[Cite as Davet v. Sheehan, 2014-Ohio-5694.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 101452 

RICHARD F. DAVET

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

WILLIAM N. SHEEHAN III, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-10-738351 

BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Boyle, A.J., and Keough, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 24, 2014 
FOR APPELLANT

Richard F. Davet, pro se 

P.O. Box 10092 

Cleveland, Ohio 44110 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

For William N. Sheehan III, 

Cuyahoga County Interim Treasurer

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Anthony J. Giunta 

Adam D. Jutte 

Michael A. Kenny 

Colleen Majeski 

Judith Miles 

Gregory B. Rowinski 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

For Collinwood & Nottingham Development Corp.

David G. Weilbacher 

1525 Leader Building 

526 Superior Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

For Lightning Demolition & Construction

Joseph C. Patituce 

Patituce & Associates 

26777 Lorain Road 

Suite 708 

North Olmsted, Ohio 44070 
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.: 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Richard F. Davet appeals pro se from the trial court’s order 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, the Cuyahoga County Treasurer1

(“Treasurer”), Collinwood & Nottingham Villages Development Corporation, and Lightning 

Demolition & Construction (collectively “appellees”). For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

I. Procedural History

{¶2} Appellant’s claims initially relate back to 1999 through 2002 when GLS 

Capital-Cuyahoga, Inc. (“GLS Capital”) purchased tax certificates from the Treasurer for 

delinquent taxes owing on appellant’s property located at 793 East 152nd Street, in Cleveland, 

Ohio. 

Tax Certificate No. Purchase Date Amount Tax Year

11522042-98 05/28/1999 $4,882.00 1991-1997 

11522042-99 09/09/1999 $1,034.08 1998 

11522042-00 01/13/2000 $1,031.71 1999 

11522042-01S 09/28/2001 $1,403.41 2000 

11522042-98 04/18/2002 $4,882.00 1991-1997 

11522042-99 09/04/2002 $1,034.08 1998 

{¶3} GLS Capital filed a complaint on October 30, 2002, seeking foreclosure on 

appellant’s property (“GLS Foreclosure”) in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-02-485248. As proof of 

entitlement to foreclose, GLS Capital attached to its complaint copies of four of the six tax 

certificates: 

Tax Certificate No. Purchase Date Amount Tax Year

 1

 The original caption of this case was “Richard F. Davet v. James Rokakis, et al.” In accordance with 

App.R. 29(C), the court sua sponte substitutes William N. Sheehan III, the present Cuyahoga County Interim 

Treasurer, for James Rokakis. 
Tax Certificate No. Purchase Date Amount Tax Year

11522042-98 05/28/1999 $4,882.00 1991-1997 

11522042-99 09/09/1999 $1,034.08 1998 

11522042-00 01/13/2000 $1,031.71 1999 

11522042-01S 09/28/2001 $1,403.41 2000 

GLS Capital subsequently dismissed its foreclosure complaint against appellant’s property. All 

parties to the action were dismissed without prejudice at the latest on May 16, 2006. 

{¶4} On May 5, 2006, the Cuyahoga County Treasurer filed a tax foreclosure action 

against appellant (“County Foreclosure”) in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-06-590884 for taxes owing 

on the same property underlying the GLS Foreclosure. A magistrate held a hearing on the 

County Foreclosure on October 19, 2007, and found delinquent taxes and other charges due and 

payable on the property. The magistrate also recommended an order of foreclosure in favor of 

the Treasurer. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and entered a decree of 

foreclosure (“Foreclosure Decree”) in favor of the Treasurer on November 27, 2007. 

{¶5} On December 19, 2007, the trial court ordered that the property be offered at 

sheriff’s sale on February 11, 2008. The court set a second sheriff’s sale, if necessary, for 

February 25, 2008. 

{¶6} On March 20, 2008, after the unsuccessful sheriff’s sales, the property was forfeited 

to the state of Ohio (“Forfeiture”) pursuant to R.C. 5723.01. As a result, the Cuyahoga County 

Auditor, now known as the Cuyahoga County Fiscal Officer (“Auditor”), became the custodian 

and agent of the property for the state of Ohio with the statutory authority to sell it. See R.C. 

5723.01(A)(1) and (2). 
{¶7} The Auditor advertised the property for sale for two consecutive weeks. With no 

success resulting from the advertisements, the Auditor held a forfeited land sale (“Forfeited Land 

Sale”) on August 8, 2008. Appellee, Collinwood & Nottingham Villages Development 

Corporation (“Collinwood”), purchased the property for $1,600. On September 30, 2008, an 

auditor’s deed was filed and recorded at the Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office to complete the 

transfer of the property’s title to Collinwood. 

{¶8} Between August 25, 2009 and April 1, 2010, appellant filed the following motions 

with the trial court in the County Foreclosure: (1) on August 25, 2009, a motion to vacate 

judgment, which the trial court denied on March 18, 2010; (2) on October 13, 2009, a motion to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the trial court denied on February 11, 2010; (3) on 

December 7, 2009, a renewed motion to dismiss for lack of standing ab initio and lack of 

jurisdiction ab initio, which the trial court denied on January 14, 2010; (4) on December 22, 

2009, a second renewed motion to dismiss for lack of standing ab initio and lack of jurisdiction 

ab initio, and a request for ruling on standing, both of which the trial court denied on March 18, 

2010; and (5) on April 1, 2010, a motion for relief from judgment, a motion for stay of execution 

of judgment, a motion to set aside magistrate’s decision, and a motion to stay effectiveness of 

magistrate’s decision, all of which the trial court denied on April 21, 2010. 

{¶9} After appellee Lightning Demolition & Construction (“Lightning”) entered into a 

contract with Collinwood on July 29, 2010, for demolition work on the property, appellant filed 

his complaint in the present action on October 5, 2010, wherein he challenged the County 

Foreclosure, Foreclosure Decree, Forfeiture, and Forfeited Land Sale in Cuyahoga C.P. No. 

CV-10-738351 (“Quiet Title Action”). His claims were premised primarily on his assertion that 

the Treasurer was not the owner of the relevant tax certificates when the Treasurer filed the 
County Foreclosure. Appellant argued that, because GLS Capital purchased the certificates 

from the Treasurer on dates preceding the County Foreclosure, the Treasurer lacked standing to 

proceed under the authority of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91675, 

2009-Ohio-1092. He claimed that the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees is, therefore, 

void. Appellant’s Quiet Title Action also included a trespass claim based on Lightning’s 

expected, but unlawful, entry on the property for demolition work. 

{¶10} Because appellant’s claims in the Quiet Title Action were each ruled on by the trial 

court in the County Foreclosure in favor of appellees, Lightning filed a motion to dismiss the 

Quiet Title Action. Appellant opposed the motion by asserting that “[n]o court has specifically 

and affirmatively stated that the prior judgment in the foreclosure at issue in this action was not 

void ab initio.” He further requested that the court conclude that his legal title to the property 

“trumps all other claims.” 

{¶11} The trial court denied Lightning’s motion to dismiss on January 25, 2011. The 

parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The magistrate ruled in favor 

of appellees in a decision dated February 14, 2012. Appellant filed objections, but the trial court 

overruled the objections, adopted the magistrate’s decision, and entered final judgment in favor 

of appellees on April 12, 2012. 

{¶12} The trial court concluded that appellant did not have a possessory interest in the 

property pursuant to R.C. 5303.01 as a result of the County Foreclosure. Appellant lacked 

standing, therefore, to bring the Quiet Title Action because he is not in possession of the property 

and he does not have a remainder or reversionary interest because the filing of Collinwood’s 

deed extinguished all of appellant’s interest in the property. Appellant also filed his complaint 
beyond the one-year statutory limitation found in R.C. 5723.13. Finally, appellant’s trespass 

claim failed because he did not have actual or constructive possession of the property. 

{¶13} On May 14, 2012, appellant appealed the trial court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of appellees. On January 10, 2013, this court reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings. Davet v. Parks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98351, 2013-Ohio-31. This court 

explained that the issue of whether appellees were entitled to summary judgment on appellant’s 

Quiet Title Action depends on whether the underlying foreclosure action was void for lack of 

standing. Id. at ¶ 24-26. Accordingly, we ordered the trial court, on remand, to (1) “determine 

whether the Treasurer was a valid holder of the subject tax certificates at the time the county 

foreclosure action was filed”; and (2) “ascertain whether the Treasurer had standing to invoke the 

court’s jurisdiction and the validity of the judgment rendered therein.” Id. at ¶ 27. 

{¶14} In order to resolve the issue of standing on remand, this court ruled that appellees 

could supplement the record for the trial court’s use, stating: 

After we listened to the parties’ arguments at oral hearing, appellees filed a joint 

motion with this court on November 8, 2012, to correct the record on appeal. 

Appellees seek through the affidavit of a Fiscal Officer 1 to correct the timing of 

the Treasurer’s reacquisition of GLS Capital’s Tax Certificate Nos. 11522042-98, 

11522042-99, 11522042-00, and 11522042-01S. According to the affidavit, these 

certificates were voided and properly returned to the Treasurer prior to May 5, 

2006. We allowed appellees’ joint motion under App.R. 9(E) in order to 

supplement the record for the trial court upon remand. 

Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶15} On remand, appellees submitted the affidavit of Fiscal Officer Kristy Neff, which 

averred that while the GLS Capital foreclosure action was pending, the tax lien certificates 

supporting GLS Capital’s case were voided and reacquired by the Cuyahoga County Treasurer on 

the following dates: 
Tax Certificate No. Date Voided

11522042-98 05/12/2005 

11522042-99 01/13/2006 

11522042-00 01/13/2006 

11522042-01S 01/13/2006 

{¶16} On May 31, 2013, the magistrate issued an amended decision in favor of appellees. 

 On June 14, 2013, appellant filed an objection to the amended decision. Following an 

evidentiary hearing and after examining the tax certificates at issue in CV-06-590884, the trial 

court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, finding that the County Treasurer had 

standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction in order to bring a tax foreclosure action; that the 

County Treasurer voided all the tax lien certificates held by GLS Capital prior to filing its 

complaint for foreclosure; that the Treasurer was the sole holder of any tax liens against the 

subject property; and that the final judgment and decree of foreclosure rendered in 

CV-06-590884 was valid and in full force and effect. 

{¶17} Appellant brings this timely appeal pro se, raising one assignment of error for 

review. 
II. Law and Analysis

{¶18} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of appellees. 

{¶19} Initially, we note that since this court’s holding in Parks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

98351, 2013-Ohio-31, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of Am., N.A. v. 

Kuchta, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4275. In Kuchta, the court explained that although a 

party’s lack of standing can be challenged in the course of the foreclosure proceedings 

themselves or on direct appeal of the judgment, res judicata bars a party from asserting a lack of 

standing in a collateral attack on a final judgment in foreclosure. Kuchta at paragraph two of the 

syllabus, ¶ 8, 23-25. In addition, the court held that “although standing is required in order to 

invoke the jurisdiction of the court over a particular action in foreclosure, lack of standing does 

not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court of common pleas.” Id. at ¶ 25. In so 

holding, the court specifically rejected the notion that a party’s lack of standing in a foreclosure 

action renders the judgment void ab initio for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 17. 

Rather, “a court of common pleas that has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action does not lose 

that jurisdiction merely because a party to the action lacks standing.” Id. Finally, the Ohio 

Supreme Court noted that “actions in foreclosure are within the subject-matter jurisdiction of a 

court of common pleas.” Id. at ¶ 20, citing Robinson v. Williams, 62 Ohio St. 401, 408, 57 N.E. 

55 (1900). Thus, our discussion at paragraph 17 in Parks relating to void judgments and res 

judicata has since been altered by the Supreme Court’s holding in Kuchta. 

{¶20} In the case at hand, appellant did not file a direct appeal from the November 27, 

2007 judgment of foreclosure in favor of the Treasurer. Instead, appellant waited almost two 

years before raising the issue of standing in various motions to dismiss, a motion to vacate, and a 
motion for relief from judgment, which were each denied by the trial court. Appellant did not 

appeal from those orders. Subsequently, appellant filed this underlying Quiet Title Action on 

October 6, 2010, wherein he argued that he had superior title to the subject properly because the 

judgment of foreclosure was void ab initio based on the Treasurer’s lack of standing at the time it 

filed its complaint. 

{¶21} In our view, appellant’s Quiet Title Action is particularly the type of collateral 

attack on a judgment of foreclosure that the Ohio Supreme Court wishes to prevent. Thus, 

pursuant to Kuchta, we find that res judicata prevents appellant from raising the issue of standing 

herein because he failed to raise the issue while the foreclosure action was pending or in a direct 

appeal following the November 27, 2007 judgment. This court has reached similar conclusions 

in prior cases involving appellant. See Davet v. Sensenbrenner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98636, 

2012-Ohio-5898; Davet v. Mikhli, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97291, 2012-Ohio-1200; Davet v. 

Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97890, 2012-Ohio-3575. 

{¶22} Nevertheless, we find that the record adequately supports the trial court’s 

determination on remand that the Treasurer had standing to initiate the tax foreclosure action at 

the time it filed its foreclosure complaint on May 5, 2006. It is fundamental that a party 

commencing litigation must have standing to sue in order to present a justiciable controversy and 

invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. 

Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 41. Standing refers to 

whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial 

resolution of that controversy. Id. at ¶ 21. “The lack of standing at the commencement of a 

foreclosure action requires dismissal of the complaint * * *.” Id. at ¶ 40. 
{¶23} In the instant case, the Treasurer’s standing arises from a number of specific 

statutes authorizing the invocation of the judicial process. R.C. 5721.18 states, in relevant part: 

The county prosecuting attorney, upon the delivery to the prosecuting attorney by 

the county auditor of a delinquent land * * * tax certificate, * * * shall institute 

a foreclosure proceeding under this section in the name of the county treasurer to 

foreclose the lien of the state* * * unless the taxes, assessments, charges, 

penalties, and interest are paid prior to the time a complaint is filed * * * . 

{¶24} Accordingly, the county’s prosecuting attorney was authorized by statute to 

institute the underlying foreclosure action against appellant in the name of the Treasurer for 

delinquent property taxes, as long as the Treasurer held valid tax lien certificates at the time the 

foreclosure complaint was filed. 

{¶25} With respect to this issue, appellees provided the trial court with copies of the 

subject tax lien certificates and, as accepted by order of this court pursuant to App.R. 9(E), the 

affidavit of Fiscal Officer Kristy Neff. In her affidavit, Neff averred that following the 

negotiated sale of tax lien certificate Nos. 11522042-98, 11522042-99, 11522042-00, and 

11522042-01S to GLS Capital, those same tax lien certificates were voided and reacquired by the 

County Treasurer on May 12, 2005 (11522042-98) and January 13, 2006 (11522042-99, 

11522042-00, and 11522042-01S). Thus, the subject tax lien certificates were due and owing to 

the County Treasurer prior to May 5, 2006. 

{¶26} Our review of the subject tax lien certificates supports the averments made by 

Fiscal Officer Neff. The certificates are stamped “void” and are accompanied by a time and date 

stamp that confirms the time line reflected in Neff’s affidavit. Accordingly, the trial court did 

not err in concluding that the Treasurer had standing to bring the 2006 foreclosure action against 

appellant pursuant to the Treasurer’s valid possession of the disputed tax lien certificates. 

{¶27} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 
III. Conclusion

{¶28} The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. 

Appellant has no possessory interest in the subject property as a result of the foreclosure action 

and thereby lacked standing to bring the Quiet Title Action. 

{¶29} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR