings me, I

guess, to a critical point. In your estimation, is there anything that

can get the Iraqi factions to change their behavior, other than ongoing occupation with perhaps increased forces—U.S. forces for an

indeterminate period of time? What would change the political dynamic on the ground where the Shia, the Sunni, the Kurds, to a

lesser extent, have a different set of calculations that they would

be making?

Dr. KISSINGER. I—look, the Sunni-Shia conflict has lasted 1,400

years——

Senator OBAMA. Right.

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. And has been bloody and brutal. So,

one should not pretend that one can solve it——

Senator OBAMA. It won’t be——

Dr. KISSINGER [continuing]. In any——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Be easy in any event, right.

Dr. KISSINGER. For any American polity or quickly. We can only

do what we think is right and most likely to produce a desirable

result. Now, it is clear that there is a limit to what the American

public can support, or will support. And all of these issues that

we’re discussing are based on assessments you cannot prove when

you make them. That’s what makes them so difficult. My assessment is that the debate of this—about the surge exaggerates an essentially tactical move. The real issue is the long-term roll of the

United States. I agree with Secretary Baker that we are likely to

be in Iraq for a long period. But that does not mean it has to be,

or should be, at the present level or in the present deployment.

This is what our next discussion should be about. And whatever

happens, it will go on for the next few administrations, the impact

of what we are deciding now. It can’t end with one administration,

no matter what we do. I think that the best course is to attempt

726

to deal with the militias, and whatever else happens—whatever

happens in that; and while that happens, prepare ourselves for

what I describe as the grand strategy. I hope that it’s done in accord between the executive and the Congress, because that will be

best for the long-term health of the American public, no matter

what happens in the future.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman——

Dr. KISSINGER. And that is what I’m trying to contribute to—I

cannot—I can’t speak for the administration, but I would be disappointed and surprised if they did not accept some of the elements

of what has been discussed here.

Senator OBAMA. Well, but—let me just close—and I know I’m out

of time——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s OK, you’re making a very salient point

here.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. By simply saying this. I think the

American people are disappointed. I’m disappointed with the manner in which, over the last several years, we have proceeded in

Iraq. And I just—I want to dispute this notion, somehow, that the

American people aren’t clear about interests in the Middle East. I

think the majority of the American people understand that we have

significant interests there. That is the reason that they were willing to authorize—or at least a number of the Members of the

Senate were willing to authorize going in. I think they perfectly understand the severity of the Islamic threat. What they don’t understand is how, after all the commitments that we have made, all the

lives that have been lost, and the billions of dollars that have been

sent, the situation seems to deteriorate, and we are actually less

safe, and the region is less stable, and we have less leverage with

the players in the region. That’s what they don’t understand.

That’s what they’re frustrated with, is the fact that they’ve made

an enormous investment in blood and treasure, and the outcome is

worse than when we started.

And so, I just think it’s important, Mr. Chairman, for the record

to indicate that if, in fact—I completely agree with the Secretary

that the surge, or escalation, whatever you want to call it, in and

of itself, is not the salient issue. The issue is: Is there a strategy

to stabilize Iraq that prevents us from establishing a permanent occupation in that region that further destabilizes it and further inflames anti-American sentiment? And that strategy has not been

forthcoming from this administration.

And I don’t—I understand, Mr. Secretary, you don’t speak for the

administration, but I—to the extent that you are suggesting that

they have some secret strategy that we have not been made privy

to, and that’s why we should not speak out against it, I would

strongly differ with you, recognizing that you have far more experience in this field than I do.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator——

Dr. KISSINGER. I’m not saying you shouldn’t speak out on behalf

of the strategy that should be pursued.

Senator OBAMA. Well, I think the concern you expressed was——

Dr. KISSINGER. I’m hoping——

727

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Is that we should not—that there

should be some sense of cooperation between the administration

and Congress so that we don’t send a message that we are divided

to the world. I completely agree with that. We had the opportunity

to do that with the Baker-Hamilton Commission, which has essentially been ignored by this administration. And so, the frustrations

that many of us have is, if we have an administration that does

not seem willing to listen, and we have a strategy that, to all eyes,

is not working, at some point we have to make some decisions, in

terms of getting it on track.

I’m way over time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you for——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Some are—I let that go, because I think it’s such an important

exchange.

The problem, Mr. Secretary, is, in a nutshell, that most of us

view the President’s projection of forces as his strategy, and he’s

explicitly rejected the strategic suggestions you and others have

made. It’s been explicit. But having said that, let me yield now to

Senator Isakson——

Senator ISAKSON. And I will——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And then we’ll be finished.

Senator ISAKSON. I will be quick.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your years of service to

the United States. And I really only have one question, which relates to the most recent exchanges. And so, I’ll state this question

and then allow you to respond. But thank you so much for your

service and for this paper.

My memory is that the United States of America went into Iraq

and had three specific goals. The first was to enforce U.N. Resolution 1441, because the entire world, 176 countries, thought there

were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and there was no confusion on that, and Hussein gave us no comfort that that wasn’t true.

The second goal was to allow the Iraqi people to hold free elections

and write a constitution. Now, we accomplished both of the first

two goals. The third-stated goal by the President of the United

States in his speech prior to our vote was that we would train the

Iraqi military in order for them to keep the peace and allow that

fledgling government to survive. I believe I’m right that those—

those are not the same words, but those are the specific goals.

The strategy to accomplish those was a military strategy, because it took a military strategy to accomplish goals one, two, and

three. Our current dilemma is our failure in No. 3, which has come

about because of the rise of sectarian violence, in addition to all the

other violence that is precipitated by other interests in the region

and al-Qaeda.

Here’s the question. You state, in your—where Senator Voinovich

was—‘‘It should be seen as’’—‘‘it,’’ meaning the current move by the

President, in terms of Anbar and Baghdad—‘‘It should be seen as

the first step toward a new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region, ideally on a nonpartisan basis.’’ And

then, in the next paragraph, the last conjunction in that sentence

728

says ‘‘and to provide the maneuvering room for a major diplomatic

effort to stabilize the Middle East.’’

That’s a lot, I’m sorry, but my question is this. My hope for the

President’s strategy, currently, is that it will produce enough stability in the current violent neighborhoods where the sectarian violence is going on, where some reconciliation can take place and you

can begin diplomacy. Am I wrong in the—in that hope?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that the objectives that I have stated,

and the objectives you have stated, are compatible with what the

President is attempting to do. And certainly mistakes have been

made. Some of these mistakes derived from an overestimation of

the ability to apply American domestic experiences to the Iraqi situation. In our country, elections are a way of shifting responsibilities. In Iraq, they were a way of deepening ethnic rivalries. That’s

hard for Americans to absorb right away.

I am convinced, but I cannot base it on any necessary evidence

right now, that the President will want to move toward a bipartisan consensus, and that the things I have said here are not incompatible with his convictions. And I have confidence that he will

attempt to do this.

It’s, of course, your responsibility to determine to what extent

that has been done by the administration. I cannot—but I think

that to spend the last 2 years of an administration in a sort of civil

war between the executive and the legislative should be avoided by

both sides. And we should be able to evolve a position on which so

much depends for such a long time as a joint national enterprise.

That’s my plea. But if I were before the President, I’d say the same

thing to him.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I appreciate the answer, because that,

too, is my goal.

You know, Mr. Chairman, every one of us prefers a diplomatic

solution to a military solution. But we can’t forget, those three

goals, which I—nobody disputed what I said—that we went into

Iraq—went into Iraq, because diplomacy had failed, worldwide diplomacy at the United Nations had failed, in terms of Iraq refusing

to comply with those resolutions. That meant the strategy had to

go to a military one or a look the other way, and if you ever look

the other way when you’re telling people there are going to be consequences, then you have no diplomacy. So, I think it’s very dangerous for us to be talking about a circumstance in which there

would be no consideration of diplomacy. We are there because diplomacy failed, and what will ultimately succeed will be diplomacy.

But my belief in this is that quelling the sectarian violence and stabilizing the conditions long enough for the beginning of reconciliation can be the first step toward regional negotiation and diplomacy working.

And I won’t make any more speeches, but I want to thank the

Secretary again. He’s given me a lot of good lines for the remarks

I’m going to have to make on the floor in a few days, and I appreciate it a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you——

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

729

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here. I want to

make it clear to you, we’re waiting for the invitation from the

President to discuss this. We have tried. I have tried, and I’d respectfully suggest a lot of people here have tried. We’re also waiting for a strategy. The President has explicitly rejected international involvement and has—the disagreements we have with

them is no international involvement and the definition of the Iraqi

mission.

But I want to make it clear, I stand ready, as just one of 100

Senators, to work with this President. I have privately told him

that—publicly told him that—and we’re waiting for both an invitation and a wholesome discussion, a fulsome discussion, about what

the strategy should be. What is the strategy?

And everyone I have talked to, thus far—there may be exceptions—from his former Secretary of State to you to Democrats involved, to the best of my knowledge, no one can come forward and

say how we can get from here to there absent engaging the international community, and that’s been flatly rejected. Flatly rejected.

Involving the United Nations, involving the Permanent Five, involving a larger construct of Muslim nations, as you suggested, has

been, every time, flatly rejected.

So, I’m not quite sure, Johnny, I’m ready to work. I am—and I’m

sure everyone is. And so, again, I don’t want you to leave, Mr. Secretary, thinking that we’re looking for a fight with the President.

We’re looking for the President to engage us. Not Democrats—

Democrats and Republicans looking for him to engage us.

And I’ll conclude by saying, Mr. Secretary, I suggested, and others suggested the same thing on the Republican side, that what the

President should have done after the last election—invite those of

us on both sides that he thinks have some modicum of influence

here, to Camp David—no staff, no telephones, no nothing—just to

sit down and have a real discussion.

I have found, at least in my experience thus far, there is not,

really, a desire to do that. I think it’s best for the country, I think

it’s best for the region, I think it’s best to respond to the American

people that way. But, in the meantime, this is all about responding

to a tactic masquerading as a strategy that changes a mission that

many of us think is not able to be accomplished by what he’s suggesting.

But, again, your contribution is significant. It always has been.

I thank you very much, and I hope you’ll remain available to us,

both publicly and privately.

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you for the spirit in which this session has

been conducted.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You’re well respected

by everyone on this committee.

OK. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Our next witness is an equally

distinguished former Secretary of State, and I understand she is in

the anteroom and will—I’ll—we’ll get her and escort her in.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come back to order.

And, again, I want to thank Secretary Kissinger, but welcome enthusiastically, as well, Secretary Albright.

730

Staff has pointed out to me I should make a clarification so no

one misunderstands. There has been an invitation to the White

House to work on a group called the Lieberman—or, not called—

the Lieberman, and others, Antiterrorism Group, but that is not

the invitation I’m talking about, so I don’t want anybody to misunderstand. The White House is always generous in their invitations for us to come down and talk, but I think we need to have

a real sense of where they want to go.

At any rate, having said that, Madam Secretary, welcome. It’s a

great honor having you here. And I want to publicly thank you for

your continued involvement, in a very detailed way, in engaging

with your former colleagues—Foreign Ministers—and you’ve put together a group of—talk about bipartisan, it’s multinational, as well

as sharing every ideological stripe, and you’ve kept that group together. It is a very influential group of individuals you continue to

meet with, and the collective input is, I’m sure, as welcomed in

other capitals as it is here. So, I thank you.

I made an opening statement earlier, so I’m not going to go any

further, other than to say you’re very welcome here, as you know,

Madam Secretary, and we’re anxious to hear what you have to say.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. I’d simply follow you, Mr. Chairman, and we’re

looking forward to hearing the Secretary’s testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. The floor is yours, Madam Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE; PRINCIPAL, THE ALBRIGHT GROUP LLC,

WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator

Lugar and members of the committee.

I am delighted to be here and to return to these very familiar

surroundings and to have the opportunity to testify. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman, for saying what you did about my former Foreign

Ministers group. It grows by virtue of what it is. And so, we have

a lot of interesting discussions and good hopes that some of our

words will be taken seriously.

I am very glad to testify, and I will speak both plainly and

bluntly. There are no good options. If there were, many of us, including many of you, would not have been issuing such urgent

warnings for the past 4 years. Those warnings were ignored. The

result is that every available alternative now carries with it grave

risks. Each raises moral and practical questions about our responsibilities. And each depends for success far more on what others do

than on what we do, which is another way of saying that, despite

our power, we have lost control of the most important U.S. national

security initiative of this decade.

I desperately want General Petraeus and our forces to succeed.

Those troops are the finest in the world and will accomplish any

mission that is within their power, but it is the responsibility of civilian authorities to assign the missions that make sense. Instead,

we have put our forces in the absurd position of trying to prevent

violence by all sides against all sides. The Sunnis want us to protect them from the Shiites. The Shiites want us on the sidelines so

that they can consolidate their power. Both are divided among

731

themselves. Al-Qaeda is using the turmoil to recruit the bin Ladens

of tomorrow. And Iran’s regional influence is greater now than it

has been in centuries. If I were a soldier on patrol in Baghdad, I

wouldn’t know whom to shoot at until I was shot at, which is untenable.

I agree with the President that it would be a disaster for us to

leave Iraq under the present circumstances, but it may also be a

disaster for us to stay. And if our troops are not in a position to

make a decisive difference, we have an overriding duty to bring

them home.

The Iraq Study Group recommended a more limited role for the

United States troops. Their view, which I share, is that Iraqis must

take responsibility for their own security, because, although we can

assist, we cannot do the job for them. We do not have enough people, we do not speak the language, we do not know the culture well

enough, and, quite frankly, we do not have the recognized legal and

moral authority to go into Iraqi homes and compel obedience. Each

time we do, we lose as much ground politically as we might hope

to gain militarily, and that’s why the President’s current policy

should be viewed less as a serious plan than as a prayer. It is not

about reality, it is about hope. But hope is not a strategy.

The truth is that Iraqis will continue to act in their own best interests, as they perceive them; and we must act in ours. Today in

Iraq, three nightmares come to mind. First, an Iraq that serves as

a training and recruiting ground for al-Qaeda. Second, an Iraq that

is subservient to Iran. Third, an Iraq so torn by conflict that it ignites a regionwide war. We may well end up with one, or all three,

of these nightmares. There is no easy exit. And I expect this year

to be brutal.

Accordingly, I offer my recommendations with genuine humility,

for they are designed simply to make the best of a truly bad situation.

First, we should do all we can to encourage a political settlement

that would reduce the violence. Americans are united on this. We

favor an arrangement that would recognize the Shia majority, protect the Sunni minority, and allow the Kurds a high degree of autonomy. In recent days, there has been some movement in the right

direction. The overall violence, however, remains at a record level,

and the prospects for a real breakthrough are tenuous, at best.

My second recommendation supports the first, which is to increase diplomatic activity. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we both know that we can talk to governments without endorsing them or overlooking past actions. Talking to governments

about hard problems is why diplomacy matters. It’s actually what

diplomats do.

The case for talking to Syria is strong, if only to warn its government about the dangers of supporting violent elements, either in

Iraq or Lebanon. Further, we have cooperated with Syria in the

past on some issues, including Iraq, and might well be able to do

so now.

As for Iran, there are many serious people with whom one might

talk. The problem is that President Ahmadinejad is not one of

them. We should do nothing that might bolster his standing, but

we should indicate our desire over the long term to have good relaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00741 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
732

tions with Iran’s people. More broadly, United States efforts to put

diplomatic pressure in Iraq with regard to its nuclear program deserve the support of every member of this committee, and those efforts may still work.

I do, however, urge the committee to ask detailed questions

about every aspect of the administration’s intentions toward Iran,

and to demand credible answers. I—it would be interesting to know

why the statements have gotten more bellicose. It would be interesting to know why there are aircraft carriers in the region. It

would just be interesting to know where they’re going. We have

learned the hard way what happens when this administration decides on a policy without putting its assumptions to the test of legislative scrutiny and informed debate.

Third, we should do all we can to revive a meaningful ArabIsraeli peace process. This is important for the Israelis and Palestinians themselves, but I also say this because United States

prestige in the region has suffered due to our inactivity these past

6 years, but, more important, because peace is the right goal to

pursue.

As shown by her recent trip, Secretary Rice has begun to engage.

I only worry that it is too little, too late. Middle East diplomacy is

a full-time job, and a roadmap does no good if it is never taken out

of the glove compartment.

Fourth, both in Iraq and in the region, we must avoid the temptation to take sides in the millennium-old Sunni-Shiite split. We

must be mindful of the interests of all factions and willing to talk

to every side, but our message should not vary. We should pledge

support to all who observe territorial borders, honor human rights,

obey the rule of law, respect holy places, and seek to live in peace.

Fifth, Congress should continue to support efforts to build democratic institutions in Iraq. As chair of the National Democratic

Institute, I’m not neutral about this, but it was always unrealistic

to believe that a full-fledged democracy could be created in Iraq

overnight. It is, however, equally unrealistic to think that a stable

Iraq will ever be created if democratic principles are not part of the

equation.

One of my great fears is that our Nation’s experience in Iraq will

cause Americans to abandon efforts to build democracy over the

long term. That would be a mistake. There are wise and unwise

ways to go about the task. But the goal of supporting democracy

is the right one. It is intimately connected to America’s role in the

world, both historically and in the future. And if we give up on democracy, we give up not only on Iraq, but also on America.

Sixth, we should make one more effort to encourage others, especially our NATO allies, to expand their training of Iraq’s military

and police. Every country in Europe has a stake in Iraq’s future.

Every country should do what it can to help.

Finally, we should call on religious leaders from all factions to

take a stand against the violence in Iraq. Everyone is so convinced

they have God on their side, we should at least make the case that

God is on the side of peace.

At the same time, we should reiterate our own pledge, on moral

grounds, to minimize harm to civilians and guarantee humane

733

treatment of prisoners. And element of confession in this would not

hurt.

The bottom line is that there must be an evolution in the political situation in Iraq that will curb sectarian violence and reduce

the level of insecurity to something that can be managed. With a

settlement, we could withdraw gradually, with nightmares avoided.

Without a settlement, our troops cannot make a decisive difference,

and might as well begin to redeploy.

Mr. Chairman, America’s own war between the States lasted

about as long as the current war in Iraq, and it went on so long

that Abraham Lincoln said, in frustration, that the heavens were

hung in black. We might say the same today.

I see profound problems ahead, but I have confidence in the resilience of our Nation. We can, in time, regain our balance, restore

our reputation, and all that is required is that we respond creatively to change, live up to our own principles, and ensure that

America becomes America again.

Thank you very much, and now I look forward to responding to

your questions.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF

STATE; PRINCIPAL, THE ALBRIGHT GROUP LLC, WASHINGTON, DC

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased to return to these familiar surroundings and to have the opportunity to testify regarding

U.S. policy toward Iraq. To maximize time for discussion, I will speak both plainly

and bluntly. There are no good options.

If there were, many of us—including many of you—would not have been issuing

such urgent warnings these past 4 years. Those warnings were ignored. The result

is that every alternative now carries with it grave risks and the potential for even

deeper and wider strife.

Each raises moral and practical questions about our responsibilities—to the people of Iraq, to our troops, and to our collective future.

Each depends for success far more on what others do than on what we do, which

is another way of saying that—despite our power—we have lost control of the most

important U.S. national security initiative of this decade.

I desperately want General Petraeus and our forces in Iraq to succeed. Those

troops are the finest in the world and will accomplish any mission that is within

their power, but it is the responsibility of our civilian authorities to assign them

missions that make sense.

Even with all that has gone wrong, I could have supported an increase in troops

if that increase had been tied to a clear, important, and achievable mission—and

if we were guaranteed that our forces would have the best training and equipment.

Instead, we have put our fighting men and women in the absurd position of trying

to prevent violence by all sides against all sides. The Sunnis want us to protect

them from the Shiites. The Shiites want us on the sidelines so they can consolidate

their power. Both are divided among themselves.

Al-Qaeda is using the turmoil to recruit the Zarqawis and bin Ladens of tomorrow. Violent criminals operate with impunity. And as a direct result of our actions,

Iran’s regional influence is greater now than it has been in centuries.

If I were a soldier on patrol in Baghdad, I wouldn’t know whom to shoot at until

I was shot at, which is untenable.

To quote 1stSgt Marc Biletski while under sniper fire in the capital last week,

‘‘Who the hell is shooting at us? Who’s shooting at us? Do we know who they are?’’

Or to quote Specialist Terry Wilson, a soldier on that same patrol, ‘‘The thing is—

we wear uniforms, they don’t.’’

I agree with the President that it would be a disaster for us to leave Iraq under

the present circumstances. But it may also be a disaster for us to stay—and if our

troops are not in a position to make a decisive difference, we have an overriding

duty to bring them home sooner rather than later.

734

James Baker and Lee Hamilton recommended a more limited role for U.S.

troops—with an emphasis on training, working in tandem, and providing a backup

rapid reaction capability.

Their view, which I share, is that Iraqis must take responsibility for their own

security—because although we can assist—we cannot do the job for them. We do not

have enough people; we do not speak the language; we do not know the culture well

enough and, quite frankly, we do not have the recognized legal and moral authority

to go into Iraqi homes and compel obedience. Each time we do, we lose as much

ground politically, as we might hope to gain militarily.

This is crucial because, if there is to be a solution in Iraq, it will come about

through political means. This has been obvious for years. An arrangement must be

worked out that will give each side more than they can obtain through continued

violence.

If Iraq’s leaders finally begin to move in this direction, we would likely see

progress on the security front. And I think the American people would be more patient about the continued presence of our troops.

But from the evidence thus far, this is neither a likely outcome, nor one we can

dictate. For better or worse, Iraqis appear to think they know their own society and

their own interests better than we do. They have responsibilities to each other that

they must meet, but no reason, based on the ‘‘thousands of mistakes’’ Secretary Rice

admits we have made, to take our advice.

They have no appetite, after Abu Ghraib and Haditha, to listen to our lectures

about human rights. And they know that President Bush has ruled out leaving, so

where is our leverage? That is why the President’s current policy should be viewed

less as a serious plan than as a prayer. It is not about reality. It is about hope.

But hope is not a strategy.

The truth is that Iraqis will continue to act in their own best interests as they

perceive them. We must act in ours.

Today, in Iraq, three nightmares come to mind.

First, an Iraq that serves as a training and recruiting ground for al-Qaeda. Second, an Iraq that is subservient to Iran. Third, an Iraq so torn by conflict that it

ignites a regionwide war. We may end up with one of these nightmares; we could

end up with all of them. There is no easy exit.

Ordinarily, civil wars end in one of three ways: One side defeats the other; an

outside force intervenes to compel peace; or the sides exhaust themselves through

violence. The first outcome is unlikely in Iraq and the second unrealistic.

I expect this year to be brutal. Accordingly, I offer my recommendations with genuine humility, for they provide no magic answers; they are designed simply to make

the best of a truly bad situation.

First, we should do all we can to encourage a political settlement that would reduce the violence. Americans are united on this. We favor an arrangement that

would recognize the Shia majority, protect the Sunni minority, and allow the Kurds

a high degree of autonomy. Such an arrangement would share oil revenues fairly,

ensure the protection of basic infrastructure, and spur economic reconstruction.

In recent days, there has been some movement in the right direction.

For example, there has been progress toward approval of a national oil law and

some evidence of restraint—both voluntary and otherwise—on the part of the largest Shia militias. The overall violence, however, remains at a record level—and the

prospects for a real breakthrough are tenuous at best.

My second recommendation supports the first, which is to increase diplomatic activity throughout the region. This was proposed by the Iraq Study Group and ignored by the administration with respect to Syria and Iran.

Mr. Chairman, we both know that we can talk to governments without in any way

endorsing them or overlooking past actions. Talking to governments about hard

problems is why diplomacy matters; it is what diplomats do. Iraq’s neighbors are

relevant to Iraq and anyone who is relevant to Iraq is relevant to the security and

mission of American troops.

The case for talking to Syria is strong, if only to warn its government about the

dangers of supporting violent elements either in Iraq or Lebanon. Further, we have

cooperated with Syria in the past on some issues, including Iraq, and might well

be able to do so now.

As for Iran, there are many serious people with whom one might talk; the problem is that President Ahmadinejad is not one of them. We should do nothing that

might bolster his standing, but we should indicate our desire over the long term to

have good relations with Iran’s people. Iran’s influence in Iraq is, of course, inevitable given its closeness and shared religion. It is not possible to exclude Iran from

Iraq.

735

However, we should bear in mind that no Arab population will take orders from

Tehran if it has an alternative. Iran will dominate Iraq only if Iraq’s Shiite population feels it must turn in that direction for protection.

More broadly, U.S. efforts to put diplomatic pressure on Iran with regard to its

nuclear program deserve the support of every member of this committee; those efforts may still work.

I do, however, urge the committee to ask detailed questions about every aspect

of the administration’s intentions toward Iran and to demand detailed and credible

answers. We have learned the hard way what happens when this administration decides on a policy without putting its assumptions to the test of rigorous legislative

scrutiny and informed public debate.

Third, we should do all we can to revive a meaningful Arab-Israeli peace process.

I say this because U.S. prestige in the region has suffered due to our inactivity

these past 6 years, but more important, because peace is the right goal to pursue.

This is true politically, militarily, and morally for Arabs and Israelis alike.

Secretary Rice appears to understand this and, as shown by her recent trip, has

begun to engage. A meeting of the quartet is scheduled for Friday. I only worry that

it is too little, too late. Middle East diplomacy is a full-time job. It requires a willingness to be blunt and the resources and prestige to encourage real compromise.

A roadmap does no good if it is never taken out of the glove compartment.

After all that has happened, the prospects for peace may seem dim, but the logic

of peace has never been more compelling. Although we should focus first on Israel

and the Palestinians, the question of a comprehensive settlement should also be addressed provided Syria changes course and begins to play a positive regional role.

The basic outlines of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East are well known.

America’s urgent commitment to such an agreement must also be clearly understood.

Fourth, both in Iraq and in the region, we must avoid the temptation to take sides

in the millennium old Sunni-Shiite split. It would be an error to align ourselves

with the Shiites (because Saddam Hussein’s loyalists and al-Qaeda are Sunni) or

the Sunnis (because Iraq’s worst militias and Hezbollah are Shia). We must be

mindful of the interests of all factions and willing to talk to every side, but our message should not vary.

We should pledge support to all—Sunni, Shia, Christian, Druze, Jew, Arab, Kurd,

Persian—who observe territorial borders, honor human rights, obey the rule of law,

respect holy places, and seek to live in peace.

Fifth, Congress should continue to support efforts to build democratic institutions

in Iraq including the next step—provincial elections. Though the odds seem long,

the best news coming out of Iraq these past few years have been the rounds of balloting, the approval of a constitution, the convening of a national parliament, and

the beginning of a multiparty system. Given where Iraq began, these events have

occurred with startling rapidity. As chair of the National Democratic Institute

(NDI), I am not neutral about this but neither is America. It was always unrealistic

to believe that a full-fledged democracy could be created in Iraq even in a decade.

But it is equally unrealistic to think that a stable and peaceful Iraq will ever be

created if democratic principles and institutions are not part of the equation.

I must add that, 2 weeks ago, an employee of NDI was killed in an attack on a

convoy in which she was riding. Three dedicated security personnel were also killed.

I said then that there is no more sacred roll of honor than those who have given

their last full measure in support of freedom. Andrea Parhamovich was from Ohio,

a constituent of Senator Voinovich on this committee. According to her family,

‘‘Andi’s desire to help strangers in such a dangerous environment thousands of miles

away might be difficult for others to understand, but to us, it epitomized Andi’s natural curiosity and unwavering commitment. She was passionate, bold, and caring,

as exemplified by her work to improve the lives of all Iraqis.’’

One of my great fears is that our Nation’s experience in Iraq will cause Americans

to abandon efforts to build democracy over the long term. That would be a mistake.

Obviously, security issues have to be taken into account in particular cases, and in

every case, there are wise and unwise ways to go about the task; but the goal of

supporting democracy is the right one. It is intimately connected to America’s role

in the world, both historically and in the future. If we give up on democracy, we

give up not only on Iraq, but also on America.

Sixth, we should make one more effort to encourage others, especially our NATO

allies, to increase their training of Iraq’s military and police. Every country in Europe has a stake in Iraq’s future; every country should do what it can to help. In

the Balkans, we used a diplomatic contact group of interested nations to coordinate

policy, generate resources, and take steps to improve security on a regional basis.

736

Something similar should have been established for Iraq immediately after the invasion; it remains a useful idea.

Finally, we should call on religious leaders from all factions and faiths to take

a stand against the violence in Iraq. Given our own lack of credibility, we can’t get

too close to this initiative without poisoning it—but there are figures of respect—

Mustafa Ceric (Grand Mufti of Sarajevo), Mohammed Khatami (former President of

Iran), King Abdullah of Jordan, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad

Badawi, Ayatollah Sistani—who might be willing and able to articulate the religious

case for reconciliation in Iraq. It’s worth a try. Everyone is so convinced they have

God on their side; we should at least make the case that God is on the side of peace.

At the same time, we should reiterate our own pledge—on moral grounds—to

minimize harm to civilians and guarantee humane treatment to prisoners. An element of confession in this would not hurt.

The bottom line is that there must be an evolution in the political situation in

Iraq that will curb sectarian violence and reduce the level of insecurity to something

that can be managed. With a settlement, we could withdraw gradually, with nightmares avoided. Without a settlement, our troops cannot make a decisive difference

and might as well begin to redeploy. In that case, we should do all we can to help

the Iraqis who have taken risks to support us these past few years.

Ordinarily, I am an optimist, but in this case I am not optimistic. I do, however,

oppose efforts at this point to cut off funds for military operations in Iraq. As many

members of this committee are in the process of showing, there are more constructive ways to express concern about administration policies.

Mr. Chairman, America’s own war between the States lasted about as long as the

current war in Iraq. It went on so long that Abraham Lincoln said in frustration

that the heavens were hung in black. We might say the same today.

I see profound problems ahead, but I have confidence in the resilience of our Nation. We can, in time, regain our balance and restore our reputation. All that is required is that America become America again.

We must respond creatively to change. We must use the full array of our national

security tools. We must live up to our own democratic principles. We must, in the

words of John Kennedy, pursue peace as the necessary rational end of rational man.

And we must honor the men and women of our Armed Forces by ensuring that

they have the right equipment, the right leadership, and the right missions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

I’m going to yield to Senator Boxer and then I’ll go last in this

round.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I so appreciate it.

Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your clarity. And I

think you’re the first person in a long time that came before us and

used the word ‘‘peace’’ a few times. And I like that, because it’s a

vision. And I remember, during the darkest days of the Vietnam

war, there was a bumper sticker that appeared, Mr. Chairman, on

some cars, and it said, ‘‘Imagine peace.’’ And at first I looked at it,

because where I was, definitely in the antiwar camp, and saying,

‘‘What does that mean?’’ And then I realized that we had almost

gotten to a point where we couldn’t imagine what it would be like

not to turn on the TV and see dead soldiers, Americans, as we’re

seeing now every day. So, we need to always think ahead to the

day when we will have that. And we need to have action now to

get to that place.

And here’s where I’m worried. I see paralysis setting in, in the

political sector of our own country. And it’s almost—it’s a fear of

what’s happening now, but a fear of how it could look, ‘‘It could be

worse.’’ And I think when you get into that place, where you’re

fearful of what’s happening now, but you fear the unknown of what

could be worse, you’re stuck. And I think we’re stuck, and I think

we need to start talking about a vision. We have to think diplomacy and talk about diplomacy. We have to think about peace and

talk about peace. We have to challenge al-Maliki, who—and now,

737

if—I apologize to him in advance—I have never heard the man

stand up in a speech and say, ‘‘I am calling for a cease-fire in my

country that I love so much.’’ I haven’t heard that. I want to hear

that.

And it’s one thing to talk about the American civil war, where

Americans versus Americans; it’s another thing to have an Iraqi

civil war, where Americans are paying a huge price. And you

quoted, in your written statement, your longer version, of a soldier—and you name him—that was from the New York Times

story—who said, ‘‘Who the hell is shooting at me?’’ They don’t

know. And, to this, we’re going to escort another 21,000 of our

beautiful children, and some of them are fathers and mothers.

We’re putting them into that hell.

So, I’m glad that you’re using the words ‘‘peace,’’ and I want to

talk to you about something I’ve been pushing, and my chairman

knows I am, because I said most people are paralyzed, not everyone. Our chairman has come forward with a vision of how this

thing can end up in a place where people will stop killing each

other and yet keep together the country of Iraq to do the things a

country has to do, including making sure the oil is shared in a fair

way. It’s not three separate countries. He’s gotten a rap on that.

Never was. Always semiautonomous, policing by your own people,

trust built up in that kind of—it’s just what’s happening in

Kurdistan.

Now, today we had a breakthrough, I think, with Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger said, essentially—and I am being fair in what he

said—he said, ‘‘You know, I think that’s where it’s going,’’ he said,

in answer to my question, ‘‘it’s going to the Biden plan. It’s moving

that way, but we have to be careful not to put the American stamp

on it, because that wouldn’t be good,’’ to which I said, ‘‘I’d rather

have us in the middle of a diplomatic solution than in the middle

of a civil war.’’

And I’m asking you the same question. And I’m not asking you

to endorse the Biden-Gelb plan, or the Gelb-Biden plan, however

it is, but isn’t it time now to think—not only think diplomacy, but

act as if that is where we’re going? The American people voted to

get us out of there, in my opinion. Yes; they’re cautious. None of

our plan—I’m on the Feingold bill, Feingold-Boxer—we say it’s

going to take 6 months, and we’re going to leave antiterror forces

there, we’re going to leave training forces there. Not one plan says

we’re walking away from the region. But the American people want

us to get out, want our soldiers to stop dying, want a diplomatic

solution. What did the President give them? A military strategy, a

battle plan, for 21,000 troops.

So, I’m asking you, because I get frustrated sometimes with diplomats, of which I readily admitted before, I’m not one, you know

that—because I’m afraid that diplomats sometimes, by nature, are

cautious in what they say, because that’s your job, that—you have

to keep everybody moving, and you can’t shut off any ideas. And

I get it. But if we could agree that now is the time to think diplomacy, rather than keep talking about surges and so on, is it not

time for, maybe, a consensus to develop around this notion of a

meeting, whether it be regional, international, where everyone

comes to the table with their plans?

738

You know, yesterday, I had an all-day hearing on global warming. It was the most interesting thing. And, Mr. Chairman, I

missed you desperately. You were here. But we had—a third of the

Senate came—a quarter in person, the rest wrote. What was that—

why was it important to do that? Because we want to see where

everybody is, and we want to envision not the catastrophe of global

warming, but how we’re going to solve it. And so, we came together

as a U.S. Senate yesterday. It was a fascinating thing. And I think

we are way past the time where we have to be much more aggressive about demanding a kind of a conference where the ideas to

solve this problem all come on the table. And I’m wondering if you

feel that sense of urgency for diplomacy and specific solutions.

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Senator. And I think that I have

sometimes been known for being fairly blunt while I have been trying to be diplomatic.

I think we need a surge in diplomacy. That is what is essential

here. And what has troubled me is that there has not been any

kind of a comprehensive diplomatic approach to what is happening—in the Middle East, specifically; but generally. Comprehensive diplomatic planning is not a hallmark of this administration.

And I think that that has been very much missing.

So, I would agree that what has to happen is a big diplomatic

push. I was interested in what Dr. Kissinger had to say. I think—

he and I obviously talk fairly frequently, and we have talked about

the idea of a regional diplomatic approach, where, in fact, you actually talk to everybody, where you might begin by having a contact

group of the immediate powers, the Permanent Five of the Security

Council and then the regional countries. But I believe that what is

happening in the region is in the national interest of a number of

different countries, and they should be at the table. So, I think that

there needs to be a very comprehensive diplomatic approach.

On the idea of what happens to Iraq, I think that—I do think

it’s essential to talk about the territorial integrity of Iraq, which

both you and Chairman Biden have talked about. What I am troubled by is that this administration failed, after the invasion, to discuss with the political people in Iraq the concept of federalism—

that is something we happen to know something about—when they

were searching for particular ways to run a country that clearly is

composed of a variety of different sects, groups, and religious approaches. And so, I think the idea of the—as the Constitution of

Iraq is written, which allows for—and mandates, in fact—a great

deal of regional autonomy, is appropriate. I think there are certain

central powers that a government needs. Some of it has to do with

the oil revenue and various other parts. So, without endorsing any

plan, I do think reality here sets in that there will be regional autonomy. I do think we have to be very careful not to pursue or precipitate a breakup of Iraq as a country, because I think, as all of

you have described, it would have a dangerous impact on the rest

of the region. But it is time for us to have a surge in diplomacy.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, can I just finish, in 30 seconds?

Thank you.

Senator Biden’s plan never called for breaking up the country

into separate countries, so I have to say that a hundred times.

Never, ever did. It’s always been the type of system that is allowed

739

in the Iraqi Constitution. I just think sometimes, you know—no

one, that I know of, is suggesting it, at least not in the Senate. So,

I wanted to clear the point on that.

But I just want to thank you very much. I don’t know how many

people saw—in the news this weekend, there was a conversation

with the people who were close to al-Sadr. And what al-Sadr said

is, as soon as the American troops are ready to go after him, he’s

gone away. And he and his boys are going to other parts of Iraq

to increase their organization. They’re not going to stand out there

and be killed. And so, while we’re surging, he’s going to expand his

influence in the rest of the country. So, how this surge, in the long

run, is going to help us resolve things is beyond me, and the only

way is what you say, a diplomatic surge, an idea such as the chairman’s and others, on the table to give hope to the people that there

is a peaceful way out of this nightmare. And I just want to thank

you for continuing to come forward, because it’s very charged, and

it’s very hard, and I thank you for your words today.

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Thank you. If I might just comment, I have—

when asked about Senator Biden’s plan, I have said that, in fact,

it is an attempt to keep the country together——

Senator BOXER. Good.

Ms. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. Which I do believe is what it is

about. I’m just talking about, in the long run, what might happen

that we do have to watch out for. But I think it is very clear, from

my reading of the plan, that it is done in order to keep the country

together, and I do think that is an essential point.

I also think that a point that you make is, our troops are in a

very difficult position. They are there, their presence is necessary

for security, but their presence is also a flypaper attracting everybody who hates us. So, there are no simple solutions here, which

is why I think that we have to have a discussion, such as you all

are initiating.

Next, on Iran, I would like to know what is going on with our

Government’s policy toward Iran.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. So would I, Madam Secretary.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, let me ask you a question based upon your

longtime extraordinary leadership with the National Democratic

Institute and your interest in democracy, generally. We had a

panel, the other day, which included a witness who had been working for the National Endowment for Democracy, but also included

the son of President Talibani, and two other persons with roots in

Iraq. What I took away from that panel was a description of Iraq

after our military operations were concluded; in a word: Anarchy.

They described how there was very little policing in most of the

areas of the country. As a result, bandits, common criminals,

preyed upon people, not simply in Baghdad, but really throughout

the country. And, therefore, the thing people care about most there,

quite apart from our interest in democracy for the country, or some

central government, was simply protection for themselves, for their

property, and so forth.

740

From this desire for security, they suggested, grew many militia,

not simply the well-known ones that involve thousands of persons,

or those identified with sectarian causes, but local groups of people

who exercise some political authority.

Out of the midst of this, the United States worked with some authorities in Iraq to have elections, elections with regard to people

in Parliament, one with regard to the Constitution, but some of our

witnesses said these elections confirmed about the number of

Sunnis there are in the country, how many Shiites, likewise, and

how many Kurds. So, it is as if we took a census. The Shiites, as

the most numerous group predictably got more representatives

than the others.

Secretary Kissinger, this morning, made the point that in a situation in which there are not well-established institutions which recognize minority rights, which have these checks and balances and

human rights and so forth, in essence, democratic votes may simply

confirm that one side is dominant and there is a sectarian feeling

that dominance may then be enforced by a government which

comes from all of this.

I’m asking your view—was our pursuit of democracy, the stages

that occurred there, appropriate? If it was not, was there, at any

point, an opportunity for these institutions that buttress democracy

to grow? Or, in the sectarian situation, is there going to be a sense,

for a while, of minority rights, rather than winner-take-all? And,

finally, if, in this current situation, the Maliki government, the Shiite government, feels that somehow it is being undermined and

seeks assistance from Iran so that it preserves at least the Shiite

side of it, as well as maybe some civil authority in Iraq, how are

we to respond to that?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, we’ve hit on my favorite subject, so—but I

think that the issue here is that I think we’re all alike, and people

want to be able to make decisions about their own lives. Therefore,

I do believe that democracy is not just a Western whim, but something that does fit across the world. But you cannot impose democracy. Imposing democracy is an oxymoron. And what the National

Democratic Institute had done in various places—we’re in over 60

countries now—is to support democracy in various places where

there are ideas and people want to participate in their own government.

I think that many mistakes were made early on in Iraq, in terms

of not understanding what had to be done with the political structure. We talked about the federalism issue. Also, that elections

would, in fact, make clear that the Shia were the majority population. But it is possible to have elections in which the majority is

elected, while minority rights are also honored.

And I think that we have learned that democracy is not an

event, democracy is a process. And there have been, I think, positive feelings about democracy in Iraq. I do think, when we saw the

purple fingers and everything, it was a legitimate movement, there

were people who took great risks to go out and vote at that time.

NDI has been on the ground, we have been training a lot of people.

Very sadly, we lost a person last week, Andrea Parhamovich—from

Ohio—who was a wonderful young woman.

741

But the truth is that we can’t give up on Iraq. We will not have

a functioning Jeffersonian democracy, or Jacksonian or any other,

for the time being. But I do believe in the idea of democracy support. I do not believe in the possibility of imposing democracy on

Iraq, which I think was really part of what was happening there.

Senator LUGAR. I offer my sincere condolences to the entire NDI

family on the death of Ms. Parhamovich. But, let me ask one question you’ve raised that Iran brings into this international context.

There are fears on the part of some of the Sunni nations surrounding Iraq that the Shiite government might ally with Iran.

What are the dangers there?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that we have to be very careful

about a long-range trend in the region which is an Arab-Persian

war—Sunni-Shia, if you want to describe it that way. And I think

that it is of great concern. And we should try, in many ways, to

hope that we’re not in the middle of it, and also to do everything

to try to mitigate such a possibility. That is not done, frankly, by

deciding that we’re never going to talk to Iranians. And the relationship between the Shia in Iraq and the Iranians exists, that’s

there. And I do think that our main problem is trying to figure out

how to develop an area within the Middle East where these shifts

can be absorbed peacefully, where we are part of some kind of a

new security framework and are able to deal with what I think

could be a disaster, which is a Persian-Arab war.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your

courtesy, as well, throughout the hearing.

And, Madam Secretary, it’s great to see you again, and we appreciate your service. And I want to thank you for your candor.

You know, I read your testimony before Secretary Kissinger finished his, and used some of it to ask questions, so there’s some degree of unanimity on one or two of these issues. Part of your testimony talks about that there are no good options, just the best of

what exists. And the result is that every alternative now carries

with it great risk and the potential for even deeper and wider

strife. Secretary Kissinger agreed with that.

But then, you go on to say, ‘‘Each depends,’’ talking about the alternatives, ‘‘for success far more than what others—on what others

do than on what we do,’’ This is another way of saying that, despite

our power, we have lost control of the most important U.S. national

security initiative of this decade. And Dr. Kissinger had a little bit

of a different view of that. He felt that we could still drive the

effort by our leadership to try to get others, who are critical to

achieving success, to do what we would help them to do to achieve

that.

How do you see that? At this point, how do you see us being able

to drive, or to change that dynamic, so that, while we may have

lost control, as you say, of the most important U.S. national security initiative of the decade, we seek to regain some of that control?

In another part of your written statement, you say, ‘‘An arrangement must be worked out that will give each side more than they

can obtain through continued violence.’’ The question is: How do we

742

get to that set of circumstances? How do we make, in other words,

Iraqis love their children more than they hate their neighbors?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. It’s going to be very difficult for me to say what

I’m about to say, which is that I am very troubled by America’s

reputation, at this point. I very much thought, and continued to

say, often, when I was Secretary, that the United States was the

indispensable nation. I have fully believed that, and I have thought

and believed in the goodness of American power. I continue to

believe in the goodness of the American people and our overall direction, but, rather than being in a position where we can drive

something now, when we get involved in something, people are

very suspicious about it.

I just came back from West Africa and East Africa, where people

were saying, ‘‘Well, you know, America’s position on Sudan is really

basically some kind of a reaction to what they’re not doing in the

Middle East.’’ And everything is viewed with suspicion. And that

troubles me incredibly, because the world needs America to have

ideas, to put bridging proposals on the table, and yet, at the moment, our motives are suspect everywhere.

Therefore, I think that what is essential is for us to begin to use

the diplomatic tool much more, which is why I thought that working through some kind of a contact group would be a good idea,

also trying to see the Middle East as a regional issue. Secretary

Kissinger spoke at length about history, and I think—feel very

strongly that people need to look at the Middle East in a historical

way. President Clinton told me to read one particular book, called

‘‘The Peace to End all Peace,’’ which provides a history of how the

modern Middle East was created after the end of the First World

War. And the short version was that it happened because the British and French bureaucracies were lying to each other. When the

British left the area, the United States became the, kind of, governing power.

And what is viewed in the Middle East now is that we are all

colonial powers, and there is a massive shift going on in the region.

I think we have to recognize that. We have to be there to support

those who want to live in peace and live in countries that make

sense. But I’m sorry to say that, at this moment, it’s a little hard

for the United States to put down a plan and say, ‘‘Salute,’’ because

our motives are suspect. That is the reason that there has to be

very active diplomacy, a regional plan.

And I also would say the following. We have to be protective of

our national interest. The United States did not begin World War

I or World War II, but, when we saw that it affected our national

interest, we went in there and fought. The Europeans and others

who did not favor this war and have criticized it, need to understand that what is going on in the Middle East affects their national interest, and they need to get in there and help. They have

to help in the training of a lot of the Iraqis, they have to help in

a lot of the reconstruction. It means we have to share the contracts

a bit. But they need to understand that they also have a national

interest in this. And, therefore, internationalizing this issue, understanding the shifts in the Middle East, is where I think we need

to go.

743

But I don’t want anybody to misunderstand me in terms of my

respect for what our troops have done, the support that the American people have given, and the necessity that ultimately America

continues to play a vital role in the world. But, at the moment, our

moral authority is seriously damaged.

Senator MENENDEZ. Under the heading of the part of your statement that says, ‘‘An arrangement must be worked out that would

give each side more than they can obtain through continued violence’’—what would you envision some of that being?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that the violence is just—I can’t visualize what it’s like to live in Baghdad or Basra or places where

people are terrified to go to meetings. Violence is getting them nowhere. And I think that what needs to be done is to really work

on—as everybody has said, there have to be political solutions to

this; there are no purely military solutions. A political solution will

provide majority rule, but, as many people here have learned, minority rights are also very important. And so, there has to be a

structure which permits that, which recognizes the differences

among the various groups in Iraq, where they gain by not killing

each other, but in sharing the wealth of what is a pretty resourcerich country. And I think, also, that the religious leaders need to

play an important part in this search for common ground. None of

it is easy, believe me. And it has been exacerbated by the fact that,

as others have described, there is routine killing and gangs. But

they can gain more by a political solution in which minority rights

are recognized and resources are shared.

Senator MENENDEZ. One very last question. Lee Hamilton was

here with Secretary Baker and he basically said he has little faith

in Prime Minister Maliki, in terms of having a series of benchmarks, chances to meet them, and not achieving them. What’s your

assessment of that?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I don’t know Prime Minister Maliki. I think

that it is very hard for us to say they’re a sovereign government

and then expect them to do exactly as we want them to. On the

other hand, if our forces are there, helping, then we do have the

right to advocate certain—‘‘benchmarks’’ is the best word, not a

timetable, but—benchmarks, in terms of what they need to achieve

in moving forward on getting the oil legislation passed or in working together on developing some of the political institutions.

We cannot leave this as open-ended. I think that’s an essential

part. We also have to make clear that we don’t want to have permanent bases there. And we have to make clear that we need to

see some progress. So, I would agree with the general thrust of the

Iraq Study Group on this, and some others who have testified.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. The Chair has asked me to recognize

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, thank you for your public service and your

levelheaded approach to foreign affairs. And thank you for your

great accomplishments while heading up our diplomatic efforts.

The Iraq Study Commission said, we ought to open up to Syria.

Now, I understand you’ve already discussed this issue here earlier

today. I went to Syria. We saw a little crack in the door after a

744

very sharp exchange between myself and President Assad on

things that we disagree on. But he did open the door, as he did 3

years ago, to cooperation with the Americans on better control of

the border. And he followed through on that over the last 3 years;

albeit sporadic, there was cooperation, and then the cooperation

precipitously stopped a couple of months after the assassination of

Rafik Hariri. Now President Assad has opened the door again.

What would be your advice to us in order to continue this dialog

if the executive branch refuses to engage in it?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, my general belief is that one

gains by communication with countries with whom we disagree. In

fact, it is even more important, because we need to know what’s

going on and what their thinking is. And I certainly met with people that I didn’t agree with—Milosevic or Kim Jong Il. But I think

that it is a way to learn a lot and to deliver some pretty tough messages.

I think that we need to take advantage of openings that President Assad provides, for a number of reasons. One, we need their—

we need Syria’s help, in terms of the way you have talked about

the border issues, but also I think it would be very useful to somehow separate, a bit, this kind of peculiar alliance or relationship

between Iran and Syria. I also, without breaking any laws, in

terms of negotiations, I think that there are ways for various parliamentarians to meet, for dialog through private channels, tracktwo diplomacy, and a way to try to indicate that Americans are interested in learning what is going on in Syria.

We also learned, through the newspapers, that there were some

attempts to restart the Israel-Syria talks. So, there are any number

of avenues, I think, where it would not hurt, and I think it would

be in U.S. national interests, to try to find out more what President

Assad is thinking, which in no way would lessen our interest or our

desire to find out what happened on the assassination of Prime

Minister Hariri. I think we’re able to do both things at the same

time.

Senator BILL NELSON. I raised the issue of Iran with President

Assad, in the way of, ‘‘Would you not realize, Mr. President, that,

down the line, your interests are opposite those of Iran, and that

Iran ultimately wants Persian domination of the Arab countries in

the region? And yet, you’re establishing a relationship right now

that ultimately is going to haunt you.’’ He disputed that. What

would you, as someone who is extraordinarily experienced in these

matters of diplomacy, advise us as an avenue to convince Syria—

specifically, Assad—that Iran is really not his friend?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think you’ve pointed out the whole value

of having these kinds of conversations, because there are not a lot

of people around President Assad who, I think, are willing to challenge a lot of his thinking. And, therefore, it is important for people

with historical background and understanding of the long-term

problems to sit there with him and point up what you have said

you did. It doesn’t mean he’s going to agree with you overnight, but

if enough people deliver the same message—I dealt with President

Assad, and—having also dealt with his father, before that—and I

think that repetition works and that it is important. And that’s the

reason to open up a variety of channels to be able to point up what

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is happening in the whole Middle East, that Syria can, in fact, ultimately take its position within the Arab world, but that it has to

behave responsibly and it has to understand what the threats to

its national interests are, too. And that’s why an outsider that can

point these things up, I think, is very useful.

Senator BILL NELSON. Given the fact that there is a schism in

Iran—we’ve seen it in the local elections recently, we’ve seen other

evidence that Ahmadinejad is being reined in—would you advise

that this is an opening for the United States? Could some kind of

dialog ultimately bring about more moderation in the extremist

kind of statements and views expressed by the President of Iran?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, let me start out by saying none of this is

easy. Iran is a very complex place. Our history with Iran is equally

complex. And during the Clinton administration, we tried a number of ways to push. This is when President Khatami was in office,

and one had to be very careful. They, in fact, did not respond, and

I have it on pretty good authority that some of them are sorry that

they didn’t. But, again, I do think the statements that President

Ahmadinejad has been making are preposterous and do not deserve

a face-to-face meeting, then, with an American official leader. But

there are a number of different groups in Iran. We do know—I

found Tom Friedman’s column, this morning, very interesting,

where he points up how many people are educated in Iran, what

the problems are, in terms of dissent, the fact that people feel that

they are not getting a reward for the richness of Iran’s oil wealth.

And I think that there, again, are ways that there can be tracktwo diplomacy and that there are other people in Iran that can be

spoken to by Americans, as well as non-Americans. And so, for the

same reason, I would try to parse that situation and make it—it’s

interesting to me that, in fact, there has been criticism of

Ahmadinejad in Iran for the statements that he’s made, both on

the nuclear issue and others. And I think we need to be able to

work within that, through a variety of other groups and track-two

diplomacy, as well as official contacts.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Do you have any—you want to follow

up with anything, Senator? You’re welcome——

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I’m so shocked.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you’re here, and, even more shocking, I

haven’t asked any questions yet, so I’m going to—the Secretary has

been very gracious with her time, and the good news is, there’s not

a lot of people left here, at this moment, and——

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I would like to ask one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Please. You go right ahead.

Senator BILL NELSON. I went to Saudi Arabia specifically at the

request of General Hayden, the head of the CIA, because there

hadn’t been a lot of congressional delegations going to Saudi Arabia. And personal relationships are important in that part of the

world. So, again, this idea of dialog, building the relationships, and

so forth. But, as I pushed, in my talk with the King, and then a

number of his nephews with whom I met, who were responsible in

the various ministries for the different functions of the government,

I didn’t get the straight feeling that they would really get involved

in Iraq and help us through their Sunni tribal contacts as I was

746

requesting. From the Saudi point of view, clearly a more stable

Iraq is in their interest—but I didn’t get the warm feeling that

they were really foursquare going to get in and do it. And that’s

not even to bring up the issue of: Would they help fund some of

the reconstruction of Iraq? Can you give me an insight into the

Saudi mind as to why? And does that portend it will be very, very

difficult to get all the rest of those neighboring countries to come

together and help move Iraq toward political compromise?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think one of the more difficult things, even

when one has access to all the intelligence, is to know exactly

what’s on the Saudi mind. And when we were in office, I found, actually, that often the Saudis were more helpful than the public

ever knew. So, I don’t know whether that’s going on now or not.

I do think that they are very concerned—I know King Abdullah

pretty well from when he was Crown Prince, and I do think that

they are concerned about changes within their own country, and—

as you point out, a number of different sects and divisions there,

and a slowness to reform. And, obviously, that is their major

concern.

I think that it would be good, also, for them to try to help in

what is going on in Iraq. On the other hand, I don’t think we want

to start seeing stories in the papers, ‘‘All of a sudden the Saudis

are going into Iraq,’’ and there’s a kind of a concern that that will

broaden everything.

So, the question is how to get their help, in terms of understanding that the Sunnis should be a part of the entire system, and

that they also need to help, ultimately, with the large funds that

they have. And that all the countries, with the Saudis in the lead,

would benefit if there were not such turmoil in the region.

But that, again, is part of what the job of diplomacy is. You can’t

just, kind of, all of a sudden decide that the Vice President is going

to Saudi Arabia. You need to have very constant contact, you need

to know what is on the Saudi mind. As I read, there’s about to be

a new Saudi Ambassador here. And I think, again, it is very important for all of you, and many of us, to go to Saudi Arabia on a regular basis and talk about things with them. I find my trips there

always very enlightening. And we need to know more about Saudi

Arabia and about Jordan and Egypt and all the countries, because,

as I said earlier, there is a massive shift going on in the region,

and it behooves us to understand that we are in the middle of a

systemic change and that our role there will be different.

And I hope that we think more about some kind of an overall security system for the region, which is why I talked, earlier, about

a comprehensive diplomatic approach to this area.

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you think, after 1,327 years of hatred

between Sunnis and Shiites, that we have a chance of bringing

those two together——

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well——

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. In the midst of this sectarian

violence?

Ms. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. I don’t think we do, because most

people don’t even know the difference between them. I do think,

however, that we should be in a position that we can—to encourage. And I never—I wrote a book about the role of God and religion

747

in foreign policy—got a good title, ‘‘The Mighty and the Almighty.’’

And what I—I had trouble, even there, trying to figure out the adjectives and the nouns, and to say ‘‘moderate Muslims,’’ because

moderate Muslims don’t believe moderately. So, I think that moderates need to be passionate about what they believe in. But I

think that there are elements within Islam that are more capable

of helping in this than we are. And that is one of the reasons that

I believe that it’s essential to get religious leaders involved in this.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Casey. And then I’ll wait until the end here.

Senator CASEY. My——

The CHAIRMAN. Unless you want some time, Senator.

Senator CASEY. No; my timing is better than it normally is.

Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony today

and for being with us, and for your public service. Remarkable public service at, then, a difficult time in our Nation’s history and, I

think, today, as well.

One of the areas that I’ve tried to focus on in the midst of the

great panels that Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar have put together for us that come from the perspective of military strategy

and the questions that surround that, the political and governmental challenges that we face in Iraq, and that they face, of

course. But I’ve tried to focus, as many of us have, on diplomacy,

and sometimes, in my judgment, the lack thereof, or the lack of a

strategic commitment to diplomacy. And I know you may have covered this today, but I wanted to get your thoughts, in terms of (a)

what’s gone before us since 2003, in terms of what I think is a lack

of a strategy on diplomacy, and (b) and, I guess, more importantly,

what we should be doing, what our Government should be doing—

the President, the State Department, and certainly this committee

and the Congress, in its oversight role—to foster a strategic diplomatic surge, if you will, as opposed to what I seem to see as a—

kind of, tactical in responding to changes on the ground or public

pressure, as opposed to a strategy effort that’s sustained, and

there’s—kind of a sustained engagement over time. I don’t know if

you can answer that, in terms of what’s gone before us and what’s

ahead, if you had the ability to directly impact it.

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Let me just say this, there’s nothing easier than

to be on the outside and criticize those that are currently involved

in American diplomacy, especially when they criticized what we

had been doing in American diplomacy. But I will try to contain

myself.

I do think that what has not happened is to have any kind of

a comprehensive approach to diplomatic solutions. To a great extent, one of the most interesting things that’s happened in—from

the perspective, now, of a professor—of the struggles between the

State Department and the Defense Department is: What is the role

of diplomacy? To what extent is there a real partnership between

force and diplomacy? It is one of the things that was very much on

my mind when we were dealing with the issues of Kosovo. Chairman Biden mentioned this Foreign Ministers group that I’ve pulled

together. We are the people that worked all together through

Kosovo, which is how we began to understand how force and diploVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00757 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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macy work together. And I don’t see that happening, particularly,

here. Diplomacy really is taking very much of a back seat. To the

extent that one has seen it, a lot of it is ad hoc, rather than being

part of a larger comprehensive plan.

I believe that it is absolutely essential to begin to see the issues

of Iraq within the region and to understand that diplomatic efforts

have to also involve the other countries in the region and then

other countries in the world, because what is happening in Iraq is

definitely affecting their national interests.

People often talk about diplomacy as a chess game between two

people. It’s not a chess game. In chess, you have a lot of time, you

sit there between moves, and it’s relatively quiet. I think it’s more

like a game of pool, where, in fact, there are balls on a table. You

pick up a cue stick, you hope very much you can get the ball into

the pocket on the other side, but, on the way, you hit a lot of other

balls. And that’s what’s happening. And we are not considering

enough the horizontal aspect of diplomacy and getting enough players involved in it.

I think, also, we need to consider, for instance, that it isn’t just

the issues in the region. As we talk about Iran and what they’re

doing on their nuclear program, or not doing on their nuclear program, you can just bet that Kim Jong Il, in Pyongyang, is listening

also. So, I think we have to understand much more the interaction

of all of this and to understand that diplomacy is not appeasement,

that it is the vehicle for delivering some pretty tough messages,

and to get the help of others in trying to resolve some of these

problems. So, I’m very glad that you are focusing on that, also very

glad to see you here.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

And I was thinking, as well, about the—I think it helps those of

us in government—and you’ve dealt with a lot of us over the years,

and we’re better if we have lists that are very specific. And I’m just

wondering whether there’s a—and you may have covered this earlier, and I had one of those five-different-hearings-in-one-morning

days, so—it’s not an excuse, it’s just an explanation for where we’ve

been today—but I guess if you were thinking of the next—maybe

not even 6 months, but 3 to 6 months, if you had a short list of

things we should do diplomatically, very specific steps, what would

they be? If you can——

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well——

Senator CASEY. Boiling it down.

Ms. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. I think that one which has to be

done, for its own sake, as well as, obviously, the effect in the region, is for very strong concentration on the Israeli-Palestinian

issue. I know that there are those who want to make it central to

resolving what’s happening in the Middle East, and I think that

linkage is not correct, because it’s important to understand that

issues there have to be dealt with for their own sake, but they have

to be dealt with. And so, I was very glad to see Secretary Rice go

to the region. I understand the Quartet is going to be meeting in

Washington on Friday, so that there is some activation of that. And

I think that would help not only the immediate issue, but also

show American interest that has been lacking.

749

I, then, also would work on trying to pull together this contact

group of countries that have an interest in the region, the Permanent Five of the Security Council, plus the countries that surround

Iraq, and—we did that when we were dealing with the Balkans,

and it creates kind of an executive committee or a group that deals

with this issue on a day-to-day basis, and then they are able, each

one, as a part of that, to broaden the circle by having relationships

with other countries. So, that would be one thing.

I also would try, through diplomacy, to get other countries to

help in the reconstruction of Iraq and in the training of Iraqis, because the only way that we’re going to get out of there, which I believe we have to do, is if the security situation is dealt with, and

the only way the security situation will be dealt with is if the

Iraqis themselves begin to deal with it.

So, I could make a longer list, but, I think, if they did that much,

that would be a big step forward.

The CHAIRMAN. It would keep them occupied for a while.

Senator CASEY. Three is a good list for the Congress, I know

that.

That’s—but I know my time is almost expired, and I just want

to reiterate our thanks to you for your public service and for your

continuing public service in addition to which your testimony today

gives us a lot of food for thought, and I’m grateful.

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Good. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Madam Secretary, thank you. It’s kind of

like the old days. I get to sit down with you alone, and I, quite

frankly, miss your energy and your insight.

Madam Secretary, I just want to make a couple of things clear.

I believe that, had the President come up to the Congress and to

the leadership here in both parties and said, ‘‘Look, I have a comprehensive plan, which includes the need to temporarily alter force

in Iraq, but here’s the whole plan,’’ he may have gotten a very different reception.

The problem with the President’s plan: It’s the tactic. It’s a tactical change in mission, inserting our troops in the midst of a civil

war, in the single most white-hot portion of that civil war, a city

of 6.3 million, in the middle of Baghdad. And so, that’s what most

of us are reacting to. And now, as Senator Lugar has said, we

share the view that the concern is that you have friends like my

good friend Senator McCain, who supports this, saying, ‘‘This is the

last chance.’’

Now, what I’m worried—and you and I have had discussions

about this—my great worry is, as this administration continues to

mishandle Iraq, the American people are not going to be prepared

to act even in those areas where there is an overwhelming rationale to need to have forward-based forces, have forces engaged in

certain circumstances. So, I’m worried the President’s proposal

here is not only going to fail, but, in its failure, the American people will walk away from whatever everybody acknowledges, from

Senator Boxer to Senator Isakson, which says that we have interest in the region.

And so, that takes me to the next point that I want to discuss

with you. I realize that—I was warned, by many very smart people

750

you and I both know, not to put forward a specific plan, months

ago. It’s been the only specific plan out there. It’s not because I’m

so smart. There’s a lot of very, very important people. But it’s a

dangerous thing to put out a specific plan, as we know, in this

town. And—but I was so convinced, from my experience in Bosnia—as you and I well know—I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to

suggest, Madam Secretary—other than you, from the outside, I was

the most consistent pounding voice to get us engaged in Bosnia and

to stop the genocide, and in Kosovo. But it was your leadership—

your leadership inside that got that done. And I learned a lot of

lessons from Bosnia.

The sectarian violence in Bosnia and in the Balkans overall, for

800 years, from Vlad the Impaler on, equals anything that we’ve

seen in Iraq. And I noticed what you did. I noticed what—at least

with a little nudging and a little bit of help from the outside by

me, what—it would be an exaggeration—what we did—you did it.

But I was—I was rooting you on and making every bit of—using

every bit of influence I could to move.

But what did you do? You had Dayton. And what did you do in

Dayton? You not only brought in the regional players, you brought

in Russia, you brought in all the major players. And you locked everybody in a room, and you came up with something far, on paper,

more divisive than anything I’ve suggested with regard to Iraq.

You set up the Republika Srpska, with a separate President. You

set up Bosnia, with two Presidents, one Croat and one Bosniak, a

Muslim. And you were right. Because the only way there was any

possibility to keep that country from shattering, even though all of

your interlocutors, from France to England—I need not remind

you, I know—said, ‘‘No, no, no, no, no, no. No.’’ Well, where are we

today? The genocide has stopped. They’re working like the devil to

unite the country under a different constitution. Things are not all,

as they say, ‘‘hunky-dory’’ in Kosovo, but—guess what?—they’re not

killing each other, and there’s hope.

Now, what I have been amazed at is why everyone thinks, when

I took the Iraqi Constitution—I was there that day, and put my

finger in the ink, and I read the Constitution that we helped write.

It calls for, it sets out explicitly that Kurdistan is a republic, is

what they call a region. They define what powers regions have,

what the powers of the central government are. I met, in my seven

trips, with as many people as anybody in this government has, I

suspect. I have been to Basrah. I’ve been to Fallujah. I’ve been

even out into Al Asad Air Force Base, in the middle of God knows

where. And guess what I found out? If you’re going to keep this

country together, you’d better give it some breathing room. The

idea you’re going to take a country, with all due respect to everyone, that has been a construct of the postwar era, World War I,

that put together groups of personages who would never have been

together as a unified country, and say, ‘‘By the way, now Saddam’s

gone. The wicked witch is dead. You’re going to have a strong central government,’’ is beyond my comprehension. Beyond my comprehension.

And so, now we’re down to a situation that the only two plans

being debated are the Biden-Gelb plan and the President’s nonplan. Nobody else has a plan. If you look at the Iraq Study Group,

751

God love them, they have proposals, but what do they say? They

say national reconciliation, ‘‘U.S. forces can help provide stability,

but they cannot stop violence, they cannot contain it. The Iraqi

Government must send a clear signal to the Sunnis,’’ and it makes

recommendations that are totally consistent with what I laid out

9 months ago.

But what I can’t understand is why this administration will not

do what you and every one of us has suggested. A year ago, I wrote

an op-ed piece, you did, Secretary Schultz, Secretary Kissinger,

calling for an international conference. Not just the regional powers. What you did in Dayton. And so, what we call for here is to

get the Islamic countries involved. Get Iran involved, but also get

France, Germany, the Permanent Five—Germany is not one—the

Permanent Five of the United Nations. Bring in Indonesia, possibly

even Pakistan, India. Bring them in. Create a circumstance where

there is incredible pressure to accept a system arrived at by the

Iraqis that will be honored by the immediate neighbors. And so,

what I don’t understand is: Why do we continue to talk about

something that I’ve not found a single solitary person thinks can

happen in your lifetime or mine, and that is a strong united central

government in Baghdad whose purpose is to rule the country and

have the ability to get trust from all the warring factions to trust

they’ll distribute the revenues fairly, to trust that everyone will be

treated equally? It’s not going to happen. I’ve been around as long

as you, Madam Secretary. It is not going to happen in anyone’s lifetime in this room.

So, I appreciate you suggesting that my plan—our plan—is to

hold Iraq together, but I’d like to ask the central question. Do you

see any possibility—and if you would, would you outline for me—

within the next 10 years, of a strong central government without

constitutional guarantees relating to energy and guarantees relating to local protecting security forces? I ask this question to everyone, which is: Can anyone picture the possibility of the Iraqi national police force—that’s what it is now—ever patrolling the

streets of Fallujah? Can anyone imagine that happening? You

know and I know, you’re not even allowed—those forces are not

even allowed to set foot in the Kurdish area, under the Constitution, without their permission. What is it that makes anybody

think we’re going to get a strong central government that will allow

our troops to come home and not continue to be sacrificed to a sectarian cycle of revenge?

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I agree with what you have said,

in terms of the actual impossibility, I think, at this point, to get

a kind of dominant centralized government. And if it comes, it will

come at great expense of all minority rights, and, therefore, will

continue the fighting.

I appreciate all your kind words about the Balkans, and I do

think we developed a great partnership. And we did manage to get

all those people—we had to lock them at Dayton, but we did manage to get something done.

Every situation is slightly different, but I do think that the concept of having an international conference where others participate

in the solution is what is necessary. And I must say I regret the

extent to which your ideas were misinterpreted up front, because

752

some people just talked about it as a partition. It is not a partition.

And I agree, also, with you, that there has to be breathing space

for the various regions.

I do think there is a problem, in that some of the neighboring

countries might then take advantage of it, and there also might be

elements within some of these regions who would then move for

some kind of independence. But the bottom line is, that is not the

necessary outcome of it.

I think the reason that it is not—that an international conference is not being considered is that this administration is not exactly big into international conferences or partnerships or trying to

work a problem out. And it is an issue, because, as powerful as we

are, the issues that are out there cannot be dealt with by the

United States alone, and it is not a derogation of our responsibilities in order for us to share this problem with other countries.

Which leads me to say what you started out with. I am deeply

concerned that when this war is over—and it will be over—that the

American people will basically say, ‘‘We’ve had it. We have enough

problems in this country.’’ And we do. It’s what I call the ‘‘Katrina

Effect.’’ If you can’t pay attention to what’s happening at home,

then people are not eager to help abroad. But we have to be engaged. The world could not exist without American engagement.

And I hope that we do not allow that to happen.

And further, Mr. Chairman, I’m very troubled about what has

happened to the word ‘‘democratic.’’ This administration, because

of—it has militarized democracy in Iraq—is giving democracy a bad

name. And the United States cannot be the United States if we do

not understand that we are better off if other countries are democratic, if we support democratic movements. We can’t impose them.

But I hope very much that we all do not turn away from the concept that democracy is the best form of government.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Madam Secretary, I appreciate your testimony. The reason I waited to go last was to be able to raise that

broad context with you. And you and I, as I said, go back a long

way. And I appreciate your input and response to my larger question.

I’ll conclude by saying that it’s about time we acknowledged the

reality which is happening on the ground. It’s about time we get

specific about a political solution, not just calling for one—suggesting one. And it’s about time we get the international community, who I believe is ready to embrace it. And I assure you, in my

view—if the Kurds understand, which they do in my discussions,

that a disintegration of Iraq, which may happen, putting them in

the position where they’re de facto independent, is the very thing

that will bring the Turks in. The only way to keep the Kurds safe

and not have that expression they have, ‘‘the mountains are their

only friends,’’ is to make sure there is a united Iraq, loosely federated. Absent that, we have a war on our hands, in my humble

opinion.

But I believe this is becoming inevitable. I think we’ll find a lot

of people coming around to, if not exactly what Les Gelb and I proposed—something closer to it, because the reality is 3.5 million people have already fled Iraq. The cleansing is well underway. And the

753

rest of the concerns we have are: Iran is getting involved, the Syrians are indirectly involved, the Saudis are threatening to become

more involved. So, the question is: How do you stop the thing that

we’re all saying we don’t want to have happen? And I would respectfully suggest, if not the only way, one of the ways is as I’ve

suggested.

And I mean what I said about your leadership on Bosnia and

your leadership in Kosovo. It saved a serious, serious, serious dislocation, and not just in the Balkans, but all of Europe, and you—

in my view, your tenure will go down in history for having avoided

that.

I thank you very much. We are adjourned. Excuse me for my——

Ms. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, could I just thank you——

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Ms. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. For having these hearings? I have

very carefully followed and read the transcripts. I think you have,

in fact, provided a forum for a truly serious discussion of the issues

in Iraq, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you do the same for Iran.

The CHAIRMAN. I will.

Ms. ALBRIGHT. You made very clear that the President does not

have authority to expand the war into Iraq, and I hope very much

that, as chairman of this committee, that you will also proceed to

give this kind of a discussion on that.

Thank you so——

The CHAIRMAN. Be sure I——

Ms. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. Much for asking me to come.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Madam Secretary. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

(755)

IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT,

SESSION 2

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:23 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Bill Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,

Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Sununu, and Voinovich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Chairman, before we begin the hearing, I’d like to make a

very brief comment on Senator Warner’s resolution on Iraq.

Three weeks ago before this committee, Secretary Rice presented

the President’s plan for Iraq. It’s main feature is to send more

American troops into Baghdad in the middle of what I believe is

a sectarian war. The reaction on this committee, from Republicans

to Democrats alike, ranged from profound skepticism to outright

opposition. And that pretty much reflected the reaction across the

country.

Senators Hagel, Levin, Snowe, and I wrote a resolution to give

Senators a way to vote what their voices were saying. I believe that

was the quickest, most effective way to get the President to reconsider the course he’s on and to demonstrate to him that his policy

has little support across the board in this body.

After we introduced our resolution, Senator Warner came forward with his. The bottom line of our resolution is the same as

Senator Warner’s: ‘‘Mr. President, don’t send more troops into the

middle of a civil war.’’

There was one critical difference. As originally written, Senator

Warner’s resolution left open the possibility of increasing the overall number of troops in Baghdad, as well as in Iraq. We believed—

the sponsors of our resolution—that that would send the wrong

message. We ought to be drawing down and redeploying within

Iraq, rather than ramping up, to make clear to the Iraqi leaders

that they must begin to make the hard compromises necessary for

the political solution virtually everyone acknowledged is needed to

bring this conflict to a somewhat successful end.

We approached Senator Warner, my cosponsors and I, several

times, to try to work out our differences, and I am very pleased

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that last night we succeeded in doing just that. The language that

Senator Warner removed from his resolution removed the possibility that it can be read as calling for more troops in Iraq. With

that change, I am pleased to support Senator Warner’s resolution.

When I first spoke out against the President’s planned surge before the new year, I made it clear that I hoped to build a bipartisan

opposition to his plan, because this was the best way to have him

reconsider. And that’s exactly what we have done. We’ll see what

happens on the floor. But this is exactly what we have done with

the Biden, Levin, Hagel, Snowe, and the Warner, Nelson, et cetera,

resolution now, all of us joining Senator Warner, as amended.

Now, we have a real opportunity for the Senate to speak clearly.

Every Senator will be given a chance to vote on whether he or she

supports or disagrees with the President’s plan, as outlined by Secretary Rice. If the President does not listen to the—and assuming

that the majority is where I believe it is, with Senator Warner and

myself and others—if the majority of the Congress and the majority

of the American people speak loudly, it’s very difficult, I think, for

the President to totally dismiss that. But this is an important first

step.

Before we begin, let me make clear that the purpose, from the

outset, was to get as much consensus as we could on the President’s overall plan, and that’s why I am delighted to join and work

off of Senator Warner’s resolution, which, quite frankly, is even a

more powerful statement than ‘‘a Biden resolution’’ coming from

one of the leading Republicans in the U.S. Senate.

And today marks the final day of our initial series of hearings.

I remind our members what they already know, that this committee will, as under my friend and former chairman and future

chairman of this committee, because we’ve been here for an awful

lot of changes back and forth over the years—that we will continue

to engage in aggressive oversight in the coming weeks, in the coming months, and throughout this year.

We are joined this morning by two very distinguished former National Security Advisors. First, we’ll hear from GEN Brent Scowcroft, and later we’ll hear from Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. They are

among the best strategic thinkers in America, and we’re honored

that they’re here to join us.

And without further ado, since I did not know we would have

worked out a compromise with Senator Warner last night—rather

than read the remainder of my statement, I’ll ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM

DELAWARE

Before we begin, let me make a brief comment on Senator Warner’s resolution on

Iraq.

Three weeks ago, before this committee, Secretary of State Rice presented the

President’s plan for Iraq. Its main feature is to send more American troops into

Baghdad, in the middle of a sectarian civil war.

The reaction on this committee, from Republicans and Democrats alike, ranged

from skepticism to prfound skepticism to outright opposition. And that pretty much

reflected the reaction across the country.

Senator Hagel, Senator Levin, Senator Snowe, and I wrote a resolution to give

Senators a way to vote what their voices were saying.

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We believe that the quickest, most effective way to get the President to change

course is to demonstrate to him that his policy has little or no support across the

board.

After we introduced our resolution, Senator Warner came forward with his. The

bottom line of our resolutions is the same: Mr. President, don’t send more Americans into the middle of civil war.

The was one critical difference. As originally written, Senator Warner’s resolution

left open the possibility of increasing the overall number of American troops in Iraq.

We believed that would send the wrong message. We ought to be drawing down,

not ramping up, and redeploying our forces that remain in Iraq. That’s the best way

to make it clear to the Iraqi leaders that they must begin to make the hard compromises necessary for the political solution virtually everyone agrees is necessary.

We approached Senator Warner several times to try to work out the differences.

I am very pleased that last night, we succeeded in doing just that.

The language Senator Warner removed from his resolution removed the possibility that it can be read as calling for more U.S. troops in Iraq.

With that change, I am pleased to support his resolution.

When I first spoke out against the President’s planned surge before the new year,

I made it clear that I hoped to build bipartisan opposition to his plan because that

was the best way to turn him around. And that is exactly what we have done.

Now, we have a real opportunity for the Senate to speak clearly. Every Senator

will be given a chance to vote whether he or she supports or disagrees with the

President’s plan to send more troops into the middle of a civil war.

If the President does not listen to the majority of Congress and the majority of

the American people, we will look at other ways to change the policy.

But this is an important first step.

The CHAIRMAN. And welcome to you, General. It’s truly an honor

to have you here. You’re one of the most respected men in this

country.

And I will now yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you for holding this hearing, and I welcome our distinguished former National Security Advisors.

This is, by our count, the 14th meeting of this committee on Iraq

since the committee began its series of hearings, on January 9.

And, just parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you, and

your staff working so well with our staff, in a bipartisan way, on

bringing before the committee, and, therefore, before the Senate

and the American people, a galaxy of remarkable people, both

American and Iraqi, who have addressed this issue, with profit to

all of us.

These bipartisan hearings have given us the opportunity to engage administration officials, intelligence analysts, academic experts, former national security leaders, Iraqi representatives, and

retired military generals on strategy in Iraq and the broader Middle East. And this process has provided members a foundation for

oversight, as well as an opportunity to dialog with each other.

On Tuesday, our committee hosted Secretary of State James

Baker and Representative Lee Hamilton, the cochairs of the Iraq

Study Group. Both witnesses voiced the need to move Iraq policy

beyond the politics of the moment. Even if Congress and the President cannot agree on a policy in Iraq in the coming months, we

have to find a way to reach a consensus on the United States role

in the Middle East.

Yesterday, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recalled a halfcentury of U.S. involvement in the Middle East. He argued that

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this history was not accidental. We have been heavily involved in

the region because we have enduring interests at stake, and these

are interests that are vital to our country. Protecting those interests cannot be relegated to a political timeline. We may make tactical decisions about the deployment or withdrawal of forces in

Iraq, but we must plan for a strong strategic posture in the region

for years to come.

Both the President and Congress must be thinking about what

follows our current dispute over the President’s troop surge. Many

Members have expressed frustration with White House consultations on Iraq. I’ve counseled the President that his administration

must put much more effort into consulting with Congress on Iraq,

on the Middle East, on national security issues, in general. Congress has responsibility in this process. We don’t owe the President

our unquestioning agreement, but we do owe him, and the American people, our constructive engagement.

I appreciate that the administration wants a chance to make its

Baghdad strategy work, and, therefore, is not enthusiastic about

talking about plan B. Similarly, opponents in Congress are intensely focused on expressing disapproval of the President’s plan

through nonbinding resolutions. But when the current dispute over

the President’s Baghdad plan has reached a conclusion, we will

still have to come to grips with how we are to sustain our position

in the Middle East.

At yesterday’s hearing, I noted that Secretary Rice had taken

steps that shift the emphasis of U.S. Middle East policy toward

countering the challenges posed by Iran. Under this new approach,

the United States would organize regional players—Saudi Arabia,

Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States and others—behind a program of containing Iran’s disruptive agenda in the region. This

would be one of the most consequential regional alignments in recent diplomatic history. Such a realignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq and bringing security to other areas of conflict in the region, including Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Moderate

states in the Middle East are concerned by Iran’s aggressiveness

and by the possibility of sectarian conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.

They recognize the United States is an indispensable counterweight to Iran and a source of stability. The United States has

growing leverage to enlist greater support for our objectives inside

Iraq and throughout the region. In this context, the President’s current Iraq plan should not be seen as an endgame, but, rather, as

one element in a larger Middle East struggle that is in its early

stages.

The President should be reaching out to the Congress in an effort

to construct a consensus on how we will protect our broader strategic interests, regardless of what happens in Baghdad in the next

several months. Without such preparation, I am concerned that our

domestic political disputes or frustration over the failure of the

Iraq Government to meet benchmarks will precipitate an exit from

vital areas and missions in the Middle East. We need to be preparing for how we will array United States forces in the region to

defend oil assets, target terrorist enclaves, deter adventurism by

Iran, provide a buffer against regional sectarian conflict, and genVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00768 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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erally reassure friendly governments the United States is committed to Middle East security.

We look forward to the insights that will be brought to us by our

distinguished witnesses this morning on the strategic and political

dynamics involved in our Middle East policy.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

General, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF LTG BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF (RET.),

FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR; PRESIDENT, THE

SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

General SCOWCROFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend you, Senator Lugar, and the committee, for

undertaking this series of hearings. By any measure, the United

States finds itself in a most difficult situation in Iraq. If there were

an easy solution to our difficulties, we would have found it before

now.

In our search for resolution, we must, above all, keep our focus

on the U.S. national interest. It is with this in mind that I would

like, this morning, to look at Iraq in a regional context.

The conflict in Iraq has brought to the surface a number of seemingly disparate tensions, issues, and conflicts which have stirred

various parts of the Mideast region in a way in which they have

now become interrelated, yet we still generally tend to consider

Iraq as if it were in a regional vacuum. For example, the costs of

staying in Iraq are brutally apparent to us, daily—troops killed,

hundreds of millions of dollars spent—but the costs of leaving Iraq

are almost never mentioned. It is almost as if pulling out our

troops and leaving Iraq were cost-free. Even those who do not support pulling out assert that our patience is not unlimited or that

President Maliki must step up to his responsibilities, or else. Or

else what?

In fact, however, the costs for U.S. withdrawal before a stable

Iraq emerges are enormous. Our friends would feel abandoned, left

to cope by themselves with a debacle we had created. Our opponents would be emboldened and encouraged to take the offensive.

Terrorists everywhere would trumpet the driving of the Great

Satan from the region. Moderates in the region, who are our great

hope, would be demoralized and run for cover. I could go on, but

the almost inevitable result would be a region in chaos, our friends

in disarray, radicalism on the march, and U.S. credibility in the region, and the world at large, seriously damaged.

But just as the region would suffer if we abandoned Iraq, the region can help us deal with Iraq. It is clearly in the interests of the

countries of the region to help. After all, countries of the region

provided troops and money for the 1991 gulf war. Even Syria joined

us in that conflict. But since then, it has come to be seen by our

friends to be dangerous to be identified with the United States. We

need a diplomatic initiative to change that; one which involves the

entire region. That means Syria, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli peace

process.

A vigorously renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict

could change both the dynamics in the region and the strategic calVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00769 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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culus of key leaders. Hezbollah and Hamas would be—would lose

much of their rallying appeal. American allies, like Egypt, Saudi

Arabia, the Gulf States, would feel liberated to assist in stabilizing

Iraq. And Iraq would finally be seen by all as a key country that

had to be set right in pursuit of regional stability.

Resuming the peace process is not a matter of forcing concessions

from either side. Most of the elements of a settlement are already

agreed as a result of negotiations in 2000 and the roadmap of 2002.

What is required is to summon the will of Arab and Israeli leaders,

led by a determined American President, to forge the various elements into a conclusion that all parties have publicly accepted, in

principle. As for Syria and Iran, we should not be fearful of opening

channels of communication, but neither should we rush to engage

them as negotiating partners. Moreover, they should be dealt with

separately. Their interests, their concerns, are different, and we

should not treat them as a duo. Syria cannot be comfortable in the

sole embrace of Iran. It also has much to gain from a settlement

with Israel, and it may be even more eager if it sees the peace

process moving forward without it.

Iran is a different matter. Nuclear issues, first of all, should be

dealt with on the U.N. track, not as a part of a regional forum. In

its present state of euphoria, Iran has little interest in making

things easier for the United States. However, if the peace process

makes progress, and other regional states become more interested

or engaged in stabilization in Iraq, Iran may be more inclined to

negotiate seriously.

In Iraq itself, we should continue to encourage moves toward reconciliation and a unified government. With respect to the surge, I

consider it a tactic rather than a strategic move. If it is successful

in stabilizing Baghdad, that could begin to change the climate and

bring a new self-confidence to Iraqi forces, which could be important. But it will not end the problem. As I say, it is a tactic rather

than a strategy.

As a general proposition, I believe American troops should gradually be deployed away from intervening in sectarian conflict. That

must be done by Iraqi troops, however well or badly they are able

to do it. Our troops should concentrate on training the Iraqi Army,

providing support and backup to that army, combating insurgents,

attenuating outside intervention, and assisting in major infrastructure protection. That does not mean that the American presence

should be reduced. That should follow success in our efforts, not

the calendar or the performance of others.

As I said at the outset, there are no easy answers to the problems we face. As we move ahead, we will not find impatience, a

quick fix, or seeking partisan advantage a friend to U.S. national

interests over the long run. It is going to be hard to make a bad

situation better. It will be easy to make it worse.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Scowcroft follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF LTG BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF (RET.), FORMER NATIONAL

SECURITY ADVISOR; PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC

[From the New York Times, Jan. 4, 2007]

GETTING THE MIDDLE EAST BACK ON OUR SIDE

(By Brent Scowcroft)

WASHINGTON.—The Iraq Study Group report was released into a sea of unrealistic

expectations. Inevitably, it disappointed hopes for a clear path through the morass

of Iraq, because there is no ‘‘silver bullet’’ solution to the difficulties in which we

find ourselves.

But the report accomplished a great deal. It brought together some of America’s

best minds across party lines, and it outlined with clarity and precision the key factors at issue in Iraq. In doing so, it helped catalyze the debate about our Iraq policy

and crystallize the choices we face. Above all, it emphasized the importance of focusing on American national interests, not only in Iraq but in the region.

However, the report, which calls the situation in Iraq ‘‘grave and deteriorating,’’

does not focus on what could be the most likely outcome of its analysis. Should the

Iraqis be unable or unwilling to play the role required of them, the report implies

that we would have no choice but to withdraw, and then blame our withdrawal on

Iraqi failures. But here the report essentially stops.

An American withdrawal before Iraq can, in the words of the President, ‘‘govern

itself, sustain itself, and defend itself’’ would be a strategic defeat for American interests, with potentially catastrophic consequences both in the region and beyond.

Our opponents would be hugely emboldened, our friends deeply demoralized.

Iran, heady with the withdrawal of its principal adversary, would expand its influence through Hezbollah and Hamas more deeply into Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan. Our Arab friends would rightly feel we had abandoned them to face alone a radicalism that has been greatly inflamed by American

actions in the region and which could pose a serious threat to their own governments.

The effects would not be confined to Iraq and the Middle East. Energy resources

and transit choke points vital to the global economy would be subjected to greatly

increased risk. Terrorists and extremists elsewhere would be emboldened. And the

perception, worldwide, would be that the American colossus had stumbled, was losing its resolve and could no longer be considered a reliable ally or friend or the

guarantor of peace and stability in this critical region.

To avoid these dire consequences, we need to secure the support of the countries

of the region themselves. It is greatly in their self-interest to give that support, just

as they did in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict. Unfortunately, in recent years they

have come to see it as dangerous to identify with the United States, and so they

have largely stood on the sidelines.

A vigorously renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict could fundamentally change both the dynamics in the region and the strategic calculus of key leaders. Real progress would push Iran into a more defensive posture. Hezbollah and

Hamas would lose their rallying principle. American allies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

and the Gulf States would be liberated to assist in stabilizing Iraq. And Iraq would

finally be seen by all as a key country that had to be set right in the pursuit of

regional security.

Arab leaders are now keen to resolve the 50-year-old dispute. Prime Minister

Ehud Olmert of Israel may be as well. His nation’s long-term security can only be

assured by resolving this issue once and for all. However, only the American President can bring them to the same table.

Resuming the Arab-Israeli peace process is not a matter of forcing concessions

from Israel or dragooning the Palestinians into surrender. Most of the elements of

a settlement are already agreed as a result of the negotiations of 2000 and the

‘‘roadmap’’ of 2002. What is required is to summon the will of Arab and Israeli leaders, led by a determined American President, to forge the various elements into a

conclusion that all parties have already publicly accepted in principle.

As for Syria and Iran, we should not be afraid of opening channels of communication, but neither should we rush to engage them as negotiating ‘‘partners.’’ Moreover, these two countries have differing interests, expectations, and points of leverage and should not be treated as though they are indistinguishable.

Syria cannot be comfortable clutched solely in the embrace of Iran, and thus prying it away may be possible. Syria also has much to gain from a settlement with

Israel and internal problems that such a deal might greatly ease. If we can make

progress on the Palestinian front before adding Syria to the mix, it would both avoid

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overloading Israel’s negotiating capacity and increase the incentives for Damascus

to negotiate seriously.

Iran is different. It may not be wise to make Iran integral to the regional strategy

at the outset. And the nuclear issue should be dealt with on a separate track. In

its present state of euphoria, Iran has little interest in making things easier for us.

If, however, we make clear our determination, and if the other regional states become more engaged in stabilizing Iraq, the Iranians might grow more inclined to

negotiate seriously.

While negotiations on the Arab-Israel peace process are under way, we should establish some political parameters inside Iraq that encourage moves toward reconciliation and unified government in Iraq. Other suggested options, such as an ‘‘80 percent solution’’ that excludes the Sunnis, or the division of the country into three

parts, are not only inconsistent with reconciliation but would almost certainly pave

the way to broader regional conflict and must be avoided.

American combat troops should be gradually redeployed away from intervening in

sectarian conflict. That necessarily is a task for Iraqi troops, however poorly prepared they may be. Our troops should be redirected toward training the Iraqi Army,

providing support and backup, combating insurgents, attenuating outside intervention, and assisting in major infrastructure protection.

That does not mean the American presence should be reduced. Indeed, in the immediate future, the opposite may be true, though any increase in troop strength

should be directed at accomplishing specific, defined missions. A generalized increase would be unlikely to demonstrably change the situation and, consequently,

could result in increased clamor for withdrawal. But the central point is that withdrawing combat forces should not be a policy objective, but rather, the result of

changes in our strategy and success in our efforts.

As we work our way through this seemingly intractable problem in Iraq, we must

constantly remember that this is not just a troublesome issue from which we can

walk away if it seems too costly to continue. What is at stake is not only Iraq and

the stability of the Middle East, but the global perception of the reliability of the

United States as a partner in a deeply troubled world. We cannot afford to fail that

test.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

We’ll have 7-minute rounds with these two witnesses, all right?

General, thank you for your testimony. It’s quite clear, as I understand it, we can’t win in Iraq—succeed in Iraq—without a political settlement; we can’t leave Iraq, because of the regional and

global consequences if we did, absent a settlement. We need regional cooperation, but our friends are reluctant to be associated

with us in this present atmosphere, so it’s unlikely to get regional

cooperation, but one way to get it would be if we demonstrated a

sincere effort to get the Israeli-Palestinian peace process back on

track.

Let me ask you, specifically, whether you believe that the Israelis

see a benefit in getting the peace process back on track.

General SCOWCROFT. I don’t know, Mr. Chairman, exactly what

the Israelis are thinking now. Their government is in a very difficult situation, as popularity is near zero. A tough response for the

Prime Minister is very difficult. It seems to me, in his inner heart,

he must feel that this could be his salvation. It, after all, is Israel’s

salvation. Israel cannot permanently live surrounded by hostile

forces. And so, a solution to this problem is very much in Israel’s

interest, just as our leaving the region would be the worst possible

outcome for Israel.

The CHAIRMAN. My instinct is that Prime Minister Olmert understands that. What I get fed back from different and disparate

sources in Israel is—well, let me characterize it a different way.

Were you the National Security Advisor today, would you be pushing the President—any President—to have a much more focused

and clear attempt to get this peace process back on track?

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General SCOWCROFT. Yes; I would. I believe the administration,

at least from all appearances, is moving in that direction. But——

The CHAIRMAN. One of the things that perplexes me, anyway, is

how long it took the administration to engage the Israelis and be

public in any utterances with regard to the war in Lebanon, how—

I mean, we just don’t seem to have anybody of real consequence on

the ground full time that the Israeli leadership knows has the ear

of the President of the United States. This is a risk, I know. I’ve

been here for seven Presidents, and every President, I know, calculates the risk of getting himself deeply involved in trying to resolve this crisis. But I guess what I’m asking you is: Isn’t it necessary for the President to get deeply involved in—not telling Israel

what to do, but making it clear that we are willing to take risks

along with them to get this process underway?

General SCOWCROFT. I think it is critical for the President to be

involved, because the states of the region are very nervous, they’re

worried about the spread of radicalism. If you noted, at the time

of the Lebanese incursion, the first word from the Arab governments was ‘‘condemnation of Hezbollah’’——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

General SCOWCROFT [continuing]. For kidnaping the soldiers.

That turned, in about 3 days——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

General SCOWCROFT [continuing]. To ‘‘condemnation’’——

The CHAIRMAN. Seems to me——

General SCOWCROFT [continuing]. ‘‘Of Israel.’’

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. We missed a significant opportunity

to—I see a common interest with the Sunni states and Israel right

now. In my dialogs with leaders in the leading Sunni states, from

Egypt to Saudi Arabia, they seem much more concerned about

this—they refer to the Shia Crescent. It seems to me there is a mutuality of interest here. It seems to me they’re in the position

where they may be prepared to be much more responsible than

they have in the past—excluding Egypt; I think they’ve been responsible, by and large—to actually be a proactive player in bringing about a positive settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. From my perspective, it even looks as though Syria is in an

unholy alliance with a country that they don’t have a real shot for

a long-term future with: Iran. So, I happen to agree with your assessment that there’s an opportunity here for, really, some solid diplomacy.

Let me conclude by asking you this: Many of our witnesses we’ve

had have laid out, in, sort of, historical terms, that when you deal

with a country that was literally the consequence of a diplomat’s

pen on a map, like the Balkans, like Syria—we could name other

places in Africa, as well—that one of two formulas seem to work.

Either you have a strongman take hold to hold that country together, or, two, you have some form of a loosely federated system

with a central government, with some significant authority in the

regions, particularly over their own security. That’s what happened

in Dayton, that’s what happened other places.

Can you comment briefly on what you see down the road as the

outlines of a political settlement that might hold that country

together—Iraq—where it’s not a threat to its neighbors, where it’s

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not a haven for terror, and where we can be a positive influence

in providing assistance for both of those things?

General SCOWCROFT. I believe that it’s possible to have a centralized Iraqi State, but it won’t be easy, and it may take a long time

to resolve itself. It is similar, in some respects, to Yugoslavia. The

difference, however—loosely federated or even independent states

in Yugoslavia has worked reasonably well. Although if our troops

left Kosovo, or our troops—or the troops that are still in Bosnia

left, I fear we’d find it was not over.

But Iraq happens to be surrounded by powerful neighbors, relatively powerful neighbors, with intense interests in the future of

Iraq. I think a loosely federated system would be an invitation to

meddling and would perhaps even hasten the regionalization of a

conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if there’s a second round, I will come back

and talk a little bit about the Iraqi Constitution, which is explicit

in setting out Kurdistan as one of those loosely federated areas, by

definition, and lays out where any of the 18 other governates can

conclude they have local control over their security. I’d like to talk

with you, but my time is up.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Scowcroft, I would just like you to think aloud about

Iraq in this sense. We’ve had testimony from Iraqis that as our

military forces obtained military victory over Saddam Hussein, the

Iraqi Armed Forces essentially disintegrated, people fled, leaving

their uniforms and their arms, and were no longer identified with

the military force. In addition to that, we heard that the police

forces, various other coercive elements, also dissipated to a point

that we had not only the celebrated sacking of the museums in

Baghdad, and looting of a tremendous scale but back in the provinces, people who were robbers, thieves, and ne’er-do-wells really

terrorized people. Now, the question that was raised by these

Iraqis comes down to this. We have worked—that is the United

States and our allies—with some Iraqi politicians to bring about a

constitution, even elections, a Parliament—which seems to be

meeting on occasion—ministers, and a Prime Minister. But at this

point the whole country lacks what at least these Iraqis said were

coercive elements, not in the sense of torture and debilitating the

people, but simply keeping some degree of order, law and order, so

that ordinary people could go about without being hit by predators.

We hear, too, that some people have formed militias, not the celebrated ones with thousands of people, but simply groups to protect

themselves.

It’s not clear, at least to me, as I’ve listened to all of this, how

order comes to this situation and whether our aspirations—by that,

I mean Iraq becoming a model example of democracy in the Middle

East—works, really, in this situation. Can you share with us some

of the thought you have given to this with respect to Yugoslavia

and other nations that have struggled to build institutions and

such capacities following conflict. And what sort of prognosis can

you give of what would be a reasonable government situation in

Iraq that would fit with the rest of the surrounding territories and

fit with our strategy, perhaps, of withdrawal from sectarian violence, but providing sufficient presence to batten down the hatches

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with regard to terrorists or those that would be totally disruptive

of borders?

General SCOWCROFT. You have asked a very difficult question,

Senator. And I think, for the United States, Iraq is perhaps sui generis. You know, we’ve had heavy involvements in Korea, heavy involvements in Vietnam, and so on; but there, we participated

alongside a government which was constituted, which was operating, which had people who knew how to run a government. Iraq

has none of those. It is destroyed. It’s a blank slate, seething with

the sectarian, religious, ethnic tensions that resulted from it being

an artificial state. So, we have to put the whole thing together. And

it’s not as if Maliki were part of a government firmly in power and

so on; we’re trying to set up a government. The situation is much

more like Somalia, for example, than it is like Vietnam.

And I don’t know how we end this up. I think we have to push

for reconciliation. We have to try to train—not just train the Iraqi

Army, but convince them what they’re fighting for, who they’re

fighting for. Is it a sect? Is it a religion? Is it an ethnic group? Or

is it the symbol of the state of Iraq? And I don’t think we’re there

yet. We’re apparently closer in the army than we are in the police,

which is badly infiltrated by these, let’s call them, private forces.

To me, that’s going to take time. And it’s going to take patience.

And it’s going to take a presence; hopefully, over time, a decreasing

presence, as they start to learn how to govern themselves. Most of

the people in the government now have never held any kind of office. You can’t expect an instantaneous democracy to emerge. You

may have to go through strongman phases and so on. But hopefully

we can be increasingly a Big Brother, offering a helpful hand, admonishing here, helping there. As we and, if we’re successful in the

region, as the regional partners of Iraq begin to play a role, we can

succeed. But it’s—there is no magic wand, and it’s a daunting task.

Senator LUGAR. What you’ve described is something perhaps like

South American democracy that arose—this is a broad characterization—but the army was the powerful group, and it provided

some order, and then, in due course, it said, ‘‘We’re tired of governing. We want to invite some civilians in to participate and provide some elements of democracy.’’ And sometimes when the civilians don’t do well, the army returns, dismisses the civilians, tries

again. Is this roughly what you’re talking about?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, there are a number of models of democracy—the Latin American model, the Turkish model. There are

a lot of them. And each culture has to figure out its own. But we

have a heavy responsibility now in Iraq figuring out its own, without plunging the entire region into turmoil with all those consequences.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator, welcome. And——

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. It’s nice not to have to wait all this

time, isn’t it? [Laughter.]

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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General Scowcroft, thank you very much for your service to our

country and for being here. We very much appreciate your advice.

I’m having some difficulty reconciling the additional troops being

sent into Baghdad with your advice that we should be redeploying

troops away from the sectarian violence as part of our strategy. It

seems to me that the President’s announcements move in the

wrong direction there, but also signal to the Iraqis that we intend

to keep our troops where sectarian violence is the worst.

I want to concentrate on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because

I think you’ve raised some very valid concerns. We’ve been talking

about this for a long time, but the framework for resolving the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is fairly well defined.

And I don’t believe time works to the advantage of resolving the

issue. I think there is an opportunity. We should be taking advantage of that opportunity, and it requires a very strong presence

from the United States—as the chairman said, not to dictate the

terms of the peace, but to be the force for keeping the parties at

the table to resolve their differences and to implement a peace

plan.

So, if you were to give the President advice as to how we could

elevate and move forward with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, could you share with us how you would see the President elevating that issue? And, second, how would you advise Congress to

try to move forward with the Israeli-Palestinian peace effort?

General SCOWCROFT. Certainly, Senator. I think a strong sense

of Presidential leadership is essential in order to give heart to our

friends in the region who—most of whom have been vocal in wanting to pursue the peace process, but are afraid to get out in front

of the United States. If the President shows some determination

that he wants to press forward, I think he will find a lot of help.

And a lot of help is needed. One of the conventional arguments is

that Israel now has a government under siege and is not in a position to negotiate. And, on the Palestinian side, there is a struggle

between Fatah and Hamas, and there is no negotiator. I believe

those problems are fixable.

The more difficult one probably is the Palestinian issue. But,

even there, there’s some movement. The Hamas external leader in

Damascus recently said that, ‘‘Israel is a reality. There will remain

a state called Israel. This is a matter of fact.’’ Now, that’s not recognizing Israel, which we have demanded of Hamas, but it’s a—certainly a step, a big step away from driving Israel into the sea. So,

there’s something there we can work with. And the Egyptians are

working hard to resolve that problem.

So, those are the things I think we need to pay attention to originally, to get the negotiators ready to talk at the table. As you say,

if they sit down, most of the issues have already been agreed, and

those that haven’t, the outlines of an agreement are still there. It

will take tough negotiating, but I think it is there.

Senator CARDIN. Is there a specific positive role that you envision

for the U.S. Congress in this regard?

General SCOWCROFT. I think the Congress should be supportive

of that kind of effort. I certainly am not prepared to tell the Congress what it ought to do. On your first point, about the surge,

there’s no question that the surge go—is in contradiction to my

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general statement, ‘‘We need to get out of sectarian conflict.’’ But

there is a particular problem right now in Baghdad, and if Baghdad should become a single-sect city, we would have a new and different kind of a problem for the whole of Iraq. So, I think there is

a rationale for trying to stabilize the situation in Baghdad, which

violates the general rule that we shouldn’t do that.

Senator CARDIN. I would point out that there are, right now in

Iraq, so many displaced individuals as a result of sectarian violence. I understand the importance of Baghdad to maintain ethnic

diversity, but it seems like Iraq has moved in the wrong direction

now for a period of time.

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I wouldn’t disagree with that. And, as

I say, on the surge—the President has decided he wants to surge.

I think that the Congress role here is unlikely to be helpful in the

direction that it’s going, in the sense that what you send is signals

abroad that if they just push a little harder, then the President

may have to change his mind.

Senator CARDIN. Of course, I would argue that if the President

would work with Congress and listen to our hearings here, there

could be much more unity in our position in Iraq.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for——

General SCOWCROFT. My guess is the President is listening attentively right now.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope so.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Welcome, General Scowcroft. It’s always pleasant, enlightening,

informative to have you before us, and we always appreciate your

thoughts.

I have just a quick response to a point you made, and then I

want to go back to a comment in your testimony and ask a question.

We all appreciate, I think, that there are no clear comparisons

of past conflicts the United States has been involved in, with Iraq.

You noted that Somalia may be, in many regards, closer to a comparison with Iraq than Vietnam. But, because you have served as

National Security Advisor to two Presidents and your entire career

has been about national security, very few understand it as well as

you do. But I would make this observation. I do think there is one

clear comparison with Vietnam where we are in Iraq, and that is

that we continue to get bogged down more and more. When the

President’s talking about sending 22,000 more U.S. troops, you can

define that in any way you want, but that’s an increase in our involvement, our military involvement. The President will soon be

coming before the Congress for another $100 billion emergency

supplemental, most all of that for Iraq. That is certainly an additional amount of involvement. We have the largest Embassy—U.S.

Embassy in the world, by far, in Iraq, and we continue to keep

building up that Embassy. That’s certainly a significant increase in

our involvement. So, rather than going the other way, we continue

to bog ourselves down, and our country. And the consequences of

that, you being a career professional military man, certainly are

aware, just as the Washington Post noted a couple of days ago,

what this is doing to our force structure, specifically our equipVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00777 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ment, that we will not have enough equipment. And I had the Secretary of the Army in my office, 2 days ago, asking him about that.

The rotation patterns, all the consequences that most people don’t

understand. You do. So, it’s my observation that that is the one

clear comparison, just like Vietnam, ‘‘Just send more troops, send

more money, send more involvement, give us more time.’’ And I

don’t think there’s any way you can escape that reality.

Now, that leads me into a question that was prompted by a comment you made. And you, I think, said something to the—I don’t

have your testimony, so I can’t quote exactly, but something to the

effect that our withdrawal, or decrease of involvement, should follow—not timelines or any other definitions—but it should follow, I

believe, in your words, should follow success in our efforts. Well,

next month, it’ll be 4 years that we have been there. We are nearing 3,100 deaths. And I was just at a funeral of a Nebraska Army

lieutenant who was one of those abducted in Karbala. We are over

23,000 wounded. And I can recite all the other numbers, which

you’re familiar with. So, after 4 years, then, based on what you

said, we should base any withdrawal or plans for decreasing our

involvement—that should follow success in our efforts.

My question is: What do you define ‘‘success’’ as being? And the

other question picks up a little bit on your exchange with the distinguished Senator from Maryland. Do you believe the Congress

has a role in this? You mentioned something about resolutions

sending wrong signals. Do you believe that Congress has a constitutional responsibility and role in war? What is that? And I’d

like you to define that, if you would, and answer that question. So,

two questions, General. And thank you.

General SCOWCROFT. Absolutely. To answer the last one first; of

course I think Congress has a role. One of the distinguished constitutional jurists, whose name I can’t recall now, said, ‘‘In matters

of war and international relations, the Constitution is an invitation

to struggle between the executive and the legislature.’’ And I’ll just

leave it there.

Do I think Congress has a role? Absolutely. And the ultimate role

that Congress has in the making of war is the power of the purse.

There’s no question about that.

Senator HAGEL. I appreciate that. And, of course, there are more

definition of our role, which is heavy in precedent over the last 230

years, as well, not just the power of the purse, as you well know.

But we’re not here before the Judiciary Committee, so—

But, please, sir, thank you, if you would answer the other question, as well, I appreciate your comments.

General SCOWCROFT. Now, the other question?

Senator HAGEL. The other question was based on your testimony

when you said that U.S. withdrawal or——

General SCOWCROFT. Oh, yes.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Any efforts to move out should

be——

General SCOWCROFT. Right.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Your words, should follow success in

our efforts. Now, after 4 years and all that we’ve put in, and we’re

continuing to put more in, what is your measurement of success?

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You said this should—this may go on for years and years, we may

go through strongmen. Well, what is our responsibility?

General SCOWCROFT. I think——

Senator HAGEL. And what is that measurement of success?

General SCOWCROFT. I think our responsibility is a state which

is stable enough to be a force for stability in the region, not for disruption in the region. And our goal, I think, has to be the region

itself now. And I think we cannot afford chaos in the Middle East.

Senator HAGEL. Well, that’s not my question. We——

General SCOWCROFT. I——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. All agree with that. But what is

your—we hear a lot of rhetoric, General——

General SCOWCROFT. It——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. From the President——

General SCOWCROFT. I——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. And others, saying, ‘‘Well, we ought

to have a measurement. We ought to know when—we’re going to

threaten and we’re going to pull out and we’re going to have benchmarks.’’ Well, when is that measurement of some precision so that

you know? Or is it beyond——

General SCOWCROFT. I don’t——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Our control?

General SCOWCROFT. I don’t know what the precision is. We have

troops in Korea 50 years after that war——

Senator HAGEL. But you’re surely——

General SCOWCROFT [continuing]. Was over.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Not making a comparison to Korea.

General SCOWCROFT. No; I’m not making a comparison to Korea.

But I don’t know when you can let the hand—when you’re training

your child with training wheels on the bicycle, how do you know

when to take the training wheels off?

Senator HAGEL. Well, again, I wouldn’t use——

General SCOWCROFT. I don’t know.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. That analogy, either. And when

you’ve got——

General SCOWCROFT. But——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Seventy percent or more of the Iraqi

people who don’t want us there, and over 60 percent say it’s OK

to kill Americans, and we’re going to put a number of new troops

in Baghdad, which you have just noted that you don’t, I guess, to

some extent, agree with—you’ve noted it’s sectarian—those are sectarian issues. So, then, isn’t there some jumble in all this? And

when you say we ought to have, as your—in your words, ‘‘a success

in our efforts,’’ well, how do you measure——

General SCOWCROFT. Well——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Success in——

General SCOWCROFT. It would be——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Your efforts?

General SCOWCROFT. It would be nice to be precise and to have

all these benchmarks that everybody can see and so on. This is not

that kind of a problem. We’re in a mess, and we’ve got to work our

way out of it.

Senator HAGEL. Well, that’s——

General SCOWCROFT. And——

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Senator HAGEL [continuing]. That’s true, but how——

General SCOWCROFT. And we’ve——

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. To do that?

General SCOWCROFT [continuing]. Got to work our way out of it,

not into a bigger mess, a regional mess, where one of the results

will make $60 oil look like a bargain.

Senator HAGEL. You do that by continuing to put more troops in

Baghdad?

General SCOWCROFT. I did not say put more troops in.

Senator HAGEL. Well, how do you work your way out of the

mess?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I can repeat what I said. You focus

on training, you focus on backing up the army, you focus on lines

of communication, you focus on infrastructure, you focus on keeping the outsiders from intervening, and you encourage reconciliation and consolidation of the government.

Senator HAGEL. Then how do you measure that?

General SCOWCROFT. The way you measure anything.

Senator HAGEL. Would you give us a good grade, over the last

4 years, of measuring success? Are things getting better?

General SCOWCROFT. No.

Senator HAGEL. So, another 4 years, we take another look, and

maybe the Congress should look at a resolution, and maybe it

shouldn’t?

General SCOWCROFT. I think this problem is not going to be over

inside a decade.

Senator HAGEL. Does that mean more American troops——

General SCOWCROFT. No.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Get fed into the grinder and——

General SCOWCROFT. I do not believe we need more American

troops.

Senator HAGEL. My time’s up. Thank you, General. Thank you

very much.

General SCOWCROFT. Because I want to get out from in between

the sectarian violence.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. Senator Menendez has

graciously allowed me to jump ahead.

General, I’m grateful for your presence here and your service to

the Nation.

And I’m going to ask a—maybe two questions about Iraq, specifically, but, before I do that, I wanted to ask a question which I

think is on the minds of a lot of people when the American people

think about Iraq, and they think about the sacrifice that both you

and Senator Hagel were just reviewing, in terms of the loss of life.

In my State, the State I represent along with Senator Specter,

we’ve lost the third highest number. So, we’re cognizant of that. I

think a lot of Americans are concerned about what happens next,

not just with regard to Iraq, but what happens next with regard

to Iran.

Someone that I respect greatly—I won’t use his name, but—

many months ago, said to me—made the assertion, and I’ll paraphrase, that if this Government were to strike Iran, one of the immediate and direct consequences of that would be the slaughter of

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GIs, hundreds, if not thousands, right away. And I don’t know if

that’s correct or not, but I wanted to ask you that question, based

upon your experience as a national security expert, your experience

in war, and what you’ve seen and read and analyzed with regard

to what’s happening now in the Middle East as it pertains to Iran.

Do you think—and let me just put it plainly to you—do you think

that if there is a military strike by this Government on Iran—do

you think it is highly likely, or unlikely, maybe—maybe you have

a third option—that a large number of American GIs would be

slaughtered in Iraq?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, Senator, I can’t really tell you, there.

I must say that the utility, at this point, of a strike on Iran escapes

me, so I haven’t pursued what the consequences will be. It seems

to me that there are many other options open with Iran—there

being a very difficult person in the Presidency at the present

time—both their general sectarian threats and the nuclear issue,

but I think we have maneuvering room with them, and time with

them. I don’t think that the Iranian structure is quite as unified

and monolithic as it appears to some and, with some very careful

diplomacy, we might be able to uncover more fissures there. And

I would certainly pursue diplomacy.

Iran didn’t just rise yesterday from the ashes to be a threat.

Iran’s been there for a long time. We’ve had problems with them

since the fall of the Shah. But I see no reason that those problems

suddenly have become overwhelmingly menacing.

Senator CASEY. But can you assess the question I just asked

about American troops in Iraq?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, if I were—if I were an Iranian leader,

having been struck by a United States air attack, for example, having no means to retaliate directly on the United States, I would do

whatever I could to take it out on United States interests, where

I could reach them.

Senator CASEY. I also wanted to point to—and I appreciate your

statement today, some of which was contained in a New York

Times op-ed on January 4—and I was struck by a number of—a

number of statements in your op-ed. One was that—I want to read,

in part—when you’re speaking of Iran, you talked about failure in

Iraq or withdrawal being the catalyst for an expansion of Iranian

influence in the region, and then you go on to say, and ‘‘Our’’—this

is in the context of some kind of withdrawal—‘‘Our Arab friends

would rightly feel we had abandoned them to face, alone, Iraq radicalism that has been greatly inflamed by American actions in the

region and which could pose a serious threat to their own governments.’’

I was struck by the juxtaposition of the sense that you would

have that they would—our Arab friends would feel abandoned, but

also your assertion that radicalism in the region has been greatly

inflamed by American actions in that region. I just wanted to have

you talk about that, in terms of what actions have inflamed that

radicalism in the region.

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I think the situation in Iraq has inflamed it. It has exacerbated the century-old tension between

Sunnis and Shias. And it has brought to the fore conflicts—again,

historic, but quiescent—between Persians and Arabs. And all of

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those now are surfaced and are boiling. And I think that the Iraq

developments have helped to create that kind of a situation.

Senator CASEY. I almost am out of time, General. Let me just see

if I can get one more in.

Again, on the question of Iran, you assert, with regard to the reaction that Iran would have if our forces were to be withdrawn or

largely redeployed—just specifically—I know we only have a few

seconds, but—what do you think the Iranian reaction would be to

a total withdrawal of U.S. forces?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, that’s very speculative, Senator. I

don’t know. I think—in some respects, they may be dismayed, but,

in other respects, I think they would be very encouraged, because

they could see the way open for the expansion of Iranian or Shia

influence throughout the region, with us having vacated. And I

think that would probably be the predominant. They would think

they had won a victory.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Before I move to Senator Menendez, I have to make a point that

we’re going to be having three votes in a row, I’m told, around

noon, and we have need for a business meeting to pass out a resolution to the committee, which is pro forma, but it sets out the

budget for the committee for the 110th Congress. So, I’m going to

suggest to my colleagues, between the first and second vote on the

floor, we go down to our Foreign Relations Committee meeting

room in the Senate on the first floor, S–116, and we’ll take 30 seconds to vote out the resolution.

With that—excuse me—oh, I’m sorry. Senator Coleman. I beg

your pardon.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on Senator Casey’s comment about the Iranian reaction to the withdrawal of our forces, in the New York Times article you talked about withdrawal, and to describe the consequences

you used a phrase, ‘‘Our opponents would be hugely emboldened,

our friends would be deeply demoralized.’’ That statement resonates with what we’ve heard throughout the 50 hours of hearings

that we have had here in the Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq,

as well as numerous briefings and markups—the committee really

has done an extraordinary job of examining this issue. The one

obvious thing is that this is a complex issue. There’s not a silver

bullet here. And there are consequences to the things that we do.

Understanding that Iraq is a mess today, it could be much worse

tomorrow. Is that a fair statement? If we withdraw precipitously,

as the Iraqi Study Group talked about—and I think your New York

Times piece also touched on this—al-Qaeda would be emboldened,

and our allies would be left with long-term doubt about American

reliability. Those who have stepped up to the front in Iraq alongside us would probably be slaughtered. And so, there are great consequences to withdrawal.

One of the issues that we have talked about here is the perception of America in the global arena. If we do the wrong thing in

Iraq, if we simply abandon Iraq, that perception could be worse.

Would that be a fair statement?

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General SCOWCROFT. I believe that’s a fair statement, Senator. I

think we would be perceived in the world, ‘‘Well America’s lost it,’’

you know, we’re a force of the past, we’re fading, we’re not up to

the challenges. I think that would be wrong, but I think that would

be the perception.

Senator COLEMAN. What are the consequences of that perception?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, it would be—it would be a subtle

shifting of where you want to put your confidence. Who do you

want to stand with, who do you want to be careful about, and so

on, and so forth? And I think it would be significantly deleterious.

Senator COLEMAN. There are some of us who understand the consequences of failure—and, again, it’s laid out in the Iraqi Study

Group, Secretary Kissinger talked about it yesterday, and Secretary Baker talked about it when he testified before the committee. They also pointed out that they believe that we’re going to

be in Iraq for a long time—hopefully, though, not in the middle of

a sectarian civil war. But it is important to let our allies know, and

to let the Iranians know, that we’re not abandoning Iraq. We must

let al-Qaeda know we’re not walking out on Iraq, but we don’t want

American troops to be in the middle of the sectarian battle that is

engulfing parts of it.

General Scowcroft, you have military experience and can offer us

a certain perspective. We have debates in the Senate. We pass resolutions. In the case of our Iraq policy, the Senate’s discussion involves a resolution that may challenge an aspect of the President’s

policy. Can you help me understand if this debate we’re having has

an impact on the folks on the ground? Does the nature of the debate that is taking place here in Congress on our Iraq policy embolden our enemies? Or do people simply think: This is the way the

United States works, it’s the way the Congress works, and folks

understand that?

General SCOWCROFT. I think it—I don’t think it has much effect

on the troops. Troops know what they’re doing. They’re following

their orders. They’re doing their damnedest. And I don’t think the

Congress voting a nonconcurrence or something in what the President has done will affect their attitudes or anything. I don’t know

how it will affect those who are opposing us over there if they

would think, ‘‘Well, look, you know, we’ve got the President on the

run now. If we just push a little harder, he’ll cave.’’ I don’t know

that. That’s pure speculation.

Senator COLEMAN. As I approach this issue, I don’t want to do

anything to undermine the resolve of the folks on the ground. I

want them to know we support them. We may disagree with an aspect of what the President is doing, but in the end we still want

to see—or at least I want to see—success, however it’s defined. Success in Iraq would perhaps be defined by some stability, by alQaeda not having a base in Iraq from which to sow greater uncertainty and instability in the region. On the other hand, here in the

Senate we have this—I believe—constitutional responsibility to

represent what our citizens are saying about U.S. policy. If we’re

troubled by something that the President is doing, we have to say

it. But it’s an important question. I appreciate the response.

Let me ask you about benchmarks. Yesterday Secretary Kissinger said that he was concerned about this idea of benchmarks

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and the consequences of holding Iraqis accountable if they don’t

achieve them. I believe in your article in the Times you also talked

about benchmarks—if the Iraqis fail to meet the benchmarks, what

do we do about it? And part of the problem—and I hope the debate

here in the United States helps on this front—is that the Iraqis

have to understand that our patience is not infinite. Maybe we’ll

leave them to kill each other in Baghdad and move American

troops to other areas where they can focus on missions such as

keeping the Iranians out of Iraq. I don’t know whether the Iraqis

are tired of killing each other. I don’t know whether they’re exhausted from that yet. How do we insist, or let the Iraqis know,

that they’ve got to actually do some things that we’ve agreed to for

us to continue with the sacrifice of blood and treasure?

General SCOWCROFT. Well, one of my problems with benchmarks

is that it sort of presupposes that the government is not doing its

best; the Iraqi Government. Well, by our lights, they’re not doing

their best, but it’s not that they are disinterested and just sitting

on their hands. They believe passionately, but not all in the same

direction, and they’re killing each other for their beliefs. And what

we’re trying to do is to put together a government which can draw

together these disparate elements in some kind of a unified approach that you could call Iraq. The problem with benchmarks is,

as this government struggles, if they don’t meet the first benchmark, we drawdown some support almost making certain they

can’t meet the second benchmark. And so, it begins to look like a

recipe for withdrawal and blaming the Iraqi Government. Is the

Iraqi Government what we would wish? No. But it’s—we’re trying

to set up a government from zero. There is no government in Iraq.

When we destroyed Saddam Hussein and the Baathists, there was

nobody left who had any experience in governing. And so, all of the

tensions, all of the sectarian and religious tensions boil up, and you

put in a bunch of people and you write a constitution quickly, and

you hope that it’s going to work. But it’s going to take time.

Senator COLEMAN. I see that my time is expired. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for your service to our country. Thank you

for your testimony.

I have a couple of questions that I hope you could be helpful

with. You know, many of our colleagues who are concerned about

challenging our present course of action all want to achieve success. The question is: How does one do that?

And some who challenge this and say the consequences of failure

make that a linkage in the case for escalation, but, overwhelmingly, the testimony that we have heard here, including from experts who come from both sides of the political divide, have said,

largely, that you cannot achieve victory here through a classic military context. And so, you know, I don’t quite buy the escalation aspect as the pivotal issue as to whether we have success or failure

in Iraq.

But that goes to the broader question. Isn’t, in essence, what we

are doing here with our troops a role of nation-building? Is that an

appropriate mission for the U.S. military?

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General SCOWCROFT. It is an appropriate role for the United

States military in a situation where conflict is a predominant fact

of the nation, yes. Hopefully, we can gradually get out of that, but

right now, without the military, there would be—there would be no

hope.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I asked you that question because

when I served in the House of Representatives, for a long time I

heard my colleagues on the other side of the aisle rail against the

context of nation-building and having the military be an integral

part of nation-building. But it seems to me that’s very much what

we’re doing.

But to further go down this line, I looked at your January oped piece, and I read it with great interest. There are a couple of

things that you said that concerns me with our present course of

action. You said, ‘‘American combat troops should be gradually redeployed away from intervening in the sectarian conflict.’’ And you

also said that controlling the sectarian conflict, ‘‘is a task for Iraqi

troops, however poorly prepared they may be.’’ And that’s where I

want to take off the next line of questioning with you.

Everything we hear from the administration suggests, or tries to

suggest, to the American people, and to the Congress, that it is

Iraqis who are leading this effort, that it is Iraqis who are going

to be on point, and that we are there, filling in, in the background

along the way, and being helpful, and talking about embedding.

But when I look at some of the most recent news reports from the

front lines, I see an incredible lack of troop strength and training

of Iraqi forces and the confusion that comes along with having

them take the lead. Here’s one quote from an article, ‘‘As the sun

rose, many of the Iraqi Army units who were supposed to do the

actual searches of the building did not arrive on time, forcing the

Americans to start the job on their own. When the Iraqi units finally did show up, it was with the air of a class outing, cheering

and laughing as the Americans blew locks off doors with shotguns.

Many of the Iraqi units that showed up late never seemed to take

the task seriously, searching haphazardly, breaking dishes, rifling

through personal CD collections in the apartments.’’ In the article,

a lieutenant colonel of the 3d Stryker Brigade combat talked about

the difficulty of conducting such operations. He said, ‘‘This was an

Iraqi-led effort, and with that comes challenges and risks. It can

be organized chaos.’’

Twenty-some-odd-thousand more troops into that scenario? I

don’t understand that.

And then, balancing that and your answer, how do we, in such

a scenario, send 20-more-thousand troops? You say that, at some

point, no matter how poorly prepared they may be, they should

lead in this effort. I probably agree with you, they need to stand

up, at some point, on their own, particularly in a sectarian conflict.

And why is it that, notwithstanding your recommendations and the

recommendations of so many others, we do not seem to have an administration willing to engage in a very vigorous way, as so many

members in a nonpartisan effort here have called for, in the regional summits and the high level of engagement of other countries

in the region, which you yourself call for, as a significant comprehensive part of this plan? Why is there such a reticence, from

776

your perception of the administration, to do that? If you could pursue those two lines, I’d appreciate it.

General SCOWCROFT. Well, I think, as to the surge, as I said, I

describe the surge as a tactical maneuver, not as a strategic move.

The reason for it, that I would adduce, is that Baghdad is a special

case, and if one can stabilize Baghdad, then it would have a great

psychological impact in the country and also might give the Iraqi

forces a greater sense of self-confidence than the article that you

read indicates that they have.

But it won’t change the situation, fundamentally, in Iraq. It

might be a blip, it might be a positive blip, but it won’t. And, as

Senator Hagel said, you know, we’ve got a long, hard slog here, and

this is—it might be helpful. If it doesn’t work, it’ll—it might be

harmful. But it’s—you know, I didn’t focus on it, because it’s a decision that the President has made, and it is being implemented,

even as we—even as we speak.

Now, I think the administration is moving to greater regional involvement. And I think that Secretary Rice’s last trip, where she

spoke some, and listened a lot, will encourage them to move further. What I worry about is that it’s going to take not just gradual

movement, it’s going to take visible determination in order to rally

our friends behind us.

Senator MENENDEZ. My time is up, but Lee Hamilton and Jim

Baker were here, and I think it was Lee Hamilton specifically who

said that the sense of urgency—and, on the diplomatic side, I don’t

get the sense of intensity and urgency that is necessary in order

to achieve our goals. But I hope both these sets of hearings and the

vote that will soon take place will have the administration understand the sense of urgency, certainly on the diplomatic side.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Well, thank you very much, Senator

Menendez.

The chairman has been called to the floor for a moment. The

thought is that we will recess the hearing and wait for Dr.

Brzezinski’s appearance, which should be in a few minutes.

Let me just ask, before I take that action, whether there are

members who have additional questions of General Scowcroft.

[No response.]

Senator LUGAR. Seeing no further questions, we thank you very

much for coming, once again, to be part of a very important hearing. You’ve made a wonderful contribution, and we look forward to

seeing you again soon.

General SCOWCROFT. I thank you all for your listening to me.

Thank you very much.

Senator LUGAR. For the moment, the committee is recessed, and

we will wait for Dr. Brzezinski’s appearance.

[Recess.]

Senator LUGAR. The committee is called to order.

We welcome Dr. Brzezinski, a wonderful friend of the committee,

for this very important appearance today.

We have asked Dr. Brzezinski to present an opening statement,

and he will do that, and then we’ll proceed to questions. I think

Senators know that we are heading toward rollcall votes at noon

777

or shortly thereafter. Therefore, we’ll begin immediately, given the

chairman’s instructions.

Dr. Brzezinski, we’re delighted to have you, and would you

please proceed?

STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR; COUNSELOR AND TRUSTEE,

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, indeed.

Your hearings come at a critical juncture in the United States war

of choice in Iraq, and I commend you and Senator Biden for scheduling them.

In my view, it is time for the White House to come to terms with

two central realities. First, the war in Iraq is a historic, strategic,

and moral calamity. Undertaken under false assumptions, it is undermining America’s global legitimacy. Its collateral civilian casualties, as well as some abuses, are tarnishing America’s moral credentials. Driven by Manichean impulses and imperial hubris, it is

intensifying regional instability.

Second, only a political strategy that is historically relevant,

rather than reminiscent of colonial tutelage, can provide the

needed framework for a tolerable resolution of both the war in Iraq

and intensifying regional tensions.

If the United States continues to be bogged down in a protracted,

bloody involvement in Iraq—and I emphasize what I’m about to

say—the final destination on this downhill track is likely to be a

head-on conflict with Iran and with much of the world of Islam at

large. A plausible scenario for a military collision with Iran involves Iraqi failure to meet the benchmarks, followed by accusations of Iranian responsibility for the failure, then by some provocation in Iraq or a terrorist act in the United States, blamed on

Iran, culminating in a, ‘‘defensive’’ United States military action

against Iran that plunges a lonely America into a spreading and

deepening quagmire eventually ranging across Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Indeed, a mythical historical narrative to justify the case for such

a protracted and potential expanding war is already being articulated. Initially justified by false claims about WMDs in Iraq, the

war is now being redefined as the decisive ideological struggle of

our time, reminiscent of the earlier collisions with Nazism and Stalinism. In that context, Islamist extremism and al-Qaeda are presented as the equivalents of the threat posed by Nazi Germany and

then Soviet Russia, and 9/11 as the equivalent of the Pearl Harbor

attack which precipitated America’s involvement in World War II.

This simplistic and demagogic narrative overlooks the fact that Nazism was based on the military power of the industrially most advanced European state and that Stalinism was able to mobilize not

only the resources of the victorious and militarily powerful Soviet

Union, but also had worldwide appeal through its Marxist doctrine.

In contrast, most Muslims are not embracing Islamic fundamentalism, al-Qaeda is an isolated fundamentalist Islamist aberration,

most Iraqis are engaged in strife because of the American occupation which destroyed the Iraqi State, while Iran, though gaining in

778

regional influence, is, itself, politically divided, economically and

militarily weak. To argue that America is already at war in a region, with a wider Islamic threat of which Iran is the epicenter, is

to promote a self-fulfilling prophecy.

I then go on, Mr. Chairman, to compare the posture of the

United States, insofar as negotiations are concerned as, in some

ways, reminiscent of the moralist self-ostracism that the United

States practiced in the early 1950s toward Communist China. But,

for the sake of time, I’ll not read that passage.

Let me end this introductory remark before advocating some policy by noting that practically no country in the world—no country

in the world—shares the Manichean delusions that the administration so passionately articulates, and the result, sad to say, is

growing political isolation of, and pervasive political—or popular

antagonism toward the U.S. global posture.

I think it is obvious, therefore, that the American national interest calls for a significant change of direction. There is, in fact, consensus in America in favor of a change, a consensus that the war

was a mistake. It is a fact that leading Republicans have spoken

up and expressed profound reservations regarding the administration’s policy. I can simply invoke here the views of former President

Gerald Ford, former Secretary of State Baker, former National Security Advisor Scowcroft, and several of your colleagues, Mr. Chairman, including Warner, Hagel, Smith, among others. And hence,

the urgent need today is for a strategy that seeks to create a political framework for a resolution of the problems posed both by the

United States occupation of Iraq and by the ensuing civil and sectarian conflict. Ending the occupation and shaping a regional security dialog should be the mutually reinforcing goals of such a strategy, but both goals will take time to be accomplished and require

a genuinely serious U.S. commitment.

The quest to achieve these goals should involve four steps:

First, the United States should reaffirm explicitly and unambiguously its determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably short period

of time. Let me comment. Ambiguity regarding the duration of the

occupation, in fact, encourages unwillingness to compromise and

intensifies the ongoing civil strife. Moreover, such a public declaration is needed to allay fears in the Middle East of a new and enduring American imperial hegemony. Right or wrong, many view the

establishment of such a hegemony as the primary reason for the

American intervention in a region only recently free of colonial

domination. That perception should be discredited from the highest

U.S. level. Perhaps the U.S. Congress could do so by a joint resolution.

Second, the United States should announce that it is undertaking talks with the Iraqi leaders to jointly set with them a date

by which U.S. military disengagement should be completed, and

the resulting setting of such a date should be announced as a joint

decision. In the meantime, the United States should avoid military

escalation.

Comment briefly. It is necessary to engage all Iraqi leaders, including those who do not reside within the Green Zone, in a serious

discussion regarding the proposed and jointly defined date for

United States military disengagement, because the very dialog

779

itself will help to identify the authentic Iraqi leaders with the selfconfidence and capacity to stand on their own legs without United

States military protection. Only Iraqi leaders who can exercise real

power beyond the Green Zone can eventually reach a genuine Iraqi

accommodation. The painful reality is that much of this current

Iraqi regime, characterized by the administration as representative

of the Iraqi people, defines itself largely by its physical location, the

4-square-miles-large United States fortress within Baghdad, protected by a wall, in places 15 feet thick, manned by heavily armed

United States military, popularly known as the Green Zone.

Third, the United States should issue, jointly, with appropriate

Iraqi leaders, or perhaps let the Iraqi leaders issue, an invitation

to all neighbors of Iraq, and perhaps some other Muslim countries,

such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan, to engage in a dialog regarding how best to enhance stability in Iraq in conjunction

with United States military disengagement, and to participate

eventually in a conference regarding regional stability.

Brief comment. The United States and the Iraqi leadership need

to engage Iraq’s neighbors in a serious discussion regarding the region’s security problems, but such discussions cannot be undertaken while the United States is perceived as an occupier for an

indefinite duration. In fact, I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that the

setting of a date for departure would trigger a much higher probability of an effective regional dialog, because all of the countries

in the region do not want to see an escalating disintegration in the

region as a whole. Iran and Syria have no reason, however, to help

the United States consolidate a permanent regional hegemony. It

is ironic, however, that both Iran and Syria have lately called for

a regional dialog, exploiting thereby the self-defeating character of

the largely passive—and mainly sloganeering—United States diplomacy. A serious regional dialog promoted directly or indirectly by

the United States could be buttressed at some point by a wider circle of consultations involving other powers with a stake in the region’s stability, such as the EU, China, Japan, India, and Russia.

Members of this committee might consider exploring informally,

with the states mentioned, their potential interest in such a wider

dialog.

Fourth and finally, concurrently the United States should activate a credible and energetic effort to finally reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace, making it clear in the process as to what the basic

parameters of such a final accommodation ought to involve.

Brief comment. The United States needs to convince the region

that the United States is committed both to Israel’s enduring security and to fairness for the Palestinians who have waited for more

than 40 years now for their own separate state. Only an external

and activist intervention can promote the long-delayed settlement,

for the record shows that the Israelis and the Palestinians will

never do so on their own. Without such a settlement, both nationalist and fundamentalist passions in the region will, in the longer

run, doom any Arab regime which is perceived as supportive of

U.S. regional hegemony.

After World War II, the United States prevailed in the defense

of democracy in Europe because it successfully pursued a long-term

political strategy of uniting its friends and dividing its enemies inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00789 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
780

stead of dividing our friends and uniting our enemies, of soberly

deterring aggression without initiating hostilities, all the while also

exploring the possibility of negotiating arrangements. Today, America’s global leadership is being tested in the Middle East. A similarly wise strategy of genuinely constructive political engagement

is now urgently needed. It is time for the Congress to assert itself.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVI- SOR; COUNSELOR AND TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, your hearings come at a critical juncture in the U.S. war of choice

in Iraq, and I commend you and Senator Lugar for scheduling them.

It is time for the White House to come to terms with two central realities:

1. The war in Iraq is a historic, strategic, and moral calamity. Undertaken

under false assumptions, it is undermining America’s global legitimacy. Its collateral civilian casualties as well as some abuses are tarnishing America’s moral

credentials. Driven by Manichean impulses and imperial hubris, it is intensifying regional instability.

2. Only a political strategy that is historically relevant rather than reminiscent of colonial tutelage can provide the needed framework for a tolerable resolution of both the war in Iraq and the intensifying regional tensions.

If the United States continues to be bogged down in a protracted bloody involvement in Iraq, the final destination on this downhill track is likely to be a head-on

conflict with Iran and with much of the world of Islam at large. A plausible scenario

for a military collision with Iran involves Iraqi failure to meet the benchmarks; followed by accusations of Iranian responsibility for the failure; then by some provocation in Iraq or a terrorist act in the United States blamed on Iran; culminating

in a ‘‘defensive’’ U.S. military action against Iran that plunges a lonely America into

a spreading and deepening quagmire eventually ranging across Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

A mythical historical narrative to justify the case for such a protracted and

potentially expanding war is already being articulated. Initially justified by false

claims about WMD’s in Iraq, the war is now being redefined as the ‘‘decisive ideological struggle’’ of our time, reminiscent of the earlier collisions with Nazism and

Stalinism. In that context, Islamist extremism and al-Qaeda are presented as the

equivalents of the threat posed by Nazi Germany and then Soviet Russia, and

9/11 as the equivalent of the Pearl Harbor attack which precipitated America’s involvement in World War II.

This simplistic and demagogic narrative overlooks the fact that Nazism was based

on the military power of the industrially most advanced European state; and that

Stalinism was able to mobilize not only the resources of the victorious and militarily

powerful Soviet Union but also had worldwide appeal through its Marxist doctrine.

In contrast, most Muslims are not embracing Islamic fundamentalism; al-Qaeda is

an isolated fundamentalist Islamist aberration; most Iraqis are engaged in strife because the American occupation of Iraq destroyed the Iraqi State; while Iran—though

gaining in regional influence—is itself politically divided, economically and militarily weak. To argue that America is already at war in the region with a wider

Islamic threat, of which Iran is the epicenter, is to promote a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Deplorably, the administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East region has

lately relied almost entirely on such sloganeering. Vague and inflammatory talk

about ‘‘a new strategic context’’ which is based on ‘‘clarity’’ and which prompts ‘‘the

birth pangs of a new Middle East’’ is breeding intensifying anti-Americanism and

is increasing the danger of a long-term collision between the United States and the

Islamic world. Those in charge of U.S. diplomacy have also adopted a posture of

moralistic self-ostracism toward Iran strongly reminiscent of John Foster Dulles’s

attitude of the early 1950s toward Chinese Communist leaders (resulting among

other things in the well-known episode of the refused handshake). It took some two

decades and a half before another Republican President was finally able to undo

that legacy.

One should note here also that practically no country in the world shares the

Manichean delusions that the administration so passionately articulates. The result

is growing political isolation of, and pervasive popular antagonism toward the U.S.

global posture.

781

It is obvious by now that the American national interest calls for a significant

change of direction. There is, in fact, a dominant consensus in favor of a change:

American public opinion now holds that the war was a mistake; that it should not

be escalated, that a regional political process should be explored; and that an

Israeli-Palestinian accommodation is an essential element of the needed policy alteration and should be actively pursued. It is noteworthy that profound reservations

regarding the administration’s policy have been voiced by a number of leading

Republicans. One need only invoke here the expressed views of the much admired

President Gerald Ford, former Secretary of State James Baker, former National

Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and several leading Republican Senators, John

Warner, Chuck Hagel, and Gordon Smith among others.

The urgent need today is for a strategy that seeks to create a political framework

for a resolution of the problems posed both by the U.S. occupation of Iraq and by

the ensuing civil and sectarian conflict. Ending the occupation and shaping a regional security dialog should be the mutually reinforcing goals of such a strategy,

but both goals will take time and require a genuinely serious U.S. commitment.

The quest for a political solution for the growing chaos in Iraq should involve four

steps:

1. The United States should reaffirm explicitly and unambiguously its determination to leave Iraq in a reasonably short period of time.

Ambiguity regarding the duration of the occupation in fact encourages unwillingness to compromise and intensifies the on-going civil strife. Moreover, such a public

declaration is needed to allay fears in the Middle East of a new and enduring American imperial hegemony. Right or wrong, many view the establishment of such a

hegemony as the primary reason for the American intervention in a region only

recently free of colonial domination. That perception should be discredited from the

highest U.S. level. Perhaps the U.S. Congress could do so by a joint resolution.

2. The United States should announce that it is undertaking talks with the Iraqi

leaders to jointly set with them a date by which U.S. military disengagement should

be completed, and the resulting setting of such a date should be announced as a joint

decision. In the meantime, the United States should avoid military escalation.

It is necessary to engage all Iraqi leaders—including those who do not reside

within ‘‘the Green Zone’’—in a serious discussion regarding the proposed and jointly

defined date for U.S. military disengagement because the very dialog itself will help

identify the authentic Iraqi leaders with the self-confidence and capacity to stand

on their own legs without U.S. military protection. Only Iraqi leaders who can exercise real power beyond ‘‘the Green Zone’’ can eventually reach a genuine Iraqi accommodation. The painful reality is that much of the current Iraqi regime, characterized by the Bush administration as ‘‘representative of the Iraqi people,’’ defines

itself largely by its physical location: The 4-square-miles-large U.S. fortress within

Baghdad, protected by a wall in places 15 feet thick, manned by heavily armed U.S.

military, popularly known as ‘‘the Green Zone.’’

3. The United States should issue jointly with appropriate Iraqi leaders, or perhaps let the Iraqi leaders issue, an invitation to all neighbors of Iraq (and perhaps

some other Muslim countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan) to engage in a dialog regarding how best to enhance stability in Iraq in conjunction with

U.S. military disengagement and to participate eventually in a conference regarding

regional stability.

The United States and the Iraqi leadership need to engage Iraq’s neighbors in serious discussion regarding the region’s security problems, but such discussions cannot be undertaken while the United States is perceived as an occupier for an indefinite duration. Iran and Syria have no reason to help the United States consolidate

a permanent regional hegemony. It is ironic, however, that both Iran and Syria have

lately called for a regional dialog, exploiting, thereby, the self-defeating character

of the largely passive—and mainly sloganeering—U.S. diplomacy.

A serious regional dialog, promoted directly or indirectly by the United States,

could be buttressed at some point by a wider circle of consultations involving other

powers with a stake in the region’s stability, such as the EU, China, Japan, India,

and Russia. Members of this committee might consider exploring, informally with

the states mentioned, their potential interest in such a wider dialog.

4. Concurrently, the United States should activate a credible and energetic effort

to finally reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace, making it clear in the process as to

what the basic parameters of such a final accommodation ought to involve.

The United States needs to convince the region that the United States is committed both to Israel’s enduring security and to fairness for the Palestinians who

have waited for more than 40 years now for their own separate state. Only an external and activist intervention can promote the long-delayed settlement for the record

782

shows that the Israelis and the Palestinians will never do so on their own. Without

such a settlement, both nationalist and fundamentalist passions in the region will,

in the longer run, doom any Arab regime which is perceived as supportive of U.S.

regional hegemony.

After World War II, the United States prevailed in the defense of democracy in

Europe because it successfully pursued a long-term political strategy of uniting its

friends and dividing its enemies, of soberly deterring aggression without initiating

hostilities, all the while also exploring the possibility of negotiated arrangements.

Today, America’s global leadership is being tested in the Middle East. A similarly

wise strategy of genuinely constructive political engagement is now urgently needed.

It is also time for the Congress to assert itself.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. And welcome, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I read, as I commended your testimony, this

morning, to my colleague, who was about to read it, and has read

it. I apologize for being absent for a moment. I had to be on the

floor.

As usual, you are direct, cogent, and insightful. I appreciate your

availability to the committee and, also, your availability to a number of us individually to seek your advice.

We just heard from a man we all regard well, one of your successors, who cautioned that if we were to ‘‘leave,’’ Iraq, there would

be these dire consequences. I read, with incredible interest, your

paragraph on page one of your testimony, saying, ‘‘If the United

States continues to be bogged down in a protracted, bloody involvement in Iraq, the final destination on this downhill track is likely

to be a head-on conflict with Iran and much of the world of Islam

at large.’’

Now, the argument the President is making is: The conflict with

Islam intensifies if we withdraw. You’re making the argument that

continuing to be bogged down here is more likely to result in that

outcome. Could you expand on that for me?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Conflict, by its very nature, is not self-containable. It either diminishes, because one side has prevailed or because there is an accommodation, or it escalates. If we could prevail militarily and in a decisive fashion, even though I oppose the

war, there would be a strong case to be made for it. But I think

we know by now that to prevail we would need to have 500,000

troops in Iraq, wage the war with unlimited brutality, and altogether crush that society, because it would intensify, probably, its

resistance. So, that’s a no-starter.

Escalating the war as a consequence of protracting it, is hardly

an attractive option for the United States, because, before too long,

as I say in my statement, we could be facing a 20-year-long involvement, not only in Iraq, but Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

And think how precarious Pakistan is, and how uncertain the situation in Afghanistan is becoming. So, it’s in our interest to isolate

the conflicts and to terminate them. And we have to exploit, at

least try to exploit, the political possibility, the political option.

Now, in the end, I cannot dogmatically argue that it is certain

to succeed. But if we don’t try, we know we’ll never have had the

chance.

The CHAIRMAN. You seem to be arguing that if we stay on the

particular course we’re on now, it will not succeed. You’re confident

the present course will not succeed?

783

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I think every indicator over the last 3 or

so years indicates that. The situation is worsening. Hostility toward the United States is intensifying. Our isolation worldwide is

both being perpetuated in some respects, becoming more culturally

grounded. Look at the public opinion polls.

I think we have to take a hard look at what the options are.

Now, I realize there are risks in a strategy in which the goal is to

find an alternative outcome than a military victory. But, at the

same time, we shouldn’t become prisoners of apocalyptic and horrific scenarios, in some respects reminiscent of those which were

described and drawn in the latter phases of the Vietnamese war,

and which did not take place. I’m not sure that if we were to disengage from Iraq, that the consequence is this kind of horrific set

of dominoes falling all over the Middle East. Moreover—and please

notice carefully, in my statement I’m not saying we should unilaterally disengage.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I’m saying we should work with the Iraqis on

setting a date, and use that as a trigger for an international conference of Iraq’s neighbors. Because I don’t believe, if you look carefully at the interests of Saudi Arabia or Jordan or Syria or Iran,

that they have a stake, an interest, in making the explosion get out

of hand. They’re——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, quite frankly——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. Vulnerable regimes.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless I’m missing something, that was pretty

much the consensus of most of the witnesses we’ve had in the last

4 weeks, and that is, they have an interest in it not exploding.

You echo the comments made yesterday and the day before and

throughout this hearing process about Iran when you say Iran is,

‘‘politically divided and economically and militarily weak.’’ Now, the

question is: If that is true—and I think we overlook how politically

divided it is and overlook how economically weak it is. We seem to

be building it up to be, you know, 20 feet tall, and that this is the

new superpower in the region. Matter of fact, some have used that

phrase. Give me your assessment of the present threat that Iran

poses in the region and what you think a continued protracted

American presence in Iraq will do to impact whether they grow

weaker, stronger, et cetera.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think some form of American presence in Iraq

is going to be a fact, assuming even a political settlement. But it

will not be the same as a military occupation and a political hegemony imposed by a militarily successful campaign. I think that

kind of presence, Iran has no choice but——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that was the objective of this administration, initially?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I have no idea what its initial objective was, because the motives it provided for the action proved to be entirely

erroneous. And if they were the real motives, then the whole campaign was based on false assumptions.

The CHAIRMAN. It’s unfair to ask you to be a soothsayer, I——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yeah.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Apologize.

784

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Now, if there were hidden motives—I can imagine, potentially, several. One would be to gain American domination over the region’s oil, to put it very simplistically. Another, it

could be to help maximize Israel’s security by removing a powerful

Arab State. Another one could have been to simply get rid of an

obnoxious regime with which the United States had accounts to

settle, going back to 1991 and the alleged assassination attempt

against President Bush senior. There could be a variety of motives.

But the official motives were WMDs.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you expand slightly on the notion—because

I interrupted you—that Iran is politically divided, economically and

militarily weak?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. It is economically weak, because it is an economy that hasn’t been thriving and it’s one-dimensional, and it’s relatively isolated. It’s politically divided, in the sense that, in my

judgment, the mullahs are Iran’s past, and not its future, and that

its fundamentalist regime is not very popular with the masses, and

particularly with the younger generation, much of which is very

pro-American. But, sadly, it is also more united, nationalistically,

in part because of our attitude toward Iran, which has been extremely hostile and which has gelled together a kind of residual national sentiment, particularly in support of the nuclear program.

And I think our policy has unintentionally—I hope, unintentionally—maybe it was devilishly clever—but I think unintentionally

helped Ahmadinejad consolidate himself in power and exercise a

degree of influence, which actually his position doesn’t justify. You

know, most Americans, when they say ‘‘President Ahmadinejad,’’

they think he is the equivalent of President Bush. He’s not. He’s

roughly a third-level official who doesn’t even control the military

resources of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. That’s an important point to make. I think the

vast majority of Americans would think he controls the——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yeah.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Security apparatus.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. And he doesn’t.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you very much.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, just to follow through on that questioning of the

chairman, you’ve called for U.S. military disengagement on a

schedule to be jointly set with the Iraq leadership. Now, as I just

heard you speaking, could this mean that in these talks with the

Iraqi leaders, they decide that there should be some United States

military presence in Iraq for an indefinite future. Would that be a

contingency of these talks? But what I’m wondering is, as we engage in the talks with the Iraqi leadership, if it would not come,

at least into their minds, that they do not want the United States

to depart altogether from Iraq, nor, in fact, if we were to get into

the second part of your thought, and that is, having entered into

these talks, or even begun to discuss a date or a timeframe, the

other countries might very well come to a conclusion that an American presence in Iraq of some sort, of some quantity, was a very

important issue for them. Are these potential consequences of these

talks that you’ve prescribed?

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Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Absolutely. I have drafted the statement very

carefully to take into account the existing situation. I have felt,

some time ago, that we should have indicated a deadline for our

departure, and, roughly a year or more ago, I said we should aim

at a year. But I’m also aware of the fact that, during the intervening period of time, the situation has deteriorated and the consequences of our departure are probably going to be more difficult

than had we done it a year or a year and a half ago. And time is

not working in our favor.

Nonetheless, having said this, I would personally use these discussions with the Iraq leaders—not only the ones in the Green

Zone, I emphasize—to identify those Iraqi leaders who have the

sense of confidence to stand on their own feet, and then set with

them a date. I would still advocate roughly a year. But I would certainly consider favorably any Iraqi desire for residual American

presence. And I can envisage it occurring in a variety of ways. For

example, the Kurdish leaders might say that they would welcome

some residual American presence, because they are understandably

fearful that either the Iranians or the Turks could use our departure as an excuse for dealing with what they view as a Kurdish

irridenta directed against them. I can envisage some situation in

which we will want to retain a military presence, perhaps, in Kuwait; and, thereby, in the immediate proximity. Theoretically, one

could envisage some residual American presence in some remote

base in Iraq, if that was the wish of the Iraqi leaders. And I think

these are the kinds of things we can discuss with them with a

deadline in mind, and then negotiate a mutually satisfactory deadline. And then, that deadline, I think, would make it easier to trigger a serious negotiating process with all of the neighbors regarding stability in Iraq and their stake in that stability.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that very nuanced and thoughtful suggestion, I think, is important to make a part of the record, because,

frequently in these debates, Senators or the general public end up

with the idea of everybody in, everybody out. There aren’t too many

nuances in this, sort of a rush—the image of the evacuation of the

Vietnam Embassy is given as symbol—the photo of the helicopter

lifting the last persons out. Now, this is obviously not what we’re

talking about here, particularly in the context of Afghanistan, nearby, in which the counsel right now of our NATO allies, quite apart

from our situation, is that probably we should do more. Now, that

comes, then, into some conflict with our military’s ability to stretch

to do a number of things at the same time, but—

Now, let me just ask—furthermore, you say, things may have deteriorated. Indeed, Secretary Rice has made the rounds. That’s certainly what she seems to have found from some of the parties. So,

this would lead those countries that have Sunni affinity to hope,

at least for the time being, that the United States was not in a

rush for the borders. And that sort of conference that you’re suggesting, of the neighbors, which I think is an excellent idea, would

bring together all of these parties that we’re dealing with bilaterally, but increasingly appear to have some common themes,

which includes a U.S. presence of some sort as a stabilizing factor.

I laboriously want to trace through what I think are excellent

suggestions to make sure that the nuances of this are understood

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by Senators, and by the public that may take seriously your testimony, as we do.

Now, I want to ask, finally—given the fact that the amount of

government anywhere in Iraq is, in some cases almost de minimis

at this point—one of the effects of our invasion and military operations, as we’ve seen, was not only the army disintegrated, so did

the police force, so did what some Iraqis have said, almost any coercive ability to bring about order. The period of rebuilding is likely

to be very long, and it’s not really clear who helps do this rebuilding, aside from us. And I—I’m troubled by that, because we’ve had

testimony from Iraqis that the problem is not just insurgents and

militia and sectarian violence—just common criminals, thousands

of them, preying upon Iraqis who do not have much protection,

wherever they may be in the country. We have some responsibility

for that, and, at the same time, it’s not really clear how you fulfill

a rebuilding of Iraq, at least in that comprehensive sense. That—

and I hope maybe that might be a part of this leadership parley

between the Iraqi leaders and ourselves. Maybe the United States

doesn’t do all of the nation-building, but, very clearly, someone will

have to try to help restore some fabric in the provinces, in addition

to the Baghdad situation that we’ve visited about.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I very much agree with what you say, Senator

Lugar. Let me just add one preliminary point and then address

specifically the points you have just raised.

My horror scenario is not a repetition of Saigon, the helicopters

on top of the Embassy, and the flight out of the country. My horror

scenario is that by not having a plan—and I understand that my

friend, yesterday, discussed perhaps the possibility of a secret plan

that the administration has—what I fear is that the secret plan is

that there is no secret plan. My horror——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s a good bet.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. Scenario is that we’ll simply stay

put, this will continue, and then the dynamic of the conflict will

produce an escalating situation in which Iraqi failure to meet the

benchmarks will be blamed on the Iranians. There will be, then,

some clashes, collisions, and the war expands.

Now, as far as dealing with the rebuilding of Iraq in a setting

in which we commit ourselves to disengage, and the commitment

to engage, set jointly, becomes a trigger for an international conference, I think a great deal depends not on us engaging in nationbuilding, but on the surfacing of a genuine Iraqi motivation. I personally view with great skepticism all this talk about us creating

an Iraqi national army, creating a nation, building—nation-building, and so forth. The problem is, we have smashed this state. We

have given an enormous opportunity for narrow sectarian interests

and passions to rise. What is needed, again, is a sense of Iraqi nationalism. And that residualist still exists. But to make it possible,

it has to be led by Iraqi leaders who are viewed by their country

as authentic. And I’m sorry to say, but the leadership, sitting in

an American fortress, which doesn’t venture outside is not very authentic. The authentic leaders are those who have their own bodyguards—indeed, their own militias—and their own capacity to assert their power. They have to be engaged in a dialog, and then in

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the solution, a political solution. And that’s what we very badly

need.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brzezinski, thank you for your testimony.

Let me ask you—we’ve had other witnesses here who have said

that, in their opinion, that the biggest winner from our engagement

in Iraq, as a result of our policies there, to date, at least—has been

Iran. Would you agree with that?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes. I wouldn’t use the word ‘‘winner,’’ but I

would say geopolitical beneficiary. Yes; they have benefited a great

deal.

Senator MENENDEZ. You started off your statement today saying

that, ‘‘If the United States continues to be bogged down in a protracted, bloody involvement in Iraq, the final destination on this

downhill track is likely to be a head-on conflict with Iran and with

much of the world of Islam at large.’’ That’s a pretty dire assessment. Could you take us through what you see happening if we

don’t change the course of events?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I have alluded to it, but you cannot be precise, because the future is always so full of contingencies that, simply, there is no way of picking out which ones you think really will

happen. But, basically, escalation, accusations, some incidents—

there have already been some incidents between us and the Iranians—there are some allegations that the Iranians are responsible

for certain acts; allegations, but not facts—and that would spark,

simply, a collision. It could even be, in some fashion, provoked.

Let me draw your attention to something that your staff should

give you and, I think, that might be of interest to some other members of this committee, and that’s a report in the New York Times,

dated March 27, 2006. It’s a long report on a private meeting between the President and Prime Minister Blair 2 months before the

war, based on a memorandum of conversation prepared by the British official present at this meeting. And in it, according to this account, the President is cited as saying that he’s concerned that

there may not be weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq, and

that there must be some consideration given to finding a different

basis for undertaking the military action. And I’ll just read you

what this memo allegedly says, according to the New York Times.

The memo states, that, ‘‘The President and Prime Minister acknowledged that no unconditioned—no unconventional weapons

had been found inside Iraq.’’ This is 2 months before the war.

‘‘Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned

invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several ways to provoke a confrontation.’’ And he described, then, several ways in which this

could be done. And I won’t go into that. I don’t know how accurate

these ways were. They’re quite sensational, at least one of them.

And if one is of the view that one is dealing with an implacable

enemy that has to be removed, that course of action may, under

certain circumstances, be appealing. I am afraid that the situation

in Iraq continues deteriorating. And if Iran is perceived as, in some

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fashion, involved or responsible, or the potential beneficiary thereof, that temptation could arise.

Senator MENENDEZ. If the Iranians are training Shiite militias,

as I think there’s a general perception that they are—isn’t the administration also, despite all of its recent statements about how it’s

going to deal with Iranian personnel in Iraq and the carrier group

that went into the gulf—isn’t it equally as important to tell Prime

Minister Maliki that he has to be as forceful in demanding that

Maliki cut ties to these groups, and clear about the consequences

if he refuses? Isn’t that equally as important as the messages we’re

sending to the Iranians?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The problem here is that we have destroyed the

Iraqi State. The Iraqi so-called national army is composed of people

with very strong sectarian loyalties, and that the militias that exist

are, in some respect, the real expressions of existing residual political power in Iraq. If Maliki undertakes an assault on some of

these militias—and some are said to be well armed and as large

as 60,000 men—he’s going to be further isolated and further weakened. So, in a sense, he’s being asked to undertake an impossible

assignment. A political settlement has to aim at drawing in those

elements in the Iraqi political spectrum, which is now very volatile

and very confused, that have a long-term interest in the existence

of an Iraqi State.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, let me ask you, then, on that point. If

the people we need to be engaged with are the people who are beyond the Green Zone and have power by virtue of the militias and

the political backing of elements of Iraqi society, what is the catalyst that gets them to the table to move them in the direction to

achieve the goal, if it’s possible—if it’s possible—of a government

of national unity? That’s the first question.

And the second question, in the remaining time that I have, is,

it seems to me that with Iraq’s neighbors, while they should have

a stake, it has not gotten to a point sufficiently bad to catalyze a

change in the behavior of Iraq’s neighbors. They haven’t seemed to

be incentivized as long as they believe that we will shed our blood

and our national treasure. They are, I believe, reticent to do anything. We have not led a real effort to get them engaged in any significant way. It seems to me that sometimes, and there are other

witnesses here who have said that, things have to get worse before

they, in fact, can cross the threshold of understanding what their

interests are.

So, I’d like your perceptions on those two things. What is it that

catalyzes these groups that you suggest are the essential elements

to try to achieve some success in a political context? And how do

we get these other countries engaged, who—we believe have a

stake, and they probably think they have a stake, but don’t believe

that it’s time for them to pull the trigger yet?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, actually, my answer is the same to both

questions. Namely, the realization that the United States is not

there indefinitely, and that, within a reasonable period of time,

with a jointly set date, the United States will disengage. That will

have the effect of forcing, first of all, the various Iraqi parties to

think of the consequences of American departure. Right now, in a

curious way, the occupation, even though resented by most Iraqis,

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is an umbrella for internal intransigence. Nobody really feels any

incentive to compromise, because ultimately they know the situation is being kept more or less afloat by our occupation, though

most Iraqis dislike it.

And, as far as the neighbors are concerned, they don’t fear any

real explosion in Iraq, because we’re there. And hence, they may

have different interests—the Saudis certainly have different interests than the Iranians—but they know that there is a kind of

enduring volatile status quo, at our expense, but which doesn’t

confront them with any real choices. But if we were to set, jointly—

and I keep emphasizing ‘‘jointly’’—the date with Iraqis for our departure, it would have the effect of forcing all of the governments

around Iraq to ask themselves, How do we deal with the problem

of stability in Iraq? Do we really want to have a regional war

among ourselves? The Saudis and the Jordanians, theoretically

against the Iranians, and the Syrians in between, is that really appealing to anybody in the region? Most of the regimes in the region

know that that kind of a war could spread and destroy them. And

hence, we are far more likely to mobilize some degree of responsible interest in an accommodation that reinforces Iraqi stability if

we do what I am advocating, a conjunction of the two actions, one

triggering the other.

And I deliberately included in my suggestions countries like

Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, because they may have some

military resources that could be available for helping an Iraqi Government stabilize and police internal arrangements and develop a

national army, a national army that’s not developed by an occupier

that’s alien—namely, us—but by fellow Muslims. They may be willing to do that. And I would like to see other countries involved,

countries that have a stake in that region’s stability because of

their dependence on energy, and they could be helpful particularly

in a massive international recovery program for Iraq, which would

be triggered by those two steps that I’ve advocated.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Doctor, thank you for your testimony and for

your great public service to the Nation, continuing to this very moment, because I believe what you’re doing here is very important

to helping the Congress play the role it must play when it comes

to Iraq and our national security generally.

I want to try to ask some very brief questions, and try to get at

least three, but I want you to take your time in answering them

as thoroughly as you think they warrant.

You made one assertion, during your testimony, about troop levels, saying that any kind of success in Iraq means, by definition,

an American commitment of 500,000 troops. I wanted to have you

expound on that, or just indicate that that’s—is that—that’s an accurate assessment of what you’ve testified to, the—that number?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Oh, you want me to answer each——

Senator CASEY. Yes.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Fine. Look, that figure is illustrative of a larger

proposition; namely, to win this kind of a war, you have to have

an overwhelming force. I’m not going to fight to the death for 500.

790

It could be 550, it could be 480, or it could be 600. My point is,

we’re no longer trying to crush a regime with a traditional army

in the field, often led by corrupt officers without much loyalty in

the rank and file to the cause on the other side. We’re fighting, increasingly, the kind of chaotic, amorphous, sectarian, ethnic, religious resistance that’s more pervasive. And we’re discovering the

same thing that the Russians discovered in Afghanistan, that the

Israelis recently discovered in Lebanon, that that kind of a popular

war requires a far higher commitment of resources on the part of

the external power that has come in, in order to win. And, therefore, our military effort would simply have to be immeasurably

greater. And that’s the purpose of the 500,000.

Senator CASEY. Certainly greater than what we have there now,

even——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Considerably——

Senator CASEY [continuing]. With——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. Greater.

Senator CASEY. Right.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Not 21,500 greater.

Senator CASEY. I’d ask you to evaluate, or critique, in any way

that you think is appropriate, two basic assertions, among many,

but two basic assertions by President Bush and his administration

that we hear over and over and over again. One, the most recent

assertion, that any kind of engagement with Iran and Syria would

be, ‘‘extortion.’’ Secretary Rice said that in her testimony. We’ve

heard that. That’s No. 1. And not in any order, necessarily. No. 2,

the assertion, ongoing now for several years, that the war in Iraq

is the central front on the—with regard to the war on terror, or the

most important front with regard to the war on terror. I guess both

of those assertions, if you can respond to both of them.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, engagement equals extortion, that’s a very

curious way of defining diplomacy. In other words, diplomacy only

makes sense if the other side, in advance, concedes our desires and

indicates its willingness to accept them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you got it right. I think you’ve defined

it.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Diplomacy that way is very one-sided and unlikely to be seriously practiced. So, this is what I meant, that we

are sloganeering rather than strategizing in our democracy.

We negotiated with the Soviets at a time when they could have

destroyed us almost instantly. The threat we face here is not even

remotely comparable. I was responsible, for 4 years, for actually informing the President of a nuclear attack on the United States. I

had 4 minutes in which to present the basic facts to the President.

Excuse me, I had 3 minutes to present the basic facts to the President. The President had 4 minutes in which to make a decision as

to how to respond. Twenty-eight minutes later, there would be nuclear exchange. Six hours later, 150 people—150 million people

might have been dead. That is the kind of threat we faced, and yet

we negotiated. In fact, negotiations were very important in marginally stabilizing that relationship.

We should negotiate with Iran. It won’t be easy. We have conflicting interests. There are conflicts outside of the region that we

have with Iran, like the nuclear problem. But certainly, attempting

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a diplomacy is essential. And freezing oneself in ostracism is reminiscent, as I said in my testimony, of the position maintained by

John Foster Dulles toward China in the early fifties.

On the second point, the central front—well, if it is the central

front, it certainly is self-created, because the ‘‘war on terror,’’

started 2 years earlier, or a year and a half earlier. And we had

the problem with terror. I would never call it a ‘‘war,’’ anyway. But

we have had, and continue to have, a serious problem with the

threat of terrorism. But the war in Iraq has, to me, the most elusive connection with the war on terror. The Iraqi regime, abhorrent

though it was, was not engaged in terrorist activity against us. And

I do not see the argument that, if we were not to continue the military campaign in Iraq, somehow or other, those who are opposing

us in Fallujah or in Ramadi or in Najaf will swim across the Atlantic and engage in terrorist acts in the United States. It just strains

credulity to hear arguments like that.

Senator CASEY. One final question. I only have a minute left.

And I asked General Scowcroft this question this morning. It’s been

asserted by some—and I heard it from one individual for whom I

have a lot of respect—that any military strike by the United States

on Iran would obviously have a lot of ramifications, but one direct

and immediate and unmistakable consequence of that would be the

slaughter of American GIs currently in Iraq, probably mostly in

Baghdad, almost like a—President Kennedy, years ago, talked

about a nuclear sort of Damocles, in a—in the context of Iran and

Iraq, a sort of Damocles over the head of American GIs that would

be an immediate consequence.

I just want to get your assessment of that, quickly, in the context

of highly likely or unlikely, and then whatever you can do to amplify that.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would say, speculatively—I’m not certain of my

answer, but I would say, instinctively, it’s not very likely.

Senator CASEY. Not very likely.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Not very likely. I think the resistance against us

in Iraq is largely indigenous, and, more or less, it expresses itself

in terms of its current capability. In other words, there is no sort

of hidden residual capability that could suddenly be unleashed because Iran has been attacked.

The fact is, you know, that most Iraqi Shiites fought pretty well

against Iran during the 8-year-long war. It’s a kind of simplistic

generalization that many people employ, to the effect that the Shiites in Iraq are, somehow or other, beholden entirely to Iran. There

are affinities and connections, undeniably, but there is an Iraqi

identity, and the Shiites fought very well against the Iranians.

The Iranians can do a lot of other things if we attack Iran, but

that one, I think, is unlikely.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Doctor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Good morning.

Senator BILL NELSON [continuing]. Dr. Brzezinski.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Hi.

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Senator BILL NELSON. In your statement, I am drawn to the

paragraph about calling for an international conference regarding

regional stability. And I quote you, ‘‘a serious regional dialog promoted, directly or indirectly, by the United States could be buttressed at some point by a wider circle of consultations.’’ I certainly

agree with you. Would you expand on that?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, Senator. It seems to me that—and I’m, to

some extent, repeating myself—that we have not yet tapped, in a

constructive fashion, the underlying interest of the states adjoining

Iraq, and we haven’t tapped sufficiently their underlying fear regarding their future by engaging them in a process in which they’re

only likely to be engaged if they think the American occupation is

coming to an end; namely, Syria’s discussions, among themselves,

but also with the Iraqi authorities, whoever they are, and with us,

about how regional stability ought to be preserved and how regional stability within Iraq ought to be consolidated. And we can’t

do that until and unless we, one, create the preconditions for it by

the decision to leave, and, two, by engaging them in an effort which

involves discussions.

Now, you don’t go to a conference simply out from the cold, all

of a sudden. You engage in previous discussions. That’s what we

hire a Secretary of State for, not to sit there and proclaim categorical statements, but to engage in the process. And the process

itself, over time, can generate some degree of responsiveness, it can

identify irreconcilable issues, as well as issues in which there is

some shared stake. That is the purpose of diplomacy. Diplomacy

isn’t the answer to everything, but it is an important component

of resolving issues and avoiding conflict.

Senator BILL NELSON. And those who say that we should not

talk to, for example, Syria are ignoring the fact that, in the past

when we talked to Syria, there was some consultation and progress

with regard to the closing of the border, cooperation, albeit sporadic, that precipitously cut off after the assassination of Rafik

Hariri. As you have pointed out, circumstances change, and, for the

first time, Syria and Iraq have now opened diplomatic relations

with each other.

And thank you for your comments.

And, Mr. Chairman, I know we’re getting close to a vote, so I will

stop so that one of our other Senators can go ahead.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you—procedural note, do I call you ‘‘Mr.

Chairman,’’ Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Senator WEBB. Is it ‘‘Mr. Ranking Member’’?

Senator BILL NELSON. Why not? [Laughter.]

Senator WEBB. Dr. Brzezinski, I certainly appreciate being able

to hear your views. And, you know, I’ve read your articles over the

years, and agree with a great bit of it, and appreciate having your

wisdom at the table.

I will—also in light of the fact there’s going to be a vote, I want

to ask you two fairly specific questions, one of which is—we’ve been

trying to sort out options, you know, if the administration were to

take those options, or if the Government were, regarding how to

get to this, you know, diplomatic conference or the forum where we

793

can, sort of, start resolving this—issues and increase the stability

of the region while we pull out our troops. And from the way that

you have constructed your testimony, it—and from what you just

said—you’re basically saying that we should first announce that

there will be a substantial withdrawal, and then arrange for a conference to be called. Is that correct? Or is it—you’re saying this

should happen concurrently or——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. No, no; let me just clarify what we should say,

or what we should do. But first let me remind you, I’m your constituent. [Laughter.]

And it’s good to see you here.

Senator WEBB. You have been the deciding vote. [Laughter.]

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. No; it’s——

Senator WEBB. I’m—well, I’m assuming——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Probably was. [Laughter.]

What we should make clear is that there’s a finite date to our

presence, set jointly with the Iraqis. And that finite date should not

be too far removed. And use that at the same time as a trigger for

convening this regional event, this regional undertaking, because,

as long as there is uncertainty about the duration of our stay, I

don’t think the adjoining states are likely to be engaged in helping

us create regional stability, even though they are fearful of regional

instability. So, these two things are interrelated, and that is why

it is a strategic package, what I’m arguing for.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

The second question is: I’m wondering if you see any circumstances under which this administration would open up some

sort of serious dialog with Iran and Syria? And, if so, what they

would be. I—to me, that’s just the ultimate sticking point in the

strategy that they—the so-called strategy that they have just announced.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I think, unfortunately, the administration

has used rhetoric terminology regarding Iran that has played into

the hands of people like Ahmadinejad, thereby creating, in a sense,

a process in which a dialog—a serious responsible dialog, not only

regarding Iraq, but regarding nuclear weapons, the nuclear program—has become more difficult. That has to be reversed. I have

no way of knowing whether the administration is prepared to undertake that reversal. I am perplexed by the fact that major strategic decisions seem to be made within a very narrow circle of individuals, just a few, probably a handful, perhaps not more than the

fingers in one hand. And these are the individuals, all of whom but

one, made the original decision to go to war and used the original

justifications for going to war. So, they, unavoidably, are in a situation in which they are reluctant to undertake actions which would

imply a significant reversal of policy. That’s, from a human point

of view, understandable, but, from a political point of view, troubling.

Senator WEBB. And it—and, from our—well, at least from the

perspective, I think, of the people who are concerned about where

we are, it is the conundrum that we face hearing the preponderance of testimony from people like yourselves, reading the Iraq

Study Group reports where the recommendations are concurrent,

that there should be some sort of military—continuation of military

794

action to try to assist the present government, but, at the same

time, that there should be diplomatic action. And the overwhelming

recommendation is that this include opening up dialog with Syria

and Iran. And yet, if this administration refuses, or consciously

avoids that step, then what you have, in the Baker-Hamilton report

is a complete stoppage of half of what the recommendations consist

of. And Chairman Hamilton mentioned, the other day when I asked

him, that this step forward, this procedural step forward, should,

arguably, come from the President and the Secretary of State, and

I don’t think we’re likely to see it. Would you comment?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think you’re right in your last comment. And,

in a sense, that constitutes a kind of constitutional stalemate,

which can only be broken, in my judgment, given the circumstances

and given the stakes involved, by congressional leadership—and,

hopefully, bipartisan congressional leadership—because at stake,

truly, is the future of this country and its role in the world. And

if we get bogged down into something very messy and expanding,

American global leadership will be in the gravest of jeopardy. It already is largely delegitimated worldwide.

So, congressional leadership here is important, and that joint

leadership can only emerge, particularly the President’s own party,

if the leadership of the President’s party, out of patriotic concerns,

becomes convinced, itself, that the President has to be faced with

the reality that much of the Nation—and the Congress, specifically—has a very different view of what is needed, and has a very

different assessment of what is happening.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. That’s a very major challenge.

Senator WEBB. Thank you for your testimony. Thank you for

being here today.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. That’s what we’re, I might add, attempting to do. Whether it will work or not—it’s a first step. If you

have any—I’m not being facetious here—any additional ideas as to

how to do that, with specificity, they’d be welcome.

But we have a vote——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Just one point——

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. I’d propose in response to just that.

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think a clear congressional resolution on the

fact that the United States does not intend to stay in Iraq for an

indefinite period of time would be very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. We have passed, I might add, on, I think, two

occasions, ‘‘no permanent basis.’’ It’s not the same thing, you’re saying.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. No, it’s different——

The CHAIRMAN. It is different. And we could not even get that

through.

But, having said that, let me yield to the Senator from——

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I just really——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Maryland.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to thank you, Dr. Brzezinski, for your testimony.

I am in agreement with pretty much everything you’ve said.

795

There’s only one thing that disappoints me, and that is you’re a

resident of Virginia rather than Maryland. [Laughter.]

Other than that, I think we’re in full agreement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, again, I want to thank you so much, Dr.

Brzezinski. As I said, you’re always so clearheaded in your recommendations. There’s no doubt about what you’re proposing. I, for

what it’s worth, agree with you, in large part, particularly as it relates to what I believe to be, not only the hyping of the circumstance for going in, but the hyping of the threat, and so on. I’ll

conclude by saying I agree with your worst-case scenario as the one

I worry about most, as well, that as this becomes protracted, it

gets—my dad used to have an expression I’ve not used often, but

when people talk about war, he’d say, ‘‘The only war worse than

one that’s intended is one that’s unintended.’’ And I worry that if

we stand on the—your phrase is ‘‘slope’’—that that’s where we

could end up, and that would be a disaster.

But I thank you very, very much, and thank you for being available to us. It is the intention of the committee to hold hearings on

Iran in a timely way, and I would ask you to consider, ahead of

time, whether you’d be willing to come back and talk about Iran.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s been

a privilege to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

(797)

A P P E N D I X

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

LETTER FROM NECHIRVAN BARZANI, PRIME MINISTER, KURDISTAN REGIONAL

GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ, ERBIL, KURDISTAN-IRAQ

JANUARY 23, 2007.

Hon. JOSEPH BIDEN, Chairman,

Hon. RICHARD LUGAR, Ranking Member,

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR BIDEN AND SENATOR LUGAR: I convey the greetings and friendship

of the Kurdish people to the United States. I am following with great interest your

important hearings on the situation in Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government

of Iraq (KRG) has been a full partner with the United States and our fellow Iraqis

in trying to build a democratic Iraq. We understand America’s frustration with the

situation in Iraq and we, too, are frustrated, disappointed, and saddened by the continuing instability, violence, and loss of life.

It is our deeply held view that the only viable long-term solution is a federal

structure for Iraq that recognizes and empowers regional governments in the north,

south, and center of the country. The Kurds are committed to a voluntary union

within a federal system and have no plans to secede from Iraq.

A program for reconciliation in Iraq must offer a ground-breaking approach to

both the decentralization of authority and the distribution of resources. In that context, I would like to take this opportunity to offer some clarification regarding the

discussion of the Kurdish position on the Iraqi oil law that came up during Secretary Rice’s appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday, January 11, 2007, and in subsequent press accounts of the negotiations over

the law.

I have personally led the intensive negotiations about the Iraqi oil law in Baghdad

on behalf of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KRG has proposed a

historic plan for the development of Iraqi oil resources and the distribution of oil

revenues that is consistent with the interim Iraqi Constitution, also known as the

Transitional Administrative Law. In accordance with article 112 of the Constitution,

the federal government and the government of the oil producing regions will jointly

manage production from existing fields. Regional governments have exclusive control over new fields, including the right to sign contracts with foreign companies.

The law will follow article 142 of the Constitution in recognizing as valid the contracts the KRG has signed with foreign oil companies.

There is agreement that oil revenues will be distributed to Iraq’s regions based

on population, thus assuring the Sunni Arabs their proportionate share of oil

wealth. And, while not constitutionally required to do so, the KRG has agreed that

this sharing will include revenues from new fields as well as existing fields, including Kirkuk. Finally, the Kurdistan Regional Government will enact its own petroleum law to implement in our region what has been agreed with the federal government.

In order to assure transparency in contracting, the KRG will permit a newly

created Federal Oil Council to audit all future contracts and to object to those that

do not meet agreed standards.

As far as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is concerned, the oil law has

not yet been finalized, although there have been recent statements and press accounts to the contrary. The last draft that the KRG was in agreement with was presented to Prime Minister al-Maliki for his review on December 17, 2006, and the

details of that draft is what I have described. Any further material changes to that

draft will require the KRG’s consent. Although the process of drafting the oil law

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is nearing completion, the important annexes to the law are still pending. Also,

there are three associated laws (the revenue-sharing law, the Iraq National Oil

Company (INOC) charter law, and a law to define the Oil Ministry’s new role) which

must be drafted and agreed upon before the whole package can be regarded as being

final.

Let me conclude with a word about Kirkuk. As you know, Saddam Hussein’s regime carried out a brutal policy of ‘‘Arabization’’—that is the forced migration of

Kurds from Kirkuk, and Arabs to Kirkuk—to alter the Kurdish and demographic

character of the city. Turcomen citizens also suffered under this policy. Although the

consequences of Saddam’s crimes are still with us, there will be a historic referendum in Kirkuk later this year. It should go without saying that the status of

Kirkuk is a Kurdish and an Iraqi issue. It is not the business of any other country,

including Turkey, which should not interfere in the affairs of the Kurdistan Region

of Iraq.

I am personally committed to deepening Kurdish and Iraqi ties with Turkey, and

my record speaks to that commitment. Turkish investment in, and trade with, the

Kurdistan Region has been decisive in our economic stability and growth. An open

and friendly border with Turkey is a top priority for the Kurds and for Iraq. However, we urge Turkey to avoid any statements or actions that could set back its relations with the KRG and further destabilize the situation in Iraq.

I hope this letter offers some clarification on the position of the Kurdistan Regional Government and that you would consider it for submission as part of the official record for your hearings on Iraq.

I plan to come to Washington in February and would welcome the opportunity to

meet with you then. KRG Minister and Director of Foreign Relations Falah M.

Bakir will soon visit Washington and will be available for consultations on the oil

law or on any other questions you may have.

I would like to convey my personal invitation to you and your Senate colleagues

to visit the Kurdistan Region of Iraq during your next visit to the region.

Sincerely yours,

NECHIRVAN BARZANI,

Prime Minister.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JONATHAN MORROW, SENIOR LEGAL ADVISER TO THE

MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES, KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT; FORMER

SENIOR ADVISER TO THE U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE

IRAQ OIL AND REVENUE SHARING AGREEMENTS: NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT FOR

STABILITY

Summary

Hopes in the United States that oil and revenue-sharing legislation will bring stability to Iraq are exaggerated. No belligerent in Iraq’s civil war is stating its aims

in terms of oil rights and revenues. In parts of Iraq outside the Kurdistan region,

petroleum development will remain hampered by security problems for the foreseeable future.

However the hopes are not entirely misplaced. Intergovernmental oil and revenuesharing agreements—likely to be concluded between the Iraq Federal Government

and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in coming weeks, and reflected in

national legislation—are an essential, if not sufficient, condition for prosperity and

stability. The agreements may form the basis of a modus vivendi for what is already

a highly regionalized, confederal, if not partitioned Iraq. As with other new-born

federations, Iraq may find that it is the logic of economics and trade, if nothing else,

that encourages cordial relations among the federal and regional governments.

Significantly, the agreements to date reflect real Iraqi interests, and have not

been imposed by the U.S. administration. They reflect the reality of a very decentralized Iraq. In doing so they strike a careful balance between, on the one hand,

the need for Iraq-wide consistency of petroleum policy, and on the other, the legitimate interests of regions, including the Kurdistan region, in administering petroleum operations in their territory. Largely at the insistence of the KRG, the Iraq

oil law will conform with international best practice in the petroleum industry, incorporating the possibility, if federal and regional ministers so choose, of using private sector exploration and development under risked contracts. The revenue-sharing law will seek to maintain a viable if not strong federal government, with the

remainder of revenues shared throughout Iraq on a per capita basis, including proportionate shares to the oil-deprived Sunni Arab areas of Iraq.

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The U.S. administration should maintain its current practice of encouraging, but

not orchestrating, these intergovernmental agreements. The United States should

increasingly defer to the IMF and other multilateral organizations to provide technical assistance on these agreements.

Introductory Remarks

I offer this written testimony on my own behalf, and at the request of the office

of the chairman of the committee. For the past 3 years I have been an observer and

participant in Iraq’s constitutional and petroleum negotiations, and have a personal

interest in the prospects that those negotiations might have for stemming the flow

of blood in Iraq. As a former U.N. official I have experience advising post-conflict

governments in petroleum law matters, particularly in the case of East Timor, now

a successful oil-producing state. I am an Australian citizen-resident in Washington,

DC.

I am currently acting as legal adviser to one of the Iraqi negotiating parties, the

KRG. In presenting these remarks I draw on my 2 years experience working on the

Iraq Constitution and legal system as a senior adviser at the United States Institute

of Peace, and as an occasional senior adviser to the United Nations in Iraq. I have

made 12 trips to Iraq over the course of the last 3 years. I have not cleared this

testimony with the KRG or with any other party.

Background

In recent weeks, Iraqi negotiators have made progress in agreeing the terms of

two critical pieces of Iraqi legislation: A law for the exploration and development

of oil and gas (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Hydrocarbons Law’’), and a law for

Iraq-wide petroleum revenue sharing (the ‘‘Revenue Sharing Law’’).

The negotiations are essentially bilateral, as between the two existing governments in Iraq: The federal government and the KRG. The venue for negotiations

is the ‘‘Iraq Oil Committee,’’ an ad hoc intergovernmental committee, chaired by

Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, that meets occasionally in the Baghdad

International Zone. The principal negotiators representing each party are Dr.

Thamir Gadhban, adviser to Prime Minister Maliki, and himself a former Oil Minister in the Allawi Government of 2004–2005; and Dr. Ashti Abdullah Hawrami,

Minister of Natural Resources in the KRG and a long-time petroleum consultant

based in London, and not aligned with either of the two Kurdistan political parties.

Dr. Gadhban, though himself a secular Shiite and now aligned with the Shiite-dominated Maliki government, carries the support of important sections of Iraq’s Sunni

Arab leadership.

These negotiations take place at a point in time when the emergence of a second

and predominantly Shia region, in the south of Iraq, seems possible. To date, and

notwithstanding the centralist preferences of Prime Minister Maliki, the prevailing

political forces in Shia Iraq are regionalist in nature; this was evident in the 2005

constitutional negotiations, and in the passage of the Law of the Executive Procedures Regarding the Formation of Regions in November last year.

The State of Play—Hydrocarbons Law

A draft of the Hydrocarbons Law was agreed on December 17, 2006, between Dr.

Gadhban and Dr. Hawrami. Though representing very different interests in Iraq,

those two individuals have developed a good—and in Iraq, rare—rapport. They are

each very experienced in the petroleum industry, and have relationship of considerable trust.

In point form, the essential terms of the agreement reflected in that draft are as

follows.

1. New intergovernmental oil body.—A new supreme petroleum regulatory body

will be created: A Federal Council for Oil and Gas. The critical feature of this institution is that it is an intergovernmental entity with direct representation of the federal government, the KRG, and any other subnational government that may come

into existence. Important decisions will be made jointly by the governments. As Iraq

comes increasingly to resemble a confederal or even international entity—analogous

to the European Union, for instance—these intergovernmental entities will be increasingly important.

2. Risk and reward contracting.—Significantly, the Federal Council for Oil and

Gas, the Iraq Oil Ministry, and the KRG, will have the ability to resort to risk and

reward contracting with the private sector, including production sharing agreements. The level of political commitment to production sharing varies within Iraq.

The KRG has endorsed a heavily private sector oriented approach in its own territory, which contains approximately 10–15 percent of Iraq’s petroleum. The KRG has

already concluded two such contracts, with Norwegian and Turkish companies, in

circumstances where significant oil discoveries have since been made; the KRG

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plans to execute several more in the near future. Such an investor-friendly approach

is much less popular in Baghdad, where unrisked service and buy-back contract

models are likely to be the norm.

3. Intergovernmental cooperation, with right of arbitration.—Consistent with the

Iraq Constitution, the KRG will retain the right to license petroleum activities in

the Kurdistan region. Under the Iraq Constitution, petroleum administration is not

an exclusive power of the federal government (art. 110) and therefore regional law

is paramount (art. 115). Existing KRG contracts are grandfathered (art. 141). However, in keeping with the constitutional requirements of intergovernmental cooperation (art. 112), the KRG will review existing KRG petroleum contracts to ensure

that they are consistent with the policy criteria agreed in the Federal Council for

Oil and Gas, and will forward future KRG contracts to the Federal Council for Oil

and Gas which in turn may, as a last resort, submit those contracts to independent

arbitrators if they perceive that they are inconsistent with those criteria.

As of today’s date, some senior Iraq Federal Government officials have resisted

the cooperation and arbitration approach as agreed on December 17, and are insisting that the federal government have a blanket right of approval over KRG contracts. This new stance is at odds with the Iraq Constitution and the principles of

cooperation that it contains. This is the principal cause of delay in negotiations and

is the obstacle preventing the draft Hydrocarbons Law going to Cabinet and Parliament.

It is unlikely that the KRG will accept this reversal of attitude on the part of

some in the federal government. First, the Constitution of Iraq supports the KRG

view. Moreover, the KRG is aware that many oil-producing federations, including

the United States, Canada, Australia, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates, give

power to manage petroleum production to subnational governments. Most importantly, there is an overwhelming anxiety in the Kurdistan region that a future Iraq

Federal Government might deliberately, and for political reasons, prevent the

Kurdistan’s oil from being produced, to the economic detriment of the region. In the

past, successive Iraq Governments, including of course Saddam Hussein’s, have

done so. This is why there is hostility in the Kurdistan region to any assertion of

an extra-constitutional right of approval by Baghdad for KRG petroleum activities.

The December 17 compromise position—including the arbitration mechanism—is

sensible, represents a serious concession by the KRG from its rights under the Constitution, and accommodates any reasonable federal government requirement for

Iraq-wide cooperation and uniformity.

In addition to this outstanding political issue, some technical work remains to be

concluded on the draft law, including the completion of annexes setting out model

contracts.

The State of Play—Revenue Sharing Law

The Revenue Sharing Law is less well advanced. The draft Hydrocarbons Law

sets out some general revenue sharing principles, but quite properly leaves the details to a separate piece of legislation. The general principles so far agreed for the

Revenue Sharing Law are as follows:

1. All oil and gas revenues will be deposited in an ‘‘Oil Revenues Fund,’’ under

the oversight of a Council of Trustees. The Council will, like the Federal Council

for Oil and Gas, be an intergovernmental institution, with direct representation of

the federal government and the KRG.

2. There will be an initial regular allocation to a ‘‘Future Fund,’’ perhaps analogous to the Kuwait Fund.

3. There will be second regular allocation to the federal government.

4. There will be a third regular allocation to the regions and governorates according to population. Where the federal government currently carries out essential government activities within region or governorate, the cost of those activities will be

deducted from the allocation of that region or governorate.

It is noteworthy that in agreeing to these principles, the KRG is waiving its right

under the Constitution to retain revenues from oil and gas fields that were not in

production at the time the Constitution entered into force—the so-called ‘‘future

fields’’ (implied in art. 112). The KRG position is that it is ready to pool revenues

from all petroleum fields—both current and future—into a common account provided certain obvious safeguards are in place. Those safeguards include a transparent and credible revenue sharing mechanism in place in Baghdad that guarantees no superfluous or wasteful federal government spending, and that guarantees

that, after the federal government allocation, the Kurdistan region will receive its

per capita entitlement (approximately 17 percent on the most reliable population

figures). The other safeguard the KRG requires is that there be a modern and investor-friendly petroleum legal regime throughout Iraq in the form of the Hydrocarbons

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Law—so that the KRG is not the only part of Iraq generating and sharing new petroleum revenues.

These four agreed principles still leave some matters to be resolved in the draft

Revenue Sharing Law. Perhaps the most important of those outstanding matters

are: 1. Establishing the proper scope of the federal government. The Constitution gives

the federal government very limited exclusive powers. Those powers include defense

and foreign affairs, but do not include, for instance, taxation or petroleum operations or criminal and family law. However there is a large range of nonexclusive

powers that no other level of government in Iraq is capable of exercising: Health

services in Kerbala, for instance, or education in Anbar, or the justice system in

Baghdad. All these activities need, for the time being, to be funded by the federal

government.

However the federal government should not receive a blank check. The regions

and governorates have a right to limit the scope of federal government spending so

that there will be significant remainder for division amongst competent regions and

governorates (including the Kurdistan region) on a per capita basis, consistent with

the Constitution. This will require a careful negotiation on the functions of the federal government and careful drafting of the negotiation results.

2. Establishing the criteria by which an existing governorate, or any new region

that may be created, will be considered competent to receive a direct allocation.

These criteria will presumably include the practical ability of that governorate or

region to receive funds and spend them on government services. Perhaps those criteria should include the need for an elected government to be in place.

At this point in time, the KRG has been invited by the federal government to

table the first draft of the Revenue Sharing Law for negotiations. The KRG has now

done so. I note that the KRG views the Hydrocarbons Law and the Revenue Sharing

Law as parts of a single package of legislation that should be passed by the Iraq

Parliament simultaneously. I also note, however, that the Iraq Parliament has been

struggling to reach a quorum since December 2006 and early passage of either law,

however desirable, seems unlikely.

Prospects for Peace

The progress on the hydrocarbons and revenue-sharing agreements is encouraging. The laws that give effect to these agreements, when they are in place, can

help ensure the fiscal viability of the Iraq Federal Government as well as the proper

constitutional integrity and autonomy of the regions. The laws will, in particular,

relieve tensions between the federal government and the KRG. The Hydrocarbons

Law will, incidentally, confirm the implication in the Constitution that the administration of Kirkuk petroleum fields will remain under the joint control of the federal

government regardless of the outcome of the Kirkuk referendum; similarly, all revenue from Kirkuk petroleum will be pooled nationally. In this way, the Hydrocarbons Law will work to reduce (but not eliminate) Arab-Kurd tensions over the

future of Kirkuk.

The chances that these laws will alleviate the central conflict in Iraq—between

Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs—are slim. Contrary to some suggestions, including

Recommendation 28 of the Iraq Study Group Report, oil laws are unlikely to provide

the venue for ‘‘national reconciliation.’’ It has often been suggested that one catalyst

for the export of terrorist activity from the Sunni parts of Iraq is a Sunni Arab fear

of the consequences of a partition of Iraq in circumstances where they lack oil resources. Any initiative—such as the imminent Revenue Sharing Law—that might

guarantee those parts of Iraq their per capita share of petroleum revenues could

eliminate that anxiety, and thus reduce violence. If revenue is being shared, the

prospects of regionalization in Iraq become less threatening.

This argument is not convincing, at least in the short term. Since 2003, no representative of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs has come forward with demands for a per capita

share of Iraq’s petroleum revenues. The Sunni Arab negotiating strategy has hitherto been wholly directed at strengthening the federal government, and has been

unwilling to adopt a regionalist strategy; or, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate put it, they have been ‘‘unwilling to accept their minority status.’’ The nearand medium-term prospects for the appearance of an economically savvy Sunni regional administration seem remote.

However, the emergence of Sunni regional political entities is inevitable, since at

some point the Sunni Arabs will be forced, by necessity, to abandon their ambitions

for restored national hegemony. The only alternative for them will be to concentrate

on securing their own regional prosperity. When that day arrives, the emerging

Sunni Arab region will need the ability to access a full per capita share of national

petroleum revenues. An impoverished Sunni region will likely be further radicalized.

802

On the other hand, a sustainable Sunni region, that can provide its own security

and other government services, can be free from the fear of majoritarian rule from

Baghdad, and can assert control through regional security forces over criminal elements now at large in the Sunni triangle. At the very least, the Revenue Sharing

Law offers this hope.

Constitutional Amendment

Efforts to permanently recentralize oil management and dismantle the constitutional revenue-sharing requirements by amending the Constitution are very unlikely to succeed. While regional interests including the KRG are prepared in legislation to step down from the Constitution and agree to sharing mechanisms, they

will likely wish to retain the constitutional default position—namely regional administration of petroleum fields and the right to retain ‘‘future fields’’ revenue.

Within Iraq, the only constituency for a constitutional amendment initiative on

oil is in the Sunni nationalist camp, representing approximately 20 percent of Iraq’s

population. The requirement in the Constitution (art. 142) that any amendment

pass a three-governorate veto test means that no such proposed amendment will

succeed, since at the very least the KRG would move its constituency in any proposed referendum to block the recentralization of oil powers. It is unlikely, of course,

that any such initiative would reach referendum. The chairmanship of the Iraq Parliament’s Constitution Review Committee is held by the major Shia regionalist

party, SCIRI. International commentators on the matter are often unaware that the

schema of decentralization set out in the Constitution was very deliberate. I have

written on these matters in greater detail in USIP Report 168, ‘‘Weak Viability: The

Iraqi Federal State and the Constitution Amendment Process,’’ July 2006,

www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr168.pdf.

Moreover, efforts to amend these provisions of the Constitution are often

grounded in the belief that a decentralized petroleum industry is less capable of succeeding than a centralized one. Given the number of successful oil producing federations in which regions control petroleum production, this belief is questionable.

It does seem possible and desirable, however, that there be some constitutional

amendments on these subject matters. In particular, a broad constituency could be

found to reflect at least some of the agreements in the Hydrocarbons Law and Revenue Sharing Law in constitutional language, giving greater permanency and clarity

to the principles of joint decisionmaking between federal and regional governments.

Later this month, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq will be convening

the Iraq Parliament’s Constitution Review Committee to consider these matters; the

federal government and KRG oil negotiators will also attend the meeting.

Another possible amendment will the entrenchment in the Constitution of an

Upper House of Parliament, to regions and governorates direct representation in

that body. Surprisingly enough, there is no permanent venue in Iraq for regional

and governorate representation at the federal level.

Recommendations for the U.S. Administration

The United States has played a minor but helpful facilitating role in the oil and

revenue sharing discussions so far. This role is an appropriate one and should not

be amplified. International misperceptions of U.S. interference in the drafting of an

Iraq oil law are likely to endure.

The United States should encourage the IMF to take a greater role in the preparation of these laws, and in particular the Revenue Sharing Law and associated institutions. The IMF is uniquely equipped to provide the specialist technical advice

in this area.

The United States should work to assist the establishment of a Sunni region in

Iraq, with an elected leadership capable of receiving and spending a per capita allocation of petroleum revenues. The United States should not attempt to prevent the

emergence of a southern (predominantly Shia) federal region if the people in that

part of Iraq so choose.

PERSPECTIVE OF IRAQ DRAFT PETROLEUM LAW BY TARIQ SHAFIQ, DIRECTOR,

PETROLOG & ASSOCIATES, LONDON, UK; CHAIR, FERTILE CRESCENT OIL COMPANY,

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

IRAQ DRAFT PETROLEUM LAW: AN INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Iraq may prove to have one of the greatest endowed petroleum resource

bases in the world, with oil potential reserves in excess of 215 billion barrels (bnb)

and proven reserves in the region of 115bnb, which puts it on par with Saudi AraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00812 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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bia. Moreover, its finding and development costs are low—amongst the lowest in the

Middle East. However, its historical maximum production rate in any one year has

not exceeded 3.5mn b/d, although its exploration and development history has

stretched almost for eight decades. Iraq’s oil production level historically has lagged

behind its oil reserve capability and has neither reflected its low extraction costs.

Present Iraq proven reserves can support a production plateau of 10 million barrels per day (mbpd) and maintain it for a decade. As such, priority should go to rehabilitation and production capacity build-up and not to exploration for a few years

to come.

Planning oil field development for production capacity growth ought to be carried

out on a composite master plan, which examines the capacities of the discovered and

producing fields (including each and every producing formation within each field)

from a technical and economic feasibility point of view. In the mean time, it should

take into consideration Iraq’s economic development plans and needs. This necessitates a centralisation of policy and planning.

1.2 Finding cost per barrel of oil is estimated at: < US Cent 0.5. Development cost per barrel of oil is estimated at: US$0.5–1.0. This puts capital investment cost

per 1 million barrels production capacity at US$3 billion for expansion of existing

production facilities and US$6 billion, at the oil field boundary. These figures may

go to US$4.5 and US$9 billion to account for security requirements and recent high

oil equipment inflation cost. Operating cost per barrel is US$1–2.

1.3 Today, Iraq’s production facilities are either dilapidated, looted, sabotaged, or

war-torn to the extent that in September 2003, the country’s production rate sank

to around 1mbpd in comparison to a pre-war level of March 2003 of some 2.8mbpd.

Thus far, at the beginning of 2007, Iraq is producing around 2mbpd and exports

around 1.5mbpd, which is declining.

Iraq’s oil industry has been governed by the concession oil agreements until the

early seventies, and decrees and regulations since then. It is about time Iraq has

a petroleum law that sets out clear terms and conditions for good oil and gas industry exploitation plans, policy, and execution.

2.0 The Draft Petroleum Law

2.1 On the invitation of the Iraqi Minister of Oil, Dr. Hussain Shahrestani, the

Iraqi draft petroleum law was researched and drafted by a team of three independent Iraqi oil technocrats (including myself), who together have international,

Middle East and Iraqi oil industry experience amounting to some 120 years. Invited

to join the team was the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Minister of Oil, but

that did not materialize.

2.2 The overall objective of the draft petroleum law is to optimize Iraq’s oil and

gas exploitation, maximize return, and unite the country and nation.

The draft petroleum law seeks uniformity of plans and policy throughout the

country. It requires the Ministry of Oil’s (MoO) consultation and participation with

the provinces. Supervision of oil and gas operations is shared between the provinces

and the central Ministry. The decisionmaking process has built in checks and balances to enhance transparency and anticorruption practices.

A summary of the key points of the second draft of the Petroleum Law is presented in Appendix I—Iraq Draft Petroleum Law: A Summary of Key Points.

2.3 The law is investment friendly. It encourages private enterprise and welcomes the international oil companies (IOCs) to work in partnership with the Iraq

National Oil Company (INOC). They have a recognized role to play in the transfer

of up-to-date state-of-the-art technology, technical and managerial training of Iraqis,

and in investment capital. Selection from among prequalified companies will be

made through tendering in a transparent and accountable process.

Contract negotiations and decisions will be tasked to a high-level Federal Commission assisted by a negotiating entity and a think tank. Authority for final signature is vested with the Council of Ministers.

INOC will be an independent holding company, with affiliated regional operating

companies with an interrelated directorship, to ensure proper communication and

management as well as the participation of the provinces. All discovered fields will

be earmarked to INOC.

The central Ministry will be tasked with the supervisory and regulatory role, in

addition to the preparation of plans and policy in cooperation and participation with

the provinces.

2.4 The law is based on Articles 111 and 112 of the new Iraqi Constitution, seen

in the light of Articles 2, 49, 109, and 110, which broadly define the authorities and

responsibilities of the Federal and Provincial authorities within the Petroleum

sector.

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In order to clarify the imprecise nature of these articles and to work on the basis

of a fair and sound interpretation, an objective and independent legal consultancy

was sought, a copy of which is presented in Appendix II—Interpretation of Iraq’s

Constitutional Articles Governing Oil & Gas by an Independent Legal Firm.

In the forthcoming review of the Constitution it is expected that a large sector

of the nation and in particular the large majority of Iraqi oil technocrats, will vote

for modification of these critical Articles 111 and 112 governing the ownership of

oil and gas and management of production, plans and strategic policy, respectively,

in light of the legal interpretation attached below. However, the draft petroleum law

has been written on the basis of this legal interpretation irrespective of whether the

review takes place.

3.0 Ongoing negotiations

3.1 As highlighted above, the overall objective of the draft petroleum law is to

optimize oil and gas exploitation, maximize return, and unite the country. As such,

the draft law was written in the interest of the nation state as a whole, to apply

equally to all parts of the country, with no margin for negotiation between the federal government and any one region or governorate or among the ethnic and sectarian divide.

3.2 The petroleum draft prepared by the drafting team has been adopted by the

MoO without modification.

However, with differences between rival sectarian and ethnic parties at its peak,

negotiations between the major parties have become the rule, in advance of democratic debate among the members of the Council of Representatives (the Parliament). The case of the draft petroleum law is no exception.

Hard negotiations have been taking place, essentially, between KRG representatives and the rest of the members of the Ministerial Committee, which was set up

to examine and make recommendations on draft petroleum law to the Council of

Ministers. Once approved by the Council, the law would be passed to the Council

of Representatives for ratification.

The KRG position, expressed in their published Draft Petroleum Law, was based

on a radical interpretation of the pivotal Article 111, allowing for the oil and gas

in the Kurdistan as the property of the people of Kurdistan, not the whole Iraqi nation, as an undivided asset. Their petroleum law is so designed as to contain terms

and conditions vis-a-vis the Federal draft petroleum law, with a large margin for

negotiation as demonstrated in the past.

It is my view that a material change in the second draft petroleum law that increases the powers of the provinces, could compromise the interests of the nation

as a whole. From the KRG perspective, a compromise made by them is part of their

negotiating strategy.

Examining the Temporary Law for Administration (TAL), issued by the CPA,

shows that consultation or cooperation in the management of oil and gas resources

by the federal government with the regions and governorates was the only requirement, conditional on an agreed fair distribution of revenue.

The Constitution, however, requires more than consultation and cooperation in

the management of resources. The draft federal petroleum law goes beyond that in

sharing with the regions and governorates management and decisionmaking. It has

been drafted for the interests of the nation-state as a whole and to apply equally

to all parts of the nation, with no built-in margin for negotiations between the

federal government and any one region or governorate.

The third and finalized draft petroleum law will in addition contain agreed principles governing Revenue Sharing and Reserved Fund. Each of the two will be entrusted independent administrative bodies. The former shall be based on equal population basis.

3.3 The negotiations did not start in earnest until the revenue-sharing issue was

settled.

The negotiations were slow, proceeding in a stop and go fashion over the last 5

months. An important breakthrough occurred when a senior KRG Minister stated

in an oil conference in London on 8 December 2006, that, following a recent definitive agreement between KRG and federal government negotiators over an acceptable

scheme of oil revenue sharing, the KRG position on the interpretation of Articles

111 and 112 had changed and come into line with that of the central government.

He added that in due course, following the building of mutual confidence, the KRG

might consent to the redrafting of relevant constitutional articles. This was regarded

by those Iraqis present as a genuine gesture by the Iraqi Kurdish nation acting in

the common interests of the Iraqi nation.

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Despite this declaration, however, the KRG appears to maintain its earlier position of authority to negotiate contracts with companies independently of the Federal

Petroleum Commission and without the requirement for its approval.

Another sticky issue is the KRG’s half a dozen PSA contracts with small oil companies. These provide windfall profits well above and multiples of the norm reasonably required by the current draft petroleum law, in the order of an internal discounted rate of return of 60–100 percent. The central Ministry has decreed them

as unacceptable and without legal base. Whether they are to be cancelled or reviewed to be brought into line with the terms of the Federal petroleum law is another issue which yet to be settled.

One possible explanation for the KRG to maintain its position on these two issues

is that there might be a lack of consensus among its leadership, or again its desire

to maintain a bargaining position.

In my opinion, if the KRG maintain this position it would amount to a de facto

rejection of Articles 111, 112, and other relevant articles of the Constitution, which

task the federal government with the responsibility for the proper management of

oil and gas resources. It would leave the door open for other regions and

governorates to follow suit and set a damaging precedence. It could lead to diversified contract terms and conditions which lack transparency, accountability, and the

checks and balances built into the federal law.

However, as of today I understand that a compromise solution has been reached

on these two issues within the Negotiating Committee, that would allow the KRG

to negotiate contracts with companies in the presence of a representative from the

central MoO and subject to the approval of the Federal Petroleum Commission

(FPC); and allow the KRG themselves to renegotiate their existing PSA contracts

to bring them in conformity with the Federal Petroleum Law but validity is subject

to the approval of the FPC. The wording is chosen diplomatically to meet the Kurd’s

sensitivity.

I understand also that the Negotiating Committee has agreed on a third version

of the Draft Petroleum Law, as of today. However, I understand that approval from

the KRG top decisionmakers has not yet been received. The further delay could be

because of disenchantment of the KRG leadership with the compromise solutions.

The third and finalized draft, which I have received today, is disappointing and

weak in the critical changes that have been made to the two principle articles of

competence of authorities and grant of rights, as a result of negotiations and bargaining.

The critical items that have been removed from the original draft are fundamental in the context of professionalism and transparency and weaken the checks

and balances built into the original draft. The principles are still there but the

mechanisms for enforcing them under Iraq’s prevailing situation have been skillfully

removed or circumvented to make the outcome purely cosmetic.

The role of the professional think tank has been considerably weakened. Its

former scope to examine all issues has been reduced to only those selected by the

FPC. The requirement to publish their annual report has been removed. Membership appointment is reduced to one year from five, and requires the unanimity of

all the members of the FPC.

The appointments of the think tank and FPC have been made to conform to Iraq’s

sectarian and ethnic divide, an alarming indication of political interference at a time

when sound professional management is badly needed.

The FPC has been enlarged up to 20 or 30 members which makes it more fit for

a debating society than trusties tasked with a vital decisionmaking role, whilst its

role has been considerably weakened. The negotiating role of the FPC has been removed and given to the regions (i.e., KRG). The FPC in the new setup may be used

to provide legitimacy to the product rather than scrutinize the process and ensure

its conformance with the principles which were so carefully put in the first draft.

The resultant checks and balances are now insufficient to cope with Iraq’s internal political complications, and are more of a facade, leaving the competence of authorities and the processes of the grant of rights fully open to manipulation by the

political forces that prevail. Further and critically for the future of Iraq’s oil and

gas industry, the balance of power in the management of Iraq’s oil and gas resources has shifted from the central federal government to the regions.

4.0 Concluding Remarks

4.1 Without a central unified policy there will be disharmony and competition

between INOC (operating on production and marketing its export oil to provide the

state’s income) and the regions and governorates (operating on exploration for

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gions and governorates, with disharmony and envy between the haves and havenots.

This would cause instability, with damaging consequences contributing to further

fragmentation, instead of promoting the unity of the nation and country.

The Constitution has tasked the federal government with the job of management

of the oil and gas resource management, not any one village, governorate, or region.

4.2 Instability would lead to an unhealthy oil industry and would discourage the

serious IOCs, who have the required knowledge, capital, and markets. Iraq would

then find itself accepting speculators with more promises than they can deliver, and

the minor companies which do not have the capability to develop Iraq’s giant oil

fields.

4.3 IOCs, in my view, are advised to aim for urgently needed rehabilitation of

the infrastructure, expansion of production capacity of partially developed fields, improving damaged reservoir performance, and to develop the many discovered but not

yet delineated oil fields, rather than going for exploration for unnecessary new oil.

A rush for exploration and development contracts would be viewed as mortgaging

the reserves of future generations. It would provide fuel to the view that the war

was for oil.

4.4 There are today a number of damaging trends of ‘‘tsunami’’ dimensions, engulfing Iraq. There is a widespread lack of security and law and order, widespread

killing for reasons of identity, ethnicity, sect, or for no reason other than criminal

ends.

4.5 There is widespread lack of efficiency in government organizations and a

near absence of institutional performance or sound management at the centre and,

especially in the provinces, in addition to a lack of investment and extremely high

unemployment.

4.6 Action to reverse these damaging trends ought to be all embracing in nature,

coordinated and united in approach, and having the welfare of country and nation

at heart above all considerations. A healthy and robust oil industry would provide

the revenue necessary for social and economic reform and the right environment for

easing much of the above trends.

APPENDIX I—IRAQ DRAFT PETROLEUM LAW: A SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS

The draft Petroleum Law aims at uniformity of plans and policy throughout the

country. It provides prior consultation with the provinces. Decisions taken at the

centre involves provincial participation.

Supervision of oil and gas operations is shared between the provinces and Ministry. The decisionmaking process has checks and balances to enhance transparency

and anticorruption practices.

Its overall objective is to optimize oil and gas exploitation and maximize return,

and unite the country. It is based on Articles 111 and 112 seen in the light of Articles 2, 49, 109 and 110 of the Constitution which broadly define the authorities and

responsibilities of the Federal and Provincial authorities within the Petroleum

sector.

1.0 Competence of Authorities

1.1 The Council of Representatives

The Council of Representatives shall enact all Federal legislation on Petroleum

Operations. It shall also approve all agreements made in connection with Petroleum

Operations that extend outside Iraqi territory.

1.2 The Council of Ministers

1.2.1 The Council of Ministers shall:

Be responsible for recommending proposed legislation on the development of the

country’s Petroleum resources for introduction into the Council of Representatives.

Be the competent authority to formulate Federal Petroleum policy and supervise

its implementation. It also administers overall Petroleum Operations, including the

formulation of Federal policy on all matters within the scope of this law including

i.a. Exploration, Production, Transportation, Marketing, the proposal of Petroleum

legislation, and the approval of such regulations as may be necessary from time to

time on said matters. It shall submit proposals on legislation to the Council of Representatives.

Be the competent authority to approve and sign Exploration and Production contracts granting rights for conducting Petroleum Operations and the amendments

thereto, in so far as they concern territory inside Iraq.

1.2.2 It shall have the following administrative entities:

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A. The Federal Petroleum Commission

Assists the Council of Ministers: In matters related to the approval of Petroleum

plans and policy which are prepared by the Ministry, and in granting Exploration

and Production rights. It is chaired by the Prime Minister with the Secretariat of

the Minister of Oil.

B. The Negotiation Committee

An entity for planning and executing the process leading to the allocation of Exploration and Production rights.

It consists of specially trained members of the Ministry, INOC and related entities

with appropriate skills and experience.

For specific negotiations the committee shall be supplemented by representatives

from the region or the governorate where the particular acreage is located.

C. The Petroleum Advisory Council

A think tank to examine and provide comments and recommendations, as a consultative entity, on overall Petroleum plans and strategic policy, licensing contracts,

overall Development policy, as well as key projects and any other relevant matters

referred to it by the Federal Petroleum Commission or the Ministry.

It consists of nine technocrats, three of whom are from the regions and governorates whose deliberations are published and nonbinding.

1.3 The Ministry of Oil

A. The Ministry is the competent authority for proposing federal policy and legislation as well as issuing regulations and guidelines and undertaking the necessary

monitoring, supervisory, regulatory, and administrative actions required to ensure

the proper implementation thereof.

B. The Ministry shall in consultation with the provincial authorities draw up federal policies and plans on Exploration, Development, and Production on an annual

or as needed basis.

The geographical distribution and timing of exploration and production programs

shall be optimised on the basis of proposals from the provinces and producing

governorates.

C. The Ministry, or a special entity under it, shall have the responsibility of monitoring Petroleum Operations to ensure adherence to legislation, regulations, and

contractual terms.

The same entity shall through inspection, technical audits, and other appropriate

actions verify conformance with legislation, regulations, contractual terms, and

internationally recognized practices.

1.4 Iraq National Oil Company, INOC

The Council of Ministers shall submit a proposal for a law to establish the Iraqi

National Oil Company (INOC), as an upstream holding company fully owned by the

government, and be earmarked all discovered fields. Fields which are either undeveloped or partially developed may be developed in cooperation with reputable oil

companies.

1.4.1 INOC shall:

Be authorised to carry out Exploration and Production Operations inside Iraq on

behalf of the government.

Establish Affiliated Operating Companies to carry out Petroleum Operations in

the provinces and producing governorates on the basis of contracted management

fees. Such fees shall cover costs and a reasonable profit margin to allow a healthy

development of operations. The share option for the provinces and governorates in

such operating companies can be up to 50 percent.

Be the operator and is authorized to enter directly into Service and Management

Contracts with appropriate oil or service companies if required.

1.5 The Provincial Authorities shall:

Propose to the Federal authorities activities and plans for the province to be included in the country’s plan for Petroleum Operations. They shall further assist and

participate with the Federal authorities in discussions leading to the finalization of

the Federal plan as required.

Participate in the licensing process regarding activities within their respective

province.

Participate as part of the Commission’s negotiation team in licensing preparations, evaluations, and negotiations regarding areas within the province.

Be represented in the activities carried out by the Petroleum Commission and Petroleum Council.

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Undertake the monitoring, regulation, and administration of Petroleum Operations to ensure adherence to legislation, regulations, guidelines, and the specific

terms of the relevant Exploration and Production Contracts. Such functions shall be

carried out in close coordination and harmonization with the Ministry to ensure uniform and consistent implementation throughout the Republic of Iraq. The Ministry

shall also provide professional support to the Provincial Petroleum entity.

INOC’s operational activities in the province shall be carried out by affiliated companies where the provincial authorities have an option to participate up to 50 percent through ownership in the respective affiliates.

2.0 The Licensing Code

2.1 The licensing process shall be based on transparent and accountable tendering and shall take into account recognized practices by the international petroleum industry. It shall adhere to the following principles and procedures:

Competitive licensing rounds—The contractual terms offered to applicants shall

be specified in model contracts.

The form and terms of the model contract shall take account of the specific characteristics and requirements of the individual area.

2.2. All model contracts shall be formulated to honor the following objectives and

criteria:

• National control

• Ownership of the resources

• Optimum economic rent to the country

• Appropriate return on investment to the investor

• Reasonable incentives to the investor for ensuring solutions which are optimal

to the country in the long-term related to, i.a:

• Improved and enhanced recovery

• Technology transfer

• Training and development of Iraqi personnel

• Optimal utilization of the infrastructure

• Environmentally friendly solutions and plans

2.3 The Model Contracts may be based upon Service Contract, Buy-back Contract, and Production Sharing Contract (PSC).

Only prequalified companies shall be considered in any licensing round.

Evaluation of prequalified applicants shall aim at establishing a short list of successful candidates for negotiations.

The selection and ranking of successful applicants shall be on the basis of the

quality and relevance of the proposed work plan and the anticipated economic rent

to the nation.

The overall allocation of Exploration and Production rights throughout the Republic of Iraq shall aim at achieving variety among oil companies and operators with

different background, expertise, experience, and approach so as to enhance efficiency

through positive competition, benchmarking of performance and transparency. The

possibility of using consortia of selected companies, particularly in large fields, shall

be considered.

Not later than 2 months after the endorsement of Exploration and Production contracts by the Council of Ministers the text of the contract shall be made public.

APPENDIX II—INTERPRETATION OF IRAQ’S CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES GOVERNING OIL

AND GAS BY AN INDEPENDENT LEGAL FIRM

There are two specific articles and a governing article in the Federal Constitution

relating to oil and gas resources.

Ownership of Oil Resources

Article 111 is unequivocal that all oil and gas are owned by ‘‘all the people of Iraq

in all regions and governorates.’’ (Emphasis added.) The language on its face does

not admit to the ownership of any particular resource by any particular group or

geographical or political region. In effect it gives all citizens of Iraq, wherever resident, an undivided interest in all of the oil and gas resources of the country. Notably

it does not vest oil and gas resources in the ‘‘state’’ nor does it allocate the resources

to particular regions or governorates. The regions and governorates are addressed

solely in the collective form. Moreover it refers to all of the oil and gas resources

and does not use the limiting language of ‘‘current fields’’ included in Article 112

First.

Given that oil and gas is the property of the ‘‘people’’ as a whole, any power to

alienate the resource by sale or other disposition lies with the ‘‘people.’’ In this reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 18:27 Dec 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00818 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 38033.004 sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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gard it is worth noting that the only political entity representing all of the people

of Iraq is the Council of Representatives. Article 49, First.

Management of Oil Resources

Article 112 First provides that the federal government, with the ‘‘producing’’

governorates and regional governments, shall manage oil and gas ‘‘extracted from

present fields’’ subject to a revenue distribution formula. ‘‘Management’’ in Article

112 is not defined nor is it subject to any words of limitation. Thus management

should be read in the ordinary sense of conducting or supervising all of the business

aspects relating to oil and gas extracted from present fields, e.g., production, transport, refining, disposition.

Article 112 Second provides that the federal government, again with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall establish the strategic policies

for the development of oil and gas in accordance with certain standards. Article 112

Second does not contain the limiting words ‘‘extracted from present fields.’’

Thus Article 112 provides a general structure for the oil and gas sector in which

strategic policies are set on a unified basis for all of the oil and gas resources of

the country and then the implementation of those policies is managed in one case

(oil and gas extracted from existing fields) by the federal government with the producing governorates and regional governments and in the second case (oil and gas

not extracted from existing fields) by the regions or the governorates. In the second

case the regions and governorates assume their power to manage by virtue of Article 115.

The word ‘‘extracted’’ does not connote a limitation in this management authority

but rather should be read as defining what oil and gas resources are subject to the

management authority of Article 112 First, i.e., oil and gas ‘‘extracted from present

fields.’’ Article 112 envisions two functions: The establishment of oil and gas policies

and management of the oil and gas resource. Nothing suggests a tripartite definition

in which ‘‘extraction’’ would not be subject to either the strategic policies or the

management function.

Authority of Region Under Article 112

Article 112 First provides that the ‘‘federal government, with the producing

governorates and regions’’ shall undertake the management of the designated resources. Article 112 Second provides that the ‘‘federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments,’’ shall formulate the necessary strategic policies.

Article 112 First provides at the end of the section for the matters addressed in

the section to be regulated by a law. The same provision for regulation by a law

is not included in Article 112 Second dealing with the formulation of strategic policies. Perhaps, the drafters did not view ‘‘policies’’ as requiring legislation, and that

the required law governing management would reflect the policies.

The precise nature of the interaction of the federal government and the regions

and governorates under Article 112 is not clear and may have been left deliberately

ambiguous. Article 112 by its language and its separation from Article 110 (the exclusive authorities of the federal government) and Article 114 (the shared competencies) is evidently something more than a shared competency but something

less than an exclusive competency. Some sort of collaborative or consultative process

is required. Two items, however, point to the leadership of the federal government

in the process. In both the first and second sections, the federal government is the

subject of the sentences and is commanded to act, albeit with the producing regions

and governorates. Second, in Article 112 First the activity subject too the section

is to be regulated by ‘‘a law.’’ The unitary reference to ‘‘a law’’ as elsewhere in the

Constitution refers to federal legislation. Thus whatever the form of collaboration

between the governmental units, the final action is to be determined by the federal

legislative council.

The leadership of the federal government in Article 112 is further reinforced by

Article 110 which sets out those areas where the federal government has exclusive

authority. Among the exclusive authorities of the federal government are ‘‘formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy’’; and ‘‘regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq.’’ Thus, the shared authority

of Section 112 is cabined by the power of the federal government to prescribe and

set policies whenever trade or investment crosses national, regional, or governorate

boundaries or involves trade or investment moving in and out of Iraq. Regional action in violation of such policies would be unconstitutional as it infringes upon areas

committed to the exclusive authority of the federal government.

Even if one reads Article 112 Second as it relates to the formulation of strategic

policies in the oil and gas sector as being an exception to the exclusive power of the

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federal government, virtually all ancillary implementing action would be subject to

those policies that the federal government has the exclusive authority to establish.

Only activity taking place exclusively within a governorate would be exempt, a very

limited area indeed.

Limitation on Present Fields

The principal negotiators of Article 112 First appear to agree that the management authority provided by the section does not apply to all gas and oil resources.

Rather it extends to oil and gas ‘‘extracted from present fields.’’ The phrase needs

to be broken up into its component parts. Nothing in the Constitution suggests that

‘‘field’’ should be given anything but its ordinary understanding in the petroleum industry and in Iraq. The Society of Petroleum Engineers defines field as follows:

Field—An area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple reservoirs all grouped

on, or related to, the same individual geological structural feature or stratigraphic

condition. The field name refers to the surface area, although it may refer to both

the surface and the underground productive formations.

In Iraq various areas and structures have historically been identified as fields,

e.g., the Rumaila field, the Kirkuk field.

Rather the controversy surrounds the qualifier ‘‘present.’’ Some including certain

Kurdish authorities have construed ‘‘present’’ as meaning ‘‘presently producing’’ or

‘‘presently capable of being produced.’’ The difference is not trivial. In the absence

of other limiting language, however, ‘‘present’’ should have its ordinary meaning of

‘‘existing.’’ There is still the issue of present when? Most people seem to believe that

it meant existing at the time of the compromise or perhaps more precisely when the

Constitution came into effect.

Regional Power To Nullify Decisions Pursuant to Article 112

The Constitution does give the regions and the governorates certain powers to

modify or nullify federal legislation, but neither can be reasonably read to apply to

Article 112. Article 115 provides:

All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong

to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organized in a region.

With regard to other powers shared between the federal government and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates

not organized in a region in case of dispute.

Since the powers in Article 112 do not appear in the list of exclusive powers of

Article 110, the first sentence in Article 115 could be read to give the regions and

governorates authority in the areas covered by Article 112. This construction, however, would make Article 112 a nullity and thus cannot stand. The second sentence

of Article 115 applies by its terms to the ‘‘shared’’ powers of the regional government

and the federal government. The shared powers are specifically dealt with in Article

114 and this reference should be limited accordingly to the powers set out there.

Article 121 Second also gives the regions certain powers. That Article provides:

In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a

matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional

power shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region.

Nevertheless, this article does not apply to the activities of Article 112 as this is

not an area where the regional government has authority to adopt legislation. This

section only applies to those areas where the federal and regional governments have

shared competency. These areas are set out in Article 114, and it is in these areas

where there is conjoint legislative authority that the regional government pursuant

to Article 121 has the limited authority to modify the federal legislation operative

in its region. To hold otherwise would again make Article 112 a nullity, not only

nullifying the federal authority but also the rights of the other producing governorates and regions to participate in the policy formation provided for by Article 112.

Validity of Existing Kurdistan Contracts

Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the Kurdistan Government entered into

certain oil exploration or development contracts with foreign companies. The contracts have not been made public and their scope and the fields to which they apply

are unknown.

In support of its authority to enter into these contracts Kurdistan representatives

point to Article 141 of the Constitution which preserves the validity of certain actions of the region of Kurdistan taken since 1992.

That article provides:

Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force,

and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court

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nulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in

the region, providing that they do not contradict with the Constitution.

Although the savings clause is very broadly drafted, it is subject to the last limiting clause that any such legislation, court decisions, or contracts do not conflict

with the Constitution. Any existing contract could conflict with Article 112 of the

Constitution to the extent that it derogates the authority given to the federal and

regional governments with respect to the management of production from existing

oil fields or to the extent that it conflicts with the strategic policies that are to be

adopted pursuant to Article 112. If such contracts purport to exercise authority

within the areas committed by Article 110 exclusively to the federal government

(e.g., foreign sovereign economic and trade policy), the contracts may also be invalid

or subject to modification with respect to activity taking place after the Constitution

became effective. Any more definitive analysis would require review of the contracts

and might also have to await decisions regarding management and policy pursuant

to Article 112.

Æ