COMMISSION 

ON THE 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

90-DAY REPORT

June 5, 2006

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

2521 S. CLARK STREET, SUITE 650 

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 ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE RONALD W. REAGAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, PUB. L. NO. 108-375, 118 STAT 1880 (2004)

June 5, 2006 

Senator John Warner 

Chairman 

United States Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Washington, DC 20510 

Congressman Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

House Armed Services Committee 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Chairman Warner and Chairman Hunter: 

The Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves is 

pleased to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the 

Senate and the House of Representatives, and to the Secretary of 

Defense, the following 90-day report on the status of our work. 

As specified in the body’s authorizing statute, Public Law 108-

375, the Commission has 13 members, appointed by the chairs 

and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Armed 

Services Committees and by the Secretary of Defense. We are 

tasked to undertake a comprehensive, independent assessment of 

the reserve components of the United States military: specifically, 

the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Marine 

Corps Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and 

Coast Guard Reserve. 

 

The overall objective assigned by the founding statute is captured 

by the mission statement we have adopted to focus our work: 

To identify and recommend changes in policy, law, 

regulation, and practice to ensure that the National 

Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, 

compensated, and supported to best meet the national 

security requirements of the United States. 

ARNOLD L. PUNARO

CHAIRMAN

WILLIAM L. BALL, III 

LES BROWNLEE

RHETT B. DAWSON

LARRY K. ECKLES

JOHN M. KEANE

PATRICIA L. LEWIS

DAN MCKINNON

WADE ROWLEY

JAMES E. SHERRARD III 

DONALD L. STOCKTON

E. GORDON STUMP

J. STANTON THOMPSON
The Commission’s work will culminate in the issuance of a final report setting 

forth the findings of our comprehensive study. We will focus particularly on 

findings and proposals that might point to the need to change current plans and 

practices. 

In addition to a final report, the law requires the Commission to submit the 

following report to Congress within 90 days of its first official meeting, 

including 

 

• A description of the Commission’s strategic plan for completing its work 

• A discussion of the activities of the Commission 

• The initial findings of the Commission 

The Commission’s first official meeting was held in Washington, DC, on March 

7, 2006. Accordingly, this report describes how we will proceed, and it 

summarizes our findings to date. It also includes a list of the major policy 

questions we will attempt to answer. As our work progresses, we are certain that 

our activities, focus questions, findings, and conclusions will evolve. 

The Commission notes with sadness the recent passing of a 

great American patriot and champion of the National 

Guard and Reserves, U.S. Representative G. V. “Sonny” 

Montgomery. During his 30 years of representing 

Mississippi’s third congressional district, Congressman 

Montgomery became known as the principal author of the 

expanded GI Bill benefit program that bears his name; as a 

dedicated steward of the House Veterans Affairs 

Committee, which he chaired for 13 years; as a 12-term 

member of the House Armed Services Committee; and 

perhaps most of all as a steadfast proponent of 

strengthening the National Guard and Reserves. He had 

the vision to promote the Montgomery GI Education Bill as 

“a tremendous incentive for bright young men and women 

to join our armed forces”; so too will the Commission be 

seeking innovative ways to ensure the continuing strength 

of the reserve components in the years ahead. His legacies 

of bipartisanship and public service are ones the 

Commission will strive to emulate as it conducts its 

business in the months to come. 

We appreciate the significant cooperation we have received from the executive 

and legislative branches. We thank you for your leadership, and we look forward 
to continuing to work with you as we fulfill the important mission vested in us 

by Congress. 

Respectfully, 

 

cc: Senator Carl Levin, Congressman Ike Skelton 
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COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

90-DAY REPORT 

PREAMBLE

As we undertake our assignment, the Commission is mindful of the long and honored 

history of the National Guard and Reserves. More than a hundred years before the 

birth of the United States military, the concept of the reserves was adopted in the 

American colonies. Then, as now, citizen-patriots were called on to provide for the 

common defense and to secure the homeland in time of need. 

America’s founding fathers recognized the importance to our young nation of a wellregulated militia composed of citizens trained in military skills, and they enshrined this 

doctrine in the United States Constitution. Yet they disagreed over the policies 

governing these pioneer reservists, including the issues of control, funding, roles, and 

preparedness. Many of those questions have remained unresolved over the life of our 

Republic, persisting to this day. 

Throughout these debates, however, one constant has remained. Americans have 

always answered the nation’s call. In times of war and peace, at home and abroad, 

they have remained faithful guardians of the country’s freedoms, safety, and security. 

As Senator John Warner told the Commission, “They took up arms when they were 

most desperately needed, and returned to civilian life to imbue our society with a 

greater sense of patriotism, service to others, and self-sacrifice.”1

That storied tradition of service and sacrifice continues today. In the words of 

Congressman Duncan Hunter, America’s citizen-soldiers serving in the National 

Guard and Reserves are “the heart and soul of our country . . . good Americans who 

come together for the purpose of helping the country. And shaping the Guard and 

Reserve is something that is now increasingly critical to our national security future.”2

Ours is a time of unprecedented challenge for the reserve components. Since 

September 11, 2001, more than half a million reserve and National Guard members 

have been activated for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi 

Freedom, and they have fought with distinction beside the active forces.3

 As 

Congressman Ike Skelton told the Commission at its initial hearing: “The fact of the 

matter is that over the past decade the reserve components have become an integral 

and vital operational reserve force, and the active duty components would not be able 

to successfully carry out their mission requirements without them.”4
2 

Senator Carl Levin similarly stressed, “Members of the Reserve Components are 

critical to the success of military operations of the Department of Defense. National 

Guard and Reserve personnel have been called upon to serve in ongoing military 

operations far more extensively than anyone expected, and they have performed 

magnificently.”5

At a time when the reserve components are so critically important, Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld has noted, adjustments have to be made: “We have the 

active force, we have the Reserve and the Guard, and then we have the Individual 

Ready Reserves, and all of them are part of this great institution and the total force. 

We need them all. We need them all to be rearranged so that we have the right skill 

sets on active duty and the right skill sets in the Reserve component and the Guard, 

which we’re in the process of rearranging right now.”6

The far-reaching implications of these developments and their effects on the reserve 

components demonstrate the timeliness and importance of the Commission’s charter, 

as summed up by Senator Warner: 

The continuing operational demands placed on Guardsmen, 

Reservists, and their families, at home and abroad, during a time 

of transformational change for the Armed Forces, have raised 

critically important questions about the appropriate roles for the 

state National Guards and our Reserve forces. Careful 

consideration needs to be given to the missions assigned to the 

Guard and Reserves, to the level of resources and equipment that 

must be provided for their use, and other career paths and 

benefits that should be available to Guardsmen and Reservists. 

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was 

established to assist the Congress and the Administration in 

gaining essential perspectives on these vital issues.7

The American people owe a tremendous debt to the men and women of the reserve 

components and their families, as well as to the businesses and communities that 

support them. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks for 

the country when he says, “We should take great pride and they should take great 

pride in the fact that we have soldier citizens like the National Guard and the Reserve 

who are willing to serve their country and they are serving their country extremely 

well.”8 We dedicate our efforts to them. Their service and sacrifice will continue to 

inspire our work. 
 3

STATUTORY MANDATE

Assigned duties. The duties of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

are set forth in the Commission’s founding statute and fall generally under the 

following five major categories of work: study, assess, identify, recommend, and 

report. 

Study – 

(1) To study the roles and missions of the National Guard and the other 

reserve components of the Armed Forces 

(2) To study the compensation and other benefits provided for members of the 

reserve components under the laws of the United States 

Assess – 

To assess the purposes, organization, structure, capabilities, equipment, 

preparedness, compensation, benefits, and funding of the National Guard and 

Reserves 

Identify – 

To identify alternatives with respect to 

(1) Future roles and missions of the reserve component 

(2) How reserve component units and personnel may best be used to support 

military operations and national security objectives9

(3) How reserve component training is organized and funded to achieve 

training objectives and operational readiness 

(4) Improved compensation and benefits and how they might affect readiness, 

recruitment, and retention among all military personnel, both regular and 

reserve 

(5) Career paths to enhance professional development of reserve component 

personnel 

Recommend – 

To recommend changes to legislation, policies, regulations, direction, and 

practices bearing on the National Guard and Reserves 

Report – 

To issue reports as necessary, including the two reports required by statute: 

(1) A mandatory 90-day report describing our activities, a strategic plan for 

completing our mission, and any initial findings 

(2) A mandatory final report setting forth the Commission’s assessments, 

findings, and policy recommendations 
4 

Implied duties. While certain key policy areas bearing on the National Guard and 

Reserves are not specifically identified in the statute, the Commission believes they 

require our serious attention if we are to achieve the mission assigned to us. Our 

approach will therefore include

Overall strategic vision. The Commission will identify the current and future 

threats to national security as specified by the experts in current defense planning 

and strategy documents, as well as by outside experts. We will identify America’s 

homeland protection and emergency response needs as established by the relevant 

federal, state, and local authorities. These studies will serve as our basis for 

assessing the proper roles and missions of the reserve components, and for 

determining the capabilities they must possess to meet the nation’s requirements. 

In turn, roles, missions, and capabilities—in effect, what America needs its reserve 

services to do—will dictate the optimal manner in which the National Guard and 

Reserves should be tasked, organized, structured, trained, equipped, compensated, 

and supported.

Mobilization/demobilization. The Commission will assess the current policies, 

laws, regulations, and practices governing the activation and deactivation of 

reserve component personnel. Mobilization is the efficient transition of a welltrained, well-equipped, and ready guardsman or reservist to active duty. 

Demobilization is the efficient transition of a guardsman or reservist back to 

civilian life or to other military duty. These transitions determine the reserve 

components’ ability to fulfill the roles and missions assigned to them. Mobilization 

and demobilization should not be considered as isolated, onetime events in a 

reservist’s career. Rather, they must be viewed as steps in creating a seamless, 

integrated force. The relevant policies and procedures must be adjusted 

accordingly. 

Command and control. The Commission will assess the historical balance of 

power between federal and state authorities in guiding the activities of the National 

Guard, which has both federal and state responsibilities. We also will seek ways to 

improve the command and control of reserve components so that they can 

respond more effectively to emergencies at home.

Overhead, infrastructure, and efficiency. As the Commission studies the 

reserve components’ current organization and structure, we will seek to identify 

significant inefficiencies, redundancies, and other institutional burdens that impede 

the optimal performance of these services. This effort will include an examination 

of command structure to identify unnecessary overhead, duplicative headquarters, 

and inefficient manning and organization in the Department of Defense, whether 

such inefficiencies involve the active component that supports the reserves or the 

reserves themselves. 
 5

STUDY APPROACH

Our duty is to gather the facts, assess them independently, follow them to logical 

conclusions, and develop the short-term and long-term recommendations that will 

ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are able to carry out their assigned roles 

in providing for the national security of the United States and the American people. 

We have adopted a set of fundamental tenets to direct us as we fulfill our obligations. 

These guidelines fall into three categories: operational principles, the ethical 

precepts that will govern how we conduct our work; methodological framework,

the tenets that will guide our policy analysis; and recommendation criteria, the 

overarching set of objectives that the Commission’s recommendations must meet. 

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

The Commission’s operational principles describe the manner in which we will carry 

out our mission. 

Nonpartisan and objective—The Commissioners have pledged to be nonpartisan 

and objective in our work, to be devoted to serving the national security interests of 

the United States, and to be free of political agendas or parochial interests. We come 

to our work with no predetermined conclusions. We maintain open minds. We will be 

guided by facts and will evaluate proposals for change solely by weighing the pros and 

cons, the costs and benefits. We will listen carefully to individuals and organizations 

that have considerable objective expertise in these areas. 

Inclusive and comprehensive—We are committed to inclusiveness throughout this 

process. The Commissioners know that policies regarding the reserve components 

concern many different constituencies, whose valuable input, perspectives, and 

expertise must be taken into account. These stakeholders include reserve personnel 

and their families, veterans, Department of Defense officials, policymakers at all levels 

of government, representative organizations, state governors and adjutants general, 

local governments, communities and businesses, the general public, and the media. 

Seeking input across the spectrum of interested persons and groups as it develops its 

findings and recommendations, the Commission is undertaking an aggressive 

outreach program to them. At the same time—and consistent with its statutory 

charter—the Commission intends to be comprehensive in its approach to issues. In 

formulating our conclusions, we will consider the full range of policies affecting the 

reserve components. 
6 

Rigorous and disciplined—Sound and responsible recommendations must be 

supported by a disciplined approach to fact-finding, as well as by rigorous analysis. 

We will work closely both with the relevant agencies of the executive branch of 

government and with Congress to agree, with as much consensus as possible, on the 

facts relevant to our assessments. As the Commission analyzes the issues that 

Congress directed us to explore, a concerted effort will be made to draw on the best 

available data and a complete record as we critically evaluate which changes would 

constitute the best public policy for the country and the reserve components. 

Similarly, the Commission will endeavor to keep the focus on essential matters and 

not stray or waste time reviewing peripheral issues. 

Transparent and accountable—The Commissioners are committed to ensuring that 

the work of the Commission is open and accessible to all interested parties. 

Accordingly, the Commission will hold multiple public hearings so that the American 

people may be informed of its work. By maintaining a public Web site 

(www.cngr.gov), remaining accessible to the press, and periodically briefing members 

of Congress and officials from the Department of Defense, the Commissioners hope 

to keep the public and policymakers fully apprised of our progress. To that end, we 

are maintaining complete records of all contacts and activities. 

To guarantee procedural fairness and the participation of all Commission members, 

we have adopted a set of rules that mirror those of the Armed Services Committees in 

both the House and the Senate. Moreover, as a congressional body, the 

Commissioners and staff members are complying with the rules and precedents of the 

Senate Ethics Committee (our designated oversight body), including public disclosure 

of and limitations on outside income, prohibitions on conflicts of interest, and 

restrictions on the receipt of gifts. 

Principled—By adhering to the principles laid out in this report rather than 

addressing issues on an ad hoc basis, the Commission seeks to ensure that its findings 

and recommendations serve an overarching strategic objective; are properly 

conceived, collectively and individually; and contribute to sound public policy that 

above all furthers the national security interests of the United States. 

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 

The following tenets reflect the analytical approach that will guide the Commission’s 

work. 
 7

• Be future oriented. The solutions proposed by the Commission must be 

sustainable over time. The goal is to achieve long-term, systemic improvements 

to our national defense apparatus that will prepare the Department of Defense, 

the reserve components, and partner agencies to meet future challenges. 

Assessments that ignore future conditions or recommendations that target 

current problems alone cannot meet this objective. 

• Think macro, not micro. In the vast and complex defense bureaucracy, 

myriad challenges exist at every level. Attempting to address every inefficiency, 

issue, or challenge affecting the reserve components would be neither feasible 

nor consistent with the Commission’s mandate, schedule, and resources. 

Rather, we will focus on the big picture, striving to identify and address 

significant and systemic issues affecting the reserve components. We intend to 

keep our focus on the horizon and not on the grains of sand on the beach. 

• Find the facts. To render sound and responsible recommendations, we must 

know the facts that provide the truest picture of reserve components today. 

The Commission will endeavor to base its judgments and recommendations on 

facts, as opposed to conventional wisdom, myth, anecdotes, ideology, or 

wishful thinking. Once the essential facts are known and understood, the 

Commissioners will endeavor to distill the key issues and substantive policy 

principles that are at stake. 

• Think outside the box. The Commission must challenge long-standing 

assumptions and conventional approaches to problems. Given existing plans 

for a smaller active and reserve component force, a likely continuation in the 

rapid pace of operational deployments, and an increased emphasis on evolving 

roles in such areas as homeland security, stability operations, and 

counterterrorist activities,10 it is imperative that the Commission think 

creatively in crafting its recommendations. A concerted effort will be made to 

identify how the operation of the reserve components can be made more 

effective and efficient. 

• Recognize success. It is important to acknowledge policies and practices that 

are working well and have proven successful over time. As the Commission 

formulates its findings, it will make every effort to take stock of what is going 

well and to reinforce success, not to focus only on what needs to be fixed. 

• Think smarter, not richer. Money will not solve every problem. Policy 

solutions considered by the Commission must be assessed with budgetary 
8 

realities firmly in mind. Our defense policy cannot simply be to write everlarger checks. 

• Understand that one size does not fit all. Each of the seven reserve 

components is unique. Each is sized and structured differently, possesses 

different capabilities, has a different relationship with its parent service, and is 

employed differently by that service. These inter-component differences must 

be evaluated and taken into account as the Commission decides what changes 

in the status quo are warranted and feasible. 

• Minimize scorecarding. The Commission will focus on making constructive 

policy recommendations to benefit national security now and in the years 

ahead. While it will be necessary to make judgments on current policies, it is 

not our objective to assess the performance of past or current policymakers. 

The Commission’s orientation is toward the future, not the past. 

• Be mindful of unintended consequences. Although foreseeing the future is 

never easy, the Commission will try to understand, and account for, secondand third-order effects that flow from its recommendations. Each of the 

reserve components is organized and operates differently, and the Commission 

must try to ensure that the policies it recommends will work well across the 

Department of Defense and in the reserve components, without producing 

harmful collateral effects today or in the future. 

RECOMMENDATION CRITERIA 

As the Commission considers what recommendations to make to Congress and the 

Department of Defense, it will be necessary for us to make a series of judgments 

about which reforms are worthy of putting forward in the final report. A set of 

guiding criteria are necessary so that the Commission does not propose policy or 

programmatic changes that are unwise, impractical, or fail to support an overall, 

objective strategic vision. To that end, the merits of the reforms considered will be 

judged by how well they meet the following goals: 

• Serve the national security interests of the United States. The foremost 

criterion that must be met by any proposed change in policy, law, regulation, or 

practice is that—if adopted—it must materially enhance and serve the national 

security interests of the United States now and in the future. The 

recommendations must substantially enhance the nation’s ability to protect our 

homeland, and our interests and values around the globe; to prevent conflict by 

remaining strong, capable, and ready; and to prevail swiftly and decisively.11
 9

Proposals that serve the broader security interests of the country will be put 

before those that may narrowly benefit individual reserve components or a 

segment of the Department of Defense. 

• Account for important new and evolving mission requirements. The 

Commission’s recommendations will be made in the wake of several major 

planning documents, including the National Security Strategy, the National 

Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the National Homeland 

Security Strategy, the National Response Plan, and the Pentagon’s most recent 

defense master plan, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In response to 

today’s unique threat environment, national planning strategies identify a 

number of evolving roles and requirements that will draw extensively on the 

reserve components, including homeland defense, counterterrorism, and 

stability operations.12 In order to ensure the salience and practicability of its 

recommendations, the Commission will take such new and emerging roles into 

account. 

• Improve the capabilities and readiness of the reserve components. The 

recommendations adopted by the Commission should aid the reserve 

components in fulfilling their assigned roles and missions and operating in 

today’s dynamic threat environment. Each of the seven reserve components 

has unique capabilities and characteristics. The Commission’s 

recommendations must capitalize on these assets and improve the ability of the 

reserve components (a) to augment active component forces, (b) to be most 

useful to combatant commanders by meshing as a component of the total 

force, or (c) to perform unique critical tasks, such as functions involving 

homeland security or, in the case of the National Guard, state missions. New 

and evolving procedures for measuring the readiness of all forces and for 

assessing improvements, particularly in training and equipping, must be 

transparent to both the active and reserve components to benefit command 

decision-making. 

• Take costs into account. The Department of Defense’s resources are not 

limitless. Like all public institutions, the department operates in a costconstrained environment. Proposals with budgetary implications must be 

scrutinized in light of this reality. Trade-offs will be necessary, and the 

Commission will endeavor to be sensitive to fiscal concerns in our 

recommendations. Such considerations must be informed by historical 

spending patterns. 
10 

• Recommend changes that are practical and executable. Solutions 

proposed by the Commission must be realistic. They must be analytically 

supportable, as well as logistically, operationally, and fiscally feasible. For 

example, it makes little sense to recommend dramatic increases in the size of 

the reserve components to meet new operational requirements if the 

components would be unable to recruit and retain enough individuals to reach 

those new levels. This focus on achieving practical solutions to real problems 

will shape all of the Commission’s recommendations. 

• Support an efficient, integrated total force. The myriad and multifaceted 

threats to U.S. national security make it difficult for policymakers and planners 

to anticipate force requirements. Moreover, many essential capabilities that are 

necessary to address modern threats reside within the reserve components. For 

these reasons, the Commission’s recommendations must recognize that 

reliance on the reserve components may increase further, particularly if current 

plans to reduce the active force are carried out. Accordingly, our 

recommendations must promote the seamless integration of the reserve force 

as the nation builds the total force of tomorrow. 

• Promote jointness. The wisdom of joint military operations, and of laws such 

as the Goldwater-Nichols Act that further them, has been validated on the 

battlefield time and again.13 The American military is the best in the world 

largely because of its skill in operating jointly. Current military operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan are more “joint” than ever before, and under current 

defense plans, future U.S. success on the battlefield will depend on increased 

“jointness.” Therefore, it is vital that the Commission’s recommendations be 

consistent with this continued reliance on joint operations. Moreover, we 

believe it is clear that in crucial areas, including stability operations and civil 

affairs, jointness must be promoted not just among the military services but 

among all agencies of the federal government, so as to bring to bear all 

instruments of our national power to achieve U.S. objectives. 

• Recognize the current reality—and the profound implications—of 

having the reserve components function as an operational force. The 

reserve components have increasingly been relied on to meet critical 

operational requirements, as illustrated most recently by the unprecedented 

number of national guardsmen and reservists who have been mobilized and 

deployed to support the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission is 

mindful of the use of the reserve components as an operational force and will 

take these circumstances and factors into account as it formulates its 

recommendations. 
 11

• Respect the differences between service in the reserve components and 

service in the active components. America’s reserve component service 

members provide an invaluable contribution to their country while balancing 

the competing demands of country, family, and civilian employment. It is an 

extraordinary feat by any measure. There are myriad valid reasons why our 

reservists do not choose active duty, but there are qualitative and quantitative 

differences between active and reserve component service. Maintaining 

appropriate distinctions between service in active and in reserve components is 

a key consideration in achieving proper overall force balance. 

• Be fair to service members and their families. The United States cannot 

maintain the finest military in the world without the continuing support of the 

people who serve, including their family members. As we review proposals to 

revise the structure and elements of the compensation and benefits package 

available to reserve component service members and their families, the 

Commission will strive to ensure that available benefits are commensurate with 

their level of commitment. It is critical that members of the reserve 

components receive full and fair compensation for the dedicated service they 

provide our country. 

• Ensure that the Army and Air National Guard will be able to fully meet 

their state obligations. These two National Guard components are unique 

among the seven reserve components because of their obligation to the states, 

territories, and possessions as well as to the federal government. The 

Commission will fully consider how proposed reforms will affect the ability of 

the Army and Air National Guard to perform state duties that may have little 

or no military analogue. The Commission’s recommendations must support the 

continuing ability of National Guard units to meet their state responsibilities. 

• Ensure that the reserve components will be effective at home and 

abroad. A key task for the Commission will be to develop policy 

recommendations that enable the reserve components to successfully perform 

important homeland-oriented missions while at the same time preserving 

operational capabilities that will be needed when deployments to overseas 

theaters occur. 

• Take advantage of the fact that the National Guard and Reserves are 

forward stationed throughout the United States. The National Guard and 

the other reserve components are uniquely situated to understand what their 

communities require and what military capabilities are available to support civil 
12 

authorities in the event of natural or human-made disaster. The extensive local 

knowledge of their leaders is a desirable asset and should be utilized when 

homeland-related roles and missions are assigned to the reserve components. 

• Take advantage of the civilian skills of reserve component service 

members. The diverse civilian occupations of reserve service members 

provide a rich pool of skills, experiences, and capabilities of use to the military. 

Many of these skills are uniquely acquired and maintained in the civilian sector 

but are critical to successful military operations and careers. Classic examples 

include health care professionals who serve in reserve component medical 

units, and police officers who serve in reserve component military police units. 

In Iraq, when an antiquities expert with investigative, prosecutorial, and military 

experience was required, the reserve components were able to provide the right 

person.14 Reserve component service opportunities and career paths must 

continue to encourage and maintain this rich and vital resource. A concerted 

effort will be made by the Commission to ensure that suggested changes to our 

military policies, laws, regulations, and practices take maximum advantage of 

crossover skills, so that the country is able to fully utilize the many critically 

important talents of our reserve component service members to meet national 

security requirements. 

• Understand and respect the impact of reserve component policies and 

practices on families, communities, and employers. The policies directing 

the operations of the reserve components have ramifications for those in the 

chain of support for our reservists and national guardsmen. Individuals in the 

reserve components cannot serve unless their families, communities, and 

employers are willing to endorse their participation and cope with the 

accompanying hardships. The Commission pledges to be keenly sensitive to 

this fact in the recommendations it makes to Congress and the Secretary of 

Defense. 
 13

WORK PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF ACTIVITIES

Guided by the precepts and principles laid out above, our strategy for achieving the 

objectives assigned to the Commission by Congress can best be described by the 

following eight phases of work: 

• Identify 

• Organize 

• Mine 

• Analyze and assess 

• Formulate 

• Reassess 

• Report 

• Advocate

IDENTIFY. The first phase of our work has been to identify the key issue areas

specified in or implied by the Commission’s authorizing statute. In other words, what 

major questions has Congress asked us to answer? What are the first-, second-, and 

third-order policy questions that must be addressed in order to make the most 

relevant and informed possible assessments? 

As part of this phase, the Commission has worked to identify the key data required 

to accurately understand the status of the National Guard and Reserves in those 

various issue areas. These data will help to establish baseline facts necessary to make 

informed and accurate assessments. 

We have also identified an evolving set of criteria, as detailed above. They will guide 

us so that our recommendations serve the national security requirements of the 

United States. 

ORGANIZE. Having taken stock of the issues we are required to examine, the 

Commission has organized its 13 commissioners and 11 research and analysis staff 

into discrete work groups. Such a division enables a subset of four or five 

Commissioners and designated staff to delve deeply into the assigned subject areas. 

Commissioner work groups—The Commission has six work groups: 

• Requirements and Organization 

• Personnel and Compensation 

• Readiness, Training, and Equipping 
14 

• Homeland Defense/Homeland Security 

• Mobilization and Demobilization 

• Funding Analysis 

Work plans—Each work group has drafted a comprehensive work plan for 

identifying the key issues, finding the relevant facts, answering the critical policy 

questions in its area, and providing the analysis necessary for the Commission to 

submit the wisest possible reform proposals in support of well-conceived objectives. 

In general, the work plans are designed to provide the full Commission with answers 

to the following four main questions: 

• What are the key challenges facing policymakers in the particular policy area? 

• What have policymakers done to date to address these challenges? 

• What remains to be accomplished to achieve desired goals? 

• How should relevant policies, laws, regulations, directives, and/or practices be 

reformed to achieve those goals? 

Each work plan spells out and prioritizes the chief policy questions that must be 

answered and the data that must be developed. It identifies the policymakers, policy 

implementers, frontline personnel, and subject matter experts who must be 

interviewed to garner the full array of relevant perspectives and expertise. It specifies 

the official reports and studies that must be considered. And it lists the installations, 

commands, and other sites that must be visited to develop the most accurate picture 

of the status quo and to make the best possible recommendations for positive change. 

MINE. As the Commission’s principles spell out, a vital part of our work—and the 

focus of the work groups—is to research and find the relevant facts, perspectives, 

opinions, and ideas we need to make well-informed assessments and 

recommendations. 

Experts, policymakers, and personnel—This process requires identifying and 

interviewing the key subject matter experts, relevant policymakers, and frontline 

personnel who can provide the Commission with the most accurate information and 

diverse points of view. In the first three months of its existence, the Commission has 

conducted more than 110 meetings, briefings, and interviews with policymakers, 

subject matter experts, and other stakeholders. We are continuing to conduct these 

activities in accordance with the work plans discussed above. 

Data requests—A vital part of the information-gathering portion of our work 

requires assembling the data and mining the many reports, studies, and other material 

that contain information bearing on the key policy questions and issues we are 
 15

chartered to study. For help in providing data and analysis essential to our work, the 

Commission has established excellent liaison with the Department of Defense and 

other institutions. They include the Congressional Research Service, the Government 

Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, think tanks, academic bodies, 

military associations, and other key stakeholder groups. The Commission is making 

data and briefing requests of these institutions and submitting official “questions for 

the record” to obtain written responses. 

Studies and reports—At various institutions, at least six major studies and reports 

bearing on the National Guard and Reserves are under way, several at the direction of 

Congress or the administration. These include two studies on service member 

compensation, as well as a major policy study on the reserve components sponsored 

by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A full listing of the major 

analyses in progress that are relevant to our work is provided as an attachment to this 

report. 

The Commission will consider the information, findings, and recommendations 

provided in these various studies to ensure that our conclusions reflect the best 

thinking across government, throughout academia, and in other institutions about 

policy issues and challenges affecting the National Guard and Reserves. 

Stakeholder outreach—To obtain the most comprehensive array of ideas, 

viewpoints, and relevant information, the Commission is undertaking a program of 

maximum outreach to the numerous groups that have an interest in matters affecting 

the National Guard and Reserves. In March, the Commission sent out more than 500 

letters to groups and individuals requesting their input. A partial listing of the 

stakeholder groups we have contacted is provided as an attachment to this report. The 

Commission is particularly eager to solicit the recommendations of service members 

and their families, and will use mechanisms such as focus groups to gain their input. 

The Commission continues to receive much helpful material from the various 

stakeholder groups, and we are carefully considering the information we are provided. 

Hearings—The Commission has determined that its work will be anchored by a 

series of major public hearings whose principal topics will roughly correspond to the 

work group assignments. Each hearing is intended to serve as a culmination to the 

bulk of our other work in the topic area, so that the information garnered in our 

studies, interviews, and site visits can be used to sharpen the hearing’s focus on the 

key issues and to make the most of our time with important witnesses. 

On March 8 and 9, 2006, the Commission conducted its first public hearing, which 

involved congressional leaders, senior civilian and military defense officials, and top 

subject matter experts. A witness roster from the hearing has been provided as an 
16 

attachment to this report, and transcripts of all our hearing records can be found on 

the Commission’s Web site (www.cngr.gov). The focus of this initial hearing was to 

examine the current and future roles of the reserve components, as well as to receive 

input on the Commission’s mission. 

The Commission determined that such a hearing would be a logical starting point for 

its work because the decisions related to how the reserve components should be 

tasked, organized, equipped, trained, compensated, and supported will rest largely on 

what the nation wants its National Guard and Reserves to do. It sought to gather 

information pertaining to the following policy questions: 

• Given the Commission’s broad charter, what do the expert witnesses think 

are the most important issues for the Commission to address, and what 

principles should govern our policy recommendations? 

• Is the reserve operational, strategic, or both? What are the policy 

implications? 

• How can an operational reserve be sustained? 

• What are the future roles and missions of the reserve components? 

• Should the National Guard and Reserves modify their organization and 

training to make homeland security a “priority mission”? What are the 

implications of the recent White House report on Hurricane Katrina? 

• Given the considerations above, are the reserves sized and structured 

appropriately? 

• What are the major problems with mobilization, and what steps are being 

taken to fix them? 

The Commission held its second major public hearing on May 3 and 4, 2006, to 

continue exploring the question of roles and missions. The emphasis in this hearing 

was on the role of the National Guard and Reserves in dealing with both terrorist 

attacks and natural disasters. The Commission focused on the following policy 

questions: 

• What changes should be made to existing laws, policies, and procedures to 

enhance the ability of the National Guard and Reserves to support 

homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support requirements? 

• What is the appropriate “balance of responsibility” among organizations 

involved in these domestic requirements—including the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the military services and 

their reserve components, and state and local governments—and how can 

we improve “unity of effort”? 
 17

• How are the roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserves 

affected by the recommendations of the White House report on Hurricane 

Katrina? 

• What is the consensus regarding the congressional recommendations on 

aligning the National Guard Bureau with the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Northern Command, and other 

combatant commanders? 

• Is there a need for separate budgetary authority for the National Guard 

Bureau? 

• How adequate are manning, readiness, training, equipping, and resourcing 

for the National Guard and Reserves? 

• Are the governors and their adjutants general confident that the National 

Guard and other state forces are adequate to meet homeland security needs 

at the state level? 

Additional hearings—The Commission has planned a full slate of public hearings in 

the major topic areas relevant to our charter. Further, each of the work groups will be 

conducting focused examinations, which will include taking testimony, in their 

specific issue areas. 

ANALYZE AND ASSESS. The analysis and assessment phase is an ongoing 

process as the Commission organizes the extensive input we are receiving and studies 

the facts bearing on our objectives. Our goal is to establish the clearest possible 

picture about the condition of the National Guard and Reserves and to identify the 

improvements and reforms that should be considered in the policy areas assigned to 

us. 

The Commission has a research and analysis staff that will aid the Commissioners in 

this phase; further, as mentioned previously, we have established liaison to gain 

additional assistance and expertise from the Government Accountability Office, the 

Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and other 

institutions. 

The Commission’s analyses and assessments will establish the basis for a set of 

findings on the policies, laws, regulations, and practices governing the National Guard 

and Reserves. These findings will in turn indicate the areas in which we should make 

recommendations for change. 

FORMULATE. After the most comprehensive possible record has been developed, 

and our work of assessment and analysis is complete, the Commission will develop a 

set of recommendations in keeping with our statutory mandate and consistent with a 
18 

final set of objectives, principles, and criteria as discussed earlier in this report. In 

rendering its recommendations, the Commission will fully vet the alternatives we 

consider and the proposals we endorse with policymakers and outside experts to 

avoid unintended consequences and the pitfalls of groupthink. 

REASSESS. The Commission’s reassessment phase will entail reviewing our work 

with a critical eye, including the use of “red teams” to provide independent critiques. 

Did we ask the right questions? Have we gathered the necessary information and 

taken into account all relevant viewpoints and considerations? Are we sure of our 

facts? Are our findings well supported by the factual record? Have we stayed faithful 

to our statutory mission, precepts, and principles? Have we achieved what Congress 

asked of us? The Commission will seek to remedy any shortcomings the reassessment 

might uncover. 

REPORT. The Commission’s authorizing statute requires that we prepare a final 

report sharing our assessments, findings, and recommendations with the Armed 

Services Committees of the House and Senate and with the Secretary of Defense. 

While the content of the report will be shaped by our ongoing research, analysis, and 

deliberations, we have already begun to discuss the principles that will determine how 

we ultimately present our work. 

We believe it is important not only that the final report provide Congress and the 

Secretary with our findings about the status quo, desired end states, and 

recommendations, but also that it supply the full justification for our decisions. To 

that end, the final report will furnish the background, pertinent facts, strategic 

objectives, and rationale behind our positions. It will be detailed and contain full 

references, thereby enabling the reader to learn not just our determinations on the 

issues assigned to us but why we came to the conclusions we did. It will paint an 

accurate and vivid picture of the status quo, using telling facts, representative 

anecdotes, and real-life scenarios. It will state desired outcomes and the path to 

achieving them in clear and unambiguous language. Our aim is to produce a report 

that is comprehensive, cogent, simply told, clearly argued, well documented, and, 

most important, worthy of implementation by virtue of its logic and its compelling 

necessity. In addition, in an effort to be of maximum assistance, we are planning, 

where appropriate, to provide Congress with the legislative language necessary to 

implement the recommendations we make. 

ADVOCATE. The Commission believes that the true measure of the value of our 

work will be the extent to which its recommendations are implemented. Accordingly, 

the Commission sees collaboration with those who can act on its proposals—

including policymakers, stakeholders, and the public—as part of its mission. 
 19

FINDINGS TO DATE

At the Commission’s first hearing in March 2006, intended to help the panel 

determine which major issues should be addressed during the course of our work, we 

specifically asked witnesses—members of Congress, officials from the Defense 

Department, and outside experts—to identify the pressing issues on which we might 

offer recommendations in this interim report. The input we received has been very 

useful in helping to shape the Commission’s agenda. 

The issues and topics raised by congressional leaders involve complex and major 

policy questions that require careful study and analysis. Because we are focusing on 

many of these questions in work currently under way, we believe it would be 

premature to offer proposals before a complete record has been established, and until 

such time as we can present findings and recommendations that fully reflect all the 

pertinent facts, a careful consideration of all relevant viewpoints, and the most 

informed deliberation. 

While mindful of the urgency of addressing these questions, we know that Congress’s 

charge to the Commission is to make the soundest and most useful findings and 

recommendations based on a thorough and comprehensive record of study. The 

Commission looks forward to working with Congress to ensure that our final report is 

filed in a timely manner, meets the needs of policymakers, and furthers our national 

security interests. Meanwhile, drawing on our work to date, we have developed a list 

of findings that, while basic, will help serve as a foundation for the remainder of our 

work. They are purposefully general, because at this early stage the Commission is still 

gathering information; it would be inappropriate for us to express our more detailed 

ideas until they are fully developed. These interim findings are seven: 

1. America faces the most diverse, complex, and unpredictable security 

environment in our history. The policies, laws, regulations, and practices 

governing the nation’s military, particularly the National Guard and 

Reserves, must ensure that America possesses the capabilities and 

readiness necessary to counter numerous evolving threats at home and 

abroad. 

According to the nation’s security and military planning documents, America faces the 

most diverse, complex, and unpredictable security environment in our history. The 

threats range from disaffected individuals possessing technology capable of inflicting 

massive damage and disruption to rogue nation-states capable of striking out and 

engaging in warfare out of desperation or despotism. 
20 

Militant Islamic extremists hostile to our values and freedoms have declared jihad 

against the United States. Numerous ethnic, tribal, and regional conflicts around the 

globe can flare up at any time, destabilizing fragile and strategically important areas. 

Failed and failing states, and vast ungoverned areas, continue to provide opportunities 

for militant extremists to recruit, train, and operate. 

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether in the hands of terrorists 

or nation-states, will remain a significant security challenge. Disease—whether 

naturally occurring (especially in the form of a global pandemic) or spread 

intentionally by our enemies—threatens to kill millions of people and cripple the 

international economy. Catastrophic natural disasters, including hurricanes, tsunamis, 

and earthquakes, can destabilize large regions of the country and the globe. The 

accelerating competition for finite natural resources also promises to intensify security 

perils in the coming decades. 

In addition to the numerous threats to national security we can identify, Americans 

must never forget one of the most important lessons of September 11, 2001—to 

expect the unexpected. The National Military Strategy identified “uncertainty” as the 

principal characteristic of today’s security environment.15 We must anticipate that 

technological advances will lead to weaponry that is more diverse, accessible, and 

lethal, and that expanding freedom and global economic integration will heighten the 

effects on America of destabilizing events that occur far from our shores. 

This growth in the number and complexity of security dangers facing the United 

States, together with the ever-present factor of uncertainty, promises to place 

increasing demands on all instruments of our national power, including the military. 

Accordingly, the need for ready and capable forces—including the reserve 

components—with multifaceted capabilities and competencies will remain high for 

the foreseeable future. 

2. The United States is engaged in what national security policymakers 

believe to be a “long war,” which is likely to last for many years to come. 

As a result, we must be prepared to respond to the new, emerging threats 

associated with this war, including conventional military attacks, 

terrorist attacks, human-made disasters, and threats from militant 

Islamic radicalism and the forces of tyranny. Responding to these 

challenges will have profound and lasting implications for the nation, the 

military services, and their reserve components.

 

The most notable and immediate phenomenon with an enduring impact on the 

employment of the reserve components is what the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense 

Review and presidential statements call our engagement in a “long war” against 
 21

militant Islamic extremists and the forces of tyranny. These documents indicate that 

the “United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country 

faced in the early years of the Cold War.”16 As part of this new security paradigm, 

military planning documents have set forth a policy reserving the right of the United 

States to act preemptively in exercising the nation’s inherent right of self-defense.17

Our engagement in a “long war” and the associated policy of preemption mark a 

substantial shift in the nature of U.S. military strategy. This new strategy recognizes 

that we are engaged in a lasting struggle for security, and over ideology, that will 

require the coherent and integrated use of all elements of our national power, 

including the reserve components of our military. 

Although it may be impossible to predict the need for military forces associated with a 

“long war,” the reserve components clearly must be prepared to face many and varied 

challenges. Making them ready for these challenges will require the adoption of new 

policies that are sustainable over time and that are designed to ensure that the reserve 

components have the right organizational structure and skills—and enough people, 

equipment, and training—to continue to be what they have been throughout our 

nation’s history: a vital element of national power. 

Finally, the daunting requirements of the “long war” must be explained to the 

American people. They must understand that it is they who ultimately will be required 

to provide the necessary funding, material, moral, and political support to prevail over 

the long haul in the war against terrorism, militant radicalism, and other security 

challenges. 

 

3. The sustained operational use of and potential future demands on the 

reserve components pose challenges that must be addressed.

The origins of an operational reserve can be traced to the implementation of the allvolunteer force in 1973. In the absence of a draft, the military has come to rely on a 

total force consisting of volunteers. The Abrams Doctrine, which was advanced 

following the Vietnam War, further developed the concept by implementing a force 

structure that depends on reserve component participation to project sustainable 

forces overseas. 

The first significant use of an operational reserve came a generation later during 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, when large numbers of reserve 

component members were called up to support operational missions. Operational 

deployments continued through the 1990s, though at reduced levels. Following the 

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, unprecedented numbers of reservists and 
22 

national guardsmen have been involuntarily recalled to active duty and have served for 

longer periods than at any other time since the Korean War. 

In his March testimony before the Commission, Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of 

Defense (Personnel and Readiness), indicated that the legislative basis for an 

operational reserve was clarified by a provision in the Ronald W. Reagan National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. As members of Congress noted in 

their conference report, “By eliminating statutory reference to planned mobilizations, 

the provision more accurately reflects the operational mission, responsibilities, and 

contributions of the National Guard and Reserve members and the manner in which 

the reserve forces will be employed in the future.”18

The contributions of the National Guard and Reserves, as individuals and as 

organizations, have been critical to the military successes achieved in Iraq, in 

Afghanistan, and in other post-9/11 actions. But the service vice chiefs of staff have 

testified before the Commission that despite their enthusiasm and vast capabilities, the 

reserve components have been stretched to their limits.19 Recruiting rates in recent 

years and changes to accession standards in certain reserve components may be the 

initial evidence of strain from increased operational use20 and may presage serious 

sustainability problems. 

The feasibility of continued reliance on an operational reserve must be examined; 

such use will require more than legislative and policy reform that focuses on the 

authority to access a part-time force. We must also carefully consider how this force 

will be funded, staffed, trained, equipped, and employed in order for it to remain 

robust and capable in the fast-paced operational environment that may characterize 

the “long war.” 

4. A balance between the use of the reserve components as an operational 

and as a strategic reserve, as necessary to meet national security 

objectives, must be achieved, and the reserve components must be 

tasked, organized, trained, equipped, and funded accordingly. 

Testimony the Commission has already received and information gathered thus far in 

its work make clear that substantially increased use of the reserve components for 

operational missions has become a reality—a reality that may continue, depending on 

future contingencies. One need look no further than the sheer number of reservists 

and national guardsmen mobilized for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 

Freedom to find conclusive evidence of the degree to which our military now relies 

on the reserve components in an operational context. 
 23

At the same time, the more conventional role of the reserve components as a strategic 

reserve—a pool of replacement manpower and capability to be employed in a largescale conflict with a peer or near-peer military competitor—cannot be ignored. The 

rising economic and military power of China, the continuing belligerence of North 

Korea, and the now overt nuclear ambitions of Iran each raise the prospect of major 

regional military contingencies for which our military must be prepared. In such largescale conflicts, the National Guard and Reserves may need to be employed as a 

strategic reserve, providing large numbers of replacement personnel, equipment, or 

brigade- and larger-sized units to augment active forces. 

Although the reserve components have made invaluable contributions to the ongoing 

conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have been deployed to those theaters as 

integral parts of frontline operational forces from the inception of the conflicts, rather 

than as a force held in reserve until unforeseen battlefield events make large-scale 

mobilization and deployment imperative. Policymakers must strike an appropriate and 

sustainable balance between the operational and strategic use of the reserve 

components that will be necessary to achieve national security objectives in a long 

war. Moreover, the reserve components must be tasked, organized, trained, equipped, 

and funded to fulfill the requirements associated with both roles. 

5. Statutes and policies that adversely affect the reserve components must 

be revised and updated.

As the National Security Strategy states, “the major institutions of American national 

security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be 

transformed.”21 The scope of this transformation includes the reserve components, 

which are guided by outdated policies and laws, some of which were aimed at 

fulfilling the predominant Cold War need for the force’s rapid expansion in time of 

peer-to-peer war. 

Examples of anachronisms that must be reviewed include 

• The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, a reserve officer personnel 

management structure based on the post-Vietnam drawdown experience, 

which has not been updated since its passage in 1994 

• The standard reservist training requirement of 39 days per year, which may not 

yield sufficient force readiness for the high operational tempo that current and 

future uses of the reserve components may demand 

• The package and structure of compensation and benefits—the product of 

decades of legislation and policy, including some recent reforms—which may 

differ between active and reserve components in ways that may result in unfair 
24 

treatment of service members performing substantially the same service but in 

different duty statuses 

• The array of personnel policies and regulations that impede the efficient and 

seamless transitions necessary to support a continuum of service by military 

personnel 

At the Commission’s hearing in March, Under Secretary of Defense David Chu stated 

that a key characteristic of an operational reserve force is that it is more “seamless” in 

its integration with active component forces. Accordingly, policies and laws in every 

area—personnel, compensation, readiness, training, equipping, organization, 

mobilization, and funding—must be carefully scrutinized to ensure they support and 

sustain a reserve component that is relevant to the nation’s needs today and in the 

future, including the seamless continuum of service that is necessary for today’s total 

force. 

6. There is confusion regarding chains of command when federal, state, 

and local authorities respond to domestic disasters, as Hurricane Katrina 

and other recent emergencies have demonstrated. The adverse 

operational consequences of this confusion, including those for the 

reserve components, must be remedied. 

The White House lessons-learned report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina 

states that “active duty military and National Guard operations were not coordinated 

and served two different bosses.”22 According to this study, reliance on these separate 

chains of command hindered unity of effort, created inadequate situational awareness 

in both federal and state leadership, and caused redundancy and inefficiency in how 

military resources provided support to civil authorities. These problems must be 

resolved. One important solution is to institute a clearly defined chain of command 

for domestic emergencies that takes advantage of core competencies; engenders unity 

of effort among federal, state, and local authorities; and ensures that constitutionally 

based authorities are respected. 

7. The Defense Department’s and other federal agencies’ engagement with 

governors regarding decisions affecting reserve component personnel, 

equipment, funding, and operations can contribute to national security 

and should be strengthened.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Department of Defense has not always 

consulted with governors on decisions that affect National Guard and Reserve 

personnel, equipment, and funding. Consultation and collaboration facilitate decision 

making and can improve overall national security and the ability of the states to 
 25

respond effectively to domestic contingencies. In view of the importance of state 

safety and security issues, care must be taken to support and strengthen collaborative 

relationships between the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland 

Security, and the states in which so much of our military capability resides. At a 

minimum, suitable processes should be established to aid information sharing 

between governors and the federal government regarding the potential effects on 

national security, homeland defense, homeland security, and emergency response 

capabilities caused by deployments and other decisions affecting National Guard 

personnel and equipment. 
26 

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 27

MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS

The Commission’s charter and our work to date, described above, lead us to focus on 

the following primary, overarching policy areas: 

• Roles and missions. What roles and missions are best suited to the 

characteristics of a part-time force employed operationally, taking into account 

that reservists and national guardsmen want to serve the nation but must keep 

that service in equilibrium with civilian careers and family demands? 

• Purposes. How can we balance the ongoing need for a strategic reserve with 

requirements associated with the continuing operational use of the reserve 

components? 

• Capabilities. What capabilities can be provided by the reserve components, 

which are required for national security objectives in the “long war” and are 

also valuable for improving homeland security and responding to natural and 

human-made disasters at home? 

• Organization and structure. What changes in the organization and structure 

of the reserve components will ensure they are appropriately sized and will 

enhance their readiness, capabilities, availability, and sustainability as they carry 

out the missions assigned to them? 

• Organization and structure. How should reserve service differ from active 

service? 

• Command and control. Are command authorities, capabilities, and 

responsibilities affecting the reserve components properly aligned? And are 

accountability and authority affecting the reserve components properly aligned? 

• Training. What changes to the 39-day-per-year training paradigm are required 

to ensure readiness of the reserve components for operational employment and 

to aid these service members in acquiring and maintaining the variety of skills 

needed across the continuum of service? 

• Readiness. How can readiness—of units and individuals—be maintained in a 

way that facilitates operational use overseas and preserves their strategic value 

while providing needed capabilities for on-call homeland security requirements? 
28 

• Equipment. What can be done to better furnish the reserve components with 

first-rate, dual-capable equipment that will maximize their effectiveness in 

accomplishing the missions assigned to them—including expediting the 

replacement of equipment, particularly high-priority items, no longer available 

to them because it is being used overseas? 

• Homeland defense/homeland security. What, if any, changes should be 

made in the U.S. Northern Command’s organizational structure and mission 

approach to meet its responsibilities effectively? 

• Mobilization. Do existing mobilization statutes provide adequate authority to 

effectively mobilize the reserve components? What changes in policy and 

practice can be made to improve the process of mobilization, activation, and 

demobilization? 

• Compensation and Benefits. What changes in the compensation and benefits 

offered for reserve service are needed to maintain an operational force that is 

adequately staffed on a sustainable basis and with the proper mix of 

experienced leaders, junior officers, and enlisted members? 

• Career paths. How will the “long war” and the operational reserve affect 

career paths and opportunities for reserve members? And how can migration 

between active and reserve components—a continuum of service—be 

optimized? 

• Funding. What changes, if any, in the levels or allocation of funds for the 

reserve components should be made to meet the current and future missions 

assigned to them? 

• Equipping and funding the National Guard. How should National Guard 

equipment and funding requirements be validated? In what ways should the 

processes now used to make these decisions be changed? What improved 

procedures and practices, if any, should be implemented to take into 

consideration the views of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the 54 

adjutants general in determining necessary equipment and funding? 

• National Guard leadership and related issues. What should be the future 

role of the National Guard Bureau vis-à-vis the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Secretary of Defense? What should be the rank of the Chief of the National 

Guard Bureau? Should the deputy commander of United States Northern 

Command be a National Guard officer? 
 29

During our first hearing, key members of Congress urged the Commission to examine 

several ideas regarding the military leadership of the National Guard. Included were 

proposals to make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, to make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau the principal adviser 

to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National 

Guard matters, to increase the grade of the position from lieutenant general to 

general, and to require that the deputy commander of United States Northern 

Command be a National Guard officer. These and other National Guard–related 

proposals have been introduced in legislation pending before the House of 

Representatives and Senate, and they touch on major policy questions that the 

Commission is examining in detail. 

In conducting our work in this area, the Commission will apply the operating 

principles, methodologies, and recommendation criteria set forth in this report. 

In assessing these proposals and any potential alternatives, the Commission will 

consult with Congress, including the sponsors of the legislation and will work with 

past and current senior military leaders, as well as other subject matter experts and 

stakeholders, to be sure that all relevant objectives, outcomes, facts, viewpoints, 

considerations, and anticipated effects are understood and factored into the 

Commission’s assessment and final recommendations. Any major relevant changes 

that the Department of Defense and/or Congress may make in this time frame will 

certainly be taken into account. Legislation pending in the House would require us to 

report our findings and recommendations on these specific proposals by March 1, 

2007, and we fully intend to meet that deadline should it be established. 
30 

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 31

MOVING FORWARD

This 90-day report provides a useful point at which to take stock of what has been 

accomplished by the Commission so far. Aside from the administrative process of 

standing up the Commission, hiring a staff, securing office space, establishing 

administrative procedures, creating a Web site, and undertaking similar logistical tasks, 

considerable preliminary work has taken place. 

Commissioners have become acquainted with one another and have gained a sense of 

purpose and direction for the Commission’s work. We have organized ourselves into 

work groups that will enable us to focus concertedly on the topics most vital to the 

Commission’s ultimate findings and recommendations. 

Moreover, as this report signifies, the key principles that will shape the Commission’s 

approach to issues, and will help frame its findings and recommendations, have been 

identified. Major substantive areas that must be examined also have been identified. 

Interviews, research, field trips, and other fact-finding activities have begun in earnest. 

Two public hearings have been conducted, both of which have yielded useful insights 

into critical topics that must be addressed—on future roles and missions, and on the 

role of the reserve components in homeland defense and homeland security. In short, 

the Commission has made steady progress, and a strategic framework is in place that 

will allow the conduct of its business in an organized, thorough, open, and deliberate 

way. 

Of course, this is only a beginning. Much remains to be done. It is apparent to every 

Commissioner that the task before us is both enormous and complicated. Given the 

large and growing list of areas that Congress has charged us to examine, the 

Commission may need additional time to accomplish our mission successfully. We 

will remain in close contact with lawmakers to make certain that everything is done to 

ensure that the Commission can fulfill its duties and provide the timely input required. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs testified in March that there 

have been numerous changes in the laws affecting the reserve components. And 

major policy decisions must no doubt continue to be made. We state the obvious in 

noting that Congress created this Commission for a very specific purpose, and we 

hope that policymakers will take full advantage of the work we have been chartered to 

perform. To that end, we would like to express our hope that the Defense 

Department would see fit to delay taking any major and irreversible policy actions 

bearing on the National Guard and Reserves until we report, where it can do so 

consistent with national security and the public interest. Such postponement would 

enable decision makers to receive the Commission’s input before committing the 
32 

reserve components to some crucial policy that might benefit from our findings and 

recommendations. 

As we have heard from every one of our hearing witnesses, the reserve components 

will continue to play a critical role in providing for the safety and security of the 

United States. Each member of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves 

is devoted to fulfilling our mission to the best of our abilities. Our commitment is to 

make sound, practical recommendations that will improve our national security, our 

military, and our reserve components for the benefit of this and future generations of 

Americans. 
 33

NOTES

1. Prepared witness statement of Senator John Warner, before the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves (CNGR), Hearing on Roles and Missions, March 8, 2006, p. 1. 

2. Representative Duncan Hunter, in CNGR, Hearing on Roles and Missions, transcript of 

March 8, 2006, hearing (www.cngr.gov/pdf/0308cngr.pdf), p. 30. 

3. Services Daily Mobilization Report, April 25, 2006; Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Reserve Affairs), February 2006. 

4. Prepared witness statement of Representative Ike Skelton, before the CNGR, Hearing on 

Roles and Missions, March 8, 2006, p. 1. 

5. Senator Carl Levin, statement provided to the CNGR, March 2006. 

6. “Secretary Rumsfeld Town Hall Meeting at the Pentagon,” March 12, 2004 

(www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040312-secdef0528.html). 

7. Senator John Warner, statement provided to the CNGR, March 2006. 

8. “Regional Media Interviews with Gen. Pace,” interview with Lisa Foronda, KHOU-TV, 

Houston, November 6, 2003 (www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20031106-0865.html). 

9. The term national security includes the mission of homeland defense. For purposes of the 

Commission’s work, our mission statement also includes the current and future roles of the National 

Guard and the Reserves in homeland security and emergency response. 

10. Quadrennial Defense Review ([Washington, DC: Department of Defense,] 2006), pp. 3, 19, 24, 

86, 91. 

11. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America ([Washington, DC: White House,] 

2006), pp. 7, 34. 

12. Quadrennial Defense Review (2006), pp. 4, 12, 17, 22, 23, 29, 34, 36, 38, 83, 90, 91. 

13. See Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. 

Campbell, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), p. 14: “Today, many consider GoldwaterNichols and its subsequent implementation as instrumental in the overwhelming successes of U.S. 

forces in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo, and most recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The prestige the U.S. military establishment currently enjoys stands in sharp contrast with its 

reputation prior to the act’s passage in October 1986.” 

14. Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, USMC, “Iraq Museum Investigation: 22APR–8SEP03,” DoD 

Final Report (www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2003/d20030922fr.pdf). 

15. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America ([Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense,] 2004), p. 7. 

16. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), p. 1. 

17. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), p. 19. 

18. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4200—Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 

Authorization Act for 2005. 

19. CNGR, Hearing on Roles and Missions, transcript of March 9, 2006, hearing 

(http://www.cngr.gov/pdf/0309cngr.pdf): Admiral Robert Willard, pp. 4–6, 43–44; General Robert 

Magnus, pp. 34, 46; General Richard Cody, p. 40. 

20. Lieutenant General Frank Hagenbeck, the U.S. Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 

testified before the personnel subcommittees of both the Senate Armed Services Committee (April 

5, 2005) and House Armed Services Committee (July 19, 2005) that the Global War on Terrorism, 

the lower propensity to serve, and negative feedback from influencers, coupled with the improving 

economy and lower unemployment, have presented a very challenging recruiting environment. 

Additionally, defense analyst Michèle Flournoy, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and 
34 

International Studies, expressed considerable concern regarding military recruiting at the 

Commission’s public hearing on March 9, 2006, referring to recruiting and retention as “the long 

pole in the tent” (see transcript, p. 95). 

21. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), p. 43. 

22. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned ([Washington, DC: White House,] 

2006), p. 54. 
1

APPENDICES 

• Commission on the National Guard and Reserves authorizing legislation 

• Commissioner biographies 

• Public hearing panels to date 

• Concurrent studies 

• Partial list of stakeholder organizations contacted 
2 

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK. 
3

APPENDIX 1 

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES 

AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION

108 Congress 

Public Law 108-375 

(As amended by 109 Congress Public Law 109-163) 

An Act 

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for military activities of the 

Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the 

Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the 

Armed Forces, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 

Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the “Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2005”. 

SEC. 513. COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES. 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the legislative branch a commission 

to be known as the “Commission on the National Guard and Reserves”. 

(b) COMPOSITION.—(1) The Commission shall be composed of 13 members 

appointed as follows: 

(A) Three members appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services 

of the Senate. 

(B) Three members appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services 

of the House of Representatives. 

(C) Two members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on 

Armed Services of the Senate. 

(D) Two members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on 

Armed Service of the House of Representatives. 

(E) Three members appointed by the Secretary of Defense. 

(2) The members of the Commission shall be appointed from among persons who 

have knowledge and expertise in the following areas: 

(A) National security. 

(B) Roles and missions of any of the Armed Forces. 

(C) The mission, operations, and organization of the National Guard of the United 

States. 
4 

(D) The mission, operations, and organization of the other reserve components of the 

Armed Forces. 

(E) Military readiness of the Armed Forces. 

(F) Personnel pay and other forms of compensation. 

(G) Other personnel benefits, including health care. 

(3) Members of the Commission shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. A 

vacancy in the membership of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the 

Commission, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. 

(4) The Secretary of Defense shall designate a member of the Commission to be 

chairman of the Commission. 

(c) DUTIES.—(1) The Commission shall carry out a study of the following matters: 

(A) The roles and missions of the National Guard and the other reserve components 

of the Armed Forces. 

(B) The compensation and other benefits, including health care benefits, that are 

provided for members of the reserve components under the laws of the United States. 

(2) In carrying out the study under paragraph (1), the Commission shall do the 

following: 

(A) Assess the current roles and missions of the reserve components and identify 

appropriate potential future roles and missions for the reserve components. 

(B) Assess the capabilities of the reserve components and determine how the units 

and personnel of the reserve components may be best used to support the military 

operations of the Armed Forces and the achievement of national security objectives, 

including homeland defense, of the United States. 

(C) Assess the Department of Defense plan for implementation of section 115(b) of 

title 10, United States Code, as added by section 416(a)(4). 

(D) Assess— 

(i) the current organization and structure of the National Guard and the other reserve 

components; and 

(ii) the plans of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces for future 

organization and structure of the National Guard and the other reserve components. 

(E) Assess the manner in which the National Guard and the other reserve 

components are currently organized and funded for training and identify an 

organizational and funding structure for training that best supports the achievement 

of training objectives and operational readiness. 

(F) Assess the effectiveness of the policies and programs of the National Guard and 

the other reserve components for achieving operational readiness and personnel 

readiness, including medical and personal readiness. 

(G) Assess— 

(i) the adequacy and appropriateness of the compensation and benefits currently 

provided for the members of the National Guard and the other reserve components, 

including the availability of health care benefits and health insurance; and 
5

(ii) the effects of proposed changes in compensation and benefits on military careers 

in both the regular and the reserve components of the Armed Forces. 

(H) Identify various feasible options for improving the compensation and other 

benefits available to the members of the National Guard and the members of the 

other reserve components and assess— 

(i) the cost-effectiveness of such options; and 

(ii) the foreseeable effects of such options on readiness, recruitment, and retention of 

personnel for careers in the regular and reserve components the Armed Forces. 

(I) Assess the traditional military career paths for members of the National Guard and 

the other reserve components and identify alternative career paths that could enhance 

professional development. 

(J) Assess the adequacy of the funding provided for the National Guard and the other 

reserve components for several previous fiscal years, including the funding provided 

for National Guard and reserve component equipment and the funding provided for 

National Guard and other reserve component personnel in active duty military 

personnel accounts and reserve military personnel accounts. 

(d) FIRST MEETING.—The Commission shall hold its first meeting not later than 

30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed. 

(e) ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL AUTHORITIES.—(1) Sections 

955, 956, 957 (other than subsection (f)), 958, and 959 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 10 U.S.C 111 note) shall 

apply to the Commission, except that— 

“(A) in applying the first sentence of subsection (a) of section 957 of such Act to the 

Commission, ‘may’ shall be substituted for ‘shall’; and 

(B) in applying subsections (a), (c)(2), and (e) of section 957 of such Act to the 

Commission, ‘level IV of the Executive Schedule’ shall be substituted for ‘level V of 

the Executive Schedule’.” 

(2) The following provisions of law do not apply to the Commission: 

(A) Section 3161 of title 5, United States Code. 

(B) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). 

(f) REPORTS.—(1) Not later than three months after the first meeting of the 

Commission, the Commission shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of 

the Senate and the House of Representatives a report setting forth— 

(A) a strategic plan for the work of the Commission; 

(B) a discussion of the activities of the Commission; and 

(C) any initial findings of the Commission. 

(2) Not later than one year after the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission 

shall submit a final report to the committees of Congress referred to in paragraph (1) 

and to the Secretary of Defense. The final report shall include any recommendations 

that the Commission determines appropriate, including any recommended legislation, 

policies, regulations, directives, and practices. 
6 

(g) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on 

which the final report is submitted under subsection (f)(2). 

(h) ANNUAL REVIEW.—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall annually review the 

reserve components of the Armed Forces with regard to— 

(A) the roles and missions of the reserve components; and 

(B) the compensation and other benefits, including health care benefits, that are 

provided for members of the reserve components under the laws of the United States. 

(2) The Secretary shall submit a report of the annual review, together with any 

comments and recommendations that the Secretary considers appropriate, to the 

Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services 

of the House of Representatives. 

(3) The first review under paragraph (1) shall take place during fiscal year 2006. 
7

APPENDIX 2 

COMMISSIONERS

• Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman – Chairman Punaro is a retired Marine Corps 

major general who served as Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division 

(1997–2000) and Director of Reserve Affairs at Headquarters Marine Corps during 

the post-9/11 peak reserve mobilization periods. Following active duty service in 

Vietnam, he was mobilized three times: for Operation Desert Shield in the first 

Gulf War, to command Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Fwd) in Bosnia and 

Macedonia, and for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. He worked on Capitol Hill 

for 24 years for Senator Sam Nunn and served as his staff director of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee for 14 years. He is currently Executive Vice President 

of Science Applications International Corporation. 

• William L. Ball, III – Commissioner Ball is currently Managing Director of The 

Loeffler Group, a government affairs practice in Washington, DC, and Texas. He 

also serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Asia Foundation, an 

international NGO operating in 18 Asian countries. He served in the Navy for six 

years followed by 10 years’ service on the U.S. Senate staff for Senators Herman 

Talmadge and John Tower. He joined the Reagan administration in 1985, serving 

as Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Assistant to the President for 

Legislative Affairs at the White House, and Secretary of the Navy in 1988–89. 

• Les Brownlee – Commissioner Brownlee was confirmed as the Under Secretary 

of the Army in November 2004 and served concurrently as the Acting Secretary of 

the Army from May 2003 to November 2004. He was appointed by both Senators 

Strom Thurmond and John Warner to serve as the staff director of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee. He is retired from the United States Army and served 

two tours in Vietnam. He is currently President of Les Brownlee & Associates 

LLC. 

• Rhett B. Dawson – Commissioner Dawson is currently President and CEO of 

the Information Technology Industry Council. He is the former Senior Vice 

President, Law and Public Policy, for the Potomac Electric Power Company. 

During the last two years of the Reagan administration, he was an Assistant to the 

President for Operations. He also served as staff director of the Senate Armed 

Services Committee. He served on active duty as an ROTC-commissioned Army 

officer from 1969 to 1972. 

• Larry K. Eckles – Commissioner Eckles retired as the Assistant Division 

Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, after 37 years of service. He retired with over 31 years of full-time civil 

service employment with the Nebraska Army National Guard and has served in 

numerous positions at state headquarters, including Chief of Staff of the Nebraska 

Army National Guard, battalion commander, and Director of Personnel. 
8 

• John M. Keane – Commissioner Keane is Senior Managing Director and cofounder of Keane Advisors, a consulting and private equity firm. He is a director 

of MetLife, General Dynamics, and Allied Barton Security. He served as the 29th 

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, retiring after 37 years of service. General Keane 

was a career paratrooper and a combat veteran, who was decorated for valor. He 

commanded the famed 101st Airborne Division and the legendary 18th Airborne 

Corps. 

• Patricia L. Lewis – Commissioner Lewis served over 28 years with the federal 

government, including service with the Senate Armed Services Committee for 

Chairmen John Warner, Sam Nunn, and Scoop Jackson. Ms. Lewis began her 

federal career in 1975 with the Department of the Navy and has held positions in 

Naval Sea Systems Command, the Office of the Navy Comptroller, and the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense. She is currently a partner with Monfort-Lewis, LLC. 

• Dan McKinnon – Commissioner McKinnon was founder, Chairman, and CEO 

of North American Airlines. He undertook special projects for the Director of 

Central Intelligence and also served as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 

during which time he implemented airline deregulation. He has owned radio 

stations in San Diego. Early in his career, he spent four years in the United States 

Navy as an aviator where he set, and holds, the U.S. Navy helicopter peacetime 

air/sea record of 62 saves. 

• Wade Rowley – Commissioner Rowley is currently a Military Border 

Infrastructure Construction Consultant with the Department of Homeland 

Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. He served over 23 years with the 

California Army National Guard and Army Reserves. His last military assignment 

was with the California Army National Guard, where he served as an Engineer 

Officer, Company Commander, and Facility Commander for the California 

National Guard Counterdrug Task Force in support of the U.S. Border Patrol. 

• James E. Sherrard III – Commissioner Sherrard served as Chief of Air Force 

Reserve, Headquarters USAF, Washington, DC, and Commander, Air Force 

Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Georgia, from 1998 to 2004. He is a retired 

lieutenant general with more than 38 years of commissioned service in the United 

States Air Force. As Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force 

Reserve Command, he was responsible for organizing, training, and equipping 

more than 79,000 military and civil service personnel required to support 

operations and combat readiness training for 36 flying wings, 14 detached groups, 

13 Air Force Reserve installations, three Numbered Air Forces, and the Air 

Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC). As Chief of Air Force Reserve, he directed and 

oversaw the mobilization of Air Force Reserve personnel in support of military 

operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. During his career, General Sherrard 

commanded an airlift group, two Air Force Reserve installations, two wings, and 

two Numbered Air Forces. 
9

• Donald L. Stockton – Commissioner Stockton owns and has operated for over 

32 years the Marshfield Drayage Company, a regional trucking company in 

southwest Missouri. He retired as a lieutenant colonel from the U.S. Air Force 

Reserves, where he served nearly 30 years. For almost 25 years he commanded 

various flights and squadrons, was deputy commander for resources, and 

subsequently was deputy commander for support of the 943rd Airlift Wing at 

March Air Force Base in California. His last command was with the 934th 

Maintenance Squadron, a subordinate unit of the 934th Airlift Wing, Air Force 

Reserve, in Minneapolis, where he was responsible for the unit’s C-130E aircraft 

and for the training of some 175 reservists. For the Reserve Officers Association 

of the United States (ROA), he is immediate past national Air Force vice president, 

a past president, and currently national councilman for the Missouri Department. 

• E. Gordon Stump – Commissioner Stump retired in January 2003 from his 

position of Adjutant General and the Director of Military and Veterans Affairs in 

Michigan after serving for 12 years. He commanded and directed a total of 157 

Army and Air National Guard units, two Veterans Nursing Homes, and 12 

Veterans Service Organizations. His prior assignments included Squadron 

Commander 107th TFS and Commander and Deputy Commander of the 

Headquarters Michigan Air National Guard. He flew 241 combat missions over 

North and South Vietnam. He also deployed to South Korea during the Pueblo 

crisis. He served as President of the National Guard Association of the United 

States and as a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Prior to his 

assignment as Adjutant General, he was Vice President of Automotive 

Engineering for Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. He is currently President of Strategic 

Defense Associates, LLC. 

• J. Stanton Thompson – Commissioner Thompson is currently an Executive 

Director for the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency. He is a 

retired naval rear admiral with over 35 years of military service. He is the former 

Special Assistant for Reserve Matters to the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM and 

North American Aerospace Command. He also served as a principal adviser to the 

commander for maritime homeland defense. During his recall to active duty, he 

provided active duty support to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 
10 

APPENDIX 3 

PUBLIC HEARING PANELS TO DATE

HEARINGS ON PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES, ROLES AND MISSIONS 

Room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 

March 8, 2006

9:30 AM (IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE) 

• Senator Mark Pryor, Co-Chair, Senate Reserve Caucus 

• Senator Lindsey Graham, Chairman, Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed 

Services Committee 

• Rep. Duncan Hunter, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee 

• Senator Kit Bond, Co-Chair, Senate National Guard Caucus 

• Senator Patrick Leahy, Co-Chair, Senate National Guard Caucus 

• Rep. John McHugh, Chairman, Military Personnel Subcommittee, House Armed 

Services Committee 

• Senator Ben Nelson, Ranking Member, Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed 

Services Committee 

• Senator John Warner, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee 

• Rep. Ike Skelton, Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee 

• Rep. Gene Taylor, Co-Chair, House Guard and Reserve Components Caucus 

• Rep. Steve Buyer, Co-Chair, House Guard and Reserve Components Caucus 

1:00 PM

• Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness 

• Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff 

March 9, 2006

9:30 AM

• General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army 

• Admiral Robert Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

• General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps 

• General John D. W. Corley, Vice Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force 
11

2:00 PM

• Michèle Flournoy, Senior Adviser in the International Security Program at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

• Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments 

HEARINGS ON HOMELAND DEFENSE/HOMELAND SECURITY 

National Transportation Safety Board Conference Center 

429 L’Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington, DC 

May 3, 2006

9:30 AM 

• Secretary George W. Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness, Department of 

Homeland Security 

• Secretary Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

Department of Defense 

• Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN, Commander, North American Aerospace 

Defense Command, and Commander, U.S. Northern Command 

1:30 PM

• Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, USA, Chief, National Guard Bureau 

• Major General Roger P. Lempke, ANG, President, Adjutants General Association 

of the United States, and Adjutant General, State of Nebraska 

• Rear Admiral Kenneth T. Venuto, U. S. Coast Guard, Assistant Commandant for 

Human Resources 

May 4, 2006

9:30 AM 

• Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law, George Mason 

University 

• Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security, and Director, 

Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University 

• Dr. James J. Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, 

The Heritage Foundation 
12 

APPENDIX 4 

CONCURRENT STUDIES

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is tracking major studies that 

address issues we are tasked to assess. Readers who know of relevant studies not listed 

here are urged to contact the Commission at 703-699-2800 to share that information 

with our research staff. 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Resources) is 

conducting an ongoing study for resourcing an operational reserve based on 

the Army Force Generation Model. The Commission has received briefs on the 

preliminary findings. Booz Allen Hamilton is conducting an Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)–funded follow-up study. 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

The center is completing its three-part effort, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols. It 

describes the third phase as “continu[ing] its analysis of military command 

structures and the defense acquisition process, while primarily focusing on the 

future of the Guard and Reserve components of the Total Force. Clark 

Murdock leads the investigative study with significant contributions from Kurt 

Campbell, Michèle Flournoy, Pierre Chao, Christine Wormuth, and other 

members of the ISP [International Security Program] staff.” 

Congressional Budget Office 

The Congressional Budget Office’s assessment of relevant proposed legislation 

and policy initiatives will be utilized. CBO has agreed to assist in determining 

potential resource impacts of the Commission’s recommendations. 

Congressional Defense Review 

The House Armed Services Committee is engaging in a comprehensive 

dialogue with security experts from the intelligence, academic, and think tank 

communities to examine which U.S. military tools can best protect our interests 

at home and abroad. The goal of this process is to produce a focused, wellresearched report that reflects the committee’s bipartisan view of the military 

capabilities we need for the future. 
13

Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation 

Committee chartered by the Secretary of Defense to identify approaches to 

balance military pay and benefits in sustaining recruitment and retention of 

high-quality people, as well as a cost-effective and ready military force. The 

Committees findings and recommendations, including a framework of 

principles with which to evaluate changes to the military compensation system, 

are being analyzed by the 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation. 

Defense Science Board 

Section 540 of the FY06 National Defense Authorization Act tasks the 

Defense Science Board with conducting a study on the “Deployment of 

Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism.” 

Government Accountability Office 

The Government Accountability Office is conducting numerous studies and 

audits that cover topics of interest to the Commission. The Commission has 

met with the Comptroller General, and all work groups have already benefited 

greatly from the cooperation and support of the GAO Defense Capabilities 

and Management Team. 

10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 

The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) will begin a 

review of military compensation on April 1; its research efforts will be 

informed by the recommendations of the Defense Advisory Committee on 

Military Compensation. 

Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Road Maps 

A January 2006 memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England 

established eight QDR Execution Roadmaps. The eight groups, each focusing 

on a different topic, are tasked with guiding DoD’s six-year plan for investment 

and organization from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013. 

Rand Corporation 

Rand Corporation has a number of projects currently under way. Their topics 

include active/reserve force mix, military health care, effects of activation on 

earnings, family support to the National Guard and Reserves, reserve 

component joint officer management, medical readiness in the reserves, reserve 

recruiting, and retirement reform. 
14 

APPENDIX 5 

PARTIAL LIST OF STAKEHOLDER ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED

Adjutants General Association of the United States Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation 

Air Force Association Defense Business Board 

Air Force Lessons Learned Defense Policy Board 

Air Force Sergeants Association Defense Science Board 

Air Force Women Officers Association Democratic Governors Association 

Air Force Reserve Policy Committee Department of Homeland Security 

American Enterprise Institute Department of Veterans’ Affairs 

American Ex-Prisoners of War Disabled American Veterans 

American Legion 

American Logistics Association 

America’s Health Insurance Plans Employee Benefit Research Institute 

AMVETS Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves 

Analytic Services, Inc. Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the U.S. 

Army Aviation Association of America 

Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee 

Association of Military Surgeons of the United States 

Association of the United States Army Federal Emergency Management Agency 

 Fleet Reserve Association 

 Foreign Policy Research Institute 

 

Blinded Veterans Association 

Brookings Institution 

 GlobalSecurity.org 

 Gold Star Wives of America, Inc. 

 Governors of the 50 states 

Catholic War Veterans of the USA 

Cato Institute Heritage Foundation 

Center for American Progress Hoover Institution 

Center for Army Lessons Learned House Reserve Component Caucus 

Center for Naval Analyses 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

Center for Strategic and International Studies Institute for Defense Analysis 

Chief Warrant and Warrant Officers Assn of the USCG Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 

Commissioned Officers Assn of the U.S. Public Health Service International Association of Chiefs of Police 

Congressional Budget Office International Association of Fire Chiefs 

Congressional Coast Guard Caucus 

Congressional Fire Services Caucus 

Congressional Navy Marine Corps Caucus Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A. 

Congressional Research Service John F. Kennedy School of Government 

Council on Foreign Relations Joint Center for Operational Analysis 
15

Lexington Institute Paralyzed Veterans of America 

Logistics Management Institute Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies (SAIS – Johns Hopkins)

 Police Executive Research Forum 

 

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned 

Marine Corps League 

Marine Corps Reserve Association RAND Corporation 

Marine Corps University Republican Governors Association 

Military Officers Association of America Reserve Enlisted Association 

Military Order of the Purple Heart, The Reserve Officers Association 

MIT Security Studies Program Retired Enlisted Association, The 

MITRE Corporation 

 Senate National Guard Caucus 

 Senate Reserve Caucus 

National Academy of Sciences, The Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association 

National Association of Counties Small Business Administration 

National Association For Uniformed Services Society of Medical Consultants to the Armed Forces 

National Coalition for Homeless Veterans Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College 

National Conference of State Legislatures 

National Congress of American Indians United Armed Forces Association 

National Defense University U.S. Air Force 

National Emergency Management Association U.S. Air Force Academy//Institute for National Security Studies 

National Federation of Independent Business U.S. Army 

National Governors Association U.S. Army Warrant Officers Association 

National Guard Association of the United States U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

National League of Cities U.S. Conference of Mayors 

National Military Family Association U.S. Department of Commerce 

National Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

National Order of Battlefield Commissions U.S. House of Representatives, leadership and certain committees 

National Security Council U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Naval Enlisted Reserve Association U.S. Marine Corps 

Naval Post Graduate School U.S. Naval Institute 

Naval Reserve Association U.S. Navy 

Navy League of the United States U.S. Senate, leadership and certain committees 

Navy Lessons Learned (NWDC Doctrines Dept) USCG Chief Petty Officers Association 

Navy Nurse Corps Association 

Non Commissioned Officers Association 

 Veterans of Foreign Wars 

 Veterans’ Widows International Network 

Office of Management and Budget Vietnam Veterans of America 

Office of Personnel Management 

 Wounded Warrior Project