BEFORE THE

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

---------------------------------------------

2013/2014 U.S.–BRAZIL COMBINATION : DOT-OST-2013-

FREQUENCY PROCEEDING : 0072 

---------------------------------------------

ANSWER OF AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

Communications with respect to this document should be sent to:

VIRASB VAHIDI WILLIAM K. RIS, JR.

Senior Vice President - Senior Vice President -

Marketing and Planning Government & Regulatory

and Chief Commercial Officer Affairs

American Airlines, Inc. American Airlines, Inc. P.O. 

Box 619616, MD 5634 1101 17th Street, N.W.

DFW Airport, Texas 75161 Washington, D.C. 20036

ROBERT A. WIRICK FRANCIS C. HEIL

Managing Director, Regulatory Senior Attorney 

and International Affairs American Airlines, Inc.

American Airlines, Inc. 1101 17th Street, N.W.

P.O. Box 619616, MD 5635 Washington, D.C. 20036

DFW Airport, Texas 75261 (202) 496- 5642

(817) 963-0394 francis.heil@aa.com

robert.wirick@aa.com 

May 3, 2013
1

BEFORE THE

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

---------------------------------------------

2013/2014 U.S.–BRAZIL COMBINATION : DOT-OST-2013-

FREQUENCY PROCEEDINGS : 0072 

---------------------------------------------

ANSWER OF AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC

SUMMARY

 American Airlines, Inc. has applied for 14 weekly Brazil 

frequencies to provide daily nonstop service to Sao Paulo from

Los Angeles starting November 20, 2013 and from Chicago 

starting November 21, 2014. American's proposal, which 

features opening Los Angeles as a new U.S.-flag gateway to

Brazil and introducing intra-gateway competition at Chicago,

should be granted ahead of the request by Delta Air Lines for

21 of the 28 (or 75%) Sao Paulo-eligible frequencies available

for allocation that Delta would use at its existing gateways.

 As part of the consideration in the Delta/US Airways 

LGA/DCA slot swap, Delta agreed to sell to US Airways seven 

Brazil frequencies that Delta is currently using to operate 

daily service between Detroit and Sao Paulo. In what we 

believe is a first in the annals of CAB or DOT route

proceedings, Delta is now asking the Government to replace the 

authority it has sold because otherwise Detroit's nonstop 
2

flights to Sao Paulo will have to be suspended. As a matter of

sound policy, the Department should not reward Delta's 

improvident behavior. If Delta's tactic succeeds, American or 

US Airways would in effect be paying Delta's debt since seven of

the 28 opportunities would be given to Delta to recover what it 

sold and would no longer be available for allocation to either

of the other two applicants.

 Delta presently holds 23 frequencies that can be used to

serve Sao Paulo, but only operates 21. Delta could be using

its two Sao Paulo dormant frequencies by scheduling peak dayof-week service on its existing Sao Paulo routes, and should 

not be considered for an award of additional Brazil authority 

while existing Sao Paulo rights are dormant.

 Delta's first choice for 2013 is Atlanta-Sao Paulo, a 

route Delta already serves. If Atlanta needs additional

service, Delta would be providing it with its two Sao Paulo 

dormant frequencies or by taking advantage of extra sections

allowed by Brazil. 

 Delta’s second choice for 2013 is New York-Sao Paulo. At 

New York, as at Atlanta, Delta already operates daily nonstop 

service to Sao Paulo. And at New York, as at Atlanta, Delta

does not operate its two dormant Sao Paulo frequencies or use 

the opportunity provided by Brazil to operate extra sections.
3

 Moreover, the New York-Sao Paulo route currently enjoys 

nonstop service by four carriers (United, American, and TAM in 

addition to Delta) operating a total of 35 daily nonstops. 

 American's 2013 proposal to open Los Angeles as a new 

U.S.-flag nonstop gateway to Sao Paulo should clearly have 

priority over Delta's proposal for cumulative flights at either

Atlanta or well-served New York. Los Angeles is the largest

U.S.-Brazil O&D market without daily nonstop service, and that

gap should be filled with an award here to American.

 American's 2014 proposal to bring intra-gateway

competition to the Chicago-Sao Paulo route, presently a United

Air Lines monopoly, should also have priority for one of the

available awards. Chicago is the sixth largest O&D market to 

Brazil, and American will offer roundtrip on-line connections

to 77 U.S. behind cities compared to just 11 by Delta at New

York.

 American will operate 247-seat B777 aircraft to Sao Paulo 

from both Los Angeles and Chicago, compared to 210-seat B767 

equipment proposed by Delta on each of the three routes it is 

seeking. That represents a 17.6 percent capacity advantage for 

American or 27,010 annual roundtrip seats. In selection cases, 

the Department has found larger capacity equipment to be a 

significant decisional factor.
4

 Delta presses for its selection by arguing that American 

is "dominant" in the U.S.-Brazil market and should not receive 

additional frequencies. Delta is in no position to make such a 

claim inasmuch as it sold seven of its Sao Paulo eligible 

frequencies to US Airways, is holding dormant Sao Paulo rights,

does not operate extra sections, and in recent years has 

canceled Los Angeles-Sao Paulo nonstop service and withdrawn 

from Recife, Fortaleza, and Manaus. In any event, the

Department often selects carriers with a strong market presence 

over applicants with fewer existing routes by focusing on the

merits of the proposals rather than merely adding up existing

frequencies.

 Finally, Delta contends that American and US Airways 

should be considered a single applicant in view of their

proposed merger. In the U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, the 

Department treated United and Continental as separate entities

even after their merger had received shareholder approval and 

the transaction had closed because to do otherwise would have 

prejudged the outcome of their still pending de facto route

transfer. The Department should follow the same policy here 

where the merger process is at a far earlier stage.

 These and other matters are discussed in further detail 

below.
5

I. DELTA CHOSE TO SELL SEVEN OF ITS SAO PAULO ELIGIBLE

FREQUENCIES TO US AIRWAYS, AND CAN ONLY BLAME ITSELF IF

DETROIT'S SAO PAULO SERVICE HAS TO BE SUSPENDED AS A RESULT

 Delta has come before the Department with an extraordinary 

and unprecedented request. In the Delta/US Airways LGA/DCA slot 

swap (76 Federal Register 63702, October 13, 2011), Delta agreed 

to sell seven of its weekly Sao Paulo eligible frequencies to US 

Airways as part of the package of consideration for the transaction. Delta did so voluntarily and with full knowledge that 

by contractually committing to sell this authority to US Airways

it would be required to suspend Sao Paulo service on March 1, 

2015, the agreed effective date of the transfer.

 Thus, Delta is asking that either American or US Airways

fund a portion of the cost of its LGA/DCA swap by having the 

Department take one of the four opportunities off the table and 

hand it to Delta because otherwise Detroit would lose service 

for six months in 2015. This is brazen bootstrapping that 

clearly should not be countenanced by the Department, as to do 

so would set a terrible precedent. Knowing that a route case is 

on the horizon, a carrier could simply sell the relevant limited 

entry authority, pocket the proceeds, and entreat the Department 

to replace the authority with a new award to avoid interruption 

of service.
6

 In its April 24, 2013 supplement, Delta attempts to justify 

selling Sao Paulo frequencies by contending that otherwise the 

LGA/DCA slot swap would not have gone forward: "While Delta 

would obviously have preferred not to transfer any of its 

unrestricted Brazil frequencies to US Airways, this was a 

necessary part of the consideration needed to close the LGA/DCA 

transaction" (p. 8). Such a statement lacks credibility. Out 

of all of Delta's assets (including cash), surely other

consideration was available to close the LGA/DCA deal if Delta 

"preferred" to keep its Sao Paulo rights.

 Delta announced the US Airways transaction (and revealed 

the sale of its Sao Paulo authority) on August 12, 2009. Less 

than a week later, Delta announced suspension of several Brazil 

routes "for the fall season," including Los Angeles-Sao Paulo 

(effective August 18), Atlanta-Recife (effective August 19), and 

Atlanta-Fortaleza (effective August 31).1 Suspension of the 

first two routes turned out to be permanent, and while Delta did 

resume Atlanta-Fortaleza service, it permanently canceled those 

flights as well in September 2010 (Exhibit AA-R-1). 

 1 http://www.ajc.com/news/business/deltas-flights-to-brazil-willchange/nQLmd/
7

 Delta calls its application "modest" by arguing that its 

"net" request is for 14 frequencies, not 21, because it will be 

transferring seven Sao Paulo frequencies to US Airways (Delta 

Supplement, p. 3). Despite Delta's clever twist, the fact 

remains that 28 frequencies are at issue for allocation and 

Delta is asking for 21 of them. It is also a fact that Delta 

expects either American or US Airways to pick up Delta's tab.

The Department should not step in to bail Delta out at the 

expense of the other applicants.

II. DELTA HAS TWO FREQUENCIES THAT IT COULD BE USING TO SERVE

SAO PAULO AND HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO FLY EXTRA SECTIONS TO 

SAO PAULO BUT IS NOT DOING SO

 Delta holds 23 weekly Sao Paulo eligible frequencies but

operates only 21. See Delta Application, DOT-OST-2013-0045, 

March 4, 2013 p. 2; Exhibit DL-101; and Exhibit AA-R-2. A

carrier holding authority it could be using to serve a 

restricted route should not be granted additional rights in the 

same market, as that would be inconsistent with "the

Department's oft-stated and longstanding policy not to permit

valuable rights to remain unused for an extended period" (Order

2005-2-10, February 16, 2005, p. 3).
8

 In contrast to American, Delta is not taking advantage of

the extra sections that Brazil permits U.S. carriers to 

operate. Delta's month-by-month published schedules from 

January 2009 to date show only two months (January and February 

2009) when Delta operated more than daily service to Sao Paulo 

from any of its three gateways, Atlanta, Detroit, and New York

(Exhibit AA-R-2). That Delta has passed up the opportunity to 

operate extra sections speaks volumes about the absence of need 

for an award of additional frequencies for Delta’s existing 

gateways. 

 By failing to make full use of authority it already holds,

Delta cannot plausibly claim priority over other applications,

including American's proposals to open a new gateway at Los

Angeles and to bring intra-gateway competition to the ChicagoSao Paulo market and challenge United's monopoly on nonstop

service.

III. DELTA'S FIRST 2013 CHOICE, ATLANTA-SAO PAULO, IS A ROUTE IT

ALREADY SERVES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE PRIORITY OVER AMERICAN'S 

PROPOSAL TO OPEN LOS ANGELES AS A NEW GATEWAY

 Delta's first choice for an award is Atlanta, where Delta

already operates daily nonstop service to Sao Paulo (Exhibit 

DL-101). Delta is the only applicant not proposing new gateway 

daily nonstop service to Brazil. American will provide new 

gateway service from Los Angeles, and US Airways will open 

Philadelphia as a new Brazil gateway.
9

 Service from a new gateway has long been a key carrier 

selection factor. In the 2007 U.S.-China Combination and AllCargo Frequency Allocation Proceeding, Order 2007-1-4, January 

6, 2007, the Department selected United (proposing Washington 

as a new gateway to China) over Continental (proposing 

cumulative service to China from New York):

"We recognize that adding U.S. carrier nonstop New York/NewarkShanghai service to the New York/Newark-Beijing services already 

in place would provide significant service benefits. However,

we have tentatively determined that, given the New York/NewarkChina services that already exist, the need for first-ever

nonstop service to China from the Washington, D.C. metro area is 

a more urgent need and will result in greater overall public 

benefits than Continental's additional Newark-Shanghai service"

(p. 19).

 See also 2005 U.S. Argentina Combination Frequency

Proceeding, Order 2005-10-18, October 5, 2005 (selecting

Continental because it would open Houston as a new gateway to

Buenos Aires); 1999 U.S.-Italy Combination Service Case, Order 

1999-2-27 (show-cause), February 23, 1999, p. 4 (“the record 

supports a tentative finding that we can derive major public 

benefits from an award in this case by providing for new gateway

services to Italy. This consideration strongly supports Delta's

Atlanta-Rome application because only Delta would open a new 

gateway to Italy”).
10

 Before the Department considers awarding rights to Delta

in this proceeding for a second daily flight from Atlanta to

Sao Paulo, American should receive frequencies to open Los

Angeles as a nonstop gateway to Brazil with daily service.

Indeed, Delta itself recognized the importance of Los AngelesSao Paulo nonstop service when it applied for frequencies to

serve the route in 2008. Here are some of the things Delta 

said in the 2008 U.S. Brazil Combination Frequency Allocation

Proceeding, DOT-OST-2008-0307:

o "Delta will . . . open a brand new U.S. carrier gateway

connecting the second largest metropolitan area in the United

States to the largest in Brazil. Delta will bring Los Angeles 

its only U.S. carrier nonstop service to Brazil. In fact, Delta

will provide the only such service from anywhere on the West

Coast to any point in South America" (Delta Supplement, DOTOST-2008-0307, October 31, 2008, p. 1).

o "The only competing proposal is American's. . . .

American would open no new U.S. Brazil gateway and leave the

West Coast without U.S. carrier scheduled service to Brazil"

(id., p. 2).

o "Los Angeles is the largest metropolitan area in the

United States without U.S.-flag service to Brazil" (id.,

Exhibit DL-209).
11

 Delta started Los Angeles-Sao Paulo nonstop flights on May 

21, 2009 but cancelled service on February 26, 2010. We are 

confident that American's Los Angeles-Sao Paulo operations will 

succeed where Delta failed in light of American's stronger 

identity and presence both at Los Angeles and in Brazil.

Los Angeles-Sao Paulo is the largest U.S.-Brazil market 

without daily nonstop service (Exhibit AA-3). Even in the 

absence of nonstop service by a U.S. carrier, Los Angeles-Sao 

Paulo, with 88,428 annual bookings, is four times bigger than 

Atlanta-Sao Paulo (22,614), and five times the size of DetroitSao Paulo (19,409). American is well positioned to introduce 

nonstop flights between Los Angeles and Sao Paulo using seven of 

the 14 frequencies available on October 1, 2013 based on its 

identity at Los Angeles and the strength of its operations at 

that gateway and in the overall U.S.-Brazil market.

 American and American Eagle operate 143 daily departures 

at LAX to a total of 43 cities, including points in China, 

Japan, Europe, Mexico, and Canada (Exhibit AA-4). American's 

proposed Los Angeles-Sao Paulo nonstop service will offer 

substantial public benefits in the large local market along with 

convenient on-line connections to numerous behind cities in the 

U.S. and in other countries.
12

 American's proposed roundtrip elapsed time for Los

Angeles-Sao Paulo nonstop service is 24:10 (Exhibit AA-R-3). 

The fastest Los Angeles-Sao Paulo roundtrip connecting service 

Delta shows is 35:08 via Atlanta, 41:15 via New York, and 39:06 

via Detroit (Exhibit AA-R-3). In the 2005 U.S. Argentina

Combination Frequency Proceeding, Order 2005-10-2, the

Department selected Continental for nonstop service from the

Houston gateway because, among other reasons, "the best service 

in the Houston-Buenos Aires market requires time consuming onestop on-line connections via existing gateways" (p. 5). Los

Angeles, the largest U.S.-Brazil market lacking daily nonstop

service, clearly merits the dramatic improvement in travel time

that American will provide.

 In awarding 2013 frequencies, the Department should 

clearly favor American over Delta. American will provide new 

gateway service from Los Angeles to Sao Paulo, a far more 

beneficial use of limited rights than Delta's proposal to 

merely add another flight at Atlanta.
13

IV. DELTA'S SECOND 2013 CHOICE, NEW YORK-SAO PAULO, IS ANOTHER

ROUTE IT ALREADY SERVES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE PRIORITY OVER 

AMERICAN'S CHICAGO-SAO PAULO PROPOSAL

 The New York-Sao Paulo market currently enjoys nonstop

service not only from Delta but from United, American, and

TAM (Exhibit AA-R-4). The combined weekly frequencies total

35, and would rise to 42 if Delta adds a second trip, or six 

times the daily Sao Paulo service at Chicago that is operated

by United Air Lines. American will introduce intra-gateway

competition to the Chicago-Sao Paulo market, with substantially greater public benefits than Delta's plan to 

duplicate the service it already provides to Sao Paulo from

New York.

 Chicago is a major hub for American, which together with 

American Eagle operates 394 daily departures at ORD to a total 

of 121 cities, including points in China, Japan, Europe, Mexico, 

Canada, and the Caribbean (Exhibit AA-6). American's proposed 

Chicago-Sao Paulo nonstop service using seven of the 14

frequencies available on October 1, 2014 will benefit the public 

with head-to-head intra-gateway competition against United in 

both the local and connecting markets.

 While Delta claims 48 on-line connecting points via New

York (Delta Supplement, p. 4), its detailed schedules reveal 

actual roundtrip on-line connections to Sao Paulo for just 11

U.S. behind cities, less than 15% of the 77 U.S. cities American 
14

will connect with roundtrip service via its Chicago hub 

(Exhibits AA-R-5, AA-R-6). See Order 2005 U.S. Argentina

Combination Frequency Proceeding, Order 2005-10-2, where the

Department, in selecting Continental's proposal to serve Buenos

Aires from Houston over Delta's proposal from New York, pointed

out that "Delta would provide on-line connecting service via New

York to only 23 cities that Delta already serves through Atlanta"

(p. 5).

 Finally, American's proposed roundtrip elapsed time for

Chicago-Sao Paulo nonstop service is 21:15 (Exhibit AA-R-7). 

The fastest Chicago-Sao Paulo roundtrip connecting service Delta

shows is 31:10 via Atlanta and 32:10 via Detroit; Delta does not 

propose roundtrip connections for Chicago via New York (Exhibit

AA-R-7). See Order 2010-10-2, p. 5.

 For all of these reasons, American's Chicago-Sao Paulo 

proposal should be favored over Delta's plan to add a sixth 

daily frequency to Sao Paulo from New York.

V. AMERICAN'S 247-SEAT B777 AIRCRAFT REPRESENTS A 17.6

PERCENT CAPACITY ADVANTAGE OVER DELTA'S 210-SEAT B767

AIRCRAFT

 American will use 247-seat B777 aircraft on each of its

proposed routes to Sao Paulo, a 17.6 percent capacity advantage

over Delta's 210-seat B767s (Exhibit AA-R-8). Indeed, all of

Delta's proposed service would be provided with 210-seat B767

equipment, the smallest capacity in this case (Exhibit AA-R-8).
15

 The Department has recognized the benefits of larger 

capacity in making limited entry awards. For example, in Order

2007-1-4 selecting United's Washington-Beijing proposal over 

Continental's for New York/Newark-Beijing, the Department stated

that "United's B-747 service would provide 253,310 seats between

the U.S. and China on an annual basis, 22% more capacity than

Continental" (p. 17). See also 2010 U.S.-Tokyo Haneda

Combination Services Allocation Proceeding, Order 2010-5-7, May 

7, 2010 (show-cause), granting Los Angeles-Haneda slots to Delta

where "through utilization of B747 aircraft, Delta would inject

more capacity into the U.S.-Tokyo market . . . . Thus, Delta's

proposed Los Angeles-Haneda service would provide passengers the

largest capacity in this large market to offer a practical

alternative service option to the existing Narita services 

available from Los Angeles" (p. 10).

 Delta has a number of aircraft types in its fleet offering

more seats than the B767-300ER. Delta operates 246-seat B767-

400ERs, 269-seat B767-200ERs, as well as larger aircraft. See

http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/traveling-withus/airports-and-aircraft/. Delta should upgrade its existing 

Sao Paulo service before asking for additional frequencies.
16

VI. IN SELECTION CASES, THE DEPARTMENT OFTEN CHOOSES

APPLICANTS WITH A STRONG MARKET PRESENCE BY FOCUSING ON

THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE GATEWAY PROPOSALS RATHER THAN

MERELY ADDING UP EXISTING FREQUENCIES

 Delta attempts to bolster its case by arguing that American 

is "dominant" in the U.S.-Brazil market and should not receive 

additional frequencies. Delta is in no position to make such a 

claim inasmuch as it sold seven of its Sao Paulo eligible 

frequencies to US Airways, holds dormant Sao Paulo rights, does 

not operate extra sections, and proposes the smallest capacity 

equipment among the applicants. Moreover, Delta’s only U.S.-Rio 

de Janeiro service is a daily flight from Atlanta (Delta Exhibit 

101) even though ample Rio de Janeiro frequencies are available 

for allocation. 

 But putting those matters aside, the Department has often

selected incumbents with a strong market presence over 

applicants with fewer existing routes by focusing on the

relative merits of each proposed gateway rather than simply 

adding up and comparing existing routes and frequencies.

 For example, in the 2007 U.S.-China Combination and AllCargo Frequency Allocation Proceeding, United (a strong

incumbent with numerous U.S.-China routes) was selected over 

Continental and American (recent entrants in the China market

with a single route each) based on the merits of United's

Washington-Beijing proposal and despite claims that such a 
17

"dominant" carrier should not receive additional authority. As 

the Department concluded in Order 2007-1-4, January 9, 2007 

(show-cause),

"While we have of course taken note of the competition

arguments asserted against United, the circumstances of this

particular case lead us to tentatively conclude that the 

benefits of gaining the first-ever nonstop service to China 

from a new gateway representing the largest unserved O&D market

in this proceeding, coupled with the capacity to maximize the

benefits of that new service, outweigh the arguments that for 

competitive reasons the frequencies should have instead been 

awarded to a different carrier" (p. 19).

 In final Order 2007-2-10, the Department was more specific 

on this point:

"We are not persuaded by Continental's argument that because of

United's position as the carrier having the largest number of

frequencies in the market, United's selection is counter to the

Department's pro-competition policy. We disagree. . . . While 

considering the number of frequencies and the current service 

of each applicant. . . .we weighed the various carrier 

selection factors in light of the particular circumstances 

presented in this specific case. We tentatively concluded that

the public interest benefits of United's service proposal -

gaining the first-ever nonstop service to China from a new 

gateway representing the largest O&D market in this proceeding,

coupled with the largest capacity to maximize the benefits of

that new service - were compelling. Nothing asserted by 

Continental in its objections would now persuade us to change 

that analysis and conclusion" (pp. 6-7).

 In other cases, the Department has likewise chosen

strong incumbents over applicants having fewer routes or 

frequencies in the country market at issue. See, for

example, Order 2010-7-2, July 6, 2010, awarding two of the

four available U.S.-Haneda slot pairs (or 50 percent) to
18

Delta, which was already operating to Japan from more U.S. 

gateways, and beyond Japan to more Asian destinations,

than any other U.S. carrier; Order 2004-7-23, July 23,

2004, awarding seven U.S.-China frequencies to each of

United and Northwest, at the time the only U.S,

combination carriers serving China, and denying American 

(a prospective new entrant) the opportunity even to apply;

the 1990 U.S.-Japan Gateways Case, Order 1990-10-15,

October 16, 1990 (selecting United, a "dominant" U.S.-

Japan incumbent, over American, a limited MOU carrier, for

the highly prized Chicago-Tokyo route).

VII. AMERICAN AND US AIRWAYS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATE 

APPLICANTS

 Delta argues that in light of the proposed merger of

American and US Airways, the two carriers should be treated

as a single applicant in this proceeding. Department

precedent does not support Delta's contention.
19

 In the U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, Order 2010-11-10, November 

10, 2010, the Department stated:

"In conducting our analysis, we considered United and 

Continental to be separate entities. While the shareholders 

approved a merger on September 17, 2010 and the merger closed 

on October 1, 2010, the Department's pendente lite exemption

(Order 2010-8-5), issued on August 30, 2010, is contingent

upon Continental and United remaining separate and 

independently operated corporations pending the Department's 

action on the air carriers' de facto route transfer

application" (p. 1 n. 3).

 See also the 2010 U.S.-Haneda Case, Order 2010-5-7 (showcause), May 7, 2010, p. 8 n. 28 ("our tentative findings here 

are made on each applicant's merits, and have not been 

considered in conjunction with, nor have we pre-judged the 

outcome of, the oneworld (American/JAL) and Star (Continental/

United/ANA) applications for antitrust immunity pending before 

the Department").

 Here, the American-US Airways merger process is at an early 

stage. Just as the Department considered United and 

Continental to be separate entities prior to issuance of the

final de facto route transfer order, so should American and US

Airways be treated separately here in the Department's 

analysis.
20

CONCLUSION

 American's application to open Los Angeles as a new 

nonstop gateway to Brazil in 2013, and to introduce intragateway competition between Chicago and Sao Paulo in 2014, 

should be the Department's priority in deciding this case. 

Delta should not be rewarded for selling Sao Paulo authority to 

US Airways and the other applicants should not be placed in the 

position of paying Delta's bills. 

 Nor should Delta's proposal to add Sao Paulo flights at 

Atlanta and New York, gateways it already serves, be favored 

over the far stronger application submitted by American. While 

American has a greater presence in the Brazil market than Delta, 

the Department should, as it always does, compare the merits of 

the applications. Based on such a comparison, the Department 

should promptly conclude this proceeding by granting American's 

application in full.

Respectfully submitted,

__________________________

Francis C. Heil

Senior Attorney

American Airlines, Inc.

May 3, 2013 
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-1

Page 1 of 2

OAG for 2009 - 2013 as of April 2013

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 10 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU

JFK GRU 7 5 5 5 4 5 6 5 5 5 5 5

LAX GRU 1 0 3 2 0 0 1 2

ATL GIG 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

ATL BSB 2

ATL FOR 3 3 0 0 0 1

ATL MAO 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3 2 2

ATL REC 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 1 2 4

JFK GRU 6 5 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL GIG 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

ATL BSB 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 5

ATL FOR 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0

ATL MAO 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 2

ATL REC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6

JFK GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL GIG 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

ATL BSB 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7

ATL FOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL MAO 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL REC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Weekly Operations 2010

Weekly Operations 2011

DELTA HAS QUIT SERVICE IN PRIMARY 

AND SECONDARY MARKETS TO BRAZIL

Weekly Operations 2009
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-1

Page 2 of 2

OAG for 2009 - 2013 as of April 2013

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

JFK GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL GIG 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

ATL BSB 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

ATL FOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL MAO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL REC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

JFK GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL GIG 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

ATL BSB 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

ATL FOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL MAO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ATL REC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35

Weekly Operations 2012

Weekly Operations 2013

DELTA HAS QUIT SERVICE FROM PRIMARY 
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-2

Page 1 of 2

Source: OAG for 2009 - 2013 as of April 2013

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 10 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU

JFK GRU 7 5 5 5 4 5 6 5 5 5 5 5

LAX GRU 1 0 3 2 0 0 1 2

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 1 2 4

JFK GRU 6 5 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6

JFK GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

 2010 (Weekly Operations)

 2011 (Weekly Operations)

DELTA IS NOT USING 2 OF ITS 23 SAO PAULO ELIGIBLE FREQUENCIES 

AND IS NOT OPERTING SAO PAULO EXTRA SECTIONS

 2009 (Weekly Operations)
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-2

Page 2 of 2

Source: OAG for 2009 - 2013 as of April 2013

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

JFK GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

ATL GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

DTW GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

JFK GRU 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

LAX GRU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21

 2012 (Weekly Operations)

 2013 (Weekly Operations)

DELTA IS NOT USING 2 OF ITS 23 SAO PAULO ELIGIBLE FREQUENCIES 
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-3

Page 1 of 1

Source: Exhibit AA-7 and Exhibit AA-8; DL -506 - 516, DL-528-529, and DL-533-538

Airline Roundtrip Route Elapsed time

American LAX GRU LAX 24:10

Delta LAX ATL GRU ATL LAX 35:08

Delta LAX JFK GRU JFK LAX 41:15

Delta LAX DTW GRU DTW LAX 39:06

AMERICAN'S NONSTOP LOS ANGELES - SAO PAULO SERVICE 

WILL PROVIDE A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN ELAPSED TIME 

COMPARED TO DELTA'S CONNECTING SERVICE
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-4

Page 1 of 1

Source: OAG 

Frequencies Seats

American 14 3,899

Delta 7 1,722

TAM 7 2,534

United 7 1,645

TOTAL 35 9,800

Delta Proposal 7 1,470

TOTAL 42 11,270

Weekly

NEW YORK ENJOYS 35 WEEKLY NONSTOPS TO SAO 

PAULO AND WOULD HAVE 42 IF DELTA'S JFK APPLICATION 

IS GRANTED
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-5

Page 1 of 1

Source: Exhibit AA-9 and Exhibit AA-10

Atlanta, GA Little Rock, AR

Austin, TX Los Angeles, CA

Baltimore, MD Louisville, KY

Bloomington/Normal, IL Madison, WI

Boston, MA Miami, FL

Buffalo, NY Milwaukee, WI

Cedar Rapids, IA Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN

Champaign, IL Moline, IA

Charlotte, NC Nashville, TN

Cincinnati, OH New Orleans, LA

Cleveland, OH New York (La Guardia), NY

Columbus, OH Newark, NJ

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX Oklahoma City, OK

Dayton, OH Omaha, NE

Denver, CO Orlando, FL

Des Moines, IA Palm Springs, CA

Detroit, MI Peoria, IL

Dubuque, IA Philadelphia, PA

El Paso, TX Phoenix, AZ

Evansville, IN Pittburgh, PA

Fargo, ND Portland, OR

Fayetteville, AR Raleigh Durham, NC

Flint, MI Reno, NV

Fort Myers, FL Richmond, VA

Fort Wayne, IN Rochester NY USA

Grand Rapids, MI Salt Lake City, UT

Green Bay, WI San Diego, CA

Harrisburg, PA San Franciso, CA

Hartford, CT San Jose, CA

Houston (Bush Intl), TX Santa Ana, CA

Indianapolis, IN Seattle/Tacoma, WA

Jacksonville, FL Sioux Falls, SD

Kalamazoo, MI Springfield, MO

Kansas City, MO St. Louis, MO

Knoxville, TN Tampa, FL

La Crosse, WI Toledo, OH

Las Vegas, NV Washington (Reagan) Nat'l

Lexington, KY West Palm Beach, FL

Westchester County, NY

AMERICAN WILL OFFER ROUNDTRIP CONNECTING 

SERVICE TO SAO PAULO VIA CHICAGO TO 77 U.S. CITIES
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-6

Page 1 of 1

Source: DL-528 and DL-529

Atlanta, GA

Boston, MA

Baltimore, MD

Las Vegas, NV 

Los Angeles, CA

Orlando, FL

Philadelphia, PA

Rochester, NY

San Franciso, CA

Salt Lake City, UT

St. Thomas, USVI

DELTA WOULD OFFER ROUNDTRIP CONNECTING 

SERVICE TO SAO PAULO VIA NEW YORK TO ONLY 

11 U.S. CITIES
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-7

Page 1 of 1

Source: Exhibit AA-7 and Exhibit AA-8; DL -506 - 516, and DL-533-538

Airline Roundtrip Route Elapsed time

American ORD GRU ORD 21:15

Delta ORD ATL GRU ATL ORD 31:10

Delta ORD DTW GRU DTW ORD 32:10

Note: Delta does not propose roundtrip connections for Chicago via New York

AMERICAN'S NONSTOP CHICAGO - SAO PAULO SERVICE 

WILL PROVIDE A DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN ELAPSED 

TIME COMPARED TO DELTA'S CONNECTING SERVICE
OST 2013-0072

Exhibit AA-R-8

Page 1 of 1

Source: Exhibits AA-1, AA-2, DL -212, DL-311, DL-412;

Supplement of US Airways, Annex A

Airline Route Aircraft Seats

US Airways PHL - GRU A330 258

CLT - GRU A330 258

American LAX - GRU B777 247

ORD- GRU B777 247

Delta ATL - GRU B767 210

JFK - GRU B767 210

DTW - GRU B767 210

DELTA's PROPOSED B767 HAS THE SMALLEST CAPACITY 

OF ANY AIRCRAFT PROPOSED IN THIS CASE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing 

document by email on the following persons:

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com

thomas.bolling@united.com

dan.weiss@united.com

karine.faden@united.com 

benjamin.slocum@usairways.com

howard.kass@usairways.com

________________________________

Francis C. Heil

May 3, 2013